

RETHINKING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY WATER
STRUGGLES IN TURKEY FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: SPACE,
STRUCTURES AND AGENCY



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STRUGGLES IN TURKEY FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: SPACE,
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Rethinking the Political Economy of Contemporary Water Struggles in Turkey from a Comparative Perspective: Space, Structures and Agency

This dissertation examines role of political economy in contemporary agrarian mobilizations. By focusing on recent water struggles in Turkey against the run-of-the-river hydropower plants (SHPs); the research digs into the societal and economic factors that enable or inhibit the emergence of strong mobilizations through a comparison of reactions against SHP projects in four localities of Eastern Black Sea region. The main logic behind the cross comparison is to find out if there is a relationship between the forms of rural livelihoods; mostly defined in terms of production, marketing, place in the general economic system, migration and viability of space; and political mobilization against SHP construction combined with the other possible reasons leading to an unrest and contention. The research revealed that prior transformation of the rural spaces affects the ways, means and discourses of the local struggles. I argue that spatio-economic transformation of the localities that unevenly transform rural settings in terms of production and consumption activities have impact on the patterns, discourses and agency in the contemporary ‘rural’ mobilizations. Therefore, the dissertation advocates for a need for theorization of contemporary agrarian mobilization from this perspective by putting the emphasis on the livelihood transformations, transformation and viability of space, commercialization of production and differentiation within the peasantry and the agency.

ÖZET

Türkiye’deki Su Mücadelelerinin Siyasi Ekonomisini Yeniden Düşünmek Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz: Mekan, Yapılar ve Aktörler

Bu tez ekonomi politiğin günümüz kırsal toplumsal hareketlerindeki rolünü incelemektedir. Türkiye’deki nehir tipi hidroelektrik santral (HES) karşıtı su mücadelelerine odaklanan araştırma, güçlü bir toplumsal mücadeleyi mümkün kılan ya da böyle bir mücadelenin ortaya çıkmasını engelleyen toplumsal ve ekonomik faktörleri araştırmaktadır. Doğu Karadeniz kıyısında ve hinterlandında bulunan dört adet HES’e karşı ortaya çıkan toplumsal reaksiyonun karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmesi yoluyla yürütülen çalışmada, tarımsal yapı ve dönüşüm sonucu ortaya çıkan toplumsal ve hanehalkı türlerinin HES karşıtı hareketlerin etkinlikleri, mobilizasyon biçimleri ve diskurları arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Araştırma, kırsal mekanların geçirdiği toplumsal ve ekonomik dönüşümün sonucunda ortaya çıkan üretim ve tüketim biçimlerinin kırsal yaşam alanlarını farklı biçimlerde dönüştürdüğü ve bu dönüşümün siyasallaşma ve mobilizasyonu doğrudan etkilediğini göstermektedir. Tez, kırsal-toplumsal hareketlerin analizi için hanehalkının ve tarımsal üretimin ve bunun getirdiği mekansal dönüşümü önceleyen, kırdaki toplumsal farklılaşmayı göz önünde bulunduran bir teorik yaklaşımın gerekliliğini savunmaktadır.

RÉSUMÉ

Repenser l'économie politique des conflits contemporains sur la question de l'eau en Turquie: Espaces, structures et agentivité d'une perspective comparative

Cet écrit s'intéresse au rôle de l'économie politique dans les mobilisations rurales contemporaines. En mettant l'accent sur les récentes luttes pour l'eau en Turquie, contre les centrales hydroélectriques, au fil de l'eau (SHP). La recherche creuse principalement les facteurs sociétaux et économiques qui rendent possible ou empêchent l'émergence de mobilisations fortes, à travers la comparaison des réactions contre les projets SHP dans quatre localités de la région de l'est de la mer Noire. La logique principale derrière cette comparaison croisée est de déterminer si il y a une relation entre les formes de vies rurales, principalement définies en termes de productions, marché, place dans le système économique général, migrations et viabilité des espaces, et des mobilisations politiques contre les constructions de SHP combinées avec d'autres raisons existantes pouvant mener à une agitation ou des conflits. De cela, j'affirme que les transformations spatio-économiques des localités qui transforment de manière inégale les configurations rurales en termes d'activités de production et de consommation ont un impact sur les schémas, discours et des modes des mobilisations rurales contemporaines. De ce fait, la thèse plaide pour un besoin de théorisation des mobilisations agraires contemporaines depuis cette perspective en mettant l'accent sur les transformations des moyens d'existence, les transformations et la viabilité de l'espace, la commercialisation de la production et la différenciation entre la paysannerie (voyez l'annexe A pour plus de détails).

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Burak'a

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ADOKOP: Arhavi Platform for Protection of Nature (Arhavi Doğa Koruma Platformu)
- AKP: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
- BOTAŞ: Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
- CEO: Chief Executive Officer
- CHP: Republican Peoples Party of Turkey (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
- CONAIE: The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (La Conferedación de Nacionales Indígenas del Ecuador)
- Çay-Kur: General Directorate of Tea Enterprises (Çay İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü)
- Çiftçi-Sen: Confederation of Farmer's Unions (Çiftçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Sendikası)
- ÇKS: Farmer Registration System (Çiftçi Kayıt Sistemi)
- DEKAP: Platform for Fraternity of Rivers (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu)
- DİSK: Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
- DHA: Doğan News Agency (Doğan Haber Ajansı)
- DSİ: State Hydraulic Administration of Turkey (Devlet Su İşleri)
- EMRA: Electricity Market Regulatory Authority
- EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
- EU: European Union
- EZLN: Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional)

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

HPP: Hydropower plant

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization

KESK: Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)

KfW: Development Bank (Bank aus Verantwortung)

MST: Landless Rural Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra)

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

NSM: New Social Movements

OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

SHP: Small-scale run-of-the-river hydropower plants

TEK: Turkish Electricity Administration (Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu)

TMMOB: Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği)

TOKİ: Directorate of Social Housing (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı)

TurkStat: Turkish Statistical Institute

YSK: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Neoliberal agrarian restructuring is therefore, an intrinsic part of the global logic of capital and hence the law of value, in which territorial restructuring is demonstrated: a reconfiguration of the ‘control over the places and spaces where surplus is produced by shaping and controlling the institutions and social relations that govern production, extraction and accumulation. (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2008)

The proliferation of mass mobilization; which are different in organization, discourse, impact and objective in geographical-spatial scope; has become one of the key phenomena of today’s world. From the anti-dam movement in the Narmada Valley, India, to the “Water Wars” in Cochabamba, Bolivia; from the Indignados movement against austerity measures in Spain to the Gezi resistance in Turkey; from the Nuit Debout against the El Khomri Law in France to the Ogoni movement against pollution by the oil industry in Nigeria are among many events that rattled world political scene. These movements were incited by altered and expanded forms of capital accumulation within the neoliberal era through reconfigured relations between society-environment-economy. A wide array of these mobilizations were provoked by the commercialization of the commons within the schemes of accumulation by dispossession: in the Cochabamba and Narmada Valley, peasants were mobilized against the privatization of water; in the Gezi Movement against the destruction of a city park. These were very complex movements, essentially different from the dominant forms of activism in the pre-Washington Consensus era. On one hand, as accurately identified by Akbulut (2014), the grievances and

discourses mobilized by them are helping the emergence of “a type of politics not only in their specific local contexts but also pertaining to challenges to state power, processes of capital accumulation, and neoliberal re-structuring of political, economic, social settings” (p. 10). Moreover, they invoke diverse discourses, agencies, motivations and engagements in economy-society-environment relationships.

One specific strain of these mobilizations are the ones with a spatial focus, which can be viewed as agrarian mobilizations, with peasants as the main actors who are fighting against the agrarian change, commercialization of production and rural space, destruction of environment and local cultures. These movements largely emerge in the Global South. Among the many others, we can count the Zapatistas of Mexico, the MST of Brazil, and the Narmada Valley of India as relatively unified and well-established struggles. There are many local-singular cases of resistance as well. So the question becomes: What are the factors lying beneath the strong and persistent opposition against the neoliberal rural change in contemporary social movements?

This dissertation stems from curiosity about the material factors lying beneath peasant mobilizations. Since the end of the 1970s, particularly after the end of Cold War, peasant studies and social movements theory have undergone significant change, especially with the growing influence of cultural studies and post-modern theory. These paradigms favored identity-based explanations underlying social movements in general. Accounts on the peasant mobilization are highly influenced by these paradigms, which are basically grounding explanations on the motivations of mobilization either on ethnic, religious, gender or cultural factors or on ecological and spatial concerns. Undoubtedly, all of these factors have influence on the peasant

mobilization but, these accounts are ignoring class bases of the phenomena and changes in the structure and operation of the new regimes of accumulation to certain extent which are resulting in incomplete, if not flawed, explanations of the agrarian change and peasant mobilization. Studies on the peasant mobilization are increasing proportionately with the commercialization and neoliberalization that take place in the rurality. Especially there are numerous studies elaborating on Latin America, where the New Social Movements (NSM) theory originated. Recent trends show that the NSM's focus is moving from urban to rural and it has started to combine with the middle peasant thesis, moral economy framework and everyday forms of resistance thesis reaching up to subaltern studies, which are mostly influenced by the discourse of post modernism. As Brass (2012) summarizes :

Euro centrism, universalism, together with the emancipator object of history-as-progress, all constitute methods/processes/concepts whose efficacy is denied. The collective is replaced by autonomous/fragmented individual subject, and the latter is defined not by production but by consumption. The realm of 'the economic' gives way to 'the cultural', while Lenin and Marx are similarly pushed aside by Gramsci and Foucault. Action is guided not by class structure/formation/struggle but by subaltern/elite identities and/or those based on ethnicity/gender/religion/region; a change in the very nature of action itself entails that revolution is replaced by resistance and in terms of the desirable (possible) outcome of such action socialism is displaced by bourgeois democracy or worse. (p.132)

Thus, the NSM and subaltern studies argue that agrarian mobilization and resistance to capitalism/colonialism have more to do with the ideology and experience of gender/ethnicity, region, ecology or religions and it is not possible to render such differences to the class position of the subject. The incompatibility of the two forms of thinking which are undermining the validity of class-based theories creates the illusion that class does not exist in these resistances. This lack is also backed up by the Marxist theories' failure to develop adequate theories on the class-determined ideological forms and practices.

The main curiosity paving way for designing this research stems from the above-summarized vacuum in theory as well as the lack of accounts that specifically elaborate on the class dimensions of contemporary popular mobilizations. Another point is the changing existential structure and definition of ‘peasantry’. Studies of the new hybrid patterns of the peasant economic activity are rising, inevitably changing the politicization and socialization patterns of rural communities. In the above-explained vein, culturalist and postmodern accounts on the contemporary peasant communities dwell their theories about nostalgia and the longing for the good old peasantry. However, peasantry should be conceptualized as a dynamic category that is trying to adapt to change as active agents, not as passive victims (see Chapter 2). Therefore, the research aims at capturing the change and reaction in its diversity, dynamism and motion together with an intention to make a contribution to emerging literature on “New Peasantry.”

1.1 Small-scale run-of-the-river hydropower plants

With these concerns in mind, this dissertation takes mobilization against small-scale run-of-the-river hydropower plants (SHP) in Turkey as the object of study and elaborates on the existence and absence of peasant mobilizations in the villages where small-scale hydroelectric power plants (SHP) are being built. SHPs are a classic example of the commercialization of both rural space and water resources. They proliferated with a series of reforms aiming at privatizing the energy production and market in Turkey (see Chapter 3). The private companies are granted with the authority and incentives to produce energy. The incentives — not only from the Turkish government but also backed by the World Bank and the European Union

— helped the proliferation of SHPs because they are regarded as clean sources of energy production, more environmentally friendly than the hydro-power plants with large reservoirs of water. SHPs operate on different principles than dams. As shown in Figure 1, they do not require a reservoir to collect water from the rivers. Instead, the water is taken into large pipes and tunnels from the riverbed. The water is carried in the penstock until it is released from a height into a powerhouse where the electricity is produced. The basic principle is diverting the water from the riverbed and carrying it until a suitable height to produce electricity. However, less environmentally invasive though they may seem, diverting large amounts of river water may reduce the flow, affect the velocity and disrupt the habitat quality and lead to problems in irrigation systems which adversely affect the local economies and ecology.

As of April 2016, there were approximately 1,000 SHP projects under different stages of construction. The unmonitored proliferation of SHPs incited a wave of mobilizations by the local communities in almost every corner of Turkey.




Figure 1. Run-of-river scheme

<http://12.000.scripts.mit.edu/mission2017/solutions/engineering-solutions/hydroelectric-power/>

Although being analyzed in various dimensions, the relationship between the political economy of the SHP processes in terms of commercialization, accumulation, labor and class dimension of the mobilization is not widely scrutinized. As stated above, these mobilizations are mostly regarded as ecological movements with cultural undertones but the wider material structures have been ignored to a large extent. Anti-SHP movements are significant from a myriad of perspectives. Irrigation and energy-production projects have a direct impact on agricultural production. State pioneered market liberalization policies have resulted in peasant displacement and new forms of employment patterns for peasant households. Political patron-client relations and the formation of new rural livelihoods are important factors to be analyzed. There are approximately 1,000 licenses granted to energy companies. Despite the fact that some villages have been resisting the energy companies for years, in some villages we see no reaction and

some can easily be co-opted by the system. What is the macro picture resulting in such a differentiation in politicization patterns?

Another point which is not widely researched but which has begun to be visible in contemporary social movements is the space-class overlap. Most contemporary resistances carry a spatial character, especially urban movements. The discourse is shaped around the claim of the protection of the living space and the right to the city. As was the case in the Gezi movement, the objective is to protect the space but there are other approaches paying more attention to class. For example, Boratav (2013) takes a Marxist stance and argues that this is a direct result of the regime of accumulation going on since the 1980s but which has gained momentum during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule in Turkey. The accumulation is fast and rentier, so it is going on over the commercialization of the space, which is not the private property of any group but should be the common area of all. Moreover, Boratav mentions there is a class dimension, a mature class reaction where the class contradictions have been deepened and poverty dispossession and deprivation are becoming common characteristic shared by different class positions.

Similarly, the commercialization going on in the rural cannot be limited to the changes in the production. Along with the commercialization of the agricultural production, the commercialization of land, nature and water are marking agrarian change, which is in line with the rapid and rentier mode of accumulation that Boratav mentions. So, limiting rural change to agricultural production and looking for mobilization against that will result in an incomplete portrayal of rural change. Rural change includes the commercialization of the space as much as it includes the

commercialization of the production. Two factors should be analyzed simultaneously for a grounded work.

Smith (1984), following Marx, observes that “a geographical space . . . abstracted from society is a philosophical amputee . . . We do not live, act and work in space so much as by living, acting and working we produce space.” (pp.77, 85) This theoretical stance is important because it attributes agency to the people living in the rural areas, which most structural theories focusing on the macro-scale changes failed to capture, if not just ignore. This spatial analysis (see Chapter 4) is crucial to see how neoliberalism is experienced on the ground, and enables us to avoid over-generalization and portrayal of neoliberalism as the single and benevolent force destroying the lives of people.

Because of the simple fact that this research looks at the differentiated factors bringing about or inhibiting peasant solidarity or dissidence in response to forces destructing established livelihoods, the importance of the ideational and cognitive factors, or the collective perceptions of the rural, representation and construction of the representations of the rural space are evident in searching for the forces and factors mobilizing or silencing people.

At this point, I would like to emphasize a crucial note on the theory. Spatial analysis of socially constructed spaces is mostly studied by post-structuralist, post-modernist scholars after the cultural turn. Cloke, Marsden and Mooney (2006) state “cultural turn has dematerialized social sciences and rural studies by turning away of the research from structures, spatialities and inequality and through its preoccupation with immaterial processes, the constitution of inter-subjective meanings, outworking of identity politics through texts, signs symbols and emotions” (p.22). This research aims at bringing material factors back in by learning from the post-structuralist’s

emphasis on mobilities and fluidities. Thus, the main variables of the research will be the basic conventional variables of the international political economy, revolving around the concepts of property, accumulation, crop regimes, labor structure, trade, changing structure of the capital and production relations. Reflections of these variables on the local contexts and local agencies will be examined because this research is designed in a way to derive more generalizable theoretical outcomes through the analysis of micro localities.

1.2 Literature review and the approaches to environmental movements in Turkey

This research is designed with a premise to bridge the macro and micro scope variables on rural change, which involves finding out the micro reflections of more macro concepts such as class, labour and production that are usually examined through the restructuring of global agricultural commodity markets the on the more recently studied and micro level such as the family, the community and the locality. These sets of concepts are researched as part of different research trends, but the interactions or ties between them are not studied extensively, especially in Turkish context. Thus, the key terms of this research will involve the reflection of each set on the other through an in-depth research on rural settings. The question is how to reconcile these seemingly separate research trends? I believe a spatial analysis of the rurality is an important way to discover the effects of macro and structural changes in the global economy on the people living through it in their small communities. Hence, rural space appears as the basic ground that the change, and this research is designed accordingly.

The dissertation is situated at the intersection of the social movements and neoliberal agrarian change. The purpose is to identify some factors which are triggering mobilization or which are leading to the depoliticization of certain peasant communities. Therefore, this dissertation is grounded on these two pillars. Research on the political reaction of peasant communities in response to neoliberal agrarian change in the Turkish context is very limited. On the other hand the research elaborating on the changes on the rural structures are increasing in number. As stated earlier, studies on the agrarian transformation in Turkey are limited in number, making each one of them more valuable for the academic inquiry. The most important one in this context is the report by İslamoğlu et al. (2008). The report consists of five sub reports on a crop-based analysis, crops being: grape, cotton, wheat, tobacco and sugar beet; and reports are prepared after a large-scale field research. This comprehensive report included the neoliberalization process as well as the tendencies of peasant restructuring. İslamoğlu reaches two main trends, the first one is peasant differentiation and the second one is impoverishment without dispossession.

A second work on the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture in Turkey presents the results of the field research in two villages (Söke-Tuzburgazı and Sivrihisar-Kınık) and argues that the structural adjustment policies aiming to fix the economic indicators ignore the unequal struggle of peasants aiming to survive under the neoliberal policies (Aydın, 2001). According to Aydın, peasants responded to neoliberalization by trying to over-exploit household labor, cultivating extra land, indebtedness, sharecropping with better-off farmers, lending their lands to other cultivators, limiting the consumption and exploiting female labor. Moreover, he argues, the impoverishment of the rural population would have grave consequences

for the well-being of the whole society. In a similar vein, Keyder and Yenal notes that peasants are increasingly incorporating off-farm income sources to the household budget through engagement with different income-diversifying activities. Thus, the traditional binary categories of peasant-worker, city and village are blurred. Several other studies confirm this phenomenon (Keyder & Yenal, 2011; Kavak, 2012; Keyder, Yenal, & Ünüvar, 2013).

Erensu (2011) argues that increase in the number of the SHPs in Turkey coincides with the rise in the global discourse favoring green energy and promoting renewable and sustainable energy production. However, renewable energy does not always mean that it is not harming nature or the populations living in the area; on the contrary, it often has drawbacks for local communities. Erensu argues that green energy discourse, which has discursive hegemony, brings about the privatization and commercialization of land and water, which results in the destruction of the rural livelihoods.

Kurt (2012) on the other hand, states that SHP projects are a clear example of the commercialization of the water and natural resources. She summarizes the developments and legal amendments commercializing the water resources which enable granting the right to use of the rivers to private companies for a 49-year period. Theoretically she uses Marx's conception of primitive accumulation and Harvey's (2005) 'accumulation by dispossession' and 'enclosures of the commons' to explain the transition, which I believe is the right conceptualization of economic transformation. She righteously argues that we should not render anti-SHP resistances to a liberal human rights discourse, but that we have to approach it from the perspective of class struggle. She tries to develop a class-based collective rights conceptualization using the anti-SHP resistance. However, although she states that

the transformation is strictly linked with the question and transformation of labor, she fails to provide a substantial explanation of how the commercialization and rural resistance is related to the labor question in the neoliberal era.

On the other hand, Eryılmaz (2012) in his PhD Dissertation tries to develop a social-ecology perspective to the analysis of environmental action in general and SHP opposition cases in particular. He utilizes Bookchin's conceptualization of social ecology, which criticizes environmentalism, deep ecology and Marxism and develops an alternative named "Libertarian Municipalism". Even though his critique of environmentalism argues that it results in the legitimization of the current status quo is significant, the model he develops afterwards is rather problematic. He analyses the discourse and demands of the people taking part in the resistance and argues that there is an increasing demand to join decision-making mechanisms. The bottom-to-top regional organization of local platforms and the "living space" discourse demonstrate the libertarian municipalism tendency and the participation demands of the local people in Turkey. He uses the social ecology paradigm to show the shortcomings of environmentalism and the discourse of the right to nature in understanding the grassroots movements in the rural, which I find a reasonable claim. He bases his analysis on the demands of mobilization, but without looking at the roots and causes of it; that, I believe, is the fundamental question in the framework of social movements analysis.

The prevalence of the new social movements theory is also visible in the studies elaborating on anti-SHP resistance. The article by Yavuz and Şendeniz (2013) is an attempt to demonstrate how the women of Fındıklı participated in the protests and how the experience of resistance has transformed patriarchal relationships. The article is based on interviews with the women taking active part in

the protests and is mostly based on discourse analysis. The women are continuously telling about how they have associated water with life, and with being a clean thus beautiful woman. Like most of the resistance rhetoric quoted in the studies on anti-SHP movements, the article is based the idealized peasant living in harmony with the nature, loving the beauties of nature and wanting to protect it. The approach represents an eco-feminist stance on the study of ecological movements. In spite of the fact that the paradigm has several sub-branches, eco-feminists mainly argue that there is an imminent connection between nature and women and they are subordinated by the patriarchal capitalist society. Hence, the struggle for ecology is simultaneously a feminist struggle. (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990) The story of the wild fox trying to be close to a woman to protect itself from the destruction of nature quoted in the article shows the position of the writers. Although it has been noted repeatedly that anti-SHP protests have not changed gender roles in the village and have not led to an explicit transformation in women's perception of the patriarchy, the participation of women is represented as a significant development.

Adaman, Akbulut and Arsel (2015), in their article on the anti-coal mobilization in Gerze, effectively point out the fact that today's rural mobilizations cannot be analyzed within the duality of the materialist vs. post-materialist explanations. The discourse, coalition building and the class-composition of those who participate in a powerful resistance has become more diverse than ever. It is impossible to be explained with threats on the livelihood but it cannot be rendered to post-materialist concerns. More importantly, we observe an increase in middle-class involvement in contemporary rural mobilizations. Throughout their analysis of the mobilization in Gerze, the writers focus on the devoted middle-class involvement in

the mobilization with their disillusionment of the state throughout their personal histories.

Knudsen (2015) is also skeptical about the claim of environmentalism as the ‘unifying’ discourse that mark the development of civil society and emergence of non-state actors in the contemporary mobilizations in Turkey, ranging from the anti-gas mobilization in Ünye to the Gezi protests of 2013. He to the contention shared by activists and some NSM scholars that ‘environmentalism’ offers a new venue for mobilization ‘above politics’. He argues that ideals of the activists cannot be interpreted as beyond class-based politics or as utopian movements. Instead, through the discourse analysis of 20 resistance cases across the Black Sea region, he contends that the national identity and party politics determine the mobilizations. He provides insights about the effects of politicization on mobilization.

Tugal (2015) does not necessarily focus on environmental movements but through his critique of liberal-democratic and NSM actors of the post-1980 era, he opens up channels for a resurgence of class analysis in re-theorization of social movements. He focuses on the role of the new petite bourgeoisie in multi-class revolts such as the Gezi Protests, which are anti-commodification in form and against alienation of commons. He distinguishes new petite bourgeois activism from spirits of creativity and aestheticization of resistance. He enables rethinking a class basis in contemporary mobilizations in Turkey, a point that I would like to underline in this dissertation. The question of “Who acts?” still remains a critical point to be answered and I argue that the transformation that the peasantry went through is crucial to the analysis of the rural mobilizations with an environmentalist outlook. Re-theorization of the peasantry is the key to this effort, just as is the need for re-theorization of the middle classes.

As stated above, anti SHP mobilizations in Turkey are mostly regarded as ecological movements with cultural undertones, but the wider material structures have been ignored to a large extent. Peasantry should be conceptualized as a dynamic category which is trying to adapt to change as active agents, not as passive victims, because such a viewpoint may prevent us from capturing the structural change that the peasantry goes through. This dissertation aims at capturing the change in rurality and the reaction against it in its diversity, dynamism and motion. I argue that contemporary rural mobilizations should be analyzed from a broader perspective that would allow us to capture the role of the structural transformation of the peasantry itself in reaction to the economic change and thus mobilization. It is important to explore the implications of this transformation on the discourses and patterns of mobilization, and this effort is possible through an in-depth investigation of political economic forces that trigger mobilization and the agencies advocating for and against them. Studies elaborating on the transformation of production and labor relations are increasing in number and provide a deeper understanding of the structure of the transformation. However, the political implications and the behavior affected by this transformation are not equally researched, which is a point addressed in this dissertation.

1.3 Research questions and methodology

This brings the emphasis back to the question of what changes in peasant political behavior bring about this change? How do contemporary peasants and rural mobilizations differ from those which preceded them? Are the new livelihood changes through further penetration of capitalism promoting or inhibiting opposition

by the peasantry? What are the factors that trigger mobilization? The widespread and powerful mobilization deserves to be analyzed more systematically and critically in a way that will answer these questions:

- What are the reasons lying beneath the mobilization of previously docile and apolitical peasant groups?
- What are the different factors resulting in the persistence of some mobilizations and the dispersal or weakening of others?

The research design explained below aims at answering these two questions. Since the research objective is to find correlations between agrarian change and politicization in the rural, I designed a comparative qualitative research in the localities that have experienced the same impetus, and observed the differentiating patterns of politicization in relation to different positions in the social structures of accumulation. Moreover, since the initial idea paving the way for this research stemmed from SHP movements and how they are conceptualized as ecological movements of local communities within the social movements literature, I found it appropriate to conduct the research in areas where SHP projects are widespread. I take anti-SHP movements not as the object of the study per se, but SHP projects in general as an independent variable through which the relationship between commercialization and politicization will be examined. As elaborated in the above sections, the spatial analysis of the commercialization and economic change in the rural areas is regarded as more appropriate given the structure of today's neoliberalization and regimes of accumulation. SHP areas are clear places where the surplus is produced through reconfiguration of the space, making them suitable for the operationalization of the research.

The research scheme is visualized in Figure 2 as follows:




Figure 2. Research scheme

Here, in this visualization, the areas where SHP projects are widespread are taken as the rural space where the transformation is going on. Although SHP projects are dispersed around the Turkey, a large number of the projects are in the Eastern Black Sea region and in its hinterland. Therefore, the Eastern Black Sea was chosen as the research site. There are multiple reasons for the field selection. Firstly, the area is going through intense commercialization which is not only limited to SHPs and the commercialization of water. The commercialization is also experienced in mining activities and in the agricultural production of tea and hazelnuts. More than 40% of SHP projects are being built in the Black Sea region (“575 HES’le 15 bin megavat,” 2011). Exemplary cases of persistent and strong mobilizations have risen from this region. Interestingly enough, the precipitation rates in the region are higher than country averages and the region is mountainous. This very fact makes the region attractive for energy companies, since the rivers are abundant in number and flow rates are suitable for energy production. On the other hand, it also implies that the agricultural production is not dependent on irrigation.

Therefore, a paradox emerges; since the production is not dependent on irrigation, what are the reasons leading to the mobilization of local communities? This very paradox enables an in-depth scrutiny of the cardinal question of the dissertation: the relationship between the political economy of a locality and the mobilization in response to disruptive effects of neoliberalism in general.

Furthermore, the geographic aspects of the region allowed us to design a research comparing the crop systems and their transformation as well as the weight of agricultural income in livelihood formations. Since the area is mountainous and the mountains are steep, the climate changes over short distances, altering the conditions for agricultural production. Therefore, the effects of differential crop regimes can be captured easily, especially the varieties in political responses in commercialized farming practices and non-commercialized ones. Likewise, the comparison permitted us to observe the structural changes in the very definition of the peasantry itself. Social movements are dynamic processes; that is why it is hard to grasp the moment, fix it to a specific time and space and research those frozen moments, so the research has to be flexible and dynamic and has to grasp the changes, the ups and downs of the phenomena under scrutiny. It is clear that social movements have phases; they are living processes, processes in action and silence as well carries the potential of revival. This research utilizes a comparative method with a premise to ensure a certain degree of validity and reliability.

The comparative cases of the research were chosen according to specific criteria but at the same time during the two years of research, changes took place in the course of mobilization and silence, but at the end, these proved to contribute to the research rather than posing a reliability bias. This section provides the basic logic of the comparison.

The primary objective of this research is to find out the imminent relationship between the defining political economic features of a locality and the political reactions against the effect of disrupting the existent livelihood being SHP constructions and the commercialization of the water resources in our case. In order to set a cross comparison, four cases were chosen according to two main criteria:

- The need for irrigation for production
- The strength of the resistance against the SHP construction

According to these criteria, four cases of resistance against SHP construction were chosen as follows:

- Does not need irrigation for agricultural production but the SHP leads to a strong reaction and mobilization (Arhavi-Kavak HES)
- Does not need irrigation for agricultural production and SHP does not lead to a strong resistance or mobilization (Borçka-Aralık HES)
- Needs irrigation for production but the SHP does not lead to a strong resistance (Pehlivanlı)
- Needs irrigation for production and the SHP leads to a strong resistance (Bağbaşı)

Matrix of the research cases is presented in Table 1 as follows:

Table 1. Matrix of the research cases

	Stronger Resistance	Weaker Resistance
Needs irrigation for production	Bağbaşı Village (Tortum, Erzurum)	Pehlivanlı Village (Tortum, Erzurum)
Does not need irrigation for production	Kemerköprü& Kavak villages (Arhavi, Artvin)	Aralık &Atanoğlu villages (Borçka, Artvin)

As seen above, in some cases, more than one village is named. This stems from the necessities of the research because one SHP project usually affects more than one village along the river, both in the sense of access to water and also taking into account all the facilities, including construction sites, regulators and water accumulation units. Thus, isolating the other administrative units was not desired and was found methodologically appropriate even though the major field research was carried in the villages most affected from the SHP projects namely, Kavak Village in Arhavi, Aralık Village in Borçka, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı Villages in Tortum.¹ The cases were chosen for their geographical proximity to each other in order to minimize the societal, cultural and historical differences between the cases. Thus, the comparative cases were selected from the coastal regions of the Eastern Black Sea region, which receives heavy rainfall during the year, and the interior mountainous and more arid regions of the Eastern Anatolia region. Figure 3 shows the area under research and the existing SHP projects in different stages of implementation.

It is beneficial to add a note on the administrative system of Turkey in order to make it easier for the reader to better conceive references to the research cases. In the administration structure, villages are attached to districts and districts are attached to provinces. Kemerköprü and Kavak villages are in the Arhavi district of the Artvin province. Similarly, Aralık and Atanoğlu are villages of Borçka, which is another district of Artvin. On the other hand, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı villages are attached to the Tortum district of the Erzurum province. In order to make the text easier to follow, I use the district name to refer to the resistances in the villages. It is

¹ As a note, throughout the dissertation, in some sections I have used the district names of Arhavi, Borçka and Tortum to refer the villages in order to make it easier for the readers. The villages in these provinces are implied, unless the town centers are explicitly mentioned.

explicitly mentioned in the text when the statement is on the center of the district itself.




Figure 3. Licensed SHP projects in the Eastern Black Sea region

<http://geodata.ormansu.gov.tr/>

The main logic behind the cross comparison is to find out if there is a relationship between the forms of rural livelihoods, mostly defined in terms of production, marketing and position in the general economic system, prior migration patterns, identity construction and political mobilization against SHP construction combined with other possible reasons leading to an unrest and contention. Thus, this cross comparison was designed in a way to assess the weights of different causes for opposition, contention and mobilization in a controlled manner. The imminent

relationship between the rural and the need for water for agricultural production is taken as the basis for comparison because the anti-SHP resistance is presented as a rural resistance and as a factor disturbing rural livelihoods and the village as a lived space. The cases without resistance are integrated into the research with an aim to single out the factors that trigger mobilization. They can be regarded as control cases, so their weight in the overall analysis is lower than in cases where the resistance is strong and persistent because the ‘lack’ itself can become meaningful when compared to the most similar case within the logic of comparison.

1.4 Field research and constraints

Prior to the field research, I gathered information on the research cases through media scanning, social media pages, attending resistance group meetings in Istanbul, and obviously through secondary resources. The research took place between August 2013 and October 2014. During this period I made field trips in August 2013 and October 2014. I spent two uninterrupted weeks on each visit and regularly followed the course of events in each case throughout the whole period — the law suits, resistance campaigns, demonstrations, and media coverage. The data collected from the villages constitute the major data source in the dissertation. At the time of the fieldwork, in Arhavi the resistance was strong and the lawsuit was going on. In Bağbaşı the upheaval was suppressed but the contention was present, whereas Pehlivanlı and Aralık were silent. Interviewees were selected through snowball sampling and the interviews were done in the houses and courtyards of the peasants, in gardens and in coffee houses and SHP construction sites —and on transportation vehicles because the distances between the villages are great.

The major difficulty that I encountered was getting entry to the fields and building trust and acquiring consent. There are three reasons for this: Primarily, the locals are suspicious of strangers. There have been instances where company representatives entered the village or construction site stating that they were researchers or civil society representatives. However, their aim was to enter the site for mapping or field exploration to prepare the project. Therefore, outsiders are approached with skepticism. I realized that I needed to be careful during the pilot research to get to know the area. I wanted to visit Fındıklı — often referred as the capital of anti-SHP resistance — where locals had not let any company officials enter the town since 2007. Fındıklı has a border with Arhavi and lies on two valleys. The locals managed to establish widespread, strong, persistent resistance and they physically impede company representatives from entering the town. The first time I visited there, I took a taxi from the town center and went to Yaylacılar village, the last village on the valley, which is around 15 kilometers from the center. Yaylacılar is the only Hemşin² village in the valley. On the road, we passed through several villages, and in all of them people looked into the taxi very carefully. I directly went to the village governor's house and introduced myself. Afterwards, they learned that in fact the villagers do not let cars with license plates other than those of the province of Rize into the valley. They stop the car, take the people out and interrogate them. There are instances where they have beaten outsiders if they think that the people work for the company. Furthermore, they are also suspicious of people who directly ask them about the SHP. They do not communicate with outsiders before asking the village governor. They are even suspicious of researchers with resistance platforms

² Hemşin is a small ethnic minority in Black Sea region, who speak a dialect of Armenian but they have become islamised.

other than the most powerful one in the valley. Luckily, taking the local taxi and visiting the village governor made my research visit easier.

The following year, I went to back to Findıklı for some interviews because I knew that they supported the struggle in Arhavi and actively participated in major events, demonstrations, sit-down strikes etc. This time, having learned from the previous years experience, I called one of the leading figures of the resistance to request an appointment. I sat down in the coffeehouse and was going over my notes as I waited before I realized I had more than half an hour until the appointment time. At that point, I have decided to take advantage of the time and visited the district directorate of agriculture. It did not take more than couple of seconds until a middle-aged gentleman stopped me and asked me where I was going. He was another leading figure of the struggle, a retired teacher who had learned that a researcher had come to town; he started observing me during the fifteen minutes I spent in that coffee house. Then obviously they did not let me go anywhere for the next two hours until I convince them I was a real PhD candidate, not an agent of the company, of the government or of any other resistance platform. I told them about every detail of my research project. When I told them the research question, one responded “Just the type of the question that the company would like to learn about”. Frankly speaking, I was overwhelmed when they finally decided to trust me and start telling about the anti-SHP struggles in the close vicinity.

Apart from the skepticism towards outsiders, some villagers were hesitant to talk about their politicization or the dominant political stance in the area. It proved to be difficult to interview them on the their political inclinations, except for the already politicized ones. It was partly due to the fear of the authority, and partly due to the general perception that politics is harmful and should be avoided. Interestingly

enough, those who have suffered more from the reaction of the state were more open in expressing the position they take and more eager to share their experiences during the struggle. However, in the areas where the imminent opposition against the SHP is weaker and a group is trying to build up the resistance, the politics in general and political party membership in particular are out of the question because they are believed to be obstacles that divide people. Thus, the questions on the political stance that individuals take were more difficult to get answers to than the questions on the course of events, the perception of and observations on SHP.

I experienced these two challenges in Artvin. The field research was easier in Erzurum with regard to skepticism towards the strangers and hesitation to talk about the politics. There was another type of difficulty, though, which was related to the quotidian forms of conservatism. The Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı villages in Erzurum are places where people are conservative and religious. This can be felt the moment one enters the village. The women wear chadors and cover their whole face (with the exception of the eyes) when they see a man. The conservatism of the people is manifested in daily interactions between the men and women. As a female researcher who was travelling alone, I felt the constraints of this conservatism during the field research. Even though the villagers were very eager to talk about the anti-SHP struggle, whenever I was left alone only with male villagers, some of them — the most educated ones — tried to take me out of the male target group. The incident happened twice, while I was doing focus group interviews in the village coffeehouse. Some of the locals approached me stating “Come, there are women over there, ask your questions to those women as well”. Even though I tried to insist on staying at the coffeehouse, I had to join the female groups at one point in order not to disturb the locals in a way that might have compromised the research. The women, on the

other hand, were more supportive and open-minded. They appreciated the fact that I was a researcher who could travel alone.

Hence, the fieldwork proved to be more difficult than expected and it required a subtle and sensitive approach. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing the respondents to give details and tell anecdotes from their daily lives and their experiences. Focus groups were preferred because respondents are more comfortable in their own environment and more willing to talk to a stranger. The questions were designed for two purposes, primarily to reveal income sources, the patterns of livelihood diversification, alternative income sources to continue living in the rural area, the professions, migration backgrounds, land use, the place of agricultural production in livelihood formation, dominant crops and so on in order to find out the impacts of the political economy of agricultural transformation. The second set of questions was on the SHP project in the locality, the struggle, and the perceptions of the state, company, nature, environment and SHP per se.

Moreover, I conducted interviews with third parties, such as activists from different resistance organizations, academics who take part in the resistance, officials working in district directorate of the agriculture, the chamber of agriculture and so on. Therefore, I was able to gather more data on life in the field and on how the public at large perceives anti-SHP struggles.

In addition to the difficulties that I encountered in the field, another interesting point was the repetitive nature of the interviews. In each research case, the interviews began repeating themselves after the second or third interview. Normally, in research methods, the rule is to stop the field research when the interviews become repetitive but I kept on interviewing different people from different circles and the content of the interviews showed no significant variation.

However troubled this situation may seem, it was actually showing the there is an underlying reason— a macro force, so to speak — which also shapes the discourses and contributes to emergence of a sort of singular discourse on the perception of the SHPs. I conducted 40 interviews in total, most of which were focus group interviews. The total number of the interviewees was 105.

As the second stage of the research, I integrated macro data on the transformation that the locality went through. The qualitative data was supported by quantitative data, with statistics from TurkStat, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and provincial administrations, reports on the production, from the newspaper articles and web sites of agricultural organizations. Demographic and Production statistics in particular were used with the aim of widening the scope of the research. The strategy was in line with the initial research purpose of situating the locality on the uneven political economic transformations and analyzing their link with the anti-SHP reaction.

1.5 Presentation of data and structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is comprised of seven chapters. This introduction is followed by Chapter 2, which presents an overview of the evolution of the theories of peasant mobilization, social movements theory, agrarian change and structural transformation of the peasantry itself. Then it tries to present an alternative approach to the contemporary agrarian mobilizations by utilizing the perspective of spatial/territorial restructuring and the new hybrid agencies emerged through it. Chapter 3 is on the brief history of the privatized hydropower development in Turkey. The chapter summarizes the political conjuncture in which the SHPs

proliferated in the framework of the rentier phase of capitalism in Turkey, legal/institutional changes that opened the commons to capital accumulation. The chapter also epitomizes the anti-SHP struggles in general.

Starting from Chapter 4, the discussion of the data begins. Chapter 4 is about Arhavi and Borçka/Aralık villages. They are the non-irrigated cases of the research. The livelihood transformation in the two localities and crop systems is analyzed. Following the sections on the geographical, economical and demographic structure in the two localities, the anti-SHP struggle in Arhavi is scrutinized in detail to present the actors, agency and discourse differentiation. Following the section on Arhavi, the SHP in Aralık is also analyzed to capture the differences from Arhavi. Chapter 5 follows the same logical pattern but scrutinizes Pehlivanlı and Bağbaşı. The first section is on the geography, demography and production both in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı villages, followed by an analysis of the fierce anti-SHP struggle in Bağbaşı and the silence in Pehlivanlı. The comparison reveals factors that provoked mobilization in Bağbaşı. Chapter 6 presents a cross comparison of all four cases and evaluates the data within the framework of the political economy. The cases are analyzed with regard to the parameters revealed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as being uneven patterns of commercialization and spatial transformation, the viability of space, the differentiation in migration patterns and integration into the city, and upward mobility and class differentiation. Moreover, this chapter includes a section on discursive differentiation, immaterial constructions of places and imagining the locality and the re-invention of tradition and their relationship to political economic variables. Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the research together with theoretical implications.

CHAPTER 2

BRINGING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY BACK IN: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF PEASANT MOBILIZATIONS

Peasant mobilization — whether as revolutions, rebellions or protest — have always been on the agenda of social scientists, with different degrees, obviously. Peasant revolutions in Russia and China and peasant questions in emerging nation-states have captured the attention of social scientists, which engendered an immense literature and theorization on the different segments and classes of the peasantry.

Nonetheless, the world is spinning and nothing remains as it used to be, including the peasantry. We are going through a period of immense complexities, interconnectedness and space-time compression that simultaneously destabilize rigid concepts. The concepts that served well to the understanding of the societies and economy have become unstable. Sassen (2014), puts forward in her latest piece, that most categories — the state, the economy, the middle classes, men, women, etc.— that served well in the past have unstable meanings today, and this opens up new terrain for research, theorization and struggles. Transversalities that cut across these categories destabilizes them, and she urges scholars to detheorize once-stable concepts in order to be able to re-theorize and re-stabilize Marxist categories; doing this requires going back to the ground level.

The transformation and hence the activism of peasantry cannot be fully understood just by using classical conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The immense proliferation of capitalism and its neoliberal phase have transformed the very existence of peasantry, though not in a uniform fashion. The central motive of

this dissertation is to track the unevenness of historical, structural and specific transformations in the peasantry — which used to a single, stable category — go through with the new agency/agencies it brings about.

This chapter is proposes an adequate theorization on the transformation and activism of the peasantry. Doing this requires overviewing of the existing literatures on social movements in general and peasant movements in particular in order to better perceive the transformation and set the scene for the later stage of proposing a new framework for the analysis of contemporary peasant activism.

2.1 A nexus of social movements, contentious politics and spatial transformation

Theoretically, the core subject of the dissertation lies at the nexus of social movements, contentious politics, and the neoliberal transformation. Obviously the evaluation of theory cannot be separated from the major epistemological traditions marking the field of political science, especially regarding the former the academic inquiry that has been clustered around rationalism, structuralism and culturalism. The theories of contentious politics from the 1960s onwards demonstrate a swing hence fruitful academic endeavor around them.

2.1.1 Theories of agrarian mobilization: Major debates in historical perspective

The primary approach was structuralism that emerged in the 1960s emphasized more the structures affecting or inhibiting the mobilizations. The structuralist trend became more varied by the deep historical analysis of Moore (1967), the anthropological studies of Wolf (1969), and the systematic agrarian analysis of Paige

(1978) and obviously the comparative-historical analysis of Skocpol (1994) whereas the political opportunity structures paradigm focused on the struggles gravitating around political struggles and the continental European scholars initiated the development of post-Marxist theories which we can locate within structuralism (Touraine, 1971). The efforts of locating the class base of the mobilizations of the era, such as the student movements of late 1960s, ultimately resulted in the development of a new social movements approach, “a variety of macrostructuralism minus the obsessive preoccupation with class that hamstrung the classical Marxist approaches” (Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997, p. 145).

The social movements literature offers us a variety of explanations on the reasons people mobilize. Among those we can count the relative deprivation and the frustration theories,³ the too poor to rebel theory, the moral economy and the everyday resistance theory by Scott as well as the important works of Wolf, Paige, Migdal and Popkin that investigate the role of peasantry in these upheavals. These accounts examine the specific grievances and motivations for peasant rebellion or peasant support for revolutionary guerilla movements. These writings argue that certain sorts of peasants are more prone or more able to rebel. There were two important debates: the “Wolf-Paige debate about what sorts of peasants revolutionary and the Scott-Popkin debate on relative weight of economic, organizational and cultural determinants of peasant behavior and on the nature of peasants psychological motivations for rebellion” (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989, p.491).

Out of the scholarly efforts to understand peasant rebellions in South-east Asia, particularly in Vietnam, emerged major debates and patterns to understand peasant mobilization. There are three popular perspectives: moral economy, political

³For more information see Gurr, T. R. (2015). *Why men rebel*. Routledge.

economy and class conflict. Paige notes on these three paradigms that they are in fact representative of three general traditions in the study of social movements which Charles Tilly (1978) has called Durkheimian, Millian and, Marxist, respectively. Popkin and his fellow "political economists" can be unequivocally assigned to Tilly's Millian category by direct attribution (Popkin, 1979). Millians, who Tilly traces to the Utilitarian tradition of John Stuart Mill, can be identified by their affection for rational individuals guided by explicit decision rules and by their corresponding lack of, or as Tilly would have it, fear of class-based political action (Tilly, 1978, p.24).

Scott (1977) argues that peasants have their own moral economy that is based on subsistence ethic: This economy includes the norm of reciprocity and the norm of minimal subsistence. This means that Scott thinks a threat to the peasant's minimal substance has great explosive potential. It also explains why peasants, despite their low class, have rebelled and even urged whole revolutions. The often backward-looking character of their movements is not due to an inherent conservatism among the peasantry but simply due to the fact that the capitalist transformation violates his conception of minimal justice.

Scott's emphasis on the moral economy and everyday forms of peasant resistance which emphasize the cultural distinctiveness of different villages evoked controversy among the scholars of contentious politics, particularly of the peasant mobilization. The major debate took place between Scott and Popkin. Popkin contends that Scott's version of peasantry behaves according to the cultural and moral norms of their localities and bases his theorization on the assumption that peasants are individual cost-benefit calculators. For Popkin, peasants are individual decision-making utility-maximizing individuals. There is an ontological split on the very existence of peasantry. For the scholars of moral economy, villages are closed

and villagers are tied to each other on the basis of custom and moral values, while for the political economists they are ‘open and internally competitive’ (Kurtz, 2000, p.104).

Scott puts forward that the centuries-long struggle of the peasants for subsistence have developed serious moral ties for the ‘safety-first’ principle. However, Popkin’s intellectual effort aimed at coming up with a more minimalist definition of peasantry to be able to develop a theorization uniting different segments of society that we call peasants. Nevertheless, the peasants that Popkin writes on are the peasants that have already lived through the commercialization and capitalization of agriculture, while Scott’s peasants are the ones living in pre-capitalist villages. As a conclusion to his analysis of Scott-Popkin debate, Kurtz (2000) emphasizes a fundamental difference between two lines of thought. He states:

As presented, moral economy is a theory of the implications of market and state penetration *into* pre-capitalist communities. Popkin's political economy is a theory about actors who operate in contexts in which market organization has already attained predominance. Understood in this way, there is no reason why the moral economy and political economy approaches could not *simultaneously* be correct (or incorrect). They may both refer to peasants, but they are not talking about same social actors. I intend no empirical critique of either approach, I claim only that they are not competing explanations. (p. 107)

Paige and Wolf also write on the peasant rebellions in South-East Asia. Wolf is primarily concerned with the devastating effects of North Atlantic capitalism on the societies. He states that “capitalist markets have torn men up by their roots and shaken them loose from their social relationships” (Wolf, 1969, p.295). With the emphasis he puts on the disruption of the social ties, he may be counted among those who embrace the Durkheimian epistemology. Moreover, Wolf argues that the middle peasants are the revolutionary segment among others because they are more

vulnerable to changes of capitalism and are more dependent on the social solidarities adversely that are affected by the proliferating capitalism.

Paige (1978), on the other hand, evaluates the same data on Vietnam, but combines it with data from other cases of peasant mobilizations and reaches the conclusion that

(...) the key element of the Delta economy was its class structure, not its potential for selective incentives. In particular I proposed that the well-documented radicalism of the Delta was a result of class conflict between backward capitalists whose only capital was land and a rural semi-proletariat whose only remaining claim was to a share of the crop as a wage. The landlords, whom I called "noncultivators, " relied on political influence to secure land and labor, lacked the resources to share their surplus with their workers and refused any political compromise. The workers, whom I called "cultivators, " severed from the conservative effect of the ownership of even small amounts of land, limited to improvement in their living standards only through group action, and dependent on the worker community for much of what the moral economists called social insurance, demanded radical change. The result was revolution.(p.10)

Obviously these are the classical paradigms focusing mostly on the period of decolonization. However, the paradigms to understand peasant dissidence have undergone significant transformation. Edelman (2001) clearly and briefly summarizes the changes in the paradigms that the social movements literature have gone through since the 1960s, ranging from the paradigms of mass behavior, to resource mobilization, to political process and new social movements.

2.1.2 Post-modernism and new social movements theory

A new social movements theory was born in the mid-1970s in order to fill the identity vacuum of the preceding paradigms such as Marxist theories. They seek to analyze the religious, communal, ethnic and other identity factors important in mobilizing people, along with the material factors. Among others, one of the

important protagonists of the NSMs paradigm, Melucci, also a social psychologist, argues that social movements have three important dimensions: the actor's recognition of commonalities and shared identities, objectives and understandings, adversarial relationships with opponents who claim the same goods or values; and actions that exceed the tolerance limits of the social system thereby pushing it to change (Melucci & Keane, 1989). Melucci's analysis is important in the sense that it not only gives priority to the ascribed identities but also to the construction of the actor's identities, which are context-dependent. He also mentions the tolerance limits of the social system. In this regard, Melucci's analysis of how people mobilize reminds us of James Scott's analysis of the moral economy. The moral economy, although it seems sound, is still problematic in the sense that it attributes a singularity and context-dependence to the peasant political activism.

