

THE “WORK” OF CARING FOR  
THE ELDERLY:  
LABOR, VALUE AND THE GIFT



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2018

THE “WORK” OF CARING FOR THE ELDERLY:  
LABOR, VALUE AND THE GIFT

Thesis submitted to the  
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in  
Sociology

by  
Dilan Eren

Boğaziçi University

2018


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
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
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
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July 2018


## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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## ABSTRACT

### The “Work” of Caring for the Elderly: Labor, Value and the Gift

This thesis focuses on paid eldercare relations which are claimed to be “family-like.” Contrary to the scholarly tendencies that reduce the claim of being “family-like” into mere tactical usage in paid-care relations, this thesis suggests taking this popular idiom seriously, and aims to trace what this claim corresponds to in the daily materiality of the paid care of the elderly. To focus on the singularities of paid eldercare, the thesis starts with an investigation of the organization of care work and explores the kind of labor that it requires. One of the central arguments of the thesis is that the site of care labor expands to include actions and practices which are traditionally seen as non-labor. Therefore, what counts as “labor” becomes one of the major discussions of this thesis. Following the discussion on what care labor is, the second major concern of the thesis is to focus on the question of the “value” of such labor. Here, it is argued that the labor of the care provider becomes valuable to the extent that it is articulated with non-labor. An analysis of the questions of “what makes care labor valuable” and “in which ways it is valorized” directs us to consider the gift as a mechanism of surplus extraction from the non-labor of the care provider. In this respect, the third major concern of this thesis is to explore the substantial role of gift relations for paid care relations to be considered as “family like.” The question of the gift is posed particularly considering what it costs to care providers to gift their non-labor in exchange for employers’ gift of *living-with*. The thesis argues that gifting non-labor, before anything else, guarantees these women to “stay” as the care provider.

## ÖZET

### Yaşlı Bakım “İşi”: Emek, Değer ve Armağan

Bu tez “aile gibi” olduğu iddia edilen ücretli yaşlı bakım ilişkilerine odaklanır. “Aile gibi” olma iddiasını basitçe taktiksel bir kullanıma indirgeyen akademik eğilimlere karşı bu tez, bu popüler deyimini dikkate almayı önerir ve bu iddianın bakım ilişkilerinin gündeliğinde neye tekabül ettiğinin izini sürmeyi amaçlar. Ücretlendirilmiş yaşlı bakımının özgül yanlarına odaklanarak bakım işinin organizasyonunun bir incelemesi ile başlayan tez, bu işin ne tür bir emek gerektirdiğini sorgular. Tezin temel argümanlarından biri, bakım emeğinin alanının geleneksel olarak “emek olmayan” olarak görülen eylem ve pratikleri de içine alacak şekilde yayıldığıdır. Bu yüzden de neyin “emek” olarak görülüp görülemeyeceği tartışması bu tezin en önemli tartışmalarından biridir. Bakım emeğinin ne olduğu tartışmasını takiben, bu tezin ikinci önemli sorusu bu emeğin “değeri” sorusudur. Burada, bakım sağlayanın emeğinin “emek olmayan” ile eklemlendiği ölçüde değerli/ kıymetli olduğu iddia edilir. “Bakım emeğini değerli/ kıymetli kılan nedir” ve “böylesi emek hangi biçimlerde değerlendirilir” soruları bizi, “armağan” nosyonunu bakım sağlayanın emek olmayanından artı değer sağlayan bir mekanizma olarak değerlendirmeye yöneltir. Bu açıdan, bu tezin üçüncü büyük kaygısı armağan ilişkilerini ücretli bakım ilişkilerinin “aile gibi” görülmesini sağlamadaki önemli rolünü açığa çıkarmaktır. Burada, armağan sorusu özellikle işverenin “birlikte-yaşama armağanına” karşılık olarak bakım sağlayanın emek olmayanını armağan etmesinin neye mal olduğunu gözetir ve “emek olmayanın” armağan edilmesinin, her şeyden önce, bu kadınların bakım sağlayıcılar olarak “kalmasını” güvenceye aldığı tartışılır.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to start with thanking to my thesis co-advisors, Nükhet Sirman and Ceren Özselçuk; without them, writing this thesis would be impossible. Nükhet Sirman has always been a great mentor to me. She is the one who taught me both the joy and the nuances of doing social sciences; I will be always indebted to her.

Without her gracious support and encouragements, I could not dare to suggest such an articulation of data and theory in the way it is pursued in this thesis. I owe her a lot. Likewise, I am sincerely grateful to Ceren Özselçuk for all the intellectual support she has provided me for years. Theoretical disputes of ours has always been a true source of inspiration for my intellectual development. Without her stimulating comments and critical perspective, without our disagreements and long discussions –which I have always enjoyed and learnt a lot from– this thesis would not be completed. I also would like to thank to Biray Kolluoğlu and Tuna Kuyucu, not just for accepting to become a part of this process, but also for providing a great working environment to me, for their friendship and support. And I would like to thank to Başak Can, for making time and accepting to become a part of this thesis process.

I am truly indebted to each and every single member of Boğaziçi Sociology Department, their impact on my personal and intellectual development is huge. Especially, I would like to thank to my dearest professors Abbas Vali and Belgin Tekçe; I learnt a lot from them. Also, I would like to thank to Ayfer Bartu Candan for the support she has provided for me especially during my field research. I am more than grateful to Güzin and Caner for their friendship. A bit sarcastic, a bit intellectual, a bit gossip-like but always joyful conversations of ours will be one of the things I will miss the most. With her honesty, frankness, humor and sharp-

mindedness, Güzin has always had a great impact on me, I am sincerely grateful for her companionship. And I am grateful to Gizem for her friendship and being the best colleague, one can ever have.

Also, I would like to thank to all the friends from SBK. Between the years 2010 and 2015, SBK has been a great place for new encounters and intellectual discussions. I will always remember those times as the times of joy and will remember those friends always with a smile.

I am also thankful to my mom and dad for the years-long support and the great patience they have provided for me. They have always been there for me.

Lastly, I want to thank to Can for all those years we have spent together. Whenever I felt lost, his enthusiasm and support helped me to find my way back. Without his presence, constant support and encouragement, this thesis could not be completed.



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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION:  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “FAMILY-LIKE” PAID CARE  
FOR SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

1.1 Introduction

Being paid is such a decisive feature that it is almost impossible not to be haunted by it in the attempt of analyzing it. If something is paid, all other features tend to remain in the shadow. In other words, when something becomes paid, it is almost impossible for the analysis not to proceed upon the process of commodification and its “moral” entailments.

The repercussions of this perspective can be seen in the analyses of paid-care as well. When the object of analysis is paid-care, the care character of it tends to be overshadowed by the paid character. The terms of the analysis tend to be overdetermined by it being a wage relation, it being regarded as a commodity relation. That is to say, while in its unpaid form the analysis is more akin to an exploration of the notion of care, in its paid form the issue is approached as if it were like any other work. Here, the focus becomes how care is turning into work<sup>1</sup>, and so, the care provider is turning into a worker.<sup>2</sup>

There are, I believe, two sources for this reading to prevail: the impact of “hostile worlds” (Zelizer, 2011) perspectives on our reasonings –there is, on the one hand the world of money, and on the other hand the world of intimacy the terms,

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance, Joy M. Zarembka, “America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day Slavery” in *Global Woman* (2004).

<sup>2</sup> See for instance “The Decasualization of Elderly Care” by Goodin and Gibson. Their work exemplifies the problem clearly: they discuss paid care as a “by product of commercial contract” while unpaid care is the by product of casual engagement. It is hard to find room for the complexity of “attitude” and “action’s” convergence. In Feder Kittay and Feder, 2002.

organization of which are supposed to be hostile—, and the tendency of over-valoring the commodification effect—the perspective which argues that in the last instance what is determining is its circulation in the money economy. In assessing paid care, the more conservative/essentialist argument goes like that, care, which is something supposed to be the intimate, private, and family-based becomes corrupted when it is waged, by way of gaining the attributes of being rational, public<sup>3</sup> and worker-based. Designating the space of care and the space of waged-work as the two separate worlds with two separate rationalities, this approach in its margins reads paid care in terms of the loss of purity.<sup>4</sup>

Contrary to this line of reading, feminists offer another way to approach the issue of paid care in a non-essentialist way. The feminist line differs from the first one by refusing to conceptualize care as if it was something “natural” or “intimate”. Rather, feminists have always worked to undermine the social and cultural assumptions about the “naturalness” of women’s work, and the work of care is one of them. In this sense, while the conservative-essentialist line tends to approach paid-care in terms of the corruption of an untouched space, the feminist approach, with all its differences<sup>5</sup>, tends to read paid-care as doubly problematic: caring in its unpaid form is already problematic<sup>6</sup>, since it is marked by patriarchal domination which imposes the responsibility of taking care primarily on the shoulders of women; when

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, see the work of Lynn May Rivas: “Invisible Labors: Caring for the Independent Person” in *Global Woman*. Here, Rivas characterizes paid care in the form of personal attendants for the elderly and the disabled as public fundamentally because it is performed by non-kin. (2004, p.82)

<sup>4</sup> This can be followed in the discourse of the Turkish government as well. In its campaigns and regulative programs, the corruption of familial values holds an important place.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, see one of the most influential radical feminist Christine Delphy’s book *Main Enemy: Materialist Analysis of Women’s Oppression* (1997), or one of the leading figures of Marxist feminist, Silvia Federici’s writings (2012).

<sup>6</sup> Feminists have already problematized the illusion of ‘the tale of warm happy home’. It is a phrase in Turkish ‘*sıcak yuva masalı*’ to expose that the family is not the site of support and intimacy but the site of violence against women and exploitation marked by patriarchal structuring. For instance see, *Sıcak Yuva Masalı* (İlkkaracan, Gülçür & Arın; 1996). Or for a similar perspective see, *Haven in a Heartless World* (Lasch, 1995).

it is paid, it is more problematic since it multiples the problem of gender inequality with class inequality. While in the feminist line, the “hostile-worlds” perspective does not prevail as it does in conservative/essentialist readings, the risk of over-valoring the quality of being paid over the quality of care still prevails in both.

Of course, by no means I try to devalorize the importance and contribution of the works which stand to explore the organization of such work by highlighting the paid quality of it. On the contrary, I do believe that it is quite important to show the new faces of the social organization of caring; and the changing facets of exploitation coming from its paid quality certainly deserves attention. There are many well-constructed studies to exemplify such a frame of discussion; undisputedly the famous book *Global Women* (2004) edited by Ehrenreich and Hochschild is one among the leading in the field. Or, in the context of Turkey, one can refer to the works of Ayşe Akalın<sup>7</sup>. These are studies which expose how the ‘biopolitical vulnerabilities’<sup>8</sup> of certain women are cultivated to make them even more suitable to work in one of the least paid and the most flexible jobs.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See for instance, Akalın (2007) and Akalın (2015).

<sup>8</sup> ‘Biopolitical vulnerability’ is a concept I articulate with reference to the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics (1990; 2003) and to Etienne Balibar’s discussion of exploitation (2013). Balibar expands the definition of exploitation by including actions such as taking advantage of others’ vulnerabilities and weaknesses which I think are inherently biopolitical, even if Balibar himself does not use this particular term. In the literature of care, there is a similar conceptualization that Aihwa Ong (2006) articulates as “biopolitical availability” which I do not choose to adopt because I think “availability” is secondary to “vulnerability”. I am not arguing, for instance, how certain women’s being already mothers make them suitable (available) for care work, but rather, I am arguing that it is important to discuss how certain women are situated, by the articulation of various vulnerabilities, made to be more flexible and mobile, thus, “available” for certain tasks, like caring. That is why I prioritize “vulnerability” over “availability”.

<sup>9</sup> Of course, living in Turkey makes it impossible to overlook such an aspect. Migrant women’s labor, especially in the case of women coming from “the east” —not just eastern European women but women coming from Armenia and women coming from the eastern side of Turkey— is the fundamental source of the labor force for the care market in Turkey. In this sense, yes, migration is an undeniable feature in the formation of the market for care, but only if migration is understood not just as transnational or regional migration, but fundamentally in terms of “being mobile” as well. In other words, the notion of migration here denotes first and foremost the notion of deterritorialization of certain women who are marked by their mobility. Here, the concept of deterritorialization signals the structural conditions, especially economic recessions and civil wars which make it impossible for women to stay or take “root” in the spaces where they are, and which force them to be mobile in order to survive. In other words, the ones who are the primary labor source of the care market are the

In fact, the discussion of the commodification of care, which contains care to work and migrant women to workers, was the line of thought that initially led me to work on paid-care relations. However, the more I conducted interviews with migrant women who work as paid-care providers, the more I realized how the notion of commodification fails to describe the organization of paid-care. My engagements within the field help me to see that when care is paid, it does not really lose its distinctive features to the domination of monetary terms; rather monetary terms proceed by referring back to familial terms and values. That is why I think that it is equally important to explore other faces of this “new” configuration of caring.

In other words, my initial argument in this thesis is that it is important to pose the question of paid care in terms which do not reduce one quality into another. That is why, as opposed to the totalizing and reductionist ground the commodification perspective rests on, I find it important to designate the domain of paid care in terms of hybridity and to see care economy as a hybrid of familial terms and values with commercial terms and values.<sup>10</sup>

In this thesis, my way of avoiding the “hostile worlds” perspectives and approaching paid care as a hybrid economy is materialized, first of all, by taking the claim of “being like a family” seriously. By taking this claim seriously, I do not

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women whose biopolitical vulnerabilities are built with gendered, class-based, ethnic and migrant conditions. Ending up by being part of the reserve of care labor comes out sometimes with a lack of enough capital (understood not only in the sense of monetary capital, but rather in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu, 1986) of monetary, cultural, or symbolic capital), sometimes with a lack of official permission to work, sometimes with the inability to speak the official language, sometimes a combination of these; and always with process that leads to overly investing in certain capacities while inhibiting some others to develop: inhibiting other capacities in order to enhance the capacities and skills to care.

<sup>10</sup> Of course, we will not take these values as ever-existing. Rather the argument is that when the two encounter one another, this encounter does not necessarily cause dissolution of the one under the sign of the other, but may cause a mutation of both. And considering my research here, the case is not about the dissolution of the familial values of caring when it becomes paid. In fact, this can be seen in terms of “axiomatization” in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1998). With the encounter of market values, familial codes become decoded but take the form of “axioms”. For instance, the familial code of “caring for your own” is replaced with the axiom of “doing for her best” when it takes the form of paid care; but this never means a replacement of familial values at all.

maintain the dominant claim that being like a family is paradoxical (the idea that care can either be paid, or familial, and not both), or that it is a way of concealing exploitation (as a tactical usage of familial discourse to conceal the paid-nature of the relation<sup>11</sup>); but also, by taking this claim seriously, I do not make a reverse reductionist reading —this time reducing the paid character to a family like character, and claiming as if paid character did not matter. Rather, by taking the claim of “being like a family” seriously, I am affirming the hybridity of the organization, and proposing to multiply the indexes of the analysis: I am asking what kind of practices make a paid care relation to acquire a “family like” quality, and what kind of alterations we can observe in the way paid care relations are practiced.

In other words, in this research, I focus on “family-like” paid care relations in order to bring out what does not fit in the previous discussions. In this sense, neither the claim of being like a family will be considered as the truth, nor the quality of being paid will be over valorized; instead, what comes out by the articulation of both qualities will be questioned.

As I said, what has leaded me to argue for the hybridity of paid care was the observation I was able to make about its organization: paid care continues to refer back to mutated but enduring familial values in its organization. My research helped me to realize that what counts as “good caring” is highly related with social and familial values (chapter 2), and the way it is obtained and the way it is responded pertains to domains other than the monetized relations (chapter 3). In this sense, one of the points that I will make in this thesis is that the value of paid-care relations depends on the extent to which these relations exceed being a paid work, and the valorization of care-labor depends on the extent to which it goes beyond professional

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<sup>11</sup> See for instance, Bora, A. 2005. *Kadınların Sınıfı*. İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul. Or, Özyeğin, G. 2001. *Untidy Gender: Domestic Service in Turkey*. Temple University Press.

performing, and actually acts caring in an embodied way. In other words, both use value (the ability to enhance the wellbeing of the cared one) and commercial/exchange value (the price of caring commodity within the market) increase as the paid-care is personalized in its practice. That is to say, even if it is paid, ‘caring gains value through personalization’ (Zelizer, 2005).

Let me be clear: I do not to deny the waged character of paid-care relations. Indeed, I started my research with the aim of tracing the process of commodification in which care is increasingly contained as work through the example of elderly care since demographic studies<sup>12</sup> were showing a care-crisis for elderly people in Turkey. Besides, the violent and exploitative character of care as paid work was not something that I could remain blind to since all the care providers I talked to had memories of such violent encounters in their personal histories. And I believe I still do all these; but not remain limited to them, not remain limited to the critique of commodification. I think the only way to reveal the organization of paid care is multiplying such reading (which focuses on the paid quality) with an equal focus on the other quality which is easily overshadowed (namely the care quality).

In other words, what is intriguing for me in “family-like” paid care relations is their capacity to force one to refrain from assumed distinctions: care provider vs. worker, caring vs. working, private vs. public, and eventually work vs. life. In this sense, “family-like” paid-care relations expose, first of all, the problematic consequences of taking analytical distinctions as empirical distinctions: the analytical distinction we make between the spheres of the capitalist market and the non-capitalist relations becomes inadequate and even misleading when we want to analyze the ontologically situated hybrid character of these relations. Rather than

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<sup>12</sup> See; Özbay., 2014.



assuming a mechanical transformation of care labor into a commodity in the form of care-work, “family-like” paid care relations signify the moments which escape from the logic of commodity and force us to articulate those irreducible moments.

Consequently, it enables us to inquire what new insights might come out of this articulation of commodity exchange with familial terms.

So, if nothing else, conducting my analysis under the sign of “family-like” paid care relations is an attempt to undertake a sociological analysis without guarantees, that is, a sociological analysis which does not lean on a-priory assumptions, and in which, relations, practices and limits do matter for us to see and articulate what has been left unaccounted for in “hostile worlds” perspectives, which have been dominating the analyses of care for some time.

## 1.2 On the conduct of research and methodological orientations

“Family-like paid care relations” is a phrase I articulate with reference to the discourses of the people I have interviewed. It should be understood in the sense of care relations which are mediated by the wage relation, but which exceed this wage-mediated character, and which are rather described as “being like a family” by the actors involved in the relation. These are relations which have a certain continuity, which in my research corresponds to at least 3 or 4 years. Here, continuity matters because the personalized character of caring is shaped in the course of time. Then, it implies that the terms of the relations are permanently negotiated and performed, and the unique structure of the caring relation is embodied.

In this thesis, “family-like” paid care relations refer to an irreducibility of an economy of intimacy to an economy of money. In other words, while the attribution of “family-like” here designates the constitution of a paid-care relation by more than

just wage bonds, the fact that it is substantially coded with kinship terms and its permanence is desired by all the bodies involved imply that “the family is something you do, and not something you are”<sup>13</sup>; and the family can be made even when it is mediated by monetary payment. In this sense, its broader implications do not only concern the organization of the economy as such, but the notions of what the family and the familial are as well. Then, the aim is neither a lauding, nor a judgement of its being better or worse; rather it is an assessment, an assessment which may easily be overlooked from the traditional family vs. work distinction.

My research process started in 2016 by following online forum discussions in which people are talking about their experiences with care providers and asking for advice, and websites which stand to play a mediatory role between the those looking for a care provider and those looking for employment as care providers. This long-term online research, which stands as a preliminary research, helped me to decide on the boundaries of the field of paid care in constructing my field research.

The arguments of this thesis depend on this online research, but even more so, on the findings of the field research that I have conducted between 2017-2018 in Istanbul and Ankara. To observe the daily organization of “family-like” paid care relations, I conducted 18 in-depth interviews within 7 households. My interviewees consist of care receivers (elderly people), care providers (migrant laborer women) and the relatives of the care receivers who, in one way or another, involved in the care relation (mostly children of the cared elderly, but also daughters-in-laws, and sisters of the cared elderly).

The formal interviews were conducted in private settings (mostly in the kitchen with the laborers, and in the living room with the elderly and their children)

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<sup>13</sup> I must present my thanks to my professor Nükhet Sirman for this formulation.

where the privacy of the conversation was more or less secured. These interviews were semi-structured in format, which means that I had a list of topics in my mind (i.e. working conditions, relationship with the employer/employee, working demands, expectations from the family). I introduced a couple of them in the beginning of the meeting, but then I let the interview flow in the form of conversation in which I encouraged my informants to direct it.

Beside the formal one-to-one interviews, I highly benefited from the observations which I was able to make during “tea-drinking ceremonies.” These “sessions” were mostly scheduled before we started our one-to-one interviews, in which both the sides of the employee and the employer were present. In the field research, I particularly cared about these tea-drinking sessions, as these were the very moments when I had a chance to observe the nuances in the manner they behaved to each other, which later helped me to understand the dynamics of the relationship between the care-provider and the care-receiver.

In the process of conducting the research and writing the thesis the question of methodology has been a major concern of mine. Apart from the relevant research methods, methodology concerns with the question of how to engage with proper theoretical discussions. So, let me introduce three methodological stances, which have guided both the way the research is conducted and the process of analyzing the findings with the proper theoretical discussions.

### 1.2.1 Tracing the practices

The encounters I have had in the field made it clear that to understand what makes a paid relation family-like, and in turn to understand what a family-like relation does to the bodies involved within the relation, I need to consider the relationships

themselves. That is why while my initial plan was to talk only to paid care providers, I expanded the scope of the fieldwork to include all involved in the relation, including the cared elderly and their children. Furthermore, because the question had become the relationship itself, it was also necessary to use observation as a method extensively in order to be able to grasp the relationship as it is practiced.

While the adoption of kinship descriptions and the investments of concerned parties in making the relationship continue for years imply an agreement regarding the “desirability” of the relationship, this does not mean that we are in a smooth space of horizontal engagement. Rather, all relations are necessarily power relations between differently situated bodies, and if bodies are situated, it would be erroneous to assume these relations as grounds for equality in conduct. As indicated, bodies that are situated as care providers are already marked by biopolitical weaknesses and vulnerabilities. So, for differently situated bodies the responsibilities, interests and expectations are differently distributed within the relationship in which they are involved.

As the first methodological orientation, then, the meaning of “being like family” for differently situated bodies is traced not through “what is said” but through “what is done”. In other words, meanings are derived from studying the practices (discursive and non-discursive) acted upon by different actors within the relation.

