

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN TURKEY:
AN OVERVIEW OF SEVEN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
AND SOLIDARITY FOUNDATIONS



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An Overview of Seven Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Social Assistance in Turkey:

An Overview of Seven Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations

The main aim of the thesis is to scrutinize the coexistence of two different social assistance understandings in Turkey observed through the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SYDV) of seven districts. On the one hand, there is a rights-based assistance, which is tax-based, regular, in-cash, and relies on transparent rules. Contrary to this, a charity-based assistance is a system that relies on personal benevolence and is irregular in time sequences and in amounts, is predominantly granted in-kind, and has discretion in rules. The trends observed in the budgetary data of SYDVs are analyzed with regard to population size and the socioeconomic standards of the districts to account for variations along with the dichotomy in social assistance understanding. The study argues that there is a positive correlation between socioeconomic characteristics, district population, and the understanding of social assistance they have, without establishing a causal link.

In order to explain the dichotomy in social assistance understandings, I propose the hypothesis that as the competition between the incumbent and the opposition party becomes stronger in a district, higher irregular social assistance amounts are allocated to the district in order to increase the likelihood of electoral victory by the ruling party. Using most similar systems design, I compare data on election results and irregular social assistance from Ümraniye and Küçükçekmece, and find support for the hypothesis.

ÖZET

Türkiye’de Sosyal Yardım:

Yedi Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı Üzerinden Genel Bir Bakış

Bu tezin temel amacı Türkiye’deki iki farklı sosyal yardım yaklaşımını yedi ilçenin Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları (SYDV) üzerinden incelemektir. Bir yanda; vergi temelli, düzenli, nakdi ve şeffaf kurallara dayanan hak temelli yardım bulunmaktadır. Bunun aksine, hayırseverliğe dayalı yardım; kişisel cömertliğe bağlı olup, zamansal ve miktar olarak düzensiz, çoğunlukla aynı yapılan ve kurallarda takdire açık olmaya karşılık gelmektedir. SYDV’lerin bütçelerinde gözlemlenen eğilimler, ilçelerin nüfus ve sosyoekonomik seviyeleriyle karşılaştırması ile sosyal yardım anlayışındaki ayrımına ait farklılaşmayı açıklamaktadır. Bu çalışma, ilçelerin sosyoekonomik durumu ve nüfusunun sosyal yardım anlayışı arasında nedensellik bağı kurmadan, pozitif bir ilgileşim ilişkisi olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Sosyal yardım yaklaşımındaki bu ayrımı açıklamak için bir ilçede iktidar ve muhalefet partisi arasındaki rekabet güçlendikçe, o ilçede iktidar partisinin seçim zaferi ihtimalini artırmak için düzensiz sosyal yardımların arttığı hipotezi savunulmuştur. Olabildiğince Benzer Sistemler Tasarımı kullanılarak, seçim sonuçları ve düzensiz sosyal yardımlar açısından yapılan Ümraniye ve Küçükçekmece karşılaştırması ile bu hipotezi destekleyici sonuçlar bulunmuştur.

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
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*Selma, my beloved mother,
Source of unconditional love and utmost patience
And İrfan, my beloved spouse,
My accepted prayers to dwell upon tranquility*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP:	Justice and Development Party, <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>
CHP:	Republican People's Party, <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>
RTÜK:	Radio and Television Supreme Council, <i>Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu</i>
SGK:	Social Security Institution, <i>Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu</i>
SYDV:	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations, <i>Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları</i>
SYDTF:	Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Fund, <i>Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu</i>
TKİ:	Turkish Coal Enterprises, <i>Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri</i>
TURKSTAT:	Turkish Statistical Institute, <i>Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu</i>
TÜBİTAK:	The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, <i>Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu</i>

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

تن آدمی شریف است به جان آدمیت، نه همین لباس زیباست نشان آدمیت

"Mankind is worthy of honor for his soul and humanity

Only beautiful attire does not reflect his worth"¹

The state, the market and society are three major actors that form the triangle of social assistance. This institutional triangle is parallel to the matrix defined by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his classical text *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, which became the guideline for the whole literature on the classification of welfare states to be analyzed in that framework. Basing the thesis on this institutional matrix, the different and shifting responsibilities have been an interesting subject of study in order to understand the blurring of boundaries in the context of the neoliberal era. Turkey, as a developing country, is especially an interesting case, with its characteristic of not yet having a defined pattern. It is a fact that, early industrialized countries undergo new forms of shifting of responsibilities under neoliberal dynamics. Similarly, having the shifts of responsibility among the trite is omnipresent throughout the history, including the Ottoman Era (Özbek, 2006).

However, instead of providing a historical analysis of social assistance in Turkey, the scope of the thesis is limited so as to give a snapshot of social assistance practice and to make some inferences about the nature of the assistance at the district level in the dichotomy of citizenship vs. charity-based understanding within the

¹ Saadi Shirazi- Ghazal 18 from Saadi's book of Ghazals.

state-market-society-and voluntary sector institutional matrix. To concretize this, a closer look into the annual reports on Social Assistance and Solidarity Institutions (*Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı- SYDV*) are used. There are two main strands of assistance on record: (1) aid whose payments are made centrally (*Merkezi Olarak Yapılan Yardımlar*), (2) aid whose payments are made by the SYDV's own resources (*Vakfın Özkaynaklarından Yapılan Yardımlar*). Centrally transferred regular social assistance on the one hand and irregular family assistance which is funded exclusively by provincial budgets on the other are taken into a comparative analysis of their explanatory power on the nature of social assistance understanding. The question here is what varieties of social assistance understandings are prevalent in Turkey at the district level. The answer is sought in the SYDV foundations example. And what is it that explains the difference in their understanding? To answer this question, the annual reports of seven district SYDVs were examined in a detailed comparison.

There is a big bubble of questions surrounding the case at hand. The first group of questions relates to what underlies the research question. What is the pattern of social assistance in Turkey? Is it the state, society or the market that is more responsible? What is the role of the SYDV in the social assistance framework? What functions do SYDVs serve and what is their position in the triangle of state, society, and market?

Going more specifically to the research question, the issue is more about these questions: According to what type of a pattern do SYDVs operate? Is it charity-based or rights-based pattern? Is there any common pattern in the seven districts or meaningful divergences or groupings among them? Do they represent similar characteristics or do they diverge? What conclusions can be reached through the

analysis of budget data onto the district SYDVs? Is it possible to reach some conclusions of the analysis of SYDVs for the social assistance practice patterns in Turkey, whether or not there is such a pattern? Centrally transferred regular social assistance on the one hand and irregular assistance which is funded exclusively by provincial budgets on the other are taken into a comparative analysis of their explanatory power on the nature of social assistance understanding. Also, the statistics on the dichotomy between cash and in-kind assistance is added into the analyses as a second dimension. The proportion of in-kind assistance is highly crucial, as they represent leniency towards the charity-based understanding of the provider. In short, what are the determinants of the division of the rights- vs. charity-based social assistance?

These questions are relevant in the Turkish context, as they coexist as competing legitimate sources of social security mechanisms. There appear two alternative social assistance understandings of charity- and citizenship-based, both of which have characteristics specific to themselves. It is something which deserves interest in a unitary centralized state, Turkey, to offer a sphere for discretion to locality and variation. Considering the historical trajectory of the Turkish republic combined with the Ottoman legacy to account for social-cultural and economic background and current international and domestic factors such as neoliberalism. It is important to view the current context in a snapshot that shows all these factors and the relevant flows and trends in Turkey with respect to this dichotomy.

By the same token, understanding alternative approaches explains the general characteristics of the system of social assistance in Turkey. The district-level analysis of seven SYDVs from two distinctive cities aims to capture the differentiation in the

understanding of social assistance. However, it is not possible to generalize from the limited sample at hand.

In the remaining part of this introduction, I will outline my thesis, which is developed on the dichotomy, and provide an introduction to the primary components of the budgetary data. I will then briefly present my arguments.

Additionally, I will talk about the methodology of this thesis and the research process. Annual reports on SYDVs are provided in comparative figures for groups of transfer types and the ratios as I take the analysis deeper with supplementary figures and tables to explain social assistance forms.

Finally, I will conclude with a brief summary of the chapters of the thesis.

1.2 What is SYDV?

Considering the Turkish context carefully, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies sits at the center of the social assistance mechanism which controls public social policy as the major actor. The founding Act.3294² of the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund by the central authority in 1986 was the step taken to reach uncovered segments of the social security services of the state. In 2004, with Act.5263, the fund was taken under the umbrella of an established institution, the General Directorate of Social Assistance (SYDGM - Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü), for efficiency purposes.

The understanding of Social assistance is analyzed by taking the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları-SYDV) as the unit of analysis, as they have a poignant place thanks to their

² Republic of Turkey. Law No. 3294, “Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Kanunu,” Official Gazette, 14 June 1986, accessed on 11 December 2016.
<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.3294.pdf>

involvement in social assistance as part of the state policy (Özbek, 2006, p. 31). Moreover, this institution provides an area of representation of state policies that abides by central planning and at the same time has the freedom of districts to be locally autonomous upon their own state of affairs. It opens a window of opportunity to analyze state policies and their reflections of social assistance at both local and national levels. As SYDVs have two separate budgets representing the dichotomy, their budgets offer a fruitful basis for that analysis. SYDVs will be analyzed according to these characteristics, and based on that, inferences will be made about the general system of social assistance in Turkey.

The social security system was corporatist before the current stage of “new poverty,” which differentiated citizens of different strata and treated them unequally. This system reflected itself on health services in particular until 2006, when all forms of security mechanisms were united under the umbrella of Social Security Institution (SGK, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu) (Buğra & Yılmaz, 2016). It is important to consider that SYDVs evolved into the lines of these changes in social security dynamics under the roof of the social policy framework of Turkey.

1.3 Methodology

The dichotomy of social assistance understanding is built upon the characteristics of budgetary distributions of specific items. First of all, it is better here to give some details of the budgetary data of SYDVs. From the wide-range of social assistance forms defined by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies as is shown in Table A1 in Appendix A, there are two major groups of transfers defined in the annual reports of the SYDVs that construct the backbone of the thesis with respect to the dichotomy of social assistance understanding as their nature. These two groups will be referred

to as regular and irregular transfers, as this is the way they are recorded in the SYDV annual reports. Yet the differentiation should not lead to any confusion for the reader. Centrally paid regular transfers are also paid according to specified periods and installments. The critical factor determining the difference between the two is whether they are paid by the central government or the budget the SYDV owns. Also, the statistics on the dichotomy between cash and in-kind assistance are added into the analyses (see Appendix B) to add a layer to the argument, but centrally paid transfers do not appear in-kind.

For the examination of the budgetary differences in diverse assistance items, this thesis adopts a cross-district standpoint. Here, regular social assistance is used as a point of reference to compare irregular transfers, since the former is demand-based and thus distributed upon eligibility, and less variation is expected in cross-district comparison. In contrast, differences between irregular assistance are of importance for the thesis as they are a much clear reflection of a district SYDV's budgeting capacities and decisions. On top of these, regular assistance falls within the citizenship-based category, while irregular assistance approximates a charity-based understanding of social assistance if we think of the dichotomy on a scale.

The irregular transfers of district SYDVs do not have a uniform recording system, especially before 2013, and they have major differences in their documentation in their annual reports. Yet they can be listed under the headings within the lines constructed by the Ministry of Family and Social Assistance in their annual report such as: family aid, education aid, health, special purpose, disabled and elderly, employment, and project support. Family aid covers food assistance, given in-kind or in-cash by some districts. Fuel aid, which is a form of family aid, is given as in-kind by Turkish Coal Enterprises (TKİ, Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri), a state-

owned enterprise, and is recorded in annual reports on their corresponding monetary worth. Special purpose aid includes disaster assistance related to fire, flood, and hospital emergencies. Still, there are some aid items in the records that do not fully fit the scheme depicted by the ministry. Other family assistance, one-time aid, education, clothing, housing, other special purpose assistance, foreigners' assistance, social security debt assistance are common to a number of districts.

Istanbul and Konya are the two cities chosen to be representative of the dichotomy of charity-based vs. rights-based and the snapshot of the state-market-society and NGO divide. Istanbul, as the biggest city of Turkey, is a representative of the diversity of the national whole in its complexity. Each district of Istanbul has a specificity of their own and allows us to make meaningful comparisons between them. Religious motivations predominate in Konya and it is known as the most religious and conservative city of Turkey (Ayata, 1991; Yavuz, 1997; Koyuncu, 2013; Aktay, 2005; Küçüktağılı, 2010; Türkyılmaz, 2016). Districts of the two cities are chosen to represent different tendencies towards the question at hand.

The empirical basis of this thesis is constituted by the budgetary data of SYDVs for the year 2014. The seven districts covered are Ataşehir, Bağcılar, Esenler, Küçükçekmece, and Ümraniye in Istanbul, and Meram, Selçuklu in Konya in Appendix C. The annual reports on the amount of regular central government sponsored payments and on the locally administered budgets for each municipal association constitute the major two items in the data pool. Analytical conclusions of the thesis rely most heavily on these two main strands and their comparative evaluations to understand the nature of social assistance understanding and how they diverge to two approaches.

It was not possible to collect more comprehensive and nationally representative data on SYDVs because of the unwillingness of the SYDV officials due to their policy of data confidentiality. Therefore, the analysis uses data of SYDV branches of seven districts, from two provinces, Istanbul and Konya.³

1.4 The dynamics behind 2014

While recognizing the significance of a historical analysis covering the Republican history and including Ottoman Era, their impact informs the differentiation across trajectories of societies. Hence, I will focus primarily on the current context, which is defined by post-1980 dynamics, the AKP rules along the lines of neo-liberal dynamics that shaped the allocation of responsibilities and the roles of the public, private and voluntary sectors in social assistance (Göçmen, 2014). And these global developments are influenced by the governments to the detriment of the logic of equal citizenship (Buğra, 2015, p. 123).

³ At the beginning of the study the aim was to access the statistics that would cover a longer duration and a larger sample of SYDVs to attain a more comprehensive analysis of social assistance in Turkey. However, due to bureaucratic difficulties of non-transparency in public institutions, it was not possible to reach them.

Persistently submitting the petitions for budgetary data personally and paying visits to provincial and district governorships and meeting heads of the associations and also filing e-petitions to the Ministry, Directorate General of Foundations, district governorships (*kaymakamlık*) and provincial governorships (*valilik*) for each and every district did not help to reach the relevant data through ordinary bureaucratic procedures. I intended to cover diverse districts, which would include Kadıkoy, Üsküdar, Fatih, Beşiktaş, and also İstanbul at the city level, if bureaucratic procedures had not prevented access public information. Intensive follow-up visits to İstanbul SYDVs, together with an acceptance of the petition by the deputy governor of İstanbul did not suffice to gain access to relevant data.

But surprisingly, Konya, Meram and Selçuklu were the exceptional associations that sent the requested data by post and by electronic mail upon my written petitioning, and without a personal contact. Except for these three, using personal contacts and mediators to reach district governors and requesting and convincing them to order the relevant head of the SYDV association to share the information was the only possible way to reach the data. And the fact that none of the governors refused to share the data upon initiation of personal contacts proves that this is the only prospering way to access the relevant information.

One incident to exemplify the manner of bureaucratic style that rejected my petitions every time is the response of one of the head of SYDV saying: “You are inquiring about highly confidential data, would you ever share budgetary data of your family budget?” in an irritated and questioning manner.

The 2000s signifies a turning point for social assistance in Turkey, as it corresponds to a time when (a) in 2001, poverty acquired a new dimension with the economic crisis and social changes in society (b) the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), with its neoliberal neoconservative policies of Islamic connotations came to power after a decade of coalitions, and (c) neoliberal policies and their implementations gained ascendancy in world politics (Buğra, 2008; Buğra & Keyder, 2003).

Along with the transformation of circumstances in the social policy environment, the innate nature of social assistance is a highly crucial thing to consider. Focusing on the dichotomy between charity-based and rights-based forms of assistance, the points of differentiation between the two become clear through a comparative analysis of their motives, premises, and implementations. Here, the definition of rights-based assistance is made in line with the principles of: tax-based, regular, in-cash, and transparent rules (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 40). Contrary to this, a charity-based assistance corresponds to a system that relies on a personal benevolence and that is irregular in time sequences and in amounts, predominantly made in-kind, and discretionary rules (Göçmen, 2014).

The aim of this thesis is to show that the system of social assistance practices in Turkey involves characteristics of both rights-based and charity-based approaches where both civil society and state actors play a role to cooperate together, while blurring the boundaries between them (Eder, 2010; Buğra, 2015, p. 125). An analysis of policies of social assistance practices in Turkey through the analysis of local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SYDVs) — five in Istanbul and two in Konya — will show that they have characteristics of both state bodies and non-governmental organizations, as we find present elements of rights-based social policy

and charity-based social assistance. Regular versus irregular transfer types corresponds to these two social assistance approaches.

Diverting responsibility from public to localities, it is a significant character of social assistance culture that has its roots even in Ottoman period, especially in circles of specific kinship ties. This is not only a tradition, but it also refers to religious obligations to take care of the needy, especially close relatives and neighbors. At the local level, the municipalities are critical agent that marks the prominence given to charity kind of social assistance ingrained on the sustenance of traditional and religious cooperation mechanisms in Turkey (Aydođan, 2009, p. 20).

1.5 On social policy in Turkey

Social right in the context of citizenship is nothing new for Turkey. A crucial discussion of the access to the health system took place in the 1990s. As a result, the Green Card system was legislated thanks to the initiations of the DYP and the SHP in 1992. Act.3816 is based on citizenship and assures social rights, but goes against equal citizenship principles. It is important to note the name of Mnif İslamođlu, whose arguments approximates T. H. Marshall in his fervor to ensure the equality principle. Not even at the time of those discussions in the parliament were his concerns about equal citizenship addressed by the AKP as a significant achievement.