According to Scott (1977), the distribution of risk for revolt depends on economic vulnerability (accompanied by fixed claims), price-system vulnerability and mono-crop vulnerability. One would usually argue that rebellions or revolts are more likely where strong communal ties exist and sharp internal divisions among the peasantry are absent. However, this overlooks the fact that it is precisely those villages and areas that do not hold these characteristics that are subject to most rapid commercialization and where communal structures fail to redistribute pain.

The essential characteristics of recent studies on rural mobilization are elaborated by Marc Edelman. Edelman (2000) notes that the post-1980 period of free-market and political liberalization has brought about an "unprecedented" wave of peasant uprisings. He also adds that the peasant tide of contention brought theoretical and methodological challenges. Peasant society has become more culturally and socially

diverse, which I believe is reflection of the structural change that agrarian society goes through.

This brings the emphasis back to the question of what changes in the political behavior of the peasantry that this change brings about. Are the new livelihood changes through further penetration of capitalism promoting or inhibiting the opposition by the peasantry? What factors are triggering the mobilization? The absence of revolt may also be explained by smoothed transformations: when new opportunities emerge, migration that urbanizes the rural and establishes external links, dependence patronage and assistance supported by the state, and encapsulation by religious structures of protection and aid. It must be noted that all these reasons for the absence of revolt may disappear or weaken and thus the risk for rebellion is never completely removed. (Scott, 1977) On the other hand, my observations on the anti-SHP movements in Turkey show the likelihood of revolt in villages where the transformation is smoothed can be more likely than the villages experiencing harsher transformation. This is emerging as a paradoxical situation in the literature on peasant mobilization.

One other paradigm through which to understand peasant mobilization is the perspective that defines peasantry in terms of ownership of the means of production and their place in the production relationship in the frame of the capitalist mode of production. This paradigm regards peasantry as a timid, suspicious apathetic and politically passive class which emerges due to economic isolation or dependence and the culture of repression that reinforce relatively low socio-economic status (Petras & Merino, 1972).

The paradigms to understand peasant dissidence are diverse and interesting, especially in the period of neoliberal economic restructuring, which demolishes the

old theories on peasant mobilization and gives rise to very strong and interesting movements such as the MST of Brazil, the EZLN of Mexico, the CONAIE of Ecuador and the transnational peasant organization of La Via Campesina. On the other hand, we also observe that in some places of the world, some peasant populations remain silent, regardless of the profoundness of the change and destruction of livelihoods. What are the reasons for these different reactions in response to the same global economic force?

As Edelman (2000) states that “processes of mobilization need to be problematized beyond formulaic models of threats to identity, the moral economy, and as a struggle over resources. Organizational patterns of movements can vary dramatically over time. There is a growing appreciation that social movements involve a dynamic long-term process of mobilization as a function of variations in political opportunities, political and social relations, personal and collective identities, and contentious politics.” Therefore, it needs to be conceptualized and analyzed beyond the appearances and manifestations that are abundantly studied through discourse analysis.

Petras is among the theoreticians who side against the new social movements theory and utilizing a class perspective. He states:

The resurgence of the new peasant and urban movements of the 1990s resulted from the fact that they were defending vital interests and that no one questioned the personal integrity of their leaders. If they lost these qualities, the movements would dissolve or become fragmented into electoral clienteles. Such groups were not simply “new social movements.” They retained and developed Marxism in new circumstances and adapted to new class actors engaged in novel types of struggle with the clear perspective of changing the national, if not international, structure of political and economic power. Former miners became coca cultivators, indigenous communities linked to urban intellectuals became guerrilla leaders, rural landless workers built antiliberal power blocs, and Guarani-speaking peasants challenged the hegemony of drug and contraband “capitalists.” It would appear that Marxism could be a creative tool in coming to terms with these new protagonists of social change. . . . The logic of the expansion of the new peasant movements

in the 1990s was intimately related to the internal transformations of the peasantry—politically, culturally, and economically—as well as a dialectical resistance to the extension of neoliberalism and the encroachment of imperialism. The displacement of educated peasants linked to modern urban centers created a new peasantry with modern organizational and media skills that linked agricultural activities to urban class struggle. (Petras, 1997, p.17)

In a similar vein, Collier also emphasizes the material basis of the successful rural rebellions in his work on the Chiapas rebellion of the Zapatistas. The Zapatista rebellion is often depicted by the various scholars from different perspectives such as the uprising against the centralist state for the indigenous cultural rights. However, Collier (2000) emphasizes agrarian rather than indigenous sources of rebellion, especially the constitutional modifications that effectively ended the land reform.

Despite the wide variety of accounts that range from the analysis of the state, the democratization, cyber politics and grassroots, and transnational organizations, two broad areas are missing Edelman (2001) states:

Peasant movements receive relatively short shrift, apart from Starn (1992). This is perhaps surprising, given that in Mexico, outside Chiapas in Central America (Edelman, 1998, 1999) and elsewhere, these have been in the forefront of the opposition to neoliberalism and that in Brazil, social movements research has been constructed heavily on the struggles of small farmers and the landless. (p. 293)

Since the end of 1970s, particularly after the end of Cold War, peasant studies and social movements theory have undergone significant change, especially with the growing influence of cultural studies and post-modern theory. These paradigms favored identity-based explanations underlying social movements in general. Accounts of the peasant mobilization are highly influenced by these paradigms, which basically ground explanations on the motivations of mobilization either on ethnic, religious, gender or cultural factors or on ecological and spatial concerns. Undoubtedly, all of these factors have influence on the peasant mobilization but to what extent they are really explanatory?

Studies on the peasant mobilization are increasing proportionate to the commercialization and neoliberalization in the rurality. Especially there are numerous studies elaborating on Latin America, where the New Social Movements (NSM) theory originates. Recent trends show that the NSM's focus is moving from urban to rural and that it has started to combine with the middle peasant thesis, the moral economy framework and the everyday forms of resistance thesis, reaching up to subaltern studies, which are mostly influenced by the discourse of post-modernism.

2.1.3 Critiques of the post-structural approaches

NSM and subaltern studies put forward that agrarian mobilization and resistance to capitalism/colonialism can be better explained through the analysis of the ideology of and experience of gender/ethnicity, region, ecology or religions, not by the class position of the subject (Brass, 2000). The incompatibility of the two forms of thinking which undermine the validity of the class-based theories creates the illusion that class does not exist in these resistances. This lack is also backed up by the Marxist theories failure to develop adequate theories on the class-determined ideological forms and practices. Bebbington (2000) reviews both the neoliberal and the post-structural arguments on the rural transformation and peasant behavior. While neoliberals perceive a divergence in the trajectory of development as 'failure' or 'inefficient', the post-structuralists usually view the change as a process of cultural destruction or homogenization. He calls for a more nuanced analysis with more focus on human agency and by "placing livelihood and coproduction of place at the center of any interpretation of the processes and effects of rural development"

(p. 1). With regard to post-structuralist analysis, he states that “post-structural positions focus our attention on the ways in which rural people make living meaningful and struggle politically for spaces of autonomy and self realization.” In order to demonstrate the shortcomings of both paradigms, he focuses on three localities in the Andes: Colta, Guamote and Otavalo. The first two are viewed as failures in development while the third is considered a success story. Comparing the similarities and differences on resource use, accumulation, migration, and sociopolitical and cultural changes enabled him to observe the complex outcomes of the transformation the viability of the rural places. He focuses particularly on the viability of places, especially through migration, which does necessarily mean non-viability, proletarianization or complete urbanization. It can also mean cultural, socio-political reproduction or constitution of lifestyles.

Bebbington’s comparative research on the unevenness of the transformation of rural spaces and especially the different and maybe unprecedented outcomes of migration is important in showing the shortcomings of the popular paradigms to understand the rural transformation and the agency.

2.2 Who are the peasants of contemporary era? Structural transformation of the peasantry itself

In order to understand the complexities of rural transformation, a group of scholars introduced an approach aiming to reveal the diverse sources of income and the diverse experiences of livelihood formation and re-formation referred to as sustainable rural livelihoods. The central question was stated as: Given a particular context (of policy setting, politics, history, agro ecology and socioeconomic

conditions), what combination of livelihood strategies (agricultural intensification, extensification, livelihood diversification and migration) emerges with what outcomes? (Scoones, 1998)

Scoones (1998) states that “livelihood comprises of the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets while not undermining the natural resource base” (p. 5). Their effort resulted in the development of livelihoods approach which aims at discovering the strategies employed by peasant households in order to be able to make a living in the face of market liberalization and increasing insecurities. Scoones (2013) states:

This may cut across the boundaries of more conventional approaches to looking at rural development, which focuses on defined activities: agriculture, wage employment, farm labor, small-scale enterprise and so on. But in reality people combine different activities in a complex *bricolage* or portfolio of activities. Outcomes of course vary, and how different strategies affect livelihood pathways or trajectories is an important concern for livelihoods analysis. This dynamic, longitudinal analysis emphasizes such terms as coping, adaptation, improvement, diversification and transformation. Analyses at the individual level can in turn aggregate up to complex livelihood strategies and pathways at household, village or even district levels. (p. 160)

The advocates of this approach state that livelihood resources (natural, economic, human and social capitals) are combined in the pursuit of different livelihood strategies. Their livelihood-based analysis has revealed important trends on the transformation of the contemporary peasantry, which is essential for the literature, and hence for this dissertation.

The central aim of the approach is to reveal the diverse sources of livelihood formation and in what ways rural communities respond to the shock that disturbs their livelihood. Diversity appears as the most celebrated word of the approach and challenging the single-sector approaches to livelihoods analysis was put as a major

promise. As Scoones put it, the appeal of the approach is: “Look at the real world and try and understand it from local perspectives.” In order to do so, the sustainable rural livelihoods approach offers an integrated, multidisciplinary, multifocal analysis to understand the complexity and dynamism of rural communities. On the other hand, the approach was criticized for not attributing sufficient power and politics and not being in sufficient communication with the global macroeconomic dynamics of globalization and neoliberalism and the approach declined during the last decade. Yet the approach helped the researchers of rural transformation by offering a matrix of potential reasons for a disturbance of the settled livelihood and in what ways rural communities respond to the shock, together with a quest for “a grounded, solid and field-based empirical stance” (Scoones, 2009).

It must be remembered that peasants are active agents trying to earn their living. Hence, we must recognize that peasants are trying to adapt their livelihood in an increasingly volatile and insecure environment that stems from the spread and deepening of neoliberal principles by attending a number of income-generating and sometimes-innovative activities with an aim of risk aversion, which is necessary for the pursuit of their livelihood. Diversification is the word that defines the spirit of the survival strategies because it enables peasants to compensate for possible risks and losses of one economic activity with the utilization of the other. Among these strategies, the first and most common way to cope with the stress is livelihood diversification.

2.2.1 Rural livelihood diversification and pluriactivity

Rural livelihood diversification is defined as “the process by which households construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities for survival and in order to improve their standard of living” (Ellis, 1999, p. 2). While Ellis makes a more general definition of livelihood diversification, Ben Bradshaw (2004) puts the concept in context as follows:

In the context of declining government subsidization of agriculture, many analysts have predicted reversals in certain characteristic trends of post-1945 Western agriculture with positive implications for agro ecosystem well-being. One example, investigated herein, is the suggestion that, in the absence of government safety nets, farmers will seek to diversify their operations in order to buffer against production failures or market downturns in any one output. (p. 35)

In many cases, crop diversification appears as an observed strategy, but most frequently it is insufficient for the survival in today’s neoliberal world. When the on-farm diversification is not sufficient for survival, a combination of both on and off-farm activities appears to the scene as an effective strategy.

There is considerable scholarly debate on how to define pluriactivity, or part-time farming. Bradshaw (2004) states:

Following Ilbery (1991), diversification tends to depict the development of alternative or unconventional farm-based enterprises such as the production of organic crops or the provision of farm tourism services. Although less settled upon, the term part-time farming is generally limited to the selling of family labor off-farm, such as driving a school bus or working in the local post office. Lastly, following MacKinnen et al. (1991, p. 59), pluriactivity is typically used to describe “the phenomenon of farming in conjunction with other gainful activity whether on- or off-farm.” That is, farm diversification and part-time farming are subsumed within the more holistic term pluriactivity. (p. 37)

At the same time, Evans and Ilbery (1993) define pluriactivity as a phenomenon of farming in conjunction with other gainful activity, whether on or off-farm. In the essence of the debate lies the motivation for generating alternative sources of income. The strategy is used by the peasantry for various reasons: in order to survive

or to alleviate poverty for worse-off peasants, to make effective use of the household labor-force, to minimize the increasing risks in agriculture, to create a self-insurance mechanism against the side-effects of specialization, and for a richer peasantry, to find an effective strategy for improving the assets of the household or for capital accumulation and market integration.

Ellis (2000) rejects the conventional dualistic classifications of the factors leading to diversification, such as the distinction between necessity and choice, and proposes six factors that lead to diversification: seasonality for reducing seasonal income variations; risk strategies for achieving an income portfolio with low covariate risk between its components; labor markets for reducing the cyclical and insecurity threats to household income by offering non-farm opportunities for income generation differentiated by other considerations such as education, skills, location and gender; credit market failures as a factor necessitating the availability of cash from off-farm activities needed for the purchase of recurrent farm inputs; asset strategies for investing in order to enhance future livelihood prospects; and coping behavior and adaptation for strengthening survival capabilities against future eventualities.

Studies on pluriactivity show that the peasantry becomes more and more pluriactive in industrialized and in developing countries. Kay (2009), citing the World Development Report of 2008, put forward that:

Small holders increasingly move beyond the farm by diversifying their employment and income opportunities. Whether small holders diversify their activities as a way out of distress or to grasp new opportunities is the pertinent question. Several studies have indicated that the increasing engagement of the peasantry in diverse activities is due to the crisis of peasant farming which is unable to compete with corporate agriculture in the era of globalization.” (p. 126)

The motivation for pluriactivity may stem from various motives; however, as seen in the World Development Report, the main reasons leading to the increase in diversification attempts are globalization and the emergence of corporate agriculture. But how effective is livelihood diversification in eradicating poverty and rural development? What does this strategy mean for life in rural area?

A study by L.R. de Silva and K.A.S.S. Kodithuwakku (2010) shows that worse-off households engage in a differentiated portfolio of activities in order to maintain their survival in the insecure and deregulated agricultural markets, while better-off households with more access to capital and communication facilities are more inclined to engage in off-farm activities with a more entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, they argue that worse-off households are more dependent on agriculture than the better-off ones and better-off household encompass more potential for improving the household income. For the worse-off households, while admitting the positive effects of the strategy for survival, Ellis (1999) notes the following:

It is widely agreed that a capability to diversify is beneficial for households at or below the poverty line. Having alternatives for income generation can make the difference between minimally viable livelihoods and destitution. However, diversification does not have an equalizing effect on rural incomes overall. Better-off families are typically able to diversify in more favorable labor markets than poor rural families. Total income and the share of income derived from non-farm sources are often positively correlated. Different income sources may have strongly differing impacts on rural inequality. For example, unequal land ownership may mean that a policy focus on crop income favors the rich above the poor; however, greater access to non-farm wage income would have the reverse effect. (p. 3)

As evident in the above excerpt, livelihood diversification may lead to the persistence of rural inequalities. The lower income earned by worse-off households from less favorable labor markets may not be sufficient for the survival of the rural poor. Migration in the most general sense emerges in this context.

2.2.2 Migration

So far, livelihood diversification is elaborated on as a strategy for survival in the countryside. We also can locate the strategies of migration in this context of survival in rural areas. At first glance, migration seems like the end of the rural struggle and the starting point of urbanization. In analyzing migration movements, attention was given to the pressures forcing peasants off their lands and attracting them to the cities. However, migration with the different shapes it takes can also be counted among the survival strategies for the small peasantry. Kay (2009) admits the existence of this phenomenon and states:

Rural households have increasingly constructed their livelihoods across different sites, crossing the rural–urban divide and engaging in agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Straddling the rural–urban divide is a survival strategy for the poorer peasantry (‘distress migration’) or part of an accumulation strategy for the richer peasantry. Rural household incomes are increasingly made up from rural non-farm activities arising from outside agriculture (wage or salary employment such as working in agro processing plants and construction; self-employment such as marketing, rural tourism and other business activities; urban-to-rural and international remittances and pension payments. (p. 122)

Here, we see the integration of urban-based income sources into the portfolio of the rural household. Migration may occur in multiple ways. As stated above, straddling the rural-urban divide is the strategy. Either one part or the whole family can engage in off-farm rural or urban activities in order to earn the money necessary for survival or reproduction of the rural household. The key here is continuing the family farm production.

Referring to the principle of seasonality proposed by Ellis, households may use the strategy of the seasonal, circular or permanent migration of one or more household members in order to be less affected by income fluctuations, which occur seasonally. Given that household consumption is somewhat linear and income

fluctuates, decreasing the gap between the two lies at the essence of the motivation.

As Ellis (2000) proposes:

This requires income earning opportunities, the seasonal cycles of which are not synchronized with the farm's own seasons. Seasonal migration to other agricultural zones may be one option, circular or permanent migration of one or more family members to non-farm occupations another (Alderman and Sahn, 1989). Under circumstances of barely sufficient survival from own-farm output, seasonal migration may occur not so much to supplement the incomes of the resident household, but to remove from it one mouth to feed (Toulmin, 1992, p.51). (p. 296)

The social function of migration has been altered. We should go beyond the urban-centric analysis of the migration as well as developmentalist interpretations that see rural-urban migration as a prerequisite for development. Moreover, the effects of urbanization and circular migration on the agencies and lifestyles have not been extensively researched. Bebbington's (2000) study where he compares livelihood construction and viability of the place in three areas in the Andes is insightful on wider effects of migration. He criticizes the analytical rigidity and states:

Migration is frequently taken as a primary indicator of non-viability. Depending on one's analytical lens, it can be seen as a consequence of development destroying agricultural livelihoods, or as a measure of the incomplete absorption of land-hungry peasants into urban labor markets. In these three cases, however, it has been more than either of these interpretations. It has been a means of producing, securing, and investing in rural localities with the effect of transforming them. Many dynamics are at play here. Migrants have consistently used earnings to purchase land, particularly in those periods when more land was available because of lower population densities and when shifts in rural power relationships weakened the hacienda's grip on land. Migration has also been an important way of financing the building of a new architectural landscape as people replace adobe and thatched-roof houses with more modern building materials. Whether as peddlers, urban laborers, or international traders (as in Otavalo and parts of Colta), these migrants have transferred income from engagement in labor and trade. (p. 509)

The complex manifestations of migration are quite clear in terms of 'economy' but Bebbington's contribution is significant in terms of the 'culture' this brings. He goes on:

Migration has become constitutive of lifestyles that make claims on more than one place. It has its appeal to those young adults like Manuel who love to come back to Colta periodically, but with time, get bored, and so also like to return to urban or coastal areas. It has also been used by many, of all income brackets and ages, not just to maintain a link with rural areas, but also to consolidate this link. Part of this is clearly an issue of status and conspicuous consumption (cf. Colloredo- Mansfield 1994). The community of Sablog Rosa Ines in Guamote is like many others in that its showiest house. A two-story house with balcony and mock brick facing, is empty for much of the year while its owners work in the northern highlands. But much of this sustained link is also an issue of lifestyle, cultural practice, and identity. (p. 510)

The analysis of migration and viability of the place in the Andes revealed that the different migration patterns effect migrants' — we could say villagers, ex-villagers or locals — consumption patterns and lifestyle choices. Migration is a constitutive factor in the formation of the agencies. This is an important point to be kept in mind when the transformation of peasantry and mobilization is the question, which has a specific importance for this dissertation.

2.2.3 The emergence of new rurality

Neoliberal globalization took the existing structures, transformed and left them in a state of ambiguity. Bernstein (2009), in his recent work turning his attention to an old debate about the capitalist transformation of agriculture between Lenin and Chayanov and tried to derive some implications for the transformation by making the observations below:

(...) the majority of 'peasants'/'small farmers' (and of those in an ever expanding 'informal economy') in a globalizing 'South' are a component of what I term 'classes of labor', and a component that is neither dispossessed of all means of reproducing itself nor in possession of sufficient means to reproduce itself. The former is not exceptional (see note 18). The latter marks the limits of their viability as petty commodity producers. 'Classes of labor', then, comprise 'the growing numbers who now depend – directly and indirectly – on the sale of their labor power for their own daily reproduction' (Panitch and Leys 2000, ix, emphasis added). Classes of labor in the

conditions of today's 'South' have to pursue their reproduction through insecure, oppressive and increasingly 'informalised' wage employment and/or a range of likewise precarious small-scale and insecure 'informal sector' ('survival') activity, including farming; in effect, various and complex combinations of employment and self-employment. Many of the laboring poor do this across different sites of the social division of labor: urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural, as well as wage employment and self-employment. This defies inherited assumptions of fixed, let alone uniform, notions (and 'identities') of 'worker', 'peasant', 'trader', 'urban', 'rural', 'employed' and 'self-employed.'" (p. 75)

What captures attention in Bernstein's observations is that we see a peasantry neither dispossessed of all means of reproducing itself nor in possession of sufficient means to reproduce itself. Thus, we see neither the process of the complete proletarianization of the peasantry nor the continuation of rurality as it used to be.

What we observe is a strange combination of the two, a new kind of peasantry, which cannot be classified with the uniform notions of agricultural – non-agricultural, worker-peasant, employed-self employed or rural-urban.

For many scholars, the blurring of the distinction between rural and urban has raised questions and they have turned their attention to this phenomenon. What we see is more and more integration of urban-based income sources into the economy of the rural household. Commuting or migrating household members are constantly moving between the rural and urban, tying the two and blurring the distinction. On the other hand, not only rural households but also urban households where families live in shantytowns and are employed in the informal sector are also straddling the rural urban divide by engaging in rural activities seasonally. Hence, a multilocational and multispatial household is emerging that cuts across the rural urban divide in both ways.

The term "rurbanization" was also coined in order to explain the backward movement of the urban population. Kay's work (2008) tried to summarize the newly

born approach of the new rurality (*nueva ruralidad*) espoused by Latin American scholars and states the following on “rurbanization”:

Today, however, the situation is more fluid and varied: not only do peasants to cities, but urban inhabitants move to rural areas, and new urban settlements spring up in the countryside leading to what some have called its ‘rurbanization’ . . . processing plants and to a lesser extent some industries are established near villages and hamlets where employers can take advantage of the cheap source of rural labor, especially women. Thus, urban labor practices are spreading into rural areas. The increasing fluidity between rural and urban labor markets is partially eroding real wage differentials between urban and rural areas. The growth of rural tourism and the penetration of the media and telecommunications have diffused cultural values, news and information across the rural–urban areas, thereby enhancing further their cultural convergence. Thus, a double process of urbanization of the rural areas and the ruralization of urban areas can be observed, although it is the cities and urban values which are clearly dominant. Despite this closer relationship the rural and urban divide is still marked in terms of income, incidence of poverty and life chances, especially in the more remote rurality. (p. 926)

Furthermore, alongside the increasing fluidity of labor between rural and urban, that of capital and commodities can be observed as well. Kay states that:

(...) The increasing dependence on inputs purchased from industry, the continuing industrialization of agriculture through agro processing plants, the spread of rural industries, the expanding integration of agricultural producers into global commodity chains, the growing intrusion of agro food corporations and supermarkets into the countryside are tying the urban and rural sectors more closely together than ever (Goodman and Watts 1994, Reardon and Berdegue’ 2002, Friedmann 2005). Hence it becomes more difficult to draw a line between where one ends and the other begins. . . . The social boundaries between rural peasants and urban workers, between poor, middle, and rich peasants, or between peasants and different classes of informal labor are thus blurred in the context of increasing globalization, under which peasant economies and rural societies cannot be separated from the wider flows of capital, commodities, and labor across different sites and social scales. (p. 122)

2.3 New peasantry and peasant dissidence

Obviously, the exhaustion of the existing frameworks for analyzing peasant dissidence is not the only reason behind the quest for wider paradigms and concepts.

The structural transformation of the social group referred to as “peasantry”, as discussed in the previous section, maybe the most important reason that encourages the transformation of the preceding paradigms.

The transformation is intense, multi-faceted and uneven. The proliferation of capitalist forms of farming, altered property relations, patterns of proletarianization and migration, the penetration of new information technologies and developing travel opportunities have affected the structural composition of peasantry. The space-time compression seriously and irreversibly shakes historical construction of peasantry as the remote, static and conservative entity. The current diversity and richness of ‘peasant rebellions’ might be attributed to this structural change. This phenomenon opens up a rich and exiting venue for scholarly inquiry.

Literature on the rural change in Latin America proves the global character of the changes in production and labor systems in agriculture. Works of Kay, Bernstein, Ellis, Cloke, Brass and so on are among the major works elaborating on the changes occurring in traditional rural structures. Bernstein not only points to the increasingly insecure, informal and exploitative working conditions for the laboring poor, including the peasants of the ‘south’; he also marks the shortcoming of social inquiry on defining the emerging ‘class of labour’ which we cannot anymore define with the dualistic divisions of rural and urban or peasant and worker. It is clear that we have to find new concepts and new formulations in order to be able to theorize the newly emerging rurality. I believe in a need for this theorization because nothing in the global world of spatio-temporal compression stays only in the rural, and nothing can be attributed to a “distant” rurality; we need to perceive what it is in order to predict the implications of transformation. One object of the research is to

come up with a better understanding of this new form of peasantry, especially on the origins and the motives of the behavior it presents.

Studies elaborating on the transformation of production and labor relations are increasing in number and providing a deeper understanding on the structure of the transformation. However, the political implications and the behavior affected by this transformation are not equally researched. Peasant households' increased occupational diversity in an effort to survive in the face of heightened livelihood challenges brought about mobility to urban centers. However, their links with their hometown continued through seasonal or circular migration, and so did the identities and ethnicity (Collier & Lowery Quaratiello 1999 [1994], White 2000, Kearney 1996). Hence, the contemporary rural structure shows complex variation, which raises the question of who acts in contemporary agrarian movements. On this question, Petras' theorization of the new peasantry and their politicization are telling. Petras and Veltmeyer (2011) states:

The "new peasantry, " especially those who led the struggle; traveled to the cities, participated in seminars and leadership training schools, and engaged in political debates. In short, even as they were rooted in the rural struggle, lived in land settlements, and engaged in agricultural cultivation, they had a cosmopolitan vision. (p. 84)

Petras, in his conceptualization of the new peasantry and its political action, manifests a different position from the moral economy paradigm or new social movements theory which dominate the social movements theory in terms of peasant political behavior. That is because epistemologically both theories take the individual as the unit of analysis and "the ideological" as the sphere of intervention or determination. As a consequence and with the influence of the post-modern theory, most scientific work is based on the discursive analysis of fragmented and autonomous individual speaking plurivocally as a gender/ethnically or regionally

specific subject in contrast to the analysis of a class composed of people speaking univocally (Brass, 2000).

Rather than presenting neoliberal principles as directly transforming the lives of peasants in a uniform way, it is important to present them as transformative factors, however deeply rooted and violently influential they are, in order to be able to recognize peasant agency and resistance. On the other hand, we should acknowledge the manifest diversity of neoliberalism in different rural contexts.

Concerning this debate, Winson (1997) proposes: “The unfolding of globalization in poorer countries is often portrayed as inevitable and inclusive by its proponents; a perspective which fails to reflect its often actor-specific origins, socio-economically exclusionary nature, and differentiated local impacts” (p.239). On the same debate, Nygren and Myatt-Hirvonen (2009) state:

According to this view, marginalized peasants and rural poor manage to cope with scarcity through a combination of diverse sources of income and social creativity. Instead of seeing people as impelled by forces beyond their control, actor-oriented frameworks emphasize people’s capability to construct the meanings of their life worlds and to find room to maneuver.” (p. 829)

There is a need to develop an actor-oriented approach in analyzing the peasant responses to neoliberalization. Recognition of peasants as active agents trying to reshape and earn their living after neoliberalism is also necessary in acknowledging the degree of diversity taking place in the real world. Trying to attribute uniformity to the phenomenon that takes place in the real world is an intrinsic attempt to facilitate the perception. However, this tendency may lead to ignorance about the diversity and differentiated responses taking place in the actual world, which are crucial for developing an extended understanding and perception closer to actuality. In order to reach the desired level of heterogeneity and actuality in analysis, Kay (2009) emphasizes the implementation of a comparative approach in order to reveal

the diverse experiences and specific tendencies in communication with certain factors. On this issue he cites White and quotes the following:

The comparative approach, requiring detailed analysis of the contrasting experiences of rural development in actual societies, with recognition of the particular historical, social and political contexts at national and local level in which agrarian changes take place, in which strategies and policies have been formed and introduced and have succeeded or failed. In this way we may hope to confront and come to terms with the diversity that exists in the real world – whatever uniform tendencies some abstract theories might suggest – and to learn from it, to see the ways in which general ‘tendencies’ interact with specific conditions to produce particular outcomes, and to understand in this way that ‘success stories’ may offer valuable lessons, but not directly transferable models for other societies to follow or for external agencies to impose.” (p. 132)

In order to understand the contemporary transformation of the peasantry and hence their activism, it is important to look beyond the uniform models that the theory suggests. As explained above, migration patterns, remittances, eased travel of the ideas through space-time compression, trans-national connections, patterns of globalization that transform life styles and capital transfers play significant roles in peasant mobilization, among many others. Contemporary analysis of peasant dissidence requires a more elaborate approach with a broader outlook that goes beyond the culture vs. economy dichotomy that could meet the challenges posed by the uneven transformations and destabilized categories of rural vs. urban, peasant vs. worker, villager vs. city dweller. This carries us back to Sassen’s call for restabilizing the destabilized categories with fuzzy edges. Although she does not write on the rural-urban dichotomy and rural transformation, I argue that categories that served well for the understanding of the peasant mobilization have been destabilized in the face of neoliberal globalization and uneven structural transformations. In this effort, she proposes certain analytical tactics to recover the instability of some categories. She calls for recovering the specificities of the space where a given process takes place and recovering the specificity of the body- not just

any body but also the reified body. There is a need for a unitary approach, which can bring together the transformation posed by the regime of accumulation that is neoliberalism; historical-structural specificities and the representations, the ‘culture.’ This integrated perspective would enable us to perceive the peasant dissidence in the unevenness of the actual life. I believe that placing the emphasis in space could provide an adequate and effective analytical tool.

2.4 Spatial analysis of rurality

Smith, following in the footsteps of Marx, observes that “a geographical space . . . abstracted from society is a philosophical amputee . . . We do not live, act and work in space so much as by living, acting and working we produce space” (1984, pp.77, 85). This theoretical stance is important because it attributes agency to the people living in the rural, which most structural theories focusing on the macro-scale changes failed to capture, if not just ignored. This spatial analysis is crucial to see how neoliberalism is experienced on the ground, how the structures affect transformation and enable us to avoid over-generalization and portrayal of neoliberalism as the single and strong force destroying the lives of people.

As Marsden et al. (1987) also mention, the new theoretical developments enable social scientists to better explain the ‘specificities of agrarian structures in time and space.’ Space offers us a realm for observing particular facets of the transformation, including the commercialization of agricultural production, the commercialization of land, nature and water. These are marking agrarian change, a transformation of the peasantry and a transformation of the representations attributed to a particular locality. After all, this dissertation focuses on peasant mobilization

against the enclosures of the river and the water in particular villages by the state's transferring the use-right of the water flow to energy companies. Hereinafter, a spatial analysis from a Lefebvrian perspective could be effective in meeting the challenges of analysis of the rural transformation and the peasant mobilization per se. However, utilizing Lefebvre's construction of space requires attention and some reservations because of the simple fact that his philosophy focuses on urban space. He takes urban as the latest stage of the capitalist development, following the industrial stage and this philosophy regards rural as passé. For him, urban space is a mediator between the larger global social order and the everyday life in a dialectical manner. He develops the notion of the right to an "urban life with all its services and advantages" (Lefebvre, 1991), and the city is the space that allows an infinite number of possible configurations of practices of everyday lives for the emancipation. Both Harvey and Lefebvre maintain that the major threats on the urban life are commodification and industrialization (Bühler, Darly, Milian, 2015). "The world of commodity has its own immanent logic, that of money and unlimited generalized exchange value. Such a form that of exchange and equivalence, is totally indifferent to the urban form" (Lefebvre, 1968, p. 79). Observing that "exchange value and the generalization of commodity, through industrialization, tend to destroy the city and urban reality by subordinating them" (p. 4), he points out that these are currently becoming "the havens of use value, seeds of a virtual predominance and of a revalorization of use."

Although the materiality occupies a central place in his analysis alongside the experiences and social constructs, the focus is on urban environments. Rural, for Lefebvre is the opposite of the urban. Bühler et al. (2015) state:

Rural space is consequently excluded from the right to the city for reasons closely linked to the city-countryside opposition. Thus, Lefebvre saw the

“traditional” rural, unlike the ancient city, as incompatible with the possibility of emancipation, insofar as peasant societies were under the yoke of social control through acquaintanceship, closed in on themselves, clientelist and conservative. Such countryside was also marked by an agrarian, cyclical space-time, juxtaposing specific local particularities (Lefebvre 1970). Yet the major hypothesis developed in *La révolution urbaine* (1970) concerns the disappearance of this “traditional” rural, with the expansion of the urban on all scales, and its generalization in the North as well as the South. Far from regretting it, Lefebvre argued that this disappearance opened the prospect of social change that could extend the right to the city to all spaces worldwide: “Whether the urban fabric closes in on the countryside and what survives of peasant life is irrelevant, so long as ‘the urban’, the place of encounter, the prioritization of use value, embedded in the space of a time promoted to the rank of supreme good among all goods, finds its morphological base, its practical-sensitive materialization” (Lefebvre 1970: 108). (p. 6)

Lefebvre’s distrust of the rural can be evaluated from two perspectives. Some scholars such as Barraclough (2013) try to expand the scope and state that “[...] the right to the city might be created anywhere and everywhere, including the places we imagine to be ‘rural’” (p. 1048), whereas there is a branch of thought which regards the city-type of life proliferating in other spaces including the rural. This assumption is compatible with the discussions on the new rurality but the forms and implications of new rurality and the city-content in it has to be intensively researched. Lefebvre saw the residential strategies of neo-rurals and suburbans as counterproductive and that they reproduced relationships of domination, through the spread of capitalism.

Bühler et al. (2015) quotes Lefebvre and states:

Through surprising detours – nostalgia, tourism, the return to the heart of the traditional city, the call of existing or newly developed centralities – this right (to the city) is slowly evolving. The claim to nature, the desire to enjoy it diverts from the right to the city. This last claim is expressed indirectly, as a tendency to flee the deteriorated and non-renewed city, alienated urban life, before truly existing. The need for and the right to nature conflict with the right to the city, without actually being able to evade it (Lefebvre, 1968, p. 107). (p.7)

Even though his ideas on the conservatism of the rural are rigid and do not give credit to the rural populations for emancipation of any sort above observation is important from the perspective that I try to develop in this chapter. The right to the

city and everyday life are core concepts for Lefebvre, but as a Marxist philosopher, his goal is to reach an emancipatory idea or space. He sees this chance in the urban phase of the capitalist development. However, as he explicitly states in the excerpt above, singling out the right to the city from this philosophical background and rendering it to a mere demand for a 'right to any space' conflicts with the essence of the concept. The need for and the right to nature is problematic and does not necessarily encompass an emancipatory core because it subsumes an evasion from the contradictions posed by commodification and industry by escaping the city, the space where contradictions are active and transformative. Any spatial demand that does not address the material core of capitalism is far from being emancipatory in his perspective; on the contrary, it is an assault on the right to the city and hence the way of emancipation.

An effort to challenge Lefebvre on the rural space should address the transformation of peasantry and the new regimes of accumulation and forms of encroachment of capitalism. That's because his conceptualization of rurality as traditional and unchanging stems from his assumption that rural has already undergone the destruction of capitalism and modernité. Bühler et al. (2015) states:

The expectations surrounding the amenities, the environment and the diversified uses of rural space do not antagonistically oppose urban populations and rural communities through processes of domination, but are informed by profound, socially and spatially diffuse changes in values and customs (Mormont 2009). By ridding themselves of traditional social relations and the control these implied on individuals, and also by integrating the dynamics of capitalism more directly, the rural spaces of the second half of the 20th century moved away from the vision Lefebvre had of them. The profound changes in their social structures, their customs and their economy, with the redefinition of power relations this implies, allow for the ideas formulated in *Le Droit à la Ville* to be transposed to these rural areas. (p. 7-8)

The commodification, the land and water grabbing, the dispossession of the villagers, recent forms of commercialization of production and space, and the dissolution of the

peasantry in the face of intensive transnationalization of the markets in terms of production and consumption continuously transform the rural areas. This is particularly observable for the peripheral economies. Hence, I would argue that Lefebvre's ideas on the production of the space could be applied to rural spaces as well, mainly due to the neoliberal regime of accumulation even though the formulation of the 'right to the village' seems problematic.

2.5 Threefold construction of space

For Lefebvre space is a "trans disciplinary focal point, an opening window through which one can thread through all the complexities of modern and postmodern world" (Soja, 1996, p.61). He proposes a threefold dialectic of space in this groundbreaking book named 'Production of Space' (Lefebvre, 1991). He founds his conceptualization on a differentiation between three types of space, which are perceived space of materialized spatial practice (*espace perçu*), conceived space of discursive representations of space (*espace conçu*), and lived space (*espace vécu*) (Kuhlenbeck, 2010). Lived space is a nexus of *espace conçu* and *espace perçu*. It covers the way people live in the space of empirically, measurable concrete spatial forms and how they perceive it. It contains "simultaneities, perils as well as possibilities: the space of radical openness, the space of social struggle" (Soja, 1996, p.311).

As Kuhlenbeck (2010) summarizes:

Lefebvre's second space (conceived space) is constructed in conceptual, symbolic, and cognitive forms. It encompasses representations of space; such as books, films, and images. It is concerned with ideational and ideological forms. It considers ways in which we deal, write and think about the empirical primary text. Concepts of space of scientists and of urban planners as well as the concepts of spatial order and production, which are subject to

power relations, are classified in this category. Lefebvre refers to conceived space as a 'storehouse of epistemological power' Representations of space affect our conduct and attitude towards a certain place. Conceived space is produced by our knowledge and background . . .In the production of space, Lefebvre seems to place greatest emphasis on this type of spatial conceptualization. Third space(lived space) includes both the physical form and mental construction of space. Third space overlays physical space and is concerned with the deeper meaning of space. It implies the directly lived space of inhabitants and users. It is also a mode of thinking about the space that draws upon both material and conceptual spaces. It extends beyond those binary conceptions of space and opens up new possibilities of thinking about and acting out space. (p. 20-21)

The major contribution of Lefebvre to the analysis of spaces rests on his conceptualization of *espace conçu*. The conceived space becomes a battleground of the re-makings of the spaces and the resistance for the spaces. The third space, lived space includes both the physical and the mental forms of the space. All these operate in a dialectical tension and contribute to the 'dialectics of triplicity.'

The threefold construction of space offers us a venue to capture the dynamic and multi-faceted transformation of rurality that was summarized earlier. There are different yet related aspects of this change. The first one is the change in the regime of accumulation. Alongside the neoliberalization of the production as a mode of accumulation, the rural space has become the target by itself, which is often analyzed under the concept of accumulation by dispossession.

Harvey (2005) highlights the impacts of structural adjustment programs and their derivatives, imposed on vulnerable countries by international regulatory institutions such as World Bank and IMF. Commoditization and privatization of the resources such as land and water for profit is among the principles imposed by these institutions (pp.150-156). On the accumulation by dispossession, Adnan (2013) adds:

Policies and interventions pertaining to land reforms, property rights and access to open access resources as well as development interventions having counterproductive impacts on people and the environment. Such outcomes have subjected peasant households to forced commoditization and land loss,

undermining their capability for self-provisioning and self-employment and constraining them to undertake wage labor for survival. (p. 96)

Issuing of new property rights on the commons, the privatization of the resource use is a part of the neoliberal logic of capital accumulation. These inevitably transform the perceived space. Ecological destruction is a facet of the spatial change together with the livelihood transformations altered by the changes in the production.

Material (perceived) transformations have an impact on the conceived transformations of the space, and how particular spaces are reconstructed, imagined and represented.

The downturn of the traditional dominance of agricultural economy as an outcome of diminishing scale of agricultural production resulted in a shift in perception of the rural space. Rural spaces divert from being landscapes of production to landscapes of consumption, which strengthens the importance of the conceived space.

In order to be able to capture both the uniform tendencies posed by the capital and particular manifestations, particular conceptions of the change are crucial to understanding rural transformation and activism. Following the basic theoretical stance of Lefebvre, Keith Halfacree (2006) constructs a three-fold architecture of the rural space, which lies at the interaction of the rural locality, representations of the rural and the lives of the rural. She states:

Rural localities inscribed through relatively distinctive spatial practices. These practices may be linked to either production or consumption activities. *Formal Representations* of the rural such as those expressed by the capitalist interests, bureaucrats or politicians. Crucially, these representations refer to the way the rural is framed within the (capitalist) production process; specifically, how the rural is commodified in exchange value terms. Procedures of signification and legitimation are vital here. *Everyday lives of the rural*, which are inevitably incoherent and fractured. These incorporate individual and social elements ('culture') in their cognitive interpretation and negotiation. Formal representations of the rural strive to dominate these experiences, as they will rural localities. (p. 51)

Halfacree's conceptualization of rural space is important and useful because it tries to encompass both the material and ideational elements of rural life. Because of the simple fact that this research looks at the differentiated factors bringing about or inhibiting peasant solidarity or dissidence in response to forces destroying established livelihoods, the importance of the ideational and cognitive factors, or the collective perceptions of the rural, representation and construction of the representations of the rural space are evident in searching for the forces and factors mobilizing or silencing people.

A distinction between localities, formal representations and everyday lives is important in grasping the facets of transformation and people's differentiated susceptibilities and efforts to make the change meaningful. I would argue that the methodology to understand this change and peoples reaction has to be focused on the relationship between these categories. A relational methodology is indispensable for the inquiry and this methodology has to aim at revealing the links between everyday lives, historical structures and global forces. A focus on everyday life in the context of globalization would not just be incomplete but deceptive as well if it is not relationally connected to the broader historical structures and spatialities that emerged out of them. Even though Lefebvre states that the contemporary dialectics is not driven by the class conflict but by the conflicts of spaces, I will try to demonstrate in the following sections that class still plays an important role in the emergence of spaces and the relationship between the spaces.

The research of Brazilian critical geographer Bernardo Mançano Fernandes on conflicts between peasants and agribusiness enabled him to develop a theory of contested territories is crucial to note in this regard (Fernandes, 2008a, 2008b; Saquet & Sposito, 2009). He argues that social classes and relationships generate different

territories and spaces that are reproduced under conditions of continual conflict; as a result, there are spaces of domination and spaces of resistance (Fernandes, 2008a, 2008b). Territorial disputes are carried out in all possible dimensions: economic, social, political, cultural, theoretical and ideological (Fernandes, 2008a, 2008b). In the case of rural areas, these disputes are embodied in the struggles between grassroots social movements and corporate food regimes over what he calls both material and immaterial territories (as cited in Saquet & Sposito, 2009). Rosset and Martínez-Torres (2012) summarizes Fernandes' theorization as follows:

Immaterial territory refers to the terrain of ideas, of theoretical constructs, of interpretive frameworks, and he posits that there are no material territories that are not associated with immaterial territories. Therefore the dispute over real and tangible territories and the resources they contain, necessarily goes hand in hand with the dispute over immaterial territories, or the space of ideology and ideas (Bezner 2007, McMichael 2007, Fernandes 2009). Contestation over immaterial territories is characterized by the formulation and defense of concepts, theories, paradigms, and explanations, all of which are used to convince others. In other words, the power to interpret and to determine the definition and content of concepts is itself a territory in dispute. (p. 3)

Fernandes's dual conceptualization of material and immaterial territories coincides with Lefebvre's perceived and conceived spaces consecutively. Nevertheless his emphasis on social classes and relationships that generate different territories and spaces reproduced under conditions of continual conflict is important. This vision may integrate a class dimension to the analysis of emergence of spaces and more importantly relations of these emergent spaces to broader political economic structures. I reiterate the need to come up with a unitary perspective to encompass and bring together uneven historical-structural transformation, the new rurality structures, and new rural agencies that are manifested in emerging spaces — both perceived and conceived — brought about these historical structural transformations in a relational manner. The effort to disentangle the complex matrix of threads

between these categories may help to understand the complex forms of rural transformation and peasant mobilizations in the neoliberal era. This dissertation aims at reaching a tangible answer in the following chapters.

2.6 New rurality, spatial transformation and peri-urbanity

As discussed in detail above, the existential definition of peasantry has significantly transformed through changes in the production, global commodity markets and peasants' active efforts to seek their survival. The survival strategies of part-time farming, pluriactivity and migration are widely resorted to by the peasant communities that experience livelihood pressures. The process, while enabling certain peasant communities adjust new and increasingly volatile circumstances, altered the rural spaces and brought about new spatial/territorial configurations. Since the opportunities for diversification vary significantly for households and locations, the territorial restructuring takes place in an uneven manner.

The capabilities of peasant households to diversify both in rural and urban areas, simultaneously being exposed to the one of these spatial transformations can be analyzed in the context of peri-urbanization. Peri-urbanization is important to be discussed in the context of this dissertation because I will analyze the transformation experienced the research cases in Arhavi and Borçka in this very context. The peri-urbanization of these two locations and differences in their peri-urbanization trajectories will be examined in Chapter 4. The following section presents the concept of peri-urbanity as a spatial configuration that emerges as a result of change in the material territories.

2.6.1 What is a peri-urban space?

An immediate look at the word peri-urban would etymologically suggest a peripheral area of a city which also shows some characteristics that have been associated with rural-like farming and agricultural practices. However, multi-disciplinary scholarly discussion implies that it is a concept which resists easy definition (R. M. Brook & Dávila, 2000; McGregor, Simon, & Thompson, 2006; Tacoli, 2006). There are scholars who use the term to define an area physically in terms of its positioning vis-à-vis a city, and there are other scholars who are not satisfied with this definition and put emphasis on the flows, processes or interface of goods and services between the rural and urban areas (Allen, 2003; R. Brook, Purushothaman, & Hunshal, 2003; Narain & Nischal, 2007). A peri-urban region can best be understood as an area of transition along an 'urban-rural gradient' (McGregor et al., 2006). In OECD reports (1979), it is stated as follows:

The term "peri-urban area" cannot be easily defined or delimited through unambiguous criteria. It is a name given to the grey area which is neither entirely urban nor purely rural in the traditional sense; it is at most the partly urbanized rural area. Whatever definition may be given to it, it cannot eliminate some degree of arbitrariness. (p. 10)

The report of D.L. Iaquina and A.W. Drescher (2000) presents a broader definition of peri-urban and the elaboration of a conceptual typology. The report puts forward six defining features of the peri-urban space:

- Rural, peri-urban and urban form a linked system (R-PU-U), which constitutes an uneven multidimensional continuum.
- In terms of migration and urbanization, peri-urban environments play a mediating role between the rural and the urban.
- Peri-urban environments are places of social compression and dynamic social change.
- The potential for food production, and its relationship to food security, must be evaluated across the entire R-PU-U system.
- In order to understand the nature and operation of the system, it is necessary to focus on the underlying dynamic processes rather than the "fixed states."

- Effective policy interventions rest on an interdisciplinary understanding that incorporates physical, biological and sociocultural paradigms. (p. 10)

The report is important in the sense that it attributes a dynamism to the peri-urban areas as the intersection space between the so called rural and urban and recognizes the variance and vibrancy of the social relations. Another important and frequently cited aspect of the peri-urban area is that peri-urban livelihoods may benefit from both in-farm and off-farm sources of income and therefore, possibilities for and existence of pluriactivity are more available (R. M. Brook & Dávila, 2000; Douglas, 2006; Lynch & Poole, 2006; McGregor et al., 2006).

Tangling with the etymology of the word would immediately direct us to a peripheralization of certain spaces vis-à-vis other predefined spaces which, in our case, is the urban. Over the course of years in the framework of developmentalism and modernism, the city is constructed as the ideal form of societal space, and the peripheral spaces surrounding it are given importance in their contribution to the city and the economy. This has resulted in a rural downturn and out-migration from the cities. The peripheralization of the ex-rural spaces through migration and in terms of the flow of goods and wealth puts the rural and rurality into an economically disadvantaged position through which is rendered to a mere place to enable capital accumulation. The commercialization of the commons and the rivers, in the framework of this dissertation, presents an example of how the peripheralization in political economic sense works. However, these paradigms also intrinsically attribute a static position to the non-urban spaces, if not inferior. How about the transformation taking place in these hybrid areas called peri-urban?

Cielo (2010) in her work on the peri-urbanity in Bolivia writes as follows:

The city is, literally and symbolically, at the core of spatialized center-periphery paradigms. That is, the city, in institutionalized practices and in social imaginaries, is constructed as the center to which access is limited. As

in other cities worldwide, Cochabamba's periurban residents are essential parts of the city's economy and urban public. Yet they are generally recognized, even by themselves, as the peripheral and negative outliers against which the urban is defined. (p. 31)

In this quotation, Cielo points at not only the economic positioning of the peri-urban residents to the city but also implies the social imagination and self-identification of the people in the framework of the core position attributed to the city. However, her portrayal does not go beyond attributing a static disadvantaged position to the peri-urban residents as well. Moreover, in spite of the fact that she talks about social imaginaries and spatiality, her analysis remains territorial and annexes the peri-urban to a physical space surrounding the city.

Following the position of Naumann and Fischer-Tahir (2012) may provide a better understanding of the peripheralization:

In order to grasp the structural problems of rural regions and their growing disconnection from the urban agglomerations, urban and regional research describes such areas as peripheral in relation to metropolitan regions and the process of becoming disconnected from and dependent on the centers as peripheralization. In this perspective, a periphery is neither a given nor a static entity to be localized on the natural margins of certain regional, national or transnational units. Instead, we interpret peripheries as the outcome of complex processes of change in the economy, demography, political decision making and socio-cultural norms and values. (p. 4)

Combining the above statement with Lefebvre's construction of three-dimensional space, it is beneficial to raise the level of abstraction one step further in order to be able to grasp what a peri-urban space might be and what its implications are.

