

RECONSIDERING THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF UNITY IN CIVIL SOCIETY



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ABSTRACT

Reconsidering the Distinction Between Community and Society and the Possibility of Unity in Civil Society

The aim of this thesis is to show that unity is possible in civil society. In the literature on the distinction between community and civil society, community is conceived as containing positive social relations which provide unity among the members, but society is conceived as containing negative relations which promotes isolation and alienation. I argue that this conception depends on Tönnies' distinction between community and society. In *Community and Civil Society*, he characterizes community with acquaintanceship, sympathy and confidence; and society with strangeness, antipathy and mistrust. This distinction gives rise to the idea that by the emergence of society, community or what is valuable in community is lost. Heidegger adopts this idea, and he argues that we should revitalize what was there before, namely, communal relations. And this idea leads him to a nationalist course. Hegel, on the other hand, revises the distinction between community and society, and he conceives society as having both negative and positive characteristics. He argues that genuine unity can be developed in society through mutual recognition provided in the corporations. In this thesis, it is argued that Hegel's conception of society and the theory of mutual recognition might be helpful in showing that unity can be developed within society, but his theory of the corporation is not adoptable today. The analysis of Hegel's conception of society and the theory of recognition reveals the need for a new kind of community in philosophy and politics. For this reason, new social movements are considered in terms of their potential to function in place of Hegel's corporations today.

ÖZET

Topluluk ve Toplum Ayırımı ve Toplumda Birliğin İmkânını Yeniden Düşünmek

Bu tezin temel amacı, toplumda birliğin olanaklı olduğunu göstermektir. Topluluk ve toplum ayrımını ele alan çalışmalarda, topluluk birliğin olduğu, toplum ise ayrışma ve yabancılaşmanın olduğu bir sosyal yapı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, söz konusu kavrayışın, Tönnies'in toplum ve topluluk kavramları arasında yaptığı ayrımı dayandığı savunulmaktadır. Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society* kitabında, toplulukta tanışıklık, sempati ve güven; toplumdaysa yabancılık, antipati ve güvensizlik olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu ayrım, toplumun doğuşuyla birlikte toplulukta değerli olan ilişkilerin yok olduğu düşüncesine yol açmaktadır. Heidegger, bu düşünceyi benimsemiş ve topluluğun yeniden canlandırılması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Bu düşünce, kendi içerisinde problemliliğin yanında, onu milliyetçi bir bakış açısına sürüklemiştir. Oysa, Hegel, toplum ve topluluk ayrımını yeniden ele alarak, toplumu hem olumsuz hem de olumlu özellikler taşıyan bir yapı olarak değerlendirmiştir. Hegel'e göre meslek örgütlenmelerinde sağlanan karşılıklı tanınma sayesinde toplumda birlik sağlanabilir. Bu tezde, Hegel'in toplum kavrayışı ve karşılıklı tanınma düşüncesinden hareketle, toplumda birliğin olanaklı olduğunun gösterilebileceği fakat mesleki örgütlenmelerin, bugün, bu görevi yerine getiremeyeceği savunulmaktadır. Hegel'in karşılıklı tanınma düşüncesinin analizi, felsefede ve siyasette yeni bir topluluk kavrayışına ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, günümüzde, yeni toplumsal hareketlerin bu bağlamda değerlendirilip değerlendirilemeyeceği ve mesleki örgütlenmelerinin fonksiyonunu yerine getirip getiremeyeceği tartışılmıştır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The modern age identifies individuality with pursuing selfish interests and using calculative or instrumental rationality. It seems as if, in order to be an individual, we must cut off our bond to community. It is a dilemma which is imposed upon the human beings who live in the modern age. Either you define yourself as a member of a community but you cannot be an individual or you define yourself as an individual and are caught in the selfish aspect of reality which brings out isolation and loneliness. Pappenheim (1968) expresses the contradiction of modern age in the following words: “We seem to be caught in a frightening contradiction. In order to assert ourselves as individuals, we relate only to those phases of reality which seem to promote the attainment of our objectives and we remain divorced from the rest of it” (p. 13). This dilemma is nurtured by the distinction between “community” and “society” which is commonly accepted in the literature.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the distinction between “community” and “civil society” as it is held in the literature and to argue for the possibility of unity in civil society, a kind of unity which allows for individual differences. The distinction between “community” and “society” is made in an attempt to classify different kinds of social relations among people. In the contemporary literature, community is mostly grasped as a social unit which involves the kind of relations that are built on care and trust. As opposed to that, the relations in society are characterized by selfishness and mistrust. Accordingly, it is argued that unity cannot be found in society. Within this work, unity is conceived as working together for common ends without considering it as a means to realize private ends.

As a contemporary example of this literature, we might consider the communitarian way of thinking which is apparent in the works of Charles Taylor (1989), Micheal Sandel (1984), and Michael Walzer (1960). In their discussion, they criticize liberalism for developing an atomistic conception of the individual who pursues only his selfish interests and grasping society as a social unit which is constructed by the aggregate of separate individuals (Sayers, 1995, pp. 2-4). Communitarians argue that modern liberals have an abstract and individualistic approach (Kymlica, 2002, p. 209). In this line of thinking, society is seen as a realm in which individuals pursue their private interests. Thus, the members of a society see others as a means to realize their private ends. They establish a relationship and maintain it as long as it continues to serve their interests. In relation to that, there is no genuine bond which goes beyond selfish interests between individuals in society. It is also widely held that, in society, relationships are built on mistrust. Nobody trusts other because people are motivated solely by selfish desires. From these characterizations, it follows that there cannot be genuine unity among the members of a society. As opposed to society, community is regarded as a social unit which is built on mutual trust. In a community, relationships are developed on the feeling of love and intimacy. People do not see others only as a means to realize their ends. On the contrary, they care for each other. Hence, for communitarians, unity is the determinant characteristic of community.

In community, similarity, such as having the same blood, living in the same place and having shared experiences, serves as a binding force. Thus, similarity creates unity, in the sense that members of a community see themselves as belonging to a whole and give up their private ends in order to realize the common ends of community which they belong. But in this unity, there is no room for individuality

since community is prior to the individual. Within the context of this work, we will discuss the possibility of unity which provides the feeling of being a part of a bigger structure, and allows for individuality at the same time. It might be called “genuine unity”. It will be argued that Hegel’s account of civil society provides the conditions for the possibility of genuine unity, which constitutes the main focus of this work.

The origin of the distinction between “community” and “society” appears in the influential work of Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society* (2001). I will argue that the distinction as it is introduced by Tönnies and commonly held by others has some problems. First, it is a sharp distinction which assigns all the positive characterizations to community and all the negative ones to society; as such, it fails to grasp the complex structure of social reality. Secondly, it might lead to a romantic idea of revitalizing community, which has its own problems. Yet the distinction as it was introduced by Tönnies has had an enormous effect in the history of social and political philosophy and the way philosophers comprehend society. For this reason, in the first chapter, I will investigate the origin of the distinction as it appears in Tönnies’ *Community and Civil Society* and lay out the basic characteristics of community and civil society. Tönnies (2001) distinguishes community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*) in order to explain the general characteristics of social relations. He argues that the relationships among people and the social bond which emerges from them can be defined either as an organic life which represents community or a mechanical construction which represents society. Therefore, community is a natural social unit, but society is an artificial one. Acquaintanceship, sympathy and confidence are the characteristics of relationships in community, while strangeness, antipathy and mistrust are the characteristics of

relationships in society. He also states that community relies on the unity of human will, whereas society relies on attaining desired ends where we cannot find unity.

Heidegger is one of the major figures who adopt Tönnies' conceptions of community and society in his works. Although in *Being and Time* (1996), his main focus is to analyze the existential constitution of the human being, which he calls "Da-sein", he introduces a theory of community. His idea of community, which is in tune with Tönnies' conception, leads him to the idea of the revitalization of communal relations. In the third chapter, analyzing *Being and Time*, I will argue that Heidegger introduces the idea of the revitalization of community, and I will focus on the problems of this idea. Additionally, stating the problems which are caused by this distinction in Heidegger's philosophy, I will argue that the distinction between community and society must be reconsidered.

In the third chapter, I will also focus on Heidegger's critique of modernity and modern society, which leads him to the idea of revitalization of community with reference to the concepts of authenticity, authentic alliance, historicity and fate in *Being and Time*. He argues that relationships among the individuals in society are built on private interests. The authentic alliance, which might be considered as unity, cannot be found in society. According to Heidegger, communal ties have been covered up by metaphysical thinking in modernity. Metaphysical thinking covers up the kinds of relationships in community by taking away one's awareness of his ontological structure. It makes us forget about our essence. What is covered up is rooted in Da-sein's ontological character of being-with (*Mitsein*) and it is always there. In other words, we are ontologically bound together. The dissolution of the relationships in community cannot change the ontological structure of Da-sein. Therefore, Heidegger grounds the possibility of unity on the ontological structure of

Da-sein. But he also claims that, in order to recover what is rooted in the ontological structure of Da-sein and bring out unity, we should remove the metaphysical thinking in modernity, which reigns in society and revitalize communal relations and ties, which is possible through essential thinking.

The idea of revitalization of communal ties is related to the idea of going back to the beginning and primordial conception of truth. Heidegger discusses this idea in *The Question Concerning Technology* (1977), *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2002), *Introduction to Metaphysics* (2000). He argues that it is the fate of Da-sein to revitalize the beginning. After his engagement with the National Socialist party, in 1933, he started using the phrase “community of nation” instead of community. In his Rectorship Address, he talks about the fate of the German community of nation, which goes back to its origins and its coming into power. In the *Black Notebooks* (2016), he clearly expresses that it is only the communal will of the German nation which can overcome the decays of the modern age.

In the fourth chapter, I will focus on Hegel’s conception of community and society. I will argue that his conception allows for unity in civil society, which is disregarded by Tönnies, through mutual recognition and thus helps us to overcome the problems caused by the original distinction posed by Tönnies. Hegel agrees with the idea that liberal society is composed of atomistic individuals and that the relations in a free market economy which have emerged in civil society are built on temporary alliances among particular self-centered individuals. It is the element of particularity which gives rise to the atomistic individual of liberal society and the relationships which are established among them. But the originality of his thought lies in the idea that the principle of particularity is not merely a negative phenomenon. Rather it is a necessary stage in the development of history which

serves for the development of a higher state of unity. Hegel asserts that once society has been developed, there is no turning back. Even if we could turn back and revitalize communal relations, it would contain an “immediate unity” in which individuals fully identify with a community, losing their distinct identity. And immediate unity does not allow for individual differences. He argues that the solution lies within society itself because, despite its problems, society is a necessary stage for the emergence of “mediated unity,” which allows members to identify with the community without losing their individuality. The mediated unity can be developed by constructing a conscious link between the particular and the universal. He argues that not only the element of particularity but also the element of universality can be found in civil society. Corporations, by providing mutual recognition for its members, constitute the source of universality in society. With this respect, Hegel argues that civil society cannot be characterized merely by separation but also by unity.

According to Hegel, the unity in civil society is developed through mutual recognition, which is first seen in the family, developed in the corporation in civil society, and fully realized in the state. Hegel thinks that by means of the corporation, which contains both particularity and universality, civil society gives rise to a further stage of unity in which both individual differences and mediated unity can be reconciled. Thus, it will be argued that the theory of corporation and the notion of mutual recognition are the keys to understanding the possibility of unity in modern society.

Consequently, the main argument of this thesis is that society is not entirely a negative state as it is conceived in Tönnies’ distinction and commonly held by others, as it is observed in the communitarian critique of liberalism. In relation to

Hegel's notions of civil society, corporation, and mutual recognition, it will be argued that unity can be developed within civil society. To this end, I will analyze Hegel's theory of the corporation and consider the criticisms that can be raised against it. I will claim that, although Hegel's theory of the corporation is crucial for pointing out the possibility of unity in civil society, it is not promising today. Because corporations are conceived as profit-oriented business organizations and, rather than providing mutual recognition, they are used as a means to achieving the goal of profitability. Thus, they cannot provide an ethical aspect to civil society as Hegel claims. For this reason, I will consider whether new social movements might function as Hegel's corporations today. New social movements are collective actions emerging within civil society that focus on a specific social or cultural issue. In new social movements, despite their national, cultural, racial and religious differences, people voluntarily come together and work for a common end; they also aim to realize their private interests. Through collective activity performed in new social movements, they provide mutual recognition for their members. In this respect, new social movements seem to promise hope for providing unity in society.

CHAPTER 2

GEMEINSCHAFT (COMMUNITY) AND *GESELLSCHAFT* (SOCIETY)

IN TÖNNIES' *COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY*

Tönnies' *Community and Civil Society* was first published in 1887, and it is one of the influential works on the distinction between community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*). In this work, Tönnies identifies his aim as to analyze the social structure and existing social ties. It might be said that the need for such an investigation has originated because of the new social ties which emerged after the industrialization. After the industrial revolution, "society has moved away from an age where *Gemeinschaft* was predominant towards an age where *Gesellschaft* prevails" (Pappenheim, 1968, p. 67). Tönnies (2001) defines this change as a transition from agriculture to industry. He states that "society, limiting ourselves strictly to the economic sphere, it comes to look like a transition from a general household economy to a general trading economy. Closely connected with this is the transition from the predominance of agriculture to the predominance of industry" (Tönnies, 2001, p. 66). It follows that the transition from agriculture to industry gives rise to *Gesellschaft*-like relations and there is no turning back from this reality. Therefore, we can say that *Gemeinschaft* refers to pre-industrialized societies, whereas *Gesellschaft* refers to industrial societies. Similarly, Heredia (1986) argues that Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* corresponds to the opposition between pre-industrial and industrial societies (p. 33). Thus, in his work, Tönnies lays out the characteristics of relations which rule over the pre-industrial and industrial societies.

Tönnies (2001) argues that all societies contain both *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like relations. One should keep in mind his assertion that he does not regard the emergence of society as the loss of communal ties and that he does not give priority to community over society. Nonetheless, his analysis presents the condition for the possibility of such a perspective by assigning all positive characteristics to community and all negative ones to society. Giddens (2014) argues that “even though his study was in many ways an accurate depiction of some important social changes brought about by rapid urbanization and industrial development, there is a sense throughout that something more valuable and important was being lost in the process” (p. 236). Thus, it leads one to consider society as the downfall of community which began with the emergence of industrialization.

Following Tönnies’ analysis, Scheler and Heidegger give priority to community over society. They conceive society as a dissolution. They argue that, with the emergence of society, communal ties have been weakened and even lost. According to them, society can be seen as the loss of what we had in the past, namely in community. Furthermore, they come up with the idea that we need to revitalize communal ties by removing or transforming the relationship which reign in society. The distinction between community and society as it appears in Tönnies’ work also has a major influence on modern political philosophy, especially on communitarian thinking, which criticizes the individualistic relationships in society for causing isolation among the members, and he focuses on the value of community. In order to see the influence of Tönnies’ distinction of community and society, first, we are going to investigate his characterizations, and then we will exhibit the connection between his ideas and later thoughts.

2.1 Tönnies' characterization of community and society

In *Community and Civil Society*, Tönnies aims to analyze the nature of existing social relations. Thus, the concepts of community and society represent distinct types of social relations. The main characteristic of community is having a real organic life, and the main characteristic of society is having a mechanical construction (Tönnies, 2001, p. 17). The distinction between organic and mechanical corresponds to the distinction between natural and artificial. Tönnies defines community as a natural unit.¹ Its emergence is based on the similarity among people such as having the same blood, living in the same place or having shared experiences. The relationships in community are established and sustained intrinsically. On the other hand, society is an artificial unit in the sense that it is constructed by external factors, not by natural ones. Individuals with no similarity or having little similarity enter into a relationship with others in order to realize their private ends. Similarity is replaced by differences in society, and the relationships in society are regulated by the independent and different ends of individuals. The relationships in society are regarded as a means for determined ends. Therefore, when the end is realized, the relationship ends.

In relation to the characteristics of organic and mechanical, Tönnies (2001) defines community as a genuine enduring life together and society as a superficial unit (p. 19). The relationships in community are more permanent and deeper, since they depend on internal motivations, while the relations in society are temporary and superficial because they are regulated by external factors. In society, relationships dissolve when the external motive disappears, which is the realization of a

¹ By defining community as a “natural” unit, Tönnies means that the relationships in community are not constructed as means to an end, but they are developed on similarities such as having the same blood, living in the same place and working for the same cause.

determined end. But in community, relationships last much longer since they are motivated by internal factors such as feelings.

Tönnies (2001) describes the concept of community as an old one, and he traces its existence back to ancient times. As opposed to community, society is both a new entity and a new concept. It is a modern development (Tönnies, 2001, p. 19). It means that the mode of a relationship, which is characterized as belonging to society, has emerged in modern times. Industrialization gave rise to a new type of relationship by changing production methods, and the origin of society was constituted. Along with the industrial revolution, handcraft was replaced by machine technology and craftsmanship was replaced by factory manufacture. Developments in technology also brought out a new kind of relationship, which involves isolation, and thus, was focused on the private ends of individuals.

According to Tönnies, society can be better understood by contrasting it with community. Although he argues that it is possible for one to be a part of both a community and a society at the same time, the relationships which are dominant in community can be found in the exact opposite way in society. Unity and separation are the basic differences between the relations in community and society. He explains this basic contrast in the following paragraph:

The theory of *Gesellschaft* takes as its starting point a group of people who, as in *Gemeinschaft*, live peacefully alongside one another, but in this case without being essentially united – indeed, on the contrary, they are here essentially detached. In *Gemeinschaft* they stay together in spite of everything that separates them; in *Gesellschaft* they remain separate in spite of everything that unites them. (Tönnies, 2001, p. 52)

In this paragraph, Tönnies argues that there is an essential unity in community, whereas there is separation and isolation in society. This is the basic opposition which belongs to the characterization of community and society. And it is relevant to

the subject matter of this work. Following Tönnies' conceptualization, unity can be defined as individuals' identifying with or feeling a sense of belonging to a community.² When there is an immediate unity, the identity of the members of a community is defined by the values and characteristics of the community. It also gives rise to the priority of common ends of a group, that is, a community, over private interests of the members. Moreover, private ends disappear in the common ends. Individuals work together to realize common ends of a community without considering their private interests. For instance, a family member might consider the well-being of his family by sacrificing his own interest or utility. As opposed to unity found in community, Tönnies characterizes society by isolation and separation. There is no common good which is determined and pursued by the members of a society; rather, everybody pursues his own good. For this reason, there are no intimate or close relations between individuals. So to speak, the only thing which characterizes society is the private interests of individuals.

Tönnies (2001) lays out the characteristics of community and society in detail by introducing dichotomies other than unity and separation. Those are the dichotomies of acquaintanceship and strangeness, sympathy and antipathy, confidence and mistrust. Acquaintanceship, sympathy and confidence are the characteristics of the relationships in a community, whereas strangeness, antipathy and mistrust are the characteristics of relationships in a society. He points out that there is a relationship between these characteristics in a way that acquaintanceship brings out sympathy and confidence, whereas strangeness brings out antipathy and

² I should note that it is immediate unity which Tönnies has in mind. In the immediate unity, members of a community fully identify themselves with the community. In other words, individual is resolved in community. Later, when I analyze Hegel's notions of particularity and universality, I will introduce the concept of mediated unity in which individuals identify themselves with society without losing their individual identity.

mistrust. And those characteristics bring out unity and separation. Later on, we will see that Heidegger adopts those characterizations while developing his idea of a community of people and the revitalization of communal ties.

According to Tönnies, we become a part of a community as soon as we are born, but we get into society later. The members of community in which we are born are familiar to us. We feel comfortable in the community in which we live. As much as community is familiar, society is like a foreign land for us (Tönnies, 2001, p. 18). The members of society are like strangers to us. Acquaintanceship and strangeness are the basic characteristics which shape the relationships in community and society. Tönnies (2001) states that “all kinds of social co-existence that are familiar, comfortable and exclusive are to be understood as belonging to *Gemeinschaft*. *Gesellschaft* means life in the public sphere, in the outside world” (p. 18). Community is like a large family in which we feel comfortable and safe. Those feelings cannot be found in society. Society is a realm in which we feel uncomfortable and discontented. Yet we cannot avoid going into a society.

The members of community are similar in various respects, such as having the same blood, living in the same place or having the same experiences, but the members of society are separated from each other, having very little similarity. Tönnies gives the example of a young man who is warned about getting into a ‘bad society’. Young men are sometimes warned about the dangers of society, but not about community. Tönnies argues that “bad community” does not make sense in the language. It implies two things. First, community is familiar to us, so there is no need to warn someone about any aspect of it. And secondly, for him, community cannot be conceived as something bad and dangerous. We cannot assign any negative

characteristic onto community. It is only society which can be conceived in a negative way.

Tönnies introduces family as the basic unit of community and he calls it community by blood.³ Other units are derived from it. Family constitutes the origin of community by providing direct mutual affirmation, as Tönnies calls it. It is the unconditional and reciprocal recognition coming from the members of the family. A member of a community is recognized as he or she is, just for being a member of that community. For instance, a child is recognized and loved by the parents, regardless of his personal characteristics, just because he is their child. The concept of “direct mutual affirmation” resembles Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition, which constitutes the basis of unity in civil society. Hegel grounds the origin of recognition on the family, and he argues that an individual is recognized as he/she is by the other members just by being a member of the family. However, in civil society, a different kind of recognition is developed, which I will analyze in detail later.

According to Tönnies (2001), he direct mutual affirmation can be found in three types of relationships:

This direct mutual affirmation is found in its most intense form in three types of relationships: namely, (1) that between a mother and her child; (2) that between a man and a woman as a couple, as this term is understood in its natural or biological sense; and (3) that between those who recognize each other as brothers and sisters, i.e. offspring at least of the same mother. (p. 22)

The characteristics of community, which are acquaintanceship, confidence and trust, are originally found in the family between the mother and child, husband and wife, and brothers and sisters.⁴ Therefore, community can be seen as a large family with

⁴ Although Tönnies defines family as the basic unit of community, which also existed before the industrial revolution, he has more of a modern conception of family that consists of husband, wife and

respect to the type of relationship between its members. Tönnies (2001) introduces three original types of community where each can be understood as an enlarged family: “Community by *blood*, indicating primal unity of existence, develops more specifically into community of *place*, which is expressed first of all as living in close proximity to one another. This in turn becomes a community of *spirit*, working together for the same end and purpose” (p. 27). They are also classified as kinship, neighborhood, and friendship. Tönnies (2001) argues that each type of community has a different function in social life: “Community of place is what holds life together on a physical level, just as community of Spirit is the binding link on the level of conscious thought” (p. 27). All types of communities are required for a social order.

Kinship or family is constructed by sharing the same blood. Tönnies (2001) says that “an ordinary man, in the long term and for the most part, will feel at his best and happiest when he is surrounded by his family” (p. 28). It is the aspect of familiarity which makes the members of family feel good. The second type of community, neighborhood, is formed by sharing the same place. By sharing the same place people develop intimate acquaintance in time. “Although it is basically conditioned by living together, this kind of community can persist even while people are absent from their neighborhood” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 28). So, in time, neighborhood exceeds the limits of place.

Among the types of community, community of spirit has the utmost importance because it gives the relationship its lasting form. Community of spirit is constructed through unity in work and opinion. Between people who work together or who have similar opinions, a bond might be developed over time. Tönnies (2001)

children. The reason is that his aim is to analyze existing social ties rather than making a historical analysis.

states that “those who are truly comrades in the faith, knowing one another like members of a craft or professional group, will feel themselves to be united everywhere by a spiritual bond and by working at the same task” (p. 29). In friendship, or in community of spirit, individuals develop a deeper bond by working for the realization of common ends.

One might think that community of spirit can develop unity within the civil society, but if we look carefully, we can see that it is not possible. First, Tönnies argues that a community of spirit is seen in small sites in which frequency of meeting is high. He asserts that community of spirit “grows most easily where people share the same or a similar calling or craft. But such a tie must be formed and fostered through easy and frequent meeting, which is most likely to happen within a *town*” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 29). It is hard to create such a bond in large cities, where the frequency of meeting is generally poor. It is also hard to develop a sense of belonging to the job, since division of labor alienates workers. Therefore, working for a common end cannot turn into a deeper bond. Secondly, for Tönnies, it is the feeling of love which creates a community of spirit, such as in the family. To argue for unity in civil society, where particularity and differences rule, we need a driving force which is different than a natural feeling of love. Lastly, and more importantly, when Tönnies talks about the work done together, what he has in mind is small-scale production or craftsmanship activity, but not business life in modern societies. He says that “in the context of comradeship or friendship – in the form of common devotion to the same profession or craft – such fatherly authority will be expressed as that of the master-craftsman over his lads, apprentices and pupils” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 30). There is no room for such relationships in modern factory life. Thus, community of spirit, as Tönnies put it, cannot be found in post-industrialized society.

Considering the relationships found in these three original types, Tönnies (2001) makes a list of the fundamental laws of all communities, which he expresses in the following paragraph:

The root of all understanding is to be found in this sequence, so we can now establish the fundamental laws of all community: 1. Relatives and spouses love each other or easily get used to one another. They often think of each other and like to converse together. The same is true of neighbors and other friends as well. 2. There is mutual understanding between those who love each other. 3. Those who love and understand each other stay together and organize their joint existence. (p. 34)

It follows that all communities are grounded on love, mutual understanding and joint existence. Love refers to a natural feeling that is developed among people who have similarities. “The social ties of community are shaped by natural and emotional relationships, which integrate social existence. Hence this sociological structure is based upon mutual sympathy and interdependence” (Salomon, 1936, p. 349). And it gives rise to mutual understanding. Mutual understanding is different from love but still it is a feeling. It is the feeling of being part of a whole. Tönnies (2001) maintains that a “reciprocal binding sentiment as the peculiar will of a community is what we shall call *mutual understanding* or consensus. This is the special social force and fellow feeling that holds people together as members of a whole” (p. 33). It is an outcome of an intimate knowledge of one another and similarity in past experiences, character, and thought (Tönnies, 2001. p. 34). In this sense, it is close to Hegel’s recognition in the family. In Hegel, however, recognition originates in the family and then turns into mutual recognition, which creates unity in civil society. In Tönnies, there is no such development.

Another characteristic of the *Gemeinschaft*-like relations is joint existence. The people who become members of a community love each other, understand each other and as a result, they organize a joint existence. This joint existence refers to a

common life in which the goods, opinions and ends are shared. Joint existence promotes unity among the members of a community. They come together in sharing a life. This joint existence excludes the private interests of individuals. Thus, private ends of the individuals are replaced by the common ends of the community.

Joint existence in community involves common possession of the goods, namely common property. “Community life means *mutual* possession and enjoyment, and possession and enjoyment of goods held *in common*. The motivating force behind possession and enjoyment is the desire to have and to hold common goods – common evils; common friends – common enemies” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 36). In community, there are common goods which are possessed by the members. For instance, in the family, not only the blood but also the assets are shared by the members. Land, houses and equipment are owned by the family, even though sometimes one or a few people have power to make decisions about them.

After industrialization, joint existence relying on common possession, which is found in community, is replaced with separate existence in society, which is grounded on private property. In addition to joint existence, common possession of goods is regarded as impossible. “All goods are assumed to be separate from each other, and so are their owners. Whatever anyone has and enjoys, he has and enjoys to the *exclusion* of all others – in fact, there is no such thing as a ‘common good’. Such a thing *can* only exist by means of a *fiction* on the part of the individuals concerned” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 53). It is assumed that the only thing that is real is the private ends of the individuals. Accordingly, individuals work for realizing their private goals and care about their own good in society. And it gives rise to the acts of exchange and contractual relations. According to Tönnies, all kinds of relationships in society can be reduced to acts of exchange and contract.

2.2 The act of exchange and contractual relations in society

In Tönnies' distinction, the act of exchange and contract define the nature of all relations in society. Heredia (1986) states that “*Gemeinschaft* is characterized by affectivity, tradition, communalism; *Gesellschaft* by impersonality, contract, individualism” (p. 34). In community, tradition is the guiding element, but in society, contracts take the place of the tradition, and they regulate individuals' actions and relationships. Tönnies asserts that relationships in society are built on private interests of individuals. In society, individuals pursue their own ends and do not consider other people. The others are regarded as a means to one's own needs and ends. The only motivation behind the relationships is to get something in return. One gives something in order to get something back. Thus, the relationship with others depends on a mutual exchange.