Still, the consequence of these discussions can be regarded as a success for making a reference back to the initial steps of the discussions pertaining to the period of the Poor Law of England. This reference retrieves the foundational ground of the citizenship literature in formulating criticisms against the inequalities of the Green Card regulation. Although it is not possible to apply T. H. Marshall's point directly to the current context, problems with the Green Card would be cited as an element of

unequal status, which is, in a sense, a detachment from citizenship (Marshall T. H., 1965, p. 88). He criticizes the social security system of England for its not being based on the equal citizenship principle, while he was promoting the social rights of people in addition to civil and political.

Therefore, in a sense, this thesis will help us to establish a link between two different contexts of T. H. Marshall's criticism of England as an early-industrialized country and of post-2001 transformations in Turkish social assistance practices with regard to their capability to grant the basic social rights to citizens, regarding the nature of social assistance.

Studies on Turkish social assistance have generally clustered around case studies without a comparable stance (Dodurka, 2014; Aydoğan, 2009; Ustabaşı, 2013; Sönmez, 2009). What is novel to this thesis and its aimed contribution is the effort given to move beyond a mere analysis of effectiveness and efficiency in social assistance institutions. This means undertaking a study on the formative level that is focused on normative bases. This approach is different from those overindulged with performance analysis regarding end result. There is the absence of in-depth analysis of the reasons for codified existence of the normative orientations of these institutions, this thesis uses concrete empirical data to reach conclusions about the normative foundations of the social assistance in a developing country, Turkey. Given the plurality of norms, values, and objectives, a dichotomy between rights-based and charity-based is developed for this thesis to ground the argument upon. It is argued that this dichotomy exists in the current context across different SYDVs beyond the scope of the ones included in this study. One study as an the exception is the one that takes the example of the city Erzurum to make a comparison across districts of the effect of social assistance on voting behavior (Küçükali, 2015).

Another one is a comparative study on the dichotomy of a social municipality nexus, taking Eminönü and Beşiktaş as two cases with different understandings (Kesgin, 2008).

Thus, the uniqueness of this study is its encompassing of seven districts in a comparison of charity- vs. citizenship-based social assistance understanding nexus. Most studies in the literature on Turkish SYDVs involve case studies; rarely does a comparative study emerge (Küçükali, 2015).

After this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces social policy and the position of social assistance in the literature. Then it puts light on the rights-based vs. charity-based understandings of social assistance, specifically defining their point of differentiation. Further, implementations of social assistance in the developed and developing world at a stage when welfare state practices have been transformed into the neoliberal context are briefly stated so as to provide the necessary background and to locate Turkey within the literature. The chapter will end with a historical analysis of social assistance practices in Ottoman period and the Republican history. But a specific emphasis will be placed on post 2002 in addition to the major findings of the study and its contribution to the related literatures.

Chapter 3 undertakes a comprehensive study of the data gathered for this study. Data on budgetary expenditures of seven districts' SYDVs are analyzed with a specific emphasis on the central to local budget ratio (state vs. district) and some observations and patterns are discussed. The chapter mainly focuses on a comparison of the data with regard to population size, socioeconomic conditions, total and per-capita amount of transfers across the seven districts along the spectrum of social assistance understandings. Additionally, there is a point of interest raised for further studies: questioning the relationship between social assistance understanding and

electoral behavior with reference to the 2014 local and the October 1, 2015 general election results. In this chapter, a comparison of Istanbul and Konya is also mentioned as a significant point to delineate the rights-based vs. charity-based understandings of social assistance.

In sum, this work offers insights into the contemporary Turkish social assistance system, the nature of it and variations among districts, taking the year 2014 and the seven SYDVs as its basis.



CHAPTER 2

RIGHTS-BASED VERSUS CHARITY-BASED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

This chapter offers a literature review linking social policy and social assistance with the topic. Then it continues by identifying the differentiating characteristics between rights-based and charity-based understandings of social assistance. After that, it follows the recitations of social assistance implementations in the developed and developing world. This is done while considering the neoliberal trend that is predominant in the context of Turkey. Before concluding, a historical analysis of social assistance practices of the Republican and Ottoman legacy is presented to provide the background for the post-2002 context behind the current context of 2014.

Social solidarity in any society is conditioned by the sustenance of peace that is built upon insurance of indigent and honorable conditions of living for all. The mechanism operating for that purpose lies in the long history of charity and recent initiations of citizenship-based social assistance mechanisms coexisting in the social policy environment of Turkey. In its clearest sense, Turkey has lagged far behind the developed countries in ensuring a universal system and still requires an ambitious push towards attaining it, as it still remains mostly a corporatist welfare system, prone to patronage relationships.

The Turkish state has always been a significant actor in centralizing power and having a control over public affairs. The way in which the state diverted its responsibility for charitable organizations by subcontracting (Eder, 2010, p. 180) is mostly related to the tendency to release its responsibility in line with the neoliberal dictums of the ruling party. Despite having a regulatory authority on charitable donations and acting as intermediary for voluntary donations, maintenance of social

assistance by itself is only limited to some specific public institutions. SYDVs are the most significant organs operating according to the purpose in a way that they concretize the local authority both at district and city levels. Hence, the present study delves into the social assistance practices that sit at the intersection of central and local institutions. SYDVs have a position that connects the dual spheres of responsible agents and that introduces charity component via voluntary aid added onto the relevant institutions' budgets.

The existing literature on social assistance provided by public institutions includes a broad range of fields from political science, economics, sociology, psychology, law and history. More specifically, social assistance finds its place in the social policy literature. For that reason, most of the references for this study will be from this area of study.

Social assistance is one of the three pillars of social security, in addition to social insurance and social services. Social security has its basis in the extent of the social duties of the State first defined in the 1961 Constitution as it is encapsulated in Article 2 by “. . . social state”⁴ (Constitution, 1961) that loads the state with that responsibility to undertake any measures to maintain mechanisms of social assistance across every corner of the society at different levels.

The main theoretical framework for this analysis is borrowed from the citizenship literature. Considering the social interdependence theory, I will argue that humans need society in order to develop and express their capacities. And to do this, they all need to be considered equals that play a meaningful part in the society. In the twentieth century, the blossoming of welfare states has been the auspicious environment to realize this aim.

⁴ Article 2 “Article 2 - The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state, governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.” 1961 Constitution

This thesis is an analysis of social assistance that takes the SYDV, the district level local public social assistance institution, as the unit of analysis. The budgetary data on SYDVs is limited to the year 2014. But the literature included intends to cover the changing policy environment and the dynamic relations of state-society-family together with the voluntary sector under the factors of the neoliberal transformations at the same time to enlighten the data at hand. This is an affirmation of the idea that local variations matter and shows how seven districts display different trends regarding their relative volumes of regular and irregular transfers. The crucial thing is what is extracted from these differences in the dichotomy of citizenship-based versus charity-based understandings of social assistance in relation to socioeconomic conditions, population size and election results. It is argued that there have been two different understandings of assistance across districts.

Now leaving aside this introduction to the overall location of the topic in the literature, how the concepts are defined will be elaborated in the following section. The whole topic will be built upon these clarifications.

Stating that the thesis is an analysis of social assistance, the starting point of this analysis is to be social policy and how it is defined in the literature. First of all what is 'policy'? It is, in Titmuss's (1974) terms, "the principles that govern action directed towards given ends. The concept denotes action about means as well as ends and it, therefore, implies change: changing situations, systems, practices, behavior". (pp. 23-24) As he notes, this involves an assumption that it will bring a reorientation and a social change presumably affecting the very lives of people.

Building upon the definition of policy, his definition of social policy relates to the aim of a society envisioned by social policy as it is defined by Hagenbuch: "stated in general terms, the mainspring of social policy may be said to be the desire

to ensure every member of the community certain minimum standards and certain opportunities” (as cited in Titmuss, 1974, pp. 144). It is clearly observed in Titmuss’s definition that three objectives are attributed to social policy: (1) it aims to provide for the welfare of citizens, (2) it captures both economic and non-economic objectives, (3) it has measures for progressive redistribution in the direction from rich to poor (Titmuss, 1974, pp. 28-30).

Noting Titmuss’s focus on citizens, it is appropriate to refer back to T. H. Marshall, who is the pioneer who mentioned the three rights of citizenship. For him, the state stands as the provider of citizenship status to its members who are its subjects. The relation between economy and policy is noted by him as: “[s]ocial policy is not inferior to economic policy a helper up of the economic system or cleaner-up of its minor messes. It stood above it, representing a higher authority by which the inherent deficiencies of the market economy could be corrected”. (Marshall T. H., 1964, p. 289) Thus, it encompasses the undeniable needs of society at large and individuals in specific to be managed hand in hand with economic policy.

The position of Titmuss (1974, pp. 28-30) regarding the aimed outputs from social policy is elaborated depending on the definition of ‘need’ as follows:

All collectively provided services are deliberately designed to meet certain socially recognized ‘needs’; they are manifestations, first, of society’s will to survive as an organic whole and, secondly, of the expressed wish of all the people to assist the survival of some people. ‘Needs’ may therefore be thought of as ‘social’ and ‘individual’; as inter-dependent, mutually related essentials for the continued existence of the parts and the whole. No complete division between the two is conceptually possible; the shading of one into the other changes with time over the life of all societies; it changes with time over the cycle of needs and of the individual and the family; and it depends on prevailing notions of what constitutes a ‘need’ and in what circumstances; and to what extent, if at all such needs, when recognized, should be met in the interests of the individual and/or of society. (Titmuss, 1976, p. 39)

His definition of need is not stagnant, but it is redefined by technological, industrial and social change in its kinds, and the responsibility attributed to public authorities also has been a highly disputed issue (Titmuss, 1976, pp. 40-54). The ever changing nature of the definition of need and with whom it is aligned determines the crucial part in social policy analysis. But for this thesis, regarding the dichotomy of social assistance understanding, it is more active in determining how the two differ from each other. One point to consider regarding how the definition of poor is articulated (Bonner, Ener, & Singer, 2003) in relation to its definition is put as such:

At times, the poor are a rhetorical necessity, as “taking care of the poor” justifies individual, community or state action. The welfare of the poor can be invoked to further the interests of one person, one neighborhood, one religious group, one town, or one nation. Definitions of poor are often flexible enough to allow benefactors to decide how inclusive or exclusive they wish to be. (p. 2)

This shows how important the articulation is in the rhetoric of groups that are not devoid of their own interests in their dealings with the poor. This emphasizes the fact that it involves essential interests pertaining to political, economic and social realms that are articulated by the involved counterparts, specifically “the desire for personal redemption or salvation . . . for beneficence” (p. 2).

Social assistance is an area which is subservient to social policy that aims to ameliorate the conditions of the people and help the citizens-in-need and to ensure an income to reach a level of subsistence. The realm of social assistance is open to the changes imposed by specific actors’ interplay among themselves and internalization of transformations of the era. The protagonist is the state, as it is the leader that imposes the policies of deregulatory pushes coming from liberal trends, and the society as the side character.

It is also crucial to consider the appropriation of the forces operating in the general context above the level of these actors. Göçmen (2013) shows in her

comparative analysis how four European welfare states differ in their responses to faith-based organizations (FBOs) under neoliberalism, based on their trajectories.

It is not only three actors the state; the market and family that are involved in addition to the non-profit sector partaking in social assistance mechanisms. Hence, the shifting of responsibilities among them is therefore not always straightforward. Relative weights of sectors are not set; in fact, they continuously have occurrences of shifts among each other dynamically. And this shows the degree to which the responsibility of social assistance depends on context. But still, the state does not give in its control over the welfare provision (Clarke, 2004; Bode, 2006).

2.1 Citizen

It is T. H. Marshall's proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the welfare state. For this reason it is crucial to clarify the concepts of citizen and citizenship with its aspects that relate to the thesis. Citizenship in Marshall's definition is stated as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (Marshall T. H., 1965, p. 92). It is highly crucial to note that he gives an unconditional equality that is independent of economic contribution.

Building upon its definition, a very revealing connotation of citizen by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon is put as such:

"Citizen" and "citizenship" are powerful words. They speak of respect, of rights, of dignity. Consider the meaning and emotion packed into the French "citoyen" of 1789, a word that condemned tyranny and social hierarchy while affirming self-government and status equality; that was a moment when even women succeeded in claiming address as "citoyenne" rather than as "madame" or "mademoiselle." Since then the word appears often as a prefix to another term, always adding dignity to the original, as in "citizen-soldier," "citizen-worker," "citizen-mother." The word has so much dignity it rarely

appears in slang. In a few informal phrases it continues to carry approval and respect, as in “a citizen of the world” or a “citizens’s committee.” We find no pejorative uses. It’s a weighty, monumental, humanist word. (Fraser & Gordon, 1992, p. 45)

The quotation offers a meaningful point of reference for comparison. Without involving a deep incursion to explore the extent these connotations apply to the Turkish citizen, it is sufficient to state that “*vatandaş*” (citizen, in Turkish) also has similar connotations as a well-respected term with positive meanings.

2.2 Typology of social assistance

Varieties of the types of social assistance structure result from the differentiation in definitions of citizens. This is clarified in how social structure is classified in three types of social assistance (1) universal or contingency benefits provided to all, (2) social insurance that distributes only according to income level or employment status, and (3) means-tested or income-related upon current resources owned (Gough, Bradshaw, Ditch, Eardley, & Whiteford, 1997, pp. 18-19). Furthermore, there is a deeper specification of social assistance types regarding the means-tested programs operating according to three criteria. This classification fits into the dichotomy developed as the first one corresponding to citizenship-based understandings of social assistance that takes universal criteria as its basis of contribution or need verifications, the second and third relate to a charity-based assistance, as it is a blend of a conditional relationship formed in relation to economic terms. Thus, the classification of Gough et al. (1997) covers the varieties of assistance understandings including the dichotomy of the thesis as well.

An approach whose basis of distribution is according to citizenship is, as King and Waldron (1988) note:

[a]t the minimum, to associate welfare provision with citizenship is to make a proposal about how welfare should be handled in society. For example, ... it is to endorse the replacement of the Poor Law approach to welfare with provision for need that is given universally, that is provided without supplication or stigma and that avoids as far as possible the invidious operation of official discretion. (King & Waldron, p. 422)

2.3 Rights-based vs. charity-based understandings of social assistance

Two main questions this dissertation deals with are: “What is the nature of social assistance in Turkey? Is there a difference between various SYDVs in terms of being dominated by a rights-based vs. charity-based culture of social assistance?”

This thesis claims neither generalizability nor comprehensibility of SYDVs in Turkey, given the limits of available data. For this reason, with a well-supported literature and empirical data, it offers a snapshot that can enhance understanding about the nature and functioning of social assistance mechanisms undertaken by SYDVs. However, the aim is to offer an insight into the cleavage in social assistance understanding:

Welfare-state regimes denotes the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent social-policy decisions, expenditure developments, problem definitions, and even the response-and-demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers. The existence of policy regimes reflects the circumstances that short-term policies, reforms, debates, and decision-making take place within frameworks of historical institutionalization that differ qualitatively between countries. The boundaries of rights and claims that are attached to social citizenship constitute an example of such institutional parameters, which are relatively historically stable . . . Regimes can be compared with respect to which essential human needs are relegated to private versus public responsibility. The division of social protection between public and private provides the structural context of de-commodification, social rights, and the stratificational nexus of welfare-state regimes. (Esping-Andersen G. , 1990, p. 80)

The difference among welfare regimes lies between the two social assistance understandings. The political parties competing for power in the Turkish political system offer their own vision of welfare regimes. And they have a sphere of

influence over themselves at the district level ensured for them by local elections for municipal authorities. This is well-supported in Esping-Andersen's study on the effects of political forces on welfare-state regimes that is explained by political power relations among social democrats and Catholic parties in 18 capitalist democracies for the directing welfare regime to be shaped according to their directions (Esping-Andersen G. , 1990, pp. 137-138). A further query about political parties, elections and their relationship to a welfare regime will be elaborated in the next chapter.

In such a definition of welfare state, what is to be understood from equality can be observed from the universalistic egalitarianism example of Scandinavia:

No one is special and no one should be excluded – and for its guarantee of adequate resources to all. In a way, this means that income redistribution is the derivative of a much broader effort to ensure that all households have command over the bundle of resources deemed necessary in order to function in society the way everyone else does. This is a notion of equality that goes far beyond just money. (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 262)

This dichotomy goes parallel to Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon's classification of human relationships at two extremes: (1) discrete contractual exchanges of equivalents, juxtaposed against unreciprocated, unilateral charity, ... where they have right to what they receive, since they merely "get back what they put in", and (2) public assistance, where they have no such right, since they are thought to "get something for nothing" (Fraser & Gordon, 1992, p. 47). For them, charity refers to:

[a] pure, unilateral gift, on which the recipient has no claim and for which the donor had no obligation. The charity that rests on individual acts of benevolence residing in a totally opposite position on citizenship based social assistance. Thus, whereas contract connoted equal exchange, mutual benefit, self-interest, rationality, and masculinity, charity took on contrasting connotations of inequality, unilateral gift-giving, altruism, sentiment, and, at times, femininity. (Fraser & Gordon, 1992, p. 59)

To put it differently, Wang states that “while charity as a form of societal response to human misery reflects virtue-based morality, which emphasizes voluntary and individual empathy, citizenship represents rights-based morality in which everyone is treated equally as a member of society” (Wang, 2007, p. 66). Therefore, charity-based is defined by its being devoid of universalism and recognition of rights for full social citizenship. In contrast, ideas of interdependence and reciprocity underlie citizenship within an inclusive perspective.

T. H. Marshall (1965, pp. 78-126) argues for citizenship in a way that is composed of the combination of three elements: (1) civil rights, (2) political rights that are only meaningful if complemented with (3) social rights. Historically, the evolution of these rights in England from the eighteenth century onward constitutes the argument on how the welfare state was established right after the Second World War, granting social rights to its members as equal citizens and providing social welfare and security. This took place at a time when post-war shortages enforced resource sharing when “class” no longer was relevant given the risk and insecurity encompassing all regardless of their classes and consumption is restrained (Marshall T. H., 1965, pp. 293-6). It is such circumstances that gave way to favorable conditions for social policy that covers all citizens as equals designed with consensus.