Lefebvre suggests, along with the physical and lived space, there is an abstract dimension of the space, which is used to convert it to readable and thus an exchangeable entity. When he talks about the abstract space, he implies primarily that the abstraction benefits the capitalists but the abstraction and re-interpretation spaces can also be used by the residents and ex-residents of a particular locality that this research claims, which might constitute a major frontier for resistance against the

commercialization. Thus, a dual pattern emerges in the analysis of the historical-structural transformation of a locality and how it is interpreted and re-interpreted for the capital accumulation and also for the resistance. In order to be more precise, in terms of the SHP construction and anti-SHP resistance in Arhavi, the peripheralization of the villages of Arhavi which happened due to intense out-migration is putting it into a peri-urban position because the structural aspects of the economic transformation lead to the peri-urbanization of Arhavi, even though it is not physically situated on the immediate periphery of the cities that received the migrant population, because both the physical flow of people, the goods, the income and the abstract imagination of the village and home-town of the migrants attaches Arhavi to the big cities that the populations have migrated. Hence, I argue that this peri-urban character affects the politicization and collective resistance in the hometown, thanks to the constant movement between the city and the rural or peri-urban. Periurbanity emerges through constant combining of rural and urban sources of income, which is facilitated through the dominant crop system, and the former commercialization of farming on the contrary to most of the rest of Turkey which is taking place recently. Moreover, I suggest that the integration levels to the city, the socio-economic position attained in the city, the former politicization in the city have also affect the strength, course and strategies of the struggle, which we can call the 'city effect.'

CHAPTER 3

PRIVATIZED HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

Quite simply, the modern canal, unlike a river, is not an ecosystem. It is simplified, abstracted water, rigidly separated from the earth and firmly directed to raise food, fill pipes, and make money. (Worster, 1992)

In this chapter, I will situate the proliferation of SHPs into the broader scene of neoliberal regime of accumulation, both on the global scale and in the specificity of neoliberal political economy in Turkey. SHPs cut across various domains of inquiry, ranging from mobilization to ecology, from production to consumption, and from energy to construction. This chapter is on the commercialization of natural resources and how the concept applies to the political economy of Turkey. It will provide a summary of the recent wave of commercialization in the context of conjuncture of energy need and rentier capital accumulation, and cronyism in Turkey in the broader picture of anti-SHP mobilizations that include legal struggles, major instances of mobilization, and resistance platforms.

3.1 A brief history of hydroelectric energy and privatized energy production in Turkey

The transformation of state hydraulic missions and development of the hydropower sector in Turkey cannot be understood without incorporating into the discussion the development of the state structure as well as the global trends regarding green energy and decentralization. Since the proclamation of Republic of Turkey in 1923, a top-

down modernization strategy with an aim to develop a centralized state structure has been pursued (Köker, 1995). The centralized structure is regarded as a key to development. The evolution of the state hydraulic mission reflects this strategy. The centralized state structure pursued state-led top-down water management both for purposes of irrigation and energy production. The state was the main actor in planning and financing these developments. The DSİ (the State Hydraulic Administration) was the institutional body responsible for water management throughout the country. From the 1920s to the 1950s, the state aimed at consolidating its central authority in the investigation, exploitation and management of natural resources, particularly of land and water (Kibaroglu, Scheumann, & Kramer, 2011). From the 1950s until the 1980s, large dams were the pivots of energy production, and investment and building and operations were carried out by public sources.

The post-1980s period is marked by a major change in economic and political structures. The global oil crisis in 1973 and the military coup in 1980 prepared the ground for a neoliberal turn in line with the objectives of the Washington Consensus, which “aimed at the replacement of traditional statist system by a market system” (Williamson, 1990, p. 402). A series of reforms resulted in a drastic change in the functioning and the responsibilities of public institutions and relationships with the private sector. Increases in foreign-direct investment and export-led growth brought integration with global markets. These policies have favored national capital; the national bourgeoisie started to gain strength in domestic as well as global markets (Öniş & Şenses, 2009). Hydropower development in Turkey gained momentum with the neoliberalization of the economy. The use of hydropower has been heavily emphasized and promoted within two schemes. Primarily, hydropower is seen as an

alternative source of energy, a strategic tool for reducing Turkey's energy dependency. Turkey has negligible sources of oil and natural gas. Seventy-five percent of the energy demand is met from imported natural gas, petrol and coal. Thus, hydropower has been regarded as a solution to address energy shortages and dependency, and renewable energy is regarded as a way to diminish energy dependency. (Başkaya, Başkaya, & Sari, 2011) Secondly, hydropower development is in line with growing international concern for climate change mitigation in that it encourages investment in renewable energy sources. The Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and the European Union accession process, which required the alignment of Turkish regulations with EU environmental *acquis* were main pillars of international pressures. In line with EU legislation on renewable energy as an alternative to fossil fuels, the Turkish government initiated a reform package to promote renewable energy production, and hydropower constituted the major share in this effort. (Adaman & Arsel, 2008)

The first hydroelectric power plant (SHP) of Turkey was constructed in 1936 between 1936 and 2007, and a total of 228 SHPs were built (Yılmaz, 2009). The distribution of power plants in different periods reflects the economic policies pursued by governments. For example, between 1960 and 1969, during the reign of state-led development strategies, we see an increase in the number of SHPs that are built to back up agricultural production by improving irrigation facilities as well as providing energy for the industries. However, during the 1970-79 period, the rate declined with the crisis of ISI policies. On the other hand, the obvious impact of the 1980 coup d'état in promoting neoliberal principles of commercialization and free market is visible in SHP numbers. In spite of the three-years dicta and the changing political environment, 69 HPPs were built between 1980 and 1989, whereas in the

following period, 1990-1999, the number was 59. The liberalization of the electricity market corresponds to this period. In 1984, the monopoly of state economic enterprises, TEK, to produce, distribute and market electricity was abolished with the Law No. 3096. In 1997, the models of build-operate-transfer and build and operate were introduced, initiated with the intention of increasing private sector involvement in the sector.

These developments are a blueprint of the neoliberal policies, which can be observed in developing countries and in other markets in Turkey. As Harvey (2005) explains:

The absence of clear private property rights—as in many developing countries—is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered as the best way to protect against the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly super-exploit common property resources such as land and water). (p. 64)

While the rolling back of the state from the economy is realized through intensive privatization programs, these developments are also backed up by the doctrines of development as well as the common good, which aim at preventing the resources from the misuse and exploitation by the masses. In our case, these doctrines apply in the privatization of the electricity market and the commercialization of water.

However, the data shows that private sector engagement in hydroelectric energy production in Turkey did not prove to be profitable as the arguments would imply.

With the legislation of Law No. 4283 in 1997, which initiated the system of build-operate-transfer, the state also guaranteed the “flow of water” and in order to promote privatization, it promised to compensate for the losses resulting from insufficient water flow in the rivers. In the report published by Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) in 2009, it is stated that due to

miscalculations in the flow rates, important deficits occurred in these power plants that the state had to compensate for. Moreover, it is stated that information about these power plants is kept secret due to commercial ethics. However, the report cites an audit by the Court of Auditors that states that 29 power stations built in the framework of the build-operate and transfer model (both thermal and hydroelectric) caused \$2.3 billion in the public deficit in four years (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği, 2009).

The solution was obvious: further liberalization of the market. The main rupture came with Law No. 4628, namely the Electricity Market Law enacted in 2001. Through this law, the Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) was established. The law enabled private entrepreneurs to build, own and operate power plants with licenses granted by EMRA (Erensu, 2013). The EMRA functions as an independent regulator and supervisor of the market. The 4628 Electricity Market Law was essential and it has become the basis for water usership rights concession contracts that define and regulate the principles for leasing the rights of water use from rivers (Işlar, 2012).

The Environmental Impact Assessment Law was revised in 2003. This revision lifted the EIA requirements for power plants with an installed capacity of less than 0.5 MW (until another amendment in the law in 2011). The law also authorized the Ministry of Environment as the institution to decide if the EIA is required for facilities with an installed capacity of 0.5 to 25 MW. Basically, this legal amendment delegated the assessment of EIA requirements to an intrinsically political-governmental body. In 2003, Law No. 25150, entitled the Water Usage Rights Bylaw, was enacted. The law enables private entrepreneurs to lease river sections for 49 years for the purposes of hydroelectric production. This law also

defined the lifeline water (*can suyu*): the amount of water that has to be left in the riverbed, as 30% (Erensu, 2013). The Enactment of Renewable Energy Law (Law No. 5346) in 2005 is critical in demonstrating the convergence of privatization of energy market and promotion of renewable energy. The law guaranteed feed-in tariffs for the producers with renewable energy production certificates. Furthermore, the state offered discounts of up to 85% to the renewable energy producers renting forestlands. In 2008, a further amendment of the Electricity Market Law annulled the requirements for production licenses for facilities with installed capacities of 500 KW or less. In 2010, with the amendment to the Renewable Energy Law No.6094, the construction of power plants in protected areas was allowed. Therefore, hydropower governance for hydropower has shifted from traditional state hydraulic mission to a neoliberal mission where state actors are regulators of both public and private interests (Işlar, 2012). These legislations provided a legal basis for small-scale hydroelectric power plants. The debates on the profitability and efficiency of the SHPs are intense. A press statement by the Chamber of Electrical Engineers provides detailed and grounded information.

More than half of the hydroelectric power potential of the existing stations is produced by public SHPs. Of a total of 22, 965 megawatts, 11, 500 is produced by the private sector and 600 megawatts of this amount is produced in stations built by the public sector and then transferred to private. In five years after the enactment of Law in 2003, private sector could only produce 500 megawatts in 25 SHPs, demonstrating lower productivity and capacity. Given the low energy productivity of the river type, SHPs and the public deficits caused by the privatization of the existing stations, the indispensable question emerges: Why insist on such an

extensive effort to commercialize the rivers in spite of the low economic rationale and intensive public opposition?

Undoubtedly, a low economic value for the national budget does not necessarily mean that SHPs are not profitable enterprises for capital owners. Law No. 5346 regulating the use of renewable energy sources for the production of electric energy guarantees the sales and prices of the electricity produced in SHPs. The price is set in the range of 5–5.5 Euros. The number licenses bought by private companies emerged as 56, 89 and 115 in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively. With the introduction of price and sales guarantees in 2005, the number jumped to 223.⁴

Alongside the sales and price guarantees, there are other factors making the river-type small scale HPPs a profitable investment for the capital owners. These factors are stated by Avci (2009). Companies investing in energy-consuming industries find investing in SHPs profitable in that they provide a cheap energy source for their own industries. It is also perceived as a long-term profitable investment given the lack of supply guarantee and increasing demand for energy in Turkey. These conditions also reinforce the expectations for the long-term applicability of price guarantees. Moreover, Avci (2009) states that the statements about the high profitability of the sector are also important in attracting the capital, especially for newly emerging capital owners looking for a rentable sector to invest. Expected flow rates in the projects may create an illusion about the amount of energy produced thus on profitability rates since the calculations of flow rates were not done properly in Turkey. The water regime is also unstable, which may result in high

⁴ It is important to note the applications should be approved by *EMRA*, these numbers are not equal to the number of HPPs projected.

variations in water flows. The results of miscalculations will become evident with in recent years with the initiation of most of the river-type SHPs operations.

One important factor is the possibility of using the water and the river basin for purposes other than energy production. The agreements and arrangements may foresee the introduction of ‘joint facilities’ that enable the company to initiate other business opportunities that will contribute to profitability levels. Moreover, it is also reported that some private energy companies sell their licensed hydropower projects to other companies. İşlar (2012) states :

Although water use agreements forbid the transfer of rights to another user, a company can transfer its rights by simply selling the shares of their subsidiary company to which the license is granted. Hence, introduction of market mechanisms to the management of a crucial resource like water has serious implications for the issues of distribution, legitimacy, transparency and responsibility in Turkish water policies. (p.380)

3.2 SHP in the context of climate change mitigation

The proliferation of SHPs is closely linked to national and global development strategies. Drawing on the goals for climate change mitigation and a recognition of the environmental harms of large-scale hydropower projects, the Turkish government also prepared an incentive package for the financing of SHPs. (Küçükali & Barış, 2009) After Turkey signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2004 and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2009, SHPs emerged as a clean source of energy within the privatized energy production structure.

The process of the greening of energy production and the privatization in Turkey gained impetus with an increased emphasis on sustainability and greening by international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and the European Union (Goldman, 2006). Similarly, the SHPs are eligible for carbon trade

in voluntary markets, for which reason globally well-known environmental organizations such as Green Peace and the World Wildlife Fund do not publicly oppose SHPs (Işlar, 2012). The World Bank also supported SHP development in Turkey by granting loans through the Clean Technology Fund, whose objective is “help increase privately owned and operated energy production from indigenous renewable energy sources within the market-based framework of the Turkish Electricity Market Law, enhance energy efficiency, and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (World Bank, 2011, para. 2). The Private Sector Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Project was signed by the World Bank and Turkey, the majority of whose funds were used to finance hydropower development. The European Investment Bank, the German Bank of Reconstruction (KfW) and the Islamic Development Bank have granted funds as well (The World Bank, 2011). Price and purchase guarantees are granted to private companies by the Turkish state, together with a reduction in construction and operation costs. The government guaranteed the purchase of electricity from private companies with a set- price for wind and hydroelectric power for a duration of 10 years (Uyar, 2011).

Hence, SHPs became a profitable investment for many capital owners, not just energy companies. Işlar states that as a result of attractive business incentives, capital groups from sectors other than energy also started investing in SHPs, together with multinational companies (Işlar, 2012). According to Dauvergne and Neville (2010), public and private spheres of natural resource governance get blurred due to a in alliances between multinational companies and local firms and governments and this makes it more difficult for states and local communities to derive public benefits. (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010)

3.3 The proliferation of SHPs and local responses

The Minister of Environment and Forestry of the epoch, Veysel Eroğlu, stated that “We [the state] are not selling rivers, we are allowing them to be used” (Radikal Gazetesi 2010a, 5 September) because of a possible reluctance to classify the transformation as a mere privatization. Water is a flow resource. It is mobile, difficult to capture and can be reused. As Işlar (2012) underlines “Water is also variable in time, space and quality, meaning that its privatization is only possible in combination with a variety of methods, and in various degrees of privatization” (p. 377). The above-stated sets of legal and institutional adjustments define the water privatization in Turkey in a rural context. Water usage rights agreements transfer usership rights for a 49-year period (with the possibility of extension every 20 years) to the companies, so new property regimes prioritize the private use of the rivers for energy production purposes. Moreover, in case of any possible land dispute between the company and any private landowner, there is an additional legal regulation to allow urgent expropriations in order to make SHP constructions possible. The state incentives and a global call for renewable energy production made SHPs a profitable investment for private companies. Figure 4 shows the increasing share of the private sector in the energy market in Turkey. The dramatic increase in the private sector involvement takes place both due to the transfer of usership rights for energy production and the also the privatization of state enterprises.




Figure 4. Share of private and public sectors in electricity production (EPDK, 2015)

I filed an official request for information to the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works in April 2016 asking for the exact number of SHP licenses. The file I have received stated that, as of April 2016, there were 992 SHPs, 450 of which were in operation and 92 under construction. One hundred sixty-one projects had acquired an energy production license and 94 had signed the water-usership right agreement, with another 195 in the planning process. The spread of SHPs can be visualized in Figure 5 as follows:



Figure 5. Country distribution of licensed SHPs

<http://geodata.ormansu.gov.tr/>

The incentives granted to the private sector by the government and the favorable financial benefits for renewable energy created a profitable business environment in Turkey's hydropower market. However, given the political dynamics of the state-business relations in the AKP era, hydropower investments rose hand in hand with cronyism in business relations. The government's efforts to support capital accumulation for certain business groups define the extensive and unmonitored commercialization of the rivers, in spite of the low economic value and significant environmental destruction.

3.4 SHPs, capital accumulation and cronyism in contemporary Turkey

One of the private companies which is active in the SHP sector is SANKO Holding, a conglomerate active in textiles, finance, food, construction, and education, together

with the earthmover industry. It is known for its political affinity to the Justice and Development Party. SANKO Energy is an important component of the conglomerate. It also produces energy for these large and various industries where the company is active. Thus, engagement in the energy sector makes a company a self-supplying one, at least in terms of energy costs that are not to be overlooked. Moreover, the company owns a joint venture with Nestle Pure Life, a bottled water brand. Company owns six SHPs, with a relatively large production capacity compared to the others (SANKO, n.d.). On the company website, two important points are visible. The first one is an emphasis on the state guarantee in commercial relations. The company offers cheap and environment friendly electric energy for ‘free consumers’ with electricity costs of more than 3000 TL. This standard is set by *EMRA*, so small enterprises are able to benefit from cheaper electricity. A state guarantee is instrumentalized in order to increase the credibility of the company. The second one is the extensive emphasis on the use of environment-friendly renewable energy sources, which is a doctrine frequently resorted to in legitimizing the extensive construction of river-type SHPs. A company that owns a renewable energy production certificate specifies the carbon-savings for each and every power plant they own. For instance, for Cevizlik HES in the Ikizdere Valley of Rize is owned by Sanko Holding. It has an 8 kilometer delivery tunnel and 86 MW installed capacity, and it claims it provides 187,000 metric tons of carbon savings per year, which is equivalent to the contribution of 660,000 trees. Yet on the other hand, the water is taken into tunnels with a diameter of 4 meters along 8 kilometers of the riverbed. The local resistance in İkizdere was intense. In the opening ceremony of the facility in 2010, the prime minister of the era, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was present. He stated, “I am the son of this land. Some people and groups, so-called

environmentalists, oppose SHPs. They oppose any kind of investment in energy. . . . They say that we are selling the rivers. It is a complete lie. There is not a single river that has been sold.”⁵ On the same day, the CEO of SANKO Holding Abdülkadir Konukoğlu stated, “This facility does not belong to us, it belongs to the people of Rize. We do not transfer money to the bank, but to the other world.”⁶ These statements are important because they show the alliance of the government with capital groups and how the environmental claims of the opponents are discredited, especially by the instrumentalization of religious rhetoric.

Another large company active in the energy sector in general and in SHPs in particular is Çalık Holding, which is known for its affinity to the ruling party. Çalık bought the *ATV* channel and the *Sabah* newspaper, two tenants of mainstream media, with the credits borrowed from public banks. The crony relationship between the government and the Holding became controversial with this incident. Moreover, Çalık has become very active in the energy sector since the 1990s onwards; the company owns energy-production facilities in Central Asia, the Middle East and in Africa (Çalık Enerji, n.d.). The former CEO of the holding, Berat Albayrak, is the son-in-law of the current President Erdoğan; Albayrak currently serves as the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in the AKP government.

One significant and interesting project by the Çalık Group is Adacami HES, which is situated in Güneysu, Rize. As explained by Mahmut Hamsici in his book named “Dereler ve İsyanlar”, Çalık plans to carry the water from the neighboring Salarha valley, on which another power station will be built. The water carried will

⁵“Ben bu toprağın çocuğuyum, bazı çevreci adı altında tipler gruplar çıkıyor, bu sıfatla HES'lere karşı çıkıyorlar. Her türlü enerji yatırımına karşı çıkıyor bunlar! . . . Çıkılmış dereleri satıyor diyorlar tamamen dört dörtlük bir yalan, satılan bir tek akarsu yok”

⁶“Bu tesis aslında bize ait değil, Rize milletindedir”
“Kefenin cebi yok, bu tesisin de altında tekerlekleri yok; onu alıp götürmeyiz onu sizlere emanet ediyoruz.”
“Biz bankaya değil öbür dünyaya EFT yapıyoruz”

be combined with the water of Ballıdere, a river in the village. The project takes all the water into pipes for 12 kilometers, along with subsequent two HPPs, and yet another facility nearby, which is owned by the local representative of the Justice and Development Party. Ironically enough, the family home of the Prime Minister is located close to this area.

In the Senoz Valley of Rize, a similar type of cronyism is observable. Fourteen HPPs have been projected and the proceedings have begun in the region. Hamsici (2011) presents the survey of the companies involved in the project. The first one is Eksim Holding, which is a family company owned by Abdullah Tivnikli, who is known for his close relations with President Erdoğan and former President Abdullah Gül. He is also the vice-CEO of the Kuveyt Türk Bank. His company owns four HPP projects. The last one is Atabey Enerji, which belongs to the Koçoğlu Group. This group is a member of World Water Council, which is active in commercialization attempts of water worldwide. The CEO of the group, Şükrü Koçoğlu, was accused of and sued of corruption in BOTAŞ's (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) auctions. The examples can be multiplied but I believe that these are sufficient to show the patron-client relations taking place in the sector. Not only large capital groups but also local small capital owners are keen on entering the sector. I would argue that these examples also signal the arguments of restoration of class power of David Harvey (2005). Certain capital groups are empowered through accumulation by dispossession that the rural communities are experiencing. These communities not only lose the lands around these areas, but also they lose their right to access water, which has been a collective good for centuries long. How come the extensive dispossession can be realized, given the evident patron-client relations at work? The next section will be on the local responses and anti-SHP struggles.

3.5 Locals in opposition

Market incentives for green energy, state support and cronyism resulted in the proliferation of SHPs throughout Turkey. However, this proliferation was largely unmonitored and devoid of proper environmental impact assessments. As explained in the legal amendments section of this chapter, the main portion of the projects with installed capacity of less than 0.5 KW are exempt from EIA and for those with less capacity than 25KW, the EIA requirement was left to the decision of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Evaluated within the above-explained framework of patron-client relations, it would not be wrong to argue that the projects may suffer from serious conservation problems, both environmentally and socially. The local and nationwide opposition to SHPs is demonstrative of these problems.

Simultaneously with legal steps to commercialize water for energy production and granting of water-usership rights to private companies, the grassroots mobilizations in different localities began to emerge. The opposition not only emerged in the villages where the SHPs were built, but people also formed nationwide organizations against the commercialization of water.

The local mobilizations are especially important in the recent political history of Turkey. Rural segments of the society are infamously regarded as the ‘docile’ population, with an over-all inclination for center-right politics. The relationship of the center-right with the rural population is founded on political compromise and reason based on reciprocal calculations. Democrat Party rulers saw the potential in the rurality, which accounted for 75% of the total population and which was dissatisfied with the Kemalist, modernizing secularist and corporatist elite and their regulatory economic agenda and secured their rule for around 10 years through rural

populism and practices of agrarian capitalism. The non-existence of a landed aristocracy with strong political power and policies impeding emergence of this in the Turkish context brought about a rural landscape which is composed of small and medium-sized family farms largely dependent on government policies and subsidies in order to sustain their livelihood. Thus, the Turkish rurality was highly dependent on political authority, making them a target for clientalism and populism, and in return, peasants formed a good voter base for the center-right parties, which dominated the political spectrum from the 1950s onwards. Peasants are regarded as a traditional, loyal constituency for center-right parties. As a result of this reciprocal relationship between the political authority and the peasants, the Turkish rural scene has not witnessed substantial strong peasant mobilizations in recent history. However, the proliferation of SHPs around Turkey brought about an unprecedented wave of grassroots mobilizations.

The first struggle began in the Firtına Valley of Rize in 1998. With political support from the government and using the credit granted by the World Bank, BM Holding started the construction of SHPs in the Firtına Valley. The locals opposed the constructions and carried out a long-standing struggle, which included a series of legal cases against the company, accompanied by sit-down strikes and protests. From 2009 onwards, the SHPs dramatically increased in number, and so did the mobilizations. The valleys hosted mobilizations by local groups. Struggles in the Loç Valley of Kastamonu, the İkizdere Valley of Rize and the Solaklı Valley of Trabzon, in Fındıklı, Şavşat, Tortum, Munzur, Yuvarlakçay, Amasya, Tokat and Tonya became emblematic of anti-commodification mobilizations.

Alongside the local struggles, the post-2010 period also witnessed attempts to form a nationwide unified struggle to combat the commodification of nature and for

the purpose of environmental protection. During this period, resistance platforms were established. We can cite the Platform of the Fraternity of Rivers (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu), Black Sea in Revolt (Karadeniz İsyandadır) and No to Commercialization of Water (Suyun Ticarileştirilmesine Hayır Platformu) as among the most active organizations combatting the commercialization of water in general and SHPs in particular. Platform for Fraternity of Rivers was founded in 2008 as an umbrella organization uniting left-wing organizations and associations, including the workers unions of DİSK, KESK and Çiftçi-Sen, the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, and local environmental and cultural protection organizations. The platform united the local anti-SHP mobilizations with nationwide chambers and unions. As evident in the name, the main objective of the organization was to fight a series of legal amendments that commercialize water resources and open them to market dynamics. The platform dissolved as a result of a disagreement between the participant organizations.

The period between 2008 and 2012 witnessed a significant upsurge among the public against the commercialization attempts. Local grassroots mobilizations, especially those originating from the Black Sea region, coalesced under the name of Platform of the Fraternity of the Rivers (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu-, *DEKAP*) in order to form a unified body to combat SHPs and to cooperate with other environmentalist organizations. *DEKAP* is known to be a collection of local struggles by the villagers and the premise is to provide a body that is above politics to protect the living space and ecology. Another well-known organization, Black Sea in Revolt (Karadeniz İsyandadır) is a city-based organization, predominantly of second-generation Black Sea migrants who were raised in the metropolises of Turkey. They collaborate with

grassroots mobilizations in the localities and link them to ecologist groups in the cities to establish links of solidarity.

As stated above, ecologist mobilizations drew attention between 2008 and 2012. Undoubtedly, the most remarkable event of the time was the Great March of Anatolia that took place in April 2011. Almost all the environmentalist, anti-commodification, grassroots mobilizations united for this event, which is also known as We will not give Anatolia (Anadolu'yu Vermeyeceğiz). Local struggles united with the national resistance platforms against the Law on the Protection of Environment and Biodiversity. Locals started marching towards Ankara, the capital, from 11 different regions of Anatolia. They walked for more than a month to raise awareness about the extensive and unmonitored commodification of the commons. When the protestors reached the outskirts of Ankara, the police blocked the roads and did not let them into the city. Groups had to camp for seventeen days in Gölbaşı. Police also obstructed their access to clean drinking water and portable toilets. Figure 6 presents a map of the march, while Figure 7 is a scene of police intervention.



Figure 6. Map of the Great Anatolian March

<http://haber.sol.org.tr/kent-gundemleri/anadolu-yu-vermeyoz-gari-haberi-42739>



Figure 7. Police intervention in the march

<http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/buyuk-anadolu-yuruyusu-bitti,aZVMD2T4n0i-i51wPQp5Tw>

Public opposition against SHPs were and still are intense and sometimes the conflict between company representatives and the local people gets harsh. On 31

October 2010, a suicide bomber exploded himself in Taksim Square. The aim was to hit the police station, but the timing was wrong. Miles away, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was in the New Ilisu Village in Mardin giving a public speech. The village was built by Directorate of Social Housing (TOKİ), after the “old” one was submerged under the waters of the Ilisu Dam. He began to blame the environmental activists who were against the building of hydroelectric power plants. He stated, “What is behind these games? That is to prevent development. That is to prevent dams like Ilisu. That is to prevent developed modern Turkey.”⁷

President Erdoğan’s speech, along with the many others that followed, helps us to identify discursive and oppressive strategies. That Sunday morning after the bomb exploded in Taksim, the Prime Minister was accusing the environmental activists and villagers who were opposing SHPs and thus the development program of the ruling party. The rhetoric of development is a tool most frequently instrumentalized to justify commercialization practices. Putting the aim of development as an independent and unquestionable factor in the midst of the purely material commercialization process without identifying what it means and what it implies inevitably results in the accusation of those who oppose the process. The people who are primarily affected by the commercialization of the river basins are labeled as status quo lovers, opposing the sacred aim of ‘development.’ What is important for our case is the use of this popular rhetoric of development combined with criminalization, in the context of suicide bombers. The Prime Minister overtly equates those who oppose HPPs with suicide bombers, which is a meaningful situation. Wacquant (2009) argues that a neoliberal state uses prison and criminality

⁷ “Bu oyunların temelinde ne yatıyor. İşte bu tür kalkınmaların engellenmesi yatıyor. Ilisu gibi barajların engellenmesi yatıyor. Kalkınmış modern Türkiye’nin engellenmesi yatıyor.” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements in relation to bombings in Taksim. The speech was given in Mardin, during the opening ceremony of New Ilisu village on 31 October 2010.

as a core political institution for building an overgrown and intrusive penal state. He elaborates on how criminality and penalization reign in social and political arenas in response to the rolling back of welfare policies. In our case, we see that the government employs a similar discursive strategy, but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, the criminalization of opponents is also visible in day-to-day encounters with the army forces in the villages. In the Loç valley, the villagers opposing the SHP complain that the gendarmerie forces are mobilized in favor of the company representatives. The awkward relationship between gendarmerie, the security forces of the companies and the villagers is explained in detail by Hamsici (2011). There are incidents of the use of brute force by the company's security forces against the villagers, where gendarmerie forces did not interfere and even cases when gendarmes and the police violated the protesters. Hence, there is very limited opportunity for locals to convey their demands and objections in the public sphere about the SHPs built in their villages. The most effective way to fight with the company is through the legal sphere.

3.6 Legal struggle

As public incentives for the proliferation of SHPs and cronyism, licensed SHPs mushroomed, but with a significant neglect for the environmental and societal consequences. Environmental impact assessment requirements appear as the main means to monitor the environmental consequences of alleged projects as well as the main realm, where legal irregularity transpires. Thence, an indispensable and most effective way to cope with the SHP by focusing on the accuracy and appropriateness of environmental impact assessment.

An environmental impact assessment (EIA) report is a requirement for a project to be implemented. Authorized independent institutions prepare the reports. The Ministry of Environment and Urban Affairs holds the authority to approve EIA reports prepared for individual projects, together with the right to grant EIA exemption for some projects. Furthermore, with an amendment of the Environmental Impact Assessment Bylaw in 2003, the Ministry transferred the authority to grant EIA exemption to the governors of provinces. Hence, the impartiality of the EIA processes was seriously compromised. As of 2012, the Directorate of Environmental Impact Assessment approved 1,850 out of 1,880 applications and only one project in the energy sector was rejected (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği, 2011). In the constitutional amendment approved by the referendum that took place in 2010, the authority of the courts to exercise a jurisdiction on the grounds of public interest was eliminated. The doctrine of public interest and the court's authority to decide whether a practice foresees common good or is used to provide a legal basis in the law suits to cancel SHP licenses. Now courts can only decide if the procedure of licenses has been realized properly, and the practice is legal in the context of existing laws. The legal battle takes place predominantly on the grounds of conflicts on EIA exemption and improper EIA preparation and implementation. Courts often rule that alleged projects should be suspended as a result of improper implementation of the EIA bylaw but a company's water usership rights or energy production license are seldom annulled. That is to say, the company can renew the EIA reports and go on with the construction. Needless to say, the court process is long and expensive.

Moreover, the process is facilitated by the legislation of new laws. The draft law on the Protection of Environment and Biodiversity is important to be noted in

this context. The law foresees the transfer of the right to declare a region with a protected area status from authorized municipal councils to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, a branch of execution by the single-party government. A centralization attempt is obvious; furthermore, the context of the drafting of the law is also significant.

The law was enacted after the İkizdere Valley was declared as a protected area. Constructions of 26 SHPs were projected in the valley; all the projects were cancelled due to the council's decision. Then the government initiated attempted to draft the Law on the Protection of Environment and Biodiversity. The law also foresees the cancelling of all the existing protected areas and re-evaluation of their status by a new council composed of ministry's officials, officials from General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, representatives from academia and NGOs. The right of auditing these sites is granted to private companies for more than five years of duration in the drafted law, which is a significant indicator of the commercialization of the natural resources. The Prime Minister's hostile declarations towards the councils declaring the İkizdere Valley a protected site and consequent legislation attempts are meaningful, carrying us to oppressive and discursive strategies underpinning the commercialization of the rivers.

Hence, the locals are stuck between the energy companies backed up by state policies and the increasingly centralized governmental authority that trespasses the separation of powers. Having set the general political-economic scene in contemporary Turkey, let us now turn to the research cases for a detailed analysis of anti-SHP struggles.

CHAPTER 4

SHP IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: ARHAVI AND BORÇKA

4.1 Peri-urbanity and the City Effect in Popular Mobilization: The Case of Arhavi

This section will analyze the anti-SHP resistance in Arhavi by putting into the broader context of peri-urbanity and the city the effect on the popular mobilization. Although the research uses grounded theory approach explained in a comparative manner, the results are associated with an accurate conceptual and theoretical framework in order to be able to link specific structural properties with diverging patterns of mobilization and discourse building.

The research revealed that specific characteristics of Arhavi as a town and a physical space and the economic and societal transformation it has gone through appears as major factors defining the evolution, growth and representations of the struggle. I would argue that the major determinant of mobilization in Arhavi is its peri-urban character, which has emerged due to prior rural urban migration and the dominant crop system in the area marked by intensive hazelnut and tea farming which enables the migrant population to supplement their household income with rural sources and therefore maintain a constant connection with the rurality they belong to. Before going into an analysis of peri-urbanity and the struggle in Arhavi, the next section elaborates on the formation and defining features of peri-urbanity and why it provides us with adequate explanatory power.

4.2 Emergence of Arhavi as the peri-urban space

Arhavi is a coastal town in the Eastern Black Sea region that borders Fındıklı, Rize and Hopa, Artvin. Like most of the coastal cities of the Eastern Black Sea region, the town is situated between two valleys originating from the high and steep mountains of Eastern Anatolia. The climate is typical of the Eastern Black Sea region, which is characterized by abundance of rainfall and mild temperatures, making the region suitable for the production of tea and hazelnuts. According to the statistic published in the official web site of the town, in 2014 the city center has a population of 15,901 and the rural areas has that of 4,405, whereas city center increased to 16,504 and the rural area population decreased to 4,061 in 2015 (Arhavi Belediyesi, n.d.). However, it should be noted that there are significant seasonal differences in the population of the villages during the summer and winter, a defining feature of the Eastern Black Sea villages as a result of migration from the region.

As noted earlier, the dominant crops produced in the region are tea and hazelnuts. Although hazelnuts are produced intensively, we can still argue that the main crop in the area is tea. Tea fields cover the region, especially the rural areas to the extent that it can be regarded as mono-crop farming. Figure 8 presents a view of the villages to be affected by SHP construction.



Figure 8. Arhavi Kavak Village

Arhavi – Arhavizyon. (n.d.). Kemerköprü Köyü. Retrieved July 9, 2016, from <http://arhavizyon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/gungoren1.jpg>

In this photo, the light green fields in the background that spread throughout the plain and scatter into the forest are tea fields. In the foreground, we can see tea bushes clearly. Figures 9 and 10 show how tea fields spread into the steep, forested areas in the region.



Figure 9. Arhavi Kemerköprü Village

Arhavi – Arhavizyon. (n.d.). Kemerköprü Köyü. Retrieved July 9, 2016, from <http://arhavizyon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/gungoren1.jpg>



Figure 10. Arhavi Kemerköprü Village

Arhavi – Arhavizyon. (n.d.). Kemerköprü Köyü. Retrieved July 9, 2016, from <http://arhavizyon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/gungoren1.jpg>

These two photos demonstrate how the tea fields spread into even the steepest areas on the hills of the village. Moreover, the agricultural production statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institute of the year 2012 show that the area of tea fields is around 26,500 acres and hazelnut fields of around 12,500 acres whereas that of corn, the traditional crop produced in the region, is only around 3,200 acres (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, n.d.).

Thus, it becomes fair to argue that tea is the major agricultural crop in Arhavi while hazelnuts are secondary. Both of these crops are industrial crops, which are also among the major export items of Turkey.

Hann's (1990) account presented below is also tells about the land ownership structure that is dominant in the coastal Eastern Black Sea region. He states:

More than 164,000 growers owned holdings of less than 0.5 hectares, whilst fewer than 100 individuals declared a tea small holding in excess of two hectares. These were the official statistics, based on factory records of garden ownership. Not surprisingly they turned out to be a very poor guide to practical farming operations. The position was further complicated by the fact that many areas of the region have never been subjected to any cadastral survey. Local inheritance rules require that gardens be divided equally between sons (whatever the national legal code may say, in practice daughters inherit land only in quite exceptional circumstances). Many of these fragmented holdings belonged to migrants who might or might not return at peak periods to assist their families in harvesting. If their absence was permanent, the holding might be worked by relatives, by hired laborers, or by sharecroppers. It was also considered desirable from the point of view of reducing tax liabilities to have one's gardens distributed among the various members of the household and even more distant kin; but although these persons might thus acquire some formal title to land, they did not necessarily have any say in how it was worked, might receive no income from it, and might not be able to press even a residual claim on the garden in the future. (p.64)

The predominance of cash crops in the villages of Arhavi points to a transition from subsistence production to commercialized production. At this point, it would be helpful to look at the yearly tea production statistics of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Turkey, as presented in Figure 11.




Figure 11. Increase in tea cultivation areas

Faostat, 2015

Even though this chart is based on changes in the aggregate area of tea cultivation in Turkey on a yearly basis, it can be argued that the trend is more or less similar to that of Arhavi, given the fact that tea can only be produced in the warm and rainy climate of the Eastern Black Sea region. In the above chart, we see that the area cultivated has sharply increased and reached a peak between 1985 and 1990, and just after 1990 it stabilized at around 70,000 hectares. Looking at this graph and taking the photos of rural Arhavi into account, we can argue that the tea production has reached a natural limit, area-wise. This means that by 1990, the dominance of tea production had established itself in the region. What is striking is the stark positive correlation between the population figures and the migration trends in the region. Figure 12 demonstrates the rural-urban levels of population change in Arhavi.




Figure 12. Rural-urban population change in Arhavi

TurkStat, 2015

This chart was prepared according to the data collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute and is based on the actual population living in the villages and the city center of Arhavi. Here we see a gradual de-peasantization in the town in spite of the increase in the area cultivated for tea production. Rural-urban levels become equal between 1985 and 1990, which is exactly the period when the tea fields reached their maximum. Hence, it is fair to argue that the proliferation of tea production has affected the de-peasantization in Arhavi. Since then, the rural population decreased gradually until 2008. The slight rise after 2008 can account for the effect of the economic crisis and voluntary re-peasantization.

Even though this graph is based on urban population levels of Arhavi only, it is also known that the Black Sea region is one of the major places in Turkey from which internal migration stems. Therefore, this trend should also be considered, keeping in mind the immense migration to other cities and also to Germany. The

data presented in Table 2 is important in the sense that it provides an insight about the extent of the migration. According to data collected by the 2007 census, around 30,000 people who are registered in province of Artvin reside in Ankara that of 57,000 reside in Bursa, 76,000 reside in Istanbul and 9,000 reside in Izmir.

Table 2. Provinces that receive migration from Artvin

Province registered	Province Dwelled	Province Dwelled	Province Dwelled	Province Dwelled
	Ankara	Bursa	İstanbul	İzmir
Artvin	29,672	56,536	76,067	9,900

TurkStat, 2015

Hence, summing up the data up to this point gives us a locality where agriculture has transformed extensively to commercial cash crop production, where intense de-peasantization took place, whereas the area cultivated for the cash crop has increased significantly and has witnessed massive rural-urban migration. However, there is a specificity which simultaneously explains the rise of cultivation and de-peasantization: tea cultivation. Neither tea nor hazelnut production is labor intensive. They are perennial plants. A tea bush has an average life of 100 years. Since the rain regime in the region is high, they do not need irrigation. Therefore, the crop does not need yearlong care; just the harvest during the summer is sufficient. The cultivation does not necessitate long-term, intensive labor. The land owner's presence in the region for 4-5 months is more than enough to harvest and sell the crop, so hazelnut and tea production is suitable for pluriactivity, which means that

the landowners can continue living in the cities and supplement their income with income from the agriculture. On the other hand, tea and hazelnut farming is more profitable than most of the other crops cultivated in Turkey. It yields a significant amount of income, which may be used to supplement household income, regardless of the place of residence. Therefore, it may be argued that the migrants to the cities kept on harvesting tea and hazelnuts produced in their land, which made keeping one foot in the village possible, which would eventually turn rural Arhavi into a peri-urban space. The societal implications of peri-urbanization become more lucid on the analysis of anti-SHP resistance, the main axis of this research, to be presented in the following section.

4.2.1 The Arhavi-Kavak SHP

The construction of the Kavak SHP in Arhavi started in 2012 (Demet Uyanık, n.d.) by MNG holding, who is one of the major capital groups of Turkey and whose owner is a pro-government businessman from Arhavi named Mehmet Nazif Günal. The construction has encountered the resistance from the locals of basically two villages to be affected by the SHP — Kavak, Kemerköprü and Konaklı villages — but this resistance was be easily co-opted by the representatives of the company until it was revived during the spring of 2014, primarily by the people from the above-mentioned villages who had migrated to Istanbul or Ankara and regularly spend their holidays in the village (Ekosistem, n.d.). The resistance was supported by other platforms active in the region as well as the business associations, migrant associations, political parties and groups etc. The legal struggle was united with the local struggle and high media coverage and finally in August of 2014, the administrative court of Rize

suspended the execution of the project due to the ill-prepared environmental impact assessment report. Obviously, like most court decisions, this decision did not mark a definitive end to the project, but it was a legal recognition that the struggle was a just motivation for further organization and resistance.

There are two important aspects of the Kavak SHP that contribute to the comparative value of the analysis. The first includes the two above-mentioned phases of the resistance. The accounts of fading away and being co-opted in comparison with the revival, organization and dissemination enables a case-specific analysis of the factors contributing to a strong struggle.

The second is the location of projected SHP. The project would affect three villages, one of which is in close proximity to the town center. Proximity to the town center is an important factor affecting agency in the struggle and the discourse of the struggle. In order to be more precise and systematic, the villages with close proximity to the urban areas or the ones where the dwellers are mostly benefiting from urban sources of income can be referred to as peri-urban areas. Categorizing Arhavi and Fındıklı as peri-urban areas will be useful for systematically analyzing the struggle in a comparative manner.

The Kavak SHP is referred to in the media as the Crazy SHP (Çılgın HES) and among the protestors. The reason is the closeness of the project to the Arhavi city center. A power plant is planned to be situated in the Arhavi town center as shown in Figure 13, but the water would be collected from the Kapistre and Çifteköprü Rivers with the tunnels and a canal to collect and carry it from the mountains and villages, which are around five kilometers away. MNG holding was also granted a construction permit for the power plant in Arhavi town center by the municipality of Artvin, even though there is a lawsuit against the project advocating

for the suspension of execution due to the infraction of rules and regulations in the process of preparation of environmental impact assessment.



Figure 13. Location of the Kavak SHP

http://www.radikal.com.tr/cevre/cilgin_hesin_cilgin_tuneline_de_izin_yok-1266615/

The struggle in Arhavi started in May 2012 with the launch of the primary phases of the project. During this initial phase, resistance was evoked in the villages imminently affected from the construction: the Kemerköprü, Kavak and Konaklı villages. During this phase, the construction plans foresaw the pulling down of 4-5 houses in Kavak Village, and 2-3 houses in Kemerköprü village, along with the expropriation of some land of the locals. The events of summer 2012 are remembered as the total struggle of everybody living in two villages, including the village governors, *muhtars*. A resistance tent was set up by the riverside and the struggle continued for about 3-4 months (Numanoğlu, 2012) but eventually faded away. One reason put forward by one respondent is the destruction of the resistance tent by the flood coming from the river. Another reason put forward for the

weakening of the resistance is the media and the general public's lack of interest in ecological problems. However, it is fair to assume that the primary phase of the resistance was less wide-spread and more local, so it was co-opted easier because most of the protagonists of the later phase said that they were not living in Arhavi back then. This leads us to the importance of migration and circular migration in the perceptions and capabilities of the agents in contentious movements, which constitutes one of the main pillars of anti-SHP resistance in Turkey, to be explained in coming sections.

Moreover, a web search of the news on the events and struggle of 2012 also reveals public support and the local nature of the conflict. A simple Google search with the keywords of the Arhavi SHP protests yielded many more results for the struggle of 2014 than for 2012, and the sources for 2014 include mainstream media, national media, TV channels and other media sources from the wider political spectrum, whereas the events of 2012 were covered mostly by local sources and less known websites. Hence, it might be fair to argue that there are differences in the strategies of organization and the agency in two phases of the resistance in Arhavi (Muhalefet, 2014).

Following the weakening of the resistance, the company has started to negotiate with some protestors, families and local governors in order to co-opt the struggle, in a clandestine manner. One major step in this move is subcontracting the construction to a company from the Kemerköprü village and supporting this person to be elected as the local governor, the *muhtar*. Thus, one natural ally with local influence is granted, even though he was against the project in the beginning. This economic-pragmatist move was enhanced by a strategy in the municipal elections of March 2014, where the subcontracting firm's cleavage registered some people out of

village as inhabitants, and these became voters in the village. The owner of a subcontracting firm, Mehmet Ermiş, was elected as the *muhtar* with six votes difference, constituting a natural ally for MNG with local manipulative power and economic clientelism. This phenomenon is also important in demonstrating how the elections and majoritarianism is instrumentalized in manufacturing consent and popular manipulation in micropolitics as a miniature of the macropolitics in Turkey. Another strategy of the company, one of the basic strategies of co-opting in many of the other cases as well, was to offer employment to some of the protagonists of the struggle. Obviously, Arhavi was not an exception. Some key people who were resisting the construction of the SHP in the initial phase were offered jobs in various positions in MNG Holding. A quotation from an interview explains how people are taken to the side of the company and how those who were still in the struggle perceived it:

For example there is a Facebook group for the people from Kemerköprü. Since 2012, a guy has made a lot of fuss stating that our village is being destroyed, sold out etc. Now, the same guy works in the accounting department of MNG and he is posting on Facebook accusing the protestors of being foreign agents. (Appendix B, 1)

The above-mentioned person was offered employment in the Istanbul office of MNG and as expected, he changed position and took a stance against the protestors.

Intense use of social media as seen in the case of Arhavi and many other peri-urban areas adds a cyber dimension to the struggle and facilitates the discussion and contention among the people. Thus, the polarization and mechanisms of creating an other, the enemy, becomes easier. During the interviews, names of people and families who allied with the company and “betrayed” the village, the nature and rivers are told one after another. One other person from Kavak Village named in this regard was among the protagonists of the struggle in the initial phase. He was also

offered a job in one of the construction sites of MNG in Trabzon. Meanwhile, two other families sold their land to the company secretly, so the trust and feeling of unity was destroyed, especially in the Kavak and Kemerköprü Villages.

Division by economic means and opportunities offered by the company are some of the most instrumentalized methods to co-opt the anti-SHP struggles. As stated above, the Kavak SHP was not the only SHP project in Arhavi; there were three other projects in the Kamilet Valley, one of which is also owned by MNG and which was protested during the course of the first phase of the resistance. One of the villagers who started to work as a security guard on the construction site of MNG that was interviewed in the summer 2013 was very openly defending his position by stating:

A lot of struggle happened in here, it became a mess. Then the company came and promised to build a facility, a mosque. They might even built a school. And we discussed and told the company (representatives) that we want our youngsters to work in the construction with formal insurance and minimum wage. Why should an outsider come and work here. It would provide jobs for our own youngsters. They accepted. I cannot get retired because my insurance has not been paid properly. I also worked in Istanbul. Now, they are paying it. There is not much time left. I will be retired once I earn the retirement right. Is it bad? And now I look around and think that this SHP is not really damaging the environment. (Appendix B, 2)

This account is meaningful in presenting how the everyday needs of the people actually living in the locality and given their socio-economic status may make them vulnerable to the offers of the company. Given the high levels of volatility and insecurity in the labor market in Turkey, the above situation is not surprising.

Considering unemployment rates, especially youth unemployment and the promise of a formal contract with a minimum wage and social security benefits, the villagers' willingness to reach a settlement with the company was highly likely and more than understandable. There are limited employment opportunities in the area, especially for the young people, who are left out of formal employment in public institutions.

For those, the most likely job opportunity is seasonal employment in tea factories, but such jobs do not last more than 6 months. The following quotation is telling:

- Do the villagers need the benefits provided by the company?

- Yes, unfortunately they do. Especially the younger people do. There are some people at the age of 35 who have never registered with social security. Also, in here most people work in the tea factories seasonally, between May and September. Between September and May, they just wander around. They have health insurance just for six months. Thus, they are easily attracted to the offers [of the company]. Those who stay firm are financially better off. (Appendix B, 3)

In fact, it is the rule of the game that the companies are playing. Profit maximization and the structural conditions of the labor in Turkey permits it, or even enhances it.

The interviewee's statement that the SHP "is not destroying the environment as they said" constitutes a point of self-legitimization for his stance against the others who are opposing it.

However, the weakening of the initial phase paves the way for the emergence of a stronger resistance in the second phase, by easing the mechanisms of enemy creation, identifying the 'other' as 'the betrayer', allowing a more organized resistance in a better-defined context. On the other hand, the kinship or townsmanship impact and the city effect become increasingly visible in the second phase of the resistance, which can be marked by a strong legal case, wide-spread participation in demonstrations, effective social media use for propaganda and organization, high levels of media coverage, both at local and national levels and impact of powerful townsmanship organizations.

The story goes on as follows: Villagers from Kemerköprü gradually retreated from the resistance with the influence of the village governor. Then one of the protagonists of the struggle from the Kavak village was also employed in one of the construction sites of MNG in Trabzon. Another family sold a strategically situated private land to the company so that the company could start construction on a private

property belonging to them. The quotation below shows how the anti-SHP unity in village dissolved by the sale of land. It also indicates the family structure in the village, which emerged as a result of rural-urban migration:

They sell their land. Firstly they hide it (from others) and then the villagers realize it because they go and chop the wood etc. Two brothers go to Istanbul and persuade their relatives (to sell the land) but tell the villagers that the relatives in Istanbul wanted to sell it and they had to comply with it. They sell the land for 250-300 thousand TL, but it would actually be worth 40-50 thousand. It is probable that they also received commissions. This thing's (SHP) exit is in the Cumhuriyet neighborhood, very close to the town center. There, a person sells the land where his father is buried to the company. As I've said, they consider selling the land for more and combining that money with the tea and hazelnut income. At the end of the day, they sell land (to the company). They (the company) deceive people. For example, the company said that they would be able to get the land through urgent expropriation anyway. (Appendix B, 4)

Contrary to some protestors' assumption that the profit drive of individuals is the main reason undermining the resistance; the economic function of the land in this social context appears as an exigent factor. The socio-historical transformation that the locality has gone through during the last decades has changed the value and function of land as the mean of production. As the quotation demonstrates, the land for the family has rendered to a unit that produces supplementary income coming from tea and hazelnut production. Moreover, the land or the revenue of the production divides gradually due to the inheritance rights, which appear as a phenomenon leading to the change in the function of and the value attributed to the land. The declining economic value of the agricultural land and declining share of rural sources of income in the household budget contributes to transformation of the land into a tradable and commercial commodity. Thus, in the particular example, the land which belongs to a family, some of whose members reside in Istanbul, benefit from the yearly share of the crop revenue. They find it more convenient to sell the land at a price that is much higher than the market price.

