UNDERSTANDING OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION THROUGH DISABILITY: INTERSECTIONALITY, SURPLUS POPULATIONS, AND RADICAL NEEDS

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2018

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Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Philosophy

by

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2018

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Intersectionality, Surplus Populations, and Radical Needs

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October 2018

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Balam Nedim Kenter, certify that

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- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
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ABSTRACT

Understanding Oppression and Exploitation Through Disability:

Intersectionality, Surplus Populations, and Radical Needs

What is oppression? What is exploitation? What is the relationship between the two? How a theory answers such questions may determine its scope and emancipatory politics. An answer that prioritizes oppression and makes exploitation its subset may sidestep class issues and economics. Whereas an answer that prioritizes exploitation and makes oppression a subset thereof may focus on class at the expense of other important parameters of oppression (such as race, gender, disability, etc.). In this thesis, I aim to put these two approaches into a productive dialectical relationship without losing sight of one or subsuming one under the other. Disability, relatively under-theorized under both types of approaches until recently, can be one paradigm that can help us understand the relationship between oppression and exploitation. I begin by offering a very provisional definition of oppression and exploitation. Next, I examine disability from two perspectives: First through the lens of an oppression-prioritizing paradigm such as intersectionality, and second, through an exploitation-prioritizing paradigm such as the theory of surplus populations. The two examinations yield two different answers: disability as non-exploitative oppression and disability as oppressive (non)exploitation. Finally, I put these two answers into a dialectical relationship through the theory of radical needs in order to arrive at a dynamic understanding of exploitation and oppression.

ÖZET

Baskı ve Sömürüyü Sakatlık Üzerinden Anlamak: Kesişimsellik, Artı Nüfuslar, ve Radikal İhtiyaçlar

Baskı nedir? Sömürü nedir? İkisinin arasındaki ilişki nedir? Bu sorulara verilen cevaplar bir siyasi kuramın kapsamını ve özgürleştirici potansiyelini belirleyebilir. Örneğin baskı kavramını önceleyen ve sömürü kavramını arka plana atan (sömürüyü baskının alt kümesi yapan) kuramlar ekonomik gerçekleri ve sınıf politikalarını göz ardı edebilirken, sömürü kavramını önceleyen ve baskı kavramını arka plana atan (baskıyı sömürünün alt kümesi yapan) kuramlar sınıf dışındaki (ırk, cinsiyet, sakatlık, vb.) önemli baskı kategorilerini göz ardı edebilir. Bu tezde, bu iki yaklaşımı birbirlerinin alt kümesi yapmaksızın üretken bir diyalektik ilişki içine sokmayı amaçlıyorum. İki tür yaklaşımda da henüz yeni yeni yer bulmaya başlamış olan sakatlık çalışmaları paradigması baskı ve sömürü arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamamıza yardımcı olabilir. İlk olarak, baskı ve sömürünün, daha sonra değiştirilmek üzere, geçici birer tanımı yapıyorum. İkinci olarak, sakatlık kavramını iki perspektiften inceliyorum: önce baskı-önceleyen bir paradigma olan Kesişimsellik üzerinden, sonra da sömürü-önceleyen bir paradigma olan Artı Nüfuslar kuramı üzerinden. Bu iki inceleme iki farklı cevap ortaya çıkarıyor: Sömürü içermeyen bir baskı kategorisi olarak sakatlık ile baskıcı bir na-sömürü kategorisi olarak sakatlık. Son olarak, Radikal İhtiyaçlar kuramını kullanarak baskı ve sömürünün dinamik bir tanımına ulaşabilmek için bu iki cevabı diyalektik bir ilişki içine koyuyorum.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my goddess of a mother, Kadriye Kenter, who makes all things possible; my amazing advisor Yıldız Silier for believing in my work sometimes with more conviction than I, for the unconditional support, and the countless hours she dedicated to this thesis at every point of the way; my committee members Sibel Yardımcı and Beril Sözmen for their close-reading and the invaluable critique and feedback they offered; my human and non-human chosen family—Mehmet Bal, Ece Ayar, Sakız, Çuki, Filiz and Kötülük Peluşu—for keeping me alive and flourishing; my fellow thesis-writing babes Öznur Şahin and Duygu Aktaş for the camaraderie and the laughter. This thesis would not have been possible without this entire support system. For we are interdependent beings and our interdependence is our most precious source of strength.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late brother, Mahmut, who had the heartiest laughter and gave the squeeziest hugs. And to a world where he would flourish, and where his radical needs would free us all.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What is oppression? What is exploitation? What is the relationship between the two? Are they synonymous? Is one a subset of the other? Is one a precondition for the other? Are they always co-present or can they be mutually exclusive? Is it possible to be oppressed without being exploited? Is it possible to be exploited without being oppressed? Should an emancipatory politics aim to abolish one or both of them, and how? How a theory answers such questions determines its emancipatory politics/potential. For instance, an answer that prioritizes oppression and makes exploitation its subset may sidestep class issues and economics. Whereas an answer that prioritizes exploitation and makes oppression a subset thereof may focus on class at the expense of other parameters of oppression. In this thesis, I am interested in putting these two approaches into a productive dialectical relationship without losing sight of one or subsuming one under the other. Disability, relatively under-theorized under both types of approaches until recently, can be one paradigm that can help navigate these questions and help us understand the relationship between oppression and exploitation.

In order to do this, I would like to first offer a very provisional definition of oppression and exploitation. Then I would like to examine disability from two perspectives: First I would like to look at how disability can be theorized in an oppression-prioritizing paradigm such as intersectionality, and second, look at how disability can be theorized in an exploitation-prioritizing paradigm such as the theory of surplus populations. The two examinations yield two different answers: disability

as (non-exploitative) oppression and disability as oppressive (non)exploitation. Finally, I aim to put these two answers into a dialectical relationship through the theory of radical needs in order to arrive at a dialectical/dynamic understanding of exploitation and oppression.

In order to arrive at a provisional and preliminary definition of oppression and exploitation, I compared and contrasted Frye's (1983), Young's (1992) and Mies's (2014) definitions of oppression and exploitation. While Frye does not mention exploitation, Young's approach can be characterized as oppression-prioritizing and Mies's as exploitation-prioritizing. From these accounts, I extracted a five-point provisional framework: 1) Oppression is systematic, structurally reproduced and intention-independent; 2) Oppression takes place at the level of the social group. The oppressed are oppressed as a member of at least one (or more than one) oppressed group; 3) Oppression has a penalizing, prohibiting, limiting, immobilizing, molding and reducing effect on the oppressed. Oppression is embodied and internalized by the oppressed. 4) Oppression under capitalism often takes the form of exploitation that can be captured by Marx's conception thereof: appropriation of one class's surplus labour for the benefit of a dominant class. Oppression is intimately tied to division of labour. 5) Oppression is made possible and maintained through actual or threatened, overt or covert, direct or structural, economic or extra-economic violence.

While this framework brings together both oppression-prioritizing and exploitation-prioritizing perspectives, the relationship between exploitation and oppression is not fully explored and the former appears as a subset of the latter. This is because, at the time I extracted this provisional definition, I was preoccupied with

other questions of primacy within the context of intersectional paradigms: What happens when multiple oppressions overlap such as race, gender and class? Do some oppressions have priority over others? Is there one oppression the eradication of which will also eliminate all other oppressions? Is there one oppressed group that can be the agent of a revolution that will accomplish the dismantling of all other oppressions by dismantling the root of its own oppression? Because I was asking these particular questions, I grouped different intersectional approaches according to what oppression they prioritized among the multiple oppressions they addressed: those that prioritized class oppression more and those that prioritized race or gender oppression more.