However, given the British example in reference to Marshall’s pioneering analysis of gradual evolution of civil, political and social rights in order, his work is not easily transferred to other cases of its evolution. This is the reason why Marshall’s account is criticized for its offering rather than gradual evolution, while the “concentric circles that expand upon hard core fundamental and indispensable

rights to the other rights of expression” as described by Dahrendorf (1994, pp. 13-4) or regarding its gender perspective ignoring women’s difficulties.

In our age of industrial societies, Esping-Andersen proposes the idea of linking de-commodification to social rights. In his formulation, the nature of a welfare state regime provides the basis for social rights. For him “a social right should be right of citizenship not of labor market participation” (Twine, 1994, p. 5).

Understanding the intrinsic connection between social rights and sufficiency, and their link to citizenship is crucial here. T. H. Marshall envisages social rights of citizenship to be providing an equality of status that cuts across classes. The stigmatization of the poor is totally against the dignified citizenship with the attached assumption which considered them as less equals in the society. Hence, they are marginalized and excluded. Each member of society only attains full citizenship status with an ensured level of sufficiency. And this sufficiency necessitates a citizenship that is constructed upon social rights that protect one from the stigmatization tied to accepting poverty relief or social assistance. The reference here to social rights is in the definition by T. H. Marshall which ensures de-commodifying social relationships and diminishing citizens’ status as ‘commodities’ (Esping-Andersen G. , 1990, p. 21).

The reason we need to focus on social rights is that “[w]elfare state provisions are not automatically, or are only partially, de-commodifying and thus do not necessarily provide a social right for citizens” (Twine 1994, 106). Thus, it is not guaranteed that social policy implementations derive from social rights. And hence, an investigation into the basis of the social policy on the nature of citizenship becomes crucial to the analysis.

Given the neoliberal impulses concertizing from 1980 onward, as seen from the way the state shirks its responsibility towards the civil society, the state still sustains its control and regulatory capacity in the realm of social policy (Özbek, 2002, pp. 24-6). In this kind of auspicious environment for civil society organizations, religion-based traditional charities gained ascendancy in its articulation of modern forms of voluntarism wherever liberal ideology predominated (Buğra, 2008, p. 128). Their alliance in denying the obligation of the state of providing social assistance was consistent with the long history of the culture that was prevalent in the state. However, it was against the requirements of the post 2001 crisis period, which necessitated a complete restructuring towards an active involvement of the state to undertake responsibility. Also, the assistances were similarly myopically focused on immediate consumption goods, rather than long term social capital investments.

Social policies are treated as a tool for de-commodifying the market relations and giving back man his worth more than his labor which is sold in the market. The treatment of labor power as a precondition for survival is detrimental to the objective of social policies to “decouple income security from the market” as it is described by Guy Standing (as cited in Wacquant, 1996; Esping-Andersen G. , 1990, p. 21). Taking the flow of the argument about the process of commodification, Fred Twine admits how it is not a call for self-sufficiency, given the higher benefits of operating in a division of labor and technological advancement. However, social costs attached to people and social interdependencies may be allocated unequally among fellow citizens (Twine, 1994, p. 107).

This dichotomy between rights versus charity-based understandings is not a unilinear progression dimension and citizenship falls ahead of charity. It is but a

difference in the logic to prioritize a perspective on others. It is about a set of preferences for new regulations, according to the way the future of the society is envisaged by the policymakers.

Justification for social assistance to the needy is the fundamental question to begin with. The differentiation between the two approaches lies in whether it is a duty related to an individual benevolence stemming from religious duty or a universalist, equalitarian principle attached to citizenship rooted in a political conception of justice provided by a public institution.

To differentiate between the two, the criteria employed are retrieved from a collection of prescriptions used for rights-based understanding (Buğra & Keyder, 2003). The characteristics of a rights-based assistance are tax based, meaning that those assistances are made compulsory and is regulated according to transparent rules. Thus, it does not vary according to discretion, benevolence or willingness. In contrast, charity does not have any enforcement power in the society. And unlike charity being predominantly in kind, it is more compatible with citizenship-based charity to be submitted in-cash (Buğra & Keyder, 2003).

Since charity is at the people's discretion and triggered by non-materialistic principles, it is inevitable that those principles do not have any enforcement power over the society. However, it is possible to take social assistance towards a paradigm that assigns to society the bulk of responsibility to take part in social assistance. Charity, despite having good intentions to mitigate the problems of the needy, has the potential to bring about hazardous consequences. This is because the charity, if does not offer a systemic change and in fact endure the existing problematic relationships of donations, it risks debasing the position of the recipients of the society permanently (Milbank, 2006; Dees, 2012; Cohen, 2005). For these reasons,

citizenship-based assistance and charity are put in opposite camps in this thesis, the former representing order, regularity, openness, and the latter arbitrariness, discretion, unpredictability.

2.4 Welfare state

A blueprint for welfare states is a reference to the realization of post-WWII prosperity, equality, and full-employment ideals, but then it revealed that currently there is a dilemma between full employment and equality. And it is an exogenous problem related to the dynamics, pushed forward by the new global economy, undermining the auspiciousness of the welfare state in the long term as unsustainable (Esping-Andersen G. , 2003). “The crisis lies in the interaction between the composite parts that, in unison, form contemporary welfare ‘regimes’: labor markets, the family, and, as a third partner, the welfare state” (Esping-Andersen G. , 2003, p. 4).

What is meant by equality has changed over time, and what was borrowed to this age comes from the post-war embrace of Keynesianism as a matter of mobility capability in its individualized form that leave the society susceptible to increasing risks by themselves (Esping-Andersen G. , 2003, p. 7). This is so much so that anyone who was left to their own mechanisms of survival at the time when welfare state is at demise.

The nineteenth century is the decade when the poor were held responsible for their condition rather than considering the problems as a public issue. During the twentieth century progress was made towards embracing other segments of society as equals in dignity and in their right to participate in society, which is an implementation of the trajectory T. H. Marshall delineated.

It is noteworthy that a difference is observed despite the hegemonic ideological climate and its reflection on implementations prevalent across the country. But it matters which approach is dominating the functioning of SYDVs. It is possible to suggest that this ideological kit is to be observed from legislative documents, SYDV staff, or donators. However, this study focuses only on budgetary data and leaves the rest to further questions that may offer a clearer understanding of the reflections of fundamental ideas.

Turkey approximates the Southern European welfare state according to many for its overburdening family and communities of kinship to provide a safety net as one of the main defining characteristics of the model (Ferrera, 1996; Buğra & Keyder, 2003).

The Turkish state has an entrenched system of inegalitarian patronage in its social security system, so much so that health services are diversified according to employment status and these three defined groups of sectors do not include the whole society. The Social Insurance Institution (in Turkish, *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu*) provides services to blue and white-collar workers in the private sector, the Pension Fund (in Turkish, *Emekli Sandığı*) for white-collar workers in the central government, and the Social Security Institution for the Self-Employed (in Turkish, *Bağ-Kur*) for self-employed and artisans. All extend to cover their families as well (Grütjen, 2008). Those that are left uncovered, in turn, are provided social protection outside the social insurance system, if they belong to the poorest section of society. Thus, in the absence of a responsible state agency, it is the family that bears the disproportionate burden against social risks (Grütjen, 2008, p. 113).

Yet as it will be elaborated further in subsequent sections, these types of solidarities are no longer capable of functioning due to the shrinking towards the

nuclear family and the migration of Kurds from their homeland under the condition of terror to urban regions (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 225). Migration to cities has resulted in the enervation of traditional and religious solidarity bonds with the countryside, together with the fact that they are unable to benefit from informal forms of state support in the form of housing (Göçmen, 2010, p. 93). Given these conditions, that is, an inability to sustain previous mechanisms to struggle, what is observed is the emergence of “new forms of poverty” (Buğra & Keyder, 2003). Therefore, given these transformations that were brought about by the force of modernization towards the dissolution of former solidarity measures, the only possible way out is delineating a system of social assistance cogitating citizenship rights seriously (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 52).

2.5 Developed and developing world

There are some crucial external factors that render each and every member of the global order. And despite they have much influence on societies according to their directions, the factors are not limited to them. So as:

There are other actors such as the family, community groups, NGOs, and private initiatives that have actively participated in social provision. Thus following Gough using the term welfare regime, as ‘a more generic term referring to the entire set of institutional arrangements, policies and practices affecting the welfare outcomes and stratification effects in diverse social and cultural contexts’ can be more useful, acknowledging the wide-variety of institutional ‘welfare-mix’. (Eder, 2010, p. 154)

There are also internal dynamics that affect welfare systems. Unless the program design of a welfare state match social demands, there occurs an inconsistency in socio-economic order in its emulation of a welfare state model from a past social order of developed nations (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 9). Although it is possible

to argue that nations undergo a common trajectory with an increase in social policies, it is still the particularities that differentiated nations.

What is taken as an example of the developed world was not implemented fully in developing countries. But within the limitations of ineffective states, apparatuses, and more importantly, citizenship rights under the guidance of some intergovernmental organizations like ILO the examples of the developed world is assimilated into them accordingly:

Social policy and welfare models . . . became historically assimilated and reconstituted by the societies of the South. This process of assimilation and reconstitution generated two main types of social policy and welfare systems: clientelistic and residual. Generally speaking, these two systems correspond to the levels of state regulatory capacity and societal organization achieved by the countries of the South. (Kennett, 2004, pp. 54-5)

Considering all the contributions to the literature developed upon the theorization of Esping-Andersen's paradigm, Buğra fits the Turkish case of social policy in Maurizio Ferrera's (as cited in Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 212) expansion of the theory named as South European welfare regimes, which include Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. South European welfare regimes are characterized as underdeveloped corporatist regimes. For Buğra, the Turkish welfare regime also follows South European welfare regimes in their post WWII implementations. This South European model covers only a limited fragment of society under corporatist measures of social security mechanisms and leaves a greater proportion on their own in the realm which was characterized by the domination of patronage relationships to state-society dimension. (Buğra, 2008, p. 89).

Turkey performs very poorly with respect to the permanent inequalities in primary citizenship areas of income distribution, employment, health, social security and political representation represented in the wide discrepancy between its ranking in relation with the size of its economy as 17th and UN Development Program

Human Development Index 83rd in 2010 that lags in human development much behind its economic capacity (Candaş & Yılmaz, 2012, p. 160). As these are also closely interrelated problems that any fault line of the system reflects and accentuates the inequalities further.

The social assistance provision is multifaceted and diversified into central authorities, local governments and varieties of interest groups including philanthropic institutions. This is both because of the multiplicity of needs in the society and also lack standardization in social assistance in general.

The link between developed and developing countries with the term “the underclass” appeared after the 1980s to refer to those who have fallen below a level of economic, social and political deprive that constructs a politically harmless group of people, but that undermines the moral values developed for universal citizenship, which ensures a meaningful participation for all members of society (Dahrendorf, 1994). This problem holds true for the long-term poor and disadvantaged groups in developed countries that do not have hope for amelioration and developing countries experience it when the global world is witness to that. As developed countries are not immune to this problem and carry the burden of the people denied equal rights to participate in their society in a meaningful way, there is also an inconsistency in claiming universality of citizenship and turning a blind eye to developing countries (Dahrendorf, p. 16). This is a plea for “just distribution of social wealth” as stated by Habermas (1994, p. 31), to ensure individual freedom and social security for all.

2.6 Neoliberal transformations

Social assistance, as it is traced back to T. H. Marshall’s definition of the rights and actualization of them in the post-WWII context, is a complement to a welfare state

provision. However, in its trajectory, there comes a realization of how unattainable the assigned objectives of welfare state are (i.e. the full employment ideal of Europe in the late 1960s) due to changes in the market. So market changes present some major challenges to the legitimacy of social assistance as well to neoliberal claims.

The term neoliberalism is used in its meaning to cover a set of policies promoting economic liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of markets that favor private actors in the economy at the expense of the state being held responsible.

The Pandora's box of neoliberal transformations brought up some challenges where states were left without the freedom of fiscal and monetary policies, as their pursuit of growth necessitates openness and thus makes them vulnerable with regard to international fluctuations in trade, capital and financial flows (Esping-Andersen G., 1996, p. 256). The 1973 oil crisis and the 1980s neoliberal transformations were pressing on, becoming more open to external effects while eroding the functions of the state to the detriment of the Bretton-Woods system.

The changes in the system pertaining to the pre-1980 period of welfare state are explained by Marshall (1964) as follows:

The 'Welfare State' passed away. Its institutions practices, procedures and expertise are still with us, but they are operating in a different setting without the original consensus which welded them into a social system with a distinctive spirit of its own. (p. 301)

He meant the solidarity was the basis back then, and now under totally different circumstances from what Marshall depicted, it has changed into materialist values. Esping-Andersen's take on the change of the current neoliberal context focuses on the incapability of the welfare state to respond to emerging needs and problems. For he does not credit welfare state itself for the postwar consolidation of social citizenship rights; rather, the triumph is thanks to the favorable

demographics and efficient market functioning at the time behind the period of less inequality, full employment and increased prosperity (Esping-Andersen G. , 2003, p. 31).

Still, even if it is not a welfare state as it was codified in the post-WWII form, states had the capability to abate the forces of globalization according to their own dynamics of their own economy (Boratav, Yeldan, & Köse, 2002). What is crucial is how to face the challenges and respond accordingly, given country-specific characteristics of state-society-market relationships, including the voluntary sector.

Changes in the post war welfare state also reflected on changes in the approach to poverty and thus a move from social security to social assistance in a residual form. The citizenship principle began to leave its dominant position to charity understanding, up until the 1980s and 1990s.

While the role of the state has been contracting for the last three decades (since the 1980s) as it was envisaged by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international donor institutions, this reduction is fulfilled by some obligations being undertaken by NGOs, community groups and other non-state actors in the realm of public goods and basic welfare (Cammett & MacLean, 2014, p. 2). The reason for this shift, as argued in the book *The Politics of Non-state Social Welfare* is not for its technical advantages or efficiency over state provision, but political. And the determining factor of developing countries is more about a state's regulatory capacity than financial resources, because it was a tough financial crisis in Turkey that revealed the depth and extent of the problem. Therefore, it is

the administrative reorganization of public welfare delivery at multiple levels that explains development outcomes along with decentralization in developing countries after the early 1980s, rather than the other explanations in the literature for market failure or the absence of the state. (Cammett & MacLean, p. 14)

Here, it is crucial to show that the rise of non-state provision has its roots in a long history, yet its juxtaposition against the state's retrenchment gave way and prominence to NGOs in the realm of the provision (Cammett & MacLean, pp. 13-4). The year 1980 was a significant point in Turkey's transformation in its long process of modernization and an irreversible shift towards liberalism.

What lies under success in facing the transformations is the way of reaching an enduring consensus despite trade-offs in the national unity for every exemplary country (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 257). As the consensus mostly has mostly been remnants of the previous decade, a contemporary approach that is tailored to meet the needs of the time needs to be developed (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 267).

Taking this state-society relationship to the center, entanglement with the market and also with the voluntary sector with the Turkish context will be briefly covered in the thesis. Therefore, as welfare states are formed into a trade-off between equality and efficiency with a tremendous variety of versions, national responses also variegate (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 25).

Actually SYDVs were intended to be a hub of private donations to reach those who are in need. It is such a state-society relationship that appoints society to take part in the system through the enforcement power of the state power under the directorate of its social policy. However, as the voluntary sector remained passive, the state undertook the responsibility. For some years, there were attempts on the side of the state and also the market to involve the firms in this responsibility. By the means of a tax deduction option made available to the firms, in-kind or cash donations to SYDVs or other sorts of *waqf* were encouraged. This was reported in an interview by a social worker of Küçükçekmece where he reported on two well-

known brands of clothing that compete to provide their products as donations to the SYDVs for publicity purposes.

This link between donations and reputation is studied in the literature at the intersection of economics and psychology. Its reflection on our study is how a donation may turn into a more attractive option for firms that undertake some responsibility for the social assistance framework. An empirical work by Elfenbein, Fisman and Mcmanus (2012) on e-marketing, evidences how charity can benefit sellers by implying better quality and enhance their reputation in the eyes of consumers. The two brands mentioned were positioned in the market with affordable prices and prefer mass production. It is possible to argue that the firm targets the mid to lower segment of consumers by offering affordable prices. Thus, the competition of the two firms was meaningful as they both targeted those groups of recipients intersecting as their prospective customers.

What is behind the transformation that is taking place across nations is not only financial distress or rising unemployment, but more accurately, the issue is also about changing dynamics that left behind all the factors that once necessitated the augmentation/initiation of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 27).

Already existing social security programs were not sufficient to cope with the crises of the 1980s and the 2000s. A reduction in state's role and expenditures was accompanied by the dual processes of the liberalization of trade and of capital movements that constitute globalization in the economic sense (Boratav et al., 2002).

It is possible to see the addition of new types of transfers by the Ministry in line with the developments that took place in the early founding years of the welfare state, in its birthplace. The struggle with the Poor Law in Great Britain was carried out by initiations of the Old Age Pensions and National Insurance Acts of 1908 and

1911 to detach the elderly, the sick, and the unemployed from the stigma of pauperism (Marshall T. H., 1964, p. 289). Then came the abolition of the Poor Law, which for many years acted detrimentally on principles of equality. The 1834 Poor Law of England:

treated claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of citizenship, but as an alternative to them-as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word. (Marshall T. H., 1964, p. 88)

It turns bitter when the Poor Law gave assistance only and exceptionally to the poor who accepted the relief in return for the deprivation of his civil right of liberty in return for assignment to workhouse by force and also with the denial of political rights (Marshall T. H., 1964, p. 88).