Another important specificity of Arhavi and its SHP struggle appears in the problem of what I would name as acquaintance vs. anonymity in the creation of an ‘other’ which suggests that the higher levels of acquaintance emerges as an impeding factor for organization and struggle. The research reveals that when the other party is unknown to the locals, the abstraction and construction of the image of the other becomes easier, which underpins the organized struggle. In the majority of the cases of anti-SHP struggle, the enemy is ‘the company’ but the names of the companies and business or political relations are mostly unknown to the locals. The company is defined as the plunderer, the traitor and more interestingly as ‘the Jewish agent’ or ‘the servant of Israel.’ This constitutes the placing of the other party within the existing discursive frames of political and cultural contention. These discursive formations play an important role in the anti-SHP struggle because the companies are benefitting immensely from the discursive supremacy of the renewable energy paradigms. However, the prevailing acquaintances which come to the surface in the particularity of the Arhavi–SHP struggle played a dividing role between the locals in the struggle because neither the company nor the subcontracting firm was unknown to the locals and the people from Arhavi. A quotation by one protagonist who resides in Ankara explains:

Our biggest misfortune is having MNG as the owner of the project. It is from Arhavi and it is a powerful conglomerate in Turkey. It is close to the government as well. We have difficulty in this sense. MNG, before starting this project, has constructed villas in the town. During that, they established links with a group of construction firms and subcontractors. It created its own circle. Then, when they say that there is a SHP and promise to buy the construction materials from these firms, they ensure support. Moreover, they have relatives, so they have influence. That was the biggest difficulty. The strongest anti-SHP fighters oppose with their beloved ones. They are his (SHP opponent’s) cousin, uncle, and grandfather at the end of the day. That was the biggest problem. For example in Fındıklı, the company, Başkent Elektrik, is from Ankara, the subcontractors are from Sivas. If these were (MNG) strangers, they would not have reached everywhere (and influenced) so easily. The municipality also left itself to the hands of MNG. Let the MNG

construct the big projects, we benefit and get our share, they think.
(Appendix B, 5)

MNG is one of the biggest holdings of Turkey, whose owner, Mehmet Nazif Günal, is from Arhavi and is known for his close relationship with the AKP government. MNG has two SHP projects in Arhavi besides other construction projects in the region. So far the holding has licenses of 10 hydropower plants, 6 of which are completed and 4 of which are under construction (MNG, 2012). In the town of Arhavi, there are schools and public buildings constructed by MNG as well. As stated above, the holding instrumentalizes the already-established business relations, patronage relations and also family connections in order to maintain a local base of support for the projects and also against the protestors. The moves such as employing key figures of the local resistance or subcontracting the construction of the SHP to a company from the village are also moves intended to divide the resistance which does not in fact have a wide popular base. Undoubtedly, the manifestation organized by the municipality of Arhavi demanding an SHP and supporting MNG represents a strong demonstration of the company's influence on the politics, both at local and national levels, and the division in the public.

On 26 August 2014, some NGOs followed the call of the Arhavi Municipality. As shown in Figure 14, they gathered to show their support for the businessmen and their pro-energy stance (T24, 2014). The mayor of Arhavi made a speech accusing the anti-SHP protestors of insulting him and the businessman Mehmet Nazif Günal in this case and declared that dwellers of Arhavi support him and support the SHP and the investments he makes in the town. He also stated, "It is

necessary to suppress the voice of the minority and marginal groups and emerge as the voice of Arhavi.”⁸



Figure 14. A photo of the public demonstration of solidarity with MNG

<http://www.sondakika.com/coskun-hekimoglu/2015>

Hence, the acquaintances appeared as a dividing factor in the case of Arhavi. The division was deepened by established patronage-clientele relationships and political alliances. The protestors were accused in the general discourse of the criminalization of the resistance and praise of the majority by naming the protestor the small minority and a marginal group. On the other hand, the public support declined after the fading away of the initial resistance, as evident in the following quotation:

Everything began with this bridge. The construction of this bridge meant the demise of the opponents. If we could have organized the people, stopped the construction workers, chased them away with stones and sticks, there would not be this much destruction. But we could not get people organized [against SHP]. We could not stop the construction. Then what happened? As the company went on [with construction], the public withdrew from the opposition thinking that they could not stop [the construction] anyway. Some

⁸ Azınlığın ve bir marjinal grubun sesi olarak ortaya çıkan sesi susturmak ve Arhavi'nin sesi olarak ortaya çıkmak gerekir

told that they construct roads for us. You explain it to them, but they do not understand. Then, we won the lawsuit. Until then we were 10 people [in the struggle], but after the court decision 110 people gathered . . . Hundreds of people we did not know came to congratulate us. [They were] from Arhavi, from the villages. Brother, where were you? Anyway, it is a nice thing but many of us asked where they you when we were in a struggle, but we won the case. From now on, they will think if those people won this lawsuit, they may also win others. So, they can support us and persuade other people to support us. (Appendix B, 6)

An effort to summarize the anti-SHP struggle of Arhavi will leave us with limited public support, a lower land value and agriculture as a means of production, co-opted locals through the employment, business or similar offers by the company and a division between the public through family ties and kinship relations. Therefore, the question becomes: How could a struggle which has co-opted during the struggle of the locals and which has limited popular support in the locality prove to be successful? The answer leads us back to the discussion of peri-urbanity, which has been explained before. The agency that emerged as a result of the peri-urbanization of Arhavi and an effective legal struggle has made victory possible.

4.2.2 Agency

The process of peripheralization in the coastal Eastern Black Sea region has contributed to the emergence of peri-urban subjects and subjectivities. The main features of these people are defined by being a part of the city economy along with the on-farm income sources derived from the existing tea and hazelnut farming. Moreover, these people are also constantly returning to the village or town of origin to spend their holiday, if not for the harvest. The constant in and out movement of people brings dynamism to the locality in terms of ideas that circulate, and simultaneously in the ways that people politicize.

Agriculture, which used to define economic activity in a rural setting has become a secondary income source for the inhabitants of those villages and also for those who have migrated from those villages. The following quotation is from a woman who lives in Zonguldak but who comes to Kemerköprü village during the summer period. Here is how she describes the place of agricultural production in their livelihood settlement:

There is agriculture but it is not enough. Tea income is not sufficient anymore. You pick one ton of tea then you get 1,250 TL. You pay half to the workers. We are also seasonal workers; we come here during the summer and harvest our tea. It is not flowing [the income] but dripping, better than nothing. Anyway, when you have the land, you inevitably work it. When it is not cut, the tea bushes turn into a forest, so you inevitably pick it and sell it. Tea has two seasons here. If you pick yourself, it takes one month. If you hire workers, it ends in one week. Then you give one month of break until the second season. (Appendix B, 7)

The tea bush, being a perennial plant, does not require much labor or all yearlong care. In fact, spending 3 months for harvest by using the household labor force is enough. This duration is even less with temporary workers who are predominantly migrant workers from Georgia. The quotation of an interview summarizes the main aspects of the protagonists of the resistance:

There are 30-40 people who actively participate into the struggle. There is a group from Arhavi, and also from outside who reside in Arhavi. There is also a group residing in the center of Arhavi; they are more experienced. There are those who reside in this village [Kavak] the whole year, since it is closer to the center. There are people who reside outside Arhavi but return in summertime. Also, almost everyone owns a house in Arhavi. (Appendix B, 8)

The majority of the population in Arhavi either lives outside Arhavi, in metropolises such as Istanbul and Ankara. If not, as the quotation demonstrates, they own a house in the center of Arhavi. The thing that unites them is their return migration to the villages during the summer time and during short holidays. Moreover, another group that plays an important role in the resistance is composed of the people who have moved back and settled in Arhavi after working outside for years and those who live

in the villages of Arhavi and who own a business in the city. During the field research it was observed that most of the protagonists of the struggle are either retired people who have moved back to their village after working in the cities or people who are still working in the city with formal employment opportunities, career plans and consumption patterns which might be evaluated within the paradigms of middle class or more specifically new middle class. One interviewee's response to a question about the villagers and the leading figures of the resistance says: "We say that the villagers are struggling but, in fact, those who are actively in struggle are the more educated, elite ones."⁹

A person living in Kemerköprü village, a frequent Facebook user with the nickname of 'HES Düşmanı' and who is among the protagonists of the resistance states:

I lived in İzmir from 1992. In fact my residency and my company are still there. We still have a house there but because of the longing, I returned. I said it is enough and I have settled in my village.¹⁰

Another couple has moved back to the village after running a business in Muğla and Antalya. They have renovated an old traditional wooden house inherited from the grandparents, and they have done it in a way to preserve the authenticity. But they ornamented it with antiques and design pieces. She states, "I am 52 years old, I did not know what SHP was. When we first arrived, I was busy with the house etc. so I did not feel the need to go to the resistance tent."¹¹

One leading figure is a financial consultant residing in Ankara while the other one has returned to the village after working in Istanbul for years. In a focus group

⁹ Interview by the author, 01 October 2014, Arhavi Biz köylü mücadele ediyor diyoruz ama aslına bakarsanız aktif mücadele eden kesim eğitilmiş, daha elit kesim.

¹⁰ Interview by the author, 05 January 2015, Arhavi 92 yılından bu yana İzmir'deydim. Gerçi ikametim şirketim yine orada. Evimiz de açık hala. Buralar daha ağır bastı özlem diyelim, geri döndüm. Artık yeter dedim köyüme yerleştim.

¹¹ Interview by the author, 03 October 2014, Arhavi. 52 yaşındayım, HES nedir bilmiyordum. Geldiğimizde de evle falan uğraştığımız için pek direniş çadırına gitmek gereği duymuyordum.

interview just at the end of the summer 2014, some other the leading members of the struggle were discussing the dates of return to their homes all around the country, if they have not permanently settled in the village; who state:

Four households stay in the village during the winter. There are those who also move to Arhavi [town center]. In Kavak village, around 15-20 families remain as well. During the summer, there are around 70 families in every village. People all leave in the winter. They sometimes come back for the weekends . . . Then we all go back to Istanbul etc. for the election periods. We returned on 18th of August and the court declared a suspension of the implementation of the project on the 19th. The next day they left [the construction site]. It was the time that we were most crowded with those who had returned for the summer, had come for the festival. They [the company representatives] could not take the risk and left. We organized a big demonstration in the center with enthusiasm. (Appendix B, 9)

This quotation also shows the constant population movement between the cities of residence and the hometown in a way to create peri-urban spaces and subjects. Here we observe a population that goes back to the cities of residence for voting but also coming back to the hometown for the summer period. Every summer, since 1973, (Arhavi Belediyesi, n.d.) a festival is organized in the town festival center which constitutes a space for interaction among the migrants from Arhavi and also serves to the abstraction of the space following Lefebvrian construction of the space that's because part from the concerts, the festival program includes competitions of tea harvesting, hazelnut shelling, cooking traditional dishes such as anchovy bread (hamsili ekmek) or laz pastry (laz böreği) or doing carpentry. Undoubtedly the festival has the social function of attachment with the rurality and preserving the societal imaginations of being a part of a locality which helps to construct the abstract space and social imaginaries that has a reflection in both in the peasant authenticity and in the resistance itself, an important aspect of the resistance to be discussed in the following sections.

The following quotation is more detailed on the structure of agency in the struggle of Arhavi:

The expert investigation took place on 28 January. We came here one week before it. We thought that we should be crowded for the expert investigation. The Arhavitelites Association arranged two buses from Istanbul. People came from there. Arhavitelites Foundation arranged one bus from Ankara. 1,500-2,000 people gathered in the Cumhuriyet neighborhood. We did not expect that much. It was very effective, reassuring. We also organized a protest in Istanbul and the crowd there was not bad at all. (Appendix B, 10)

This quotation provides us with an insight into the profile of the people who are participating in the resistance. The qualities of the agency in the specificity of Arhavi are better portrayed in this quotation. Here we see that the people who are living outside Arhavi in the big cities are still part of the public of Arhavi through townsmanship solidarity networks and the movement of people. Arhavitelites Association participates in the organization of the manifestation with the buses that they have provided. The people who live in the cities have come to the hometown in order to participate in the protests. Moreover, they also organize protests in the cities they live in, they get organized in the form of platforms and they establish relations with other political environmental organizations such as Kuzey Ormanları Savunması as seen in Figure 15:



Figure 15. Kavak Anti-SHP demonstration in Istanbul

<http://www.kuzeyormanlari.org/2015/01/17/arhavliler-hese-karsi-direnisi-mngnin-kapisina-tasidi/>

The interview goes on as follows, giving further insight about the agency and the structure of the solidarity created on the basis of townsmanship and environmentalism as well as the effects of other political inclinations and affiliations.

I am usually in Ankara but I travel to Istanbul very often. We organized a nice demonstration in Istanbul as well. The Arhavitiles Association has a stance against SHPs. After that, we were planning to organize a demonstration in front of MNG, right before the elections. Here, the construction started on 10 March, and the caterpillar entered. Two days later we organized the demonstration; we were around 200 people. We took the caterpillar out (of the construction site). The CHP constituency had been active but they slowed down because of the elections. After the elections when AKP won, the Istanbul Arhavitiles Association winced, because of the fear of the government. The Foundation also backed off. Hence, everybody was left to their destiny. (Appendix B, 11)

Here we see that the solidarity built to protect the town from the SHP and the company is not immune to existing political cleavages. Townsman organizations and patronage and clientele relations with the government occur as a factor impeding the full-fledged struggle and solidarity. In a similar vein, political party membership appears as another factor, which might keep people from engaging into broader

solidarity against the SHP in this very particular setting. The following quotation is telling in this vein:

The CHP¹² constituency got angry. The results were announced at the election night and the AKP won. Some friends posted on my Facebook and stated “Ok, Arhavi made its choice. Let the SHP be constructed, I will not move my finger for it.” On (the demonstration of) 28 January, we were crowded but on 10 May, there was not a single person from the CHP constituency. AKP barely won, with a 200-vote difference. In this village and in Kemerköprü, CHP won. Then we told them that AKP barely won, even though they gave money to people and also despite the existence of those who come from outside to pick tea; that this is not actually a defeat for CHP but we could not integrate those people into the struggle again. We became isolated. We thought that we would do whatever we could and then we would try to widen (the support base of) the struggle. (Appendix B, 12)

Thus, after the municipal elections of 30 March 2014, the protagonists quoted above were left alone. The events that have followed are marked by the legal case and the struggle of the most active people in order to support the legal struggle. The Arhavi Platform for Protection of Nature has been revitalized and they have established another ‘Resistance Tent’ as in Figure 16:

¹²CHP is the main opposition party in Turkey’s party system that is a center-left party often claimed to be the representative of Kemalist legacy.



Figure 16. Arhavi resistance tent

Photo by the author

The tent that is situated near the main construction site has served as a place of gathering for the people from Arhavi and also for the other anti-SHP activists in Turkey. Prof. Dr. Beyza Üstün was invited to give a talk on the environmental destruction caused by the river-type HPPs; the leading figures of the anti-SHP resistance of Fındıklı and city-based environmentalist platform called the Karadeniz in Revolt had joined the group for solidarity and support. In the meantime the most influential lawyers of the environmental law have taken up the case. Upon the exploration of the project zone, they have discovered that there are severe infractions in the project design and also in the environmental impact assessment reports. There was fraud in the measurements of the flow rates, the catchment area was not planned properly, and construction waste was not disposed of according to the criteria. With

pressure from the lawyers and those who resist against the SHP, an expert witness provided the court with a report declaring the mis-implementation of the project. Eventually, the court decided for the suspension of the execution in the first place and secondly the annulment of the environmental impact assessment report. Therefore; the construction of Kavak SHP was stopped. Obviously, the company has the right to apply for another an environmental assessment in order to renew the construction license.

4.3 The SHP in Borçka: A spark that fades away

The existence of something is easier to reason on while the absence barely gives us concrete explanations to hold on to and from which to construct our reasoning. The strength of the anti-SHP struggle in Arhavi enabled a long account on the discourses, actors, agencies, relations and so on. However, when the weakness of mobilization in Borçka is under scrutiny, the scientist is relatively deprived of the guidance of the concrete events shaping the day. That's why this section is doomed to be shorter than the previous one. Nevertheless, this is also when the comparative method becomes essential to reach plausible explanations beyond a plethora of speculations. In this section, I provide an overview of the SHP projects and the distinctively weak struggle in the Aralık village of Borçka. I first analyze the structures, including the crop system, demographics, livelihood formations as well as the politics and discourse before I present a comparative analysis of anti-SHP mobilizations in Arhavi and Borçka.

Borçka is situated on mountain hills, approximately 60 kilometers from Arhavi. The mountains are steep and the roads are curved. When you arrive in Hopa

you need to climb the mountains. The region does not provide people with large plains to settle along the coast, and the first settlement that you encounter is Borçka, which you reach after 30 km on a very steep and crooked road. It is a small town, situated on the both sides of Aksu River. The villages are dispersed, but founded around the rivers. The famous Macahel Valley and Karagöl lake are also in the administrative borders of Borçka. The eastern part of the town is particularly close to the Georgian border, so the town hosts a population of Georgian origin who speak Georgian.

The case that I analyze for this dissertation is about an SHP construction in Aralık village, which is only 10 kilometers from the town center. However, a general overview of the extent of the commodification taking place in Borçka is important in showing the degree of transformation. The major change was caused by the Borçka Dam (DSİ, n.d.-b) that was constructed on the Çoruh River. The dam is situated 2.5 kilometers out of the town center, as a part of a large hydropower project that foresees 10 large dams on the main axe of the Çoruh river and 5 others on the main axes (DSİ, n.d.-a). The Deriner Dam is also part of this large project, which will be the largest dam in Turkey and the 6th largest in the world. Moreover, the Yusufeli Dam is an infamous part of this project because it will submerge most of Yusufeli, a town of Artvin. The Deriner Dam is not far from Borçka, yet the Borçka Dam was constructed in the middle of the town. Undoubtedly, this has severe societal and environmental consequences. The climate became more humid and some of the population was dislocated through expropriation of the land.

Secondly, on one of the streams of Aksu River, a SHP was constructed named Erenler HES. This SHP caused a dramatic decline in the amount of water that passes through Borçka and the locals report discomfort because of the smell and the

insects that grow in the shallow water. Twice during 2015, heavy rain resulted in a flood around Borçka, and three people died. The natural water regime has been seriously hindered because of the dam and SHP construction. Lastly, 32 SHP projects are under construction or have already started operation in Borçka and most of them are owned by local businesses (Hamsici, 2011). As Mahmut Hamsici states, Borçka is among the towns where the resistance sparked late compared to other cases such as Fındıklı, İkizdere and Loç Valley.

Among these efforts to organize the struggle, the Borçka platform for protection of rivers was established in 2010, and they have organized meetings to inform the locals on the effects and consequences of the SHPs. However, the activities of the platform still have not resonated among the wider public. An Internet search with the keywords of ‘Borçka’ ‘Aralık’ or ‘HES Mücadelesi’ does not yield a lot of results regarding the struggle, but it does yield information about the SHPs and dams. The Aralık SHP story of the village is one example reflecting this phenomenon. Before going into detail with the absence of the struggle, let's follow the scheme of this dissertation and look at the basic aspects and structures in Borçka. Figure 17 shows the town center of Borçka.



Figure 17. A scene in Borçka

<http://www.7martgazetesi.net/haber/borcka/>

The town lies between Hopa and Artvin and borders Georgia in the north. It is situated along the streams of Çoruh River. The population is 27,654; 9,008 people live in the town center while 18,646 live in the villages. Agricultural production is dominated by commercial farming, basically of tea and hazelnut. Figures 18 and 19 demonstrate the rural-urban population changes in Borçka.

I visited Aralık village twice, once in the summer of 2013 and then again during the autumn of 2014. The village is 10 km from the center of Borçka along the way that goes directly to the touristic sites of Macahel and Karagöl. It is not a remote, isolated place. On the contrary, tour buses and cars from every part of the country frequently pass through the village. The development of tourism in the region has also enabled the locals to diversify their economic activities. There are small motels run by the locals as well as restaurants by the river that serve local and ‘organic’ food. Like Arhavi and other villages of the coastal Black Sea region, tea

and hazelnuts are the dominant crops produced in the village. Ninety percent of the tea is grown according to the standards of organic farming.

Population figures reveal the period and extent of out-migration from the village. Here, similar to Arhavi, we observe that out-migration starts and accelerates throughout the 1980s and the decline is considerable between 1985 and 2005. This coincides with the proliferation of commercial farming. The locals state that before the migration began, the tea production was not widespread. The main activity was forestry and husbandry. In addition, they state that the unemployment in the village and limited access to social security are among the push factors.

The population difference between summer and winter is high, which is a reflection of the general characteristics of the region. Seventy or 80 families stay in the village whole year but this number increases up to 200 families during the summer. As an interviewee states “The population of this place varies a lot. During the summer, we are around 1,000 people, if you count the children as well, but it decreases a lot during the winter period. We had 129 registered voters for the elections, and all voted. In August, we had 230, 185 of whom voted.”¹³

¹³Interview by the author, 07 October 2014, Borka. Buranın nfusu hi belli olmuyor. Yazın, oluk ocuk toplasak 1000 kiři oluyoruz ama kışın bu ok dřyor. řyle dřnn Mart ayındaki seimde 129 semenimiz vardı. Hepsi oy kullandı. Ađustos’ta da 230 semen vardı, 185’i falan oy kullandı.




Figure 18. Rural-urban population levels in Borçka

TurkStat, 2014




Figure 19. Total population change in Borçka

TurkStat, 2014

4.3.1 The Aralık SHP and the Taşköprü SHP

There are 5 SHP projects on the Klaskur stream, two of which are important for this research. First one is the Aralık HES. The Aralık HES has already been constructed and actively working. It has a 12.5 MW capacity. The power plant starts from Atanoğlu village, neighboring Aralık, and the ends in Aralık. The second one is the Taşköprü HES. The project is approved and the license has been granted. However, the construction has not started yet. There is contention among the public but a very weak resistance. Two projects have to be examined chronologically to understand the HES and reaction in Aralık. Figure 20 provides us an aerial view of the Aralık HES. As it is clearly visible, the whole area of construction has been adversely affected. De-forestation is evident. The area includes the two villages, Aralık and Atanoğlu.



Figure 20. Bird's-eye view of the Aralık SHP

<https://www.google.com.tr/maps?source=tldsi&hl=tr>

Everybody that I interviewed in Aralık told me that Atanoğlu village is supporting the SHP. This division is a barrier before the organization of a strong resistance. The interviews say that main motivation of those who support it is to be able to sell their lands. Land in these villages has lost its value as a means of

production, especially the land that is in the remote, mountainous areas. The villages are depopulated, the labor power is limited and on-farm income is not the only source of income for the households in this context. Moreover, the land is constantly being divided among the family members through inheritance or jointly owned by the inheritors. Here is an excerpt from the interview with a prominent figure in the village on the basic aspects of land ownership and the value of land:

Major crops are hazelnuts and tea. Hazelnuts are more valuable. If you own one hundred hazelnut trees, you can make good money. One hundred roots is nothing. (meaning they usually own more) Our neighbor for example, owns the largest hazelnut orchards, 87 acres, and 55 acres. That is very good but they cannot get a full yield because the land is usually sloppy and there are wild animals. After him, usually there are (farms) of 30, 20 acres. Cadastral distribution took place; the families divided and shared the land. If the land was 10 acres, three people shared it as three-acre farms. The farms became smaller of course; people became disadvantaged with regard to state subsidies for agricultural products. The state issued a law for the protection of farmlands, promoted re-unification of the farms but no one trusts the other. People do not trust their brothers . . . They do not pay a lot for production supports. There are also subsidies for organic production. (Appendix B, 13)

For some villagers, the SHP project provides a venue to make money out of the land.

An interviewee stated that the locals, especially in Atanoğlu, were pro-SHP because they thought that they could profit from expropriation. People expect to liquidate land either through expropriation or selling their land to the company. Particularly the people who dwell in the city tend to profit from the situation.

Similar to the first phase of struggle in Arhavi, the company took measures to co-opt the resistance that included the purchase of lands, employment for the locals and ‘buying’ the locals. Selling the lands to the company is a major motivation. The prices of the land increased to 25,000 TL per acre, 6 years ago, which was highly unlikely before because buying land in this village is uncommon. As an interviewee states, “Normally, the acre of the land costs 16-17 thousand TL. For those who have resisted the company and have not sold their land, the price rose up to 30 thousand

TL. A villager resisted the expropriation of his land. The usual price was 100 thousand but he got 250 thousand TL.”¹⁴

In addition to the land purchases, the company employed 13 people from the village to work in the construction and another person to regulate the water flow in the regulator. Thus, the already weak opposition was co-opted and the Aralık SHP began to produce electricity in 2010. EnergoPro currently owns the Aralık SHP, after being handled between different firms, including MNG Holding. Figure 21 shows the photo of Aralık SHP.



¹⁴Interview by the author, 27 August 2013, Borka “Normalde 16 bin-17 bin arazinin dnm, Őirket 20 bin verdi. Direnenler, satmayanlar iin fiyat 30 bin TL’ye kadar ıktı. Bir kiŐi evinin istimlak edilmemesi iin direndi, normal devlet fiyatı 100 bin TL iken, 250 bin aldı.”



Figure 21. The Aralık SHP

Photo by the author

4.3.2 The Taşköprü SHP

Meanwhile, during the construction of the Aralık HES, Türkerler Energy acquired a production license from for the construction of the Taşköprü SHP, again on the Aralık Stream, from the Electricity Market Regulation Board (EMRA) and the second round of the game started. The Taşköprü HES was approved in 2009 but the

construction has not started yet. Discussions and developments regarding the Taşköprü HES enable us to observe the impacts of local politics.

The current muhtar, who was elected in the local elections of 2014, has spent most of his life out of Aralık. He decided to return to his village in 2009, where he opened up a small hotel by the river. He is interested in Georgian culture; he used to edit a magazine on the culture and traditions of the Georgians. Moreover, he was a leftist activist during the 1980s. He states:

When I returned to my village in 2009, the Aralık SHP was already constructed and had begun operating. In the same year, we learned that there is another SHP project (in the village). With 20 friends, we hired a lawyer and spent 12 thousand TRY. The court suspended the construction and decided that the EIA process is compulsory. During this process, we organized two demonstrations in the village, one when the project owners came; the other was when the experts came (for EIA). It was 2010. (Appendix B, 14)

The legal struggle began against the Taşköprü SHP, when the muhtar and some other friends arrived to village. This is the point where we understood the production license was granted to the company without EIA report. Twenty people sued the company and the court decided that EIA was necessary and so suspended the execution. The previous muhtar described this attempt by stating “Old Dev-Yol supporters sued the company to prevent (SHP).”¹⁵

Dev-Yol is a popular Marxist-Leninist group of the late 1970s in Turkey. It was influential among students, workers and union-members. It transformed into a popular movement and had significant support around Turkey. They were also organized in the villages. The influence of Dev-Yol in central Anatolia and the Eastern Black Sea is worth noting. The most exquisite example is Fatsa, undoubtedly where Dev-Yol supporters tried a socialist rule in Fatsa, under the governorship of Terzi Fikri. Artvin is also known to be a city where the left is

¹⁵ Dev-Yol eskileri engellemek için mahkemeye verdi

significantly stronger. The figures of the defendants who were trialed in a Dev-Yol Case after the coup d'état of 1980 are informative. The number of defendants in mass trials in Artvin was 898 while it was 900 in Fatsa and 1,000 in Ankara (Dev-Yol, 2003). The impact of leftist tradition in Artvin is observable.

The company issued an exemption from EIA requirement again in 2012 but it went unnoticed by the public as the current muhtar continues:

Later we learned that the village governor secretly supported SHP (EIA) process. TG Elektrik A.Ş got an EIA exemption document in 2012, (it needs to be) announced by hanging the document in a public place but no one knows except the muhtar. It was not posted but they issued a report stating that it was posted and made public. We learned it in October 2014 after I was elected the village governor. I sued about the decision in 13 October 2014 but I lost the case because two years had passed after the announcement of EIA exemption. (Appendix B, 15)

On the other hand, the position of previous muhtar is critical. The law requires announcement of any decision by the authorities both in the village and in the municipality in order to make the public aware of the developments and use their right to oppose if they are willing to. However, in this case we see that the villagers did not learn about the new EIA exemption for two years and at the end, they lost their right to take it to the court. Hence, the legal struggle was blocked and the company acquired ultimate authorization to built Taşköprü SHP.

Construction of Taşköprü SHP has not started yet even though it has a history of 6 years. Legal struggle is the key method to resist against an SHP, but public support is essential in this effort. Now that the legal struggle is blocked, the new village administration is trying to raise awareness among the villagers and the relatives who live in the cities. They organize public meetings to inform the public about the SHP and possibly to organize resistance. However, in Aralık, the public contention against the SHP seems scattered and weak as the following excerpt implies:

There were people who conveyed their ideas during the SHP meeting, those who have an interest support the SHP. For example one person says that if there is an SHP construction in here, I can rent my car to the firm and gain income. There are others who think that they can work in construction or do business. There are people who think this way but they are a minority. Now there is a consensus in the village. . . . Not a lot of people are against struggle, there are a lot of people who oppose the SHP construction. But also they are not entirely against the construction. If there will be a benefit to the village, they accept it. (SHP) (Appendix B, 16)

Similarly and unlike Arhavi, the villagers who migrated to the cities do not form a strong body to combat against the SHP. The changing value of the land seems like an important factor in this stance. As the following quotation from the interview with a prominent figure of the village shows:

Some of those who work in the cities support it, some do not. There are some people who have land in the SHP area. They are in contact with me. Lately, officials wanted to visit the village for expropriation. We told them not to come, that we would not help them. We told that it would be better for them if they do not come. They prepared a report stating that they could not proceed with expropriation. Then that person (in the city) called me, to ask if some one came or not (for expropriation) I told that no one came. The state pays very little; their farms are also very small in size. The company can also buy them by paying more. People do not live in the village; that is our disadvantage. One brother is pro-SHP while the other one is against it. (Appendix B, 16)

Hence, the villagers of Aralık village were not able to form a strong and substantial resistance against the Taşköprü or the Aralık SHP. The attempts to organize a resistance or to legally fight against the company ended up as weak sparkles that faded away. The construction has not begun yet, and the new administration is being prepared to fight in spite of all the odds, as the muhtar states:

Owners of the project have not made progress during the last six years. We have gone on with the struggle through our own means since last year. Villagers report the company workers who come to start the project directly to me and we stop them on the road and send them back and we tell them not to come (to the village) again. In July 2015, company crew came with their collaborators from the village but we sent them back and told them “we want voluntary relationship, if it is compulsory, we call it rape.” (Appendix B, 17)

The role of the new muhtar is important in any attempt to fight against the SHP. He was among the ones who first sued the company for the improper preparation of the Taşköprü SHP in 2009 when he first arrived in Aralık. He was not the muhtar back then. He had left the village when he was young, lived in Istanbul until 2009 when he settled back in the village and opened up a little bed and breakfast. Then in 2014, he was elected as the village governor. After that, he started organizing meetings with the villagers in order to inform them not just about the SHP, but also on the other issues that concerning the village administration.



CHAPTER 5

TWO ANTIPOLES IN DEEP RURALITY: THE ROUGH AND TUMBLE

STRUGGLE OF BAĞBAŞI AND APATHY IN PEHLİVANLI

I am 86 years old, my daughter, why am I guilty? I went there to protect my water. I have two trees my daughter, what will I do if they dry up? I sell (the crops) of my land, how can I survive if they dry up?¹⁶

I arrived in Bağbaşı on a warm afternoon in early autumn by midi bus after long hours of travel through the Kaçkar Mountains. I was travelling from Hopa to Erzurum, along the Çoruh Basin and the four-hour bus ride showed me how all the basin and the mountains had become a gigantic construction site. We passed by the Deriner Dam, one of the biggest of ten dams to be constructed on the Çoruh River, and through Yusufeli, a town which will disappear under the reservoir of the Yusufeli Dam, and a myriad of river type SHPs. There were more than forty tunnels that pierce the mountains, and a proportionate number of viaducts uniting two sides of the valley where Çoruh and its branches were flowing. The inhabitable heights of the mountains were inhabited by hundreds of construction workers.

During the four hours of bus ride, the climate also changed drastically. We started from evergreen fields and forests of the coastal Black Sea. It was raining, as it usually does in this climate. Then, as we climbed up towards Artvin, the climate became more and more arid; the environment became more and more barren.

Especially after Yusufeli, the only green spots visible between the rocks and

¹⁶ Excerpt from the documentary 'Damn the dams' by Osman Şişman & Özlem Sarıyıldız. Ben 86 yasına girirem yavrum, niye suclu olirem. Suyumu korumaya ciktim. Benim iki tane agacim var yavrum, o kuruduktan sonra ben ne yaparim. Benim tarlamda satiliyor yavrum o kuruduktan sonra ben neyinle idare ederim.

mountains were around the small rivers feeding the Tortum Stream. The value of water sources for the livelihoods around here became visible to bare eyes.

The driver, thinking that I was a teacher (apparently because the women who come alone to this area are teachers) left me at a turnoff two kilometers away from Bağbaşı with a bunch of teenagers who were travelling in the same bus. We started walking towards the village where we immediately saw the regulator of the SHP. I took the chance to start the conversation with the teenagers about the SHP and all of them told us about how they had thrown stones at the caterpillars, how they had blocked the road for construction and how the companies had to leave construction. They were all telling that the water was crucial for their life, and they could not do any agriculture without water, the basic economic activity of the village.

The conversation went on and I asked the boys where they were coming from because they were carrying luggage and talking about passing the Eid holiday with their family. All of them replied that they were attending Quran courses¹⁷ in Rize, taking advantage of the new reforms in national education system infamously known as 4+4+4, which allowed them to give a break to formal education and attend community religious schools. They were very proudly telling that they would become mufti¹⁸, because they were learning how to read the Quran in the best way possible and also they can still get high school diplomas through distance education even though they do not attend high school. The number of youngsters from the village intrigued me because the villages that I had researched before were increasingly showing a tendency to shelter an aging rural population. Here, in Bağbaşı, I was coming across to more than eight youngsters around the same age.

¹⁷Quran courses are education programs organized by General directorate of religious affairs in order to teach the students to read and interpret Quran and educate them on teaching Islamic service.

¹⁸Mufti is the official who is in charge of Islamic affairs for a district or province.

Another reason for my telling this anecdote is to convey an idea on the triumphant religiosity in the locality. Erzurum is known to be among the most conservative and traditional cities in Turkey, especially when religion and perceptions about the state and authority and gender relations are concerned. Obviously, the situation was no different in this village, around 100 kilometers from the city center of Erzurum. Here in Bağbaşı, a poor village dependent on agriculture, we witnessed one of the fiercest and most violent struggles in rural Anatolia, which collectively mobilized almost everyone in the village, regardless of their age, gender, political affiliation or perception of authority. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the anti-SHP struggle of Bağbaşı, in comparison with the relative silence for the same SHP project in the neighboring village, Pehlivanlı.

5.1 Serdarlı, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı: The geography, history and the society

There are three different SHP licenses granted for the company which are affecting three villages — Serdarlı, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı — all of which are situated in the same valley. Although Erzurum as the administrative center is situated in Eastern Anatolian Region, the province of Tortum, where Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı belong, lies at the border of the Eastern Black Sea Region. Since the climate is arid and the altitude is high, people have settled around water sources, which are riverbanks in this setting. That's because the alluvial soil is fertile and irrigation is easier. The three villages neighbor each other along the banks of the Ödük Stream on which the three river-type SHPs were tried to be constructed. The photo in Figure 22 is more telling than words on the physical structure of the valley, the aridity of the climate and the fertility coming up thanks to the river.



Figure 22. A view of Bađbaşı and Pehlivanlı Villages

http://Bađbaşımehmetakif.meb.k12.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/25/15/418973/icerikler/Bađbaşı_189832.html

Along the valley, the climate is milder than most of the other parts of the region because it is surrounded by high mountains. The major source feeding the river stream is the water of the melting snow coming from the heights of the mountains. Thus, the flow is higher during the spring but gradually decreases throughout the summer, and around August, being the hottest time of the year, the water decreases to an extent that the irrigation even gets interrupted. Moreover, drinking water of the settlement is also provided from the same river. Hence, the livelihood in the Ödük Valley is heavily dependent on water resources.

In the article by Arıcı and Karakuzulu (2012) it is stated that the major economic activity in the valley are agriculture and husbandry. The majority (83%) of the active population works in the agricultural sector while only 16.2 % is employed in the service sector. Even though the villages had municipal administration until the 2014 reform in local administrative structures, the study concerning public administration underline that functionally, the village character of the settlements is prevalent and they could not have turned into towns. The same study indicates that there had been an out-migration from the villages towards the cities but for a certain time the migration was low in intensity and seasonal in character. However, recently the out-migration (see Figures 23, 24, and 25) has increased and gained permanence. An analysis of the population statistics of the three villages reveal the socio-economic structure of the research site and underpin the findings of the above-mentioned article by Arıcı and Karakuzulu.




Figure 23. Population figures of Erzurum

TurkStat, 2014

The evolution of the levels of rural-urban population in the city of Erzurum is demonstrated in the graph above. Here we observe that the rural population of the city was persistently high until the end of 1990s. It is only during that period that the urban population of the city outnumbered the rural population. Moreover, from this chart we observe that the out-migration from Erzurum also corresponded to the post-2000 period. The divergent position of Erzurum from Turkey's country statistics can be observed from the chart below:




Figure 24. Rural-urban population distribution – Turkey (in millions)

TurkStat, 2014

The urban population exceeded the rural population level in Turkey in 1985. Since then, the rural population is in dissolution. However, a comparison of country statistics with the statistics of Erzurum reveals how Erzurum diverges from the general trend. Longer persistence of the rural population can be attributed to government protection and support of production and/or subsistence farming, which helps rural households to stay in the village even though the farming revenues are

low, insecure or fluctuating. It is important to reiterate that the climate is arid, so the farming is characterized by the cultivation of grains and husbandry. However, the area that is subject to analysis for the research is less arid and irrigation is easier, thanks to Tortum stream. The following chart, which demonstrates rural-urban population distribution in Tortum, is effective in showing the rural societal structure prevalent in the region.




Figure 25. Rural-urban population levels in Tortum

TurkStat, 2014

Here we observe that the rural population has been considerably higher than the urban population in the province of Tortum in Erzurum. Although there was a decline after the late 1980s in the percentage of the rural population in favor of the urban, rural structure of the town is prevalent. It is even observed that there is an increase in favor of the village after 2007. The dominance of agriculture in the province is summarized in the monthly magazine of the Tortum Administration of Agriculture as follows:

The fundamental economic activities in the region are agriculture and husbandry. Unemployment is high because arable land is not sufficient to accommodate the population and is not fertile. The geographic features also hinder cultivation. That's a factor that accelerates out-migration. Mechanization is not possible due to the small farm size, where grains and vegetables are produced. Fruit is produced along the river basins. Although the extensive farming is widespread, our effort to develop intensive farming continues. ("Tortum Hakkında Genel Bilgi," n.d.)

Since the villages under scrutiny are situated in the river basin, the dominant crops produced are fruits and vegetables. It would be fair to argue that the climate and land ownership patterns did not allow the development of commercialized farming. Instead, petty commodity production accompanied by subsistence farming has enabled small peasant household economies to continue in the region until very recently. In an article by Karakuzulu and Arıcı, it is stated that the frequently cultivated crops in Bağbaşı are apples, beans, mulberries, walnuts, potatoes, maize, pears, plums, cherries, peaches, apricots, tomatoes, cucumbers, strawberries, carrots and grains. The authors also note that use of chemicals and fertilizers are uncommon but this cannot be turned into a marketing advantage because the marketing opportunities are limited. Farms sizes are small, so the cultivation is done according to the needs of the household and a certain portion is sold in the domestic food market.

The population statistics of Pehlivanlı, Serdarlı and Bağbaşı (see Figure 26) illustrate the continuity of the village structure throughout the last demi-century (Arıcı & Karakuzulu, 2012).




Figure 26. Population change in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı
TurkStat, 2014

Even though the immediate similarity with regard to the prevalence of peasantry in Erzurum and Tortum, closer examination of the statistics on the three villages reveals the divergence from the general trend. Here, we observe that there is a steady increase in the population until the 2000s. Moreover, there is an increase even after 1985, when the dissolution of the rural population started to accelerate. It is important to note that the steep increase and decline between 1990 and 2000 might stem from an alteration in the local administrative structure even though it could not be traced during the preparation of the chart from the statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institute. On the other hand, the data of Serdarlı might be taken as a guide reflecting the real population trend during that period because all three villages present similar trends. The steady increase in the population until the beginning of the 2000s implies that the agrarian structure and production was effective in maintaining the social reproduction in the locality. By the same token, the village

populations are above 2,000 people, which is more than the average village population of 1,000 people, according to the figures of 1990 (Metz, 1995). Even though the stark decline in the population began with the 2000s as a result of an immense neoliberalization of the agricultural commodity markets through structural adjustment programs and a decline in the welfare regime in Turkey, the 2014 census data indicates that there are 1,624 people living in Bağbaşı, 1,110 in Pehlivanlı, and 920 in Serdarlı. (Brinkhoff, n.d.)

It is also beneficial to note that the field research revealed a circular migration trend of people coming to the village during the summer time for production and the harvest period, but unfortunately there is no official data available to assess the extent and structure of the circular migration. In order to make an estimation, the number of voters might be telling. In Bağbaşı, there were 1,551 registered voters for the municipal elections of March 2014 and 1,446 for the presidential elections of August 2014 (YSK, n.d.). In spite of the fact that these figures exclude the individuals younger than the age of 18, they are very close to the number of residents of the village. Therefore, we can expect that the villages be more populated during the summer periods.

5.2 The SHP in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı

The rural setting under scrutiny in this chapter is relatively more populated than most of the villages in terms of peasant households that have been able to reproduce themselves until the last decade through subsistence farming and petty commodity production. Since the region is arid, the branches of the Tortum stream have played a crucial role in the persistence of the rural social structure. Still, there are numerous

households whose subsistence highly depends on agricultural production, which is synonymous with water, and there are three SHP projects under construction on the single stream passing through Serdarlı, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı. The projects are designed on the principle of taking the stream into tubes and pipes from the spring of it until the end, which means restricting the access of the local population to water. For this very local setting, it implies a major threat to their livelihood. Let us move away from the macro and secondary data and give the word to the locals on their experiences, perceptions of the village and their struggle against the SHP projects. Figure 27 provides a scene from the resistance in Bağbaşı while Figure 28 shows Bağbaşı and the arid environment surrounding the village.



Figure 27. Women in resistance in Bağbaşı

http://www.haberler.com/tortum-da-hes-arbedesi-4-yarali-2972106-haberi/?utm_source=facebook&utm_campaign=tavsiye_et

How did this place become a village, look it happened like this. We have small gardens (farms). If the water goes, there will be nothing left here, it will dry up. This is not a village with water.¹⁹

¹⁹ Interview by the author, 10 October 2014, Tortum. Burası nasıl köy olmuş, işte bak böyle. Küçük bahçelerimiz var. Bunun suyu gidende bir şey kalmaz ki burada kurur. Sulu köy değildir.



Figure 28. Ödük Valley

http://www.panoramio.com/user/854698?comment_page=1&photo_page=2

Once you get off the bus and start walking along the river towards Bağbaşı village, you realize that the river is the only source of the green. Beyond the basin of the river, what you see are mountains and arid soil. After passing the regulator of SHP, the village settlements begin. There are small houses surrounded by fields and there is a village coffee shop. This is Pehlivanlı village. The valley continues for 25 kilometers up to the mountains where the river originates and Pehlivanlı is the lowest village at the end of the river. A three-kilometer walk would lead you to Bağbaşı village, which is situated in the middle of the valley and continues for around 10 kilometers along the river. If you climb further, you reach Serdarlı, the last village of the valley. Pehlivanlı and Bağbaşı are situated close to each other, but Pehlivanlı is a

large village and a small portion of it lies along the river. The larger part is situated towards the north and benefits from another stream.

There are three SHP projects on the same river, beginning from Serdarlı, ending in Pehlivanlı. The Kayı Group, which is a big holding for energy and construction projects in Turkey and the surrounding region, is constructing two of them. The third project is the Bayraktar HES but the construction has not started yet. On the website of the Kayı group, the projects are defined as follows:

Büyükbahçe and Bağbaşı SHPs are consecutive projects located in Tortum and Erzurum with an installed capacity of 12.1 MW and 14 MW each. These projects were executed together and in total both SHPs have 2 diversion weirs, 4 km pressurized water transmission line, 17 km water transmission line, 2 head ponds, 2 power houses and a 2 km water transmission tunnel. Despite the difficult climate and working conditions, KAYI Construction successfully completed the EPC turnkey construction in 2014. KAYI Construction is the investor, developer, contractor and the operator of the Büyükbahçe and Bağbaşı SHPs and the plants are expected to generate 33.08 GWh and 37.16 GWh per year.

This explanation simply suggests that the flow will be taken into pipes at least for 17 kilometers and public access to the river will be restrained. Keeping the above explanations on the strong agrarian structure and dependence on on-farm income sources in mind, it is beneficial to give voice to the villagers to be able to grasp the reality from their own words.

5.3 Agrarian structure

A villager recalls the small peasant agriculture, which has started to decline, as follows:

My father was a farmer. Not here, we say mountains, in the meadows. We had our farms there. Here is not like those areas. Here the largest (farms) are 10-12 acres but there we had 20 acres of land. He used to cultivate wheat, lentils and barley. We used to cultivate that sort of crop. We work a farm one

year and then we fallow it during the following year. My father used to do husbandry as well. (Appendix B, 19)

This quotation gives us the idea about grain farming accompanied by husbandry in the higher plains performed by the peasants whose farm size was smaller inside the village. The arid plains allowed larger farms but because of the lack of irrigation, only grains were cultivated.

It is a widespread strategy to supplement peasant household economy from extra income sources, related or not to farming. This includes small artisanal work and carpentry but mechanization undermined these activities that left peasants impoverished and resulting migration. The poverty of the inhabitants and the importance of subsistence farming are explained:

There is no income standard here; people live between the mountains. An area of 250 m² fed five sisters. Even if the people cannot find anything, they cultivate potatoes, or things like that and earn a living. No one begs.²⁰

Subsistence farming, although being done in small farms, is effective in the reproduction of peasant households. However, migration because of increasingly harsher conditions becomes inevitable for some households. A villager states:

There are those who fled, to Istanbul. There is a hose factory over there (in Istanbul). Before, three people from our village worked there whom the bosses loved and respected. Thanks to them, 200-300 families work there.”²¹

Migrations are complex; there are various motives for migration for a village woman living under difficult economic and societal conditions as summarized below:

Mostly the younger people migrated, the elders stayed (in the village). Our old people also go and live with their kids. The village became empty. In the past, we used to do farming and husbandry but now when people start going to city, we cannot do them any longer. Three or four families do husbandry now, the old beauty (of the village) disappeared. Now, the brides want to go to Erzurum, they do not want to live in the village. For example, if the

²⁰Interview by the author, 09 October 2014, Tortum. Gelir düzeyi yok burada yahu, dağın arasında yaşıyorlar. 250 metrekare alan 5 tane kız kardeşi doyurdu. İnsanlar hiç bir şey bulamazsa bile patates ekıyor, bir şeyler yapıyor ekmeğini oradan kazanıyor. Kimse de gidip elini açmıyor.

²¹ Interview by the author, 09 October 2014, Tortum. Kaçan kaçtı gurbete, İstanbul'a. Orada bir hortum fabrikası var. Daha önce köyden 3 kişi çalışmış orada ustaların ve patronun çok sevdiği saydığı kişiler. Onların sayesinde 200-300 tane aile çalışıyor orada.

daughter of the neighbor goes to Erzurum, the girl thinks, “Why should I stay in the village?” The son of the neighbor goes to school and finds a job in the city. The other tells his son that he should also go and find a job at minimum wage so that the wife can be a housewife. Honestly, in our village people do not have an income standard (they are poor). One cannot earn the necessary income to sustain a family in the village. Even if they stay here, they cannot sustain the family. If they work together husband and wife, they can only feed themselves. We do not have enough land for agriculture. It is difficult to subsist in here; going to the city is kind of a must. (Appendix B, 20)

The deprivation and disturbance of the economic order in the village urges migration to the cities, but the cities offer only offer a low-paid, informal and insecure working environment to the most recent comers from the village. The livelihood strategies of the migrants from Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı are no different from most of the urban-rural poor, which nothing but pluriactivity; combining on- and off-farm revenues together. Studies on pluriactivity show that the peasantry is becoming more and more pluriactive in industrialized and in developing countries. Kay (2009), citing the World Development Report of 2008, put forward that:

Smallholders increasingly move beyond the farm by diversifying their employment and income opportunities. Whether smallholders diversify their activities as a way out of distress or to grasp new opportunities is the pertinent question. Several studies have indicated that the increasing engagement of the peasantry in diverse activities is due to the crisis of peasant farming which is unable to compete with corporate agriculture in the era of . . . globalization. (p. 126)

In the essence of the debate lies the motivation for generating alternative sources of income. The strategy is used by the peasantry for various reasons: for survival or for poverty alleviation for the worse-off peasants, for effective use of the household labor-force, for minimizing the increasing risks in agriculture, for self-insurance against the side-effects of specialization, for richer peasantry, for improving the assets of the household or for capital accumulation and market integration.