As my fieldwork experience has suggested, directly asking “what it means” does not lead to any productive end. Neither elderly people nor paid care providers have a definition of what it means to be like family, instead they try to give a sense to it by giving examples. That is why I have decided to uncover the different meanings

of being like family for different actors by tracing and articulating the corresponding daily practices.

Depending not on narratives but on discourses and practices does not imply that we are hunting down the “true” meaning of these relations and that we should refrain from people’s narratives because narratives reflect false-consciousness. Rather, it is the type of question that is being asked which makes it important for us to study the practices. Since the subject of inquiry concerns not a particular actor, but the relationship itself, “what is said” in narratives would reveal only a partial functioning (narratives are inadequate not because they reflect false-consciousness, but because they are partial, they could reveal things from one perspective) and it is only through looking at the practices that these partial narratives can be analyzed as a meaningful relation. In this sense, the discourse of “being like a family” could be analyzed neither if the analysis neglects daily practices, nor if such a discourse is taken as a mere ideological concealment of the exploitation of the care provider, and the nuances of intimacy which the phrase evokes are ignored. On the contrary, only an analysis that proceeds by tracing practices is capable of revealing what is produced in such hybrid relations.

In this sense, the first methodological importance of looking at “family-like” paid care relations comes from its composite character: it forces us to trace the practices (both discursive and non-discursive) and to ask how they function and what they produce. Such a methodological stance has enabled us to explore that care economy is something comprised of multiple ties, terms and rationalities in its organization which corresponds to different practices from differently situated bodies.

### 1.2.2 Prioritizing relations over individuals: Relational ontology

In relation to the first one, the second methodological orientation I propose will be prioritizing not the individuals but relations as the core object of the analysis. What leads me to adopt the perspective of prioritizing relations over individuals is to confront the tendency of seeing and conceptualizing care as a dyadic relation: the problem of conceptualizing caring as a relation taking place between *two individuals*.

Of course, approaching the dyadic readings of care with caution is not something specific to me. Conceptualizing care as a relation that takes place between *two individuals* is a perspective that has been criticized for some time now, especially by the ethics of care literature. The target of the ethics of the care literature is that taking the modern notion of individual as a reference point in approaching the economy of care generates a dyadic understanding and runs the risk of romanticizing the practice of caring, and so dismisses the fact that caring functions socially and politically (Tronto, 1993, 1995). In this sense, the claim of the ethics of care literature is primarily a political claim for redistributing the work of caring among the community. As much as I value the attempt of this literature, before dissolving individual into the community I think we need a much stronger attack against the notion of the individual from a microscopic level.

In this sense, beside the critique of romanticism that I share with the ethics of care literature, the other problem I have with starting an analysis with discrete, atomistic individuals is that when individuals are taken as already defined subjects, and when the relations become secondary, the positioning of the individuals within a relationship can easily be conceptualized in terms of alienation. The problem with analyses which are constructed around the notion of alienation is that they run both the risk of searching for the true human nature, and the risk of dismissing what is

specific to that relation. In other words, one problem is more philosophical, and the other is more methodological. The philosophical one aside, the methodological problem concerns that when analysis starts with the individuals, it can easily be settled at the moment of the exposure of alienation, and it may not be pushed towards looking for new arrangements that have come about. On the contrary, what I am after in this thesis is seeing what kinds of subjectivities are produced when the paid care relations gain a family-like character.

At this point, I suggest adopting a Spinozian perspective of relational ontology, a perspective that I find rather promising for a sociological analysis in which “the schema of interaction, connection or complexity appears as the original, not secondary or derived” (Balibar, 1993). As much as what I propose here is looking at relations with a specific philosophical reference, it would be wrong to ignore the existence of a relational sociology which is also influenced by a perspective of relational social ontology. In the discipline of sociology, proceeding with analyses through relations goes back to Simmel, Bourdieu, and its influence is even getting stronger with Charles Tilly, Mustafa Emirbayer and Viviana Zelizer in new economic sociology. An example would be Tilly’s concern not to proceed with individual consciousness or with the mere play of structures (Tilly, 2006). As Tilly does, I also want to challenge the notion of the rational and conscious individual. But, since the fundamental critique we propose here is the analysis of alienation, I want to challenge the notion of uniformed and atomistic individual as well.

In his influential article, Emirbayer delineates the implications of relationality for a sociological analysis at three levels: the microscopic, meso and macroscopic level (1997). My concern with challenging the alienation point of view implies a microscopic level of interest. This is the level of analysis at which preconstituted and

pregiven subjects are problematized, and the ways in which subjects are embedded in relations can be traced. Here, I find Spinozian ontology promising, because his relational ontology does not only challenge the conscious or rational individual, but the perspective of pre-constituted atomistic individual as well. In Spinoza's relational ontology, each individual appears as the product of relations and the encounters they have. In other words, in Spinozian philosophy, the process of individualization is prioritized over the individual. Here, individuals are understood as produced under "a history of constitutive affections and transformations in response to encounters with other beings" (Sharp, 2011), that is to say, there is no individual, subject or actor before the relations. All the subjects are the products of relations which have certain durations, but which are always in change to the extent they have new encounters<sup>14</sup>. In this sense, in none of the examples we will give in this thesis will the analysis of alienation be pursued.

When I suggest a micro level of analysis of relationality with reference to Spinoza, I consider the opportunity it offers to take a step beyond exposing exploitation through alienation and to expose exploitation as a subjectivity construction process: as a process of situating bodies within a relation of power. Thinking through relationality is not new to sociological thinking, but thinking relationality from a Spinozian perspective of relational ontology could further contribute to our conceptualizations<sup>15</sup>. As Emirbayer says, one of the main questions

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<sup>14</sup> Here, it is important to remind us that looking at the singularity of the relations does not mean separating the current relations from the previous ones. In this sense, it is not ahistoricizing. As I said at the beginning, one of the things that makes certain women suitable for paid care is their biopolitical vulnerabilities. It is not any woman but the migrant woman who becomes the subject of paid care. In this sense, the point here is neither refuting the previous subject positions nor dismissing the institutional impacts on the organization of the relations. Rather, the point is to avoid assuming a subject prior to the relations.

<sup>15</sup> As I said, Mustafa Emirbayer's influential "manifesto" (1997) of relational sociology recognizes the importance of "microscopic" level of relational analysis. Although while discussing the microscopic level Emirbayer does not mention Spinoza at all, but rather refers to the construction of the subject through the object-subject relation, I think what I call micro level and what he calls "microscopic"



for sociology is “the choice between substantialism and relationalism”, and relational sociological perspectives refrain from “basic assumptions and depict social reality instead in dynamic, continuous, and processual terms” (Emirbayer, 1997). I think this is a methodological orientation of starting with relations, which enables me to ask “what is produced and how” within the caring relations. There is a qualitative difference between tracing the product of such relations to “care providers turning into workers” and tracing it to the production of “caring women”. And this qualitative difference matters in our analyses. In other words, in order to refrain from making a priori assumptions that could block the analysis from exploring what does not fit, or what is new, as the second methodological orientation suggests, I start with relations, with a philosophical influence coming from the perspective of relational ontology.

### 1.2.3 Looking at the limits

If the first two methodological orientations are tracing practices and starting with relations themselves as the object of inquiry, the last one would be looking at the *limits*. As it is already discussed, the complexity within the relationality of “hostile-worlds”, which is concretized in our example of “family-like” paid care relations, urges us to not assume terms and values of the relationship beforehand. It urges us to refrain from quick associations such as “since it is paid then the terms of the relations are market terms, and they have an employer-employee relation”; or “since it is defined as “family-like” then they are like a family, they are intimate, and they

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level share the same concern, albeit with different philosophical references. Of course, these different philosophical references imply different conceptualizations, yet this would be a discussion way beyond the scope of this introduction chapter.

support each other with love”. It calls us to concern the limits, it invites us to investigate a hybrid space with terms which are not pure.

In this sense, the background question echoing behind each and every argumentation of this thesis is the question of “to what extent”: to what extent is it a paid relation, to what extent is it a family relation. For instance, it appears as a “family-like” relation when the residents of the household let the daughter of the paid care provider stay with them for a few days, yet the relation appears more like a work relation when they ban the husband from coming and staying. Or, it appears as “family-like” when gifts are exchanged, yet it appears as a paid relation when laws state that the true family is the genealogical family and the care provider can claim neither the body, nor the inheritance of the deceased cared one.

In this sense, an analysis that does not pose the question of “to what extent” would remain inadequate in exposing the complexity of the “family-like” paid care relation. Thus, this last methodological orientation is rather a Foucauldian one. As Foucault argues it is in the limits, at the margins where you can see the function of power (Foucault, 1997). And keeping the limits as the horizon would enable us to better ground our analyses of hybridity.

Then, if I can sum up, the three methodological orientations that have guided me in each and every moment of the construction of the thesis are: “tracing the practices” and “looking at the limits” in order to locate power within the care relations and to understand the function and meaning of “being like a family” for differently situated actors, and “proceeding with relations themselves” in order to be able to engage with what is new without being trapped in an analysis of alienation.

### 1.3 Theoretical premises and overview of the chapters

This thesis takes “family-like” paid care relations as its object of analysis. The main question which leads us to track down not any paid care relation but particularly the ones which are claimed to be “family-like” is the question of what a “family-like” quality would add to the organization of a paid care relation in its daily enactment.

In this sense, focusing on the daily organization of the work of care, and the kind of labor it demands, Chapter 2 explores the articulated space of eldercare with a particular interest on the questions of “what counts as caring”, “what counts as work” and “what counts as labor”. Here, following Joan Tronto’s intervention, the notion of care will be conceptualized in terms of a set of practices in order to elaborate the point that caring is not just a sentimental affinity but also acting and laboring. The chapter will argue for a conceptual affinity between the notions of labor, action and practice. Rather than a theoretical confusion, the interchangeable usage of these terms is a purposeful decision to reflect on one of the core arguments of the chapter: (1) the distinction between work and nonwork does not hold in the work of care, and so, (2) the site of care labor appears rather outspread; which means that (3) what counts as labor includes actions and practices which traditionally were not seen as belonging to laboring. In this chapter it will be argued that in conceptualizing paid care, exploring only its work aspect would be inadequate to grasp its dynamics, rather the ways in which the caring quality is articulated with the working quality is what needs to be elaborated. And for this end, an analysis of the affective and communicative demands of care work will be delineated.

Maintaining the line of analysis that is pursued in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will focus on the questions of value and the valorization of care labor. Particularly considering the expansionist configuration of care labor –which follows neither time-

tables nor distinct sites of action—, and the biopolitical character of the production process of the care labor, this chapter will deal with the limits of different Marxist understandings of the labor theory of value, and will propose an alternative reading, a reading which considers the inseparability of economic and social values. It will be argued that we need a new configuration of value and the process of valorization which is capable of grasping the expansionist configuration of care labor. To this end, it will be proposed that the source of value becomes the vitality of the laborer considering all her affective, communicative and corporeal capacities that the money-form of value (as the hegemonic form of value in expressing the economic value) appears inadequate to express, and we will argue that, here, the gift-form appears as an equally substantial form of value in the valorization of care labor.

Following the argument of conceptualizing the gift as a mechanism of valorization, Chapter 4 stands to read care in terms of the gift. Here, we will introduce a Maussian reading of the gift, the one which concerns the gift in terms of counter-gift by focusing on its circulation. In this sense, after grounding the reasons of the methodological choice of proceeding with a Maussian one, the particular question that will be asked in this chapter will be the question of what it costs to the laborer to return the gift of the employer. And this question will be elaborated in the last section of the chapter in terms of a debt relation by revealing how returning the employer's gift of *living-with* pertains to the subjectivity of the care providers considering both her spatial mobility and her future actions.

## CHAPTER 2

### CARING FOR THE ELDERLY:

### THE WORK AND ITS BEYOND

#### 2.1 Introduction

How to define the notion of care is a major discussion among the ethics of care scholars; it centers around the question of how to differentiate what should be seen as caring and what should not. Some propose to define care as a kind of reproductive labor,<sup>16</sup> some propose the notion of fostering “human capabilities” as the criterion of what counts as caring,<sup>17</sup> yet others propose to limit the fostering of “human capabilities” with “basic capabilities”<sup>18</sup>. In this debate of what counts as caring, Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher’s definition of caring is among the most cited one within the literature and has become quite influential as incorporating two important features in the definition of care.

Tronto and Fisher define caring as “species activity that includes everything that we do to *maintain, continue, and repair* our ‘world’ so we can live in it as well as possible” (Tronto, 1993, p.103). As much as the actions to “*maintain, continue, and repair*” do matter, what makes their definition significant is their proposal to think of caring in terms of a combination of caring “practice” with a caring “aim”. Resorting to Aristotelian nested ideas to delineate the realm of care, Tronto argues that care is recognized ‘*when a practice is aimed at* [emphasis added] maintaining,

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<sup>16</sup> For instance, see Sibyl Schwarzenbach (1996). She designates caring as reproductive and differentiates it from productive labor in the following terms: reproductive labor directly aims at maintaining and sustaining, while in productive labor such aims appear as secondary.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, Martha Nussbaum (2000) suggests a rather wide list of “human capabilities” and argues that caring includes everything to foster these.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel Engster (2005) notes that Nussbaum’s list is criticized for being too middle-class and White. The range of “human capabilities” is so wide that if we follow these as the criteria of caring “the poor” might appear as if s/he is not caring. So, Engster proposes to limit it with “basic capabilities” with the intention to set a minimum of what counts as caring.

continuing, or repairing the world' (1993, p. 104). In this framework, caring has to be an activity, a practice, a laboring combined with a certain aim oriented towards the wellbeing of the other.<sup>19</sup>

I have two reasons to choose to take Tronto and Fisher's conceptualization as a reference point in this research, which, I believe, why they have been so influential in the literature. First of all, their formulation reveals the labor-demanding nature of caring, as opposed to tendencies that conceptualize care as a disposition. Caring as a disposition is a tendency which underlines the importance of having a concern over something as the core of caring. Yet, while it explores the importance of concern and interest, it runs the risk of dismissing the part of actualization of that concern with action. In this sense, Tronto and Fisher's intervention is to show that a disposition is never enough, that it needs to be enacted. In their reading, taking care of someone requires practice, laboring, action. In this sense, the first significance of their analysis is giving a material basis to the conceptualization of caring. Even before thinking care in terms of wage-work, their conceptualization of thinking the "nonwork" form of care through practices makes it possible to reveal that it still requires labor. Secondly, to the extent that they insist on the combination of practice with a caring aim and caring manner, they are able to avoid falling into the trap of dismissing the dispositional quality entirely or subsuming it under a mechanical analysis of reproductive labor in the attempt of exposing its labor demanding side.<sup>20</sup>

Within the framework they offer us, having concern for someone but not acting to impact the causes of concern would not be seen as "taking care of",

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<sup>19</sup> Other oriented aim is shared by other care theoreticians as well (Feder Kittay, 1999), likewise it is applied to self-care (Gilligan, 2003; Tronto, 1993).

<sup>20</sup> Even if I find the reference of aim philosophically problematic, I should give their analysis the credit it deserves for succeeding in designating the realm of care as a composite realm: concerning both practice and disposition.

likewise various forms of actions undertaken to repair or maintain the other would not be caring if the actions are not initiated with the aim of repairing it. In this sense, loving someone and wishing the best for her/him is not caring, if you do not actually do something about it; similarly, while a nurse practically heals someone, if her actions are not initiated by the concern to increase the wellbeing of the person, but rather initiated by doing what she has to do to get paid, then she is not caring either. For something to be conceived as caring, it needs to be enacted, and enacted with a caring aim, in a caring manner.

Since one can pinpoint neither certain actions nor certain expressions of aims as “proper care”, this explanation provided by Tronto and Fisher is rather vague in terms of setting boundaries to normatively deciding what is caring and what is not. As much as there are approaches which are uncomfortable with the vagueness of the realm of care, and try to delineate some limits to it,<sup>21</sup> as I said this vagueness is one of the things I find promising and helpful in thinking care as paid work.

I find this vagueness associated with the fertility of the concept: their discussion of caring does not concern the question of “what” but pursues the question of “how”. Their reading matters to the extent that it delineates the realm of care in terms of quality in a contextual, relational manner. Before anything else, the vagueness of the realm of care in their explanation makes it hard to say, “this and this are caring”, and “these others are not”. In this framework, we cannot say that feeding is an act of caring if it is not combined with a caring concern, or we cannot say that cutting trees is not caring if it is done to take care of someone. Every action has the

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<sup>21</sup> For instance see, the proposal to limit the realm of care with basic capabilities concretized in the work of Daniel Engster, which is an attempt to clarify the vagueness in such conceptualizations. Accordingly, the more complicated the realm of care, it is more akin to Western bourgeois notion of the good life. He proposes that caring should be understood in a more basic way, as “helping individuals to meet their basic needs and to develop and sustain those *basic or innate capabilities*” (Engster, 2005, p.52).

potential to be conceived as caring, but also none of them can be caring. That is why, even if we will eventually come up with another conceptualization of caring in this thesis, we start with Tronto and Fisher's conceptualization as it attempts to qualify caring, not to quantify it.

In this chapter, based on fieldwork data –that gathered through interviews I conducted with both the employee side (the paid care providers) and the employer side (the cared elderly and their children), and also the observations I have been able to make within the households– I will try to give a picture of the daily organization of the work of eldercare. To the extent that I am interested in paid care relations which are considered “family-like”, I will try to concretize the kinds of practices and attitudes that are required for the work of eldercare to be considered as such. Then, I will try to reveal the kind of care labor required within the context of care work.

## 2.2 Drawing boundaries: The content of the work of eldercare

Beside relating care with laboring, if there is one thing we can elaborate with reference to Tronto and Fisher, it is the point that in drawing the boundaries between care and non-care, it is futile to pursue the question of what care is. As caring is, as a concept in itself, about the question of manner, attitude and aim, it concerns the question of how it is practiced. In other words, in the simplest sense of the term, the content of care is context dependent. And when caring appears as waged-work, designating a clear definition and content is even more complicated.

Care work as a concept already appears to be loosely defined in its conceptualization at the level of abstraction; but care work as daily engagement appears to be quite loose at the level of materiality as well. Care as work suffers both from the flexibility coming from its being work, and from its context dependent



character coming from its being caring.<sup>22</sup> Exactly what kinds of practices the work of care requires vary from case to case depending especially on the health condition of the cared elderly. Yet, even without touching upon the singularities of the relations, we can still indicate that there are two fundamental components that the work of eldercare consists of: the work of constant watching and bodywork. Regardless of the specific content, we can designate these two as the constituent characteristics of care work. Let me explain these two components separately to give a sense of what the content of the work of eldercare would be.

### 2.2.1 The work of watching

The work of watching is work that requires the care provider to be always ready to act. Even for the healthiest elderly, it is a good chance that the physical actions of the elderly would be limited. And even if the elderly is willing to and able to act by herself/himself, there is still the risk of being easily hurt. That is why the work of eldercare demands the care provider to keep an eye on the elderly and be always ready to act in cases of emergencies. Considering the aging of the body and the decrease in its renewing capacity, a small twist may cause injuries, like a broken bone, which would take long to heal. Thus, given the bodily vulnerability of the elderly, securing bodily integrity is one of the main concerns which designates the first demand of the work of eldercare: to be watchful, to be on alert all the time.

You have to be careful. You always, always have to watch her. Once she wanted to get water by herself, the moment she got up from the couch she got dizzy and she almost fell. Thank God, she held on to the table. . . . Nothing happened but something could have happened. She could have hit her head, or she could have broken her arm while trying to hold on to the table...

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<sup>22</sup> It suffers both from flexibility of the contemporary working arrangements as any other form of work does in varying degrees, and from the vagueness coming from the difficulty of delimiting what practices count as caring.

Since the smallest gestures like getting up to get some water would run the risk of stumbling and hurting the self, the task of the care provider to be always on alert means that she acquires a kind of attitude, that I would like to call “being on tenterhooks”. Besides, it is not just observing bodily movements, the care provider also has to keep an ear for the noises the elderly makes since each groaning may indicate an attempt to do something risky or may be a call for help.

Here what cultivates the being on tenterhook attitude is anxiety. An anxiety directed against the danger of the elderly to get hurt, which may result in a worsening of working conditions (if the elderly was injured, the burden of the caring would increase) or even in losing the job (in case of the death of the elderly). The key to keeping the job and keeping it less burdensome is not just keeping the elderly alive but keeping the elderly alive in a better position as much as it can be done. In this sense, the practical stimulus of being on tenterhooks would be the desire to keep things from getting worse.

Then, independently from the tasks included in daily arrangements, the work of eldercare involves watching each moment of the elderly to avoid accidents as much as possible. Such a task of constant surveillance and being ready to act upon an unforeseeable event that requires intervention, imply something about the nature of the work of eldercare: it is beyond a time-table. The work spreads over even the moments the care provider is having a break. How can we think of resting on a couch if one cannot drop one’s guard or be on the alert? There is no break in the work since there is no moment which is not marked by the anxiety of the work of watching.

One of my laborer informants complains that one of her previous jobs was an incessant one in that the elderly she was caring for was not listening to her and was trying to do “dangerous” things by herself like reaching over for the plates on the

upper-shelf, or trying to put her shoes on by herself even though such actions were not advised by the physician because of the bad-hips she had.

I always needed to be watchful of her. She was doing these behind my back. . . It would have been better if she just let me do it. . . . Believe me it is just easier to give the plate.

Considering that it is a live-in job mostly in the form of 6+1 arrangement,<sup>23</sup> the expansion of the work of watching envelops the whole life.

It is true that the line between work and non-work is quite blurry not just in the work of eldercare, but in any other domestic live-in work which is experienced as overwork and flexibility of work-time. Yet, when it is care work, the forms of overwork are much more creative,<sup>24</sup> and the degree of the flexibility of work-time is much more transgressive. Even the nights, which would be maybe the only private, non-work part for domestic live-in workers like cooks and cleaners, are included within the work-shift for care laborers. The work of watching has no boundaries, it spreads even into the nights. The work of watching is an endless work-shift.

An interrupted sleeping pattern is something I was able to detect right from my first interview with care providers. Their sleeping arrangements are organized accordingly. For instance, moving the bed to the room of the elderly is rather a common practice for these laborers, they say it is easier than getting up to check the elderly from time to time. Or some use baby monitor type devices so that the care provider would be able to track the unusual noises the elderly makes, or to hear if s/he calls her to use the bathroom or to bring some water if s/he needs at night.