The definition of oppression used by approaches that gave class priority among oppressions is likely to prioritize exploitation whereas approaches that focused on other categories of oppression are likely to prioritize oppression. The grouping of intersectional approaches in this way, then, is also an indirect route to answering the question about the relationship between oppression and exploitation raised in this thesis. Nevertheless, intersectionality is a part of the same intellectual history of how Western Marxism moved away from class as a unit of analysis. Wood (1998) traces this history in terms of moving from class to the masses, replacing the working class as the agent of revolution, separating economics from politics and subordinating the former to the latter. Thus, whether an intersectional approach productively engages with class or not, it will still engage with it within the context of multiple other oppressions (most of which can be addressed without necessarily thinking about capitalism or exploitation). Studying disability as an oppression among multiple intersecting oppressions, then, will yield a certain answer to the

relationship between oppression and exploitation, as well as the difference between other oppressions and disability oppression. Disability studies is a relative newcomer to academia and a relatively new addition to intersectional analyses of oppression. Some prominent scholars in the field suggest that disability might be used as an organizing or grounding principle in understanding other parameters of oppression (because they view disability as a possibly more fundamental and prior category of oppression that is in some senses even constitutive of other oppressions) (Erevelles and Minear, 2010; Erevelles, 1996; Davis, 1995). Whether taken as the ground of all oppressions or not, disability may act as a heuristic in understanding how oppression works and how it is related to exploitation in intersectional paradigms.

Another paradigm that can aid as a prism for understanding intersecting oppressions is Marx's concept of Surplus Populations although it was not originally developed for this purpose. By looking at how this concept can accommodate disability, this time from an exploitation-prioritizing framework, I aim to reach another conception of disability, a conception of disability as (non)exploitation. According to Marx, The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation (and one of the most striking contradictions of capitalism): “the greater the growth of capital, the greater the mass of the proletariat and the productiveness of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army, or a portion of the proletariat that is redundant to capital” (2000, p. 519). The reserve army of labour, or the relative surplus population, can be absorbed by capital during times of growth and shed again during times of crisis. It has three forms: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant. The latter is also called the consolidated or absolute surplus population, the sphere of pauperism, which is hardest or even impossible to be absorbed by capital even in times of revival. The

lowest segment of this group are virtually unemployable and include: "the demoralized and ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation, due to the division of labour; people who have passed the normal age of the labourer; the victims of industry, whose number increases with the increase of dangerous machinery, of mines, chemical works, etc., the mutilated, the sickly, the widows" (Marx, 2000, p. 519). This is the segment of the surplus population where we find disability (including those disabled by the work conditions under capitalism), illness, old age, and widows.

All of the latter categories have been theorized within disability studies as being disabled by oppressive social systems such as ableism as well as patriarchy rather than (or only because of) some kind of impairment. Being excluded from the surplus value-creating productive sphere, the consolidated surplus population is, by definition, not exploited by capital yet this non-exploitation is oppressive: "the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour" (Marx, 2000, p. 519). As Michael Denning says, "under capitalism, the only thing worse than being exploited is not being exploited" (2010, p. 79). In a system where one is obligated to sell their labour to survive, exclusion from the labour market is oppressive and violent.

In the post-1970s global capitalism, characterized by deindustrialization, deagrarianization, and the rise of service and informal economies, the global surplus population has reached 1.3 billion people according to a conservative estimate, accounting for 40 % of the world's workforce (Benanav, 2014). By contrast, only about 33 percent of the world's workforce is employed in the non-agricultural formal

sector (Benanav, 2014, p. 25). Unemployment and under-employment are no longer marginal conditions. Given the historical exclusion of people with disabilities from traditional wage-labour, a significant portion of the global surplus populations might be comprised of the global population of the disabled, which a recent estimate by the United Nations (UN) puts at 1.2-1.44 billion people (United Nations, 2015, pp. 38-39). In this sense, the study of surplus populations are very relevant to a study of disability on a global scale.

However it is defined, unemployment, underemployment, wagelessness, informal economy, surplus populations, etc., globally outnumber the formally employed today. This phenomenon has been garnering academic interest lately. While few of such works have directly engaged with Marx's definition (or they have used it in a limited fashion), they have employed and/or generated terms that are close to, but not identical to, surplus populations such as the industrial reserve army, lumpen proletariat, precariat, wageless, and so on. Interestingly, nearly none of these accounts deal with disability in any meaningful capacity (or other parameters of oppression for that matter) even though global processes of surplusization tend to take place along the lines of race, gender, class, sexuality, disability as capital sheds the labour of those who are most vulnerable.

While capital might be indifferent to those it exploits or renders redundant, capitalism does not exist in a vacuum and latches on to pre-existing social norms and attitudes (sometimes fundamentally altering them). So in a patriarchal, white supremacist, ableist society, those rendered surplus will likely come from the ranks of women, people of color, and the disabled, for instance. They will be the most disadvantaged in finding work, then first to be laid-off or discarded. It is in this sense

that I think oppression and exploitation form a dialectics: while not all oppressive systems can be traced to the advent of capitalism, there is no oppressive relationship that capitalism will not exploit.

From the perspective of intersectionality, disability is an oppression among other oppressions which may (or may not) be constitutive of (or an organizing principle for) other oppressions such as race, gender, and sexuality all of which seem to be based, in an important way, on the naturalization of body normativity. Similar to Lennard Davis (1995), Erevelles (1996) claims that the ideology of disability is central to capitalism because by inscribing biological difference as a 'natural' cause of all inequality it justifies all other oppressions: “[D]isability . . . is [therefore] the organizing grounding principle in the construction of the categories of gender, race, class, and sexual orientation” (1996, p. 526). Disability studies in particular, and intersectional approaches in general, address class issues and make such connections between different oppressions sometimes through capitalism. Particularly in disability studies, the non-exploitation of the disabled has been addressed in terms of exclusion and oppression. On the other hand, the focus on increasing employment opportunities for the disabled has adopted the discourse of autonomy at the expense of cognitive disabilities. Further, this focus on employment may also have prevented a more radical critique of capitalism and its relationship to disability.

While Marx's general law of capitalist accumulation and his notion of surplus populations goes to the heart of the capitalist system and is becoming more relevant in today's deindustrialized and deagrarianized global economy, it has little to say about disability or other parameters of oppression. Similarly, more recent revivals of the theory are mostly silent about disability although some of them do engage other

kinds of oppression in their relationship to capitalism, imperialism and colonialism, especially race and less so gender. Nevertheless, Marx's notion of surplus populations does have disability built into it (both in terms of the social model, as disability created by exclusionary and oppressive systems and in terms of impairment, illness, and old age) and remains the most detailed and clear treatment of the issue. Making use of insights from intersectionality and empirical data about the global surplus populations, it is possible to see surplus populations as a prism that can reveal multiple intersecting oppressions in their relation to capitalism. Yet on their own, oppression-prioritizing theories and exploitation-prioritizing theories remain unable to address all oppressive and exploitative systems. I think this stems from their different definitions of oppression and exploitation and their different prioritization of the two. This difference can be revealed by an examination of how the two approaches theorize disability.

