THREATENING SECURITY:
CONFLICTING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SECURITY
DURING THE GEZİ PARK PROTESTS

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BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2017

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Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science and International Relations

by

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Boğaziçi University

2017

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June 2017

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ABSTRACT

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18 days of resistance against the destruction of Gezi Park at the heart of Istanbul opened up a new phase for the public political debate in Turkey. For a while, neither the government and its supporters nor separate groups from the opposition could discuss a public issue without referencing to the Gezi Park Protests and its after effect to the politics in Turkey. The Resistance drew attention of researchers from a wide range of disciplines. Still, almost none of studies produced as a result of this attention focused on the conception of security which was formed during occupation of Gezi Park and its surrounding area. In this thesis, however, the discussion is on the conceptualization of the security in and around the Park – the occupied area. After a brief discussion on the security studies and literature with respect to the concept, the argument of the thesis is constituted on how different the conceptions of security in and around the Park and outside of that were. While trying to understand the conception of security outside of the park by focusing on the police force and its practices, which is one of the security force supposed to provide security, this thesis is an attempt to find out which conditions and practices occurred for the feeling of security in the Park. For this reason, in this thesis content analysis of the accounts of the participants to the Resistance, police officers' and victims' accounts, and historical analysis of the police force itself will be resorted to understand how the security as a discourse and practice is formed and implemented.

ÖZET

Güvenliği Tehdit Etmek:

Gezi Parkı Protestoları Sürecinde Çatışan Güvenlik Kavramsallaştırmaları

Gezi Parkı'nın yıkılmasına karşı 18 gün boyunca İstanbul'un kalbinde gerçekleşen direniş, Türkiye'de kamusal siyasal tartışmalarda yeni bir dönem açtı. Bir süre için ne hükümet ve onu destekleyenler ne de muhalefetteki gruplar Gezi Parkı protestolarına ve sonraki etkilerine atıfta bulunmadan herhangi bir konuyu tartışabildiler. Direniş farklı disiplinlerden birçok araştırmacının dikkatini çekti. Ancak hala neredeyse hiçbir araştırma Gezi Parkı'nın işgali sırasında işgal edilmiş alanda oluşan güvenlik kavramsallaştırmasına odaklanmadı. Öte yandan bu tezde temel tartışma konusu bu kavramsallaştırma olacak. Mevcut güvenlik çalışmaları ve literatürü üzerine kısa bir tartışmanın ardından Gezi Parkı'nın dışında ve içinde farklılaşan güvenlik kavramsallaştırmalarına odaklanılacak. Bir yandan Park'ın dışındadaki güvenlik kavramsallaştırması polis gücü ve pratikleri üzerinden anlaşılmaya çalışılacakken, bir taraftan da Park'ın içinde ortaya çıkan kavramsallaştırma ve bunun nasıl daha güvende hissetmeye yardım ettiği tartışılacak. Bu sebeple bu araştırma için polis memurlarının ve polis şiddeti mağdurlarının ifadelerine, polis kurumunun tarihine ve direnişe katılanların anlatılarına odaklanarak bir söylem ve pratik olarak güvenliğin oluşturulmasını ve uygulanmasını anlamak için içerik analizi uygulanacak.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Gezi Park Resistance represented a breaking point for politics in Turkey. After eleven years of success in the contestation of power in Turkey, it was the first time the ruling party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party), had been challenged by a civil uprising. Their rule, alongside that of their leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[1], had been tested by several actors and events prior to the uprising. These included the former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attempts to restrict the power of the ruling party by employing his veto power, and the Armed Forces' challenge to the AKP in various ways, including the publishing of an e-memorandum on the army's own website. However, the Gezi Park Resistance was the first of its kind in terms of a civilian occupy movement against the government's decision to replace Gezi Park with a replica of the Artillery Barracks which was demolished in 1940. It is likely that neither the government nor the public in Turkey expected such a large and unprecedented demonstration to be sparked by the issue. The then PM Erdoğan asserted that the protest was not only a matter of preventing the government from uprooting a couple of trees in the Park. His argument was also corroborated by those who participated in the protest. One interviewee asserted that many people felt so oppressed due to the policies of the government that the uprooting of trees in Gezi Park was the last straw (Interviewee Z)[2].

However, what drives me to study the Gezi Park Resistance further was neither its unprecedented nature nor the question of how a small resistance against

[1] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the prime minister since 2003. Until 2014, he kept his post as the PM winning all the elections including the local and general elections. In 2014, he was elected as the presisdent of Turkey.

[2] The interviews will be cited as Interviewee X. The names were coded as T,W, X, Y and Z.

the demolition of a park turned into a resistance of unexpected size and duration. My main motive is the question of how the protesters who gathered and occupied at Gezi Park could become an almost self-reliant community from various, and sometimes conflicting, backgrounds. After a preliminary investigation, it became apparent that there was a collective opinion among the occupying protesters: they felt safer and more secure in the park rather than outside or rather than when there was no resistance and the park was enjoyed as a daily public space. Having read these accounts, and reflecting upon my own experiences of attending the protest, I realized that I also shared this feeling of security and sense of safety.

Why was this the case? The citizens felt more secure when resisting the police and in the spaces which they occupied. The protestors were not in the Park to be in a more secure place than they were outside of the Park. However, the conditions of the Park led some of them to assert that they had never felt safer before. This is the main reason why I have chosen to focus on the literature approaching security as a state of being, not as a technology of power. This paradox raises the question of how the state and the protesters conceptualize their own definitions of security. It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the conceptualizations of both parties. It can be speculated that what happened in the park led the protesters to conceptualize an alternative way of thinking about and practicing security. Were the protesters able to invent a new way of experiencing security without threatening others? This research is an attempt to investigate whether an alternative way of establishing security did happen during the Gezi Park Resistance.

Why is this issue so significant? Although the concept of security has been widely discussed in international relations literature, the subject has only drawn the attention of political scientists more recently. In order to discuss the security of

individuals, along with that of the state, across a wider range of issues, most scholars and researchers had to wait until the end of the Cold War. Discussing security from the perspective of the state has never been fully displaced, and studying the state as the highest level of political analysis still preserves its significance in security studies.

In contrast, the security of individuals remains a neglected research topic, though one in which there is increasing interest. Since the end of the Cold War, Security Studies have extended their scope into many different sectors and levels. The concept of security has also extended to all spheres of life. On any given day, we are concerned about traffic accidents, securing a monthly income, residing in safe buildings, contagious diseases, the degrading conditions of the environment, political instability, the constant possibility of an economic crisis, terrorist attacks, and even aliens' invasion of Earth or a future takeover by a superior artificial intelligence. The list goes on. We take precautions to mitigate these supposed threats, or at least expect political institutions to do so on our behalf. Almost all of our daily practices are shaped by these security concerns or are expected to be so. However, we do not consider daily life security issues critically enough, most individuals merely aligning with and normalizing the precautions. The violation of basic rights is legitimized by utilizing the concerns of security. Public institutions established for the sake of the well-being of the people have started to threaten this very well-being for the sake of establishing security. But if people desire security and build an order to establish it, why do concerns about security lead to insecurity for some ordinary people? This critical inquiry necessitates understanding how we conceptualize security under different circumstances. Without understanding the conceptualization of security, it

is not possible to understand how security has become a weapon to be used against us.

The Gezi Park Resistance was a unique experience and unprecedented for many reasons. Such large-scale occupation movement had never previously been witnessed in Turkey. Additionally, for fifteen days the state lost its authority in the occupied area. Therefore, Gezi Park and its surrounding area provide a chance to make queries regarding social movements, political and social identities in Turkey. Apart from this, the protestors defined the occupied area as a secure place. Actually, for some, it was much safer than the state-controlled area. That is why thinking on the occupation and what sort of security was devised during the Resistance is an opportunity to further discuss whether it is possible to think of an alternative conceptualization of security or not.

In the following chapters, I intend to survey the conceptualization of security from the perspectives of both the state and the participants of the Occupy Gezi movement. But in order to do this, it is first necessary to make sense of what security is. In Chapter 2, this question will be analyzed through a review of existing literature on the concept. As mentioned, the concept of security has long been a concern for students of international relations. From Realpolitik to theoretical discussions, the concept will be further examined to provide a base from which to understand and analyze the conceptualization of security in and around Gezi Park, and through the eyes of the state. Four major theories on security will be discussed - Realism and Liberalism as representative of traditional approaches, and the Aberystwyth School's and the Copenhagen School's approaches to security as two critical ones.

Chapter 3 will focus on the conception of security from the level of the state in Turkey. For this chapter, considering the vast nature of this topic, I intend to

analyze the conceptualization of security in the eyes of the state through focusing on the police force. As an institution responsible for preserving peace and providing security, the police force acts as a reflection of the state's conceptualization of security. I will focus on the question of what police and policing are. Following this, the history and trajectory of the police force in Turkey, and how it has reached its contemporary form, will be discussed. Within this context, the state's conceptualization of security will be analyzed through the police's legal obligations and practices. This will help us to understand what conception of security, and under what perceptions of threat, the police operate.

The fourth chapter will switch the focus to the Gezi Park Protests and how protesters conceptualized security within Gezi Park. Four steps will be followed to analyze the assumptions along which security in the Park is founded. The first step is the background of Gezi Park and the events which paved the way to the occupation of the Park. Secondly, a selective timeline of the Gezi Park Protests will be provided. Following this the protesters' practices and threat perceptions, depending on their accounts, will be analyzed to understand their conceptualization of security. The final section includes the perspective of police officers who served around the Park during the Protests.

I will try to answer the question of whether or not it is possible to form an alternative conceptualization of security during the Gezi Park Protests. In search of an alternative conceptualization of security, I will compare and contrast the conceptualization of security at the level of the state and the occupied space in and around the Park.

This research aims to compare and contrast the conceptualization of security at the level of both the state and the Gezi Park Protests. While analyzing whether the

protesters defending Gezi Park were able to develop an alternative conception of security, I will search for two separate conceptualizations of security in the Park – firstly during the Protests, and secondly at the level of the state through investigating security through the eyes of the police. Defining security as the absence of threat, I focus on two variables: the perceptions of threat and the conditions of security.

The conceptualization of security within the limited space in and around the Gezi Park is the main focus of this research and this space will be used as the case study. The main reason for this is that, despite the fact that the repercussions of the Gezi Park Resistance were witnessed in almost all urban areas across Turkey, with the sole exception of Bayburt, the protest in and around Gezi Park was the only case of an occupation during the demonstrations. Additionally, during the occupation, the police force (at least, those in uniform) were removed from the Park, and it, therefore, represents the closest example of a stateless urban area in Turkey which enables a comparison to a non-state-centered conception of security. However, contrary to the protesters in the occupation, the state is composed of a series of institutions, some of which in particular are supposed to function as a means to establish security. In Turkey, two institutional bodies, the military, and the police force are directly responsible for the provision of security. The military is one of the central institutions which is responsible for the preservation of security and peace. To broadly define its responsibility, it acts against both internal and external threats which endanger the overall security of the state. The military is, therefore, one of the most obvious choices to survey the conceptualization of security from the level of the state. But it is primarily responsible for the protection of rural areas and the borders of Turkey. Additionally, military officers mostly reside in military lodging buildings which are close to military barracks and quarters and they mostly pursue isolated

lives with their families and peers. Contrary to military officers, the police mostly live among ordinary citizens. As a result, along with the institutional influence over them, they are in constant interaction with civilians. Moreover, they mainly deal with the establishment of security in urban areas. Immanent to their function in the cities, the police are supposedly the main force which suppresses and/or prevents incidents which threaten public safety. For this reason, the police force is a more appropriate institution to interpret the conceptualization of security by the state with respect to the Gezi Park Resistance.

A combination of primary and secondary data was used for this thesis. The data was collected for the two cases both separately and interrelatedly. It is crucial to understand the nature of the working environment, duties, and warrants of the police in order to analyze the police's conceptualization of security. Laws and regulations regarding the police force have an undeniable role in this sense and the related documents were therefore analyzed to make sense of the police's conceptualization of security. The main legal source of authority over the police force in Turkey is Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu (Police Duties and Powers Act). The Act was amended in 1934 and new regulations have been initiated since then. In search of an understanding of security, an evaluation of the evolution of the police force in Turkey is essential to the aims of this research. Although the police's role is defined by the Act, their actions should also be analyzed through the manner of implementation of the authority granted to the officers. The coherence of police activities in separate cases reveals how the police tend to implement laws and regulations. I also approached the police force by analyzing the cases of police intervention, which includes shootings, responses to meetings and rallies, and finally how they approach certain identity groups such as Kurds and LGBTs. These cases

constitute the basic determinants to map the level that police violence can reach without crossing legal boundaries. This analysis reveals the mechanisms of violence created by laws and also sheds light on the threat perception of the police. These cases were analyzed through journalistic accounts and NGO reports.

The Gezi Park Resistance case, on the other hand, provides a more limited timeframe with respect to the police force. Without understanding the symbolic meaning that Gezi Park holds, the picture would be incomplete. The position of the park in power contestations is explained through the construction process of the Military Barracks before the construction of the Park and the historical background of the Park and the Taksim Square. These analyses and discussions provide the necessary background to discuss Gezi Park from the perspective of both the police and the protesters.

Extensive research conducted in Gezi Park is employed in this thesis. Many research centers, such as KONDA, conducted quantitative and qualitative research during the protests to understand the profile, motivation, and perception of the protesters. Journalistic accounts, INGO and NGO reports, and policy reports written by both international and domestic think-tanks were scanned and included in the data set. These reports were selected on the basis of informing how protesters and police defined and perceived security and threat in three spaces - outside the park; in the barricades; and inside the Park. Since rich resources and research already exist, extensive field work was not required. Nevertheless, considering the sensitivity and topicality of the issue five interviews with protesters from various backgrounds were conducted to verify the reliability of the existing data and literature. As a result, these interviews should not be considered part of the data set in their own right, but an

attempt to verify the data employed to analyze the protesters' conceptualization of security.

The interviewees were determined through snowball sampling. This method allowed the trust issues to be overcome and facilitated entry into smaller, more closed, networks. Considering the sensitivity of the issue, and the prosecutions against many protesters following the dispersion of the Resistance, the names of the interviewees are not shared in the thesis. Interviews were conducted as in-depth and face-to-face. Several questions were directed to participants in order to draw the main framework of the interview but most of the questions were open-ended in order to facilitate participants' contribution through bringing up new themes and topics. Additionally, this method helped to create the comfortable environment of a normal conversation. In order not to jeopardize this environment, taking notes was preferable to voice recording.

There are several limitations to this research. Police and police violence are highly topical, politically sensitive, and under-studied areas of research. Although a rich literature exists on police and policing across Europe and the US, this research is mostly focused on the work of the police (Uysal, 2017, p. 213). This fact is the same for Turkey. The reason for this is that the police force as an institution is generally closed, protecting itself against the gaze of outsiders. In Turkey, there are only a few researchers who are studying the police force. There is, therefore, a need for further research across various disciplines. The limited number of studies which exist on the police in Turkey were reviewed for this thesis. It is very difficult to interview members of the police force and, as a result, this study was only able to employ a limited number of interviews with the police officers.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS SECURITY?

Throughout this study, my main concern is to analyze and compare understandings of security in two different but interconnected contexts, the resistance in Gezi Park and the political order within which the resistance erupted. To carry out this task, it is imperative to discuss what security is according to conventional but also critical security studies. I will try to raise some critical questions regarding the dynamics of the establishment of security as a discourse.

Security has long been a core subject in the discipline of international relations, and it has associated solely with the state. The main theories of security have, therefore, always been related to the states' security. The traditional approaches vary across a spectrum, ranging from individual state's security in an anarchical order according to the realist perspective to collective security depending on the collaboration of states according to the liberal perspective. However, with the end of the Cold War, while traditional approaches have tried to keep security as a concern, and security studies as a discipline within the framework of international relations, critical views regarding the concept and the discipline have evolved simultaneously and have attempted to shift the referent object of security from the state to the individual. In this chapter, I will briefly summarize the traditional approaches of realism and liberalism and two widely discussed critical approaches of the Copenhagen School and the Aberystwyth School.

Security has long entered our daily lives in a plethora of contexts. International security, national security, cyber security, social security, personal security, economic security, food security, political security, environmental security,

border security, public security… Security as a concern and technique is attached to the core issues which we encounter on a daily basis. This is one of the reasons why it is such a multifaceted and multilayered task to try and define and operationalize security.

Although there is a consensus in security studies that security, practically, is freedom from fear and threat, the referent object of security studies still remains contested (Baylis 2008; Buzan 1991). The major problem in the identification of the referent object lies within the question "whose security?" The limited list above reveals the major answers to this question: individual, national, or international security (Baylis 2008). At the level of international relations, prominent scholars of security studies define security as preventing states from attack, threat or aggression (Bellany, 1981; Luciani, 1988; Ullman, 1983; Buzan, 1991). On the other hand, there are non-state-centric approaches to security: the emancipation of individuals, gender-based critiques, environmental approaches, and so forth. (Booth, 1991; Hough, 2008).

The rise of the international relations discipline as a distinct and popular sub-field of political science paved the way for ambitious debates over relations between the nations. Between two world wars, securing and sustaining peace at the international level was a significant question to ponder among prominent scholars. The issues of "democracy, international understanding, arbitration, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security" were seen as noteworthy concepts for the promotion of international peace and security (Baldwin, 1995, p. 119).

Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the concept of security has been heavily associated with the state and military threats. The protection of the state and

national security dominated the field. Therefore the analysis of which conditions are secure and which are not was defined through the lens of the military and nations as a whole. However, after the end of the Second World War, the attempts to conceptualize security drew attention to its ambiguous nature. Arnold Wolfers, who was one of the founders of realism in the international relations discipline, argues that security is an ambiguous symbol (Wolfers, 1952). After a lapse of several decades, Baldwin touched upon the same concept and concluded that security is "essentially a contested concept" (1997, p. 10).

The main difference among the conceptualizations of security is what the referent object is. A referent object of security can be broadly defined as what is to be protected or under threat. Traditional approaches build up their analysis and theories of what security is and how it can be established in the state. Although there is no consensus or solid definition of security among critical approaches, they, on the other hand, roughly argue that what security is depends on the context in which you ask the question. Taking this lead, in the next sections I will first explain these approaches, both traditional and critical, and then discuss them to find a way to conceptualize and operationalize security.

2.1. Classical/traditional approaches

The main referent object of traditional security approaches can roughly be identified as the state. Concurrently, the main threat comes from states which have the military capability to challenge one another. Theoreticians of political realism (both classical and neo-realists) label the state as the protagonist while discussing security. Within this scheme, the main threat to a state's security can be the clash of interests, which

is inevitable in any anarchic order. Anarchic order at the international level is one of the core assumptions of realism.

According to William Wohlforth (2010, p. 9-10), realism depends on three core assumptions. Groupism*:* People are organized as groups at every level to survive. Survival requires in-group consistency and solidarity which also paves the way to clashes with other groups. The nation-state represents the largest possible human group. Egoism: Human beings are essentially egocentric. During the decision-making processes at both political and individual levels, they are driven by self-interest. Power-centrism: Human affairs are defined by the notion of control and resources. Both represent social and material powers, respectively. Political relations are determined and take shape by the interaction between social and material powers. The combination of these assumptions, of groupism, egoism, and power-centrism, leads to international anarchy. At this point, anarchy is a defining condition to establish security. A state as the largest possible human group is alone in protecting itself against its counterparts' to set the conditions to survive. In other words, a state can only trust itself in the power contest.

