

REGIME CHANGE IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS



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
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ABSTRACT

Regime Change in Early Hellenistic Athens

This thesis undertakes a causal analysis of the political instability that the Athenian democracy experienced during the four decades after the death of Alexander the Great. The frequency of changes in the city's political regime in this period has not received systematic treatment by scholars. Drawing on literary, epigraphic, and numismatic evidence, this thesis argues that the instability, so unusual after nearly two centuries of almost uninterrupted stability, resulted from the interplay between internal and external dynamics, i.e. *stasis* (civil strife) and foreign intervention. *Stasis* in Athens was the result of a combination of causes, including foreign influence and political culture. A comparison with the relatively long-lasting political stability that came after forty years of turbulence demonstrates that a balanced foreign policy and reconciliatory memory politics contributed to the stability of democracy.

ÖZET

Erken Helenistik Dönemde Atina'da Rejim Değişikliği

Bu tezin amacı, yaklaşık iki yüzyıl süren siyasi istikrarın ardından, Büyük İskender'in ölümünden sonraki kırk yıl boyunca istikrarsızlıktan belini doğrultamayan Atina demokrasisinin yaşadığı krizin nedenlerini anlamaktır. Helenistik dönem Atina tarihi üzerine yapılan araştırmalar şehrin siyasi rejiminin bu devirde olağanüstü sıklıkta değişmesini sorunsallaştırmamıştır. Yazılı, epigrafik ve nümizmatik kaynakları kullanan bu tez ise söz konusu istikrarsızlığın sebebinin iç ve dış mihrakların, yani *stasis* (iç karışıklık) ve dış güçlerin müdahalelerinin, karşılıklı etkileşimi olduğunu öne sürmektedir ve bu etkileşimin ışığında *stasis*'in girift sebeplerini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Kırk yıllık siyasi istikrarsızlıktan sonra gelen görece uzun soluklu demokratik istikrarla bir karşılaştırma yaparak, dengeli dış politika ve uzlaşma kültürüne dayalı geçmiş inşasının demokratik istikrara katkısını vurgulamaktadır.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: APPROACHING THE REGIME CHANGES IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS	1
1.1 Scholarship.....	3
1.2 Evidence.....	6
1.3 Key concepts and methods.....	13
1.4 Outline of thesis	23
CHAPTER 2: A NARRATIVE OF THE REGIME CHANGES (322-262)	25
2.1 322-301: Between democracy and oligarchy	25
2.2 301-262: From tyranny to democracy.....	34
CHAPTER 3: <i>STASIS</i> : THE INTERNAL CAUSE OF REGIME CHANGE	38
3.1 322: Anti-Macedonian democrats vs. pro-Antipatrid oligarchs.....	39
3.2 319-317: Pro-Polyperchonian democrats vs. pro-Antipatrid oligarchs.....	49
3.3 303-301: Anti-Demetrian vs. pro-Demetrian democrats	56
3.4 301-295: Pro-Lacharians vs. pro-Charians	63
3.5 287-286: Pro-Ptolemaean democrats vs. pro-Demetrian oligarchs.....	65
3.6 Conclusion	67
CHAPTER 4: CAUSES OF <i>STASIS</i> (322-286).....	68
4.1 Political culture: A synchronic cause of <i>stasis</i>	69
4.2 Foreign influence: A diachronic cause of <i>stasis</i>	87
4.3 Economic tension as a cause of <i>stasis</i> ?.....	90
4.4 Intra-elite conflict: A diachronic cause of <i>stasis</i>	91
4.5 Conclusion	94
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC STABILITY (286-262)	96
5.1 Political culture	96
5.2 Foreign influence	97
5.3 Intra-elite conflict.....	101
5.4 Conclusion	106
APPENDIX A: THE DATE OF THE ATHENIAN REVOLT AGAINST DEMETRIOS	107
APPENDIX B: NAKONIANISM AND DIKAIOPOLITANISM IN ATHENIAN HONORARY DECREES	111
APPENDIX C: NAKONIANISM AND DIKAIOPOLITANISM IN ATHENIAN HONORARY DECREES (GREEK)	115
REFERENCES.....	119

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Agora</i>	<i>The Athenian Agora - Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens</i>
<i>Agora XVI</i>	Woodhead, A. G. (1997), <i>Agora XVI: Inscriptions: The Decrees</i> , Princeton.
<i>FGrH</i>	Jacoby, F. (1923-), <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin and Leiden.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (1890 -), Berlin.
<i>ISE</i>	Moretti, L. (1967-1975), <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche I-II</i> (Florence).
<i>P. Oxy.</i>	<i>The Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i> (1898-), London
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , (1923-), Leiden and Amsterdam.

CHRONOLOGY

August 338 (7 <i>Metageitniōn</i>)	Battle of Chaironeia
June 323 (28/30 <i>Daesios</i>)	Death of Alexander
Summer 323	Start of the Lamian (Hellenic) War
	Defection of Kallimedon and Pytheas to Antipatros
Winter 323/2 (16 <i>Posideōn</i>)	First Athenian citizenship grant to Euphron of Sikyon (<i>IG II³.1 377, 378</i>)
August 322 (7 <i>Metageitniōn</i>)	Battle of Krannon; end of the Lamian War
	Two negotiations between Antipatros and Athens (in Thebes)
September 322 (20 <i>Boēdromiōn</i>)	Installation of the Macedonian garrison on the Mounichia Hill
October 322	
(9 <i>Pyanopsiōn</i>)	Death of Hypereides
(16 (?) <i>Pyanopsiōn</i>)	Death of Demosthenes
Summer 319	Death of Demades
	Death of Antipatros
Fall 319	Philip III's <i>diagramma</i>
Winter 319/8	Polyperchon's letters to the Greek cities
	Nikanor's refusal to give back Mounichia to the Athenians
	Athenian embassy to Polyperchon
(11 <i>Maimaktēriōn</i>)	Athenian citizenship grant to Ainetos of Rhodes, an associate of Polyperchon (<i>Agora XVI.101</i>)
	Athenian citizenship grant to Amynt[as], probably an associate of Polyperchon (<i>IG II² 386</i>)

Spring 318	Return of the Athenian exiles with Alexandros (Polyperchon's son)
(12 <i>Elaphēboliōn</i>)	Citizenship grant to Apol[---], probably an associate of Polyperchon (<i>Agora XVI.102</i>)
late March (30 <i>Xanthikos</i>)	The deadline for the return of exiles according to Philip III's <i>diagramma</i>
	Athenian <i>ekklēsia</i> meeting with the returned exiles; deposition of Phokion
	The embassies of two Athenian factions meet with Polyperchon in Phokis
May (19 <i>Mounichiōn</i>)	Illegal trial of oligarchs; death of Phokion
	Polyperchon's letter to the Athenians, in which he called the people free and autonomous
(10th prytany 319/8)	Athenian citizenship grants to Sonikos and Eukles, two associates of Polyperchon (passed with his intervention) (<i>SEG XLIX.105</i>)
Summer-Fall 318	Polyperchon's military failures
	Kassandros seizes the Attic fort Panakton
318/7 (?)	The deme of Troizēn honors Hagnonides (<i>IG II² 2796</i>)
December 318 (30 <i>Maimaktēriōn</i>)	Second Athenian citizenship grant to Euphron of Sikyon (<i>IG II² 448</i>)
February 317 (29/30 <i>Gamēliōn</i>)	Honorary decree for Hermo[...] of Herakleia, probably an associate of Kassandros (<i>Agora XVI.104</i>)
	Honorary decree for the <i>epilektoi</i> (<i>Agora XVI.105</i>)
March 317 (<i>Anthestēriōn</i>)	Athenian citizenship grants to an Epidamnian and an Apollonian (<i>IG II² 350</i>)
Spring 317	Negotiations with Kassandros and capitulation
	Demetrios of Phaleron appointed as the <i>epimeletes</i> of Athens
	Death of Hagnonides and other democrats

315	Antigonos' proclamation at Tyre
June 307 (26 <i>Thargēliōn</i>)	Demetrios arrives at Piraeus and makes a proclamation (<i>kērugma</i>)
August 307	Mounichia garrison destroyed and democracy restored by Demetrios
	Demetrios of Phaleron escapes
late 307 (6th prytany 307/6)	Postmortem honorary decree for Lykourgos of Boutadai (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 852a-e; <i>IG II</i> ² 457 + 3207)
307/6	Start of the Four Years War
304/3	End of the Four Years War
303	Exile of Demochares of Leukonoe
303/2	Athenian honorary decree for Medeios of Larissa
late Spring 301	Battle of Ipsos; Death of Antigonos Monophtalmos
	Athenians decide "not to receive any kings to the city"
	Athenian envoys meet Poliorketes in the Cyclades and inform him about the city's refusal to receive him
Autumn 301- Spring 300	Military conflict between Lachares and Charias on the Akropolis
	Illegal trial of the generals who fought against Lachares
Spring 300 (<i>Elaphēboliōn</i>)	Performance of Menander's <i>Imbrioi</i> cancelled "because of Lachares, the tyrant"
September 299 (21 <i>Metageitniōn</i>)	Honorary decree for Poseidippos (an Athenian ambassador to Kassandros) (<i>IG II</i> ³ .1 844)
May 297	Death of Kassandros
Spring 295	Demetrios' assault on Athens; escape of Lachares
	Athens capitulates to Demetrios Poliorketes

	Athenian democracy restored; garrisons installed on the Mounichia and Mouseion hills
March 294 (9 <i>Elaphēboliōn</i>)	Athenian citizenship grant to Herodoros (an associate of Demetrios) (<i>IG II³.1 853</i>)
June 294-June 293	Olympiodoros' first archonship
June 293-June 292	Olympiodoros' second archonship
late Spring 292 (29/30 <i>Mounichiōn</i>)	Athenian honorary decree for Philippides of Paiania (<i>IG II³.1 857</i>)
292/1	Return of the oligarchic exiles to Athens
Spring 287	Ptolemy postpones his plan to invade Attica
	Phaidros of Sphettos suppresses the first attempt to revolt
Spring 286	Athens revolts against Demetrios; victory at the Mouseion Hill
Summer 286 (11 <i>Hekatombaiōn</i>)	Athenian honorary decree for Zenon the Ptolemaic admiral (<i>IG II³.1 863</i>)
Fall 283 (18 <i>Boēdromiōn</i>)	Athenian honorary decree for Philippides of Kephale (<i>IG II³.1 877</i>)
281/0	Athenian request for granting postmortem honors to Demosthenes (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 850f-851c)
271/0	Athenian request for honors for Demochares of Leukonoe (Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 851d-f)
Winter 270/69 (18 <i>Posideōn</i>)	Honorary decree for Kallias of Sphettos (<i>IG II³.1 911</i>)
269	Start of the Chremonidean War
Winter 266/5 (11 <i>Posideōn</i>)	Athenian citizenship grant to Strombichos (<i>IG II³.1 918</i>)
Summer 262	Athens capitulates to Antigonos Gonatas

CHAPTER 1

APPROACHING THE REGIME CHANGES IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS

Towards the end of Book 5 of the *Politics*, after conducting a thorough analysis of the causes of regime change in ancient Greek cities, and giving numerous examples of the internal causes, Aristotle makes the following observation:

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the democracies.¹

There were, thus, two types of regime change according to Aristotle: one with internal causes, the other with external causes. Since all his other examples from history dealt with the first type, he clearly found internal causes more relevant to the central theme of Book 5, i.e. the analysis and prevention of regime change.²

Contingent on the haphazard course of history, the external causes defied systematic analysis, and as such were irrelevant to a prescription for political stability.³

Aristotle's dichotomy may be theoretically justified, but, when it comes to the analysis of actual regime changes, it disregards the interplay between internal and external causes by overlooking one crucial issue: some form of internal cause was usually a necessary condition even for the externally-triggered regime changes.⁴

¹ *Pol.* 1307b20-25; trans. Jowett; see also *ibid.* 1312a40-b9. On Aristotle's treatment of regime change see Gehrke, "Verfassungswandel," 137-150.

² Gehrke, "Verfassungswandel," 138-9.

³ Polansky, "Aristotle on Political Change," 333; Simpson, *A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle*, 389.

⁴ In the absence of a comprehensive list of the regime changes in Greek *poleis* (as opposed to lists of *stasis*, which is different from regime change; see Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 124 n5), it is not possible to determine whether there was ever an externally-triggered regime change that did not have an internal cause. From a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that the 209 externally-triggered

The regime of a *polis* must be overthrown from within, either with outside help or without it.⁵ *Poleis* or kings wishing to impose a regime change on a *polis* had to be represented *intra muros* either personally or via some general, to have some kind of local support to overthrow the regime from within, and to stabilize it, albeit not always successfully. If they had no internal support, but still wanted to enforce a regime change, they had to destroy the *polis*, in which case the very entity in which the regime could change disappeared.⁶ Kings destroyed many cities, including Aristotle's hometown Stagiros during his lifetime.⁷ Often, however, internal support for a foreign power was readily available because the political factions in Greek cities preferred to outdo their opponents at the expense of independence.⁸

The interplay between internal and external causes is, therefore, crucial to our understanding of regime changes. Early Hellenistic Athens provides ample evidence for such interplay, even if the Stagirite philosopher did not live long enough to see it. The Diadochoi, Alexander's successors, often intervened in the Athenian constitution, and interacted with the city's internal factions. After the Lamian War in 323-322,⁹ Athenian history followed an unprecedented pattern: in just four decades, the political regime of the city changed eight times. Some of these regimes were more durable than others, but overall this was the most unstable period of the city's history. Having enjoyed continued stability under democracy since 508/7, except for

regime changes in Owen IV's list, which occurred between the sixteenth and twenty-first centuries, many of them in Europe, but also across the globe, often involved a connection between the external actors and internal divisions, and even when they did not, they typically involved some kind of internal support for the external power triggering the change; see Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas*, 23-4.

⁵ This is an *a priori* proposition based on a commonsensical understanding of the inside and outside of a city. It is difficult to make an *a posteriori* proposition for this claim because there is no comprehensive list of the regime changes in Greek *poleis*.

⁶ In the absence of internal support (and sometimes despite its presence), aggressive external powers had four options: destruction, dispersion, enslavement, and expulsion; Hansen and Nielsen, *ibid.*, 120-3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 844.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 124-9, esp. 126.

⁹ All ancient dates are BC unless otherwise noted.

two brief oligarchic interludes in 411 and 404/3, Athenians now switched between democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny.

Why did the Athenian democracy become so unstable after 322? In dealing with this question, I focus on the regime changes between 322-286 and the stable democratic regime between 286-262. It is an interesting question because, beyond the desire to understand the particularities of Athenian history, it bears on the larger question of democratic stability, i.e. why are democratic regimes so stable?¹⁰ Studies devoted to explaining the stability of Athenian democracy mostly focus on the Classical period,¹¹ but an explanation of the subsequent instability will also contribute to our understanding of the problem. Despite the unprecedented frequency of regime changes and the unusual persistence of civil strife between 322-286, there has been no scholarly effort to analyze why such a pattern emerged.

1.1 Scholarship

In the last decades a significant amount of work on the political, social and institutional history of Hellenistic Athens has appeared and brought about a revision of the mainstream ideas of previous generations. Most of this revision has emphasized the continuity between the Classical and Hellenistic periods, especially at the institutional level. Against earlier approaches, it has been demonstrated since the 1980s that the Athenians continued to give importance to the institutions of the *polis* and to their democracy in the Hellenistic period.¹² The Athenian *ekklēsia*

¹⁰ Ancient sources were also interested in this problem. Aristotle argued in the 320s that democracy was more stable than oligarchy and tyranny; *Pol.* 1296a13–14; Mulgan, “Aristotle’s analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” 322. The question is whether the subsequent period proved him wrong.

¹¹ On the stability of Classical Athenian democracy, see e.g. Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy*, 144-204; and the articles in Herman, *Stability and Crisis*.

¹² Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 4-6, 77-128; Habicht, *Athens*, 36-149; Dreyer, *Untersuchungen*, passim; Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 27-124; Tracy, *Athens and Macedon*, 9-14; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, passim, esp. 94-128; Osborne, *Athens*, 55-109.

(assembly) and *boulē* (council), and other democratic institutions continued functioning as before.¹³ Previous generations of scholars had not all thought that the *polis*-system and democracy disappeared in the Hellenistic era, but according to the former mainstream opinion these institutions lost their importance at the end of the fourth century throughout the Greek world, whether overnight or piecemeal.¹⁴ Today many scholars would disagree, and argue that, if anything, the *polis*-system and democracy became more important after the Classical period, especially for smaller *poleis*.¹⁵ As for Athens, its political and military strength may have declined after the Lamian War, but most of its institutions from the Classical period persisted.¹⁶

Recent work on Hellenistic Athens has questioned what had been taken for granted as decline (of the *polis*, democracy, etc.). From the perspective of institutional history, Philippe Gauthier emphasized that political and military decline did not necessarily entail institutional decline.¹⁷ Andrew Bayliss has warned against taking for granted that Hellenistic Athenians suffered from moral decline and were morally corrupt individuals, willing to betray their city for self-interest, without any ideological motive whatsoever.¹⁸ Nor did the institutional changes in the Athenian honorific culture signify moral corruption.¹⁹ The earlier scholars' preconceived ideas about decline had led to a relative lack of interest in Hellenistic Athens,²⁰ but the new trend towards questioning what had been taken for granted as decline has sparked an

¹³ Habicht, *Athens*, 4-5; Dreyer, *Untersuchungen*, 13; Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 50.

¹⁴ van Nijf and Alston, "Political Culture," 4-7. Vlassopoulos offers a critical account of the modern historiography of the *polis* in *Unthinking the Greek Polis*, 28-67. For democracy see Grieb's introduction, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 13-26.

¹⁵ van Nijf and Alston, "Political Culture," 5.

¹⁶ See n. 13 above.

¹⁷ *Les cités grecques*, 4.

¹⁸ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 49-60.

¹⁹ Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 124; Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 253; Miller, "Euergetism," 412-3.

²⁰ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 10-48.

interest in the city's internal dynamics, including institutions and political factions.²¹

The relationship between internal and external political actors received attention similarly.²²

In spite of this new trend in the scholarship, political instability remains in the realm of what had been taken for granted as decline. Habicht's standard narrative and the subsequent studies all present the regime changes after the Lamian War without particular attention to their causes. It is as if the Athenians' loss of political and military power in the Hellenistic period automatically results in regime change. This lack of interest in causality results from the fact that the main aim of scholars was to construct a narrative of political history, and the fact that most of the scholars working on Hellenistic Athens were epigraphists. As a result, they were not so much interested in explaining the regime changes as in describing them. Thus, Habicht and later scholars generally present, for each regime change, a description of the external political developments, i.e. the political turbulence caused by the struggles among the Hellenistic warlords,²³ and the Athenian responses to them. The mutual relationship between the external and internal developments,²⁴ and the causal relation of these two factors to the constitutional changes, are absent from the modern narratives. While the external interventions into Athenian affairs have received scholars' attention as part of their descriptive approach, the causal connections between external intervention and internal conflict remained undiscussed.

²¹ The works of Dreyer, Grieb, and Bayliss all claim to give particular emphasis to the importance of internal dynamics in Hellenistic Athens. This does not mean that earlier scholars did not care about these dynamics. As early as Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, a lot of effort has been made to understand such dynamics and their relationship with external powers. Nevertheless, the recent decades have seen a significant increase in these efforts.

²² Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 37-208; Wallace, "Freedom of the Greeks," 137-148, 163-172.

²³ This label for the Diadochoi comes from Austin, "Hellenistic Kings"; quoted by Ober, *The Rise and Fall*, 301.

²⁴ A good example of such a mutual relationship is provided by Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 599-629, which shows that Polyperchon's - an external actor - actions influenced Athenian internal affairs, but in return, his actions were also influenced by the Athenians' responses to them.

In this context, *stasis* (civil strife) becomes relevant to the main problem of this thesis because it often signified contact between internal and external actors.²⁵ However, despite the recently growing interest in the city's internal dynamics, so far there has not been an almost complete lack of interest in *stasis* and its causes in early Hellenistic Athens.²⁶ More than thirty years ago Moses Finley claimed that “[s]*tasis* became the rule” in the city after 322, and his claim has remained uninvestigated since then.²⁷ One reason for this lack of interest may be the lack of narrative sources like Thucydides and Xenophon, which relate detailed information about the Classical *staseis*. Recently, however, Benjamin Gray's work has dealt with *staseis* in the Hellenistic *poleis* by combining literary and epigraphic evidence, and proposes a new analysis for the causes of *stasis* (see 1.3.4 below), while emphasizing the continuities in the Classical and Hellenistic political culture.²⁸ His approach is, therefore, helpful for studying the internal conflicts of early Hellenistic Athens, and this thesis aims to follow his methodology of combining different kinds of evidence and identifying complex causal mechanisms.²⁹

1.2 Evidence

1.2.1 Literary sources

There are no ancient narrative sources for Athenian history after 300. The narrative that we have for the period between Alexander's death and 300 consists of some

²⁵ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 127.

²⁶ Except for Rzepka, “*Stasis w hellenistycznych Atenach*” which my lack of knowledge in Polish unfortunately prevents me from discussing; and Shear, “The Politics of the Past,” 281, 292-5, which examines the Athenians' response to the internal strife in 286, and calls this episode explicitly as *stasis*, but does not investigate its causes. Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 197-291, analyzes the causes of internal strife in 322, but does not identify it as *stasis*.

²⁷ *Politics in the Ancient World*, 116.

²⁸ *Stasis and Stability*, esp. 197-204; see also Börm, “*Stasis*”.

²⁹ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 204.

chapters in Books 18 and 20 of the universal history of Diodoros of Sicily. Because it is a universal history, its interest in Athens is limited to the city's relationship with the Diadochoi, and therefore it does not include abundant details about the city's internal dynamics. Plutarch's biographies, especially *Phocion* and *Demetrius*, are important sources for different periods of Athenian history in the early Hellenistic period, but they are also limited by what Plutarch wanted to emphasize in his biographee's career. Apart from Diodoros and Plutarch, there is a variety of literary sources that record certain details of Athenian history in this period, some of them in fragmentary form. These sources include Arrian's *Ta Meta Alexandron*, Nepos' *Phocion*, Pausanias' *Periegesis*, Philochoros' *Atthis*, and Polyainos' *Strategemata*. Among these, only Philochoros' work is a narrative of Athenian history, and it devotes more than half of its books to the period between 322-262, but it survives only in fragmentary form.³⁰ Preserving various details about different political regimes in early Hellenistic Athens, all these sources testify to the political instability in the city, but none of their authors problematize the issue of regime change because they were not writing political theory like Aristotle.

Our literary sources have traces of the biases of earlier contemporary accounts, as well as of the bias of their own political context. It has long been established that Diodoros consulted mostly pro-Macedonian sources for his account of the Diadochoi.³¹ His use of Hieronymos of Kardia resulted in a particularly positive portrayal of the general Eumenes, and, according to Pausanias, of the Macedonian king Antigonos (either the one known as Monophthalmos or his grandson Gonatas).³² Hieronymos himself was a contemporary of our regime changes, and in his lost work of history he made significant use of authentic documents from the

³⁰ Knoepfler, "Trois historiens hellénistiques," 40-42.

³¹ Walbank, "Sources," 2-3, 6.

³² Paus. 1.9.8; Roisman, *Alexander's Veterans*, 9-30; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 32-40.

Macedonian archives at Pella, and from the chancelleries of Eumenes and Antigonos.³³ Diodoros' positive portrayal of Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes is important for our analysis of regime change because they intervened in the Athenian constitution on two occasions. The Sicilian historian's negative attitude towards Athenian democracy has also been interpreted as the influence of Hieronymos.³⁴ Diodoros' use of Douris of Samos, an anti-Macedonian historian, is a matter of debate among scholars, but, in any case, he apparently did not consult the Samian historian for Athenian affairs.³⁵ Nor does he seem to be acquainted with the work of the pro-Athenian Philochoros.

The way that Diodoros compiled and consulted his sources obviously depended on his own time and place. As a Sicilian Greek writing at the end of the Roman Republican era, his motivation for compiling and composing a universal history was influenced by the changes in the Roman world.³⁶ He wanted to provide moral lessons from the past as *exempla* for the rulers of his own time. His proems often reflect such moralistic concerns, both echoing the voice of his predecessors as well as displaying the political concerns of the first century BC.³⁷ Whatever the extent of Diodoros' original contribution, part of his motivation was to create a moralistic work of history so that his contemporaries could derive lessons from the past, as declared in the main proem to the *Bibliotheke*.³⁸ The moralistic nature of this work determined how Diodoros portrayed the regime changes in Athens so that his accounts of the interventions of Antipatros, Kassandros, Antigonos, and Demetrios in Athens are structured as examples of good/bad conduct of rulers towards their

³³ Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 131-7; Rosen, "Political Documents".

³⁴ Roisman, *Alexander's Veterans*, 19. For Diodoros' attitude towards democracy in general, see Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus*, 167.

³⁵ Knoepfler, "Trois historiens hellénistiques," 32-34.

³⁶ Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus*, passim.

³⁷ Sacks, *ibid.*, 9-22.

³⁸ Diod. 1.1-3; Sacks, *ibid.*, 10-11, 79-82.

subjects. This concern with providing *exempla* of good rulers for his contemporaries, and the strength of the anti-democratic sentiments in the *Bibliothèque* thus loaded his description of the regime changes with a layer of meaning that we need to be aware of, if we want to see beyond the bias in his work.

Plutarch probably consulted more contemporary sources than Diodoros. His *Phocion* used a wide variety of sources,³⁹ and for the *Demetrius* he consulted the pro-Macedonian Hieronymos, the anti-Macedonian Douris, as well as the pro-Athenian Philochoros.⁴⁰ Plutarch's project was to write moralistic biographies of ancient figures in pairs that consisted of one Greek, one Roman, and a comparative section. As a result, his portrayal of the regime changes in Athens was also influenced by his use of sources in order to depict historical figures in a way that emphasized their moral conduct. Phokion received a very positive treatment from him, but Demetrios a very negative one. The moralistic aspect of these works does not mean, however, that Plutarch manipulated his sources or that he did not care about historical accuracy.⁴¹ Pausanias' main source for our period was probably Hieronymos (despite the periegete's dislike of him), but he was not completely dependent on this single source.⁴²

When Plutarch and Pausanias wrote about Greek history, they did so within the Roman Imperial context, and to a certain extent under the influence of the Second Sophistic movement, although not necessarily as part of it.⁴³ This context required them to reconcile Roman Imperial rule with their Greek identity and to reflect on the question of decline, issues that had a strong influence on their treatment of Athenian history. Although lacking the modern periodization which we impose on the

³⁹ Tritle, *Phocion*, 18-35.

⁴⁰ Sweet, "Sources"; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 69-70; Walbank, "Sources," 3, 7.

⁴¹ Schettino, "The Use of Historical Sources," 417-8.

⁴² Knoepfler, "Trois historiens hellénistiques," 39; cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 72-4.

⁴³ Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 135-161, 330-356; Porter, "Ideals and Ruins," 63-92.

Classical and Hellenistic periods, they thought that the Greeks had declined in the course of the previous centuries, either because of fate/divine providence, according to Plutarch,⁴⁴ or, because of treachery/moral corruption, according to Pausanias.⁴⁵ For the periegete, Greece after Alexander resembled a “blasted and withered trunk”.⁴⁶ Treachery was responsible for Athenians’ loss of autonomy, which Pausanias indirectly equated with regime change in a compelling comparison between the Battle of Chaironeia and the Lamian War.⁴⁷ Similarly, some passages in Plutarch’s biographies indicate that he had a very negative view of Athens after Demosthenes’ death.⁴⁸ Plutarch and Pausanias shared the preconceived notion of moral decline in Athens. Just as with Diodoros, therefore, we need to be careful of bias in their writings. Cross-checking Plutarch with Diodoros, as well as with the contemporary evidence, whenever possible, is, therefore, crucial.