Tönnies calls the mutual exchange between individuals a contract. In the contract, the interests of two people or a group of people intersect, and they come to a temporal agreement in order to realize their self-interests:

The concurrence of wills in every act of exchange – if we think of exchange as a societal act – is called a *contract*. It is the result of two divergent individual wills intersecting at one *point*. It lasts until the exchange has been completed; and it requires the two acts which together constitute the exchange. (Tönnies, 2001, p. 59)

This act of exchange which is called contract represents the nature of relationships in society. Every relationship in society can be regarded as a contract which is made between two parties, involving the exchange of money, goods, acts or promises for achieving a desired end. Those are mutual agreements which expire when both parties reach their goal. A contract, in the sense of a temporary agreement between the individuals, is commonly regarded as belonging to society. In community, there is no need for a contract since trust is naturally developed in the relations.

In the following sections, we will see that Hegel deals with contracts in relation to the moment of the system of needs in society. In the system of needs, individuals make temporary alliances in order to realize their private ends. The difference is that, for Hegel, the act of exchange is the basis of an understanding that one needs the other in order to realize his private ends which later on develops into mutual recognition in society. But for Tönnies, it does not have a function to develop a mutual recognition.

It is worth pointing out that mutual exchange also covers non-material components. It is not only the goods; the acts and services might also be the subject of exchange in a contract. A concrete object or not, anything that is exchanged in the contract through mutual consent is called a commodity. Tönnies (2001) says that “in any exchange the place of a tangible object can be taken by some form of activity or service that is given and received. It must be useful or agreeable to the receiver, just like a material object. It is then regarded as a commodity, with its production and consumption coinciding in time” (p. 62). Accordingly, attitudes such as politeness and care are also regarded as an exchange. Tönnies (2001) explains it in the following paragraph:

The primary rule is politeness an exchange of words and courtesies where everyone appears to be concerned for everyone else and to be esteeming each other as equals. In fact, everyone is thinking of himself and trying to push his own importance and advantages at the expense of all the rest. For any favor which one person renders to another he expects, even demands, an equivalent in return. (p. 65)

In this paragraph, he argues that there is an exchange underlying every relationship. When someone is polite to the other or one is concerned for the other, it is because they expect the same thing in return. Even politeness and care are regulated by an exchange. As it was stated, in the contract, individuals act together for achieving a

determined end which creates a temporary alliance between two parties. When the end is realized, the alliance automatically ceases. The temporary alliance which is constructed by any kind of contract cannot provide a genuine unity. Although individuals act together for the same cause for a period of time, they remain separate in the origin. Tönnies (2001) states it in the following paragraph:

Their wills and spheres of interest interact with each other in manifold different ways, yet they remain independent of one another and lacking in deep intimacy. A general picture now emerges of what may be called "Civil Society" or Society based on general commercial exchange. (p. 64)

In this paragraph, he states that although the contract seems to unite its parties and thus create a unity, they remain separate in the origin. And since he characterizes all the relations in society with commercial exchange or contract, it follows that, for Tönnies, unity cannot be found in civil society. The contractual nature of the relationships in society makes the emergence of unity impossible. Behind the seeming unity, everyone is concerned only with himself. Thus, according to Tönnies, unity can only be developed among the members of a family, neighbors or friends, namely, in a community.

Tönnies draws attention to the relationship between civil society and a free market economy by associating contractual relationships in society with commercial exchange. The relationships which are regulated by a mutual exchange between individuals are constructed like market relations. In other words, the only aim is to get benefit from a relationship. What one gives and receives in return must be on balance. Tönnies calls it a market mechanism, and he calls society a market society. He states that "it is rather an eventual outcome, in relation to which the gradual evolution of market, Society or *Gesellschaft* must be understood" (Tönnies, 2001, p. 64). He considers the emergence of society as the unavoidable consequence of

changing market codes. In the following paragraph, Tönnies (2001) explains the operation of market mechanism which works in society:

Nothing happens in *Gesellschaft* that is more important for the individual's wider group than it is for himself. On the contrary, everyone is out for himself alone and living in a state of tension against everyone else... Nobody wants to do anything for anyone else, nobody wants to yield or give anything unless he gets something in return that he regards as at least an *equal* trade-off. (p. 52)

In this paragraph, he defines the relationships in society by an “*equal* trade off” and thus he emphasizes on the similarity between social relations and market mechanisms. He also argues that “all conventional sociability may be understood as analogous to the exchange of material goods” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 65).

According to Tönnies, social relationships are regulated by the free market economy. As a result of the evolution of a market society, the relationships of trade and industry came to control our lives. In other words, society limits the individuals to an economic sphere (Tönnies, 2001, p. 66). It is a common tendency in the literature on the distinction between community and society to associate society with modern, capitalist market mechanism. From this perspective, social structure, which is constituted by self-oriented and competitive individuals and the relationships among them represents society.

In his introduction to *Community and Civil Society* (2001), Jose Harris argues that Tönnies' message in the book was misunderstood by the readers. According to Harris, Tönnies has been mistakenly regarded as a supporter of the community. But Harris disregards the fact that, although Tönnies asserts that his analysis is not time-specific and that the two types of relationships are not mutually exclusive, grounding the emergence of *Gesellschaft*-like relations on changing production methods, he opens his theory up for a historical evaluation. And even though he does not want to,

his characterization of community and society gives rise to the idea that he is a supporter of collectivism and his conception of community is developed as an objection to modern individualism.

2.3 Natural will (*Wesenwille*) and rational will (*Kürwille*)⁵

The notion of will is closely connected to Tönnies' conceptualization of community and society. He explains *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like relationships by appealing to the distinction between natural will and rational will. Both natural and rational will lead a person to act. Tönnies (2001) explicitly links the natural will to community and the rational will to society in the following words: "I call all kinds of association in which natural will predominates *Gemeinschaft*, all those which are formed and fundamentally conditioned by rational will, *Gesellschaft*" (p. 17). Natural will operates in *Gemeinschaft*-like relationships, whereas rational will operates in *Gesellschaft*-like relations.

Natural will and rational will are distinguished with respect to their operation. Natural will is seen as the pattern of material reality – as the psychological activity of the human body (Tönnies, 2001, p. 95). Natural will gives rise to psychological activities when the body is stimulated. In its origin, natural will is inborn and inherited, but it has a spontaneous growth and might become relatively independent from its inherited origin. There are three forms of natural will: the desire for pleasure, habit and memory (Tönnies, 2001, p. 105). As opposed to natural will, rational will is the product of thought, and it comes into being by the agency of a person who thinks. "It is an entirely different perspective, which deals with the will

⁵ The term "*Wesenwille*" was invented by Tönnies. It is derived from the terms "*Wesen*" meaning "being" and "*Wille*" meaning "will". Thus, "*Wesenwille*" means the will at the basis of being. "*Kürwille*", on the other hand, refers to an already existing word, "*Willkür*". "*Kür*" means "free style", "*Küren*" means "to choose". It is generally translated as "arbitrary will".

as a product of thought, as a calculative, rational-choice-making will, since it takes for granted an advanced form of rational intelligence existing in the human organism” (Tönnies, 2001, p. 114). Rational will has three forms: deliberation, arbitrary choice (decision making) and conceptualization (Tönnies, 2001, p. 131).

Deliberation or thinking brings out the rationality of means and ends:

In the very act of thinking about what we are going to do we make a sharp *division* between end and means; a division which is spelt out and clarified when the one is seen to be the antithesis of the other, i.e. the end is something good or pleasurable, the means something bad or painful. (Tönnies, 2001, p. 116)

Rational will classifies everything within the categories of means and ends. It concentrates on finding means to attain desired ends. The end is characterized as something which gives pleasure and the means are categorized as the ways to attain the determined end.

Tönnies explains the process of rational will in relation to the rationality of means and ends. He calls it arbitrary will. In the following paragraph, he argues that the process of arbitrary will places the individual against the nature, as both the giver and receiver.

He attempts to master and to get more out of her than he has put in; that is, to extract units of pleasure which have cost him no trouble, labour, or other unpleasant experience. But within the realm of nature he will be confronted by some *other*, equally striving, *equally* calculating agent of will whose means and ends are both related to and in competition with *his* means and ends, and who thus gains and seeks to gain from his misfortunes. In order to coexist as practitioners of arbitrary will, they must either agree together or not come into contact with one another. (Tönnies, 2001, p. 139)

In this paragraph, it is laid out that practice of rational will underlies relationships in society. Rational will brings out the desire to have pleasure with minimum pain and effort. An individual who practices it focuses on realizing her own ends without considering the ends of others. However, to realize her own ends, she needs to get

help from others. Therefore, rational will requires its practitioners to come to an agreement. Thus, it constitutes the basis of contractual relationships and exchanges which characterize society.

The activity of rational will induces everyone to strive for his or her own good. Thus, it creates isolation in society, as opposed to the sense of belonging created in community. Salomon (1936) argues that “the general type of society means a social structure which combines private and isolated individuals in a collectivity with very utilitarian means-end relationships” (p. 349). According to him, social relations are regulated by utilitarian principles. Tönnies attributes the disappearance of unity and the emergence of isolation to specialized development, which is the outcome of industrialization. He further explains the difference between isolation and sense of belonging as follows:

In the realm of natural will, the relations of individuals with one another can be considered only in terms of a ‘whole’ which is alive in each of them. Already we have seen how the members can become isolated from one another through the process of specialized development, and so forget their common origins. They may cease to exercise their functions on behalf of the wider community or co-operative group, and instead perform them only for themselves – so that everyone is working for his *own* good and only accidentally for the good of others. (Tönnies, 2001, p. 139)

In this paragraph, Tönnies argues that with the emergence of isolation, individuals ‘forgot their common origins’ and they no longer work for community but they work for their own good. It entails that with the emergence of society, the sense of belonging to a whole, which is community, has been replaced by isolation. In other words, *Gemeinschaft*-like relations are replaced by *Gesellschaft*-like relations. And this line of thinking might give rise to the idea of the loss of community.

The concept of rationality is studied thoroughly by Weber. In his analysis of social life, he introduces four types of rationality: instrumental, substantive, formal

and theoretical. Among them, instrumental and substantive rationality are relevant for our investigation. Weber refers to rationality of means and ends as instrumental rationality. It is also called practical rationality. When the action “is determined by expectations as to behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends” (Weber, 1978, p. 24).

Instrumental rationality is defined in terms of the calculation of means and ends. In “The Social Psychology of World Religions” (1991), Weber explains instrumental rationality as the “attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means” (p. 293).

According to Weber (1978), in classification of social action, an action is instrumentally rational when the end and all the possible means are rationally considered and the means are put in order with respect to the possibility of leading to a determined end (p. 26). Like Tönnies, Weber takes instrumental rationality as the consequence of capitalist economy. It is the need for calculation and measurement in capitalism which gave rise to rationality of means and ends. Hence, for Weber, instrumental rationality is a characteristic of modern capitalist societies. Although he regards the emergence of instrumental rationality as inevitable, he sees some dangers in it. First, it may turn society into an impersonal mechanism which controls the lives of its members. It is specifically bureaucracy which he has in mind. At first, bureaucracy was developed as a means to attain some end. But “over time, as its power grows, the bureaucracy takes on a life of its own so that, rather than being the servant to other ends, it becomes the master” (Giddens, 2014, p. 43). Secondly, in time, means may become the ends. He further explains this point, when he talks about the spirit of modern capitalism, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of*

Capitalism (2001): “Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs” (p. 18). At first, money was used to satisfy man’s needs, but with the emergence of modern capitalism, so the instrumental rationality, it became the end, the purpose of life. Weber finds this reversal of natural relation irrational, since the initial end is lost.

As opposed to instrumental rationality, substantive rationality does not refer to the capacity of means and ends calculation, but it refers to the capacity of adopting value systems which lead to action. According to Kalberg (1980), it is the “man’s inherent capacity for value-rational action” (p. 1155). Actions and relations are regulated in conformity with adopted value systems, including customs, traditions and habits of the relevant group. Giddens (2014) gives the example of a friendship where substantive rationality is at work. “Friendship relations tend to involve the values of mutual respect, loyalty and assistance, and this value cluster directly frames people’s actions in this area of life” (Giddens, 2014, p. 41). The value-based relations which Weber defines as belonging to substantive rationality resembles Tönnies’ *Gemeinschaft*-like relations. In general, Weber’s distinction between instrumental and substantive rationality corresponds to Tönnies’ rational will and natural will, where rational will performs means and ends calculations and natural will focuses on values, intimacy and feelings.

Like Weber, Habermas (1990) analyzes rationality in relation to social action too. He defines his aim as to find a new balance between the separated moments of reason and it can be established in communicative everyday life (Habermas, 1990, p. 19). In *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984), volume one, he argues that rationality involves both instrumental and communicative understandings. He calls

the method which analyzes the instrumental aspect of rationality “realistic” and that which analyzes the communicative aspect “phenomenological”. The realist approach focuses on goal-directed actions. He asserts that “The realist can confine himself to analyzing the conditions that an acting subject must satisfy in order to set and realize ends. On this model, rational actions basically have the character of goal-directed, feed-back controlled interventions in the world of existing states of affairs” (1984, p. 11). The phenomenological approach, on the other hand, does not deal with goal-directed actions; rather, it investigates the conditions of the possibility of the unity of an objective world (Habermas, 1984, p. 12). Habermas grounds the communicative rationality upon the phenomenological approach.

Habermas (1984) argues that “the world gains objectivity only through *counting* as one and the same world *for* a community of speaking and acting subjects” (p. 13). There, he introduces the notion of communication-community. It is a community in which, members can reach an understanding intersubjectively. In this sense, rationality refers to the process of reaching a consensus among communicatively acting subjects. Thus, he enlarges the individualist understanding of rationality to a social one. Habermas’ conception of instrumental rationality is close to Tönnies’ rational will, but communicative rationality differs from natural will. Habermas focuses on communication and intersubjective understanding in community, whereas Tönnies appeals to given values in a community and disregards the intersubjective aspect. Later, we will see this intersubjective aspect in Hegel’s conception of society.

The distinction between natural will and rational will is the determining ground of the relations in community and society. Natural will is prior to rational will and the latter is grasped as the product of modernity and industrialization. Salomon

argues that Tönnies' analysis of existing social ties in general aims to grasp the modern body politic. In modernity, "social behavior patterns are linked by utilitarian means-end relationships. Hence, contracts and conventions are types of these modern social relations, and rational conventions, instead of the folkways of a community, determine the prestige of social groups" (Salomon, 1936, p. 357). Tönnies' formulation of rationality of means and ends has an influence on the literature regarding the conception of society. In the next chapter, we will see that Heidegger adopts a similar perspective and in the section on *the they* he characterizes social relations in modernity in terms of rationality of means and ends.

2.4 Reevaluating Tönnies' distinction of community and society

Although Tönnies' distinction between community and society has had a major influence on the literature, it has some problems which need to be discussed. For this reason, I will first deal with the problems of the original distinction, and then I will exhibit its influence on later works.

In the literature, Tönnies is commonly considered as the defender of community. Thus, he is embraced by communitarian readers for assigning prior value to community and criticized by the liberals for devaluating society. However, the problems of the distinction have rarely been discussed. For this reason, in this part, I am going to focus on the problems which are caused by the distinction.

First, the distinction of community and society, as it is posed by Tönnies, cannot represent the reality of the social structure. The clear-cut oppositions he presents as characterizing *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like relations seem to fail to grasp the reality. Tönnies states that his analysis of community and society depends on the analysis of factual data, but deriving from the factual data, he

presents two ideal types which exclude each other. Social relations are more complex and intertwined than presented in these ideal types.

Wirth (1926) argues that these ideal types lead us to a sterile philosophy which is inadequate to grasp the many sided and complex reality (p. 422). Tönnies assigns all and only positive relationships such as confidence, sympathy and acquaintanceship to community; as opposed to that, all the negative relations such as mistrust, antipathy and strangeness to society. The distinction implies that confidence and sympathy are always found among the members of a family, but we can think of some examples which are not properly covered by the distinction. In the family, acquaintanceship does not necessarily bring trust, but both acquaintanceship and mistrust can be found. There are siblings who do not trust each other although they are acquainted. Mistrust can also be developed between a mother and a child, or a father and a child. Furthermore, it is known that there are families in which the relations among the members are ruled by hostility. Domestic violence against women and blood feuds can be considered as examples. Likewise, we can think of neighbors who have complaints about each other although they share the same place and have shared experiences. On the other hand, we may also think of people who feel sympathy towards the ones with whom they do not have blood relations or shared experiences. These examples help us to understand that social relations are more complex and interwoven than Tönnies presents in his distinction.

Secondly, but in relation to the first problem, Tönnies' conceptualization of society does not make room for unity. In Tönnies' view, society is an artificial social unit which promotes artificial relations. In society, there is a difference between how things seem and how they are. There is a constant illusion which is strengthened through temporary alliances, namely, contracts. This illusion covers the selfish

interests underlying conventional relations. Individuals seem to care for others and they appear to be concerned with the goodness of others, even though the fact is otherwise. It seems as if there is a bond among the members of a society, but they remain separate in origin.

Tönnies (2001) argues that “community means genuine, enduring life together, whereas Society is a transient and superficial thing. Thus, *Gemeinschaft* must be understood as a living organism in its own right, while *Gesellschaft* is a mechanical aggregate and artifact” (p. 19). It follows that what is genuine and permanent can be found in community, whereas in society we only have what is artificial and temporary. In this conception, unity belongs to community whereas contractual alliances and isolation belong to society. And later, this idea evolves into a communitarian critique of liberalism which is manifested in Alasdair MacIntyre’s (2007), Charles Taylor’s (1989), Micheal Sandel’s (1984), and Michael Walzer’s (1960) works. From the perspective of these so-called communitarian philosophers, an atomistic understanding of society in which individuals pursue their private interests leaves no room for the possibility of unity. In this manner, it might be argued that Tönnies’ conception leaves the individual alone and alienated in society.

Thirdly, Tönnies’ conceptualization and hidden critique of society may give rise to the romantic idea of the revitalization of community. Romantics see society as a downfall and, although Tönnies finds it pointless, they try returning to community. The influence of this perspective can be observed in Scheler’s and Heidegger’s works. They suggest removing the kinds of relations in society and revitalizing the kinds of relations found in community. This romantic ideal is problematic in two aspects. First, it seems as an impossible goal. Even Tönnies himself regards the emergence of society as an irreversible alteration. Secondly, as in the case of

Heidegger, it may give rise to the nationalist conceptions of community. Heidegger's idea of national community and his engagement to the National Socialist Party can be considered within this respect.

2.5 The influence of Tönnies' distinction on later conceptions of community and society

Despite its problems, Tönnies' distinction has a major importance with respect to its influence on the later conceptions of community and society in philosophy. Scheler and Heidegger shares Tönnies' idea concerning the notion of unity adopting the original distinction between community and society. Both philosophers argue that the self-oriented motivations behind the relations in society prevent the emergence of unity. They both claim that it is the private and selfish interests of the individuals which prevent the emergence of genuine unity in society. Furthermore, they see society as a downfall. They assign more value to community and upon it they ground the possibility of unity in social life. Thus, they try to revitalize the *Gemeinschaft*-like relations.

In *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (1973), Scheler develops a system of values. He comes up with the idea that values exist independently of human beings and that there is an order of rank between them. Corresponding to each value system, there is a social unit as the bearer of those values. And the same order of rank applies to them.

In his analysis of social units, Scheler introduces the distinction of community and society in a way that resembles Tönnies' distinction. Similar to Tönnies, he characterizes community as a natural social unit and he regards society as an artificial one. Scheler (1973) says that "society as opposed to the natural unit

of the life-community is to be defined as an artificial unit of individuals having no original 'living with-one-another'" (p. 528). There is an original togetherness in the life-community, which we may call unity, and it is absent in society. He further explains that there are independent and individual persons in society whereas there is solidarity and real collective unity in community (1973, p. 539). Namely, instead of unity as an original togetherness in community, there is isolation in society.

Another similarity in Tönnies' and Scheler's distinctions is that they characterize the relations in society with distrust, as opposed to boundless trust found in community. Scheler (1973) clearly states that "just as boundless trust in one another is the basic attitude in the life-community, unfathomable and primary distrust of all in all is the basic attitude in society" (p. 529). Since there is distrust between people in society, there is a need for a contract to continue living together. Scheler claims that a contract is required in society to preserve its existence, whereas in community there is no need for a contract because in the life-community people are bound together naturally. In society, this natural bond is destroyed. "Every kind of willing together and doing together presupposes the actus of promising and the phenomenon of the contract that is constituted in mutual promising – the basic phenomenon of all private law" (Scheler, 1973, pp. 528-529). The contract does not remove the distrust permanently but it only brings out a temporary solution. The contract can be sustained as long as both parties carry out their promises.

As I have stated, Scheler argues that there is a ranking system among the social units, and he asserts that there is a higher form of community that he calls love-community. It is also the highest form of social unit in the order of ranks. According to Scheler, this highest form is represented by the Christian idea of

community. He calls it “the Christian love-community” and manifests its characteristics in the following paragraph:

We assert that this unity, and it alone, is the nucleus and total novelty of the true and ancient Christian idea of community, and that this Christian idea represents, so to speak, the historical discovery of this unity. (1973, p. 533)

The love-community of Scheler has peculiar characteristics which are distinguished from other forms of communities. Christianity is the binding element of the love-community. More interestingly, Scheler argues that the highest form of community can be found in the true idea of the Christian community in history, but it has been suppressed. The Christian love-community Scheler introduces is not a new type of community. It reigned in some periods of history, but then it retreated. Hence, it must be revitalized. Thus, Scheler’s aim in the whole book can be summarized as the revitalization of this ideal.

As Scheler, Heidegger also argues that real unity cannot be found within society. In *Being and Time* (1996), he states that despite everything which unites individuals in society remain separate in the origin. This idea can be traced back to Tönnies’ work. As I have analyzed, Tönnies characterizes the relations in community with unity and the relations in society with isolation. He states that despite all the differences, individuals are essentially united in community and despite all the similarities, they are separated in society. The same idea can be observed in Heidegger’s thoughts when he talks about two kinds of being-with. There, he distinguishes “being employed for the same thing” and “devoting themselves to the same thing”, the former represents relations in society and the latter represents relations in community (1996, p. 115). In being employed for the same thing individuals come together in order to realize a determined end but in devoting

themselves to the same thing they voluntarily act together for a common end. In the first case, the end is given to them whereas in the second one they determine a common end together and they work toward attaining this end. In one mode, individuals stay separate despite everything which unites them. In this case, the others are encountered in the mode of indifference. In the other mode, they stay together even when the others are not factually there (Heidegger, 1996, p. 113). According to Heidegger, the first one is a negative mode of being-with and the other is a positive mode. The positive mode of being-with represents the relations in community, whereas the negative mode represents the relations in society.

Another similarity which shows that Heidegger adopted Tönnies' distinction is that he introduces trust and mistrust as distinguishing characteristics of the relations in community and society. Heidegger mentions trust when he talks about different modes of being with others. According to Heidegger (1996), "the being-with-one-another of those who are employed for the same thing often thrives only on mistrust" (p. 115). He assigns the characteristic of mistrust to the relations in society.

Furthermore, the link between free market economy and society, which is introduced by Tönnies, is also observed in Heidegger's thoughts. For both thinkers, the relations in society are shaped by modern production methods and the free market economy, which follows industrialization. When they talk about society, they use terms which make a reference to the market system, and they give examples from modern technology. When Heidegger talks about the everyday being of Da-sein, he mentions public transportation and information services, which are the products of modern technology. Heidegger (1996) argues that everyone becomes similar when using public transportation and information services (p. 119). Although this similarity seems to unite them, they remain separate in the origin. He also makes a

reference to modern factory production by saying that “the wares are produced by the dozen” (1996, p. 66). Before modern factory production – in craftsman activity – the work was cut to the figure. There was a reference to the wearer in the production process. Now the constitutive link is lost and “the average” people who cannot be distinguished from others take the place of the wearer. “The average” belongs to everyday being of Da-sein in society and it is constituted by the modern production methods.

As a start, those similarities seem sufficient to argue that Heidegger seems to adopt Tönnies’ conception of community and society in his works. For Tönnies, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* is irreversible. It is like fate to us. Pappenheim (1968) holds that Tönnies saw the dangers of trying to go back to the times of *Gemeinschaft* (p. 69). But still he could not help that his conception gave rise to such a romantic disposition. In the following chapter, I am going to analyze Heidegger’s conception of community in detail, and I will show how it leads him to argue for the revitalization of the spirit of German community of people and causes his engagement to the National Socialist party.

Lastly, the influence of the original distinction can also be observed in the communitarian thinking. Communitarians criticize the liberal understanding of individuality for disregarding the communal aspect of the identity of the individual. According to them, the identity of the individual is constituted by community. Hence, for communitarians, community with its relations, institutions and traditional aspect, has priority over society.

In the communitarian literature, there are two different views concerning the relation between community and society. Some communitarians see society as a loss of community. According to this view, “the ties and bonds of traditional community

have been shattered and destroyed” (Sayers, 1995, pp. 2-4). Therefore, the defenders of this view argue that we should restore what was once there before. Although not calling himself a communitarian, in *After Virtue, A Study on Moral Theory* (2007), MacIntyre argues that modern society disrupts ties and relations found in community. His solution is to revitalize the relations in community by readopting Aristotelian virtues.

As opposed to MacIntyre’s view, some communitarians such as Walzer, Sandel and Taylor argue against the idea of the loss of community and they claim that society carries out communal ties in a deeper level. According to Walzer (1960), “the deep structure even of liberal society is in fact communitarian” (p. 10). He thinks that society cannot be seen as dissolution of community. People are bound to each other at a deeper level even in society. He says that “liberal theory distorts this reality and, insofar as we adopt the theory, deprives us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness” (1960, p. 10). It means, *Gesellschaft*-like relations do not sweep away, but cover up *Gemeinschaft*-like relations. And there is the possibility of uncovering them again, because we are bonded at a deeper level, even if we are not aware of it.

Like Walzer, Taylor believes that we are communal beings in a deeper level and this communal bond determines our identity. Taylor (1989) says that “my identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose” (p. 27). He argues that our identity is initially formed by the tradition of community in which we live. According to Taylor (1989), “living within such strongly qualified horizons is

constitutive of human agency” (p. 27). He believes that only on the ground of the tradition we develop an authentic stance.

Sandel (1982) also argues that the identity of the individual is constituted by a community in which one takes part. The liberal conception of the individual as independent from social norms and practices, namely from the culture and unattached to community brings out ‘an unencumbered self’. And he defines this unencumbered self as “a person wholly without character, without moral depth”, but not as a rational agent (1982, p. 179). Constitutive attachments are required for the formation of identity. He states that individuals in society “conceive their identity as defined to some extent by community of which they are a part” (p. 150). And he explains the constitutive aspect of community in the following paragraph:

I am indebted in a complex variety of ways for the constitution of my identity- to parents, family, city, tribe, class, nation, culture, historical epoch, possibly God, Nature, and maybe chance- and I can therefore claim little or no credit (or for that matter, blame) for having turned out the way I have. (1982, pp. 142-143)

It follows from the paragraph that rational choice has no role on the constitution of one’s identity. Instead, in Sandel’s view, communal institutions and relations have primary role. He even gives credit to nature and chance, but neither to rational choice nor to reflection.

Taylor explicates the relation between self-identity and communal ties, in *Sources of the Self, The Making of Modern Identity* (1989), while he analyzes the common picture of the self. According to Taylor (1989), “A common picture of the self as... deriving its purposes, goals and life-plans out of itself, seeking ‘relationship’ only in so far as they are ‘fulfilling’, is largely based on ignoring our embedding in webs of interlocution” (pp. 38-39). In this respect, the reign of instrumental rationality in modernity is a consequence of the loss of the awareness of

our communal embeddedness. And it follows that once we gain this awareness back, it will be overcome.

Taylor claims that it is the modern language of identity which brings out the ideal of detachment from historic communities. But even the ones who endorse this ideal “are still in a web, but the one they define themselves by is no longer the given historical community” (Taylor, 1989, p. 37). Instead, it might be the company of a small group of like-minded people with whom they share an understanding. This small group does not necessarily contain the people with whom we have face-to-face relations; rather, it might be constituted by the people who do not live in the same historical period with us, but the ones whose ideas we share.