One of the most problematic issues is about the institutional form of social assistance which was once formed, does not match the needs of a contemporary matrix of family-state-market triangle. Newly emerging economic realities are missed under the rapid bombardments of change. The point of reference must no longer be a post war scene of socioeconomic situations, but catching up with newly emerging realities of the time such as flexible labor markets, ageing population, an increase in single parent families, dissolution of big family and hometown ties formed against insecurities and risks (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 131; Buğra, 2008). Also, the trade-off between full-employment and equality,⁵ and the limitedness of national governments over policies, should be added to the reasons for which welfare states are in crisis.

New poverty is the term coined by Ayşe Buğra to denote the new context and new challenges of the time. The term encompasses the rise of new forms of

⁵ This tradeoff can be understood in the example of North America with a success rate of employment at the cost of rising inequalities, and Western Europe's huge army of unemployed citizens yet covered by and thus overburdening social security finances (Esping-Andersen G. , 1996, p. 4).

deprivations under the neoliberal transformations that are depreciating various forms of previously available bulwarks against poverty, such as kinship, religious networks, brotherhoods, the diminishing role of the state as a welfare provider (Buğra & Keyder, 2003; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). This was also covered by Eder (2010) in her seminal work on the diminishing indirect welfare state provisions of informal housing and agricultural subsidies since the 1980s that culminated in the 2001/2002 crises relies mostly on family, kinship and brotherhood ties. (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 222).

However, when new poverty put the state in the obligation to play a role in the alleviation of poverty after the 2001 crisis, being in compliance and full harmony with the international context, social solidarity colored with Islamic connotations gaining importance at the expense of citizenship rights was what defined AKP's approach at the time, as Buğra (2008, p. 218) clearly posits. Thus, it is such a period to observe the dichotomy of the rights-based versus charity understanding in their fundamentally oppositionary positions. This belonged to an ideological framework of a period dominated by much reference to Islamic norms of charity, diverting the responsibility from the state to the society (Buğra, 2015, p. 127).

The SYDV initially was formed as an attempt to generate private donations to abate the burden on the state budget for social assistance, but it failed to fulfill that mission (Buğra, 2007, p. 46). Also, the administrative manner of dissociating from social rights basis towards a manner of philanthropy in the ideological context of an entanglement with Islam and neoliberalism under the AKP rule led to an unprecedented shrinkage of public responsibility (Buğra, 2007, p. 46). As Islamic rhetoric takes the individual benefactors instead of the state as the responsible agency (Bonner et al., 2003, p. 3), and the re-appropriation of Islam into the political context

of Turkey threatens to bring down the state responsibility. Yet this is not to be seen as a withdrawal of the state from power. In fact, it is the state owning the power to direct

[T]hrough the legal changes that allowed some NGOs to assume more responsibility in social assistance, the government has increased its political reach and, in a way, has also genuinely compensated for its lack of institutional capacity to provide sufficient social assistance for the poor and the needy. (Eder, 2010, p. 181)

The dilemma in the approach of the AKP is to be understood in its contradictory stance of having urges both putting the responsibility for caring for the needy by its Islamic solidarity mechanisms and family rather than by state is on the one hand. And its ambitious neoliberal standing, highly attentive for IMF imposed is a representation of conservative, liberal approach whose implementations necessitating an anti-social policy stand disturbed by the calamities of 2001 crisis that revealed the necessity of state responsibility in the cause of poverty alleviation as Buğra (2008, pp. 219-23) puts on the other hand. Also, the reason the AKP was not able to actualize its intention to divert the responsibility for the amelioration of poverty from the state to charity, given the pressing conditions of the time that forced an inclusionary revision of unequal corporatist social security system (Buğra, 2008, p. 199).

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the rate of poor individuals under \$4,3 per day is 1,62% for the year 2014, which is the lowest rate attained following the pattern of diminishing poverty rates for the 2002 crisis when poverty hit 30,30% in Turkey (Poverty Study, 2014). Still, these successful steps do not correspond to collection of the fruits of increased responsibility of the state or a raised awareness in the social assistance framework.

As it is stated in a review article of a conference on the social policy of Turkey, while an increase in the budget of social assistance is observed, it is still hardly possible to agree that the rhetoric adopted by Ministry of Family and Social Policy officials reflects a paradigm shift in the prescription of policies (Almaçık & Üstübcü, 2012, pp. 181-2), despite recognition of dependencies; dependencies of old age, of sickness and incapacity, of childhood, widowhood and so forth by addition of new transfer types were defined in SYDVs.

2.7 The Turkish context, the Ottoman legacy and charity

Charity has always been a crucial actor in Turkish culture, having its roots in Ottoman era. Unlike *zakat* and its compulsory nature, *waqfs* (foundations), as a form of *sadaqa* (charity), offer a realm of voluntary giving that characterizes the culture that lingers on in Turkish society. Entitling the SYDVs with the word *waqf* with reference to neither Islamic ruling nor Ottoman practice can hardly establish a valid correlation, if not a mere literal similarity. But still, while it can be disputed whether SYDVs fully comply with the definitions of *waqf*, the name of *waqf* is in harmony with the area of freedom enjoyed both by the central authority's preferential and nontransparent evaluations and allocation from the Fund to the districts, and the freedom of benevolent inhabitants of the districts. They, in combination, determine the total amount of the budget for the irregular transfers of their flexibilities.

A differentiation is required here to make it clear why prominence is given to citizenship-based social assistance understanding and not to the charity-based one. The connotation of charity-based social assistance types used in the thesis is related to its nature of being flexible, unaccountable, irregular, and unpredictability. The negativity does not stem from the fact that it is unable to address the current needs of

the society, or even unnecessary, as most criticisms commonly do, and in fact it provides a social legacy of social services (Singer, 2003). Therefore, it is not convenient to disparage the Ottoman institutions of the time as rudimentary. Apart from the central position of the Sultan who gave to charities and *waqfs* around the Empire, there appears to be a sort of “protective social system” in the nineteenth century. Especially in its last quarter of that century, the emergence of local governments in forms of municipalities was crucial to constructing a social system surrounding around the sultan (Özbek, 2012, pp. 412-3). Thus, local authorities had a prominent position in support of the center back then. This gives not only clues to the existence of a public initiative, but also transfers the authority of the center and shift some of its responsibility to the local as well.

It is crucial here to make a reference to Nadir Özbek, a scholar working on the Ottoman institutions and public policy. He specifies that, for the state, enhancing the productive capacity of its population by the way of opening up a sphere of itself together with the claims of necessity and legitimacy is the main criterion for what constitutes the modern forms of social assistance (Özbek, 2002, p. 11). This is crucial to highlighting the differentiation of modern forms of state involvement in the traditional, rather than a simplistic labeling of informal kinship solidarities as traditional and remnants of pre-modernity (Özbek, 2002, p. 11).

2.8 Operating principles at local and central levels of governments

When SYDTF was established in 1986 with a dual source budget, one portion was coming from the public resources and the other from private donors with a philanthropic attitude. The founding principle of the Fund states that its main objective was “to help citizens in the state of poverty and destitution, or, when

necessary, to help non-citizens who are in Turkey legally or otherwise, to take measures that will enforce social justice by ensuring the fair distribution of income, to encourage social aid and cooperation”.

Maintaining social assistance rests primarily with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, as it has been the responsible unit for policymaking in developing norms and standards since 2011, for the collection and allocation of resources, and for the monitoring and auditing of programs. However, local responsibility for both cities and districts are not something to be undermined as it is the SYDVs themselves that have the authority to decide on the budgeting of those transfers that remain outside regular transfers paid by the central government.

Regarding the structure of the public assistance system, power and authority are asymmetrically shared by the central and the local governments. The central government’s policy is implemented by the local authorities. As the social assistance system operates in the district’s and city’s SYDVs, they become the lowest echelon for the implementation of state policies.

Its modest size and wide variations across regions makes direct control hard for the central government to sustain. Local SYDVs have autonomy within their domain of jurisdiction. Thus, whether it is the local or central government to deal more effectively with the social assistance depends on the specific context. Local authorities have the advantage of being proximate and better-informed; in return, the central government is more disciplined and systematic.

Organizationally each decision making board of SYDVs is composed of locally elected representatives or centrally appointed officials. And it is this board that decides on the transfer item options, and their priorities are actualized in the

practical details. This is because there is no strictly defined policy to plan the budgeting. Hence, there is variation across districts.

Political interests of the SYDV senior officers and the Ministry bring about some loyalty ties. Identity or ideology binds them in ways that affect the implementation of policies in real practice, in some cases may lead to even the promotion of their religious outlook and advancement of party interests (Doron, 1978, p. 455). Note that all the districts included in the data except Ataşehir voted for the ruling AKP party in both the general and municipal elections. Whether party politics affects the discretion of officials in their budgeting decisions and whether patronage has any role in distorting a just distribution is the subject of a study on Ankara that sheds light on how SYDV operations are affected in their discourse, method and strategy (Aydođan, 2009, p. 45).

The Fund is engineered as a combination of a number of revenue sources coming from public institutions. These are 2.5% of income and institutional taxes, 50% of traffic fines, 15% of Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK, *Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*) advertisement incomes, 2% of local management funds, and up to 10% from a collection of other funds.

As mentioned above, the inegalitarian nature of the social security system is composed of three groups that have been defined over the years. Firstly, it was in 1946 that the Institution of Social Securities for paid employees was instituted. Then in 1950, the Retirement Fund for public officials was defined, followed by Bağ-Kur for the self-employed in 1971. These were stratified social security systems for retirement, health and employment. In 1992, the Green Card was introduced to cover those uncovered by any other security system and who lived in poverty. Given these separate systems that treated segments of society unequally, the report (Candaş &

Yılmaz, 2012, p. 89) points to how it is at a critical rate when it is given that almost half of the employment go unrecorded.

2.9 In-cash versus in-kind

In-kind transfers are much less preferred due to the inefficiencies attached to the costs of processing of bids, purchases, transportation, storage, distribution, and timing (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 50). In-cash transfers, on the other hand, are favored, as they offer the option to the recipient of determining their needs and the priority.

In relation to the dual social assistance understandings defined in the study, the in-kind versus in-cash dichotomy sits upon that division between charity-based and citizenship-based. As particular preference is given to in-cash transfers rather than in-kind, the approach approximates a more standardized and rights-based understanding of social assistance. This is because in-cash transfers construct the strand of expenditure that is more standardized with previously defined and transparent rules and that is systematic and regular. On the other hand, the dominance of in-kind transfers represents the quality of older models where the behavior of the recipient is constrained and utility is diminished.

2.10 The AKP and its understanding of social assistance

The AKP took power in the 2002 elections as a majority government after two decades of coalitions. Once defining characteristic of this new ruling group was their ambitiousness about following EU criteria, and omnipresent Islamic connotations allied with neoliberal motives. It was a heavy task to undertake the burden of the 2001 economic crisis, which led to the eruption of a new poverty, changed the

dimension and visibility of poverty around the country, and turned into something that is transferred the responsibility to state and concretized into a government policy (Buğra & Adar, 2008, p. 100; Buğra & Keyder, 2003).

As we see, all crises attached to the welfare state's constituent elements have some adequacy limitations in solving contemporary needs and problems. Thus, the solution lies in the promulgation of social policy tailored to the defined issues. The candidacy for European Union membership has been a crucial goal for Turkey, which had started to implement changes from 1999 to be in compliance with EU social policy. There was an increase in the budget for education, updating the regulations for the protection of children and the disabled, reconsidering the social security and health systems (Özcüre, 2010).

For Göçmen (2010), a religiously motivated civil society and new forms of welfare provision date back to the period when the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*) mobilized people into a social network around the ideals of social justice and equality after the 1970s. Although there are discontinuities and sharp splits between the AKP and the National Outlook Movement, it is still possible to get a grasp of the connection between them in terms of religious connotations of similar audience groups in the society. This holds true despite the socioeconomic evolution of the process.

Neoliberal transformations have some effects also on the “virtue of charity-based on the traditional culture of social solidarity whose source is Islamic religion and faith, has been activated by the social network of the community of conservative ideology” (Koçal, 2014). And even if not constructing an apotheosis of social assistance and assigning a significant role in social assistance (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 36), observing the most effective examples of social assistance either by

municipalities or NGOs belonging to Islamic groups is found significant in a UNDP Report (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 32).

These took place in Turkey in relation to the concurrent developments taking place in the US and the European context of the 1980s and 1990s that signified, as defined by Göçmen (2014), the period of blossoming of religiously motivated civil-society associations (RMAs) or FBOs. Accordingly, the aggrandizement of these RMAs/FBOs operating in the realm of social assistance is explained by the dual dynamics of neoliberalism and the rise of political Islam (p. 93). Göçmen assigns importance to the forces of neoliberalism in the determination of responsibility allocation among the public, private and voluntary sectors.

There is no escape from value choices in welfare systems. The construction of any models or the elaboration of any theories which have anything to do with 'policy' must inevitably be concerned with 'what is and what might be'; with what we (as members of a society) want (ends); and with how we get there (the means).

Not only is 'policy' all about values but those who discuss problems of policy have their own values (some would call them prejudices). But, whatever they are called, it is obvious that the social sciences –and particularly economics and sociology– are not, nor can ever be, 'value free'. (Titmuss, 1974, p. 132).

Taking this quote as a reference, consider the position of family for the charity-based understanding of the incumbent government and the imminent focus given to family is explained by the logic borrowed from Titmuss, as the following quote makes clear the position of family under the forces of industrialization:

Nor can the contemporary problems of family life be entirely solved within the family itself. The family does not function in a vacuum. How it functions today is, as I have attempted to show, profoundly affected by the forces of industrialization. It is simultaneously benefited and damaged by those forces. The rapidity of change in highly industrialized societies during the last one hundred years has put the family on the defensive. Its responsibilities have grown; it has been placed in more situations of divided loyalties and conflicting values; it has been forced to choose between kinship and

economic progress; and it has been constantly subjected to the gales of creative instability (Titmuss, 1976, p. 117).

This chapter offered the literature review of social assistance. It started with a microscopic view of the principal element of citizen and built upon that an understanding it acquired of social policy and how it is formed. Then, enhancing the limits of the vision to cover different arrangements of state-market-family and voluntary sector over the responsibility is elaborated. Finally, the exposure to Turkish context of neoliberal transformations is explained. The following chapter will introduce the analyses of budgetary data onto this framework.



CHAPTER 3

AN ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY DATA OF SEVEN SYDVs

In this chapter I undertake a comprehensive study of the data gathered. First, the share of central budget to the local amount of transfers in the expenditure budgetary data onto seven districts' SYDVs is analyzed. The total and per capita amount of transfers in relation to population size and socioeconomic conditions for seven districts are evaluated within the duality of social assistance understandings. The comparison of Istanbul and Konya is also mentioned as a significant point to delineate the rights-based versus charity-based understandings together with their reflection of district level in the two cities. The chapter will conclude by suggesting further studies to establish the relationship between social assistance understanding and electoral behavior by revealing the example of the 2014 local elections and the 2015 general election results, shown in Appendix D.

This thesis is based on the dichotomy of two cultures that are at play in the field of social assistance: an age-old culture of charity, and a more contemporary pattern of rights-based citizenship. These cultures perform assistance activities for those in need, with variations in their formations and hence implementations, despite the fact that both lie under a unitary social policy structure. It is possible to relate the variations observed in the implementations of the two cultures to the difference in their formations. As the decisions on resource allocation as social assistance rests in social welfare regime preferences, there is a close connection between these two.

Since the social assistance system is not standardized and is tightly administered by a central authority, there is room for districts to implement their versions of assistance, given the room for arbitrariness in the system at the local level

implementation. The deeply rooted culture of charity and ambitious steps taken towards social assistance based on citizenship basis are on the stage and continuously clash with each other. Hence, it is possible to observe the two cultures coexisting with the system, upholding predominance of the system over the other, partly and relatively.

As these two understandings were explained in the previous chapter, the cleavage between two is in the definition of citizenship-based as tax based, regular, in cash, transparent rules (Buğra & Keyder, 2003). To put it in simpler terms, arbitrariness, discretion, and unpredictability sit on one end of the charity spectrum, and order, regularity, and openness stand for apotheosis citizenship-based end.

3.1 The scope and nature of the study

The focus of the thesis is the dichotomy of the nature of social assistance as either citizenship- or charity-based in seven districts with the aim of conceptualizing and contextualizing the existing forms of social assistance in Turkey in the year 2014. It is bound with the purpose of providing a snapshot of the context, rather than a historical analysis.

In this chapter there is a comprehensive study of the data gathered on expenditure budgetary data on seven districts' Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations; five of these are from Istanbul and the remaining two are from Konya. These districts are Ataşehir, Bağcılar, Esenler, Küçükçekmece, and Ümraniye in Istanbul, and Meram and Selçuklu in Konya.

These districts' ranking with respect to the quality of life are as follows: Ataşehir ranks 8th, Ümraniye 20th, Küçükçekmece 25th, Bağcılar 36th, and Esenler 39th among all 39 districts of Istanbul, according to the report on the socioeconomic

conditions of districts of Istanbul published by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO, İstanbul Ticaret Odası) in 2011 (Şeker M. , 2011). To add an insight into these rankings, Ataşehir is among second degree according to the ordinal rankings of 39 districts into five degrees. Ümraniye and Küçükçekmece rank in the third degree, Bağcılar belongs to the fourth degree and Esenler is in the fifth degree (Şeker M. , 2011, pp. 56-8). The index developed for the study to measure the quality of life is a composite of seven other indexes calculated according to demographic structure, economic growth, human capital (education), transportation facilities, health, environment, and social life indexes by 54 variables. This thesis will take this report as a benchmark for the relative level of socioeconomic positions of districts.

Figure 1 reveals strong support for the ordinal ranking of districts according to their relative socioeconomic measures. As the level of education is a crucial signifier for human capital, the smooth lines of unprecedented flows follow the same ordinal ranking of districts with the report prepared by ITO. Hence, it strengthens the argument that the ordinal ranking of the districts in the report are in line with the structure of education levels across districts.