From the perspective of intersectionality, disability can be construed as a (largely) non-exploitative oppression. From the perspective of surplus populations, on the other hand, disability can be categorized as a category of oppressive non-exploitation. They are like the two sides of the same coin. But how to see both sides of the coin at the same time? How can we put these two different approaches into a dialectic relationship with another so that we can unleash the emancipatory potential of both? In order to do this, I want to use disability and another concept closely associated with disability. I want to look at the foregoing story through the perspective of needs.

The concepts of disability and need are not strangers to one another. In dominant discourses, the disabled tend to be coded as needy and dependent, an

unproductive minority of people who are burdens to the general productive and abled population. Thus the needs of the disabled tend to be considered "special" rather than generalized, basic, relevant, or, radical. "Special needs" is a product of such ableist attitudes. Because of this underlying attitude, many movements of people with disabilities also gravitated towards adopting a rights discourse rather than a needs discourse. The concept of need I will be operationalizing in this thesis, however, goes against the commonsensical understanding of needs as weakness or lack. I will instead be using the Marxist understanding of needs as powers and capacities, needs as activity rather than only passivity. According to Marx, the wealthiest person is the person richest in needs. When needs arise, they demand satisfaction, and their satisfaction creates new needs, driving ingenuity and progress. Built on this concept of needs as powers, Marx also has a notion of radical needs, those needs whose satisfaction can overthrow the system that has created and yet cannot meet these needs.

It was Agnes Heller who turned this concept into a full-blown theory: “radical needs . . . are qualitative and remain unquantifiable; second, they cannot be satisfied in a world based on subordination and superordination; third, they drive people towards ideas and practices that abolish subordination and superordination” (1993, p. 33). Connecting Heller's (1976, 1993) theory of radical needs with Sayers' (2003) notion of needs as empowerment, Khader's (2008) notion of interdependency as a precondition for agency, and with concepts from disability studies and activism such as universal design, I suggest that “special needs” are radical needs. Moreover, I suggest that any need can become politicized and radicalized or defused and depoliticized in different contexts (and through different struggles) as Fraser (2013)

suggests. Keeping the core of Heller's and Marx's definition of radical needs as those needs that are created (but cannot be satisfied) by systems of subordination and super-ordination, I suggest that radical needs are system-shattering but world-building, that those who are richest in needs would be at the intersection of multiple oppressions, making radical needs intersectional, that radical needs are interconnected and following their in-order-to-chains lead to other more fundamental needs and to the roots of oppression and exploitation.

CHAPTER 2

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION: A PROVISIONAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I will try to produce a very provisional framework for oppression and exploitation before moving onto the particular question this thesis is concerned with: the relationship between oppression and exploitation. For this purpose, I will first give a brief summary of Anne Cudd's (2006) genealogy of oppression, tracing the differing definitions of the concept in the West from the modern era (16th - 18th century) until the 20th century in her book-length work on oppression. After this general overview, I will examine three particular accounts of oppression in detail: Marlyn Frye's (1983), Iris Young's (1992) and Maria Mies's (1986/2014) conceptions (a philosophical inquiry, an oppression-prioritizing account, and an exploitation-prioritizing account, respectively). I will then put together the strongest aspects of each account to create a provisional framework.

According to Cudd, looking at the works of Locke, Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau, the early modern period understanding of oppression can be characterized as “arbitrary or unjust laws imposed on citizens illegitimately that cause material (economic or physical) deprivation” (2006, p. 7). Beginning in the 18th century, oppression refers to economic exploitation by a ruler, usually in the form of over- or unequal-taxation (Cudd, 2006, p. 6). For classical modern liberal theorists, domination, tyranny and oppression are synonymous, all meaning arbitrary rule resulting in revocation of political rights, economic deprivations, and physical violence (Cudd, 2006, p. 7). Cudd argues that 19th century conceptions of oppression brought four conceptual shifts. The first conceptual shift is from a purely political

conception (ruler versus ruled) of oppression to a more social conception where oppressor and oppressed correspond to social groups (2006, p. 7). The second conceptual shift is the view of oppression as not strictly imposed by rulers but also by social convention and tradition; the two figures Cudd examines here are Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill who both address women's oppression by referring to prejudices, social expectations, and dominant social mores of society (2006, pp. 8-9).

The third conceptual shift comes from Hegel and introduces the idea of psychological domination alongside physical and political domination as a cause (and consequence) of oppression (Cudd, 2006, p. 10). The fourth shift is made by Marx in locating the cause of oppression in the economic system: “oppression begins with division of labour, and thus with the ability of one group of people to coercively appropriate the product of another's labour” (Cudd, 2006, p. 9). As Cudd notes, all four shifts can still be discerned in current discussions of oppression.

In the next section, Cudd discusses what she finds to be the most important theories for 20th century discussions of oppression, namely Hegel, Marx, and Mill's theories which Cudd further distinguishes using Nancy Fraser's terminology for theories of justice (theories of recognition and theories of redistribution): “While Hegel founded the recognition theory, Marx and Mill are the seminal distribution theorists” (Cudd, 2006, p. 10). As further developments in the 20th century, Cudd also briefly mentions Gilman's, Simon de Beauvoir's, and Frantz Fanon's contributions as well as Hegel-, Mills- or Marx-inspired others such as Willett, Young, Bartky, Fraser, Ferguson, Hartmann, Hartstocj, Chodorow, Dinnerstein, Gramsci, and MacKinnon (2006, p. 19).

Let me now turn to the three accounts of oppression/exploitation that I want to examine in detail. Marlyn Frye's (1983) study of oppression, despite its limitations, is a good starting point for a philosophical inquiry into oppression. It shows the kind of work philosophy can do for clarifying politically charged concepts. Iris Young's conception of oppression builds on and corrects some of the problems with Frye's account and is conducive to considering multiple oppressions. However, Young's conception of oppression treats class oppression separately than other oppressions and uses watered-down Marxist concepts. Mies's (2014) notion of oppression, which focuses on the division of labour, offers a way to capture most of Young's faces of oppression (as at least three of the five implicitly depend on the division of labour) without losing sight of class. But Mies's conception is also problematic as it subsumes oppression under exploitation and uses speculative historical and anthropological theses in order to establish patriarchy as the primary oppression that anticipated capitalism.

Two important aspects of Frye's account of oppression are the systematic, networked character of oppression and its penalizing, prohibiting, limiting, immobilizing, molding and reductive effect. For Frye, oppression molds, immobilizes, and reduces the oppressed. Oppression means being subject to multiple, often conflicting, systematically related, pressures. Frye calls this the “double bind” (Frye, 1983, p. 2). One of Frye's examples is how women are punished both for sexual activity (“whore”) and lack thereof (“frigid”). Frye evokes the visual image of a bird cage to capture the systematic character of multiple forces coming together to form a seamless, invisible network that imprisons the oppressed (1983, p. 4). When taken on their own, one by one, the thin wires of the cage do not explain oppression.

The level of analysis must be "bird's eye," if you will, in order to capture the entire system of bars that make up the limiting enclosure. The strongest aspect of Frye's account of oppression is this systematic and often disguised nature of oppression.