Taylor emphasizes that modernity gives rise to highly independent individualism. He argues that this kind of individualism comes with illusions concerning the construction of identity (1989, p. 37). These illusions are caused by the ‘disenchantment’ of modern culture, namely liberalism. Taylor (1989) further explains it in the following paragraph:

The developing ‘disenchantment’ of modern culture... and which has undermined so many traditional frameworks and, indeed, created the situation in which our old horizons have been swept away and all frameworks may appear problematic – the situation in which the problem of meaning arises for us. (p. 26)

To sum up, in Walzer’s, Sandel’s and Taylor’s views, there is the claim that modern liberal society cannot take away our bondedness but only changes the way we see things and thus it takes away the awareness of our communal being. This brings out some problems such as highly independent individualism and the problem of making sense of our identity, because when we detach ourselves from communal relations, the ground which gives meaning to our identity is lost. As a solution to these problems, they argue that we need to regain our awareness. Despite their

differences, both perspectives attribute utmost importance to communal relations whether they argue that those types of relations are lost or covered by modern liberal understanding. In addition, both criticize modern individualist perspective and argue that communal relations are constructive of our identity.

In conclusion, Tönnies' conceptualization of community and society has an influence on the literature regarding the distinction between community and society. In this chapter, I have argued that this conception has some problems. One is that it may give rise to the idea of revitalizing the *Gemeinschaft*-like relations namely returning to community in order to redevelop unity as argued by Scheler and Heidegger. In the following chapter, I will focus on Heidegger's thoughts as an example of this idea and show its relation to Tönnies' conception of community and society. Another problem is that the views which adopt this conception overvalue communal relations namely universality and undervalue particularity, differences and individuality which are developed within society. Sayers (2007) argues that the error of the communitarian perspective is disregarding the element of particularity while focusing on universality (p. 90). It is also the case for the romantic approach which is held by Scheler and Heidegger. As a solution to that problem, in the final chapter, I will focus on Hegel's understanding of society, which combines the elements of universality and particularity. I will also show how his view, which is also apprehended by Durkheim, may give us a different perspective concerning the possibility of unity in society.

CHAPTER 3

HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY AND HIS CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS

In this chapter, it will be argued that in his works, Heidegger criticizes modern society and introduces an idea of community. This idea will be grounded on *Being and Time* and developed with reference to his later works, addresses and notes.

Although the idea of community is not evident in *Being and Time*, its ontological foundation is laid in this this work. In his later works, the idea of community becomes apparent which turns into “the community of nation” in the end.

The conceptual framework of *Being and Time* fits the general structure of the literature on the distinction between community and society. Within the context of *Being and Time*, he grounds his criticism of society on ‘different modes of being-with’ and ‘*the they*’ and the idea of community on ‘the authentic existence’, ‘historicity’ and ‘destiny’. Even though *Being and Time* presents the ontological foundations of his criticism of modernity and the idea of community, it is further developed in his works, especially *The Question Concerning Technology*, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, *Letter on Humanism* and in his notes between 1931-1938 which were recently published in *Black Notebooks*. In these works, we see that Heidegger develops his ideas on the ground of the notion of truth. In order to develop this claim, I will analyze his thoughts in relation to the literature on the distinction between community and society. I will also show that they have some common concepts and thoughts. Furthermore, I will argue that Heidegger comes up with the idea of the revitalization of community which was also introduced by Scheler in *Formalism in Ethics*. Unlike Scheler, Heidegger grounds the idea of the revitalization

of community on the notion of “destiny”. According to him, reoccurrence of community is determined as the destiny. Destiny is not to repeat exactly what is in the past, but it might be understood as relating itself to the past in the moment. However, destiny cannot carry out itself. Da-sein must work for the realization of the destiny. Da-sein must understand its destiny as both in its past and future, and it must accomplish its role. In other words, destiny assigns the role of the revitalization of community to Da-sein.

Lastly, we will see the relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political engagement. It has been widely questioned whether Heidegger’s political engagement is a necessary consequence of his philosophy.⁶ The idea of the revitalization of community seems to have an influence on his political choice. In this work, it is claimed that although one cannot deny the link between his philosophy and political engagement, the latter is not a necessary consequence of the first. In order to understand his relation to the National Socialist Party, I will investigate both his philosophical thoughts as they appear in *Being and Time* and his rectorate speech on “The Self Assertion of German University,” where the idea of community shows up more clearly. There we will see the link between his philosophical thoughts in *Being and Time* and his political engagement through the concepts of “historicity”, “destiny” and the idea of ‘going back to the origin’.

Heidegger’s idea of community is fundamentally grounded on the investigation of the way of being of Da-sein. Therefore, first, I will focus on the investigation of the existential analysis – the analysis on the conditions of the possibility of experience – of Da-sein. Heidegger (1996) calls the discipline which investigates the existential analysis of Da-sein “fundamental ontology”. As a start, I

⁶ It has been argued that Heidegger’s engagement to the National Socialist Party is the necessary consequence of his philosophy (see, Löwith, 1988).

will investigate basic thoughts and concepts Heidegger deals with within the study of fundamental ontology.

3.1 Basic ideas and concepts of fundamental ontology

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's focus is the question of being (*Sein*). He argues that in the traditional ontology, there are three prejudices concerning the question of being. "Being" is thought as the most universal concept, indefinable and self-evident (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 2-3). According to him, these ideas mislead us and that there is still a need for the investigation of the being. This investigation is related to the investigation of the way of being of the human being. Heidegger calls the human being's kind of being "Da-sein." Etymologically, "da" means "there" and "*Sein*" means "be". And "Da-sein" means "being-there." It is often translated as "existence". However, it refers to the existence of the human being. Heidegger (1996) argues that the being of Da-sein is different from the being of other beings. Its difference lies in the fact that "understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein" (1996, p. 10). It is only Da-sein who understands the being. Thus, Heidegger starts his investigation of being with the investigation of the way of being of Da-sein.

In order to reveal the nature of the analysis of Da-sein's way of being, Heidegger distinguishes "ontic" and "ontological" investigations. Basically, ontic refers to what concerns beings, whereas ontological means what concerns the ways of beings. In other words, ontic is about the possible factual ways to be for the kind of being of Da-sein and factual properties for any other kind of being. It is related to the possibilities to be chosen by Da-sein, such as being a musician, being an architect or being a mother, and so on. For any other kind of being, it is related to properties

or descriptive characteristics – for instance, the world being round, a table being rectangular. On the other hand, ontological is about the existential structures of Da-sein and categories and structures of a being of any other kind (Dreyfus, 1990, p. 20). Ontological meaning is related to the investigation of being. According to Heidegger (1996), the study which focuses on the being of Da-sein is and must be an ontological one. It involves the conditions of the possibility of experience such as “being-with” for the kind of being like Da-sein, categories such as “quality” and “quantity” for any other kind of being. Thus, fundamental ontology as an ontological investigation focuses on the existential structure of Da-sein, namely the conditions for the possibility of existence (*Existenz*).

In *Being and Time*, sections 26-27, Heidegger asserts that Da-sein’s being is being in the world. And as a being in the world, Da-sein initially encounters (*Begegnen*) useful things at hand or things objectively present. Heidegger uses the notions “handiness” or “readiness to hand” (*Zuhandenheit*) and “objective presence” or “presence at hand” (*Vorhandenheit*) as he talks about different modes of being that we encounter in the world. Objective presence involves an attitude of merely looking at something or theorizing.⁷ It is an attitude of a scientist or a theoretician, but if we look at things only theoretically, we cannot get a proper understanding (Heidegger, 1996, p. 65). To get a proper understanding, we should relate to them in their handiness. “Handiness” refers to Da-sein’s relation with the things it encounters in the world in their use. The more we use a thing, the more original our relation to it becomes (Heidegger, 1996, p. 65). According to Heidegger (1996), practical engagement with things precedes the theoretical understanding of them.

⁷ In Heidegger’s terminology, “objective” means that I can consciously focus on my relation to innerworldly beings. In this sense, objective presence presupposes our engagement to things in their use.

Introducing the objective presence and handiness as Da-sein's relation to the things encountered in the world, Heidegger presents an alternative to the subject and object distinction, which is posed by modern epistemology, in which the subject heads towards what is there in front of him namely the object and has a knowledge of it. Theoreticians or scientists reinforce this distinction, yet in most cases, we relate to things without theorizing them. "The less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more actively we use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful thing" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 65). Thus, the distance between the subject and object diminishes.

Heidegger (1996) defines a useful thing as "something in order to..." (p. 64). Our everyday association with useful things focuses on the work. The work carries the totality of references found in the structure of "in order to". It has a reference to three things; one is the what-for of its usability. The shoe is produced for wearing. Secondly, the work has a reference to the work material. Lastly, it has a reference to whom it is produced for, namely, Da-sein. Later, he criticizes modern technology by cutting the reference of the work – the thing produced – to Da-sein. Accordingly, in the modern technology, our relation to things we encounter in a theoretical way becomes more salient. As an example of handiness, Heidegger refers to hammering. Hammering discovers the totality of references contained in the useful thing, hammer. "The act of hammering itself discovers the specific 'handiness' of the hammer. We shall call the useful thing's kind of being in which it reveals itself by itself 'handiness'" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 65). By engaging in the act of hammering, Da-sein relates to hammer in its handiness. It is the craftsmanship activity through which Da-sein relates to things in the totality of references.

Heidegger argues that there are three ways of being. So far, we have mentioned handiness and objective presence. They express the being of the kind of beings unlike Da-sein. And the third one expresses the being of the kind of beings like Da-sein:

1. The being of the innerworldly beings initially encountered (handiness);
 2. The being of beings (objective presence) that is found and determined by discovering them in their own right in going through beings initially encountered;
 3. The being of the ontic condition of the possibility of discovering innerworldly beings in general, the worldliness of the world.
- (Heidegger, 1996, p. 82)

Heidegger calls the being of Da-sein “existence”. Existence is the name for the being that Da-sein can and does relate (Heidegger, 1996, p. 10). Namely existence is the being of a being (Da-sein) which is concerned about its being. He asserts that “*understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein*” (1996, p. 10). The third kind of being, namely existence, is an existential determination of Da-sein. In other words, it is the way of being of Da-sein (Heidegger, 1996, p. 82).

Heidegger uses the notion of existentials when he talks about the way of being of Da-sein. And he introduces the concepts of *existentiell* and *existential* understanding. “The existential understanding is an understanding of the ontological structures of existence, that is, of what it is to be Dasein” (Dreyfus, 1990, p. 16). When someone investigates what it is to be Da-sein in general, he is engaged in an *existential* analysis, and gets an *existential* understanding. On the other hand, “*existentiell* understanding is an individual’s understanding of his or her own way to be, that is, of what he or she is” (Dreyfus, 1990, p. 16). When someone thinks about his or her own ontic conditions such as being an academician, student or a doctor, he gets an *existentiell* understanding of himself/herself.

Heidegger argues that Da-sein always comes to an understanding of itself initially through its ontic possibilities – possible ways to be. “Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 10). When an academician understands himself in terms of the possibility of being an academician or not being an academician, he has an *existentiell* understanding. “Existence is decided only by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities. We come to terms with the question of existence always only through existence itself.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 10) He calls it an “*existentiell* understanding”. Da-sein’s understanding of existence does not necessarily require an ontological investigation because existence is primarily an ontic question (Heidegger, 1996, p. 11). At this point, existence is distinguished from existentiality. “The question of structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. We shall call the coherence of these structures existentiality.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 11) The question of the ontological conditions of existence, the of structure, comes after the ontic question. Namely, existentiality is the subject matter which comes after existence in the analysis. The analysis of the structure displays the character of an *existential* understanding which comes after an *existentiell* understanding.

In the previous paragraph, where Heidegger explains different ways of being, he mentions the concept of the “world” because initially Da-sein lives in the world. This notion is also encountered when he talks about the way of being of Da-sein. It should be pointed out that the notion of the “world” has a special meaning in Heidegger’s terminology. He lays out the different meanings of the word “world” in the section on “The Worldliness of the World” in *Being and Time*:

1. World is used as an ontic concept and signifies the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world. 2. World functions as an ontological term and signifies the being of those beings named in 1. Indeed, “world” can name the region which embraces a multiplicity of beings...3. Again, world can be understood in an ontic sense, but not as beings essentially unlike Da-sein that can be encountered within the world; but, rather, as that “in which” a factual Da-sein lives. Here world has a pre-ontological, *existentiell* meaning. There are various possibilities here: world can mean the public world of the we or one’s “own” nearest (domestic) surrounding world. 4 Finally world designates the ontological and existential concept of worldliness. Worldliness itself can be modified into the respective structural totality of particular “worlds” and contains the a priori of worldliness in general. (1996, p. 61)

In the third and fourth senses, Da-sein’s investigation of itself is revealed both in the ontic and ontological sense. When the world is interpreted as an ontic concept in which factual Da-sein lives it has an *existentiell* meaning. But when the world is interpreted as an ontological concept, as one of the conditions of the possibility of experience of Da-sein, then it has an *existential* meaning. Heidegger (1996) states that “worldliness is an ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-world” (p. 60). In the section on the “Worldliness of the World”, the word “world” makes a reference to the last two meanings: *existentiell* meaning and worldliness. Throughout *Being and Time* (1996), when he talks about the everyday being of Da-sein the word “world” refers to the *existentiell* meaning, but when he talks about the existentials, it refers to worldliness.

Heidegger (1996) argues that temporality constitutes the existential being of Da-sein (p. 217). And he says that “the project of the meaning of being can be accomplished in the horizon of time” (p. 217). He questions the traditional understanding of time. “The tradition regards time as a linear series of ‘now’ points that can be measured. Time is thereby interpreted as a modification of presence. We call ‘past’ what is no longer present and ‘future’ what is not yet present.” (Alweiss,

2002, p. 119) Time is not something to be measured. The real meaning of time can only be understood in relation to “care” as the essential constitution of Da-sein’s. This care structure is expressed in terms of Da-sein’s being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world- as-being-together-with (Heidegger, 1996, p. 183). Da-sein’s being-ahead-of-itself constitutes its futural aspect. In being-ahead-of-itself, Da-sein projects itself upon possibilities. Being-in-the-world constitutes its past in the sense that it is already thrown into some factual conditions. Thrownness of Da-sein refers to its being-in-the-world (p. 127). It means that Da-sein always is already in a definite world with other innerworldly beings (p. 203). And being-together-with constitutes its present. But these three dimensions of time which are presented in the care structure of Da-sein cannot be separated. Essentially, Da-sein is its past, present and future. Heidegger (1992) says that “in running ahead, Dasein *is* its future, in such a way that in this being futural it comes back to its past and present” (p. 13).

Da-sein’s possibility of being itself, the possibility of authentic existence, lies in its futural aspect. As a being-in-the-world, Da-sein is thrown into death as being-toward-its-end. And this thrownness to death belongs to the fundamental constitution of Da-sein. According to Heidegger, Da-sein, for the most part, does not know that it is thrown to its death. Thrownness to death reveals itself in the attunement of angst (Heidegger, 1996, p. 232). Heidegger distinguishes angst from a fear of one’s own death. In the fear of death, one sees death as a case which happens every day. As opposed to that, in the angst, Da-sein’s being towards death is disclosed and in this disclosure lies the possibility of Da-sein’s being itself:

Anticipation reveals to Da-sein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the illusions of the they, factual and certain of itself. (Heidegger, 1996, p. 245)

The disclosure of being-toward-death constitutes Da-sein's potentiality of being itself. With death, Da-sein goes beyond its every day possibilities and projects itself into the possibility of being-itself.

So far, I have analyzed the distinctions of ontic, ontological, existentiell, existential and the concepts of handiness, objective presence, the world and temporality which are significant to our subject of investigation. In the next part, I am going to focus on the idea of community and the criticism of society in *Being and Time* in relation to the notions of "being-with", "different modes of concern", "*the they*", "historicality" and "authenticity".

3.2 The idea of community in *Being and Time*

In *Being and Time* Heidegger criticizes society and he develops the idea of community in a way that is linked to the literature on the distinction between community and society. His criticism of modern society and the idea of community is developed especially in sections 26 (The Mit-dasein of the Others and Everyday Being-with) and 27 (Everyday Being One's Self and *the They*). The idea of revitalization of community comes up in section 74 (The Essential Constitution of Historicity). Focusing on these chapters, it will be argued that the idea of community is a hidden theme which underlies his thoughts on "being-with-others", "authentic existence" and "historicity" in *Being and Time*.

3.2.1 Da-sein's being-with others

In section 26, in *Being and Time* (1996), Heidegger argues that in order to get an understanding of the everyday being of Da-sein, we should start our investigation with being-in-the-world (p. 110). In the world, Da-sein initially encounters the things

at hand and the things objectively present, but it also encounters the beings of the same kind with itself. “The kind of being of the existence of the others encountered within the surrounding world is distinct from handiness and objective presence” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 111). Da-sein along with the things objectively present encounters a kind of being which has the same sort of existence with itself. He asserts that “these beings are neither objectively present nor at hand, but they are like the very Da-sein which frees them – *they are there, too, and there with it*” (1996, p. 111). These beings are Da-sein of others whose existence is familiar to Da-sein.

Da-sein’s encounter with others in the world might be regulated by the modern understanding promoting the distinction between subject and object. When Da-sein relates to others in the *existentiell* level, there is a subject “I” who distinguishes himself from the others, namely from the object of its experience. But Heidegger expresses that in this encounter, existentially, Da-sein does not isolate itself from the others. “‘The others’ does not mean everybody else but me-those from whom I distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 111) Da-sein’s being is defined as being-with others. In this respect, its being presupposes the existence of others with whom Da-sein is in relation. Therefore, ‘the others’ refers to the existence of other Da-seins among whom Da-sein also exists. Heidegger calls the Da-sein of others Mitda-sein. He says that “The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is Mitda-sein” (1996, pp. 111-112).

Da-sein is essentially defined as being-with. It has an existential and ontological meaning (Heidegger, 1996, p. 113). It means that the being of Da-sein is determined by its being-with others. Heidegger asserts that “the world is always already the one that I share with the others. The world of Da-sein is a with-world.

Being-in is being-with others.” (1996, p. 111) These statements are significant for our subject of investigation since Da-sein’s existential characteristic of being-with others constitutes the foundation of the idea of community.

According to Heidegger, being-with is the subject matter of an ontological investigation not an ontic one. Being-with as having an ontological meaning is one of the existential characteristics of Da-sein. He says that “the phenomenological statement that Da-sein is essentially being-with has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not intend to ascertain ontically that I am factually not objectively present alone, rather that others of my kind also are.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 113) It means that regardless of its factual conditions Da-sein is always with others. As being in the world with others, Da-sein shares the world with them (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 111-112). Thus, the world of Da-sein is the one that is shared with others. It is a shared world. Da-sein lives in a shared world independently of its factual conditions. Heidegger (1996) argues that even when Da-sein is factually alone; its being is a being-with. In other words, even in reality, Da-sein is alone, in its being, it is in relation with others (p. 113). Therefore, when he talks about ‘being-with’ he does not refer to being physically together in the same place, rather he refers to the condition of the possibility of being physically together.

In the following paragraph, Heidegger (1996) argues that there are different modes of being-with:

Thus, being-with and the facticity of being-with-one-another are not based on the fact that several “subjects” are physically there together. Being alone “among” many, however does not mean with respect to the being of others that they are simply objectively present. Even in being “among them” they are there with. Their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking and “being away” are modes of Mitda-sein and are possible only because Da-sein as being-with lets the Da-sein of others be encountered in its world. (p. 113)

In this paragraph, Heidegger explains different modes of being-with. Lacking and being away are the modes of *Mitda-sein* and they are the negative modes of being-with. They are possible on the ground of *Da-sein*'s existential condition of being-with. He further explains it in the following paragraph:

Being-with existentially determines *Da-sein* even when another is not factually present and perceived. The being alone of *Da-sein*, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be *lacking* only *in* and *for* a being-with. Being alone is a deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter (Heidegger, 1996, p. 113)

In this paragraph, he defines being alone as a deficient mode of being-with. It means that being alone requires *Da-sein*'s being-with in a more fundamental way. The negative modes of *Mitda-sein* such as being alien or indifferent to others, being away from others, etc. are grounded on the positive mode of being-with. The negative modes are possible because *Da-sein*'s existential characteristic of being-with enables *Da-sein* of others to be encountered in the world. I am going to talk about the modes of being-with in more detail in the following section while dealing with the modes of concern (*Besorgen*).

“Being-with” as one of the existential conditions and the fundamental characteristic of *Da-sein* brings out the idea of community in the ontological sense. We are – human beings, *Da-sein* – essentially related to each other. This relatedness in the most basic level – the level of the structure of existence – gives rise to the possibility of the existence of a community. That is to say, communality is an ontological aspect of *Da-sein*. Having an ontological meaning, community characterizes the relations structured by the positive mode of being-with. The negative modes of being-with which he mentions – being alone, indifference, being away, being alien – might be seen as the characteristics of the relations within society whereas the positive mode symbolizes the relations within community. In the section

on the modes of concern and authentic existence I will further analyze the positive and negative modes of being-with in relation to community and society.

3.2.2 The modes of concern and authentic alliance

As already stated, in the world, Da-sein encounters useful things, things that are objectively present and Da-sein of others. In this encounter, “care” (*Sorge*) is determined as an existential characteristic of Da-sein. In other words, Da-sein cares about the things which it encounters in the world. Thus, being-in-the-world is identified with care about what is encountered.

With respect to the things encountered, care has two distinct features. One is the care about useful things at hand or the things that are objectively present. The other is the care about the Da-sein of others. But the care about Da-sein of others is not a matter of care (*Sorge*), it is a matter of concern (*Fürsorge*). Heidegger states that “the being to which Da-sein is related as being-with does not, however, have the kind of being of useful things at hand; it is itself Da-sein. This being is not taken care of, but is a matter of concern.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 114) As being-with others Da-sein is concerned about the others.

Heidegger (1996) exhibits the difference between two kinds of care in the following sentence: “Since being-in-the world is essentially care, being-together-with things at hand could be taken in our previous analyses as *taking care* of them, being with the *Mitda-sein* of others encountered within the world as *concern*” (p. 180). A person takes care of his belongings, the things that he uses. It is a matter of taking care of. But he is concerned about his neighbors, his friends, the ones in his family. He further differentiates three kinds of concern. It is a classification concerning Da-sein’s relation to others. He defines the first as negative or deficient, the second as

seemingly positive and the third as positive. According to him, Da-sein mostly lives in the deficient modes of concern. “Being for-, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another, are possible ways of concern. And precisely the last-named modes of deficiency and indifference characterize the everyday and average being-with-one-another.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 114) The everyday being of Da-sein is characterized by the negative mode of concern. It means that Da-sein most of the time lives in the deficient mode of concern.

Besides the everyday negative mode, Heidegger introduces one other negative mode which seems positive at first. He asserts that regarding its positive modes, concern has two extreme possibilities (1996, p. 114). One of the two extreme possibilities is indeed a negative mode. “It can, so to speak, take the other’s ‘care’ away from him and put itself in his place in taking care, it can leap in for him” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 114). This possibility of a concern resembles our taking care of things that are objectively present. Since this mode of concern takes the other’s care away from him “in this concern, the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 114). Because the domination mostly remains hidden, this possibility initially seems as a positive mode. But essentially it is a negative mode. Heidegger (1996) asserts that “this kind of concern which does the job and takes away ‘care’ is, to a large extent, determinative for being with one another and pertains, for the most part, to our taking care of things at hand” (p. 114).

As Heidegger explicates in *Being and Time*, we see that selfish interests of the individuals lie behind the negative modes of concern. While those selfish interests are in the open in the first negative mode, they are covered up in the second one. According to Heidegger (1996), “in this concern, the other can become one who

is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him” (p. 114). Because the domination is hidden, it prevails more powerfully. Individuals are misled to think that they are internally bound together. In both negative modes, individuals who have the same interest cooperate to attain their goal. In this respect, each person comes together with the ones who might be useful for them. Everyone is seen as a means to the interests of the other. Since the driving force is the individual interests, trust cannot be found in this relation. Nobody can trust others knowing that they are concerned with their self-interests.

According to Fritsche (1999), Heidegger’s main criticism against society is that individuals pursue their selfish interests. He expresses his point in the following paragraph:

From the perspective of right-wing authors, society was a realm, or a form of synthesis of individuals, in which isolated persons act for the sake of their selfish interests. In this view, the only bound between individuals in society is the common assumption that each individual acts on behalf of his or her selfish interests, while regarding other individuals exclusively as a means in the pursuit of his or her interests. (p. 69)

Heidegger argues that there is only one positive mode of concern, which he calls “authentic alliance” or “authentically bound together” (*Eigentliche Verbundenheit*).⁸ I think that Heidegger’s idea of community originally lies in the notion of “authentic alliance” that is the positive mode of concern belonging to the essential constitution of Da-sein as being-in-the-world. This relation can be seen in the following paragraph, where he explains the difference between the negative and positive modes of concern:

A being-with-one-another which arises from one’s doing the same thing as someone else not only keeps for the most part within outer limits but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The being-with-one-another of those who

⁸ The word “alliance” is used in Stambaugh’s translation where Heidegger talks about the positive mode of concern (see p.115). In Macquarrie’s translation “bound together” is used instead (see p.159).

are employed for the same thing often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same thing in common, their doing so is determined by their Da-sein, which has been stirred. This authentic alliance first makes possible the proper kind of objectivity which frees the other for himself in his freedom. (Heidegger, 1996, p. 115)

In this paragraph, he characterizes the negative and positive modes of concern in a way which corresponds to the conceptual framework used in the literature on the distinction between community and society. He defines the negative mode as “being employed for the same thing” and the positive mode as “devoting oneself to the same thing”. Here, Heidegger uses the term “employment” to make a reference to work life in the modern society in which people are hired and paid as a means to production. The employees are paid if they contribute to the profits and in turn they work as long as they get paid. In this reciprocity, relationships are based on mutual interests and it means that there is no inner commitment among people. They are at work in being-with-one-another for reaching a determined end. The alliance between the two parties ceases when the end is realized. Thus, the negative modes correspond to the relations in society. However, when he defines the positive mode; he uses the notion of “devotion” to refer to the voluntariness of the commitment, which is developed without external constraints. When individuals voluntarily devote themselves to the same thing, they do not merely consider their individual interests. As opposed to negative modes of concern – including the seemingly positive one the – authentic alliance is built on trust. In the authentic alliance, individuals are not externally brought together but they voluntarily devote themselves for the same thing. There is the unity of the will rather than the unity of ends. This is one of the characteristics of the relations found in community.

Fritsche (2003) also argues that this paragraph can be interpreted within the framework of the distinction between community and society. He says that, in the

quote above, “in the first two sentences Heidegger talks about the logic of civil society and capitalist economy, while in the rest of the quote he lays out the logic of community” (2003, p. 3). Heidegger characterizes negative and positive modes with employment and devotion. These are the fundamental characteristics which distinguish community and society in the literature. He therefore argues that it follows from the paragraph that the positive mode of concern – the authentic alliance - can be found in community whereas the negative modes of concern lie within society.

In the same paragraph, we see that Heidegger makes a reference to “distance” which he presents as an existential character of “*the they*” later. His aim is to state that in the negative mode of concern distance is experienced among one-another. Distance is determined as a characteristic of the relations within society as opposed to the close relations within community. By mentioning the notion of the distance, he makes a further reference to society. Following these points, we might say that the distinction between community and society, as different kinds of being-with, underlies the idea in this paragraph.

Furthermore, in my opinion, while Heidegger talks about authentic alliance as the positive mode of concern in this paragraph, he uses the term “authentic” intentionally to refer to the authentic existence of Da-sein. Thus, he relates community to the authentic existence of Da-sein. The negative modes characterize the everyday and average being of Da-sein which characterizes the inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) existence of Da-sein. As opposed to the negative modes, the positive possibility of concern gives the care, which has been taken from Da-sein, back to him. “This concern which essentially pertains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps the other to become

transparent to himself in his care and free for it” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 115). It frees the other for himself. Thus, the positive mode of concern makes the authentic existence of Da-sein possible. Faye (2010) further argues that for Heidegger, authentic existence cannot be achieved by an individual being. He says that “authentic existence has nothing of an individual being about it. It can be accomplished only as a common destiny (*Geschick*) in ‘the historicizing of the community, of the people’ (*das Geschehender Gemeinschaft, des Volkes*).” (p. 16) He argues that Heidegger’s idea of “destiny,” which is not composed of individual fates but which belongs to a community, showing that authentic existence can only be realized as being a part of a community (2010, pp. 8-18).

The relation between community and authentic existence of Da-sein also appears in the section on *The Essential Constitution of Historicity* (p. 352), where he links the authentic occurrence of Da-sein with the occurrence of community. Considering its relation to authentic existence, we can formulate Heidegger’s idea of community as follows: Community is a social unit in which Da-sein realizes its authentic existence through constructing relations to Da-sein of others in a way they voluntarily devote themselves to the same thing.