Walter Lippmann states: "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (1943, p. 51). The same security approach can be traced in neo-realist studies (which consists of the structuralist reinterpretation of political realism). Stephen Walt, a prominent neo-realist theoretician, identifies security studies, borrowing from Nye and Lyn-Jones, as "the study of threat, use, and control of military force" (1991, p. 212). The core determinant of the conditions of security is the power contest among states, and the prioritization of the military capacity of the unit of analysis (the state) to foresee and

analyze the situation in hand. Coercive capacity, therefore, has the utmost significance for the survival of actors in the field.

From a political realist perspective, the contestants at the international level seek to increase their military capacities, for the sake of the individual survival of the state. This perspective thrived under the climate of the arms race, nuclear weapons' proliferation, and the Cold War. The anarchic order of the international arena leads states to pursue their own security through self-help. The theory of realism builds itself upon the assumption of unbreakable distrust among actors. As long as no one trusts each other, it is inevitable that war will erupt for the establishment of security. Survival, therefore, becomes the driving force of states (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 9-10).

The central questionable point in these assumptions is that the state is approached as a given. Regardless of their constituents, states are perceived as the singular body of engagement at a fictional level of international relations. Within this framework, people as the constituent of the state are disregarded. Thus, dying soldiers and civilians and devastated and precarious lives of citizens are perceived only as collateral damage which should be risked for the security of the state. Realist thinkers insist that the concept of security should be employed only if it is the state which is at stake. Differing factions within a state concern realists only if those factions cause the dismemberment of the state. Thus, realists are coherent in approaching the state as the referent object of security. Nevertheless, the misconception of the relation between a state's security and people's security fails to allow realists to see the possibility that a state may also be a source of threat to its own people. For this reason, employing a realist approach to security is impractical for understanding how policing may become a source of insecurity. Thus, analysis at the level of the state cannot be applied to the Gezi Park Resistance.

Although a liberal interpretation of security was a response to the political realist perspective, the unit of analysis and the core assumptions regarding the international community and the establishment of security remain the same. The main difference is that while the neo/realists argue that each actor (states in general) follows their own interests, liberal versions of security studies believe in the strength of supranational cooperation and alliances for the coinciding interests.

Liberal security studies, as might be expected, depend on the core assumptions of liberalism. One of the most significant assumptions of this is human nature. As stated by Thomas Paine (1791, p. 169 quoted by Roussoe and Walker, 2010, p. 22) "the man, were he not corrupted by [non-democratic] governments, is naturally the friend of man, and that human nature is not itself vicious". Therefore, under a democratic (and liberal) order, humankind is able to find the eternal peace as part of a community. "It only remains for men to create a good organization for the state… so that man, even if he is not morally good in himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen," (Kant 1795, p. 112, quoted by Roussoe and Walker, 2010, p. 23).

Liberalism is believed to be capable of establishing a peaceful society (both at the local and international level). Through the pillars of democracy, economic interdependency, and international/local institutions, the liberal order would prevent states or factions from waging war (Roussoe and Walker, 2010, p. 26-29). Roughly speaking, democratic societies would be reluctant to wage war against another faction, in order not to have to shoulder the economic burden of war. Those resources can then be used for other purposes such as education, infrastructural investments, and to further the economic prosperity of a society. Additionally, any threat to economic ties between separate factions prevents those groups from fighting

each other. War interrupts trade and, thus, individual profits. Under a liberal democratic order, leaders will avoid any war-like action in order not to lose the support of interest groups and individuals who benefit from trade. Should such a framework be established correctly, which also requires a truly liberal economic and political order, any war can be avoided. Moreover, international institutions support the thriving of international cooperation, as long as supranational entities have the power to intervene in clashes and facilitate the conflict resolution process.

However, the liberal perspective, though it takes into account the individual concerns for establishing security, is also state-centric. At the end of the day, liberal security studies' main assumptions depend on a well-functioning strong trade network and democratic states system. The individual concern is only recognized as long as it is commercial. Therefore, liberal security approaches centrally focus on the state and free market and assumes that as long as they work properly, people (states) are secure and wars will be prevented. Realist and Liberal theories on security (which may be considered traditional interpretations) intercept at the point of "accepting the world as it is" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 20). On the one hand, Realists assume that the anarchic world order is a given. After taking it for granted, they analyze the situation in accordance with this assumption. On the other hand, Liberals assume there is a fixed human nature which is able to be tamed or at least returned to its original version (as Kant and Paine suggested) with the correct order. Finally, following this point, they offer a world order and checks and balances (adequate and deterrent military capacity or strong supranational institutions) to preserve and establish peace. Therefore, these approaches tend to put forward problem-solution strategies.

If we return to the founding principles of political liberalism, the work of the founders proves how the state is intrinsic to the security of individuals. Both Hobbes and Locke, implicitly, acknowledge the state/ruler as those who will decide on the path of *Salus Populi Suprema Lex* (the safety of the people is the supreme law) (Neocleous, 2008, p. 16). Therefore, authority becomes the guarantee for the well-being of the people. In a Machiavellian sense, the sovereign/authority is exempt from the obligations of morality, due to its duty to protect the well-being of the people (Neocleous, 2008, p. 18). The liberal presumption of security has an overriding aim to settle the conditions for an individual to enjoy freedoms and rights (Rothschild, 1995, p. 83). In other words, security provision is for the sake of the well-being of individuals. The well-being, as can be seen in both Hobbes' and Locke's frames, is preserving and developing the conditions for the safety and security of the people. In other words, the well-being of the people is dependent on that of the state.

By touching upon the well-being of a society, Adam Smith also stresses how the state is essential to the public good. According to Smith, security is taken as a condition in which there is no harm to one's life or property (Rothchild, 1995, p. 62). Neocleous stresses that Smith positions security and liberty as vital for each other. Taking that comment further, Neocleous also holds that Smith gives priority to security (Neocleous, 2008, p. 24). Following the same line, Jeremy Bentham sees political liberty as a branch of security (Neocleous, 2008, p. 25). Therefore, providing security for individuals is a foundational necessity for liberal politics and also, ultimately, a societal good. Neocleous shows how the amalgamation of security and liberty is founded on a fear of insecurity over property (Neocleous, 2008, p. 30). In liberal thought, the will to survive is equated with the will to secure the future of

the private property. Security as a means of achieving safety is thus a kind of defense mechanism against not knowing what is coming next (Bubandt, 2005, p. 277).

Rapidly developing technology and the arms race, which even transcended to the realms of space during the Cold War, seemed to increase the fear of uncertainty. The threat of weapons of mass destruction fueled the emergence of security studies during the period of 1955-65. David Baldwin identifies this period as the "Golden Age" of security studies (Baldwin, 1995, p. 123). The ultimate objective envisioned for a potential nuclear war was to prevent it or, if it were to happen, to win the war (Mutimer, 2010, p. 46). The existence of nuclear weapons and the idea of nuclear apocalypse exponentially triggered fears of uncertainty. The decline during the Détente period was followed by rising tension in the Cold War during the 1980s and thus a rekindled interest in security studies (Baldwin, 1995, p. 125). The Cold War's influence had been to rigidify security studies into a militarist/strategist perspective rather than the security of the individuals (Baldwin, 1995, p. 126). As discussed above, realist and liberal interpretations of security and the establishment of peace mostly remained stuck between hard (such as the military) and soft (such as trade) power negotiations/contests among states.

2.2. Critical approaches to security

The end of the Cold War, beginning from the 1990s, has allowed the concept of security to be extended beyond the framework of international relations. For the sake of eliminating newly emerged threats to the security of the whole population, both the measures of security and its rituals have been strictly obeyed and tightly imposed on daily life. Aslı Çalkıvik (2010, p. 32) argues that these rituals and measures are extended within a scalar spectrum ranging from microbes to the Earth. In other

words, after the end of the Cold War, the fear of epidemics and environmental disasters have become a source of insecurity. This change can also be observed in the changes of film plots. Before the end of the Cold War, the disaster genre was dominated by nuclear disasters or unexpected clashes among super-powers. But following the end of the Cold War, new security concerns like global warming, large-scale outbreaks of disease, and post-apocalyptic worlds after disasters have taken over the genre.

Emerging Peace Studies in the 1980s proposed two new perspectives to the establishment of peace, and therefore security. One is negative peace. Broadly speaking negative peace is the absence of war. On the other hand, positive peace is "the pursuit of social and economic justice as a means of addressing underlying causes of conflict" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 18). The positive peace approach opened up a new way of studying security. Policies on health, the environment, welfare, etc. started to be taken into consideration for a safe and peaceful community. Although this approach reifies the state as an actor, both as an object and subject of security provision, it also highlights security as an issue to be approached at lower levels. While, prior to the end of the Cold War, security was discussed only at the level of the state, it was now being extended to the level of individuals and communities. However making references to individuals and smaller communities rather than nations did not create distance between states and the provision of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 19).

The extension of the focus of security studies was initiated by scholars who did not challenge the main pillars of the concept itself (Aradau and van Munster, 2010, p. 73). Employing the critical approaches of the Frankfurt School, mainly the rejection of the objectivity of knowledge, critical security studies were triggered by

the end of Cold War. The meta-discipline of critical security studies was so-named during a small conference, which was titled "Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies", held in Toronto in 1994 (Mutimer, 2013, p. 89). While mentioning critical security studies, one should be careful not to get confused and seek a new meaning altogether for security. The initiative is intended to challenge the traditional security approaches and to diversify the focus of the discipline. Some scholars also introduced the perspective of social construction to security studies.

> An emerging school of "critical security studies" (CSS) wants to challenge conventional security studies by applying postpositivist perspectives, such as critical theory and poststructuralism. Much of this work … deals with the social construction of security, but CSS mostly has the intent (known from poststructuralism as well as from constructivism in international relations) of showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted. From this perspective, threats to security are seen as socially constructed. (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 34-5)

There are two prominent schools which approached traditional conceptualization of security, critically, the Copenhagen School (or Securitization Studies) and the Aberystwyth School (or Welsh School). They emerged after the end of the Cold War. They were a motive to reconceptualize security owing to their belief that the traditional approaches did not adequately respond to the needs of the field of the security studies. The Copenhagen School of critical security studies was founded by three scholars who were studying international relations theory at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Its name was coined by the leading critic of the approach, Bill McSweeney.

Before focusing on these schools, it is important to mention other critical approaches to the concept of security. As stated by Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, the feminist approach to security contributed to the discussions over the concept from a critical stance which problematized issues such as "identity, violence, and

justice" (2010, p. 33). The feminist and gendered approaches converge in their criticism of patriarchy. Nevertheless, they vary with respect to the object, method, and consequences of this critique (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.36). The intervention of feminism into security studies started through the interrogation of women's place in international security. Cynthia Enloe approached and criticized security studies from a liberal feminist perspective and asked the question of the place of women in the study of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.36). She rejects the ungendered approach to security studies, which conceals the roles of femininity and masculinity in international politics. She looked into the relationship between women and nationalism, and military bases where women are marginalized. Her unique contribution was her examination of the military bases. According to Enloe, the role of the wives of military officers who were residing in bases was "fundamental to the assimilation of the base in local communities and to the support of the furtherance of their husbands' military careers" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 37). The domestic work of the women and its contribution to the establishment of a base and, therefore, to international security are utterly ignored. Challenging the Realist assumption that security is an issue between states, the gist of her research was to emphasize that security should be discussed at the personal level by problematizing masculinity and femininity.

Another attempt to insert the question of gender into security studies was that of J. Ann Tickner. Her main contribution to security studies was to analyze security from a standpoint feminist perspective. She questioned the assumptions of inside/outside, domestic/foreign, and public/private, and argued that these binaries are representations of the masculine and feminine roles which devalue the roles of women (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 40). She asserted that introducing

femininity into international relations and security studies may open up new possibilities to establish peace by replacing "autonomy, self-help, and perpetual conflict" with "peace, togetherness, and cooperation" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 40). Additionally, she takes a normative position: to establish peace, there is a need to resolve inequalities, including gendered ones. Therefore, the non-gendered discipline of security studies should be rehabilitated (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 40). Her description of feminine experience was criticized because she attributed a unique feminine experience to the female body. On the one hand she promoted a non-gendered study of security. However, on the other, she integrates presumptively gender-specific experiences into security studies.

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams state that apart from liberal feminism and standpoint feminism, another major feminist approach to security is the poststructuralist approach. There are various poststructuralist approaches to security and gender, the common point of which is to argue against the "reconstructive projects of Enloe and Tickner"; and to reject the idea that there is a unique male or female experience (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 41). Because our view of the world is shaped by gendered lenses, according to Spike Peterson, the study of security is to be carried out through "transforming ways of being and knowing" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 41). Focusing on the everyday practices reproducing gendered identities, she asserts that security and insecurity should be studied "in the context of interlocked systems of hierarchy and domination" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 42).

Additionally, poststructuralist approaches to security are not limited to the discussion over the gender aspect. Michel Foucault was one of the most prominent scholars who reconceptualized security from a poststructuralist perspective. While he

was in search of power as both discourse and relation, he focused on four strategies: discipline, sovereignty, governmentality, and biopolitics (Burke, 2013, p. 81). Scholars studying security, inferring from Foucault's ideas, approached security not as "as a state of being" but "a set of practices and strategies that may have the effects of being (identity, nationhood and subjectivity)" (Burke, 2013, p. 82). Security practices are a combination of sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical technologies and security policies have their own parts in all these technologies (Aradau and van Munster, 2010, p. 77). Although there are many other works which analyze what security is from a poststructural perspective, this thesis will deploy the critical security studies approach of two prominent schools of security studies, the Copenhagan School and the Aberystwyth School. Although other non-state centric theories can be applied to the context of the Gezi Park Resistance, this thesis approaches security as a state of being, like feeling and/or being secure, rather than security as a technique to preserve order. The research question of this thesis depends on the statements of a number of protestors who claimed that conditions in the occupied area made them more secure than the people who were outside of the Park. Therefore, being secure is the focal point of inquiry in this study. As can be seen in the following pages, the definition of security by critical security studies' schools from an existential point of view is more fitting to such an inquiry into the state of being secure or insecure.

The Copenhagen School of critical security studies contributed to the field through Buzan's sectoral analysis of security and Wæver's concept of securitization (Mutimer, 2013, p. 73). Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, p. 21) argue that security is about survival. Thus, any threat to security is existential and should be immediately eliminated (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 21). According to

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, p. 23), "(S)ecurity is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." The same approach to the symbolic power of the concept can also be seen in the Aberystwyth School. Once something is argued to be a security issue, it reaches the point of absolute priority (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). Conditions of security can be analyzed through three units of analysis: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. Referent objects "are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a claim to survival"; securitizing actors are those "who securitize issues by declaring […] a referent object"; functional actors are those "who affect the dynamics of a sector" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 36). These are also the basic elements of securitization. First, a securitizing move comes from securitizing actors, then securitization. Yet, it is not enough for something to be referred to as a security issue. If a securitizing move is initiated, there should be a response from a platform to the move. Without an acceptance of a securitizing move, there would be no successful securitization (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). Wæver (1995) defines security as a speech act.

While mentioning sectors Buzan refers to different interactions at a methodological level where the concerns of security are revealed. Those sectors are, in general, views of the international system through a lens that "highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units" (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993, p. 31 quoted by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 27). The sectors listed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, p. 27) are military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Each sector has its own referent object from the level of the states to the individual. For the military sector, the

referent object is the state, and the main securitizing actors are the ruling elites (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde: 1998, p. 49). Environmental security "concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend" (Buzan, 1991, p. 19-20). Economic security, considering a wide range of interpretations for how the economy should work, depends heavily on which actors from which ideological background makes the securitizing move (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 95). Roughly speaking, mercantilists, liberals, or socialists would refer to different aspects of the existing economic system and try to securitize separate aspects of it. While for the mercantilists globalization and blurring of national borders could become the main source of threat, for liberals, existing borders, which impose obstacles to international free trade, have the potential to become the source of economic insecurity. As for the societal sector, depending on regional diversities, what threatens and what can be securitized differs. Although traditional security studies focused on the nation-state as the referent object for a long time, the societies which formed them were not paid any attention. In accordance with the present world system, the referent objects of the societal sector are "tribes, clans, nations (and nation-like ethnic units, which others call minorities), civilizations, religions, and race" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 123). Societal insecurity occurs when a group of people reacts to a development as a threat to their societal integrity. What defines this group of people as a society is their common self-identification (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 199). And as a result, an incoming migrant flow may be perceived as a threat and become an issue to be securitized. Finally, the political sector is, most probably the most confusing among the sectors mentioned. Due to the fact that securitization itself is a political act, all sectors listed above are intrinsically

political (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 141). Therefore, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde coin the political sector to fill the vacuum left in-between the rest of the sectors. In other words, threats which are non-militaristic, non-economic, non-identificational, non-environmental issues can be categorized as subgroups of political insecurity (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 142). On the other hand, Buzan (1991, p. 118) identifies political threats as "(aiming) at the organizational stability of the state."

Ken Booth, the founding father of the Aberystwyth School in Critical Security Studies, describes security as the "absence of threats" in general (Mutimer, 2010, p. 49). According to Booth (2008, p. 102), security and safety can only be achievable as long as that there is an object to be secured from a threat. Following this description, Richard Wyn Jones perceives security deeper and broader than before and extends towards new actors other than states (Wyn Jones 1999, p. 165). Ken Booth argues that studying security should "go beyond problem-solving within the status quo and instead seek to help engage with the problem of the status quo" (Booth, 2008, p. 10). In other words, security should not only be a means to an end, but an end in itself. Therefore, security itself is the normative position to be reached by humanity.

Emma Rothschild (1995)'s description of the change in security studies and the perspectives to the concept of security can help us with this motive of looking beyond the status quo and extending the object of security studies further. She claims that the security of states as an international/militaristic phenomenon has had to share its place with the security of individuals and groups. She explains the change in approach to security using four mobilities (Rothschild, 1995, p. 55). By mobility, she means the extension of the focus of security provision. Conceptualizing her theory

using a three-dimensional model, she argues that security studies extended their perspective beyond the state as both object and subject of security provision. The first is the downward mobility from the state towards individuals. Individuals' safety became a concern for the security studies. The second is the security of nations to the security of the supranational system or the supranational physical environment, which is an upward mobility. The very existence of the United Nations system is put forward as an object of security. While traditional security approaches identify the UN as a means to achieve either security or dominance over other states, due to this change in perspective, the UN becomes one of the protagonists to be secured. The horizontal mobility, the third, is the acknowledgment that each level of physical entities has their own conditions of security. In other words, states have their own conception of security, while institutions, groups or individuals also have their own. Therefore the question of security extended from solely that of the military to political, environmental, societal, cyber or human security. Each of those dimensions requires separate attention, decisions, and policies. Finally, the responsibility of establishing and sustaining security is distributed across a wider number of actors. While it had been the responsibility of a central government, the provision and sustenance of security now become a daily concern of everyone: supranational entities, central governments, local governments, the press, businesses, the market, individuals, etc.