1.2.2 Epigraphic sources

Inscribed Athenian public decrees, and particularly honorary decrees, are almost the only contemporary evidence which we have for the regime changes in early Hellenistic Athens. These honorary decrees, which were inscribed both in honor of foreigners, and increasingly in the second half of the fourth century in honor of Athenian citizens, contained motivation clauses that referred to the honorand’s role in the city’s recent past.⁴⁹ The Athenians had multiple reasons for passing and inscribing such decrees, but recording the past for future analysis of Athenian politics was not among them. The motivation clauses of the decrees often

⁴⁴ Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 154-5.

⁴⁵ Swain, *ibid.*, 336.

⁴⁶ Paus. 7.17.2; trans. Frazer.

⁴⁷ Paus 7.10.5; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1.

⁴⁸ E.g. Plut. *Demosth.* 3; *Phoc.* 38; *Demetr.* 10.2. See Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 16-18.

⁴⁹ Lambert, “What was the point”.

chronologically record political events that are otherwise unknown to us, and they also constitute evidence of the ways in which the Athenians constructed their official history under different political regimes. These clauses became longer at the end of the fourth century and started to contain more detailed accounts of the Athenian past⁵⁰ and, therefore, more implicit and explicit allusions to regime changes. The hortatory intention clauses that are found in the majority of honorary decrees give us information about Athenians' expectations from their allies and also fellow citizens.⁵¹ These clauses were the part of the honorary decrees in which the proposer declared the general purpose of inscribing the decree. Athenians themselves were aware of the importance of inscribed decrees as sources for the past, as Philochoros' lost compilation of Attic inscriptions indicates.⁵²

The increasing significance of the honorary decrees is also clear from the increasing use of the 'highest honors' decrees after the Lamian War.⁵³ These decrees provide evidence for the political developments after the Battle of Ipsos in 301, a period for which there is a dearth of literary sources. They are also evidence of the Athenians' concern with rewriting and commemorating their past in one of the most turbulent episodes of their history.⁵⁴ The honorary inscriptions and statues commemorated particular aspects of the city's past under different regimes, by using the public space of the Agora. In their own ways both the oligarchic and the democratic regimes were concerned with the issue of commemoration. As part of this concern, they continued to use the Agora as the commemorative space of the

⁵⁰ Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 253.

⁵¹ Miller, "Euergetism".

⁵² Knoepfler, "Trois historiens hellénistiques," 40; Luraghi, "The demos as narrator", 256-259.

⁵³ Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 252-260; Kralli, "Athens"; Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 79-96. See also the comments of Azoulay, "La gloire et l'outrage," 338-340.

⁵⁴ Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 252-260.

Athenian citizen, in continuation of the practices of memory politics that had started at the end of the fifth century and ended at some point in the fourth century.⁵⁵

Honorary decrees were inscribed under both democracy and oligarchy, although the democrats made a more powerful use of these decrees, by giving more historical details in the motivation clauses, as well as by reflecting the democratic ideology more strongly in the language of the decrees. There is no demonstrable correlation between democracy and the number of inscriptions, but the democratic formulae in the decrees and their location within the commemorative landscape of the Agora served to emphasize that the city was a democracy.⁵⁶ The Athenian democrats needed to emphasize this fact at times of political fluctuation, and to distinguish themselves from the previous oligarchic regime, just as they had in the aftermath of the oligarchic regimes of the Four Hundred/Five Thousand and of the Thirty at the end of the fifth century.⁵⁷ As a result, the honorary inscriptions allow us to understand how the Athenians consciously wanted to conceptualize the political trauma induced by the regime changes.

1.2.3 Numismatic sources

Some surviving Athenian coins provide evidence for the early Hellenistic economic and military crises, and are, therefore, useful for understanding political instability.

These coins include the gold pi-styles minted in mid-290s, the so-called quadridigité silver tetradrachms, and the silver tetrobols and pentobols.⁵⁸ Their types give the

⁵⁵ Shear, "Cultural Change".

⁵⁶ Hedrick, "Democracy"; Pébarthe, "Inscriptions et régime politique". See also the comments of Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens".

⁵⁷ Shear, "The politics of the past," 295-300; Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 220-223; Wallace, "Alexander the Great and Democracy," 11-12.

⁵⁸ Kroll, "The evidence of Athenian coins"; *idem*, "The reminting," 251-4; *idem*, "On the chronology".

approximate dates of these issues, and their denominations are sometimes helpful to understand their intended use.

1.3 Key concepts and methods

For all its fragmentation, the evidence is rich enough for us to analyze the internal and external causes of regime changes. Before doing that, however, it will be useful to explain the key concepts and methods that I apply to the evidence in this analysis. They are based on Aristotle's *Politics*, which is almost contemporary with our period, and modern scholarship.

1.3.1 Regime and regime change

A regime (*politeia*) “is the city’s organisation of the offices and particularly of the supreme (*kurios*) office”.⁵⁹ Various literary and epigraphic sources confirm this definition by Aristotle.⁶⁰ In practice there were three main regime types: democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny,⁶¹ all common in Aristotle’s time, i.e. right before the period that this thesis covers.⁶² Literary and epigraphic sources confirm this tripartite classification, even if Aristotle and other philosophers defined further subcategories.⁶³ In reality there was no regime that was purely democratic, oligarchic, or tyrannical; rather, all regimes contained elements from the three types, and it is the overall features of a regime that allows us to identify it as one of the three.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, we often ignore how a particular regime named itself. We can nonetheless identify regimes through our “interpretation of how the attested political

⁵⁹ Arist. *Pol.* 1278b8-12, where he equates regime (*politeia*) with government (*politeuma*). The translation is from Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 80 n3.

⁶⁰ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 80-86.

⁶¹ Hansen and Nielsen, *ibid.*, 81.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 84.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 84.

institution works and what the decision-making stratum of the citizen population is called.”⁶⁵

To my knowledge, we do not have an ancient definition of the concept of regime change (*metabolē politeias*). From the contents of Book 5, a book devoted to the analysis of precisely this concept,⁶⁶ we can define it as a partial or complete change modifying the political organization of a city, such as making it more democratic, or turning it into an oligarchy from a democracy. The discussion in Book 5 makes it clear that regime change had four causes:⁶⁷ *stasis*, election intrigue,⁶⁸ negligence,⁶⁹ and gradual alteration.

1.3.2 Democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny

The essential principle of democracy was that “the *dēmos* (people) is supreme (*kurios*)”.⁷⁰ Aristotle did not provide a specific definition of democracy, but throughout the *Politics* he made observations about what the supremacy of the *dēmos* signified.⁷¹ It is through the presence of certain administrative principles and political institutions that a regime becomes democratic,⁷² and it is often through these principles and institutions that we are able to identify a regime as democratic. In Athens, according to Stephen Tracy, four such elements give us a checklist for detecting democracy during different periods: sortition of offices, annual incumbency, functioning of the assembly (*ekklēsia*) and the council (*boulē*), and

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁶⁶ *Pol.* 1301a20-25; Hansen and Nielsen, *ibid.*, 124 n5.

⁶⁷ *Pol.* 1303a14-25; Skultety, “Delimiting,” 348; Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 124 n5.

⁶⁸ “As at Heraï[a] where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisan”; *Pol.* 1303a15-6, trans. Jowett.

⁶⁹ As at Oreos, where “disloyal [i.e. to the regime] persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices”; *Pol.* 1303a17-8, trans. Jowett.

⁷⁰ *Pol.* 1278b12. In this thesis I leave the word *dēmos* untranslated in order to avoid the inherent ambiguities of the word ‘people’, and instead deal with those of ‘*dēmos*’.

⁷¹ E.g. *Pol.* 1317a40-b41, 1281a40-b6, 1297b37-1298a33.

⁷² *Pol.* 1317b17-41.

open courts.⁷³ In the absence of any one of these elements, for the detection of which the epigraphic evidence is crucial, we cannot talk of a democratic regime. Identifying democrats is a different matter, and generally there is not enough evidence to trace the ideological views of individual Athenians in detail. They did not form political parties in the modern sense of the term, but rather what we may call political groups or factions.⁷⁴ The overall evidence from early Hellenistic Athens suggests that there was a democratic faction, or factions, whose actions led to the maintenance of the institutional elements in Tracy's checklist.⁷⁵

Oligarchy was the regime in which only a few members of the political community were supreme, a situation that Aristotle defined as the opposite of democracy.⁷⁶ As with democracy, he explicated the details of this regime at various places in the *Politics*, but did not give a precise definition.⁷⁷ Matthew Simonton's study of oligarchy reviews the evidence from both political thought and actual oligarchic regimes in the Classical period, and proposes the following definition:

oligarchia was a *politeia* in which access to the authoritative magistracies (*archai*) was restricted to those in possession of a certain (usually quite exclusionary) property requirement (*timēma*), who constituted the sovereign ruling element (*kurion politeuma*).⁷⁸

As Simonton shows, the property requirement was a typical feature of the Classical oligarchies.⁷⁹ In early Hellenistic Athens, however, there are examples of oligarchic regimes that do not seem to have a property requirement. It is, therefore, helpful to use Simonton's definition together with the checklist of four items that Tracy

⁷³ Tracy, *Athens and Macedon*, 10.

⁷⁴ For an overview of the terminology see Sawada, "Athenian Politics," 57-9.

⁷⁵ See below Chapter 3.

⁷⁶ *Pol.* 1278b14.

⁷⁷ E.g. 1266a12-15, 1292a40-b10.

⁷⁸ Simonton, *Classical Greek Oligarchy*, 40.

⁷⁹ Simonton, *ibid.*, 37-9.

suggests for identifying democracy.⁸⁰ If one of the four items is absent from a particular regime and we cannot talk about democracy, then the question is whether it was an oligarchy or tyranny.

None of the Athenian oligarchic regimes called itself an oligarchy. They were named as such only in the public discourse of the later democracies, or in the works of later theorists like Aristotle. Just as with democracy, therefore, it is through the institutions of a particular regime, such as the property requirement or sortition, that we are able to identify an oligarchy. Again, the identification of particular oligarchs is not easy in the absence of detailed evidence, but the overall evidence suggests that an oligarchic faction, no matter how small, remained active in Athenian politics.

Tyranny was the regime in which one individual usurped supreme power, not the *dēmos* or the few. Aristotle defined it as a corrupt monarchy,⁸¹ and then developed this notion in different passages.⁸² A tyrannical regime did not call itself tyrannical, and it was generally its opponents, or later sources, which labeled it as such.⁸³ The problem is that democrats used the term ‘tyrant’ to describe oligarchs and vice versa.⁸⁴ Thus, while detecting genuine one-man rule we need to make sure that one individual usurped the regime, and that it was not a situation in which the regime’s contemporary or later critics used the term for defamation.

1.3.3 *Stasis*

Often translated as internal war or civil strife, *stasis* was a fundamental aspect of *poleis*.⁸⁵ Factions belonging to the same city frequently clashed with each other

⁸⁰ See footnote 73 above.

⁸¹ *Pol.* 1279b5-7.

⁸² E.g. 1313a35-b40.

⁸³ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 83.

⁸⁴ Lewis, “Introduction,” 4-6; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 74.

⁸⁵ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 124-129.

beyond the accepted limits of regular political conflict, and these clashes often had something to do with the city's regime. This kind of clash, which the Greeks called *stasis*, was not the same as regime change (*metabolē politeias*), which could take place in a non-violent way, as Aristotle argued.⁸⁶ Precisely speaking, in his approach, *stasis* was one of the four causes of regime change.⁸⁷ He did not give a definition of the concept of *stasis*, but defined its various aspects throughout Book 5, from which Steven Skultety derives the following definition:

Specifically, *stasis* is that species of political change in which participants (A) use the instruments of force or deceit (B1) to change the form of the constitution or (B2), though they leave the form unchanged, try (B2a) to get the constitution 'in their own hands'; (B2b) to alter the 'degree' of the constitution; or (B2c) to change a specific part of the constitution.⁸⁸

According to this definition, we can talk about *stasis* only if a group of people aims to change/modify/seize the regime via coercion or deception. If the aim does not concern the regime, then what we have is not a case of *stasis*, but a different kind of clash. Moreover, if the means does not involve coercion or deception, that is, if a group of people aims to change/modify the regime through legal channels, we cannot talk about *stasis*. In this sense, *stasis* is not the same as partisan conflict because the latter does not always use force or deceit, and it does not necessarily aim at regime change. *Stasis* always involves conflict between factions, since against the group of people which aims to seize/change/modify the regime there is usually another group which wants to preserve the status quo.

How can we identify an outbreak of *stasis* in a given time and place? The safest method is to see whether our primary sources talk about *stasis*. Often,

⁸⁶ *Pol.* 1303a14-15; Hansen and Nielsen, *ibid.*, 124n5; Skultety, "Delimiting," 348n30; cf. Gehrke, "Verfassungswandel," 137.

⁸⁷ Skultety, "Delimiting," 348.

⁸⁸ Skultety, "Delimiting," 357.

however, the ancient sources gloss over this phenomenon, and refer to it only implicitly.⁸⁹ In Kalimtzis' words, "oftentimes the concept of *stasis* will dominate as a theme, without a single appearance of the word".⁹⁰ The evasiveness of such a widespread phenomenon⁹¹ is understandable because of its disruptive effects. The citizens who participated in *stasis* tended to leave few traces about it afterwards because they wanted to reconcile with the opponent faction by preserving the idea of their *polis* as a community of brothers.⁹² This hesitation to leave traces resulted from denial and repression of past conflict. It means that the modern historian in search of evidence for *stasis* has to work like a detective or a psychoanalyst to detect its traces.⁹³

Literary evidence that provides a narrative of events is often more explicit about *stasis* than the epigraphic evidence, which gives the impression of a harmonious community producing decrees,⁹⁴ but there is no contemporary narrative for early Hellenistic Athens (see above 1.2.1). Nonetheless, the traces of contemporary accounts that we find in the later narratives of Plutarch and Diodoros, combined with the epigraphic sources, give us indirect evidence for internal conflict. If we can detect within the evidence traces of the elements that make up *stasis*, then it is reasonable to conclude that there was *stasis*, even if the evidence does not explicitly say so. Skultety's definition gives us three such elements: factions, coercion/deception, and attempts at regime change/modification/seizure. Our sources often do not talk about factions, but they contain evidence for conflicting interpretations about regimes, e.g. the same regime being considered as the

⁸⁹ Börm, "Stasis," 4.

⁹⁰ Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity*, 1-2.

⁹¹ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 124-9.

⁹² Loraux, *The Divided City*, 64-68, 197-213.

⁹³ Loraux, *ibid.*, 71-83.

⁹⁴ Börm, "Stasis," 4; see also Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 255.

overthrow of democracy by one group, and as the city's ancestral constitution by another; these conflicting views suggest the presence of factions. It is easier to assess whether these factions used coercion/deception, i.e. illegal channels. Even if there was not always outright violence among fellow citizens, there were illegal trials in which the factions dominating the city executed or exiled their rivals. The presence of foreign troops supporting the same regime as a faction was also a sign of coercion because it signaled the threat of violence against the regime's opponents. The factionaries' aims are more difficult to assess since we do not have firsthand declarations of purpose, but it is not farfetched to conjecture the aims of the factionaries on the basis of their actions. The presence of these three elements is enough to claim the existence of *stasis*, whether our sources indicate it or not.

There may be two counter-arguments against this method of detecting *stasis*. First, it may be argued that it is gratuitous in that it depends too much on the definition of the concept, which, in principle, could be defined for the purpose of finding *stasis* in a particular set of examples. However, Skultety's definition is one that is designed for the purpose of establishing what Aristotle meant by the term. Moreover, Aristotle's own account is a normative analysis of *stasis*, which itself relies heavily on a descriptive basis including a good many historical examples.⁹⁵ That is, Aristotle's understanding of the concept depended on the conceptualization of his own time, which he then used for normative purposes. Secondly, the pragmatic value of this method may be questioned: does it help us understand better the political instability of this period in its own terms, or does it create a situation in which we, as modern commentators, stay strictly within our own terms when we talk about things that the original commentators did not see? Against this counter-

⁹⁵ Gehrke, "Verfassungswandel," 146-9.

argument, I would stress that Skultety's definition has a strong emic element in it because it depends on a contemporary understanding of *stasis*, as explicated by Aristotle. Since *stasis* was a very common and at the same time an evasive phenomenon, ancient commentators may well have glossed over it, but their circumvention should not result in our denial of the phenomenon.

1.3.4 Political culture: A synchronic cause of *stasis*

Why did *stasis* occur in *poleis*? Various approaches are available for answering this question. In this thesis, I adopt an eclectic approach, and combine different explanations, including foreign influence,⁹⁶ tensions between the rich and poor,⁹⁷ and intra-elite conflict.⁹⁸ These explanations, however, do not enable us to understand the *staseis* in which self-interest or self-preservation would have been expected to prevent the factionaries from fighting, but did not.⁹⁹ It is political culture, which consists of political ideas, norms, and paradigms, that allows us to account for why the participants in *stasis* occasionally disregarded their own interests.¹⁰⁰ Although not significantly changing between the fifth and second centuries, the political culture of Greek *poleis* contributed to the emergence of both *stasis* and stability throughout this period. In this sense, it was a synchronic cause. That is, what engendered *stasis* were not changes in political culture; rather, the latter provided the citizens of *poleis* with the essential conceptual tools for promoting stability or *stasis*. Thus, it was an indirect cause, especially in cases where the actions and rhetoric of factionaries, influenced by political paradigms, cannot be explained solely or fully by

⁹⁶ Börm, "Stasis," 3; cp. Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 126-7; Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen*, 29-34; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 268-308.

⁹⁷ de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle*, 291-2, 300-304; Fuks, *Social Conflict*, 9-51.

⁹⁸ Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen*, 34-41; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 309-353.

⁹⁹ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 199-200.

¹⁰⁰ Gray, *ibid.*, 200-4.

self-interest.¹⁰¹ Foreign influence and intra-elite conflict, which were more immediate causes of *stasis*, had a diachronic impact, i.e. changes in them could lead to stability or *stasis*. The aggravation of these two phenomena led to *stasis*, while their mitigation led to stability.

How exactly did political culture contribute to the emergence of *stasis*? In his extensive analysis of the rhetoric and actions of factionaries from various *staseis* that led to the exile of citizens, Gray argues that the factionaries made use of existing political paradigms, norms, and ideas in ways that triggered *stasis*.¹⁰² Their use is significant for understanding the causes of *stasis* because it explains why the regular political tensions in *poleis* sometimes escalated to the level of *stasis*, and how the participants legitimized political violence, which had the potential to harm their own interests. According to this perspective, Greek factionaries did not import their methods of legitimization of violence and exile or invent them at the moment of *stasis* because they already possessed them within the conceptual repertoire of their own political culture. The uncompromising use of pre-existing political paradigms and ideas explains how and why exclusionary *stasis* often occurred. It was severe political conditions such as warfare that generally triggered this kind of uncompromising use, but the paradigms and ideas were already there before the emergence of severe conditions. Thus, the same political ideas could lead to *stasis* or stability depending on how they were used.

The two major paradigms within the political cultures of Greek *poleis* are the Naxian and Dikaiopolitan ones, which Gray named after the *poleis* that produced the documents best and most clearly exemplifying them (Table 1).¹⁰³ The former paradigm consists of political ideas and assumptions that emphasize the collectivity

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 200.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 197-292.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1-34.

and concord (*homonoia*) of the community, while the latter consists of those that emphasize strict reciprocity among individuals. They did not correspond to democratic and oligarchic ideologies because both were present in different ways within the rhetoric and actions of the proponents of each ideology. These paradigms provided the basis for Greek views on a wide range of concepts from freedom to honor, and it is possible to detect their influence in a Greek factionary's rhetoric and action by identifying the underlying virtue-concepts. Concepts like *eunoia* or *philotimia*, although a regular part of Athenian culture of approbation since the fifth century,¹⁰⁴ indicate the impact of the Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms on Athenian political culture.

Table 1 Nakhonianism and Dikaiopolitanism

Nakhonian Features	Dikaiopolitan Features
Community; selfless devotion	Justice; strict reciprocity
Shared goals, history, and traditions represented by ancestors	Self-interest; self-sufficiency of individuals
Brotherhood	Individualism
Indeterminacy about the specific content of shared ideals	Well-defined ethical and political framework of institutions
One-mindedness; monopolistic view of the <i>dēmos</i>	Regulatory norms
Perception of rival faction as external enemy	Internal enemy possible
<i>Homonoia; eunoia</i>	<i>Philotimia</i>
Virtue friendship (<i>philia d'aretēn</i>)	Utility friendship (<i>philia dia to khrēsimon</i>)

¹⁰⁴ Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues".

These paradigms represented different ways of legitimizing political violence and exclusion.¹⁰⁵ Significantly, however, factionaries used both paradigms, often in conjunction. It was not the application of one or the other paradigm that caused *stasis*, but rather their uncompromising applications that escalated regular political conflicts to the level of *stasis*.¹⁰⁶ Gray argues that at times of political stability, citizens of *poleis* left room for conceptual ambiguity and contradiction - hence tolerance for other views - in their rhetoric and actions,¹⁰⁷ whereas during *stasis* there was generally no room for ambiguity. This observation suggests that uncompromising applications of the pre-existing political ideas in a society could contribute to the emergence of *stasis*. The reason behind these applications was the political culture itself, as well as the individual decisions and tendencies of the factionaries.¹⁰⁸

1.4 Outline of thesis

I will first present a brief overview of Athenian political history between 322-262, and describe the regime changes (Chapter 2). From this overview it will become clear that the external cause of these changes was the intervention of Hellenistic kings. In order to understand the internal cause of these changes, we must then ask whether there was *stasis*, election intrigue, negligence, or gradual alteration in the city, which were the internal causes of regime change according to Aristotle (see above 1.3.1). Drawing mostly on indirect evidence, I will argue that there were various episodes of *stasis* accompanying the regime changes, and that *stasis* was their internal cause (Chapter 3). Having ascertained that foreign intervention and

¹⁰⁵ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 109-158.

¹⁰⁶ Gray, *ibid.*, 223-270.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 159-196.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 6-16, esp. 15.

stasis caused the political instability, it is natural to ask why *stasis* became so frequent after 322. In order to answer this question, I will look at the relationship between Athenian politicians and Hellenistic rulers, intra-elite conflict within the city, and Athenian political culture, and I will argue that all these factors played a role in generating *stasis* (Chapter 4). Since the thirty-six years of political instability was followed by twenty-five years of democratic stability after 286, the obvious question that will emerge then will be to understand why the democratic regime was so stable between 286-262. I will conclude by arguing that changes in honorific culture, foreign policy, and memory politics were the causes of political stability in that period (Chapter 5). One of the larger conclusions that emerges from this argument will be that in early Hellenistic Athens the stability of oligarchy was often due to foreign intervention, whereas the stability of democracy depended more on a balanced internal and foreign policy, i.e. on the Athenians themselves.

CHAPTER 2

A NARRATIVE OF THE REGIME CHANGES (322-262)

Classical Athenian democracy was a remarkably stable regime in comparison with the checkered political history of ancient Greek *poleis*. Except for the short-lived oligarchic regimes of 411 and 404/3, Athens preserved its democratic form of government during the 180-odd years between Kleisthenes' administrative reform in 508/7 and the end of the Lamian War in 322. After this war, as the struggles between the Diadochoi destabilized whole regions in the Eastern Mediterranean, the city went through eight regime changes in less than forty years.

2.1 322-301: Between democracy and oligarchy

Almost three generations had passed since the rule of the Thirty Tyrants ended in 403, when Athens once again came to be ruled by an oligarchy. This change took place after the city's defeat at the end of the Lamian War in 322. After Alexander's death, Athens and a coalition of Greek cities revolted against Macedonian rule;¹⁰⁹ despite initial successes, the alliance was decisively defeated at Krannon in Thessaly on 7 Metageitniōn, approximately in August 322.¹¹⁰ By then, the Macedonian fleet had destroyed a large part of the Athenian navy.¹¹¹ Eager to dismantle the insurgent coalition, the victorious Macedonian generals Antipatros and Krateros refused to negotiate a general settlement, and insisted on settling with each *polis* separately.¹¹²

The coalition had to comply with this demand because the Macedonian forces began

¹⁰⁹ Pausanias gives a list of the members of this coalition: Paus. 1.25.4.

¹¹⁰ Diod. 18.16-17; Plut. *Phoc.* 26. Habicht, *Athens*, 39-49; Tracy, *Athenian Democracy*, 27-29. The date of the battle: Plut. *Cam.* 19.5; *Demosth.* 28.1.

¹¹¹ Diod. 18.15.8-9; *FGrH* 239 fr. B9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.3.

¹¹² Diod. 18.17.7.

to besiege and seize the Thessalian *poleis* by force. By negotiating individually with the rebellious cities, Antipatros was able to install oligarchies and garrisons in them.¹¹³

After two meetings in Thebes with the Athenian envoys,¹¹⁴ on whom he imposed unconditional surrender,¹¹⁵ Antipatros took the two same measures in Athens. Firstly, he installed an oligarchy by stipulating a wealth-census as a condition for political participation.¹¹⁶ According to this condition, only those Athenian citizens who possessed more than 2.000 drachmas had the right to vote and take part in the city's government. The disenfranchised poor citizens numbered either 12.000 or 22.000,¹¹⁷ whereas those who preserved their political rights were about 9.000.¹¹⁸ Secondly, Antipatros installed a garrison on the Mounichia hill in Piraeus¹¹⁹ as a temporary measure.¹²⁰ Diodoros reports that the purpose of this measure was to prevent the possibility of revolution.¹²¹ By undermining the city's connection with its port, historically a place with great democratic significance,¹²² Antipatros precluded the restoration of the city's naval power, which was so vital for democracy.¹²³ Lastly, he demanded payment of a war-indemnity¹²⁴ and the surrender of the democratic leaders, including Demosthenes and Hypereides, who had led the Athenians to rebel against Macedonian rule.¹²⁵

¹¹³ Diod. 18.18.8, 55.2, 68.3, 69.3.

¹¹⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 26.3-27.5.

¹¹⁵ Diod. 18.18.3.

¹¹⁶ Diod. 18.18.4.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4: 12.000; Diod. 18.18.5: 22.000. Some of them remained in Attica under difficult conditions; others went to Thrace where Antipatros offered them land (*Phoc.* 28.4).

¹¹⁸ Diod. 18.18.5.

¹¹⁹ Diod. 18.18.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3.

¹²⁰ Diod. 18.48.1.

¹²¹ Diod. 18.18.5.

¹²² Garland, *The Piraeus*, 7-57.

¹²³ Green, "Occupation and co-existence".

¹²⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3. The Athenians postponed and ultimately avoided this payment: *Phoc.* 30.4.

¹²⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 846e; 849a-b; *Phoc.* 27.3; *Demosth.* 28.2-3; see also Diod. 18.10.1-2. Antipatros did not demand their execution; it was the Athenian *ekklēsia* who ratified their death sentence on Demades' motion, Plut. *Demosth.* 28.2; Arr. *FGrH* 156 fr. 9.13; Nep. *Phoc.* 2.

Phokion and Demades, two of the Athenian envoys who had negotiated with Antipatros in Thebes, played a significant role under the new regime.¹²⁶ Other Athenians had active roles too, a situation which suggests that they did not oppose the regime change.¹²⁷ The property requirement leaves no doubt that the new regime was an oligarchy, although it did not abolish all the democratic institutions.¹²⁸ According to one tradition, the democratic courts and rhetorical activity halted under this regime.¹²⁹

The epigraphic sources record a further institutional change towards oligarchy, but Antipatros apparently did not impose this measure. The secretary of the council was replaced by an *anagrapheus*.¹³⁰ The former was a democratic office because its holder was decided on an annual basis via sortition, whereas the latter was oligarchic because it was elected and possessed substantial powers, possibly including the supervision of all legislation.¹³¹ The inscribed decrees from the archon-years 321/0, 320/19, and 319/8 give an unusually prominent position to the office of *anagrapheus*.¹³² This prominence shows the oligarchic nature of the 322-318 regime because the emphasis on this elected individual undermined the authority of the *boulē* at a symbolic level, if not in fact.¹³³ It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the

¹²⁶ Diod. 18.18.1-2, 18.48.1, 18.65.4-6; Plut. *Phoc.* 26-32; Nep. *Phoc.* 2-3. According to Bayliss' argument, Phokion was Antipatros' official caretaker (*epimelētes*) for Athens; *After Demosthenes*, 140-1; cp. Plut. *Phoc.* 29.4. Demades apparently played a more secondary role; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 48-9. According to a tradition reported in Plutarch (*Phoc.* 30.2), Antipatros considered them his two friends in Athens. Epigraphic evidence for Demades' activity in the *ekklēsia*: *IG II²* 372, 380, 383a, 399, 400, *Agora XVI.100* (Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 75).