Despite its different modes which have been mentioned so far, being-with is an existential characteristic of Da-sein. Da-sein is always ‘being-with-others’. “Being-with-others belongs to the being of Da-sein, with which it is concerned in its very being. As being-with, Da-sein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of others. This must be understood as an existential statement as to its existence.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 116) In other words, it belongs to the ontological constitution of Da-sein. However, the factual conditions in which Da-sein lives is very different. One’s own Da-sein lives for the most part in the negative modes of concern, and it is encountered in the

world of taking care of things. “In being absorbed in the world of taking care of things, that is, at the same time in being-with toward others, Da-sein is not itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 118). Heidegger (1996) asks, “Who is it, then, who has taken over being as everyday being-with-one-another?” (p. 118) This question is answered in the section on Everyday Being One’s Self and *The They*. It is *the they* (*das Man*) who takes over Da-sein’s being in its everyday mode of being-with.

3.2.3 Everyday being one’s self and *the they*

In the section on “Everyday Being One’s Self and the *They*” Heidegger argues that it is *the they* (*das Man*) who has taken over being as everyday being-with-one-another. “The who is not this one and not that one, not oneself and not some and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, *the they*.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119) *The they* refers to Da-sein’s everyday being-with-one-another. The criticism of civil society in *Being and Time* can be best understood through the notion of *the they*, in the sense of everyday being-with-one-another.

Heidegger introduces 6 existential characters of *the they*. Those are distantiarity, averageness, levelling down, publicness, disburdening and accommodation. Those existential characters signify the ways of being of *the they* which is introduced in order to understand who *the they* are. Firstly, he asserts that existentially expressed being-with-one-another has the character of distantiarity (Heidegger, 1996, p. 118). It is not clear what he means by distantiarity as an existential character. He specifies that “in taking care of the things which one has taken hold of, for and against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them” (1996, p. 118). Basically, it means that Da-sein differs from others and it cares about this difference. There is a constant care “whether this difference is to be

equalized, whether one's own Da-sein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in relation to them, whether Da-sein in its priority over others is intent on suppressing them" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 118). Care is present in all these cases.

There are two possible interpretations of distantiality as an existential character. It is argued that by distantiality Heidegger refers to Da-sein's desire to conform to others. Dreyfus, in *Being in the World*, argues that Da-sein in its everyday being is eager to conform to norms. The distance of Da-sein from the others shows that it fails to conform. Therefore, Da-sein is always concerned about its distance from others (Dreyfus, 1990, pp. 152-153). According to this interpretation, Da-sein wants to remove the distance. In the other interpretation, quite the opposite is argued. It is that by distantiality Heidegger refers to Da-sein's desire to be different from others. According to this interpretation, Da-sein tries to differentiate itself from others: "Distantiality as one character of the 'they' produces the desire, or the need, to be different from other Dasein, and only in consequence of the successful realization of that need does the 'they' produce averageness and leveling down" (Fritsche, 2003, p. 3). It is keeping the distance which Da-sein always cares about and works for.

I am inclined to interpret distantiality in a slightly different way, which covers both of these interpretations. I think that we should start with the basic idea that Da-sein is aware of its differences from others. It sometimes tries to remove them and to be equalized with others but sometimes tries to strengthen them and to be ahead of others. This awareness, however, always involves/requires a comparison. This comparison leads to a competition. There is always a competition between Da-sein and others in everyday being-with-one-another. Da-sein tries to be equalized when it falls behind, but when it has an advantage it tries to keep this advantage. The

comparison itself creates a distance between Da-sein and Da-sein's of others. This is why the care about differences means the care about distance. According to Heidegger, Da-sein is always disturbed by this care. He says that "Being-with-one-another is, unknown to itself disquieted by the care about this distance" (1996, p. 118). The reason is that it leads Da-sein to compare itself with others. Da-sein's being disturbed by this care indicates that "distantiality" belongs to the negative mode of concern. And it is very close to the isolation found in society.

Heidegger (1996) asserts that in distantiality, Da-sein stands in subservience to others (p. 118). Distantiality, as it occurs in everyday being-with of Da-sein, has the feature of subservience. This subservience leads Da-sein to "averageness". It is important to remember that Heidegger has identified subservience as a quality of negative mode of concern. By mentioning subservience here, he gives a hint that he is talking about the negative modes of concern in this section.

The others have taken the being of one's own Da-sein from itself by limiting and controlling its everyday possibilities. "It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it. The everyday possibilities of being of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others." (Heidegger, 1996, p. 118) In this relation, others are represented by '*the they*'. As already stated *the they* represents others with whom Da-sein is in relation. But it does not refer to definite others rather it represents any other. Heidegger argues that the dictatorship of *the they* rules over Da-sein's everyday being-with others. The more Da-sein resembles the others, the less the others become distinguishable.

In using public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the rest. This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Da-sein completely into the kind of being of "the others" in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119)

In this paragraph, it is important that Heidegger gives the example of public transportation and information services while he talks about everyday being of Da-sein. Both public transportation and the information services are the instances of modern society. Giving these examples, Heidegger refers to modern society in which modern technology is developed as means to the ends.

According to Heidegger, in its everyday-being-with-the-others Da-sein acts in conformity with *the they*. *The they* unfolds its dictatorship on the ground of this conformity. He explains the dictatorship of *the they* in the following important paragraph:

In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, *the they* unfolds its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the “great mass” the way they withdraw, we find “shocking” what they find shocking. *The they*, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness. (1996, p. 119)

The domination of *the they* is sometimes hidden as in the second negative mode of concern. Even when we think we distinguish ourselves from the others we do it in a way that is determined by *the they*. In everyday being-with one another, nobody is different from the other. Even when one tries to differentiate oneself, one does it in a way that they do. Under the dictatorship of *the they*, there is no difference between one’s own Da-sein and the Da-sein of others.

The domination of *the they* creates averageness (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119). Heidegger establishes *averageness* as another existential character of *the they*. “In its being, *the they* is essentially concerned with averageness. Thus, *the they* maintains itself factually in the averageness of what is proper, what is allowed and what is not.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119) In averageness, Da-sein acts in conformity with what is set as proper. What is the right thing to do is determined by *the they* and Da-sein

acts in accordance with it. *The they* deepens its domination by means of averageness because Da-sein voluntarily falls under this constraint in the first place. In this conformity, Da-sein does not project all of its possibilities because it is not aware of all of them. Averageness reduces Da-sein's possibilities to a few which are approved by *the they*. Thus, averageness gives rise to Da-sein's tendency of *levelling down* of all possibilities of being (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119). Levelling down of all possibilities is the way of being of *the they*.

Those three mentioned existentials constitute another characteristic of *the they*. Heidegger (1996) says that "distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of being of *the they*, constitute what we know as 'publicness'" (p. 119). Distantiality, averageness and leveling down cover up everything through publicness and argue that what is covered up is evident. Thus, "publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119). What is original is hidden in publicness. Instead, the cover is presented as the original.

In its everyday being-with-one-another, *the they* dominates Da-sein by taking its responsibility away. "Because *the they* presents every judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Da-sein away from it" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 119). Da-sein does not take the responsibility of its decisions and judgments because it is *the they* which makes them. In following the path which is predetermined for it, Da-sein does not think that it has responsibility. By taking its responsibility away, *the they* disburdens Da-sein. It makes Da-sein underestimate everything. "Not only that; by disburdening it of its being, *the they* accommodates Da-sein in its tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And since *the they* constantly accommodates Da-

sein, it retains and entrenches its stubborn dominance.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 120)
Thus, the dictatorship of *the they* is strengthened.

As a result, under the dictatorship of *the they* no one can be distinguished from the other. “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. *The they*, which supplies the answer to the who of everyday Da-sein, is the nobody to whom every Da-sein has always already surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 120) *The they* represents both nobody –as not being a specific person to be referred –and everybody– as involving every one whom Da-sein is in relation with at the same time.

I should point out that the existential characteristics of everyday being-with-one-another are represented by the negative mode of concern. Heidegger introduces two negative modes of concern. One is the mode of deficiency and indifference – being for, against, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another. Those features are seen in distanciality and averageness. The other negative mode –which seems positive in the first instance, has two basic attributes: taking away the care from the other and taking the freedom of the other. *The they* takes away the care from Da-sein through distanciality. And by averageness and leveling down of all possibilities of being, it takes away its responsibility and thus it takes away its freedom. The existential characteristics of *the they* are covered by the characteristics of the negative modes of concern. Thus, we can infer that Da-sein in its everyday being-with-one-another lives in the deficient modes of concern.

In section on *the they*, Heidegger distinguishes the *they-self* from the authentic (*eigentlich*) self (1996, p. 121). Heidegger argues that living in the deficient modes in everyday-being-with-another, Da-sein stays dependent on others – on *the they*. This way of being of Da-sein is in the manner of inauthenticity (1996, p. 120).

Heidegger identifies *the they* as belonging to positive constitution of Da-sein. Being-with-others as the positive constitution of Da-sein lies at the foundation of *the they*. He says that “*The they is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Da-sein*” (1996, p. 121). He explains why he regards *the they* as belonging to the positive constitution of Da-sein by making a distinction between the *they-self* and the authentic self. “The self of everyday Da-sein is the *they-self* which we distinguish from the *authentic self*, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. As the *they-self*, Da-sein is dispersed in *the they* and must first find itself.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 121) In *the they*, Da-sein, recognizes itself as the *they-self*. According to Heidegger (1996), “initially Da-sein is *the they* and for the most part it remains so” (p. 121). *The they* belongs to the facticity of Da-sein. On the other hand, in *the they*, there is the possibility that Da-sein discovers its authentic self. “It discloses its authentic being to itself... by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Da-sein cuts itself off from itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 121). It means that by removing the coverings which are created by *the they*, Da-sein might free itself and thus discover its authentic self.

Heidegger (1996) argues that Da-sein’s relation to *the they* may change historically: “It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of concretion in accordance with Da-sein. The extent to which its dominance becomes penetrating and explicit may change historically.” (p. 121) It follows that *the they* has an historical aspect. Although the dominance of *the they* always exists in everyday being, its degree might change historically. I think that on the way to authentic alliance, Heidegger does not want to propose removing *the they* since he defines it as belonging to the positive constitution of Da-sein and also it is the condition for the possibility of having authentic existence. Heidegger points out the necessity of realizing the

dictatorship of *the they* and what is covered up by *the they*, for the discovery of the authentic self. He says that “*authentic* existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness” (1996, p. 167). He argues that *the they* cannot be detached from Da-sein since it is being-with-others as an essential constitution of Da-sein. But there is the need for a modification of the relations which are constituted by *the they* in order to reveal the authentic self. Da-sein must change its relationships with others which are established in everyday being-with-one-another. It must clear the coverings to see what is primordial, and take back the responsibilities which have been taken away from him by *the they*. Thus, he must break its dependency on *the they*.

Heidegger’s comments on the dictatorship of *the they* and Da-sein’s relation to it reflects his criticism of society. The characteristics which he mentions while explaining *the they* makes us think that *the they* consists of isolated and indistinct individuals. There he refers to individualism. Individualism emphasizes on the moral and political worth and priority of the individual. Over-emphasis on the individual in the modern age brings isolation and loneliness. As the age glorifies the individual in theory, it makes the individual lost in actuality. Everyone becomes similar in their efforts to be different from the others. Nobody is distinct and unique. The fear of Da-sein to be similar to others, which is manifested in distanciality, is what makes him similar. According to Heidegger, the authentic existence can only be possible through a discovery of what is covered up by the dictatorship of *the they* and it starts with removing the domination of individualism. The domination of individualism is determined by Tönnies as belonging to society. In the literature, civil society is characterized as promoting relations that are built on individual interests. Tönnies (2001) expresses it by saying that in society “nobody wants to do anything for

anyone else, nobody wants to yield or give anything unless he gets something in return that he regards as at least an *equal* trade-off” (p. 52). The relationships in society are described as trade relationships among isolated individuals. He characterizes society as being constructed by the sum of individuals having no original unity. In the section on *the they*, Heidegger seems to share his criticisms. Both criticize society as promoting relationships dominated by individualism.

Heidegger’s criticism of society becomes salient when he talks about the worldliness of the world. In this section, he makes a reference to modern factory production by mentioning “the wares are produced by the dozen” (1996, p. 66). He distinguishes modern production from the craftsmanship. Before the modern factory production, the work was cut to the figure of the wearer. This type of production had a reference to both the wearer and the user. Heidegger argues that when the number of the production was increased, the constitutive reference to the wearer became undefined. It is the average for whom the work is produced. It is *the they* – indefinite and ambiguous. The domination of *the they* is observed in the modern factory production, as he points out, and modern factory production appears in society (Heidegger, 1996, p. 66).

So far, I have argued that Heidegger refers to society while he talks about the negative modes of concern and the characteristics of *the they*. His discussion on the negative modes of concern and *the they* can be interpreted as a criticism of society. Da-sein’s hovering over the dictatorship of *the they* and the negative modes of concern reigns within the society. In the literature on the distinction between community and society, society is regarded as a social unit in which people are not essentially united but rather they remain isolated, nobody trusts the other,

relationships are established on the rationality of means and ends, and in general mechanical relations prevail. Heidegger adopts the same perspective in his thoughts.

In section on *the they*, Heidegger develops the idea of discovering what is covered up by the dictatorship of *the they* and developing an authentic existence. This idea can be interpreted as the need for the removal of the relations within society and the revitalization of communal relations which is grounded on Da-sein's ontological structure of being-with others. The relations which prevails in the society, under the dictatorship of *the they*, covers up our essential bond to others. Thus, the realization of the dictatorship of *the they*, involves the realization of Da-sein's essential constitution of being-together. In the following section – on historicity – Heidegger further explains the notion of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) in relation to the concept of community.

3.2.4 The notions of historicity and authenticity

In previous sections, I have discussed Heidegger's criticism of society through the notions of the negative modes of concern, authentic alliance, and *the they*. We have seen that Heidegger criticizes society by criticizing the relations within society. In the section on historicity, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly mentions the concept of community for the first time. Now it becomes clear that, according to Heidegger, the social unit with which Da-sein is ontologically involved as being-with is community. We find ourselves living in a society in which there are artificial bonds among people, but authentic alliance can only be developed within the context of a community. Therefore, the idea of the revitalization of a community comes up as a way to establish authentic alliance.

The notion of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) appears in relation to the dictatorship of *the they* and authentic existence. Historicity is identified as one of the existential characters of Da-sein and it is interpreted as a concrete development of temporality (Heidegger, 1996, p. 350). Historicity is revealed in relation to the mode of authentic existence. “Authentic Dasein can become authentic not through any of the possibilities it might choose, but only through its own attitude toward any chosen possibility” (Fritsche, 2003, p. 13). It is by taking the responsibility of its own choices Da-sein might have authentic existence. As I have discussed before, Da-sein’s taking the responsibility of its choices requires the realization of the dictatorship of *the they*. Heidegger argues that the dictatorship of *the they* might change historically because Da-sein’s relation to *the they* is historically constituted. It follows that historicity lies at the foundation of the authentic existence.

Heidegger argues that Da-sein’s being-with others is determined as destiny (*Geschick*). He says that “If fateful Da-sein essentially exists as being-in-the-world in being-with others, its occurrence is an occurrence-with and is determined as *destiny*. With this term, we designate the occurrence of the community, of a people.” (1996, p. 352) Da-sein’s being-in-the-world cannot be conceived independently of others. His being is being-with-others and this being-with-others constitutes the essence of community. It can be claimed that the (re)occurrence of community as belonging to the essential constitution of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world is determined as destiny. The notion of destiny might be linked to the idea of the revitalization of community. It is Da-sein’s destiny to recover communal ties.

The concept of destiny is generally defined as “what makes itself actualized”. It implies that we have no role in the happenings in our lives and that these are beyond our control. Heidegger assigns quite a different meaning to the concept of

destiny. He agrees with the ordinary understanding that destiny involves the meaning of being predetermined. In this sense, destiny stands for what is predetermined by Da-sein's existential conditions. However, according to him, destiny cannot actualize itself. For it to be actualized, Da-sein's commitment and struggle is required. It is Da-sein's *fate* – the individual fate – which contributes the realization of the destiny. “These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 352). In other words, individual fates are determined by the destiny. Heidegger uses the term “destiny” in the sense that embraces all individual fates. By ‘embracing’ we do not mean the sum of individual fates because destiny means more than the sum, but rather we mean containing and determining the individual fates in the existential and ontological sense.

Fritsche (1999) argues that “the rerealization of *Gemeinschaft* depends on Dasein's proper listening and successful fighting. It can no longer be assumed that what is supposed to happen according to the fate will happen anyway. Rather, without Dasein's compliance with fate and Dasein's active struggle for its realization, that fate would not be realized” (p. 141). Da-sein can follow the path driven for itself – its fate – only if it has authentic existence. Otherwise, he would neither listen to the call of the fate nor hear it. In his later works, Heidegger calls it “the call of being”. On the other hand, Da-sein, who has authentic existence, cannot do without complying with its fate. It is not a choice to be made, but it is a necessity which can be recognized within the mode of authentic existence. But this necessity is revealed when Da-sein relates to its essence and nature.

While Heidegger defines the destiny, he makes a reference to the characteristics of society. First, we shall examine the following statement: “Destiny

is not composed of individual fates, nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 352). This statement contains two references. As I have stated before, society is defined as a social unit which is built on individual interests. By saying that “destiny is not composed of individual fates,” he refers to the individualist characteristic of the relations within society. It implies that destiny cannot be recognized in society. In the second part of the statement, he states that “being-with-one-another cannot be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects”. “Mutual occurrence of several subjects” is also a characteristic of society. He argues that being-with-one-another is something more than being physically together. It requires a deeper togetherness which can be found within community. As opposed to society, it is internal and intimate bonds, not a physical co-existence which constitutes community. The same criticism has been raised by Scheler in *Formalism in Ethics* (1973). According to Scheler, society is a social unit that is composed of the sum of individuals. As opposed to society, community is not composed of individual persons but rather collective persons which represent the unity of individuals.

When Heidegger argues for the revitalization of community in *Being and Time*, he does not refer to a specific community which was once there in history. Rather, he means the possibility of the kind of existence which has been there, but is forgotten today (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 352-353). He calls going back to the possibilities of Da-sein that has been there “retrieve” (p. 352). “Retrieve is not conceived by ‘something past’; in just letting it come back as what was once real. Rather, retrieve responds to the possibility of existence that has-been-there.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 352) The past contains the possibility of existence in an authentic way.

Heidegger (1996) says that “retrieve neither abandons itself to the past, nor does it aim at progress. In the Moment, authentic existence is indifferent to both of these alternatives.” (p. 353) He gets the idea of community from the past. But he does not refer to a specific past community to be revitalized. As we have seen, Scheler also argues for the revitalization of community, but a community he has in mind is the Christian love community which existed in the past. In this respect, Scheler presents a romantic idea in the sense that he misses what had been there and wants to return to it. Heidegger differs from the romantics in that he does not refer to a specific community of the past; rather, he sees the possibility of the existence of a community in the past which was covered up by the emergence of society. Before isolating competition came out, there was an authentic alliance. Fritsche (1999) explains it in the following paragraph:

Recognizing its fate, authentic Dasein understands that the past, to which it owes its *eigentliches* ethos and identity, is an entity that was pushed aside by *Gesellschaft*, and the past allows for positive relations to the Other in contrast to the loneliness and instrumental relations to the Other in *Gesellschaft*, that is, in contrast to solicitude in its deficient mode as well as in the first of its positive modes. (p. 132)

Society presents endless multiplicity of possibilities most of which are not real ones. In the simplicity of its fate, Da-sein recognizes the real multiplicity of its possibilities. Da-sein can only do that by relating itself to the past. Society makes people forget about their past and their origin. Thus, it covers up the possibility of authentic existence. Uncovering the possibility of the authentic existence means to reconstruct the relations belonging to community, namely revitalizing the communal relations.

Heidegger’s idea of the revitalization of community is closely related to his criticism of metaphysics and his understanding of truth. For this reason, in the next

section, I am going to analyze his criticism of metaphysics in relation to the notion of truth as *aletheia*.

3.3 Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics

Heidegger's idea of the revitalization of community cannot be understood in isolation with his criticism of metaphysics. In all his works, Heidegger starts his investigation from what is given and arrives at what is primordial and essential. Concerning the question of being, what is given is metaphysical thinking, which was provoked by modernity, and what is primordial can be grasped through essential thinking. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (2000), Heidegger first explicates metaphysical thinking and its subject matter and then he reveals the essence of its fundamental question, namely the question of being. In its essence, metaphysics questions being.

Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics grounds on the distinction between being (*Sein*) and beings (*das Seiende*).⁹ Beings are observable entities which constitute the subject matter of sciences. We relate to them as things that are objectively present, but being is the essence of all beings – it is what is primordial. Being is the ground for the possibility of existence of variety of beings. Heidegger argues that metaphysics questions beings as such. And he sees a great danger in the metaphysical thinking. In this question, “being remains forgotten” (Heidegger, 2000, p. 20). In the metaphysical thinking, being remains in oblivion. We do not think about the being anymore. Both in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and “Letter on Humanism”, he talks about the oblivion of being as a problem which is faced in modernity.

⁹ In some English translations the word “being” is capitalized. Following Stambaugh's translation, I will use it uncapitalized in this work.

In "Letter on Humanism" (1998), Heidegger introduces another problem which is caused by the oblivion of being in modernity, namely by metaphysical thinking. He argues that the oblivion of being gives rise to homelessness of human beings:

Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of being by being. Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being remains unthought. The oblivion of being makes itself known indirectly through the fact that the human being always observes and handles only being. (Heidegger, Pathmarks, 1998, p. 58)

In his engagement in metaphysical thinking, the human being does not think about the being anymore. "Man, today is in flight from thinking" (Heidegger, 1969, p. 45). It is the abandonment of being by the human being, but it is also the human being's abandonment of its own house. It gives rise to the alienation of the human being from himself. Heidegger states that Marx recognized "the estrangement of the human being has its roots in the homelessness of modern human beings" (1998, p. 258). Going back to *Being and Time*, we can say that homelessness is the cause of the inauthentic way of being of Da-sein.

According to Heidegger (1998), "homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world" (p. 258). Only Da-sein can change this destiny by following its fate which is assigned by being. Da-sein has the role of reconstructing its relation to its essence. The path for Da-sein is predetermined by being. Its role is to be the shepherd of being:

The human being is not the lord of beings. The human being is the shepherd of being. Human beings lose nothing in this "less"; rather, they gain in that they attain the truth of being. They gain the essential poverty of the shepherd; whose dignity consists in being called by being itself into the preservation of being's truth. (Heidegger, 1998, p. 260)

The role of shepherd of being is assigned to Da-sein by being itself as a destiny. In other words, it is the call of being. In being the shepherd of being, Da-sein realizes

that it is not the lord of beings and the center of the universe. Rather, it is a means for the preservation of the truth of being. In making this point, Heidegger criticizes the individualist and self-centered understanding of modernity. According to Heidegger, being is prior to the individual and the individual is determined by being to a certain extent. For this reason, the human being must uncover its relationship to being in order to know himself.

Heidegger (2010) argues that the essence of being is related to the essence of truth (p. 93). The essence of being is revealed as the truth of being, since to know is to stand in the openness of being (Heidegger, 2000, p. 23). Da-sein's constitution is in relation to being. Therefore, the truth of being can only be revealed by Da-sein. In *Being and Time*, *The Question Concerning Technology* and *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger analyzes the notion of truth and he starts his analysis with the traditional understanding. He claims that the traditional understanding of truth has been developed and adopted within the limits of metaphysical thought. Then he states that the traditional understanding of truth is a derivative one. It is derived from the primordial understanding of truth. Heidegger displays that the primordial meaning of truth was known once in the ancient times, but with the emergence of metaphysical thought, it has been covered up by the derivative meaning and we have forgotten the original meaning through the history of thought. When we contemplate on the derivative meaning of truth going beyond the metaphysics we can see that it refers to a more primordial phenomenon. Thus, in his works, Heidegger's project is to uncover the primordial phenomenon of truth.

The traditional understanding defines truth as the property of statements and propositions. It is claimed that a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. In *Being and Truth*, which contains his 1933-1934 lectures, Heidegger calls

the traditional conception of truth correctness. Accordingly, if we want to know whether a statement is true, we should check whether it represents reality properly. If a statement represents reality as it is, then we say that it is true. Back in the time of the Greeks, the primordial conception of truth was prevalent (2010, p. 96), but the traditional understanding of truth can be found in Plato's and Aristotle's works. Heidegger (2010) argues that Plato's works involve a struggle between two conceptions of truth – correctness and unconcealment – which become clear in the allegory of the cave (p. 101). In this allegory, Plato uses two different meanings of truth, correctness and unconcealment. He starts by looking at what is concealed, namely shadows, and then moves to what is unconcealed, namely things themselves. Looking at what is unconcealed is more correct than looking at what is concealed. Heidegger (2010) asserts that, "In turning toward what *is* more, looking and asserting must also be formed *more correctly*. This is the first passage where we encounter the *doubling of the concept of truth*." (p. 111) In this doubling, correctness presupposes unconcealment.

Truth as correctness can also be observed in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. He defines truth and falsity in the following words: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true." (Book IV, Part 7) In this definition, truth and falsity are determined in terms of the correspondence between the statement and reality. According to Heidegger, Aristotle displays in his works the derivative meaning of truth and thus constitutes the origin of metaphysical thinking, along with Plato. Heidegger's point is that, although the Greeks were familiar with the primordial meaning of truth, metaphysical thinking had started to come into play.

According to Heidegger, the traditional understanding of truth has cut off our bond to primordial truth. Guignon (1983) asserts that “Heidegger tries to lead us to see that this traditional understanding of truth is *derived from* a deeper and more primordial conception of truth” (p. 198). Thus we can reconstruct our bond to truth that we had before but which was covered up later in history.

Heidegger objects to the traditional understanding for covering up what is essential, and he defines truth as a discovering activity:

To say that a statement is true means that it discovers the beings in themselves. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings “be seen” (apophansis) in their discoveredness. The being true (truth) of the statement must be understood as discovering. Thus, truth by no means has the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a correspondence of one being (subject) to another (object). (1996, p. 201)

In the primordial understanding, truth is grasped as discoveredness (unconcealment). In order to talk about the correspondence between the statement and its object, there must be an object which is discovered and a subject who performs the discovering activity. Greeks used the word *aletheia* for truth. It means to unconceal and to open what is covered up. Truth as a discovering activity precedes truth as the property of statements and the objects which are discovered:

Discovering is a way of being of being-in-the-world. Taking care of things, whether in circumspection or in looking in a leisurely way, discovers innerworldly beings. The latter becomes what is discovered. They are “true” in a secondary sense. Primarily “true,” that is, discovering, is Da-sein. Truth in a secondary sense does not mean to be discovering (discovery), but to be discovered (discoveredness). (Heidegger, 1996, p. 203)

Truth in the sense of the discovering activity of Da-sein is the condition for the possibility of encountering things. Heidegger calls it “a way of being-in-the-world”. It is one of the existential conditions of Da-sein which is investigated in *Being and Time*. In the quote above, Heidegger makes a connection between discovering

activity and taking care of things. With a further reflection on *Being and Time*, one might say that relating to truth in a primordial way, as a discovering activity, brings out the positive mode of taking care of things, whereas relating to truth in a metaphysical way, adopting the traditional definition, gives rise to negative modes of taking care of things. Thus, in Heidegger's ontological analysis, the concept of truth has a fundamental role. It is the condition for the ontological way of being of Da-sein.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger relates the discovering activity of Da-sein to the authentic existence. Only the authentic Da-sein can discover primordial truth. Guignon (1983) argues that "Heidegger makes it clear that a necessary condition for grasping primordial and authentic truth is that one actually be in the authentic existentiell mode" (p. 136). Heidegger claims that when we become authentic, namely we relate to ourselves clearing away the concealments produced by 'the they', we can have an existential understanding of ourselves. When Da-sein relates to itself in this way, the truth of being is uncovered (Guignon, 1983, p. 74).