A study by L.R. de Silva and K.A.S.S. Kodithuwakku shows that worse-off households engage in a differentiated portfolio of activities in order to maintain their

survival in the insecure and deregulated agricultural markets, while better-off households with more access to capital and communication facilities are more inclined to engage in off-farm activities with a more entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, they argue that worse-off households are more dependent on agriculture than the better-off ones and better-off household have more potential for improving the household income. For the worse-off households, while admitting the positive effects of the strategy for survival, Ellis (1999) notes the following:

It is widely agreed that a capability to diversify is beneficial for households at or below the poverty line. Having alternatives for income generation can make the difference between minimally viable livelihoods and destitution. However, diversification does not have an equalizing effect on rural incomes overall. Better-off families are typically able to diversify in more favorable labor markets than poor rural families. Total income and the share of income derived from non-farm sources are often positively correlated. Different income sources may have strongly differing impacts on rural inequality. For example, unequal land ownership may mean that a policy focus on crop income favors the rich above the poor; however, greater access to non-farm wage would have the reverse effect. (p. 3)

The field observations and interviews signal that pluriactivity is a strategy largely employed by the small and worse-off peasantry in this social setting. Agricultural production is supported by urban income sources. The following quotations reveal the distress migration that appears as a widespread survival strategy:

Every one is farming, everyone. Even those who live in the city come, it is full of people during the summer. In autumn, people take their food (for winter) and leave. They even come from Izmir. They sell their harvest.²²

In the similar vein, a group of women say:

We are here six months during the summer, and in the winter we work in a textile factory. We take a leave for the summer. We do farming in the summer and we sell the crops. It is more profitable here during the summer, so we prefer coming here. When we go back, again we work in the factory.

²² Interview by the author, 10 October 2014, Tortum. Herkes ziraat yapıyor herkes. Şehirde kalan herkes bile geliyor, yazın buralar doluyor. Güzün de herkes kendi yiyeceğini alıyor gidiyor. İzmir'den bile geliyor. Ekip biçtikleri şeyleri hepsi satıyorlar.

Everyone returns in the spring. They cultivate grains and take care of their trees.²³

Attachment to the village continues in the realm of local politics as well:

People come here in summer; it becomes very crowded. They all come for their vacation. They also never miss the elections. Everybody would support his or her candidate. And the candidates used to bring them here for free. Finally, they just gave up; nobody wanted to come.²⁴

Along with the pluriactive ones, existence of households that are entirely dependent on rural income is an important aspect to note along with the dependence of agricultural production on irrigation, as villagers explained:

The total area of agricultural land is 11,000 acres, it needs to be irrigated. Crops cannot survive even if you miss a week. There are plenty of people who live from agriculture. Other than the people who work additional jobs, 15% of people live only by agriculture – greenhouses, tomatoes, apples, etc. Tomatoes and beans earn more. With 15-20 acres of land and pension, a family of 6 can live.²⁵

It is important to note that the pension regime of the welfare system which is recently under serious erosion had enabled peasants to get retired by working on their own land and paying certain amounts to the public retirement fund called Bağ-Kur. The pensions became an important source of income for the reproduction of peasant households, even though the on-farm revenues were in decline. The crucial importance of irrigation and hence the river in this arid village situated between two mountains is also expressed as follows:

Three years have passed, and 3 more years we spent in the court defending. We as villagers say that either give it up, or buy it and we leave. It is

²³ Interview by the author, 10 October 2014 Tortum. Yazın buradayız 6 ay, kışın tekstil fabrikası. Yazın izin alıyoruz. Yazın ziraat yapıyoruz, onları satıyoruz. Yazın buranın karı oradan daha fazla olduğu için tercih ediyoruz burayı. Döndüğümüzde yine fabrikaya. İlbaharda herkes buraya gelir. Ekinini eker, ağaçlarına bakar.

²⁴ Interview by the author, 10 October 2014 Tortum. İnsanlar yazın gelirler, yazın bizim burası çok kalabalık olur. Hepsi gelir tatilini yapar burada. Seçim zamanları da hiç kaçtırmazdılar. Herkes o senin adayın bu benim adayım derdi. Kişiler de aday olanlar o halkı ücretsiz olarak getirirdi. En son seçime kimse gelmek istemedi, bıktı millet

²⁵ Interview by the author, 09 October 2014, Tortum. 11000 dönüm tarım arazisi var, arazilerin sulanması gerekiyor. 1 hafta sulanmazsa hiçbir şekilde ürün yetişmiyor. Hala tarımdan gelir sağlayan epey bir kesim var. Ek gelir sağlayanların yanında sadece tarımdan geçinen yüzde 15 kadar kesim var. Seracılık, domates, fasulye, elma vs. Domates ve fasulye daha fazla para getiriyor. 15-20 dönüm arazi artı emeklilik maaşı ile 6 kişilik bir aile geçiniyor.

impossible to live like this; they can buy the land and send us away, or just leave the water to us. Agriculture or husbandry — we raise the livestock by feeding them on this land. We have around 29-30 water trenches. They are going to give only 1 trench to us. They have already cancelled 7 trenches. We do not know how it happened. Look, there are 14.000 people in this valley. 14,000 people all have their private registered land. Cadastral survey has been done. In brief, if they operate this SHP, life will end for all 14,000 people. Then what should they do? They should confiscate all of the land and pay the price and not care about the rest, or they should not do anything at all. We do not want another land, if they take this land we will find another to settle. (Appendix B, 21)

To sum up, all the statistical data and villagers accounts leave us with a strong prevalence of agriculture and rural life. It was also very interesting to observe as a researcher that every person that you come across in Bağbaşı village, from the teens to the eighty-year old women, were telling the same stories and same motives for resistance to the SHPs to be constructed in this valley. Figure 29 shows the women after the police intervention to resistance. The following section is about the local politics paving way for collective mobilization in the Bağbaşı village.



Figure 29. Women after police intervention

Screenshot from <http://www.videoizle.co/video/46090/tmmob-hes-iste-boyle-belgesel-filmi>

5.4 The local politics of the rentier regime and the legal struggle

Before the amendment of the law of local administration in 2014 that changed the administrative status of the villages and towns and attached most of them as districts to the city center, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı used to have the administrative status of the towns, governed by mayors. Since they are large populated villages, the neighborhoods of the town were administrated by local governors, muhtars. When the first rumors of the SHP construction arrived at the valley, there had been three mayors and more than three muhtars in charge of the local administration. The analysis of the relations between local administrators, the company, political authority and the people provide us with information about political alliances and the perceptions of the authority of the locals and the process paving the way for collective mobilization. It is important to note that the primary objective of this thesis is to scrutinize on the popular collective action, so the individual accounts are the primary source of data. The interview fragments and excerpts are important in reflecting the perceptions and standpoints of the interviewees. Hence, the accounts on the personnel of the company are reflecting how the locals perceive the events and how their perceptions of authority shapes and shaped by the course of events. The information should be evaluated accordingly.

A villager who owns a fish farm on the river recalls the beginning of the project:

At first they come and tell about the project, this pipe you see below, to the public in such a sympathetic way. There is also the Tortum waterfall. They build a so-called waterfall, so they supposedly serve the public. A waterfall will give a visual pleasure, so people will come here. They inform the public that way. In the meantime, we have talked about it. I have talked to my father as well. There are other SHPs in the near vicinity, so we went and visited these sites. We have seen that it is not what they tell us. Then we tried to do something by filing the first petition about it to understand what it is and how it will be done. (Appendix B, 22)

The SHP construction packaged as a service to people that would contribute to the touristic value and the natural beauty of the valley though an analogy of the waterfall, which hardly resembles to the penstock pipes of the river-type power plants.

A woman recalls those days:

Sinem: Have you heard when the construction started?

- No we have heard about it before, we objected a lot and just succeeded. We collected signatures from the notable people of course. There were agronomists in Bağbaşı, the Mayor of Serdarlı, they have stood up to it. But it was not enough. When the caterpillars came to start construction, the people went out. People fought before, but nobody listened them. They fought a lot but could not succeed. (Appendix B, 23)

The important point to note from this quotation is the emphasis on the notables of the village. It is a visible tendency, especially among the women, to identify some persons as superior, the vanguards of their own agency. The culture of submission to the authority that has permeated the daily language is visible in this very quotation. A similar tendency is visible in perceptions and of the state; the police and the army, to be explained in the following sections, reveals the perception of authority that could be broken during the resistance against the SHP. The quotation below is rather long but effective in understanding local politics, which revolves around the SHP. One of the prominent figures of the Pehlivanlı village who owns a fish farm and a river-mill responds to my question on the reaction of the local headmen as:

When I heard about it, I talked to the district governor and the mayor to have a dinner and talk about water. I said, it is not because I raise fish here, but I do not want to lose nature. I mean, we can both produce electricity and have water. These people are cutting off all of the water. The top village is at 25 km. and I will see myself as the top village; you all will be at the bottom of the village. If you are in, then I am in. Then one of them agreed with me, another one did not. Another one, from our village said that they were talking as if we were in a foreign country and we do not understand. Then I hear that this very guy is hanging around with the SHP officers. . . And later this guy, damn our politics, wanted to become a candidate for mayor of Tortum and could not succeed. Internal Affairs offered him a consultant position and made him withdraw his candidature. Look what's happening. And now,

shame on the government, I heard that he is indeed a consultant to the Minister of Internal Affairs in Ankara. If somebody sinks to such small stuff and sells his own village, he might as well sell his own country. I hate AKP as well, this is not the way to win an election. (Appendix B, 24)

After the licensing of the Project and before the construction actually started, the villagers who were skeptical and critical of the SHP got in touch with the mayors. This very quotation belongs to the fish farm owner who also runs a mill and owns a guesthouse in Pehlivanlı village, so he is among the few better-off people of the village. The literature on pluriactivity suggests that better-off farmers diversify in more favorable markets such as small entrepreneurship in tourism. This family is an example of the better-off farmers who are diversifying in more favorable markets. The quotation demonstrates that he is among the notables of the village who has a direct relationship with the local governors. Another important point to note is that he has a direct interest in the water flow; the river is an immanent source of the household sustainability for this particular family. Thus, his family is among the first who was concerned by the Project. They filed the first petition and they joined in the first steps of organization against it.

The relationship of the respondent with the local governors and politicians helped us to grasp the micro-politics in the town. He states that ex-governor of the Pehlivanlı village, who was running for local elections, was encouraged by the ruling party to drop his candidacy in return for a consulting position in the capital city.

Yet another important point comes out of the interviews on the bigger question of legality and lawlessness. It is widely acknowledged that a legal struggle against the implementation of an SHP Project is the primary resistance method. Current laws and regulations involve a series of procedures and requirements to be fulfilled in order to grant the construction license and the usership rights for the private company, which undoubtedly opens opportunities to pursue a strong legal

case against it. However, courts do not operate by themselves, and cases that bring a big capital group against a group of peasants may require a strong and determined struggle backed by popular support and collective mobilization. The anti-SHP struggle of Bağbaşı is an example of how the legality, lawlessness, criminalization and violence intermingle with each other and how the ideas of justice and authority change with the course of the events.

There are certain laws and regulations to be following when an SHP is to be constructed. One basic requirement is the fulfillment of environmental impact assessment (ÇED, EIA) procedures. As the name implies, environmental impact assessment report necessitates evaluation of the environmental and societal impacts of the Project to prevent hazardous projects from implementation or to take measures and impose limitations to diminish the externalities and make sure that the Project does not seriously harm the ecological and societal sustainability. The reports are granted to private enterprises, but the right to issue a complaint or declare a legal case on the basis of mis-preparation or ill-implementation of the report is reserved. These complaints and legal cases constitute the basis of a legal struggle in the majority of the anti-SHP struggles. The Bağbaşı HES is not an exemption. The unrest brought about issues regarding the proper implementation of the regulations when the Project started in 2009. As an answer to my question on the importance of lawyers in the process, a middle-aged male villager responded:

Sinem: Are the lawyers important in the process?
(...) There should be someone that set their heart to the process. There was the fiddle of EIA report. The deputy governor wrote his name and signed that this report but that was not necessary. Are you an environmental engineer? Maybe he never came to this region. He does not know. They told him that this should be signed and he did so.²⁶

²⁶ Interview by the author, 11 October 2014, Tortum.
Sinem: Avukatlar önemli mi bu süreçte?

In this except of the interview, the villager says that the vice-governor of Erzurum province had signed the document making Bağbaşı SHP exempt from the environmental impact assessment requirements. Such an exemption means that the Project can be implemented without taking measures to ensure the environmental and economic sustainability of the region. Moreover, other procedural requirements are an information meeting and posting the announcement on a public spot to be seen by the locals. In the following quotation from an interview with a village woman, she implies that this procedure is also overruled. She states:

We did not know upfront that our mayor has sold this place. That decision was supposed to be posted and advertised for 15 days for objections. (The mayor) gave it away already, we did not know about it. It was posted for 15 days and the public will know and then decide. Is it your decision? I do not know if they bribed him but this region was sold for nothing.²⁷

The well-prepared documentary, named “Damn the Dams” by Şişman and Sarıyıldız on the anti-SHP struggle in Bağbaşı provides more solid information on the legal struggle and how the law is manipulated. The following excerpt belongs to one of the attorneys involved in lawsuit. The statement is taken from the mentioned documentary.

The governorship of Erzurum stated that the EIA is not necessary, it is simply serving the government, and it paved the way for this project. We have declared that this is illegal and pressed charges with our friends. According to the conclusion drawn by the faculty members, the environment will be adversely affected by this project and EIA is definitely needed, so the decision of the governorship of Erzurum is wrong. A second exploration was decided and this time conducted by Istanbul Technical University. Veysel Eroğlu is one of the politicians who enmeshed Turkey in SHP projects – his wife came together with the experts and it was understood that the experts and his wife had a business relationship, so they cannot be objective. Despite this opinion in the case file, the exploration has been conducted and it was

(...) Ona gönlünü veren biri lazım, inanmış biri lazım. ÇED raporu gerekli değildir dalaveresi vardı. Vali yardımcısı adını yazmış, yanına imza atmış. Yani sen çevre mühedisi misin, bu bölgeye belki hayatında gelmedi. Bilmiyor. İmzalanması gerekiyor demişler ona, imzalamış.

²⁷ Interview by the author, female respondent, 09 October 2014, Tortum. En baştan biz bilmiyoruz, bizim reisimiz satmış burayı. O gelende 15 gün asıda kalıyor evet hayır diye. (belediye başkanı) vermiş kızım bizim haberimiz yok. 15 gün askıda kalacak ki bu millet haberdar olacak da, karar verecek. Senlen oluyor mu bu iş? Günahları başlarına da bir şey yediler mi yemediler mi de satılmış da 5 paraya satılmış buralar.

concluded that the environment would not be adversely affected. Since two reports contradict each other, the court needs a third report. The court calls for the parties to make deposits, and the Bağbaşı Municipality makes the deposit in June. They wait for the next exploration date. In the meantime, the citizens want to be involved in the case. As of 07.10.2011, the court rejects the request for involvement against the conventions. The parties should be notified by the court in order to take a decision. The court cannot reject it since the citizens' fields are irrigated with this stream. However, it has been rejected and a few hours later, the court dismissed the case. Neither we, nor any lawyer, can understand this: How did the court, who could not decide on 4.6.2010, was able to decide on 7.10.2011? The court needs to answer this question. Did they have a revelation? This is the question. This is clearly against the laws. (Appendix B, 25)

In Bağbaşı, we see that the legal struggle between the company and the villagers revolved around the question of whether the environmental impact assessment was necessary or properly prepared. First the vice-governor signed the document stating that the EIA is not required. Then the villagers opposed it and the first expert exploration suggested that the EIA is necessary whereas, the second expert exploration concluded the opposite. Concerning the latter, the villagers have declared a possibility of impartiality because one of the experts had a business liaison with the wife of the Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs of the time. Villagers made a demand to become a party in the legal case but the court rejected this demand as well as the EIA requirement on the same day while the villagers were waiting for the third report of the experts. Eventually, the villagers' attorneys appealed the case to a higher court.

This brief summary is an example on how business and government relationships have become clientelist and how the legal and bureaucratic institutions become an instrument of domination and lawlessness when the commercialization of the commons is concerned. There are grey areas and cases of exemptions where the management and ownership of the common resources are concerned. There are no well-defined property rights or strict procedures to be followed, while the

commercialization and delegation of the use-rights to private companies. Here we see that the political authority wanted to directly delegate the usership rights to the private company by keeping it exempt from EIA requirements with the consent of the bureaucracy and the local court become instrumentalized during this process, in order to protect the exemption of the private company. It is important to note that the EIA process is costly and time consuming. Even though the process was completed without problem, restrictions to be imposed to protect the ecological balance would mean that the company would earn less profit than the intended level because the amount of the water to be taken into the pipes has to be determined and appropriate amount of water has to be left in the river basin to ensure the sustainability of the ecological balance and local economic activity. Therefore, in this arid environment and populated village structure, it is expected that the amount of the water left in the basin would be a significant amount, inevitably decreasing the electricity production capacity of the SHP. One villager stated the following:

The EIA reports used to be prepared by state officers, but now private companies prepare them. In this case, Mitto from Ankara prepared EIA. It is completely wrong, saying that there is no farmland, no human habitation, etc. The trees were noted as willows and poplars.²⁸

Research and media coverage showed that the main reason leading to elevation of EAI requirements for the company was the description of the area as a poplar grove which was uninhabited and uncultivated. The following quotation describes the mass upheaval after the initial phase of the legal struggle was defeated and the construction actually started:

²⁸ Interview by the author, male respondent. 10 October 2014, Tortum. Simdi bu ÇED raporunu hazırlayanlar eskiden devlet kuruluşlarıydı, şimdi özel şirketler hazırlıyorlr. Burada çed raporunu hazırlayan ankaradan mitto diye bir şey. Yalan yanlış bir rapor. İşte tarım arazisi yok, insan yaşamıyor. Nüfus kalabalığı yok. Ağaçlar hep söğüt kavak olarak gösterilmiş.

The reports in Ankara are fundamentally wrong. No human is noted in the report; this offends the residents. You (live) here, but the government says the opposite, it says I do not recognize you.²⁹

Figure 30 shows the women of Bağbaşı during a sit-down strike.



Figure 30. Women of Bağbaşı during sit-down strike

<http://meldaonur.net/?p=733>

5.5 Anti-SHP resistance in Bağbaşı

5.5.1 Facing injustice, shifting perceptions and alterations in self-concept

The initial shock to the people of Bağbaşı came with the rejection of the lawsuit demanding the implementation of EIA requirements. Affirmation of the local bureaucrat and the court that the area was a forest where people do not live caused a

²⁹ Interview by the author, male respondent. 10 October 2014, Tortum. Ankaradaki raporlar kökten sahte. Burada insan diye bir şey görünmüyor, en fazla zoruna giden o. Varsın burada, devlet diyor ki sen yoksun. Ben seni kabul etmiyorum

shift in the perception of the selves and the alteration in ways that they are attached to the authority of the state. The defeat and intentional ignorance of the authority on the very existence of the people damaged the imminent attachment of the locals to the state, which I believe is an important phase in mass mobilizations, especially in the relatively close societies in a distant rurality such as Bağbaşı. This encounter was destructive on the given attachments and loyalties, yet it hopefully created a new possibility for the re-establishment of new forms of relating with the state and authority. The formation of the collective selves was destroyed by the disregard and the reaffirmation of the authority and a new possibility to claim them reemerged.

A villager states: “They see no human here, that is what offends us the most. You are here, but the state tells that you do not exist, that they do not accept you.” This is an assault on the very existence and the agency of the people. Their way to put their agency into force was through the legal cases so far, which led to no desired outcome. Then the construction started, which caused a shift in the way that the agency is put into action that is physical resistance.

Once the first construction machines tried to enter the village on 11 December 2008, the villagers decided to impede the construction by simply sitting in front of the construction equipment and blocking the routes, thus not allowing the construction to proceed. Villagers made a demonstration against it. Then the company repeatedly tried and the villagers have reacted in the same manner. After organizing couple of demonstrations, the villagers decided to post a guard in the construction field day and night because the company also tried to bring machines during the night in order to avoid public resistance and opposition. The guard lasted for months and whenever the machines tried, those on watch were informing the villagers and hundreds of people were gathering to impede it. The place where they

stayed in shifts is on a hill overlooking the village, where the caterpillars were supposed to open a way in order to be able to place the penstocks. The villagers said they waited there for months, sitting in front of the caterpillars, day and night. They said that even in the month of Ramadan, they sat “under the sunlight, in hunger and thirst.”

In 2010, six people were arrested and sentenced to 6-months imprisonment. In September 2011, the EIA demand was rejected. The escalation rose during the course of the months and the events broke up on 11 October 2011. Villagers use the words “war” or “apocalypse” to describe that day when hundreds of police (around 500) and gendarmes entered the village and forcefully dragged people out of the occupied site. An elderly woman describes that day as follows:

We went there with our heart and soul. They knocked us off. They forced us down the hill. They kicked and beat us with truncheons. Then they put us in a van, we were yelling and crying, and nobody cared.³⁰

The violence of the police and gendarmerie intervention has become a milestone in the memories of the villagers, so does the indifference of the authorities. An old woman from Bağbaşı tells her experience as follows:

It has been 2 years since the start. Soldiers were everywhere, my girl, here and there. They did not let us go anywhere. They beat everybody, especially the women. I went there but I could not fight, I am not strong. I would not, one should not resist against the state. A man came and said that he was going to wash his head in the fountain, I said that’s fine, but our stream will vanish. He said, ‘auntie, stream will vanish, do you see these mountains? You have power, but only at home. We do not know the what state does or why they work in secrecy, at nighttime. If the state is responsible for this we cannot resist, but if it is a private company they cannot do this. Some men serve time because of this’. (Appendix B, 26)

The woman was in her seventies. I met her the moment that I entered the village. It was early in the morning and she was going to the field in order to pick up

³⁰ Excerpt from the documentary ‘Dam the damns’ by Osman Şişman and Özlem Sarıyıldız. Malımızla canımızla biz oraya gittik. Bizi oradan asagi itelediler. Yukardan asagi bastılar. Vurdular tepigi, bastılar jopu bindirdiler ordan asagi joplari. Ondan sonra attılar arabaya icine millet bagiriyor kıyamet kopuyor, kimseden bir imdat yok.

the walnuts that have fallen by themselves. She was having difficulty in walking so I offered her my help while she started telling me her experiences with the anti-SHP struggle. The field was small, surrounded by little feeders directing the water from the river, a system developed by the villagers to irrigate the fields. The water was barely enough for the fields, since it is the end of summer.

Her account of the anti-SHP resistance carries signs of confusion about the “intentions” of the state authority. The villagers’ discourses, as visible in this woman’s memory, reflect a perception of the strong state and deeply rooted submission to authority that has been associated with the state. We see that “state,” as an idea, exists as a separate, distinct, powerful and always righteous authority whose actions and cannot be questioned. Yet her reasoning leads her to question the intentions of the extrinsic entity called the state. She asks, “We could not understand, what this state does, why they are working the machines at night?” And she adds, “if it was the company doing this, we would break their hands.” On the other hand, the police and the gendarmes were intimidating the woman, saying that she did not have any power, except at homes. This intimidation finds its reflection in her account. Nevertheless, the question emerged in her thoughts as she goes on:

They took me as well, they say that I had to come. My feet did not work. I wanted to go the other way but the soldiers wouldn’t let me. I begged them to let me pass, but they did not. We were also afraid since it was the state. There was a hidden passage there, we used it to pass. I said, ‘my child, my feet do not work, I cannot go, how can you resist the state. They worked here at night. Who would take care of me if I had a surgery, I only have one son’. (Appendix B, 27)

Another woman that we came across in the field approached us and when she learned that I was there to learn about the anti-SHP struggle, she started talking. I find it necessary to convey account of these two old peasant women uninterrupted:

- They did everything; beating, some were dragged. Some were hospitalized, everything. It was an army, 700 people.

- We have a farm land my girl, how did here become a village do you think? We have little land, if we lose the water, we cannot grow anything. It is not a watery village.

- Now we are losing the water. In summertime the stream dries up, it is not enough for the land. We have a pension, although it is very low. What will people without a salary do? They send children to schools. They sell the fruits and use the money for education expenses. They survive from this money. We have a pension around 1000 TL but what will other people without pension do? Our village is so huge that you cannot walk from the start to end. It is called Bağlarbaşı, the land is huge but we have very little water. What will we do if we lose even that? The land is large, but the water is insufficient.

- How much land do you have?

- Mine is not that big though. We used to live in Erzurum but my husband retired; we married the kids off and moved here. We did not know at first that our mayor sold this place. It is pending for 15 days. (The mayor) gave it away already, but we did not know about it. It has been pending for 15 days and public should know and then decide. Is it your decision? I do not know if they bribed but this region was sold for nothing. We saw that something was being built here by the state. Later we learned that the water was sold, maybe 700, or 1,000 policemen came here. I say policemen but not all of them were, some were ordinary people with uniforms. Policewomen and policemen beat us, some fell down some fainted. We suffered a lot. Our water is the food and water for people. If we lose this stream, we won't have any water to drink. We were guarding there from early morning, in Ramadan so that we won't give our water. They came, without any mercy, swearing, beating our men, sued us. They called us from the police station, said that you threw stones to the officers, you did this and that. I am sick; I have a kidney stone. One day I heard that the policemen called me. I went there and saw that they were heavily bribed, they are all bribed. I was accused of this and that. I said that I did not do anything, I am sick. At that time I went to Erzurum for x-ray. I asked them to show me the footage; in the footage there is a person that looks like me. I asked them to watch again, and identify me. Then I said that it is a sin what you are doing, calling people one by one and asking these questions. There was a policewoman there who apologized to me. My husband also said that I was sick and they would be responsible if anything happens to me. The policewoman asked for forgiveness, I said I will not forgive you. You dragged us around; we lost our water, our property, and our lives. We have suffered a lot, my girl; there were also some people among us who were bribed. It happened inside the village as well, they chased people who are against the SHPs. My husband has no tolerance for injustice; he wants that (although he does not own a farm) people with farmland should be able to feed their families, school their children, what will they do without water? He resists so that they keep their water.

If this SHP is built, the stream will vanish. Everything is done, piping and so, it will be connected to something? (Generator) Now in the news we see that it is cancelled. The people who started this project were together with our prime minister's brother in law. Our mayor sold the water. We did not know about it. Then we called the people to come and see here, if it is only willows and poplars. We have many kinds of fruit, apples, pears, quinces, everything.

They throw tear gas at us. Two policemen came when the caterpillar was working, one held my left arm and the other my right arm. I was just sitting there, God is my witness, I did not throw any stones. They came and pulled me unsuccessfully. Then they threw tear gas at me; I fainted. They sprayed it right onto my face. They are just aides, but merciless. My face burnt, became red and swollen. Poison. We do not understand who is responsible, my girl. If it is our government, the ministers should come and see. You know the guy, the leftist, Kılıçdaroğlu³¹, he came here and hired lawyers to defend us. He helped a lot. He asked what are these people guilty of. Their land is poor. They are poor. I tell you, I have a pension but many do not. He came and helped us, took us to bank. Who is going to defend us? We resisted. It is cancelled but it is not for good. This project will continue. (Appendix B, 28)

Her experience is like a brief summary of the anti-SHP struggle in Bağbaşı.

After living in Erzurum, where her husband works, they came back to the village.

They are supplementing the retirement pension of the husband with subsistence farming. Although they do not own much land, the income they earn is enough for the subsistence of the family. They are well aware of the fact that the water flowing from the river is the basis of the subsistence of many others, so they joined in the resistance, which was suppressed brutally by the police who beat the men and the women and arrested a myriad of people.

In the quotation, two points are interesting. The first one is the weakening of the attachment with the AKP government. When the construction started, most villagers thought that it is the government working for the good of the village. However, when they became aware of the fact that the usership right of the water was granted to a private company, this illusion diffused. The woman still struggles with the thought of why no government member or party member came to the village, to talk to them, to understand their problems. That's because the loyalty to the government, to political authority, requires attention to the problems of the fellow citizens, in part of the government. Nevertheless, she complains about the indifference of the government officials, while the leader and deputies of the CHP,

³¹Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is a Turkish social democrat politician. He is also the leader of CHP, Republican Peoples Party

Republican Peoples Party (CHP), the “left” came to listen and supported them in their struggle. The detachment deepened when they came face to face with the police force, the indifference of the bureaucracy and the injustice from the justice system. We see this in various interviews and media coverage. A woman states, ‘When I saw the prime minister (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) on TV, I used to say that I loved him more than my son, my brother, but now I hate him. I hate them all. They are all full up. They filled (bribed) these people up, I am convinced.’³²

The resistance generated minimal response on the level of the officials, not a single moderation or amelioration. We can observe how the attachment with the ruling authority and the sense of citizenship was undermined in the following quotation:

We are only in contact with the soldiers and the police. There is no official who comes and talks to us. A soldier comes, confronts us with bludgeons and pepper spray. Everyday, in every incident they come with gendarmes. If this thing belongs to the private sector, why is the gendarmerie involved? If it belongs to the state, state officials should come. They left it to the gendarmerie. They (the gendarmes) guard the construction as we guard our village. (Appendix B, 29)

The state violence was faced systematically during the resistance, but the absence of any official who lent an ear to their demands blurred the distinction between the state and the company. The presence of state security forces to protect construction is the major reason for their confusion. Similar tendencies appeared in other interviews and focus group meetings, as seen in following excerpts:

- We started to understand PKK, they did not take the hills for nothing. One feels like restrained.
- Not any single authority came here, unfortunately. Only the CHP deputy of Çanakkale came. Emine Ülker Tarhan, deputy of İstanbul. (Melda Onur)

³² Basbakan cikti miydi televizyona derdim ki oglumdan da cok sevirem kardesimden de cok sevirem, simdi nefret ettim. Hepsinden nefret ettim. Bunlar hep doymuslar kizim. Bunlari doyurmuslar, ben ote beri bilmem.

- Even though AKP votes are around 90%, including me, they did not send any single person here to check us to listen to our problems. And right now it is still 90%. It disturbs a person.
- Once upon a time Russia invaded here and stayed for 3 years and did nothing but good. These people cannot be compared to them. They behave like we are not citizens of this country. Russians built roads here. These ones sent their police; they beat the women. They cannot do it to other people but they did it to us. Look at us; we are always in the court, in Erzurum and Ankara. They dismissed the case. We are supposedly bandits, we all are. The men are useless but did you see our women? (Appendix B, 30)

Even though it is not among the research objectives of this dissertation, it is necessary to note that the disappointment in the voting behavior is minor. The villagers admit this fact and add:

- CHP came here with everybody but still did not get any votes. Only in the final election they could get some.
- When I was a kid, they (CHP) took away the veils of some women, so they cannot get any votes still. But the police and soldiers came here, swore at 50-100 women, dragged them and they still vote for them. I do not understand it. They put a spell on people or so.
- This was a municipality; they closed it and connected it to Erzurum. They did everything to us and still get the votes, I do not understand. If you want to get result in the election you lie, you say that you give the vote to prime minister. It was 40 years ago since being a municipality. Look over there, there is a brand-new community clinic, are there any doctors? We used to have 2 doctors, 2 nurses and an ambulance waiting. (Appendix B, 31)

5.5.2 Violence and criminalization

Going back to the words of the old women quoted on page 165, the second point that captures attention that is evident and impossible to ignore is the violence during the intervention and subsequent and exigent criminalization. Every single person that I have interviewed told me stories on the harshness of the police intervention; how crowded they were and how they arrived in busses and attacked people with pepper gas and batons and how they dragged them, pushed them with shields etc. Figure 31 shows a scene from the mentioned police intervention. Three police officers attacked a woman who is at least in her sixties. Two of them held her arms while the third

sprayed the pepper gas directly on her face. Two other women describe the extent of the violence as follows:

The police came with 4-5 buses, they forced people down the hill. It started in spring and lasted until fall. We even waited during Ramadan, starved. They attack us from above. . . We resisted against the SHP. If you visit, you will see that there are many villages. The construction of the SHP is almost completed, there are only some tunnels left. Policemen beat us all. You should see the arms of women, all bruised. They threw tear gas, did everything, dragged women. We sat on caterpillar to stop its operation. I used to go there everyday. (Appendix B, 32)



Figure 31. Women fighting against the police, Bağbaşı

Screenshot from <http://www.videoizle.co/video/46090/tmmob-hes-iste-boyle-belgesel-filmi>

The intervention was violent. The police beat up the women and the men, they got injured, they were dragged on the soil and they got arrested. One man summarizes the events and resistance as follows:

A lot happened here, we resisted, we watched there for a few months, people stayed there. They did not sleep in their homes. In Erzurum, there were no

special forces; they all have been transferred here to beat us. Then, they started the construction. People were jailed, and many more things. You should have seen it. When we look back, I can say that there is nothing that people did not do. They did everything to resist. This is the result. When we look back we do not say “if only”. When grandchildren think about their grandparents, they cannot say that they did not do this or that. (Appendix B, 33)

As seen in most of the interviews cited above, the intervention had not been enough. It was followed by a widespread and systematic criminalization of those who participated in the resistance. Legality, which could not function during the lawsuits demanding EIA, was put into force in order to punish the people, without exception. In order to picture the extent, we can revisit the experience of the women, who was dragged out of the field by the police who sprayed pepper gas directly on her face. She was summoned to the police office accused of throwing stone and resisting the police. Before the day of brutal police intervention, 6 people were already sentenced to 6-month imprisonment from the same crime as another women tells:

But nothing worked. My brother served 5 days in prison because of the SHP, and then he was sentenced to 5 years. Later, an arrest warrant was sent, then they sent them to superior court, still ongoing. We have a lot of problems. 5 others were with my brother; they served much more. My brother served just 5 days; the others threw stones at cars, and they served 5-6-7 months. (Appendix B, 34)

It is important to note that the construction started two years later than the intended date because of the legal and physical resistance. The subcontracting firms changed three times during the process. The villagers stated that Kayı Construction wanted to do carry the construction but the resistance impeded it. One villager says:

At first they tried to do it themselves, we did not let them. They gave to other companies from Erzurum so that they know the people but it was unsuccessful as well. I think Kayı continues now, but it is already cancelled. We resisted a lot, and the Erzurum 2nd Administrative Court decided to cancel the project. At first there was pressure to continue and court decided to continue, so then we applied to the Council of State, and they saw that the

verdict was wrong. Experts from 5 universities were sent here, and according to the report that they prepared, a decision would be given. (Appendix B, 35)

Here, in this quotation, we see that the strategy, similar to the case of Arhavi, that subcontracting the construction to a local firm which knows the society better thus manipulates better is useful to handle the contention. However, in Bağbaşı this strategy did not work, unlike in Arhavi; the resistance could neither be co-opted, nor weakened. In a local newspaper, the owner of the subcontracting firm, Erdal Turan, stated that they made a loss of around 3 million TL in 3 months and added “if we cannot finish on time, we will have to pay 500 thousand TL per day. To reimburse, we are suing 10 people that we have identified for damages.”³³

It is interesting to observe that the company has also subcontracted the cost of the resistance to the subcontracting firm and the firm has sued 10 people of Bağbaşı. Those 10 people were made to pay 50,000 TL fine, and 25 people were fined for 250-500 TL. On the other hand, it is important to note that three subcontracting firms went bankrupt during the resistance.

The unequal treatment by the courts and the police is one of the major experiences marking the shifting perceptions of the villagers towards the state, the authority and the justice system. The following quotation is telling in this regard.

The court process was relentless. To be honest, it was very biased. Some friends filed complaints. None of them were addressed. The caterpillar loaded stones to its scoop and unloaded it on top of people. This caused a fray. Cars windows were broken, people were harmed. Nobody came and asked about anything. Only I heard on it TV. They say that 9 out of 10 people voted for us, only 3-5 people are against us. They can come and check it out. Last time they raided here, they came with 550 cops, 15-20 soldiers. They say that these are “foreign forces” outside the village. They can come and check their IDs, which they already did. They identified every one of us. (Appendix B, 36)

³³Yüklenici firma sorumlusu Erdal Turan, üç ayda üç milyon zarar ettiklerini söyleyerek, "Eğer zamanında bitiremezsek lisans sahibi firmaya günlük 500 bin TL tazminat ödemek zorunda kalacağız. Bu zararın tazmini için tespit ettiğimiz 10 kişi hakkında tazminat davası açtık" dedi

The events recounted in the quotation resulted in the imprisonment of six people. Five of them were sentenced to 6-months imprisonment for damaging the private property of the company. On the other hand, the complaints of the villagers were left unanswered by the relevant authorities, and it created the perception that state protects the company. The injustice could not find a reaction from the political authority as well. The interviewee complained about the criminalization and stigmatization by the political authority. Official declarations on the events carry criminalization of the protestors by stating that they are the provoking the docile population that predominantly votes for the ruling party of the time, AKP. Discursive criminalization on behalf of the ruling party had legal dues for the villagers as well. Alongside the fines and the imprisonment, large-scale detention and probation were employed in order to deter the population. Two hundred fifty-two people were called to sign a document certain days of the week to ensure that they would be unable join the protests, while there were lawsuits against a myriad of them.

Among them, the most striking of the probations exercised against the people of Bağbaşı is the case of Leyla. Figure 32 demonstrates a newspaper coverage in national media on the sanctions against Leyla for participating the resistance. It is also a crystalized example of the extent of systematic criminalization exercised in the village.

HES'i protesto eden Leyla'nın 9 yıl hapsi istendi

ERZURUM'un Bağbaşı Beldesi'nde Hidroelektrik Santralini (HES) protesto eylemlerine katılan Leyla Yalçinkaya'ya mahkeme, 'HES eylemlerine katılanlarla görüşmeme' cezası vermişti. Bu cezayla gündeme gelen ve HES protestolarının sembol ismi olan Leyla'nın başı dertte. Bu kez Leyla hakkında 3 ayrı suçlamada 9 yıl kadar hapis istemiyle dava açıldı.

Taş atıp, küfür etti iddiası

Tortum İlçe Jandarma Komutanlığı'nda er olarak vatani görevini yapan 22 yaşındaki Abdullah Teke, HES protestoları sırasında Leyla'nın attığı taşla yaralandığını, Leyla'nın kendisine küfür ettiğini, Er Adil Aldemir ise aynı gün kendisine 'şerefsizler' diye bağırarak hakaret ettiğini ileri sürdü. Bunun üzerine Tortum Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, Leyla hakkında dava açtı. Savcılık Leyla için 3 ayrı suçtan 9 yıl hapis istedi. 21 Şubat günü Tortum Adliyesi'nde başlayacak ilk duruşmayı, CHP İstanbul Milletvekili Melda Onur başkanlığındaki bir heyet de izleyecek. (DHA)



Çocuk mahkemesinde dava açıldı

Önce akrabaları da dahil, protestoya katılanlarla konuşma cezası alan Leyla Yalçinkaya (sağda) şimdi de hapis korkusu yaşıyor. 9 yıl hapsi istenen Leyla, olay tarihinde 17 yaşında olduğundan, çocuk mahkemesinde yargılanacak...

Figure 32. Newspaper coverage on a lawsuit against 17-year-old Leyla.

<http://meldaonur.net/?p=499>

Leyla is a young woman from Bağbaşı village. When the events broke out and the police intervened against the protestors, she was 17 years old. She was first taken under custody and then put on probation. She was banned by the court from going to the construction site and from talking with the other villagers. Then, two conscripted soldiers who were on duty during the intervention sued her. Soldiers sued her on the basis that she threw stones and caused injury and insulted the soldiers. There were three different lawsuits against her and the prosecutor demanded up to 9 years of imprisonment.

Leyla is showing the extremity of the criminalization process. The extent is hidden in the declaration of the attorneys of the cases. Among them, the most

famous one is Eşber Yağmurdereli, who was born in Tortum. He is among the influential political figures of the left in the 1970s, and spent long years in prison (Yağmurdereli, 2015). After the illegality and criminalization reached to peak, he volunteered for the defense of the villagers as their lawyer. He stated that there are more than 500 lawsuits against the villagers that demanded 2-5 years of imprisonment (Akkuş, 2013).

Figure 33 shows a scene from the resistance of the villagers. Here, in this photo we see an old villager surrounded by the policemen. After two years of physical resistance, when I was doing the field research, the memories were still alive, and so is the distinction between the “criminal” and the “protestor” who is struggling for legitimate demands. The following quotation shows us the clearness of the distinction, despite all the deterrence they faced.

We are growing all kinds of fruits, except citrus. They are all organic. No artificial fertilizers, no chemicals, only animal fertilizer. We wonder whether it is going to end or not. We lost hope. We are all patriots here. When we came across policemen and soldiers, we lost trust in the government. They did not see us as people, so we can do something. I have been at the court for 3 years. They ask me “why did you go there,” dear judge if this stream runs out we will be perished, the life ends. We did not go to clash with the police or the workers. We went there so that the authorities can hear us; they can be a remedy. Unfortunately, they did not understand. No other problem happens here, stealing or so. (Appendix B, 37)



Figure 33. Struggle in Bađbaşı

<http://bianet.org/bianet/cevre/137156-tortum-daki-hes-e-durdurma>

5.5.3 Fruits of the resistance and misery

The struggle and the misery of the people of Bađbaşı finally bore fruit when the complaints about the disposal of excavation waste managed to evoke an official response. The construction was carried in the basin for 14 km. The mountains were dug in order to make roads and to place penstocks. Naturally, the excavation waste reached enormous proportions, so the sub construction firm named PALDET carried them to fields and even in the river basin. The villagers issued a complaint to the Official Directorate of the State Hydraulic Works. Upon the investigation, the Directorate prepared a report declaring the suspension of the implementation of the project as a result of the following observations (“Tortum’daki Hes İnşaatına ‘Geçici Durdurma’”, 2012):

It has been understood that the waste from construction was dumped randomly to streambed and this waste has cut the connection between the stream and the source. The archive in our district office has been inspected and there is no information about the waste dumping areas and also there has been no study about finding a dumping area. The main contractor and subcontractor also has no project about waste dumping in the archives. The connection between a river mouth and the source should be reestablished at once by retaining uncontrolled dumping and removing the already dumped waste. (Appendix B, 38)

The major cause of the suspension is the fact that there is no environmental impact assessment report that foresees possible environmental consequences and imposes measures to regulate them. Excavation waste disposal is among the most important, and there is no measure binding the company in the project. Finally, after repeated rejection of the lawsuits arguing for the necessity of the EIA by the local courts, the DSİ decided that the construction had to be suspended until necessary measures were taken and the damage reversed.

Following this development, another good news arrived in Bağbaşı from the high court that evaluated the appeal of the villagers and annulled the local court decision that granted EIA exemption to the company on 16 May 2012. Upon the decision, an impartial expert group from five different universities was formed. The experts decided that the SHP projects would seriously affect the ecological, economic and social life in the valley. It made clear that agriculture is the main economic activity and it would be adversely affected. The report was presented to the local court that finally cancelled the licenses of all 3 SHP projects in the Ödük Valley(DHA, 2014). After 4 years of struggle on every front, the villagers were able to stop the construction, and prevent SHP from operating. Kayı's license to build SHP projects is also cancelled. Now the project is suspended but the villagers are skeptical and pessimistic as seen in the following words of a villager:

Sinem: How does SHP project continue now?

V: Hopefully it finished, we pray for that. People had enough of resisting. They are not in a position to resist. They only pray now, they gave up, they lost. It was devastating, they were cruel to us. Our people were tormented unspeakably. They know that we are good people, we are not aggressive, we are not destructive. They could cause bloodshed. Is it possible to kick a 90-year-old lady, can anyone keep silent about it? Similar things happened. Soldier and public officials are all biased. (Appendix B, 39)

5.6 Meanwhile in Pehlivanlı

As explained in the first sections of this chapter, Pehlivanlı is the neighboring village of Bağbaşı. As seen in Figure 34, the two villages are only half a kilometer from each other. Pehlivanlı is situated towards the end of the valley where the main regulator of the SHP is placed. Unlike in the mobilization in Bağbaşı, the villagers of Pehlivanlı village remained silent and sometimes supportive of the Bağbaşı SHP.

The attitudes of people in these two villages are direct opposites of each other, which is undoubtedly intriguing. Pehlivanlı dwellers did not oppose the SHP, while the ones just half a kilometer away were beaten up or taken into prison. A villager from Pehlivanlı states:

Our village did not object. Our mayor even supported the SHP. In the whole town, only my husband resisted. Think about it, even our relatives did not support us, did not ask why Ali is resisting it. Nobody backed us. The Bağbaşı and Serdarlı villages resisted with their hearts and souls; they are the leaders.³⁴

What made the villagers of Pehlivanlı unresponsive to the SHP that also would have affected their own village? Answering this question will be useful in addressing the possible forces and motives that mobilized people in Bağbaşı and that made villagers of Pehlivanlı unresponsive.

³⁴ Interview by the author, 09 October 2014, Tortum. Bizim köy karşı çıkmadı. Bizim belediye başkanımız HES'ten destek çıktı, halktan çıkmadı. Bir Pehlivanlı'da düşün ki bir benim eşim karşı çıktı. Düşün ki kendi akrabamızdan bile diyen olmadı ki yani Ali Bey burada karşı çıkıyorsa ne sebepte çıkıyor. Destek çıkan olmadı. Bağbaşı, Serdarlı oralar canıyla dişiyile karşı çıkıyorlar. Bunlar yürütüyorlar bu işi.



Figure 34. Aerial view of Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı

Google Earth

It is important to note that the Google Earth pin marks show the administrative centers of the villages, but the lower parts of the villages are closer and the photo shows that the Ödük stream that passes through Bağbaşı continues through the lower neighborhoods of Pehlivanlı until it joins another water flow at the Kireçli Bridge, where the generator and turbine of Bağbaşı SHP were built.

Field research revealed two factors which led to silence in Pehlivanlı: employment opportunities by the company and less threat to livelihood based on agricultural production. As several interviews confirm, the ratio of irrigated land to be affected by the SHP is higher in Bağbaşı than in Pehlivanlı. The interviewees stated that 11,000 hectares of land would be adversely affected in Bağbaşı, while it was just 1,000 hectares in Pehlivanlı. Most of the arable land in Pehlivanlı is in the upper neighborhoods, where they can irrigate their land from another stream. Therefore, the peasants of Pehlivanlı would be affected less by the SHP compared to the peasants of Bağbaşı. As a villager said “Up the hill, the part which receive most

harm is Bađbaşı village. We do not have much land on that water. They have large lands.”³⁵

The company, realizing this difference in people’s attitudes, decided to pay the villagers in Pehlivanlı in order to avoid a stronger and unified resistance and to continue construction of the SHP. Initially they decided to construct the regulator in Bađbaşı and they wanted to purchase land from some villagers. When they faced resistance, they decided to construct the generator in the exit of Pehlivanlı. They purchased some land from the peasants at critical points of the construction and offered employment to locals. A villager from Pehlivanlı recalls:

Our village, Pehlivanlı, did not support it. The stream flows down and their land is on top of the hill, this affects us. The major point is that they have young people. Young and unqualified people, lazy people, they have hired these people and paid their salaries although they did nothing. What happened then? Somebody’s relative got a job there, so other people said that they earned their money; I cannot take the bread out of his mouth. They used this argument a lot. But think about it, the construction only lasted for 2 years, and they gave only 1000 TL; in total 24.000 TL. If it was more than enough to change their life, maybe, but this was selling your neighbor for money. This is just pocket money . . . They all need even this pocket money, would they not? I tell you, their income is low but this project does no good for the future, and they are not starving. (Appendix B, 40)

As explained throughout the chapter, the socioeconomic status in the village is low and agriculture is the main economic activity. Formal employment opportunities are limited and youth unemployment is high. Therefore, the main axe that divides people and defines their contentions are the livelihood pressures that they experience. The pressure in Bađbaşı is stronger because the SHP was a direct threat to the livelihood but for Pehlivanlı, less land would be affected by the SHP, and hence the villagers made decisions that provided short-term benefits. This

³⁵Interview by the author, 09 October 2014, Tortum. Burdan yokuşa doğru, asıl zarar gören kesim Bađbaşı köyü var. Oranın zarar görmesi şimdi bizim bu su üzerinde fazla aramız yok, onlarınkisi çok fazla arazili.

attitude undermines the chances of solidarity among the villagers. The following excerpt is telling:

The people of Bağbaşı are already resisting, but these people here, whatever they talk, they can just change their minds if you pay them. They say that they will not give any land: Then the company comes and asks about their income. They say 50TL, company says I will pay you 500 TL and I will start construction. At first they say that they would not support. Some of them secretly dealt with the company for the land in return for money. Others tell these people to take care of themselves. People are pragmatist; our villagers are like that. The mayor is so. Now electricity is produced, and there is the construction site of that SHP. They gave farmlands there, also some from uphill. We lost our grip now, so no one can resist. (Appendix B, 41)

5.6.1 Menfaat vs ekmek

Similar to the other anti-SHP struggles, company used measures to buy the people. This included purchasing land for more than the market price or bribing the key figures. *Menfaat* means ‘interest’ in Turkish language. *Menfaat* is the most commonly used word by the villagers of Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı when they recount the SHP. Ali is the owner of a fish farm and a water mill on the Ödük Stream; he is among the few people who fought against the SHP in Pehlivanlı since the beginning. His experiences reveal how the discourses and debates lock around the issue of *menfaat*. Both the villagers in Bağbaşı and in Pehlivanlı said that he opposes the SHP because he runs a fish farm on the river as the following excerpt shows of the villager from Pehlivanlı:

Very few support the SHP. Some are mischief. Some do to find job or earn money. People in Pehlivanlı worked for construction. There is one person who does not want the SHP since he has lots of fish. Pehlivanlı village uses another stream for water. They supported the project for money.³⁶

³⁶ Interview by the author, 11 October 2014, Tortum. HES’i destekleyen pek az. Muzır olan oluyor da. Paraya sebep, işe sebep bir şeyler oluyor. Pehlivanlı’nın insanı çalıştı. (insaatta) Ali Koçak da istemiyor, onun balığı çok ya. Pehlivanlı’da başka çaydan su kullanıyorlar. Paraya sebep desteklemişlerdir.