According to Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 21), there are three core principles that distinguish critical security studies. The first one is to understand security as a derivative concept. Security can only be defined through the way one sees the world. Ken Booth (1991)'s definition of security summarizes this principle: "Security" is basically "the absence of threat". The tempting simplicity of this

argument prompts us to ask the questions of "which threats, from who? How do we define the threats" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 22). Therefore, how to achieve security turns into a problem of who you are and under which conditions you ask the question.

The second principle is a broadened security agenda. In addition to Rothschild's (1995) argument above, Buzan (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 23) argues that there are five issues from which threats may arouse: war, poverty, famine, political oppression, and environmental degradation.

The third and final principle is the individual as the referent object of security. As discussed above, security is analyzed through the state in Realist and Liberal approaches. Yet, critical security studies focus on the individual rather than the state. The referent object of security should not be the state, which is an abstract identification of large human communities, but individuals. Bill McSweeny (1996, p. 16) claims that security can only be applicable at the international level if it is so at the individual level.

There are two main theoreticians of Aberystwyth School: Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. The Welsh School is also called the Aberystwyth School of Security Studies or Critical Security Studies (CSS). At this point, confusion may occur owing to the existence of two distinct critical security studies. One is, as mentioned above, Aberystwyth School, founded and led by Booth and Wyn Jones. It is also referred to as Critical Security Studies (with capital letters). Simultaneously, there is also another pattern which is referred to as critical security studies. This school, critical security studies, has a diverse theoretical and research agenda followed by thinkers who are mainly influenced by the intellectual lead of the Frankfurt School and postmodern/poststructuralist critical thinkers (Booth, 1997, p.

109). Ken Booth's thinking, the Aberystwtyh School thinkers, is mainly associated with "the cosmopolitan, self-consciously progressive, emancipatory, postpositivist, post-Marxist, open-ended about human possibilities, Enlightenment-inspired, and epistemologically self-conscious" (Booth, 1997, p. 109). Apart from criticizing the traditional security approaches (particularly realism), Booth and Wyn Jones makes a clear statement of what security is. Ken Booth mainly argues that:

> "Security" means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (and individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war are one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, theoretically, is security. (Booth, 1991, p. 319)

He strictly criticizes the realist approach to security and reconceptualizes it as a means to emancipate people. Booth asserts that emancipation is "freeing of people from physical and human constraints" (Booth, 1991, p. 319). Additionally, individuals' liberty through emancipation should be "compatible with the freedom of others" (Booth, 2008, p. 112). True emancipation can only be achieved when it is "not timeless or static […], not at the expense of others […], not a cloak for the power of the West or any other entity claiming to have a monopoly on wisdom" (Booth, 2008, p. 113). Considering the fact that Booth equates emancipation and security, the conditions for the former are also applicable to the latter. Thus, Booth has his own reconceptualization of security other than the traditional versions. He even challenges the idea that security is essentially a contested concept (Booth, 2008, p. 100). "If we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?" (Booth, 1991, p. 317). According to Booth, security has four basic characteristics or faculties: insecurity is a life-determining condition, security is an instrumental value, security is a powerful political word, and finally, security is a derivative concept (Booth,

2008, p. 101-110). These faculties are the main pillars in which he defines what his concept of security is. Let us look at this one by one.

a) Insecurity is a life-determining condition: In order for people to determine under which conditions they feel secure, they should also know "how insecurity feels" (Booth, 2008, p. 101). For example, he asserts that 9/11 was an event which changed perspectives attached to the security/insecurity dichotomy. The nuclear weapons' arms race and its threat during the Cold War was the first time that people in the West felt they were, or potentially would be, victims of a faraway threat (Booth, 2008, p. 101). But although this argument that uses the example of 9/11 reflects what people lived through in the Western world, such incidents had already been a fact in other parts of the world - in Iraq in 1990-1991 for instance. Iraq was attacked by a coalition of 35 states led by the US in the First Gulf War. However, it seems that as long as such threats come from faraway states, Booth does not see them as a result of violent intentions. Apart from warlike situations, he states that "(O)rdinary insecurities determine lives," (Booth, 2008, p. 103). People may feel insecure due to a lack of job satisfaction, loss of a dignified life, low wages which only allow people to survive rather than allow a fulfilling life, poor education, etc. These conditions may trap people in insecurity. He believes that security provides people space where they can make choices which also includes elective threats (Booth, 2008, p. 104).

b) Security is an instrumental value: Booth (2008, p. 105) states that "[security as an instrumental value] is at the heart of the political significance of the concept." There are three main distinctions to understanding this: absolute and relative security, subjective and non-subjective security, and survival and

security. Although there is no such thing as absolute security, absolute insecurity may exist under “a sense of total fear” (Booth, 2008, p. 105). The causes of this fear may be objective or subjective depending on the conditions. On the one hand, extreme paranoia may cause a ceaseless feeling of subjective insecurity. On the other hand, a death-camp is an objective source of fear for its inmates (Booth, 2008, p. 105). However, such classifications of objective and subjective threats may become misleading. Within this framework of threat and insecurity, fear against the inmates of a death camp may be perceived as a source of insecurity for their wardens. Therefore, Jewish people’s imprisonment can be labeled a “measure of security” for Nazi Germany in accordance with their feeling of security. This paradoxical threat-security provision assumption may leave us in a deadlock of insecurity if we try to understand and analyze the problem from a security perspective. Under relative security, Booth makes a distinction between subjective and non-subjective security and argues that one may feel his or her own conditions enough to feel secure. This is subjective security. Yet, the path of history may well prove that these conditions are not ultimately secure. While the US had the consistent feeling of insecurity due to a potential direct attack from the Soviet Union, history proved that no such threat existed even at a strategic level from the Soviet side (Booth, 2008, p. 106). Thus, existing conditions beyond one's own level of perception also determine non-subjective security. The third distinction is about survival. Booth argues that security should be more than mere survival. As mentioned above, he suggests that security extends beyond the conditions needed simply to survive - there should also be a space for choice.

c) Security is a powerful political word: The word of security comes with a huge promise of well-being, as Booth (2008, p. 108) asserts. This promise grants the word a strong symbolic power. In political discourse, security implies priority. If an issue is determined as being that of security, it immediately renders it the first priority (Booth, 2008, p. 109). Therefore, Booth claims that it is crucial to challenge traditional security assumptions which may have the power to determine the whole condition of politics. "In realist-informed 'national security' theorizing in the Cold War, security did indeed appear to be a conservative concept: but it was not the concept that was inherently conservative, but rather the politics behind the conceptualization" (Booth, 2008, p. 109).

d) Security as a derivative concept: "(S)ecurity outcomes (policies, situations, etc.) derive from a different underlying understanding of the character and purpose of politics." (Booth, 2008, p. 109). Booth argues that a traditional understanding of security was a result of the conceptualization of the concept. As long as realists associate security with problem-solving, national sovereignty and power, security will don the mask of a conservative concept. If we change the foundations, the concept's application also changes (Booth, 2008, p. 110).

Richard Wyn Jones is the other prominent scholar who contributed to CSS. According to Wyn Jones, "CSS is regarded as an attempt to develop an emancipation-oriented understanding of the theory and practice of security" (Wyn Jones, 2005, p. 215). He puts forward the idea of deepening the conceptualization of security. Deepening can both provide the basis to criticize the state-centric conceptualization of security, and help to reinterpret security from a critical and

alternative perspective (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 81). CSS as a project is itself an attempt to incorporate the previously produced works on security and reinterpret them "with a particular set of methodological principles and precepts to develop a new, emancipation-oriented paradigm for the theory and practice of security" (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. ix).

Above, it is discussed that Realist and Liberal approaches are not suitable to explain the individual conceptualization of security. While Realism focuses and persists in doing so on the security of the state, Liberalism envisions state-centric solutions. Therefore, in the following two chapters, I will combine the two other approaches, the Copenhagen School and the Aberystwyth Schools conceptions. I will employ the conception of security by the Aberystwyth School: security is freedom from threat. As mentioned above this approach also differs from the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of security. While it defines security as a matter of survival, the Aberystwyth School sees more in security. The discrepancy is a product of the Copenhagen School's insistence on security as a state-level issue which should not be extended more. Even if it discusses different sectors, survival of a state is the primal objective for security policies. In other words, the security of sectors should be established for the sake of the state's security. But the Aberystwyth School extends the spectrum of objects of security to the level of the individual. Particularly, security of an individual has the priority. Within this framework, the state is a means to establish security. Due to this perspective, the Aberystwyth School was criticized. In Chapter 4, I will try to elaborate the approach to the security during the Gezi Park Resistance, where, I believe, security was conceptualized as the elimination of threats in accordance with Booth's and Wyn Jones' reconceptualization of security.

CHAPTER 3

WHAT DO THE POLICE PROTECT?

The Republic of Turkey has the second highest number of police officers per citizens in the world after the Russian Federation, with 474.8 police officers per 100.000 citizens (McCarthy, 2013). In addition, public trust in the police force as an institution in Turkey depends on partisan bonds. TESEV's study (2015) shows that one's trust in the police force tends to depend on which party takes over in the latest elections. Considering Turkey's current conditions, approximately 50% of the population who supports AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party)[3] also generally approves of the police's activity. In other words, in Turkey, police are not able to attain a basic level of generic trust from the public. While it is the Turkish Armed Forces who are the custodians of the existent political order in Turkey as the "watchman" (Cizre, 2004, p. 156), the police share the burden of implementing that very order in urban spaces, as the "public order army" (Berksoy, 2007, p. 134). Clearly, there is no perfect balance between the police and the army, and from the 1980s onward, there have been attempts to alter this balance in favor of the police as an institution with increased militaristic capability and organization (Berksoy 2007).[4] The police, therefore, have a significant and increasing role to establish internal peace in Turkey (Berksoy, 2007, p. 150-151).

In this chapter, I will try to analyze what the police's position in the political order means and how it is positioned in relation to the conceptualization of security.

[3] AKP has been running the single party governments since 2002. In the most recent general election in November 2015, the party gained 49.50 % of the valid votes (for detailed information see http://secim.ntv.com.tr/).

[4] With the latest coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, this balance and how it changed have to be reconsidered and studied. This issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The main objective of this chapter is to understand the concept of security from a critical point of view through focusing on its application by the police force in Turkey. Throughout this chapter, we will see how the police both act as the regulator in the urban area and as the manifestation of the security conceptualization of the state. The police force has two supposed function: public safety and the state's security. Although in Turkey these two duties are mostly intermingled, I heavily focus on the conditions for which the state's security was favored. Additionally, the security paradigm is, I argue, exclusive, criminalizing, and vertically organized, or professional. In the following pages, I will first briefly discuss the history of the police force – its origin and application in Turkey – to explain their position in the establishment. Then, through examples of various recent policing trends in Turkey, I will try to prove my main argument for this chapter: considering the above-mentioned features of the police force and its agency, the role of the police is to sustain the established security paradigm (the state's conception of security) rather than keeping and make feel people safe. While doing so I will approach the police both as an institution and as a form of action.

Before elaborating on the conceptualization of security in Turkey, what is police and policing should be explained. Why did the institution of the police force emerge? As an extension of the state, the police force has become prominent with the modern age, but police forces were entirely different before their modern formation. Until the twentieth century, the police hardly found a place in historically significant events, they were only able to take part in the news. As David Bayley puts it, police business was "too routine" for people's life (Bayley, 1985, p. 5). This province of work was intrinsic to society's life to the extent that people themselves had been fulfilling the function of policing crimes. Prior to their modern formation,

establishing the security of people was the work of the local authority, either representing a central authority or as the legal authority itself. For example, Foucault (2009, p. 337-348) argues that the police's role in the modern state was to regulate the urban area to let market relations function at its economic optimum. Additionally, the police are interwoven with the prison system which disciplines and creates docile bodies, and responsible for surveying or creating the feeling of surveillance for every event, to put the individuals in their correct place in society (Foucault, 1979, p. 213-214). Preserving the relation with incarceration, police have also become, in the name of the state, the watchman of political economic order. Within a modern framework, the police force can be defined along the lines of Bayley (1985, p. 7): "people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group through the application of physical force." This definition is applicable for the evolution of legal legitimacy and application of the theories of social contract. It also raises the question of the state's right to use legitimate violence. For the modern state, the police as an institution require a combination of legal regulations and legitimacy in the eyes of the public - this is how subjects actively allow the police to survey the population. In other words, the police are equipped with techniques to deal with those who cause the disorder. The disorder can be a result of the prevalent threat of, in legal terms, an offense against the person, violent offense, sexual offense, or offense against property. On the other hand, in the eyes of the state, upheavals, occupy movements, or any sort of manifestation of social discontent can be perceived as a threat. Therefore, referring to Booth's conception of security, elimination of these occasions is part of the provision of security. Within the framework of this study, the disorder can be understood as a threat to security. Considering the conceptualization of liberty, security, and order, the modern police,

both as an institution and action, are necessary under the current formation of urban relations. There has always been an institution or, albeit in rather a disorganized manner, collective responsibility (Ergut, 2015, p. 48-49). Yet, with the onset of modernity and following new political and economic structures, such forms of collective security, combined with military intervening riots and rather massive upheavals, were not sufficient to establish public order.

The concept of the police itself dates back to the fifteenth century with different versions which hold almost the same meaning. As Mark Neocleous states, the police force emerged in various formations with the rise of cities throughout Europe following the fifteenth century and had always been linked with the preservation of good order and peace (Neocleous, 2000, p. 1). The crises and later incapability of feudalism to establish order in a changing world of trade, along with the bourgeoisie and urban formation, brought about the evolution of the pre-modern semi-militaristic wardship into a professional crime-preventing and order-preserving body. Following this, an increasing population in urban areas allowed the lay entities of authorities to take over the issue of the safety of citizens (Neocleous, 2000, p. 2). In addition to this, and concomitantly to it, the laicization of the political authority shifted the source of order from the divine to the mundane (Neocleous, 2000, p. 7). This picture also demonstrates that policing had been developed as a sort of local issue. At this point, it should be noted that despite there being people who performed a kind of proto-police business, these represented mostly headhunters more than the police in the modern sense of the term (Ergut, 2015, p. 50). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that policing community as a whole only came later as a modern application.

Despite the significance of the locality and a certain version of collective responsibility in the historical development of policing, the capitalist production and political incidents in Europe rendered it essential to establish a police order. In its simplest sense, police forces followed two separate paths in Britain and France. Nevertheless, this separation was eventually blurred, aside from some organizational differences. Although in their pre-modern versions both Britain and France shared many similar points, their different historical trajectories of modernization caused different policing patterns. Through historical experiences, Britain ended up with a more localized version of policing (with the exception of their policing practices in Ireland). In the British version, the police basically meant police force. This, of course, does not mean that the police have never been responsible for the suppression of social discontent and the surveillance of social movements. But, rather, the suppression of crowds was only an occasional business. For the French police, on the other hand, policing and surveillance of political activists and potential criminals was a daily business (Emsley, 1996, p. 253). The organization of the police institution in Britain was implemented level by level. While the Thames River Police was founded in 1798, the Metropolitan Police Service (1829) was founded under the legislation of the Metropolitan Police Act, and the former merged into the latter. Then, in 1856, all the geographies across England and Wales were technically covered by the police network (Jason-Lloyd, 2005, p. 2-3), although Clive Emsley (1996) argues that this was only the case on the surface.

The Metropolitan Police Act was issued both for crime prevention and for policing discontent. In contrast, despite being similar to some extent, the French police, having started its transformation at a local level, continued it at the national one. Local bodies who were fulfilling the duties of the police were mostly loyal to

the local authority. However, after the Revolution of 1789, a comparatively centralized police force and gendarmerie were formed. Nevertheless, the French police force could only be legally subsumed within the same organizational body in 1941 (Milliot, 2009, p. 88). Despite the late centralization of the police force, French police were actively used for the formation of the nation-state and against the discontent which was caused by it. Nation state transformation corresponds to the institutionalization of modern capitalism and its discontents, as well. Clive Emsley argues that the French Police was vital for the administration to beget good order. Emsley states that *maréchaussée* (later gendarmerie), which had been handling the policing business outside of Paris and dated back to the sixteenth century, played an important role in the inauguration of the new regime following the Revolution (Emsley 1999, p. 13). Besides, this sort of policing was spreading throughout Continental Europe[5]. It was also being applied in the British Isles. But, in contrast to the police force being established in England, particularly in London, the British Empire resorted to a more brutal version of policing. This was, to some extent, a result of conditions. As Emsley (1996, p. 251) states, the central authority in France had to undergo a plethora of upheavals and revolutions, some of which it could not deal with, during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The French police, therefore, had the duty of repressing political activists and surveying them. Emsley mentions that nearly all attempts at upheaval caused a direct purge among higher ranking officials (1996, p. 252). This explains how important the police force was for the regime. If officials were successful at surveying the population, they were expected to be capable of taking preemptive and preventive measures against not

[5] Clive Emsley explains further how this model of policing had spread over Continental Europe in detail in his work, *Gendarmes and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 1998, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

only the manifestation of discontent but also against potential protesters. Those who were incapable of preventing an upheaval were therefore deemed to be not fit for the post. With the transfer of the policing tradition, this would become a characteristic which would transfer to its Ottoman counterparts (see Lévy-Aksu, 2017). According to some thinkers, there were two reasons for such an act. Firstly, this was an action to establish order under the new regime and centralize the authority via policing activities. Secondly, according to Clive Emsley, the gendarmerie was used in France for the sake of distinguishing the French nation from those who did not speak French or know anything about Frenchness (Emsley, 1996, p. 253). In other words, the activities of policing were also used for the formation of an order that was being adopted by the center. Considering the post-Independence War Turkey, the establishment of a central authority and the whole project of nation building by the hand of the authority allowed the police institution to be centrally directed to perfectly fit to the newly founded republic.

3.1. The formation of policing in Turkey

The history of the police in Turkey can be dated back to the foundation of the police service in the Ottoman Empire in 1845. This was also the date when the French style of policing and police entered the country. This argument is widely voiced by researchers of police studies (Ergut, 2015; Berksoy, 2007; Lévy, 2009). The Continental policing tradition and technology have strongly influenced the adoption of modern policing in Turkey. Techniques of policing, the reasoning behind policing and the police's relation with and reaction to laws and order can be counted among the similarities.

Following the foundation of the Republic, the Police Duties and Powers Act was passed (Berksoy, 2007, p. 80) in 1934. In 1965, Society Police was formed, a branch of the police which was specifically founded for preserving public order. They were equipped with the latest technology and trained with the help of the military under strict hierarchical discipline (Berksoy, 2007, p. 82). This new curriculum also covered a militaristic education for the suppression of illegal meetings and defining certain places where those illegalities might occur. The words/tasks chosen by the future 1971 regulation would explain these in a much more explicit manner. It goes without saying that this curriculum was to prepare the police force for the coming years. It is also noteworthy to state at this point, that another regulation was being made regarding the intelligence agency at this time. Despite the lack of any comprehensive work in this field, we know for a fact that the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı – MIT) was formed in 1965 (Berksoy, 2013, p. 51). The internal and foreign intelligence were merged under the roof of the same institution. In addition to this, the militaristic characteristic of MIT was mentioned in TESEV's report.