In "The Origin of the Work of Art" (In *Off The Beaten Track*, 2002), Heidegger introduces the idea of the happening of truth. He states that in the work, when there is a disclosure of the being as what and how it is, there is a happening of truth at work" (2002, p. 16). In the work of art, the discovering activity of Da-sein is conceived as a means to the happening of truth. The work of art is not a thing which is produced and it is not merely the product of the artist. Rather, it is the place where the truth happens. And the artist is not the originator but merely the mediator of this happening. A Van Gogh painting is not an object of art produced by Van Gogh using canvas and paint. Van Gogh is not the creator but the mediator of this work. In the painting, the truth happens. It comes into openness, through the mediation of its

artist, who can listen to the call of being. In the following paragraph, Kockelman (1985) explains the happening of truth in the work of art:

According to Heidegger, the painting by van Gogh appears to be the disclosure of what this piece of equipment, this pair of shoes, is *in truth*. The painting lets this being emerge into the non-concealment of its Being. The Greeks called non-concealment: *a-letheia*, and we speak of truth, even though we no longer think much when we use the word. If a work of art reveals a being and discloses what and how it is, then a happening of the truth is at work here. (p. 134)

Heidegger gives the example of a Greek temple in explaining the happening of truth. He says that in the Greek temple, the happening of truth can be observed. The Greek temple does not portray anything as was initially thought. It simply stands there and merely by standing there it allows for god's presence. He explains his point by saying that "the work is not a portrait intended to make it easier to recognize what the god looks like. It is rather a work which allows the god himself to presence and is, therefore, the god himself." (Heidegger, 2002, p. 22) The work of art cannot be conceived as the product of an artist which was created using some materials. It is not the expression of an idea or representation of reality. Rather, it is the place where truth happens. Thus, the work of art mediates our relationship to truth.

Heidegger's main argument is that in metaphysical thinking, we have forgotten the primordial meaning of truth, which is *aletheia*. In *The Question Concerning Technology* (1977), he argues that the modern conception of technology cuts our relationship to the essence of technology, which is related to truth. In this conception, modern technology is conceived as a means to an end, not a way of revealing truth. Human beings try to control technology to attain their ends, but the more they try to control it, the more it slips out of their hands. "We will, as we say 'get' technology 'spiritually in hand'. We will master it. The will to mastery becomes more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control." (Heidegger,

1977, p. 5) In the end, it results in the control of our lives by technology. However, it is the consequence of a derivative understanding of technology. Therefore, questioning its essence, we should come to the right relationship with technology. We can use technology, but without letting it have control over our lives. Heidegger (1969) describes it by saying both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to technology (p. 54).

According to Heidegger, the instrumental understanding of technology covers up the primordial understanding. It seems that we have forgotten the ancient roots of the word “technology”. In *the Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger, explains the origin of the word “technology”. *Technikon* is the Greek word for *technology* and it means what is related to *techne*. In *the Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes three different kinds of knowledge: *episteme*, *techne* and *phronesis*. (Book VI, chapters 3, 4). *Episteme* means theoretical knowledge which aims to provide universal knowledge of scientific objects. *Phronesis* is the knowledge which gained through rational deliberation concerning the value of action. *Techne* is the knowledge of art. For Aristotle, the knowledge of art is the knowledge of how to make things that involve a true reasoning. “*Techne* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. *Techne* belongs to bringing-forth, to *poiesis*; it is something poietic.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13)

According to Heidegger, truth lies in the essence of technology. *Techne* is a mode of revealing truth which involves bringing forth. In the bringing forth, what is concealed is brought out into unconcealment. Heidegger (1977) says that “through bringing-forth, the growing things of nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to their appearance” (p.13). It is the happening of truth. In its essence, “technology comes to presence (*West*) in the realm

where revealing and unconcealment take place, where *aletheia*, truth happens” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13).

Heidegger (1977) argues that modern technology is also a mode of revealing. The revealing which happens in modern technology is challenging (*Herausfordern*) (Heidegger, 1977, p. 14). In the challenging revealing, man takes nature, as an unlimited source of energy which stays ready for a further demand, as a standing reserve. Heidegger calls it “enframing” (*Ge-stell*) and defines it as “the way which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve” (1977, p. 23). The challenging enframing as a mode of revealing conceals the primordial way of revealing in the sense of *poiesis*. It has the danger of blocking the happening of truth. Yet he also says that “the closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine” (1977, p. 35). Modern technology, in its essence, has the saving power besides the danger of blocking the revealing of truth. *Da-sein*, having an authentic existence can relate to the essence of technology as a mode of revealing, by transcending the understanding, challenging enframing, produced by the metaphysical thinking of modernity.

Zimmerman (1990) argues that Heidegger’s critique of modern technology is grounded on his critiques of modernity, rationality and industrialization (p. 249). He also points out that the real problem for Heidegger was not the products of the modern technology but the perversion in the human being’s understanding of itself in the technological age (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 43). Thus, Heidegger’s thoughts on modern technology can be conceived within a more general critique of modern thinking, which he calls metaphysical thinking.

Heidegger thinks that metaphysical thinking is a falling down. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (2000), he states that “we now leap over this whole

process of deformation and decline” (p. 15). He sees a relationship between the decline of western thinking and its conception of being (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 34). In this decline, the human being does not relate to being in the proper way. In the modern western world, being is not being thought. He also argues that Da-sein can reverse this process by adopting essential thinking, which focuses on the truth of being. Moreover, he argues that it is Da-sein’s destiny to think about being and make it come into the openness, namely to reveal its truth.

The relationship of the human being to being is constructed in thinking and language. In *What is Called Thinking* (1968), Heidegger distinguishes the common view of language from the essence of language. According to a common view or traditional understanding, language is considered a means or tool for expressing thoughts. He also argues that it is the nature of modern technology which holds sway in all directions, turns speaking into information (1982, p. 132). In a technological and calculative universe, language is used as a means to transfer the kind of information which best fits that universe. In modernity, man acts as if he is the master of language, but it is the language which masters man (Heidegger, 1976, p. 146). For Heidegger, however, language is neither the means nor the field of thought. “Language arises from be-ing and therefore belongs to it” (1999, p. 352). Language speaks what is essential through the speaking of man (1968, p. 128). In *Poetry, Language, Thought* (1976), he states that language speaks its own speech, not the speech of man (pp. 192-193). “Man speaks in that he responds to language. This responding is a hearing. It hears because it listens to the command of stillness.” (1976, p. 210) The call which man listens to is the call of being. “The calling here, calls into the nearness” (1976, p. 198). The calling as a mode of language calls Da-

sein to its roots and there lies the possibility of removing the rootlessness and homelessness of Da-sein.

In its speaking, language speaks the truth of being. It is the place where the truth of being is unconcealed. This unconcealment happens in language. Therefore, he says that language is the house of being. Heidegger (1982) states that “saying means to show, to let appear, to let be seen and heard” (p. 122). This happening is close to the happening of truth in a work of art. In other words, language is the place where the truth – the essence – of beings comes into the open. Da-sein, who thinks in an essential and meditative way and thus relates to the essence of language, becomes the guardian of the truth of being:

Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human being. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to being solely as something handed over to thought itself from being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking being comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. (Heidegger, 1998, p. 239)

In *Discourse on Thinking* (1969) Heidegger argues that “the old rootedness is being lost in this age” (p. 53). This age is the age of technology and calculative thinking. Heidegger’s solution to the problem of rootedness is meditative thinking, as opposed to calculative thinking. Calculative thinking sees everything as means to something else, but meditative meaning focuses on the essence of beings. Only by adopting meditative thinking does Da-sein relate to its essential nature.

As we have seen, Heidegger assigns to Da-sein the mission of revealing and protecting the truth of being, which is given by being itself. To accomplish his mission, Da-sein must clear away all the misconceptions, obscurities, and covers that are produced by the metaphysical thinking of modernity and reveal what is essential. Heidegger’s approach in his analysis of the notion of truth, namely starting from

what is given and moving towards what is primordial and essential, is the method he adopts in his thinking in general. What is given corresponds to the way of being in society and what is primordial corresponds to the way of being in community. The call of being can be seen as the call for an essential community in which authentic existence prevails.

Towards the end of the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he implies that the mission of revealing and protecting the truth of being fits German people, and there, he presents a nationalist perspective. Although it is not clearly explicated within the context of this book, it can be observed in the lines of the following paragraph:

Asking the question of Being, is then one of the essential fundamental conditions for awakening the spirit, and thus for an originary world of historical Dasein, and thus subduing the danger of the darkening of the world, and thus taking over the historical mission of our people, the people of the center of the West. (Heidegger, 2000, p. 52)

In this paragraph, Heidegger assigns to German people the role of overcoming the decay of the modern world. He calls it the historical mission of German *Volk*.

Heidegger's nationalist perspective can be observed more clearly in the rectorship address he gave at Freiburg University. In this speech, he speaks of 'community of people,' referring to the German *Volk*, and he assigns the role of reversing the decay which was originated and sustained by the metaphysical thinking to the German community of people which relates to the truth of being.

3.4 The idea of community and the link to national socialism

Heidegger uses the notion of "the community of people" when he talks about community in the section on historicity in *Being and Time*. This is the first link between Heidegger's thoughts and National Socialism in *Being and Time*. In his later works and speeches, it becomes the community of "German people".

Heidegger's idea of "the community of people" and the notion of "destiny" is regarded in tune with the National Socialist thought in the literature. According to Fritsche (2003), "In the section on historicity in *Being and Time*, prepared by the structure of the entire book, Heidegger criticizes civil society from the viewpoint of the extreme right-wing arguing for the destruction of civil society in the name of a revitalization of the National Socialist *Volksgemeinschaft* (community of the people)" (pp. 75-107). Löwith argues that Heidegger's commitment to the Nazi party is a necessary result of his philosophical thoughts in *Being and Time*.¹⁰ He claims that one who understands his thoughts on historicity together with his criticism of metaphysics can see the close link to National Socialism. Faye (2010) further argues that the hidden agenda of *Being and Time* was to prepare the ground for the National Socialist thought, which is manifested in his unpublished courses and seminars, written mostly between 1933 and 1935.

On the other hand, a group of Heideggerian are inclined to separate his political activity from his philosophy. His student Habermas states that, in his courses before 1933, Heidegger did not express any thoughts which could later be regarded as sympathetic to National Socialism. Of course, it does not mean that no relation can be found in between. Even though his political engagement was not a necessary result of his philosophical thoughts, nor did he have a secret agenda in *Being and Time*, as Faye argues, it would be a mistake to entirely distinguish his political engagement from philosophical ideas, because one can still see a connection between them.

The close link between his thoughts and the ideology of National Socialism becomes apparent in his first address as the rector of the Freiburg University. In

¹⁰ See Löwith, 1988.

1933, Heidegger gave a speech immediately after he was as rector of Freiburg University. Heidegger declared his engagement to the National Socialist Party in this speech. Sluga (1995) states that, in his inaugural speech, “Heidegger, the philosopher, was throwing his support to the new regime, and the regime was ready to celebrate the philosopher as one of its own” (p. 1). In the rectoral speech on the essence of university, a clear relationship between Heidegger’s philosophical thoughts and National Socialism can be observed. He talks about his vision for the university in his address. It is the realization of the essence of German university. He states that the self-assertion of German university is the common will to its essence (Heidegger, 1993, p. 109). He argues that the essence of university must be lightened out and realized.

In his speech, Heidegger combines science and the fate of the German people within the framework of university. He specifies that university has two missions: One is to develop science and the other is to work for the realization of the fate of the German people. Science in its essence is closely connected to the fate of German people. He ascribes the German University a crucial role in relation to the fate of the German people. He states that “We regard the German university as the advanced school which from science and through science educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of the fate of the German people” (1993, p. 109). A German university has the mission of educating leaders and guardians – the ones who work for the realization of – the fate of German people.

According to Heidegger it is the mission of the German people to realize the destiny. In this respect, university in its essence is engaged in this mission, which is the fate of the German people. He explains this point in the following paragraph:

The will to the essence of the German university is the will to science as the will to the historical, spiritual mission of the German people as a people that

knows itself in its state [*Staat*]. Science and German fate must come to power at the same time in the will to essence. And they will do this then and only then when we – the teachers and students – on the one hand expose science to its innermost necessity, and on the other, when we stand firm toward German fate in its urgent distress. (1993, p. 109)

According to Heidegger, science in its essence is the study of being. In the paragraph above, he argues that the German university can carry out the role that is assigned to the German people, which is to study being. Thus, he combines science and nationalism in the figure of university.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger he defines fate and destiny in relation to the existential character of Da-sein. In the quote above, we see that these notions have political reference. Heidegger regards fate as “the fate of a nation”; unsurprisingly, it is the fate of the German people. He further argues that the university, including both teachers and students, has an essential role in the realization of the German fate. By saying ‘German fate’ instead of ‘fate’ in the rectorate speech, he makes it clear that he understands community from a nationalist perspective. It is the community of a nation which must be revitalized, and its realization means coming to power. For this reason, his speech can be seen a disclosure of his support to the Nazi party.

As I have stated, some people claim that his philosophical ideas led him to National Socialism by necessity, but it is not clear whether this nationalist perspective underlies the ideas in *Being and Time*. A further step is required from ‘community’ to ‘the community of nation,’ namely from the ideas in *Being and Time* to the ideas in the rectorate speech which can be seen as a support to the Nazi party. According to this perspective, his philosophical ideas set the stage for his support to National Socialism although they did not necessarily give rise to it. Heidegger might have taken National Socialism as a political view which provides the possibility to realize his philosophical ideas in reality. Malpas argues that Heidegger’s version of

National Socialism was different than the one which is embodied in the figure of the Nazi Party, but he saw for a period the possibility of convergence between his own National Socialism and the National Socialism of Hitler (Malpas, 2016, p. 6). And he thought that his philosophy could provide the grounds for political action. In this period, Heidegger wanted to rearticulate his vision in *Being and Time*, focusing on the idea of a people (*Volk*), and his philosophical journey made a turn into a new direction (Malpas, 2016, p. 12).

Heidegger tells Löwith that his commitment to National Socialism is grounded on his conceptualization of historicity. Löwith (1988) expresses his thoughts on the issue using the following words: "I was of the opinion that his partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy. Heidegger agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of 'historicity' was the basis of his political engagement" (p. 115). He concludes that Heidegger's political engagement is the necessary result of his understanding of historicity. However, showing that there is a relationship between two phenomena does not prove that one is a necessary consequence of the other. Heidegger believed that his philosophical thoughts might lead the political developments of those days. He even expressed his support to the Nazi party in the following words, which were published in a local newspaper before he was assigned to the rectorship: "Do not let doctrines and ideas be the rules of your Being. The Führer himself and he alone is the present and future of German reality and its rule." (cited in Wolin, 1993, p. 96) Later, in a *Der Spiegel* interview, he expressed that he would never write those sentences after his first year as rector (Wolin, 1993, p. 94). He admitted that it was a mistake to believe in this idea. He expressed his regret in a letter to the Rector of Freiburg University:

I realized that it was a mistake to believe that, from the basic spiritual position that was the result of my long years of philosophical work, I could immediately influence the transformation of the bases-spiritual or non-spiritual-of the National Socialist movement. (1993, p. 63)

In his letter to the Rector of Freiburg University (1945), he asserted that he thought his spiritual position and conception of university could be reconciled with the perspective of the Nazi Party. He wrote: “I was equally convinced, especially following Hitler's May 1933 speech asking for peace, that my basic spiritual position and my conception of the task of the university could be reconciled with the political will of those in power” (1993, p. 63). Heidegger thought that he might carry out his philosophical ideas within National Socialism and lead the spiritual developments in the ideology of the party. According to Thomson (2005), “in 1933, Heidegger seized upon the National Socialist ‘revolution’ as an opportunity to enact the philosophical vision for a radical reformation of the university he had been developing since 1911” (p. 34). Heidegger might have thought that he was called by being and it was time to act for him.

Heidegger saw the National Socialist movement as a solution to the hardships faced by the Weimar Republic: unemployment, civil wars, economic problems, the threat of communism (Safranski, 1998, p. 228). For himself, however, National Socialism was not just a political development. The problems in the Weimar Republic were a part of a bigger problem, a decay which takes place in western thinking. Thus, Heidegger regarded National Socialism as a development in the history of being. It was an opportunity to overcome the breakdown caused by metaphysical thinking. In this respect, it was the beginning of a new era (Safranski, 1998, p. 228). Heidegger saw a chance in National Socialism to realize his philosophical ideas within a political context.

In the rectorate address, Heidegger mentions the notion of the beginning. He argues that the essence of science can come out “only when we submit to the power of the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence. This beginning is the onset of Greek philosophy” (1993, p. 110). He tells us that the essence of science was revealed at the beginning of Greek philosophy but that the technical thinking of modernity has taken science from its beginnings. Nevertheless, the essence does not remain in the past. “The beginning still exists. It does not lie behind us as something long past, but rather stands before us” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 111). He also talks about returning to the Greek beginning in his Plato lectures in 1931-1932 (Safranski, 1998, p. 227).

The idea of beginning and its relation to the truth of being also appears in the *Black Notebooks*, first published in 2014. The book covers Heidegger’s notes in small, black notebooks from 1931 to 1938. In these notes, Heidegger’s main concern between those years becomes clear. He states there are two weights which have been burdening our existence for some time, since the start of the metaphysical thinking. One is the entrenchment of the primordial understanding of being and the other is the mathematization of knowledge (2016, p. 42). Heidegger thinks that National Socialism had come up with a plan to overcome these problems.

Heidegger believed that National Socialism and Hitler started the awakening of the communal will: “The great experience and fortune that the Führer has awakened a new actuality, giving our thinking the correct course and impetus” (Heidegger, 2016, p. 81). It is the communal will of the German nation which transforms into a community from a mass. He says that, “A marvelously awakening communal [*Volklich*] will is penetrating the great darkness of the world” (2016, p. 80). It is the solution for the decay of the age which can be achieved through

returning to the beginning. In his notes, Heidegger says that only Germans can hear the call of beginning (2016, p. 72). Going back to the great beginning is “the most secret communal [*Volklich*] mission of the Germans” (2016, p. 80).

The beginning can be revitalized today if the authentic Da-sein hears and obeys the call of the fate. In his notes, Heidegger talks about the revitalization of community as uncovering the beginning – what is primordial. This line of thinking from what is covered up to the origin is embedded in the general structure of thought in *Being and Time* and in his other works, which set the ground for his engagement with the National Socialist thought.

3.5 Heidegger’s understanding of community and its implications

I think that *Being and Time* is a work which has a dual agenda. One is to analyze the existential constitution of Da-sein and the other is to lay out the ontological foundation of the community. It gives rise to two possible interpretations of *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s ideas in this book can be discussed both from an individualist and a social/communal perspective.

Disregarding the notion of historicity, Heidegger’s *Being and Time* can be interpreted from an individualist perspective, and it seems that Heidegger places the autonomy of the individual above community. Heidegger’s focus on the notion of authenticity, the negative aspects of publicness and the dictatorship of *the they* may lead one to think that he has an individualist approach. But when he talks about having an authentic existence by taking its responsibility back from *the they*, what he means is that Da-sein develops authentic existence in which genuine relations are constructed with others. He introduces “being-with” as belonging to the existential structure of Da-sein. Heidegger grounds his theory of community on the notion of

“being-with”. This notion brings out the possibility of reading Heidegger’s thoughts from a communal perspective. Heidegger defines Da-sein as a communal being by stating that ‘Da-sein is essentially being-with-others’. It implies that in its ontological constitution Da-sein is related to others. More impressively, he states that “Da-sein is essentially for the sake of others” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 116). This short sentence implies that despite the factual conditions, ontologically, others have priority over one’s own Da-sein. This might be understood as the priority of community over the individual.

Faye argues that Heidegger’s main objective in *Being and Time* is to ground the idea of community against the idea of an individual existence of the *I*. He says that “the real project of *Being and Time* is the will to destroy the idea of the *I* in order to make room for the ‘most radical individuation,’ which is emphatically realized not in the individual but in the organic indivisibility of the *Gemeinschaft* of the people” (Faye, 2010, p. 17). He also argues that the refutation of Cartesian ontology was announced in the plan of *Being and Time*, which was not realized. Heidegger’s aim was to destroy the Cartesian idea of the *I* – I think. And it was not a philosophical project but a political one which is embedded in National Socialism. (Faye, 2010, p. 17)

It is argued that Heidegger does not provide a sufficient account which leads to the idea of community. This argument depends on the view that a sufficient account of community must express the factual qualities of a community. Since Heidegger asserts that he does not refer to any real community, it leads some people to think that Heidegger has an ambiguous notion. He explains that this community is rooted, in the past and in the moment, in Da-sein’s existential character of being-

with. He talks about an ontological possibility of any real community but it does not mean that the concept is ambiguous.

In this chapter, it has been argued that Heidegger presents a theory of community in relation to the notion of “authenticity” in *Being and Time*. Being-with-others constitutes the communal aspect of Da-sein’s being, and it is the condition for the possibility of any other kind of relation. Da-sein’s essence is ontologically being-with-others, whether it recognizes it or not. Heidegger introduces it as a pre-ontic character. Namely, regardless of the ontic conditions of Da-sein, that is, the factual conditions, being-with-others is determinative for Da-sein. It is the ontological communal aspect of Da-sein which primordially determines its ontical existence. It means that by determining being-with as an existential, namely the way of being of Da-sein, Heidegger argues that Da-sein is a communal being. Since being-with is an existential, it is determinative in society too, but in society, deficient modes of being-with are at work most of the time. The relations developed in society cover up the authentic existence of Da-sein. Therefore, Heidegger argues for the revitalization of community by removing the relations within society which prevent developing an authentic existence. Newell (1984) argues that “A certain kind of sociality is, for Heidegger, constitutive of human life at the most basic level, of man as he is apart from any particular regime, society, or culture” (pp. 775-784). The ontological communal status of Da-sein belongs to Da-sein regardless of its society, culture and nation. Therefore, ontologically it precedes political ideologies and nationalist explanations of community.

Staying within the limits of *Being and Time*, it might be argued that Heidegger does not have in mind a specific community which existed in history. Rather, he talks about the possibility of the emergence of any community in which

authentic alliance reigns. But in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, “Letter on Humanism”, “The Self-Assertion of German University” and *Black Notebooks*, he points to a specific community, the German national community. In these works and his speech, he focuses on the idea of ‘the beginning.’ He determines Da-sein’s mission as going back to “the beginning” and revealing the truth of being. One might also say that, because of his engagement with National Socialism, Da-sein’s mission becomes the mission of the German national community. Thus, later, the ontological communal status of Da-sein gains ontical facticity and national character as belonging to the German national community.

CHAPTER 4

HEGEL'S THEORY OF RECOGNITION

AND THE POSSIBILITY OF UNITY IN CIVIL SOCIETY

The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the possibility of unity within civil society by appealing to Hegel's thoughts in the *Philosophy of Right*. It will be argued that Hegel's theory of the corporation provides the ground for this unity.

According to Hegel, civil society cannot be characterized as a social unit which is dominated by relationships that are built merely on selfish desires. Hegel characterizes civil society as promoting individual needs, but he also argues that the unity can be developed among the members of civil society on the ground of the corporation. The corporation develops unity by combining particular interests of the individuals and common ends of the corporation through the activity performed.

Hegel's notion of unity cannot be understood without making a reference to the concept of mutual recognition. The corporation provides mutual recognition, which constitutes the basis of the unity created in civil society. With these reasons, unlike Heidegger, Hegel does not regard civil society as a state to be removed. For him, by means of the corporation, civil society is a necessary stage for the emergence of the state in which individuals feel at home. Thus, the function of the corporation is to develop unity in civil society that is later fully realized in the state, which is the largest community. Since my aim is to discuss the possibility of unity in civil society, I focus on the conception of civil society and will not go into the details of his theory of the state. With this aim, I will focus particularly on the third part of the *Philosophy of Right* (1996), making reference to *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977), *Science of Logic* (2010) and *Introduction to Philosophy of History* (1988). Then I will

emphasize the notion of recognition and the theory of corporation. Finally, I will discuss whether Hegel's conception of civil society and the theory of corporation still has promise today.

Hegel's system of ethical life is developed on the notions of particularity and universality. In the "Introduction" of the *Philosophy of Right*, he introduces the concepts of particularity and universality in a way that lays out the whole structure of the book.

4.1 Universality and particularity in the *Philosophy of Right*

In the "Introduction", Hegel states that the subject matter of the *Philosophy of Right* is the idea of right conceived as the unity of the concept of right and its actualization. In "The Actual and the Rational" (in *Hegel and Modern Philosophy*, 1987), Sayers points out that Hegel's notion of actuality is closely related to his conception of truth, which he defines as the correspondence of the object with the spirit or concept. The concept is general and abstract, and thus it needs to be actualized. The actualization of a concept is called existence. The concept cannot actualize itself. For it to be actualized, the activity of the will is required. Hegel (1988) explains this idea in the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*:

For actuality, there must be a second element added-and that is activity or actualization. The principle of this is the will, i.e., human activity in general. Only through this activity is the concept (along with its implicit determinations) realized, actualized-for these aims and principles are not immediately valid in and of themselves. (p. 25)

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel connects the idea of right to freedom. He argues that freedom constitutes the substance of the idea of right, which needs to be actualized. Thus, he devotes the *Philosophy of Right* to the investigation of the concept of freedom and its actualization. (1996, p. 25) It means that, in order to

understand absolute freedom, one must grasp the concept of freedom and its existence. And he explains the link between the idea of right and freedom in relation to the will:

The basis [*Boden*] of right is the *realm of spirit* in general and its precise location and point of departure is the *will*; the will is *free*, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [*Bestimmung*] and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom. (Hegel, 1996, p. 35)

It follows that freedom is reciprocally connected to the will. The relationship between freedom and the will is very similar to the relationship between weight and the body (Hegel, 1996, p. 35). Freedom constitutes the will just as weight constitutes the body. Furthermore, the weight does not only constitute the body; it is the body. According to Hegel (1996), “It is just the same with freedom and the will for that which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is actual only as will or as subject.” (p. 35) Therefore, to understand the actualization of freedom one should focus on “the will”. It leads Hegel to describe the actualization of freedom through the moments of the will. This is the point where he introduces the notions of universality and particularity. In the first moment, the will is defined as universal. In the second moment, the element of differentiation is involved and the will is defined as particular. In the last moment, the unity of universal and particular constitutes the will.

Hegel uses the concept of universality (*das Allgemeine*) in two different ways. One of the meanings of universality is “being undetermined”; in the case of the will, it is the state in which it has not yet determined itself or has withdrawn from all determinations. It is called the universality of the will. He also uses the concept of universality in the traditional sense in which several individuals or species have something in common. For instance, all human beings have in common to be rational

animated substances, parrots, eagles, and sparrows have in common to be birds, or all engineers share that capacity which makes them engineers.

In the case of the development of the will, “universality” signifies the meaning of being undetermined. Hegel argues that the will has the capacity to withdraw / abstract itself from all determinations. Initially, the will has the ability to abstract itself from everything. In absolute abstraction, everything is abstracted from the content, every determination is cleared out and every limitation is removed. Thus, the first moment of the will is the negation of what is determined and limited. ‘I’s abstraction of itself from everything represents the first moment of the will. It is the ‘I’s thinking of itself, it is pure reflection of the ‘I’ on to itself. I negate my relationship to others and relate myself only to myself. There is immediacy in the sense that there is no reference to my relationship to others. “I am I” is the expression of this thinking. There the ‘I’ thinks of itself in universal terms. Hegel calls it the absolute abstraction or universality. It is the element of pure indeterminacy the will has. As Hegel puts it:

The will contains the element of pure indeterminacy or of the ‘I’s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved; this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of oneself. (1996, p. 37)

The element of indeterminacy refers to ‘I’s thinking of itself without relating to anything exterior. It involves the activity of negation through which the movements of the will are realized. The ‘I’s pure thinking of itself is the negation of all determinations. By performing the activity of negation, a person abstracts herself from all sorts of determinations. It is an immediate relation of a person to himself. Immediacy means not being related to anything other than itself. Hegel regards this capacity of abstraction to be necessary for individuality/ for being a person. For

Hegel (1996), “the highest achievement of a human being is to be a person” (p. 68). He distinguishes personality from subjectivity, for any living being is a subject but not a person. Personality covers more than subjectivity. In this respect, subjectivity represents the possibility of personality, namely the possibility of abstraction, whereas only as a person I perform this activity. The first moment of the will, as the abstraction from everything that is determined and limited, represents negative freedom. If the will determines itself in this way it is called negative freedom (Hegel, 1996, p. 39). It is negative freedom in the sense of indeterminacy. But for Hegel, negative freedom is not free, since it presupposes and is bound to what it negates. In this sense, negative freedom or, as he calls it abstract freedom, is not complete but deficient.