Another important aspect of the cage of oppression is that the occupants of the cage are not individuals but certain kinds of people. One is trapped as a woman, as a Black person, as a lesbian and so on (Frye, 1983, pp. 7-8). The focus on social groups as subjects of oppression rather than individuals is also a strong aspect of Frye's account. But perhaps because Frye does not have a very precise account of social groups, her notion of being oppressed as a certain group also leads to more controversial ideas, like the over-victimization of women. For instance, when Frye says that women are oppressed as women, one sense she uses this is that being a woman always selects one for victimization and oppression. In contrast, according to Frye, men are never oppressed as men: men can be oppressed as members of other categories such as class, race, sexuality or disability but being a man is always something beneficial for men (1983, p. 16). This claim can be challenged. For instance, especially in nations which still have conscription men are forced to become soldiers where they are expected to kill and maim other humans under orders from superiors, and sacrifice their own life in the name of several exalted taboo concepts like the flag, the nation, etc. Although men, if they acquiesce to their fate, seem to be rewarded for their "heroism" in several ways, this seems a disproportionately small "benefit" for such horrors as the sacrifice of one's life or limb, the trauma of killing or hurting others, the dehumanization of being under unquestionable orders of superiors, or the bullying and violence rampant in military barracks. This seems to be at least one instant where being a man is not automatically

beneficial for men. Even Frye's double-bind can apply here. Imagine the case of a soldier who is ordered by his superior officer to undertake a particularly heinous act: if the soldier defies the order, he might be punished, maybe even killed, for insubordination. But if he undertakes the heinous act, he might get punished after the war for complying with an illegal order—not to mention that the heinous act will be on his conscience his entire life.

More controversially, perhaps again in relation to her notion of a social group, Frye seems to think that race and class are categories that only organize men into which women have been dispersed; women have been assimilated and their group identity inhibited to the extent that they do not see themselves as a category of oppressed people (Frye, 1983, p. 8). This suggests on the one hand that the most fundamental divide is between women and men (both are social groups, not natural groups, for Frye) but also it strangely puts women outside of society, of history. Frye appears to be suggesting that there is an originary division between men and women after which women remain intact but men keep bifurcating further into other divisions of class, race and so on. It is as if women can only be women; they cannot have a race or a class. Women are just inserted and assimilated into what is essentially an already-formed male social structure. This claim is not convincing.

But Frye has a stake in making the claim because it will buttress her other major claim: that *woman* is a more fundamental category which cuts across other categories such as race and class. According to Frye, women from all these groups are together in the same "ghetto of function": the service of men and their interests (Frye, 1983, p. 9). Frye says that, regardless of whatever race or class they are from, women service men (no matter how different forms the service may take depending

on the class or race culture of men in question). Frye then identifies “women's sphere” as the “service sector” in an attempt to expand and feminize this economic term (Frye, 1983, p. 10). It is difficult to tell if Frye's definition of oppression only applies to women's oppression or whether it can equally explain other types of oppression because her level of analysis frequently shifts between individual, group, intergroup, and all of humanity. Frye defines social group membership through confinement in the same category of persons and/or confinement in the same geographical and/or functional space. Applying the criteria to other forms of oppression we would need to say that the working class's function is to serve the interests of capitalists and that people of color function to serve the interests of white people. But Frye specifically and repeatedly argues that service is exclusively definitive of “women's sphere” (1983, pp. 9-10). On the other hand, saying that the oppression of workers or Black people merely benefits those dominant groups may be stating it too broadly and vaguely. The problem seems to be that on the one hand Frye wants to say that women's oppression is more fundamental and unique compared to other oppressions but on the other hand she wants to generalize this model of women's oppression as being characteristic of all oppression in general. This tension makes her account too narrow (modeled on the specific oppression of women and the “service” idea) and too broad (oppression vaguely benefits one group to the detriment of another) at the same time.

Finally, in order to distinguish an oppressive structure from a non-oppressive social structure which can also be immobilizing, reducing, and molding in its effects, Frye suggests that an oppressive structure reduces one group of persons for the benefit of another group, whereas a social structure limits all for the benefit of all. In

order to understand if a kind of social barrier is oppressive to a group Frye suggests asking these questions: who constructs, maintains, promotes and benefits from the barrier? Is the barrier protecting the interests, classification and status of one group as superior? Is the barrier part of a structure that serves to confine, reduce and immobilize one group? (1983, p. 14) While these questions are indeed very useful, this distinction between social and oppressive structures belies another problem with Frye's account of oppression: that it can only be used for clearly dyadic oppression relations between one specific oppressed group and one specific corresponding oppressor group which directly and consistently benefits from the oppression of the former. This might not be very suitable for analyzing multiple oppressions or when there is no clear single oppressor group.

On the whole, Frye's concept of oppression does not deliver the sharpness and sureness it aspires to; it remains vague. It lacks a clear definition of a social group. It controversially claims that race and class organize men but not women into groups. It seems too broad and too restricted at the same time. Finally, it makes oppression a matter of a dyadic relationship between two clear oppressed and oppressor groups. Still, some characteristics of oppression Frye identifies may be useful: its structural, systematic, seamless nature; the idea of multiple conflicting forces creating a network of oppression; social groups as targets of oppression; some critical questions to distinguish the oppressor from the oppressed (such as the benefit question); adoption of various different levels of analysis (micro, macro) to make oppression visible. Let us now turn to Iris Young's (1992) more detailed account of oppression, her classic "Five Faces of Oppression," which avoids some of the pitfalls of Frye's conception but has problems of its own.

Young's article on oppression (1992) aims to create a cogent account of the very complex condition of oppression especially when there is more than one kind of oppression at play. Young sets out to identify a set of criteria to clearly describe the nature of oppression in a world where many groups are oppressed to different extents and in different ways. Oppression, according to Young, names a family of five concepts and conditions: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. If a group is subject to at least one of these conditions, it is considered to be an oppressed group.

Before describing each of the five faces of oppression, Young first devotes some time to oppression as a structural concept (1992, pp. 38-39). This section can be considered an extension and clarification of Frye's opinions about the structural nature of oppression. Frye's account does not explain what it means for something to be systematic or structural. According to Young, something systematic is not the direct result of the intention of an individual with power, like a tyrant (1992, p. 39). It is not a direct result of choices or policies. What causes oppression then? Young says that it is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and assumptions that lie behind institutional rules and so changing laws does not eradicate oppression (1992, p. 39). Oppression gets systematically reproduced in economic, political, and cultural institutions. Here Young repeats Frye's idea of the enclosing structure of forces and barriers that limits a group of people.

Unlike Frye, Young goes one step further in defining structural oppression as being distinct from the intentions of individuals or particular laws. In connection to this and in contradistinction to Frye, Young specifically states that an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group although for every oppressed group

there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group (Young, 1992, p. 39). The latter (having privilege at the expense of the oppressed) seemed to be the very definition of an oppressor group for Frye, so it is not clear how having a correlate oppressor is different from having a correlate privilege group; perhaps the only difference is intention-independence.

Thirdly, Young differs from Frye in that she does not privilege women's oppression as being fundamentally prior to other forms of oppression. Rather all oppressions have their own dynamics and no form of oppression can be given causal or moral primacy in Young's account (1992, p. 40). But many different forms of oppression mentioned in this section are set up against class oppression and its claim to primacy. So they are already propped up as different clusters (class versus everything else) endangering the causal and moral neutrality at issue.