¹²⁷ From the surviving inscribed decrees we know nine other Athenians who proposed decrees: Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 47-9. See also Plut. *Phoc.* 35.

¹²⁸ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 68-73; Tracy, *Athens and Macedon*, 11-2.

¹²⁹ *Suda* s.v. Demades. There is no record of trials or rhetorical speeches from 322-318, but after the democratic restoration of 318 Hagnonides prosecuted Theophrastos (Diog. Laert. 5.37); Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 100; Habicht, *Athens*, 49 n34.

¹³⁰ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 85-6; Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 49-50. On the secretary of the council: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 54.3.

¹³¹ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 86; Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 50.

¹³² Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 85.

¹³³ Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 46. That the authority of the *ekklēsia* dwindled between 322-318 is also clear from Phokion's negligence of its orders (Plut. *Phoc.* 30.4-5, 32.5; Bayliss, *ibid.*, 80-1).

spring of 318, one of the first moves of the restored democracy was to reduce the prominence of this office, and then to replace it with the secretary of the council at the beginning of the archon-year 318/7.¹³⁴

The circumstances leading to the second regime change in our period were closely connected to the struggles among Alexander's successors. With their temporary reconciliation at the conference of Triparadeisos in the summer of 320, Antipatros became the regent of the Macedonian kingdom, and acquired vast powers.¹³⁵ Since Philip III and Alexander IV, Alexander the Great's heirs, were unfit to rule,¹³⁶ the regent had vast powers, which now Antipatros possessed. His death in the summer of 319, however, signaled the beginning of a new wave of conflict among the Diadochoi.¹³⁷ Antipatros bequeathed the regency and its immense powers to Polyperchon, but the former's son, Kassandros, was unsatisfied with his father's bequest, and secretly allied himself with Ptolemy and Antigonos against the new regent.¹³⁸ One of Polyperchon's counter-measures against this new alliance was to promulgate an ordinance (*diagramma*) in the name of Philip III in autumn 319,¹³⁹ in order to keep the Greek *poleis* on his side.¹⁴⁰ Lacking any direct reference to democracy, autonomy, or freedom, this carefully constructed ordinance nonetheless managed to seduce many *poleis*, Athens among them, with its promise of going back to the status quo before the Lamian War.¹⁴¹ It not only nullified the oligarchic regimes established by Antipatros, but it also ordered that those Greeks whom he had

¹³⁴ Habicht, *Athens*, 49.

¹³⁵ Anson, *Alexander's Heirs*, 70.

¹³⁶ After Alexander the Great's death, his half-brother Philip III and posthumous son Alexander IV became kings, but the former had mental problems and the latter was only a baby; Anson, *ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 83-121; on the date of his death, see *ibid.*, 121 n1.

¹³⁸ Diod. 18.48-49, 54-55. Technically, it must be Philip III who made Polyperchon the new regent; Anson, *ibid.*, 83.

¹³⁹ The exact date of its promulgation is unclear, though certainly between Antipatros' death and the 30th of Xanthikos.

¹⁴⁰ Diodoros gives the full text of this ordinance: 18.56.1-8.

¹⁴¹ Diod. 18.56.3. Poddighe, "Propaganda Strategies," 226.

sent into exile be restored to their cities. The return of the exiles was to take place until the 30th of Xanthikos according to the Macedonian calendar, i.e. the end of March 318.¹⁴²

For Athens, this ordinance meant the end of the 322-318 regime. Together with the Macedonian troops under the command of Alexandros, Polyperchon's son, thousands of Athenians, who had been disenfranchised in 322, returned to Attica in March 318.¹⁴³ Alexandros' purpose was to seize the Piraeus, which was then in opposition to Polyperchon because Kassandros had managed to obtain the control of the garrison at Mounichia.¹⁴⁴ While Alexandros failed to realize his aim, two revolutionary *ekklēsia* meetings, in which the formerly disenfranchised Athenians participated, took place in spring 318. During these meetings, the democrats under Hagnonides' leadership, who had acquired Polyperchon's support for their cause, discharged Phokion and other magistrates of the 322-318 oligarchy, punished them with exile, death, and confiscation, and filled their positions with extreme democrats.¹⁴⁵

These two meetings effectively restored democracy in spring 318. The legal basis of this regime change was Polyperchon's ordinance, as well as the letter that the regent wrote to "those in the *asty*".¹⁴⁶ In these letters Polyperchon declared that the king, i.e. Philip III, "restored their democracy to them, and ordered that *all* Athenians should take part in the government in accordance with their ancestral customs (*kata ta patria*)."¹⁴⁷ The ordinance also provided the legal basis for the exile

¹⁴² Diod. 18.56.4-5; Poddighe, "Propaganda Strategies," 233-4.

¹⁴³ Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1-2.

¹⁴⁴ Diod. 18.65.3; Habicht, *Athens*, 47-8.

¹⁴⁵ Diod. 18.65.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2-35.2.

¹⁴⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1 (emphasis added).

of the oligarchic leaders and the confiscation of their goods.¹⁴⁸ The return of the disenfranchised, as prescribed by the ordinance, rescinded the oligarchic property requirement. The office of *anagrapheus* was replaced with the democratic *grammateus* at the beginning of the archon-year 318/7.¹⁴⁹ The democratic courts seem to have recommenced their activity in 318/7.¹⁵⁰

This democracy lasted about twelve months. Not only did Polyperchon fail to seize the Piraeus from Kassandros, but also his plans against the latter's coalition turned into a fiasco.¹⁵¹ Kassandros, however, preserved his control of the Piraeus and began invading Attica.¹⁵² After enduring his siege in winter 318/7, the Athenian *ekklēsia* discussed the option of negotiating peace with Kassandros, and unanimously decided to negotiate and try to get the best deal out of him.¹⁵³ The city found itself in a very similar position to the aftermath of the Lamian War. After the negotiations, Kassandros installed an oligarchy, and kept the garrison in Mounichia, a measure that he professed to be temporary.¹⁵⁴

This time the property requirement was fixed at 1.000 drachmas, and Kassandros demanded the installation of a caretaker (*epimelētes*) for the city. Demetrios of Phaleron was chosen (*ērethē*)¹⁵⁵ for this post, and he remained Kassandros' caretaker for ten years.¹⁵⁶ Demetrios had taken part in the negotiations with Antipatros in 322,¹⁵⁷ and played an important role under the 322-318

¹⁴⁸ Diod. 18.56.7.

¹⁴⁹ Habicht, *Athens*, 49.

¹⁵⁰ Diog. Laert. 5.37; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 100; Habicht, *ibid.*, 49 n34.

¹⁵¹ Diod. 18.70.1-72.9.

¹⁵² Habicht, *Athens*, 51-2; Paus. 1.25.6.

¹⁵³ Diod. 18.74.2: “*edoxe tois pasi*”.

¹⁵⁴ Diod. 18.74.3. Reportedly, Antipatros had also purported to establish the garrison as a temporary measure: Diod. 18.48.1.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. 18.74.3. On the ambiguity of using the passive voice in this passage, see Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 78; cf. Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 60; Habicht, *Athens*, 52 n43. See also *IG II²* 1201 l. 11.

¹⁵⁶ When Demetrios Poliorketes arrived in 307, it was still the Phalerian who “administered the city for Kassandros” (Plut. *Demetr.* 8.3); Diod. 20.45.5.

¹⁵⁷ [Demetr.] *Eloc.* 289.

oligarchy.¹⁵⁸ Athens remained an oligarchy with property requirement for ten years under his rule. Hagnonides and other democratic leaders were condemned to death as in 322.¹⁵⁹ The epigraphic record gives the impression that the *ekklēsia* ceased its activities almost entirely between 317-307.¹⁶⁰ As with the *anagrapheus* of 322-318, Demetrios introduced new oligarchic offices like the *nomophylakes* and the *gynaikonomoi* to supervise the social and political life of the Athenians.¹⁶¹ Despite the lack of direct evidence for the distribution of offices in this period, the fact that Demetrios himself was the eponymous archon of 309/8¹⁶² suggests that the democratic principle of choosing offices by lot was abandoned.¹⁶³

It may be objected that the 317-307 regime was actually a tyranny because it was a one-man rule, and Demetrios usurped the supreme power by getting the support of Kassandros. The Phalerian, indeed, had a reputation for tyrannical practices,¹⁶⁴ including the prohibition of extravagance exclusively for people other than himself.¹⁶⁵ The problem with such an argument is that, as the title of *epimelētes* implies, Demetrios did not possess supreme power because his authority was smaller than and dependent on Kassandros. Moreover, the property requirement was a typical feature of the oligarchic regimes, and it is better to identify the 317-307 regime as an oligarchy with tyrannical elements (see 1.3.2 above).¹⁶⁶ In any case, we know that Demetrios ruled the city in an undemocratic way, and it is not surprising that he was

¹⁵⁸ He was among those men condemned to death *in absentia* alongside Phokion in spring 318; Plut. *Phoc.* 35.2.

¹⁵⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 38.1; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 67.

¹⁶⁰ Only two decrees certainly date to this period: *IG II²* 450 and 453. *IG II²* 1201 is a deme decree. Bayliss, *ibid.*, 82-3.

¹⁶¹ Bayliss, *ibid.*, 86-8.

¹⁶² Dion. Hal. 9.

¹⁶³ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 90.

¹⁶⁴ Plut. *Demetr.* 10.2. Pausanias called him a tyrant: 1.25.6. Later tradition also refers to the ‘overthrow of the oligarchy’ when referring to 307: Dion. Hal. 9 (s.v. Anaxikrates); 11.37, 40.

¹⁶⁵ On the Phalerian’s lavish statues, see Azoulay, “La gloire et l’outrage”.

¹⁶⁶ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 77-80. Cf. Tracy, *Athens and Macedon*, 12; Lara O’Sullivan, *The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum*, 105-163. For a criticism of Tracy and O’Sullivan, who claim that the 317-307 regime was not as undemocratic as the ancient tradition suggests, see Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 63-93.

among the Athenians who were condemned to death after the democratic restoration of 307.¹⁶⁷

Another *diadochos* soon had an influence on the Athenian regime. In 315, Antigonos Monophthalmos made a proclamation (*dogma*) asserting that “all the Greeks were free, not subject to foreign garrisons, and autonomous”.¹⁶⁸ His purpose was to get the support of the Greek *poleis* in his struggle against Kassandros and Ptolemy. As part of this conflict, Antigonos began to remove the Antipatrid garrisons and to free the *poleis* in accordance with his professed policy.¹⁶⁹ In 307, it was the Athenians’ turn to be endowed with the three promises of Antigonos’ proclamation. The One-Eyed sent his son Demetrios, who later came to be known as Poliorketes (the City-Besieger), to end Kassandros’ sway over Athens.¹⁷⁰ He arrived at Piraeus in June,¹⁷¹ and with a proclamation (*kērugma*) he declared that he came to liberate the Athenians, to remove the garrison on the Mounichia Hill in the Piraeus, and to restore the Athenians’ ancestral constitution (*patrios politeia*).¹⁷² After completely destroying Kassandros’ garrison in August 307,¹⁷³ he assembled the Athenian people in the *asty* and restored their ancestral constitution.¹⁷⁴ With this declaration began six years of democratic rule.

A number of democratic measures came into effect after this point. Destroying the statutes and statues of Demetrios of Phaleron, the restored democracy undid

¹⁶⁷ Dion. Hal. 3. He went into exile: Plut. *Mor.* 69c–d; Strabo 9.1.20.

¹⁶⁸ Diod. 19.61.3, trans. Geer; Habicht, *Athens*, 66. The Tyre proclamation depended on the ideological model of Philip III’s ordinance in 319; Poddighe, “Propaganda Strategies,” 238.

¹⁶⁹ Wallace, “Defending the Freedom,” 236–9.

¹⁷⁰ Diod. 20.45.1.

¹⁷¹ Plut. *Demetr.* 8.3: on the 26th of Thargelion in 308/7.

¹⁷² Diod. 20.45.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 8.5; Polyainos, 4.7.6. Demetrios’ proclamation was based on his father’s orders; Diod. 20.45.1; Rosen, “Political Documents,” 86.

¹⁷³ On this date, see Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 96n2.

¹⁷⁴ Plut. *Demetr.* 10.1; Diod. 20.46.3. Diodoros put the emphasis on Demetrios’ restoration of freedom (*eleutheria*) to the Athenians.

some of the institutional reforms of the preceding oligarchy.¹⁷⁵ The secretary of the council, an office that disappeared between 317-307, came back. The *ekklēsia*, almost entirely inactive for ten years, became an extremely active institution, which inscribed more than one hundred public decrees in six years.¹⁷⁶ The need to inscribe public decisions in order to make them visible to everyone became an obsession in this period, a situation that the Athenians referred to within the decrees themselves.¹⁷⁷ The democratic courts, apparently dysfunctional during the last ten years, also enjoyed a revival.¹⁷⁸

The functioning of institutions does not mean that the 307-301 democracy was not without its problems. Due to its thorny relationship with the Antigonid rulers, Athens accommodated more and more undemocratic practices towards the end of the fourth century. The extravagant, although not unprecedented,¹⁷⁹ honors granted to Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes in 307¹⁸⁰ were only the beginning of a series of fawning behaviors towards Demetrios, which were perceived as disrupting the democratic institutions and principles.¹⁸¹ These behaviors increased hostility in Athens towards Poliorketes, and eventually the Antigonids' military defeat at the Battle of Ipsos in the late spring of 301 triggered another regime change. Antigonos fell on the battlefield; subsequently, on his way back to Athens Demetrios learnt from Athenian envoys in the Cyclades that the *ekklēsia* had passed a decree (*psēphisma*) that made it illegal to receive a king to the city.¹⁸² The power vacuum in the city caused by the exclusion of Demetrios gave rise to a new regime late in 301.

¹⁷⁵ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 104.

¹⁷⁶ Habicht, *Athens*, 70.

¹⁷⁷ *IG II²* 487 ll. 8-9; Plut. *Mor.* 852d. Hedrick "Epigraphic Writing," 330-2.

¹⁷⁸ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 105.

¹⁷⁹ Mikalson, *Religion*, 75-104.

¹⁸⁰ Plut. *Demetr.* 10.2-4.

¹⁸¹ Habicht, *Athens*, 77-9.

¹⁸² Plut. *Demetr.* 30.3.

2.2 301-262: From tyranny to democracy

A few months after the Athenians learnt about Demetrios' defeat at Ipsos, Lachares, the general of mercenaries, established himself as the city's tyrant as a result of an episode of military conflict among Athenian citizens.¹⁸³ Kassandros supported this regime,¹⁸⁴ but died in May 297.¹⁸⁵ During the regime of 301-295, the Athenian assembly continued functioning as if under democracy, and Lachares does not seem to have made institutional changes.¹⁸⁶ Military financial officers called trittyarchs and an *exetastes* (inspector), who were assigned not by sortition but by election, replaced the democratic treasurer (*tamias tou dēmou*).¹⁸⁷ The democratic practice of conducting judicial scrutiny (*dokimasia*) for the receivers of public honors appears to have ceased in this period, a situation which suggests that the democratic courts might have stopped functioning.¹⁸⁸ Meanwhile, Lachares' opponents held the Piraeus until Demetrios Poliorketes came back to capture the city in 295.¹⁸⁹ After an unsuccessful first attempt, Poliorketes took the city from Lachares in the spring of

¹⁸³ Military conflict: Paus. 1.29.10; *P. Oxy.* 2082 (= *FGrH* 257a) fr. 1-2; Thonemann, "Charias on the Acropolis". Date: Lachares' tyranny began some time between 28 Metageitniōn 301/0, i.e. August 301 (*IG* II² 640 ll. 5-6), and the festival of Dionysia in Elaphēboliōn 301/0, i.e. approximately March 300 (*P. Oxy.* 1235); Osborne, *Athens*, 25-36; cf. Dreyer, *Untersuchungen*, 19-75. The new explanation of *P. Oxy.* 1235 that Lara O'Sullivan, "History from Comic Hypotheses" offers is unconvincing because she wants us to assume that its author confused Stratokles with Lachares, a solution that is more speculative than the one that had been offered by Ferguson, "Lachares and Demetrios Poliorketes," and accepted by Osborne, *Athens*, 30; cf. Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 125 n2.

¹⁸⁴ Paus. 1.25.7; 1.29.16. Pausanias' sources were sympathetic to Poliorketes and hostile to Kassandros: Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 127.

¹⁸⁵ *FGrH* 260 fr. 3.4; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 125 n2.

¹⁸⁶ Osborne, *Athens*, 29.

¹⁸⁷ Henry, "Athenian Financial Officers," 63-8; evidence for the election of the inspector (*exetastes*): *IG* II² 1270 l. 3; Henry, *ibid.*, 64 n67.

¹⁸⁸ Osborne, *Naturalization* II, 140-3, 152-3.

¹⁸⁹ Polyainos 4.7.5.

295.¹⁹⁰ He forced the city's capitulation by ravaging the Attic countryside, blocking grain shipments, and thereby inducing famine.¹⁹¹ The tyrant managed to escape.¹⁹²

The Athenians' determination to resist Demetrios' siege is clear from the death penalty which they instituted for those who mentioned peace or reconciliation with Demetrios.¹⁹³ Severe famine led to their capitulation. Contrary to Athenians fears, Demetrios did not punish them, and, instead, he offered them grain and "established the magistrates who were most acceptable to the people".¹⁹⁴ In a scene reminiscent of the extravagant honors granted in 307, the Athenians gave Poliorketes not one, but two garrisons.¹⁹⁵ One was on the Mounichia Hill in the Piraeus, while the other was on the Mouseion Hill near the Akropolis. The new regime was a democracy very much like the 307-301 regime, for it preserved democratic institutions like the secretary of the council, and revived the practice of judicial scrutiny (*dokimasia*).¹⁹⁶

This democracy persisted for approximately fifteen months. Between 294-286, the city's regime was an oligarchy with no property requirement.¹⁹⁷ The office of *anagrapheus* was reintroduced in 294/3 or the following year,¹⁹⁸ and the judicial scrutiny (*dokimasia*) was abandoned.¹⁹⁹ Disrupting the democratic principle of annual incumbency, Olympiodoros served twice as the eponymous archon in 294/3

¹⁹⁰ Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1-3. The dating is based on the assumption of a miniature archon-year in early 295, and on the connection of Plut. *Demetr.* 34.4 with the fragments of the inscribed decrees *Agora XVI.165* and *IG II³.1 851, 852*; see also *IG II³.1 985 ll. 21-24*. For the miniature archon-year, see Osborne, "The Archonship of Nikias Hysteros"; *idem*, "The Eponymous Archons," 75-7; *idem*, *Athens*, 30-33.

¹⁹¹ Plut. *Demetr.* 33.3-34.2.

¹⁹² Plut. *Demetr.* 33.4.

¹⁹³ Plut. *Demetr.* 34.1.

¹⁹⁴ Plut. *Demetr.* 34.4, trans. Perrin.

¹⁹⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 34.4-5.

¹⁹⁶ *IG II³.1 853 ll. 5-7, 49*.

¹⁹⁷ Osborne, *Athens*, 34-5; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 135-6; Habicht, *Athens*, 90-1.

¹⁹⁸ *IG II³.1 857 + SEG XLV.101*; *IG II³.1 858 + SEG XXI.354*; *Agora XVI 167*; Osborne, "The Archons of Athens," 85 n11.

¹⁹⁹ Osborne, *Naturalization II*, 154.

and 293/2.²⁰⁰ Moreover, Poliorketes restored the oligarchic exiles in 292/1, including Deinarchos who had been accused of antidemocratic activity in 307.²⁰¹

Unhappy with this Demetrian oligarchy, the Athenian democrats looked for the right moment for rebellion, which they found when Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, and Pyrrhos the Epirote launched a joint attack against Poliorketes in Macedonia and Greece.²⁰² Ptolemy's plan to seize Attica from Demetrios in the spring of 287 was a good moment to rebel, and the democrats seem to have made an attempt at that point, and to have created a situation that was going to be called "difficult times" (*kairōn duskolōn*) under a later oligarchic regime,²⁰³ but the Egyptian ruler postponed this plan.²⁰⁴ When Lysimachos and Pyrrhos defeated Poliorketes in Macedonia, the Athenian democrats, supported by Ptolemaic troops, seized the opportunity to rebel in the spring of 286.²⁰⁵ At the beginning of the revolt (*epanastasis*), they managed to capture Demetrios' garrison on the Mouseion Hill, but not the one on Mounichia. After the peace negotiations with Poliorketes, in which Pyrrhos and the representatives of Ptolemy participated, the city's regime changed into a democracy, but the Piraeus remained in Demetrios' hands.

The 286-262 regime was a democracy with the secretary of council, annual incumbency, sortition of offices, and a functioning assembly.²⁰⁶ This regime pursued

²⁰⁰ Dion. Hal. 9 (= Philochoros *FGrH* 328 fr. 167); *IG* II³.1 858 + *SEG* XXI 354 ll. 1-2: "[Epi *Olympiodōrou* *arkhontos deute[ron etos]*"; Osborne, *Athens*, 34-5, 113.

²⁰¹ Dion. Hal. 2 (= Philochoros *FGrH* 328 fr. 66); Dion. Hal. 3, 9; Plut. *Mor.* 850d.

²⁰² Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 61-2.

²⁰³ *IG* II³.1 985 l. 33.

²⁰⁴ *IG* II³.1 985 ll. 30-43; Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 69-70.

²⁰⁵ *IG* II³.1 911 ll. 11-40; *IG* II³.1 918 ll. 9-19; *IG* II³.1 919 ll. 3-8; Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1-2; Paus. 1.26.1-2, 1.29.13. For the date of the revolt see Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 62-71. Since the assessments of Christian Habicht, *Untersuchungen*, 45-67, and Osborne, "Kallias", the *opinio communis* dates this revolt to 287: Habicht, *Athens*, 96-7; Dreyer, *Untersuchungen*, 200-223; Tracy, *Athens and Macedon*, 42-3; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 106-7; Osborne, *Athens*, 36-43. Recently Shear, "Demetrios Poliorketes" emphasized the necessity of 286 as the date of the revolt because it is not otherwise possible to explain the cancellation of the Great Panathenaia that was going to be celebrated "[for the] fir[st] t[im]e a[f]te[r] t[he] city had been recovered" (*IG* II³.1 911 ll. 64-5); Shear, "Demetrios Poliorketes," 139-40; see also eadem, "Writing Past and Present," 162n5. See Appendix A.

²⁰⁶ Osborne, *Athens*, 43-50; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 106-112.

a neutral policy in terms of its relationship with Hellenistic kings, although it preserved a closer relationship with Ptolemy I and II.²⁰⁷ One of its main problems was the unavailability of the port of Piraeus, which was not reunited with the city until 229.²⁰⁸ Under democratic rule, Athens enjoyed political stability for twenty-five years, until the end of the Chremonidean War in the summer of 262.²⁰⁹



²⁰⁷ Shear Jr, *Kallias*, 61-73.

²⁰⁸ For the bibliography on the date of Piraeus' recovery, see Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 134 n3.

²⁰⁹ Apollodoros *FGrH* fr. 44 (= Philodem. *De Stoicis* 3); Osborne, *Athens*, 50.

CHAPTER 3

STASIS: THE INTERNAL CAUSE OF REGIME CHANGE

Fifteen years after the democratic restoration of 286, Laches from the deme of Leukonoe made an official request for his deceased father, Demochares, to receive posthumous honors for his services to the city. As was the usual practice, he listed his father's achievements in order to explain to fellow citizens why his father deserved honors. According to Laches, Demochares

was the only Athenian of his generation who did not occupy himself with revolutionary schemes to change the constitution (*politeuma*) of his country to something other than democracy.²¹⁰

Since the council and the assembly did grant the requested honors,²¹¹ this exaggerated statement apparently contained some truth in it. After all, the city's regime had changed eight times since Demochares' career began in 322, and this severe political instability could conceivably produce different ways of thinking about how individual Athenians dealt with it. It seems nonetheless unlikely that Demochares was the one and only unswerving supporter of Athenian democracy in his generation.²¹² The implication of his son's claim is that many Athenians of this generation did engage with plots to change the city's regime. If this interpretation is accurate, the implications have great significance for understanding the causes of political instability in early Hellenistic Athens because the city's inhabitants had responsibility for the lack of stability.

What exactly was their responsibility? After all, as the narrative in the previous chapter made clear, some form of foreign intervention triggered each regime change,

²¹⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 851d-f, trans. Waterfield.

²¹¹ Plut. *Mor.* 847d-e. On Demochares see Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 153-60.

²¹² Roisman and Worthington, *Attic Orators*, 274 n20 postulate the inaccuracy of this claim.

by either besieging the city or threatening to do so. If we follow Aristotle's classification of the causes of regime change,²¹³ these changes would belong to the category of externally-caused ones, but such an approach would miss out the responsibility of the city's inhabitants, to which Demochares' son was alluding. It is thus appropriate to analyze the internal causes, and ask whether *stasis*, election intrigue, negligence, or gradual alteration, i.e. the internal causes that Aristotle identified,²¹⁴ contributed to the instability. An analysis of the last three of these causes would need detailed information, and unfortunately our evidence does not provide such precision, but there is enough indirect evidence for an analysis of *stasis*. Drawing on the methodology given above (Chapter 1.3.3), I argue that there were five episodes of *stasis* in Athens between 322-286. These conflicts took place between the democratic and oligarchic factions, whose identifications remain problematic, but it is clear that some Athenians supported the democratic regimes in this period, and others the oligarchic ones. Most of the factions were not demonstrably anti-Macedonian, and cooperated with different Hellenistic rulers. The intense struggle between these factions was the Athenians' share in political instability. In other words, *stasis* was the internal cause of regime change.

3.1 322: Anti-Macedonian democrats vs. pro-Antipatrid oligarchs

The conflicts between Athenian politicians throughout 330s and 320s, which were often about foreign policy, did not escalate to the level of *stasis* until 322. Despite their clashing views, influential politicians like Demades, Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lykourgos, and Phokion managed to overcome the hostilities among each other for

²¹³ See p. 1 above.

²¹⁴ *Pol.* 1303a14-25; Skultety, "Delimiting," 348.

the sake of the common interest of their city.²¹⁵ The general mood was anti-Macedonian, but the city had to appear pro-Macedonian due to the defeat at Chaironeia, and the subsequent alliance with Philip II.²¹⁶ As Brun argues, there is not enough evidence to talk about pro- and anti-Macedonian factions during these years.²¹⁷ The legal disputes between Lykourgos and Autolykos, Lykourgos and Leokrates, and Demosthenes and Aischines were all related to the defeat at Chaironeia and their attitudes towards the Macedonians.²¹⁸ Such conflicts around a man's position towards the Macedonians, in conjunction with discord around a man's position in relationship to the regime, constituted the basis of factions in the coming decades. These two types of antagonism did not always coalesce with each other, and there is not much evidence about whether the pro-Macedonians were always anti-democratic politicians.

Whatever factions there were in the city before the Lamian War, the conflict among them did not turn into *stasis*. Who made up the factions in 323 then? Diodoros attests to their existence in his description of the debates on the eve of the Lamian War, and he talks about two groups: the *dēmos* and the wealthy citizens (*ktēmatikoi*):

In the Assembly at Athens, while the men of property (*ktēmatikoi*) were advising that no action be taken and the demagogues were rousing the people (*ta plēthē*) and urging them to prosecute the war vigorously, those who preferred war and were accustomed to make their living from paid military service were far superior in numbers.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ Habicht, *Athens*, 6-30.