As Biriz Berksoy (2007, p. 4) states, during this period the number of police officers in Turkey had risen to one officer for every 265 citizens.[6] Under the excuse of the contemporary social changes of the 1960s and 1970s, governments were willing to keep social discontent suppressed by increasing the number and expanding the technological capacity of the police force. These years witnessed an exponential increase in the shantytowns along the peripheries of the industrial cities in Turkey. This also brought about skyrocketing unemployment rate, unionization, and

[6] According to the Strategic Plan prepared by the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü – EGM), it is planned to reach that balance (EGM, 2008, p. 50).

discontent (Berksoy, 2007, p. 91). In 1971, a new regulation was passed to enhance the legal capacity of the police force to intervene in meetings and demonstrations:

> *the surveillance of legal meetings, marches, acts of strikes and lockouts; the prevention of revolts, lootings and pillages; the protection of constitutional democratic institutions of the Republic and their representatives and foreign state officials against any danger or assaults*; as well as *taking measures to secure life and property*; taking part in rescue activities in cases of disasters and fires endangering public life; taking precautions in celebrations and demonstrations; and avoiding possible destructive illegal incidents while enhancing other proactive policing services. (Berksoy, 2007, p. 97-98; italics added)

The society police were established in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, and Zonguldak. Considering the sociopolitical atmosphere of the late 1960s, this regulation seems to be a form of a reaction to the social changes which had taken place in the previous decade. In addition to this, further investigation on the next decade will very well demonstrate that this regulation was in effect a sort of resumé for the future vagueness of police duties. Tasks given to the police force were broadly defined and mainly associated with crowds and collective actions. These manifestations of discontent, therefore, are labeled as an issue of security. As securitization theory suggests, this is also a speech-act to securitize. Taking measures to secure life and property, and avoiding possible destructive illegal incidents, for instance, are two points which are vague enough to be stretched to the limits of violating the basic rights of a citizen. In addition to this, proactive policing was praised in the regulation. Proactive policing activities mainly use the methods of patrol and implementation of investigative mechanisms. Lack of sensitivity for the protection of basic human rights may cause severe violations in the employment of these mechanisms. Both before and after this regulation, there were many reported torture incidents and deaths under torture, which also indicates how far these investigative mechanisms can go. Ambiguity in these duties, let the police, and

directly those who authorize police, define the actions to be suppressed. The subjective diagnosis of an incident as a security issue enabled police to intervene. The symbolic power of security gives the utmost priority to deal with any issue related to security (Booth, 2008, p. 109). If police are rendered to determine when it is necessary to suppress disorder as part of this emergency of the security situation, the police are shouldering the arbitration – being proactive against incidents which have not yet happened, grants police a right to take arbitrary decisions to establish security regardless of its expense.

3.2. Militarization of police force after 1980

After the 1980 military coup d'etat, the police force changed with the opportunity provided by the state of emergency and abolition of the Constitution. These changes were not only on paper but also in operations made against those seen as a threat to order. The military junta tried to get rid of police officers with leftist tendencies in the institution as much as they could after an extensive evaluation (Berksoy, 2007, p. 81). Again, in this period, the militarization of the police force reached its peak. Although the education of the Society Police was made under the guidance of military officers, through time the lack of discipline and misplacement of the units caused a loss of effectiveness in the street. Therefore, a much more disciplined, structured, and militaristic force was necessitated by governments to deal with future discontent. The expected origin of discontent was increasing economic degradation among the middle and lower classes (Berksoy, 2007, p. 131). With the implementation of neoliberal measures in economic policy, the economic conditions of the middle and lower classes had already been influenced dreadfully. These policies were started to be implemented even before the coup – they were named 24

January (1980) Decisions. As Korkut Boratav argues, the pre-coup governments, fearful of the public dissent and possible reactions from an organized society, were not able to make the necessary regulations for the neoliberalization of the economy (Boratav, 2005, p. 149). Thus, while the military coup was taking disciplinary measures against politically organized groups which were able to resist economic liberalization, the police was equipped with the necessary legal rights and technology.

In 1982, a new regulation made in the Police Act inserted new units of Rapid Action (Çevik Kuvvet) (Berksoy, 2007, p. 114). Rapid Action Units were formed as a replacement to Society Police. Different from Society Police, Rapid Action Units were formed in all cities and provided with better equipment (helmet, shield, gas mask and entitled to use gas to disperse crowd). For that reason, they were widely named as robocop (Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü, 2016). These are the units still in use in Turkey. According to the law, the duties of these units are as follows:

> a) the establishment of order and security in legal meetings and demonstrations, b) taking proactive measures and patrolling the places where social movements that can impair the public order may break out, c) the prevention of the damages that may be inflicted on workplaces, and their invasion during strikes and lockouts, d) the prevention of illegal acts on streets or public squares, e) the protection of society's and persons' material property or moral values from assaults that may be caused by social incidents, strikes and lockouts and illegal acts on streets and public squares, f) the establishment of order and security in celebrations and demonstrations if other police forces are insufficient, g) the conduct of other operations, in which the Special Teams of the Rapid Action Units have to take place, h) the pacification of illegal incidents mentioned above by using force, whenever necessary (Berksoy, 2007, p. 114-115).

As can be seen in the listed duties, the Rapid Action units were formed for the purpose of crowd control and as a proactive measure to workers' movements. The establishment of the order has possibly the utmost importance for the regulation on which the policing activities would be legalized. The following years would be the

ones during which the police needed to preserve order in a newly established economic understanding of neoliberalism. The threats against the new political economic order should be eliminated to secure the order. After the January 24 Decisions (1980), the government was well aware of the potential of future social discontent, specifically counting on already developed resistance from the workforce. The oncoming coup d'état had dealt with most of the resistance by incarceration, torture or killing. Concomitantly, by crippling the whole system of unions and constructing a discipline mechanism between the state and the workforce, they also prevented – to some extent – the future probability of upheaval. However, one of the most important branches of discipline mechanism and order establishment is the strengthening of policing activities. Considering the duties mentioned above, rapid action units have been devised as a special background for crowd control. Thus, we can very well define rapid action units as special units which prevent any social discontent which arises, with the excuse that harm might occur. The wording "wherever necessary" provides the police with the freedom to determine when and where demonstrations are to be violently suppressed.

Additionally, Rapid Action Units' founding regulation mentions the protection of private property more than previous regulation of Society Police for which Rapid Action Units are the replacement. Another striking point is that there is no more stress on the surveillance of crowds but on their dispersal and prevention from putting jeopardizing daily business. The security conditions that the units are supposed to fulfill are defined as related to the control of the crowd. Any demonstration or gathering that may harm the private property or the functioning of the working places is to be stopped by the units.

In 1983, 1986 and 1993, there were other additions to the police force. The Special Forces (Özel Harekat Timleri) were formed in 1983. The Special Forces' area of jurisdiction covers both urban and rural areas. Their stated purpose is to run hostage rescue operations and protect statesmen, but they have also often been involved in anti-terror operations. In 1986 the Anti-Terrorism and Operations Department was formed. An Anti-Terrorism Act was passed in 1983 (Berksoy, 2007, p. 164). These were highly employed during the struggle with the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – Kurdistan Workers' Party) which was formed as a Marxist-Leninist party before the 1980 Coup d'Etat. Armed struggle with the PKK was started in 1984 and still continues today. The above-mentioned brief history of the police force in Turkey proves that its reason d'étre has always been to preserve order and prevent anyone from attempting to disturb it. In other words, police's purpose was to establish the conditions of absence of threats against the political-economic order which was seen affixed with the security of citizens. However, as can be seen, what was prioritized in this parallelism was the security of the order and the state.

There are several more changes that brought about the current security paradigm. The first one is the 2005 changes in the Criminal Law. The second one is the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2006. The third one is in the Police Duties and Powers Act (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu - PVSK) in 2007. These three consecutive changes, which closely followed each other, allowed the central authority to strengthen its own influence over the police force and entitled the police to broader and more solidified powers over citizens (Berksoy, 2012, p. 77). Since it was issued in 2007, 340 people have been killed by the police as of 2015 (Baransav, 2017). PVSK can be taken as an example to comprehend what these powers may cause. The main reason beneath the amendment on the surface was to reduce smuggling and

terror. However, as an outcome of this regulation, police and military officers' so-called extra-legal actions during the 1980s and 1990s have become legal rights for the police (Saymaz, 2012, p. 13). The first sign of this legalization was a change in Article 16 of the PVSK. This article almost leaves it completely open to conclude when to resort to firearms during a patrol, chase, et cetera without any need to take the permission of a superior officer. While the regulation has been ostensibly changed to limit police officers' authorization of resorting to firearms, the exact limits drawn by the law-maker are in reality left to an officer on duty to decide, depending on the occasion, implicitly letting subjective criteria determine what to do (Berksoy, 2013, p. 34). The amendment also grants authority to fire on the condition that the suspect is warned, not only for any occasion which poses a danger to an officer's or citizen's life but also during a chase to catch a suspect.

Until this point, I have tried to approach the police as an institution. In the following paragraphs, I will try to focus on police actions and how police officers perceive society and citizens. I will discuss police's actions during the Gezi Park Protests separately.

3.3. Some cases of in/security

I would like to take the Baran Tursun Case (2007) as a generic incident for police shootings. Baran Tursun, born in 1989, had been living in Izmir since his family had migrated from Lice, Diyarbakır in 1992 due to the insecurity in the Southeast region. On the evening of November 25th, 2007, Baran was driving back home with his friends, after a celebration. The car he was driving, which belonged to his father, was found to be suspicious and chased by police. According to the testimony of one of his friends in the car, there was no warning to stop by the police (Biryol, 2008). Due

to the fact that his driving license had been seized by the police twice previously, Baran did not stop. The number of police cars in the chase suddenly increased to three. The police barricaded off the road. After four minutes of the police chasing Baran's car, gunfire was heard. Baran was shot at by police officer Oral Emre Atar, who was one of those blocking the road. The car crashed into a tree and when officers came to arrest the three in the car, they saw that Baran was bleeding in the head. He was taken to the hospital, and his two friends were taken to the police station. At first examination, the cause of his death was recorded as resulting from the injuries attained in the car crash. However, in the hospital, it was found that Baran had been shot in the head. He survived only five more days. The case of the shooting of Baran Tursun shows that the police did not only aim to stop the car since the police forces are equipped with advanced technology to prevent such incidents occurring.

In the course of the investigation, camera records showed that some documents which were in the trunk, likely belonging to his father, were taken out by the officers and laid out on Baran's knees. As such, papers on his lap would demonstrate that he had crashed the car into the tree while he was distracted by some papers he was reading at the moment (Biryol, 2008). Thus, the plot of the car crash was revealed. Following the investigation, charges were dropped against Oral Emre Atar, the officer who had shot Tursun. Atar argued that he fell down while the car was passing nearby them during the chase, and thus the gunfire was accidental. During the court proceedings, thirty-eight police officers were heard as witnesses. Only one of them testified that while shooting, Atar had remained upright. By the end of the trial hearings, the court decided that the officer was standing while shooting. The court decision that sentenced Atar to imprisonment for a term of two

years and one month was reached after a lengthy (approximately 2 years) process, which included claims of spoiling of evidence and prevarications. In the meanwhile, the officer who had testified that Atar had remained standing during the shooting was reassigned to another position. There was no significant institutional, disciplinary punishment for Atar except for a twenty-four-month suspension of advance in seniority (Saymaz, 2012, p. 220-223). The case of Baran Tursun is not an exception. There have been cases of arbitrary shooting, spoiling of evidence, protection of murder suspects by police and administrative authorities. The attitude of administrative superiors is inclined to legitimize the murder as an accident, or with the hypothetical, generic claim "what if there was a bomb in that car?" (Biryol, 2008) rather than clear and imminent or present danger, demonstrated by evidence. However, this explains a lot when it comes to the excuses that the police employ. Citing the possibility of a bomb in the car demonstrates that the police officer is attempting to legitimize the killing. Nevertheless, this is not a simple evasion of the charges against him. The legitimacy of protecting public safety provides the police with a huge space of freedom in their actions. Legal or not, police officers are expected to detect and exterminate any threat or, at least, the sense of threat.

The case of Baran Tursun is well-known, as it had been a topic of debate in mainstream media for some time. But today such incidents rarely make it to the headlines, having been normalized, and appear in the press merely as ordinary news. A statement by one of Tursun's lawyers, Alper Bağıran, may contribute to understanding what is beneath the surface of such police violence. He mentions a bonus system to measure the performance of police officers. According to Bağıran, in 2008, the year following Hüseyin Çapkın's appointment to Izmir as the chief of police, reports of alleged "resistance to police officers" and robbery charges in Izmir

had increased in number significantly (Biryol, 2008). The fact that this system has been in action for a while was admitted by the Governor of Istanbul, Hüseyin Avni Mutlu, in response to the parliamentary question to the Minister of Interior asked by Melda Onur, who was then a parliamentarian and member of the main opposition party, CHP (Republican People's Party) (Sabah, 2012). According to the Governor, the BONUS system[7] was devised to help improve the police's success. The number of points gained is determined depending on the provincial density of crimes ranked in the list of point[8]. The list explains why there had been an increase in cases of robberies and resistance to the police. The score gained by the apprehension of thieves was designated as 1000 points. It does not even matter whether or not the suspect was arrested - if the suspect is found to be guilty of the alleged crime the officer gets 250 more points. Given the fact that the regular, public order police force in Turkey also serves as the judicial police, their involvement in judicial investigations and court proceedings opens up a much-debated issue of conflict of interests, that focus on the capacity to influence an investigation, and thus, eventually final court judgments about suspects under prosecution. The list also includes the item of resisting police officers, with a score value of 20 points, which is surprisingly low in comparison to the capture of a thief. In that vein, hypothetically, it would require 50 incidences of being confronted with resistance while on duty, for a police officer to score 1,000 points and to get closer to being promoted, instead of being assigned to guarding duty. The vagueness regarding the definition of resistance – and of the criteria of transgressing the criminal threshold – remains. The only standard for defining what is resistance and what is not is determined by the very police

[7] For detailed information about the BONUS System, please see: http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/126697-huseyin-capkin-in-basarisi-cok-siddet-az-elestiri
[8] See the list http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=polis-puan-cetvelindeki-bilinen-bayan-terimiresmi-olarak-aciklandi&haberid=1452

officer himself who claims to be have been resisted. In other words, a subjective decision of a police officer to determine whether an action is that of resistance may end up as a punishment without any juridical procedures. There are a plethora of cases in which people were taken into custody for alleged resistance to the police, but were in fact subjected to ill-treatment and torture in police stations, according to Human Rights' Association's (İnsan Hakları Derneği – IHD) annual reports[9]. It has been claimed that the BONUS system was put to practice in Izmir by the administrative team of the police that was reposted there from Bursa, with Hüseyin Çapkın's appointment as the Provincial Police Chief of Izmir (Gönen, 2012, p. 51). The higher the number of people an officer arrests, the more he records a crime, or fines for misdemeanors, etc. the higher the points gained. These points are influential in the career of officers, for getting promoted to operational branches or being assigned for guard duties. As such, police officers work not only under direct or indirect encouragement, in/formal authorization for disproportionately violent action, but also under the pressure of getting more points. With the application of the BONUS system, transvestites, for instance, have been exposed to harassment in the streets, hairdresser salons, while shopping, etc. Depending on the law of misdemeanors, police officers may fine an act of public disturbance for 50 TL (approx. € 12). Apart from the violence they are subjected to in police stations, transvestites walking on Istiklal Avenue are fined for the act of public disturbance which is defined in law as "disturbing others for the reason of selling goods or services" (Aktaş Salman, 2009). In such an incident, there is both humiliation and fining without any other reason than the act of walking. Here, we can also see the

[9] For detailed information, please see: http://www.ihd.org.tr/td_d_slug_2/

fixed imagination and labeling of any allegedly inappropriate individual as disturbing and harmful to the integrity and well-being of society (Aktaş Salman, 2009).

One victim of such common practice, alias Ebru, tells her story: "Once, I had bought beef from a butcher's shop and bread from the market, and was walking home. An officer intercepted and fined me. Another time, when I was at the coiffeur, they took me out of the shop and fined me for the act of disturbance" (Aktaş Salman, 2009). This interview was published in July 2009 two months after the BONUS system was imported to Istanbul. The implementation of the BONUS system in Izmir was not only associated with Baran Tursun's murder. The outcomes seem to be more structural than meets the eye. Demands to increase police's authority and capability vis-a-vis citizens is mostly supported by the arguments of increase in crime. In other words, the police's incapability of intervention is due to a lack of authority when it is necessary. Indeed the amendment to the PVSK was legitimized by this very fear. The preamble of the amendment in PVSK in 2007 proves this since the preamble openly argues that the police will need these powers to prevent crime and increased capacity during investigations (Uzun, Özkul & Özkan, 2007). This change also envisions a preemptive perspective in policing. Application of the law has been employed with new tactics. In Izmir, a strategy of provocation, named as scratching[10], started to be employed under the directorate of Hüseyin Çapkın (Gönen, 2012). The provision of adequate fear of crime and insecurity, for the chief, should be the first duty of the police (Gönen, 2012). The fight against crime also helped reap the consent of acceptable and respected citizens of the city, who themselves are not in the category

[10] Scratching (*kaşıma* in Turkish) can be roughly defined as provoking. The police uses this method to first harass a group of people to draw them to rise against the police. Therefore, the police would have the opportunity to suppress those groups. The strategy was used against the shantytowns in Izmir to cleanse these neighborhoods in order to securely implement urban renewal projects. For a detailed account of police's strategies in Izmir, please see: Gönen, Z. (2012, January). Suçla Mücadele ve Neo-Liberal Türkiye'de Yoksulluğun Zaptiyesi. Birikim, 48-56.

of usual suspects. Hüseyin Çapkın initiated weekly and monthly meetings of police officers. During those meetings, officers were instructed with the characteristics which they are meant to be aware of during their duties. Depending on certain characteristics, along with biases, this led to respectable citizens being harassed by the police - stopping to check ID cards and criminal records of those people became routine practice, with the aim of picking up potential criminals. There were scheduled meetings for designating who were to be controlled. For example, Kadifekale, a suburban area in Izmir, was securitized via the application of this method, which ripped out the mostly Kurdish population of there.[11]

The backdrop of the BONUS system reveals a wider picture. The groups that were pressured with controls and checks were predominantly people suffering poverty: the Kurds, gypsies, sex workers, LGBTs, and the like, that were placed in the lower socio-economic strata. These groups should be separated from the acceptable and respectable ones, in the eyes of the police. This is the main axis of securing the urban area. Defining the so-called dangerous identities, police would know where to put the pressure. Çapkın's practices of control were successful" his strategy was appreciated and appraised by his superiors in Ankara and he was considered successful enough to be promoted to Istanbul as the Chief of Police. With a parliamentary question in 2012, it was revealed that the BONUS system was only applicable for incidents in which an officer writes minutes (Karabağlı, 2012). Inferring from this point, and from the incidents mentioned, the BONUS system is used for disciplining the streets. By targeting dangerous identities, the presence of those groups in certain districts is prevented. Those districts can be Beyoğlu in

[11] For detailed information on how police actions were used during urban transformation process in Izmir see Gonen, Zeynep. 2011. Neoliberal politics of crime: The Izmir Public Order Police and criminalization of the urban poor in Turkey since the late 1990s. (Unpublished dissertation.)

Istanbul, where business activities are high in density, or Kadifekale in Izmir, which is planned to be gentrified.