Getting up from the bed at night is much more dangerous for the elderly considering the risks of sudden changes in blood-pressure which may cause dizziness or losing

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<sup>23</sup> Bridget Anderson's formula meaning six days of working and one day break. (Anderson, 2000)

<sup>24</sup> For instance, a cook cooks, a care provider cares. But since caring does not refer to any specific practice, like the act of cooking, it can take many forms.

the balance and falling down. In other words, getting up at nights is a nightly routine for the care laborer which is part of the job as a kind of obligatory pre-emptive acting against the risk of things getting worse.

If during the day being on the tenterhooks attitude is what defines the work of care, it literally turns into sleeping with one eye open at nights. The need of the elderly to get up at nights to use the bathroom or to take various medicines are more routinized breaks in the sleeping time of the care provider, which are most of time arranged by her setting the alarm a few times at night for certain hours. But also, there are the things which happen instantaneously that cannot be planned, like the night suffocations, sweat flushes, or an uncontrollable need to go to the bathroom, which are common for elderly people whether they are experiencing extreme morbidity, or not. Such situations are not endemic, and so, the care providers encounter them frequently enough. These are referred to as the times the elderly “gets worse” by the care provider. But they are neither rare, nor marginal.

### 2.2.2 Bodywork

If one characteristic that defines the practice of eldercare is constant surveillance, the other defining feature is the obligation to deal with the body in various ways and degrees. Bodywork is pointed out to be the most emphasized characteristic of the work of eldercare within the literature. In the words of Julia Twigg, care work is *bodywork* which “involves touching, manipulating and assessing the bodies of the others” (Twigg, 2000, p. 137).

The bodywork of eldercare requires physical intimacy with the other’s body for various reasons like to clean, heal, move, or maintain it. Considering the vulnerability and incapacity of the aging body, acting upon those bodies to assist

them constitutes one part of the bodywork. The work of eldercare is a bodywork before anything else, to the extent that it assists the body to move. The work of eldercare is also body work to the extent that it deals with bodily waste and dirt, or as Anderson calls, with *dirty-work* (Anderson, 2000). As much as it is a work of moving the body, it is also a work of handling the dirt (i.e. bathing), the bodily fluids (i.e. vomits, inflammatory wounds, feces), and the residuals (i.e. toenails, dentures, hair). In other words, alongside the physical burden of assisting the body to move, taking care of the body requires excessive physical intimacy and dealing with bodily dirt as well.

So far, I tried to give a sense of what the work of eldercare consists of. Despite the fact that the intensity, burden and specific content of the work largely depends on the health condition of the elderly in question, we can still characterize what the work of eldercare deems. (1) It is fundamentally bodywork. It is caring for a body whose capacity to act autonomously is diminished. Some are unable to climb the stairs, some are unable to bathe herself/himself, and some are unable to move at all. (2) It demands that the care provider always be ready to act upon the body. In this sense, it requires constant attention over and surveillance of the body. (3) To the extent that it is a live-in work, it lengthens work-time into the night as well, and the division between work-time and non-work time becomes indistinguishable.

Considering these characteristics, even a quick glance at sketching out the demands of the work would reveal that it is organized within a terrain in which time and space for work and non-work, as well as the boundaries of intimacy need to be rethought. It is a work, in which to live and work coincide, a work that redefines personal spaces, and redesignates the limits and extent of physical contact and intimacy.

What is outlined above there is the formal framework of the “musts” of the job that one needs to consider before starting to work as a care provider for an elderly. In other words, so far, the work of eldercare has been portrayed with its formal demands as work.<sup>25</sup> Yet, any analysis of care-work would be inadequate without elaborating the caring part of it. In the following part, I will try to reveal the characteristics of the work of eldercare from the perspective of caring which aims to reveal how caring is incorporated in the work of care. In other words, the focus will be the actualization of the caring side which, as I will claim, is the determining characteristics for care work to be qualified as family-like.

As my research concerns not the work of eldercare in general, but the work of eldercare which is claimed to be family-like, it is necessary to reveal how care work is practiced beyond its performance as mere work; that is to say, how caring is incorporated in the accomplishment of the work. Thus, in the following pages I will focus on those characteristics that are necessary to the practice of the work of caring by focusing extensively on my research findings that I was able to gather both through conducting interviews with the employer side of the relation (meaning the elderly cared for and the children of the elderly in question) as well as the employed side (the paid care providers themselves), and through the observations I was able to make during my visits to the households about the daily engagements of these two sides.

### 2.3 Caring as if caring for her own

Before I started my research, I conducted preliminary research by following various internet forums where people were exchanging opinions about how and where to find

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<sup>25</sup> Meaning that what caring requires as a work, as a job.

good a care provider, about the trouble they had and how to resolve them, what they should expect her to do, how they negotiate with her.<sup>26</sup> Following these forums made me see that the quality of the work of care is what is at stake. What the employer side complains about was the problem of finding someone who “truly cares”. Apparently, for the families, the problem is not to find someone to hire, but to find someone to keep as hired.

As much as it was valid for all types of care work, when I focused on the eldercare, the problem of “finding someone to keep hired” is concretized in terms of finding someone who is good at getting along with the elderly. In order not to be replaced with another laborer, getting along with the elderly is quite significant for the care provider. And the source of the good relation is frequently formulated as *caring as if caring for her own* by the employer side. In those forums, the phrase “caring as if caring for her own” is proposed as a kind of self-evident formulation, no one elaborates it, and no one asks what it means. There is apparently a consensus over the phrase which is considered equal to good, qualified caring. This unidentified, supposedly self-evident character of the formulation of “caring as if caring for her own” has led me to narrow my focus down to include those relations which are claimed to be family-like.

Of course, the ascription of a family-like quality can be traced to the historically embedded association of caring within the familial domain. Even if that were the case, what I am after is neither searching for its historical roots, nor making a genealogy of such an association. I am not pursuing the question of “why” they are called “family-like” —the meaning and reasons of such ascription requires a whole

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<sup>26</sup> For instance, just in this forum there are more than 150 discussion titles about paid caring services: [https://www.kadinlarkulubu.com/forum/search/78213804/?q=bak%C4%B1c%C4%B1&o=relevance&c\[node\]=154](https://www.kadinlarkulubu.com/forum/search/78213804/?q=bak%C4%B1c%C4%B1&o=relevance&c[node]=154)

different research. Rather, I am interested in such an ascription to the extent that it implies a difference, an additional axis in the organization of the work of caring, and what I pursue is to reveal the difference in the materiality of the daily engagement. In this sense, what I am interested in is revealing the kinds of practices, attitudes and values produced in such relations. I aim to explore how “caring as if caring for her own” is concretized in the daily practices of caring in relation to the kinds of labor and relations it demands. If the value of the work of care depends on caring as if caring for her own, then the question for me is to reveal the practices and relations under the sign of this apparently self-evident description.

To contact informants, I got in touch with people who claimed to be involved in a family-like paid care relation. I was mostly directed to the households by third parties, who claimed to have observed rather good relations between the care provider and the elderly she cared for. For me, one of the signs of a laborer’s contentment was if she could “easily” invite me to the household or not. If she invited me to the household, I assumed that she was able to claim the household she works in, maybe, as more than a workplace. For the employer side, inviting me to the household or not would not of course be a criterion. Instead, I tried to catch the moments whether they said something like the need to also ask the laborer. This, at least, gave me an idea of whether the laborer side had a say in decision making, whether the power of decision making was consolidated in the hands of the employer side, or dispersed. If I communicated with the laborer initially and was invited directly by her, I was surer that it was the kind of household that I was looking for. Being initially invited by the employer was more like a gamble, since considering the power dynamics, there was a good chance that the contentment of the employer might be the misery of the employee.



In my interviews, as much as I traced the features of their long-term relationship within the current household, I preferred to ask general questions where they could also refer to their previous experiences that were either good or bad. I asked the laborers what made them leave their previous jobs, what made them stay there, to describe the best working condition for them and so on. And I asked parallel questions to the employer where they could reveal their experiences of good and bad care.

The statement that triggered my research, “caring as if caring her own”, was surfaced in my interviews as a self-evident explanation as well: a good care provider would care as if she were caring for her own mom/dad. Everyone I talked to mentioned this as *the* determining quality of the work. Accordingly, to care for somebody as if s/he were her own mom/dad is something molded by an affective engagement. Rather than specific practices, the expectation concerns the way the care provider engages with the one she cares for. If we put it in the terms of the care literature, a caring manner appears to be what matters.

Since caring as if caring for her own is given as a self-evident explanation, to be able to reveal its nuances, the methodological approach I preferred to use was tracing the associated practices both within the discourses and through the observations that I was able to make. To explore the ‘meaning’ of something in terms of what it corresponds in its materiality, I believe tracing the associated practices is the only way, since such a methodology is not restricted to ‘the meaning’ within the narrative but derives it from the materiality of the practice.

More specifically, I can say that in the daily engagement, the work of eldercare is considered as family-like to the extent that it articulates *nonwork* within work of caring. The articulation of non-work within the work expresses itself (1) in

volunteering to do extra work beyond the work-tasks, and (2) in performing the labor in an affective way. In other words, the way and the manner bodywork and the work of watching are acted out are what I will focus on here.

### 2.3.1 Doing the extras “voluntarily”

As much as it is mostly the bodywork side of the work of eldercare that has been elaborated in the literature of care, it would be erroneous to assume that the physically demanding aspect is restricted only to bodywork. Rather, as many other studies in the literature of care and domestic labor underline, most of the time the work of care and housework are intertwined (Bora, 2005; Özyeğin, 2001; Young, 1997). Of course, care work implies a realm beyond housework, yet there is no steady, reliable distinction between housework and care work, and in most of the cases, housework appears as big part of it, a part which accretes in time.

If the elderly and the care provider are the only ones who live in the same house, the care of the elderly would coincide with the care of the environment that is lived in as well. Cooking, cleaning, dusting or ironing would be part of taking care of the elderly. Yet, if the household is shared with others, mostly with the children of the elderly and their families, cleaning or cooking would have a dimension of extra work since they would benefit not just the elderly but others as well. In such cases, the family and the care laborer negotiate about the content and reach an agreement. Most of the time in such cases, the laborer is either told to be responsible particularly for bodywork or is charged with a few extra chores like preparing breakfast or dinner. Yet, as one of my interviewees puts it: “This never remains like that. Before you know you are doing all the work. Once you were just helping, then you become the cook.”

Doing extra work appears as a tactic to keep the job in the first place, yet it implies more than that. It also corresponds to a step taken to make the work relation more than a work relation, an attempt to create a livable environment. Since paid care providers are working for people with whom they are also living, it is beneficial to be able to construct the work place as a livable environment. As much as they want to keep the job, they also want to be accepted by the family, and doing things that are not part of their job is a way to ensure that. Apparently, it does serve the purpose, since doing extra work is one of the things the employer side mentions to explain how great the care provider is.

We are lucky to have Maya. You should see how attentive she is, not just for my mom but for all of us... She is only responsible for taking care of my mom, but she takes care of us all. . . . She never sits back, always comes to help me so that I sometimes have to kick her out of the kitchen, but she comes anyway.

The story always starts by offering some help to do the chores and the next thing the laborers know is that these little extras become part of their job and the family members become the helper.

When Nana [the cared elderly] was sleeping during the day I was going down to help Güliz Hanım [the daughter of the elderly]. If she was cleaning, I was taking a swab and helping her; if she was cooking, I was chopping the vegetables... Now, I am chopping and cleaning every day.

The change of the role of the paid care provider in the home from the helper to being responsible for the chores is the case for the all the care providers that I talked to.

Even if they were inexperienced at the beginning, considering the fact that some of them are doing this job for a decade and have worked with many different families, why do they still offer help in the first place? At least some of them are experienced enough to know that their work will soon be multiplied. Yet, as one laborer put it if she did not start to offer help she “would not have a job to complain about the hard work.”

What I want to underline is this: offering help to do things that are not part of the job is mostly initiated by the laborers themselves. Yet, this ‘voluntary’ helping, the indication of taking a nonobligatory initiative, is actually quite obligatory. Offering to do extra work as if it were “coming from the heart”, as if it were voluntary helping, is necessary to keep the job, to be accepted by the family, and to render your labor valuable. It is one of the first signs that shows you are *caring*, even if you are paid to care what you offer is beyond the work contract.

If you do not work more, if you do not help them, your time would be quite short there. They would start to offend you. They would start to think that you do it for money, that you do not really care. And they would search for somebody else to replace you. . . . Of course, I do it for money, but to keep the money coming, you should give them something. You should make them like you...

Here, what doing extra work voluntarily stands for is a way of marking the realm of work as non-work. Even if money is the initial mediator in the work arrangement, doing extra work voluntarily is considered as an invitation to renegotiate the terms of the job. Here, rather than its wage-contract feature, its ‘caring’ quality is emphasized. In this sense, in the materiality of the relation we can indicate the practice of doing extra work “voluntarily” as one of the marks of ‘genuine’ caring. Then, we can attain the first criterion of the work of caring as if caring for her own: doing more work as if it were “coming from the heart”, as if you wanted to do it, that is as if doing more work was nonwork.

### 2.3.2 Affective labor (I): “Little details”

Beside volunteering for extra chores, the employer side uses another sign to assess whether the paid care provider to “truly” cares. This refers to the “little details” in the manner in which the work is done: A good care provider “listens and answers *interestedly*” even though the elderly tends to repeat things over and over again;

“makes her/him smile all the time”; “laughs at her/his jokes *sincerely*”; “does not sleep before s/he sleeps”; “sleeps with one eye open”; “never skips brushing her hair”, “never feels disgust when cleaning her/his wounds”, “never says ‘off!’”, “never offends her/him”, “always acts *respectfully*” and so on.

These “little details” are marked by an affective engagement. Rather than the practices themselves, the attributions are important here. They are “little details” in the sense that they imply the small, even instantaneous undertaking of various actions which are not physically demanding, meaning that they do not require extra physical effort like lifting things for instance; they are rather affectively demanding, meaning that they describe an attentiveness for the cared one.

With “little details”, what is demanded is not the accomplishment of certain tasks mechanically or repetitively, but rather doing them by being *actively* invested in them. What is emphasized here is the immaterial aspect. In the words of Maurizio Lazzarato:

Work can thus be defined as the capacity to activate and manage productive cooperation. In this phase, workers are expected to become “active subjects” in the coordination of the various functions of production, instead of being subjected to it as simple command. (1996, p.134)

Listening or laughing at the jokes of the elderly is not enough to be considered a sign of a caring manner; you have to be involved in the relationship as an active participant so that you need to continue the conversation in a way which shows you are interested in it. Talking, or listening is already labor by itself, but listening *interestedly* indicates another aspect, the immaterial aspect of the work. Such labor, which I prefer to call *affective labor*, combines bodily labor with immaterial labor.

To explore the immaterial quality of such labor, emotional labor is the traditionally preferred term within the literature of care and domestic labor. Yet, I prefer to use the term affective labor with reference to Spinozian affect theory which,

for several reasons, I believe, is much more capable of revealing the nature of such work and labor.

What renders the work of caring valuable is something beyond professionally performing the work tasks; rather it is the extent to which the performed action is embodied. In this kind of labor, what is produced is not commodities as such that are destroyed when they are consumed; rather what is produced is the relations themselves which are not subject to be destroyed but to be cultivated further in its consumption. As Kathi Weeks argues for the organization of work-society "...it is subjectivity that is hired and managed and at work" (2007, p. 247), and so that "the prescription and definition of tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities" (Lazzarato, 1996; as cited in Weeks, 2007, p. 247).

In other words, a qualified work of care does not demand a kind of performance, but it demands the subjectivity of the laborer to be formed. In this sense, we can follow the inadequacy in the conceptualization of emotional labor in the works of Arlie Russel Hochschild. Hochschild's discussion is quite important here in the sense of recognizing the immateriality of labor, yet it remains problematic to the extent that it pursues a difference between "the managed heart" and "the unmanaged heart". For Hochschild, emotional labor "requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others" (2012, p. 7). Yet, what affective labor can reveal is the fact that the production of a proper state of mind in others is only one of its aspects, but what is produced is actually a relation, a communication that takes place within and between bodies.

Such labor would not be satisfied by the actions of *acting as if*, since what is deemed to be produced is not just a 'proper state of mind in others' but a relation of

communication —remember that what is hard for the employers is not to find migrant labor, but to find someone who is getting along with the elderly. In other words, the first reason I prefer affect over emotion is to be able to argue that what is put at work is not something exclusively internal to one body, but it is something relational. For Sandro Mezzadra (2005), “affect is considered to be the substance of interaction and communication: contrary to “emotion”, affect is defined by its relational character, and cannot be reduced to an internalized feeling.” Of course, considering other works of Hochschild, it is quite possible that she would agree with the analysis that emotions are socially, relationally produced, yet in her approach sociality seems to be concerned only when it is “managed” by the wage relation. Considering that she discusses emotional labor as calling for “a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality” (Hochschild, 2012, p.7), she implicitly relies on the assumption that there must be something that has not been coordinated. And this untouched source, according to Hochschild, is apparently the “self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality”.

In other words, the resonance in her arguments, considering the references to self and individuality, gives the impression that as if there were managed and unmanaged hearts, and the works which demand emotional labor demand *managing* the heart which apparently has the potential to not to be managed since it is indicated “as a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality”. Yet, one of the things affect theory insists on is that the self, or individuality, in the words of Hochschild, is always-already managed. From the perspective of affect, which recalls the philosophy of Spinoza, relations come before any self since affect “is not conceivable otherwise than in terms of the production of a relation” (Mezzadra,

2005). In other words, Hochschild's conceptualization of emotional labor reproduces the discourse of alienation; yet affect theory stands for smashing such ground and rather proposes an understanding of the self and individuality in terms of relationality. In other words, while in her discussion of emotional labor Hochschild (2012) tries to attack the extra alienating side of such labor, in affective labor discussions the attack targets directly the notion of alienation itself and its legitimacy in our analyses. In this sense, in a perspective of affect what is of concern is not whether the heart is managed or not, but in what direction it is channelized, in which terms mobilizes it to action. If we continue the description of "managed heart" what affect theory pursues is not exploring the "managed heart" with reference to the unmanaged, but exploring different intensities and directions of "management". Affect theory declares that all hearts are always already managed. So, the first reason to go along with the notion of affect rather than emotion is to refuse to refer to the "self [as] that [which] we honor as deep and integral to our individuality".

My second concern to adopt affect rather than emotion is to keep the body within the realm of discussion. If you think that Hochschild entitles her book *The Managed Heart*, the preference of the term *heart* here runs the risk of solidifying the Cartesian distinction between body and mind, or body and heart in our case. I prefer affect over emotion to reveal that such labor does not only involve the *heart* but the body as well.

In Spinoza, an affect always implies an alteration, an alteration of power of acting for better or worse: "By affect I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections" (1996, *E III*, def.3). In this sense, while the term emotion runs the risk of shadowing the body even if what it aims is to



reveal the immaterial side, I find the notion of affect quite useful to go beyond mind-body, manual-mental distinctions, since affects are changes in power concerning bodily capacities. In other words, I find it quite important to emphasize the immaterial side of laboring, and the emotional labor discussion could be seen as a good attempt of doing this; yet I find it even more important to avoid readings which conceive the material and immaterial labor as if they imply separate realms: as if the immaterial concerns the mind, or heart in the discussion of Hochschild, and the material concerns the body. Rather, it is crucial to show that the material and immaterial are intrinsic to labor and that the body is its realm. In this sense, if the first critique we directed to Hochschild's analysis of emotional labor is that it is not just producing proper state of mind in others but, within a relation, producing it in yourself too. The second critique is that it is also not just a matter of *mind*, but a matter of body as well.<sup>27</sup>

Thirdly, drawing from Brian Massumi's formulation, an emotion is more like "a recognized effect, an identified intensity" (2002, p. 61) which necessitates a cultural analysis of meaning. Yet, to the extent that we do not aim to reveal which specific emotions are put to the work, we are not really interested in "emotions" per se. In other words, we do not try to *name* the emotions and see whether laborers are "happy" or if they are "frightened", and we do not pursue to detect whether they really "mean it" or "just act like it" as a distinction Hochschild is concerned with her study of flight attendants. Rather, to the extent that my research is interested in changes in capacities and the way they are put into work as a source of value in care work, rather than specific emotions I am concerned with how bodies are moved to be a "good" care provider. To put it differently, with reference to Hasana Sharp's

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<sup>27</sup> For a further reading on Spinozian body and affect relation see: Deleuze, 1988.

reading of affect, we can say that while an emotion is “a *response* to an event”, an affect is not the response, but it “*is* that event” (Sharp, 2011, p. 29). In this sense, I am after the events.

Thus, in my vocabulary, the work of eldercare is affectively demanding since it invests in the subjectivity and it requires active participation to create and sustain a relationship, a communication. What is produced is the relations themselves which alter all the bodies that are involved.

There are works which mention the jokes migrant care laborers make about the work of eldercare as if it were the easiest job to do, considering the less physically demanding character of it (Akalin, 2009). Yet, aside from the fact that being less physically demanding is a context dependent issue (caring for someone confined to bed is physically quite demanding work), such a representation indicates the underestimation of the peculiarity of the work from the lens of care. Such a representation of the work of eldercare in the discourses of migrant laborers, who came to find caring or domestic work, and did not work in eldercare, refers to the “apparent” non-work qualities of the work. Yet, for most of the eldercare laborers this teased, “apparent” nonwork quality is one of the exhausting aspects of the job. Most of the laborers I have talked to complain about the obligation of having conversations with the elderly. Hearing the same story again and again and trying to respond to it as if you heard it for the first time is quite hard work a care provider needs to handle.

In this sense, in the work of eldercare it is important to express one’s active participation in the relation, and not “bearing” it for the money. This is why Hochschild’s emotion remains inadequate to reveal the characteristics of the work of eldercare. It is not just producing a state of mind in others, both yours as well. You

need to be the one who does not take it because you are obligated to as it is part of your job, but you have to show that you are the one who desires to participate and cultivate the relationship. In short, it is beyond the appearance, beyond an as if; one needs to become an active participant within the relation. This is the first sense that care labor is an affective labor: *it “involves the investment of subjectivity”* [emphasis added] (Lazzarato, 1996, p.133).

### 2.3.3 Affective labor (II): Taming the body to bear the unbearable

I want to turn back to the bodywork aspect of the work of eldercare. Handling the dirty-work “properly”, and not avoiding excessive bodily intimacy, which is considered to be a sign of “genuinely” caring, is one of the most challenging parts for the laborers. I have heard many stories from both sides about how bathing and cutting the toenails are big deals that define the terms of the relationship. For instance, wearing plastic gloves when doing bodywork is considered as a sign of disgust, disrespect and insult.<sup>28</sup> But more than that, it is considered as a sign of marking the zone as work. Wearing elastic gloves is considered as drawing a redline between the cared body and the caring body. For the receiver of care, wearing gloves is considered a problem, it is conceived as offensive, not in cleaning the wounds or cleaning the shit or pee, but especially in bathing and cutting nails. Gloves make it visible that the action supposed to be taken is disgusting or infectious. It is seen as a way of saying “I do it because I have to”.