²¹⁶ Brun, "Y avait-il vraiment des anti-Macédoniens".

²¹⁷ Brun, *ibid.*, esp. 88-90.

²¹⁸ Habicht, *Athens*, 27-8.

²¹⁹ Diod. 18.10.1, trans. Geer.

Diodoros thus presented the Athenians' decision to wage war against Macedonians as a verdict against the will of the wealthy citizens because the Athenian orators determined the will of the majority.²²⁰ His account alone may not be enough evidence to postulate two factions in Athens at this time, but the expulsions before and after the war and the continuity of factionalism in the following years suggest the existence of at least two separate factions, as we shall see.

These factions obviously did not come out of nowhere. They were the result of already-existing tensions in the city, which got out of control in the face of the possibility of war. Although Diodoros does not inform us about the ideological orientations of the two factions, it is clear from their designations that one had democratic inclinations, whereas the other had oligarchic ones. The influence of Diodoros' pro-Macedonian source and his anti-democratic perspective is evident in the language of the passage above.²²¹ There is no evidence, nevertheless, that there were democrats who were against the Lamian War. Moreover, at least one citizen known for his anti-democratic ideas, namely Kallimedon of Kollytos,²²² was (or became) pro-Macedonian, as his flight to Antipatros shows. Citing Phylarchos, Plutarch relates that Kallimedon defended the Macedonian cause against Demosthenes during the Lamian War.²²³

This period also saw a series of trials of pro-Macedonians, as the anti-Macedonians like Demosthenes tried to eliminate their political rivals. Demosthenes had impeached Kallimedon for planning “the overthrow of the *dēmos*” (*epi katalusei*

²²⁰ Diod. 18.10.2

²²¹ Diod. 18.10.1: *dēmokopōn*; cf. the passages cited by Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus*, 167.

²²² On Kallimedon see Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 67-8.

²²³ Plut. *Demosth.* 27.1-5.

tou dēmou);²²⁴ Aristotle, who had a close relationship with the Macedonian general Antipatros, was charged with impiety;²²⁵ and Demades²²⁶ was punished with *atimia* for a *graphē paranomōn*.²²⁷ It is improbable that all of the few known pro-Macedonians simultaneously committed these crimes purely by chance. It is plausible, therefore, that the anti-Macedonian democrats systematically persecuted some of the anti-war Athenians right before the Lamian War; thus, these lawsuits were political trials, i.e. coercive means of eliminating rivals. These prosecutions resulted in voluntary exile: Kallimedon and Pytheas (an opponent of Demosthenes) fled the city to join Antipatros,²²⁸ and Aristotle fled to Chalcis.²²⁹ Demades seems to have remained in the city.²³⁰ The trials of 323 were about preserving the existing regime, not changing it, as Demosthenes' charge against Kallimedon demonstrates. These trials and the defeat at Krannon led to the emergence of at least two factions and *stasis* in the following decades.

The two meetings for negotiations between Antipatros and the Athenian envoys, which took place at Thebes after the battle of Krannon,²³¹ provided an important opportunity for the oligarchic faction - to which at least Demades, one of the envoys, belonged - to take their revenge on the democratic faction, which had condemned oligarchs in the previous year. Moreover, Antipatros' interventionist policy gave them a chance to change/modify the regime via coercion. Diodoros and Plutarch both report that Antipatros decided to change the Athenian constitution²³² -

²²⁴ Din. *In Dem.* 1.94. The expression “*katalusis tou dēmou*” recalls the language of the anti-tyranny law of 336 (*IG II³.1 320 ll. 9-10, 16-7*), as well as the language of the fifth-century oath of Demophantes (*Andoc.* 1.96-8), among many other examples from the fifth-century.

²²⁵ Diog. Laert. 5.1.5; Habicht, *Athens*, 37.

²²⁶ On Demades see Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 40-49.

²²⁷ Diod. 18.18.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.2; *Suda*, s.v. Demades; Ael. *Var. Hist.* 5.12.

²²⁸ Plut. *Demosth.* 27.1-5.

²²⁹ Diog. Laert. 5.1.10.

²³⁰ Diod. 18.18.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.2.

²³¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.1-5; Diod. 18.18.1-6.

²³² Diod. 18.18.4; 20.46.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3.

which he did in other Greek cities as well²³³ - but the Athenian envoys were probably behind the details of his intervention.²³⁴

The crucial question about these negotiations is how much of an influence the envoys actually had or could have had on the course of discussions. On the one hand, it does not seem likely that the Athenian envoys could resist anything which Antipatros imposed on the city, because Antipatros and Krateros, who broke the Greek alliance by seizing Thessalian *poleis* by force²³⁵ and then led all their forces against the Athenians,²³⁶ were about to march into Attica.²³⁷ According to Diodoros, the *dēmos* was not a match in battle (*axiomakhos*) for the Macedonian troops²³⁸ because having lost both on land and sea, Athenians probably did not have the means to restart military action.²³⁹ Moreover, both Diodoros and Plutarch make it clear that Antipatros demanded unconditional surrender.²⁴⁰ Thus, it appears that the envoys had to accept anything.

It is unclear, on the other hand, why Antipatros would care about the political regime of Athens, as long as the city obeyed to him, a situation that was more likely if the envoys and their supporters remained in power.²⁴¹ Philip and Alexander had been mostly unconcerned with it.²⁴² Pausanias wrote that Antipatros was in a hurry to go to Asia after the Lamian War, and just wanted to make peace quickly.²⁴³ Accordingly, if the envoys tried to convince Antipatros that the city would remain

²³³ Antipatros' treatment of the cities in Thessaly: Diod. 18.17.7-8; other cities: Diod. 18.18.8. He established oligarchy in Megalopolis: Diod. 18.68.3. See also: Diod. 18.55.2.

²³⁴ Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 54 n 177; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 50-51; Habicht, *Athens*, 40; Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 19-20.

²³⁵ Diod. 18.17.7.

²³⁶ Diod. 18.18.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.2.

²³⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 26.3.

²³⁸ Diod. 18.18.3.

²³⁹ Cf. Paus. 7.10.5.

²⁴⁰ Diod. 18.18.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.4.

²⁴¹ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 221; Hackl, "Die Aufhebung," 62-3, 66-8.

²⁴² Habicht, *Athens*, 13.

²⁴³ Paus. 7.10.4.

loyal to him as a democracy, they might have had a chance to do that. Antipatros did not let them negotiate freely,²⁴⁴ but Plutarch reports two traditions about the negotiations for the Macedonian garrison in Piraeus, both of which suggest that the envoys discussed possible outcomes with Antipater.²⁴⁵ These two traditions suggest that the envoys had a chance to discuss the regime change as well. There is no evidence in our sources that any member of the embassy except Xenocrates made any attempt to preserve the existing regime.²⁴⁶

From Photios' epitome of *Ta Meta Alexandron* by the third-century-AD historian, Dexippos of Athens, it is possible to deduce that at some stage of the negotiations, perhaps at the beginning, the Athenian envoys argued their case too boldly.²⁴⁷ Against the envoys, Antipatros apparently made arguments for peace, and reminded them that they were not in a position to bargain.²⁴⁸ Dexippos records no attempt to protect the existing regime in Athens, nor any statement by Antipatros that can be interpreted to show that he was concerned about the Athenian regime.

In light of the little evidence which we have, there is no doubt that Antipatros was responsible for the regime change in 322 because he stipulated it.²⁴⁹ The evidence, however, does not indicate that he cared about the details of the new regime, nor does it indicate a reason why he should do so. Moreover, he certainly did not stipulate the exile of the Athenians who lost their political rights.²⁵⁰ In all probability, it was the envoys who suggested the term *patrios politeia* (ancestral

²⁴⁴ Diod. 18.18.3: "When Antipater had heard what they had to say, he made answer that he would end the war against the Athenians on no other condition than that they surrender all their interests to his discretion" (trans. Geer).

²⁴⁵ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.4-5.

²⁴⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.4.

²⁴⁷ Martin, "Antipater after the Lamian War".

²⁴⁸ Martin, *ibid.*, 303.

²⁴⁹ Diod. 18.18.4.

²⁵⁰ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 221-2.

regime) to Antipatros, who then used its ambiguity to modify the regime,²⁵¹ but there was no reason for him to be concerned with anything more than the loyalty of the city to the Macedonian kingdom. The Athenian envoys, however, had the opportunity to negotiate about the garrison and the extent of the exiles, but they did not negotiate about preserving the regime or protecting the democratic faction, which was composed of fellow citizens. On the contrary, they were content with Antipatros' stipulations, which they found humane.²⁵²

Even though Antipatros may have been the sole author of the terms of the negotiations, as far as we know, he defined them in an ambiguous way that allowed the Athenian envoys to interpret them as they wanted. *Patrios politeia* was an ambiguous expression, a situation that had posed sundry problems in the later fifth-century.²⁵³ The idea of an ancestral constitution could be interpreted in different ways. For instance, in his letter to Athenian citizens in 319 (i.e. at a time when Athens supposedly had its *patrios politeia*), Polyperchon also made a similar ancestral reference. He asserted that the king ordered Athenians to “govern in accordance with their ancestral ways” (*politeuesthai kata ta patria*).²⁵⁴ Just as Antipatros and Polyperchon could use these two terms in completely different meanings, Athenian politicians themselves could understand different things from the idea of the ancestral regime. The *patrios politeia* ordered by Antipatros in 322 thus had different meanings for democrats and oligarchs. The majority of the Athenian *dēmos* probably perceived it as an external imposition, whereas the supporters of the new regime could use the term to legitimize the new regime.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3; see also Diod. 18.18.5: “*kata tous Solonōs nomous epoliteuonto*”.

²⁵² Plut. *Phoc.* 27.4.

²⁵³ Shear, *Polis and Revolution*, 41-69, 167-170, calls the *patrios politeia* “a nebulous phrase” (169).

²⁵⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1.

²⁵⁵ Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 54-5.

These opposite interpretations had a significant role in the late fifth-century *staseis* too.²⁵⁶

The majority of Athenian citizens gave up their political rights in 322. The property qualification was implemented in a coercive way. There is no evidence that the majority of the *dēmos* who did not meet the qualification voted to give up their citizenship during an assembly meeting, the only legitimate way to implement such a requirement. It was the military defeat and the Macedonian garrison in Mounichia that made this coercion possible. As Plutarch relates, Athenians were extremely disturbed by the garrison.²⁵⁷ However, after reporting an interesting tradition that associated the introduction of the garrison with bad omens and sacrileges that disturbed the functioning of Athenian *polis*-religion,²⁵⁸ Plutarch went on to emphasize that the garrison's real harm to the people was the fact that it allowed the coercive disenfranchisement:

Now, the garrison, owing to the influence of Menyllus, did no harm to the inhabitants; but the citizens who were deprived of their franchise because of their poverty numbered more than twelve thousand, and those of them who remained at home appeared to be suffering grievous and undeserved wrongs, while those who on this account forsook the city and migrated to Thrace, where Antipater furnished them with land and a city, were like men driven from a captured city (*ekpepoliorkēmenois*).²⁵⁹

It is not difficult to see how this kind of a radical partition within the citizen body would arouse *stasis*. The Macedonian garrison prevented the escalation of the *stasis* to the level of violence between factions. Under these circumstances, the ambiguity of *patrios politeia* and the fact that Antipatros stipulated the regime change may have helped the leaders of the new regime to present the

²⁵⁶ See footnote 253 above.

²⁵⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 28.

²⁵⁸ On the concept of *polis*-religion, see Sourvinou-Inwood, "What is *polis*-religion".

²⁵⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4, trans. Perrin.

disenfranchisement at the same time as a necessary and externally imposed measure. In other words, they could present themselves to the Athenians who retained their political rights as implementing a genuine reform, while to those who lost their rights they could give the impression that all these measures were imposed from the outside. From the perspective of the disenfranchised, and from that of the democrats who retained their political rights, however, this measure could not be mistaken for anything but the attempt of the oligarchic faction to eliminate the democrats. Since the leaders of the new regime were the envoys to Antipatros, who were presumably content with his impositions, we can guess that the *dēmos* would have identified the envoys as the leaders of the oligarchic faction. The perspective of the disenfranchised and the democrats may be detected in the discourse of the reestablished democracy of 318, which presented the 322-318 regime as an oligarchy, and declared that the *dēmos* was dissolved during that period, as we shall see in the next section.²⁶⁰

Another significant use of coercion against the democrats was the murder and exile of their leaders in September 322. Demosthenes and his supporters, Hypereides, Aristonikos of Marathon, Himeraios of Phaleron, and Eukrates were all executed.²⁶¹ Antipatros demanded that the Athenians give up (*ekdidonai*) Demosthenes, Hypereides and their associates, and the envoys were pleased with this condition.²⁶² Antipatros' demand most probably implied the execution, but technically all he asked for was their delivery. Nevertheless, according to one tradition, Demades proposed the motion to sentence them to death, and the *dēmos* passed it.²⁶³ Since this

²⁶⁰ *IG* II² 448 ll. 61-63; Diod. 18.66.5.

²⁶¹ Plut. *Demost.* 28.2-4; Plut. *Mor.* 846e-f; Nep. *Phoc.* 2.2; Arr. *FGrH* 156 fr. 9-11. Eukrates: [Lucian] *Dem. Enc.* 31.

²⁶² Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3-4.

²⁶³ Plut. *Demosth.* 28.2; Arr. *FGrH* 156 fr. 11; cf. Nep. *Phoc.* 2.2: “populi scito in exilium erant expulsi”; Plut. *Mor.* 849a-b: “*ekdidosthai hupo tou dēmou*”.

tradition does not exactly fit with the account in Plutarch's *Phocion*,²⁶⁴ it is not clear if it is historically accurate, or if it was the product of ancient rhetorical education. Moreover, Plutarch refers to Athenian and Macedonian decrees (*dogmata*) that ordered not only the banishment of the democrats, but also prohibited their burial in Attica.²⁶⁵ This measure equaled to treating them as traitors, just as the democrats had done to the oligarchs after the *stasis* in 411.²⁶⁶ By issuing these decrees (*dogmata*) the new regime presented the former leaders of the city as traitors, and tried to erase their memory and dissociate them from their hometown. Treating political opponents as traitors must have increased the potential for *stasis* because it created a situation in which one faction delegitimized the other, and thus undermined the potential for peaceful dialogue between the factions.

Just as with the imposition of a significant property qualification, the exile and the political trials of democrats were a means of illegal pressure that eliminated the opponents of the oligarchs. The evidence does not allow us to argue that Antipatros was the only one responsible for these coercions. They suited the interests of both Antipatros and the Athenian oligarchs, and whoever came up with them, the responsibility lay on both sides.²⁶⁷

The creation of a property qualification for citizenship obviously aimed to change the regime into an oligarchy. The coercive elimination of the democratic leaders probably served this purpose as well, even if its direct aim may not have been regime change. The oligarchs used coercive means to implement a regime change. Moreover, the institutional changes introduced by the new regime, i.e. the

²⁶⁴ Cf. Dmitriev, "Killing in Style".

²⁶⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 849c.

²⁶⁶ Antiphon: Plut. *Mor.* 834b; Phrynichos: Lyk. *In Leoc.* 112-3; Shear, *Polis and Revolution*, 60-1. For Athenians' treatment of traitors see Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.22; Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy*, 154-5.

²⁶⁷ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 51.

replacement of the secretary of the council with the *anagrapheus*²⁶⁸ or the abolition of the democratic courts,²⁶⁹ were not stipulated by Antipatros. We can take these institutional changes as a means of implementing a regime change on the part of the oligarchs because there is no evidence that they were introduced via legitimate means, e.g. by passing a resolution in the assembly.

To sum up this section, the oligarchic faction found an opportunity to modify the political regime during the negotiations with Antipatros in 322. The evidence suggests that they took upon this chance, and modified the regime based on the Macedonian general's stipulations. The bloody purges of the democrats, as well as the threat from the Macedonian garrison, indicate the violence of the change. This situation suits our definition of *stasis*.

3.2 319-317: Pro-Polyperchonian democrats vs. pro-Antipatrid oligarchs

The tension between the democrats and oligarchs escalated after the promulgation of Philip III's *diagramma* in autumn 319. Just as Antipatros' intervention had offered an unexpected opportunity to the oligarchs in 322, this time the conflict between Kassandros and Polyperchon gave the democratic faction the chance to take its revenge and to modify the regime so that it became democratic again. On this occasion, what differentiated the discourse of the two factions was not about being pro- or anti-war, but rather their support for Kassandros or Polyperchon. The leaders of the two factions were respectively Hagnonides of Pergase, who had been exiled, but not executed, during the events of the *stasis* in 322,²⁷⁰ and Phokion, the most

²⁶⁸ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 85-86; Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 49-50.

²⁶⁹ *Suda* s.v. Demades: "*houtos kateluse ta dikastēria kai tous rētorikous agōnas*"; cf. Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 224n11.

²⁷⁰ Plut. *Phoc.* 29.3.

influential politician of the 322-318 regime, especially after Demades' death in 319.

Nepos described these factions in this way:

There were at that period in Athens two parties (*factiones*), one of which espoused the cause of the people, and the other that of the aristocracy; to the latter Phocion and Demetrius Phalereus were attached. Each of them relied on the support of the Macedonians; for the popular party (*populares*) favoured Polysperchon (sic), and the aristocracy (*optimates*) took the side of Cassander.²⁷¹

Oligarchs like Kallimedon of Kollytos and Charikles seem to have supported Kassandros all along, but when the military success of Polyperchon was a possibility, Phokion had to try to get Polyperchon's support for the oligarchic cause. As a result, Hagnonides and Phokion met with Polyperchon in Phokis and tried to get his support for the causes of their respective factions.²⁷²

At this point, the Piraeus was held by Kassandros,²⁷³ and Athens was "divided against herself".²⁷⁴ This expression suggests that there was *stasis* at this point. The democrats, who probably wanted to take revenge and restore democracy, were now in the *asty*. As Plutarch put it:

For the exiles (*phugades*) who had burst into the country with him [sc. Alexandros] were at once in the city (*en astei*), strangers (*xenōn*) and disfranchised citizens (*atimōn*) ran in to join them, and a motley and turbulent assembly (*pammigēs ekklēsia*) was gathered together, in which Phocion was deposed from his command and other generals were chosen.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ Nep. *Phoc.* 3.2, trans. Watson.

²⁷² Plut. *Phoc.* 33.3-7.

²⁷³ Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; Diod. 18.64.1-65.3.

²⁷⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1: "*heautēi peripetēi*".

²⁷⁵ Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2, trans. Perrin.

These *phugades* were those who had been forced into exile in 322.²⁷⁶ They now had the chance to modify the regime by coercive means, and they could legitimize their changes through Philip III's *diagramma* which clearly referred to them.²⁷⁷ Phokion's deposition was illegitimate from the perspective of the 322-318 regime because, as Plutarch's passage above demonstrates,²⁷⁸ former members of the *dēmos* who had lost their political rights decreed it. The democratic faction, however, did not recognize their loss of rights. They were able to ignore their own disenfranchisement thanks to the presence of Alexandros' army in Attica, that is, by external coercion, just as the oligarchs did in 322 thanks to the Macedonian garrison.

Another indicator of *stasis* was the warning in one of the clauses of Philip III's *diagramma*.²⁷⁹ According to this clause, the exiles were to return to their hometowns "untorn by *stasis*" (*astasiastous*).²⁸⁰ It also stipulated that they were not to remember past wrongs (*amnēsikakoumenous*), a clause that probably refers to the previous years' *staseis*, including the Athenian one in 322. However, in another clause the same ordinance also justified the exile of the opponents of the kings and Polyperchon,²⁸¹ the regent, as well as the confiscation of their goods. This second clause weakened the force of the warning against *stasis* because it justified further hostilities.²⁸²

Presumably at the same *ekklēsia* meeting in which Phokion was deposed, the *dēmos* abolished (*katelusen*) the existing magistrates, and replaced them with extreme democrats (*dēmotikōtatoi*). This measure clearly intended to restore democracy, and, to refer to our definition of *stasis* (1.3.3), it changed the form of the

²⁷⁶ Poddighe, "La condition juridique," 277-280.

²⁷⁷ Diod. 18.56.4; cf. Diod. 18.66.4.

²⁷⁸ See footnote 275 above.

²⁷⁹ Börm, "Stasis," 7.

²⁸⁰ Diod. 18.56.4.

²⁸¹ Diod. 18.56.7.

²⁸² Börm, "Stasis," 7.

regime (B1), and was presumably also a form of getting the regime “in their own hands” (B2a). Again, from the point of view of the oligarchic faction, this *katalusis* was made possible by coercive means, i.e. the presence of Alexandros’ army. Moreover, the *dēmos* which was exiled and had its leaders massacred in 322 took its revenge by declaring the 322-318 regime an oligarchy, sentencing some of its magistrates to death, and decreeing exile and confiscation for other magistracies, including Phokion.²⁸³ The democrats were no less violent than their opponents.

Under these circumstances, the oligarchs could either escape to the Piraeus, which presumably Kallimedon, Charikles, and some others did,²⁸⁴ or to Alexandros, Polyperchon’s son, a course which Phokion preferred. For him, the latter option, which meant turning coat, was dangerous because until that point Phokion was closely associated with Kassandros’ man, Nikanor.²⁸⁵ This tactic ended up badly for Phokion and the oligarchs. Polyperchon gave the authority (*exousia*) to the *dēmos* to execute or acquit Phokion.²⁸⁶ The democrats, who were now able to legitimize their revenge through Polyperchon’s authority, executed Phokion and other members²⁸⁷ of the oligarchic faction in an illegal trial, accusing them of the overthrow (*katalusis*) of the *dēmos* and the laws.²⁸⁸ The trial was illegal because the defendants were denied the right to defend themselves.²⁸⁹ This trial is reminiscent of the illegal execution of the generals after the Battle of Arginousai in 406,²⁹⁰ but unlike its fifth-century parallel, it took place within the context of *stasis*, and was therefore part of a

²⁸³ Diod. 18.65.6.

²⁸⁴ Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 33.

²⁸⁵ Diod. 18.64.1-6; Nep. *Phoc.* 2.4-5.

²⁸⁶ Diod. 18.66.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 34.3.

²⁸⁷ They probably included Hegemon, Nikokles, Pythokles of Kedoi, and Thoudippos of Araphen; Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 34 n4.

²⁸⁸ The trial: Diod. 18.66.4-67.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 34.3-36.4. The illegality of the trial: Habicht, *Athens*, 49; Diod. 18.67.6: “*diablēthentes*”.

²⁸⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 34.4-5.

²⁹⁰ Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 146-150. He considers the trial ‘relatively’ illegal (148); on the trials after the end of the oligarchic regime of 411, see Shear, *Polis and Revolution*, 60-7. For the trial of the generals after the Battle of Arginousai, see Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12.

“judicial campaign against their [sc. democrats’] political opponents”.²⁹¹ As such, it served two purposes: firstly, to take revenge for the executions and exile of 322, and secondly, to change the regime by force.

The first purpose is clear from the fact that the *dēmos* did not allow the bodies of the executed politicians to be buried in Attic soil,²⁹² just as with the executed democratic leaders in 322.²⁹³ Once again, this measure indicates that the new regime, i.e. the restored democracy, presented its opponents as traitors, and not as Athenians who had a different idea of serving their city. This situation hints at the democratic faction’s desire to gloss over *stasis*.

The second purpose was an indirect one. It helped to eliminate the political rivals who opposed regime change. There is evidence that some of the modifications of the previous regime were overturned. First of all, we may safely assume that the property qualification was abolished, because Diodoros refers to “many supporters of democracy, who had been expelled from citizenship and then, beyond their hopes, had been restored”.²⁹⁴ Furthermore, the honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon, which had been demolished under the 322-318 oligarchy, was re-inscribed in December 318, that is, under the restored democracy, and declared that the *dēmos* returned and regained its democracy and laws.²⁹⁵ Secondly, as we know from the epigraphic evidence, another modification of the 322-318 regime was removed in the

²⁹¹ O’Sullivan, “Athenian Impiety Trials,” 147.

²⁹² Diod. 18.67.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 37.2-3.

²⁹³ Plut. *Mor.* 849c.

²⁹⁴ Diod. 18.66.6.

²⁹⁵ *IG II*² 448 ll. 62-64.

archon-year of 318/7,²⁹⁶ and the *dēmos* replaced the office of *anagrapheus* with the secretary of the council.²⁹⁷

These two changes, i.e. the abolition of the property qualification and of the office of *anagrapheus*, were major modifications to the regime. In harmony with our definition of *stasis*, the democrats used coercive means to change the regime in 318. These coercive means were exile and execution of the oligarchs, who had opposed war in 323 and then established an oligarchic regime by coercion, and institutional changes. To sum up, there was *stasis* in 318 because there is evidence for the existence of factions, for their coercive means, and for their aim to change the regime. This *stasis* did not end in 318, however. Since it depended on the conflict between Kassandros and Polyperchon, it continued alongside that conflict. When Polyperchon was defeated,²⁹⁸ the *dēmos* lost its protector, and it had to negotiate peace with Kassandros.²⁹⁹

There is not much evidence about these negotiations. Since the *dēmos* could not regain the Piraeus from Kassandros, and, as in 322, it presumably could not defeat him in battle, the Athenian envoys did not have much leverage in their negotiations with Kassandros.³⁰⁰ Moreover, since the Piraeus was still under Kassandros' control, one may guess that some of the oligarchs had taken refuge there, and that the *dēmos* had to negotiate with them as well.³⁰¹ The inaccessibility of the Piraeus exacerbated the position of the democratic faction because, without

²⁹⁶ *IG II*² 350, 448, *Agora XVI*.104, 105 refer to the secretary of the council. After the democratic restoration, the decrees still referred to the *anagrapheus* during the remaining period of the 319/8 archon-year, but its importance visibly dwindled on the decrees; *IG II*² 388; *Agora XVI*.103; *SEG XLIX*.104, 105; Habicht, *Athens*, 49, Oliver, "Oligarchy at Athens," 49.

²⁹⁷ Habicht, *Athens*, 49.

²⁹⁸ Diod. 18.72.5-9.

²⁹⁹ Diod. 18.74.1-3.

³⁰⁰ Habicht, *Athens*, 51-53.

³⁰¹ Habicht, *ibid.*, 52.

access to its port and the safe transportation of grain,³⁰² this situation meant that the city risked famine if it tried to resist Kassandros' siege. In any event, at the start of the negotiations there was a good deal of debate in the Athenian assembly.³⁰³

Elisabetta Poddighe, in her analysis of the indirect evidence for these negotiations, argued that the political affiliations in the assembly in the winter of 318/7 were of mixed nature, i.e. that they included both the democrats and the oligarchs.³⁰⁴ This mixed situation indicates both the decrease in the democrats' support for Polyperchon,³⁰⁵ and the contact between the democratic and the oligarchic factions. At some point after February 317,³⁰⁶ the negotiations came to an end.

The result of these negotiations was the return of the property qualification in a diminished form and the maintenance of the Macedonian garrison (ostensibly temporarily). The negotiator and the leader of the new regime was Demetrios of Phaleron,³⁰⁷ who was honored by the deme of Aixone for reconciling the Piraeus and the *asty*.³⁰⁸ The *stasis* must have ended when the new regime was established under Demetrios of Phaleron at some point in the spring of 317. The oligarchs took their revenge from the *dēmos* in no time: Hagnonides, who had proposed the death sentence for Phokion and the supporters of the 322-318 regime, was executed and

³⁰² Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 623-4.

³⁰³ Diod. 18.74.2.

³⁰⁴ "Atene e le lotte tra i diadochi". She argues that the honorary decrees for Hermo[...] of Herakleia (*Agora* XVI.104), probably an associate of Kassandros, and for the *epilektoi* (*Agora* XVI.105; *IG* II² 1209) reflected the growing influence of the pro-Kassandrian oligarchic faction; Poddighe, *ibid.*, 15-17. Accordingly, Euphron's decree (*IG* II² 448), passed shortly before these decrees, would reflect the attitude of the democratic faction; see Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 620-8.