During operations, on the other hand, police officers do not get bonuses but are instead evaluated by their chiefs. This strategy was a paragon for the police forces in the other parts of Turkey, particularly in big cities with significant migrant populations and where there is fertile soil for policies of further gentrification and poverty. Eventually, the central authority manifested their appreciation of such a strategy by legalizing the system of evaluation through issuing a new regulation on performance evaluation in 2012 (Resmi Gazete, 2012). As can be seen above, the police's duty is not to protect individual citizens but to protect society as a whole, actually the population in Turkey.

Preemptive action, which is exemplified through the logic of policing and performance evaluations, turns the police officers into hunters. From the perspective of the regulations and structural changes, the problem reveals itself to be structural, rather than simple individual preferences - police actions are aimed at eliminating unwanted individuals from the public scene. Police's responsibility is, on the surface, to protect citizens and preserve public safety. However, as can be seen above, police try to protect the public order by designating threats to the society. These threats are determined by the subjective conditions of the central authority which aims to protect the political economic order. An identification which may cause disorder and, therefore, insecurity renders a citizen a source of threat. As long as the threats to the order are eliminated, security can be established. The legal, historical background and the actions of police force prove that the object of security is the state and the order. Within this framework, the conditions of security can only be fulfilled, once all threats against the state and the order, the referent objects, are eliminated. The

source of threat can be designated as a citizen or a group of citizens. Or a language can be securitized and, though not totally banned, can become a source of threat and, thus, needed to be suppressed. A certain sexual orientation can be designated as a threat to the public order, despite not being illegal, and to be labeled as dangerous.

In this chapter, I have tried to discuss the police's supposed role in the establishment of order and security which leads to the insecurity of individuals. Security in the public is being aggravated by the police's actions and state's conceptualization of security. Police are in an attempt to preserve security and safety. However, due to the fact that security is a derivative concept, the security provision entitled to the police force leads to the insecurity of citizens, depending on their identity. On the other hand, for the rest of the citizens who buy the speech act of securitization, police make them feel secure by eliminating current and potential threats to their well-being. The symbolic power of security empowers the state's position as the provider of security.

The police force as the agent of the state to provide security acts in accordance with the securitization of issues and determines its own objectives. Therefore, the police are in the role of wardens of the established conceptualization of security in urban areas. In the following chapter, we will try to comprehend the conception of security during the Gezi Park Resistance from the perspectives of both police force and protesters. The differences between the protesters and police will better crystalize the distinction between the conceptualization of security. Thus, we will able to see the conflicting conceptions of security in the Gezi Park Resistance context. This will help us to understand how the objective of achieving security ends in the endless cycle of insecurity.

CHAPTER 4

GEZİ PARK RESISTANCE AND ITS BORDERS: AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY?

The previous chapter discussed the conceptualization of security in the eyes of the state through an assessment of the police's actions and a broad analysis of the police's legal obligations within the context of a timeframe running from the establishment of the police force in the Ottoman Empire, its development after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, to 2013 when the Gezi Park Resistance[12] occurred. This chapter will discuss how protesters conceptualized security and their perception of threat during the Resistance. Taking into account the relationship between security and threat, the conception of the security during the Resistance will be analyzed, along with the question of whether the protesters participating in the Gezi Park Resistance could have developed an alternative version of security. The ways in which their conception of security and perception of threat were formulized during the Resistance will also be discussed. To this end, both the Park itself as a space from where the state authority was temporarily absent and the borders which separated the state authority from the Park will be examined in conjunction.

The borders of the occupied area represent the encounter between the police and protesters. The police's actions and how they perceived the protesters are therefore one of the topics which will be addressed in this chapter. This encounter will also provide hints regarding the conceptualization of security from the viewpoints of both the police and protesters and comparing the two will crystallize

[12] From this point onwards I will refer to the Gezi Park Resistance as the Resistanc, and Gezi Park and its surrounding occupied area as the Park.

the differences between these two parties. As for the analysis of the Park, people from various backgrounds argue that Gezi Park and its surrounding were the most secure area in Istanbul.[13] But how and why? Was it only a false sense of security or were the protesters actually secure? The practices and the accounts of the protesters will help us see how changes in the referent object and the conceptualization of security affected practices to establish security. In other words, another question asked by this chapter is whether the differences in the conceptualization of security changed the practices of security.

Throughout the 15 days when the Park was occupied, the state temporarily lost its authority over the Park. Although it was seen by one protester as a controlled retreat (Interviewee Z), the police were pushed outside the Park and no officer of the state was there to implement their authority over individuals there. However, the police's attempts to take over the Park and its surroundings continued during the 15 days of occupation. Protesters resisted the police attacks in Harbiye and Gümüşsuyu, Dolmabahçe and Beşiktaş. In other words, while one of the main features of the occupation was the absence of the police inside the Park and the surrounding area, their presence outside it was also a defining factor. Thus, protesters had to remain vigilant against the police's intervention. Although there was no authority in the Park, the borders – barricades – were sites of clashes between protestors and the police, the former trying to prevent the latter from resettling the state's authority in the Park.

This chapter will discuss four points in order to understand the spatial significance of the Resistance and how the conceptualization of security was

[13] Özden Melis Uluğ and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar's book Bir Olmadan Biz Olmak (Uluğ and Acar, 201 (*Not Being One but Being Us* in English) is one of the most comprehensive studies providing a large number of interviews from an extensive scale of ideological backgrounds.

developed during the Resistance. First, Gezi Park has its own historicity of power contestation between actors in the public sphere and the state. This contestation has impacts on varying conceptualizations of security as a derivative concept. Therefore, to provide the reader with a background of the symbolic significance of Taksim Square and Gezi Park it is critical to understand that clashes over the appropriation of these spaces reveals the perception of threat of different parties and, therefore, the distinct conceptualizations of security. Second, a selective timeline of the events during the Gezi Park Resistance will be provided. This timeline will cover the events from just before the occupation of the Park to the immediate aftermath of the dispersion of the Resistance. These two consecutive sections will thus provide the reader with the frame of the chapter and essential context. Third, the conceptualization of security will be analyzed using the individual accounts of protesters. Distinctive perceptions of threats will be utilized to distinguish the referent objects of security, and the means and practices used to establish it. Finally, the chapter will touch upon the police's perception of the protesters during the Resistance. This will crystallize the distinctive points in the opposing conceptions of security.

4.1. The Gezi Park and the Taksim Square: A symbol of power contestation

Although Gezi Park and Taksim Square were not the only places where protests erupted, they were the central focus of the Resistance. Taksim Square has a long history of conflicts among different actors in the public sphere and the state. The state constantly attempts to appropriate the Square through making spatial changes in the Square and its periphery. Confronting those attempts with daily practices, groups made up mainly of non-Muslims and middle-class bourgeoisie tried to reclaim the

public place for their own practices. This history of events is intrinsic to the history of the Republic, from the birth until today. Clearly, it is not possible to argue that the confrontation in the public space was simply between two parties, the state, and non-Muslims. The state is a distinctive actor having the largest and the most powerful means to its own end, which is why in many cases one of the two conflicting parties is the state. A significant amount of research has been produced which demonstrates that Taksim Square is a space of conflict between the state's attempts to shape public space and practices, and the attempts of the Resistance against these top-down attacks.[14] The state's attempts to reshape the space, therefore, reveals what is convenient and what not for the Square in the eyes of the state.

Taksim Square's origin of significance in the Republican era dates back to the first decades of the newly born Republic of Turkey. Taksim Square was envisioned as a model site of modernization in the urban planning projects of Istanbul (Gül et al. 2014, p. 64). Gezi Park and Taksim Square were designed by the French urban planner Henri Prost. The construction was completed in 1944. The purpose of the construction was to use the area as a ceremonial site and a monumental public square (Karasulu, 2014, p. 166). Bülent Batuman (2015, p. 885) argues that it is possible to analyze the construction and history of Taksim Square and Gezi Park in two phases. First, the open space was gradually shaped for the formation of the newly-born nation state. One of the first interventions in the Square was the erection of Independence Monument in 1928. According to Batuman, the hegemony of the state over the Square and its periphery was also performed through the repression of the non-Muslim community. Beyoğlu was mainly inhabited by the Christian and Jewish community during the first couple of decades of the Republic. The central

[14] For further discussion on the power contestation over public spaces in Turkey with respect to Gezi Park and Taksim Square, please see: Romain Ors, 2014; and Batuman, 2015.

administration saw the repression and the forced migration of the non-Muslim community as a phase for the Turkification project in Turkey (Aslan, 2007; Ulker, 2005; Elal, 2016). In the case of Taksim, the French and Ladino-speaking Jewish community was a threat to the nation building project. Batuman provides some accounts of the repression of the non-Muslim community in Beyoğlu through campaigns to enforce the speaking of Turkish in the public and juridical pressure over the community (Batuman, 2015, p. 886).

In the 1930s, the administration of Istanbul raised their demands for a larger ceremonial area for the purpose of gathering masses during the official celebrations. Prost firstly proposed a transformation of the ancient Hippodrome (At Meydanı) as an equivalent to the Red Square in Moscow. The new square was expected to replace Beyazıt Square in Fatih as the site of official celebrations. At that time Beyazıt Square was the central square of Istanbul. However, the transformation of the Hippodrome and its surrounding would take more time than expected by the administration of Istanbul. Therefore, Prost suggested the demolition of the Artillery Barracks and the building of a vast green area, including the lands which belong to the Armenian community. The planned appropriation consisted of the Armenian Cemetery and a church named Surp Kirkor Lusarovich Church. Despite the opposition of the Armenian community in Istanbul, the whole land area was transferred to the municipality. Objecting to the dispossession, the Armenian community in Istanbul sued the Municipality, but they lost the case and instead were forced to compensate the loss which they had caused against the Municipality during the juridical procedure (Batuman, 2015, p. 888). There are a significant number of cases similar to this one. Although they vary in terms of the conditions, the intention of Turkifying the area was common among consecutive governments, regardless of

which party held the post. What the state aimed to develop was a Turkish, or at least a Turkified Muslim bourgeoisie, who dominated the area and pursued the Turkish version of socialization in public space (Batuman, 2015, p. 890).

The final and most serious attack against the non-Muslim population in Beyoğlu district came on September 6-7, 1955. The events started with a news article published in Istanbul Express daily on September 6, which claimed that the house where Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was born in Thessaloniki had been bombed. The news article later proved to be wrong. These were the days when negotiations over Cyprus were ongoing and it was later revealed that the pogrom had been initiated by the government in order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the Turkish public over the issue of Cyprus. People poured into the center of Istanbul from the periphery of the city. Shops which belonged to the non-Muslim population, mostly Greeks, on Istiklal Street were looted by the masses in a spree which continued for two days. Greek people living in Beyoğlu were harassed, injured, and/or killed. Although the attacks mainly targeted the Greek population, the properties of other non-Muslim groups were also assaulted. After the September 6-7 pogrom, the Greek and Jewish population fled from Turkey en masse. During the Yassiada Trials, former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes who was accused of the organization of the Pogrom along with Fatin Rustu Zorlu, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued that the September 6-7 Pogrom was a demonstration of the sensitivity and patriotism of the Turkish public. The Turkification of the district had been almost finalized with violent means encouraged by the government. The violations of the basic rights of the Greek people in Turkey were never punished – instead, Greeks were externalized as an insidious group of people who were actually the citizens of an enemy state.

However, throughout the following years and under the rule of various governments, the identity of the Square was formed by the everyday practices of a diverse population. Although the state attempted to reshape the public space repressively, the everyday practices of the population visiting the area prevented the Square from becoming simply an official site of celebrations (Batuman, 2015, p. 292). Moreover, the civic political activities carried out in the Square opened up a new struggle between the central authority and civilian population. The rise of the labor and student movements in Turkey raised a new challenge for the central administration. Taksim was the site for both pro-state and unions' or students' rallies in Istanbul. The May 1 Celebrations and workers' demonstrations in Taksim have a symbolic significance on the appropriation of the area, and the struggle between the authority and civic population. From the early twentieth century onwards, May Day has been celebrated in Turkey, the first celebration occurring in Izmir in 1905. The first celebration in Istanbul was in 1910 and since then, Beyoglu has been a focal point of May Day celebrations.

In the 1970s, workers movements were on the rise in Turkey. The largest celebration in Turkey was in 1976 in Taksim. The following year, in 1977, the May Day celebration in Taksim was targeted. Thirty-four people died as a result of the stampede caused by the gunfire. Mourning for this tragedy was consequently added to the symbolic value of Taksim Square for leftist groups in Turkey. Following the celebration in 1978 in Taksim, martial law was declared in 1979; and May Day celebrations were not held again in Taksim until 2010. After the coup d'état of 1980, political gatherings and demonstrations in Taksim were banned. Consequently, Taksim Square became a memorial place for the workers' movements in Turkey.

Additionally, after the restoration of the parliamentary governments, workers were prevented from running political rallies in the Square.

Up until 2010, labor unions repeatedly attempted to celebrate May Day in Taksim Square. Although the AKP had followed a liberal agenda in the first couple of years of its rule, by 2007, 2008, and 2009 unions were not welcome in the Square and were subjected to police attacks. However, in 2010, the government allowed the first officially-permitted rally in the Square and for the following two years, the unions, political parties, and various civil society actors attended May Day celebrations there. But again in 2013 rallies were banned in Taksim, declared by PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He also claimed that the Square was not structurally safe due to the ongoing pedestrianization project, and precautions were subsequently taken to prevent people from entering the Square. Extensive numbers of police officers were stationed in the Square (İnceoğlu, 2015, p. 536). Additionally, Erdogan announced that all future rallies in Istanbul would only be held in places designated by the government. The AKP government was attempting to reduce the significance of Taksim Square to a touristic and commercial site. Depoliticizing the Taksim Square and its periphery was an attempt to reduce the historical significance of the place. In the following years, the Istanbul Mayorship (Istanbul Valiliği) designated meeting sites for demonstrations and gatherings. After 2013, Taksim Square, despite its symbolic and spatial significance, has never been designated as a permitted meeting site by the official authorities. Many researchers from various fields of study have agreed that the central administration's attempts to regulate public spaces, specifically Taksim Square, led people to resist during the Gezi Resistance (Batuman, 2015; Çelik, 2013; Tugal, 2013).

Both the pedestrianization of the Square and the construction of the Artillery Barracks were also attempts to reshape Taksim in accordance with neoliberal urban policies. The pedestrianization project would result in limited access to the Square by limiting the pedestrian areas on the main streets leading towards Taksim (Batuman, 2015, p. 896). People's access to the Square in the case of a political rally would, therefore, be limited, and police would easily be able to prevent people from reaching there. The government was able to diminish any chance of organizing massive political rallies by first illegalizing gathering there and then transforming the space by rendering it inaccessible. The project was fiercely objected to by Taksim Solidarity mainly due to the fact that the decision regarding the Square, the Park, and its periphery was reached without the participation of city-dwellers (Taksim Solidarity, 2013). Taksim Solidarity defines the pedestrianization project as a project of "concretization, dehumanization, and depersonalization" (Taksim Solidarity, 2013). As for the Artillery Barracks, the plan was not to replicate the historical barracks in its former place. The sole remnants of the Artillery Barracks were the photos of its surface. It was impossible to re-erect the Barracks in the same architectural structure - the government's plan instead was to build the Barracks as a huge complex, containing a shopping center, recreational sites, and hotels (Vardar, 2013).

The pedestrianization project and the construction of the Artillery Barracks, according to Taksim Solidarity (2013), was an attempt to commercialize a significant public place and to invade the urban area with steel and concrete. The story of Taksim Square and Gezi Park is that of a struggle between the central administration's ambition to regulate public spaces and the counter-attempt by citizens against the government. Among all these attempts, while the occupation had

become a security concern in the eyes of the government and, therefore, the police, the central authority's intervention in transforming a public space which is among the limited number of green areas of the city, became a threat to protesters. Gezi Park and the Artillery Barracks embodied in themselves the commodification of the public spaces, and commons (İnal, 2013, p. 18). The police's role here was to prevent citizens from reclaiming what is public.

4.2. A selective timeline of the Gezi Park Resistance

There have been varying analyses made regarding the Resistance. Some have called it a collective delirium (İnal, 2013) or an uprising for dignity (İnsel, 2013). One of the most shared reflections about the Resistance was its unprecedented nature. The Resistance started as a result of an environmentalist concern which concluded as an occupy movement against the government's intention and attempt to reconstruct an Ottoman artillery barracks. The Barracks were planned in the same place (the Gezi Park) as a replica of the one which was constructed in 1806 and then demolished in 1940. But the replica was planned to be reconstructed as a complex consisting a shopping mall, a hotel, and other recreation facilities (Vardar, 2013). Although the project was rejected by the Commission for the Protection of Cultural Properties (Kural, 2013), then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly insisted on demolishing the Park and reconstructing the Artillery Barracks (Vardar, 2013).

Parallel to the bureaucratic process on the future of the Gezi Park, civic initiatives were organized to prevent the demolition of the Park. These civic initiatives coordinated their activities under the umbrella of the Taksim Solidarity Platform. The Platform had 128 constituents from a large scale of civic initiatives: small neighborhood associations, the Chamber of Turkish Engineers and Architects,

the Istanbul Chamber of Medicine, environmental activist associations, LGBT organizations, political parties, etc.[15] The initiative began in 2011 as a reaction against the government's plan to transform Beyoğlu, particularly Taksim Square, under the project of more expansive urban transformation across Turkey. The Platform was founded on March 2, 2012 (Sol, 2012). It opposed the destruction of Gezi Park by arguing that such decisions regarding public spaces should be taken only after public deliberation.

On May 28, 2013, a group of 50 environmental activists including Peace and Democracy Party[16] PM Sırrı Süreyya Önder, started their watch against the demolition of the Park (NTV, 2013b). The police tried to disperse the protestors using tear gas. Protesters' tents were burned down by the municipal police (Zabıta)[17] (Erçiçek et. al, 2013). On the following day, May 29, support to the protesters increased with the attendance of several publicly known actors and writers, and more PMs from the Republican People's Party[18]. The encampments were reestablished in the Park to prevent the bulldozers from demolishing trees. On May 30, at dawn, police raided the protesters again with tear gas and water cannons. Twice on the same day, while the PMs were giving a press release, the police attacked the protesters (Hurriyet, 2013).

[15] For the full list of the constituents, see: http://taksimdayanisma.org/bilesenler

[16] (Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi in Turkish) The party was founded in 2008 as the successor to Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi in Turkish) which was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2009. The Party is well-known for its struggle against the human rights violations in Kurdistan of Turkey, its support to environmental activists and LGBT movements.

[17] Zabıta (Municipal Police) is a special branch of law enforcement legally responsible to the municipalities and the city councils. Distinct from the national police force, the municipal police are responsible for implementation of orders and prohibitions by city councils. It is not organically linked to the police force in Turkey.

[18] (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi in Turkish) The main opposition party in the parliament.