Figure 1. Level of education in districts of İstanbul, consolidated from TurkStat data
Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=72&locale=tr>

The split between Konya and İstanbul is crucial here, just as the socioeconomic comparison is not evidenced by the available data. Therefore, the districts of Konya are analyzed separately, as taken to the rightmost of the x-axis. Just as it is noted in the title, the level of education is consolidated for subgroups; i.e., combining nine categories defined by TurkStat into five, illiterate, literate but non primary school graduates are combined into the ‘below primary school’ category. Two separate groups defined for postgraduates, including Master’s and PhD holders, are combined into one group. Secondary school is added to primary school. Notice that these groups do not indicate the total number of graduates, but it indicates its ratio to district population to control for population size.

What is significant in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is the percentage of the population having a high school and above level of education decreases in the districts with lower socioeconomic levels. Conversely, the rate of primary school graduates and below in district populations increases when moving in the same

direction. And the most noticeable point is that there is no exception to these trends except for the shift from the districts of Istanbul to Konya. Figure 1 in its complementary stance with the ITO report constructs the foundation of thesis arguments about socioeconomic levels of the districts.




Figure 2. Level of education in districts of Konya, consolidated from TurkStat data
Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=72&locale=tr>

Another demographic factor is introduced in Figure 3 and 4 with the distribution of age groups combined for 15 years of age across seven districts. The age distribution is smooth and consistent across the seven districts, paralleling both the ITO ranking and the level of education. It is observed that moving towards the districts of lower socioeconomic conditions along x-axis, the share of 0-29 age group also increases. And similarly, moving in the same direction, the remaining four lines signifying the 30+ age groups diminish. This means that the age composition of districts with lower socioeconomic conditions has a younger population composition than districts with high ones. Yet there is no causality relationship to be found between socioeconomic standards and age structure, but it is possible to see a

correlation in Figure 3 and Figure 4 to note to supplement the socioeconomic ordering by ITO report on characteristics of education and age demographics.




Figure 3. Population structure according to age
Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=72&locale=tr>

From the data set collected for this thesis, two main strands of analysis were developed for the purpose of offering a snapshot of social assistance in Turkey. First, they were analyzed with a specific emphasis on the cumulative analysis of central to local budget ratios and in-kind to in-cash ratios. Secondly, some other observations and patterns are discussed regarding transfer types in specific. It is crucial here to note that these efforts in reference to comparative measures of social assistance among district SYDVs are the means to delineate the rights-based vs. charity-based understandings of social assistance.




Figure 4. Population structure according to age

Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=72&locale=tr>

Note that an effort is given to move beyond a mere analysis of effectiveness and efficiency of social assistance institutions prevalent in the literature. Noting the lack of in depth analysis about the normative foundations of the assistance institutions, this thesis uses concrete empirical data to take the level of analysis to a formative level to reach conclusions of the normative foundations of Turkey, to make a contribution to the literature. Given the differentiations in norms, values, and objectives, a dichotomy is constructed between rights-based and charity-based to ground the argument. This is a representation of the dichotomy that exists on the current context across different SYDVs beyond the scope of the ones included in this study.

The structure of the social assistance mechanism is determined by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. And social assistance is carried out by the center in cooperation with local branches under the direction of the Social Assistance Directorate General (SYDGM). There is a limited degree of decentralization that allows for better execution of policies for easing access to information on

communities. In a country like Turkey with a relatively powerful central government dominating the local authorities leaves less room for differentiations at the legislative level. Therefore, the only possibility to observe district-specific variations is in policy implementations while still operating in the area demarcated by the centrally prescribed regulations. Thus, the findings of this study are limited by these narrow possibilities of differences that occur among SYDVs in the center. Yet as it will be shown later, these differences are representative of a cleavage at the formation level that is deducted from the norms and values that are effectively incorporated in determining the nature of their approach to social assistance.

3.2 Analyzing SYDV budgets

This part of the chapter is an analysis based on the total sum amounts of Turkish Liras allocated to regular and irregular social assistance in comparison to each other. The three budgets that will be analyzed are: (1) the central budget for regular transfers, which is the amount of assistance that the Ministry of Family and Social Policies provides to district SYDVs from the Fund only to transfer those amounts to the citizens identified by district SYDVs as appropriate recipients, (2) the SYDV's own budget for irregular transfers made in cash, (3) the SYDV's own budget for irregular transfers made in kind.

The first one is the total amount of Liras spent by the central government with the coordination of district SYDVs, yet the amount is strictly not counted under the domain of the spending will of the SYDVs and is not deducted from the SYDV's share from the Fund budget. Although the total amount is recorded under the district SYDV regular transfers and applications are taken by SYDVs, the amount is transferred to those eligible recipients identified by the district SYDVs and directly

sent to the beneficiaries' accounts from the center through an integrated software system.

Note that, these are transfers made regularly for specific groups of recipients that fit the profiles of need defined by the regulations, while the sole mission for SYDVs is its transmission. These transfers include conditional cash transfers for education, health, and pregnancy; others are for relatives of soldiers in need, widows, disabled people over the age of 18, relatives of the disabled, people over the age of 65, and silicosis patients: all are under the scope of Article No. 2022. All nine categories of transfers are paid regularly with a variety of specific payments sequencing as long as the applicant fits into the defined profile of recipient in the regulations of the central budget. The payment amount, the sequencing, and transfer issues are totally under the responsibility of the Ministry, not the SYDVs. The SYDVs only bear the burden of identification of the requests to determine whether they comply with the specified criteria for eligibility. And the amounts of money do not enter the SYDV branches. They are only recorded in the budget occupying an informative function to indicate the total volume of people profiled as eligible by SYDV and who have access to transfer via that branch. Thus, any variation in size of the budget relating to central transfers across districts may be due to demographic differences. A spurious factor to interfere here might be the eligibility criterion for irregular transfers. If there is any connection found between centrally paid transfers and the irregular transfers, this is because for eligibility, household income is very critical. This point is to be elaborated in the following parts of the chapter.

Unlike regular transfers that are paid centrally and are structured as monthly allowances, irregular transfers numbered 2 and 3 above are paid by own resources of district SYDVs. And these 2 and 3 mostly involve urgency of their nature and

predominantly paid for one time. This is a crucial distinction between the two types of transfers.

The volume of a SYDV's own budget that is appropriated for irregular transfers depends on a number of factors and thus variations across districts are inevitably observed. The most crucial component is the part the SYDVs receive as a specific share from the Fund for their budget recorded under irregular transfers of varying degrees according to the evaluations of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies that considers the monthly available budgets for them. In addition to population and socioeconomic conditions, which are important indicators, the demand is a more central criterion for the Ministry in assessing the amount to be transmitted. Also, the Board of Trustees has the appeal option on an increase in their share from the Fund. However, the most problematic part is that the information on the size of these budgets coming from the Fund is completely inaccessible to public scrutiny. This barrier exists even on social workers employed at the SYDVs who are undertaking academic research. This is the most critical shortcoming of any study for missing the insight for preferential allocation of the Fund resources for 1,000 SYDVs across the country. It is a serious deficiency on the side of the public bureaucracy's transparency to inhibit any research regarding the central authority's decision on distribution of the Fund to districts. A reference will be made to this point in the concluding part of Chapter 3.

Apart from the amount of TL coming from the Fund, SYDVs also have their sources of income and different capacities of raising donations locally which adds to this differentiation of SYDV budgets across districts. However, the central budget that is administered by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies occupies the

predominant component of their budgets recorded under the regular transfers in total compared to irregular transfers in total.

Considering the total amounts of the year 2014, the General Directorate of Social Assistance got 10,578,667,000 Turkish Liras from the Ministry's total budget. This high amount allocated to the Directorate has been significant because the Ministry's budget, as it is displayed in Table 1, for that year was 17,024,807,000 Turkish Liras, which corresponds to 3,97% of the general budget of public institutions (2014 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, 2014). The Fund for that year transferred a total amount of 4,351,800,939.30 TL to 1,000 SYDVs around the country. These SYDVs are either at the district or city level that receives 1,38% of GNP with 20,393,993,000 Turkish Liras (2014, p. 74). However, it is 3% of GNP that is targeted but not attained for Turkey, as its share of social spendings remained below the threshold determined by the EU.

Table 1. Turkey's Social Assistance System in Figures for the Year 2014

Source: The Ministry of Family and Social Policies 2014 Annual Report p.74

Total Social Assistance Expenditure	22,914,990 (000 TL)
Share of Social Assistance Expenditures in GDP	1.31%
Number of Households Receiving Social Assistance	3,005,898
Number of Households Receiving Regular Social Assistance	2,274,182
Number of Households Receiving Temporary Social Assistance	1,892,656
Amount Transferred to Assistance from Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (SYDTF) Resources	4,351,800,939.30 TL
Number of Old-Age and Disability Salary Beneficiaries under Law No. 2022	1,300,377
Number of People for whom Universal Health Insurance (UHI) Contributions are Paid by the Government	9,261,748
Rate of Individuals with per Capita Daily Expenditure below 2.15 USD per Current Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (2013)	0.06%
Number of Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF)	1,000
Number of SASF Staff	8,611
Number of SASF Social Assistance and Inspection Officers	3,845

What is recorded in the annual report of 2014 signifies the prominence given to regular transfers made over irregular transfers. The number of households receiving both regular and irregular transfers occupies the majority, with a number of 1,160,940 households. Those only receiving regular transfers are 1,113,242 households and those only receiving irregular transfers are 731,716 households. This makes a total of 3,005,898 households benefitting from social assistance out of 77,695,904 people in Turkey for the year 2014. What is most noticeable is that irregular transfers do not construct the major basis of the social assistance method preferred in Turkey. Regular transfers reach a significantly higher number of people, and irregular transfers are in a supplementary position to regular transfers. Also, regarding the share of regular transfers, the lowest rate in a district is 55%, meaning

45% of the share of irregular transfers level is maximum in Selçuklu among all districts.

Note that the regular transfers are used not only as a means of cash transfers. They aim to cushion the vulnerabilities of people in addition to alleviating poverty. Attaching conditions for access to health care and education aid, the system strengthens capabilities by incorporating people into public services. For example, pregnancy aid, which is a human development conditional income transfers program, is given in three installments on condition that the pregnant woman gives birth in hospital and maintains medical inspections as specified in the regulation.

As more and more weight is given to regular transfers rather than irregular, the approach approximates a more standardized and rights-based understanding of social assistance. This is because regular transfers constitute the strand of public expenditure that is standardized with previously defined and transparent rules, in-cash, tax-based, and regular, as its name denotes. On the other hand, the dominance of the in-kind transfer represents the quality of old models, where the behavior of the recipient is constrained and utility is diminished. Those do not have any chance of attaining the objectives of social justice, in contrast to the ones that rely on stable and permanent welfare institutions (Barrientos & Santibanez, 2016, p. 10).

A multidimensional definition of poverty cannot be addressed by in-kind transfers that dominate social assistance. It is this integrated understanding of poverty that defines new areas of support and the addition of new dimensions to be covered by the policy that expands the number of items defined under the scope of regular transfers. The design of the policy reflects the perspective on poverty and citizenship.

In line with this, categories of recipients have been increased in Turkey over the years, as it was declared as an aim by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy to define more areas of disadvantaged groups to be covered by social policy. This policy was initiated as a UNDP/IMF funded project, but now its timeframe is open ended. Financing is covered by the Fund that was opened under the Central Bank. The selection of the recipient is made by a means test.



3.2.1 Analysis of comparative budgetary ratios

With all the data at hand, the starting point of an intriguing analysis is the cumulative values of transfer amounts held in seven districts. To have a general snapshot of the social assistance mechanism, the total sum amount is used to initiate the endeavor and then give a direction to the study. Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrates the total amounts of transfers made in the year 2014 for seven districts. Irregular transfers are included in the figure as the summation of in-cash and in-kind to provide a comparison with regular transfers and to illustrate the differing width of spread they have in terms of Turkish Liras amounts. Regular transfers do appear only in cash form, but although irregular transfers are recorded as TL worth, found in either cash or in-kind form.




Figure 5. Volume of four types of budget for seven districts measured by the amount of TL spent

Regular payments, with the exceptional outlier Bağcılar as the most crowded district by 754,623 residents in Istanbul, reveal a relatively concentrated distribution of transfers among seven districts ranging from 9.3 to 14.1 billion Turkish Liras. Yet

in-cash transfers made under irregular transfers are the most concentrated transfer type proportional to being in lower amounts, and display a low range of difference between 1.7 to 4.3 billion Turkish Liras. Compared to in-cash transfers, in-kind transfers are distributed and thus reflected in irregular transfers. Yet these figures are not dramatic enough to make inferences about any trend.




Figure 6. Volume of four types of budget for seven districts measured by the amount of TL spent

What is the most noticeable in Figure 7 is that in-cash transfers are closely correlated with the district population size. The amount of TL allocated for in-cash transfers corresponds to districts that are ordinally listed according to their population size, with the exception of Meram. Meram has higher TL amounts of in-cash transfers than Ataşehir, which is a more populated district Yet this exception of Meram is meaningful and in line with the argument that Selçuklu and Meram have a different approach than the districts of Istanbul and they allocate higher amounts for social assistance even in regular transfers than the other districts.

A similar pattern applies to regular transfers as well. In the ordinal ranking according to district population, regular payments correlate with the ranking. The exceptions are with Selçuklu, Esenler and Meram. The exception of Esenler is

understood by its having the lowest socioeconomic conditions. This necessitates a higher amount of regular transfers for Esenler which is disproportional to its population size and hence distorting its ranking among other districts. Selçuklu and Meram are distinguished by their type of social assistance approach they have and their effort to increase the reach and the amount of social assistance by their discourse, strategy and methodology.

Figure 7 illustrates the respective ratios of in-kind, in-cash aids of irregular transfers and regular transfers, ordered according to their rate of in-kind transfer levels of total district budgets. In-kind transfer rate sticks out, especially for Selçuklu with 34,40%, which is followed by Küçükçekmece 21,41% and Meram 20,27%. In the following sections, the special case of Küçükçekmece having such a high rate of in-kind transfers will be discussed in terms of how they harness its active cooperation strategy with firms to enlarge the volume of in-kind transfers.




Figure 7. Rate of three types of transfers for districts of İstanbul, according to their TL amounts

Thus, leaving Küçükçekmece aside, Meram and Selçuklu exceptionally as Figure 8 signify the lowest in-cash transfer rates with 10% each, and their in-kind

transfers are at least more than double the in-kind amounts. The rest have higher in-cash transfer rates than in-kind. The argument here is that the difference in their respective rates of in-kind and in-cash rates signifies again their particular approach in social assistance. This is a representation of how a limited amount of budget that district SYDVs have allocated by a decision making unit among possible alternative transfer types and result in these distribution statistics.

The lowest rate of in-kind transfers belongs to Esenler, with 0%, then Ümraniye, at 9,20% , which has almost half the rate of its in-cash transfer. Bağcılar deserves attention for being the most populated district and with its proportional amount of regular and in-cash transfers. However, the rates of in-kind transfers do not go unparalleled in its relative size and remains unnoticeably similar to other districts. Here, the district has the highest share of regular transfers of all seven districts is Esenler. However, in-kind transfers do not go unparalleled in its relative size and remains unnoticeable.




Figure 8. Rate of three types of transfers for districts of Konya, according to their TL amounts

To have a clearer understanding about the relative amounts of transfers of districts, we will analyze the rate of citizens of a district population receiving transfers, shown in the Figure 9 and 10. The population statistics are drawn from the census prepared by TurkStat in the year 2014. These ratios provide a more accurate measure in terms of giving a per-capita calculation devoid of huge cash amounts. Also the effect of population size will be corrected by this method.




Figure 9. Rate of inhabitants receiving aid in the districts of İstanbul




Figure 10. Rate of inhabitants receiving aid in the districts of Konya

This figure favors central transfers over in-cash transfers to have the narrower spread among seven districts, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. This is a more accurate form of representation of proving how central transfers are smoothly distributed among districts according to the number of their inhabitants that need them. Here, the number of people enters into the calculation in our analysis rather than the cash value of transfers. And the reason the ratio of the number of recipients of district population is significantly higher for regular transfers is that these transfers are personal and calculated personally. However, for irregular transfers, the number of recipients is mostly calculated as a multiplier of the estimated size of households.

Just for this reason, unlike in Figure 5 and 6, in Figure 9 and 10, Küçükçekmece ranks in the middle among in-kind transfers when it is corrected for per-capita amounts. Here, Selçuklu is the frontrunner in in-kind amounts per recipient. Küçükçekmece, Ataşehir, and Bağcılar have higher rates of in-kind transfers than in-cash and central transfers. And what explains the higher rates of

these four districts requires more study in detail, with an analysis of in-kind transfers' distribution of TL worth of items and the number of recipients. But regarding the main argument of the thesis, Meram is also expected to have a higher rate of in-kind transfer. So why Meram scores are mediocre is also another question to be explored in a further study. It cannot be explained with the data at hand.

Considering up until now the aggregate level data onto the in-cash and in-kind divide, Figure 11 and 12 introduces sum amounts of regular and irregular transfers across seven districts, taking into account the ordinal ranking of the districts on the x-axis regarding their socioeconomic level. Again, the two districts of Konya are situated to the rightmost of the figure, as they do not directly fit together with the Istanbul districts, mainly due to their different understanding of social assistance, and their socioeconomic positioning does not corroborate with any studies available.




Figure 11. Total amounts of regular and irregular transfers across districts of İstanbul according to decreasing socioeconomic conditions




Figure 12. Total amounts of regular and irregular transfers across districts of Konya according to decreasing socioeconomic conditions

Except for Bağcılar, which is the most populated district of Turkey, the total TL amount of regular transfers increases while going towards districts with lower socioeconomic standards. This is understandable with direct reasoning that in the districts with lower socioeconomic conditions, more people are there to seek social assistance. And thus, the total amounts of regular transfers are higher in districts with poor socioeconomic status. But it should be noted that the reasoning is not causal. There is a correlation between socioeconomic conditions and population size, as will be shown in the following part.