³⁰⁵ Poddighe, "Atene e le lotte tra i diadochi," 12-15; Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 626n89.

³⁰⁶ The *terminus post quem* for the beginning of the 317-307 oligarchy is the honorary decree for an Epidamnian and an Apollonian (*IG* II² 350) passed in the Attic month of Anthestēriōn. This decree suggests, because of its democratic proposer, that the regime was still democratic at that moment; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 73-4.

³⁰⁷ On his career see Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 58-67.

³⁰⁸ *IG* II² 1201 ll. 7-8.

Phokion received public burial.³⁰⁹ Thus, the mechanism of revenge which had begun in 323 still functioned in the years after 317.

3.3 303-301: Anti-Demetrian vs. pro-Demetrian democrats

After ten years of oligarchic, and almost tyrannical,³¹⁰ rule under Demetrios of Phalerion, the democratic restoration of 307 made the political conditions in Athens similar to the period before 322. In this sense, the oligarchs could not aim to change the regime as explicitly as in 322. Until the end of the Four Years War (307-304),³¹¹ there was still a chance that Kassandros could take the city back, and reestablish the regime of 317-307. As a result, the democrats fearing the return of oligarchy had reason to continue supporting Poliorketes, at least during the war, while the oligarchic faction were not politically active. In 307, the oligarchs under the leadership of Demetrios of Phaleron and Deinarchos of Corinth had feared the revenge of their fellow citizens (*politai*), which probably referred to the democrats,³¹² and had gone into exile.³¹³

After the end of the Four Years War in 304, the democrats' attitude towards Poliorketes seems to have bifurcated, and we can detect the activities of two factions in the city: the anti-Demetrian democrats, who aimed to protect the principles of the democratic regime against the Antigonid carelessness towards them, and a pro-Demetrian faction, which preferred to grant Poliorketes literally everything he wanted, either for the purpose of acquiring benefits for the members of this faction, or because its members thought that supporting Demetrios at all cost was important

³⁰⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 38.1.

³¹⁰ See Chapter 2.1 above.

³¹¹ Diod. 20.106.7; Plut. *Demetr.* 23; Plut. *Mor.* 851d; *IG II²* 467 l. 22; *IG II²* 469 ll. 8–10; *IG II²* 470 ll. 11–14.

³¹² Plut. *Demetr.* 9.2.

³¹³ Plut. *Demetr.* 9.1-3; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 fr. 167; Plut. *Mor.* 850d. Habicht, *Athens*, 67.

for protecting democracy. None of them was necessarily anti-Macedonian, but they presumably had different ideas about the connection between the city's regime and Demetrios Poliorketes. We cannot automatically assume that the anti-Demetrians were anti-Macedonian since we do not know whether they used such a discourse, or whether they were supported by another foreign ruler or not.

Between 307-303, there does not seem to have been a problem between these two groups, which were perhaps not even formed at that time. In 304/3, however, an intense conflict between two groups broke out. Demochares of Leukonoe, with whom we began and who was publicly active between 307-303,³¹⁴ and a prominent member of the anti-Demetrian faction, supported a decree (*psēphisma*) that blocked Demetrios Poliorketes' intervention into Athens' internal affairs.³¹⁵ In response, the pro-Demetrian faction

put to death some of those who had introduced and spoken in favour of it, and drove others into exile; furthermore, they voted besides that it was the pleasure of the Athenian people that whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in future, this should be held righteous towards the gods and just towards men.³¹⁶

Demochares and Philippides of Kephale were among those who were sent into exile on this occasion.³¹⁷ Stratokles of Diomeia, the most significant member of the pro-Demetrian faction, and probably a democrat, certainly supported this extreme punishment; indeed, he may himself have been the proposer of the anti-Demetrian democrats' exile and others' execution.³¹⁸ His pro-Demetrian stance is clear from the

³¹⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 851d.

³¹⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 24.4-5.

³¹⁶ Plut. *Demetr.* 24.4. Plutarch does not talk about factions here, but see below.

³¹⁷ Demochares: Plut. *Demetr.* 24.5; *Mor.* 851e-f. Philippides: *IG II³.1 877 ll.* 9-10, 16-17; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 117.

³¹⁸ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 78-109, esp. 90-104; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 152-186; cf. Luraghi, "Stratokles of Diomeia and Party Politics".

extravagant honors which he had proposed for Poliorketes and his father in 307;³¹⁹ moreover, from 306 on, he proposed honors for at least eleven associates of Poliorketes,³²⁰ he manipulated the sacred calendar to satisfy the king's desire to participate in the Eleusinian Mysteries,³²¹ and he reappeared on the Athenian political scene during the second Demetrian rule after 295.³²²

When Plutarch describes the divisions between Athenians in 304,³²³ he does not speak about factions, but in the absence of factions the situation becomes difficult to explain. If the same decree (*psēphisma*) could be passed, and then was not only rescinded, but also led to the punishment of its proposers, there must be two strong opposite groups in the assembly, especially given the decree's controversial content in relationship to the city's regime. Moreover, the larger context of the conflict over this decree makes it clear that there were two clashing attitudes at this time. As Paschalis Paschidis demonstrates,³²⁴ the first half of 303 witnessed a series of anti-Demetrian measures, including a legal constraint on the value of honorary crowns,³²⁵ the reinstatement of the judicial scrutiny for citizenship grants,³²⁶ and a possible calendric manipulation of the administrative year.³²⁷ These measures were passed as if in response to the lavish honors that Stratokles and his faction granted to Antigonos, Demetrios, and their associates. Moreover, with self-imposed democratic spirit, the city's law code was republished, "so that no one ignores the laws of the

³¹⁹ Diod. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.2-4.

³²⁰ Luraghi, "Stratokles of Dioemeia and Party Politics," 195 n10.

³²¹ Plut. *Demetr.* 26.1-2.

³²² *IG II*³.1 857 (293/2).

³²³ See footnote 316 above.

³²⁴ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 95-8.

³²⁵ Paschidis, *ibid.*, 95 n3; Osborne, *Naturalization II*, 135.

³²⁶ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 96 n1; Osborne, *Naturalization II*, 136.

³²⁷ In the archon-year of 303/2, the tribal rotation of the secretary of council bypassed the tribe that was created in honor of Demetrios; Osborne, "The Archonship of Nikias Hysteros," 283. According to Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 98, this bypass is a calendric manipulation, and "less than a year after the reaffirmation of his [i.e. Demetrios'] semi-divine natur[e], to say the least, peculiar, and is best explained as another sign of discontent with Poliorketes"; cf. Osborne, *Naturalization II*, 283 n24.

polis”.³²⁸ It cannot be a coincidence that, right at the moment of these anti-Demetrian reactions, the two prominent anti-Demetrians, i.e. Demochares and Philippides, were expelled. This expulsion was the response of the pro-Demetrian faction against the reactions of the anti-Demetrian faction. In view of the large number of decrees proposed by Stratokles and other pro-Demetrians that the Athenian assembly passed,³²⁹ there must have also been a significant number of citizens supporting the pro-Demetrian faction. In his decree proposals after the first half of 303, Stratokles began to put less emphasis on public benefit, and instead focused on the mere act of granting honors for Demetrios’ associates.³³⁰ I do not imply that Stratokles was a radical or moderate democrat,³³¹ or that he was a self-interested sycophant,³³² but that he was undeniably pro-Demetrian since at least 307. We do not hear about any action which we can interpret as anti-Demetrian, or that suggests affiliation with another ruler.

Having established the presence and character of these two factions, it is now important to ask whether they used coercion/deception, and/or whether they aimed at regime change. As in 322 and 318-317, there was no military conflict among the Athenians between 303-301, but the possibility of being exiled or executed by the pro-Demetrian faction was a real threat to the anti-Demetrians, especially after the dispute in 303 over Poliorketes’ intervention. Although there was no foreign garrison in the Piraeus, Demetrios’ troops in the region constituted a threat against the anti-Demetrians. Furthermore, the calendric manipulations that both factions devised contained a form of deception, even if those responsible for these arrangements were

³²⁸ *IG II²* 487 ll. 6-10; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 97; cf. Hedrick, “Epigraphic Writing,” 331-3.

³²⁹ Kralli, “Athens and the Hellenistic Kings,” 130-1 lists twenty-six such decrees.

³³⁰ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 98-103.

³³¹ Cf. Luraghi, “Stratokles of Dioemeia and Party Politics,” 208-220.

³³² Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 185-6; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 102.

presumably not lying to the public. The deception that is involved in the act of manipulation does not seem to have been aimed at so much changing the regime as attacking the rival faction.

It is not easy to determine the aims of the factionaries (see above chapter 1.3.3). The picture emerging from their actions is one in which the anti-Demetrians emphasized democratic continuity at the institutional level, whereas the pro-Demetrians gave greater emphasis to securing Demetrios' goodwill towards Athens. Similarly, from this picture we can deduce that one faction aimed to preserve democracy against Poliorketes' excessive interventions, the ramifications of which he possibly ignored or did not care about, and that the other faction aimed to secure the monarch's support, for whatever reason. It is, however, from the discourse, or rather the traces of the discourse, of each faction that we see most clearly that the two had conflicting interpretations, and hence expectations, about the Athenian regime in 303.

Whereas the anti-Demetrians perceived the city's regime as an oligarchy in 303, the pro-Demetrians apparently considered it as a democracy.³³³ The honorary request for Demochares, drafted thirty-two years after the honorand's exile,³³⁴ and the dramatic verses that Plutarch attributed to Philippides³³⁵ both suggest that the Athenian democracy was overthrown in 303, and that it was their opponents, i.e. the pro-Demetrian faction, who overthrew it. While referring to Athens in 303, they used the charged expression "the overthrow of democracy" (*katalusis tou dēmou*), which was in use since the late fifth century, and was also used in the rhetoric of the democratic faction in 318.³³⁶ Strictly speaking, Demochares' son, Laches, who

³³³ Cp. Wallace, "Freedom of the Greeks in the early Hellenistic period (337-262 BC)," 137-148.

³³⁴ See footnote 317 above.

³³⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 12.4.

³³⁶ *IG II²* 448 ll. 62-3; see footnote 224 above.

drafted the honorary request in 271/0, designated the persons who exiled his father in 303 - and they probably included Stratokles³³⁷ - as “those who overthrew the *dēmos*” (*katalusantōn ton dēmon*).³³⁸ His father was definitely familiar with this expression, and he actually used it to define the oligarchy of 322-318 in the request for honors that he himself drafted in 281/0 for his uncle Demosthenes.³³⁹ According to Plutarch, Philippides asserted that Stratokles’ actions “overthrow the *dēmos*” in one of his comedies.³⁴⁰ If such traditions contain traces of the discourse of the anti-Demetrian faction in 303, then they suggest that this faction perceived the city’s regime as an oligarchy. In fact, it is hard to accommodate this perception with our knowledge of the actual situation in the city because there was no property requirement for citizenship in 303, and all the democratic institutions functioned, at least on paper.

The rhetoric of the pro-Demetrian faction with regard to the city’s regime was at variance with that of its opponents. To the extent that we can reconstruct it from the motivation clauses of the honorary decrees proposed by Stratokles and other supporters of Poliorketes, this rhetoric seems to have presented the city’s regime as a democracy that was restored by Antigonos and Demetrios in 307, as well as positioning the interests of the Athenian *dēmos* next to those of the Antigonids.³⁴¹ The convergence of the democracy’s interests and those of Demetrios was expressed not only in the public discourse of decrees, but also in physical space when, in 303/2, the pro-Demetrian faction erected a bronze equestrian statue of the king next to the

³³⁷ Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 154; *contra* Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 172-6.

³³⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 851e.

³³⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 851c.

³⁴⁰ Plut. *Demetr.* 12.4.

³⁴¹ *IG* II² 492 l. 22; *IG* II² 495 ll. 15-20; *IG* II² 496 ll. 16-21; *IG* II² 498 ll. 15-20; *IG* II² 558 ll. 5-10; *SEG* XIV.58 ll. 6-11.

statue of Demokratia in the Agora.³⁴² Moreover, in their discourse Demetrios' enemies were also identified as the enemies of democracy.³⁴³

These conflicting interpretations do not directly inform us about the aims of the two factions, but they are evidence of different expectations about the city's regime. For instance, the pro-Demetrians would expect to protect the city's democratic institutions by appeasing Poliorketes' illegal demands, whereas the anti-Demetrian faction would expect to preserve the Athenian democracy by trying to prevent such concessions. In view of these expectations, it is reasonable to argue that both factions aimed to keep the city democratic, but they used conflicting methods, and therefore created a situation in which they fought against each other in order to preserve the regime.

From these observations it follows that *stasis* took place between 303-301, when anti- and pro-Demetrian factions clashed with each other on account of different interpretations of political regime, and used forceful means to threaten their opponents. After the news of the Battle of Ipsos reached Athens around September 301,³⁴⁴ the *stasis* ceased for a short time. The anti-Demetrians passed a decree 'not to receive any kings in the city'.³⁴⁵ Since Poliorketes had abolished the garrison in Piraeus in 307, the pro-Demetrian faction lost the ability to threaten its opponents when Demetrios took his troops to Asia.

³⁴² *ISE* 7 ll. 13-14.

³⁴³ *ISE* 7 ll. 3-4.

³⁴⁴ Stratokles' last recorded political activity in 301 dates to 28 Metageitniōn (*IG* II² 640).

³⁴⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 30.3.

3.4 301-295: Pro-Lacharians vs. pro-Charians

Shortly after the end of *stasis* in the autumn of 301, Lachares, who was the commander of the mercenaries³⁴⁶ and one of the leaders of the *dēmos*,³⁴⁷ engaged in a military conflict against Charias the hoplite general.³⁴⁸ The ancient sources explicitly identify this conflict as *stasis*.³⁴⁹ As far as we can tell, there were two factions in the city at this time, one supporting Lachares, and the other Charias, but we do not know the political orientations of these two groups. Since Lachares was a leader of the *dēmos*, and since Charias “caused the *dēmos* to feed his soldiers”,³⁵⁰ that is, the *dēmos* did not want to feed them but he made them do it, we may conjecture that the pro-Lacharians were a democratic faction, at least at the beginning, and that the pro-Charians were oligarchic, or at least undemocratic. The evidence does not allow us to make guesses beyond this conjecture.

The pro-Lacharians defeated the pro-Charians, who had seized the Akropolis, and the hoplite general took refuge in the Parthenon with three of his men.³⁵¹ Just as with Phokion and his supporters in the spring of 318, Charias and his men were illegally executed at an *ekklēsia* meeting, in which they were “all put to death by a single vote” (“[*miai*] *psēphōi pantas apektei[nan]*”).³⁵² The generals of Arginousai had received the same illegal treatment in 406.³⁵³

On Kassandros’ advice,³⁵⁴ and as a result of or by means of *stasis*,³⁵⁵ Lachares usurped the supreme power and became tyrant by early spring 300.³⁵⁶ This situation

³⁴⁶ *P. Oxy.* 2082 (= *FGrH* 257a) fr. 1. This papyrus fragment is from the Olympiad Chronicle that is attributed to the second-century AD chronicler Phlegon of Tralles.

³⁴⁷ Paus. 1.25.7.

³⁴⁸ *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 1.

³⁴⁹ *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 1; Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1.

³⁵⁰ *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 1 with Thonemann, “Charias on the Acropolis”.

³⁵¹ *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 2.

³⁵² *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 2.

³⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12; Osborne, *Athens*, 29 n49; Habicht, *Athens*, 83.

³⁵⁴ Paus. 1.25.7.

³⁵⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1.

fits our definition of *stasis* because, if the outcome of the pro-Lacharians' actions, i.e. Lachares' tyranny, tells us something about their aims, it is reasonable to argue that the factions aimed at regime change, or at least the seizure of the regime.

Whether Lachares actually became a tyrant is problematic,³⁵⁷ especially in view of the continuity of the democratic institutions between 301-295,³⁵⁸ but the fact that ancient sources described him as a tyrant suggests conflicting interpretations about the city's regime between 301-295. The coercive means, i.e. warfare and illegal death sentences, also fit our definition.

By the time Poliorketes came back to take back Athens in 295, Lachares' opponents occupied the Piraeus.³⁵⁹ We do not know who these opponents were, and when their occupation began, but it is possible that they were the pro-Charians, and that they somehow managed to seize the Piraeus between 300-295, perhaps during the *stasis* in winter 301/0. It is also possible that after Kassandros' death in May 297, Lachares lost his external support and his opponents grew stronger. This episode of civil strife ended with Demetrios' seizure of the city, and Lachares escaped after he minted coins using the gold that he stripped from the religious dedications on the Akropolis.³⁶⁰ His purpose was to pay his troops,³⁶¹ presumably for fighting against Demetrios and/or his opponents in Piraeus. That the numismatic evidence confirms this literary tradition³⁶² demonstrates that the literary account was not just a made-up story around the controversial figure of Lachares. These coins are evidence of the political instability reigning in Athens in 295 because it is only under extreme

³⁵⁶ *P. Oxy.* 1235; Habicht, *Athens*, 83; *contra* O'Sullivan, "History from Comic Hypotheses".

³⁵⁷ Börm, "*Stasis*," 12.

³⁵⁸ Habicht, *Athens*, 84.

³⁵⁹ Polyainos 4.7.5.

³⁶⁰ Paus. 1.25.7; Polyainos 3.7.1-2.

³⁶¹ *P. Oxy.* 2082 fr. 4.

³⁶² Kroll, "The reminting," 251-3.

circumstances that an Athenian would commit the sacrilege of destroying objects that belonged to the gods.³⁶³

3.5 287-286: Pro-Ptolemaean democrats vs. pro-Demetrian oligarchs

After eight years under Demetrios' control over the city, the democrats attempted to revolt against Poliorketes.³⁶⁴ Demetrios had a lot of support in Athens,³⁶⁵ and although this support began to dwindle after 289, approximately when Plutarch records a negative change in the king's character,³⁶⁶ a pro-Demetrian faction seems to have struggled against the democratic revolt. This situation makes sense because, regardless of such a character change, there was much at stake for the Athenians who were active members of the regime of 294-286. The oligarchs who returned in 292/1 belonged to the pro-Demetrian faction as well.³⁶⁷

In the spring of 287, the democrats were expecting a Ptolemaic offensive that would support their revolt.³⁶⁸ This support never came and the revolt attempt failed. One reason for the postponement of the Ptolemaic support was the efforts of the Athenian general Phaidros of Sphettos, a prominent member of the pro-Demetrian regime,³⁶⁹ who brought the harvest of grain and other crops from the Attic countryside.³⁷⁰ As a result, it would not have made sense for the Ptolemaic troops to besiege the city, and they postponed the attack after installing a military base on the

³⁶³ Kroll, *ibid.*, 253. The only other occasions on which the Athenians minted gold coins were in 407/6 at a time of instability and in 87/6 right before Sulla's siege.

³⁶⁴ On the date of this revolt see Appendix A.

³⁶⁵ Habicht, *Athens*, 92-4.

³⁶⁶ Plut. *Demetr.* 41.1-42.6.

³⁶⁷ Shear, "The Politics of the Past," 281.

³⁶⁸ Plut. *Demetr.* 44.2: "Ptolemy sailed to Greece with a great fleet and tried to bring it to revolt." (trans. Perrin).

³⁶⁹ *IG II*³.1 985 ll. 21-30.

³⁷⁰ *IG II*³.1 985 ll. 31-6; Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 72; *contra* Osborne, *Athens*, 39.

island of Andros.³⁷¹ The honorary decree for Phaidros, passed during the later Antigonid oligarchy, glossed over this first stage of *stasis* as “difficult times” (*kairōn duskolōn*).³⁷²

The democratic faction made a new attempt in the spring of 286, and this time managed to overthrow the pro-Demetrian oligarchy. Kallias of Sphettos, who was Phaidros’ anti-Demetrian brother, and Zenon, both of them in Ptolemy’s service, played an important role in this *stasis*. While the democrats under Olympiodoros’ leadership managed to expel Demetrios’ soldiers from the Mouseion Hill,³⁷³ these two commanders ensured that the harvest was gathered and brought into the city so that the democratic faction could endure the imminent siege by Demetrios.³⁷⁴ Their assistance with the harvest took place between mid-May and late-June, the standard time for the grain harvest.³⁷⁵ After the harvest was gathered and brought in, Kallias actively fought against Demetrios during his siege of Athens,³⁷⁶ and participated in the subsequent negotiations between the democrats and Poliorketes.³⁷⁷ Presumably, the pro-Demetrians took refuge in the Piraeus, which the democrats were unable to capture, and where these negotiations took place.³⁷⁸ With the end of the negotiations, the *stasis* too came to an end. Using the fundamental coercive means, i.e. arms, the democratic faction managed to change the regime.

³⁷¹ Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 68.

³⁷² *IG II*³.1 985 l. 33.

³⁷³ Paus. 1.26.1

³⁷⁴ *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 19-23; *IG II*³.1 863 ll. 16-19; Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 20-21.

³⁷⁵ Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture*, 32.

³⁷⁶ *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 28-32.

³⁷⁷ *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 36-40.

³⁷⁸ *IG II*³.1 911 l. 35.

3.6 Conclusion

Five episodes of *stasis* contributed to the regime changes in 322, 318, 317, 301, and 286. These outbreaks of internal conflict contained systematic exclusion and persecution of opponents, and followed a mechanism of revenge, especially in the first three examples. Athenians were not unresponsive to the interventions of foreign rulers. In conjunction with these interventions, the violent conflicts within the citizenry caused the regime changes after 322. There is no evidence for *stasis* during the regime changes in 307, 295, and 294, but these changes would not have been possible without internal disputes either. The obvious question, then, is whether these five episodes of *stasis* were related to each other, and whether, between 322 and 286, we should talk about one prolonged *stasis* that got more violent whenever an opportunity occurred. This prolongation seems possible, especially since the emergence of *stasis* created the potential for even more instability. In order to understand the connections between these five episodes, we need to analyze the deeper dynamics behind them, as we shall do in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

CAUSES OF *STASIS* (322-286)

In Menander's *Sikyōnioi*, performed under the restored democracy of either 318/7 or 307-301,³⁷⁹ two Athenians have a bitter dispute:

Smikrines: Riff-raff (*okhlos*) - that's what you are, stuffed full of drivel. You rogue, expecting that a man who weeps and begs will tell the truth (*dikaia*)! Today that's normally a sign of total lack of probity. That's not the way truth's decided - no, it's reached [far] better in a small [committee].

Democrat: You're an elitist (*oligarkhos*) Sm[ikrines], upon my oath - a rogue, too!

Smikrines: [I] don't [give a damn!]

Democrat: You lot are too [contemptible], you'll be the death of me, I swear!

Smikrines: Why call me names? [You're] poison!³⁸⁰

In this passage, the playwright depicts two citizens with different ideologies who are unwilling to engage in a rational discussion about their divergent beliefs. Instead of arguing about how truth is decided, an issue that is here presented as the source of the dispute, they prefer to insult each other. If the comic exaggeration of this exchange of insults contained some truth, then similar scenes might have occurred frequently in real life between 322-286, the period in which we identified five episodes of *stasis* in the previous chapter. Since we do not have access to actual dialogues between late fourth-century Athenian democrats and oligarchs, this scene is one of our few sources for understanding how such conversations took place, or at least how Menander perceived them as taking place. Beyond the humor of insults, the picture which we get from this scene is one of political intolerance, so much so that it is difficult to imagine these two citizens participating in an assembly meeting and deliberating for the common good of their city. Instead, it is easier to imagine

³⁷⁹ Lape, *Reproducing Athens*, 216-7.

³⁸⁰ Menander, *Sikyōnioi* ll. 150-160, trans. Arnott.

them as killing or exiling each other - in political trials or similar situations - when the opportune moment occurred. The question is why such occasions occurred so often between 322-286, and not even once between 404-322.

Having established that *stasis* is the internal cause of political instability in this period, we will now ask what caused *stasis* itself. The point is not to extend the chain of causality ad infinitum, but to see how the evidence from Athenian history helps us explain the unprecedented degree of instability after 322. For this purpose, following the methodology that I described above (Chapter 1.3.4) I argue that political culture contributed to the emergence of *stasis* between 322-286, but its explanatory power is limited to a deeper domain: that of detecting the ideas which Athenians needed to draw on when they fought with one another. The assumption here is that they needed ideas because otherwise the complex reality behind political instability is reduced to material gain. Because of political ideas, the conflicts among Athenians went beyond, and sometimes against, mere self-interest. What political culture cannot explain, however, is why the *staseis* occurred precisely in this period. The answer to this question has to consist of an account of changing circumstances. I argue that these circumstances were brought about by the actions of the foreign actors that had an impact over Athens, and by the conflicts among the city's elite members, whereas economic tensions did not demonstrably contribute to the emergence of *stasis*.

4.1 Political culture: A synchronic cause of *stasis*

Since political culture was a synchronic cause of *stasis* in Greek poleis between fifth and second centuries (see above 1.3.4), we must ask whether it also contributed to the frequent occurrence of *stasis* in Athens between 322 and 286. The surest way to answer this question is to assess the influence of political culture over the rhetoric

and actions of Athenian factions. In the absence of detailed narrative sources directly documenting such rhetoric and actions, it is difficult to reveal causal connections, but we do have indirect evidence for them, mostly, although not exclusively, in the motivation and hortatory intention clauses of public decrees that were inscribed under different regimes (see above 1.2.2). As we shall see, these decrees show that the Athenians who proposed and passed them did so under the influence of Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms (Appendices B and C). Moreover, literary sources that provide information, no matter how little, about the rhetoric and actions of factionaries also provide indirect evidence for this influence. If we possessed detailed narratives recording direct evidence for such rhetoric and actions, the next step towards revealing causality would be to investigate whether Athenian factions used these paradigms in an uncompromising way, a situation that engendered *stasis* (see above 1.3.4). In the absence of such narratives, we cannot show that the Athenians *did* use them in an uncompromising way, but the concomitance between the influence of political culture and the emergence of *stasis* suggests that there was causality between the two phenomena because there are enough examples in which the former demonstrably contributed to the emergence of the latter.³⁸¹ This concomitance is demonstrable. We have established the prevalence of *stasis* in Athens between 322 and 286 (Chapter 3), and we shall now chronologically detect the presence of Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan features (Table 1) within the rhetoric and actions of Athenian factions through this period.

³⁸¹ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 216-9 (Athens in 404/3), 259-62 (early fourth-century Corinth), 262-4 (Phigaleia in circa 375), 209-15 (fourth-century Phlius), 236-8, 254-8 (early-second century Iasos). Gray examines the contribution of political culture to exclusionary *stasis*, but this criterion does not affect our argument because all the Athenian *staseis* between 322-286, perhaps except for the one in 287-6, led to the exile of Athenian citizens.

Radical interpretations of the Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms characterized the rhetoric and actions of factionaries in 322.³⁸² Democratic orators had emphasized a forceful interpretation of Athenian unity, and stigmatized their opponents before 322.³⁸³ According to these orators, individuals with undemocratic and/or pro-Macedonian views were not part of this unity. For example, Demosthenes denounced Aeschines as a self-interested and untruthful individual, instead of another Athenian with different political views.³⁸⁴ Lykourgos' presented Leokrates as a traitor who betrayed the entire city, including its dead citizens.³⁸⁵ Leokrates was not just another Athenian who had a different take on unity and civic virtues and who therefore could/should be tolerated. Instead, Lykourgos aimed to exclude his opponent from the citizen body because Leokrates did not tally with his sense of democratic unity. Similarly, Eukrates' anti-tyranny law of 337/6 precluded any possibility of peaceful dialogue among democrats and anti-democrats.³⁸⁶ By legitimizing the murder of the latter, Eukrates and the *nomothetai* who enacted this law forced their interpretation of Athenian unity as democratic against any possible alternative views. By setting disenfranchisement as a punishment for those members of the Areopagos who participated in public deliberation under a non-democratic regime, this law forced a specific interpretation of unity against the Areopagos.³⁸⁷ One of the reasons for the prevalence of this forceful interpretation was probably the diplomatic uncertainty in the years between 338 and 323.³⁸⁸ Whatever its cause, these exclusive views must have contributed to the escalation of tensions within Athens.