May 31 was one of the breaking points of the Resistance. On May 31, the police maintained the barriers to prevent the reoccupation of the Park and attacked the protesters with water cannons and tear gas to disperse them to the surrounding area. Many protesters were hospitalized including PM Onder who was shot by a canister on his shoulder (Vardan and Ocak, 2013). The protests grew and extended across Turkey. In big cities like Ankara, Izmir, Konya, Manisa, Mersin etc., separate demonstrations sprung up in support of the resistance for Gezi Park (Bianet, 2013). Particularly in Ankara and Izmir, two of the biggest cities after Istanbul in Turkey, police aggressively attacked protesters with tear gas and water cannons. A call was made for a demonstration at 19:00 in the Gezi Park. In order to keep participation in the demonstration low, the Metropolitan Municipality halted public transportation to Taksim Square (Bianet, 2013b), including the temporary closing down of Taksim Metro Station, which remained so during the duration of the occupation. But thousands still poured into Taksim Square, despite the fierce and violent police intervention. While demonstrations spread across Turkey, those who did not attend the demonstrations in the Square and the Park banged on pots and pans in the streets. Although the protesters were being aggressively attacked by the police, the mainstream media channels such as CNN Turk, Haberturk and NTV did not broadcast the police violence. For example, CNN Turk broadcast a documentary on penguins (Fleishman, 2013). These TV channels were later addressed as "the penguin media", in reference to that documentary.

On June 1, a group of thousands of people marched from Kadıköy[19] to Taksim via the Bosporus Bridge to join the protesters in the Taksim Square. On the fifth day of the clash with protesters, the police had left the Park and its periphery by

[19] Kadıköy is one of the most populated districts of Istanbul and on the Asian side of the city.

the afternoon (Hürriyet, 2013b), and people from the other districts of Istanbul joined the occupation to support the protesters and the Gezi Park Resistance. Those who were not able to get on the ferries were transported by private boats and yachts across the Bosporus. While the clashes in Taksim Square continued, people who supported the Resistance in the Park demonstrated with cacerolazo[20]. In other words, during these days, the whole of Istanbul had become a site of an expansive demonstration by people from different economic, political, and cultural backgrounds. One could easily see a demonstration in support of the occupation of the Park in separate districts of Istanbul.

On the next day June 2, in the early hours of the morning, protesters carried out an area cleaning in and around the Park. Area cleanings then became a regular morning activity carried out collectively by the protesters for fifteen days. Concomitantly, two fires which had been started on the previous day were extinguished by protesters working in collaboration. Following the cleaning, they also planted new flowers as a replacement of those which had been ripped out during the police attack. On the same day, then Prime Minister Erdoğan defined the protesters as "a handful of çapulcu[21]" (T24, 2013). The term çapulcu has a long history of usage in Turkey by politicians degrading and criminalizing protests against governments. But this time, protesters promptly embraced and transformed the word çapulcu into a symbol of the Resistance, starting to call themselves çapulcus. Even

[20] Cacerolazo is a tactic of civil disobedience, first used in Chile in the 1970s. It can be roughly defined as a group of people making loud noise by banging pots and pans to draw attention to ongoing protests. It again came into prominence during the neoliberal crisis in Argentina in 2001, then in Quebec in 2012 during students' strikes. (Source: http://beautifultrouble.org/tactic/cacerolazo/)

[21] Çapulcu roughly means marauder. The term chapulling was also derived from çapulcu. A Wikipedia entry was prepared for the concept (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapulling)

an internet-based channel titled Çapul TV was founded to live-stream videos and broadcast interviews from the Park.[22]

On June 3, despite the fact that the police had left the Park and its surrounding area, they continued to resort to violence against protesters in Dolmabahçe and Beşiktaş. Because ambulances were not able to reach those areas, doctors and medicine students who were attending demonstrations set up makeshift hospitals. One of them was in Dolmabahçe Mosque. Many protesters who were injured because of the police attacks and intense tear gas exposure were treated in the mosque. Prime Minister Erdoğan accused the protesters of entering the mosque without taking off their shoes and drinking alcohol there (Al Jazeera, 2013). Although he insisted on the matter of drinking and argued that there was evidence of this occurring until now no evidence has been provided.

In the following days, police continued their attacks against protesters in Istanbul and other cities where demonstrations to support the occupation in Gezi Park took place. While the clashes between the police and the protesters were ongoing, up until June 11 there had been no attack by the police on the Park and its surroundings. But on June 11, the police attacked the protesters in the Park several times during the day (Tahaoğlu and Akgül, 2013). The Mayor of Istanbul, Huseyin Avni Mutlu, invited parents to take their children out of the Park, claiming that the protesters were not safe there (Tahaoğlu, 2013). Following his warning, police attacked the Park again with tear gas and water cannons in the evening. On the next day, June 12, Prime Minister Erdogan met with representatives of the Taksim

[22] Çapul TV continued its broadcast through a web-site and a Youtube channel. During the Resistance the channel continued broadcasting interviews with the protesters and scenes from the Resistance. It had become a critical reaction to the indifference of the mainstream TV channels to the ongoing occupation of the Gezi Park. Although the web-site which Çapul TV used to broadcast is under maintenance currently, please see its Youtube channel to see the content: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiR-XdvDZAPdxtt47UHCzDw/videos

Solidarity Platform to hear their demands. The results of the meeting were discussed in seven simultaneous forums in the Park on June 14. On the morning of June 15, the Taksim Solidarity Platform announced the decision reached in the forums: the Resistance would continue. But the Resistance was completely dispersed on the evening, the police's fierce attack at 21:00 forcing the crowd to leave the Park and its surroundings.

Throughout the course of 20 days, a small-scale occupation of Gezi Park transformed into a massive protest movement during which protesters occupied a central area of Istanbul. Aside from the occupation in Istanbul, demonstrations were organized in all cities of Turkey, except one, to support the occupation movement. The police's violent attacks against the protesters injured many people and killed Mehmet Ayvalıtaş (20), Abdullah Cömert (22), Ethem Sarısülük (26), İrfan Tuna (47), Mustafa Sarı (27), Selim Önder (88), and Ali İsmail Korkmaz (19)[23].

The majority of protesters in the Resistance (78.9%) claimed that they had no ties with any organization, association, political party, foundation, etc. (Konda, 2013, p. 14). Only 6.4 % of the protesters defined themselves as representing a certain group. Additionally, Esra Ercan Bilgiç and Zehra Kafkaslı's (2013, p. 17) research on the Resistance demonstrates that those who attended the Gezi Resistance depict a motley picture of self-perception – according to their rating average: libertarian (3.77), environmentalist (3.47), laicist (3.44), democrat (3.34), Turkish (3.31), Ataturkist (2.95), Istanbulin (2.92), anti-militarist (2.74), anti-capitalist (2.70), socialist (2.66), leftist (2.63), student (2.58), Muslim (2.57), Kemalist (2.53), liberal (2.36), nationalist (2.28), feminist (2.24), atheist (2,16), nationalitarian (2.11),

[23]Additionally, Berkin Elvan (15) was shot with a tear gas canister on June 16, 2013; and passed away on March 11, 2014. He became one of the symbolic names representing the legacy of the Gezi Park Resistance. His funeral did turn into a huge demonstration. The prosecution of the alleged homicide could start after almost three years after Elvan's death.

apolitical (1.95), religious (1.78), communist (1.68), minority member (1.64), anarchist (1.59), conservatist (1.46), LGBTT individual (1.32), Kurdish (1.30), AKP supporter (1.17).

The surveys conducted during the occupation of the Park were not comprehensive enough to grasp a complete picture of the Resistance. The main reason beneath this was the fact that there was a continuous circulation of protesters in the Park. However, these surveys give a glimpse of the heterogeneous nature of the occupation. Moreover, there are dozens of interviews, maybe hundreds, which confirm the surveys[24]. Therefore, one may easily claim that there was no ideological center of the Resistance.

4.3. Daily practices and transformation

I will now attempt to narrate the daily activities in the Park and analyze them from the perspective of finding a different conceptualization of security in the Park than outside of it. In order to do so, the main focus of this section is the daily practices and life in the Park, the interactions between the protesters, and the components of how a sense of security was conceptualized there. In order to do this, I will explore the forums held in the Park, how daily encounters among protesters were experienced, and how the inner safety of the community was preserved. The struggle in, and for, the protection of the Park was actually the expression of other more entrenched lasting fronts of struggle: ecological sensitivity, neoliberal capitalism, repressive practices of the police, and conservative state policies (İnal, 2013, p. 17-18).

[24] Some of those studies are Bir Olmadan Biz Olmak (2014) by Yasemin Gülsüm Acar and Özden Melis Uluğ; Polis Destan Yazdı (2015) by Deniz Kologlu, Didem Gençtürk, Gözde Kazaz, H. İlsen Mavituna, Saner Şen

The processes which occurred during the Gezi Park Resistance transformed the Park and the surrounding area in accordance with the needs of the protesters. Although the planning of the Park and its periphery was shaped under the will of the central administration, the protesters adapted it with their presence and practices. They transformed the Park and its periphery for their daily needs by building up a kitchen, an infirmary; by establishing an independent TV, a radio, and a newspaper; organizing workshops; creating a garden and alternative energy sources; etc. (İnal, 2013, p. 17). This list acts as a reminder of Nuray Sancar's comment regarding the Resistance, in which she described the younger generation, as the protagonists of the Resistance, acting like in a city-building simulation game (Sancar, 2013, p. 52). In the referred genre, the main objective of the player is to build up self-sufficiency and reliance in surviving and then profiting. Although many of those games are formulated in conformity with capitalist rules, a gamer is free to build up a city to his or her liking. This genre started to be popular during the late 1990s and reached its peak in the mid-2000s. The most prominent ones were based on the idea of organizing the given resources and constructing a whole city from commercial zones, energy sources, and housing to recreational sites. In some versions of this game, the gamer is also responsible for the provision of security, health, and basic municipal services to the virtual dwellers of the city. The objective is for the gamer to keep his or her city habitable.

However the scene that Gezi protesters created during the occupation was almost totally free from the capitalist features of these games. For all of the respondents who were interviewed for this research, a community life evolved during the Resistance. While the main threat perceived was the police, most of the interviewees asserted that they felt secure and safe in the Park during the Resistance.

As a contingent gathering of protesters in the context of occupation, the protesters, in their eyes unintentionally built up a safe place in the Park. Both interviews conducted during this study and separate accounts of protesters from various backgrounds confirm this argument from different perspectives.

In the Park and its periphery, the protesters who were inhabitants there for fifteen days collectively transformed the occupied space in accordance with their needs. By altering the organization of the city, inhabitants revolutionized the forms of socialization. This newly formed community was free from a superior authority, an organized law enforcement and bureaucracy, and money (Zileli, 2013, p. 59). A protester from Taksim Solidarity explains the formation of how a small community without money was formed in the Park (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 458-459). Firstly, those selling alcoholic beverages were cleared out. Alcohol consumption might have jeopardized the Resistance against police attacks. Additionally, according to interviewees and accounts of the protesters, overuse of alcohol might facilitate the exacerbation of any disputes among people from different ideological backgrounds. Any clashes amongst protesters in the Park would strengthen the government's hand in dispersing the occupation through more violent means. Besides, as in the case of Dolmabahçe Mosque, the government tried to use the traditional values of society in Turkey to trigger and increase enmity against the protesters. Secondly, peddlers were removed from the Park by the protesters. Interviewee T states that she witnessed such an incident. The protesters asked peddlers to leave the Park not in order to found a commune in which there was no use of money, but for the fact that bottled gas in their carts may cause uncontrollable explosions and fire.

Finally, people started to bring food which was collected at certain points to be taken freely by the protesters. In addition to food, gas masks, water, medical

supplies, etc. were brought to the Park. Most of the interviewees (T and U) argued that they themselves had brought supplies such as food, water, and blankets to support the occupation. These were distributed in accordance to the needs of the protesters. Therefore, after a while, there was no need for the circulation of money. By applying such an order during the Resistance, the protesters formed their own secure place where there was no shortage of food or medical supplies. As implied in the accounts of the protesters and the interviewees (Interviewees U, X and Z), the protesters collectively took precautions to eliminate threats against the occupation. Considering that the referent object of security is what is being threatened, there were three main referent objects of security; the Park, the occupation, and the protesters themselves, both individually and collectively.

Forums were one of the most significant indicators of the collectivity in the Park. They were regularly held during the occupation of the Park. The main discussions were held in these open spaces without restricting any ideas. If one were to claim that there was a center of the Resistance, they would be these forums. Although, Taksim Solidarity was seen as the representative of the Resistance and called for a meeting with the government, the Solidarity was also bound by these forums and the protesters as well. One of the most significant features of these forums was that they were held by appropriating direct democratic methods. In most cases, people spoke for themselves. Forums were also one of the elements which extended the Resistance territorially. Even after the dispersal of the protesters from the Park, forums continued at focal points of many major cities including İzmir, Ankara, and the other districts of Istanbul (Tahaoğlu and Yöney, 2013).

However, another significant characteristic of the forums was creating links between the Gezi Park occupation and other parts of Istanbul, and even other big

cities of Turkey like Ankara and Izmir. Forums were also held in Maltepe, Cihangir, Beşiktaş, and Kadıköy in Istanbul. Decisions and declarations were announced after the forums were held. Those forums continued after the end of the Resistance. Attendants discussed various debatable issues such as how to maintain the Resistance or to extend the scope of it. These were rare experiences for the citizens of Turkey, considering the lack of instances of direct democracy across Turkey. During the forums the attendants developed their own rules of reaction to the speeches. The duration of the speeches were regulated to allow time for everyone to voice their ideas. These forums provided the opportunity for several groups which were opposed to each other outside of the Park to encounter each other. Moreover, the chance of these encounters allowed the protesters discuss many conflicting issues openly.

Narratives by the protesters provide a snapshot of the community formed in the Park and reveal the main features of the community itself. Different identities and individuals got together in the Gezi Park. Some attended the Resistance as part of a group and others individually. Those groups might be roughly categorized as leftists, Islamists, Kemalists, LGBT organization, nationalists, etc. Although the different groups were much more comprehensive than the above-mentioned list, owing to the limitations of making a quantitative analysis of the protesters it is difficult to make a fully comprehensive list of all the identities represented in the Park. However, the categorization of these identities can be taken as an indication that the heterogeneous crowd in the Park was an unexpected mixture, considering their previous disputes on a plethora of issues. Although these issues were not completely resolved in the Park, some were settled temporarily. The Resistance and an occupied space where there was no authority revolutionized the ways of socialization and the conception of security in the Park. Considering the fact that most of these groups had previously

not been able to, and still are not able to, gather and debate disputed issues, there must have been something special about the Park which rendered it possible for them to act collectively.

A category of one of the most popular groups, whose attendance in the Resistance surprised and even shocked most others, was the Islamists. Two of the subgroups of the Islamists who participated in the Resistance were Anti-capitalist Muslims and Revolutionary Muslims. These are groups which are mostly populated by young, Muslim individuals with Islamist-leftist arguments. They gather around a group of controversial Islamist intellectuals as their opinion leaders, the most celebrated of whom is Ihsan Eliacik, an Islamist writer. They attracted public attention during the May Day celebrations in 2012 and organized under the "Struggle against Capitalism Association" (Kapitalizmle Mücadele Derneği in Turkish). The name of the organization derives from the infamous "Struggle against Communism Associations" (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği in Turkish) which were a series of associations across Turkey led by Islamists and nationalists against the threat of communism in Turkey. Anti-capitalist Muslims' main argument is that the capitalist order is in contradiction with the foundational values of Islam. During their first attendance of May Day Celebrations and in the subsequent ones, they gathered in Fatih, which is a prominent historical district in Istanbul for Islamists, practiced Friday prayer and then walked towards Taksim Square to join the corteges of other organizations.

A member of the Anti-capitalist Muslims defined the 15 days experience in Gezi Park and the alternative societal relations which were formed during those days as "a small example of heaven because among those who were living there, there was neither boundary nor class... There was no discussion of whether you are on my side

or the other" (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 52). Gezi Park has already become a memory of a peaceful community or even a piece of heaven. What constructed this memory was the community which was contingently formed in the Park. A protester who declared himself a member of the Revolutionary Muslims argues that the Park was a place of encounter (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 70). He says that his prejudices against several political groups like Kemalists, Socialists, Republicans, and Communists had been adverse until the eruption of the Gezi Park Resistance. Those groups are perceived to be against religion, particularly Islam, in Turkey. Therefore, he described how he had expected protests and verbal attacks against their speeches during the forums. However, no Islamist groups' speeches were attacked, interrupted or protested. He says that those were critical moments during which their perception of the other groups had changed.

Interviewee T verified the strength of these encounters with an anecdote. She described how one day her boss asked his chauffeur to bring supply packages to the Park. Since the chauffeur did not know the way, the interviewee accompanied him to the Park. Along the way, he was complaining about why they had to take supplies to the protesters. The interviewee said that the chauffeur was not fully aware of the events in the Park and was prejudiced against the protesters. But when they arrived at the Park and asked some of the protesters to carry the supplies to the Park, the interviewee saw the shocked silhouette of the chauffeur. On their return journey, he was ceaselessly asking whether they were really the protesters and what was really happening in the Park. He was overwhelmed when he saw that the protesters who were carrying the supplies were university students who, in his eyes, were normal kids and not a bunch of dangerous terrorists. After that day, the interviewee

describes, he always asked whether she or the protesters in the Park needed anything as she was leaving the office to attend the protest.

Additionally, an LGBT activist states that the absence of police and municipal police around the Park and Istiklal Street was most impressive (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 139). As seen in the previous chapter, LGBT individuals gravely suffer from the police's repression in Beyoğlu district. LGBT individuals, especially transvestites or a transsexual person, are a regular target of law enforcement in Beyoğlu district. A case was described in the previous chapter, regarding the harassment of LGBTs by the police. Even the absence of the police may result in the elimination of factors of insecurity against LGBT individuals. As discussed in the previous chapter, the police's conception of security depends on certain threat, some of which are against specific identity groups. These groups are mostly marginalized, demoralized, and even demonized by established conceptualizations. The occupation of the Park and the elimination of the traditional security conception essentially cast out threats of law enforcement against LGBTs. LGBTs' heightened sense of security is therefore to be expected in the absence of the state's authority.

Another activist from Lambda Istanbul Association[25] also defined the absence of the police as a condition for security. She also described the occupation as "a piece of heaven" (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 171). This is the second case, within the scope of this study, where the metaphor of heaven is mentioned. The other case was the Islamist groups in the Park. Outside the Park, it is mostly the case that Islamist groups define LGBT individuals as perverts. However, in the context of the occupation of the Park, both groups were able to co-exist and described the occupation as a piece of heaven. The Park and the occupation was such for everyone

[25] Lambda Istanbul Association is an LGBT-rights advocate NGO in Turkey. For further information, please see: http://www.lambdaistanbul.org/s/

(Interviewee Y). The co-existence of different groups who were expected to clash under the so-called political order was possible during the Gezi Resistance. Some of the interviewees (X, Y, Z) asserted that this was for the protection of the Resistance and the Park. These groups' reason for being there was broadly the same - to protect Gezi Park and prove to the AKP government that the protesters were not content with the way the government was practicing politics.

4.4. Conditions of security in the Park

During the Resistance, many formerly adversary groups were mutually accommodated in the Park - Islamists were able to perform their religious duties uninterrupted while being part of the political activities such as attending forums or daily activities like cleaning the Park. They had become a part of the community while still preserving their Islamist identity. On the other hand, LGBT's were able not only to survive but also to raise their voices without being harassed or violated. This indicates the inclusive characteristic of security conceptualization in the Park. Taking the assumption that security cannot be easily established under the condition of survival, the Park had become a secure place for LGBT individuals to provide the conditions for the establishment of security. As mentioned in the previous chapters, in order to be secure, one should be able to enjoy a life far from threat, more than merely having the ability to survive.