Everyone I talked to on the employer side mentions this as a problem they faced at least once –but in most of cases many times. Demanding elastic gloves (in

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<sup>28</sup> As much as it is quite an intriguing topic to focus on bodily dirt, its cultural meanings and the vulnerability it engenders when it becomes visible, it is a whole different project that I will not be able to explore. Yet, I can recommend the work of Julia Twigg on bathing: Twigg, J. (2000). *Bathing: The Body and Community Care*. Routledge: New York and London.

cutting nails or giving bath) becomes the “last straw” that ends the relationship with the care provider. In other words, demanding wearing gloves is a reason, and a serious reason, to be fired exactly because it is a reminder that the care provider does not see the elderly as her own; she does it because she is paid for it. To the extent that wearing gloves implies a desire of isolation, separation from the cared body, it implies marking the zone as work. Here, the employers’ demand for the care provider to undertake work as if it were nonwork takes the form of bearing the unbearable. For the care providers, cleaning open wounds, handling bodily fluids are first among the unbearable things of the work, and “caring as if the elderly is your own” first and foremost corresponds to being able to accomplish these without being disgusted.

This aspect of the job is an important sign to make the point we made about affective labor: the realm is always the body. The investment in subjectivity cannot be thought without the investment in the body as well. As we mentioned above, it is not the state of mind of the other, but the state of mind of the care provider as well what is at stake; and it is also problematic to reduce this kind of production merely to the mind, it is a bodily matter. Similarly, here, managing disgust is not a matter of heart, but a matter of body. It is not just managing the heart, but also managing bodily reactions. In this sense, we can state the second characteristics that makes care labor affective labor: *You have to tame your body to bear the unbearable.*

#### 2.3.4 Affective labor (III): Not to make it feel like a burden

Up until now, we have indicated tasks and manners expected from a care provider and demanded by both the elderly and their children. Yet, beside these common features, there is another point that I want to emphasize which, I believe, bears quite

a significant implication in rethinking care work. This is the point which is brought forward exclusively by the elderly themselves: *not to be made to feel like a miserable, needy, burden.*

All the elderly that I talked to were willing to talk about their previous bad encounters in which their incapacity to act autonomously was “slapped into their faces”<sup>29</sup> as if it were a fault, a deficiency. Referring to these bad encounters, they indicate the main reason for which they appreciated the relation they had with their current care providers: the latter does not make them feel needy, or like a burden. Their narration on this matter is quite crucial in rethinking caring and the demands of care work in relation to the discussions of dependency and autonomy.

The demand of “not to be made to feel like a miserable, needy, burden” signifies an intrinsic quality in engaging with the elderly. As we have thought bodywork in terms of taming of the body not to be disgusted, we can think of it in these terms too. As the encounter with the care provider’s mimics and acts of displeasure to handle bodywork generates negative images the cared one’s own body, those expressions are taken badly. As one elderly who suffered from the care providers who apparently “do it for money” put it in this way: “Some do it by rubbing it [your weakness] in your face, some do it gently and quietly that even you do not notice.”

As much as the context of not feeling degraded can be broadened it includes, beyond the intense moments of engaging with bodywork, many more ordinary instances of engagement like fetching water. Another elderly gave an excellent example of how “not to be made to feel like a miserable, needy, burden” was expressed in most ordinary instances. She was more than 80 years old and had

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<sup>29</sup> It is a crude translation of an idiom in Turkish: “Yüzüne vurmak”

trouble with walking, but she wanted to take care of herself as much as she could. According to her narrative, the biggest problem she had with care providers was that they tried to do stuff instead of helping and enabling her to do. “When I say I will take some water, I mean I will do it. I do not just want to drink water, I want to get it as well.” She told that this was the first thing she was concerned about in hiring, it was a kind of test that she used to figure out if the care provider truly cared for her or if she was just doing her job.

When Nora first started to work here, in the first couple of days I said, “I want to get water” and she stopped me and brought the water herself. But then I said that I want to be the one who gets it, she understood me. Others would let me get it a few times, but I can see the discontent in their faces... Then after a while they started to bring it to me again. It is easier you know, bringing the water. But Nora understood that I wanted to get my own water.

While at a quick glance it may be argued that such utterance is a sign of a requiem for lost autonomy, it would be an inadequate representation of the situation. Rather I think it is a good moment for us to stop and review the notions that we have held for so long that we started to believe that they are fundamental to our being in the world, notions such the individual and autonomy. I propose to read this desire of not to be made to feel needy, not as mourning for the lost autonomy, but as an aspiration for a supportive relationship. As much as we are used to think of care in terms of lack and dependency, I think it is time to think of it in terms of articulation of bodies with reference to affect theory. Let me explain.

In his unique reading of the body, Spinoza argues that bodies are extended and productive. We cannot think of bodies as fixed entities confined within the physical-biological mass. Rather, he takes the body as a process, a process whose capacities vary according to the interactions it has with other bodies, with the environment it is part of. In other words, “a body exists and acts within a force field of bodies, affected by and affecting other bodies” (Sharp, 2011, p. 27).

Spinoza proposes a relational existence, a relational ontology for bodies. Spinoza's reading leads us to think of dependency-autonomy not in terms that can be detected within the specific bodies themselves, but in terms determined within relations. In other words, in Spinoza's ontology, "limits and capacities can only be revealed by the ongoing interactions of the body and its environment" (Gatens, 1996, p. 57). In this sense, one implication is that to the extent that all bodies are in a relation to affect and to be affected by each other, all are dependent. The second implication is that an aging body cannot be judged with reference to its biological boundaries and capabilities; if all bodies are considered as extended, the capacity of a body to act would be primarily related to the environment that it is enveloped. The actions of a perfectly "healthy" body could be quite limited in an unsupportive environment, and an aging body could act perfectly well in a supportive relation, where it can articulate itself with other agreeable bodies. In this sense, autonomy here is proposed to be rethought not as a capacity confined to the individual, but as a capacity that can be generated or diminished in relations of affecting and being affected by others. Likewise, dependency here does not appear as external to the individuals but as constitutive of them. What is important here is that it is the bodies that are primary to individuals and not the other way around. Thus, dependency cannot be measured in terms of the dependency of the individual; dependency as relationality is the condition of existence.

In this sense, a body who helps another to get water would be thought as supportive in terms of increasing the body's capacity to act. Presenting an aging body who gradually becomes deprived of her capacity for renewal could easily be seen as less powerful than a young body, but it would be a perspective grounded on the assumption that individuals are self-sustaining, self-sufficient. The notion of a

self-sustaining individual has been the target of feminists for centuries as it ignores women's reproductive labor of maintenance and care: behind the self-sustained appearance, there is the labor of women. The notion of the self-sufficient individual is problematic, erroneous or, in the words of Spinoza, inadequate also from the perspective of affectivity. Spinoza problematizes the isolationist perspective of selves: "The human body needs for its preservation a great many other bodies, by which, as it were [quasi], it is continually regenerated" (2002, p. 255). Spinoza's extended notion of individual with the refusal of atomic, self-sufficient, isolationist understanding of individual proposes another perspective for us to think about the self in terms of interiority and exteriority. As Aurelia Armstrong underlines neatly:

Spinoza's relational conception of individuality involves a fundamental rethinking of concepts of interiority and exteriority which are premised on limiting the borders of the self to the spatial boundaries of the anatomical body or the self-enclosed confines of Cartesian consciousness. Interiority and exteriority are instead redefined in terms of what 'agrees' or 'disagrees' with the individual's identity. What is internal to the individual is that which agrees with her nature in the sense that it contributes to her self-maintenance or augments her power. . . . *Thus, my relation to others who 'agree' in nature with me are internal to me...* [emphasis added] (2009, pp. 18-19)

In this sense, such a perspective can lead us to think of caring not from the lens of unmarked compensations of lacks and losses of the aging body but from the lens of support to increase the mobility of the body. Rather than assuming individuals as anatomically contained entities, if we conceive of them as relational, then the 'internal', the 'agreeing' ones would not be limited to the anatomically contained body, so that we would not have to think of an elderly in terms of her biologically aging body and its decreasing capacity to act, but in terms of an elderly in a relation of care. An elderly who is looking for someone to care for her by not making her feel like a burden, miserable, and needy is one who is looking for relationships that can empower her, first of all by 'agreeing' with her and enhancing her capacities.



The relationships that are supportive and empowering for all the bodies involved is called friendship for Spinoza. I find his description of friendship very close to caring. I would prefer to conceptualize caring relations as relations of empowerment for all the bodies involved. Yet, of course, such a description of caring is viable only if it is mutually empowering; when caring is contained as work, as it is in our case, rather than mutual enhancement, we have subsumption: the subsumption of less powerful bodies to more powerful ones; or to put in other words, making certain bodies the care provider for the ones who are able to afford it. When a care relation is contained as work, while what is demanded by the care receiver is quite ‘liberating’ and empowering for the care receiver, it can be quite exhausting for the care provider.

Then, the final aspect of demanding the articulation of nonwork with the work of care takes the form of production of a caring relation in the form of “friendship” if we use the friendship in the way Spinoza does. The work of care should be enacted as if it were friendship. In this sense, we can reveal the third characteristic that makes care labor affective labor: *its production should be the enhancement of the power of acting of the cared body.*

#### 2.4 Conclusion

We started this chapter with the discussion of what counts as caring with reference to Tronto and Fisher’s conceptualization, especially for the reason that their emphasis on labor and practice provides us with a useful ground to pursue the discussion of care in terms of care work. We then tried to give a rough outline of the “musts” of the work of eldercare by defining two of its components as the work of watching and bodywork. We further tried to indicate that nonwork needs to be incorporated into

the work of care in the daily actions of the laborer for the relations to be considered as family-like. We tried to explore the expressions of this articulation in the materiality of daily life. In this sense, methodologically speaking, we tried to derive the meaning out of tracing the associated practices.

In this sense, this chapter attempts to explore what kind of work care work is. Among others, one important feature has been underlined: the work/nonwork distinction is not analytically useful, rather for the laborer such work implies the “colonization of life by work” (Weeks, 2007, p. 243). In other words, the aim of this chapter has been to reveal the unique organization of the work of eldercare when it is claimed to be done with a family-like quality in which the analysis of affective labor appears to be determinant. Considering that such work invests in the subjectivity to put in work not just as manual labor, but as active participation, and produces a relationship, a communication first and foremost, the incorporation of affective labor is shown to be the form of labor constituent in the work of eldercare for it to be considered as family-like.

The organization of work of eldercare and the form of labor it requires have further implications regarding what counts as labor and how to think its valorization. In the next chapter I will try to explore these implications.

## CHAPTER 3

### RETHINKING VALUE(S) AND VALORIZATION(S) OF CARE LABOR

#### 3.1 Introduction

Feminist approaches to the notion of value and valorization tend to be rather indirect. Even if these notions are embedded in analyses as one of the major feminist concerns, as in the devalorization of women's labor, they are dealt with as direct objects of matter. Contrary to this tendency, in this chapter, we will take the questions of value and valorizations as the direct objects of concern, and considering the qualities of care labor, we will try to expose the inadequacies of specific value discourses and propose alterations in the formulation of them.

Traditionally, Marxism and anthropology have been the two major approaches which directly concern themselves with the question of what counts as value and how to think of valorization. While for Marxists, the heart of the value discussion is labor (the labor theory of value), for anthropologists, value is a question that should be searched for in culture, in history, and in the social, and the notion of value is conceptualized in terms of social importance. Of course, neither Marxist nor anthropological theories of value can be seen to form a single trajectory; rather there are different Marxisms as well as different anthropological accounts of value which can appear even quite contradictory with one another.

In this chapter, contrary to the traditional anthropological approach that grasps value in "things", following David Greaber's (2001) discussion, only one branch of the anthropological theory of value, namely, approach which sees value in "social practices" will be one of the reference points. The Greaberian approach of value will inform us in the sense of posing the question of value and valorization of

paid care labor in terms of what qualities and practices make the labor of care irreplaceable within a care relation.

Since our object of concern here is nothing but care labor, it is not surprising that Marxist analyses of value, taking the labor-power as the source of value, will be the dominant index of this chapter, referred to both as sources of inspiration, and as discourses to challenge or alter in relation to the qualities of labor that care labor introduces. With reference to feminist interventions to (particular) Marxist readings of value and labor, and with reference to the distinctive characteristics of care labor, some alterations in Marxist terms will be proposed: alterations (1) in the conceptualization of labor, (2) in the calculation of what would be the source of surplus, and (3) in the forms that the value of labor is expressed.

Within this framework, the following pages can be seen as an attempt to contribute to the feminist concern of mapping women's labor within the production system by taking the question of value and valorization seriously, and as a direct matter of concern, by re-posing them with a focus on care labor.

### 3.2 Theories of value

In many feminist studies, the notion of value appears as an intrinsic concept so that even if various discussions revolve around it, the notion of value itself rarely appears as the direct matter of concern. If the notion of value is ever addressed, it is, most of the time, not as a question to elucidate or to reformulate, but rather it is raised *formally* in empirically rich studies which contextualize the issue as the devalorization of care labor in the labor market. In these kinds of works, the devalorization of women's labor is discussed in relation to the underpayment of the jobs which are traditionally seen as women's work, or in relation to the non-waged

appearance of the housework. The devalorization of women's labor is discussed in relation to gender, race and class inequalities, and the question asked revolves around whether the gendered aspect of the work is due to the fact that they are not valuable in the market, or to the fact that their work is not valuable because it is handled mainly by women.<sup>30</sup>

This line of study is helpful to document the representation of women's labor by capital, yet I find them inadequate as a basis for further analysis since they render only a restricted ground of discussion: they merely deal with the consequences, namely, with market appearances. As much as tracing the representation is practically useful for feminist struggle in making the devalorization of women's labor visible, I find it necessary to take a step back and focus on the valorization process itself before the appearance of devalorization.

Of course, there are also feminists who do that. This line of path is taken mostly by Marxism influenced feminists who do not only challenge the consequences (the market appearances) but propose to challenge the rationality as well. These are the feminists who do not attack capitalist ideology solely but target Marxist approaches as well. I think it would be fair to say that this path is taken by feminists who see a shared neglect over women's labor in the analysis of labor and value both in capitalist ideology and within Marxism. Rather, they propose various "corrections" of Marx himself and his "male" followers.

As much as such a path can be attributed to rather different varieties of feminisms, here, I want to focus particularly on Leopoldina Fortunati's work, since

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<sup>30</sup> For instance, the traces of such reading is present also in Tronto's reading of care. Care work is devalued; care is also devalued conceptually through a connection with privacy, with emotion, and with the needy. Since our society treats public accomplishment, rationality, and autonomy as worthy qualities, care is devalued insofar as it embodies their opposites. (1993, p. 117)

she deals with the question of labor and value directly and immediately as concepts to reconceptualize.<sup>31</sup> She reposes the valorization problem of labor considering women's labor.

In other words, contrary to the first path, rather than starting with the obvious, which is of course fine and necessary for practical reasons, the line we will draw on with reference to Fortunati deals with the theory of value itself and proposes to alter it. Hers is an attempt to re-theorize the theory of value inclusive of women's labor. In this frame, rather than the discussions turning around the inequality within the market, the second line of discussion allows an exploration of the value of paid care as it *actually* concerns with the question of valorization. Then, let me start with Marx and Fortunati's intervention to his theory.

### 3.2.1 The "law of value" and Fortunati's intervention

The question of value has an important place in Marxist discussions both as an object explaining the capitalist valorization processes and as an object of self-valorization indicating the creative capacities of labor. The discourses of value are already multiple even in Marx's own texts.<sup>32</sup> It has been quite some time that Marxist scholars agree that it would be mistaken to assume as if Marx developed *a* theory of value and it is *the* "law of value". Rather, various Marxist theoreticians, with

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<sup>31</sup> Others, like Autonomist Feminists or Socialist Feminists deal with Marx himself and different readings of Marxisms, and expose the limits in conceiving the singularities of women's labor. Yet, I will focus particularly on Fortunati because the discussions of value and valorization are her explicit matters of concern, whereas in others the notions of value and valorization appear derivatively, indirectly as embedded in the concern over women's labor with its other aspects. For instance, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Salma James (1972) stand against the tendency to conceive women's labor in the form of "*personal service outside of capital*" which limits women's suffering only to male "oppression" and which does not allow to see it in terms of "exploitation" to the extent that it appears to be non-waged labor; rather Dalla Costa and James expose how women's labor is inside of capital (Dalla Costa & James, 1972).

<sup>32</sup> As it will be discussed in the following pages, different conceptualizations can be traced in different writings of Marx (1969, 1973, 1990).

different approaches to the issue, argue for the multiplicity of value discourses in Marx's own writings so that the one known as the "law of value" is only one of them (Henderson, 2013; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Caffentzis, 2005; Vercellone, 2007).

Even if the one known as the "law of value" is not the only one, or even if Marx himself has never made a strict, clear definition of something called *the* "law of value", it has been the most controversial and so the most referred one. The "law of value" concerns the labor-value theory in Marx's writings, and in the most basic sense it is formulated as "the value of a commodity is determined by the socially necessary labor-time required for its production" (Caffentzis, 2005, p. 94). This first discourse of value in Marx, the "law of value", presumes two important criteria: (1) there is a meaningful distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and (2) socially necessary abstract labor-time appears to be the unit of measurement.

I start with this first discourse of value in Marx, since it is the discourse which has been taken up in Fortunati's work both as an object to challenge and an object to rely on. She maintains the idea that there is a meaningful distinction between productive and unproductive labor, but proposes an alteration in the boundaries of what counts as productive and what counts as non-productive.

Traditionally, the realm of productivity is reserved for male labor, and women's labor is taken as mere reproductive labor to the extent that women's labor is associated with the domestic sphere. The boundaries of such distinction are set by some writings of Marx where he sees the productive work in the labor which is "directly transforming into capital" and so, which "must be waged", and which is "realizing itself in commodities, in material wealth" (Fortunati, 1995, p.101). These conditions of productive labor delineated with reference to Marx's *Theories of Surplus Value* (1969) function to reserve the realm of productivity for waged

commodity production, since for Marx “the only worker who is productive is one who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, or in other words contributes towards the self-valorization of capital” (as cited in Fortunati, 1995, p.101). At that point Fortunati criticizes Marx for being unable to see that women’s labor is *actually* productive, yet *formally* appearing to be non-productive:

Reproduction work seems neither to produce surplus-value nor to be paid work, nor does it seem to produce commodities. At the real level however, the opposite is true. Here, (a) it produces surplus-value even if not in terms of exchange value; (b) despite being posited by capital as a natural force of social labor it is non-directly waged work; (c) it is a work that produces a commodity, labor-power notwithstanding the fact that this is a “special” commodity, which takes on the secondary determining characteristics of productive work in a specific way, because it is a commodity which cannot be sold either by capital or by the female houseworker, but only by the worker himself. (Fortunati, 1995, p.102).

In other words, to the extent that Fortunati argues that women’s labor is productive since it is materialized in commodities (even if not in the traditional form), it is waged (even if it is non-directly), and it does contribute to capital (even if not in the form of exchange-value), she actually affirms Marx’s criteria of productivity, only refusing the formal boundaries of them. She attempts to stretch the boundaries to include women’s labor within the sphere of productive labor.

According to her, Marx’s inability to grasp the productivity of women’s labor, which is concealed behind its non-productive appearance, depends on his neglect in considering the labor within the household with its singularities. Here, before anything else, the singularities of the labor within the household imply their gendered character. Marx misses this fact that labor is gendered, that it is specifically women’s labor. Citing Marx from *Theories of Surplus Value*:

[t]o this class of productive laborers itself, therefore, the labor which they perform for themselves appears as “unproductive labor”. This unproductive labor never enables them to repeat the same unproductive labor a second time unless they have previously labored productively.



Fortunati criticizes Marx for:

referring to a mythical working class that is simultaneously labor-power as capacity for production and labor-power as capacity for reproduction, i.e., that carries out productive work in the factory and non-productive work in the house. He saw a working class that goes from factory to fireside, from workshop to washing-up, from work productive for capital to work non-productive for capital. Had he instead . . . seen the tendency towards the sexual division of labor, he would have begun to deal with the kernel of the problem, but he didn't. (Fortunati, 1995, p.100).

There is not such a mythical unified working class. What is not seen here is nothing but the fact that it is women's labor done for men. Marx's omission of women's labor within the household, as has been the target of feminists for so long, makes one either dismiss women's labor at all, or consider women's labor merely as reproductive, or at best, as Marx does, to conceive it productive only in terms of use-value consumption, "productive only as a process of productive consumption and not as a process of production (or of productive work)" (1995, p.51).

I think there are two fundamental reasons for Fortunati not to choose any other value discourses in Marx, but particularly to be impressed by and to ground her own discussion on this particular Marxian labor theory of value: (1) labor-value theory underlines the fact that what is productive is labor, not capital, and (2) it enables measuring (quantifying) the exploitation of labor with reference to the calculations of socially necessary labor-time and surplus labor-time, which enables one to concretize the notion of exploitation which is highly concealed in the wage system.<sup>33</sup> So, by stretching the boundaries of what is to be counted as productive labor, by finding an equivalent place for women's labor in the schema of production of surplus value, Fortunati pursues an analysis that these two functions of the law of value enable.

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<sup>33</sup> I believe these are also the reasons for other Marxists who insist on keeping Marx's labor theory of value. For instance, see, Caffentzis, 2005; Cleaver, 2005; Resnick & Wolff, 1989; Althusser et al., 2016.

So, in a nutshell we can say that this work of Fortunati could be seen as an attempt to “revise” Marx’s labor theory of value by exposing what he leaves out. She grounds her arguments on the validity of the “law of value” to measure labor-value, and her intervention is rather *formal* since she keeps the norm but tries to stretch its boundaries to include women’s labor in the sphere of productive labor. In this sense, I think her position can be seen as an attempt of “counter-interpellation” (Balibar, 2013), the focus of which is saying ‘we [women] are productive too.’ I start with Fortunati because her work is quite important within feminist literature as it stands as one of the thorough attempts dealing with the notions of value and valorization from the perspective of women’s labor. Yet, as much as I appreciate the significance of her work, I still find it limited for our analysis.