Finally, Young addresses the concept of a social group which was one of the vague points in Frye's account. Since, like Frye, Young also defines the unit of oppression to be the social group, it is important to define what it is and her social ontology is indeed the strongest section of her paper. The social ontology in this section is one of process not substance. Social groups are real as forms of social relations and they are differentiated from other groups through social processes (such as the division of labour) (Young, 1992, pp. 41-42). Philosophy conceives of groups either as aggregates (arbitrary classification according to one attribute such as race) or as associations (Young, 1992, p. 41). The aggregate model is an individualist conception and identifies oppression with group identification, as something that happens to groups when they are identified as such (Young, 1992, p. 44). In this view, people should be treated as individuals and not as members of groups; the

solution to oppression then becomes the eradication of groups. Young argues that it is not group differentiation that is inherently oppressive as not all groups are oppressed. The association view, favored by political philosophers, also has its own problems because it implicitly gives the individual ontological priority to the group: individuals constitute groups (Young, 1992, p. 42). According to Young, it is the opposite: the individual is a product of social processes; there is no self prior to socialization (1992, p. 43). In Young's picture, while social processes of affinity and differentiation produce groups, they do not give the groups a substantive essence: group differentiation is fluid, cross-cutting, multiple and shifting and as such challenges the idea of a unified autonomous self (people tend to have multiple group affiliations) (1992, p. 45). Especially in highly differentiated complex societies groups are fluid processes, according to Young: for instance, Black people are not just a simple unified group with a common life but differentiated by age, gender, class, sexuality, nationality and so on (1992, p. 45).

The first face of oppression Young examines is *exploitation*. This section owes its skeleton to Marx. It is the Marxist idea of exploitation expanded beyond class: some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of, other people (Young, 1992, p. 46). This transfer of power from one group to another is unreciprocated, structural, and continual: it is re/produced through systematic processes (Young, 1992, p. 47). In this section, Young argues that other forms of exploitation, like race-specific or gender-specific exploitation, share this same basic structure. Interestingly, while this definition of exploitation is only one facet of oppression for Young, it is oppression proper for Frye: systematic immobilization of one group to the benefit of another. In Young's

conception of exploitation, this takes the form of a transfer of powers and capacities (1992, p. 46) (so a form of reduction, or expenditure). When discussing Mies (2014), we will see that she does the opposite and subsumes oppression under exploitation.

The second face of oppression is *marginalization*. In Young's usage marginals are people the system of labour cannot or will not use (1992, p. 49). Being outside of the labour system in a capitalist society is to be expelled out of the realm of the social, relegating one to an underclass. Some of the marginals Young has in mind are old people, single mothers, the disabled, and First Nations (Native Americans) on reservations. Marginalization is dangerous because it leads to both social and material deprivation and may even lead to extermination (Young, 1992, p. 59). Young argues that marginalization stems from the liberal idea of equal citizenship given to all rational autonomous agents (1992, p. 50); in other words, people who are classified as dependent and/or non-rational are marginalized, and a less individualistic model of rights might lessen the oppression of the marginalized. In the earlier sections, Young had advocated shifting the structure of society rather than changing laws on paper in order to overcome oppression, but this treatment of marginalization falls back on changing the model of rights instead of dismantling the capitalistic mode of production which seems to need this kind of marginalization. Young's concept of marginalization (being shut out of the labour system) is very similar to Marx's theory of surplus populations (the under- and un-employed, as a reserve labour army for times of overproduction) as we will see in later chapters of this thesis. As Marx, Young also includes the disabled into groups who are marginalized (or rendered superfluous to capital in Marx) so this part of her analysis is particularly pertinent to considering the disabled as an oppressed group.

The third face of oppression, called *powerlessness*, is a reworking of another Marxist concept: the distinction between mental and manual labour. In Young's account, however, the distinction between mental and manual labour, middle and working class, and professionals versus non-professionals are treated as the same distinction. Most of the section focuses on the final distinction since powerlessness is defined as being a non-professional: i.e., lacking the authority, status and sense of self professionals have; having no expansive, progressive character of profession (no chance of advancement, promotion); less autonomy and less authority over others; no privileges extending outside working place (Young, 1992, p. 59).The distinction between professionals and non-professionals is a matter of division of labour, but the main difference Young proposes is that the privileges of professionals go beyond the workplace and create its own culture of exclusive professionalism which discriminates against oppressed groups like women and minorities (Young, 1992, pp. 53-54). Since the division of labour structures society in an important way which is not limited to the workplace, it is difficult to see what is special about the professional/non-professional distinction.

If the first three faces of oppression were attempts to expand certain Marxist categories to include oppressions other than class, the fourth face, *cultural imperialism*, seems to be a mixture of several concepts like double consciousness, false consciousness, ideology, hegemony, and imperialism from various sources like Du Bois, Fanon, Marx, and Gramsci. Young says that this is a face of oppression which does not depend on the social division of labour like the former three (1992, p. 54). In Young's conception, cultural imperialism stems from the dominant social group having exclusive access to means of interpretation and communication and

thus imposing its own views as universal, invalidating and rendering invisible subordinate groups' views (1992, p. 54). However, the simultaneous move to particularize global scale cultural imperialism to cultural dominance of ruling class within one society (or nation) and the move to generalize the particular Black experience in the United States (US) to a general theory of oppression do not work very well in this particular facet. For instance, the global cultural dominance of United States is an off-shoot of its economic and military dominance (which can also be connected to the global division of labour). Although this kind of cultural imperialism might export a certain value system across the globe, it is unclear if it can truly create the kind of double-consciousness Young borrows from W.E.B. Du Bois the works of whom specifically referred to the Black experience in the US. That is, unless it is situated within the historical progression of colonialism, slavery, capitalism and imperialism across the globe (which would also necessitate considering the global division of labour). Still, the problem of differentiating highly specific local forms of cultural imperialism and global forms of cultural imperialism remains. Because ultimately it seems that this particular facet is to explain the subjective effects of oppression (usually the key in understanding both resistance and complacence to oppression) so Young incorporates many good theories into this facet but the mixture unfortunately comes at the expense of simplifying the theories and reducing them to one another. What we end up with is Marxism without mediation, dialectics and historical materialism, and critical race theory and anti-colonialism white-washed and taken out of context.

The final face of oppression taken up by Young is *violence*. Oppressed communities are subject to systematic violence, harassment, intimidation and ridicule

(Young, 1992, p. 56). Furthermore, being a member of an oppressed group comes with this knowledge, the ever present threat of being a victim of violence, depriving one of freedom and dignity (Young, 1992, p. 56). Violence is a social practice always looming as a possibility in the horizon of social imagination, legitimized to the extent that it is tolerated: It is rule-bound, social and pre-mediated (Young, 1992, p. 57). The kind of violence Young has in mind is group-directed violence which is institutionalized and systemic, encouraged, tolerated or enabled against members of specific groups (1992, p. 58). For instance men know that assaulting, raping, beating or killing women is rarely punished; racist police officers know that beating and killing black people is rarely punished. This is an example of how violence against certain groups are tolerated and enabled systematically. Obviously these acts are illegal on paper. Yet they are rampant and the perpetrators get away with it for the most part. Among these five facets, systematic violence and exploitation might be the most important markers of oppression.

Young's treatment of oppression makes it clear that it is important to distinguish oppression from exploitation (for Young, exploitation is a facet of oppression but it is oppression proper for Frye and, in a sense, for Mies too). Also if three of the criteria depend on division of labour, then maybe instead of having three different criteria, we should have one detailed criterion that can account for exploitation, marginalization and powerlessness. Because if all these are fundamentally linked to the division of labour as Young says, then it might be that, one cannot have one without the other. So satisfying only one of the criteria (which determines whether a group is oppressed or not) might not even be possible. Violence, on the other hand, can be viewed as a tool, as a weapon, as to how the

division of labour is effected and maintained. Cultural imperialism, although very important, is the least convincing and coheres the least with the rest. The strengths of Young's work are the stress on the structural character of oppression (and the attempt to define what 'structural' means), the fluid social ontology of groups and the important stress on violence. These are aspects that we can use.