Accounts from protesters often refer to the feeling of security in the Park. Most of them noted that their feeling of security was based on an idea of solidarity within the Park. Interviewee T, X, Y, and Z openly asserted that they felt, and also actually were, secure. Although they all accepted that the presence of the police around the Park and the constant threat of violent police attacks drove them to feel

insecure, knowing that the protesters in the Park would, and did, help and protect each other during the attacks gave all of them a sense of security. Additionally, they mentioned that this feeling was not interrupted until after the police had dispersed the Resistance utterly. An anecdote illustrates this point well. During a Friday prayer of anti-capitalist Muslims, LGBT individuals protected them from the rain with rainbow colored umbrellas (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 171). It was surprising for both those praying and for the rest of the protesters. Another incident is the protesters who simultaneously surrounded those practicing Friday prayer (Interviewee Y and T). Interviewees defined this moment as an astonishing and unexpected demonstration of solidarity in the Park and also suggested that the main purpose of the protesters was to prevent any provocation which might harm the Resistance.

The protesters were afraid of any potential harm to the legitimacy of the Resistance as a peaceful demonstration. The protesters were unwilling to lose their legitimacy, which might have facilitated a violent police intervention. Interviewee Y asserted that he was not expecting to remain in the Resistance forever. The Park was a place where protesters were not excluded (Interviewees T, X, and Y). They could express their ideas. Yet, they stressed one feature of the Park more than others - the fact that no one would interfere into their affairs. As such, the well-being of the Resistance itself became one of the referent objects of security. Most of the protesters were taking precautions to protect the Park and the Resistance. These precautions ranged from preventing potential quarrels among the protesters to keeping the Park clean. The transformation of the daily practices was in accordance with the perception of the threat, which in turn was adapted to the conditions of the Resistance. However, concerns with respect to the individuality of the perceptions of threat cannot be denied. The stress on others' interference in their affairs was also

what made the Resistance valuable for the protesters. In other words, the Resistance was a shield protecting the protesters not only from the attacks of the police but also from interference into personal matters. The protesters were only allowed to be a part of the Resistance as long as they complied with the rules which had been designated before they joined the occupation. The Resistance was what the protesters made of it - not something with the highest priority compared to the protesters' needs. Yet, these perceptions were not separate from each other. On the contrary, the Resistance was protected and cared for by the protesters because doing so eliminated some of the threats against the protesters.

However, this fear is not distinct from conditions outside of the Park. The protesters were concerned about the actions of the undercover police officers provoking clashes among different political groups in the Park (Interviewee X, Y, and Z). There were even violent incidents like the burning of cars and attacks against ATMs, for which the protesters saw the police as responsible. Despite accusations against undercover police throughout the Resistance, there is only a limited amount of material evidence to prove the accused provocations by the police. However many protesters mention the presence and activities of the undercover police or civilians working for the police on the internet or during interviews.[26] Additionally, Ayşen Uysal (2017, p. 293-251), who is a prominent researcher working on street protests and policing in Turkey, conducted a detailed study on policing activities during the demonstrations in Turkey. These activities include undercover police interference to

[26] There is even a topic (gezi parkı'na sivil polis sinsilikleri – 'undercover police sneakiness into Gezi Park' in English) on the well-known eksisozluk.com, a collaborative hypertext internet based dictionary. To read a couple of entries on undercover police, please see: https://eksisozluk.com/gezi-parkina-sivil-polis-sinsilikleri--3857438. There are also webpages dedicated to prove that undercover police were responsible for some violent incidents. To see an example: http://listelist.com/taksimde-oynanan-molotoflu-tiyatronun-en-guzel-sahneleri/. However, the activities and even the presence of undercover police officers in the Park were completely denied by the then Minister of Interior, Muammer Güler (Hürriyet, 2013).

demonstrations through sneaking into the crowds, surveying protesters, and recording information about the crowds to hand over to prosecutors. It is to be expected that the police would attempt to infiltrate the Resistance for further policing activities. However, it seems unlikely that these allegations can be confirmed until the incidents are officially proven.

Although there was a constant fear of the police's provocations breaking the Resistance, the protesters were also worried about potential disputes among political groups which had already earned each other's enmity before the Resistance. An interviewee stated that she could never feel safe among ultra-nationalist groups like Türkiye Gençlik Birliği[27] or Ülkücüler[28] and that she also did not feel safe in the Park (Interviewee X). However, she also stated that the Park had been the only place where she could feel as safe as possible next to those groups. Even though the protestors were not able to completely resolve the disputes among themselves, the imperative to keep the Resistance intact to prevent the government from reinserting its authority over the Park encouraged the protesters to push their political or identity disputes aside in the Park for the Resistance. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the protesters did not attempt to solve these discrepancies.

An LGBT activist from Lambda Istanbul, who claimed that, for her, Taksim and Gezi Park had never been safer before, argues that there was no reason to be cautious, and also adds that it was not only a result of the absence of the police (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 153). People were eager to understand each other and were open to collaboration and change. Ipek Demirsu (2013) provides an anecdote of such an

[27] Youth Union of Turkey. An ultra-kemalist and ultra-nationalist youth organization organized in almost all cities in Turkey among university and high school students.

[28] Members of the ultra-nationalist organization of Ülkü Ocakları (translated in English as Grey Wolves; direct translation: Idealists' Club). The organization is closely linked to the ultra-nationalist neo-fascist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party).

incident. A group of Çarşı[29] fans were shouting at the police, calling them faggots (*ibne* in Turkish). Çarşı is a football fan club which is widely known for its protest stance against the police violence towards football fans and during May Day celebrations. Although many distinct fan groups attended the Resistance, Çarşı was the most prominent regarding their resistance against police attacks. One protester approached the group and warned them that he was offended by their manner of expression. The group was first shocked and then responded by saying "you are an honorable (delikanlı) faggot who is resisting on our side" (Uluğ and Acar, 2014, p. 162). An interview with another LGBT activist revealed that Çarşı had also paid a visit to their office, which was then close to Taksim Square. One day, a group of people who wore scarfs with the Çarşı logo came to the office to apologize for insulting homosexuality while swearing (Uluğ and Acar, 2015, p. 153). This apology was not merely by a random group nor a random incident. Football has always been an infamous site of sexism, with many slogans cried out during the matches including sexist expressions. In the following days, those who were shouting sexist slogans were warned by Çarşı members (Sebik and Kizildag, 2013). While LGBT and/or feminist organizations were preparing graffiti, posters, and banners which demanded an anti-sexist change in swearing, some, not all, of the fan groups were attentive to their efforts (Demirsu, 2013). People started to perceive each other as fellow protesters. The encounters in the Park during the Resistance strongly affected and transformed separate groups and individuals, at least during the course of the Resistance.

[29] Çarşı is one among many fan groups of Beşiktaş Football Club, known for their political awareness and active participation in the Gezi Park Resistance. They had a pioneering role which drove different football fan clubs to join the Resistance.

For this reason Ayşe Gül Altınay regards Gezi as a school for those who took part in the Resistance (Altınay, 2013, p. 294). One of the most noteworthy incidents during the Resistance was the encounter between LGBT individuals and football fan groups (Altınay, 2013, p. 302). Each group was forced to learn from each other by resisting together. As long as societal relations, language, and practices were transformed, different groups and identities developed ways to learn and experience each other's presence.

The occupation of the Park and its surrounding were not the only factors which enabled an encounter between separate groups. The transformation of the area into an alternative space where people found the opportunity to engage with each other, or an isonomic foundation, opened them up not only to encounters with others but also to transforming themselves. There was the Resistance and the individuals and groups which forms and sustains the Resistance.

The role of the police was not completely limited to dispersing the occupation. They were not only an entity which was kept utterly outside of the Park - even their presence around or disguised existence in the Park also defined the occupation. As discussed above, the police force, whether in uniform or undercover, was one of the most important threats in the eyes of the protesters in the Park. As Ken Booth suggests, there is a distinction between a feeling of security and being secure. Therefore, their perception of the occupation and the protesters, and the way they were perceived is critical to crystallizing the conception of security in the Park.

4.5. Respect existence or expect resistance: The barricades

Accompanying to the internal organization of the Park, the barricades have solid symbolic value and are the material border between the two different

conceptualizations of security. The material significance of the barricades was to delay constant police attacks and prevent TOMAs (Riot Control Vehicle) to enter to the occupied area (Atılgan, 2013, p. 54). The barricades were erected following the casting of the state authority outside of the Park and the surrounding areas, and were defined as a deterrent factor against police's attempts to break the Resistance down (Atılgan, 2013, p. 54). The arterial roads reaching Taksim Square and Gezi Park were barricaded by the protesters. When the Resistance occurred, Taksim Square had already been transformed and had become a construction site. Hence, construction materials along with crowd control fences were the main components of the barricades. In a sense, barricades also represented how the Resistance transformed its environment. While crowd control fences were used by the police to contain a crowd, they became a part of the measures to contain the police outside the Park.

The barricades' existence had also a strategic value to establish the security of the Resistance and, so the protestors. A protestor defending the barricades explains how the other protestors embraced and supported the barricades (Atılgan, 2013, p. 54). He says: "There is huge cooperation [for the Resistance]. Here is a collective being. People bring stones and strengthen the barricades. Everyone supports us." (Çiltepe and Uluç, 2013, p. 53). Another says, "Yes, [the meals] are brought to us first. Because we are the advanced guards [of the Resistance], we receive the food before anyone else." (Çiltepe and Uluç, 2013, p. 53). In her piece on barricades, Başak Ertür also confirms the protestor's account and says, "[T]hose at the barricades were the first to receive their share of the daily medical provisions, food, clothing, and equipment that were donated to the occupation…" (Ertür, 2016, p. 101). Although there were many other protestors who did not take part in the barricades, it is plausible to argue that they supported and embraced the presence and

recognized the role of the barricades for the protection of the Resistance. They were significant to keep the occupied area secure against the police intervention. When the clashing parties stopped temporarily, there were protestors acting as watchouts to warn the other protestors in the case of a police activity against the barricades (Ocak, 2013).

The strategic significance also leads to a symbolic one. As a protestor named Salih stated, "A barricade is something symbolic. It is courage and strength." (Atılgan, 2013, p. 54). However, Ertür approaches the barricades from a different angle. In her essay on the barricades' role in the Resistance, she argues that building barricades is not merely a traditional token of resistance, but also recognizes vulnerability (Ertür, 2016, p. 118). Recognizing the vulnerability of the occupation, barricades become a site of resistance beyond heroification and monumentalization (Ertür, 2016, p. 116). Therefore, "[R]esistance may be understood as a reclamation of vulnerability, even when it appears as its very defiance through heroic acts by ordinary people who put themselves on the line." (Ertür, 2016, p. 118). During the Resistance, close to the barricade in Taşkışla[30], there was a signboard welcoming the protesters and warning the police: "Respect the existence or expect resistance". This was a slogan that became famous during Occupy Wall Street and, then, used during the Arab Spring. The protestors were mostly driven by anger against the ruling party which was believed to disrespect their existence. As can be seen above, they mostly accused the government and the state of not respecting certain identity groups, environment and transforming a public place without consulting the city dwellers. Additionally, the police brutality was a breaking point which triggered more than half of the protestors to join the Resistance (KONDA, 2014, p. 18). Considering the

[30] Taşkışla is in Gümüşsuyu, an artery reaching Taksim Square from Beşiktaş.

death incidents and injuries, a demonstration to demand respect for trees and the Park evolved into a resistance to defend protesters' bodily integrity and life in the Park.

4.6. The basic characteristics of security in the Park

What explains the sharp difference between the State's and the protestors' conceptualizations of security was the respective methods used to establish a secure space. The conceptualization of security in the Park differed from the outside on three main points: it was inclusive, horizontally organized, and voluntary. On the other hand, the conceptualization of security by the state was exclusive, vertically organized, and professional.

First of all, one of the core features of the security conceptualization in the Park was its inclusive nature. The Park was open to every civilian citizen. The occupation had started with a couple of protestors who came to defend Gezi Park and confronted the construction workers and police. Most of those were members of Taksim Solidarity. Nonetheless, in a few days, a small occupation turned into an unprecedented movement which held the Park and did not let the police enter for 15 days. The unprecedented nature of the occupation lied behind the presence of a myriad of identities or political groups defending the Park. According to KONDA's report, approximately 80 % of the protestors were not part of a political party, association, and/or foundation (2014, p. 14). While some of the identity groups were already marginalized like LGBT, Kurds, Leftist groups or non-Muslims, the others could be defined as mainstream or approvable identities such as Kemalists, conservatives, Turks, ultra-nationalists or Muslims. However most parties in the latter group of identities were marginalized during their support to the Resistance.

In the Park, however, all of these groups were represented by individual protestors or groups. Nevertheless, these groups' and individuals' presence in the Park does not explain how they could manage to form an inclusive understanding of security. These people achieved to live for days side by side, and maybe most importantly avoiding violence against each other in order to resolve a conflict. However, outside of the Park, before the Resistance, it was almost unimaginable to expect either that an Islamist and an LGBT individual even sitting close to each other, or a passionate football fan pondering on how to swear and curse with non-sexist words. As Gambetti asserted, this state of being together was not merely "a juxtaposition of social identities" (2016, p. 40). The identities had to encounter with each other. The absence of a dominant force determining what was normal or mainstream let no identity to enforce its discursive power over the rest. This absence did not automatically resolve the existing conflicts instantly. Only appearing in the Park did not suffice for LGBT protestors to earn the recognition of patriarchal mindset "without paying the price of swallowing tear gas" (Gambetti, 2016, p. 40). As Gambetti stated, this recognition could only be achieved with macho definitions the creation of a new language, such as the neologism "delikanlı faggot"[31]. Therefore, it can be said that the Gezi Resistance facilitated making one's identity visible and recognizable for other unfriendly identities. For some, there would be always delikanlı and not-delikanlı LGBT people who would and might be in need of earning recognition repeatedly at each encounter.

Nevertheless what was achieved through the Resistance was the generation of procedures of recognizing other identities. Thus, a masculine Turkish football fan became more prone to define his own and his identity's security along with the

[31]Delikanlı is a word in Turkish, which means honorable and courageous. The word is mostly associated with manly behavior.

security of an LGBT individual. Even if when group defined another as a threat, within the borders of the Gezi occupation, the former could not simply eliminate the latter. In the Park, the feminist groups were able to resolve the problem of sexist swearing by discussing the issue with the football fans. This did not eliminate the whole problem. But, the absence of a dominant identity or ideology forced everyone to start to discuss and communicate without violent means to resolve intergroup or intragroup disputes. Therefore the protestors were able to achieve an inclusive conceptualization of security which was not fueled by antagonism among groups. While an LGBT protestor may feel threatened by the presence of an Islamist or a macho fan group under normal circumstances, being in the Park made a transsexual individual feel safer than ever. The lack of a dominant position for any social identity obstructed the emergence of an identity-based threat perception.

The main threat perceived was the presence of the police beyond the barricades or any possible undercover police infiltration to break the Resistance. The second feature of the conceptualization of security in the Park, in addition to the inclusiveness, was its horizontal character. The reason behind the horizontal understanding in the conceptualization of security was the leaderlessness of the Resistance. Although holding a pioneering position, Taksim Solidarity never became the leader of the Resistance. There was no central core of the Resistance where the power to lead it would reside. The presence of an unexpected variety of people in the Park and the inclusive nature of the Resistance were defining factors for the conceptualization and the establishment of security in the occupied area. On the surface, the destruction of the Park was prevented by keeping the police outside of the Park. Additionally, the peace or at least the ceasefire among many groups was

reached to protect the park. However, as mentioned above, this was not about just standing together avoiding to get in touch with others.

The enmity between different football fan groups has always been prevalent in Turkey. Fenerbahçe fans dislike Galatasaray fans, or Bursaspor fans despise Beşiktaş fans. Wearing Fenerbahçe uniforms and freely walking in Beşiktaş district of Istanbul may become a dangerous challenge. But during the Resistance, a Galatasaray fan enthusiastically said: "When I saw a Fenerbahçe fan on the ground, I could have kicked him. But now, to protect him, I am ready to jump to death." (Çiltepe and Uluç, 2013, p. 53). These fans' implacable enmity were left aside during the Resistance. An alliance of all fan groups was formed, called Istanbul United, whose emblem was a combination of Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, and Beşiktaş football clubs[32]. These football fan groups were merged into each other by resisting. Most of them fought against the police officers at the barricades. The ceasefire was reached to protect the Park and other protestors. The superiority claim of Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, or Beşiktaş over each other became temporarily obsolete as a casus belli in the Park. Without a superiority claim, one of the referent objects of security was defined as other protestors given no priority.

And finally, intrinsic to the inclusive and horizontal conceptualization of security, the voluntary contribution to the security of the Park and other protestors was a distinctive factor with respect to the conceptualization. The protestors were not there for any professional duty. According to KONDA's report, more than half of the protestors came to the Park when they heard the trees started to be uprooted or when they saw the police violence.

[32] These are the most prominent football clubs originated from three districts of Istanbul.

After banishing the police from the Park, the protestors continued their voluntary efforts by cleaning the Park, caring for injured protestors, and transforming the Taksim Square and the Gezi Park into a home. The protestors attended all these activities voluntarily and organized the life in the Park. No group was to take orders from another. There was no hierarchical order among resisting groups or individuals. Nevertheless, this did not mean an unruly orderless gathering of people doing whatever they wanted in the Park. Those who had experience helped at the barricades. Protestors who were inexperienced were helped by the experienced ones.

> I was at the barricades but the tear gas had severe effects on me. I have asthma and could hardly bare to inhale the gas. But I wanted to be at the barricades. Someone saw me and came by my side and told me to step aside if I was feeling bad. I also told him that I wanted to help to them. He first looked at me. As you can see, I am a strongly built guy. He asked me to rest first and then if I feel better I could bring stones to the barricades. (Interviewee Z).

Those who were not able or willing to fight at the barricades were to bring stones, medical supply, or food. After a while, the protestors started to assume roles in accordance with their own conditions and the needs in the Park. However, the protestors were not entitled to a certain position or forced to do anything involuntarily. There was no fixed professional role of security provision.

4.7. From the police's eyes

The difficulty of accessing police officers to interview and therefore, the lack of research on the police officers' personal perceptions of civilians, protesters, politics, the state, and other issues has limited this paper's sources about the police's perception of the Gezi Park Resistance. There is only one study which gives an insight into how the police force viewed those whom they suppressed in Gezi Park - Ahmet Erkan Koca's book. Koca (2015) provides the personal perspectives of police

officers who served during the Resistance against the protesters. There are also the accounts of protesters from various sources regarding how the police treated and regarded them. Understanding how the police and protesters interacted with and perceived each other, may contribute to an analysis of the determinant role of the police in the conceptualization of security in the Park. This part of the chapter will also be a small addition to the discussion on how the police as individuals perceive security. In his work, Ahmet Erkan Koca (2015) illustrates how the police officers who engaged with the Gezi Park Resistance perceived the protesters. Firstly, protestors were commonly seen by the police as hiding their actual malicious intentions behind their love of nature (Koca, 2015, p. 15). According to the officers who talked to Koca, the Gezi Park Resistance was regarded as a foreign plot against Turkey, which was thriving economically and politically (Koca, 2015, p. 87). A protestor from Gezi Resistance also claims that the police asked him how much money he had been paid to attend the demonstrations (Koloğlu, et al. 2015, p. 130). The protesters, at least their leaders, were in the police's eyes those who were paid to rise up against the state. The police see themselves as the custodian of order and the defender of the state (Uysal, 2017, p. 220). Protesters who openly oppose the state's policies are, from the police perspective, automatically viewed as natural enemies. Moreover, perceiving the demonstrations as having been incited by external forces turns the police's role into that of protecting their country against foreign agents. This carries policing beyond a vocation. Although in some cases, the police may oppose the governments' decisions regarding amnesty or limiting the authority of law enforcement (Uysal, 2017, p. 220), in the context of the Resistance the police and the government were natural allies against those creating disorder. Any harm against the government, in the police eyes, was also against the state which is sacred.