It is interesting to observe that the people always assumed an element of interest in others' attitudes towards the SHP. It is expected and usual for the people who side with the company, but people also assume a pursuit of interest for the villager who opposes the SHP. However, the same assumption also applies to the people who oppose the SHP in Pehlivanlı. The fact that he has an imminent interest in the flow of the water is perceived as the reason behind his opposition to the SHP. *Menfaat* has pejorative connotations but in our case it goes beyond the pejorative sense and becomes a concept that motivates the direction of political behavior. He does not deny his imminent interest in the river, like other villagers who state that they fight for the bread, *ekmek*, so it means to ensure survival. He states:

I have rented the stream to the state before. The grain mill also has a separate stream. This is a salmon farm; they need to give me water somehow. If my stream does not come with a separate pipe, the fish farm cannot work. In Bağbaşı village, they use it for irrigation; the remaining water is not enough. They have written 80 liters of water. It is not possible with 80 liters of water; I need 200-250 liters of water. When the project is completed, they will simply say that you should work the farm less. Then I will sue them, but the judges are their men, they will also say that I should work my farm with 80 lt. Then what is it called, vegetative state, I will be in. I have such problems. I do not; really do not want the stream to be cut. Then they promised me this much and I asked villagers, my stream is promised, why am I resisting? Then they say that his stream will mix with the branch and we will use it. Sure you will use but you should support a bit. (Appendix B, 42)

He frankly states that the SHP will adversely affect his business, so he fights against it in order to ensure his share of water flowing from the river. The others in Pehlivanlı see his opposition and they also think that they will have enough flow from the river thanks to his fish farm and the water mill because his fish farm is located in the upper parts of the Ödük Stream flowing through Pehlivanlı. Moreover, the other keyword 'bread', that alludes to people's motives in this social setting, also appears in his polemics with the fellow villagers:

He asks me, don't you want us to earn money (eat bread)? You jackass, you will work there for 2 years, earn 20.000 TL, after 2 years you earn nothing

but when they hold the stream there will be no life here, even if you go away. It is said that they will pay but it is kept confidential. It would only be gossip right now. (Appendix B, 43)

The villagers of Pehlivanlı perceived the SHP as a way to earn some money to supplement the household income. The connotations of ‘ekmek’ are significant from this stance. Another woman from Pehlivanlı recalls the discussions of Ali with the others as follows:

Our mayor supported the SHP. I do not know why he was. They asked why Mr. Ali was resisting because our village would benefit from that. They built the construction site at the entrance of our village . . . There is a large land; the site was built there. People said that many villagers will work there. Look, many people earn money (*ekmek*), so do not resist so that your sons can work here as well. They worked and earned some. A little bit but they earned. (Appendix B, 44)

It is important to address the motives of non-mobilization in Pehlivanlı in understanding the strong mobilization in Bağbaşı. The *menfaat* and *ekmek* explain not only non-mobilization in Pehlivanlı, but also the mobilization in Bağbaşı. These are two neighboring villages, which have undergone the same structural transformation and share same culture, history, and politicization patterns. Livelihood formations are similar in these two settings, so the livelihood pressures for the peasant households are similar. The same livelihood pressures breed two directly opposite politicization patterns under the stimulus of the SHP that was felt and perceived in a different fashion and to differential degrees.

The SHP exerted critical pressure on the poor peasant households of Bağbaşı; it would gravely affect the agricultural production in the village, the basic source of subsistence. Therefore, facing very serious pressures, the villagers of Bağbaşı fought against the SHP with all means possible. On the other hand, the adverse effects on subsistence agriculture in Pehlivanlı was comparatively less. It was not supposed to affect most of the arable land. Moreover, the SHP opened up short-term

opportunities for the villagers. Land was purchased for more than the market price, getting money from the company and working in the construction were tempting for the people of Pehlivanlı because these provided means for easing the livelihood pressures, at least in the short-term.

The difference between the two villages is stark, but another finding that was mentioned throughout the chapter also confirms the key importance of the threat to livelihoods. It is not only the villagers of Pehlivanlı who did not support the mobilization, but also some villagers in Bağbaşı whose land is situated in areas that would not be affected by the SHP, demonstrated the attitude that the following quotation implies:

- So you say that people whose land will be affected resisted but the others did not?
- Yes, people with bigger lands did so. It is not only a land issue; the stream should flow. These people are not conscious of that. The court case still goes on. All of the sewage is connected to that stream, what will happen without it, it will stink. Irrigation turn will come once in a month at least . . . People in Serdarlı did not resist as well. The project does not cause damage to anything there, but the other 14 km. (Appendix B, 45)

The case of the SHP mobilization in Bağbaşı and non-mobilization in Pehlivanlı enables a scrutiny on the interplay between mobilizing and silencing factors in an irrigated setting where subsistence agriculture is prevalent. It is important to observe the mobilizing effects of livelihood pressures on the previously docile, non-politicized and compliant sector of the society which does not belong to any ethnic or religious minority and in which the state authority is perceived as sacred. Yet Bağbaşı constitutes one of the most brutal cases of anti-SHP mobilizations in Turkey, where people were beaten up by the police, collectively punished and criminalized. On the other hand, the emergence, patterns and discourses of mobilization are significantly different from the mobilizations (and non-mobilizations) in the non-irrigated cases of Arhavi and Borçka. The next

chapter provides a comparison of all four cases and traces the underlying reasons for differentiated patterns of rural mobilization.



CHAPTER 6

FOUR CASES IN COMPARISON

The dissertation started with a simple question: How does dependence on irrigation for agricultural production affect the anti-SHP mobilizations in a rural setting? Even though the correlation seemed straightforward, a comparative analysis of four cases revealed that the relationship between water-dependency and mobilization is a more than straightforward but is complex and layered if analyzed from a wider perspective of the political economy and spatial construction. However, the relationship between the geographical space and the society is not one way. The space produces us and our subjectivities as well, while we, as humans, produce the space by working, acting and living in it. That spatiality and society are mutually constitutive of a foundational tenet of critical geographies scholarship, a core idea grounded in Lefebvre's germinal work, *The Production of Space* (Halfacree, 2006, p. 44; Soja, 1989, p. 19). The production of space, Smith (1984) reminds us, "implies the production of the meaning, concepts and consciousness of space which are inseparably linked to its physical production" (p. 77).

The manifolds of spatial construction and the manifested impacts on mobilization patterns become clear through step-by-step analysis of the four cases. I will follow the logic of Lefebvre — conceived space (*espace conçu*) vs perceived space (*espace perçu*) — and Fernandes (material and immaterial territories) in order to be able to systematically explain the different layers that contribute to spatial construction and specific types of agency emerging in particular types of spatiality.

6.1 Production, viability of the place, migration and material territories

Two of the four cases of anti-SHP mobilization take place in non-irrigated context and the other two in irrigated. The non-irrigated ones are located in the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey, where the climate is humid and rainfall is abundant while the irrigated ones are in the arid Eastern Anatolia. Undoubtedly, the crops produced in the arid land are different from those in the humid and rainy lands of the coastal Black Sea. Hence, the crop system appears as the primary difference between the categories of irrigated and non-irrigated settings.

6.1.1 The impact of the crop system: Commercial vs subsistence production

The primary difference between irrigated and non-irrigated social settings is obviously the crop system and its evolution throughout time by the state policies or market dynamics. In the differentiation between the rainy valleys of Artvin (Borçka and Arhavi) and arid villages of Tortum, it is observed that the crops and production patterns have evolved differently. A divergent transformation of production in the villages resulted in differential pressures on the livelihoods and affected the course of social transformation as well. For the two categories of villages that are under scrutiny, the commodification of agricultural production appears as the main axe of differentiation. Peasant households in the Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı villages of Tortum still form their livelihood on subsistence farming that was supported by some degree of income diversification. They produce various fruits, vegetables and grains thanks to the river flowing down the valley and micro-climatic conditions enabled by the mountains that surround the villages. However, the transformation of the peasant agriculture in Arhavi and Borçka from subsistence production to cash-crop

production is significant in the transformation of the social structure, push-factors, migration and subsequent urbanization.

6.1.1.1 The proliferation of tea-farming in the Eastern Black Sea region

What defines the particularity of the Eastern Black Sea region is the proliferation of tea production through persistent state incentives since the 1930s. The region was not well connected to the economic centers, the land is scattered, mountainous and difficult to cultivate. Rize and its surroundings used to be among the poorer regions of Anatolia. The rural economy during the early Republican period was directed towards subsistence and the main staple was maize (Beller-Hann & Hann, 2000). In addition to subsistence farming, remittances from male migrants were supporting the local economy (Zihnioğlu, 1998). From the beginning of the twentieth century, the fragmentation of land through inheritance rendered most farms insufficient for household subsistence, so the male labor began migrating to other regions, particularly to Istanbul and the big cities of the Western Turkey, as well as the cities of Russia. The situation deteriorated for the inhabitants of the Eastern Black Sea region with the Bolshevik revolution that hindered the labor migration and with the Great Depression that abated the exports of fruits and hazelnuts (Hann, 1990). Tea was considered as the most suitable crop to cope with the poverty in the region. Moreover, tea consumption and yet the tea imports were gradually rising. The promotion of tea production was also in line with the agrarian capitalism of the DP and as well as subsequent import substitution industrialization.³⁷ Public incentives

³⁷Import substitution industrialization (ISI) is the economic policy which aims at replacing foreign imports with domestic production to reduce dependency and bring about a self-sufficient national economy. ISI strategy was dominant in Turkey between the years of 1950-1980. For more information on ISI policies in Turkey, please refer to:

resulted in an increase in the number of tea producers. The state not only guaranteed attractive prices for the tea yield, but it also very actively developed the infrastructure for transportation and processing. Producers were encouraged to replace maize plots with tea bushes. In 1947, the first tea factory was founded in Rize and many others followed it. Turkish tea production had to be protected from the pressures of international competition. Unlike the large-scale plantations of South Asia or the collectivized production in the state-owned farms of the USSR, smallholders in Turkey produced tea and the harvest just took place between May and October. In order to protect the infant tea industry from the quality standards of the international market and from the global price pressures, Çay-Kur was established as the state monopoly. Quality standards were disregarded and Çay-Kur bought all the yield of the smallholders. The tea economy was made possible in the suitable climate of the Eastern Black Sea region and substantial state protection ultimately brought prosperity to the poor rural households of the region (Beller-Hann & Hann, 2000). As a consequence, subsistence farmers were transformed into cash-crop producers. Tea became a profitable crop for the peasants to cultivate and it began to be grown in most of the arable land and gained the status of a mono-crop in the region. However, unconditional state purchases and price guarantees boosted production and resulted in setbacks. Peasants, who wanted to maximize their income, picked the tea leaves extensively, not taking quality standards into account. Normally, only the fresh upper leaves should be picked. The result was immense increase in yield but proportionate decline in the quality and Çay-Kur was dumping the tea to the sea. By the beginning of 1980s, Çay-Kur decided to implement new picking equipment, harvesting techniques, quota and price regulations to control

Pamuk, S. (1981). Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey. *MERIP Reports*, (93), 26-32.
Pamuk, Ş. (2008). *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete* (Vol. 2). Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

quality and marketability. The reform was in line with the emerging neoliberalization trend that began after the coup d'état of 1980. Furthermore, the monopoly position of Çay-Kur was lifted in 1986. Figure 35 presented below is helpful in illustrating the rise of tea economy and how it was affected by the regulations of the 1980s.




Figure 35. Proliferation of tea cultivation

TurkStat, 2014

Here, in Figure 36, the discrepancy between the area of the tea gardens and amount of yield is clear. The area of gardens increased until the mid-1980s and so did the yield, but the yield increased exponentially. This made the prosperity of the smallholders in the Eastern Black Sea region possible, together with state incentives and market protection. Yet we observe a rather sharp decline by the beginning of the 1990s due to quality and price measures of Çay-Kur and the opening of market to private tea companies.

The second setback was the differentiation of the peasant households of the region. As Hann and Beller Hann (2000) observed during his eight-year long ethnographic fieldwork in the region between 1983 and 1999, he observed that the impact of the industry was less egalitarian than presumed. He argues that it created spatial inequalities between the localities close to the coast, where the communication is easier and leaf-yields are higher, and the inner lands with higher altitudes and less yield (p. 51). The implications of the differentiation between highlanders and the farmers of the coast reach more than a differentiation in the rural per se. He also observes:

Given the limited land resources available here, particularly in the vicinity of the major coastal towns, and given the relatively low ceiling on the size of holding that can be farmed with family labour alone (related to the highly seasonal character of the work), in the longer term many families have been tempted to look for additional sources of income off the land (the main solution in the areas of dense settlement) or to increase the size of their holdings through reliance upon outside labour (the only option in some of the more remote regions). (p. 66)

Hann navigates us through two implications of equal importance with his insights and predictions. The first one is the differentiation between the villages of the region, and the second one is the differentiation of diversification and migration trajectories. These two points carry significant importance in understanding both the tea economy of non-irrigated villages of the Eastern Black Sea region, and the differentiation of societal structure that emerged in Borçka and Arhavi, a factor that contributes to the differential political response to the SHP. Arhavi lies on the coast, while the Aralık village of Borçka is situated in an inner and more remote area with a higher altitude. Hann's observations are beneficial for the comparison of the two non-irrigated cases. It can be argued that better connection to transport and processing opportunities, combined with the possibility of harvesting more yield, enabled the households of Arhavi to benefit more from the tea economy under

protection than the highlanders of the Aralık village. Hann's predictions apply to differentiation between Arhavi and Borçka, at least in the yield amount, because the geographic and climatic conditions are determining factors. The tea yield is more in Arhavi. The producers I interviewed in Arhavi, as well as the officials in the Directorate of Agriculture, stated that they could pick tea bushes three or four times a year, whereas it is less for Borçka. Therefore, in the protection and promotion of tea industry, following the ethnographic analysis of Hann, it is fair to argue that the average household in the village of Arhavi has benefited more compared to the village of Borçka. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the average income earned by per acre in the villages of Arhavi and Borçka, but fieldwork revealed clues on such differentiation.

For example, for the lawsuits against the company in Arhavi, the costs of opening a lawsuit or hiring a lawyer specializing on the environmental law did not occupy an important place in the interviews even though there were consecutive lawsuits against the company. However, in almost all the interviews in Borçka, the costs were a major topic. The muhtar and couple of friends paid one and the businessman from the Aralık Village, İsmet Acar, who owns a construction company, might be paying the costs of a possible lawsuit. He built a school and cultural center in the village. The migrants from Aralık mostly work in lower income generating jobs, whereas the interviewees in Arhavi who are active in resistance are mostly those who dwell in the city and who work either as civil servants or entrepreneurs. These are preliminary observations which are beyond the research scope and require further research on the migrant prospects for integration in the city and integration patterns in the city. However, the migration data of Arhavi and Borçka will be telling.

6.1.1.2 Rural-urban migration, the viability of place and differentiation

As explained in the previous section, traditional subsistence farming was transformed through transformation of tea farming in Borçka and Arhavi into cash-crop farming. The incentives and supports for promoting the tea economy altered the social structure and contributed to emergence of a mono-crop economy. Nevertheless, in spite of the uniformity of the effect posed by the state-led developmental policy, the impact on the localities was far from being uniform. A comparative analysis of the out-migration statistics has merits in demonstrating the divergence. These charts were already presented in previous chapters but analyzing them comparatively will be helpful in understanding the uneven transformation on the localities under scrutiny.

Figure 36 gives us the population change in Kavak and Aralık between 1965 and 2015. We can observe the impact of the tea economy on the place viability and migration patterns. Here, we see that Aralık used to be a more densely populated village compared to Kavak and that the population increased during the golden period of the tea economy and sharply declined after 1975, whereas in Kavak, the population steeply increased until the mid-1970s and remained around the same level until 1990, when it started to decline sharply.




Figure 36. Population change in Arhavi and Borçka

TurkStat, 2014

Extensive out-migration took place between 1990 and 2000 in Kavak, while in Aralık the population constantly declined from 1975 until 2007. At the end, Aralık turned into a small village where around 300 people live, which is less than the recent population of Kavak. As the figure shows, the transformation posed by the change in the production system from subsistence farming to commercial farming has adversely effected both villages but seemingly, the livelihood pressures were felt more severely in Aralık then Kavak. The slight increase until 1975 can be attributed to an expansion in the tea fields but once the maximum cultivable area was reached the village economy could not be sustained and the out-migration from the village took place. The unsustainability can also be due to the fragmentation of land because the land was already scarce and fragmented. The village livelihoods seem more sustainable in Kavak. Even though the land is also scarce and divided in Kavak, tea farming is more profitable in coastal regions because tea yields are more due to favorable climatic conditions and better connection to the center and the villagers in

Kavak had benefited more from the tea economy. The out-migration is evident, yet if we take one step back and look at the broader picture, we also see striking differentiation between urbanization and the out-migration patterns of Arhavi and Borçka. Figures 37 and 38 demonstrate the extent of this differentiation.




Figure 37. Rural-urban migration in Borçka

TurkStat, 2014

The trends are strikingly different. By the beginning of 1965, Borçka was a small town where most of the people dwelled in the villages. The town center hosted a population of approximately 5,000 people. After 1985, we witness a sharp decline both in urban and in rural population figures. It is evident that the Borçka town center could become urbanized and thus be evolved into a viable place for the villages. Such an extent of out-migration from the town also implies that off-farm opportunities that would enable pluriactivity were limited and the livelihood pressures brought by the change of the production system forced an out-migration from the village. Currently 10,000 people live in the center of Borçka and 12,000 in the surrounding villages.




Figure 38. Rural-urban migration in Arhavi

TurkStat, 2014

Nevertheless, the population statistics of Arhavi demonstrate another pattern. In Figure 39 we observe that the villages remained as viable places until mid-1980s. After 1985, the rural population started to decrease but urban population started to increase with the same rate. The gradual and long-term increase in the population of the town center signals a certain level of urbanization, opportunities for diversification and longer viability of the rural livelihoods. We can also argue that the people of Arhavi benefited more from the state-promoted tea economy, as previously explained. What this differentiation in income and migration patterns brings and what it implies for the mobilizations of today has to be thought about, a point I will return to after adding the research cases of the irrigated context into discussion.

In the humid and rainy valleys of the Eastern Black Sea region, tea farming as a top-down developmental policy resulted in a major alteration in the village structure and a differentiation among the peasantry. However, the arid valleys of Tortum, which host the Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı villages, subsistence farming

continued rather smoothly when the traditional social structure in the non-irrigated counterparts were toppling.

6.1.1.3 Subsistence farming Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı

As extensively discussed in the previous chapter, agriculture is the main source of income for most of the households in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı. Farming is mainly for subsistence purposes and the excess products are sold in the local market place.

Production of industrial crops are limited, and there is no sign of specialization on certain crops — cash crops, basically. Figure 39 gives the distribution of the crop range in Bağbaşı. Here we observe that there is a fair distribution of grains, fruits, vegetables and forage crops for husbandry, whereas industrial crops occupy only 2 percent of the production in Bağbaşı.




Figure 39. Crop distribution in Tortum

Tortum Directorate of Agriculture, 2010

This figure gives us an idea on the variety of the crops produced in Bağbaşı but it is important to note that the data that is the source of the graph is based on farmer registration system (ÇKS) records and farmers register as wheat producers in

order to benefit more from state support. The observations in the field enable me to assume that vegetables and fruits are produced more than the figures in the chart indicate. A research by Arıcı and Karakuzulu (2012) supports this observation; they add that the crops are produced in smaller farms and according to the needs of the household (p. 44). Figure 40 shows the population change in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı.




Figure 40. Population change in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı
TurkStat, 2014

Figure 41 allows us to observe that the out-migration was not a defining aspect of these villages. On the contrary, there was a steady increase until 2000s. After 2000, the population started declining. The reasons for this decline can be traced in the neoliberal restructuring of the post-2000 period. Previously, the out-migration was limited and circular, but recently it gained a permanent character. Hence, given high population levels and limited out-migration, we can argue that Bağbaşı remained as a viable place where peasant households produced for social reproduction. Moreover, accumulation did not take place. The households remained peasant households or the peasants became workers or both, that is categorized as new peasantry. A group of village women from Bağbaşı says:

We are here 6 months in summer, in winter we work in a textile factory. In summer we take leave, we do agriculture and sell the products. We produce molasses, etc. In summer we prefer to be here since it is more lucrative. Then we return to the factory, a friend's sister has an embroiderer, we work there.³⁸

And also it is important to remember that the construction of an SHP will destroy

Bağbaşı's viability and sustainability of the households, as noted earlier:

The total area of agricultural land is 11,000 acres; it needs to be irrigated. Crops cannot survive even if you miss a week. There are plenty of people who live on agriculture. Other than the people who work additional jobs, 15% of the people live only from agriculture – greenhouses, tomatoes, apples, etc.... Tomatoes and beans earn more. With 15-20 acres of land and a pension, a family of 6 can live.

6.2 Differentiation

Hann's (1990) following prediction on the prospects of the tea producing villagers of the Black Sea region is cogent and we observe this differentiation decades after his field research. He states:

As migration processes continue, some of those who leave the rural society, the children of the prosperous tea farmers, will move into good trades or the white-collar professions, whilst others, such as the children of the sharecroppers, will become unambiguously proletarian when they reach the city. Thus, not only is the rural society internally divided but far from being marginal to the class struggles of the wider society, it is continuing to contribute quite directly to their reproduction. This is why a correct understanding of what is happening in the countryside, one that is more sensitive to the requirements of certain high-value crops and regional differences, is so important for an understanding of what is happening to wider social structure. (p. 75)

This very transformation of production system in the Black Sea region resulted in the emergence of different spaces in terms of viability, household sustainability and accumulation as well as upward mobility of the peasants. Adding the subsistence

³⁸ Yazın buradayız 6 ay, kışın tekstil fabrikası. Yazın izin alıyoruz. Yazın ziraat yapıyoruz, onları satıyoruz. Pekmez yapıyoruz falan. Yazın buranın karı oradan daha fazla olduğu için tercih ediyoruz burayı. Döndüğümüzde yine fabrikaya. Ablalarının nakış yeri var, orada çalışıyor.

farming villages of Tortum into the equation allows us to perceive altered forms of spatial transformation. Comparing production, viability and the migration data of the research cases reveals three categories of distinct spatial settlements. These spatial settlements can be summarized as follows:

- Arhavi-Kavak became a viable place where profitable cash-crop farming enabled accumulation and brought further urbanization in Arhavi and upward mobility, that is, “middle classization”.
- Borçka-Aralık became a non-viable place where cash-crop farming resulted in out-migration; accumulation and thus upward mobility was limited
- Pehlivanlı and Bağbaşı remained viable places for subsistence farming, but it had limited accumulation and limited upper mobility.

Hence, four research cases have been altered into distinct spatial settlements during the course of the last five decades. The change of crop system in Arhavi and Borçka took place before Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, where the agricultural production has been under pressure recently. Uneven transformation engendered uneven livelihood formations. Peasant households in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı have experienced increased dependence in on-farm income, even though they have migrated circularly. The children of the prosperous tea farmers of Arhavi moved into the town center and subsequently to big cities, worked in white-collar jobs while keeping one foot in the village. The less fortunate tea farmers of Borçka have migrated to metropolises; even though they continue their link with the village through circular migration, their prospects in the cities were less fortunate than the counterparts from the coastal and more fertile Arhavi.

Haesbaert (2004, p. 20), in his work on territoriality, states that "there is no way to define the individual, group, community, society without also inserting them

into a particular geographic context. The subjects, they produce their own territories and the destruction of these territories means the end of these subjects.” As discussed above, territorial settlements have evolved differently through the divergent changes in crop systems, migration, and diversification. I argue that the divergent transformation of spaces contributed to the emergence of different subjects, with different agencies, priorities, and discourses. The next section provides a comparison of the agency and of patterns of mobilization with an aim of tracing the link between the material and immaterial transformations of the territories.

Considering that the SHP constructions in these settlements constitute a novel form of commercialization with a negative impact on the territoriality, the plurality of reactions against the construction is important in an effort to understand the link between material and immaterial transformation of particular territories.

6.3 Resistance and immaterial territories

Anti-SHP struggles in the villages are fought both in material — land and production — and immaterial fronts being the realm of traditions, cultures, symbols and ideals. However, the weights of material and immaterial components in the composition of resistance vary significantly according to the three spatial categories that were explained in the previous section. This section aims at presenting the noteworthy components of the resistance and how they differentiate according to the spatial settlements.

6.3.1 The changing economic function of land

Basically, a river-type small-scale SHP grants the usership right of the water that flows in the river basin to private companies for a period of 49 years. The water is at the center of commercialization, but the land is also a contentious area between the companies, the state and the local people. Land is critical in two senses, firstly for its value as a means of production and secondly for its exchange value. Moreover, it has become a strategic tool to resist the company for the locals and simultaneously a tool for the company to co-opt the resistance. That's because companies usually have to purchase land from the locals in order to build a construction site, the regulator, and the generator of a power plant. The effectiveness of co-option strategies of company and the resistance strategies of peasants vary according to the economic function of land in that village.

As comprehensively discussed, early and widespread commercialization of agriculture in the tea producing villages of the Black Sea region have altered the share of on-farm income in household budget. The villagers have migrated into cities or town centers and moved into different occupational statuses, even though their prospects for upward mobility have been different. The transformation rendered these villages into peri-urban spaces through migration and because of the highly seasonal character of the production system. Independent of the differential integration into the city economy, the social and economic meaning of land has been altered.

The land has been scattered, limited and divided through inheritance. Chris Hann (1990) presents the farm size data of Çay-Kur and describes the land holding structure in tea producing villages as follows:

More than 164,000 growers owned holdings of less than 0.5 hectares, whilst fewer than 100 individuals declared a tea smallholding in excess of two

hectares. These were the official statistics, based on factory records of garden ownership . . . Many of these fragmented holdings belonged to migrants who might or might not return at peak periods to assist their families in harvesting. If their absence was permanent, the holding might be worked by relatives, or by hired laborers, or by sharecroppers. It was also considered desirable from the point of view of reducing tax liabilities to have one's gardens distributed among the various members of the household and even more distant kin; but although these persons might thus acquire some formal title to land, they did not necessarily have any say in how it was worked, might receive no income from it, and might not be able to press even a residual claim on the garden in the future. (p. 64)

Hence, tea is produced in small farms and the migrants who live in the cities come for the harvest during the peak season for a couple of months. That is one of the factors that contribute to peri-urbanity, as explained in Chapter 4. Migrants supplement their income with on-farm income, an interviewee states:

There is agriculture but it is not enough. Income from tea is not enough anymore. You have to collect 1 ton to earn 1.250 TL. Half of it will be spent on workers. We are seasonal workers, we come here in summer to collect tea leaves. It is not flowing but it is dropping, what can we do, it is better than nothing.³⁹

The main quality of land as the primary means of production has been seriously compromised through the decline of the profitability of the tea economy and out-migration from the village. Then the land is rendered to a mere commodity for most people, with an exchange value, and the SHP created a market for the land. The two following excerpts are from two different interviews, one in Arhavi (Kavak) and one in Borçka (Aralık), respectively.

Kavak:

They sell their land. Firstly they hide it (from others), then the villagers realize it because they go and chop woods. Two brothers go to Istanbul and persuade their relatives (to sell the land) but tell the villagers that the relatives in Istanbul wanted to sell it and they had to comply with it. They sell the land for 250-300 thousand TL; that would actually be worth 40-50 thousand. . . As I've said, they consider selling the land for more and combining that money

³⁹ Tarım yapıyor da yalnız yetmiyor. Çay geliri artık yeterli değil, 1 ton toplayacaksın 1250 tl alacaksın. İşçi zaten yarı parası. Mevsimlik işçiyiz, yazın gelip çayımızı topluyoruz. Çok akıyor ama damlıyor, bu bile kardır n'apalım.

with tea and hazelnut income. At the end of the day, they sell the land (to the company). They (The company) deceive people. For example the company says that they can get the land through urgent expropriation anyway.

Aralık:

Normally, an acre of land costs 16-17 thousand TL. For those who have resisted the company and have not sold their land, the price rose to 30 thousand TL. A villager resisted the expropriation of his land, the usual price was 100 thousands but he got 250 thousand TL.⁴⁰

In the first excerpt from Kavak, we both see the divided nature of landholdings through inheritance and the bargain over the land. On the critical locations, landowners manage to sell their land for five or six times its actual value. The same is true for the villagers in Aralık. The field research showed that those who initially do not want to sell their land to the company could actually manage to sell it for higher prices. Moreover, in Aralık, those who do not reside in the village are especially eager to sell their land. Hence, they support the SHP.

However, in Bağbaşı and in Pehlivanlı, land is still the primary means of production for most of the households. The reason is the enduring subsistence farming and persistence of on-farm income as the primary source of household income. For most villagers in Bağbaşı, land selling was not considered an option. They were constantly stating that land and water are the basis of their life and survival. Yet only a few people from Pehlivanlı sold their land to the company or rented some land to the company.

⁴⁰ “Normalde 16 bin-17 bin arazinin donumu, sirket 20 bin verdi. Direnenler, satmayanlar için fiyat 30 bin TL’ye kadar çıktı. Bir kişi evinin istimlak edilmemesi için direndi, normal devlet fiyatı 100 bin TL iken, 250 bin aldı.”

6.3.1 Abstraction: Differentiation in discourses and symbols

Since the beginning of this very chapter, I have presented the differentiation brought about by the changes in production systems, migration patterns, place viability and household reproduction, and therefore, the changes in the material construction of territories. Nevertheless, mobilization and behaviors cannot be explained by structural factors and materiality in space construction, obviously. The social movements literature offers a wide range of explanations and motives that inspire human behavior and thinking; these are based on identity concerns, exclusion, prior politicization, ecological motives, material motives and so on. Alongside the motives, the organization techniques, discourses of mobilization, framing, coalition building are widely studied. This section is written with the objective of bridging the material constructions of the space with the immaterial constructions.

The differentiation between the villagers has been extensively analyzed. The fundamental outcome of this divergent transformation of the villages under scrutiny is a disparity in upward mobility and class formation. Accumulation was facilitated and therefore urbanization and then a middle-classization took place in the fertile coastal towns of the Black Sea region. However, the prospects were limited for the peasants of both Borçka and Tortum, as well as the chances for upward mobility and middle-classization. Comparatively analyzing the mobilization patterns of the research cases not only gives the link between material transformation of the spaces and the mobilization patterns, but it also provides insights about the classbase of contemporary mobilizations; particularly the middle class vs. lower class politicizations.

6.3.3.1 Dere vs su

This section provides a comparison of the anti-SHP mobilizations with regard to the immaterial constructions of the spaces. Thus, the comparison applies to the villages where the mobilization is strong and persistent: Kavak and Bağbaşı. The primary difference that is striking appears with regard to the discursive constructions around the river and water.

SHPs are an assault on locals' rights on the water flowing through in their immediate environment. Undoubtedly, the emphasis is on the river and the water in the context of discursive constructions. Nonetheless, the ways the locals in Arhavi and the locals in Bağbaşı framed their claim on the water are fundamentally different. Locals in Arhavi and in Borçka exclusively referred to 'the river', while their counterparts referred to 'the water' when they recalled their struggle against the SHP. The difference may seem subtle and go unnoticed. However, I argue that there is a key difference in people's approach, which is observable in their mobilization strategies and their politicization. The excerpts from Bağbaşı, Aralık and Kavak, presented below exhibit this difference.

Bağbaşı:

We have a farm land, my girl, how did the place become a village, do you think? We have small orchards, so if we lose the water, we cannot grow anything. It is not a village with water. Now we are losing the water. In summertime the stream dries up, it is not enough for the land. We have a pension, but it is very low. What will people without salaries do . . . It is called Bağlarbaşı, the land is huge but we have very little water. What will we do if we lose even that? The land is large, but the water is insufficient. (Appendix B, 28)

Kavak:

Then, naturally there was a resistance in 2012 June. All of the people, including the muhtar, resisted. Also, Kemerköprü village set up a tent for the resistance. That area is like a natural pond, it is a socializing place for citizens of both villages. People used to swim there, have picnics and would grill anchovies. Most of the construction work they do is either unauthorized or

against the law. Or, it does not conform to standards. We set up the tent and saw that the stream was full of debris. We objected, and soon after we saw that a caterpillar, supposedly building a set to prevent rainfall from damaging the streambed. Then we stood in front of the caterpillars and issued a press release.

The excerpt from the interview with women activists of the Arhavi Kavak anti-SHP struggle is also telling (“Karadenizli kadınlar doğa talanına direniyor! | Yeryüzü Kadınları,” n.d.):

When we saw what happened to the Cihani stream, we hugged each other and cried, that was our childhood, that stream was where we did our laundry, where we swam after collecting tea leaves, where we learnt how to swim. I felt like my child was murdered.⁴¹

Aralık:

It is no good to live here unless there is this stream flowing in front of my house. Why would it be? Just watching it is a great pleasure to me. That SHP makes no sense to me. I have farmland up the hill but there is no point in ruining this stream for that. Think about the drought years like this year. The stream will dry, we will stink here. This stream is for our cleaning.⁴²

The accounts in Bağbaşı emphasize solely the critical importance of water for agricultural production and livelihood sustainability. However, in Kavak and Aralık the two excerpts among, many other accounts, are founded on the social function of the river as the place villagers gather, cook traditional dishes and have picnics. It is a place where the village kids learned to swim in the old times. They used to live in peace with the soothing sound of the river. The river is a part of their history, identity and culture. They state that they cannot live if they do not hear the sound of the water. Moreover, as the respondent in Aralık states, river is the source of purity and cleanness. The river actively becomes the part of resistance through abstraction

⁴¹ ‘Cihani deresine yapılanları görünce arkadaşlarımızla birbirimize sarılıp ağladık, orası bizim çocukluğumuzdu, çamaşır yıkadığımız, çay topladıktan sonra girip serinlediğimiz, yüzmeyi öğrendiğimiz derelerimizdi. Evladıma kıyılmış gibi hissettim.’

⁴² Aralık: Şimdi şu evimin önünde benim bu dere akmadığı sürece burada yaşamamın hiçbir kıymeti yok. Niye öyle bir şey olsun ki. Şu an derenin orada akması bile büyük bir zevk coşku yani. Ya ondan sonra bu yapılan HES’in benim için bir mantığı yok. Benim yukarıda arazilerim var ama onun uğruna bu dereyi mahvetmenin anlamı yok. Bu sene gibi bir de kurak geçtiğini düşünün. Ne olacak dere kurur, kokacağız burada. Bu dere bizim için temizlik.

and personification. The tendency is detectable in Aralık, but more obvious in Arhavi. Hence, in Arhavi, the press releases, photo shootings, interviews and demonstrations are done also done inside the river and the songs are composed for the resistance with the lyrics of “Black Sea is in revolt; our river is not for sale. Do not put handcuffs, let our river flow in liberty (so that) they can see the sea.”⁴³

Figure 41 allows us to observe the presentation of river as an integral part of the resistance.



Figure 41. Villagers resisting in Aralık

<https://zete.com/arhavide-cilgin-hes-icin-ucuncu-kez-ced-sureci-baslatildi/>

This fundamental difference in the construction of the water discourse leads us through two interrelated observations. The protestors in Arhavi do struggle both in material and immaterial territories (perceived and conceived spaces), whereas the ones in Bağbaşı struggle only in the perceived, material realm. The abstraction of

⁴³İsyandır [Karadeniz](#), satılık değil deremiz. Vurmayın kelepçeler özgür aksın dereler denizi görebilsinler

the spaces is more likely for the predominantly urbanized and upwardly mobile peri-urban subjects of the coastal Black Sea region.

The second observation is related to the changing economic function of land. Land and water are keys to agricultural production, especially in irrigated villages. As discussed above, land has a use value for the subsistence farming villages such as Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, whereas industrial tea farming in the Black Sea region has rendered agricultural production to a supplementary income source and land into a commodity with exchange value. The use value of land as principle means of production brings about a material, non-abstracted, concrete conception of water. However, the commodification of village land and water contributes to the abstraction of the space because perceptions are also contested spaces that people struggle over. This aspect of abstract constructions of space is analyzed predominantly in the context of urban studies. A village woman in Bağbaşı explicitly framed the stark difference in the perception of water in Bağbaşı and Arhavi as follows:

Bağbaşı:

Among the SHP sites, ours is the most harmed one, no other site is harmed more than ours. In Black sea region the harm is much less. They (in Black sea region) have water and they only want to see the pleasure of having it, the ambience of it. Here, 10 days without water will cause a draught. We had a stream here and in summer it faded. After it, a complete drought was seen. There was no water in the stream. There was a lack of rain all around Turkey so it affected here as well. The sources were all dry; most of the houses were without water. This place would be destroyed without water, what will happen? We ask the same, we don't know the answer.

Bağbaşı:

They misunderstood us, we are not against the SHP, we are against doing it here. Of course energy should be produced, but not here. Many people resisted but I do not expect any result. They mentioned a pond and we were

happy about it. It was said long before, they say it would be this year, but still nothing is seen. People are happy just to have a pond.⁴⁴

6.3.3.2 The abstraction of spaces and re-inventing tradition

Concrete abstraction of spaces is a concept extensively theorized by Lefebvre. Its correspondence in Fernandes' theorization of territories is the immaterial territories. Even though these conceptualizations have differences, both basically refer to the terrain of ideas where a conflict over territories is fought. Fernandes asserts that territorial disputes are carried out in every possible dimension, from economic to ideological, and the immaterial territories are 'theoretical constructs, of interpretive frameworks'. Hence, a struggle over tangible territories and the resources goes with the dispute over immaterial territories, or the space of ideology and ideas (Bezner Kerr, 2007; McMichael, 2009; Saquet & Sposito, 2009). Similarly, Lefebvre (1991) argues that abstract spaces are spaces of contention, even though they are the constructions of the capitalists, as he states:

Abstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its 'lens.' And, indeed, it renders homogeneous [...] Thus to look upon abstract space as homogeneous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause, and the goal for the reason why that goal is pursued. (p. 287)

Abstract space is the space of ideas, images and symbols reflected on a particular space. It is a means of rendering a place into a commodity to be marketed.

⁴⁴ HES olan bölgelerde en zayıfatlı bizim buraymış. Burdan fazla olan yokmuş. Karadeniz'de ufakmış. Nemi suları var, suyun süsünü güzelliğini istiyorlar onlar. Bizim burada 10 gün sulama kurur. Yazın bir deremiz gelir buraya, o kurudu. Onun altında ne bastıysa kurudu. Çayda su yok ki. Kuraklık var ya Türkiye genelide, burayı da aldı. Gözeler kurumuş hep. Çoğu evlere su gitmemiş. Su olmazsa bura mahvolur gider. Ne olacak, biz de onu diyoruz bilmiyoruz ki.

Ve,
Bizi yanlış anlamasınlar, biz HES'e karşı değiliz, biz sadece bu köyde HES'E karşıyız. Tabii ki enerji olsun, tabii ki insanlar faydalansın ama burada olmaz.

Çok karşı çıkan oldu da, ben bir şey beklemiyorum sonuçta. Bir gölet dediler ya, ona sevindik. Baya önceden vardı da, bu sene kesin olacak diye hala ses yok. Gölet olursa diye seviniyor insanlar.

However, in the case of a SHP construction, which is a form of commodification, the abstract space also becomes a battleground for the locals who fight against SHP constructions. Fernandes' insights on the defense of immaterial territories provide a guide to analyze this contention. He adds that contestation over immaterial territories is characterized by the formulation and defense of concepts, theories, paradigms, and explanations.

The analysis of the anti-SHP struggle of Arhavi enables us to grasp the relationship between the societal and economic transformation of the localities, how the spaces are constructed through changes in the production and regimes of accumulation, the socio-economic meaning of the land as well as the transformation of the people and their agency in relation to particular spaces. Another significant aspect that attracts attention is how the abstraction of space helps protestors, mostly those who live in the cities, to reimagine the villages they came from through symbols and authentication. Moreover, collective mobilization contributes to the abstraction, re-invention and reconstruction of the spaces and simultaneously gets strengthened through those strategies. The case of the anti-SHP struggle in Arhavi gives us a rich repertoire from which to analyze a struggle over immaterial territories. Symbols and defense concepts were used abundantly during the struggle. Like the personification of the river and making it an active part of the struggle through remembering; memory, culture and traditions appear as key elements of the construction of symbols and defense concepts. One example of this phenomenon is the rediscovery of local-historical particularities and intensive use of them in the discourse and organization of the resistance in order to create a common attachment to the locality of origin together with a distinct identity of the region. I believe this process can be evaluated under the concept of 're-invention of tradition.' It is a re-

invention of tradition because the peri-urban agents who became urbanized and migrated to the big cities and became the middle classes are, so to say, cleaning the dust off the local traditions and symbols. This effort does not occur as a mere resistance strategy, but as a part of identity construction that the protestors re-establish the link with the locality. They are also able to mobilize other people from the locality as well as the broader public around the same cause.

An active member of a city-based environmental organization, Karadeniz İsyandadır, has told during an interview that he remembers the day when the yellow scarf (*sarı yazma*) emerged as the iconic symbol of the anti-SHP resistance in the Loç Valley during a meeting to organize the resistance. The yellow scarf, being the traditional cloth for the women of the region, was re-constructed as the symbol of resistance and after that it was intensively used in flyers, banners and other propaganda material. Moreover, the struggle of the sarı yazma became the defining element of the news on the anti-SHP struggle of the Loç Valley in Kastamonu. Figures 42 and 43 show the ways and the extent of this particular symbol.



Figure 42. Women in yellow scarves in Kastamonu

<http://www.etha.com.tr/Haber/2011/01/01/guncel/loc-vadisinde-hese-muhur/>



Figure 43. Women in yellow scarves holding a banner reading “Yellow Scarves in revolt”

<http://www.etha.com.tr/Haber/2010/05/29/yasam/hese-yumurta-ve-boru-yagmuru/>

A similar phenomenon is observable the anti-SHP struggle of Arhavi as seen in Figure 44. With the revival of the struggle, especially by the people who were living outside Arhavi after the fading out of the initial phase, a symbol emerged for their propaganda to emphasize a common history, background and attachment to a particular geography. The symbol found by the protestors of Arhavi was the hawk (*atmaca*) because training the hawks for hunting used to be an important cultural practice in Arhavi. The Istanbul branch of the Platform for the Protection of Nature in Arhavi took the following photo during an anti-SHP protest in Istanbul.



Figure 44. Banner reading "Do not touch the rivers of Arhavi, do not anger the hawk"

<http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/153699-arhavi-nin-dereleri-istanbul-a-akti>

The strong organizational capacity of the Istanbul branch of the Platform underpinned the argument that Arhavi had become a peri-urban space through prior migration but with one foot in the village. In fact, good deal of the protestors lived in Istanbul and Ankara, and they continued to struggle in the city as well, either in major lieu for protests or in front of the headquarters of MNG holding. Figure 45 presents a photo taken from a demonstration in front of the construction branch of MNG Holding, MAPA İnşaat, and the protestors are wearing hawk masks, the re-invented symbol of Arhavi and representing the anger, strength, culture and dignity of the people of Arhavi.



Figure 45. People in hawk masks

<http://www.kuzeyormanlari.org/2015/01/17/arhivililer-hese-karsi-direnisi-mngnin-kapisina-tasidi/>

In time, the symbol of the hawk became widespread. Apart from the masks and the mascot of the resistance, it began to constitute an identity not only for the protestors, but also for the people of Arhavi. The name of the resistance collective

has changed to Hawks of Arhavi, Arhavili Atmacalar, and social media pages and profile photos are dominated by photos of hawks. The women of ADOKOP, Arhavi Platform for protection of nature, named themselves Female Hawks (*Kadın Atmacalar*) and started to appear on national and local media. They were not more than 10 women who struggled against the SHP. One member is a journalist, another is a financial advisor, both of whom live in Istanbul. Some others live in the Arhavi town center and some returned to their village after working in other cities. The hawk went beyond being just a defense symbol, but it became an identity, especially for the urbanized middle classes in the region. Figure 46 and 47 are emblematic.



Figure 46. "Kadın Atmacalar" in Arhavi

http://www.radikal.com.tr/cevre/havva_ana_yalniz_degil_cevreyu_pacavra_ettunuz_biz_da_sizi_edecguz-1399189/

The symbol of the hawk appears as a pivot of reinvention of tradition and hence identity formation. It is important to perceive that the abstraction and reinvention of tradition and construction of the local micro-identity emerge in a particular fashion. What is even more striking is the staging of this very re-invented

identity in a carnivalesque manner, in an aestheticized form of dissent. The photos in the river captured women ganging like warriors. They posed imitating the claw of the hawk.



Figure 47. Women in Arhavi

http://www.radikal.com.tr/cevre/havva_ana_yalniz_degil_cevreyu_pacavra_ettunuz_biz_da_sizi_edecemiz-1399189/

A member of the Female Hawks wrote the poem below. The aestheticization is eminent and the poem is filled with the references to the culture and traditions. *Horon*, a local folk dance of the region, is formulated as the dance of the resistance; *tulum* is a traditional musical instrument. The author read this little piece of poetry in Istanbul during an event organized for solidarity with Artvin. It encompasses discourse of the resistance based on re-invented tradition and re-discovered identity of the hometown among the peri-urban population.

Artvin has filled us with honor, when it sent us to the metropolis. It is hard to keep honor. When I talk about Artvin, the pain in my heart is seen from my face. I do not cry. I do not cry, I do not sear my heart! I do not give my hope away to evil... I blow with the whistle of the storm that signals it. I stand with the breath of the bagpipe that spears my heart... Ohh oh my mountains, peaks

covered with clouds, foothills covered with snow! Clouds on my head, stream in my heart, sea at the side! Sometimes blows, sometime storms! Sometimes storms, sometimes stops. Flies high like a hawk. We run to the home in August. My soul is mountain, sea, and stream. Step on the floor. Horon is my right! Horon is the revolt! We won't fall without horon! We are children of mountains, clouds, sea. Nature is our teacher. We walk rightfully with the law, and dance the horon. Do not browbeat! We dance horon right! Do not annoy...⁴⁵

A similar tendency is observable in the Aralık village of Borçka but in a very subtle and discrete manner. Since there is not a strong, widespread and well-established mobilization, only the traces of abstraction and re-invention of local identity are observable among the few people who oppose the SHP. Aralık is a village inhabited by Turkish-citizens of Georgian origin. The Georgian name of the village is Klaskur. The quotation presented below demonstrates the link between the anti-SHP resistance, the nostalgia and quest for local identity and poor resonance among the greater public.

They say that we will protest the SHP, the guy responds what is it to me after this age. What good does it do? They can't see the things like us. We made a referendum to change the name of our village back to Klaskur, when I tell this to him, he asks "isn't it already Klaskur, why do you care?"⁴⁶

6.3.3 Bağbaşı: A struggle exclusively over material territories

In Bağbaşı, a completely different pattern is observed. Like the direct and use-value based approach to water framing of stream vs. water, the abstract construction of the

⁴⁵"Bizleri büyük şehirlere uğurlarken, yüreğimize onur yüklemiş bir şehir Artvin. Onuru korumak zordur. Artvin'i anlatırken, yüreğimin acısı yüzüme vurmuş! Ağlamıyorum. Ağlamam, yüreğimi dağlamam! Umudumu kötü ile bağlamam... Eserim, fırtınanın geliyor diyen ıslık sesiyle. Dururum tulumun yüreğimi delen nefesiyle .. Oyyy oy dağlarım, başı dumanlı, etekleri karlı dağlarım! Başımda bulut, yüreğimde dere, kıyılarımda ise deniz! Bir eser bir çoşar! Bir çoşar bir susar. Atmaca gibi, yüksekten uçar, Ağustosta memlekete koşarız. Ruhum dağ, deniz, dere, Vur ayağuni yere. Horon haktur! Horon isyandır! Horonsuz savrulmayız yere! Dağların, bulutların, denizin çocuklarıyız ya biz, Doğadır öğretmenimiz. Hak ile hukuk ile yürür, horon vururuz biz. Yıldurmayun! Horonu düz vururuz, Kızdırmayun..."

⁴⁶ HES yapılacak eylem yapacağız diyorlar, adam ben bu yastan sonra ne yapayım diyor. Neyime lazım olacak diyor. Olaya bizim gibi bakamıyor olaya. Referandum yaptık biz bu köyün adının yeniden Klaskur olması için, bunu söylediğim zaman ya zaten Klaskur'dur ne istiyorsun diyor.

space and the building of resistance discourse on local-cultural specificity did not take place. I did not spot any specific cultural or traditional reference or any framing, any slogan or any banner except for the ones illustrated in Figures 48 and 49.



Figure 48. Banner reading "No HES"

<http://meldaonur.net/?p=733>



Figure 49. Photograph of resistance in Bağbaşı

<http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-satilik-belde-197344/>

As seen in these photos, the resistance is limited to actual physical resistance by peasants sitting in front of the caterpillar and staging a months-long sit-down strike in addition to the legal struggle where they sued the company for the violation of environmental impact assessment regulations. As explained in the previous chapter, the villagers of Bağbaşı suffered from imprisonment and systematic criminalization. The abstraction and re-invention of identity are not cases in the subsistence farming villages where the rural livelihoods were not disrupted through commercialization.

6.4 Coalition-building and organizational structure

Lastly, another major difference between the mobilizations in Kavak and Bağbaşı emerges in the ways the protestors form alliances and seek solidarity among the larger public. Not surprisingly, the protestors in Kavak could manage to establish

broader alliances with different ecological organizations, foundations and associations, whereas the protestors in Bağbaşı found support from a political party. In Kavak, the impact of the city-link of the protestors and class position they attained in the city contributed to differentiation in organizational patterns. Primarily, the protestors got organized in resistance platforms. The platform in Arhavi was ADOKOP. In the Black Sea region, similar resistance platforms are abundant. The most well known one is Platform of Fraternity of Rivers. Actually it is an ensemble of a myriad of local resistance platforms, predominantly from the Black Sea region such as Şavşat Platform of Fraternity of the Rivers, (Şavşat Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu) Fındıklı Platform of Fraternity of the Rivers Fındıklı Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu, and so on. According to some predominant figures of the platform in Fındıklı, the main premise of the Platform of Fraternity of the Rivers (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu) is to be 'above-politics' and they strongly object to involvement in party politics of any sort.

The second one is the Black Sea in Revolt, a city-based organization of the young activists of the Black Sea origin, the second and/or third generation of migrants from the Black Sea region. The Platform supports local resistances through organizing demonstrations, events and protests in the cities, mostly in Istanbul. They are, so to say, a mediator between the local resistance and other ecologists. They organize trips to construction sites and arrange camps to make the local cultures known and to revive local traditions. ADOKOP has links with both organizations. Activists from both are actively in the struggle in Arhavi.

In addition to the ecologist organizations, resistance in Arhavi has organic links with the townmanship organizations. İstanbul Association of Arhavitiles (İstanbul Arhavitiler Derneği), Ankara Association of Arhavitiles (Ankara

Arhivililer Derneđi), Association of Businessmen from Arhavi (Arhavili İş Adamları Derneđi) and Foundations of Arhavitiles (Arhivililer Vakfı) are integral components of the resistance. This is an indicator of the peri-urban character of Arhavi as a spatial construction. These organizations arrange demonstrations and solidarity events both in Arhavi and in the cities, Ankara and Istanbul in general.