Although one has the capacity to isolate oneself from all one’s determinations, and although it is the highest achievement of a human being, one cannot stay in the state of indeterminacy for too long: one must have determinations. This is the transition of the ‘I’ from indeterminacy to determinacy. Hegel (1996) explains this activity in the following paragraph:

In the same way, ‘I’ is the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation, determination, and the positing of a determinacy as a content and object. – This content may further be given by nature, or generated by the concept of spirit. Through this positing of itself as something determinate, ‘I’ steps into existence [*Dasein*] in general – the absolute moment of the finitude or particularization of the ‘I’. (p. 39)

The second moment of the will is called determinacy since it is to determine and thus differentiate itself. It is the negation of negation, namely, the negation of what is already negated in the first moment. This is the moment of the particularization of the ‘I’. In the second moment, the ‘I’ differentiates itself from the universal. In its thinking of itself the ‘I’ has a reference to content. Having a content means becoming

something determinate and differentiated. In this state, the will gives itself determinate existence in something external. This brings out the beginning of the existence of the 'I'. In other words, it becomes actualized since determination means actualization (Anderson, 2009, p. 150).

In the negation of one's immediacy, one posits something, and one can posit something as independent of oneself. In this case, one presupposes something as independent of itself. Throughout the conscious life, the 'I' is not related only to itself but to the 'non-I', the world outside of it. The 'I' relates to the 'non-I' as something that exists independent of it. In this relationship, the 'I' presupposes and posits something as independent of itself, namely as an object which is independent of the 'I'. Particular subject is the manifestation of freedom because particularity gives its content to universal will, but although it is a further manifestation of freedom, it still remains a negative one because the will is engaged in its object. Thus, the will loses itself in the object.

The elements of universality and particularity are combined at a further stage. After relating to the external world as something independent of itself, by working on the exterior world, the 'I' negates its independence and realizes in it the determinations into which it posits itself. This is an activity of "negation of what is already negated". In this negation of negation, the 'I' recognizes itself as both something indeterminate and determinate. This involves a contradiction which then leads to mutual recognition. Later, I will analyze in detail the notion of contradiction and its relation to mutual recognition.

In the third movement, indeterminacy and determinacy are united. Hegel asserts that the will is the unity of these two moments. "It is individuality [*Einzelheit*], the self-determination of the 'I', in that it posits itself as the negative of

itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same time remains with itself [*beisich*], that is, in identity with itself and universality” (Hegel, 1996, p. 41).

Individuality represents the third moment of the will as the unity of the first two moments. It involves both the element of universality, which is found in the first moment, and the element of particularity, which is aroused in the second moment.

According to Hegel, in the first two moments it is assumed that determinacy is not compatible with freedom, but he argues that through mutual recognition, both determinacy and freedom can be found in the third moment, and this idea underlies Hegel’s system of ethical life (Williams, 1997). Entering a relationship with others is not the loss of the self, rather it is the real gain. In this gain, the ‘I’ relates to itself through relating to others.

The third moment exhibits that “freedom lies neither in indeterminacy nor determinacy, but is both at once” (Hegel, 1996, p. 42). The link to universality is the ground for its indeterminacy, whereas the content is the ground for its determinacy. Hegel (1996) expresses the relation between determinacy and indeterminacy by saying that “then the third moment is that ‘I’ is with itself in its limitation, in this other; as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with itself and does not cease to hold fast to universal” (p. 42). The ‘I’ determines itself but at the same time it does not completely lose the element of indeterminacy. In this way, it steps out into existence without breaking off its tie to universality.

Hegel (1996) calls this moment concrete freedom. He says that “Freedom is to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself [*bei sich*] in this determinacy and to return once more to the universal” (1996, p. 42). He defines freedom by making a reference to particular (determinate) and universal. Concrete freedom requires that the will construct a bridge between the particular and universal. It

means that when the ‘I’ acquires content and becomes particular, it should also be aware that, beyond this content, it is a part of the universal. In the individuality, there is no immediate unity as in the first moment of the will. There, we find an immediate unity of the ‘I’ with the universal. Here, there is a differentiated unity as the individual is conscious of himself as a particular being but at the same time aware of his bond to the universal. Since freedom requires both particularity and universality, individuality is the sole source of freedom (Anderson, 2009, p. 149).

As we have seen in the Introduction of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel lays out the actualization of freedom through the moments of the will in relation to the notions of universality and particularity. He also constructs a link between the moments of the will, the realms of right, and the stages of social relations, starting from the abstract and following to the concrete. The general structure of his whole project as can be sketched out as follows. (See the following table)

MOMENTS OF THE WILL	UNIVERSALITY	PARTICULARITY	INDIVIDUALITY (UNITY OF THE PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL)
REALMS OF RIGHT	Abstract right	Morality	Ethical life (concrete freedom)
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ETICAL LIFE	The Family	Civil society	The state

Table 1: The Structure of the Philosophy of Right

In the realm of right, universality corresponds to abstract right. It is the abstract idea of right which has not yet actualized. When universality is differentiated into particularity abstract right is actualized as morality. But its actualization can only be completed by the emergence of the element of individuality as the unity of universal

and particular. The complete actualization of the abstract right, which is called concrete freedom, represents the ethical life.

The moments of the will are important since they are determinative in the stages of social relations. Universality as the first moment of the will is found in the family, and it gives rise to an immediate unity in which members identify themselves with the family. Hegel thinks that immediate unity is imperfect since it does not allow for individual differences. The members do not have an identity independently of their families. Particularity as the second moment of the will is developed within the civil society. Particularity as differentiation is the dissolution of the unity found in the family. Particularity by itself leads to separation. Through particularity, individual differences enter in civil society. Particularity represents the general characteristic of civil society. The last moment of the will, individuality, as the combination of universality and particularity, is developed within the state, which is a higher community. Individuality is characterized by a mediated unity between the individual and the state. Individuals identify themselves with the state without losing their distinct identity. It is the perfect unity for Hegel, which he explains in the *Philosophy of Right*. As I will examine later, the perfect unity has its origin in civil society since it is the ground of particularity. The possibility of unity, which allows for individual differences, lies within society.

4.2 The notion of contradiction

The concept of contradiction, which Hegel explains in *The Science of Logic*, underlies the movements of the will and his theory of mutual recognition. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel argues that the principle of contradiction is the essence of all things and it is the root of all movement. "Each moment is self-mediated through its

other and contains this other” (Hegel, 2010, p. 374). The principle of contradiction implies that the negative and the positive contain each other. “In this respect, each moment can be considered to constitute the unity of its contrary determinations” (Boer, 2010, p. 361).

Hegel (2010) distinguishes the principle of contradiction from the principle of non-contradiction which is defined as “nothing is A and not-A at the same time” (p. 381). It means that there is nothing which is “both A and not-A”, as well as there is nothing which is “neither A nor not-A.” Hegel argues that reflexive thinking cannot grasp the principle of contradiction in the proper way. He defines the principle of contradiction as “A is neither A+ nor A- and just as much also A+ and A-” (2010, p. 381). A is both “A+ and A-” and “neither A+ nor A-”. Hegel’s principle of contradiction represents the third moment of the will. It means that I am something which is equal to all my determinations, and at the same time I am none of my determinations, in the sense that I differentiate myself from all the determinations. I am all my determinations and none of my determinations at the same time. I am both a mother and a teacher at the same time, and I am neither a mother nor a teacher but a concrete person who can hold different determinations. I posit myself in some determinations as something different from me, and I can relate myself independently of these determinations in an immediate way by negating them.

Hegel argues that contrary concepts both presuppose each other and posit their independence. When a concept is posited as independent from its counterpart, it presupposes its dependence on the other. “Hegel introduces the concept of contradiction by claiming that the positive and the negative, which present themselves as independent concepts, exhibit the concept of contradiction” (Boer, 2010, p. 361). We can think of the concepts of mediacy and immediacy, which are

related to the development of the will. Immediacy is being in a state of no relation through the negation of all the relations to others, through the negation of mediacy. Mediacy and immediacy are posited as independent concepts, namely, as something either immediate or mediated. But they presuppose each other in a way that, without immediacy, mediacy cannot be performed, and without mediacy, immediacy cannot be performed. These two opposite concepts are both mutually dependent and independent at the same time, which means that they express a contradiction. In this sense, the principle of contradiction is the driving force of all movement, i.e. the development in history, the realization of the Spirit.

According to Hegel (2010), “Something is alive only to the extent that it contains contradiction within itself: indeed, force is this, to hold and endure contradiction within” (p. 382). Everything alive has the capacity of positing itself into determinations and stepping back from them and going back to indeterminacy. Hegel further explains this point in the *Philosophy of Right*, section 35, where he talks about ‘the person.’ He argues that the person conceives itself as something both indeterminate, and abstract; and something determinate and concrete. I am both a person who is capable of abstracting from all the determinations and undertaking them. Hegel (1996) says that “As this person I know myself, as free in myself and I can abstract from everything, since nothing confronts me but pure personality” (p. 68). And yet “I am of such an age, of such a height, in this room, and whatever other particular things I happen to be” (Hegel, 1996, p. 68). This involves a contradiction since I am both something indeterminate and determinate at the same time. This means that in its determinacy, namely, in one’s relationship to others, one sees that he is related to himself. For Hegel, the biggest achievement of the person is to

support this contradiction (1996, p. 69), because the principle of contradiction is the source of mutual recognition.

There is nothing that does not perform double negation; in other words, there is nothing that does not maintain contradiction, i.e., there is nothing whose relationship to itself is not mediated by a relationship to its concrete negation (as the concrete negation of form is not the external world at large or another individual, but rather matter; and the negation of 'I', is another person.)

Hegel's notion of contradiction signifies that the 'I' requires the existence of the other in order to proceed with its liveliness. One cannot truly reflect into himself without reflecting into others. In the same way, one cannot relate to himself, without being related to others. One says, "I am a father", "I am an artist", "I am a teacher." However, unless his determinations are recognized by others he is in relation to, he does not feel that he truly expresses himself. This is self-recognition in the other, and self-recognition requires the recognition of the other. You cannot be yourself in your immediacy, but only when you are recognized by others. Only then do you feel at home. In this sense, self-recognition presupposes mutual recognition. Hegel explains this relationship in the *Philosophy of Spirit* when he talks about the development of self-consciousness. Through the theory of mutual recognition, Hegel transforms the modern conception of subjectivity into intersubjectivity and moral subjectivity into ethical subjectivity. His project substantially depends on the notion of contradiction.

Taylor (1979) argues that, by introducing the concept of contradiction, "Hegel's point is that all descriptions of things as immediate turn out on closer examination to be inadequate; that all things show their necessary relation to something else, and ultimately to the whole" (p. 43). The relationship of the 'I' to others and to the whole, which is community, is constructed through the institutions

in the ethical life. The contradiction is carried out and then resolved through these institutions, which means that mutual recognition is developed in the institutions in ethical life.

In the next part, I will focus on Hegel's concept of ethical life and investigate the elements which constitute ethical life in relation to the discussion of universality and particularity. There, I will especially focus on Hegel's account of civil society and the corporation.

4.3 The system of ethical life in the *Philosophy of Right*

The third part of the *Philosophy of Right* is entitled "ethical life". In this section, Hegel introduces the concept of *Sittlichkeit*, which is commonly translated as ethical life. 'Sitte' means the customs of a society or a group of people. The word '*Sittlichkeit*' implies that the social dimension cannot be separated from ethics. Taylor (1979) argues that "the doctrine of *Sittlichkeit* is that morality reaches its completion in a community" (p. 84). When one consciously feels he belongs to a community and does not view community in merely instrumental terms, this belonging represents 'absolute ethical life' (absolute *Sittlichkeit*) for Hegel (Avineri, 1972, p. 84).

Hegel distinguishes ethics from morality in the sense that what is lacking in morality is completed in ethics through a social dimension. For Hegel, "Ethics was not a matter of autonomy but heteronomy of being influenced by other people. Nor was it primarily a matter of rational principle but part of a life of shared values, feelings, and customs, what Hegel calls '*Sittlichkeit*' (from 'Sitte' meaning 'customs')" (Solomon, 1988). Hegel argues that ethical life is not the product of autonomous individuals, as posited by Kant, but it is grounded on sociality. Hegel's

system of ethical life can be conceived as an objection to Kant's morality. According to Kant, principles of morality are constructed solely by reason independently of any kind of experience. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1993), he argues that "for reason to give law it is required that reason need presuppose only itself, because the rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without any contingent subjective conditions which differentiate one rational being from another" (p. 19). Thus, reason must be the only source for morality. In addition, in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (2002), he clearly states that "there is no genuine supreme principle of morality which does not have to rest on pure reason independent of all experience" (p. 25). In the *Philosophy of Right* (1996), Hegel criticizes Kant's system of morality and he regards it as empty formalism:

However essential it may be to emphasize the pure and unconditional self-determination of the will as the root of duty - for knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of the will first gained a firm foundation and point of departure in the philosophy of Kant, through the thought of its infinite autonomy – to cling on to a merely moral point of view without making the transition to the concept of ethics reduces this gain to an empty formalism, and moral science to an empty rhetoric of duty for duty 's sake. (p. 135.)

Hegel argues that rational principles of morality are not set by autonomous individuals and that they cannot be constituted in isolation from society. It is often pointed out that Hegel has a distinct understanding of rationality. While Kant conceives rationality in isolation from anything empirical, Hegel defines it as belonging to a social world, because social life is the product of a rational principle called "the spirit". Therefore, the institutions in society and the mores and practices which are held in those institutions, through which individuals can fully identify themselves with the whole, are rational. Individuals that are part of that larger life have moral obligations based on established norms and uses. Thus, Hegel's notion of

Sittlichkeit which stands for ethical life, assumes the rationality of moral obligations one has in society. (Hegel, 1996, p. 83)

In his objection to Kant, Hegel transforms subjectivity into intersubjectivity by including social dimension into morality. Honeth (1995) states that “he chooses the concept of ‘*Sitte*’ (‘mores’ or ‘customs’) quite intentionally, in order to be able to make clear that neither laws prescribed by the state nor the moral convictions of isolated subjects but only attitudes that are actually acted out intersubjectively can provide a sound basis for the exercise of that extended freedom” (p. 13). Ethical life as the realization of an abstract freedom cannot be isolated from the mores and customs of a society; rather, it is grounded on them. In addition, the shared practices of a society and social institutions such as family, corporation and the state have an essential role in constituting the identity of an individual. “The individual subject is only who he (or she) is by virtue of society and tradition which brought him into being and which maintains and promotes his identity” (Rose, 2007, p. 142). In other words, I am who I am by means of society in which I live. For this reason, Hegel analyzes the institutions of ethical life and their functions in the realization of freedom.

Hegel asserts that there are three constituents of ethical life: family, civil society and the state. Family constitutes the foundation of ethical life and the state culminates its full development. As to civil society, its function is to constitute the link between family and the state.

4.3.1 The family

Hegel considers family as the foundation of ethical life. The unity in the family depends on the feeling of love. This is a natural unity since it is based on a feeling.

The family has both a subjective and an objective aspect. Its subjective aspect is grounded on the particular interests of two people whereas its objective aspect lies within their free choices to become a single person. The subjective aspect represents the element of particularity while the objective aspect represents the element of universality in this union.

The individuals identify themselves with the family in marriage. The union of two people in the family is seen as a self-limitation at first since they give up their individual personalities in order to constitute a single personality. (Hegel, 1996, p. 201) According to Hegel (1996), this union is, in fact, a liberation because they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it:

The subjective origin of marriage may lie to a greater extent in the particular inclination of the two persons who enter this relationship, or in the foresight and initiative of parents, etc. But its objective origin is the free consent of the persons concerned, and in particular their consent to constitute a single personality and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union. In this respect, their union is a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation. (p. 201)

The parties have their substantial self-consciousness within marriage because they see themselves as a part of a universal. The family is the root of ethical life because the link to universality is first constructed here through the feeling of love. Hegel (1996) claims that “The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the consciousness of this union as a substantial end” (p. 202). The marriage symbolizes the unity of particularity and universality created through the feeling of love. This unity is dissolved in the civil society with the emergence of separation, and then we find similar kind of unity in the state. The unity in the state, however, cannot be based on a feeling. There, instead of love, we find law, which is formal and has a rational content. (Hegel, 1996, p. 199)

4.3.2 Civil society

The dissolution of the unity in the family brings out civil society. Civil society is determined by two principles which are particularity and universality. They correspond to two different aspects of civil society. The principle of particularity represents the differences. In the civil society, particular interests of the individuals are prior to the common ends of society. It is the element of particularity which characterizes civil society. Everyone focuses on their own needs and tries to attain their private ends. But they also know that they cannot attain their ends alone; rather, they need the help of the others. Therefore, they make temporary alliances with others as means to attain their private ends. The alliance ends when the parties realize their private goals. Later, even though it is temporary, this alliance brings out the element of universality in civil society.

The particular person as belonging to the first principle of civil society is in relation with other particular persons. This mutual relationship constitutes the ground of the principle of universality. The possibility of the principle of universality is raised by the satisfaction gained in this mutual relation. Hegel (1996) expresses the origin of the principle of universality in civil society in the following paragraph:

In civil society, each individual is his own end, and all else means nothing to him. But he cannot accomplish the full extent of his ends without reference to others; these others are therefore means to the end of the particular [person]. But through its reference to others, the particular end takes on the form of universality, and gains satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of others. (p. 220)

Although they are conceived as two different elements, there is a close relationship between particularity and universality. “In furthering my end, I further the universal, and this in turn furthers my end” (Hegel, 1996, p. 222). It means that in civil society,

particularity and universality are mutually bound. Thus, particularity and universality together constitute civil society.

Although particularity and universality have become separated in civil society, they are nevertheless bound up with and conditioned by each other. Although each appears to do precisely the opposite of the other and imagines that it can exist only by keeping the other at a distance, each nevertheless has the other as its condition. (Hegel, 1996, p. 221)

At first, particularity might be regarded as the sole principle which rules over civil society, but it particularity gives rise to universality. If individuals would not try to realize their private ends, the alliance could not come out. Furthermore, it is universality which allows for particularity since, without the alliance with others, no one can further his private ends or vice versa.

While explaining the particular and universal aspect of society, Hegel asserts that civil society has three moments within: the system of needs, the administration of justice and the police and the corporation. Those are the constituents of civil society. (Hegel, 1996, p. 226) Among them, the system of needs brings out differentiation and alienation. Based on utilitarian principles, “society was justified not by what it was or expressed, but by what it achieved, the fulfilment of men's needs, desires and purposes. Society came to be seen as an instrument, and its different modes and structures were to be studied scientifically for their effects on human happiness.” (Taylor, 1984, p. 191) This conception of society prevents men from identifying themselves with society, and thus creates alienation. Hegel (1996) argues that “civil society tears the individual [individuum] away from family ties, alienates the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-sufficient persons” (p. 263). The system of needs signifies the negative aspect of civil society, but Hegel argues that civil society as the system of needs is necessary for the

self-actualization of the individual since everyone has the right to develop and express their individual differences (1996, p. 140). It is the right of particularity.

Hegel first defines civil society as the system of needs. But it is not the only constituent. According to him, civil society is not entirely a negative state, as we can understand from the discussion of particularity and universality. Civil society, as the stage in which both particularity and universality are found, is an intermediary between the family and the state (Hegel, 1996, p. 220). This mediation between the family and the state can be provided through the corporation. The corporation serves as community in civil society by providing the element of universality. The members of a corporation feel themselves as a part of a whole. The unity which is lost by the dissolution of the family is recovered by the corporation. Therefore, civil society is necessary for the existence of the state. Anderson points out that the unity of particularity and universality is first actualized in civil society through corporations. For this reason, civil society for Hegel means more than market relations or the system of needs. Although this unity is first actualized in civil society, its perfect manifestation is seen in the state. The focus is the particularity in civil society. The state creates the awareness of this unity and its focus is universality rather than the particularity (Anderson, 2009, p. 152).

In the stage of civil society, there is a mutually binding relationship between the citizens and civil society. The citizens have rights within society and in turn they have duties towards it. Hegel (1996) states that “civil society must protect its members and defend their rights, just as the individual [*der Einzelle*] owes a duty to the rights of civil society” (p. 263). The rights of the individuals are protected by the administration of justice.

In the system of needs, people recognize themselves in their particularity. Apart from particularity through the administration of justice universality is entered into civil society. But this unity is a relative one which is realized by the corporation. The corporation realizes the relative unity of subjective particularity and the universality. “Through the cooperative nature of civil society, it is through estates that civil society relates to the state as a whole. In striving for a common aim rather than a purely individual one, man allows universality into the extreme particularity of society.” (Rose, 2007, pp. 142-157) In the corporation – in general, in the estates – individuals are united in their effort to realize common ends. Thus, they relate to the universal. This relation with the universal provides the ground for the state.

The police and the corporation mediate between the family and the state by creating a unity between the particular and universal. “These institutions constitute the actualization of the unity of particularity and universality in civil society, in as much as they have the interests of both individuals and the community as their concern” (Anderson, 2009, p. 152). Thus, they are ethically mediating institutions between the family and the state.

Hegel (1996) argues that “the family is the first ethical root of the state; the corporation is the second, and it is based in civil society” (p. 272). The corporation has the role of a family of caring for its members in the civil society. The difference is that the family functions by the feeling of love, whereas the corporation functions by legal regulations. Although the root of the state is the family, its factual basis is grounded on the estates. Hegel (1996) assigns special importance to the estates, “because private persons, despite their selfishness, find it necessary to have recourse to others” (p. 234). The unity in the family is stronger than the unity in civil society but particularization has not yet emerged in the family. For a perfect unity, which can

be found in the state, the principle of particularity is required. Only then do individuals recognize themselves in relation to the universal, but without sacrificing their distinct identity and without being lost in the universal. This principle is provided within the civil society, so the estates, as the uniting element in civil society, have more importance than the family.

Hegel maintains that, throughout history, three kinds of estates have emerged in accordance with the concept. These are the substantial estate, the formal estate and the universal estate. (Hegel, 1996, p. 234) Each corresponds to an element in ethical life. The substantial estate is the agricultural estate which is found in the family – the natural society. It contains the concrete universal. The universal estate is found in the state. It has the universal as an end to its activity. The formal estate is the estate of trade and industry which has emerged in the civil society. Its focus is the particular. And the corporation is an institution which appears in the formal estate (Hegel, 1996, p. 270).

The police and corporation

In the civil society, police and corporation constitute the link to the universal. The police is an institution which is responsible for the protection and security of the members of civil society and the particular interests of the individuals. The police maintain order by enforcing the laws which binds all of its members. Yet it is an external order so long as it is provided by an external authority, namely, the police. The police function as an external order which has a role in the actualization of the universal inherent in civil society (Hegel, 1996, p. 269). On the other hand, the corporation maintains the unity beyond that external order in civil society. Its real function is to unite people by setting common ends. The universal element – the

unity – in civil society is nourished by the corporation through the cooperative efforts of individuals to a shared end. Civil society gives rise to the estate of trade and industry, whose focus is the particular. The corporation as a characteristic of this intermediary estate provides the unity between the particular and universal (Hegel, 1996, p. 270).

Hegel (1996) asserts that the corporation has the role of a second family (p. 271). It has the role “to protect its members against particular contingencies, and to educate others so as to make them eligible for membership” by the approval of public authority (Hegel, 1996, p. 271). This is the formal characterization of the corporation. Its formal aspect is constituted by the legal approval of public authority. The corporation has special importance beyond its formal function because it makes mutual recognition possible. Hegel argues that an individual gains recognition by being a member of a corporation. He is recognized as a member on the condition that he acts in conformity with the regulations adopted within a corporation. Since corporations are legally regulated institutions, it is initially a legal recognition which is gained by just being a member of a corporation. The legal recognition refers to having the honor of belonging to an estate. The lack of legal recognition causes the individual to search for recognition in the selfish aspects of his trade such as gaining more money or having more reputation. But it cannot provide him the mutual recognition, the satisfaction of being a part of a whole. Thus, the life of an individual becomes unstable. Hegel (1996) explains the significance of legal recognition in the following paragraph:

If the individual [*der Einzelne*] is not a member of a legally recognized [*berechtigten*] corporation (and it is only through legal recognition that a community becomes a corporation), he is without the honour of belonging to an estate, his isolation reduces him to the selfish aspect of his trade, and his livelihood and satisfaction lack stability. He will accordingly try to gain recognition through the external manifestations of success in his trade, and

these are without limit [*unbegrenzt*], because it is impossible for him to live in a way appropriate to his estate if his estate does not exist; for a community can exist in civil society only if it is legally constituted and recognized. (p. 272)

It is not only a legal recognition which the corporation provides. The member of a corporation works to promote the ends of the corporation which he belongs to. In time, the common ends of the corporation become more salient than his selfish interests. He is united with others in working for a common end. Thus, he is recognized by others, and he recognizes himself as belonging to a whole, which is the universal. (1996, p. 271)

In the civil society, the principles of particularity and universality are at work in a close relationship. Individuals have the right to pursue their particular welfare, and this right is actualized within the union of particularity and abstract legal universality (Hegel, 1996, p. 273). The members of civil society concentrate on fulfilling their own private ends. But they cannot realize it on their own. In order to fulfill their private ends, they need to work with others. The private ends are required to integrate with the common ends. This brings out the idea of a universal activity because the individuals with private ends must work together. The universal activity is a necessity which at first lacks consciousness. The awareness of the universal activity can only be developed within the corporation. The members of a corporation are aware of the universal activity in which they are engaged. They conceive it not only as a means to realize their private ends but as a common end to be realized.

Hegel argues that in ethical life, men must be provided a universal activity. In ancient times, it was provided by the state. But in the modern times, it is not always provided by the state but by the corporation. In the corporation, individuals are consciously engaged in universal activity:

In our modern states, the citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the state; but it is necessary to provide ethical man with a universal activity in addition to his private end. This universal [activity], which the modern state does not always offer him, can be found in the corporation. We saw earlier that, in providing for himself, the individual [*das Individuum*] in civil society is also acting for others. But this unconscious necessity is not enough; only in the corporation does it become a knowing and thinking [part of] ethical life. (Hegel, 1996, p. 273)

Corporations are the social institutions originated within the civil society. Social institutions have the role to realize freedom in the realm of particularity. In the family, individuals attain their rights directly, but in the civil society they attain it through social institutions. In these institutions, they discover self-consciousness by attaining an occupation and engaging universal activity. In gaining self-consciousness they recognize the universal aspect of their particular interests. (Hegel, 1996, p. 287)

It is important to notice that in Hegel's theory, occupation and activity are the keys to constructing the relationship between the particular and the universal in civil society. Hegel introduces the notion of universal activity while he talks about the activity performed in the corporation. The universal activity refers to the work done for the common ends of the corporation. What makes it a universal activity is that the members of the corporation embrace the common ends of the corporation as their own and they work for it. Thus, they relate to the universal. Through the corporation individuals with private ends are united for the common ends.

To sum up, Hegel's conception of civil society has its difference in the idea of the corporations. The corporation generates the ethical element in civil society. Through this ethical element, civil society cannot be seen as merely a market place. The corporation is "a means of giving the isolated trade an ethical status, and of admitting it to a circle in which it gains strength and honour" (Hegel, 1996, p. 273).

Without corporations, civil society would be a ruthless competitive market place in which everyone pursues his private ends without caring for the others, seeing them only as a means to realize his selfish interests. In the original distinction of Tönnies, society is characterized as a social institution in which everyone pursues his private ends and where relationships are built on mistrust. This idea led Heidegger to argue for the revitalization of the communal ties, but Hegel argues for the opposite. According to him, society provides a unity above selfish interests and therefore it is not something to be gotten rid of, but it is a necessary stage.

Furthermore, in the original distinction, community is characterized by a natural unity among the members. There is an immediate recognition in community which is given unconditionally, but this recognition does not involve the recognition of particularity or individual differences. On the other hand, in civil society, individual differences are recognized. However, it lacks the natural unity which is found in community. In Hegel's conception of civil society, both particularity and unity – universality – are found. In addition to that, in this conception, society is not regarded as decadence but a necessary stage for the emergence of the highest community, which is the state.

As a result, through the corporation, civil society is conceived as a necessary stage for the realization of the higher community because the unity of particularity and universality is first actualized there. But as Anderson (2009) points out, in the corporations, the members lack the reflection on this unity (p. 152). Nevertheless, the corporation has a limited end, which is completed by the full integration of the individual to the universal. "The sphere of civil society thus passes over into the state" (Hegel, 1996, p. 273). The corporation has an intermediary role between the family and the state which ceases with the actualization of the state proper.