Let us now turn to Mies's Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (2014), where she connects the capitalist division of labour with patriarchy, taking the sexual division of labour to be the historically prior and politically most relevant oppression. According to Maria Mies, women's productivity is the precondition for all other activity, not only in the sense that women produce all other humans but because, she argues, the first division of labour along women gatherers (and later the first agriculturalists) and hunter men in first human societies could only take place on the basis of women's subsistence activity (Mies 2014, p. 58). Hunting was a risky enterprise and comprised only a small part of early human diet; studies show that even in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies women gather 80 percent of the daily food (Mies, 2014, p. 58). Mies thus aims to de-mystify the man-the-hunter hypothesis that posits men's productive activity as the biggest contributor to the survival of the community. So why were women the producers unable to prevent the establishment of a hierarchical and exploitative relation between the sexes? Mies says that the framing of this question presupposes that political power directly emerges from economic power (2014, p. 61). Instead she argues that men's political power arose from their monopoly of the means of violence after their tool production diverged from women's productive tools (such as the digging stick) and they made non-productive lethal tools (weapons) which they soon discovered could be used not

only to kill prey but to terrorize, coerce, and enslave other humans. This gives hunters a power over other beings, an appropriative, exploitative and predatory object relation, which does not arise from their own productive work.

This predatory mode of production based on the patriarchal division of labour is not abolished but transformed and realized fully under feudalism and capitalism (Mies, 2014, p. 66). While forms of domination and appropriation change, the same basic structure of asymmetric and exploitative relations that are propped up by a monopoly on the means of coercion remain at the core (Mies, 2014, p. 66). In capitalism the hunter/warrior paradigm is taken to its logical extreme; while feudal and pastoral modes of production still accepted their dependence on nature, the capitalist class sees itself as master over nature (Mies, 2014, p. 68). In Mies's account, capitalism is a manifestation of patriarchy and one of capitalism's particular innovations is the universalization and intensification of the use of violence as an economic force. Mies's model can easily encompass and surpass the three faces of Young's oppression model that depended on division of labour (exploitation, marginalization and powerlessness) while making their intimate connection to systematic violence (another face of Young's model of oppression) into a coherent whole, as aspects of capitalist patriarchy. For instance, Mies can expand the consideration of women's non-waged work as a free resource for capital to other non-waged, non-capitalist work that capitalism needs. In this, Mies makes use of Luxemburg's thesis about peasants, colonies, and the imperialist system as the non-capitalist milieux and strata (along with nature) that capitalism must exploit in order to continue its process of permanent primitive accumulation (Mies, 2014, p. xvii). So from a base of capitalist patriarchy and its endemic violent exploitation, it might be

possible to address various forms of oppression (including but not limited to gender, class, and race) and their interrelations as part of the history of the violent movement of capital across the globe in its myriad forms: trade, slavery, war, colonialism, imperialism.

However, Mies's thesis that capitalism is a manifestation of patriarchy, while compelling, remains rather speculative. Mies's efforts to carry this line of argument risks losing the historical specificity of capitalism, making it into an ahistorical form of patriarchal appropriative production that has been in place since the first human societies. While capitalism and patriarchy might be mediated through each other and are linked in some intimate way, forcing an originary causal relationship between them seems to strain the argument. It is, after all, plausible to assume that patriarchy and capitalism can exist without one another. Moreover, it is not clear that it is necessary to establish such a causal relationship. The relationship Mies builds between capitalism and patriarchy might be the reason why she decides to subsume oppression under exploitation in her brief note on distinguishing exploitation and oppression (2014, pp. 36-37). Like Young, Mies also wants to expand Marx's specific notion of capitalist form of exploitation (appropriation of surplus labour by capitalists) towards a wider connotation but ends up making it rather vague:

> In the last analysis, it means that someone gains something by robbing someone else or is living at the expense of someone else. It is bound up with the emergence of men's dominance over women and the dominance of one class over others, or one people over others. (2014, p. 36)

At the end of the day, exploitation is a relationship of gain for Mies: she wonders why men would oppress women if they did not have something to gain from it. She worries that oppression or subordination without reference to exploitation might become severed from its material-historical basis and turn purely cultural or

ideological (Mies, 2014, p. 36). If anything, it might be Mies's insistence on tracing the root of all exploitative relationships to a single cause, an “original sin,” or what she calls “the man-woman relationship,” that risks being less than materialist. It's like the Fall but in this version Eve found a good way to pick and preserve apples whereas Adam managed to isolate poisonous cyanide from apple seeds and made spears from its branches. And soon he ran off to enslave a bunch of people with his cyanide-tipped spears. This sort of story doesn't add up.

In addition, this theory depends on a binary view of gender which is now considered to be historical and culturally specific to the West and which the colonizers imposed on pre-colonial cultures with different gender systems (see Lugones, 2007, 2010). Still, we can use some of Mies's insights without committing to this kind of speculative origin story. We can temper her account with Young's social ontology and preserve Young's model of keeping both oppression and exploitation but without necessarily making exploitation a subset of oppression. But let us also remember that there is no purely ideological or purely economical basis for oppression. Perhaps we can say that patriarchy mainly oppresses women (provisionally employing Frye's definition: reduces, immobilizes, molds them, etc) whereas capitalism mainly exploits them (appropriates their surplus labour, etc.) but under capitalist patriarchy (or patriarchal capitalism, depending on prioritization) women may be both oppressed and exploited. Keeping both oppression and exploitation might provide more flexibility particularly for when we begin to consider more than one oppression. Let's conventionally call the general concept “oppression” without committing to making exploitation a subset of oppression (or vice versa).

All three accounts of oppression have their strengths and weaknesses. Let's now recapitulate the best bits from each account and put them together to arrive at a provisional definition:

1. Oppression has a systematic, seamlessly networked character ("the bird cage") which may be invisible to the oppressed & may require a macro point of view or perhaps a different consciousness to become visible. Systematic oppression means it is usually intention-independent and structurally reproduced by social, political, cultural, and economic institutions.

2. Oppression takes place at the level of the social group. The oppressed are oppressed as a member of at least one (or more than one) oppressed group. Although it is ultimately individual persons who are oppressed and sometimes it is possible to talk of an individual oppressing another, the oppressed have been socialized as a member of an oppressed group and the member of the dominant group has been socialized into viewing the oppressed as expendable and so on. Social groups are neither aggregates nor associations but processes. While social processes of affinity and differentiation produce groups, they do not give the groups a substantive essence. Group differentiation is fluid, cross-cutting, multiple and shifting. In highly differentiated complex societies, groups are fluid processes. Different group affinities mediate group membership in an ongoing process. There is no individual prior to socialization. Group differentiation is historical. As we will see in the later chapters, a group has to be seen as a group in order to be seen as oppressed.

3. Oppression has a penalizing, prohibiting, limiting, immobilizing, molding and reducing effect on the oppressed. The oppressed are often caught between conflicting, systematically related, pressures ("the double bind"). Oppression is

embodied and internalized by the oppressed molding their consciousness, thereby disguising or naturalizing their oppression, making it hard to detect and resist oppression.

4. Most oppression under capitalism takes the form of exploitation that can be captured by Marx's conception thereof: appropriation of one class's surplus labour for the benefit of a dominant class. Although expanding this definition to other cases of oppression, where "one group benefits at the expense of the latter", may risk vagueness. Oppression is intimately tied to the division of labour that systematically appropriates, exploits, devalues certain kinds of labour (such as carework, service work, "unskilled" work, hard labour, etc.) while awarding others (mental labour, professionalized, specialized, skilled labour). Division of labour also creates unemployable surplus populations and underclasses to potentially mobilize as a reserve army of labour during overproduction.