The total TL amount of irregular aid also increases in the direction towards lower socioeconomic conditioned districts, with the exception of Esenler. The case of Esenler should be understood in light of its condition of having the lowest socioeconomic conditions. Its budget for irregular transfers does not correspond to its needs. The regular transfer budget also does not suffice for its low socioeconomic standards, despite its comparatively manageable population size.

Leaving the exceptions aside, increasing irregular transfer amounts while moving towards the right on x-axis, is in line with the argument that those districts with lower socioeconomic conditions approximate charity-based social assistance understanding. This argument will be elaborated in more detail below. It is sufficient to say for now that this ordinal ranking of districts on the x-axis offers a better explanation for analysis across districts as in Figure 13 and 14, in contrast to Figure 11 and 12. Even omitting Meram and Selçuklu, there is still no smooth trend of increasing transfer amounts, neither regular nor irregular ones, according to the increasing population size. Yet it should be noted that a correlation between socioeconomic conditions and population size is observed in Figure 11, with correlation lines in a positive slope, even though it is neither a causal nor a direct relationship.




Figure 13. Per- capita regular and irregular assistances for districts of İstanbul according to population size




Figure 14. Per- capita regular and irregular assistancesfor districts of Konya according to population size

Figure 8 illustrates per-recipient TL amounts of regular and irregular transfers. Per-recipient TL amounts are calculated by dividing the total regular and irregular transfers by the number of recipients for the seven districts lined up according to their socioeconomic levels. It should be stated that per-recipient is not a confident factor because of differentiations that are possible in the composition of transfer items across districts. As an indicator of the difference between transfer amounts, the old age transfer paid monthly is 141.56 TL, the transfer to the disabled is determined according to the degree of disability in two groups. Those with 70% ability and above got 424.69TL, those with 40-69% received 283.13TL per month in the year 2014. Given this variation in transfer types, the number of recipients recorded in the annual reports includes those who received assistance for at least a month. Therefore, those who receive the amount throughout the year for 12 months and those who only receive for a month are recorded as one recipient. Thus, per-recipient calculations tend to undermine in two ways the real amount of per-recipient TL value. However, cross-district comparisons supposedly cancel out this factor or abate them for being exposed to the same factors.

What is significant in Figure 8 is the smooth downward line of per-recipient for regular transfers towards lower socioeconomic conditions. This is not possible to understand with direct reasoning because, as more people fall in need of transfers under bad socioeconomic conditions, and given that regular transfers are not bound by budget, per-recipient regular transfers are expected to increase, not decrease.

On the other hand, per-recipient irregular aid, as in Figure 15 and 16, does not display a significantly meaningful flow, given the narrow dispersion with lower TL amounts. Leaving this measure aside, per-capita calculations offer a better explanation for understanding the dynamics of social assistance accordingly.




Figure 15. Per-recipient regular and irregular transfer TL amounts for districts of İstanbul




Figure 16. Per-recipient regular and irregular transfer TL amounts for districts of Konya

Figure 13 and 14 illustrates per-capita amounts of the districts for regular and irregular aid. A ranking of the districts on the x-axis is based on the study mentioned above that classifies Ataşehir within the second group, Ümraniye and Küçükçekmece in the third, Bağcılar in the fourth, and Esenler in the last group for their socioeconomic conditions. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive studies for Konya as for the districts of Istanbul. So although we can refer to the report prepared by the Mevlana Kalkınma Ajansı (2012, p. 24) and state that Selçuklu ranks first in Konya and has better socioeconomic conditions than Meram, which is the second, there is still not a clear link between those studies to integrate the districts of Konya with districts of Istanbul. Thus, Selçuklu and Meram are added to the rightmost in the x-axis, and Selçuklu is put to the left of Meram as it has better socioeconomic conditions..

What is significant about the Figure 13 and 14 is how the two lines go against each other according to the x-axis in their ups and downs while moving along to the right, which indicates decreasing socioeconomic conditions. There is only one

exception of a split in district in Istanbul, and it is Esenler. The different pattern continues while moving to Selçuklu and Meram. This is partly because the level of socioeconomic standards does not connect to the district at the interchange point. But more importantly, as the main argument of the thesis states, the social assistance approach to the districts of Konya is different than those of Istanbul. Therefore, the reason they exhibit a different movement for per-capita flows can be seen from both the split and varied slopes of the two lines.

Per-capita irregular aid in Esenler is the lowest. This is despite the fact that Esenler has the lowest number of recipients; still the amount of the irregular transfer budget is the smallest. The population of the district is not the reason for this, as Ataşehir and Meram both have lower populations than Esenler; they still accumulate higher TL amounts of budget. A better explanation for the case is that Esenler has the worst ranking of socioeconomic status, which also reflects on the efforts to raise assistance budget of the district and the availability of such resources of local donators. This can be observed in the ratios of recipients to population for two transfer types. For regular transfers the ratio of Esenler is the highest among all districts, despite the total amount is not the highest. However, for the irregular, the ratio is lagging behind other districts, so the lower percentage of the population's needs are covered by irregular transfers, contrary to what Esenler's socioeconomic status necessitates.

The per-capita regular aid is lower in Ümraniye and Küçükçekmece (see Table 2). This is to be understood from the two districts having a better socioeconomic condition and fewer recipients. Here, the explanation is limited since the data also does not speak for itself.

Table 2. Regular and Irregular Transfers, Population Size and Recipients for Seven Districts Calculated for Their Share Among Seven Districts

	Regular Aid	District Population	Recipients	Per-capita Regular Aid	Per-recipient Regular Aid
Ataşehir	10%	10%	8%	13%	17%
Ümraniye	12%	17%	12%	10%	14%
K.çekmece	14%	19%	13%	10%	14%
Bağcılar	23%	19%	24%	16%	13%
Esenler	15%	12%	17%	18%	12%
Selçuklu	13%	15%	13%	12%	15%
Meram	13%	9%	12%	21%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	94,613,459.1	3,970,456	62	175	10,914.5
	Irregular Aid	District Population	Recipients	Per-capita Irregular Aid	Per-recipient Irregular Aid
Ataşehir	8%	10%	16%	11%	7%
Ümraniye	10%	17%	8%	8%	18%
K.çekmece	19%	19%	16%	14%	17%
Bağcılar	19%	19%	16%	14%	17%
Esenler	5%	12%	8%	6%	10%
Selçuklu	25%	15%	26%	24%	14%
Meram	14%	9%	11%	23%	18%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	41,129,385	3,970,456	168,882	74	1,720

A spurious factor to insert here is the eligibility criteria for irregular transfers. If there is to be a member covered by any other social security within the household, the possibility for being qualified eligible for regular transfer is eliminated. As the Consolidated Social Assistance System (*Bütünleşik Sosyal Yardım Sistemi*) (<http://butunlesik.yte.bilgem.tubitak.gov.tr/>), which interlinks 22 public institutions synchronically under the scrutiny of SYDGM, constitutes a colossal archive of data onto diligently and effectively handle projections and evaluations, the centrally integrated system informs all these social assistance institutions about the conditions

of applicants in terms of whether they have any other alternative sources of assistance to prevent extra amounts by some recipients.

Having recorded all the data on socioeconomic conditions, evaluation reports and aids received by households are combined into a unitary electronic platform. Since 2011 this technological shift eliminated repetitive applications to institutions and reduced bureaucratic workload for applicants.

If there is to be found any relationship between centrally paid transfers and irregular transfers, it is because, for one-time transfers, household income is very critical. To make it more clear, a household may choose to relinquish regular transfers to be eligible for an irregular transfer, i.e., a one-time transfer. What is observed from the Figure 17 and 18 evidence on this relationship? It is observed from the two lines going in the opposite direction according to x-axis, if one goes up, the other goes down moving towards the right. Regular transfers are used as an alternative to irregular transfers. This seems unreasonable due to the preference for an irregular and uncertain option. Still, this is what is reported by a social worker from the field. Yet this factor is to be neglected, given the limited data at hand. Any further studies to cover these issues may enlighten such types of calculated recipient actions and the possibility for them to make preference among transfer types.




Figure 17. Per-capita TL amounts of regular aid and irregular aid across districts of İstanbul

Leaving aside the exceptions, the flow of the two lines explains one thing. Moving from the most prosperous districts to the poorer ones, per-capita regular aid decreases, while per-capita irregular aid increases. The increasing rate of irregular aid is understandable, but the decrease in regular aids seems puzzling. But still it is meaningful for the fact that the number of recipients and also number of residents increases as the TL volume of regular transfers for that district. Therefore, the decrease in per-capita regular aid is to be understood for the reason that the TL increase does not match the recipient increase.

The exception starts with Esenler, with its unmatched position in terms of its socioeconomic situation and population size. Therefore, for convenience reasons, it is better to leave the district in this analysis and try to explain it by its low socioeconomic conditions. Selçuklu and Meram follows a similar flow for the two variables moving in the same direction and not fitting in the ordinal ranking according to its population size, as is seen in Figure 18.




Figure 18. Per-capita TL amounts of regular aid and irregular aid across districts of Konya

There is no clear link with population size or with socioeconomic conditions for irregular transfers. For example, Ataşehir, Bağcılar and Küçükçekmece all have 26,000 recipients for irregular transfers. Both their population sizes and socioeconomic classifications differ and do not allow reaching any meaningful explanation with the variables at hand. However, if the exceptions of Esenler, Meram and Selçuklu are omitted from the analysis, there is a positive relationship between population size and TL amounts of both regular and irregular transfers in sum amounts and also socioeconomic conditions, as shown in Figures 19 and 20. This is not to say that there is a causal relationship between these three, but the districts are ordered according to both their socioeconomic ranks and populations in increasing order, listed as Ataşehir, Ümraniye, Küçükçekmece, and Bağcılar on the x-axis in order. Therefore, the correlation line strenghtens the argument that as the district population increases, regular and irregular aid in sum also increases. This increase in population size also coincides with worsening of socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, combining these two, there is a positive correlation between the sum

amount of aid and worsening socioeconomic conditions. This correlation is stronger for regular aid, considering the larger slope of the regular aid correlation line.




Figure 19. Correlation between total amounts of regular transfer and district populations




Figure 20. Correlation between total amount of irregular transfers and district population

Referring back to Figure 1 and 2, and in relation to Figure 9, 10, 13 and 14, the distribution occurs in two main groups of lines in opposite directions, and the cleavage is positioned in the primary school and below level on the one hand, and high school and above on the other. There is no exception to the previously mentioned assumptions of the ordinal ranking of districts: in fact, there is full harmony. Therefore, this shows additional evidence on how the districts of Istanbul are ranked: Ataşehir, Ümraniye, Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar, and Esenler. For Konya, Selçuklu has a higher level of human capital. Thus, increasing amounts of total regular and irregular transfers, as shown in Figure 11 and 12, is consistent with the fact that worse socioeconomic conditions measured by human capital hold true.

Taking this further in correlation with Figure 13 and 14 for transfer amounts per-capita, the higher level of socioeconomic conditions of Ataşehir corresponds to lower levels of per-capita irregular transfers and conversely higher amount of per-capita regular transfers compared to other districts. Starting from Ataşehir and moving along the ordinal ranking of these districts towards lower socioeconomic conditions, as per-capita regular transfers decrease, per-capita irregular transfers increase. The fact that these two oppositionary trends together supports the argument based on the dichotomy of social assistance understanding.

In sum, a charity-based social assistance is specific to those districts that have higher per-capita amounts of irregular transfers, but lower levels of per-capita regular transfers in definition. And this definition in the literature is found to correspond with their socioeconomic situation. As socioeconomic conditions worsen, measured by education statistics for their human capital, the social assistance of the districts reveals characteristics are more in line with charity than citizenship-based one.

Focusing on the districts of Konya, although Selçuklu has the highest amount of irregular transfer budget with 10.209 TL and the highest rate of in-kind transfers among all districts, its per-capita irregular aid still lags behind all other districts. There is a problematic point in the number of recipients in Selçuklu: why coal aid is reportedly given to 33,701 people and recorded under irregular transfers. But this number is misleading because of the ambiguity, if it is reported on households or multiplied calculation of number of residents in those houses. It is more probable that it is recorded as an estimated multiplication for family sizes. Thus, this increases the number of recipients at a much higher rate than other districts and leaves the per-capita irregular transfers of Selçuklu a much lower amount and makes comparison meaningless.

It is also noticeable that, although Selçuklu has a higher number of residents than Meram has, they have almost the same amount of regular aid and number of recipients. However, for irregular transfers, Meram has an incomparably high amount of the budget, leaving all districts behind, including Selçuklu. Noting that charity-based social assistance understanding of Konya is crystallized in the example of Meram, and the special case of Selçuklu will be elaborated more in detail in the following sections of the chapter.

Turning back to the main argument of the thesis, the taxonomy according to approaches to social assistance, districts are grouped under the cities they belong to. Meram and Selçuklu on the one side, and the remaining five districts are on the other side, creating the two bodies of our comparative analysis. Figure 21 illustrates the predominance of in-kind transfers given in Konya, with a significantly higher amount of TL in comparison to Istanbul. The average TL worth of in-kind transfers

made in Konya supersedes the districts of Istanbul, even the in-cash and in-kind transfers in averages remain less than those of Istanbul.

In-cash transfers in both cities remain in minimal amounts, but Istanbul has a higher amount of in-cash transfers. As the argument proposes, the preferred social assistance approach of Istanbul relies more heavily on regular transfers, after which come in-cash transfers in relatively residual amounts. Only in-kind transfers remain exceptional. In contrast, Konya has a significant amount of in-kind transfers, superseding the in-cash amount by doubling it.




Figure 21. Amounts of three kinds of transfer for two cities calculated as the average of seven districts

The data in Figure 21 are for city averages and show how two cities differ from each other across transfer types. Yet the sum amounts, as shown in Figure 22, reveal a crucial fact about the districts of Konya. Despite the significant difference, that is, that there are two districts from Konya and five from Istanbul, the aggregate amount of in-kind transfers in Konya supersedes that of Istanbul. The sharp contrast is more clearly understood when in-cash and regular transfer comparisons of the two cities are observed. The high difference in in-cash and regular transfers between the

two cities' sum amounts on the one hand and mere differences in the difference for city averages crystallize how districts of Konya are representing a different assistance understanding that can be measured by in-kind transfers both in average and even in sum amounts.

Another observation is that although Konya lags behind Istanbul in regular transfers, Konya, with its two districts, can compete with the five districts of Istanbul in in-kind transfers and exceeds slightly in irregular transfers. It is understandable that Konya has lower TL amounts of regular transfers, but its capability of competing with a much more populous city in irregular transfers is only to be explained by the predominance given to in-kind transfers, which is comparable neither to its population size nor its socioeconomic conditions. It is only its power to collect resources for in-kind transfers of society itself due to its preferred social assistance approach to the understanding of charity.

The share of transfers made in-kind compared to that of in-cash shows the particular understanding of social assistance. In-kind assistance embodies in itself the inner assumption that the giver knows what the beneficent needs more than they themselves do. As it is highlighted in the literature, in-kind spending does not attain the attempted healing for recipients compared to the benefits in-cash provides to the beneficiary.




Figure 22. Amounts of three kinds of transfer for two cities calculated as the sum of seven districts

Three transfer types for seven districts have been analyzed up to now in comparison to each other so as to have an overview of general trends in social assistance performances. What is observed is that the two districts of Konya appear to follow a different style than the districts of Istanbul. It is argued that the explanation for this difference lies in the cleavage of their normative foundations to be observed in the rights-based vs. charity-based understandings of social assistance. Now, focusing on transfer types in specific will shed light more on the context, as they reveal crucial differentiation points, again caused by differences in approach.

3.2.2 Analysis of transfers

In the previous section, I provided an analysis of the allocation of total budgets for districts. Therefore, a more general overview is provided below, where I will give more detailed insights into transfer types. This part of the chapter is more focused on the transfer types and one by one for the items in specific.

3.2.2.1 Irregular transfers

Irregular transfers are recorded under each SYDV's account and have some significant variations in their system of recording. A share of the budgets is composed of income from the Fund (SYDF) and the other part rests on the districts' own capability to raise a funds for themselves in cash or in-kind and other existing sources of revenue such as rents and interest. And this budget is in the total control of the Board of Trustees of the local foundations for the determination of recipients and the scheduling of transfers.

The decisions are also not strictly standardized, as they are made by the Board of Trustees under the leadership of *vali* or *kaymakam* (governor of the province or district governor). The board also includes two NGO representatives, two charitable citizens chosen by the provincial assembly, one member chosen among the *muhtars* (elected local governors). Although there is not a strictly standardized system in regular transfers either, irregular transfers represent an absence of unity in the system that is understood by the decision making discretion they have. This means they are less likely to offer expectable sequencing, in fact they have the option for volatile volume of the budgets at hand, but more importantly, the SYDVs assume a role in the cause of enhancing cooperation between the central government and the local governments (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, p. 38).

Food aid, education aid, one-time aid, other family aid, and emergency aid are the main assistance items that are commonly listed by almost all seven SYDVs, and these are generally made in-cash. The main in-kind item of social assistance listed in regular transfers is coal, whose distribution is undertaken by TKİ.

There is a variety of items in SYDV budgets not commonly shared by more than two of the SYDVs in our sample. These items are housing aid, foreign aid,

clothing aid, other special-purpose aid, emergency hospital expenses aid, and social security contributions aid. But some items that are not shared by any SYDVs but specific to their own way of recordings can be grouped together in a meaningful way. For example, Küçükçekmece SYDV has separate entries for disasters (emergency), other (fire) assistance (fire assistance), and other forms of disaster. Bağcılar has other specific items like home furniture aid, foreign aid, medical supplies aid, which was granted to 15 people in the amount of 85,735.92TL in 2015, according to the records. It also has *Eid* aid, made in-cash but not given for some years; it was given to around 500-700 people in some years, and then left out of the list by 2012, when there was a change in annual report. That could be the reason. Given all these variations, it is more convenient to gather all these related items under an umbrella items i.e., emergency aid, for our purpose of analysis.