4.3.3 The state

Hegel describes the state as a larger community in which each member identifies himself with this whole. It must be stressed that Hegel has a peculiar conception of the state. His conception is best understood in opposition to the modern contract theories, which characterize the state as a rational instrument to maintain order. Hegel argues that civil society is often misconceived as the state. It is civil society, not the state, which is constructed by the approval of particular wills. Therefore, Hegel (1996) characterizes civil society as the external state and the state based on need (p. 221). “In this society everyone is an end to himself; all others are for him nothing. And yet without coming into relation with others, he cannot realize his ends.” (Hegel, 1996, pp. 154-155) For the sake of realizing private ends, individuals come to an agreement with each other. But the origin of a state cannot be conceived as an agreement. Hegel claims that the state is not a mere aggregation of particular interests but a union among its members. If the state was constructed through an agreement of particular wills, it would be based on a chance:

If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of individuals [*der Einzelnen*] as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also follows from this that membership of the state is an optional matter. (Hegel, 1996, p. 276)

Hegel thinks that if we reduce the state to an institution which provides security and protection, its emergence becomes an optional matter as in the contract theories of the state. For Hegel, the emergence of the state is a necessity. The state is based on a necessity as the self-realization of the spirit, which is the universal will. The universal will requires the individual will to realize itself. To put it differently, the individual will has a role in the self-realization of the universal will by seeing the necessity in it and consciously identifying itself with the universal will.

Like the civil society, the state contains the elements of both particularity and universality but the focus is the latter. In the state proper, particularity is developed and yet brought back to universality. “Thus, the universal must be activated, but subjectivity on the other hand must be developed as a living whole. Only when both moments are present [*Bestelzen*] in full measure can the state be regarded as articulated and truly organized.” (Hegel, 1996, p. 283) For the state to be in balance, both moments must be present in proper measure.

In history “man starts off as an immediate being, sunk in his particular needs and drives, with only the haziest, most primitive sense of the universal” (Hegel, 1996, p. 366). Then he becomes a member of a society, which represents a larger life for Hegel. Taylor argues that man must be a part of a community since he can only achieve his ends by being a part of a public life of a community. The larger life refers to the culture – social norms and practices – of a society. “The life of a language and culture is one whose locus is larger than that of the individual. It happens in community. The individual possesses this culture, and hence his identity, by participating in this larger life.” (Taylor, 1979, p. 87). The identity of an individual is shaped by the culture of a society. The larger life in which man integrates into the universal through the institutions and practices represents the state. “Thus, the state which is fully rational will be one which expresses in its institutions and practices the most important ideas and norms which its citizens recognize, and by which they define their identity” (Taylor, 1979, p. 94).

Hegel (1996) argues that in the ancient states the element of universality was present, but particularity had not yet developed (p. 283). The subjective end was lost in the end of the state, namely, in the universal end. There was no place for individual rights, especially the right to think differently from the state. (Beiser,

2005, p. 228) “For them, the ultimate factor was the will of the state” (Hegel, 1996, p. 285). Beiser (2005) adds that ancient republics did not allow the citizens to seek their own interests (p. 228). This means that particularity has not been developed properly yet. Hegel (1996) gives the example of Plato’s republic, in which subjective freedom is not recognized since the tasks of the individuals are assigned by public authorities (p. 286). He argues that “subjective freedom, which must be respected, requires freedom of choice on the part of the individuals” (1996, p. 286). Without the freedom of choice concerning one’s activities, subjective freedom cannot be realized, whereas in the modern states, the view, volition and conscience of the individual is the focus. Individuals expect their inner life to be respected (Hegel, 1996, p. 285). “The essence of the modern state is that the universal should be linked with the complete freedom of particularity” (Hegel, 1996, p. 283). The universal allows and develops the right to particularity in the modern state. Only in there we see the conscious unity of the private ends of the individuals and the end of the state. Williams (1997) argues that Hegel tries to combine the ancient and modern thinking in his theory of the state (p. 235). The element of universality represents the ancient thinking and the element of particularity, which allows for differences represents modern thinking. In his theory of the state Hegel combines them both.

Taylor emphasizes the difference of Hegel’s state from the ancient idea of the state. He asserts that in modernity “we have developed a consciousness of the individual which had no place in the ancient polis” (1979, p. 109). In the Greek polis, there was an immediate bond between the state and its members. Individuality was lacking there and was developed later in modernity. In this respect, modernity characterizes the separation of the individual from the state. It is the negation of the immediate unity found in the first place. In modern civil societies, the consciousness

of individuality is developed, but the bond between the individual and the state is lost. In the civil society, individuals cannot fully identify themselves with the state. The reconstruction of this bond between the individual and the state requires the negation of the separation in the civil society through corporations. Thus, the mediated unity between the individual and the state can be developed.

In the state, individual ends are integrated into the ends of the state. In the following paragraph, Taylor explains that the state as a larger community constitutes the ground for the identity of the individuals by removing the opposition of self-goal and other-goal.

The state or the community has a higher life; its parts are related as the parts of an organism. Thus the individual is not serving an end separate from him; rather he is serving a larger goal which is the ground of his identity, for he only is the individual he is in this larger life. We have gone beyond the opposition of self-goal and other-goal. (Taylor, 1979, p. 86)

In the state, the self-goal of the individual is identified with the common goals of a society. When man fails to identify himself with the state, he is left with subjective ends. He sees himself in isolation from society as an individual with selfish interests. It gives rise to individualism. Taylor distinguishes individualism from individuality. He says that “individualism comes... when men cease to identify with the community’s life, when they reflect, that is, turn back on themselves, and see themselves most importantly as individuals with individual goals” (Taylor, 1979, p. 91). According to Taylor, to reach the perfect community, which is the state in which everyone feels at home, men must overcome individualism.

Hegel’s ethical life, with its social institutions, constitutes the stages in the self-realization of the spirit in history. It becomes more apparent when he talks about the state as the final stage in the realization of the spirit. The idea of the realization of

the spirit can be traced back to the *Introduction to Philosophy of History*, where we can find a detailed explanation.

4.4 The realization of spirit in the history

Hegel's system of ethical life can be analyzed from the perspective of the progress in history. Hegel argues that there is a development in history, and it is directed towards an end which is the self-realization of the spirit. (Hegel, 1988, p. 57) He asserts that "world history begins with its universal goal: the fulfillment of the concept of Spirit" (Hegel, 1988, p. 27). Then he links it to freedom, saying that "the idea of freedom is the essential nature of Spirit and the final goal of history" (Hegel, 1988, p. 26). In the *Introduction to The History of Philosophy* (1988) he sets the final goal of history as the realization of the idea of freedom.

Hegel (1988) explains the nature of the development in history as follows: "The logical nature, and moreover the dialectical nature of the concept in general is that it is self-determining: it posits determinations in itself, then negates them, and thereby gains in this negation (*Aufheben*) an affirmative, richer, and more concrete determination" (1988, p. 67). The development in history takes place through negation till it reaches its full realization. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel introduces the stages of the realization of freedom in relation to the notion of negation. The ethical life with its institutions is the condition for the realization of the idea. The idea or the spirit is realized in history through stages (1988, p. 96). The realization of the idea has its origin in the family, civil society constitutes the mediary stage, and it is fully realized in the state. The state is the final end towards which all other stages are directed. The spirit fully actualizes itself in the state. The state as the last stage in the realization of the spirit represents the perfect community.

The difference of the state from the previous communities is that it is fully adequate to the concept (Taylor, 1997, p. 96).

Hegel (1988) argues that subjective will and its activities are means to realize the goal of the Spirit and “this goal is none other than to find itself, to come to itself, and to behold itself as actuality” (p. 28). This brings out the idea of the compatibility of necessity and freedom. History follows a necessary course which is ruled by reason. The individual has the role to see the necessity hidden in history, namely the self-actualization of the idea and work for it. In this respect freedom is grasped as to see this necessity and to act upon it.

The historical stages are set with necessity by the Idea (Hegel, 1988, p. 28). Hegel’s view on the necessity in history, or in the realization of spirit, determines his account of the state. Ethical life is the process of the self-actualization of the spirit, which is not possible without unity in the family and particularity in the civil society (Hegel, 1996, p. 286). But the self-actualization of the spirit is completed in the state. The state is the last stage in ethical life. While Hegel talks about the state, he mentions the concepts of ‘the spirit’, ‘the concept’ and ‘the idea’, and he uses them interchangeably. He argues that the state is the realization of the spirit. In this self-actualization, the state brings the individual to its concrete existence. In other words, an individual has objectivity only by being a member of the state (Hegel, 1996, p. 276).

The emergence of the state cannot be considered as the result of the volition of individuals, as it is conceived in the theories of contract. Rather, it is the result of a necessity. “In an important way, therefore the agency is not fully ours. We did not design and plan the rational state and will it into existence. It grew through history.” (Taylor, 1977, p. 420) According to him, “the public life of the state has this crucial

importance for men because the norms and ideas it expresses are not just human inventions. On the contrary, the state expresses the Idea, the ontological structure of things.” (Taylor, 1979, p. 93)

Hegel’s conception of the state as an end towards which history progresses brings out the question whether Hegel argues that contemporary states are the state proper. Or to put it differently, whether, for him, history has reached this end. The following paragraph, where Hegel distinguishes the perfect state from the imperfect one, might help us to have an understanding of this issue.

The Idea of the state in modern times has the distinctive characteristic that the state is the actualization of freedom not in accordance with subjective caprice, but in accordance with the concept of the will, i.e. in accordance with its universality and divinity. Imperfect states are those in which the Idea of the state is still invisible and where the particular determinations of this Idea have not yet reached free self-sufficiency. (Hegel, 1996, p. 282)

In this paragraph, Hegel argues that the modern idea of the state characterizes the state proper, but it does not follow that all the existing states in modern times are perfect states. Basically, what it amounts to is that all the modern states have the potential to be perfect states. For a state to be a perfect one, the Idea must be actualized. Hegel, however, implies that there are states in which the modern idea of the state is invisible. Thus, we cannot claim that all states existing in modern times are perfect states.

Hegel argues that the determining characteristic of the imperfect states is that they are governed in accordance with subjective caprice. On the other hand, perfect states are the ones in which subjective freedom is compatible with the universal will. “Only when both moments are present in full measure can the state be regarded as articulated and truly organized” (Hegel, 1996, p. 283). The state is in balance only if particular ends of the individuals become identical with the universal end. “What

matters most is that the law of reason should merge with the law of particular freedom, and that my particular end should become identical with the universal; otherwise, the state must hang in the air” (Hegel, 1996, p. 287). But if subjective ends of the individuals are not satisfied, they cannot identify themselves with the state (1996, p. 287). For this reason, the state must provide the satisfaction of the subjective ends of individuals.

The perfect state can be thought as a larger community in which subjective ends and particular differences of individuals are recognized, yet are made compatible with the ends of a society. This is possible when the individuals identify themselves with the state through the customs and practices of a society. The complete realization of the spirit requires man to link himself to the universal. When the individual identifies himself with the state, the self-realization of the spirit is completed.

Hegel’s idea of the development in history and his metaphysical system in general, which involves concepts like Idea or Spirit, are criticized as being ambiguous and speculative. And this criticism leads to the tendency of reading Hegel’s epistemological and political thoughts in isolation from his metaphysics. Despite its problems, taking out metaphysics upon which he grounds his entire system might result in a misconception of his thoughts. Beiser (2006) says that this approach overlooks almost 90 percent of Hegel’s thoughts, including his answer to the Kantian challenge on metaphysics (p. 3). Neither denying metaphysics as a mysticism or a speculation nor going after solely abstract and general concepts can provide an accurate reading of Hegel (Beiser, 2006, p. 3). It might be argued that, to understand Hegel, one must study his metaphysics and see its peculiarity. In his metaphysics, Hegel relates what is conceptual and thus potential to what is real and actual. By

defining the realization of the spirit in terms of the intersubjective self-awareness of freedom, he allows for the possibility of an analysis from the perspective of the development of mutual recognition. Thus, the realization of the spirit cannot be thought independently of the individuals who become mutually self-conscious (Beiser, 1993, p. 293).

The questions of whether Hegel's metaphysics is substantial or whether it is adoptable are not directly relevant to our goal in this work. For this reason, without going into the details of this discussion, I will focus on his views on civil society in relation to the notion of mutual recognition.

As I have stated, the development in ethical life can also be analyzed from the perspective of the notion of recognition. Institutions in ethical life, which are family, corporation, and the state, provide recognition for their members and thus create unity. In the following part, I will exhibit the role of recognition in the development of ethical life and unity. To this end, I will first investigate the notion of recognition as it shows up in one of Hegel's early works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and then I will discuss the function of recognition in the *Philosophy of Right*. And since my aim is to show that unity can be developed within the civil society, I will focus especially on the mutual recognition provided by the corporation.

4.5 The theory of recognition

In this part, it will be argued that recognition is the key concept to understanding Hegel's system of ethical life. Williams (2012) argues that "recognition constitutes the general structure of Hegel's ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*)" (p. 35). Although he does not explicitly present a theory of recognition in the *Philosophy of Right*, with a closer look, the significance of this notion can be observed in the part on ethical life, and

also in his other works. The importance and the role of the notion of recognition in Hegel's entire system is pointed out by many people. Rockmore (1993) argues that, in modern political philosophy, social life is based on the idea of self-preservation, but for Hegel, it is the desire for recognition which brings out relationality. And the desire for recognition is the most basic human need. Taylor (1994) states that "recognition is not a courtesy we owe people, it is a vital human need" (p. 26). Russon (2011) argues that mutual recognition is what gives rise to the sense of community in Hegel's theory. He also states that "equal recognition – the situation of a cooperative enactment of a situation in which we each recognize ourselves and others as an integrated community of equals – is what Hegel calls 'Geist', 'spirit', 'the 'I' that is we and the we that is 'I'" (Russon, in Houlgate, 2011, p. 58).

In this study, it is claimed that recognition has a role to create the sense of unity in the ethical life; family, civil society and the state. Since the aim of this study is to account for the possibility of unity in the civil society, I will focus on the *Philosophy of Right*, where he expresses the role of mutual recognition in society. To get a better grasp of the notion of recognition, I will first analyze the concept as it appears in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the section on lordship and bondage, commonly known as the master and slave dialectic. There, he clearly elaborates on this notion, while explaining the development of self-consciousness. In analyzing the notion of mutual recognition, I will make reference to the concept of contradiction, which Hegel explains in detail in the *Science of Logic*.

4.5.1 Recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Recognition shows up as the key concept in both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Philosophy of Right*. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the development of self-

consciousness from consciousness and in the *Philosophy of Right*, the realization of freedom in relation to social institutions is analyzed in relation to the notion of recognition.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is often considered the first of his mature works, which is followed by the *Science of Logic* and the *Philosophy of Right*. (See Stern, 2002, pp. 4-8.) Stern (2002) argues that, in his mature works, "Hegel takes it that we are responsible for creating the kind of intellectual and social environment that lead us to find the world intellectually and socially alien, as the World itself is and should be a 'home' to us" (p. 13). The reason for this alienation is that we conceptualize things one-sidedly or in oppositions, such as something being either particular or universal, free or determined, immediate or mediated. Hegel discusses it in relation to the concept of contradiction. In his mature works, Hegel tries to overcome these oppositions so that individuals feel at home. Hegel characterizes the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an introduction to his system because it lays out two things: first, the problems which are caused by thinking in oppositions, and second, the method of dialectical thinking, which allows us to relate to the world in a proper way. Hegel states that overcoming oppositions is possible through dialectical thinking in which it is recognized that conceptions which are regarded as one-sided are indeed inseparable (Houlgate, 1988, p. 14). Dialectical thinking brings out mutual recognition.

Hegel argues that recognition is the necessary condition for gaining self-consciousness in a way that its deriving force is the desire for recognition (Wood, 1990, p. 85). "'Self-consciousness' here refers not to the awareness of oneself as a self-identical subject of experience but instead to what could be called a *self-conception*" (Neuhouser, in Westphal, 2009, p. 38). According to Taylor (1994),

recognition is the fundamental element in the development of one's identity. He says that "our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *misrecognition* of others" (1994, p. 25). Identity as self-consciousness is not an immediate relation; rather, it is mediated through other consciousness, which means that my identity depends on others. In the proper self-conception, one perceives himself as overcoming the oppositions. Hegel (1977) explains the process of gaining self-consciousness by elaborating on the relationship between master and slave:

They exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman. (p. 115)

In this paragraph, Hegel distinguishes two types of consciousness: being for itself and being for another, which he calls "independent consciousness" and "dependent consciousness". Initially, the former is called mastery and the latter is called slavery. The construction of a master and slave relationship presupposes a struggle for recognition, which then turns into a life and death struggle. To end this struggle, out of fear, one gives up the request for recognition and becomes a slave. In this relation, the master gets recognition without recognizing the other, namely, the slave, and the slave gives up his own desire, remains unrecognized and works for the realization of the master's desires. He recognizes the other as the master, and he recognizes himself as the master's slave (Kojève, 1980, p. 8). Thus, the slave becomes the recognizing part and the master is the one which is recognized; but this recognition is one-sided and unequal (Hegel, 1977, p. 116). In this case, the master has an immediate relation to himself, without relating to anything external. He develops an independent self-consciousness. It is what Hegel characterizes as "I am I," but he argues that "self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (Hegel,

1977, p. 10). Thus, the independent self-consciousness of the master and the recognition he gains from the slave is not complete. In this condition, the master does not have real freedom because one has freedom if he liberates others instead of dominating. The success of the master is an illusion, and he is not in the condition, as he initially desired (Wood, 1990, p. 88).

Hegel (1977) argues that, as opposed to the initial picture, it is the slave who will develop a true independent consciousness (p. 117). It is through his work for the master, “the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is” (Hegel, 1977, p. 118). “In his work the slave labours for someone else’s satisfaction, and so learns respect for the independent existence of the objects around him” (Stern, 2002, p. 85). And he arrives at a level of self-consciousness which cannot be acquired by the master.

Hegel (1977) explains the process of attaining a fully developed self-consciousness in the following paragraph:

Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost *itself* for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self. (p. 111)

The first step in the master and slave relationship is that the slave gives up his independent existence and becomes dependent on the master. By doing so, he loses himself for the other, but then, in the other, he finds his true self and gains a fully developed self-consciousness. What is first seen as a loss turns out to be a gain. The slave gains himself, by losing himself. Hegel (1977) states that “although, as consciousness, it does indeed come *out of itself*, yet, though out of itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself, *is for itself*, and the self outside it, is for *it*” (p. 112) The slave turns back to itself, by stepping out of itself. These expressions seem to involve a contradiction. but as I have stated, Hegel develops an alternative to the

traditional one-sided thinking, and it becomes apparent when he explains the master and slave relationship. For him, through these contradictions, one can step into a fully developed level of consciousness. By starting with the other, actively removing it and turning back to itself, consciousness moves into self-consciousness (Houlgate, 2013, p. 83). Hegel (1977) explains self-consciousness in the following paragraph. In this level of consciousness;

Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another. (p. 112)

Hegel argues that an individual relates to himself through the mediation of the other, he recognizes himself as mutually recognizing one another. Thus, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the desire for recognition is determined as the driving force and mutual recognition is determined as the condition for fully developed self-consciousness.

4.5.2 Mutual recognition in the *Philosophy of Right*

As I have stated, mutual recognition is introduced as the condition for self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but in the *Philosophy of Right*, it functions as the uniting element in society. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel analyzes the realization of the Spirit or the development of absolute freedom by investigating social institutions with reference to the notion of recognition.

As I have mentioned, the family is the beginning and the ground of ethical life. Its role is to make the transition from natural life to ethical life. Accordingly, recognition is first seen in the family. Family relations are characterized by love, and love is the origin of recognition in the family. A member of a family is recognized as

he or she is just being a member of that family through love. Love removes the distinction between being-for-self and being-for-other. At first, being-for-self and being-for-other seem to be mutually exclusive seems to have contradiction. It is thought that individuals cannot have independent existence and a mutual bond at the same time. For Hegel, however, it is possible through the feeling of love. When it comes to love, this independent separate existence is not sufficient (Williams, 1997). Through love the self-sufficient independence is negated and the independence which involves both being-for-other and being-for-self is developed. This is the first step in the realization of freedom. “Thus, love overcomes the mutual exclusion between selves by removing the opposition between being-for-other and being-for-self” (Williams, 1997, p. 217). At first sight it seems the loss of the independence, but actually it brings genuine independence.

Hegel explains the realization of freedom in the family in relation to the moments of recognition, in section 158. He argues that there are two moments of recognition in the family. “The first moment of recognition is the loss of the self before the other” (Williams, 1997, p. 215). It is the negation of the self as an independent personhood. “In love, I negate my independence” (Williams, 1997, p. 219). “The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me” (Hegel, 1996, p. 199). Namely, I gain myself in another person by losing myself in the first place. It is both a loss and gain at the same time. Therefore, love involves a contradiction. Hegel (1996) argues that it is the most immense contradiction (p. 199), but love both produces and resolves this contradiction. It produces a contradiction because it involves both independence of the self and its dependence on the other. But it also

resolves this contradiction because one recognizes his true self through this contradiction.

Genuine independence is developed when the contradiction is resolved by the mutual recognition of the lovers. Williams calls it substantive independence. He states that it also enlarges the selfhood of the lovers. Strengthening the selfhood requires removing self-sufficient subjectivity through love and mutual recognition rooted in that love:

Substantive independence is intersubjective and achieved through reciprocal recognition. Here being in relation to the other does not cancel my genuine independence and freedom; rather independence and freedom are realized together in union with the other. (Williams, 1997, p. 217)

The self-sufficient independence is the abstract freedom and it becomes more concrete through mutual recognition in the family. Although union with another in the family brings more satisfying freedom comparing to self-sufficient independence, it still is not freedom in the fully concrete sense.

There are further stages in the realization of freedom and in the development of recognition, as well. Civil society is the stage that comes after the family as the dissolution of the ethical element. It is the dissolution of the unity in the family. The unity in the family is replaced by reflective separation and difference in the civil society (Williams, 1997). The immediate unity between the individual and family leaves its place to isolation and atomized individuals. It is the principle of particularity which works in civil society. The principle of particularity gives rise to subjective freedom. For Hegel, the subjective freedom and the principle of particularity is a modern development, and so is civil society. Subjective freedom is what was lacking in the ancient thinking; in this sense, it is a development of modernity, but it is not sufficient because it lacks conscious connection to universal.

Hegel calls civil society “the external state”. It is the state based on need. The end of the external state is to serve the private self-interests of the individuals. The connection of individual to the universal – if there is any – is mediated by private interests (Williams, 1997).

In civil society, as an external state, recognition has a formal character. It means that individuals are not recognized as they are, but through the things that are externally appraised. Williams calls it external recognition. In civil society, people recognize each other, not as whole human beings, but only in their abstract formal capacities as owners of property, or as abstract laborers necessary for the mutual satisfaction of needs (Williams, 1997, p. 144). An individual is not recognized because of who he is, as he is recognized in the family. Rather, recognition is gained through the abstract formal capacities he has. It follows that, if one loses those formal capacities, the recognition which he gains disappears.

One should pay attention to the point that external recognition is not the only type of recognition found in society. When Hegel talks about civil society, he clarifies that it cannot be seen merely as a market economy in which everything is reduced to exchange and the satisfaction of mutual interests. Corporations transcend formal relations developed in the external state and offer the possibility of a unity among the members of civil society. There, in the corporation, lies the possibility of a kind of recognition different from the external one.

Williams argues that in civil society, there are two types of recognition, which correspond to two aspects of civil society: external recognition and mutual recognition. External recognition develops a formal unity among the members of a society, whereas mutual recognition develops an internal unity. External recognition is grounded on the atomistic aspect of civil society in which others are recognized as

a means to realize self-interests of the individuals. On the other hand, mutual recognition is possible through the corporations. Corporations are self-regulating voluntary organizations. They are like guilds, which care for their members. The members of a corporation have recognition and honor only by being a member of that corporation, such as in the family. Williams (1997) says that “recognition in the determinate mode of honor is the medium wherein the individual is raised to universality” (1997, p. 261). Honor gained by being a member of a corporation is the manifestation of the recognition in the corporation. The members of a corporation recognize themselves and are recognized by others both as individuals and as belonging to a whole – which is the corporation.

Through mutual recognition in the corporation, the self-sufficient particularity is enlarged to universality. The members of a corporation pursue both their private ends and the ends of the corporation since what is private becomes compatible with the universal. Particular ends and universal-social ends are united through the activities performed in the corporations and individuals head towards the universal. “Hegel believes that the corporations can restrain and transform the ethos of self-seeking particularity into the pursuit of universal-social-ethical ends” (Williams, 1997, p. 225). Corporations constitute the ethical aspect of the civil society and they are the mediating institutions between the family and the state, which is a higher community.

We have seen that both particularity and universality – we may also say unity – are inherent in civil society, but Hegel notes that this unity is not complete since it lacks the consciousness of the individual. According to him, complete unity is found in the state with the development of awareness of that unity. This is the last stage in the realization of freedom. The state is the last stage in the development of

recognition as well. In the state, the members who are conscious of their relationship to the universal are mutually recognized, both as particular individuals and belonging to a whole.

The state is characterized as the highest ethical community in Hegel's theory. "We' in Hegel's account of ethical life, and the concept of state is intended to recapture on a higher level the ethical community and sense of membership inherent in family" (Williams, 1997, p. 257). The state is a larger ethical community in which the members identify themselves with the whole through the adopted customs and practices. According to Williams (1997), when the members consciously identify themselves with the state, they are recognized as particular individuals who are a part of a whole. He asserts that recognition is a process through which the 'I' becomes a We. It is the foundation of the unity of particular and universal. Through mutual recognition a particular individual feels himself as a part of a whole, which is a community. Through the sense of belonging to a whole, mutual recognition provides the individual to feel himself at home. Thus, the isolation and the alienation which originate in civil society are overcome.

To sum up, in Hegel's system of ethical life, mutual recognition is developed first in the family, then in the corporation, and finally in the state. Mutual recognition, which is provided by the universal activity performed in the corporation creates unity in civil society. The influence of Hegel's idea of unity in society can be observed in Durkheim's thoughts. Like Hegel, Durkheim argues that, through the universal activity performed in the corporation, unity can be developed in society. Durkheim's thoughts are of special importance for our purpose since it can be considered as an alternative to Tönnies's characterization of community and society.

Therefore, in section 4.6, I will focus on Durkheim's idea of solidarity in comparison with Tönnies' and Hegel's thoughts.

4.6 Hegel's influence on Durkheim's idea of solidarity in society

Hegel's conception of society has been very influential in Durkheim's thoughts.

Following Hegel, in *The Division of Labour in Society* (1984), he argues that unity is developed by the universal activity which is performed in the corporation.

Furthermore, he asserts that society is not a realm which involves only selfish interests of the individuals but rather a realm where solidarity might be developed.

Thus, appealing to Hegel's conception of civil society, Durkheim criticizes Tönnies' distinction of community and society and presents an alternative to it.

After Hegel, both Tönnies and Durkheim analyze social structure. Even though both are influenced by Hegel and their analysis of the social structure have some similarities, they develop quite different perspectives on civil society.

Durkheim deals with Tönnies' distinction and criticizes it from several angles. His criticism is crucial for us to show how Tönnies' conception of society leads us to the idea that unity cannot be developed in society, whereas Hegel's conception can provide the ground for its possibility.

Tönnies' conception of civil society has the influence of Hegel's system of needs, which is constituted by the element of particularity. In Hegel's view, the system of needs constitutes the negative aspect of civil society. (Hegel, 1996, p. 140.) Hegel defines the system of needs as the market system. In the system of needs, individuals recognize themselves in their particularity, which means that everyone is out there only for himself and all else means nothing to him (Hegel, 1996, p. 220). But unlike Tönnies, in Hegel's conceptualization, civil society is not

entirely a negative state. In civil society, the element of particularity gives rise to the element of universality. According to Hegel, there is a reciprocal relationship between these two elements. He states that “in furthering my end, I further the universal, and this in turn furthers my end” (Hegel, 1996, p. 222). One cannot realize his end without the help of others. Namely, we need others to achieve our goals and the others need us as well. The mutual satisfaction gained in this relation brings out the element of universality, which is the ground for unity. In working together, individuals feel a part of the universal, which then unites them. Tönnies disregards the element of universality in civil society. In his view, universality can only be found in community. For this reason, in Tönnies’ distinction, society is characterized by negative relationships in which individuals work for their private ends, while community is characterized by positive relations in which members identify themselves with the whole and they work for common ends.