5. Oppression is made possible and maintained through actual or threatened, overt or covert, direct or structural, economic or extra-economic violence. Violence is a social practice legitimized to the extent that it is tolerated: it is rule-bound, social and pre-mediated. Oppressive violence is group-directed violence which is institutionalized and systemic, encouraged, tolerated or enabled against members of specific groups. Oppressed communities are subject to systematic violence, harassment, intimidation and ridicule.

Since this 5-point framework was developed with the intent to craft a provisional definition, the central question of the thesis, that of the relationship between oppression and exploitation, is not adequately addressed here. Also, as Cudd's work, this framework too operates within a 20th century paradigm of

oppression. As a bridge to the second chapter, which will be about intersectionality and disability, I add a 6th item to this framework which explicitly characterizes a new shift from single-axis oppressive paradigms to multiple-axis oppressive paradigms in the 21st century. While the idea of intersecting oppressions as developed by feminist women of color has been around since the second half of 20th century (and intersectional thought can be traced to 19th century), intersectionality as such has recently become a very important paradigm in both current conceptions of oppression and also resistance against it:

6. Oppressive systems tend to be intersectional, interlocking, simultaneous, and in some cases, mutually constitutive. Single-axis paradigms of oppression are inadequate for capturing cases of oppression where a person is an involuntary member of more than one subordinate social group. Oppression that stems from belonging to more than one such group (being Black and being woman for instance) cannot be reduced to the mere sum of gender and race oppressions.

The remainder of this thesis will be particularly exploring items 4, 5, (Chapter 4) and 6 (Chapter 3) but on the whole, I will be arguing for a dialectical account of exploitation and oppression (Chapter 5) where all of the aspects of oppression/exploitation can be incorporated.

CHAPTER 3

DISABILITY AS OPPRESSION: INTERSECTIONALITY

In this chapter, I will try to understand how disability can be theorized with intersectionality which I take to be a framework for understanding multiple, interlocking, simultaneous oppressive systems. I will try to answer three questions in the following order: 1) What is intersectionality? 2) How does disability figure into intersectional paradigms? 3) What can we discern about (the relationship between) oppression and exploitation from how disability is theorized in intersectional paradigms? The first section will be a brief survey of intersectionality literature.The second section will be a brief survey of how disability studies, a relative new comer to academic and political discussions of oppression, has theorized disability and situated disability in intersectional paradigms. Finally, I will discuss what the theorization of disability in intersectional paradigms can tell us about the relationship between oppression and exploitation. I will argue that intersectionality is an oppression-prioritizing paradigm and that disability can be largely theorized as a non-exploitative oppression therein.

Intersectional thought has been traced back to nineteenth century Black women philosophers, scholars and activists such as Maria Stewart, Anna Julia Cooper, Sojourner Truth, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett who analyzed multiple oppressions, albeit without using the specific term intersectionality (Gines, 2011; Hancock, 2016). This line of thought continues in the works of The Combahee River Collective, Audre Lorde, Angela Davis, and bell hooks, to name a few, until it is explicitly theorized as intersectionality in Kimberlé Crenshaw's 1989 article

Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, followed closely by Patricia Hill Collins' 1990 book Black Feminist Thought (The Combahee River Collective, 1982; Angela Davis, 1983; hooks, 1984; Crenshaw, 1989, 2008, 2011; Collins, 2000; Lorde, 2009; Gines, 2011). If these three phases roughly correspond to the three waves of feminism, then the recent mainstreamization and institutionalization of intersectionality[1] roughly correspond to the fourth wave.

Concomitant with intersectionality, another theory was being developed around the same timeline, beginning with feminist epistemology in the 70s and 80s and evolving into Standpoint Theory in the early 90s in such fields as natural sciences, sociology, philosophy of science, and political theory (Harding, 2004). According to Standpoint Theory, knowledge is situated and the standpoint of the oppressed is epistemologically privileged with regards to how society functions (as opposed to the perspective of dominant groups) (Harding, 2009, p. 194) —not unlike Marx's project that centers the perspective and the needs of the worker in order to understand how capitalism works. Standpoint theory aims to "study up," beginning with the lives of the oppressed and moving to a more general analysis of society (Harding, 2009, p. 195). But a standpoint "is an achievement, not an ascription. Moreover, it is a collective one, not an individual one" (Harding, 2009, p. 195). In other words, being a member of an oppressed group does not automatically lead to epistemological privilege or consciousness of oppression; it requires the conscious work of centralizing the standpoint of the oppressed and it takes place at the group level. Finally, standpoint epistemology is not cognitively or politically relativist, or value-neutral (Harding, 2009, p. 195). While the earliest iterations of standpoint theory tended to privilege women's point of view, this view was complicated and

1 See Hancock, 2016 for a history of this mainstreaming and institutionalization.

enriched by anti-racist and postcolonial movements which took Standpoint Theory to another level (Harding, 2009, p. 196). Collins and Crenshaw, foundational figures in intersectional theory, were also among the game-changers of Standpoint Theory (Harding, 2009, p. 196). While Standpoint Theory makes its epistemological intervention in terms of knowledge production, Intersectional Theory makes a political intervention in terms of understanding and resisting systems of oppression; those at the intersections of multiple oppressions do not only have an epistemological but also revolutionary advantage (although again, as with Standpoint theory, it is not enough to be merely "standing" (or sitting)[2] at these intersections in order to go from class-in-itself to class-for-itself).

When I write that I take intersectionality to be a framework for understanding oppression, I am already beginning to answer the first question of the chapter in a very particular way. This choice of words circumscribes the theoretical and political focus. It is possible to take intersectionality as a species of identity politics or as a theory of both identity and oppression as Gines (2011) does. I take intersectionality to be a framework for oppression that centers the oppressed. In this very general sense, I view it as the same species of theory as Marxism. If centering the perspective and needs of the oppressed to analyze oppression can be defined as identity politics, then, Marxism can be considered a species of identity politics. When I take intersectionality to be a framework for understanding multiple, interlocking, mutually constitutive systems of oppressions, this also determines my focus on a particular strand of the research where intersectionality is thus operationalized. As I

2 Inspired by Nancy Mairs's book *Waist High in the World: A Life Among the Nondisabled* (1996), Garland-Thompson asks: "What perspectives or politics arise from encountering the world from such an atypical position? Perhaps Mairs's epistemology can offer us a critical positionality called sitpoint theory, a neologism I can offer that interrogates the ableist assumptions underlying the notion of standpoint theory" (Garland-Thompson, 2002, pp. 20-21)

briefly stated above, since being explicitly theorized by Crenshaw and Collins in the early 1990s, intersectionality has gone through a fourth wave, this time one of mainstreaming and institutionalization where the focus on the concept of oppression has become significantly less pronounced (Hancock, 2016; Wilson, 2013; Lutz et al, 2011). Since the central question of this thesis deals with oppression, in the foregoing brief survey of intersectionality research, I focus on several accounts that engage with the concept.