A step forward towards standardization in annual reports has been implemented from 2012 onward across all districts. The items are regulated under specified categories relative to the previous cacophonous recording history. An exception is for the TKİ coal aid, which was recorded in tonnage weight instead of the corresponding TL value of the amount until the 2013 report on Bağcılar. The information sharing among many institutions with the help of TUBITAK also corresponds to this period when each and every citizen was monitored under an integrated social assistance services system that connected 22 public institutions via web service that was connected to two different banks of automated payments directly to citizens (ISASS, 2015). This is crucial to a unitary centralized equalizing pattern of treating all citizens more efficiently and effectively.

As shown in Table 3, in all seven districts, there is no commonly distributed irregular transfer. Even though there are only two entries shared by six of them, the

exceptional district absence differs for each item. There is a sharp contrast between irregular transfers, which are standardized and regulated across the country.

Küçükçekmece champions with 12, and Meram is the one with the fewest types of irregular transfer, recorded as 3.

There are five items that have both in-cash and in-kind transfer types.

Therefore, it is not only a variation in what type of purpose and area to do transfers, but also in what ways, either in-cash or in-kind, which also differs across districts.

Yet even when five pairs of in-kind and in-cash types are combined as one item, the number of districts to have that item does not increase, except for food aid, which rises to six. Similarly, combining Emergency (Disaster) Aid, Other (Fire) Aid, and Other Disaster Aid does not lead to an increase in the number of districts. This is because the districts that have a greater number of items recorded specify their transfers in detail. When the detailed items are combined, it is still the same number of districts that have those transfer types.

Table 3. Distribution of Irregular Transfer Items across Districts

Irregular Transfers	in-cash/in-kind	Bağcılar	Küçükçekmece	Ümraniye	Selçuklu	Esenler	Ataşehir	Meram	# of districts
One time aid	c	X	X		X	X	X	X	6
Other Family Aid	c	X	X	X		X	X	X	6
Food Aid	c	X		X	X		X	X	5
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	c	X	X	X	X		X		5
Fuel Aid	k	X		X	X		X		4
Education Aid	c	X	X	X			X		4
Food Aid	k	X	X						2
Other Family Aid	k	X				X			2
Housing Aid	c		X				X		2
Foreigners Aid	c		X			X			2
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	k	X							1
Other Disaster Aid	c		X						1
Other (Fire) Aid	c		X						1
One time aid	k		X						1
Emergency Hospital Aid	c		X						1
Emergency Hospital Aid	k				X				1
Clothing Aid	k	X							1
Other Special Purpose Aid	c						X		1
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	c		X						1

In-kind transfers in three districts, Küçükçekmece, Esenler and Meram, do not have fuel aid recorded. A significant amount of the districts that have it, so for Ataşehir, Bağcılar and Selçuklu, it is the item with the highest number of recipients and the highest amount of TL worth. Thus, it is a big deficit for the ones that do not have it.

Since 2003, coal has been distributed by the state-owned Turkish Coal Enterprises to those families in need. The distribution is at least 500 kilograms of coal per family. As shown in Table 2, Selçuklu has significantly a low amount of fuel aid in proportion to its population compared to other districts. This also is an illustration of how the Selçuklu SYDV can mobilize the resources for its residents

with its different social assistance approach. Although coal is distributed by another semi-state institution, Selçuklu manages to get a greater number of resources for its residents.

It should be added that fuel aid is recorded in annual reports according to its monetary value. However, it was not until 2013 that Bağcılar recorded fuel aid not in TL but in tonnage. Meram had started in 2011.

Table 4. Distribution of Fuel Aid by Districts and its Ratio for Per-Capita Calculations

Districts	Fuel Aid in TL	District Population	# of Recipients	Per Recipient Fuel Aid	Per capita Fuel Aid
Bağcılar	3,154,730 TL	754,623 TL	12,741 TL	248 TL	4 TL
Ümraniye	1,424,850 TL	674,131 TL	3,500 TL	407 TL	2 TL
Selçuklu	7,865,981 TL	584,644 TL	33,701 TL	233 TL	14 TL
Ataşehir	1,553,765 TL	408,986 TL	18,356 TL	85 TL	4 TL

For irregular transfers, there is another kind of analysis that is provided by adding the amounts of TL spent and the number of people receiving transfers separately, and the ranking of items in the report. The first item in both rankings is fuel aid, which is provided by the state-owned Turkish Coal Enterprises in-kind and it is registered in its TL value, as shown in Table 2. Ranking for TLs spent, one-time aid ranks as the second. However, according to the number of people receiving it, it ranks as the fourth.

In the analysis of irregular transfers (see Table 5), we see aid items in total sum amounts to the seven districts. It is significant that transfer types display a great variety in terms of the amount of transfers and the number of recipients. This variation still occurs despite the fact that transfers for seven districts are consolidated into one sum amount, as there are no more than two transfer types distributed by six

districts and two transfer types common to five districts. Transfer budget sizes are also significantly different. Hence, it is convenient to assign aid to one of three groups that demarcate significant shifts in TL amounts and the number of recipients. Fuel aid, other family aid, food aid, and one-time aid constitute the first group that, despite changing places, they keep their position among top four on the list.

The second group is composed of clothing aid, education aid, and emergency (disaster) aid. Then comes the largest group: emergency hospital aid, other (fire) aid, housing aid, other special-purpose aid, foreigners aid, other disaster aid, and social security prime aid (special purpose aid). These correspond to inconsequent numbers compared to the district population for truly exceptional cases with a minimal number of recipients.

One-time aid made in-kind for Küçükçekmece is quite significant, as it is the highest amount of all the districts, with 4,418,990.80 TL distributed among 12.631 inhabitants. It is Meram which approaches that amount with 3.739.072,91 TL but it is in-cash for 6.133 inhabitants. The reason lies in the recording differences and aid collection strategies. But most importantly, it is about the difference in their social assistance approach.

Referring back to Figure 7 and 8, where Küçükçekmece scores high on the rate of in-kind transfers. It is reported by the Küçükçekmece social work expert that the foundation seeks to take the benefit of the tax deduction policy adopted by the government in return for donations made as social aid. Taking advantage of the two biggest brands offering low-price clothing in the sales market, the foundation approached them by mentioning the other firm's contributions, aiming to trigger competition.

Table 5. Irregular Transfers Ranked by Number of Recipients and Total Amount of TLs

Rank	Aid Types Ranked by Number of Recipients	# of people	Rank	Aid Types Ranked by TL Amount	TL Amount
1	Fuel Aid	68,298	1	Fuel Aid	13,999,326.02
2	Other Family Aid	41,088	2	One time aid	9,821,741.71
3	Food Aid	26,872	3	Other Family Aid	9,455,164.29
4	One time aid	23,111	4	Food Aid	6,318,546.03
5	Clothing Aid	5,653	5	Education Aid	726,236.97
6	Education Aid	1,754	6	Emergency (Disaster) Aid	524,354.55
7	Emergency (Disaster) Aid	486	7	Clothing Aid	94,240.25
8	Emergency Hospital Aid	52	8	Emergency Hospital Aid	38,671.29
9	Other (Fire) Aid	26	9	Other (Fire) Aid	34,900.00
10	Housing Aid	12	10	Housing Aid	2,000.00
11	Other Special Purpose Aid	2	11	Foreigners Aid	1,750.00
12	Foreigners Aid	2	12	Other Special Purpose Aid	1,300.00
13	Other Disaster Aid	1	13	Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	1,000.00
14	Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	1	14	Other Disaster Aid	300.00

3.2.2.2 Regular transfers

Regular transfers display a different trend in distribution across districts. Unlike irregular transfers, regular transfers are not given at the discretion of a decision making body, but according to pre-specified conditions and regulations. Thus, if the profile of a person in need matches the description, she directly qualifies for the transfer.

Another reason why regular transfers follow smoother transitions amongst themselves is that the transfer items are specifically pre-defined and exhaustive. There is no room for variation that can be attributed to differences in SYDV implementations — only demographic attributes.

For example, as Esenler has the worst socioeconomic conditions in Istanbul, it has a regional high point compared to its district size in both old age transfers and conditional cash transfers. Similarly, it is Ataşehir which ranks the best among these seven districts in terms of its socioeconomic conditions, and this explains why it has the lowest of regular transfer budget volume, with an amount of 9,304,650.72 TL.

In Figure 23 and 24, some configurations on the data have been made. First, disabled transfer is omitted, as its huge amounts of TL prevent any meaningful comparison with other transfers in a single figure. Secondly, combining education, health and pregnancy aid in Figure 21 made it possible to eliminate inconsequential amounts so as to make a meaningful comparison. Unless this is realized, conditional aid splits into three minimal amounts that would not give an idea about their distribution in relation to other transfers. To provide a deeper understanding, conditional cash transfers are analyzed separately in Figure 23 and 24.

Interwoven dispersion of transfers across districts makes shortcut explanations impossible. The data at hand is not sufficient to reach comprehensive conclusions. Yet given that districts on the x-axis are ordered according to the number of residents, what is noticeable is that population size does not give any idea except for the Esenler example given below and only for two transfer types.

We should note the difference between regular and irregular transfer amounts in TLs of their distribution across districts. Referring back to Table 2, there is no possible way to construct a graph similar to the one in Figure 23 and 24. This is

because there is no unity of recording for irregular transfers. But what is observed here is that the range of the TL amount is less than four billion, which is 14 billion in irregular transfers. Therefore, irregular transfers across districts have fluctuations that are deeper, and absentees distort the analysis, negating the possibility of mentioning a pattern for irregular transfer.




Figure 23. TL amounts of three regular transfer item distributions for districts of İstanbul




Figure 24. TL amounts of three regular transfer item distributions for districts of Konya

Figure 25 was obtained by calculating the ratio of transfer recipients to district populations for three conditional cash transfers. Conditional education transfer ranges from 1.18% to 0.38% across districts. The spread of conditional health transfer is lower than that of education, with 0.30% to 0.09%. Conditional pregnancy transfers remain minimal; this is distributed to 17 people in Esenler, with the highest amount, and only one person in Selçuklu, which was the lowest amount. The explanation for the relative increase in Esenler can be explained with reference to its unfavorable socioeconomic conditions that necessitated a higher transfer amount to more of its residents. The share of conditional education transfer also is lowest in Ataşehir, which is the most prosperous district among the 7.

Most importantly, we should note the relationship between Meram and Selçuklu exemplifying the type of assistance that is characterized predominantly by social assistance grounded upon the logic of charity. This can be observed through the increase in two conditional transfers, education and health. One possible explanation is that since these two particular districts have a predominant culture of charity, people in-need are informed about the possible ways of obtaining benefits. Therefore, both district SYDVs are actively identifying needy people, and people in-need hunt for benefits, either rights-based or in the form of charity.




Figure 25. Conditional transfer ratios for the number of recipients to district population

3.3. Comparison of Ümraniye and Küçükçekmece districts

The analysis in the previous sections shows that the amount of per-capita irregular assistance varies widely across different districts. How can we explain this variation?

Prior research on the determinants of social assistance in various settings shows that social assistance decisions of incumbent parties can be influenced by political and electoral concerns. More specifically, politicians can offer material goods in exchange for votes, which is the defining characteristic of clientelism (Stokes, 2007). Incumbent parties can use different types of goods (public or private) to maximize their vote share. For instance, Rosas, Johnston, & Hawkins (2014)

examine Venezuela's social programs and show that local public goods are provided in localities where voters have high affinity for the incumbent, and private goods are provided in localities which are weakly supportive of the incumbent.

Similarly in Turkey, Buğra and Candaş (2011) report the dramatic increase in the amount of in-kind assistance distributed by SYDVs before the municipal elections in 2009. Before the elections, there were instances where local welfare administrators distributed consumer durables in places with low support for conservative parties. This particular example of clientelism is an example of irregular assistance by definition since it is not executed according to transparent rules, is not open to public scrutiny and lacks accountability.

Following these findings in the literature, my hypothesis to explain the variation in the amount of irregular assistance is as follows: Districts with stronger electoral competition have higher levels of per-capita irregular assistance. When the competition is stronger in a district among the incumbent and the opposition party, higher irregular social assistance amounts are allocated to those districts to win votes by the ruling party. In other words, the irregular social assistances are higher for those districts in which political competitiveness is pressuring the incumbent party.

In order to measure the level of electoral competition in seven districts of this study, I present the results of the local elections in 2014. Figure 27 reveals some facts about the relationship between election results and the approach of districts to social assistance. As noted before, the ranking the districts according to the report by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce on the socioeconomic conditions of districts of Istanbul published in 2011 coincides with a ranking of districts according to their increasing level of in-kind transfers and thus social assistance understanding and also population size.




Figure 26. 2014 local election results in percentage for two parties across five districts of Istanbul

Whereas there is competition in Istanbul between the AKP and CHP, in Konya, it is the MHP that gets the second place. Also, unlike in Istanbul, where the AKP loses some districts to the CHP, the AKP wins by a landslide victory in Konya against the MHP.

In a comparison between two cities, making a reference to Table 2 is convenient to construct a comparison with Figure 27. It is evident that fluctuation in the Istanbul districts is not observed in Konya. The differences are almost negligible and they represent a similar share of votes for the two parties across two districts as they show a similar distribution of per-capita regular and irregular aid. Thus, the argument follows that the two districts of Konya representing the charity-based

social assistance understanding are more homogenous than the five districts of Istanbul.




Figure 27. 2014 local election results in percentages for two parties across two districts of Konya

Differences in the vote shares of the top two parties in five districts of Istanbul are large, with CHP winning the Ataşehir municipality at a rate of 49.77% on the one hand and losing Esenler to the AKP with 14.98% on the other hand. A higher rate of support for the AKP in Konya is evident, with its districts having 67.16% and 70.73% against Esenler, with 62.32% having the highest support in the Istanbul districts.

Evaluating the local election results along with the types of assistance in these districts, we observe that even if the AKP is in charge, the composition of assistance varies across districts. My hypothesis to explain this variation is as follows: Districts with stronger electoral competition have higher levels of per-capita irregular assistance.

A statistical analysis of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, applying the logic of a most similar systems design, this hypothesis can be tested with a comparison of Küçükçekmece and Ümraniye districts.

The most similar systems design is a variant of the method of difference, formulated in the classic study of Mill (1974), which devises a comparative framework with two or more similar cases except for a single factor and tries to figure out the cause of a phenomenon. It is one of the comparative research designs developed for understanding small number of cases in the comparative politics literature (Collier, 1993)

Among all these seven districts, Küçükçekmece and Ümraniye, according to the İTO report (2011), belong to the third group with regard to their standard of living. AKP has high electoral support in both districts, but the gap between AKP and the second party, CHP, is much more narrower in Küçükçekmece, as it can be seen in Figure 28. Hence, these are two districts that are similar in their socio-economic characteristics but differ in the level of electoral competition between AKP and CHP.

A comparison of per-capita and per-recipient irregular social assistances of these districts provides support to the hypothesis. Although the two districts have similar socioeconomic standards and have similar levels of regular transfers, their per-capita irregular assistance amounts are very different.




Figure 28. Per-capita regular and irregular assistance amounts for two districts

The amounts of per-capita irregular assistance in Selçuklu and Meram are also consistent with the hypothesis: Both districts have similar amounts of per-capita irregular assistance, and in both districts AKP has won municipal elections by very large margins. In the absence of high electoral competition, there are no large differences in per-capita irregular assistance between two relatively similar districts in Konya.

Taken together, an examination of the available budgetary data provides support to the hypothesis that high level of electoral competition in a district increases per-capita amounts of irregular assistance.

3.4 Concluding remarks

All the tables and figures analyzed up to now have been attempts to shed light on the question of how to explain the trends of these seven SYDV districts. The cross-district differences, as well as trends observed, are the empirical findings of the study

and are the object of investigation. How can one explain, on the basis of what is known, the socioeconomic differences, including those in population size and the support of a political party, that account for the dichotomy in social assistance understandings in these districts? The answer is not clear, and the possible explanations can be grouped into three main categories.

The first category is related to the society. There are three dynamics about a society that may have an effect on the results. On the one hand, a participant population that knows their rights and applies more for transfers has an effect on the increasing volume of regular transfers. This can be observed in Table 2 from the example of Esenler, where the number of recipients is much lower in terms of residents' bad socioeconomic conditions. Knowledge of the society and numerous applications explain why some are high in regular transfers. Although the data at hand is too limited to make strong arguments, the variables at hand give some inferential signs. This difference is still not seen as related to differences in social assistance approach, and is not proven in this thesis. Therefore, further studies should be done to support this argument.

On the other hand, society may mobilize a larger amount of charity thanks to a charity-dominant culture and that fact that it has a myriad of donators for in kind transfers. Also, a more active and ambitiously involved SYDV approach necessitates a larger budget for irregular transfers. An effective SYDV approach is supposed to function both to reach citizens and inform them of their rights and to be actively involve in society to raise sources for irregular transfers and to exploit all possible means to appeal to the Ministry for an increase in their share of the Fund. The Küçükçekmece SYDV is an example of this, as mentioned before, in terms of how they take advantage of tax benefits from the regulation for tax-deductibles, and more

importantly, by harnessing the competition among firms, with the aim to expand market share and improve public profiles by giving in-kind aid items.

The second strand of explanation is socioeconomic conditions. This question is ruled out by the example of the most prosperous district, Ataşehir, and the worst, Esenler, ranking next to each other in Figure 5 and 6 with the lowest level of transfers in total TL amounts. To argue either that the most prosperous districts can mobilize larger amounts for social assistance budgets, that or poor socioeconomic conditions of districts lead to an increase in the number of residents in need of social assistance and thus need to obtain larger amounts of transfers does not necessarily hold true. We disregard this argument about socioeconomic conditions having an effect on the amount of assistance in a way that leads to larger or smaller amounts of assistance.