Her analysis bears a great potential, which can be easily pursued into richer grounds, if she has pursued it to the end. However, she chooses to remain within the logic of valorization in terms of the “law of value” (1) by keeping the axiom of distinction of productive and unproductive essentially unchallenged, (2) by not really dealing with the labor-time discussion, and (3) by indicating an important realm in saying that the product of women’s labor is “commodities in a different form” but not elaborating that adequately. In this sense, the inadequacies I find in Fortunati are the inadequacies I find in this first discourse of value in Marx, and her reluctance to cultivate the potential challenges that can be pursued to the end.

In the following sections, considering the three defining characteristics of care labor, (1) its tendency to render challenge the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, as well as (2) between work-time and live-time, and (3) the kind of product that it produces –which, as I will argue, is biopolitical– , and I will

elaborate the reasons for which the argument that the “law of value” perspective is inadequate to comprehend the processes of valorization of care labor in its paid form.

### 3.2.2 Care labor: What is excusable and what is not?

#### 3.2.2.1 Nida and Alma

During my interviews with care providers I was always a bit nervous thinking that I may cause trouble for them if there was something urgent they needed to do, and did not while talking to me. One day, the care provider woman I was talking to all of a sudden jumped up while we were talking and said that she had forgotten to give ‘Mama’ her medicine, I immediately thought that I made her forget. She left the kitchen, where we were talking, went to give the medicine to the elderly lady she cared for. When she came, I apologized to her for interrupting her daily routine and causing trouble, but she carelessly told me not to worry, apparently, she was forgetting it all the time.

No, no... it is not because of you. I always keep forgetting them. Even Enver Bey [the son of the elderly] sets the alarm in my phone for me to not forget, but apparently it is broken again... it happens time to time.

I got in touch with Nida through a friend of mine and I heard many things about how wonderful she was as a care provider, so I thought that this little story of ‘keeping missing the time of medicine’ was made up by Nida for me to not worry.

After our conversation with Nida, I was able to talk to the elderly she cared for. She kept talking about how she loved Nida, how she was happy and lucky to have Nida with her. I apologized to her for distracting Nida and causing her to give the medicine late. In response to my apology she smiled and said the same thing Nida says,

It is just Nida! Remembering the time to give my medicine is not the best thing she does! We set all the watches [alarms] but she misses them all the time, I guess we are not used to keep the cell-phones around us...

The medicine was for her high blood pressure and giving the pills on time was supposed to be one of the priorities for a care provider, yet apparently it was not, and it was not an issue for the care receiver either. All the other qualities of Nida, which can be summarized as being a good companion, worked quite well to compensate for her inadequacies in the practical tasks she supposed to fulfill.

In another household, before conducting the interviews I was drinking tea together with the care provider and the elderly woman she cared for. The elder lady was teasing the care provider by saying that she would rat her clumsiness on me and tell she keeps breaking her tea cups. And the care provider, Alma, continued with this teasing atmosphere: "then I will tell her how you eat candies secretly". The elderly continued to pretend that she was intimidated and said "no, no I am just kidding she is wonderful," winking at me mischievously. And this funny conversation continued back and forth throughout our tea ceremony.

In our private conversations, I referred to all the jokes they made hoping to understand how serious they were about the clumsiness of Alma. Apparently, Alma, was rather clumsy, that she was either breaking things or bumping her into closet doors or something. I would think that breaking things could easily be seen as a problem for the households she worked in, yet her clumsiness was never a problem for the elder lady Alma then cared for.

It is one of her flaws. I have mine. I keep forgetting where to put my glasses and make her to find them. . . . So, what if she breaks some cups, she takes such a good care of me that I would not change her for the world. If you have a clumsy daughter would you stop loving her? Of course, you don't.

What was even more interesting to me is that apparently Alma's clumsiness had always been her mark, yet it had rarely been an issue in the households that she worked in previously.

I cannot say that I ended up with some households because I was clumsy... Yes, in some households it has been taken badly. Once for instance I broke a pricy piece of china and they tried to deduct it from my salary, but it was just an instance; if I did not break the china it would be something else... Do you understand what I mean? What actually caused them to deduct the cost from my salary and me to quit was that our chemistry was not compatible, we were not getting along.

According to Alma, there were cases where her clumsiness was used as an excuse to end the apparently not-working relationships, but it had never been the real reason.

#### 3.2.2.2 Naze and Ayşe

Naze was working with the same family for more than five years, and it was one of the family members that I know who introduced us. When we were talking in the kitchen one of the relatives of the elder couple she cared for came in to get some water, chatted with me a bit, and before she was leaving the kitchen, she asked Naze if she remembered Ayşe, hold to me that I should hear about Ayşe, and they started to laugh. She left the kitchen, and Naze started to talk about the woman called Ayşe.

Naze was caring for an elderly couple and when the situation of the male one she was caring for, to whom she referred to as "my father", was getting worse, the older son of the cared couple, Taylan, offered Naze to hire someone to help her. Naze kept refusing it but Taylan insisted that her workload of her got heavier and it would be better if they could find someone to work under Naze's instruction to make things easier for Naze. Then, one day Taylan brought this woman, Ayşe, to see if Naze and she could get along, and Naze had reluctantly accepted to give it a try.

Apparently, what caused laughter and gossip about Ayşe was her peculiar character which was seen rather unorthodox to be a care provider. Naze told me stories about the things Ayşe did within the week that she was hired. Accordingly, the first thing she did in the mornings was to make herself a cup of coffee. Without having her coffee, she would not do anything in the name of service. She would have her breakfast before anyone else, and only then she would prepare the breakfast for others. And apparently, she was a “facetious” person too, she did not hesitate to sprightly say things like “to care for someone you should care for yourself first, am I right.”

The characterization of Ayşe that caused laughter and gossip, and eventually caused her to lose the job, was this attitude of prioritizing herself, and doing it openly, explicitly, or in the words of Naze, prioritizing herself “as if it was something to be proud of”. According to Naze, with such an attitude, it was impossible for her to keep the job. It is not that she did not do the tasks that she was responsible for, she was doing the tasks that Naze asked her to do “eventually”, but not “immediately.” And this was the problem: not doing them immediately. What made her act of preparing breakfast only after drinking her coffee so problematic was hidden in Naze’s words, “it was not her priority... You understand what I mean, right?”

Of course, it was not just a matter of time, it was not that breakfast was late. Saying “to care for someone you should care for yourself” was not a bad, but actually a smart thing to say from a long-term perspective. If the care provider does not care for herself, she could easily be overwhelmed or become sick which would directly impact on the quality of the work she does. But the problem in Ayşe’s motto of ‘take care of yourself first’ was the explicit prioritization of self-care which means

that the care of the other came secondary. She could, and she should *also* take care of herself, but not *as a priority*. The priority should be given to taking care of others. Then what are the characteristics suitable for caring that Ayşe did not have? This was the self-sacrificing character. A self-sacrificing character which would ensure that when necessary, drinking coffee and having breakfast will be what would be given up.

One important thing is that in that week there was not a single moment one could say Ayşe was neglecting the things she should do. Yet, she was marked already as *not caring enough* due to her attitude of self-prioritizing that she was not abstaining from showing others or putting into words as a kind of motto.

### 3.2.2.3 The value of practical labor

I referred to the cases of Nida, Alma, Naze and Ayşe to make it explicit that even the most valued care providers, meaning the ones who are seen to be irreplaceable within the caring relation, are not perfect laborers, but have flaws, incompetencies and inabilities. They make mistakes and those mistakes may even be quite consistent, quite characteristic of them. Yet, there are excusable flaws and non-excusable ones. What is the criterion?

Considering the cases of Nida, Alma and Ayşe, what makes them irreplaceable or easily replaceable is not their capabilities in accomplishing practical work. Nida forgets to schedule the time for medicine, Alma's clumsiness is a known fact, yet they appear to be irreplaceable. On the contrary, when Ayşe is criticized, no one disputes her ability to do stuff, but this ability could have not saved her from getting fired. Her attitude appears to be the cause for her labor to be devalORIZED,

meaning to become expendable, replaceable. Her self-prioritizing character was not excused, even if *in practice* she did not do anything wrong.

As failures in accomplishing practical work appear to be excusable, what makes them so appears to be success in another side of care labor, which is the non-practical labor. Remember that the one thing that is in the forum discussions is that the people do not find it hard to find someone to hire, what is hard to find was finding someone to keep as hired in the long term. Here, what makes a laborer stay, what makes a laborer precious is also what makes her labor valuable. And I argue that the criterion for care labor to be seen valuable was less to do with its actual, practical laboring, and more to do with the affective and communicative capacities put into work. Or let me put it in this way, what makes care labor valuable and the laborer irreplaceable depends on her ability for “getting along with the elderly”.

### 3.2.3 The source of value: The vitality of the laborer

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, when we described the work of eldercare we mentioned the importance of affective and communicative capacities of the laborer put into work; and argued that this form of labor, with its immaterial, subjectivity invested aspect, is expressed in a variety of forms. The capacity of the laborers to create and maintain companionship and friendship was expressed in “little details” like listening interestedly, laughing sincerely, watching TV together, expressing curiosity about the stories the elderly tells and so on. Then, rather than perfection in following the schedule of feeding, cleaning or giving the medicine; chatting with the cared one and amusing her make the labor of the care provider more valuable. If we recall that one of the points that the ethics of care literature insists on was that manner matters more than actual fulfilment of the tasks when it comes to care. In view of the arguments in



chapter 2, I will continue with the notion of value and argue that the source of value of care labor appears to be the corporeal, affective and communicative capacities of the laborer, capacities which imply the immaterial dimensions of care labor.

In assessing something like paid care, the labor theory of value, even in its stretched version in Fortunati, is not sufficient to explore the processes of valorization. For the first reason that within this framework, the time spent on certain activities loses its importance in deciding the worth of care labor as soon as the source of value appears to concern the labor in its immateriality, so that necessary labor time versus surplus labor time calculation would not help us here to grasp the productive character of such labor. Secondly, such labor configuration shatters also the grounding axiom that posits a meaningful distinction between productive and non-productive labor, since in our story what makes the labor precious is nothing but its capacity to articulate activities which are traditionally seen as non-labor within the labor. As it is elaborated in the previous chapter, care labor gets valorized in moments like watching TV together, sharing interesting stories, chatting and so on. Beside the configuration of labor, this latter point raises another question: what does care labor produce?

Here, our argument is that the product of care labor is biopolitical,<sup>34</sup> meaning that it produces a life; to the extent that it produces companionship, it produces relations, and subjectivities as new forms of commodities. As Fortunati has indicated but did not elaborate its implications other than the difference in its circulation (“a commodity which cannot be sold either by capital or by the female houseworker, but only by the worker himself”), the product of care labor differs from traditional

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<sup>34</sup> Hardt and Negri conceptualize biopolitical production as “the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.” (2000, p. xiii)

commodities in its forms. Traditionally, commodities imply end-products, yet to the extent that what it produces is the caring relation, it is a product without an end-product in a certain form. In the absence of a finished product, what is produced appears to be the dynamic relationality between the care provider and the care receiver.<sup>35</sup>

In the book *A Grammar of the Multitude* (2004), Paolo Virno opens up a discussion about products without end-products. He quotes the definition of products without end-products from Marx that a “product is not separable from the act of producing” (Marx, 1990; cited in Virno, 2004, p.53) that these kinds of products “find in themselves their own fulfillment without being objectivized into an end-product” (Virno, 2004, p. 53). Of course, here the reference of ‘products without end-products’ concerns rather the production of art in the discourses of both Marx and Virno. Yet, their blindness to women’s labor, like care labor, as products without an end-product aside, these insights are quite rich and allow us to elaborate further the nature of care labor.

If the “product is not separable from the act of producing”, the product of care labor becomes production. The production and the product cannot be thought as separate moments, rather they should be thought as one. Then, considering the quality of producing without an end-product, how can we formulate the valorization of such labor?

Labor that does not take the form of end-product is also an issue addressed by George Henderson. In his book *Value in Marx: The Persistence of Value in a More-Than- Capitalist World* (2013), he deals with the inadequacy of labor-time as the unit

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<sup>35</sup> Hardt and Negri indicate a similar point when they elaborate the issue of how to think about biopolitical production: “The ultimate core of biopolitical production, we can see stepping back to a higher level of abstraction, is not the production of objects for subjects, as commodity production is often understood, but the production of subjectivity itself” (2009, p. x).

of measurement to consider such products. Yet, unlike the position elaborated here, Henderson does not announce the end of labor-time as the proper unit of measurement, rather he proposes an alteration in how we conceptualize it.

Henderson argues that Marx writes that even in communal production the “determination of labor time remains essential” (Henderson, 2013, p. 46), and for Henderson the real question is “what it is that labor time counts” (Ibid., p. 47). Depending on the Marx of *Capital* and *Grundrisse*, he proposes to keep labor-time as the unit of analysis to calculate value, but not as a quantitative measure, which devalues the “actual use values produced and exchanged” (Ibid., p. 47), but *as a qualitative measure* which makes it necessary to consider the question of use-value directly.

As much as the attempt of Henderson to explore qualitative aspects of the laboring sounds promising while thinking the value of labor which does not result in an end-product, I still think that even if labor-time counts qualitatively, it will be still inadequate to deal with care labor considering its time-table shattering organization, its affective and communicative configuration (that we explored in Chapter 2) and the form of the product it produces. If care labor’s production is biopolitical (meaning that what is put into work becomes subjectivities, affectivities, communicative capacities articulated within laboring) and if its product is also biopolitical in its form (meaning that the product of care labor is a caring relation, a life), I do not think that “a politics of use value”<sup>36</sup>, which I believe what Henderson’s

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<sup>36</sup> In his book, the major argument of Henderson can be put in the following way: rather than providing a clear-cut definition of “what value *really* is” (2013, p.88), Marx’s analysis of value discusses what value could have been, and can be in the future: “[h]e shows that value, in an alternate reckoning lies elsewhere, in a world that remains to be made” (Ibid, p.89). And maintaining a parallel reading, Henderson himself does not aim to solve the problem of value either; he keeps it open. With this respect, it is more than legitimate to read Henderson’s discussion in terms of possibility/impossibility of value. However, to the extent that he finds “thinking labor-time qualitatively” to be a promising step to start with in thinking value differently, I think the trajectory

suggestion may end up with, would be adequate to explore what kind of a production we are talking about.<sup>37</sup> I think, here the question is not choosing between use-value and exchange-value. As opposed to the traditional tendency to relate economic value with exchange value, Henderson proposes to think economic value with use value; but the point I want to underline is that to be able to reveal the value of the labor in biopolitical production, what needs to be focused is the configuration of what we call value. That is why I think the value (economic value) needs to be thought beyond the use/exchange distinction; it needs to be thought in terms of its inseparability from social value: that is to say what needs to be underlined is that the configuration of value needs to be thought beyond mere economic value; and be thought as necessarily social and economic.<sup>38</sup> As Thomas Lemke puts it “[b]iopolitical production’, . . . refers to dissolving divisions between economics and politics and between nature and culture” (Lemke, 2017, p.112), so what is argued for is not a politics of use-value, but the configuration of economic value as such which

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Henderson suggests leads us to think value in terms of use value. That is why, I argue that his discussion resembles a politics of use value.

So long as only time is valued, there is no (immediate) need to be worried about the actual use values produced and exchanged—for example, whether they are really needed, whether certain concrete labor skills are overemphasized at the expense of others, whether there are too many of one kind and not enough of another (the old problem of imbalance). But if labor time counts qualitatively—if we immerse ourselves in the problem of how labor time is concretely spent—then we confront these issues directly rather than incidentally and haphazardly. We would then have not just a “higher degree” of the old “law” but a very different law indeed: purposeful and common control of the “economy of time.” (Henderson, 2013, p. 47)

<sup>37</sup> My objection to Henderson’s suggestion considers specifically my object of analysis which is paid care in the form of *live-in* work (See, Chapter 2). His suggestion might be useful in thinking about paid care labor practiced in nurseries, as they will not be in the form of *live-in* work. As the organization of paid care in nurseries follows time-tables and working-shifts, we can differentiate the work time from nonwork time, and in such cases, taking labor-time as the matrix of analysis might be meaningful, and taking it in the way Henderson proposes us to do, assessing qualitatively, might be helpful for us to discuss how such labor is valorized. In other words, to be more specific, my problem with Henderson is that his suggestion cannot provide us with the proper tools to differentiate the qualitative difference between paid care labor when it is acted as a *live-in* work and when it is acted as a *live-out* work: it might be a promising attempt to explore labor which matters qualitatively in *live-out* works, but not to assess the labor in *live-in* work when its configuration makes labor-time reference insignificant.

<sup>38</sup> As Hardt and Negri argue “the inside defined by use value and the outside of exchange value are nowhere to be found, and hence any politics of use value, which was always based on an illusion of separability, is now definitely inconceivable.” (2000, p. 209)

“is not linked to the production of material objects but to the production of social relations and forms of life” (Lemke, 2017, p. 114).<sup>39</sup>

As the question is the configuration of value and, considering the biopolitical character of the production process and the product, I argue that labor-time can neither quantitatively nor qualitatively express and measure the source of value. I argue that the source of value and valorization of care labor lies somewhere other than labor-time (no matter if it is counted quantitatively or qualitatively). The source of value appears to be *the very vitality of the laborer* which concerns her corporeal, affective, communicative capacities, and her very subjectivity put into work.

When the source of value appears to be the vitality of the laborer, then the sites of productiveness expands over the whole aspects of life, meaning that the source of surplus cannot be restricted to the laboring capacities acted in working time; rather the processes of surplus extraction targets the very life of the laborer, including her subjectivity.

To the extent that the “law of value” grounds itself on the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and takes labor-time (socially necessary labor-time) as the unit of measurement, it becomes inadequate to grasp the productive property of care labor even with the revisions Fortunati, or Henderson proposes.

The realm of non-productive is challenged by Fortunati to some extent by showing that women’s labor is productive, but it is kept as a meaningful reference point. Here, I claim that productivity spreads over the whole of life that such distinction needs to be blown apart completely. The little details that make care labor

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<sup>39</sup> The implication of such reading is that: there is no outside of production (production is biopolitical), as such, there is no outside of economic value rather economy is implied here in its folding with the social and the political.

valuable force us to reconceptualize our conceptual givens: we need to rethink what non-work, non-labor, and non-productive labor are, or if they have ever been so.

When production becomes biopolitical, when what is put into work and what is produced become life itself with all its aspects, the distinction made between productive and non-productive becomes non-tangible and inadequate to lean on. I think such labor leads us to re-pose the question of the ground on which labor is valorized. And as Balibar suggests, maybe before anything else, we should start with rethinking the validity of the axiom of a meaningful ‘distinction between productive and unproductive labor’: “My guess — not really more than a guess — is that we should question the axiom itself, namely the distinction of *productive and unproductive labor...*” (Balibar, 2005).

Then, we need a new set of vocabulary to proceed. A new set of tools to enable us to conceptualize processes of valorization of care labor by taking the *vitality* of the laborer as the true source of value with reference to all its corporeal, affective and communicative qualities. We need a new set of conceptual tools which are capable to directly affirm the biopolitical character of the production of care labor (both in terms of the production’s expansion over life, and in terms of the dynamic and relational character of the product), and which is capable to affirm the immateriality of labor directly without deriving it from modified indexes of time.

#### 3.2.4 Biopolitical production and the immeasurability of value: Rethinking labor

The main problem Hardt and Negri have with the “law of value” is its claim of measuring of value. In *Empire* (2000), they announce that measurability is the characteristic impact of Western metaphysics on our thoughts, and in the discussion of value its repercussions can be traced to Marx’s “law of value”.

The great Western metaphysical tradition has always abhorred the immeasurable. . . . Even Marx's theory of value plays its dues to this metaphysical tradition: his theory of value is really a theory of the measure of value. . . . If there is no measure, the metaphysicians say, there is no cosmos; and if there is no cosmos, there is no state. In this framework one cannot think the immeasurable, or rather, one *must not* think it. . . . This metaphysical illusion disappears today, however, because in the context of biopolitical ontology and its becomings, the transcendent is what is unthinkable. (2000, p. 355)

As opposed to the claim of measurability of the "law of value", Hardt and Negri try to think the unthinkable: they propose to think value in terms other than its measurement; they propose to think it as something *immeasurable*, as something *beyond measure*.

Besides pointing to the impact of metaphysics on our thought which imposes quantifiability, Hardt and Negri are able to problematize the traditional conceptualization of labor, which is rather restricted and cannot comprehend the qualities of labor in its entirety. So, to generate their unorthodox theory of value, they take another *radical* step and propose to alter the conceptualization of labor from a restricted understanding into an expanded sphere: labor as "value-creating social practices" (Hardt & Negri, 2003, p.7). I have preferred to use the attribute *radical* because their proposal to reconceptualize labor and hence value has received many objections from other Marxists who criticize them for transgressing the age-old conceptual and ontological attempt to differentiate labor from action.

The attempt to differentiate the notion of labor from social action is an attempt coming from Aristotle (1992), maintained by Hannah Arendt (1998) and insistently pursued by many contemporary Marxists lines of thoughts like the *Midnight Notes Collective*. Rather than seeing Hardt and Negri's proposal simply as a confusion, theirs can be seen as the way to understand the nature of care labor. Let me explain why.

The notion of labor has traditionally been defined “as having a beginning-middle-end temporal structure, as being able to be planned, repeated, reproduced and imposed externally while action is spontaneous, creative, unique and cannot be imposed externally. One can force another to labor again and again, but one cannot force another to act even once” (Caffentzis, 2005, p.97). In this definition, the dynamic and creative capacities are attributed to action, and repetitiveness defines labor. Such a formulation of labor can be thought as form of labor under the authority of factory regime (this is still dubious though), where labor appears in terms of its abstract qualities, emptied from its creative and subjective sides within a mechanical cycle of productivity. Yet, it certainly cannot explain the formation of care labor that we have discussed so far.

Hardt and Negri argue that the site of labor is much more mobile and dynamic, what is to be thought as labor is “historically defined through contestation” (Hardt & Negri, 2003, p. 9). In this sense, updates are more than legitimate to define the site of the labor with respect to its contemporary forms; and, considering that the immaterial side appears to be more and more hegemonic in the configuration of labor, they announce that the traditional conceptualization of labor, which carefully differentiates it from action, is not valid anymore, if it ever was before.

Hardt and Negri’s reconceptualization of labor grounds on Marx’s writings on *living labor*. In the *Grundrisse* (1973), Marx highlights the living character of labor by saying that “labor is the living, form giving fire” (1973, p.361). And the concept of living labor is significant for Negri as it introduces rather a dynamic conceptualization of labor which is able to grasp the moments traditionally seen as non-labor.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> In fact, in *Marx Beyond Marx*, he argues that the emancipation of living labor will be the emancipation of non-labor (Negri, 1991, p.83).