³⁸² Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, passim in ch. 5.

³⁸³ Gray, *ibid.*, 240.

³⁸⁴ Dem. *De corona* 140, 207, 232.

³⁸⁵ Lyc. *In Leocr.* 59-60.

³⁸⁶ *IG II*³.1 320, ll. 7-11; Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 388-393.

³⁸⁷ *IG II*³.1 320, ll. 11-22.

³⁸⁸ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 239.

Such aggressive interpretations of Nakonian ideas triggered the exile of pro-Macedonians in 323, and provoked the oligarchic faction to have an equally forceful interpretation of Athenian unity.³⁸⁹ Moreover, exile must have radicalized Athenians like Kallimedon at this point.³⁹⁰ As a result, the oligarchy of 322-318 too had aggressive Nakonian features, a situation that shows how the pre-war political tensions escalated to *stasis*. Four such features are observable in the rhetoric and actions of the members of this regime.

Firstly, the active members of this regime claimed to be the legitimate representatives of the Athenian people by presenting themselves as the sovereign *dēmos* in their decrees, as if no significant change had taken place in 322.³⁹¹ The rhetoric of the restored democracy in 318 makes clear that this designation was controversial. The oligarchic faction claimed to be the *dēmos*, whereas the excluded democrats later claimed that the *dēmos* was not in the city between 322-318.³⁹² Despite the inherent ambiguity of the term *dēmos*,³⁹³ in 322 both factions apparently gave specific content to the word strictly in contrast with the other side's designation. As in Thucydides' analysis of the Corcyrean *stasis*, the factionaries "changed the ordinary meanings of word in relation to reality (*es ta erga*) in accordance with their justification (*dikaiōsei*)".³⁹⁴ This partisan attitude did not leave room for doublethink and ambiguity, two important causes of political stability according to Gray.³⁹⁵

This Nakonian monopolistic view of the *dēmos*, which was borrowed from Athenian democratic culture, had an aggressive meaning because it rejected the claims of political opponents to represent the *dēmos*. The citizenships granted to non-

³⁸⁹ Gray, *ibid.*, 240.

³⁹⁰ On the effects of exile: *ibid.*, 377-9.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 245.

³⁹² *IG II²* 448 ll. 61-64.

³⁹³ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 167-8, 174.

³⁹⁴ Thuc. 3.82.8; Hornblower, *A Commentary*, *ad loc.*

³⁹⁵ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 161-172.

Athenians for the sake of their goodwill (*eunoia*) towards the Athenian *dēmos* were also examples of aggressive Nakonianism, taken from the democratic culture (Appendices B and C).³⁹⁶ It was not the references to *eunoia* - which were common in Athenian honorific culture³⁹⁷ - that made these honorary decrees tools of aggressive Nakonianism, but the new regime's claim to decide and declare the city's benefactors in the name of the totality of Athenians.

Secondly, the new regime wanted to maintain the public space in good order, which was also a Nakonian emphasis on the collectivity of the city.³⁹⁸ Demades passed a decree instructing the *agoranomoi* and individual Athenians to preserve the order and cleanliness of the agora and procession streets in Piraeus.³⁹⁹ Such order would give the impression of ideal unity to Athenians and foreigners. The latter presumably now included the opponents of the new regime (see pages 74-5 below). This Nakonian emphasis on the orderliness of public space as symbolizing the unity of Athenians was not necessarily aggressive, but it had the potential for aggressive interpretations.

Thirdly, traditionalism, an important aspect of the Nakonian paradigm, was fundamental for the rhetoric of the 322-318 regime.⁴⁰⁰ The problem of which faction owned/represented the city's traditions was a controversial issue. The members of the new regime accepted Antipatros' clause that they would establish the ancestral constitution (*patrios politeia*) of the Athenians, or perhaps they gave the idea to Antipatros during the peace negotiations (see Chapter 3.1 above), and claimed to govern the city in accordance with Solon's laws.⁴⁰¹ The architectural styles of two

³⁹⁶ E.g. *IG II²* 398 ll. 1-2; *IG II²* 400 ll. 4-6; *IG II²* 407 ll. 8-10; *Agora XVI.100* ll. 19-20.

³⁹⁷ Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues," 52-4.

³⁹⁸ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 246.

³⁹⁹ *IG II²* 380 ll. 8-12, 20-23.

⁴⁰⁰ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 247.

⁴⁰¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 27.3; Diod. 18.18.5; Habicht, *Athens*, 44.

extravagant khoregic monuments erected in 320/19 also indicate that the members of the new regime claimed the city's past.⁴⁰² The monuments of Nikias and of Thrasylos both made stylistic references to the Propylaia, a monument that symbolized the glory of Athenian past.⁴⁰³ The strong resemblance of Nikias' monument to a Doric temple is further sign of conservatism.⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, the dithyramb sang by the victorious chorus in the boys' contest of 319, which we know thanks to the reference in the khoregic inscription of Nikias' monument,⁴⁰⁵ was actually a reperformance of an old song of Timotheos of Miletos.⁴⁰⁶ As members of the new regime, Nikias and Thrasylos emphasized past glories. Just as the leaders of the regime referred to Solon in their political self-presentation, the members of the elite referred to the monuments and songs of the past. Such references, which were controversial in view of the claims of the restored democracy over the city's past (see page 77 below), show the influence of aggressive Nakhonian ideas over the rhetoric of the oligarchic faction between 322 and 318.

Fourthly, the members of this regime presented their political opponents as traitors, and not as fellow Athenians who had a different view on how to serve their *polis*. This type of denouncement was an almost inevitable consequence of aggressive Nakhonianism.⁴⁰⁷ According to Plutarch, Phokion "taught" (*edidakse*) "the busybodies and revolutionaries ... to love their country (*philokhōrein*) and farming".⁴⁰⁸ These people, disenfranchised in 322, were enemies of the regime, as

⁴⁰² On these monuments, see Wilson, *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*, 226-235; Townsend, "The Philippeion," 99. Gray refers to these monuments only in connection with their Dikaiopolitanism; see footnote 420 below.

⁴⁰³ Wilson, *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*, 231.

⁴⁰⁴ Wilson, *ibid.*, 228.

⁴⁰⁵ *IG II²* 3055.

⁴⁰⁶ Wilson, *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*, 227. On Timotheos' dithyrambs as 'classics', see West, *Ancient Greek Music*, 381.

⁴⁰⁷ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 247-9.

⁴⁰⁸ Plut. *Phoc.* 29.4.

the designation “revolutionary” (*neōteristai*) makes clear.⁴⁰⁹ The regime’s rhetoric, surviving in the accounts of Plutarch and Diodoros,⁴¹⁰ thus presented its opponents as people who did not love their country (*khōra*), and needed to be taught patriotism. By contrast, Phokion made sure that “educated and cultured men were always in office”.⁴¹¹ The identification of the active members of the regime as educated and cultured suggests that the oligarchs’ rhetoric denounced the disenfranchised Athenians as lacking the virtues necessary for political participation. Similarly, Plutarch emphasized the presence of foreigners in the assembly meetings of the restored democracy. This emphasis, which ultimately went back to the rhetoric of the oligarchic faction advocating the regime of 322-318, or to another source that was favorable to this regime, indicates the oligarchic faction’s tendency to portray their opponents as traitors, who were guided by personal interest or some foreign power.⁴¹²

The Nakonian attitude to perceive political rivals as traitors is also observable in the insistence on denying them the right to burial in their own country.⁴¹³ Plutarch reports that the oligarchic faction denied this right to Hypereides in 322.⁴¹⁴ When we consider this custom in connection with the denouncing rhetoric of factionaries like Phokion, it is also indicative of their aggressive Nakonianism. Lastly, the presentation of opponents in this aggressive way required the regime of 322-318 to nullify previous honors awarded to its opponents. Such honors would give the impression that their opponents were virtuous people.⁴¹⁵ Thus, the nullification of the

⁴⁰⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 29.4.

⁴¹⁰ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 248. As Gray argues, even if this rhetoric did not make its way into this particular point of Plutarch’s account, the approach of his anti-democratic sources must have been similar to it because they dated to not much later than 322-318.

⁴¹¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 29.4.

⁴¹² Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2, 34.2. Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 251-2.

⁴¹³ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 250.

⁴¹⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 849c.

⁴¹⁵ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 252-3.

citizenship of Euphron of Sikyon, which was granted by the previous regime,⁴¹⁶ indicates the influence of aggressive Nakhonianism.

These four aspects demonstrate that aggressive Nakhonianism underscored the rhetoric and actions of the members of this regime, and therefore, of the oligarchic faction in 322. This aggressive application of the Nakhonian paradigm seems to have functioned in conjunction with strict Dikaiopolitism.⁴¹⁷ The honorary decrees proposed between 322-318 contained clauses emphasizing the strictly reciprocal relationship between the city and its benefactors (Appendices B and C).⁴¹⁸ Such clauses were already common in the honorary rhetoric of democracy,⁴¹⁹ but they show that in this period Athenians continued to emphasize Dikaiopolitan ideas.

The khoregic monuments of 320/19, both of which had a strictly Nakhonian side in their emphasis on traditions, also had a Dikaiopolitan side that is signaled by their extravagant use of the monumental practice of khoregia.⁴²⁰ The practice of erecting khoregic monuments was already a Dikaiopolitan habit under democracy because it suggested that liturgical activities deserved honors. As Wilson suggests, the ostentatious monuments of Nikias and Thrasyllos were related to the increased importance of personal wealth under the regime of 322-318.⁴²¹ Their sumptuous monuments are evidence of the influence of strict Dikaiopolitism among the members of this regime, and therefore among the factionaries in 322.

Both the honorary and khoregic rhetoric thus emphasized Dikaiopolitan ideas.

This emphasis shows that such ideas could be the basis of legitimization of the

⁴¹⁶ Wallace, "History and Hindsight".

⁴¹⁷ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 233-4.

⁴¹⁸ E.g. *SEG* XXVI.83 (*IG* II² 392+586) l. 8: *eu[e]r[ge]tēmatōn*; *SEG* XXXII.94 l. 3: *euergeto[untas]*; *IG* II³.1 484 l. 6: *[eue]rgetōsin*; possibly *IG* II² 400 ll. 11-12. Tracy, "De Antipatro et Archedico Lamptrensi" dated *IG* II² 402 (= *IG* II³.1 484) to either 338 or 337, but even in that case it shows that the pro-Macedonian Athenians made use of strict Dikaiopolitan ideas before the *stasis*. On the date of *SEG* XXXII.94, see Walbank, "*IG* II², 407 and *SEG* XXXII, 94".

⁴¹⁹ Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues," 54-5.

⁴²⁰ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 234-5.

⁴²¹ Wilson, *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*, 226-7.

property requirement for citizenship.⁴²² According to Gray's argument, Dikaiopolitan thinking provided this basis through the idea that rich Athenians were the real contributors to the city's interests, and therefore 'they' deserved to benefit from citizenship, not 'others'.

In winter 318/7 internal divisions in the city were quite strong. As a continuation of the intra-elite conflict of 322, they probably became deeper as a result of the oligarchs' aggressive applications of political paradigms in the previous four years. For the rich democrats and thousands of disenfranchised Athenians, each decree representing the oligarchic leaders as the sovereign *dēmos* must have been a source of distress. Seeing them inscribed in the public space of the city, the disenfranchised must have perceived such decrees as reminders of their exclusion. These decrees resulted from a deliberation process in which they perceived themselves to have the right to participate, but this was not the *de facto* situation.

Against the aggressive confidence of the oligarchic regime in its self-presentation as the true representative of the Athenian past, the democrats radicalized. This radicalization is obvious in their rhetoric and actions. The question of who owned the past created tension. In the winter of 319/8, Polyperchon's letter announced that "the king ordered that all the Athenians should take part in the government in accordance with their ancestral customs (*kata ta patria*)".⁴²³ His letter seems to have been aimed to provoke the traditionalism of the democratic faction as a response to the oligarchs' traditionalism. It also shows that the ownership of the past was closely related to identity. The oligarchic rhetoric stigmatizing the democrats as traitors had already raised the question of what made an Athenian and who decided on this matter. The letter now announced that 'all' Athenians should

⁴²² Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 233-4.

⁴²³ Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1.

participate in the government, but the oligarchic rhetoric, by excluding the disenfranchised, gave the impression that all the Athenians were already in power.

There were other reasons for the intensity of internal divisions in winter 318/7. Four years before, Antipatros' agents killed the leaders of the democratic faction. Demades, who had proposed the decree for their death,⁴²⁴ was now also dead, but given the circumstances in 322, the democrats might have condemned the oligarchic faction for their loss.⁴²⁵ After all, Antipatros had never formally demanded their death. The democrats' desire for revenge must have also been an important cause of *stasis*.⁴²⁶ Their leaders' memory was excluded from the city by denying them burial, just as they themselves were excluded. Some honors that had been granted under democracy were destroyed.⁴²⁷ The imposition of a different view of the past required the erasure of the democratic past and identity. This situation must have also increased the democrats' hostility towards the oligarchs. Lastly, the exiled Athenians who flocked into the city in March 318 were presumably radicalized by the experience of exile, just like the oligarchs Kallimedon and Pytheas in 322.⁴²⁸

Aggressive Nakhonianism continued to be influential in the rhetoric and actions of factionaries during the *stasis* of 318-7. Nakhonian ideas were expressed in the citizenship grant to Ainetos of Rhodes in early December 319 (Appendices B and C).⁴²⁹ At this point the exiled democrats had not yet returned, but this grant was probably the work of the democratic faction because Ainetos seems to have been an associate of Polyperchon, whose support the democrats wanted to obtain.⁴³⁰ Two

⁴²⁴ Plut. *Demosth.* 28.2.

⁴²⁵ A tradition that Pausanias preserves denounced the oligarchic Athenians as traitors, and responsible for the city's losses; Paus. 7.10.4.

⁴²⁶ On revenge as cause of *stasis*, see Fisher "Hybris, Revenge and Stasis," 88-9.

⁴²⁷ *IG II²* 448 ll. 60-2. For the possibility of other such cases, see Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 620 n69.

⁴²⁸ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 240, 301.

⁴²⁹ *Agora XVI.101* ll. 30-35.

⁴³⁰ Poddighe, "Il 'diagramma' di Poliperconte," 41-49.

other foreigners, probably Polyperchon's associates,⁴³¹ soon received honors from the Athenians. The text of the decree for Amyntas does not survive, but an honorary decree for another possible associate of Polyperchon, named Apol[---], also contained traces of Nakonianism (Appendices B and C).⁴³²

The latter decree was passed on the 12th of Elaphēboliōn,⁴³³ around the time of the return of the democrats with Alexandros' army in March 318, when the two groups clashed with each other via their actions and rhetoric. Apparently neither group tried to reconcile. When the democrats seized the *ekklēsia* and charged the oligarchs, they had to legitimize the political violence that they were committing. Among their probable sources of legitimacy were not only Philip III's *diagramma*, but also Nakonian ideas from Athenian political culture, which we can see formulated later in the new honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon in December 318 (see below). The oligarchs did not, or rather could not try to reconcile either. In order to protect themselves from a democratic revenge, they tried to divide the city physically first by allowing Nikanor's (i.e. Kassandros') occupation of the Piraeus in the winter of 319/8 and then by offering the port to Alexandros (i.e. Polyperchon) in March 318. It is difficult to reconstruct their rhetoric at this moment because Plutarch and Diodoros emphasize that they were not given a hearing in the *ekklēsia* meetings or in Phokis. Probably reflecting the oligarchic rhetoric of the period, Plutarch nevertheless gives the following incidence between a representative of the oligarchic faction and Polyperchon in Phokis:⁴³⁴

⁴³¹ Poddighe, *ibid.*, 49-55; Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 612-3.

⁴³² Amyntas: *IG II*² 386; Apol[---]: *Agora XVI.102* l. 13.

⁴³³ *Agora XVI.102* l. 4. On this festival day the *boulē* summoned the *ekklēsia* for a special meeting: ll. 6-7; see Woodhead, *Agora XVI*, *ad loc.*

⁴³⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 33.7, trans. Perrin.

When Hegemon said that Polyperchon could bear witness to his good will towards the people (*pros ton dēmon eunoiai*) and Polyperchon replied in wrath, “Cease telling lies against me in the presence of the king,” the king sprang to his feet and would have smitten Hegemon with a spear.

From this passage it appears that the oligarchs continued to present themselves in Nakhonian vein. The clash between both sides’ rhetoric excluded the possibility of reconciliation, towards which they did not make any attempts. After the trial of oligarchs and Phokion’s death, the *asty* remained in the democrats’ control, while the oligarchs took refuge in the Piraeus. Since Polyperchon and then Alexandros continued their unsuccessful attempts to seize Piraeus in the following months, there was no possibility of reconciliation. The restored democracy made use of aggressive Nakhonianism in its honorific rhetoric. The citizenship grant for Sonikos and Eukles thus emphasized their goodwill towards the Athenian *dēmos* as the justification for the grant.⁴³⁵ True, this decree was ordered by Polyperchon⁴³⁶ and did not carry the usual democratic references like *edoxen tēi boulēi*, a situation witnessing Polyperchon’s despotic tendencies,⁴³⁷ but its particular wording reflected the choice of its proposer, a certain [K]tesias, and ultimately the approval of the *ekklēsia*.

The persistent military failures of Polyperchon in summer-autumn 318 daunted the democratic faction who relied on him for their success and the unification of the *asty* and the Piraeus as a democratic *polis* (see Chapter 3.2 above). The changes in the contents of the first and the second honorary decrees for Euphron indicate that by the end of autumn 318, the rhetoric of the democratic faction had become more idealistic because they realized that salvation through Polyperchon was now less likely, and that they needed more moral support to endure Kassandros’ siege.⁴³⁸ The

⁴³⁵ *IG II²* 387 ll. 12-13.

⁴³⁶ *IG II²* 387 ll. 8-10.

⁴³⁷ Poddighe, “Il ‘diagramma’ di Poliperconte,” 55-57.

⁴³⁸ Wallace, “History and Hindsight,” *passim*.

second posthumous decree for Euphron not only redefined the Lamian War as a struggle for democracy under the leadership of Athens, but also set the honorand as an exemplary figure who was willing to sacrifice himself for democracy and for the removal of a foreign garrison.⁴³⁹ The first decree had emphasized the Sikyonian *polis*, but in the second decree, the emphasis moved to Euphron the individual. The reason for this shift was the changes in the political conditions towards the end of 318. The emphasis on Euphron's self-sacrifice for democracy served to define what an Athenian was. According to this decree, it was someone who tried to remove foreign garrisons and sacrificed himself for democracy.⁴⁴⁰

The rhetoric of the decree of 318 contained aggressive Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan ideas. Peaceful bargaining with the oligarchic faction was made more difficult by the use of these ideas. For example, the decree identified the previous four years as an oligarchy,⁴⁴¹ even though in actual practice the previous regime preserved certain democratic practices. The restored democracy did not have to present the previous one in such a partisan manner. The democratic faction emphasized their particular Nakhonian idea of Athenian unity, used an exclusionary public discourse, and thus added fuel to the flame instead of working towards reconciliation. In the vein of Nakhonian monopolism, the decree equated *dēmokratia* with *eleutheria* by contrasting it with *douleia*.⁴⁴² This equation excluded the Athenian oligarchs who might have fought for what they believed to be *eleutheria* in the Lamian War. Moreover, the decree emphasized that in return for Euphron's services to the democratic cause, the Athenian democracy promised to take care of

⁴³⁹ *IG II²* 448 ll. 54-6; Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 619-20.

⁴⁴⁰ *IG II²* 448 ll. 53-56

⁴⁴¹ *IG II²* 448 ll. 61-63.

⁴⁴² Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 620.

his child, who is also depicted on the relief above the inscription of this decree.⁴⁴³

The “communal rearing of war orphans” was a Nakonian way of recognizing self-sacrifice.⁴⁴⁴ Finally, there were also Dikaiopolitan ideas in the second decree for Euphron. As with the examples from the previous years, the Dikaiopolitan emphasis on the relationship of mutual interest between the Athenian *polis* and its benefactors was reiterated in the text of the decree.⁴⁴⁵

Apparently soon after the ratification of Euphron’s decree on the last day of Maimaktēriōn, the negotiations between two factions started. An oligarch, the comic poet Archedikos of Lamptrai,⁴⁴⁶ was active in the *ekklēsia* in the following weeks,⁴⁴⁷ a situation that suggests a possible reconciliation at the beginning of 317. The opportunity to reconcile must have arisen within the context of the “many meetings” (*pleionōn enteukseōn*) with Kassandros,⁴⁴⁸ who controlled the Piraeus and was besieging Athens. Poddighe argues for the possibility of the oligarchs’ outnumbering the democrats during the debates between the two factions in this context.⁴⁴⁹ In any case, reconciliation became possible in winter 318-317 because the oligarchs, who had taken refuge in the Piraeus in spring 318, now had a chance to return to the *asty* thanks to Kassandros’ siege, and the democrats had to consider reconciliation as an option in view of Polyperchon’s failure to seize Piraeus, and the serious food shortages due to the inaccessibility of the harbors.⁴⁵⁰ Therefore, regardless of whether the oligarchs actually returned and participated in the political deliberation at this point, there was the possibility of reconciliation.

⁴⁴³ *IG II²* 448 l. 74; Wallace, “History and Hindsight,” 621.

⁴⁴⁴ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 174.

⁴⁴⁵ *IG II²* 448 l. 58: *eue[ergeta]s*; *IG II²* 448 l. 60: *euergesias*.

⁴⁴⁶ On his identification as the comic poet, see Habicht, “The Comic Poet Archedikos”; cf. Tracy, “De Antipatro et Archedico Lamptrensi,” 251.

⁴⁴⁷ Poddighe, “Atene e le lotte tra i diadochi”.

⁴⁴⁸ Diod. 18.74.1-3.

⁴⁴⁹ Poddighe, “Atene e le lotte tra i diadochi,” 15-16.

⁴⁵⁰ On food shortage, cp. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics*, 52.

There is nevertheless no record in our sources of such reconciliation, even though Diodoros states that it seemed good to ‘all’ (*pasi*) the Athenians in the *ekklēsia* to send envoys to Kassandros for peace negotiations. The persecutions of the democratic leaders after the regime change and the exclusionary character of the Phalerian regime imply that no reconciliation took place. This failure to reconcile is not surprising because aggressive Nakhonianism continued its influence in early 317. Both of the honorary decrees passed on the last day of Gamēlion included Nakhonian references,⁴⁵¹ which indicate that the oligarchs who apparently returned to the city preserved their aggressive Nakhonianism. The honorary decree for an Epidamnian and an Apollonian, which was possibly the last decree passed under the restored democracy, seems to contain a Nakhonian reference as well.⁴⁵²

The rhetoric of the factions during the *stasis* of 303-301 is traceable in the honorary decrees granted to the friends (*philoī*) of Demetrios. This rhetoric reflected the attitude of the pro-Demetrian democrats, who proposed such decrees. These decrees contained aggressive uses of the Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms. As such, they show how the particular uses of these paradigms caused the *stasis*.

The texts of the honorary decrees for the “friends” of Demetrios contained political ideas that reflected the potential for aggressive ideas about Nakhonian unity (Appendices B and C). For example, the decrees for Neaios (304/3),⁴⁵³ Oxythemis of Larissa (303/2),⁴⁵⁴ his son Medeios of Larissa (303/2),⁴⁵⁵ Alkaios of Ainos (302),⁴⁵⁶ Solon of Bargylia (302),⁴⁵⁷ and Adeimantos of Lampsakos (302/1)⁴⁵⁸ all legitimized the grants given to these men by reference to their goodwill towards the Athenian

⁴⁵¹ *Agora XVI.104* l. 13; *Agora XVI.105* l. 8.

⁴⁵² *IG II² 350* l. 11; O’Sullivan, *The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum*, 245 n7.

⁴⁵³ *IG II² 553* l. 11.

⁴⁵⁴ *IG II² 558* ll. 7-9, 17.

⁴⁵⁵ *IG II² 498* ll. 13-14, 19-20; cf. Bayliss, “A Decree Honouring Medeios of Larissa”.

⁴⁵⁶ *IG II² 495* l. 18.

⁴⁵⁷ *IG II² 496+507* ll. 19-20.

⁴⁵⁸ *Agora XVI.122* ll.23-25; Wallace, “Adeimantus of Lampsacus,” 148-9.

dēmos, and in some cases towards the king. The decrees for Alkaios and Solon were proposed by Stratokles, and thus show that his faction was inclined towards Nakhonianism. The rest of the decrees most probably reflected the approach of the same faction, but some of them could well be the work of the democrats who wanted to get Demetrios' support. By its emphasis on the city's legal tradition, the republication of the entire Athenian law-code in 304/3 was also a Nakhonian move.⁴⁵⁹

We can also detect an example of Dikaiopolitan emphasis on reciprocity between 303-301. The decree for Eucharos of Konthyle, who was honored for supervising the republication of the law-code in 304/3, emphasized the reciprocal relationship of interest between the *polis* and individual citizens by justifying his honors "on account of his virtue and justice *towards the council*".⁴⁶⁰ The purpose of ratification was also declared in a Dikaiopolitan manner: "... so that the council may appear to return appropriate thanks (*aksian kharin*) for benefits rendered".⁴⁶¹

Another example of strict Dikaiopolitanism from this period is the one and only statue of Demetrios of Phaleron that the Athenians left intact on the Akropolis when they destroyed hundreds of his statues.⁴⁶² The exact date of this collective *damnatio memoriae* is unclear, but it surely happened between 307 and 301. In contrast with the Nakhonian attitude of externalizing and disparaging the enemies of the common good, the Dikaiopolitan paradigm insisted on individual citizens' responsibility for the problems that troubled the common affairs of the city.⁴⁶³ As Azoulay argues, the Athenians' motivation for exceptionally leaving one statue of their former despotic

⁴⁵⁹ *IG II²* 487 ll. 6-10; Hedrick, "Epigraphic Writing," 329; Habicht, *Athens*, 70.

⁴⁶⁰ *IG II²* 487 ll. 16-17 (emphasis added).

⁴⁶¹ *IG II²* 487 ll. 10-12; trans. Hedrick, "Democracy and the Epigraphical Habit," 412. The phrase "for benefits rendered" translates "*ekastōi[s] tōn pephilotimēmenōn*", literally "to everyone who acted with love of honor".

⁴⁶² Diog. Laert. 5.77; Azoulay, "La gloire et l'outrage," 332-5.

⁴⁶³ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 54-5.

ruler on the most sacred spot in the city was to present him as a negative example.⁴⁶⁴ In Dikaiopolitan vein, this statue reminded the citizens that they had to make an effort to treat fellow citizens justly, and not follow the Phalerian's example. In other words, the common good of Athenians was not treated as axiomatic; instead, justice mattered more than the community. Whether it was the democratic faction which decided to leave this statue intact or Demetrios Poliorketes requested it, as Favorinus claims,⁴⁶⁵ this action provides evidence for the impact of strictly Dikaiopolitan ideas in Athens around the time of the *stasis*. Similarly, the extravagant honors granted to Demetrios' friends, Bourikhos, Adeimantos and Oxythemis around 302/1 also emphasized the reciprocal relationship between the city and its benefactors, just as with the lavish honors granted to the Antigonids in 307.⁴⁶⁶ True, these honors show how important these men were for Athens,⁴⁶⁷ but they also indicate the prevalence of the extreme Dikaiopolitanism in the city's honorary culture.

The impact of the Athenian political culture on the outbreak of *stasis* between 301-296 is difficult to assess due to the inaccessibility of the rhetoric and actions of the factionaries. The honorary decree for Poseidippos, which was passed in 299, made use of both the Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms, a situation which shows that they were once again at the disposal of the factionaries' aggressive use. The decree justified the honors for Poseidippos through "his goodwill towards the Athenian *dēmos*",⁴⁶⁸ embedding a particular notion of Athenian unity within the self-presentation of the Lacharian faction. The text of the decree explained the purpose of its own drafting in this way: "... so that as many people as possible may act with love

⁴⁶⁴ Azoulay, "La gloire et l'outrage," 333.