Additionally, it should be noted that there is no direct relationship between the amount of transfers and population size. Therefore, simple cross-district comparisons of transfers have limited value. This is why in the literature more emphasis is diverted to the rate of recipients to population.

What were the driving forces behind the higher proportion of in-kind types in overall assistance for some districts and not for the others? This is the major finding of the study that, for Konya, it is a different approach to social assistance that necessitates reliance on in-kind transfers, shown in Figures 21 and 22. The difference between the Konya and Istanbul districts shows a shift from an older charity understanding to a multidimensional and rights-based approach to social assistance. In addition, a comparison of districts with similar socioeconomic conditions in İstanbul supports the hypothesis that irregular assistances are higher in districts

where the incumbent party faces stronger competition from opposition parties, and is therefore in greater need to engage in clientelistic policies.

The direction of Istanbul districts and the Ministry towards a more comprehensive understanding of poverty is to be implemented fully via the hands of the SYDVs. Over the years, we see new items have been introduced in the annual reports, especially under the regular payments. There are entries for new areas of transfers that are defined but for which there is not yet any spending recorded, such as silicosis, social security premium aid. Some of these new items appeared in annual reports even in the year 2014, but no TL amount appears under them. (Article 2022 introduces orphan aid as a regular transfer from 2015 onward.) However, the legislative process of the aid will be fully functioning and reach those who need it over a specific period of time.

In short, we observe less of a variation in regular transfers across districts, while controlling for demographic differences. This is because they are not dependent on any discretion of a man-made decision. In contrast, irregular transfers are made upon by a decision of the autonomous board.

In conclusion, this chapter was intended to show that regular transfers and irregular transfers have disparate dynamics across different SYDVs. This difference is explained by the dichotomy between the cultures of social assistance in the districts included in this study. The limited authority defined at the district level allowed SYDVs to operate by displaying the different approaches to social assistance.

This preference for social assistance understanding was observed from the election results. In Istanbul two competing social assistance approaches and differentiation are observed across five districts. But in Konya, it is a case of a

unitary social assistance understanding. It allows one to observe the dichotomy between charity-based and citizenship-based in districts of Istanbul, and the predominance of charity-based in Konya.

I also recognize that this data is not perfect. In an interview, an assistance worker reported that clothing was donated by a well-known brand operating in the district, Küçükçekmece. They tried to trigger competition between different firms for taking action in this cause. For our analysis, it is a weakness that not all districts recorded this exclusively under the clothing item. Our suggestion is to provide a more clear and standardized record and so that annual reports on different SYDVs can talk to each other, so that a harmony in recording is achieved. And one of the initial steps for this is to standardize the name of the entry categories and strictly define what types of transfers fall into which category.

It is also crucial to note that the findings of the study are limited to the districts studied and are not generalizable to the two cities in their totality, or to other districts or cities. It would be worth studying a number of districts and cities to have a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the social assistance dynamics in Turkey. The contribution of this study to the literature is the introduction of budgetary data of SYDVs into the analysis of the determinants of social assistance.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that all these analyses are based on regular transfer amounts and the expenditure data onto the irregular transfers. The unavailability of data on the resources of SYDVs that would cover irregular transfers constitutes an outright obstruction to further analysis about the budgets of SYDVs determined by the combination of the received share of the Fund and locally raised amounts by acts of benevolence. The reason for the knowledge deficit is attributable to the bureaucratic barrier to access information.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

T. H. Marshall's proposition for social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the member of the welfare state. For this reason it is crucial to clarify the concepts of citizen and citizenship for any endeavor in social assistance. Citizenship in Marshall's definition is stated as the condition of being full members of the society. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. T. H. Marshall envisioned a way of relationship between the state and its citizens and this find itself a room for implementation in post WWII welfare states of Europe, and also in developing world, including Turkey. Yet, this citizenship based understanding of social policy has not been the only hegemonic way of state policies, in fact, it has been trimmed from some of its characteristics under the neoliberal forces of change.

Considering the literature on citizen and its projection on the Turkish context, which includes a long charity culture originating in the Ottoman heritage, there appears a duality in social assistance approach. On the one hand, there is citizenship based social assistance, and on the other, there is charity based one. The main aim of the study is to obtain a snapshot of social assistance understandings in Turkey. The first step was to focus on the in-kind and in-cash divide. The other major divide is centrally paid regular transfers and locally budgeted irregular transfers. These divisions were encountered in a comparative analysis across districts, calculated for total amounts and per-capita values. The statistics are relevant to account for the dichotomy in social assistance understandings to find an answer for the main research question: "What are the determinants of the division between the rights- vs.

charity-based social assistance in Turkey?” Thus, this study endeavored to provide an insight into social assistance understandings and to show the dichotomy represented at district level implementation.

One of the main aims of this study was to accumulate support for a social assistance system that is built upon citizenship rights. During the research it was observed that the literature on Turkish social assistance via charity versus citizenship-based rights is not abundant. Thus, this dichotomy is empirically substantiated for Turkey in order to invite further studies.

The districts were chosen to represent a variety of social assistance understandings: citizenship-based versus charity-based. The variation is explained in terms of in-cash versus in-kind transfers and also regular versus irregular transfers with comprehensive evaluations. The amounts are calculated for their relative ratios to population sizes and according to socioeconomic conditions the districts have. The variety presented in this comparative analysis made it clear that different trends associated with regular and irregular transfers made either in-kind or in-cash are crucial. They were found to be correlated with socioeconomic conditions and population size in the determination of social assistance understanding.

The main finding is that districts having irregular transfers dominating regular ones indicate a more charity-based social assistance understanding. And the characteristics of those districts are such that they are relatively more populated and with poor socioeconomic conditions.

The analysis of the districts of Istanbul and Konya revealed the dichotomy in social assistance understanding more clearly than the differences among the districts of Istanbul. Konya is known for its charity-dominant culture and strong kinship ties. However, the differentiation among the districts of Istanbul is also precious for going

beyond specific characteristics pertaining to the city. A more detailed analysis towards observing variations relating to socioeconomic characteristics and population size of the districts are obtained thanks to the study.

In an attempt to figure out what accounts for the difference in per-capita irregular assistance, I propose the hypothesis that as the competition among the incumbent and the opposition party becomes stronger, higher irregular social assistance amounts are allocated to the district with the aim of winning votes by the ruling party. Using a most similar systems design, I compare Küçükçekmece and Ümraniye, as districts with similar standards of living, and show how the existence of a stiff competition in elections had an effect in irregular assistance amounts. AKP has a high electoral support in both districts, but the gap between AKP and the second party, CHP, is narrower in the district that has higher per-capita irregular assistance.

These findings from empirical research that was centered on the budgeting trends of SYDVs provide a snapshot of the divide in social assistance mechanisms in Turkey. These topics should provide a basis for future research especially which has information on shares of the Fund allocated to districts and locally raised budgets to offer a full snapshot of social assistance in the Turkish context. An attempt to lift the bureaucratic barriers to obtain the data is the ultimate key to such an endeavor.

APPENDIX A

MAIN CATEGORIES OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Food	Education Aid	Health Aid	Special Purpose Aid	Disabled and Old Aid	Employment Aid	Project Support
Housing	Education Materials	Conditional Health Aid	Cook House	Old Age	Job Routing	Income Producing
Social Housing Project	Conditional Education Transfers			Disabled		Urban Social Support
Fuel	Lunch	Disabled Needs	Disaster (Emergency)	Relative of Disabled	Job Start	Employment Training
Widowed	Free Course Book			Silicosis		Social Work
Soldiers' Family in Need	Transportation Housing and Food	GSS Income Assessment and Prime	Foreigners	Home Care		
Education Aid	Free Transportation of Disabled Students					
	Dormitory Building					

APPENDIX B

DETAILS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

	Regular Irregular	in-Cash in-Kind Both		Regular Irregular	in-Cash in-Kind Both
FAMILY AID			EDUCATION AID		
Food	I	B	Education Materials	I	B
Housing	I	B	Conditional Education Transfers	R	C
Social Housing Project	I	K	Lunch	I	K
Fuel	I	K	Free Course Book	I	K
Widowed	R	C	Student Transportation, Housing	I	K
Soldiers' Family in Need	R	C	Free Transportation of Disabled Students Foundations	I	K
HEALTH AID	R/I	C/K/B	SPECIAL PURPOSE AID	R/I	C/K/B
Conditional Health Aid	R	C	Cook House	I	K
Disabled Needs	I	B	Disaster (Emergency)	I	B
GSS Income Assessment and Prime	R	C	Foreigners	I	B
DISABLED AND OLD AID	R/I	C/K/B	EMPLOYMENT AID	R/I	C/K/B
Old Age	R	C	Job Routing	I	C
Disabled	R	C	Job Start	I	C
Relative of Disabled	R	C	PROJECT SUPPORT	R/I	C/K/B
Silicosis	R	C	Income Producing	I	C
Home Care	R	C			

* 'Regular' is represented by R, 'Irregular' by I, 'in-cash' C, 'in-kind' K, and 'both' by B.

APPENDIX C

BUDGETARY DATA FROM THE ANNUAL REPORT OF SEVEN SYDVS

Table C1. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Ataşehir SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	1552	378,282.76 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	568	110,740.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	2	280.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	195	354,250.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	139	333,500.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1318	5,261,549.23 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	412	1,096,473.37 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1168	1,769,575.36 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash		
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash	4013	598,600.00 TL
Food Aid	in-kind		
Fuel Aid	in-kind	18356	1,553,765.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash	148	93,100.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash	102	45,950.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	7314	961,880.00 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind		
Education Aid	in-cash	41	22,200.00 TL
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash	10	1,000.00 TL
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash	2	1,300.00 TL
Foreigners Aid	in-cash		
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	5110	9,304,650.72 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	8438	1,724,530.00 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	18356	1,553,765.00 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	26794	3,278,295.00 TL
Personnel Expenditure		17	659,971.29 TL
Overhead Expenditure			60,887.65 TL
Total Administrative Expenditure			720,858.94 TL
Gross Sales			
Other Incomes			
Aids and Donations			
District Population		408986	

Table C2. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Bağcılar SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	6837	1,892,630.07 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	1405	234,070.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	7	520.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	635	1,149,000.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	369	840,250.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	2964	11,768,945.05 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	671	1,929,047.40 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	2355	3,694,817.85 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash		
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash	1191	625,810.97 TL
Food Aid	in-kind	151	19,302.40 TL
Fuel Aid	in-kind	12741	3,154,730.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash	109	121,150.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind	11	25,404.55 TL
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash	1	350.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	5545	2,869,430.76 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind	131	10,538.53 TL
Education Aid	in-cash	1136	635,300.00 TL
Clothing Aid	in-kind	5653	94,240.25 TL
Housing Aid	in-cash		
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash		
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	15243	21,509,280.37 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	7988	4,256,391.73 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	18731	3,409,219.74 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	26719	7,556,257.46 TL
Personnel Expenditure			
Overhead Expenditure			
Total Administrative Expenditure			
Gross Sales			9,750,463.64 TL
Other Incomes			6,335,435.83 TL
Aids and Donations			3,415,027.81 TL
District Population		754623	

Table C3. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Esenler SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	5419	1,477,362.59 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	1366	352,570.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	17	2,220.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	327	576,500.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	309	675,000.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1921	7,687,057.88 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	346	1,034,031.90 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1445	2,273,778.29 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash	3	25,390.18 TL
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash		
Food Aid	in-kind		
Fuel Aid	in-kind		
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash		
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash	3372	1,044,490.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	10956	1,094,650.00 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind	3	15.00 TL
Education Aid	in-cash		
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash		
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash	1	750.00 TL
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	10875	14,103,910.84 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	12871	2,139,890.00 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	3	15.00 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	12874	2,139,905.00 TL
Personnel Expenditure		22	1,031,454.85 TL
Overhead Expenditure			6,476.92 TL
Total Administrative Expenditure			1,037,931.77 TL
Gross Sales			
Other Incomes			
Aids and Donations			
District Population		458857	

Table C4. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of K.Çekmece SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	3244	849,949.97 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	683	116,380.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	15	1,970.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	277	500,000.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	543	1,365,500.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1672	6,675,891.11 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	215	632,148.73 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1800	2,869,879.76 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash	2	17,954.08 TL
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		7,896,211.46 TL
Food Aid	in-cash		
Food Aid	in-kind	1988	60,532.66 TL
Fuel Aid	in-kind		
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash	173	254,800.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash	1	300.00 TL
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash	26	34,900.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-cash	853	564,888.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind	12631	4,418,990.80 TL
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash	51	36,500.00 TL
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	1191	2,510,450.00 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind		
Education Aid	in-cash	22	11,850.00 TL
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash	2	1,000.00 TL
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash	1	1,000.00 TL
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash	1	1,000.00 TL
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	8370	13,029,673.65 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	12020	3,416,688.00 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	14305	4,479,523.46 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	26325	7,896,211.46 TL
Personnel Expenditure		30	1,494,098.19 TL
Overhead Expenditure			266,661.37 TL
Total Administrative Expenditure			1,760,759.56 TL
Gross Sales			
Other Incomes			
Aids and Donations			8,693,149.68 TL
District Population		748398	

Table C5. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Meram SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	2618	738,325.70 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	749	199,755.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	3	700.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	284	459,750.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	557	1,467,000.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1751	6,658,845.08 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	285	801,748.75 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1533	2,399,202.97 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash		
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash	4472	464,500.00 TL
Food Aid	in-kind		
Fuel Aid	in-kind		
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash		
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash	6133	3,739,072.91 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	11551	1,521,800.00 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind		
Education Aid	in-cash		
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash		
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash		
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	7590	12,725,327.50 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	12762	1,986,300.00 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	6133	3,739,072.91 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	18895	5,725,372.91 TL
Personnel Expenditure			1,017,562.44 TL
Overhead Expenditure			65,359.49 TL
Total Administrative Expenditure			1,082,921.93 TL
Gross Sales			7,727,578.51 TL
Other Incomes			3,282,094.26 TL
Aids and Donations			4,445,484.25 TL
District Population		340817	

Table C6. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Selçuklu SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	2986	830,052.63 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	981	259,660.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	1	90.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	459	696,000.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	338	892,000.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1824	7,268,625.81 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	313	872,975.27 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1166	1,847,846.02 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash		
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash	9803	2,331,400.00 TL
Food Aid	in-kind		
Fuel Aid	in-kind	33701	7,865,981.02 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash	1	1,000.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash	19	8,000.00 TL
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind	1	2,171.29 TL
Other Family Aid	in-cash		
Other Family Aid	in-kind		
Education Aid	in-cash		
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash		
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash		
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	7796	12,667,249.73 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	9823	2,340,400.00 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	33702	7,868,152.31 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	43525	10,208,552.31 TL
Personnel Expenditure			1,057,255.41 TL
Overhead Expenditure			60,688.10 TL
Total Administrative Expenditure			1,117,943.51 TL
Gross Sales			
Other Incomes			
Aids and Donations			
District Population		584644	

Table C7. Budgetary Data Taken from the Annual Report of Ümraniye SYDV

REGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind	# of Recipients	Amount of TL
Conditional Education Transfer	in-cash	3093	852,811.39 TL
Conditional Health Transfer	in-cash	605	89,430.00 TL
Conditional Pregnancy Transfer	in-cash	5	295.00 TL
Aid for Soldier Families in Need	in-cash	117	196,500.00 TL
Aid for Widowed	in-cash	249	616,000.00 TL
Aid for Disabled	in-cash	1691	6,646,202.22 TL
Aid for Relatives of Disabled	in-cash	276	787,342.25 TL
Old Age Aid	in-cash	1344	2,077,349.33 TL
Silicosis Aid	in-cash	1	7,436.10 TL
IRREGULAR TRANSFERS	In-cash/in-kind		
Food Aid	in-cash	5254	2,218,400.00 TL
Food Aid	in-kind		
Fuel Aid	in-kind	3500	1,424,850.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-cash	44	28,900.00 TL
Emergency (Disaster) Aid	in-kind		
Other Disaster Aid	in-cash		
Other (Fire) Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-cash		
One Time Aid	in-kind		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-cash		
Emergency Hospital Aid	in-kind		
Other Family Aid	in-cash	4397	486,400.00 TL
Other Family Aid	in-kind		
Education Aid	in-cash	555	56,886.97 TL
Clothing Aid	in-kind		
Housing Aid	in-cash		
Other Special Purpose Aid	in-cash		
Foreigners Aid	in-cash		
Social Security Prime Aid (Special Purpose Aid)	in-cash		
Total Regular Transfers	in-cash	7380	11,265,930.19 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-cash	10250	2,790,586.97 TL
Irregular Transfers	in-kind	3500	1,424,850.00 TL
Total Irregular Transfers	both	13750	4,215,436.97 TL
Personnel Expenditure			
Overhead Expenditure			
Total Administrative Expenditure			
Gross Sales			
Other Incomes			
Aids and Donations			
District Population		674131	

APPENDIX D
ELECTION RESULTS

2014 LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS			
	Party	Ratios	# of Votes
ATAŞEHİR	CHP	49.77%	127,199
	AKP	41.79%	106,806
BAĞCILAR	AKP	57.22%	242,245
	CHP	19.70%	83,387
ESENLER	AKP	62.32%	162,889
	CHP	14.98%	39,144
KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE	AKP	41.94%	186,038
	CHP	39.63%	175,783
ÜMRANİYE	AKP	49.48%	194,211
	CHP	29.78%	116,902
SELÇUKLU	AKP	67.16%	215,885
	MHP	18.83%	60,525
MERAM	AKP	70.73%	136,160
	MHP	16.16%	31,107
İSTANBUL	AKP	47.92%	4,096,221
	CHP	40.08%	3,426,602
KONYA	AKP	64.26%	774,717
	MHP	18.46%	222,504

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