What triggers Hardt and Negri to reconceptualize what is to be called labor is their observation that caring, affective and emotional investments become the characteristic aspects of labor in contemporary production. Even if such observation is open to contestation and it has been subject to many objections, their argument is quite important to the extent it is this very observation of the change in the configuration of labor which has led them to recognize the inadequacies in the traditional conceptualization of labor. Apart from the debate on whether immaterial labor has become the hegemonic form of labor in contemporary relations of production or not, their discussion is significant for our argument as it is directly an attempt to affirm and valorize the distinctive qualities of types of labor like care labor.

In other words, their starting point is that the affective and immaterial aspects of labor, which are traditionally seen as non-labor, or as part of women's work, expand into various forms of laboring and are getting more and more decisive in value production. Such observation forces them to see the concept of labor not as a given, static concept but as a "mobile" concept subject to change. When the qualities of labor like its immaterial aspects, or types of work like care work get multiplied, they force us to consider the "new configurations of productivity" in today's capitalist formation (Hardt & Negri, 2003, p. 6).

So, what makes this transgression of the traditional ontological distinction made between labor and action *radical*, and not well-received by a many number of Marxists, resides in the methodological implications such convergence between labor and action bears: Hardt and Negri's analysis opens "the concept of labor across the spectrum of social production to include even the productive sphere that Marx called the horizon of non-work" (Hardt & Negri, 2003, p. 7). In other words, contrary to

Fortunati's attempt, which only stretches boundaries, Hardt and Negri directly target the legitimacy of any distinction posed between productive and non-productive labors.

Moreover, Hardt and Negri's expansion of the scope of labor allows us to construe the incorporation of non-labor within labor as a substantial point of analysis. According to Hardt and Negri, in its new configuration, labor has no distinctive space, because it spreads everywhere so that it would be futile and even erroneous to try to understand economic production as belonging to a distinct sphere other than social production.

On the one hand, the relations of capitalist exploitation are expanding everywhere, not limited to the factory but tending to occupy the entire social terrain. On the other hand, social relations completely invest the relations of production, making impossible any externality between social production and economic production. (2000, p. 209)

In this sense, such diagnosis bears another methodological approach to deal with the notion of labor and the notion of value. The criteria of what counts as labor are necessarily embedded in wider social relations so that

What counts as labor, or value creating practice, always depends on the existing values of a given social and historical context, in other words, labor should not simply be defined as activity, any activity, but specifically activity that is socially recognized as productive of value. The definition of what practices comprise labor is not given or fixed, but rather historically and socially determined, and thus the definition itself constitutes a mobile site of social contestation. (Hardt & Negri, 2003, p. 9)

When economic production overlaps with social production, then the question of what determines the value of labor necessarily concerns other spheres of sociality as well. In other words, considering our case, what counts as care labor cannot be thought as being autonomous from what socially counts as "good caring". To the extent that economic value converges with familial values, we can say that the labor-

value theory of Marxism converges with the anthropological theory of value, emphasizing the “social importance of actions” (Greaber, 2001).

Then, if the question of value traditionally has been posed as a question of measurability, with such a frame, Hardt and Negri pose it as a question of *immeasurability*. What counts as labor is unforeseeable, what is productive cannot be defined beforehand, and the time of production is not identified at all. Expanding the notion of labor by multiplying it with creative capacities, Hardt and Negri argue that values created by labor are immeasurable, beyond measure.

Then, what would be the legacy of Hardt and Negri in thinking of the value of labor? Does the claim of immeasurability of value leave us without tools? I think when Hardt and Negri say we cannot measure the value of labor, they indicate the complexity of the question of value as a consequence of the complexity of the nature of labor. Contrary to some Marxists, who are insistently claiming that it is a “confusion” (Caffentzis, 2005, p.103), I do not think that this declaration claims the end of the hegemony of capital over labor; rather it implies that the surplus extraction of capital is much more complicated than we have credited it for. As Kathi Weeks formulates that the problem “cannot be reduced to extraction of surplus value . . . but extends to the ways that work dominates our lives” (Weeks, 2011, p. 13). The announcement of value’s immeasurability or its being beyond measurability does not declare the absence of value; it invites us to go beyond the metaphysics of the abstract, and to try to trace the concrete by focusing on the living of labor as such.

The problem with measuring value, with necessary labor-time and surplus labor-time calculation is that when the biopolitical nature of production is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that (1) the time calculation here is not tangible enough to lean on, and (2) rather what makes paid care labor valuable in terms of

capitalist valorization appears to be the degree to which it is capable of articulating nonwork in the daily enactment of it. As we have said, the source of value appears to be the very vitality of the laborer which concerns her corporeal, affective, communicative capacities, her very subjectivity is put into work.

The reason to refer to Hardt and Negri in this chapter is to benefit from the conceptual tools they generate. If nothing else, their reading of the Marx of the *Grundrisse* in relation to the concept of living labor leads them to conceive the problem of the restricted understanding of what counts as labor. What they see as the “new configuration of labor” is actually a perfect perspective to grasp the configuration of care labor with.

There is one last reason for us to ground our work on Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of labor and value. Even if Hardt and Negri themselves do not formulate it as such, extending their reading, we can explore a further implication of the value of such labor: the value of labor gets formed in a hybrid space, then we will argue that the valorization of care labor takes on forms other than the money form. And considering our case, in the next part we will propose to think of the gift as a substantial form of value through which care labor is expressed.

### 3.3 The gift-form of value: Rethinking valorization

The money-form of value has traditionally been thought of as the hegemonic form of the expression of labor-value. Within this discourse, all other possible forms are seen at best as supplementary. The money-form appears as *the* form of value where exchange value is taken as *the* form of value. Yet, contrary to conceiving other forms as supplementary to the money-form of value, I will argue that as the configuration of care labor implies a folded site for economic production with social production,

the form of value that can express such labor takes at least another substantial form other than the money-form: namely, the gift-form.

In fact, considering paid care relations, I argue that the wage, the price of labor, the money-form indicates the value of labor in question only in terms of its minimum value. Thus, it can be said that the wage in paid care relations imply the minimum worth of the labor that is performed. The wage considers care labor only in terms of abstract labor, meaning that without considering the singularities it takes during the process of production, care labor is taken as just like another form of labor, valorized only in terms of the average labor-time that is invested. In this sense, the money-form can only correspond to care labor contained as work, work not different from any other work like factory work. However, as we have said, paid care labor is more than that. There is a difference that matters.

While the money-form is measure for the abstract value of care labor, the gift-form expresses labor not in its abstraction but in its singularity. It is the gift-form of value which is capable of affirming the singularities which makes up care labor. The gift-form of value expresses whether labor as such is capable of producing something significant, something irreplaceable. In other words, the gift-form corresponds to the ability of the laborer to “care genuinely”. If what money-form of value expresses is the minimum worth of labor as work, the gift form expresses the moments it exceeds the necessities of work by incorporating non-labor within labor; the gift-form expresses the nonwork of paid care.

In other words, as we have said, the configuration of care labor appears in terms of the incorporation of non-labor within labor, and the source of value appears as the very vitality of the laborer, that is, her success in investing in her corporeal,

affective and communicative capacities, and it is the gift-form that expresses the value of such labor.

The important point is that, what is implied here is not two separate valorization processes expressed in different universes. That is to say, the argument is not that the money-form corresponds to the economic value, namely the exchange-value, and the gift form corresponds to use-value, the social value. Rather, since economic value is necessarily formed in articulation with social value, we need to think its expression in an articulated form as well. What care labor shows us is the inadequacy to assume that its valorization can only be expressed in the wage form. Its value is rather expressed in a combined form: the money-form expresses the quality of care labor as work, but it is the gift-form which expresses its quality as caring.

Contrary to the approaches which take the money form as the substantial and the possible others as supplementary, we argue that the gift-form is equally substantial, if not more. The gift-form corresponds to care labor enacted in a qualified way; it corresponds to the extraction of surplus not in the form of surplus time, but in the form of the articulation of non-labor within labor. In this sense, we propose the gift-form as an expression of the vitality invested character of care labor and the biopolitical form of production.

### 3.3.1 The gift versus exchange

In the introduction chapter of this thesis (Chapter 1), the sphere of “family-like” paid caring relations is defined as a folded space, which necessarily articulates market values with familial values of “genuine caring”. And as it is discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), for the care provider to be considered as one of the family, she

needs to offer an excess to her labor, she needs to incorporate surplus of her labor in the form of non-labor. And our argument here is that, this excessive character of care labor cannot be expressed in money-form of value, rather it needs to be thought in terms of the gift-form.

The more the laborer produces affectivity and communication, the more the terms of the relation are altered from being a mere wage-contract into being a relation of “companionship”; and the more the terms of relation resemble to an intimate economy, the more the labor become valuable. And the value of care labor in such an economy is expressed in the gift-form, not in the money-form.

But what is the gift-form of labor-value? How does it differ from the money-form? One traditional approach to understand what a gift is formulated in Mauss as exchanges in the form of presents (Mauss, 1990). But actually, this is a formal description, which does not really make us to grasp the singularity of the gift. Even in the words of Alain Testart, it confuses the gift with the exchange: it “mixes up two things as one” (Testart, 2013, p. 253). Testart argues that what makes a gift something other than a form of exchange is important to ask, and it is neither the form it takes (like the form of present), nor the absence or presence of the counterpart (as Mauss also underlines there is the obligation to return the gift), nor the fact that gift and counter-gift may be deferred in time; rather Testart suggests one criterion to decide what makes something the gift: the distinctiveness of gift comes from the notion of abandonment of the right to demand a counterpart that the gift contains within itself.

[T]he gift is the *transfer of a good that implies the renunciation of any right over this good, as well as of any right that might issue from this transfer, in particular something requiring a counterpart*. . . . The idea of gift contains the notion of abandoning. The donor abandons a good, any idea over this good, as well as any right that emanate from its transfer. . . . In the exchange, on the contrary, whoever exchanges something has a right to require a

counterpart- and it is the right itself that defines the exchange. (Testart, 2013, p. 258)

The intervention Testart makes to differentiate the gift from the exchange has broader implications for us to differentiate the characteristics of the gift-form of value from the money-form of value.

The money-form of value, as the dominant form of exchange relations, bears the right to demand a counterpart in itself. When the counterpart is not reciprocated, it is within the rights of the donor side to ask for it. Yet, the characteristics of the gift-form of value is that it does not and cannot bear any right over what is given from the moment it has been given. As Mauss is quite good at explaining it, the return of the gift can be and is expected for most of the time; but, this is the point Testart underlines, this expectation cannot be forced without losing its characteristics to be the gift. In other words, one cannot force the other to return the gift in the classical sense of the term, even if the failure in return of the gift would be disappointing for the donor, and it can affect his future attitude toward the particular gift receiver who had failed to return the gift. Let me try to further elaborate why this particular point raised by Testart matters for our case.

### 3.3.2 Gift as the valuing of non-labor

Satisfying the formal, minimum requirements of the practice of care as work, described as the work of watching for and bodywork in Chapter 2, cannot be seen as the gift. Rather, as we have discussed, they are contractual *obligations* for the ones who provide eldercare. In this sense, fulfilment of them can be seen as labor in an exchange relation. Let's say, in exchange for the fulfilment of bodywork, the wage as the money-form of labor is given. In this relation, neither the wage, nor labor fulfilling the particular working-task can be seen as part of the gift relation. They are



counterparts of an exchange relation that if one fails to supply one part of the exchange, the other one will have the right to demand the return of the counterpart.

On the other hand, qualities of care labor which make it irreplaceable within relation, formulated as capacity to incorporate non-labor within labor, appear as gifts. Incorporation of non-labor within labor can be and is expected, but cannot be forced. One can force someone to clean the house but cannot force to “spend quality time with the elderly”. Spending quality time with the elderly is what is expected from the employer side, but it is not something that can be obtained through force. If it is forced, it loses its character of being non-labor, its quality of being “genuine”, its quality of being the gift. That is why, we have said that for the employer side the difficulty is not to find someone to hire, but to find someone to keep as hired for the long term. This is the sense that the structure of the articulation of non-labor is more akin to gift relation. To the extent that laboring as if it was non-labor matters within care relations, the gift appears to be quite central to explore how care labor is valorized within paid care relations.

That is why the money-form of value is not capable to express the value of care labor in its entirety: the terms that non-labor is incorporated are beyond what the money-form is capable to express. Rather, this wage-contract exceeding quality of care labor resembles the gift relation, which can be expressed in the gift-form. So, what is argued here is that in thinking about the valorization of care labor, the gift-form of value of labor needs to be taken as substantial as the money-form, if not more.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The fundamental concern of this chapter was rearticulating the notions of value and valorization of labor which can grasp distinctive characteristics of care labor. More specifically, in correspondence to the limits of traditional understanding of labor value, the one known as the “law of value”, we have tried to formulate another approach of value and valorization proceeding without reducing the qualitative differences of care labor into quantifiable units of measurement. With this concern, several interventions have been made considering (1) the configuration of care labor, (2) the site of its acting, (3) the dynamics of the production process, (4) the form of the product of care labor, (5) the source of surplus labor, and finally (6) the form of value wherein the valorization of care labor is expressed.

In this sense, first we have tried to indicate the shortcomings of the “law of value” even in the updated forms of it in the discourse of Fortunati, or in the discourse of Henderson in a different manner. Then, in search for a different set of conceptual tools, we have looked at (1) Hardt and Negri’s expansion of the site of labor into including value creating activities, and (2) their declaration of immeasurability of the value. These two points of reference, coming from another value discourse of Marx, a discourse they read from the *Grundrisse*, enabled us to think valorization of care labor with reference to its living character which implies a radically different reading than the one in which valorization is conceived in the forms of abstraction of labor.

All in all, this chapter is an attempt to contribute to feminist concern of mapping women’s labor from a theoretically oriented perspective. By specifically focusing on care labor, the chapter has proposed several arguments:

1. The site of labor has expanded over to include the sites which are traditionally seen as sites of non-labor.
2. The difference between productive and non-productive labor loses its ground as care labor incorporates non-labor within itself.
3. Production process of care labor as living labor does not result in finalized commodities which can be measured by the abstract labor time contained in it; rather these products appear to be biopolitical in their nature that the production process and the product (which is caring relations and subjectivities themselves) cannot be traced to separate moments.
4. The source of the value of labor in question appears to be the vitality of the laboring body considering all corporeal, affective and communicative capacities of hers.
5. Labor-time as the unit of measurement falls short in thinking of the valorization of care labor as the work spreads to all of life of the laborer that there is no meaningful distinction to pursue between the work time and nonwork time.
6. The productive nature of care labor implies that economic production and social production coincide that the production of care labor cannot be thought solely in economic terms: the value of care labor or the ground of its valorization considers other values and is expressed in combined forms.
7. In relation to the sixth one, the money-form cannot be thought as the hegemonic expression of economic value, economic value of care labor as co-constituted with social value is expressed in the form of gift which is as substantial as the money, if not more: it is the gift-form that express the value, the importance, the significance, the irreducibility of care labor.

8. Economic value cannot be thought separate from social value. So that in exploring the value of care labor, the labor-theory of value in its revised form necessarily converges with anthropological theory of value.

In Chapter 2 we tried to explore what care work is; and in this chapter, we focused on the configuration of care labor that is put to work and tried to explore how it is valorized. While ending this chapter by indicating the irreducibility of the gift-form of value in paid care relations, in the following chapter, we will further raise questions about the notion of the gift and how it functions in extracting surplus value from the vitality of the laborer by focusing on the question of the return gift.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE RETURN OF THE GIFT:

#### WHAT IT COSTS TO RETURN THE GIFT OF *LIVING-WITH*

##### 4.1 Introduction

As I have clarified in the introduction chapter of this thesis (Chapter 1), the potential I see in working particularly on paid-eldercare relations which are claimed to be family-like is the potential it bears to challenge the traditional conceptualizations of what work (chapter 2), and labor or value (chapter 3) is.

In this chapter, I propose to look at care in terms of gifts. Of course, I am not the only one in proposing such reading, there are other works which propose to read gift and care together. For instance, in his essay Philippe Chaniel asks if we can define ““good care” as care that becomes more like a gift” considering the fact that both a gift economy and a care economy are “victims of the same lack of recognition”, that both are “marginalized, rendered invisible, seen inferior” and considering that both “good care” and the gift involve “quality of reciprocity” and the “refusal of any unilateral services” (Chaniel, 2012). Like Chaniel, we propose to read care as a gift as well; however, contrary to his reading, what motivates us is not the idealized conceptual familiarity between the two, but, as we mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, a realization that gift relations appear as substantial mechanisms of surplus extraction in care relations. In other words, contrary to the readings which draw a parallel between the nature of care and nature of the gift, we refrain from assuming natures. Rather, we propose to read care in terms of gifts because as we have seen in the field encounters, gift relations appear quite substantial in the formation of care work.

With this respect, in this chapter we will thus proceed with a reading of care in terms of the gift, with an analysis of gift relations taking place within paid-care relations and considering particularly the question of what is produced in the circle of giving, receiving, and counter-giving.

Of course, there are different ways to approach the issue of the gift. And approaching it from this particular angle, from the circulation of the gift and counter-gift, is a methodological choice which needs to be grounded. In this sense, in the following section, I will try to explain the reasons why the circulation of the gift, a Maussian account, is methodologically suitable for us.

#### 4.2 Conflicting theories and methodologies of the gift

If there is one thing that different approaches within the gift literature agree on, it is the problematization of Mauss's reluctance to differentiate the gift from the exchange in his essay *The Gift*. For instance, as we mentioned in the previous chapter Alain Testart is one them, even if he follows Maussian notion of the gift in some senses, he criticizes Mauss for not problematizing the relation between the gift and exchange; similarly, Jacques Godbout (2006) refers to the importance of differentiating the circulation of the gift from the circulation of rights and mercantile commodities. Jacques Derrida's critique of Mauss also targets this problematic in the Maussian account of the gift. Yet, Derrida's account diverges from others quite significantly as his critique of the Maussian gift is much more methodological.

Mauss conceives of the gift as a circular system, consisting of three moments: giving, receiving, and counter-giving (Mauss, 1990). The critiques of Testart and Godbout appear more like moments to complete what was inadequate in Mauss, they take the Maussian formulation of the structure of the gift and explore some moments

which they think are obscure in Mauss. However, Derrida objects to Mauss's reading on its very founding ground. For Derrida the problem is not just Mauss's reluctance to differentiate the gift from exchange, but his methodological choice to approach the gift in terms of circulation. In other words, even if Testart, Godbout and Derrida start with the same problematic, Derrida's objection to Mauss's reading is much more fundamental. That is why, Mauss and Derrida signify the two prominent, yet different and even opposing, perspectives on the gift in the literature. And that is why, for us, it is important to confront Mauss with Derrida: their methodological difference is decisive regarding the direction the analysis of the gift can take. That is to say, different methodological approaches of theirs bear quite different implications on the analysis of the gift.

So, in the following pages, we will try to explore the implications of Mauss's methodological choice of proceeding the analysis of the gift through the counter-gift with reference to Mauss's *The Gift* and the texts of Mauss's biggest critic Jacques Derrida on the concept of the gift.

#### 4.2.1 Mauss versus Derrida: Counter-gift versus pure gift

As it can be seen in the title of his book *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (1990) Mauss conceives of the gift as a relation of exchange. Mauss's choice of approaching the gift as always embedded in a relation of circularity brings forth the notion of the counter-gift forward. That is to say, in Mauss, the gift appears in terms of the counter-gift. In other words, one must need to think counter-gift if one wants to talk about the gift.

However, for Derrida (1994; 1995), one of the most influential critiques of Mauss's account of the gift, if we ever talk about gift, before anything else, we must

separate it from the circularity. Derrida prefers to approach the gift through the notion of pure gift, not through the counter-gift as Mauss did. According to Derrida, the pure gift is exterior to circulation, it is out of exchange relation; and being part of any circularity, of any exchange is the one thing that annuls the gift from being so. While we do not see any attempt in Mauss to differentiate the gift from exchange, in Derrida, the annulment of the gift is associated with circulation, with reciprocity. In other words, what appears as fundamental in Mauss (the existence of the gift within circulation/exchange), is seen by Derrida as the core of the problem; as the cause of the annulment of the gift to being a gift.<sup>41</sup> As opposed to the Maussian emphasis on the circularity of the gift, Derrida prefers to conceive of the gift in terms of a pure gift as his first methodological premise. In fact, this is the ground of Derrida's famous critique of Mauss:

Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* speaks of everything but the gift: It deals with economy, exchange, contract (*do ut des*), it speaks of raising the stakes, sacrifice, gift *and* counter-gift—in short, everything that in the thing itself impels the gift *and* the annulment of the gift. (Derrida, 1994, p.24).

Here, the heart of the methodological dispute between the Maussian perspective and the Derridean one reveals itself in the following way: for the Derridean account it is crucial to differentiate the gift from the counter-gift in order to be able to talk about the gift *in itself*, while for the Maussian approach they are not only inseparable, but also the counter-gift appears much more promising as an index of analysis than the gift in itself. For instance, while following Maussian methodology, Godbout pursues the question of what happens to the gift receiver, producing a reading of Derrida, sociologist Olli Pyyhtinen proceeds with the conceptual difference between the gift (volunteer) and the counter-gift (obligatory) and pursues the question of conditions

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<sup>41</sup> The gift is “annulled each time there is restitution or countergift” (Derrida, 1992, p.12).



of voluntary gift giving, and in his book *The Gift and Its Paradoxes: Beyond Mauss* (2014) Pyyhtinen criticizes Mauss for only ever speaking “of the counter-gift, never of the gift itself, in itself” (2014, p.23).

This difference in methodologies causes the Derridean line of thought to criticize Mauss for “automatically” assuming “that gifts are only in exchange” (Pyyhtinen, 2014, p.21), and so, for missing what the unique quality of the gift is: the quality of being voluntary, being given out of “gratuitousness”. Even that Pyyhtinen says that it is as if Mauss “is interested in the gift only as an element of a system of exchange” (Ibid., p.21). And Derrida criticizes Mauss by saying “[h]e speaks of it blithely as ‘gifts exchanged’. But he never asks the question as to whether gifts can remain gifts once they are exchanged” (Derrida, 1994, p. 37). That is why, according to Derrida and Pyyhtinen, Mauss does not “speak of the gift” as his account of the gift reduces the question of ‘what the gift is’ to the exploration of the ways and mechanisms of the circulation of the gift.