However, a completely different pattern is observable in Bağbaşı. The resistance in Bağbaşı does not have any such links with ecological organizations, nor with their townsmen organizations in the cities. In fact, there is no quest for civil society solidarity among the villagers of Bağbaşı. The indifference of the political parties, especially the ruling party, the AKP, is of people's concern. They insistently state that the government does not pay attention to their demands. The resentment is explicit in the following quotation:

Not any single authority came here, unfortunately. Only a CHP MP of Çanakkale came. Emine Ülker Tarhan and the lady who is a mp from Istanbul came (Melda Onur). Even though AKP votes are around 90%, including me, they did not send any single person here to check us. To see our problems. And right now it is still 90%. It disturbs one.⁴⁷

What is important to note is the ongoing predominance of party politics and a tendency to perceive the course of events within the framework of party politics in Bağbaşı. However, in Arhavi civil society involvement in stronger and organization of the resistance in civil society forms is visible.

⁴⁷Bir tane yetkili gelmedi, ama maalesef, CHP'nin Çanakkale milletvekili geldi. Emine Ülker Tarhan, İstanbul milletvekili bayan (Melda Onur) (O kadar adamlar geldi bir tane oy çıkmadı ya CHP'ye. Simdi biraz çıktı oy son seçimde. Burada yüzde 90 AKpartie oy verdigi halde, ben de dahil, bir tane bekçilerini buraya yollamadılar ki gidin bakın bu insanlar orada ne yapıyor. Bunun sıkıntısı ne? Ve bu arada yine %90 oy veriyorlar degme gitsin. Dokunuyor insana.

6.5 Discussion

Since the beginning of the chapter, the divergent transformation of the localities under scrutiny has been presented. The material transformation of the localities was triggered by differentiated commercialization patterns. Early commercialization in the Black Sea region brought about an early disruption of the livelihoods. The disruption does not take place in a uniform manner, however. Villagers of the coastal and more fertile Arhavi benefited more from a state-supported tea economy than the less fertile inner-lands of Borçka. The tea economy contributed to urbanization, followed by a middle-classization. This phenomenon was explicit in the backgrounds of the prominent figures of the resistance and the organizations they formed in the cities such as Association of Businessmen from Arhavi which did not exist in the case of Borçka.

On the other hand, so far sustainable peasant livelihoods in Bağbaşı have survived through subsistence farming. The village continued to be a viable space, but it was inhabited by lower-class peasants. The migrants from the region became workers in the cities and on-farm income was a major source for these households.

Hence, there is a class differentiation that has emerged due to the commercialization of agriculture, which ultimately affects politicization and mobilization patterns. The mobilization in Arhavi shows the characteristics of middle-class activism, defined by broader alliances, intense social media use, aestheticization of decent and new carnivalesque forms of resistance (Tugal, 2015). Moreover, I would also suggest that fights over immaterial territories do not take place in a uniform manner. They are intrinsically linked with the uneven transformation of the spaces and the class structures that were brought about by these

uneven transformations. Analyzing the mobilization patterns in Bağbaşı and Kavak in a comparative perspective would give us this differentiation.

The major line of rupture in these two types of local struggle is in the dispute over the immaterial territories. As explained in detail in Chapter 4, the peri-urban agency in Arhavi manages to fight vigorously over the immaterial territory while in Bağbaşı; any kind of abstraction, re-invention of tradition and a quest for a distinct local identity is observable. The resistance is framed within the terms of interest and for the sustainability of the local economy and household sustainability.

Even though the mobilization emerges as a reaction to the same factor, the SHP, the course of the mobilization, with its discourses and patterns and fight over the material and immaterial territories demonstrate an divergent fashion and the roots of this divergence lie in the uneven transformation of the localities that bring about an uneven class structure. The comparison enables us to observe this very differentiation.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 Basic findings

The motivation to write this dissertation stemmed from the curiosity to understand under which circumstances people rise up against authority in today's world which has become more inter-connected, smaller, more surveilled and obviously more chaotic. The chaos does not only reign in the daily affairs, but it pertains to academia as well. Undoubtedly contentious behavior is an intensively researched topic from various perspectives (see Chapter 2). Contemporary mobilizations demonstrate complicated structures in terms of the composition of the people who join the upheavals, the discourses and alliances they utilize and the modes of the resistance. Especially when it comes to the mobilizations that take place in the rural areas, the analysis becomes more complicated due to the uneven transformations of the "ruralities" themselves.

The categories that we use as social scientists to analyze the social movements have been destabilized and have become less effective tools for explanation (Sassen, 2014). Within the framework of contemporary mobilizations in rural areas, the categorization is exceptionally difficult. Should we categorize the recent movements in the rural areas as agrarian mobilizations or ecological ones? Or shall we categorize them as eco-socialist or agro-ecologists? Do people mobilize only for the protection of nature, to protect the lived space or because there was a threat to their livelihoods? Or do they mobilize to protect their cultural rights against the cultural destruction posed by capitalism? Who are the primary agents of the

mobilization? Who supports the mobilization, who is for and who is against it? Are they peasants? If so, which sub-category do they belong to?

With these questions in mind, I decided to focus on anti-SHP mobilizations in Turkey as a case study. These mobilizations are regarded both as rural and ecological movements. They are also seen as an unprecedented wave of peasant mobilization in Turkey pioneered by a bunch of courageous villagers, especially elderly and brave rural women. Significant public awareness has been raised during the last decade on the issue, and a myriad of academic works has been published.

Apart from being an example of strong mobilizations that take place in the rural areas, the anti-SHP mobilizations share significant commonalities with the mobilizations of similar nature that include anti-dam struggles in Chile and in India or in Cochabamba and some other rural mobilizations. The methodological options to analyze such mobilizations included a single-case analysis of one struggle, a broader analysis of multiple anti-SHP struggles from a more macro perspective and cross-country comparison of water-struggles among others. However, I aimed at going to the micro level for a through and in-depth analysis of the mobilizations and actors within the broader political economic perspective with an aim to re-study the destabilized categories that Sassen writes about. She calls for recovering the specificities of the space where a given process takes place and recovering the specificity of the body- not just any body but also the reified body. There is a need for a unitary approach, which can bring together the transformation posed by the regime of accumulation, that is neoliberalism; historical-structural specificities and the representations, the 'culture.' This integrated perspective would enable us to perceive the peasant dissidence in the unevenness of the actual life. I believe that

placing an emphasis on the space, the transformation and the conceptualization of the space, could provide an adequate and effective analytical tool.

The analysis of the cases after the field research revealed a major difference between the villages in which the livelihood depends on agricultural production, Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, and those which are not dependent on agricultural production, that is, Arhavi, Borçka and Fındıklı in terms of the similarities, differences and major defining features of the anti-SHP struggle. The determining aspect marking the difference is the transformation of the rurality as a response to changes in their place in the economic order, whether they are in the center or on the periphery and in the evolution of the rural spaces. I would argue that the coastal villages of the Eastern Black Sea region has evolved differently than that of arid villages of Erzurum in their position in the economic order, especially in the framework of the transformation of the production regime and land use, the structure of migration, and the levels of integration of the migrants to the city. The transformation of the rural spaces affects the ways, means and discourses of the local struggles. Therefore, I suggested a theorization putting the emphasis on the spatial transformation of the ruralities and their affect on and links with the mobilization.

In this context, I conceptualized that Arhavi and Borçka have become peri-urban spaces through the specific transformation that they have gone through. They went through an early commercialization of production. Tea production under state protection and promotion has proliferated and tea has become the dominant crop for the region. State incentives aimed at addressing the chronic poverty experienced in the region. Developing petty commodity production brought a wave of prosperity, especially in the coastal, more fertile regions of the Eastern Black Sea region in Arhavi and facilitated household accumulation. The peri-urban character eased the

movement of ideas and city-based politicization patterns into the hometown. In the specificity of Arhavi, the city-effect in the anti-SHP mobilization is evident, which gives a particular framing and discourse to the mobilization. A group of people that can be classified as new middle class who are from Arhavi but lived and worked in the big cities pioneered in the resistance. They enabled broader alliances and contributed to the strengthening of a carnivalesque resistance with rituals, reinvented traditions and micro-identities. However, in Borçka, despite all attempts, a similar pattern could not be reached. The difference can be traced in the arguments of the viability of the space and differences in upward mobility of the villagers. The rural-urban migration pattern kept the town of Arhavi as a viable socio-economic space, with better chances of accumulation, upward mobility and middle-classization, whereas the villages of town of Borçka have been adversely affected by rural-urban migration. The commercialization of farming took place in a fashion similar to that in Arhavi but as the result of geographical limits on the amount and quality of harvest, accumulation possibilities for households were limited. The result was out-migration from the village, but the middle-classization could not take place to the extent that it did in Arhavi, and city-based agents could not succeed in energizing the struggle. Changing economic function of land also played an important role in the capacities for mobilization. Out-migration from the village brought about part-time farming. On-farm activities became a supplementary income source for most of the household, and land shifted from being the major productive asset to a supplementary income source, hence an exchangeable commodity with a market value. The market value of the land has increased significantly with the SHP construction and through the resistance. Land-purchases appear as the major strategy of companies to co-opt the resistance and facilitate the construction together with

creating job opportunities, which are two main weak spots that obstruct the emergence of strong local mobilization. Upwardly mobile city dwellers with ecological consciousness and cultural sensitivities that are from the villages of Arhavi are immune to the companies' strategies within this framework.

Nevertheless, the local dwellers and the less lucky migrants in terms of accumulation are more inclined to respond positively to the co-option strategies of the companies.

Therefore, as a result of this comparison, I suggest that middle-class actors were prominent in the mobilization in Arhavi. They had better capabilities to bring about a strong resistance with a different organizational structure, a strong legal battle, and most importantly, through the immense use of re-invented micro-identities, rituals and symbols with an emphasis on ecological protection and cultural specificity.

What I call the city effect is the motor force of the resistance, and the new middle class activism brings about an aestheticized version of dissent, a performance of imitating and reinventing rurality.

Unlike the commercialized petty-commodity producing villages of the Eastern Black Sea region, the arid valleys of Tortum sheltered peasant households, which endure on subsistence farming. The viability of these societal settings continued, despite the low socio-economic status. Rural population levels remained almost stable until the beginning of the 2000s. Since production is dependent on irrigation, the SHP posed a serious threat to the livelihood, and this has fiercely mobilized a previously closed and docile population. However, the discourse, framing, extent and techniques of mobilization are completely different from the peri-urban contexts of coastal Black Sea region. The extent of mobilization is directly related to the extent of threat to the livelihood in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı. When the threat is high, as in Bağbaşı, the mobilization is strong. However, when the threat is low, as in

Pehlivanli, and there are opportunities provided by the company that would ease the livelihood pressures, non-mobilization is more likely.

7.2 Theoretical implications

The cross-comparison of four localities allow us to draw theoretical conclusions for the study of contemporary social movements. As widely scrutinized in Chapter 2, there are mainly three lines of thought in the realm of social movements: Popkin's rational peasant, which put emphasis on rational, interest-calculating peasants; Scott's moral economy, in which peasants act when there is a threat to their minimal subsistence defined in the cultural context; and lastly, the political economists. Especially Popkin (1979) and Scott (1977) hold the corners of the main debate in peasant mobilization theory. The debate revolves around rationality vs. culture in shaping human action and there is an ontological split in their conceptualization of the peasantry. For scholars of moral economy, villagers are tied to each other on the basis of customs and moral values, whereas for Popkin, they are individual cost-benefit calculators. As Kurtz (2000) notes, these two approaches are not competing explanations. They might be true in a given the empirical context because the peasantry's existential definition is different for each approach.

However, throughout the dissertation, I have argued that 'peasant' is not a static concept, not a static entity. Rather, it is a dynamic group of people that cannot be isolated from the broader historical-structural transformations. As elaborated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, peasants are affected by changes in livelihood formations, global production and accumulation regimes as well as domestic socio-economic resettlements. Peasants respond to these changes in a dynamic, plural and uneven

manner that resists easy categorization. Pluriactivity, circular migration, rurbanization and new rurality are manifestations of broader historical-structural changes and the plurality of the 'peasant' agency. I argue that the historical-structural transformation of the localities that place rural settings in different positions in terms of production and consumption activities have an impact on the patterns, discourses, agency and class in the contemporary 'rural' mobilizations.

A distinction between localities, formal representations and everyday lives is important in grasping the facets of transformation and people's differentiated susceptibilities and efforts to make the change meaningful. I argue that a relational methodology is indispensable for the inquiry and that this methodology has to aim at revealing the links between the everyday lives, historical structures and global forces. A focus on everyday life in the context of globalization would not just be incomplete, but deceptive if it is not relationally connected to the broader historical structures and spatialities that emerged out of them.

In order to be able to grasp the unevenness transformation of communities, I suggest that a holistic analysis of territories provides a plausible approach. I argue that a differentiation of the peasantry takes place at three levels in an uneven manner and that this differentiation should be analyzed at two levels. Figure 50 is the scheme summarizing the theorization that I propose to bring political economy back into the study of rural mobilizations. The two levels of analysis include a closer research in material and immaterial territories.




Figure 50. Proposed research scheme

Focusing on Fernandes' (2009) conceptualization of material and immaterial territories allows us to explore the links between the material transformation of the space, livelihood constructions and ideational factors in the ways people imagine and attribute meaning to them. Furthermore, this is in line with Lefebvre's conceptualization of perceived and conceived spaces, which provides a crucial basis for understanding human behavior. Nevertheless, since he writes about the city and argues that the three-fold construction only applies to urban era of the human history, the theorization does not allow for broadening to the realm of rural studies. This does not defy the importance of conceived and perceived spaces; the theorization allows us to study these two distinct spaces identified by Lefebvre but he states that contemporary social struggles are not driven by class conflict. On the other hand, Fernandes' argues that these two spaces that correspond to material and immaterial

territories are the two sides of a coin and that class plays an important role in the construction of territories.

Even though Lefebvre states that the contemporary dialectics are not driven by class conflict but by the conflicts of spaces, I tried to demonstrate that class still plays an important role in the emergence of spaces and the relations between the spaces.

Fernandes' argument that social classes and relationships generate different territories and spaces that are reproduced under conditions of continual conflict; as a result, there are spaces of domination and spaces of resistance (Fernandes, 2008a, 2008b). Territorial disputes are carried out in all possible dimensions: economic, social, political, cultural, theoretical and ideological (Fernandes, 2008a, 2008b). In the case of rural areas, these disputes are exemplified by the struggles between grassroots social movements and corporate food regimes over what he calls both material and immaterial.

To be able to grasp the role of class and political-economic factors, I propose a three-layer analysis as seen in Figure 51; the first two layers to be analyzed in the material constructions and the third layer to be analyzed in immaterial construction of territories. The first layer of differentiation is imminently related to the production activities in the locality. I prefer specifying it as a dominant crop regime and the transformation it goes through as a result of market forces. The line of differentiation that I have encountered in my research was the two forms of agriculture, that is, commercial vs. subsistence farming practices, as shown in Figure 51. In research on Arhavi and Borçka, commercial farming was the dominant form, while in Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, subsistence farming was still persistent in spite of market forces.

LEVEL 1: DIFFERENTIATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

	Commercial farming	Subsistence farming
Arhavi	✓	
Borçka	✓	
Bağbaşı		✓
Pehlivanlı		✓

Figure 51. Differentiation in agricultural production

Peri-urbanity is an important concept to bring into the discussion to better perceive the uneven transformation of localities . It has an explanatory power in understanding the main axe of differentiation between the subsistence and commercial farming villages. In terms of migration and urbanization, peri-urban environments play a mediating role between the rural and the urban. Peri-urban environments are places of social compression and dynamic social change. In order to understand the nature and operation of the system, it is necessary to focus on the underlying dynamic processes rather than the "fixed states" of urban and rural.

The villages of Arhavi and Borçka became locations of part-time farming in peri-urban areas through out-migration as the result of commercialization of farming. Land was changed from a means of production and subsistence to an exchangeable commodity, which facilitated the co-option of the resistance through land purchases by the company. This required the incorporation of peri-urban middle class actors residing in the cities into the struggle for a strong mobilization with broader alliances

and innovative ways of framing of the resistance. The urbanized new middle classes also made a 'city effect' possible. The question of how the city effect; which is important in the altered politicization of the locals against a livelihood threat; became a crucial phase in the resistance was examined in the second layer, under the heading of migration and viability of space. I placed it in the second layer of analysis of the transformation of material territories. The aim is to grasp the influence of farming practices on a particular territory. Throughout the dissertation, I argued that farming practices and chances for accumulation have an influence on the viability of the place. Figure 53 shows how this differentiation took place in research cases. Accordingly, I argue that the Arhavi district center was transformed into a viable place because of improved chances for accumulation, whereas Borçka became a non-viable place. The subsistence-farming villages of Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı remained as viable places because the market influence on commercialization was low. I have argued that Arhavi and Borçka became peri-urban spaces due to intensive out-migration as a result of the commercialization of farming. Arhavi benefited more from the tea economy under state protection since it was more fertile and because cultivable land was available. The chances for accumulation were higher compared to those in the villages of Borçka. Urbanization of the Arhavi town center and upward mobility in the big cities was made possible through household accumulation. The chances were slim for Borçka. Figure 52 presents the second level of differentiation.

LEVEL II: MIGRATION & VIABILITY OF PLACE		
	Viable	Non-viable
Arhavi	✓	
Borçka		✓
Bağbaşı	✓	
Pehlivanlı	✓	

Figure 52. Migration and place viability

As Bebbington (Bebbington, 2000) notes, migration does not necessarily mean non- viability, proletarianization or complete urbanization. It can also mean cultural or socio-political reproduction or constitution of lifestyles. This very statement carries us to the third layer of differentiation in the study of rural mobilizations, which is the differentiation of agency. Differentiation of agency in strong mobilizations (such as those in Arhavi and Bağbaşı) has roots in the uneven transformation of the immaterial territories. In non-irrigated context, the resistance is strong thanks to the involvement of city-based Arhavilites who can be categorized as new middle classes. In the irrigated villages of Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, interest in and threats to livelihood become the major forces contributing to or impeding the resistance.

The main line that divides the two is the construction of immaterial territory, or perceived space. In Arhavi, the abstraction of space was strong, whereas in Bağbaşı it was almost absent, as visualized in Figure 53. Abstraction of the territory and re-invention of traditions appears as a mobilizing force in the peri-urban viable context of Arhavi. The counter-force is interest, which impeded the emergence of strong mobilization in the other peri-urban context of Borçka. In the viable but rural contexts of Bağbaşı and Pehlivanlı, abstraction was almost absent. The interest was driving the mobilization in Bağbaşı, where the threat to livelihood was serious, but it was simultaneously impeding the mobilization in Pehlivanlı, where there was a very limited threat from the SHP to livelihood.

ABSTRACTION VS INTEREST		
	Abstraction & Reinvention of tradition	Interest
Arhavi	✓	
Borçka	(attempts but limited response from villagers)	✓
Bağbaşı		✓
Pehlivanlı		✓

Figure 53. Differentiation in immaterial territory

The main conclusions of the dissertation can be summarized as follows:

- Integration levels of migrants from the villages into the urban economy affect resistance.
- The new middle class aspects of the active protestors enabled broader alliances with environmental organizations and other active groups.
- The resistance has an environmental stance in Arhavi.
- The protest becomes more carnivalesque and aestheticized, which is an aspect of new middle class protests.
- Re-invention of tradition and a longing for the authenticity is appealing to second- and third-generation city youth.

Broader theoretical conclusions:

- Peasant is not a static concept, nor is it a static entity. Rather, it represents a dynamic group of people which cannot be isolated from broader historical-structural transformations.
- The historical-structural transformation of localities places rural settings in different positions in terms of production and consumption activities, and this has an impact on patterns, discourses, agency and class in contemporary rural mobilizations.
- There is a need to come up with a unitary perspective to bring together uneven historical-structural transformation, new rurality structures, and new rural agencies that are manifested in emerging spaces — both perceived and conceived — in a relational manner.
- Class still is an important category in the analysis of social movements.

This vision is helpful in integrating a class dimension to the analysis of emergence of spaces and more importantly relations of these emergent spaces to broader political economic structures. I reiterate the need to come up with a unitary perspective to bring together uneven historical-structural transformation, new rurality structures, and new rural agencies that are manifested in emerging spaces — both perceived and conceived — that brought about these historical structural transformations in a relational manner. The effort to disentangle the complex matrix of threads between these categories helps to understand the complex forms of rural transformation and peasant mobilizations in the neoliberal era.

7.3 Suggestions for further research

The research took place in four rural settings and their immediate surroundings. It showed that uneven trajectories of rural-urban migration played crucial role for the travel of ideas, for class position attained in the city, for capacities and language and framing of the dissent as well as the role of commercialization of farming on rural households. Within the framework of the proposed research for this dissertation, it was not possible to broaden the scope to carry out in-depth research in the cities in a manner that would allow me to trace the migrated families and collect their experiences and their chances in the cities of destination. I used interviews conducted in the rural areas, social media and Internet sources and the secondary literature to substantiate my arguments. However, I believe there is a need to analyze the patterns of integration into the city with a focus on the place of origin, the viability of those places, the mode of production, the accumulation opportunities,

and upward mobility. That is because I believe that the structural factors in the places of origin have an impact on the life chances in the cities.

Moving on from this observation and the basic findings of this dissertation, I believe the new middle classes (sometimes referred to as the ‘bohemian bourgeoisie’) play an important role in triggering mobilizations and shaping the course and discourses. The link between the new middle class activism and aestheticization of dissent provides a very important and fruitful area for research on contemporary mobilizations.

Last but not least, I believe that the integrated methodology that I advocate for the study of contemporary mobilizations throughout the dissertation applies not only to rural mobilizations. Bringing together the material and immaterial transformations of particular territories and communities, digging out the structural transformation, the capitalist penetration and the emerging class positions and their interaction can provide a useful approach for understanding grassroots mobilizations.

APPENDIX A
RÉSUMÉ DÉVELOPPÉ

Repenser l'économie politique des conflits contemporains sur la question de l'eau en Turquie: Espaces, structures et agentivité d'une perspective comparative

La prolifération de la mobilisation des masses, que cette dernière diffère par son organisation, par son discours, par son impact ou son objectif, ou dans sa portée géographique, est devenu un phénomène-clé du monde d'aujourd'hui. Du mouvement anti-barrage de la Vallée de Narmada en Inde jusqu'à la « Guerre de l'eau de Cochabamba » en Bolivie; du mouvement des « Indignés » contre les mesures d'austérité en Espagne à la « Résistance Gezi » en Turquie; De « Nuit Debout » contre la loi El Khomri au « Mouvement pour la survie du peuple Ogoni » contre la pollution pétrolière au Nigéria, les mobilisations font partie de la multitude d'évènements ayant marqué la scène politique mondiale.

Ces mouvements sont incités par des formes altérées et étendues de l'accumulation du capital au sein de l'ère néolibérale par une reconfiguration des relations entre société, environnement, et économie. Mais ils demeurent complexes et sont différents par leur essence des formes dominantes d'activisme issues de l'ère précédant le « Consensus de Washington ». Comme l'a précisément identifié Akbulut, les griefs et les discours que ces mouvements expriment permettent l'émergence « d'un type de politique non seulement circonscrit dans son contexte local, mais impliquant aussi de nouveaux défis pour la puissance étatique, les processus d'accumulation du capital, ainsi que une restructuration néolibérale des

paramètres politiques, économiques et sociaux ». Par ailleurs, ces mouvements invoquent une diversité de discours, d'agentivité, de motivations et d'engagement dans les relations entre économie, société et environnement (Akbulut, 2014)

Une forme particulière de ces mobilisations est celle comportant une concentration sur une zone géographique donnée, avec des paysans comme acteurs principaux combattant : les changements agraires, la commercialisation de la production agricole et de l'espace rural, la destruction de l'environnement et des cultures locales. De tels mouvements ont abondamment émergés dans le Sud pris dans sa globalité. Ainsi, il conviendra de se poser la question suivante : Quels sont les facteurs entraînant une forte et persévérante opposition contre le changement néolibéral de la ruralité dans les mouvements sociaux contemporains ? Ce mémoire tire sa raison d'être d'une curiosité exprimée face aux facteurs matériels sous-tendant les mobilisations paysannes.

Depuis la fin des années 1970; plus précisément après la fin de la Guerre Froide; les études relatives à la paysannerie et à la théorie des mouvements sociaux ont subi des changements significatifs, plus particulièrement avec l'influence grandissante des études culturelles et des théories post-modernes. Les paradigmes ambiants ont favorisé une explication des mouvements sociaux fondée en général sur des considérations identitaires. Les réflexions portant sur la mobilisation paysanne sont grandement influencées par ces paradigmes, qui supposent une explication des fondements de la mobilisation sur des facteurs ethniques, religieux, culturels, ou encore sur des questions de genre, peuvent aussi être évoqués les inquiétudes concernant l'écologie ou la préservation de l'espace rural.

Indubitablement, tous ces facteurs ont effectivement une influence sur les mobilisations paysannes. Pour autant, ces éclaircissements ignorent à la fois les

considérations de « classe », la question des changements de structures, les opérations d'accumulation de ressources des nouveaux régimes politiques et ont pour conséquence une explication incomplète du changement agraire et de la mobilisation paysanne.

Les études menées sur la mobilisation paysanne augmentent proportionnellement avec la commercialisation et la néo-libéralisation de la ruralité. Il existe plus spécifiquement de nombreuses études développant le cas Latino-Américain, d'où les Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux (NMS) tirent leur origine. Les récentes tendances montrent que les NMS se déplacent des milieux urbains vers les milieux ruraux, et qu'ils commencent à combiner à la fois les thèses des paysans de classe moyenne, le concept « d'économie morale », et la thèse des formes quotidiennes de résistance, allant jusqu'à des études subalternes, principalement influencées par le discours post-moderniste. Ainsi, les NMS et ces études subalternes avancent que les mobilisations agraires, la résistance à l'encontre du capitalisme et du colonialisme sont moins dues à la « classe » des individus qu'à une idéologie globale, une expérience régionale, et à des facteurs de genres, d'ethnicité et de religion.

L'incompatibilité entre les deux façons de penser, ébranlant la validité de la théorie basée sur les « classes », crée l'illusion que la « classe sociale » n'existe pas dans ces mouvements d'opposition. Cette illusion est confortée par le fait que les théories Marxistes n'ont su développer de réelles explications quant aux formes et à l'application d'idéologies basées sur l'idée de « classe ».

L'interrogation principale ayant mené à la rédaction de cette recherche découle donc de la ci-dessus résumée inexistence théorique, couplée à un manque

d'explications développant les dimensions de « classes sociales » au sein des mobilisations populaires contemporaines.

Il faut cependant conceptualiser la paysannerie comme une catégorie dynamique s'efforçant de s'adapter au changement de façon active, et non pas en tant que « victime passive ». Par conséquent, la réflexion aura pour but de saisir ce changement et sa réaction dans sa diversité, dans son dynamisme pris en tant que mouvement à part entière, avec l'intention de contribuer à l'émergence de la littérature relative à la « Nouvelle Paysannerie ».

Gardant les difficultés précédemment énoncées à l'esprit, cette thèse aura pour objet l'étude de la mobilisation contre les Centrales Hydroélectriques « au fil de l'eau » à petite échelle (SHP- Small Hydro Powerplant) en Turquie. Il conviendra également de détailler l'existence, ou l'inexistence de mobilisation paysanne dans les villages où des centrales hydroélectriques (SHP) de petite échelle sont construites. Les SHP sont un exemple classique de commercialisation de l'espace rural et des ressources hydriques. Elles ont proliféré par une série de réformes visant la privatisation du marché et de la production énergétique en Turquie (Voir le Chapitre 3).

Les entreprises du secteur privé se voient accorder l'autorité nécessaire ainsi que des avantages les incitant à produire de l'énergie. Ces avantages- qui ne proviennent par ailleurs pas seulement du gouvernement turc mais également de la Banque Mondiale et de l'Union Européenne- ont contribué à la prolifération des SHP en ce qu'elles sont de plus perçues comme des sources « propres » de production d'énergie, plus respectueuses de l'environnement que les centrales hydroélectriques à grands réservoirs d'eau. Les SHP reposent sur un fonctionnement différent des

barrages. Elles ne nécessitent pas de réservoir pour collecter l'eau des rivières. L'eau est transportée par de larges canalisations et par des tunnels depuis le lit de la rivière.

L'eau est déplacée dans une conduite forcée jusqu'à ce qu'elle se déverse d'une certaine hauteur dans une centrale où l'électricité est produite. Le principe étant de dévier l'eau du lit de la rivière et de la transporter jusqu'à une hauteur suffisante pour la production électrique. Bien que cela puisse paraître moins envahissant pour l'environnement, dévier de grandes quantités d'eau de rivière peut à la fois réduire le débit de cette dernière, nuire à la vitesse de l'eau, bouleverser la qualité de l'habitat et conduire à des problèmes de systèmes d'irrigation, pouvant alors avoir des effets néfastes sur l'économie locale et l'écologie.

En Avril 2016, 1000 projets de SHP ont été recensés à des degrés divers de construction. La prolifération non surveillée des SHP a provoqué une vague de mobilisation par les communautés locales dans presque chaque région turque.

Bien qu'analysée dans des dimensions variées, la relation entre l'économie politique des SHP- de par leurs procédés de commercialisation, d'accumulation et de travail- et la question des « classes sociales » de la mobilisation n'a pas été examinée. Comme établi précédemment, ces mobilisations sont généralement perçues comme des mouvements écologiques avec certains traits culturels mais de plus larges structures matérielles ont été largement ignorées.

Cette recherche a pour but de ramener le facteur matériel en partant de l'accentuation des mobilités sociales et des fluidités post-structuralistes. Les principales variables de la recherche seront donc les variables conventionnelles de l'économie politique internationale, s'inscrivant dans les concepts de propriété, d'accumulation, de régime agricole, d'emploi, de structure, de commerce, de la structure variable de la relation entre capital et production. Il sera aussi opportun

d'examiner ces variables au sein de contextes locaux. Les agentivités seront par ailleurs évoquées en ce que cette recherche est conçue de façon à tirer des conséquences théoriques généralisables par l'analyse de micro-localités. Les exemples comparés de la recherche sont choisis en fonction de critères spécifiques, mais il faut souligner que durant les deux années de recherche, des changements ont eu lieu au sein même de la mobilisation, impliquant parfois même le silence des mouvements. Pour autant, ces perturbations ont pu contribuer à la recherche sans remettre en cause sa fiabilité. Il conviendra de détailler dans la section qui suit la logique de base de la comparaison effectuée au sein de la réflexion.

L'objectif premier de cette recherche est de déterminer la relation entre la définition des caractéristiques économiques et politiques d'une localité et les réactions politiques allant à l'encontre de la perturbation des moyens d'existence préexistants les SHP, et ainsi la commercialisation des ressources hydriques.

Afin d'établir une comparaison, quatre exemples seront choisis selon 2 critères principaux :

- Le besoin d'irrigation pour la production
- La force du mouvement d'opposition à la construction des SHP

Selon ces critères, 4 exemples de mobilisation contre la construction de SHP seront choisis :

- Localités où il n'existe pas de besoin d'irrigation pour la production agricole mais où la SHP a amené une forte réaction et une mobilisation (Arhavi – Kavak SHP)
- Localités où il n'existe pas de besoin d'irrigation pour la production agricole et la SHP n'amène pas de forte réaction ou de mobilisation (Borçka – Aralik SHP)
- Localités où il existe un besoin d'irrigation pour la production mais la SHP n'a pas amené de forte résistance (Pehlivanli)
- Localités où il existe un besoin d'irrigation pour la production et la SHP a amené une forte résistance (Bagbasi)

La matrice résumant les cas d'étude se présente ainsi :

Table 1. Matrice des exemples de mobilisations utilisés dans la recherche

	Opposition forte	Opposition faible
Besoin d'irrigation pour la production	Village Bağbaşı (Tortum, Erzurum)	Village Pehlivanlı (Tortum, Erzurum)
Pas besoin d'irrigation pour la production	Villages Kemerköprü & Kavak (Arhavi, Artvin)	Villages Aralık & Atanoğlu (Borçka, Artvin)

Comme il peut être observé, certains exemples présentent le nom de 2 villages. Cela découle du fait qu'une SHP affecte plusieurs villages de par son action sur la rivière, sans oublier l'infrastructure elle-même impliquant sa construction, ses régulateurs et ses Unités d'Accumulation Hydrique. Par conséquent, l'isolation des autres unités administratives, bien que non désirée, a été méthodologiquement indiquée, alors que l'activité principale est conduite dans les villages les plus affectés par les SHP à savoir : Kavak dans le district d'Arhavi, Aralik dans le district de Borçka, Bagbasi et Pehlivanli dans le district de Tortum.

Les localités ont été choisies en fonction de leur proximité géographique de façon à minimiser les différences culturelles, sociétales et historiques au sein des exemples tirés pour le projet de recherche. La logique sous-tendant la comparaison est de déterminer si il existe une corrélation entre les moyens de subsistances ruraux, -définis essentiellement en termes de production, de marketing, par une situation au sein du système économique général, par des modèles précédents de migration, par une construction identitaire- et la mobilisation politique contre la construction des SHP combinée avec d'autres éventuels facteurs d'agitation civile et de discord. Ainsi, la comparaison fut conçue pour évaluer le poids des différentes causes motivant les mobilisations, les mouvements de discord et les oppositions se déroulant de façon contrôlée.

La relation nécessaire entre la ruralité et le besoin hydrique pour la production agricole est prise comme base pour la comparaison en ce que l'opposition anti-SHP est présentée comme une mobilisation rurale, et en ce que les SHP représentent un trouble pour les modes de vie et les villages en tant que lieux de vie. Les études de cas menées dans les villages n'opposant pas de résistance sont intégrées dans la recherche dans le but d'isoler les facteurs déclenchant les mobilisations. Ces études peuvent être considérées comme des exemples de « mesure », impliquant ainsi un poids plus faible dans l'analyse globale par rapport aux exemples de villages où la mobilisation est importante et continue. L'« absence » de mobilisation devient en soi significative lorsqu'elle est comparée à d'autres cas : ici réside la raison d'être du choix de la comparaison.

Cette thèse comprend sept chapitres. L'introduction présentement lue est suivie du Chapitre 2, qui offre une présentation de l'évolution des théories relatives aux mobilisations paysannes ; à la théorie des mouvements sociaux ; au changement agraire et aux transformations structurelles de la paysannerie en elle-même. Le chapitre essaye par la suite d'apporter une approche alternative des mobilisations agraires contemporaines en utilisant la perspective d'une restructuration spatiale/territoriale et des nouvelles agentivités hybrides qui en ont émergé.

Le Chapitre 3 consacre une brève histoire du développement de l'énergie hydraulique privatisée en Turquie. Le chapitre résume la conjoncture économique dans laquelle les SHP ont pu proliférer dans le cadre la phase rentière du capitalisme en Turquie ; sont aussi évoqués les modifications de l'ordonnancement juridique et institutionnel ayant ouvert à tous l'accumulation de capital. Ce chapitre évoquera aussi la lutte anti-SHP en général.

Le Chapitre 4 entame quant à lui la discussion relative aux données récoltées. Ce chapitre sera consacré aux villages Arhavi et Borçka/Aralik. Il s'agit donc des exemples de villages n'étant pas irrigués. L'analyse porte sur les transformations des moyens d'existence et les systèmes de récolte. Les sections présentant les structures géographiques, démographiques et économiques des deux localités précèdent l'étude détaillée de la lutte anti-SHP à Arhavi qui évoque les acteurs, les agentivités et les différents discours présents au sein de la mobilisation. Enfin, le Chapitre 4 a pour objet d'analyser le cas d'Aralik afin d'y saisir les différences avec l'exemple d'Arhavi.

Le Chapitre 5 répond à la même organisation logique mais s'attarde sur l'étude des villages Bagbasi et Pehlivanli, suivi d'une analyse de la farouche lutte anti-SHP à Bagbasi et du silence au sein de Pehlivanli. La comparaison met en évidence les facteurs provoquant la mobilisation à Bagbasi. Le Chapitre 6 présente une comparaison des 4 villages choisis et évalue les données par le prisme de la politique économique. Les études de cas sont analysées en référence aux paramètres révélés dans les Chapitres 4 et 5, à savoir les modèles inégaux de commercialisation et de transformation spatiale, la viabilité de l'espace, la différenciation des modèles de migration et l'intégration urbaine, la mobilité sociale et la différenciation par les « classes sociales ». Par ailleurs, ce chapitre dispose d'une section relative à la différenciation discursive, aux constructions immatérielles, perception de la localité, et à la réinvention des traditions locales et leur relation avec les variables de l'économie politique.

L'analyse comparative a révélé une considérable différence entre les villages dont les moyens d'existence dépendent de la production agricole (Bagbasi et

Pehlivali), et les villages qui n'en dépendent pas (Arhavi, Borçka et Findikli) en termes de caractéristiques principales du mouvement anti-SHP.

L'aspect déterminant marquant la différence serait la transformation de la ruralité comme une réponse à leur relégation au sein de l'ordre économique, qu'ils soient en ou en périphérie, selon l'évolution de l'espace rural. J'ai avancé l'idée que les villages côtiers situés à l'est de la Région de la Mer Noire ont évolué différemment des villages arides d'Erzurum au sein de l'ordre économique, plus particulièrement dans le cadre de la transformation des régimes de production et de l'utilisation des terres, de la structure de la migration, et au niveau d'intégration des migrants dans les villes.

La transformation des espaces ruraux affecte les façons de procéder et les discours des luttes locales. J'ai ainsi suggéré une théorisation se concentrant sur la transformation spatiale des ruralités et leurs effets et liens sur la mobilisation. Dans ce contexte, j'ai conceptualisé les villages Arhavi et Borçka comme étant devenus des espaces péri-urbains par la transformation spécifique qu'ils ont subi. Ces villages ont en effet vécu une précoce commercialisation de la production. La production du thé, sous la protection et la promotion étatique, a proliféré et est devenue la culture dominante de la région. L'Etat a incité une telle production afin d'enrayer le chômage chronique observé dans la zone géographique concernée. En développant une telle marchandise secondaire, les zones costales de l'Est de la Région de la Mer Noire -les plus fertiles- , ont vu arriver une vague de prospérité, facilitant alors l'accumulation des foyers.

Le caractère péri-urbain a pu faciliter le « voyages d'idées » et un modèle politisation municipale au sein des localités. Dans le cas d'Arhavi, l'effet « citoyen » sur la lutte anti-SHP est évident en ce qu'il donne un cadre et un discours particulier

à la mobilisation. Un groupe d'individus pouvant être identifiés comme provenant de la « nouvelle classe moyenne » provenant d'Arhavi mais ayant vécu et travaillé dans de grandes métropoles sont devenus les pionniers de la résistance. Ces derniers ont pu nouer de plus larges alliances et ont contribué à une résistance rendue « carnavalesque » par des rituels, des traditions réinventées et des micro-identités. Un tel résultat n'a pu être atteint à Borçka, malgré plusieurs tentatives. La différence pourrait se retrouver dans les arguments selon lesquels la viabilité de l'espace rural ne serait pas la même, et l'idée que la mobilité sociale des villageois n'est pas de même ampleur que celle des villageois d'Arhavi.

Le modèle d'exode rural-urbain a pu conserver Arhavi comme un espace socio-économique viable, avec plus de possibilité d'accumulation, de mobilité sociale ascendante et une formation d'une « classe moyenne », alors que les villages de Borçka ont été négativement impactés par l'exode rural. La commercialisation des fermes de Borçka, bien que survenue de façon similaire à Arhavi, s'est confrontée aux limites géographiques se traduisant par de faibles revenus et une faible qualité des récoltes. Par conséquent, la possibilité d'accumulation des foyers fut limitée. La conséquence fut une émigration du village mais la « classe moyenne » n'a pu s'imposer avec l'ampleur observée à Arhavi, et les individus ayant pu bénéficier d'une expérience métropolitaine n'ont pu stimuler la lutte.

Le changement de la fonction des terres a aussi joué un rôle important dans la raison d'être des mobilisations. La migration sortante des villages a amené une activité fermière partielle. Les activités fermières sont devenues supplétives aux sources de revenus de la plupart des foyers : la terre est passée d'actif principal de production à source supplémentaire de revenu, la rendant ainsi une marchandise échangeable avec une valeur mercantile. Cette dernière a par ailleurs

considérablement augmenté avec la construction des SHP et par la résistance à cette dernière. L'acquisition de terres semble être la stratégie principale des entreprises afin d'atténuer les mobilisations et de faciliter la construction par la création d'emplois, constituant corrélativement une faiblesse empêchant l'émergence d'une forte mobilisation locale.

Les villageois d'Arhavi ayant vécu dans une zone métropolitaine sont insensibles à de tels arguments de par leur conscience écologique et leur sensibilité culturelle. Il faut néanmoins noter que les villageois n'ayant pas eu l'opportunité d'émigrer vers de plus dynamiques centres urbains, et qui n'ont alors pas pu accumuler du capital, sont plus enclin à réagir positivement aux options que leur offre l'implantation des entreprises de constructions de SHP. Ainsi, par cette comparaison, je suggère que les acteurs de « classe moyenne » sont les plus visibles au sein de la mobilisation à Arhavi. Ils disposent de meilleures capacités pour mener une forte résistance, avec par exemple une organisation structurelle, des connaissances juridiques, une réappropriation des micro-identités, des rituels et des symboles et par un développement culturel et la présence d'une conscience écologique. Ce que j'appelle l'« effet citadin » est le moteur de la mobilisation impliquant que l'activisme de la « nouvelle classe moyenne » apporte une version esthétisée du désaccord ainsi qu'une créativité dans l'imitation et la réinvention de la ruralité.

Contrairement à la commercialisation de marchandises secondaires, à l'instar des villages de l'Est de la Mer Noire, les vallées arides de Tortum ont abrité des foyers paysans, qui ont dû subsister par l'activité fermière. La viabilité de ces paramètres sociétaux fut continue, malgré le faible statut socio-économique. Les niveaux de la population rurale s'est maintenue stable jusqu'au début des années


2000. Comme la production est dépendante de l'irrigation, les SHP ont posé une menace sérieuse sur les moyens de subsistance et à fortement mobilisé une autrefois docile population. Pour autant, le discours, le cadre et l'étendue des techniques de mobilisations sont complètement différents des contextes péri-urbains de la côte de la Mer Noire. L'étendue de la mobilisation est directement liée à l'étendue de la menace sur les moyens de subsistance au sein des villages Bagbasi et Pehlivanli. Lorsque la menace est importante, comme à Bagbasi, la mobilisation l'est aussi. En revanche lorsque la menace est faible, comme dans le cas de Pehlivanli, et qu'au surplus, les entreprises offrent certaines opportunités levant les pressions sur les moyens de subsistance, une absence de mobilisation est observée.

Cependant, tout au long de la thèse, j'ai avancé l'idée que la paysannerie n'est pas un concept statique. Il s'agirait plutôt d'un groupe d'individu dynamique, qui ne peut être isolé de plus larges transformations historiques et structurelles. Comme développé dans les chapitres 2 et 3; les paysans sont affectés par les changements de leur moyens d'existence, des moyens de production et des régimes d'accumulation ainsi que des migrations socio-économiques. Les paysans réagissent à ce changement de plusieurs façons, et à de divers degrés, rendant alors une catégorisation complexe. La pluriactivité, les migrations circulaires, la ré-urbanisation et la nouvelle ruralité sont les manifestations d'un changement historique et culturel plus large, et de la pluralité de l'agentivité « paysanne ». Il est avancé dans la recherche que la transformation historique et structurelle des localités, plaçant les paramètres ruraux à différentes positions en termes d'activités de production et de consommation, ont un impact sur les modèles, les discours, les agentivités et les classes au sein des mobilisations « rurales » contemporaines.

Une distinction entre les localités, les représentations formelles et les vies quotidiennes est importante afin de saisir les différents aspects de la transformation, les différentes sensibilités des individus, et les efforts fournis pour rendre le changement significatif. Je soutiens qu'une méthodologie relationnelle est indispensable pour cette enquête, et que cette méthodologie doit avoir pour objet de révéler les corrélations entre les vies quotidiennes, les structures historiques et les forces globales. Une focalisation sur la vie quotidienne dans le contexte de la globalisation ne serait pas seulement incomplète, mais aussi fallacieuse, si elle n'est pas liée à de plus amples considérations quant aux structures historiques et aux spatialités qui en émergent.

Afin de saisir la transformation déséquilibrée des communautés, je suggère qu'une analyse holistique des territoires fournit une approche plausible. J'avance qu'une différenciation de la paysannerie a lieu sur trois niveaux à différentes manières, et que cette différenciation doit être analysée à deux niveaux d'analyse. Le schéma suivant résume la théorisation que je propose. Cette dernière suppose de ramener l'économie politique dans l'étude des mobilisations rurales. Les deux niveaux d'analyse incluent une recherche plus précise des territoires matériels et immatériels.

3 NIVEAUX DE DIFFERENTIATION DANS 2 NIVEAUX D'ANALYSE



Proposition de schéma de recherché

Dans la perspective de comprendre le rôle des « classes sociales » et des facteurs politiques et économiques, je propose une analyse en trois niveau. Les deux premiers niveaux sont à analyser à travers les constructions matérielles, le troisième, lui, concerne une construction immatérielle de territoires. Le premier niveau de différenciation est éminemment lié aux activités de production dans la localité. Je préfère le spécifier en tant que le régime de récolte principal et les transformations qu'il a pu subir sont le résultat de forces du marché. La ligne de différenciation que j'ai rencontrée dans ma recherche se traduisait par deux formes d'agriculture commerciale, opposée à des pratiques fermières de subsistance. Dans les études d'espèces, l'agriculture commerciale fut dominante à Arhavi et Borçka, alors qu'à Bagbasi et Pehlivanli, les activités fermières de subsistance étaient permanentes, malgré l'influence des forces du marché.

La péri-urbanité est un concept important dans à apporter dans la perception des transformations inégales des localités. C'est la péri-urbanité qui permet d'expliquer l'axe principal de différenciation entre la subsistance et les villages ayant une activité fermière commerciale. En termes de migration et d'urbanisation, les environnements péri-urbains jouent un rôle de médiateur entre le rural et l'urbain. Les environnements péri-urbains sont des lieux de compression sociale et de changement social dynamique. Afin de comprendre la nature et les opérations de ce système, il est nécessaire d'axer la recherche sur les processus dynamiques sous-jacents, plutôt que sur les « conditions fixes » du milieu urbain et rural. Les villages Arhavi et Borçka sont devenus des lieux d'activité fermière à temps partiel au sein de zones péri-urbaines de par l'émigration des localités par la commercialisation agricole. Les terres furent altérées par les moyens de production jusqu'en devenir une marchandise secondaire, facilitant alors l'atténuation de la résistance par l'achat de terres impulsé par les entreprises.

Cela nécessitait l'incorporation d'acteurs de « classe moyenne » péri-urbains résidants dans des métropoles dans la lutte pour une forte mobilisation avec de plus larges alliances et des inspirations innovantes pour fonder le cadre de la résistance. Cette nouvelle « classe moyenne » urbanisée a aussi rendu « l'effet citadin » possible.

La question de savoir comment « l'effet citadin » est devenu une phase cruciale de la résistance doit être examiné à la lumière du deuxième niveau de réflexion, concernant la politisation altérée d'habitants locaux à l'encontre d'une menace sur des moyens de subsistance, concernant ainsi les questions migratoires et la viabilité de l'espace. Je place ainsi la réflexion sur le deuxième niveau prévu : la transformation des territoires matériels. L'objectif étant ainsi de saisir l'influence des

pratiques fermières sur un territoire particulier. Au cours de la thèse, j'ai soutenu l'idée que les pratiques fermières et les opportunités d'accumulation ont une influence sur la viabilité des terres.

Comme il est suggéré dans les notes de Bebbington (Bebbington, 2000), la migration n'implique pas forcément l'absence de viabilité, la prolétarianisation ou une complète urbanisation, mais elle peut signifier la reproduction culturelle ou socio-politique ou encore la constitution de nouveaux modes de vie. Cette assertion nous emmène alors au troisième niveau de différenciation au sein de l'étude des mobilisations rurales, à savoir la différenciation des agentivités. La différenciation des agentivités dans les fortes mobilisations (Arhavi et Bağbaşı) puise ses racines dans la transformation inégale des territoires immatériels. Dans le contexte des villages non-irrigués, la résistance est forte grâce à l'implication des expatriés issus des métropoles, pouvant être classés comme étant de la « nouvelle classe moyenne ». Dans les villages irrigués de Bağbasi et Pehlivanli, le menace pesant sur les moyens de subsistance devient la contrainte majeure empêchant la résistance.

La ligne principale de séparation entre ces deux exemples est la construction d'un territoire immatériel ou *espace perçu*, à Arhavi, l'abstraction de l'espace demeurait puissante, alors qu'à Bağbasi, il en était presque absent. L'abstraction du territoire et la réinvention des traditions apparaît comme une force mobilisatrice au sein du contexte viable et péri-urbain d'Arhavi. L'autre force mobilisatrice serait l'intérêt porté à la construction des SHP, qui était pourtant absent au sein du contexte péri-urbain de Borçka, empêchant alors l'émergence d'une forte résistance. Dans les contextes viables mais ruraux de Bağbasi et Pehlivanli, les abstractions étaient presque absentes. C'était l'intérêt porté aux SHP qui menait la mobilisation à Bağbasi, où la menace sur les moyens de subsistance était sérieuse, alors que dans le

village de Pehlivanli, où les moyens de subsistance n'étaient que faiblement menacés, le peu d'intérêt porté à la construction des SHP empêchait la résistance.

Ainsi, les conclusions principales de la thèse peuvent être résumées ainsi :

- Les niveaux d'intégration des migrants issus de villages au sein de l'économie urbaine affectent la résistance
- La « nouvelle classe moyenne » constituée de protestataires actifs a permis de nouer de plus larges alliances avec des organisations environnementales et d'autres groupes actifs.
- La résistance comporte une position écologique au sein du village Arhavi.
- La protestation devient plus « carnavalesque » et esthétisée, ceci étant alors un des aspects apportés par la « nouvelle classe moyenne ».
- La réinvention des traditions et le désir d'une certaine « authenticité » sont attrayants pour la jeunesse citadine de 2^{ème} et 3^{ème} génération.