When society is characterized as merely a negative state which involves selfish relationships and isolation, as Tönnies does, it gives rise to the idea of removing society and revitalizing communal relations. Following Tönnies’ conception, Heidegger was led to the idea of revitalization of community. On the other hand, when society is not considered as merely a negative state, but also a positive state, as Hegel does, the possibility of unity can be grounded in civil society. In his analysis, Durkheim appeals to Hegel’s conception of society and the notion of universal activity; thus, he talks about the possibility of solidarity in society.

Durkheim analyzes the social structure and the social ties in *The Division of Labour* in relation to production methods. He introduces the distinction between mechanical society and organic society, which corresponds to Tönnies’ distinction between community and civil society. Although Durkheim agrees with Tönnies on

the essential characteristics of community and society, he opposes his idea of community being natural and society being artificial. Being natural is seen more valuable than being mechanical or artificial. Thus, Tönnies' characterization assigns more value to community. Durkheim argues that society is as natural and as organic as community because it does not seem possible for a society to begin as an organic unity and end as a pure mechanism. There can be found very little continuity between these two social forms if we define one as natural and the other as artificial (Aldous, 1972, p. 1198). Since society is thought to be developed from the community, it must be as natural as community. It implies that, in Durkheim's view, society is as valuable as community.

As opposed to Tönnies, Durkheim gives the name mechanical society to community and organic society to society. He "not only reverses Tönnies' terminology but he rejects the utilitarian conception projected of *Gesellschaft*" (Heredia, 1986, p. 35), that is, the idea of society as an aggregate of self-oriented individuals. According to him, community-type relationships are mechanical because mutual relationships among individuals seem to be similar to the relationship among the molecules of an inorganic body (Aldous, 1972, p. 1199). In a mechanical society, people produce for their own needs, but in an organic society, they produce for the needs of others. According to him, the division of labour gives rise to organic societies. In organic societies, specialization brings out the mutual need for the labour of others. Individuals cannot satisfy their private needs without getting help and they become mutually dependent on others.

In mechanical societies, there is solidarity, which comes from similarity. The norms, values and beliefs of a society are shared by all its members. There is a powerful social and moral integration of the members to society. Behavior is

governed by social norms. Conformity to the group is expected. Collective consciousness dominates the individual consciousness. Individuals regard themselves as part of a group, not independent of it. Durkheim calls this binding force “mechanical solidarity”. Mechanical societies are held together by mechanical solidarity, where collective consciousness is the determinant factor. In mechanical societies, the individual is absorbed in the group. (Durkheim, 1973, p. 67)

As opposed to mechanical societies, in organic societies, the individual is conceived independently of the group and the collective will is replaced by individual will. People become individuals, and individual consciousness grows while collective consciousness diminishes. In the loosening of common norms and values, we lose our identity with the group. Durkheim calls this loosening “anomie”. Anomie refers to the disintegration of the individual from the social and moral bonds. In the anomie, the individual loses the sense of belonging to society. He is left with himself. According to Durkheim, anomie is seen in transition to modernity and a market economy. Therefore, it is a modern condition. So far, Durkheim’s thoughts on organic societies are very similar to Tönnies’ conception of society. The difference is that Durkheim sees anomie as an abnormal consequence of the division of labour, not a necessary one. In addition, he thinks anomie can be overcome because, despite individual actions in modern society, there is a type of collective activity which is found in the societies of the past (Durkheim, 1984). Durkheim (1984) argues that collective activity constitutes the ground for solidarity in organic societies. It is called organic solidarity, which is developed in corporations or profession groups (Durkheim, 1984). He states that, in place of the groups found in a mechanical society, “a secondary group of a new kind had to be constituted. Thus, the corporation was born” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 46). The members of a corporation

are engaged in a collective activity which, in turn, creates an organic solidarity among them.

Durkheim's idea of corporation and collective activity seems to be inspired from Hegel's notion of universal activity. Hegel argues that the corporation is a mediatory institution between family and the state. Through the universal activity in which the members are engaged, the corporation constructs the link between the individual and universal. Thus, the corporation is the ground for the element of universality in society. Like Hegel, Durkheim argues that the corporation takes the place of the family in organic societies. He states that "just as the family had been the environment within which domestic morality and law had been worked out, so the corporation was the natural environment within which professional morality and law had to be elaborated" (Durkheim, 1984, p. 46). In the fragmented societies, corporations provide universal element through professional morality and law. It helps the individual to integrate with society, so it creates solidarity.

Although Durkheim argues that solidarity is developed through universal activity, he does not bring out the notion of mutual recognition. However, despite their differences, both Hegel and Durkheim propose to modify the medieval corporation to provide mediation between the individual and the state (Knapp, 1986, p. 599). Thus, one might rightly claim that they want to provide a solution to the problem of the disintegration of the unity in civil society and the state.

As a result, Tönnies disregards the element of universality in civil society introduced by Hegel. For him, universality can only be found in community. Therefore, he presents an account of society in which unity cannot be developed. Durkheim, on the other hand, sees the possibility of unity in civil society. Following Hegel, through the collective activity performed in the corporation or profession

groups, Durkheim talks about genuine unity in civil society, which he calls “organic solidarity”.

4.7. Reevaluating Hegel’s conception of civil society and the theory of the corporation

The common tendency among communitarians is to see society as dissolution of communal relations. This perspective disregards the positive elements, which are rooted in civil society, while focusing on its negative aspects. Hegel’s conception of civil society in the *Philosophy of Right* captures its positive aspect by introducing the element of particularity as a necessary movement for the emergence of unity. The element of particularity is the source of differentiation and separation. The self-oriented individual of civil society has its origin in the element of particularity as argued by communitarians. But particularity is also conceived as the source of autonomy and the birth of independence of the self (see also Sayers, 1995, pp. 2-4). Similarly, Hegel does not see particularity as something to be overcome. Rather for him, it is a necessary condition for the actualization of morality and freedom. According to Hegel, a perfect unity can be established only through the mediation of particularity, namely through separation.

Hegel does not regard civil society as the dissolution of community in general. But he talks about the dissolution of a specific kind of community which existed in ancient times. The ancient community was grounded on immediate unity. The development of civil society can be regarded as the loss of immediate unity but not of community. For Hegel, the state and the corporation are alternative forms of community which involve mediated unity. For this reason, civil society cannot be conceived as loss; on the contrary, it is an improvement towards genuine unity.

Although Hegel criticizes modern atomist individualism, which is grounded on the formal aspect of civil society, he does not praise an immediate unity between members and community; therefore, he presents an alternative to the main stream communitarian perspective. Williams (1997) too asserts that “Hegel presents an alternative to the abstract atomic individualism of modern liberalism and to abstract collectivism, whether of classical political philosophy (Plato) or of modern communitarianism” (p. 231). His conception of civil society can provide us an alternative to both communitarian and liberal perspectives on the distinction between community and civil society and the notion of unity.

So far, it has been shown that in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel introduces the corporation as an institution which provides mutual recognition and unity in civil society. In section 4.7.1, I will discuss whether Hegel’s theory of the corporation still hold today.

4.7.1. Corporations today

Hegel is criticized for celebrating capitalism by making civil society, with its atomistic aspect, as a necessary stage in the ethical life for the realization of freedom. This criticism reflects an overreaction to Hegel’s theory. Hegel appreciates the role of market economy in the dialectical movement in history, and he welcomes capitalism, since it allows for the expression of subjective freedom (Rose, 2007, p. 116). However, he is aware of the alienating and atomizing aspect of capitalism (Rose, 2007, p. 123), and he does not praise its atomistic aspect, but rather focuses on the ethical aspect, the uniting force in it. The theory of the corporation indicates that his point is not to endorse capitalist market economy but to show the positive aspect and ethical element in it. Williams (1997) contends that corporations “are

needed as an important first institutional-organizational step to prevent human beings from being reduced to mere commodities in national and international capitalism” (p. 131). Without the corporation, civil society would be a ruthless state in which ethical element cannot be found. Due to the existence of the corporation, civil society cannot be regarded as merely a state of market economy. Corporations promote unity in civil society, which is initially found in the family. For this reason, Hegel does not see civil society as merely a decay of community but rather as a necessary and positive development in the ethical life.

As stated earlier, Hegel’s account of civil society can be considered an alternative to Tönnies’ conception and the views which are influenced by it. Still, his theory of the corporation is open to criticism in some respects. Business organizations of today are the closest thing to Hegel’s corporations. It might be argued that Hegel’s corporations are different from today’s business corporations. “Hegel’s moral corporations existed before modern corporations took shape” (Klikauer, 2016, p. 17). Despite their differences, however, Hegel’s moral corporations and business corporations of today have similarities. First, both are voluntary organizations. In this respect, they are different from the family or neighborhood. Secondly, they are organized to set principles for the activities performed within a profession.

Hegel characterizes the corporation as a legally recognized institution which represents a form of business practice and provides for the common ends of an estate. According to Hegel, individuals who are members of a corporation are legally and mutually recognized. They work for the common ends of the corporation and develop a unity going out of their private interests. He argues that in the corporation, through the economic activity, individuals relate to universal. The theory of

corporation implies that “in the economy we must work for others in order to meet our own needs and this gives us an immediate motivation to socialize our behavior, conform to universal standards” (Ross, 2008, p. 51). It is through the norms and rules set by the corporation and followed by its members that an ethical aspect – the rights and duties – is brought into economy. Otherwise, civil society would be a ruthless competitive market place. Through the corporation, working for the private interests turns into working for the common ends.

Hegel assumes that economic alliance brings out unity among people, but the problem is that the link between economic/formal union and unity seems to be weakly constructed in the account of the corporation. Specifically, how to move from particular to universal is not clear. Hegel explains the link between particular and universal in relation to the theory of recognition and the concept of universal activity. Each member who is motivated to realize his private interests knows that he should work for the common interests of the corporation. Thus, they engage in a universal activity. When the members who are particular individuals are engaged in a universal activity, mutual recognition is created in the corporation. But since the common activity performed in the corporation is focused on the goals and interests of a group of people who have the same profession, it cannot be seen as a universal activity. Even Hegel admits that the link to universal is limited in civil society, but it will be completed in the state. The reason Hegel sees the common activity in the corporation beyond a temporary alliance is that in his account, the corporation is a business organization which has ethical concerns, regarding the operation of an industry, independently of the aim of economic profitability. Today, in the free market economy, we do not see corporations as was described by Hegel. The business organizations which are closer to the corporation are economically based

organizations. They represent the common interests of a group of people participating in an industry. But these common interests are limited to economic sphere and the main focus is to increase profitability. The norms and rules are set to achieve this goal not to provide the ethical. Therefore, his theory of the corporation seems to be invalid today.

Despite its problems, Hegel's account of the corporation is important with respect to showing that the element of universality can be found in civil society. Accordingly, unity which allows for individual differences can be created in civil society, through mutual recognition. In the "Dialogue of Solidarities", Bell calls attention to a relevant point. Analyzing Tönnies' distinction, he states that in *Gesellschaft*, actors feel a solidarity of interests, whereas in *Gemeinschaft*, they feel solidarity of sentiments. He argues that, for collective action, Hegel says for unity, one of these solidarities cannot be enough. Both are needed together to produce a higher kind of solidarity. (Bell, 1998, p. 182) His idea seems to be influenced by Hegel's conception of society, which involves the elements of both universality and particularity. Bell (1998) calls this higher solidarity the "solidarity of solidarities", which can be developed through the dialogue of solidarities in all scales from smallest to the largest ones (p. 182). Like Hegel's, his solution is a new kind of community which combines both ancient and modern elements. But unlike Hegel's theory, his allows for a wide range of communities that develop solidarity in society.

Hegel is commonly regarded as defending communitarianism since he praises the sense of belonging to community, but it cannot be argued for considering Hegel's thoughts in its totality. Although Hegel refers to ancient communities while developing his theory of the state, he also upholds some liberal values (Beiser, 2005, p. 225). According to Beiser (2005), Hegel's significance lies in his attempt to

combine communitarianism with liberalism in his theory of the state (p. 225). He combines the element of universality in communitarianism and the element of particularity in liberalism and it brings out a unique conception of community and society. Westphal (2003) calls it “moderate collectivism” and he argues that Hegel overcomes the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism (p. 107). He states that “where others see only an exclusive dichotomy, Hegel identifies a biconditional relation” (2003, p. 107). In the moderate collectivism of Hegel, social context conditions but it does not determine the identity of the individual.

Consequently, this study on the distinction between community and society led us to the idea that the unity which is said to be lost by the emergence of society is an ancient conception. Based on Hegel’s thoughts, unity can be conceived in a way which combines ancient and modern conceptions. It is called mediated unity. Hegel attributes this unity to the corporation and in the full sense to the state. Although we have exhibited some problems of Hegel’s theory of the corporation it is still very important with respect to pointing out the need for a new kind of community which provides mediated unity in society.

4.7.2. New social movements

Although Hegel’s theory of the corporation has lost its validity today, it is still significant with respect to revealing the possibility of mutual recognition and mediated unity in civil society. And this brings out the question of whether there can be other institutions which may carry out the function of Hegel’s corporation today. In this respect, new social movements are promising hope for providing mutual recognition for their members and creating mediated unity in society.

The concept of new social movements has come up in the second half of the twentieth century, although the early emergence of social movements goes far back in history. New social movements are the collective actions emerging within civil society which focus on a specific social and cultural problem. They are conscious, voluntary and ongoing efforts of a group of people to change some aspect of their society which they criticize (Goodwin, 2014, p. 3). There are on-going discussions about the definition of the concept of new social movements, since the subject matter and the extent of the movements vary. Within the context of this study, I adopt the following conception of new social movements: They are critical actions, organized against the injustices and inequalities in a society and/or in the world, which try to make a change.

The anti-nuclear movement, the animal rights movement, the LGBT movement, the women's movement, the Arab Spring and the occupy movements can be listed among the new social movements. Occupy Wall Street, an occupy movement, is one of the instances of new social movements which draw broad attention by the social media. To protest economic inequalities, a group of political activists planned an occupy action. The occupy began in a public space with 2,000 protestors on September 17, 2011. It lasted two months and attracted the world's attention, which caused occupy movements to spread around the world. (Goodwin & Jasper, 2014, pp. 30-44)

New social movements involve protests – acts of challenging, resisting and making demands – against authorities, power holders and cultural beliefs and practices of a particular group (Goodwin, 2014, p. 4). “In regard to their opponents, protestors hope to change behavior through persuasion or intimidation or by imposing costs on them, and to undermine their opponents' credibility with the

public, media, and the state” (Goodwin, 2014, p. 214). They use mainly news media to spread their message, and the participants of the new social movements are mobilized through networks, so they are organized regardless of the distance. Some social movements create formal organizations, while others depend on informal networks and more spontaneous actions. In this respect, they are different from Hegel’s corporations since Hegel’s corporations are legally organized institutions.

Despite their differences, new social movements can carry out the function of the corporation in civil society. As in the corporation, new social movements, with individuals exhibiting differences, voluntarily strive together for realizing a common end. What unites the participants is neither a blood relation as in the family nor the vocation they practice – as in the corporation– but the critical point of view which is shared by all. Participants engage in a common activity for a cause in the social movements and it brings out the element of universality. Thus, new social movements may take on the role of the corporation, where the link between particular and universal is constructed by universal activity.

The problem with new social movements is that the sense of unity created in a movement might be limited to the sphere of the movement. It might not develop into the level of a state or society, but might instead be carried out by smaller groups. In Hegel’s theory, the ultimate end is to create mediated unity in the state. New social movements are not qualified to realize this end and, thus, not qualified to function as corporations. Still, it might be argued that, through the sense of unity, which is provided within these smaller groups or communities, problems of the society such as isolation, loneliness and alienation, might be overcome since the members of these groups start striving for a common cause, leaving aside their private interests. One of the problems of the original distinction between community

and society, which I have discussed in Chapter 2, was to characterize society as merely a negative state in which everyone pursues his/her own selfish interests and lives isolated from others. New social movements may constitute the positive aspect of society since they remove isolation and alienation for their members. Thus, through new social movements, the possibility of unity in civil society might be discussed.

In the new social movements, individuals engage in a universal activity in which they recognize others and are recognized by them. Through mutual recognition provided by the universal activity performed in the relevant group, they feel themselves a part of a community without losing their individuality. Thus, the sense of unity is created among the participants of new social movements. In this sense, new social movements function as a new form of community in civil society, which provides mediated unity.

To conclude, new social movements may carry out the function of corporations within the limits of society. They create collective identity, which allows for individual differences and the sense of unity in civil society as Hegel's corporations do. However, new social movements do not mediate for the emergence of a higher stage of community, which is the state. They represent a new form of collective life in which individuals gain recognition via striving for a common cause. Thus, mediated unity is provided by new social movements in society.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the literature, the modern age is commonly characterized by individualism, instrumental rationality, and giving rise to the problems of isolation and alienation. Nisbet (1962) argues that the nineteenth century is the age of individualism and rationalization because it is thought that they are the sole means by which bring men freedom from the past. He says that “competition, individuation, dislocation of status and custom, impersonality and moral anonymity were hailed by the rationalist” with this aim (1962, p. 4). But this supposedly gained freedom costs men the loss of meaning which he had before. Paul Tillich argues that, in the western culture, today, not the faith and confidence, but the feelings of fear and anxiety, uncertainty, loneliness, and meaninglessness are found (cited in Nisbet, 1962, p. 13). The modern age in general is associated with a loss. The loss of meaning, the loss of trust and the loss of unity, which is the focus of this study. To overcome this loss, some suggest returning to tradition to try to revitalize the kind of relations which were there before modernity.

In this thesis, it has been argued that the idea of a loss, which leaves its mark on the modern age, originates from the conception of community, and society which was originally presented by Tönnies and is commonly adopted by some philosophers in the literature. Within the context of this work, I have focused on the notion of unity which is thought to be lost in society, and I have argued that unity can be developed in civil society by revising the original conception of community and society. With this aim, I first analyzed Tönnies’ distinction between community and society.

In *Community and Civil Society* (2001), the relations in community are characterized by acquaintanceship, sympathy and confidence whereas the relations in society are characterized by strangeness, antipathy and mistrust. In Tönnies' characterization, community is introduced as something familiar and desired, but society as something strange and to be refrained from. Following Tönnies' conception, Nisbet distinguishes community and society in a way that in community, people work on common problems collectively and they live under an authority. On the other hand, in society, there are no common problems, functions and authority (Nisbet, 1962). He refers to the collective and individualist characters of community and society, respectively.

In his analysis, Tönnies states that he does not assign priority to community over society and that he only tries to provide a factual analysis of the existing social structure. Still, his analysis gives rise to the idea of priority of community since in his characterization, Tönnies assigns all the positive characteristics to community and all the negative ones to society. In addition, he grounds the emergence of society on industrialization and modernity. Thus, the rise of society represents a change, which is the cause of a loss, a loss of what was there before in community, an idea that I think is highly problematic.

The idea of a loss which arises from the original distinction between community and society can be observed in Heidegger's thoughts. Therefore, in Chapter 3, I focused on his conception of community and society. Heidegger presents an ontological idea of community which is grounded on being-with as the existential characteristic of Da-sein. The essence of Da-sein is determined as being-with, which means that Da-sein is ontologically a communal being. However, with the emergence of metaphysical thinking, which is a characteristic of modernity, Da-

sein's essence is covered up and the communal ties of the ancient times have been destroyed at the ontic level. This idea of a loss led Heidegger to argue for the revitalization of communal ties, which is possible by overcoming metaphysical thinking. Then, his thoughts took a nationalist course, and he assigned the role of overcoming metaphysics to a German community. Thus, the idea of a loss prepared the ground for his engagement with the National Socialist party.

The problems of the idea of a loss is also discussed by new communitarians such as Walzer, Sandel and Taylor. They argue that communal relations are not destroyed, but still exist today, as also argued in this work. "The new communitarians believe that community already exists, in the form of common social practices, cultural traditions, and shared social understandings" (Kymlica, 2002, p. 209). For them, the problem is that we are not aware of our communal relations anymore, and liberalism has the blame for that. Liberal theory distorts this reality and causes us to ignore our deeper communal embeddedness. Thus, their suggestion is to focus on the communitarian aspects of sociality and to recognize that the deep structure of society is communitarian. From my perspective, however, the problem with new communitarians' approach is that they seem to disregard what is appreciated in liberal thinking, which is the emergence of individuality. The deep structure of the society is indeed communitarian, that is, we are bonded at a deeper level, but the account for this communality must be changed in such a way that it contains both individuality and collectivity. We are not bound to each other or to a community in a way that we were in ancient times. The deeper communal structure of society has changed. Having the same blood, living in the same place, and belonging to a nation are not the bases of our communality anymore. We want our

individuality to be recognized. Thus, we should look for a kind of communality which allows for recognition of our individuality.

Like new communitarians, Nancy objects to the idea of the loss of community in his work, *The Inoperative Community*. Unlike them, he has an ontological account of community that seems to allow both individuality and universality, which is the subject of interest in this study. He argues that, in the history of thought, society is regarded as the dissolution of community and that it gave rise to the idea that it must be regained or reconstituted. According to Nancy (1991), “society was not built on the ruins of a community” (p. 11). He explains this thought in the following paragraph:

Nothing, therefore, has been lost, and for this reason nothing is lost. We alone are lost, we upon whom the “social bond” (relations, communication), our own invention, now descend heavily like the net of a economic, technical, political and cultural snare. Entangled in its meshes, we have wrung for ourselves the phantasms of the lost community. (1991, p. 12)

Nancy thinks that the idea of a loss is our invention. Similar to Heidegger, Nancy (1991) argues that community is Da-sein’s way of being. It is what happens to us. “Community is that singular ontological order in which the other and the same are alike (*sont le semblable*): that is to say, in the sharing of identity” (Nancy, 1991, p. 34). For Nancy, community has an ontological status. In this sense, it is not something that is created by individuals. “Community is not the work of singular beings... for community is simply their being” (1991, p. 31). It follows that there is a kind of sociality in the essence of human beings regardless of their doings in life.

Nancy (2000) argues that in philosophical discourse, being-with is introduced as an addition to some prior being, and he finds it necessary to reverse this picture (p. 30). He says, “It is not the case that the ‘with’ is an addition to some prior Being; instead, the ‘with’ is at the heart of Being” (2000, p. 30). According to Nancy (2000),

even though Heidegger defines the essence of Da-sein as being-with, he first establishes the originary character of Da-sein. Thus, he conforms to the general order of philosophy. He cannot exhibit the coessentiality character of being properly. (p. 31) Nancy (2000) argues that Hegel reverses this order and sets out the coessentiality of being, namely its ontological relationality properly, since, while he explains the sense certainty, the stage at which consciousness has not yet entered into a relation with another consciousness, he uses a language which already presupposes a relation to another consciousness.

Nancy (2000) claims that a further analysis is needed into the essence of Da-sein, and he introduces the concept of singular plurality. He asserts that singular-plurality constitutes the essence of being (pp. 28-29). "*Being singular plural* means the essence of Being is only as coessence" (Nancy, 2000, p. 30). Thus, community refers to the ontological sociality of being, which means that there is no singular being without the other singular being (Nancy, 2000, p. 28). Nancy's notion of singular plurality differs from Heidegger's being-with in that, while Heidegger solely focuses on the universal element of "being-with," as I have argued in this work, Nancy's account involves both universality and particularity, which we also find in Hegel.

Nancy's *The Inoperative Community* and the concept of singular plurality can be interpreted as the search for a new sense of political, which involves both unity and difference (Rehberg, 2004, p. 230). He says that "(Western) philosophy's political programs have come to a close" (Nancy, 1991, p. xxxviii). In this work, Nancy searches for a new form of community and presents an ontological account for it. Community is not given to us. Human beings have always been and will always be in a community in the ontological sense. He grounds community on the

ontological structure of the human being. He says that “The singular being, because it is singular, is in the passion... of sharing its singularity” (1991, p. 32). This passion makes the individual share his singularity with his *like*. He also says that “the like-being resembles me in that I myself ‘resemble’ him: we ‘resemble’ together, if you will. That is to say, there is no original or origin of identity. What holds the place of an ‘origin’ is the sharing of singularities.” (1991, p. 33) For Nancy, I am not the origin of that resemblance. The like-being does not resemble me as a portrait resembles an original (Nancy, 1991, p. 33). There is no singular being which constitutes the origin of community. The origin of Nancy’s ontological community is a common identity which is grounded on the sharing of singular identities. In his account, Nancy replaces “identity” with “shared identity of singular beings” in a way that it does not allow for individuality. I experience myself as a singular “alike” being but not as an individual being separate from other individual beings.

For Nancy, community is not a matter of recognition or the product of an activity because it has an ontological status. In this sense, my account of community, which I have developed in this study, is in opposition to Nancy’s account of ontological community. I have argued that common activity, namely working together for common ends, and mutual recognition gained in this activity are required for unity and the sense of community in society.

Within the context of this work, I have argued that the new form of community can be grounded on Hegel’s theory of the corporation and notion of mutual recognition. For this reason, in Chapter 4, I analyzed Hegel’s conception of society in relation to the theory of corporation and the notion of mutual recognition. I also focused on his conception of civil society and argued that it allows for unity. Hegel argues that society cannot be characterized as a social state in which merely

negative relations are found. There are two distinct elements which regulate the relations in society; particularity and universality. The element of particularity constitutes the subjective aspect of society, in which everyone pursues his/her own selfish interests. Hegel calls the subjective aspect of society which is ruled by particularity the system of needs. In the system of needs, individuals focus on their private interests and see others only as a means to achieve their goals. But according to Hegel, the system of needs is not the only aspect of society. Houlgate (2005) argues that human interest which is focused on the satisfaction of individual needs comes to realize that it requires pursuing common goals. Thus, they become interdependent and form communities in which those needs can be realized. (Houlgate, 2005, p. 25) This interdependence belongs to the universal aspect of society.

The universal element is found basically in the corporation in society. In the system of needs, people realize that they cannot satisfy their needs and interests alone. They become a member of a corporation and there, they engage in a collective activity. They work together to realize their goals. During this collective activity, they both gain recognition from others and they recognize the others. The mutual recognition provided within the corporation creates a sense of unity among the members. Tönnies disregards the latter positive aspect of society in his conceptualization. Thus, he has a pessimistic perspective which makes the development of unity in society impossible.

Hegel develops the notion of unity based on the idea of mutual recognition, which he first exhibits in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There he explains the development of self-consciousness from sense-certainty. He posits that self-consciousness can only be developed through the mediation of consciousness of the

other. In other words, one's proper relation to himself can be constructed through the mediation of the other. Further, in the *Philosophy of Right*, he introduces mutual recognition while he talks about the moments of the will and the stages of the realization of freedom. He argues that the full realization of freedom requires the negation of initial independence and losing one's self in another, but this loss becomes a gain and brings genuine freedom. That is, freedom and self-realization are possible through the mediation of the other. As presented in these works, the notion of mutual recognition presupposes an aspect of relationality found in the essence of human beings.

The notions of relationality and sociality are found both in Heidegger's and Hegel's thoughts. Hegel explains it in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* when he talks about self-consciousness through the mediation of another consciousness and in the *Philosophy of Right*, when he talks about the self-realization of Spirit with reference to social institutions in the ethical life. Heidegger brings it out when he analyzes the existential character of Da-sein. He states that being is being-with. Both philosophers assign this relationality to the essence of human being. In their theories, a kind of communality can be found belonging to the essence of being. But then they move into different directions. Heidegger argues that this relationality is covered up by the emergence of metaphysical thinking. According to him, although this possibility is embedded in the essence of Da-sein, the communal relations are covered up in the modern age. Thus, he introduces the idea of going back to the origin, which stands for the revitalization of communal ties. Hegel, on the other hand, argues that this relationality is not covered up but is instead developed throughout the system of ethical life, especially through the emergence of particularity in society. Therefore, the possibility of genuine unity lies in society.

Consequently, this study on the distinction between community and society argues that unity is possible in society and shows that there is need for a new kind of community which involves mediated unity, in which particularity and universality are combined. I have suggested that new social movements are promising for functioning as a new kind of community in today's modern society. They can provide a sense of unity through mutual recognition and at the same time keep individuality, which is not satisfactorily found in the work of new communitarians or Nancy's ontological understanding of community as singular plurality. Whether social movements perform this function or not, the need for a new kind of community becomes salient in this work based on Hegel's theories of the corporation and mutual recognition. This need lies at the heart of today's philosophy and politics.

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