Or let me put it in another way. If we adopt Mauss’s structure of the gift as a system consisting of three moments of giving, receiving and giving-back, Maussian theory can be seen as focusing more on the giving-back part (the counter-gift), while Derridean theory focuses on the giving part (the pure gift). This methodological difference has an impact on what to pursue in the analysis of the gift: while Mauss goes after the questions of the obligation to give back, Derrida prioritizes inquiring about the gift-giving in the first place.

With this respect, in one sense Derrida and Pyyhtinen are right to announce that Mauss does not speak of the gift; but in another sense, they are not. Yes, Mauss does not talk about the gift as the gift in itself, as the gift in its purity, as the gift in its abstraction. For instance, Mauss does not really try to explore the nature of the gift

and the act of gift giving as such, Pyyhtinen does. “Gratuitousness in and of the gift” (Pyyhtinen, 2014., p.23) is not the object of concern in Mauss’s account. What he pursues is the movement of the gift and its effect on the bodies of the giver and receiver. But it is exactly for this reason that Derrida’s claim that Mauss does not speak of the gift is also problematic. Mauss *does* speak of the gift, but he does it not in terms of pure gift, but in terms of circulation/exchange of the gift.<sup>42</sup>

Here we can see the two roads opened up by two different methodological approaches to the notion of gift. The Derrida influenced one focuses more on searching for the possibility of non-annulled gift—for instance, Pyyhtinen declares the object of his book to be an attempt to pursue an analysis of the gift in terms of

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<sup>42</sup>As much as Derrida announces that in Mauss’s reading gifts “are destined to bring about once again the circle in which they are annulled” (Derrida, 1994, p. 24), he does not deny the fact that the gift exists out of a relationality, that an exterior to reciprocal relationality is not possible. Here, Derrida’s position needs not to be conceived as a rejection of circulation, but rather arguing that there is more in the gift than circulation: he suggests an “excess of the gift over the circle . . . in a way that does not deny the circle but tries instead to *keep* the “relation without relation of familiar foreignness” (Derrida 1992: 45)” (Callari, 2002, p.257). In other words, Derrida stands to complicate the relationship between the gift and the economy:

Now the gift, *if there is any*, would no doubt be related to economy. One cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to the money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which interrupts economy? That which, in suspending economic calculation, no longer gives rise to exchange? That which, opens the circle so as to defy reciprocity or symmetry, the common measure, and so as to turn aside the return in view of the no-return? If there is gift, the *given* of the gift (*that which* one gives, *that which* is given, the gift as given thing or as act of donation) must not come back to the giving . . . It must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the form of return to the point of departure (Derrida, 1992, p.7)

In fact, that is why Derrida announces that the gift is *the impossible*. Derrida’s approach is seen to be significant for some for its capacity to rethink what is called the economy (Callari, 2002; Osteen, 2002). However, the reading of the gift we propose here does not conceive the moment of giving in terms of generosity, but in terms of abandonment of the right to demand the counter-part. In this sense, the reading of the “gap” between the giving and the return, which is the productive ground of the Derridean analysis as the core of the impossibility/inevitability of the gift, loses its significance for our analysis. In fact, that is why we have presented the Derridean and Maussian readings as methodologically divergent in the first place, and that is why we offered not a coherent but a rather limited reading of the Derridean notion of the gift. As much as Derrida’s reading of the gift as an *aporia* provides a space for political imagination, as we will note in the following pages, in asking the question of what makes the gift and what annuls it, Derridean line of thought will not be helpful for our project as the gift in itself, the gift giving, does not appear to be generous in the first place.

exploring “the possibility of irreversible, unilateral and free giving” (Ibid., p.31)–, and the Maussian one searches for what comes out in the circulation of the gift.

In comparison to Maussian account, I find Derridean methodology not suitable for our analysis: it runs the risk of sticking into the giving part and failing in exploring the productivity in the gifts in circulation. For instance, since his focus of concern is the conditions of the pure gift, Pyyhtinen’s analysis tends to overlook one of the crucial points in Mauss’s argument, which is that: before anything else gift produces debt. According to Pyyhtinen Mauss’s reading of gift in terms of counter-gift makes him reduce the gift relation into a debt relation. Indeed, Mauss is the one who reminds us that there is no free gift and that all gifts must return in one way or another. But is it fair to say that Mauss’s introduction of the concept of debt into the gift means that “the distinction between the gift and debt/loan, just as that between the gift and counter-gift, becomes close to non-existent in Mauss’s theory” (Pyyhtinen, 2014, p.24)? While Pyyhtinen takes the reference to debt as a sign of reducing gift into exchange, I think he misses the broader implications of Mauss’s reading: the production of bonds of debt in the circulation of the gift.

To be more specific, I think in our case, in looking at the gifts circulating within paid care relations, following the Derridean account, considering the core axiom that ‘gifts get annulled if they are involved in exchange’, could lead us to an analysis of the alienation, the alienation of the gift. We could easily end up saying there no true gifts, since the gift becomes corrupted when it is introduced into the order of exchange. The free, pure, or gratuitous (as in Pyyhtinen) gift remains a sort of ideal concept, and in the order of materiality, in the order of exchange to the

extent it is the only way the gift is circulated, the gift appears as annulled, as corrupted.<sup>43</sup>

Of course, the pure gift discussion may have important contributions in other contexts, in other discussions.<sup>44</sup> But here, since we are considering the gift at the level of materiality, we will rather stick with the Maussian perspective, considering the intervention/contribution of Testart (2013) and Godbout (2006) to Mauss's account as reading the gift in terms of counter-gift is more capable of exposing the asymmetry in the circulation of the gift. Within the framework of our research concern, the impossibility of the gift is not our major concern: our object here is not the gift in its abstraction, the gift in itself, the gift in its purity, but the gift in its circulation: more specifically the gifts exchanged within a paid care relation.<sup>45</sup>

Mauss does not hold such a claim about the "nature" of the gift, since for him the question is always the circulation of the gift; and the circulation of gifts exposes the mechanism beyond the ascribed/supposed gratuitousness. He shows that gift

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<sup>43</sup>It is important to make a parenthesis here. Here, there is the risk of reducing Derrida's philosophical discussion into a sociological/anthropological one, which may end up with the domestication of Derridean thought. (I must thank to my professor Ceren Özselçuk for bringing this up.) In this sense, it is important to note that the way we deal with Derridean thought is limited only to his critique of Mauss, of the "gifts in circulation," considering solely its methodological implications for doing sociology/anthropology. In this sense, what we criticize here would be a particular application of Derridean thought into sociological/anthropological analyses (more than his philosophy) which is quite determinant in the types of questions that we ask. In other words, we problematize Derrida-influenced sociological/anthropological questions to the extent that they may end up by taking the circulation of the gift as the annulment of the gift (or to put it in another terminology, in terms of the alienation of the gift) as it is in the work of Pyythinen.

<sup>44</sup> For instance, in his book *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community* (2010) Roberto Esposito is influenced by the Derridean pure gift among other sources to conceptualize his discussion of politics-community relation in terms of the gift. Similarly, as it is noted in the footnote 40<sup>th</sup>, Derrida's problematization of the gift as an aporia offers a productive ground to complicate what is called economics.

<sup>45</sup> This methodological choice does not depend on a logical comparison we made between the Maussian and the Derridean accounts, rather it depends on our research question. In other words, we will not proceed with Derrida because as I will discuss in the following section (section 4.3), the intention of the gift giver does not really matter for the gift receiver. The receiver is not concerned with whether the gift is given out of generosity, or out of pity. In this sense, the act of giving is not a significant moment for us. Rather what appears to be important is the moment of receiving and returning the gift. To the extent that it enables us to search for what comes out in the circulation of the gift, proceeding with the Maussian account is much more productive for us.

giving and receiving are not separable moments, they are together, and their unity imposes bonds of debt before anything else. In this sense, it is unfortunate that Pyyhtinen was not able to explore the point of debt Mauss makes about the organization of gift relations. Indeed, Mauss reads the gift in terms of debt, but this debt is quite different in its organization from being indebted to the banks. Gift receiving can be seen as loan taking, but the terms of how you get it differs both in its organization and in the way the return is obtained. As Mauss says the gift-debt is regulated in more moralistic ways, which target nothing but the conscience, and so the subjectivity, of the debtor in terms of allocating her future actions. Considering the boundaries of our analysis here, we will not approach the gift in terms of gratuitousness and/or annihilation, but in terms of its circulation, in terms of the return of the gift, in terms of what it produces.

So, let us try to elaborate the benefits of taking the gift in terms of its circulation as the methodological stand of our analysis in exploring the place of the gift in paid care relations. In the following section, we will focus on different cases of gifts, and try to explore the impact their circulation has on the continuity of the mentioned paid-care relations.

#### 4.3 The unilateral appearance of the gift: Gifts of the employer

Mauss defines the gift as “exchange and contracts [that] take place in the form of presents” (Mauss, 1990, p.3); later, the contemporary scholars of the gift question the notion of “present” and underline that gifts should not be thought of only as commercial presents given with fancy covers. Rather, what can be gifted can take various forms: for instance, in some recent discussions of the gift organs and blood donation (Healy, 2006), free-labor (Terranova, 2000; Mitropoulos, 2012), care

(Chaniel, 2012), women's unpaid labor (Staples, 2007), and politics (Esposito, 2010) are conceived in terms of the gift.

After all, the first form of the gift we took up in our analysis was the non-labor that the laborer articulates in her labor. Yet, even if the non-labor of the laborer is seen as a substantial gift in our analysis, it has been brought up as a form of gift neither in the narratives of the laborers nor by the employers. The gift was always an important subject in each and every conversation I had with my interviewees, but what was qualified as the gift was always the gift of the employer given to the laborer, not the gift of the laborer (non-labor) given to the employer.

In other words, in the narratives of my informants, the gift appeared as if it was only the employer side who was able to give a gift. And the conversation involved employers who gave gifts vs. who did not, the laborers who were worthy of gift giving and who are not, and so on. So, let me start with this unilateral appearance of the gift, and ask what the employer gives. For the sake of clarity, I will discuss the gift of the employer in two fundamental forms: in the form of commodities and in the form of favors.

#### 4.3.1 What the employer gives (I): Gifts in the form of objects

In the interviews I conducted, it did not take much time for the conversation to come to the issue of the gift. The gift appeared in the discourses of both employers and laborers, when they tried to explain to me that the terms of the relationship they had were much more "intimate" than a standard employer-laborer relation. In other words, the gifts given by the employer to the laborer are introduced as evidence of mutual caring, as tokens that demonstrate that the employers also care for the care providers.

In paid care relations, the most common and widely circulating gifts that are given by the employers are gifts in the form of objects. As such gifts can be bought from the market in exchange for money to give to the paid care-provider, they can also be donated among the things that are in good conditions but not used by the employer side anymore (mostly clothes and toys for the children of the laborer).

It appears that the first gift laborers receive was a piece of clothing. According to different stories I heard, it appears that clothes were bought for them by the elderly/hirer mostly when they were out together to shop. What motivates the donor to gift a piece of clothing is immediately loaded with class and migration-based implications. These women have a limited and possibly old wardrobe as an inevitable result of both coming from a lower-class background and coming as a migrant with a suitcase. In this sense, here, the employers' attitude towards gift giving resembles a kind of "charity", an attempt to compensate for a lack. That's to say, the motivation of gift-giving depends on the assumption that the care providers would probably need it.

It is the assumption of the "need" which stretches the condition that presents need to be something new. When clothes in relatively good condition are not used anymore they are "gifted" to the laborer as well, and they are conceived as gifts by the gift-receivers. Likewise, the assumption of "need" expands the target subject of the gift. Gifts given by the employers mostly extends into the children of the laborers. Used or new clothes and toys are gifted to the laborers to transmit them to their children back home.

While need-based gifting is one of the most prevalent types of gifts in object forms, there are of course also less "compensation of a need" and more "enhancement of joy" type of gifts. These gifts do not have to be huge or expansive.

For instance, buying different colors of nail polish for the care provider because she enjoys having colorful nails, or buying her favorite cookies from time to time are gifts just as buying a nice picture frame for her to put the photograph of her children in, or new scarfs to wear. These are some examples of small gifts which are not bought to fill an assumed lack, but to enhance joy in the laborer.

Both joy enhancing gifts and need compensating ones are spontaneous gifts, in the sense that they are not seriously planned in advance; but also, neither of them is spontaneous, in the sense that they entail some amount of observation of and interest on the part of the gift receiver —what she likes, what she does not like; how many children she has, the age and gender of the children and so on.

Of course, the distinction made between enhancing joy or satisfying a need is an analytical distinction; it would be problematic to claim that the spheres of need and joy are in no way overlapping. Here, the argument bears more on the perspective, the motivation of the elderly in giving a gift. For the laborers, for the receivers of the gift, the difference in the motivation of the giver does not correspond to any difference in the way they acknowledge the gift. What makes receiving something as small as a piece of cake, or something as inexpensive as nail-polish, or something that is already used as a gift is that they are given as an excess, they are given by the employer in a non-obligatory manner.

In the eyes of the laborers, this excessive, the beyond-obligation character of the gift marks a zone beyond work. For them, receiving a gift from the family you work with signals that you also *live with* them to the extent it demonstrates interest and care for you. In this sense, the immediate implication of receiving something



extra without being asked to return<sup>46</sup> is nothing but the multiplication of the ties, of the terms of the relation between the laborer and the employer.

For instance, except for one, all laborers I talked to have children, and at one point in our conversations they showed me the pictures of their children dressed up with the clothes their employers gifted. Extending the line of gifting to include their children serves, before anything else, as a kind of recognition that these women have lives other than being care providers. The sphere implied here is the personal sphere of the laborer. She is recognized and welcomed within the caring relation other than her labor; her history is welcomed.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, receiving something as little as nail polish, or a piece of cake bought for her implies an invitation for the laborer to be recognized not as abstract labor put into work, but as a living body with certain likes, habits and tastes. That is why, no matter how small, inexpensive, or spontaneous they are, the gifts given by the employers to the laborers imply adding an aspect of living into working.

#### 4.3.2 What the employer gives (II): Huge favors

Beside the gifts given in the form of concrete objects, there is another form of gift that the employer side gives to the laborer, which I will call gifts in the form of huge favors. As it has been argued for the gifts in object forms, this form of gifts are also the tokens of *living with* in the household that you work in. However, I do pursue an analytical differentiation between the two in order to reveal the point that there is a difference between the two in terms of the intensity of the “living-with effect”. Let

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<sup>46</sup> Of course, the return of the gift is expected and, in a way, demanded but in a rather indirect way. The obligation to return the gift will be discussed in its particular terms in the next section (section 4.4).

<sup>47</sup> Of course, such welcoming is limited, even some might say that it is rather a colonizing, assimilating welcoming. We will pursue neither an argument of colonization nor assimilation, instead, as it is indicated in Chapter 1, we will continue to hold the perspective of the limits.

me introduce three cases of huge gifts which, I think, will be highly helpful to assess the kind of difference I want to point out.

The first is the case of Naze. Naze's son needs money, "a lot of money" she says, for her son to go to college. Naze couldn't afford to pay that amount of money and asks for it from her employers ashamedly. It is important to note that she does not ask for the money as a gift, rather asks for it as an advance payment to be deducted from her future paychecks. And her employer, the son of the elderly couple she is caring for, gives the money and does not deduct it from her wage. Naze tells me about her surprise and happiness in tears. Apparently, it was not their giving the money and not asking it back that makes her tell the story in happy-tears, but the trust and love those people have for her which are materialized in this event. Naze always loved them, she was always glad to work with them, in their daily encounters they always treated her with love and respect, but after this event, she says she sees how enormous their reliance on and love for her are. This gesture, this gift which is huge for Naze makes them "a family even more".

Our second case is the case of Marina. Marina, as well, talks about a similar "touching" story. As Naze, Marina says she has always loved her Mama (the elderly she cares for), they were getting along very well, Mama "never made her feel as an outsider" and so on. One day, one of Marina's daughters wanted to come to Turkey to see Marina. Marina was excited but also a bit nervous about finding a place for her daughter to stay. Luckily for these kinds of "emergencies" Maria and some other migrant care provider friends of her had a back-up plan. Eight of them rented an apartment in a cheaper neighborhood to use as a place to spend their off-work time together, and host when their families come. So, she thinks it will be okay that her daughter can stay there for a couple of days. Then, she mentions about her daughter's

coming to Mama, and Mama asks her why she is sending her to a rental apartment while they can host her here. According to Marina, this was the turning point in their relationship with Mama. Mama's letting and offering her daughter to stay with them makes the household she works as the house she also *lives in*, it makes the work-place of her at the same time the live-place. And Marina adds "since then, I have not thought of leaving Mama ever. This is where I live".

The third and the last case of ours of Maria. Maria's story starts with an accident her son had. He was already suffering from epilepsy since his childhood, and when he started to work in a construction site, he fell and had to have critical surgery. Maria was in uncharted waters, she was just back from her annual leave, and now she needed to go again. She abstained from asking her employers for permission to go to see him, but she was helpless, and she was ready to take the risk of being fired. But when she told them about the accident, her employer-family became concerned, they did not just let her go but also asked her to send her son's documents to them that they could consult their other doctor friends. In Maria's words:

You know they are doctors, they know better than us... They offered to help us, I took the pictures of the documents and films and I sent to them. Then, they called me and said that they wanted to speak to the doctor. They talked, I was so nervous I do not remember even what they were saying but then the doctor gave me the phone, and Minase Hanım [the daughter of the elderly she cared for] said that "Maria don't worry we talked to his doctors and we talked to our friends here, the treatment he receives is quite good, don't worry he will be okay." I couldn't describe how I relieved and how I feel indebted to them. ... *Honestly, they took care of my son as their own...*

As we can follow from these stories, huge favors happen rather unexpectedly, but employers do not make huge favors unless they invest in the friendship, in the companionship side of the relation. While gifts in the form of objects may be given as a gesture of invitation to alter the terms of the relation and take it to a realm of friendship, gifts in the form of favors are given depending on already existing bonds

of non-work. When I asked the employers the conditions under which they did such favors, they all indicated an already established trust in the laborers that they would not abuse their favor. As a form of gift, doing such favors involves expenditures (no matter how big or small for the employers themselves, favors are bigger than object forms of gifts to the extent the expenditure does not only concern money but social relations) on the part of the employer, and they are willing to renounce what they give only if they are “sure that she is not lying.”

In this sense, while huge favors depend on previously existing “family-like” bonds, what they produce is a reinforcement of these bonds more than ever. In these three cases above, the laborers were careful about asking help by strictly sticking to the boundaries of the work relation —Naze wants extra money, but as an advance payment to deduct from her salary, Marina does not even ask if her daughter can stay where she works, and Maria knows that asking for extra permission may break her working contract, but she takes the risk—, they do not demand gifts. The money, place, time and care given by the employers in these cases are gifts because they are given as an excess to the work relation, and because their return is not specified by the donor side—for instance, Naze does not *have to* pay the money back.

As we said, all the gifts are seen as the tokens of “living with” by the laborers. They imply a relation which is beyond a mere work relation. In discussing the gift of the employer, if the initial reason for us to divide it into two forms—as in the form of objects, and in the form of favors— was to underline that the gift does not have to be in the form of concrete objects, the other reason was to suggest that the effects the gifts in the form of favors produce, the strength of the bonds, are much more intense since they go beyond the “recognition of the tastes” of the laborer, and introduce an additional solidarity-like bond between the giver and the receiver.

#### 4.4 The return gift: Production of caring woman

Beyond the unilateral appearance of the gift, now we are able to inquire into the return of the gift, to inquire what the laborer gives in exchange for the employer's gift. In fact, we have already produced an answer to the question of the gift of the laborer in the third chapter of this thesis: the gift of the laborer is no other than the articulation of non-labor within labor. But it is only now that we can elaborate what such an articulation of non-labor corresponds to; and it is only now that we can explore what gifting non-labor costs to the laborer.

In the previous section of this chapter (4.3) it has been stated that no matter what the initial motivation of the giver is, the gift appears to be the tokens of multiplication of the work bonds with the bonds of friendship and solidarity in the eyes of the laborer. In the eyes of the laborers, receiving the gift from the employer implies that she is not just working for these people but also *living with* them.

In this sense, when we ask the question of the return of the gift, neither the gift of the employer nor the gift of the laborer will concern specific gifts. The following analysis of the return of the gift will not consider the gift in the specific forms it gets within specific contexts; rather it will consider the gift of the employer in terms of *the gift of being able to claim the work place as the living place*, and parallel to that, will concern the gift of the laborer in terms of what is offered in exchange for the invitation to multiply the work bonds with non-work bonds. In other words, when we ask the return gift, we do not search for what is returned in exchange for the nail-polish, or in exchange for letting the laborer's daughter stay with her for some time; meaning that the following analysis will not trace the circulation of gifts with an empirical focus that whether enactment of the laborer's

non-labor takes the form of watching TV together, or genuinely participating in the conversations.

To the extent we are considering the gift in terms of stretching the work boundaries and making the laborer feel that she *also lives with* the people she works for, we will ask the return gift in terms of how the laborer responds to the invitation of turning the relation into something beyond work.

As we have already implied in the Chapter 2, such a gift, the gift of living with, pertains to the subjectivity of the laborer woman: what is enhanced in paid-care relations with the support of circulation of the gifts is the production of caring women, caring women as embodied subjectivity beyond professional performance. And in this plane of relations, the immediate production reveals itself in terms of staying.

#### 4.4.1 The immediate production of the gift: Guaranteeing the care provider to stay

Let us return to the three cases of huge favors that we talked about for the sake of exploring further what they produce. If we recall, in the case of Naze, what is given to Naze as a gift is not really the money for her child's education, rather what makes it a case of the gift is its broader implications. Giving money in this case is a gift to the extent that it is given as an extra, without asking for a return of it.<sup>48</sup> When money is given without being deducted from her salary, it indicates the beyond of a work relation; and when it indicates the beyond of a work relation, the return of such a gift cannot be compensated by returning the money. So, the way Naze acknowledges,

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<sup>48</sup> Gifting money may sound paradoxical for some who put the gift and money in two opposing poles. Here, we have exposed a convergence considering the manner, not the form of what is given. From another perspective, Viviana Zelizer also mentions gifted money. Her argument rather considers differentiations in the social and cultural meaning of money: "to the extent that money does become more prominent in social life, people will segregate, differentiate, label, decorate, and personalize it to meet their complex social needs" (Zelizer, 1997, p.216)

affirms and responds to the bigness of such a gift is expressed in her words that they “become like a family more than ever”.