Les plus larges conclusions théoriques sont :

- La paysannerie n'est pas un concept ou une entité statique. Il s'agit plutôt d'un groupe d'individus dynamique qui ne saurait être isolé des transformations historiques et structurelles.
- Les transformations historiques et structurelles des localités placent les paramètres ruraux dans différentes positions en termes d'activité de production et de consommation. Ceci ayant alors un impact sur les modèles, discours, agentivités et « classes sociales » dans les mobilisations « rurales » contemporaines.
- Il existe un besoin de soulever une perspective unitaire pour expliquer ensemble les phénomènes de transformations inégales historiques et structurelles, les nouvelles structures de la ruralité et les nouvelles agentivités rurales qui se manifestent par des espaces émergents, conçus et perçus d'une façon relationnelle.
- La « classe sociale » reste une catégorie importante au sein de l'analyse des mouvements sociaux.

Cette vision aide à intégrer la dimension de la « classe sociale » au sein de l'analyse de l'émergence des espaces, et de façon plus importante, elle aide à comprendre les relations de ces espaces émergents avec de plus larges structures économiques et politiques. Je réitère le besoin d'apporter une perspective unitaire

afin d'inclure à la fois les inégales transformations économiques et structurelles, les nouvelles structures de la ruralité, les nouvelles agentivités rurales manifestées par des espaces émergents, perçus et conçus, de par leur transformations historiques et structurelles, de façon relationnelle. L'effort visant à démêler la complexe matrice exposant ces catégories aide à comprendre les formes complexes de la transformation rurale et des mobilisations paysannes dans l'ère néolibérale.



APPENDIX B

QUOTATIONS IN THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEWS

1. Interview by the author, male respondent. 02 October 2014, Arhavi. Şöyle mesela, Facebook'ta Kemerköprülüler sayfası var. Orada bir çocuk 2012'den beri ortalığı birbirine katmış köyümüz bitiyor yıkılıyor elden gidiyor diye şimdi aynı çocuk MNG'nin muhasebesinde çalışıyor. Şimdi de dış mihraklar falan diye paylaşımlar yapıyor.
2. Interview by the author, male respondent. 25 August 2013, Arhavi. Bizim buralarda protesto olmaz mı, çok oldu. Ortalık birbirine girdi. Sonra şirket geldi bize, köyünüze tesis yaparız, cami yaparız dedi. Okul bile yapacaklar belki. Biz de konuştuk. Dedik ki şirkete şantiyelerde bizim gençlerimizi sigortalı olarak çalıştıracaksınız. Asgari ücretten. Başka yerdeki insan niye gelsin burada çalışsın, bizim gençlerimize iş kapısı olur böylece. Kabul ettiler. Benim sigortam düzenli yatmadığı için emekli olamıyorum. İstanbul'da falan da çalıştım. Şimdi sigortamı yatırıyorlar, çok kalmadı. Dolunca emekli olabileceğim bu sayede. Kötü mü? Hem aslında ben de bakıyorum şimdi, bu HES doğaya çok da zarar vermiyor.
3. Interview by the author, male respondent, 03 October 2014, Arhavi. Maalesef var tabii. Öyle ki özellikle gençlerin falan. Bazıları var 35 yaşında bugüne kadar bir gün bile sigortaları olmamış. Bir de burada insanların çoğu çay fabrikalarında mevsimlik, Mayıs-Eylül arası çalışıyor. Eylülle mayıs

arasındaki sürede eli cebinde geziyor. 6 ay sağlık güvencesi oluyor, 6 ay o da olmuyor. Dolayısıyla cazip şeylere çabuk kapılabiliyorlar. Dik duran, maddi açıdan daha iyi.

4. Interview by the author, male respondent. 03 October 2014, Arhavi . Bunlar araziyi satıyor. Önce gizli tutuyorlar, sonra köylüler anlıyor bunlar gidiyor bir şeyler kesiyor biçiyor odunlar falan. İki kardeş gidiyor İstanbul'daki diğer akrabaları ikna ediyorlar, ama burada da İstanbuldakiler istedi biz de satmak zorunda kaldık diyorlar. Aslında 40-50 bin edecek araziye 250 bine 300 bine satıyorlar, belki açıktan da para alıyorlar. Bu şeyin çıkış noktası Cumhuriyet Mahallesi oluyor, ilçe merkezinin dibi zaten. Orada da bir kuyumcu tip babasının mezarı dahil bir arsayı satıyor şirkete. (...)Dediğim gibi şey düşünüyorlar demek ki 40-50 bin tutcak araziye daha fazla verince, oradan ne geliyor adama, çay fındık geliri belki var. Satıyor sonuçta, bir şekilde kandırıyorlar insanları. Mesela diyor ki şirket, acele kamulaştırmıyla alırız.
5. Interview by the author, male respondent. 03 October 2014, Arhavi. Buradaki en büyük şanssızlık MNG'nin yapması projeyi. Hem Arhavili hem de güçlü bir holding sonuçta ve ülke geneline de güçlü bir holding. Hükümete falan da yakın, o tarz bir şeyi de var. Bizim en büyük sıkıntımız zaten hep orada yaşıyoruz sıkıntıyı çünkü MNG burada daha önce bu projelere başlamadan kendine konaklar yaptı şehrin girişinde. Orada zaten bir grup inşaat firmasını, taşeronları vs. kendine bağlamış zaten. Kendi kitlelerini yaratmış. Sonrasında onlara bir de şey deyince işte HES var yapacağız sizden alacağız malzemeyi deyince zaten belli bir kitleyi elinde tutuyor. E, akrabalık

ilişkilerinden dolayı sağa sola da çabuk bulaşıyorlar. Biz zaten en büyük sıkıntıyı orada yaşadık. Yani en sağlam HES karşıtı olan birinin karşısına onun en yakını dikiliyor. (...). Adamın kuzeni, dayısı, dedesi bir şekilde. O çok büyük bir problem. En büyük problemimiz oydu. Fındıklıda mesela Ankara'dan bir firma, başkent Elektrik, taşeronlar genelde Sivaslı falan, öyle olsa. Direkt bunlar yabancı olsa bu kadar rahat her yere erişemeyecekler. (...) Belediye de kaderini MNG'ye bırakmış durumda, büyük projeleri MNG yapsın, biz de çıkarımızı sağlayalım, payımızı alalım.

6. Interview by the author, male respondent. 04 October 2014, Arhavi Her şey bu köprüyle başladı, bu köprünün yapımı, karşı çıkanların yıkımı oldu. Bu köprü yapılırken biz kitleyi toplayabilsek, çalışanları durdurabilsek, taşlı sopalı kovalayabilseydik, o adamları yanaştırmazdık bu kadar tahribat verilmeyecekti. Ama o kitleyi yakalayamadık. Insaati durduramadık, Sonra ne oldu adamlar devam ettikçe halk nasıl olsa durduramayız deyip geri çekildi. Kimi işte bize yol yapıyor diye kandırıldı. Ama anlatıyorsun anlamıyorlar. En sonunda bizim dava çözülünce biz günde 10 kişi toplanabiliyorsak son dava kazanıldığında 110. (...) Tanımadığımız yüzlerce insan tebriğe geliyor. Arhavi'den, köylerden. Kardeşim siz neredeydiniz? Ha güzel bir şey. Gerçi çoğu kişi biz direnirken siz neredeydiniz dedi ama bu kazanılan bir dava. Bundan sonra her davada bunlar bunu kazandıysa bunu da kazanır düşüncesiyle arkamızda olabilecek insanlar. En azından laflı ve sözlü etraftakileri ikna edip destek sağlayabilirler.

7. Interview by the author, female respondent. 03 October 2014, Arhavi. Tarım yapılıyor da yalnız yetmiyor. Çay geliri artık yeterli değil, 1 ton

toplayacaksın 1250 tl alacaksın. İşçi zaten yarı parası. Mevsimlik işçiyiz, yazın gelip çayımızı topluyoruz. Çok akmiyor ama damlıyor, bu bile kardır n'apalım. Yani arazi varken şimdi bu etraftaki, onu mecburen değerlendiriyorsun. Toplamadın mı çay oluyor orman, onu mecburen kesip satıyorsun. 2 Sezon falan çay toplanır burada. Kendin toplarsan 1 ayda bir sezonu biter, işçiye toplarsan 1 haftada da bitirirsin. 1 ay ara verirsin, sonra ikinci el.

8. Interview by the author, male respondent. 01 October 2014, Arhavi Aktif mücadele eden 30-40 kişi. Arhavili bir grup var, dışarıdan gelenler var tabii, orada yaşayan. Arhavi'nin içinde yaşayan bir grup da var, biraz daha tecrübeli kesim. Bu köy (Kavak) yakın olduğu için yaz kış yaşayan daha fazla. Dışarda yaşayanlar yazın gelenler var bir de genelde herkesin Arhavi'de evi var.

9. Interview by the author, male respondent. 03 October 2014, Arhavi . Köyde kışın biz 4 ev kalıyoruz, aşağıya Arhavi'ye taşınanlar var. Kavak Köyü'nde 15-20 aile oluyor. Yazın bir köyde 70 hane kadar oluyor, kışın gidiyorlar belki haftasonları falan geliyorlar . . . Derken biz seçim döneminde biz İstanbul'a falan dönmüştük. 18'inde (Ağustos) geldik, 19'unda yürütmeyi durdurma açıklandı. Birden bir coşku, bir sevinç oldu. Ertesi gün adamlar pıllarını pırtlarını toplayıp gitmişler. Ben şahsen yürütmeyi durdurmadan sonra şantiyeye dalma eylemini yapacaktık, rahat vermeyecektik onlara. Bir de en kalabalık olduğumuz dönemdi, dışarıdan yaz için gelenler, festival için

gelenler. Onlar göze alamadı, toplanıp gittiler. Büyük bir coşkuyla çarşıda eylem yaptık.

10. Interview by the author, 02 October 2014, Arhavi. Neyse, 28 ocakta burada bilirkşi incelemesi oldu. Ondan bir hafta kadar önce buraya geldik, burada işte bilirkşi incelemesi var kalabalık olmamız lazım dedik. İstanbul'dan da Arhivililer Derneği iki otobüs ayarladı, oradan insanlar geldi. Ankara'dan Arhivililer vakfı bir otobüs ayarladı. Burada 1500-2000'e yakın insan toplandı Cumhuriyet Mahallesinde. Yani o kadar beklemiyorduk. Baya etkili oldu, ses getirdi, moral oldu. İstanbul'da da biz Şubat ayında bir yürüyüş yapmıştık. Orada da fena bir sayı yoktu.
11. Interview by the author, male respondent. 02 October 2014, Arhavi. Ben çoğunlukla Ankara'dayım ama gelip gidiyorum İstanbul'a. İstanbul'da da güzel bir eylem oldu. Arhivililer derneği vs. hepsinin HESlere karşı bir duruşu vardı. Sonrasında bu seçim öncesi yine MNG'nin önünde bir eylem yapılacaktı. Burada 10 Martta çalışma başladı, iş makinesi girdi. 2 gün sonra biz bir yürüyüş yaptık. 200 kişi falan. Makineleri falan çıkardık. Ondan sonra biz CHP örgütü falan aktif bir ekip gidip geliyordu. Seçimi bahane edip bir yavaşladılar. Seçimden sonra AKP kazanınca İstanbul Arhivililer Derneği bir çekinmeye başladı, hükümet bitirir bizi diye. Vakıf geri durmaya başladı. Öyle olunca herkes kaderiyle baş başa kalmış gibi oldu.

12. Interview by the author, male respondent. 02 October 2014, Arhavi. CHP küstü, CHP tabanı. Seçim gecesi oylar açıklandı, AKP kazandı. Benim facebook'uma arkadaşlar şöyle dedi: "Tamam Arhavi kararını verdi, HES de olsun, hayatta bir daha adımımı atmam." (...) 28 Ocakta kalabalıktı, ondan sonra 10 Mayıs'ta bir tane CHPLi yoktu. AKP ile kılı kılına kaybettiler, 200'e yakın oyla. Bu köyde, Kemerköprü de CHP rahat kazandı. Sonra dedik ki az farkla AKP kazandı, kendiniz diyorsunuz para dağıtıyor, dışarıdan gelenler var çay toplamaya vs. dedik bu CHP için yenilgi değil aslında, falan ama bir türlü o kitleyi bir daha yanımıza çekemedik. Yalnız kalmış olduk. N'aparsak yapcaz, sonra büyütme çağıracağız hareketi dedik.
13. Interview by the author, male respondent. 07 October 2014, Borçka. Ağırılık olarak fındık, ve çay var. Fındık daha değerli bir bitki. Şu anda bir 100 kök fındığın olsun, iyi para getirir. 100 kök de hiç bir şey bir yandan. Bizim köyde en büyük fındıklığı olan bir komşumuz var. 87 dönüm, 55 dönüm. Çok iyi ama yüzde yüz verim alamıyorlar bundan çünkü arazi çoğu zaman eğimli ya. Meyilli arazide ve yükseklerde yabani hayvan olduğu için. Ondan sonra 30-25-20 filan. Kadastro geçti buradan, aile içi paylaşımlar da oldu. 10 dönümse 3 kişi böldü 3'er 3'er paylaştı. Küçüldü arazi tabii, tarımsal destekler bakımından da zarar gördü insanlar. Devlet toprak koruma kanunu çıkardı arazileri birleştirme yönünde destekte bulunuyor ama kimse kimseye güvenmiyor. Adam kardeşine güvenmiyor. (...) Desteklemeyi fazla vermiyor.

14. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 December 2015. 2009 yılında köyüme döndüğümde bir adet Aralık HES yapılmış ve faaliyete geçmişti. Aynı sene ikinci HES projesinin olduğunu öğrendik. 20 arkadaşla avukat tutup, 12.000 tl harcadık ve yürütmeyi durdurma sonucunda, “ÇED gereklidir” kararı ile dava sonuçlandı. Bu süre içerisinde köyde 2 kez kitlesel gösteri yaptık. Biri, proje sahipleri geldiğinde, diğeri ise mahkeme sürecinde bilirkişiler geldiğinde. Yıl 2010.

15. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 December 2015. Ancak köy muhtarının el altından HES sürecine destek verdiğini sonradan öğreniyoruz. TG Elektrik A.Ş. 2012 yılında “ÇED Gerekli Değildir” belgesi alıyor, süreç askıya çıkartılıyor ama muhtarın dışında kimse bilmiyor. Askı asılmadığı halde asılmıştır tutanağı tutuluyor. Durumu ben Ekim 2014’te muhtar olmamdan dolayı öğreniyoruz. 13 Ekim 2014’de dava açtım ama askı süresinin üzerinden 2 yıl geçtiği için davayı kaybettim.

16. Interview by the author, male respondent. 07 October 2014. Borçka. HES görüşmesinde de fikir belli eden vardı, menfaati olanlar HES istiyor. Mesela birisi diyor ki burada HES çalışması olursa ben kendi arabamı oraya kiraya veririm kira geliri elde ederim. Kimi tabii tamamiyle olaya farklı bakıyor, çalışırım, iş yaparım diyor. Bu şekilde düşünenler var ama azınlıkta. Şimdi köy içerisinde bir konsensüs oluştu (...) Mücadeleye çok fazla karşı çıkan olmadı. Köylü olarak çok fazla karşı çıkan olduğundan HES’e. Ama şöyle oluyor, çok da karşısında duracağız olayı olmuyor. Eğer bir faydası olacaksa köye tamam diyor.

17. Interview by the author, male respondent. 07 October 2014. Borka. Őehirde alıŐanların kimi destekliyor, kimi desteklemiyor. Bir kısmı var tabii, HES arazisinde toprađı var. Benimle iletişim halinde. Geenlerde maliyeciler gelmek istedi istimlak iin, biz dedik ki gelmeyin size yardımcı olmayız yeri de gstermeyiz ve gelmediler. Gelmemeniz sizin iin hayırlı olur dedik. İstimlak yapılamamıŐtır diye rapor tuttular. O kiŐi de beni aradı, gelen giden var mı diye, gelmediler dedim. ok cüzi rakamlar var, arazileri de küçük küçük. Daha fazla para verip Őirket de alabilir. Olabilir tabii. O bölgedeki insanlar en azından burada yaŐamıyorlar, öyle bir dezavantjımız da var. Bir kardeŐ HES'e karŐı diđerleri istiyorlar.

18. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 December 2015. Proje sahipleri 6 yıldır proje namına henüz bir yol alabilmiŐ deđildirler. Son bir yıldır mücadeleyi kendi yöntemlerimize göre sürdürüyoruz. Projenin uygulanması iin gelen görevlileri köy halkı bana ihbar ediyor, yollarını kesip bir daha gelmemelerini tembihleyerek gönderiyoruz. Köyden iŐbirlikileri alarak Temmuz 2015'te gelen ekibe "Biz gönüllü birliktelik isteriz, zorla olana tecavüz deriz" diyerek gönderdik.

19. Interview by the author, female respondent. 09 October 2014. Benim babam iftilik yapardı. Burada deđil dađlar diyoruk biz, mezralar. Ekim alanlarımız oralardaydı. Bizim buralarda o taraflar gibi deđil, en ok 10 dönüm 12 dönüm. 20 dönüm arazisi vardı orada. Buđday ekerdi, mercimek

arpa. O tür şeyleri ekerdik. O da bir yıl ekerdik bir yıl ekmezdik. Nadası da var bir de hayvanların otlaması var. Hayvancılık yapardı babam.

20. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Yani çoğunluk gençlik öyle oldu, yaşlılar kaldı daha çok. Yaşlılarımız da evlatlarının yanına gidiyor. Köyümüz boşaldı. Daha önceden hayvancılık rençberlik hepsi vardı şimdi bu şehre geçme oldu ya hep kalktı onlar. Hayvancılık 3-4 ailede kaldı. Eski güzelliği kalmadı. Şimdiki gelinler Erzurum'a gitmek istiyor, köyde yaşamak istemiyor. Komşunun gelini gitmişse ben niye oturayım ya diyorlar, örnek olarak diyorum, asıl değil de. Komşunun çocuğu okumuş görevini almış gitmiş. Öteki diyor ki olsun sen de git bir işe gir asgari ücret bile olsa eşi orda çalışır hanım da oturur. Köyümüzün de daha doğrusu belirli bir gelir seviyesi yok. Evi geçindirecek gelir falan hiçbir seviye yok. Burada da dursa yapacak hiçbir şeyi yok. Karı koca beraber çalışsalar belki boğaz tokluğuna olacak. Tarım zaten arazi alanımız yok, geniş bir alanımız yok. Zor durum geçim zor burada. Şehre gitmek yine mecburiyet gösteriyor.

21. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum . Uç yıl bitti, üç yılı da mahkemelerde savunduk. Bizim köylü olarak dediğimiz şu: Ya bundan vaz geçin, ya da istimlak edin biz çıkıp gidelim. Yaşanmaz yani mümkün değil. isterse istimlak etsinler başka yere göndersinler, yada suyu almasınlar. Tarım hayvancılık. Hayvancılığı da bu araziden olan yemle otlama samanla yapıyoruz. 29-30 tane su kanallarımız var burada. Bunların verecekleri bir kanal su, 28i yok. 7 tanesinde su şeyi vermişler, 29un 7 sinde

artık bağlamışlar. Nasıl oldu bilemiyoruz. Bak bu vadide 14.000 insan yaşıyor. Baştan sona kadar 14.000 insan. Bu 14.000 insanın komple arazisi, yeri tapulu. Kadastro girmiş. Bunun uzununu kısası şu: eğer bunlar bu HES'i götürürlerse bu 14.000 insanın hayatı biter. o zaman ne yapmaları lazım, ya burayı komple istimlak edip, paramızı verip gidin nereye giderseniz demeleri lazım, ya da yapmamaları lazım. Başka yer de istemiyoruz, burayı alsınlar biz kendimize yer buluruk.

22. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Şimdi ilk başta o kadar sempatik bir şekilde gelip halka anlatıyorlar ki aşağıda gördüğünüz boru. Tortum şelalesi de var ya. Buraya şelale yapıyorlar, yani halka hizmet ediyorlar. Şelale oldu mu görsel olarak haz duyacak, insanlar gelecek buraya. O şekilde halka bilgi veriyorlar. O arada biz düşündük nedir ne değildir. Babamla da konuştuk. Sonra başka yerlerde HES yapılmış, gittik oraların inşaatlarını dolaştık. Baktık ki anlatıldığı gibi değil bunların yaptıkları. Sonra gittik kendi adımıza ilk dilekçeyi bu nedir, bize bilgi verin ne oluyor diye bir şeyler yapmaya çalıştık.

23. Interview by the author, female respondent. 10 October 2014, Tortum.,
Sinem: İnşaat başlayınca mı haberiniz oldu sizin?-Yok canım önceden haber alındı, çok karşı çıkıldı da ancak başarabildiler. Önceden haberdar olundu, imzalar toplandı. Tabii ileri gelenler. Bağbaşı'nda ziraatçiler vardı, Serdarlı'nın belediye başkanı falan çok karşı durdular. Ama onlar yeterli olmadı. Onlar başlatmaya kepçeler falan geldi ya iş makineleri, o zaman halk

döküldü. Ondan önce çok uğraşan oldu da lafları geçerli olmadı. Çok uğraştılar yani millet canını dişine taktı derler ya ama olmadı.

24. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum.

Muhtarlar falan nasıl yaklaştılar HES'e? -İlk önce bunu duyduğunda 3 belde var, kaymakam belediye başkanına dedim ki gelin oturalım yemek yiyelim bir de sular ile ilgili konuşalım. Dedim arkadaşlar, ben burada balıkçılık yapıyorum diye değil. Ben bu suyun yeşilliğın gitmesini istemiyorum. Yani elektrik de üretilsin yine de su gelsin buraya. bu adamlar hep kesiyorlar. En üstteki köy 25 km. Ben en üstteki köy gibi göreceğim kendimi, siz en alttaki köy yani bir bütünü burada. Varsanız eğer ben de bu işin içinde varım. Bir tanesi tabii evet öyle, ondan sonra diğeri bir tanesi ya söyleyelim bakalım hele ne olur. Bir tanesi de sanki yabancı bir ülkeye gitmişiz de konuşuyorlar da sanki bir şeyler anlamayız ya yabancı dilden öyle. O bizim köylü olan. Ondan sonra duyuyorum ki bizimkisi HES yetkilileriyle geziyor(...). Ve bu adam, bizim memleketimizin siyasetine yazıklar olsun, Tortum ilçesinde belediye başkanı aday olmak istedi yapmadılar. İçişleri bakanı bu adama danışmanlık teklif edip başka bir partiden aday olduğu halde o adaylıkta vazgeçirdi. Bak neler oluyor. Ve şimdi şu anda, yazıklar olsun bu hükümete. Duydum Ankaralarda danışman olmuş iç işleri bakanına. Ufak şeye tenezzül edip de köyünü satan adam yarın ülkeyi de satar. AKP'den de nefret ettim böyle seçim kazanılmaz.

25. Excerpt from the documentary ‘Damn the Dams’ by Osman Şişman & Özlem Sarıyıldız. Erzurum valiligi CED raporu gerekli degildir diyerek iktidara hizmet etmis, bu bu projenin uygulanmasi icin gerekli zemini hazirlamistir. Biz de bu hukuk disi oldugunu ifade ederek diyerek avukat arkadaslarimiz bir dava actilar. Ogretim uyesi arkadaslarin vardiklari sonuca gore cevre bundan olumsuz etkilenecektir, mutlaka CED’e gerek vardir dolayisiyla valiligin karari hatalidir diyerek ikinci bir kesif karari aldi. Bu sefer Istanbul Teknik Universitesi bir kesif yaptilar, Veysel Eroglu, ki bu HES projelerini Turkiyenin basina musallat eden siyasetcilerden bir tanesidir. Veysel Eroglunun esiyle bu gelen bilirkisilerin bir is ortakligi oldugu ayni buroda calistiklari tespit edilmiş, dolayisiyla bilirkisilerin objektif karar veremeyeceklerine dair bir gorus dosyaya konulmuş, buna ragmen bir kesif yapilmiş. Buna ragmen bir kesif yapilmiş ve cevrenin olumsuz etkilenmeyecegi kararına varılmış bu sefer. Iki rapor birbiriyle celistigi icin mahkemeler ucuncu bir rapor gerektigine karar veriyorlar haliyle. Mahkeme de Haziran ayi itibariyle masraflari yatirmasi icin cagrida bulunuyor. Bağbaşı belediyesi de gidiyor kesif masrafını yatiriyor. Kesif gununu bekliyorlar. Bu arada vatandaslar mudahil olalim diyor. 07.10. 2011 tarihinde sabahleyin oturmuşlar birdenbire vatandasin mudahele talebini reddetmişler ki usullerde boyle bir sey yok. Taraflara bunun teblig edilip fikirleri sorulduktan sonra mahkemenin bir karara varmasi lazim. Cunku vatandasin bagi bahcesi tarlasi bostani bu suyla sulaniyor onun icin mahkemenin bu mudahale taleplerini reddetme gibi bir lüksü de yoktur. Buna ragmen bu talep reddedilmiştir. Bundan bir kac saat sonra mahkeme esas hakkında karar vermiş ve davayı reddetmiştir. Simdi bizim bir hukucu olarak

anlayamadığımız hiçbir hukukcunu da anlayamayacağı durum sudur:

4.6.2010 tarihinde dava için aydınlanmayan mahkeme, 7.10.2011 tarihinde nasıl aydınlanmıştır. Bu soruya mahkemenin bir cevap vermesi lazım. Vahiy mi gelmiştir de aydınlanmıştır ve bu vahiy nereden gelmiştir. Soru bu. Bunun hukuk içinde olmadığı çok acıktır.

26. Interview by the author, female respondent. 11 October 2014, Tortum. “2 sene oluyor bu iş başlayalı. Asker her yerdeydi kızım, bi orada bir burada. Geçirmediler ki bizi hiçbir yere. Herkesi dövdüler, karıları nasıl dövdüler. Ben gittim de karşı koyamadım ki belim bacağı tutmuyor. Etmem de zaten devlete karşı gelinmez ki. Adam geldi, dedi ki teyze başımı yıkayacağım çeşmede, dedim yıka da sularımız da gidiyor ki. Dedi ki Teyze, sular gider, bu devleti görüyor musun bu dağları. Dedi ki teyze senin sözün geçer de evde geçer. Bilemedik bu bu devlet ne ediyor. Neden gece mece gizli çalışıyor. ki bunu devlet ediyorsa eli bükülmez, devlet etmiyor da şirket ediyorsa o zaman kopartırız yapamazlar bunu. Adamlardan mahpusta yatan oldu bu yüzden.

27. Interview by the author, female respondent. 10 October 2014, Tortum. Beni de götürüyorlar, ile diyolar ki geleceksin. Ayaklarım tutmuyor. Ordan gidiyorum askerler koymuyor. Yalvarıyorum diyorum ki uşağım koyun ben gideyim askerler koymuyor. Biz de korkuyoruk devletin adamıdır da. Orda geçit var gizli ordan geçtik. Dedim yavrum geçemiyorum ki ayak yok. Gidemiyorum ki yavrum devlete karşı gelinir mi, devlet bu. Gece çalıştılar burada. Ameliyat olsam kim bakar, bir tane uşağım var.

28. Interview by the author, female respondents. 10 October 2014, Tortum

Sinem: Seni de mi dövdüler teyze? -Neler ettiler, dövdüler, kimilerini yerde sürüdüler. Kimileri ambulansa düştü neler oldu. Yani bir orduydu, 700 kişi. Arazimiz var kızım, burası nasıl köy olmuş, işte bak böyle. Küçük bahçelerimiz var. Bunun suyu gidende bir şey kalmaz ki burada kurur. Sulu köy değildir.- Aha şimdi suyumuz gidiyor. Yaz oldu mu bu su kuruyor. Bu araziye yetmiyor. Bizim az da olsa bir aylığımız var. Onu olmayan ne yesin kızım. Çocuğunu okutuyor, geçim buranın üstüne. Meyvesini satıyor, okulunu okutuyor. Ondan yiyeceğini içeceğini temin ediyor. Bizim az aylığımız var, emekli 1000 TL ayda oluyor ama bize yeter. Ama öylesi var ki yavrum aylığı yok, çocuk okutuyor. Bizim köyümüz öyle büyüktür ki buradan gitmeyle bitmez. Bağlarbaşıdır buranın adı. Yerimiz arazimiz çok ama suyumuz az işte. O olmasa ne olacak. Arazi çok su yetişmiyor.

Ne kadar arazin var?Benimki az ama. Eskiden biz Erzurum'da oturuyorduk da şimdi beyim emekli oldu. Çocukları evlendirdik geldik yerleştik buraya. En baştan biz bilmiyoruz, bizim reisimiz satmış burayı. O gelende 15 gün asıda kalıyor evet hayır diye. (belediye başkanı) vermiş kızım bizim haberimiz yok. 15 gün askıda kalacak ki bu millet haberdar olacak da, karar verecek. Senlen oluyor mu bu iş. Günahları başlarına da bir şey yediler mi yemediler mi de satılmış da 5 paraya satılmış buralar. Biz de burada gördük ki bir şeyler yapılıyor, dedik hükümet yaptırıyor. Bir de sonradan duyduk ki bu su satılmış. 700 tane belki 1000 tane polis döküldü. Polis döküldü deyince hepsi de polis değildir. Üniformasını giydirmişler milleti getirmişler. Karı polisi de erkek polisi de. Verdiler sopayı verdiler, kimisi

ayıldı bayıldı düştü da. Neler olduk neler çektik. Suyumuz da, milletin yiyecek içeceği. Ha bu su kesilsin içecek suyumuz bile kesilecek. Ondan sonra sabah namazında, ramazanda orda bekliyorduk ki sıcakta aç susuz ki suyumuzu vermiyek. Geliverdiler, hiç acıma duyguları yoktu. Erkeklerimize sövdüler, dövdüler, mahkemeye verdiler. Karakollara düştük. Diyorlar taş atmışsınız, şunu yapmışsınız bunu yapmışsınız. Hastayım ben de, böbreklerimde taş var. bir gün geldi isim ki beni de çağırmişlar. Kaltık gittik, karakola. Oradakilerin hepsi satılmış kızım, parayla doyurmuşlar hepsini. Gittik geldik oturduk, teyze sen öyle etmişsin, böyle etmişsin. Dedim ki gözünüz gördü mü benim bişey yaptığım yok, ben hastayım dedim. O zaman da ben yoktum, Erzurumdaydım gittim filmlerim çekilecek. Dedim hele bu filmleri gösterin de bakayım artık beni benzetmeyin. Orada fotoğraf gösterdiler, bunlar sen değil misin? Bir tanesi boyu moyu bana benziyor. Dedim ki döndürün döndürün bir daha bakın ki ben miyim dedim. Ondan sonra günahı dedim, herkesi buralara çekiyor sual ediyorsunuz ortalıkta dedim. Ondan sonra bir bayan vardı, gel kusura bakma dedi. Beyim de hanımım rahatsız bir şey olursa sizden bilirim demiş. (Kadın)hakkınızı helal edin dedi, dedim hakkımı helal etmem. Siz bizi sürüttünüz ortalıkta. Hem suyumuz hem malımız hem canımız gitti, ortalıklarda süründük. Ne bileyim yavrum, çok şeyler çektik. Burada da satılmış insanlar oldu, ara yerde para yediler. Köyün içinde de oldu bir şeyler. Hep bütün millete, kim bu HES'in peşine düşmüşste, yani gitmesin diye onların ismini verdiler ortalıkta süründürdüler. Benim beyimin de haksızlığa tahammülü yoktur. İstiyor ki kendi arazim yok ama bu arazisi olanlar, uşak okutanlar, rızkı olanlar yani neye şey etsinler. Mücadele ediyor ki su gitmesin. Bu HES yapılırsa sular

kesilecek biter yani kalmaz. Her şey yapıldı borular falan, bir tek şeye bağlanacak? (jeneratör) Şimdi haberlerde durduruldu durduruldu diyor. Bizim başbakanımız, başbakanımızın eniştesinin evinin içindeymiş bu suyun şeyini başlatan onlarmış. Bizim de kendi büyüğümüz vermiş. Kaç yerde bak vermediler reisi falan. Haberimiz olmadı. Sonra da çağırdık falan insanları. Dedik ki gelin bakalım bir gezin burayı görün. Sadece söğüt kavak yazılmış burada. Ne söğüdü kavağı bak kaç türlü meyvemiz var elmadır, armuttur, ayvadır her türlü meyvemiz var. Biber gazını sıktılar bayılttılar. Geldi iki tane polis, kepçe çalışıyor. Biri bir kolumdan tuttu, diğeri öbür kolumdan. Ben de oturuyorum öyle Allah var ki taş maş da atmadım. Geldi polisler tuttular çekiyorlar, ben de oturuyorum ki kaldıramıyorlar. Geldi bi tanesi baş edemiyorlar biber gazını sıktılar, bayılttılar beni. Yani böyle sıfatıma hemen yüzüme. Gerçi onlar da emir kulu n'apıcan? Ama böyle acımazlık da olmaz. Gözlerim yüzlerim yandım, haşlandım, nasıl kıpkırmızı oldu şişti yüzüm gözüm. Zehir. Kızım ne diyeyim, iyi de biz anlamadık ki kimde şey. Hükümetimize şey diyorlarsa, bakanlar falan geleydi de bir bakaydı da. Şey var ya, solcu, Kılıçdaroğlu, geldi burada avukat tuttu adam, avukatlarını getirdi bizi savundurdu. Çok yardımcı oldu. Dedi bunların ne günahları var, arazileri fakir. Fakirdilerler arazileri, durumu yok burada. Fakir burası kızım fakir. diyorum benim az aylığım var. Olmayanlar, çok kişi olanlar yetmiyor kızım. Geldi o yardım etti araba tuttu, bankaya götürdü falan. He halimizi kim arz edecek? İşte mücadele ettik bakalım. İptal edilmiş de yine bunu koymazlar kızım. Buraya su bağlanır.

29. Excerpt from the documentary 'Dam the damns' by Osman Şişman and Özlem Sarıyıldız. Sadece askerle polisle muhattap. Bir yetkili yok gelip bize bir sey anlatan. Asker geliyor onumuze cikiyor, jop biber gazi. Her gun her olayin basinda jandarmayla kalkip geliyorlar. Sanki bu is ozel sirketinse jandarmanin ne isi var. Devletinse devlet yetkilileri gelsin. Birakmislar jandarmaya, biz nasil kendi koyumuzun nobetini tutuyorsak jandarma da onlarin nobetini tutuyor.

30. Interview by the author, male focus group. 9 October 2014, Tortum. PKK'ya hak verir hale geldik, yani adamlar boşu boşuna dağa çıkmamışlar. İnsan duvara sıkıştırılmış gibi oluyor. - Bir tane yetkili gelmedi, ama maalesef, CHP'nin Çanakkale milletvekili geldi. Emine Ülker Tarhan, İstanbul milletvekili bayan (Melda Onur) -Burada yuzde 90 Ak Partiye oy verdiği halde, ben de dahil, bir tane bekçilerini buraya yollamadılar ki gidin bakın bu insalar orada ne yapıyor. Bunun sıkıntısı ne? Ve şu ada yine %90 oy veriyorlar değme gitsin. Dokunuyor insana. -Burayı zamanında Rusya işgal etmiş, 3 sene burada kalmış da yardımdan başka bir şey etmemiş. Ruslar bunların yanında solda sıfır kaldı ya. Öyle bir işgal ki doğrudan doğruya bu ülkenin vatandaşı değilsiniz gibi bir hareket oldu ya. Rus geldi, yol yapmış burada. Bu n'aptı, polisi yolladı ordan kadınlar gitmişler, onları perişan ettiler bir şeyler. Başka yere gidip yapamıyorlar onu, bize güzel yapıyorlar. Bak bize mahkemeye uğraşyoruz. Mahkeme durdurdu. Hem Erzurum idari hem Ankara. İptal kararı verildi. Biz olduk eşkiya ya. Hepimiz eşkiyayız. Bizim nene hatunları gördün mü, erkekler işe yaramadı da.

31. Interview by the author, 1male focus group. 09 October 2014, Tortum. -O kadar adamlar geldi bir tane oy çıkmadı ya CHP'ye. Şimdi biraz çıktı oy son seçimde. - Ben çocuktum, Halk Parti'nin zamanında 3-4 kadının başından ihramlarını aldılar ondan hala daha millet burada onlara oy vermiyor. Ama burada millet geldi 50-100 kadına hakaret etti yerlerde sürüdü hala daha bunlara oy verirler. Ben anlamıyorum ki bu işi. Halka sihir mi ettiler ne yaptılarsa. Bak burası belediyeydi belediyeyi kaldırdı, Erzurum'a bağladı. Bize yapmadık iş bırakmadı, millet gene razı, nasıl razı ben bilemiyorum. Sandıkta sonuçta istersen yalan söylersin ben başbakana oy verdim dersin ben bilmiyorum ki. 40 yıl olmuştu burası belde olalı. Bak şimdi şurada bir sağlık ocağı yapılmış, içine bak imrenirsin. Bir bak içinde doktor var mı? Eskiden bir köy odasında iki doktor vardı. 2 tane hemşire, kapıda ambulans.
32. Interview by the author, female respondent 10 October 2014, Tortum. Polisler geldi 4-5 otobüs, insanları attılar aşağı. Bahardan güne kadar sürdü kızım. Ramazanda bile aç susuz sıcaklığın altında bekledik. Basıyorlar taşı kayayı yukarıdan. (...) Çalıştık işte HES'e karşı da koyduk. Gitsen görse az köy değil ki bura çok köy. (ÇED'E referansla)Ufak tünelleri kalmış sadece, her birşeyleri de bitmiş inşaatın. Polisler milleti simsiyah etti simsiyah. Hele karıların o zaman kollarını göreydin aklın dururdu aklın. Milletın gözüne biber gazı da sıktılar, her şeyi yaptılar, karılar sürüklendi. Makinenin üstüne oturdu. Ben her gün gidiyordum.
33. Interview by the author, female respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Baya bir şeyler oldu burada. mücadele verildi, orada nöbet tutuldu bir ay iki ay

orada insanlar kaldı. Girmesinler diye evlerinde yatmadılar. Erzurumda çevik kuvvet adına hiç birşey kalmadı. Hepsini buraya sevk ettiler, komple halkı attılar aşağıya. Sonra da başladılar bir şekilde. Hapse atılanlar, bir sürü şey işte. Yaşamak lazım. En sonunda geriye dönüp baktığımızda şunu söyleyeyim ben. Halkın yapması gereken hiç bir şey kalmadı. Her şeyi yaptılar. Bu hale geldik. Geriye dönüp baktığımızda keşke bunu da yapsaydık diyebileceğimiz hiç birşey yok. Yani şöyle söyleyeyim. İlerde torunlar dedelerine baktığı zaman şunu yapmamış deme şansları yok.

34. Interview by the author, female respondent. 10 October 2014, Tortum. Ama hiç bir şey etkili olmadı. Benim kardeşim HESden dolayı 5 gün ceza evinde yattı, 5 yıl ceza verdiler. Ondan sonra mahkeme kararıyla tutuklama kararı geldi. Ondan sonra yargıtaya gönderdiler bunları. Hala sürünüyor işte. Çok sıkıntımız var. Kardeşimle beraber 5 tane de başka insan vardı işte yukarılardan, onlar çok yattılar. Bizimki 5 güne çıktı, bunun suçu yoktu meydana. Bunlar karşı çıkmışlar, arabalara taş atmışlar. 5-6-7 ay yatanlar oldu içeride.

35. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. İlk başta kendi yapayım dedi, müsaade edilmedi. Erzurumdan birileri olsun, halkı tanıyan dediler, onlar da geldi başaramadılar. Tekrar Kayı devam ediyor herhalde. Şu an zaten iptal edilmiş vaziyette. Burada çok mücadele verdik. Mücadelemizin sonunda Erzurum 2. Idare Mahkemesi iptal kararı verdi. Birincide baskı yapıldı, yapılsın diye karar verildi. Sonra biz danıştaya başvurduk. onlar dedi ki yanlış karar verilmiş burada. Yeniden 5 tane

ünv.den ayrı bilirkişiler gönderildi. Onların tutmuş olduğu rapora göre karar vereceksiniz dedi.

36. Excerpt from the documentary 'Dam the damns' by Osman Şişman and Özlem Sarıyıldız. Mahkeme surecleri de çok ağır geçti. Isin dorgusunu konusak çok taraflı geçti yani. Arkadaslardan şikayetçi olanlar oldu. Hiç biriyle ilgilenen olmamış. Keptenin kovasına tas doldurmuş yurummuş, milletin üzerine bırakınca orada bir arbede oldu. Arabaların camları kırıldı. Burada arbede sırasında zarar gören arkadaşlarımız oldu. Kimsede gelip ne oluyor diye sormadı. Televizyonda yalnızca ben duydum. O köyün 10 kişiden 9 tanesi bize oy vermiş diyorlar. Karşı olan 3-5 kişi. Gelsin baksınlar. Bir de en son buraya baskın yaptıklarında 550 polis, 150-200 askerle geldiler. Neymiş efendim, köye dışardan gelen provokatörler. Gelsin kimlik tespiti yapsınlar, ki yaptılar zaten. Herkesi tek tek teşhis ettiler.

37. Interview by the author, male respondent. 9 October 2014, Tortum. Meyve işi de narenciye dışında her şey var. Burada tamamen organik. Ne ticari gübre girer ne ilaç girer. Hayvansal gübre hep. Bizde şimdi bir gün sonrasında duracak mı bu durmayacak mı, meselemiz bu. Ümidimiz kırıldı. Burada biz vatansever insanlarız. Askerlerle polislerle karşı karşıya gelince, devlete karşı da güvenimiz azaldı. Bunlar bizi adam yerine koymadılar ki biz de onun için bir şey yapalım. 3 yıldır mahkemedeyim. Ne işin vardı oraya neye girdin- Ya hakim bey bu su bittiği zaman biz perişan oluyoruz, hayatımı bitiyor. Biz polisle veya işçiyle çatışmaya gitmedik. Biz gittik ki durun yetkililer sesimizi duyar belki bir çare olur diye oraya gittik. O da maalesef

anlanamadı. Yoksa bizim burada hiçbir sıkıntı bir hırsızlık bir şey olmaz yani.

38. Excerpt from the documentary 'Dam the damns' by Osman Şişman and Özlem Sarıyıldız "İmalat kazılarında çıkan pasa malzemesinin dere yataklarına gelişigüzel boşaltıldığı ve 10- 30 metre yüksekliğinde dolgu platformu derelerin memba ve mansap ilişkisinin kesildiği tespit edilmiştir. Söz konusu proje ile ilgili bölge müdürlüğümüz arşivleri incelenmiş olup, onaylanan projeler arasında uygun pasa döküm alanları ilgili herhangi bir yer tespitinin yapılmadığı ve ilgili firma ile ana firma tarafından herhangi bir projenin onaylatılmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Yapılan bu tespitler söz konusu dere yataklarının kontrolsüz bir şekilde depolanan pasa dökümünün durdurulması ve dere yataklarından dökülen pasa malzemelerinin acilen kaldırılarak memba ve mansap ilişkisinin bir an önce sağlanması gerekmektedir.

39. Interview by the author, female respondent. 11 October 2014, Tortum.

Sinem: HES ne oldu şimdi? -Vallahi inşallah battı, dualarımız o yönde. Millet hep artık usandı da mücadeleden. Mücadele edecek durum kalmadı da. Yalnız hep dua ediyor. Pes ettiler, yenildiler yani. Çok ağır geçti, millete çok zulüm ettiler. Yani tarif edilmeyecek işkence gördü bizim halkımız. Şimdi onlar biliyor bizim buranın çok iyi bir halkı var, ne olursa olsun. Yıkıp yakıcı değil, elini kana bulayıcı değil. Kan çıkaracak olaylar oldu yani. 90 yaşındaki bir kadın tekmelenir mi, buna kimse dayanabilir mi? Bu şekilde olaylar oldu. Jandarma olsun, bütün kamu personeli, belediyeden hep taraflı

insanlar.

40. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Bizim köy Pehlivanlı pek desteklemedi. Dere alttan gidiyor, onların arazileri yukarıda, onun etkisi var. Bir de en büyük kullandıkları şey, yani bu köyde genç falan vardır. Onlardan hayatta bir yerde iş yapamayacak olanlar çalışmayan tembel insanlar, onları aldılar, hiçbir iş yaptırmadan maaş verdiler onlara. Ne oldu, birinin akrabası, birinin yeğeni, oraya girdi, onu gören yanındaki olmasın diye düşünen insan da dedi ki o ekmek yiyor. Ben onu ekmeğinden edemem. Onu baya bir kullandılar. Ama düşünün orda en fazla 2 yıllık inşaat var, verdikleri de bir şey değil, muhtemelen 1000 TL para veriyorlar, 24000 tl para için. Hani hayatını kurtarıyor olsa neyse. Komşunu paraya satıyor olur mu öyle? Harçlık alır gibi bir şey. (...)Şimdi var, hepsinin ihtiyaçları var. Şurada kalıp da ihtiyaç olmaz olur mu? Dedim ya sana, gelir seviyesi düşük falan ama. Yarın için hiçbir menfaati olmayan işe, yani insan acından (açlıktan) ölmüyor.

41. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum.

Bağbaşındakiler zaten karşı ama buradaki insanlar var ya, ne kadar konuşursa konuşsun ağzına bir şey attın mı dönenler çok. Kendi yerimizi vermeyiz diyorlar ama şirket geliyor diyor ki sen buradan ne kadar kazanıyorsun, 50 TL, diyor ki al sana 500 TL ben buraya makinelerimi koyayım da çalışmaya başlayım. Ben vermiyorum diyor. Kimisi de gidip gizli diyor ki sen o parayı bana ver ben tarlayı vereyim. Kendi menfaatini düşünüyor. Bunu yapanlara

başkaları diyor ki sen bunu yaparsan dikkat et kendine. Faydacılar yani, bizim aşağılar (köy) böyledir. Belediye başkanı da öyle. Şimdi öyle orda bir yer yapılıyor elektrik üretiliyor. Onun yanında da bu HES'in şantiyesi var. Orada tarla verdiler. Yukarıdan da yer veren oldu. Artık ipin ucu kaçtı ya. Kimse başa gelemedi.

42. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Ben bu balık çiftliğinin suyunu daha önce kiralamışım devletten. Değirmenin de suyu var. Alabalık çiftliği belli orada, bir yerden verecekler bana suyu. Benimkisi de özel boruyla gelmezse çalışmayacak balık çiftliği. Bağbaşında bağbahçe sulanıyor, bırakılan su buraya gelmez yoksa. 80 lt su yazmışlar buraya, 80 lt su ile olmaz 200-250 lt su lazım buraya. Yarın santrali yaptıkları zaman bana diyecekler ki sen fazla çalıştırmayacaksın ya da şu kadar çalıştır diyecekler. Sonra ben düşeceğim mahkemeye, mahkeme de adamların hakimleri savcılarını onlardan yana. Büyük ihtimalle diyecekler ki 80 litreyle döndüreceksin. Yani bitkisel hayat mı diyorlar, ona itecekler bizi. Benim de öyle bir sıkıntım var onlarla. Halbuki suyun kesilmesini candan istemiyorum. sonra suyum garanti oldu ya dedim arkadaşım bakın benim suyum garanti. Ben niye mücadele ediyorum o zaman. Daha güzel olacak belki de boruyla getirecekler daha kolay olacak. Bu sefer de benim suyum gelecek ya, oradan çaya gelecek biz de oradan kullanacağız diyorlar. E, tabii ki kullanacaksın ama destek ol biraz da.

43. Interview by the author, male respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Bana ne diyor adam, sen bizim ekmeğe yememizi istemiyor musun? Lan eşek herif

seni, sen orada 2 yıl çalışacaksın, 20.000 TL para alacaksın, 2 yıldan sonra hiç bir şey yok ama adamlar suyu sattın mı burada hiçbir hayat olmayacak, sen bile buradan göç edip gideceksin. Para verdiği falan da var ama gizli tutuluyor. Şu anda dedikodudan başka bir şey olmaz söylemek.

44. Interview by the author, female respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. Bizim belediye başkanımız HES'den yana destek çıkmış. Bilmiyorum neden destekliyordu. İşte onu da yaptılar. Ali Bey niye karşı çıkıyor işte bizim köy (faydalanır) dediler. Yani bu HES'in şantiyesini bizim köyün girişinde bir yere kurdular. (...) Büyük yer var. Şantiye oraya kuruldu. Diyenler oldu ki işte bizim köyden kaç kişi çalışacak bak burada. Kaç kişi işe alındı bak burada ekmeğinde. Siz karşı çıkmayın işte sizin oğlunuz da iş yapar. İşe de girdiler de çalıştılar da, işte arabalarını çalıştırdılar. Biraz kazandılar illa ki kazandılar.

45. Interview by the author, male respondent .11 October 2014, Tortum. Sinem: Arazisi etkilenecek olanlar karşı çıktı, olmayanlar da karşı çıkmadı diyorsunuz yani? - Evet, arazisi çok olan öyle yaptı. Sadece arazi meselesi değil, o suyun akması önemli. Onun bilincinde değil insanlar. Hala mahkeme devam ediyor. Bütün kanalizasyon o dereye bağlı, o olmayınca ne olacak, kokacak ortalık. Bir ayda ancak sıra gelir sulama için. (...) Serdarlı'nın insanı da pek karışmadı. Oralara fazla zarar vermiyor ya. 14 km boyunca zarar verecek.

46. Interview by the author, female respondent. 09 October 2014, Tortum. HES olan bölgelerde en zaiyatlı bizim buraymış. Burdan fazla olan yokmuş. Karadeniz'de ufakmış. Nemi suları var, suyun süsünü güzelliğini istiyorlar onlar. Bizim burada 10 gün sulama kurur. Yazın bir deremiz gelir buraya, o kurudu. Onun altında ne bastıysa kurudu. Çayda su yok ki. Kuraklık var ya Türkiye genelide, burayı da aldı. Gözeler kurumuş hep. Çoğu evlere su gitmemiş. Su olmazsa bura mahvolur gider. Ne olacak, biz de onu diyoruz bilmiyoruk ki.



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