⁴⁶⁵ Diog. Laert. 5.77.

⁴⁶⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 10.2-11.2; Demochares *FGrH* 75 fr. 1 (= Athen. *Deipn.* 6.253a).

⁴⁶⁷ Wallace, "Adeimantos of Lampsakos," 146-7.

⁴⁶⁸ *IG* II³.1 844 ll. 17-19.

of honor in providing service (*khreian*) for the profit (*sunferonta*) of the *dēmos*”.⁴⁶⁹

This explanation shows the impact of strict Dikaiopolitanism on the rhetoric of the Lacharian faction.

The rhetoric of the oligarchic faction during the *stasis* of 287-286, which we can trace in the honorary decree for Philippides of Paiania, made use of both Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan ideas. In a Nakonian manner that had the potential to disturb the democratic faction, the decree justified the honors on account of Philippides’ goodwill towards the Athenian *dēmos*.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, by giving a very long and extremely vague list of Philippides’ contributions,⁴⁷¹ it made use of strict Dikaiopolitanism, which insisted on determining as much as possible the contents of individuals’ contributions to the *polis*, while leaving the details of these contributions indeterminate.⁴⁷² The final clause of the decree permitted Philippides to inscribe on the stele his benefactions (*euergesias*) as well as those of his ancestors.⁴⁷³ In a Dikaiopolitan manner, this clause emphasized that the contributions of individuals should be enumerated, while it left open the details of these contributions by leaving the list open.

Overall, Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms had an influence over the factionaries’ rhetoric and actions between 322 and 286. One might argue that they were influential before 322 too. Then, the question would be to understand why political culture became active as the synchronic cause of *stasis* after 322, and why it served as a cause of stability before that. Changing political conditions inside and outside Athens incited factionalism.

⁴⁶⁹ *IG II*³.1 844 ll. 23-25.

⁴⁷⁰ *IG II*³.1 857 ll. 10-11, 20.

⁴⁷¹ Luraghi, “Stratokles of Diomeia and Party Politics in early Hellenistic Athens,” 217.

⁴⁷² Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 52-3.

⁴⁷³ *IG II*³.1 857 ll. 51-53.

4.2 Foreign influence: A diachronic cause of *stasis*

The causal connection between foreign influence and the *staseis* in our period is obvious. As we saw in Chapter 3, almost all the Athenian factions, perhaps with the exception of the democrats in 322, had connections with an external actor: pro-Antipatrid oligarchs, pro-Demetrian democrats, etc. This situation was very common in other *poleis* too, so much so that we can consider such external connections as a standard procedure of factions in Greek *poleis*.⁴⁷⁴ Some kind of external intervention contributed to the emergence of each *stasis* between 322 and 286, but the level of such intervention seems to have fluctuated throughout this period.

The first significant external factor was the outbreak of the Lamian War. The discussions before the war divided the Athenians in 323.⁴⁷⁵ This division did not emerge *ex nihilo*, but the war fuelled it. Later on, in 318/7, foreign influence gained even more importance. Athens did not wage any war at this time, but the oligarchic and democratic factions supported different foreign powers, namely Kassandros and Polyperchon respectively, unlike in 322 when the democratic faction seems to have preferred an anti-Macedonian attitude (see above Chapter 3.1). The conflict between the two Macedonian leaders was an important cause of *stasis* in 318, when the oligarchic faction sought to establish a reciprocal relationship with Kassandros, while the democratic faction tried the same with Polyperchon. The former relied on Kassandros to preserve the property requirement, and the latter on Polyperchon to remove the requirement and the garrison in Mounichia. Both Macedonians relied on Athenian support for getting rid of each other. In particular, Kassandros' alliances with Ptolemy and Antigonos, and Polyperchon's proclamation of Philip III's

⁴⁷⁴ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 126-7.

⁴⁷⁵ Diod. 18.10.2; Nep. *Phoc.* 3.2.

diagramma in autumn 319 escalated the internal divisions in Athens to the level of *stasis* (see above Chapter 3.2).⁴⁷⁶

Foreign influence is clearly identifiable in the *stasis* between 303-301. The political position of the two factions depended on their relation to Poliorketes, whose presence in the city during this period was a direct cause of *stasis*. His epistolary interference in the *ekklēsia* sessions became the object of factional dispute, which led to the death and exile of democrats (see above Chapter 3.3).⁴⁷⁷ Such interference was not *a priori* troubling for the democrats, as is clear from Polyperchon's previous involvement with the *ekklēsia* under the restored democracy.⁴⁷⁸ The declaration of unconditional obedience to Demetrios, which was advocated by Stratokles and passed in the *ekklēsia*, indicates how much influence the Macedonian ruler had in the city,⁴⁷⁹ but it also shows the extent to which non-Athenian factors could become the nexus of internal strife.

Just as with Antipatros, Polyperchon, and Kassandros before them, Antigonos and his son did not necessarily care about the Athenian political regime in 307,⁴⁸⁰ and it is more likely that the already-existing internal tensions led them to take sides about the city's regime. That the Antigonids did not care about the political regimes in their subject cities is clear from their unsuccessful siege of the disobedient Rhodes in 305,⁴⁸¹ which had a democratic regime at that time.⁴⁸² As this episode shows, they cared about a city's obedience to them, and not its regime, since otherwise they would have supported the Rhodian democracy, instead of attacking it.

⁴⁷⁶ Diod. 18.54-57.

⁴⁷⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 24.3-5.

⁴⁷⁸ *IG II²* 387 ll. 12-15; cf. Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 168.

⁴⁷⁹ Plut. *Demetr.* 24.4; Bayliss, *After Demosthenes*, 169-171.

⁴⁸⁰ Shear, "The politics of the past," 278.

⁴⁸¹ Diod. 20.81-88.

⁴⁸² Robinson, *Democracy Beyond Athens*, 169.

Foreign influence was among the causes of *stasis* in 301, at least if the tradition about Lachares' connection with Kassandros is accurate (see above Chapter 3.4).⁴⁸³ The pro-Lacharian faction showed its support for Kassandros because the honorary decree for Poseidippos, which was passed in early autumn 299, recognized Kassandros' royal title for the first time among the Athenian official documents.⁴⁸⁴ There is evidence for further foreign influence in this period, although its connection with *stasis* is unclear. Lysimachos donated grain and the yardarm and mast for the conveyance of *peplos* at the Great Panathenaea of 298.⁴⁸⁵ These donations arrived in the city in the archonship of Euktemon (299/8).⁴⁸⁶

The outbreak of *stasis* in 287 was the internal counterpart of an external war against Demetrios Poliorketes, in which the democrats fought against the pro-Demetrian oligarchs (see above Chapter 3.5). The democrats' attempt to get rid of Demetrios was at the center of the civil strife, but the conflict between Macedonian rulers appears to be another important aspect. Ptolemy I supported the democratic faction through his officers Kallias and Zenon.⁴⁸⁷

Just as with the previous examples of foreign influence, neither Kassandros in 301 nor Ptolemy in 287 had particular reason for showing interest in how Athenians organized their political institutions. Their particular concern was to keep Poliorketes from becoming powerful again in Greece.

⁴⁸³ Paus. 1.25.7.

⁴⁸⁴ *IG II*³.1 844 ll. 13-14; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 115.

⁴⁸⁵ *IG II*³.1 877 ll. 11-16.

⁴⁸⁶ *IG II*³.1 877 ll. 13-16.

⁴⁸⁷ *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 22-27; *IG II*³.1 863 ll. 11-2.

4.3 Economic tension as a cause of *stasis*?

There is no direct evidence that a conflict between poor and rich Athenians was among the causes of *stasis* in this period. De Ste. Croix, while interpreting the *staseis* in 411 and in 404/3 as consequences of class struggle, did not make a similar argument for 322 because he treated the latter mostly as an external intervention.⁴⁸⁸ Drawing on Diodoros, he nonetheless emphasized that the masses supported the Lamian War.⁴⁸⁹ Since food crises in the city became chronic throughout the 330s and 320s due to the difficulties in importing grain,⁴⁹⁰ the economic tensions between the poor and the rich may have intensified by the time of the *stasis* of 322, but the causal connection is not obvious.

The role of these tensions in causing *stasis* is to be suspected in the outcome of the two episodes of civil strife in 322 and in 318/7. The introduction of the property requirement suggests that the tensions between poor and rich Athenians may have influenced the city's internal divisions in 322. By connecting citizenship with wealth, this requirement made these tensions more obvious than its predecessor in 411, when the oligarchic faction connected citizenship with military contribution.⁴⁹¹ In this sense, the property requirement itself provides indirect evidence for tensions between rich and poor among the causes of the *stasis* in 322. There were presumably other possible reasons for effectuating the connection between political rights and wealth, but the very concept of such a connection contains in itself such tensions.

For the later periods, epigraphic and numismatic evidence indicates that financial difficulties existed. Thus, the frequent changes that the office of the people's treasurer (*tamias tou dēmou*) went through starting with 303/2 are evidence

⁴⁸⁸ de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle*, 291-2, 300-304

⁴⁸⁹ de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle*, 609-610 n2; Diod. 18.10.1.

⁴⁹⁰ Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics*, 41-5; Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply*, 150-164; Habicht, *Athens*, 26-7.

⁴⁹¹ Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 235.

of the city's financial disturbances,⁴⁹² as is the inability of the Athenian public treasury to pay for the costs of Athenian cavalry.⁴⁹³ Later on, shortly after the beginning of Demetrios' second rule, at some time after the mid-290s, Athenians stopped minting coins,⁴⁹⁴ an extreme situation proving the city's financial problems. The paucity of evidence does not allow us to talk about a causal connection between these financial problems and the emergence of *stasis*, but their concomitance suggests that such a causal connection is plausible, especially in view of the insistence of ancient sources on the relationship between *stasis* and economic inequality.⁴⁹⁵ In our case, however, since the nature of economic tensions that Athens experienced between 322 and 286 remains unclear, we cannot make a strong case for such a causal connection.

4.4 Intra-elite conflict:⁴⁹⁶ A diachronic cause of *stasis*

The potential for conflict among the Athenian elite could make it possible for external war to trigger internal divisions. As the rhetorical evidence shows, throughout the 330s and 320s some members of the elite severely opposed each other on various political issues. For instance, Lykourgos' accusation of treason against Leokrates and the trial over Demosthenes' crown are evidence of political tensions in 330.⁴⁹⁷ Further tension is observable in the trials following the political scandal in 324-3 surrounding the Harpalos affair, during which Demades and Demosthenes

⁴⁹² Oliver, "Polis Economies," 113; Henry, "Athenian Financial Officers," 51-68.

⁴⁹³ IG II² 1264; Oliver, "Polis Economies," 112.

⁴⁹⁴ Kroll, "The Evidence of Athenian coins," 209.

⁴⁹⁵ Börm, "Stasis," 10; Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory*, 127 n34.

⁴⁹⁶ By this concept, I do not mean that the *stasis* could be reduced to conflict between members of the elite, who, regardless of ideology, were exploiting the masses for their own political interests; cp. Gehrke, *Stasis*, 328-39. Instead, I use it simply to refer to conflict among the powerful Athenians, who genuinely opposed each other for ideological reasons or sometimes for the sake of honor and revenge, but there is not enough evidence from Athens to argue that the elite Athenians disguised their true motives at time of internal strife. Moreover, these struggles were also connected to the outside of the city; the interplay between foreign influence and intra-elite conflict is striking.

⁴⁹⁷ Lyc. *In Leocr.*; Demosth. *De Corona*; Aesch. *In Ctesiphonem*. Habicht, *Athens*, 27-8.

were accused of taking bribes from Harpalos, Alexander's treasurer.⁴⁹⁸ Later literary evidence preserves other examples of tensions among the elite from this period.⁴⁹⁹ Such conflicts were certainly typical of Athenian democracy,⁵⁰⁰ but they had the potential for creating future tensions that could lead to *stasis*.⁵⁰¹ This potential becomes particularly clear if we consider that some of the Athenians, like Demosthenes and Hypereides, who participated in these conflicts, died in the *stasis* of 322, while others, like Demades, became the leaders of the subsequent regime.

These intra-elite tensions were in part triggered by the defeat at Chaironeia and the subsequent external political developments, but they must have also resulted from individual desires for honor and profit, causes which Aristotle identifies in his contemporary analysis of the internal causes of *stasis*.⁵⁰² The historical examples given by Aristotle show that "the slightest perceived misallocation of honor or profit could trigger *stasis*".⁵⁰³ The trial over the legitimacy of the honorary crown for Demosthenes in 330 and the trials against the Athenians who made illegitimate profit from Harpalos' money in 323 are evidence of such perceived misallocation.

During the *stasis* of 318/7, the already-existing tensions among Athenians again played an important role, as the mutual interaction between Athenians and external actors shows. In return for foreign intervention, Athenian politics influenced

⁴⁹⁸ Din. *In Demosth.*, *In Aristogit.*, *In Philocl.* Habicht, *Athens*, 31-33.

⁴⁹⁹ E.g. Plut. *Mor.* 843d-e; Dion. Hal. 10; Harpoc. s.v. θεωρικά.

⁵⁰⁰ Classical democracy was highly capable of tolerating the conflicts among its citizens; Simonton, "Stability and Violence," 68-81.

⁵⁰¹ Cf. Habicht, *Athens*, 18, who maintains that the tensions between Athenian politicians in this period did not prevent their consensus about the need to liberate the city. The approach of Brun, "Y avait-il vraiment des anti-Macédoniens?" supports this view. Whether there was a general consensus about the Macedonians in the city or not, there was certainly tension between political figures. Even if such tensions were typical of Athenian democracy, they nevertheless provided the potential for future conflict that could escalate to *stasis* under the right conditions. According to Habicht, *Athens*, 27-8, they resulted from the patriotic public mood in the city, which was intolerant of cowardice, but the rhetoric used in these conflicts suggests that the situation was more complex. See Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 189-192.

⁵⁰² Arist. *Pol.* 1302a31-34; cf. 1302a38-b2. Skultety, "Delimiting," 350-55. See also Fisher, "Hybris, Revenge, and *Stasis*," 85-90.

⁵⁰³ Skultety, "Delimiting," 354.

these external actors. Polyperchon's political program was, thus, the result of his interactions with Athens and other Greek cities (see above Chapter 3.2).⁵⁰⁴ Just as with Antipatros, there was no reason for him to care about the political regime in Athens, as long as the city was on his side. Athenian factionalism led him to rework the contents of his political agenda. As Shane Wallace shows, it was only after his encounter with the democratic faction at Phokis in spring 318 that Polyperchon began to refer to autonomy and democracy.⁵⁰⁵ These two terms were the keywords of the rhetoric of the Athenian democrats at this point, as can be deduced from their self-serving interpretation of the *diagramma*, which actually contained neither.⁵⁰⁶ In constructing his policy Polyperchon thus relied on the already-existing divisions in Athens.

Between 303-301 members of the elite participated in the conflicts over Demetrios' actions. The intra-elite conflict between Athenians like Stratokles, Philippides, Demochares, and Kleomedon of Kydathenaion⁵⁰⁷ was among the causes of *stasis* because Demetrios' attitude towards the city was evidently shaped by these conflicts, and cannot be solely responsible for them. If there had not been already-existing conflicts between these Athenians, it is not clear how Demetrios' extravagant actions could be interpreted as preferable to one elite group, while unacceptable to another, so much so that the members of one group exiled and killed members of another, while the latter rebuked the former for abolishing democracy. Apparently, these conflicts were ideological in character, and they were probably also motivated by the prospect of honor and profit.

⁵⁰⁴ Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 609-618; other cities: 616-7.

⁵⁰⁵ Wallace, "History and Hindsight," 616. The meeting at Phokis: Diod. 18.66.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.3-7. A previous Athenian embassy could have also influenced him: Diod. 18.64.3. For the change in Polyperchon's political program after Phokis: Diod. 18.66.2-3; Plut. *Phoc.* 34.3.

⁵⁰⁶ This interpretation is clear from their appeals to Polyperchon and Nikanor: Diod. 18.64-65.1.

⁵⁰⁷ They came from established families; Stratokles: Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*, no 12938; Philippides: no 14546; Demochares: no 3716; Kleomedon: no 8674.

Demetrios' restoration of the oligarchic exiles in 292/1⁵⁰⁸ must have considerably increased the intra-elite conflict in Athens. As a result, it contributed to the emergence of the *stasis* in 287-286. There is not much evidence about what these exiles did after their return, but the experience of exile must have radicalized them, as with various examples of exile that we know from other *poleis*.⁵⁰⁹ After the political regime became oligarchic with the reintroduction of the office of *anagrapheus* in 294/3⁵¹⁰ and with Olympiodoros' illegal archonship in 293/2, the tension between pro-Demetrian oligarchs like Dromokleides, Stratokles, Gorgon and Phaidros and the anti-Demetrian democrats must have been high.

4.5 Conclusion

The continuous influence of Nakhonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms on the rhetoric and actions of Athenian factionaries between 322-286 suggests that Athenians' uncompromising use of these paradigms contributed to the emergence of *stasis*. Foreign influence and intra-elite conflict were the specific causes of *stasis*, while there is not enough evidence to assess the role of economic tensions between rich and poor Athenians. The fact that we detected the same causes behind all of the five episodes of *stasis* which we identified in Chapter 3 indicates that instead of talking about five different *staseis*, it may be more accurate to refer to a prolonged *stasis* that lasted from 322 to 286, repressed during certain years, and revealed during others.⁵¹¹ Against this kind of a causal continuity, one might argue that it is our eclectic methodology that gives us similar results for what were in reality disparate events. One way to check the validity of this criticism is to see whether political culture,

⁵⁰⁸ Dion. Hal. 2-3; Plut. *Mor.* 850d.

⁵⁰⁹ On the effects of exile, see Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 377-9.

⁵¹⁰ *IG II*³.1 857; *Agora XVI*.167.

⁵¹¹ Cf. Hansen and Nielsen, p. 125 n14.

foreign influence, and intra-elite conflict caused *stasis* in the period after 286. We shall do this in the conclusion chapter.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC STABILITY (286-262)

The foregoing discussion shows that there was a real problem of political stability in Athens between 322-286. Foreign intervention played an important role in this situation, but the fact that the regime type changed with each intervention was the result of internal conflict. Thus, the external cause of regime changes was foreign intervention, and their internal cause was *stasis*. Furthermore, *stasis* was the result of a combination of complex causal mechanisms, including foreign intervention, intra-elite conflict, and political culture. Athenians preferred to restore their democratic system whenever they had the opportunity, that is, in 318, 307, 295, and 286, even if it meant cooperating with foreign powers. Oligarchic factions, no matter how small, also cooperated with foreign powers, and established oligarchic regimes with a property requirement in 322 and 317, or made the regime less democratic in 304-301 and 294. The ideological conflict between these two factions contributed to the political instability between 322-286. Surprisingly, the democracy that came into power in 286 managed to maintain its stability for twenty-four years, a much longer period than any of the regimes between 322-286. This situation needs explanation. Why was the 286-262 democracy more stable than the previous regimes? As I shall argue, changes in foreign influence and intra-elite conflict caused the stability of democracy in this period.

5.1 Political culture

Athenian political culture was a diachronic cause of political instability between 322-286 (see above Chapter 4.1). It was not so much the political culture itself, as the

antagonistic potential of the Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms which caused the *staseis*. The same paradigms, when not used in a single-minded manner, were also conducive to political stability, in which case their use left space for ambiguities and contradictions.⁵¹² We should therefore ask whether there was a change in the use of these paradigms between 286-262, one that will have contributed to political stability under this regime. The indirect evidence that I used in order to detect Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan paradigms in the rhetoric of the Athenian factionaries prior to 286, namely, references to political ideas in the honorary decrees of different regimes, does not present such a change for the period between 286 and 262. Instead, these references seem to have been continuously made in this period (Appendices B and C). It is, therefore, difficult to assess the exact impact of political culture on stability, but, based on Gray's larger analysis,⁵¹³ it is reasonable to assume that political ideas such as *eunoia* and *philotimia*, which provided the factionaries in the previous years with the potential to construct exclusionary discourses against their opponents, would now become more ambiguous, and as a result less conducive to *stasis*. In this sense, the Athenian political culture probably was a catalyst for stability, but the lack of direct evidence makes it difficult to understand how this catalysis worked exactly.

5.2 Foreign influence

The regimes which lasted the longest in the period between 322 and 286 were the oligarchies of 317-307 and of 294-286. The oligarchy of 322-318 also lasted longer than the two brief democracies of 318/7 and 295/4. The stability of the oligarchic regimes was ensured by the presence of the Macedonian garrison in Piraeus because

⁵¹² Gray, *Stasis and Stability*, 159-195.

⁵¹³ *Stasis and Stability*, 156-196.

each time these regimes ended, there was an attempt to remove the garrison, with success in 307, and without success in 318 and 286. Such attempts did not accompany the regime changes from democracy to oligarchy in 317 and 294. This situation suggests that the oligarchic faction, which was by definition in the minority, had to rely on the presence of these garrisons in order to maintain an oligarchic regime, but the democrats, equally in need of foreign support, preferred to get rid of these garrisons. As in the Classical period,⁵¹⁴ the Piraeus had an essential role for democracy, but it was only between 307 and 301 that the Athenians had uninterrupted access to their port during the entire period that this thesis covers (Table 2).⁵¹⁵

Table 2 Regimes and Access to the Piraeus

Period	Regime	External Support	Access to Piraeus
322-318	Oligarchy	Antipatros	No
318-317	Democracy	Polyperchon	No
317-307	Oligarchy	Kassandros	No
307-301	Democracy	Demetrios	Yes
301-295	Tyranny	Several (Kass., Lys.)	No
295-294	Democracy	Demetrios	No
294-286	Oligarchy	Demetrios	No
286-262	Democracy	Several (Ptol., Lys.)	No

The foreign garrison thus had different meanings for democracy and oligarchy. We cannot argue, however, that the garrison was the only determinant of political stability for each regime because the democracy of 286-262 managed to maintain a stable regime despite not having access to the Piraeus.⁵¹⁶ Moreover, there was no lack of political turbulence in Greece and the neighboring areas in this period, as the

⁵¹⁴ See footnote 122 above.

⁵¹⁵ There was no Macedonian garrison in Piraeus between 301-295, but Lachares' opponents occupied the port, probably not a long time after the *stasis* broke out (see Chapter 3.5).

⁵¹⁶ Piraeus remained in Antigonid control until 229 BC; Habicht, *Athens*, 124; Paschidis, *Between City and King*, 134 with n3.

Battle of Kouropedion in 281, the Celtic invasion in 279, and the Chremonidean War between 269 and 262, among other episodes, demonstrate.⁵¹⁷ Athens followed a balanced foreign policy in the years after 286, but in general, it continued to have close ties to Ptolemaic Egypt and a hostile relationship with Antigonos Gonatas, the son of Demetrios Poliorketes.⁵¹⁸ This balanced foreign policy consisted of preserving close ties with different external powers, while not letting any of these powers intervene into city's internal affairs. Such a policy is reflected in the large financial gifts that the city received from various Hellenistic rulers, but not from the Antigonids.⁵¹⁹ The financial situation of some Athenian families improved through the 280s,⁵²⁰ a development to which this policy certainly contributed. An improvement in the city's finances is also observable from the city's reinstatement of its own coinage, a practice that had ceased in mid-290s.⁵²¹ The composition of the silver in these new quadridigité tetradrachms and drachms suggests that they were minted from the talents that the city received from the Hellenistic kings.⁵²² If this suggestion is correct, it demonstrates the great influence of the city's balanced foreign policy in this period because the very existence of Athenian coinage depended on such policy. Moreover, a significant increase in the Athenian cavalry took place in 282/1, and this increase itself is evidence of the city's financial improvement since it required significant expenditure on the part of the public finances and the wealthy Athenians willing to make public donations.⁵²³

⁵¹⁷ Will, "The Formation," 110-7; Walbank, "Macedonia and Greece," 221-236.

⁵¹⁸ Habicht, *Athens*, 124-142, esp. 126-7.

⁵¹⁹ 130 talents from Lysimachos (Plut. *Mor.* 851e); 50 from Ptolemy I (Plut. *Mor.* 851e); 50 talents from Ptolemy II (*JG II*³.1 911 l. 52); and 20 talents from Antipatros, the nephew of Kassandros (Plut. *Mor.* 851e); see Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 79-86.

⁵²⁰ Oliver, "Polis Economies," 121.

⁵²¹ Kroll, *Agora XXVI*, 10; idem, "On the chronology," 34-6.

⁵²² Kroll, *Agora XXVI*, 10; cf. Oliver, "The Politics of Coinage," 44, who rejects this suggestion; see Kroll's response in "The evidence of Athenian coins," 210 n17.

⁵²³ *SEG XXI*.525 ll. 7-10; Habicht, *Athens*, 138; Oliver, "Polis Economies," 117-9.

In the 280s, the city had close ties with Lysimachos, for whom the Athenians set up an honorary statue in the Agora;⁵²⁴ they also granted various honors to the intermediaries who arranged his help for the city.⁵²⁵ Athenians further benefited from a close relationship with the Ptolemaic kingdom between 286-262.⁵²⁶ Ptolemy I Soter and his successor Ptolemy II Philadelphos occasionally provided financial support and grain supply for the city, which was constantly on the verge of grain shortage and famine due to its lack of access to Piraeus. The Athenians' investment in this relationship is observable in the honors that they granted to their intermediaries with Egypt.⁵²⁷ Later, during the Chremonidean War, Ptolemy II sent troops to help the Athenians in their fight against Antigonos Gonatas.⁵²⁸ Archaeological and numismatic evidence confirms the presence of these troops in Attica.⁵²⁹ Further numismatic evidence also demonstrates that the Athenians minted silver pentobols using the Ptolemaic weight standard.⁵³⁰ The purpose of these pentobols must be to pay Ptolemaic mercenaries, but the very act of adopting a foreign weight standard indicates the extent of Ptolemaic influence.

The evidence for the balanced Athenian foreign policy thus demonstrates that the foreign influence on the city's internal affairs preserved its importance in this era. In contrast to the previous periods, Athens pursued a policy of alliances with various foreign powers except for Antigonos Gonatas, whereas previously a single external ruler dominated the city's foreign policy and internal affairs (Table 2). The only exception was during Lachares' tyranny, but it was also the most unstable period because the Athenians were so divided that they took up arms against each other. A

⁵²⁴ Paus. 1.9.4.

⁵²⁵ *IG II³*.1 866 ll. 6-9; *IG II³*.1 867 ll. 1-4, 16-20; *IG II³*.1 877 ll. 10-17; *IG II³*.1 924 (+ *SEG* XXXVIII.619 l. 10).

⁵²⁶ Habicht, "Athens and the Ptolemies".

⁵²⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 851e; *IG II³*.1 868; *IG II³*.1 911 ll. 40-70.

⁵²⁸ *IG II³*.1 912 ll. 16-23.

⁵²⁹ Habicht, *Athens*, 144-5; Kroll, *Agora XXVI*, 11 n42.

⁵³⁰ Kroll, *Agora XXVI*, 11; *idem*, "On the Chronology," 38-40.

comparison with the previous period thus suggests that the alliances of Athens had an impact on the political stability that reigned in the city in this period, just as it had an impact on the city's finances.

Another difference from the previous periods was the fact that the politically closest monarch to the city, i.e. Ptolemy, was geographically the farthest. Just as with the earlier kings, Ptolemy did not have any reason to care about the Athenian regime, except for obtaining the city's compliance;⁵³¹ however, beyond this standard royal apathy, he was situated too far to cause problems in the city's internal affairs, even if he wished to do so. In contrast Demetrios Poliorketes, who purportedly supported Athenian democracy, actually harmed it by his very presence in the city. Thus, Ptolemy's distance could also play a role in the political stability of the regime in question.