Therefore, the police approached protests against the government as an act of war. This was not an instance of the police trying to settle simple bar fights – here, in the Resistance, they were against an enemy. Thus, Koca suggests that a discourse of winning-losing dominated the police (Koca, 2015, p. 87). A confirmation of this analysis can be seen in the Rapid Action Unit Head Fatih Sarıyıldız's pep talk-message to the officers on duty during the Gezi Park Resistance:

> Brave sons of Rapid Action Units! After the Legend of Çanakkale, you are making the second [legend]. Our brother wounded by a molotov cocktail returned to his duty with his arm bandaged. Another ran back to his duty the day after his marriage. Most of our brothers who were wounded refused to go on leave. We have hardly slept for 16 days. Often we have not been able to eat. We are serving our duties together under harsh circumstances. I am proud of serving under this unit full of heroes... (Gazete Vatan, 2013)

By changing some keywords, this pep talk may very well be used for soldiers who are tired of war but have enough reason and bravery to attack their enemy. However, when it comes to their distinction between friend and foe, it is not as simple as a binary of all protestors being the enemies of the state. The heroification of the police continued even after the dispersion of the Resistance. Then PM Erdoğan openly congratulated the police by announcing in a speech: "The police created a legend" (NTV, 2013). Most of the officers interviewed by Koca rejected the idea that all demonstrators in the Gezi Park Resistance were dangerous militants. They made a distinction between "demonstrators and innocent people, provocateurs and innocent people" (Koca, 2015, p. 88). They made the claim that during the first four days the occupation of part of the Park was within a civil-democratic framework, but from the fourth day on, when protesters poured into Gezi Park and Taksim, they argue that so-called destructive and separatist organizations and regular people became mixed up in the Park. In other words, the police began to see elements of the crime against the state. Thus, from that point on, police did not have the urge to indulgence in being

polite to the demonstrators. One of the officers stated: “We have nothing to do with those reading books. Our problem is with militants. Militants' aim is to spoil everything. They spring up whenever things are put on the right track.” (Koca, 2015, p. 92). Here, we see another manifestation of threat in the police’s eyes. Those offending and intending to harm the welfare and order of society are the militants. Protesters were argued to be serving the foreign enemies of Turkey. The police took the opposition of the protesters as a direct threat to the security of the state due to the fact that the very essence of their raison d’être is to preserve the order and protect the integrity of the state. The police force, in this case, and many others, positioned itself as the extension of the government. By openly stating that “they [protesters] see us [police] as inferiors, they see us as those voting for AKP”, an officer frankly declares that their colleagues are defending the order of the government. However, merely being around where the protests occurred was enough to be exposed to police violence. Even an AKP member was a victim of that violence (Koloğlu, et al. 2015, p. 65-67).

While this point may seem to be obvious, nevertheless it is important to comprehend how the police position themselves as protecting a regime of truth. Situating oneself as a defender of, or the custodian of the government and order, the police also perceive the protesters/criminals to be morally corrupt people. Koca's interviews confirm this, indicating that police officers persistently argued that protesters were morally corrupt (Koca, 2015, p. 95). There were two specific alleged transgressions which the government-backed media and representatives of the government stressed heavily. The first was later referred to as the “Kabataş incident”. The incident was argued to have happened on June 1, 2013, during the first days of the occupation in Kabataş, which is one of the main transportation hubs in Istanbul.

The supposed victim was a prominent AKP politician's daughter-in-law. She asserted that a large group of men wearing black leather trousers and donning chains had humiliated, harassed and urinated on her. The incident was used by the government backed media as an indicator of how morally aberrant the protesters were. However, the incident was never proved but instead was falsified by the records of surveillance cameras.[33] The second incident was the accusation against protesters who wore shoes to enter a mosque, and drank alcohol there. Although the imam of the mosque rejected the accusations against protesters, the supporters of the government resorted to the incident to show how perverted the protesters were. The protesters' moral breakdown also proved, in the eyes of the police, that they were hiding their true intentions (Koca, 2015, p. 15). This narrative renders the fight against those militants as something vital and essential. The police here are defending the order and peace against those who desire to bring chaos and evil upon society. As Koca (2015) explains in his analysis, this narrative goes back to police education on which Gustave le Bon's ideas about masses have profound influence (Koca, 2015, p. 93-96). Le Bon argues that any individual in a crowd is aberrant and allows his or her wild instincts to take over morality (Uysal, 2017, p. 227).

In EGM's (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü – the General Directorate of Security) 2009-2013 Strategic Plan, there is a statement which summarizes the securitizing point of view that the police force officially has. The document heavily stresses that one of the crucial things the police should be aware of is not to mistake citizens for terrorists (EGM, 2008, p. 43). Firstly, the police officially acknowledge the existence of the category of terrorist. Secondly, a terrorist is alienated from the conception and rights of a citizen. In other words, a terrorist is categorically outside of, and

[33] For more detailed account on the incident: http://t24.com.tr/haber/adim-adim-didik-didik-kabatas-olayi,251474

destructive to, the order which the police is dedicated to protecting. Therefore, stepping outside the boundaries of the order to be preserved is reason enough to be punished and/or disposed of. As Erkan Koca suggests, police have a punitive attitude towards people, specifically when a limit is passed, whereby one does not obey any direct order given by the police (2013, p. 281). Uysal (2017, p. 222) also argues that the police acted against the protesters as if they were prosecutors. Additionally, Koca argues that the police took mere disobedience as an insult to its own authority and the self. This disgracefulness is taken at both a personal and national level (Koca, 2013, p. 282). The police as the protector of state authority and the political order personalize their public service as a service to the nation and the state. Therefore any disobedience against the police is also disobedience against the state. This self-positioning leads them to see the protesters in the Park and all over Turkey as terrorists targeting the integrity of the state or, at least, civilians who had been deceived by these terrorists.

The police's immediate conceptualization of security during their encounter with the protesters in the Park was shaped through three phases. Firstly, the police understand themselves as the protector of the state and its order. Secondly, they are also a reflection of the state's authority against the order-breaking protesters. And finally, as a crowd, the protesters were essentially dangerous to the public due to their unleashed immorality, cruelty, and enmity against the people. As an addition to the previously discussed conceptualization of security in the police force, in the case of the Gezi Park Resistance, the police's reactions also reveal that there were both individual and state levels of perception of threat. Although this result resembles the perception of threat by the Resistance, which was both experienced at the individual level and the level of the Resistance, the perception of the threat of the protesters at

the Resistance level was derived from individual expectations. The protesters were attempting to protect something not given, their own creation of the Resistance, as opposed to the reality of the state, which was the equivalent for the police. The value which was attributed to, and tried to be protected by, the Resistance was the protesters' own security and personal and community level well-being.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to follow the tracks of an alternative conceptualization of security formed during the Gezi Park Protests. Parallel to this, my main hypothesis at the beginning was that protesters were able to develop an alternative conception of security during the Resistance. What made the difference in these two separate pictures was not a complete change from a state-level conceptualization of security to an individual one. For each case, there were two main referent objects of security. The referent objects in security conceptualized by the police were the citizens, police officers, and the state. Parallel to this, they were the protesters as individuals and the Resistance in the Park. What distinguished the conceptualization of security in the Park from the police's conceptualization of security were three main characteristics: inclusiveness, horizontal organization, and voluntariness. On the contrary, the conceptualization of security by the police was exclusive, vertically organized, and professional.

As can be seen in Chapter 3, the police had an exclusive understanding of security. Establishing security can be roughly defined as eliminating threats. The distinctive point between two different understandings of security is how the threats are defined. The threats are determined in accordance with the referent objects of security. Intrinsic to their duty, the police are conditioned to search for threats within the society. As discussed in Chapter 3, in addition to eliminating threats against citizens' lives and well-being, the police are also entitled to eliminate threats against the political order. For the sake of establishing security of the state, a native language can be identified as an immediate threat to the integrity of the political order. Or a

group of people defending their civil rights can be designated as a threat to the political order and beaten up and detained by police officers. Depending on the political context, what is identified as a threat also changes. However, as can be seen in the context of the Gezi Park Resistance, the protestors developed an inclusive understanding of security. When the protestors from various groups had to encounter with each other and resolve their disputes, their method of resolution was not to eliminate or contain the threat. Rather than that, protestors were able to devise a peaceful way to solve their conflicts. It was unimaginable for Kemalists or ultra-nationalist to stay close to a pro-Kurdish group. Normally, what was expected was those groups to fight with each other. Nevertheless, they were willing to stay side by side and communicate. This condition forced these groups to re-evaluate their social identities. The situation was the same for the Islamists, football fans, and LGBTs.

In addition to exclusivity, the police understood security from a vertical and professional perspective. Police officers are bounded to their duties by the law. They have superiors to give order; and officers are obliged to carry these orders out. A police officer's career is depended on his or her responsiveness to these orders. Although there is a possibility that police officers can object to an unlawful order, the institutional culture and subjective procedures of promotion may simply prevent them from doing so. Therefore, rather than assuming an understanding of security in a horizontal order, the police concur to a top-down understanding. On top, there is the state as the primary determinant of the threats. The police officer, on the other hand, is bounded with a contract where he or she admits to obey the orders. A protestor who fought at the barricades says: "There were times when we chat with the police. We asked 'Why do you do this, you are exaggerating [the violence]'. He responded 'We are just servants.'" (Atılgan, 2013, p. 54).

The police's duty is a professional one for which police officers are paid. It is hard to argue whether a certain proportion of them see their jobs as being a service to the motherland or merely a professional duty. However, one can presume that there might be police officers who perceive their duty only at a professional level. Establishing security is their job. On the contrary, the protesters in Gezi Park were there voluntarily and not bounded by a written law to preserve security in the Park. The protestors were only bounded by the implicit contract to protect the Park, trees, and fellow protestors.

Throughout this research, as mentioned above, I focused on two cases: the police force and the protesters who occupied the Park. One of the most challenging phases was to find a coherent theory of security which could be applicable to both an institution and individuals. For this reason, a definition of security was focused on which defines the threat perception and security as being free from threats. Taking security as a derivative concept made my search for separate conceptualizations of security easier. After establishing how to define security, I started to investigate the conceptualization of security in the police force. The perspective of the police force was critical to make sense of what security means for the state since the state's conceptualization can be understood through the police officers' understanding of security. Taking into account that police are one of the primary tools to establish safety in the urban areas, police's actions play a defining role in the implementation of the public safety policies by the state. Yet, as can be seen in Chapter 3, the police's sole purpose is not only to preserve public safety, but also maintain the political order. Therefore, police force and its actions were significant variables to understand security in the eyes of the state. The top-down and vertical nature of the police duty gives the opportunity to assume that the police's understanding of

security resembles the state's. I first examined the evolution of the police as an institution and, alongside this, the legal framework which formed the boundaries of the authority of the police force. Following this, a focus on the practices of police violence and how officers legitimized their extra-legal actions revealed that police exercise the security of the state – not of its constituents but of its institutional existence - as an end in itself. However, for the Resistance, the security of the Park and the constituents of the Resistance – the protestors – was the basis of the conceptualization.

There are officers who claim that they are the protectors of the political order and the state against internal threats. They perceive their own duty as being vigilant against anything jeopardizing the state's integrity. However, this does not mean that they completely exclude the security of citizens. But they have a fluid understanding of citizenship, rather than a portrait of a citizen drawn with legal and legitimate rights. For the police, a citizen should be loyal to the state and not raise their voice against either it or the police force. Although some police officers believed that some of the protesters were concerned citizens, they also believed that these people had been deceived by marginal groups – incurable threats – to rise up against the state. The separation of marginal groups and ordinary citizens helped the police easily designate who to suppress. From their perspective, marginal groups should be kept under control or, if necessary, crushed by the police.

In the third chapter, these identities were discussed, and how the police were organized to criminalize and incarcerate the different identity groups. In the police's eyes, there are certain characteristics which indicate a potential criminal. These features can be the color of one's skin, the country or city of origin, the neighborhood resided in, or a political view represented. The act of protest becomes

securitized by the state and, therefore the police. At this point, we see the symbolic power of the concept of security. As long as an issue is stigmatized as a matter of security, extra-legal actions can be justified to be taken. The violence against protesters is legitimized through this perception of threat. Once an action is defined as a source of threat against the integrity of the state, the police tend to attack fiercely. Although both the citizens and the states are legally mentioned objects of security for the police, they have the disposition to prioritize the security of the state, due to the professional and vertical nature of their duty.

As for the protesters who participated to the Gezi Park Resistance, however, they have an inclusive, horizontal, and voluntary conception of security. As discussed in the previous chapter, the protesters were concerned with their own security which was also bound with the security of the Resistance. They tried to protect the Resistance by keeping many conflicting political and social groups at peace. Although this was a form of temporary state of peace, their desire to keep the Resistance intact against the attacks of the police became the priority. As shown in the previous chapter, the protesters in the Park were a mixture of the spectrum of political and social identities in Turkey. What brought them together was different for each group or individual. What creates the main distinction with respect to the conceptualization of security was the relative inclusiveness of the Park.

The difference is in their methods of resolving the disputes and, therefore, the elimination of the threats. Seeing the constant threat of violence by the police, the protesters were inclusive to everyone who would strengthen their resistance against the government. The Resistance was a guarantee for their security. The protesters started to define themselves with the Park and the Resistance throughout these fifteen days, and even afterward. Their well-being and security were dependent on the

integrity of the Resistance. Nevertheless, they were not completely secure, as long as they were under threat by the police. They should have kept the integrity of the Resistance by protecting each other. Undercover police or groups were perceived as threats. However, taking precautions against the police, and trying to resolve, if not settle, disputes among groups, for the sake of the resistance, were the methods employed to prevent the occupation from ending. The act of occupation and erection of the barricades were a means of defense, rather than an act of aggression. The whole Resistance started against the aggression of the police. By assuming the position of defense against an exclusive, vertical, and professional understanding, the protestors succeeded in developing a distinctive understanding of security than the state's. It would be a flawed argument to suggest that the approach to disputes in the Park was always to resolve conflicts among individuals and different groups. As stated in the previous chapter, an interviewee from Kurdish origin asserted that she was not completely free from her fears of the ultra-nationalist and Kemalist groups. However, the will to maintain the Resistance kept the protesters inside the Park safe. The threat of police violence, the demolition of the Park, and therefore the dispersion of the occupation held the utmost significance for the protesters.

Therefore, rather than representing a bubble and something separate from the conceptualization of outside the Park, the security understanding which was developed in the Park was actually a byproduct of the state's conception of security in Turkey. What drove the protestors to develop an inclusive, horizontal, and voluntary conception was the aggressiveness of the state's conception. The fear of the police, of losing the green areas to the invasion of the construction frenzy, and the feeling of oppression by the government's policies paved the way for the protesters' conception of security during the Resistance.

In this study, I mainly focused on the international relations discipline and how security was conceptualized in international relations literature. The notion of security is utterly fundamental and foundational for the discipline. It is widely discussed and problematized by the international relations theorists.

As Çalkıvik notes, international relations theorists mostly accept the sovereign as the sole security provider in exchange of submission to the law devised by this sovereign body (Çalkıvik, 2010, p. 22). This bargain is supposed to be sine qua non for the modern citizen to achieve a secure environment. The other variables, such as relations with other states or global warming, are only secondary compared to a state or a sovereign. The law needs to be applied and enforced by a sovereign which is capable of violent means to prosecute and punish, for the purpose of avoiding a chaotic world where no one is secure from his or her neighbor's violent actions without the protection of this Hobbesian sovereign. This was the logic which was implicitly contested.

The protestors, by expelling the state from the Park, not only challenged the authority of the state but also its sovereignty. The state as the sovereign was no longer in the occupied area to protect its citizens. From a Hobbesian and liberal perspective, each and every protestor should have been prone to a potential violent act by another protestor in the Park, because the sovereign was no longer present there. But what happened in this case? Even without a sovereign, protestors achieved the establishment of conditions to be secure from a supposed threat from others. The only solid threat of violence was that posed by the police. The Resistance, therefore, was a challenge to the sovereign and its sovereignty. The core argument of the sovereign as providing security in exchange for obedience was contested by the protestors who attended the Gezi Park Resistance.

Those who came to the Park were not in search of a safer and more secure place than that in which they had lived. They were there for many reasons such as preventing the destruction of Gezi Park, disliking or hating the government, resisting police violence. The list goes on. However, no one was there to feel or be secure. They were not in the streets for safety. Security, depending on the definition employed in this study, was what the protestors achieved, but not what they had sought. The protestors were aware of the fact that they might be gassed, beaten with batons or shot by water cannons. By embracing their vulnerability, protestors were able to resist the violent means of the police force. They trusted each other and resisted in solidarity against the police.

With reference to Jean Jacques Rousseau's conception of solidarity, another inference of the contingent community in the Park can be interpreted as the replacement of security with solidarity. From this perspective, what cemented the communitarian life in the Park was not the common perception of threat but the trust between the protestors. Solidarity in equality and without dominance could enable a community which did not prioritize security, or in other words the elimination of threats. However, a protestor stated that he could sacrifice his life for another fellow protestor. From a Rousseauian perspective, security was no longer an issue of debate for the protestors in the Park since they could form a community in solidarity.

As a contested concept, the Gezi Park Resistance opened up new questions to be asked regarding the concept of security. This thesis is merely an attempt to reflect on one of these questions. The Resistance was not merely an occupation movement but also a laboratory for social scientists. The fifteen-day occupation challenged concepts and notions which are mostly taken for granted. One of these concepts was security. In this thesis, I have tried to shed some light on how the state-centric

conceptualizations of security is not sufficient to make people feel secure. Even though this attempt was a way to approach the Resistance, it is possible to ask what the Resistance taught us with respect to security. Considering the concept's function in hierarchies and power relations, it is possible to ask whether the Resistance was a challenge to the concept of security as a whole. Approaching security as a technology of power rather than a state of being profoundly changes the way we can ask and reply to a question regarding security with respect to the Gezi Park Resistance.

Considering the results of this study, one could argue that occupy movements can produce a conception of security which is a byproduct of the conception held by the state. Furthermore, I believe that follow-up research on what changes have occurred in the lives of the protesters, with respect to the occupation of the Park, should also be studied. Finally, I encountered cases which indicate that the marginalization of different identity groups may cause the development of various new strategies of establishing security. Although these strategies are not completely isolated from the state's conception of security, the mutual perceptions of threats may reveal new aspects of marginality caused by state policies.

At the conclusion of this research, I have found that an alternative way of practicing security was developed by the protestors, albeit contingently. Contrary to an exclusive, vertical, and professional practice of security, the protestors managed to form relations to secure themselves in an inclusive, horizontal, and voluntary manner.

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