Or for Maria, letting her go to visit her son is a gift, but what makes this already big gift even bigger is the unexpected interest the employers show for her son’s medical situation. Here, the employers do not only offer an expenditure (giving up from the days they are supposed to get profit from) but also offer to incorporate their medical knowledge and network for her benefit. And this doubles the impossibility of the return of it: such a gift appears as non-reimbursable in the eyes of the receiver. And in such a situation, Maria offers the only thing she can offer in exchange for such a huge gift: she offers her future existence to be the care provider of theirs.

There were other families who saw how good I am at caring. They were asking me to come and work for them. They were offering more money. But how could I go? When they made me such a huge favor, it would be wrong to leave them. Of course, I was not thinking of leaving, I was not searching another house to go to, I was comfortable and in peace here. I am not ungrateful, you know how terrible families I have seen, they are fine. . . . I mean even if they had not helped my son, I would not leave, but now, I cannot leave even if I want which I don’t... They help me in my bad times, they let me go to my son, never asked when I would come... I just cannot leave them until one day they ask me to go, or god forbid, if Mama passes away.

Similarly, Marina recognizes the broader implication of letting her daughter stay with her as an invitation to “live with” and responds to it with the only means she has, with staying: “since then, I have not thought of leaving Mama ever. This is where I live.”

When the gift of the employer is not conceived solely in itself, but rather in a broader context of implying that you are seen as a friend, as a companion, as one of the family, as something other than a mere worker, then your return needs to be something beyond your work. As expressed in the stories of Naze, Marina and

Maria, the immediate production of the gift of living with is keeping the receiver more bonded to the existing relationship. When business is multiplied with friendship and work is multiplied with non-work, it becomes harder for the laborer to leave.<sup>49</sup> In this sense, the received gifts touch directly the lives of the laborers: the laborer returns such gift with her loyalty. She promises to be loyal to the family that she works for, and the immediate appearance of this promise –which does not only lead the laborer to invest her present but also her future as well in the relation– is *staying*.

This perspective also helps us to see the other facet of “family-like” paid care relations, its dark side. Beyond the appearance of “better” or “humane” conditions of working, or beyond the “supportive”, “gratuitous” or “caring” appearance, “family-like” paid care relations are more binding than a “regular” work relation. If it was a mere work relation, the laborer could have a decision considering solely the work rational: i.e. if she was offered better working conditions elsewhere, she might choose to leave her current work. However, when the relationship becomes folded with friendship/companionship, leaving becomes harder since many more variables are already introduced for her to consider. As it was the case for Maria, she cannot leave for better pay or for a lesser work load; leaving the family who “helped” her when she was in trouble is more than just leaving a “job”, it is ending an “intimate” relation.

This binding character of the gift has two facets. As Mauss says, it both “ties” and “divides” (Mauss, 1990, p.73). As we have discussed in terms of binding, the gift ties the giver and the receiver together. But this tying up is never unifying as it is never symmetrical; rather, considering the asymmetry between the giver and the

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<sup>49</sup> Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2007) also mentions this situation of “couldn’t leave” in his research, but not in terms of debt, but rather in terms of intimacy.



receiver in the circulation of the gift, the two are always separated in terms of the subject positions they are attached to. As a receiver, the laborer carries the burden of the return, and the more the gift gets bigger, the more the relation becomes binding.

In other words, all gifts bind the receiver to the giver. But the bigger the gift gets, the heavier becomes the burden. As we said at the beginning, there is a difference, in terms of intensity, in the return of the gift for nail-polish and the gift for a favor. While both pertain to the subjectivity of the laborer, to the extent that the return of the gift is the non-labor of the laborer, the amount and intensity of the execution of non-labor is proportional with the worth<sup>50</sup> of the received gift. Let me put it in another way, buying her favorite cookies for the laborer, supporting her children to finish college, or buying inexpensive earrings for her, all of these eventually open the plane of relationality into an alteration: they introduce a connection which appears involving caring for and concern for the laborer beyond the boundaries of the work contract, and so introduce non-work terms within the relation. Their impact in terms of effectivity varies in correspondence to the worth of the gift in the eyes of the laborer. And the bigger gifts come with bigger repayments. For instance, Chanial argues that such a situation can go to the point of domination.

[T]he lack of symmetry between gift giver and gift receiver may tip into a relationship of domination. When this occurs, the more dominant partner will be the one who gives the most, with the other being belittled and reduced to the status of mere receiver. Domination can thus be reformulated in gift terms as giving so that the other cannot return the gift. (Chanial, 2012, p. xiv)

Mauss notes a similar situation in terms of slavery. If one cannot repay what s/he has received, s/he becomes “slavery for debt”, which means s/he loses her/his “status as a free man” (Mauss, 1990, p.42). In a similar manner, Fox and Swazey (1992) use the

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<sup>50</sup> Here, worth should not be thought only in monetary worth, the worth of the gift here is used rather in terms of its “importance” for the receiver. For instance, in the case of Marina, letting her daughter to stay at the employer’s house does not have a monetary cost to the employer, but it is still quite significant and worthy for the laborer.

expression of “tyranny of the gift” to explain the indebtedness of the gift receiver. And here, informed by all these readings, but particularly influenced by Nietzsche, we will propose thinking of the return of the gift in terms of the production of subjectivity of the caring woman and its fixation.

#### 4.4.2 The cost of the return gift: Continuing to be the care provider in your free time

In his truly fascinating book, *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche talks about “the actual labour of man on himself” (Nietzsche, 2006, p.36) to explain how debt implies subjectivation. Following Nietzsche what is argued here is that the gift relation, as a form of debt relation reserves and reproduces a particular subjectivity for the laborer.

When I mentioned that the return of the huge gift is staying, staying is meant both in terms of the physical spatiality of staying and in terms of the fixation of subjectivity: it is staying not as someone else but as the care provider.<sup>51</sup> As we have said, it does not only fix the current state of being of the gift receiver, but her future as well as a care provider. When such huge gifts are received, the laborer promises to return it in the future. Again, following from Nietzsche, the indebtedness of the gift receiver ensures a calculable, so a dependable subjectivity. They create indebted subjects who have nothing to return but their own bodily capacities. It is like Mauss’s story: when you do not have anything to return the gift, you would gift pieces of your body, and in our case, you gift yourself to be a committed care provider today and tomorrow. The laborer’s return of the gift is her flourishing towards becoming the loyal, devoted care provider who will stay with the family.

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<sup>51</sup> Even if she is claimed to be family and seen as a daughter, she is considered as such to the extent that she knows her place as a care provider. The claimed familial status is ensured only if the laborer “willingly” remains in the position of the care provider; if she transgresses the line she might easily be considered as spoiled, and so on.

At this point I want to highlight one crucial point. The argument that ‘production of the caring women invests in the life of the laborer woman in all its aspects’ means that the caring woman subjectivity is not something performed only during working time, but something which pertains to her non-work relations as well.

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we have associated the spread of this “work” subjectivity into nonwork time in relation to “live-in” character of care work –as the organization of live-in work does not consider the work-nonwork distinction. As much as it is an important point to explore the nature and organization of care work, it would only be a partial explanation for the argument of embodiment since it considers only the spatial confinement of these women as the reason of embodiment. However, I argue that even when there is spatial change, even when the laborer gets out of the house that she works-in and *lives-in*, the caring subjectivity continues to prevail.<sup>52</sup> Let me tell you a story.

One of my informants, Nora, tells that she feels like a stranger when she sleeps with her husband. As part of her work, she sleeps in the same bed with the elderly she cares for as her nightly routine involves taking care of the elderly in her sleep as well. And in those times, when she is not “working”, when she goes back home, she continues to act like as if she is still sleeping with the elderly even if it is her husband who is sleeping next to her. Whenever her husband attempts to get up from the bed –to take some water or something–, she automatically jumps out of bed to support him to get up, or whenever he moves in bed, she catches herself checking if he is whining or needs help.

Similarly, when Naze tells me about how much she misses the husband of the elderly couple she cared for, who recently passed away, she says that she still wakes

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<sup>52</sup> This is why we insist on analyzing caring subjectivity not in terms of professional performance but embodiment.

up at night to check if he is ok, if he is breathing; sometimes she finds herself smushing the apple for him to eat as she always did but he is not there anymore.

Nora laughed as she told me this story which popped up not when we were talking about her work, but when we were talking about her family. Naze told me her story in tears, and it came up when she tried to explain how much she missed the deceased elderly that she cared for. Here it is important to note that the common motive of getting up at night, as well as finding yourself smushing the apple implies a non-conscious level. Even if there is spatial change, even if the work conditions cease to exist, the traces of being the care provider continue to prevail. Their relationships with the kind of subject they are supposed to be pour into every instance of their lives. That is why I am proposing to pursue the analysis with the notion embodiment. Since they embody the attitude of being always ready to help/act, it does not matter if the elderly is present or not. Their routine, the way they engage with their own bodies prevails in their “personal”, non-work time as well. They do not act like that because they know the necessities of the job; they do not act like that because it is part of their job; rather they act like that because these actions already became a part of themselves.

In other word, when we have posited non-labor as the gift of the laborer, the question of what it costs to the laborer appears to be “becoming the care provider”. It is such a gift that the cost of returning it takes your life, considering both your future actions and all aspects of your life.

As I have discussed in the chapter on work (Chapter 2), what is demanded is not a worker but a care provider, not someone who professionally acts but who acts in an embodied way. In this sense, the subjectivity invested aspect of care work once again steps forward. At the beginning of this chapter I said that I am interested in

reading care relations in terms of the gift as it is the circulation of the gift which introduces another mechanism of surplus extraction. It extracts the surplus of the non-labor, appropriates what escapes from the wage relation. In this sense, the embodiment of caring has further implications for us to rethink exploitation.

It is not just the cases of Naze, Maria and Marina that we have given to explore the return gift, but also all the examples we have provided to explain the organization of care work that entail that the work dominates the lives of the laborer.<sup>53</sup> In this sense, as we argued that the production should be thought in terms of biopolitical production; now I am arguing that exploitation needs to be thought as biopolitical as well. Here, exploitation cannot be reduced to the extraction of surplus value, but it extends to the lives of the laborer by making caring life.

Arguing for thinking of exploitation in terms of biopolitical exploitation has direct implications: (1) exploitation cannot be defined solely in economic terms –it is not a mere matter of quantity of labor extracted<sup>54</sup>, rather (2) it needs to be thought as a political concept –it is not just the allocation of surplus labor time but taking advantage of biopolitical vulnerability<sup>55</sup>. In this sense, there is no specific place and time for exploitation, it is everywhere.<sup>56</sup> Exploitation is in the moments when the care providers try to return the gift of *living-with* by investing in their becoming in the perfect care provider as such. “Staying” implies exploitation as it limits both the spatial boundaries and the mobility of these women in the present and the future.

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<sup>53</sup> For instance, Kathi Weeks (2011) talks about such expansion of work into life as a general condition of post-fordist work in terms of work society.

<sup>54</sup> For instance, see Negri, 1992.

<sup>55</sup> Here, biopolitical vulnerability implies the asymmetry and disadvantaged position of the laborer coming both from her migrant status (as it is noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis) and from her further disadvantaged position of being the gift receiver in the asymmetry of the gift relation.

<sup>56</sup> Negri and Hardt discuss this quality in terms of the “non-place of exploitation” in their book *Empire* (2000).

This was the reason why, at the end of the Chapter 3, we argued that the site of surplus value concerns the vitality of the laborer. And this was the reason why I introduced the notion of the gift into my analysis: it is nothing but the circulation of the gift and the bonds of debt it produces which appear to be the substantial mechanism for surplus extraction from non-labor in care relations. The gift appears to be the mechanism through which non-labor is being articulated to labor and will be articulated in the future.

#### 4.4.3 Why holding the perspective of “the gift in circulation” matters

In the previous section (section 4.3), we started with the unilateral appearance of the gift, which means that we started with tracing what is given to the laborer as a gift, within paid-care relations. However, if one leaves the argument here, and does not trace the counter gift, one could easily fall into the trap of appearances, the trap of crude empiricism. In other words, if we would follow the gift only in its one-directional appearance, we might easily dismiss the gift of the laborer: the gift of the articulation of non-labor within her labor. At that point, holding the perspective of the gift in terms of its circulation enables us, before anything else, to explore the beyond of the plane of appearances, and so not to reproduce an updated model of the good old story of the harmonious warm-happy-family at the time when care appears to be something purchased.

Considering our field research, focusing solely on the giving part, trying to explore the motivations of the giver is not the appropriate tool to pursue the analysis of the gift. We cannot leave the analysis here with the point on how humane, and so favorable, the gift is as if it was something that multiplies the cold rational of the work contract with warmth; or with a point on how huge favors appear solely as nice

gestures of solidarity, forgetting all the unequal conditions of the relation between the employer and laborer.

The tendency of conceiving the gift as something humane is bolstered by the traditional dichotomic perspective of the gift vs. exchange: the humane organization of the gift vs. the cold rational of exchange.<sup>57</sup> As we have insistently tried to abstain from leaning on any “hostile worlds” perspective throughout this thesis, we do not rely on it with regard to the issue of the gift either. Rather, as tempting as it is to assume an equal reciprocity on the side of the gift, taking the gift in circulation provides us with the ground to conceptualize the asymmetry that informs the terms of the relation between the donor and the receiver of the gift. In this sense, it is not a coincidence that Marcel Mauss pursues his analysis of the gift with the terms of obligation and debt.

For Mauss, even if “in theory” the gifts are given in a way that is “voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily” (Mauss, 1990, p.3). And the obligation here is the obligation to return the gift, the obligation to reciprocate. In this sense, even if the gift appears as if it belongs to a system of solidarity, gratuitousness and free-exchange, it is binding and fixing as well.<sup>58</sup> “A gift is received ‘with a burden attached’” to it (Ibid, p.41). And the failure to return the gift is “slavery for debt” (Ibid, p.42).

I think if nothing else, taking the gift within a system of circulation is one of Mauss’s contributions to the literature of the gift to the extent that it encourages other

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<sup>57</sup> In fact, the traces of such romanticism are evident even in Mauss. While opponents criticize him for reducing the gift into exchange, in some passages he says that “fortunately” not all relations are like that. Here, we can sense the impact of this dichotomic perspective on his reading: gifts appear on the “fortunate” side: “Fortunately, everything is still not wholly categorized in terms of buying and selling” (Mauss, 1990, p. 65).

<sup>58</sup> We can think of Bourdieu’s two truths of the gift: gift giving is acted as if it was coming out of generosity (subjective truth), but in practice it is always exchanged (objective truth). (Bourdieu, 1990)

readings to arise which ask what happens to the gift receiver or what it takes to return the gift.

Of course, “the gift in circulation” perspective by itself does not guarantee making an analysis of exploitation, asymmetry, tyranny, domination or debt. But at least it provides the proper means for us to pursue such an analysis. That is why, adopting the perspective of “the gift in circulation” matters, before anything else, methodologically. Just as it enables us to trace the movements and impact of the counter-gift, it encourages us to search for what it “costs” to the ones who received the gift.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have (1) maintained the argument that the gift of the laborer is articulation of non-labor within labor (an argument that we previously made at the end of the Chapter 3), (2) tried to ground why, in family-like paid care relations, the gift appears as a substantial tool to generate surplus value from the non-labor of the care provider, and (3) investigated what it costs to the laborer to gift the non-labor.

Of course, this was a particular reading of the gift which led us to think the non-labor and extraction of surplus in terms of the gift. To note the significance of this particular way of approaching the gift we started this chapter with exploring the conceptual but more importantly methodological differences between the Derridean and Maussian approaches.

Lorna Weir says, “Derrida dissociates the gift from economy (*oikonomia*) as such, treating the gift as incalculable and therefore beyond property, appropriation and profit” (Weir, 2013 p.161). However, what we tried to expose here is, contrary to Derrida, the association of the gift with the economy; that is to say, the Maussian



question of how gifts circulate. Exploring how the gift appears within the dynamics of exchange between the paid care provider and the care receiver provides us with a ground to explore the formation of care work.

In his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze (2006) underlines that it is important to note that Nietzsche's reading of the social depends not on the notion of exchange but on debt.<sup>59</sup> And Maurizio Lazzarato elaborates the methodological importance of Nietzsche's approach in his book *The Making of the Indebted Man* (2012): while exchange may support the illusion of equal positions, debt introduces notions of inequality and asymmetry right from the beginning. And this is another reason for us to valorize Mauss's reading of the gift: introducing the gift in terms of debt enables us to search for the consequences of the asymmetrical relation between the giver and the receiver in the circulation of the gift.<sup>60</sup> In other words, in this chapter we have followed Mauss's reading of the gift in terms of the counter-gift as a methodological guide which enabled us to ask what it costs to return the gift of *living with* in terms of a debt relation: this introduces the asymmetry and difference of power between the employer and the laborer. That is what prevent us falling into assuming an equal exchange.

Moreover, influenced by Nietzsche we argued that the cost of responding to the gift of *living-with* requires investing first and foremost in subjectivity and not just mere disciplined worker subjectivity. Rather, it spreads over and prevails in every aspect of the lives of care providers. That is why we argued that exploitation is

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<sup>59</sup> "Nietzsche sees the archetype of social organization in credit rather than exchange" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 135).

<sup>60</sup> Considering Deleuze's differentiation between debt and exchange, we can make a counter claim to those who criticize Mauss for reducing the gift into exchange: if he ever reduces the gift, it is not into exchange, but into debt. And this would be an important intervention to make, again considering Deleuze's distinction, since reading in terms of exchange and reading in terms of gift imply different terms between the gift giver and the receiver.

everywhere, in every moment, and the gift functions as one of the mechanisms to ensure that.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Conducting an analysis of care under the sign of “family-like” paid care relations enabled us to explore, in this thesis, the hybridity in its organization which, I believe, has the potential of pursuing a sociological analysis without guarantees. So, in each and every argumentation proposed here, we tried to abstain from the reading of “hostile worlds” which, I believe, introduces more dichotomies. In this respect, contrary to the temptations of simply saying that the claim of being like a family is a tactical usage which produces an illusion of a symmetrical employee- employer relationality (as a tool to erase power relation), or of optimistically arguing for transforming the working conditions into a “better”, “humane” or “solidarity-like” set of conditions, we took the claim of “being like a family” seriously: not to vilify or to exalt it, but to reveal that such a claim implies something different in the organization of paid care work.

Here, in this thesis, we did not pursue the question of “why”, care providers and care receivers do not attribute another quality (friendship for instance) but a family-like one to the relation. In this sense, we did not explore how powerful the images of the family are, and trace the social, historical and political associations or discrepancies between the images of the family and the images of work. Rather, what we did in this thesis is taking this claim and looking for what it corresponds to, that is to say, searching for its expressions in the materiality of daily life. In other words, we did not pursue why it is called “family-like” but pursued what happens when paid care work becomes “family-like”. In this sense, our analysis stands to reveal the

organization of such work, more than the meaning of the ascription of being like family.

Hence, we traced the claim of being like family in its practical consequences. This was of course, before anything else, a methodological choice. Depending on the research findings, it is argued that for the bodies situated as care providers to generate and enhance “family-like” paid care relations it necessitates devotion and sacrifice (Chapter 2); which is responded with relations of “solidarity” in cases of emergency (Chapter 4). And, for the bodies situated as care receivers, it necessitates giving beyond the wage, introducing the gift of *living-with* to the care provider (Chapter 4) so that a “dignified” caring relation can be obtained where bodily inability or dependency is not experienced as such (Chapter 2).

Another outcome we explored in thesis is that a “family-like” quality does correspond to an alteration in the terms of the relation (from a mere work relation into a hybrid one), but this comes with a price. That is why, the question of “cost” has been another concern of our analysis in relation to the practices of the care provider: the cost to the laborer of being considered as the family. As it is elaborated in Chapter 4, when the work gains such a “family-like” quality, it becomes more binding for the laborers. Before anything else, a “family-like” paid care relation subjects the laborer to be the care provider in her present and in her future.

Proposing to look at “family-like” paid care relations may be seen by some as an attempt to complicate things to the point that the notion of exploitation becomes intangible to use as a conceptual tool, yet I think this is not the case. Exploitation does not belong solely to the process of commodification. Emphasizing the cases of “family-like” paid care relations is a way to multiply the frame of exploitation in our analyses, not to erase it. When we focused on the hybridity of such care relations, our

aim was no other than to expose the rather subtle forms of exploitation —exploitation with a biopolitical emphasis, in terms of situating certain bodies in certain subject positions. In other words, the way we use the notion of exploitation is not merely an economic phenomenon but a social and political one. In this sense, following Etienne Balibar's (2013) proposal to think exploitation in terms of taking advantage of vulnerabilities, we proposed a reading of exploitation which is no less social and political than economic.<sup>61</sup> That is why, when we have read care work in relation to subjectivity, it was in terms of power relations as it was in terms of exploitation. That is why at the end of the Chapter 4, following Hardt and Negri we argued that to the extent that production is biopolitical, exploitation has no place, it is everywhere.

We started this thesis with a critique of the commodification perspective, not to refuse the fact that the organization of care changes in its commodified forms, but to insist that there is more than a taken-for-granted change of care from something intimate to something purchased. In this sense, in dialogue with different theories of labor, value and the gift, we tried to explore the dynamics of paid eldercare under the sign of being like family: the work of care invests in the subjectivity of the laborers to ensure that they are not workers but care providers (chapter 2). What is at stake here becomes the vitality of the laborers, as the production of value expands to all of the life of the laborers such that even their non-labor becomes the source of value (Chapter 3). And what ensures such dynamics to run is not the wage contract, but the circulation of the gift: the employer's gift of *living with* ensures the laborer's staying as the care provider (Chapter4).

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<sup>61</sup> That is why we have preferred to use the concept of biopolitical production in Chapter 3: to the extent that the site of production expands to all aspects of the life of the laborer, the distinction among the spheres of the economic, social, and the political do not hold for our analysis to depend on.

In this sense, we tried to pursue a non-economistic reading of the care economy focusing on the organization of paid care by (1) situating the care economy between the economic and the social, (2) situating the involved bodies within a matrix of power, and finally (3) reading the paid care relation not in terms of an exchange but as a gift-debt relation.

As my last words, I would like to say that, for me, this thesis stands, before anything else, as an attempt of methodological intervention for doing sociology in the comfort-zone of the critique of commodification. Following a rather Foucauldian concern of how to approach theory, in this thesis we intended to proceed with tracing the practices, mapping the expression of “family-like” paid care relations in the materiality of the daily life. Such a methodological stance helped us to conceptualize commodification as one factor among others, to indicate the site of our analysis somewhere between the social and the economic, and to articulate its implications for us in thinking what counts as caring, labor, and value as well as what counts as the gift, family and work.

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