5.3 Intra-elite conflict

The internal cause of the political instability between 322-286 was *stasis*, and one of the causes of *stasis* was conflict among the members of the Athenian elite (see above Chapter 4.4). It is natural to ask, therefore, whether intra-elite conflict diminished between 286-262, and whether its absence was a cause of the political stability in this period.

The lack of narrative sources makes it difficult to deal with this question in detail, but the abundant epigraphic record interestingly does not indicate, whether directly or indirectly, any instance of intra-elite conflict between 286-262. It would

⁵³¹ Ptolemy had intervened in Cyrene's regime after the *stasis* in 322 (Diod. 18.21.7-9), but the regime that he installed there via a *diagramma* (SEG IX.1) was not a democracy, even if a less exclusionary oligarchy than the one before the *stasis*; Robinson, *Democracy Beyond Athens*, 132 n104. Robinson emphasizes that Cyrene was a radical democracy at some point according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 1319b1-19).

be an argument from silence if we claimed, solely on the basis of the paucity of epigraphic references to such conflict, that the members of the Athenian elite were less often in conflict with one another in this period. As we shall see, however, in consideration of two other aspects of this regime, it makes sense to argue that the intra-elite conflict decreased, and that this decrease was a cause of political stability. These two aspects were Athenians' honorific culture and memory politics.

Firstly, what Jacob Miller calls the "paradoxical symbiosis of democracy and agonism" contributed to the stability of the 286-262 regime.⁵³² This symbiosis resulted from the mutual dependence of Athenian democracy and its elite benefactors. While the city desperately needed the help of benefactors, whether Athenian or foreigner, the benefactors in their turn needed to make conspicuous displays of their wealth. This latter need played an important role because the elite citizens of democratic *poleis* had sufficient ground to cooperate with the Hellenistic kings intending to overthrow their democracy, "e.g. if the democratic masses increase[d] the Elite's tax burden or decrease[d] the Elite's access to civic honors".⁵³³ As a result, the Athenian honorific culture developed in such a way as to ensure that the elite citizens got access to civic honors, in return for which these citizens made benefactions that sustained the stability of democracy. The hortatory intention clauses (see above Chapter 1.2.2) highly intensified under the 286-262 regime, and this intensification provoked the competition among benefactors willing to help Athens and display this help.⁵³⁴ The motivation clauses also grew longer.⁵³⁵

The honors for the city's benefactors, both Athenian and foreign, who made crucial contributions to the sustenance of Athens, were justified during this period by

⁵³² "Euergetism, Agonism, and Democracy," 419.

⁵³³ Ober, *The Rise and Fall*, 327.

⁵³⁴ Miller, "Euergetism," 392-3, 412-3.

⁵³⁵ Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 253-5.

the long motivation clauses of their honorary decrees, making their contributions as conspicuous as possible, and in these decrees' hortatory intentions, which motivated other possible benefactors by emphasizing the agonistic aspect of euergetism. These changes in the honorific culture of the city had already begun towards the end of the fourth century, but they became much more common in the honorary decrees of the 282-262 regime, a situation that suggests their contribution to political stability. Such changes were part of the changing relationship between the Athenian *polis* and its elite citizens: the abolition of the liturgical system at the end of the fourth century made the latter look for new ways of displaying their wealth, while the city's financial situation worsened throughout the early Hellenistic period.⁵³⁶ As a result, the mutual dependence of the *polis* and its elite increased, and one of the Athenians' solution to this problem was the "intensification of the hortatory strategy".⁵³⁷ It is plausible that this solution redirected the harsh intra-elite conflicts of the previous periods towards a tame elite competition for euergetism. The absence of evidence for intra-elite conflict from 286-262 makes sense in view of the changes in the Athenian honorific culture, which now gave more chance to the members of the elite to display their individual achievements with much longer motivation clauses.⁵³⁸ Under the previous regimes, longer motivation clauses and strong hortatory intention clauses never became as common as after 286.

Secondly, by focusing on reconciliation, the memory politics of the 282-262 democracy played an important role in sustaining political stability. As Julia Shear argued, after the *stasis* in 286, the Athenians had to decide how to remember and respond to this internal conflict while reestablishing their democracy.⁵³⁹ This

⁵³⁶ Oliver, "Polis Economies," 113-4, 120-1.

⁵³⁷ Miller, "Euergetism," 413.

⁵³⁸ Luraghi, "The demos as narrator," 254-5.

⁵³⁹ Shear, "The Politics of the Past," esp. 292-300.

response used the memory strategies of their late fifth century predecessors, who remembered the *stasis* and the oligarchic regimes of 404/3 as external war. Information about these strategies was still available around 286 via certain documents, including the decree and oath of Demophantos.⁵⁴⁰ The Athenians decided to use these strategies immediately after the *stasis* of 286, as we can tell from their immediate decision to bury those who died for the democratic cause in the public cemetery, i.e. to present them as people who died in an external war.⁵⁴¹ If the phrase “democracy of all Athenians” signaled the unity of all citizens, which would require them to forget past wrongs as in the aftermath of the late-fifth-century *stasis*, then the influence of these memory politics might have continued until 270, when Eucharis of Konthyle used this phrase to label the city’s regime.⁵⁴² Shear’s analysis of the honorary decrees that were granted under this regime to Athenians and foreigners indicates that the specific way of responding to the *stasis* of 286 was a prominent element of the public rhetoric, and that a memory politics underlined these responses. The continuities between the memory politics underlying the language and physical location of fifth-century documents, such as the decrees of Demophantos and Theozotides,⁵⁴³ and those of the documents from 286-262, such as the honorary decrees for Philippides of Kephale, Demosthenes, Demochares, and Kallias of Sphettos, show that the Athenians had recourse to the methods of their great-grandfathers while responding to *stasis*.⁵⁴⁴

The Athenians did not imitate these strategies blindly, but they adapted them for the needs of their own time, when they needed the support of Hellenistic kings.

⁵⁴⁰ Andoc. 1.96-8; Lyk. *In Leokrat.* 124-7; Shear, “The Politics of the Past,” 287.

⁵⁴¹ Shear, “The Politics of the Past,” 299-300.

⁵⁴² *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 83-4.

⁵⁴³ Demophantos: Andoc. 1.96-8; Theozotides: *SEG XXVIII*.46.

⁵⁴⁴ Philippides (283/2): *IG II*³.1 877; Demosthenes (281/80): Plut. *Mor.* 850f-851c; Demochares (271/70): Plut. *Mor.* 851d-f; Kallias (270/69): *IG II*³.1 911. On the memory politics in the request for the honors for Demosthenes see Shear, “Writing Past and Present”.

They did not ignore external support in what they presented as an external war in their public decrees, unlike their fifth-century ancestors who had chosen to present the events of the *stasis* as a war in which one side was completely Athenian, and the other completely foreign.⁵⁴⁵ This denial of *stasis* was conducive to reconciliation and political stability as was the case in the fifth-century. Given their practice of cherry picking from the available strategies, the members of the regime of 286-262 must have been consciously pursuing these reconciliatory memory politics.⁵⁴⁶ Its memory politics designated the Athenian opponents of the 286 revolt as external enemies, and, in this sense, it might seem to have induced further polarization, but the selective approach to remembering, as in the aftermath of 404/3, actually gave the opportunity to reconcile the factions who fought against each other in 286. The Macedonian garrison that remained in Piraeus after the negotiation with Demetrios

[g]ave the Athenians a common foe against which they could all agree to direct their attention together. Expelling the remaining Macedonian forces, consequently, brought the divided citizens together, and this shared purpose served to begin healing the fractures caused by the revolution. The references in the decrees will have reinforced these dynamics and they repeatedly reminded the Athenians of their united resolve in removing the Macedonian garrisons.⁵⁴⁷

The Antigonid garrison possibly served as shelter to some of the supporters of the Demetrian oligarchy, but it also provided the opportunity for those who remained in the *asty* to reconcile with their former opponents. A result of the 286-262 regime's deliberate memory politics, this situation justifies the lack of evidence for intra-elite conflict. Just as the changes in the honorific culture decreased the strife among elite

⁵⁴⁵ Shear, "The Politics of the Past," 297-9.

⁵⁴⁶ Shear, *ibid.*, 298.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 297.

citizens, the restored democracy's politics of the past also contributed to political stability in this period.

5.4 Conclusion

The primary causes of the stability of the democracy between 286 and 262 were its balanced foreign policy and reconciliatory memory politics coupled with a honorific culture that became more apt to mollify the tensions within the elite, and with a political culture that provided the conceptual apparatus for the doublethink necessary for stability. This regime's conscious memory politics suggest that the Athenians themselves were aware of the problem of instability that I analyzed throughout this thesis, and that they attempted to deal with it. The overall picture that emerges from the discussions in this thesis is that, although we can detect complex causal mechanisms behind instability in early Hellenistic Athens, a balanced foreign policy, a reconciliatory interpretation of the controversial past, and concessions to the wealthy citizens' desire to flaunt their riches were able to overcome these mechanisms.

APPENDIX A

THE DATE OF THE ATHENIAN REVOLT AGAINST DEMETRIOS

The problem of the date of the revolution from Demetrios is important for our discussions because it is relevant to the argument that there was *stasis* in Athens in 288/7-287/6, and to the claim that the subsequent democratic regime chose to remember this *stasis* in a way that is reminiscent of the fifth-century memory politics. The relevant sources are the honorary decrees for Kallias of Sphettos (*IG* II³.1 911), Phaidros of Sphettos (*IG* II³.1 985), Zenon (*IG* II³.1 863), and Strombichos (*IG* II³.1 918), as well as brief references in Plutarch (*Demetr.* 46.1-2) and Pausanias (1.26.1-2). In the *editio princeps* of Kallias' decree in 1979, T. Leslie Shear, Jr. argued that the revolt against Demetrios took place in the spring of 286, after an initially unsuccessful attempt in the spring of 287,⁵⁴⁸ that Demetrios besieged Athens in the summer of this year, and that the two-stage peace negotiations between Athens and Demetrios lasted until winter 287/6.⁵⁴⁹ One of the central tenets of his approach is that the brothers Phaidros and Kallias had opposite political affiliations, the first one being a supporter of the Demetrian oligarchy, the second a supporter of the democratic cause and a commander in Ptolemy's service.

Phaidros brought the harvest of grain and other crops from the countryside in 287, when Athens went through "difficult times" (*kairōn duskolōn*) because of the risk of Ptolemy's attack and the democratic attempt to revolt.⁵⁵⁰ In this way, he protected the Demetrian oligarchy. Further details of Phaidros' attempts towards this end are unclear because the crucial parts of the corresponding lines on his decree

⁵⁴⁸ Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 61-73. Bibliography on the earlier debates about the date of the revolt: Shear, Jr., *ibid.*, 14 n23.

⁵⁴⁹ Shear, Jr., *ibid.*, 74-8.

⁵⁵⁰ *IG* II³.1 985 ll. 33-6.

were erased in the *damnatio memoriae* of 200, which means that they certainly mentioned Demetrios and did so in neutral or positive terms.⁵⁵¹ The erasure of these lines is evidence for Phaidros' affiliation with Demetrios in 287.⁵⁵² On the other hand, Kallias, in cooperation with Zenon,⁵⁵³ both in Ptolemy's service, protected the grain harvest in June 286 in order to assist the revolt against Demetrios, and make sure that the revolutionaries could endure the latter's siege. The additional reference to the other crops (*allous karpous*) in Phaidros' decree,⁵⁵⁴ in contrast to the single reference to grain in Kallias' decree,⁵⁵⁵ indicates that the harvest operations in both decrees referred to separate occasions.

There were thus two discrete occasions of harvest-assistance with different purposes in two consecutive years. The honorary decrees for these men do not specify the purposes of the honorands in either of these instances, but the historical context of the decrees suggests that Phaidros aimed to endure the imminent siege of Ptolemy's fleet that could help the revolutionaries, while Kallias aimed to endure

⁵⁵¹ *IG II*³.1 985 ll. 37-44; Liv. 31.44; Byrne, "The Athenian *damnatio memoriae*".

⁵⁵² *IG II*³.1 985 ll. 37-8, 40-4, 47-52.

⁵⁵³ Shear, Jr.'s restoration of *IG II*³.1 863 ll. 16-18 as "*epimeleitai de [tēs synkomidēs to]u sitou tōi dēmōi opōs a[n asphalestata eis]komizētai*" ("he takes care [of the harvest o]f the grain for the *dēmos* so) that it is brought [into the city with the greatest safety]") suggests that Zenon himself actively took part in the protection of the harvest (*Kallias*, 20-1). Habicht, *Untersuchungen*, 49-50, rejected this restoration and insisted on the traditional interpretation of these lines (the accepted restoration in *IG II*³.1 863: "*epimeleitai de [kai tēs komidēs to]u sitou tōi dēmōi opōs a[n asphalestata dia]komizētai*": "[and] he takes care [of the carriage o]f the grain to the *dēmos* s[o] that it is carried with the greatest safety]"), according to which Zenon helped with the transportation of grain from outside Attica, not its harvest, and only after the negotiations were over. Habicht's criticism rests on the necessity of *kai* on l. 17, and does not necessarily reject [*eis*]komizētai on l. 17. If we restore the lines as "*epimeleitai de [kai tēs komidēs to]u sitou tōi dēmōi opōs a[n asphalestata eis]komizētai*", it is plausible that Zenon's activity was to help the transfer of the gathered harvest from the countryside together with Kallias (cf. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics*, 123 n67, who restores [*eis*]komizētai, but takes it to mean that Zenon escorted the grain from outside Attica). Moreover, his honorary decree indicates that "*sunagōnizo[menos tēi tou dēmo]u sōtēriai*" ("he made common cause for the preservation of the *dēmos*" (trans. Byrne), where the use of the verb *sunagōnizesthai* emphasizes the agonistic aspect of Zenon's actions; Miller, "Euergetism," 405 n72, 407. This agonistic aspect suggests that Zenon competed with others for helping the city, at least from the Athenian perspective. Kallias was a suitable candidate for such competition in June 286.

⁵⁵⁴ *IG II*³.1 985 l. 35.

⁵⁵⁵ *IG II*³.1 911 ll. 25-6.

that of Demetrios. As I discussed above (Chapter 3.5), these two men belonged to different factions during the *stasis* in 288/7-287/6.⁵⁵⁶

In their reevaluation of the chronology of these events, Osborne and Habicht argued that Kallias and Phaidros, who were both supporters of the revolution in their view, helped with the harvest on the same occasion in the summer of 287, when the revolt against Demetrios and the latter's siege took place.⁵⁵⁷ According to Osborne, it does not make sense for Phaidros to assist the grain harvest in 287 if he wanted to suppress an attempt at revolution, because this action "could only assist in the withstanding of a siege", but not "in the face of an attempted *coup*".⁵⁵⁸ In this interpretation,

[t]he gathering in of the harvest surely would be something that a person trying to prevent a revolution and subsequent siege, as Phaidros allegedly was, would have sought, if anything, to frustrate. For the gathering in of the harvest would clearly help the Athenians to endure a sieg[e].⁵⁵⁹

This criticism does not take into account the revolution's connection with the imminent Ptolemaic siege, which Shear, Jr. explains in the context of the increasing Egyptian influence in the Cyclades in the first half of the 280s.⁵⁶⁰ It actually makes sense for Phaidros to ensure the gathering of the harvest for the purpose of suppressing the revolt in 287 because, in the event of a Ptolemaic siege, the oligarchic government had to feed the Athenian population if it wanted to prevent a revolt. This explanation fits well with the fact that Kallias' honorary decree was passed under democracy, and makes no reference to his brother, while Phaidros' decree was passed under oligarchy (250s), and referred to Phaidros' family members

⁵⁵⁶ Shear, "Politics of the Past," 281.

⁵⁵⁷ Habicht, *Untersuchungen*, 45-67; Osborne, "Kallias"; Osborne, *Athens*, 36-43.

⁵⁵⁸ Osborne, *Athens*, 42.

⁵⁵⁹ Osborne, "Kallias," 186.

⁵⁶⁰ *Kallias*, 73, 78 n217.

but not to Kallias.⁵⁶¹ Phaidros's support for the Demetrian oligarchy is clear from the lines that were excised in the *damnatio memoriae* of 200, and indirectly from the reduction of his praiseworthy actions to liturgical activities under the 286-262 democracy.⁵⁶²

This date also explains the cancellation of the Great Panathenaia in 286 because, as Julia Shear's autopsy of the stele of Kallias' decree demonstrates, the first celebration of this festival after the revolt took place in 282/1.⁵⁶³ If we date the revolt in 287, then it becomes difficult to explain this cancellation, a situation that happened only under extreme circumstances.⁵⁶⁴ If we date it to 286, however, the *stasis* and the revolt provide sufficient ground for the extreme measure of cancelling the festival. As a result, not only the distinction between the harvest operations of Phaidros and Kallias, but also the Athenians' decision to cancel their most important festival in 286 suggest 286 as the date of the revolt against Demetrios.

⁵⁶¹ Reference to Phaidros' father: *IG II³.1 985 ll. 2-31*; to his son: l. 57.

⁵⁶² *IG II³.1 985 ll. 53-63*; Shear, Jr., *Kallias*, 10.

⁵⁶³ Shear, "Demetrios Poliorketes," 139 restores "*pr[ō]t[o]n*" on line 64 of *IG II³.1 911*, and refutes the restoration of "[trito]n" on the same line (Osborne, review of *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens*; Dreyer, *Untersuchungen*, 211); see also Ronald Stroud's comment in *SEG XLIX.113*.

⁵⁶⁴ Shear, "Demetrios Poliorketes," 149-152. Financial difficulties or weather conditions cannot explain the cancellation because there is enough evidence showing that the Athenians did not consider these situations as reason for cancelling the festival.

APPENDIX B

NAKONIANISM AND DIKAIOPOLITANISM

IN ATHENIAN HONORARY DECREES

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
pre-322	<i>IG II³.1 484</i>		... so that as many as possible of the friends of the king and of Antipater, having been honored by the Athenian people (<i>dēmos</i>), may benefit the city of the Athenians ... (ll. 2-6) (trans. Lambert)
322-318	<i>IG II² 398</i>	... with an inherited good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 1-2)	
	<i>IG II² 400</i>	... bringing the grain to Athens, he serves the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 4-6)	... and since he is a benefactor of the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 11-2)
	<i>IG II² 407</i>	... since he is well-minded and useful, and he demonstrates good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 8-10)	
	<i>SEG XXVI.83</i>		... so that everyone may know that to those who have <i>philotimia</i> towards it, the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> returns commensurate thanks for their services ... (ll. 5-8)
	<i>SEG XXXII.94</i>		... so that everyone may know that the <i>dēmos</i> honors those

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
			who serve it in a useful manner ... (ll. 2-4)
	<i>Agora XVI.101</i>	... on account of his virtue and good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 32-4)	
	<i>Agora XVI.102</i>	... in previous times he was continuously well-minded towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 11-4)	
	<i>IG II² 387</i>	... they are well-minded towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> (ll. 12-4)	
318-317	<i>IG II² 350</i>	... they are well-minded towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 11-2)	
	<i>IG II² 448</i>		... when the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> honored him with citizenship and the other honors which are fitting for benefactors, both himself and his descendants, because of his merits and because of the benefactions of his ancestors ... (ll. 56-60) (trans. Austin)
	<i>Agora XVI.104</i>	... in previous times he was continuously well-minded towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 11-4)	
	<i>Agora XVI.105</i>	... and on account of his good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (l. 8)	
	<i>IG II² 487</i>		... so that the

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
			council may appear to have rendered a commensurate favor to each of those who showed <i>philotimia</i> ... (ll. 10-2)
303-301	<i>IG II² 495</i>	... to commend him on account of his virtue and good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 17-9)	
	<i>IG II² 496+507</i>	... to commend him on account of his virtue and good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 18-20)	
	<i>IG II² 498</i>	... he was well-minded and useful for the preservation of the <i>dēmos</i> , and on each occasion he continued to say and do things that are advantageous to the <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 18-22)	
	<i>IG II² 558</i>	... those who show their good will towards the [city's] affairs are honored commensurately... (ll. 14-7)	
	<i>Agora XVI.122</i>	... on account of his zeal and good will towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 23-4)	
301-296	<i>IG II³.1 844</i>	... he showed the good will that he had for the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 17-9)	... so that as many as possible may show <i>philotimia</i> in providing service in the interests of the <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 23-5)
	<i>IG II³.1 857</i>	... were always good men to the	... Philippides shall be allowed to

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
		Athenian <i>dēmos</i> and at every opportunity proved their good will and <i>philotimia</i> ... (ll. 8-11)	inscribe in addition on the stelai his benefactions ... (ll. 50-2)
293/2	<i>IG II³.1 867</i>	... on account of his virtue and good will towards King Lysimachos and the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 18-20)	
post-286	<i>IG II³.1 871</i>	... since previous times he has been well-minded towards the Athenian <i>dēmos</i> ... (ll. 13-5)	
	<i>IG II³.1 875</i>		... they will receive thanks that are worthy of their benefactions ... (ll. 28-9)
	<i>IG II³.1 877</i>	... he showed his good will towards the <i>dēmos</i> ... (l. 9)	
	<i>IG II³.1 892</i>	... and to commend the ambassadors, who have come, on account of their good will towards the Athenians ... (ll. 27-9)	

APPENDIX C

NAKONIANISM AND DIKAIOPOLITANISM

IN ATHENIAN HONORARY DECREES (GREEK)

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
pre-322	<i>IG II³.1 484</i>		[ὅπως ἂν ὧ]ς πλεῖστοι τῶν τ[ο]ῦ βασιλέως φίλων καὶ Ἀντιπάτ[ρ]ου τε[τιμημένο]ι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθ[ηναίων] εὐεργετῶσιν τὴν πόλιν [τὴν Ἀθηναίων] (ll. 2-6)
322-318	<i>IG II² 398</i>	πα[τρικὴν ἔχων εὐνοίαν] [πρ]ὸς τὸν δῆμο[ν τὸν Ἀθηναίων] (ll. 1-2)	
	<i>IG II² 400</i>	σίτ]ον ἄγων Ἀθήνα[ζε] χρείας παρέχετ[αι] τῷ δήμωι τῶ[ι] [Ἀθηναίων] (ll. 4-6)	ὦν καὶ εὐεργ[έτης] τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθ[ηναίων] (ll. 11-2)
	<i>IG II² 407</i>	εὐνοὺς ὦν [καὶ] χρήσιμος καὶ ἔνδει[κ]νύμενος τὴν ε[ὐνοίαν] τῷ δήμωι τῶ[ι] Ἀθηναίων (ll. 8-10)	
	<i>SEG XXVI.83</i>		ὅπ]ως ἂν εἰ[δῶσιν] ἅπαντες ὅτι [ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθην[αίων] τοῖς φιλο[τιμουμένοις] πρὸς αὐ]τὸ[ν] ἀ]πο[δί]δωσ[ιν] χάριτας ἀξίας τῶν] εὐ[ε]ρ[γε]τημάτων (ll. 5-8)
	<i>SEG XXXII.94</i>		ὅπως] ἂν πάντες εἰ[δῶσιν] ὅτι ὁ δῆμος τιμαὶ τ]οὺς εὐεργετοῦ[ντας] ἑαυτὸν εὐχρήστως (ll. 2-4)
	<i>Agora XVI.101</i>	ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν	

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
		Ἀθηναίων (ll. 32-4)	
	<i>Agora XVI.102</i>	ἔν] τε τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χ[ρόνοι διετέ]- λει εὐνοὺς ὦν τῷ δή[μωι τῷ Ἀθην]αίων (ll. 11-4)	
	<i>IG II² 387</i>	περὶ] τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸ]ν [Ἀθηναίων εὐνο]υς ὄντας (ll. 12-4)	
318-317	<i>IG II² 350</i>	εὐνοί] εἰσι]ν τῷ δήμωι τ[ῷ Ἀθηναίων (ll. 11-2)	
	<i>IG II² 448</i>		[καὶ τι]μήσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων πολι[τεῖαι] καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς αἷς προσήκει τοὺς εὐε[ργέτα]ς καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγγόνους διὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρε[τὴν καὶ] διὰ τὰς τῶν προγόνων εὐεργεσίας (ll. 56-60)
	<i>Agora XVI.104</i>	ἐν τῷ ἔμ]προσθεν [χρόνοι διατετέλ] εκε εὐνου[ς ὦν τῷ δήμωι τῷ Ἀ] θηναίων (ll. 11-4)	
	<i>Agora XVI.105</i>	[ἔνεκα καὶ] εὐνοίας τῆς [εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων (l. 8)	
	<i>IG II² 487</i>		ὅπως [ἄν] οὖν ἡ βουλὴ [φα]ίνηται ἀξίαν χάρι[ν] ἐκάστωι [[ς]] ἀ[πο]διδούσα τῶν πεφλοτιμημένων (ll. 10-2)
303-301	<i>IG II² 495</i>	ἐπαιν[έσ]αι αὐτὸν ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοία[ς τῆ]ς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων (ll. 17-9)	
	<i>IG II² 496+507</i>	ἐπαινέσαι αὐτὸν ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας τ[ῆ]ς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀ- θηναίων (ll. 18-20)	

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
	<i>IG II² 498</i>	χρ]ήσιμος ἦν καὶ εὖνους [τῆι τοῦ δήμου σ]ωτηρία καὶ διετέλ[ει λέγων καὶ πράτ]των ἐν παντὶ καιρ[ῶι τὰ συμφέροντα τῶι] δήμωι (ll. 18-22)	
	<i>IG II² 558</i>	τ[ιμωμένων] ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου κατ' ἀξίαν [τῶν ἀπο]δεικνυμένων τὴν εἰς τὰ πρ[άγμα]τα εὖνοιαν (ll. 14-7)	
	<i>Agora XVI.122</i>	προθυμίας] ἕνεκεν καὶ εὖνο[ίας τῆς περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀ]θηναίων (ll. 23-4)	
301-296	<i>IG II³.1 844</i>	ἀποδεικνύμενον τὴν εὖνοιαν, ἣν εἶχε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων (ll. 17-9)	ὅπως ἂν ὡς πλεῖστοι φιλοτιμῶνται χρεῖαν παρέχεσθαι ἐ [[<πι>]] τὰ συμφέροντα τῶι δήμωι (ll. 23-5)
	<i>IG II³.1 857</i>	[πε]ρ[ι] τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηνα[ί]ων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς κ[αιρ]οῖς ἀποδεικνύμενοι τ[ῆ]ν εὖνοιαν καὶ τὴν φιλο[τιμ]ίαν (ll. 8-11)	εἶναι δὲ Φιλιππίδ[η]ι ἐν ταῖς στήλαις προσαν]αγράψασθαι {ς} τὰς εὐερ[γεσίας] (ll. 50-2)
293/2	<i>IG II³.1 867</i>	ἀρ]ετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὖνοίας [τῆς πρὸς τὸν β]ασιλέα Λυσίμαχον καὶ π[ρὸς τὸν δῆμον] τὸν Ἀθηναίων (ll. 18-20)	
post-286	<i>IG II³.1 871</i>	ἔκ τε τῶν ἔμπροσθε χρόνων ε[ὔν]ους ἐστὶν τῶ[ι] δήμωι τῶ[ι] Ἀθηνα[ί]ων (ll. 13-5)	
	<i>IG II³.1 875</i>		χά[ριτας ἀπολή]πονται ἀξίας τ]ῶν εὐ-εργετημάτων (ll. 28-9)

Period	Inscription	Nakonianism	Dikaiopolitanism
	<i>IG II³.1 877</i>	ἀποδεικνύμενος τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐνοίαν (l. 9)	
	<i>IG II³.1 892</i>	καὶ ἐπαινέ]σαι τοὺς πρέσβει[ς τοὺς ἤκοντας ἀρετῆς ἔνε][κα] καὶ εὐνοίας τῆ[ς εἰς Ἀθηναίους (ll. 27- 9)	



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