I begin with The Combahee River Collective's 1977 Statement because it is a collective political statement that first addressed the phenomenon of multiple interlocking oppressions in a concise form that most resembles the notion of intersectionality. The statement is a culmination of three years' worth of Black lesbian feminist grassroots organizing and it addresses race, gender, sexuality, and class:

> The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. . . .We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously. (The Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983, p. 13)

The Collective attributes Black women a unique position because their position characterizes the condition of being a member of (at least) two castes at once that cannot be reduced to the mere sum of gender oppression (modeled on White women's oppression) and race oppression (modeled on Black men's oppression) (1977/1983, p. 14). The Collective identifies as socialists, advocating for the

dismantling of capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy but does not believe that a socialist revolution that is not also feminist and anti-racist can guarantee Black women's liberation (1977/1983, p. 16).

While the focus of the group is "embodied in the concept of identity politics" and the group firmly believes that the most radical politics will come directly out of their identity (1977/1983, p. 16), this does not necessarily mean that identity politics per se is the most radical politics. Rather, this speaks to the unique position of their identity as black lesbian working class women at the very bottom of all social hierarchy, making their condition a potentially revolutionary position; the idea being that if the base can be tipped the whole structure will tumble:[3]

> We might use our position at the bottom, however, to make a clear leap into revolutionary action. If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression. (The Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983, p. 18)

Their inclusive politics touches upon all issues concerning "the lives of women, Third World and working people," particularly "those struggles in which race, sex, and class are simultaneous factors in oppression" (The Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983, p. 21). The work they have done includes workplace organizing at factories that employ Third World women as well as abortion rights, battered women, rape, and healthcare in Third World communities and Black neighborhoods (The Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983, p. 21).

To recapitulate, The Combahee River Collective takes one intersectional identity position (what they characterize as "the bottom") as the potential

3 A similar sentiment can be heard in contemporary feminist slogans in Turkey: "Dünya yerinden oynar, kadınlar özgür olsa!"[The world would tumble, if women were free!"] I heard different versions of this in different marches. In Pride, women is replaced with gays, lesbians, trans people, etc. An intersectional category is also possible: lesbian trans women.

revolutionary agent and mediates all other oppressions through it. While they do not necessarily prioritize between different oppressions and instead take care to characterize them as being interconnected, they do prioritize the subject position where all four oppressions they mention intersect.

Kimberlé Crenshaw has two seminal articles (Crenshaw 1989, 1992/2008), the former on anti-discrimination law and the latter on violence against women, which are frequently cited in the intersectionality literature as the articles to coin the very term. Firmly rooted in practice and concrete examples, Crenshaw's work further grounds the concept and offers some very illuminating metaphors and descriptions to illustrate how intersectional oppression operates. In her first article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, Crenshaw looks at what she calls the "single-axis framework" in anti-discrimination law which erases intersectional identities or subsumes them in one identity only (either woman or black for instance) (1989, p. 139). Crenshaw argues that feminist theory and antiracist politics operate on the same single-axis principle that addresses oppression by focusing on privileged group members; for gender oppression the paradigm is white women, and for race oppression the paradigm is middle class black men (1989, p. 140). Both groups are oppressed in only one way (privileged in all others) and they would not be discriminated against if they were not women or if they were not black. In order to demonstrate the conceptual limitations of the single-issue analysis, Crenshaw offers an interesting metaphor to understand intersectionality:

> Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex

> discrimination or race discrimination. (…) To bring this back to a non-metaphorical level, I am suggesting that Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women's experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination-the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women-not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women. (1989, p. 149)

Crenshaw says that feminist movements and anti-racist movements share these dominant ways of treating discrimination that deny both the unique "compoundedness" of black women's experiences as well as the centrality of black women's experiences to larger classes of people (1989, p. 150). The specificity of black women's experience either becomes absorbed into the collective experience of the larger groups or marked as too different.

According to the dominant view of discrimination, the discriminator treats all people within a certain social category similarly. Race and gender become significant only when they work to the disadvantage of someone but the privileges (of whiteness or maleness) that may accompany race and gender are never addressed. So it is assumed that unless disadvantages of race and sex interfere, all is fair and neutral. Sex and race discrimination then come to be defined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but for their racial or sexual characteristics (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 151). In order to show how black women are marginalized in these discrimination paradigms Crenshaw uses another interesting metaphor:

> Imagine a basement which contains all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical ability. These people are stacked-feet standing on shoulders-with those on the bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, where the heads of all those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up against the ceiling. Their ceiling is actually the floor above which only those who are not disadvantaged in any way reside. In efforts to correct some aspects of

> domination, those above the ceiling admit from the basement only those who can say that "but for" the ceiling, they too would be in the upper room. (1989, p. 151)

There is a hatch through which those immediately below the ceiling can crawl, but only available to those who have a singularity of burden. Those who are oppressed in multiple ways are left below unless they pull themselves to the groups permitted to squeeze through. According to Crenshaw, in feminist and anti-racist politics this top-down framework is preserved whereas intersectionality allows for mediating (in Crenshaw's words "mitigating") different oppressions.

Crenshaw's other seminal article Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color finds another mediating role for intersectionality, this time between multiple identity and the ongoing need for identity politics, and she importantly distinguishes intersectionality from anti-categorical anti-essentialism. According to Crenshaw, the problem is not the existence of categories but the values attached to them and how those values create hierarchies (1992/2008, p. 298). While categorization is itself an exercise of power, this is not an exercise exclusive to dominant classes; subordinated people participate as well and sometimes subvert these meanings.

Crenshaw thinks that there can be meaningful identity politics as long as it is based on challenging the system of subordination based on that identity rather than the vulgar social constructionism of challenging the construction of identity per se (1992/2008, p. 298). Taking intersectionality as a framework for understanding oppression that foregrounds the oppressed is useful in this sense because it brings the discussion to the level of common systems of oppression justified on those identities, rather than the level of common identities. We can be oppressed by the same/similar

systems without being the same. And although we are not the same, we will all have reason to struggle against those systems.

Crenshaw's articles share The Combahee River Collective's practical approach to identity politics that avoids the pitfalls of both essentialism and anti-essentialism; the focus on concrete examples as a guide to the theory; and, finally, the prioritization of Black women's intersectional position as the potentially revolutionary “bottom.” Interestingly, Crenshaw's articles do not feature the word oppression as often as they feature discrimination, disadvantage, marginalization, subordination, partly because of the language of law and the court cases she is examining (literally, anti-discrimination law). But as the previous chapter provisionally showed, these are all objective facets and systematic effects of oppression. Further, the way Crenshaw uses these terms point at structural and institutional effects of oppressive systems on both groups and individuals. Thus her account provides insights about how multiple oppressions work through institutions, political movements and law, even those that are formally dedicated to achieving equality and anti-discrimination.

Writing just a few years before Crenshaw's article, bell hooks describes a very similar mechanism to Crenshaw without using the term intersectionality but by explicitly using the terms oppression and exploitation, the two of them always paired together:

> As a group, black women are in an unusual position in this society, for not only are we collectively at the bottom of the occupational ladder, but our overall social status is lower than that of any other group. Occupying such a position, we bear the brunt of sexist, racist, and classist oppression. At the same time, we are the group that has not been socialized to assume the role of exploiter/oppressor in that we are allowed no institutionalized "other" that we can exploit or oppress. (Children do not represent an institutionalized other even though they may be oppressed by parents.) White women and black

> men [15] have it both ways. They can act as oppressor or be oppressed. Black men may be victimized by racism, but sexism allows them to act as exploiters and oppressors of women. White women may be victimized by sexism, but racism enables them to act as exploiters and oppressors of black people. Both groups have led liberation movements that favor their interests and support the continued oppression of other groups. Black male sexism has undermined struggles to eradicate racism just as white female racism undermines feminist struggle. As long as these two groups or any group defines liberation as gaining social equality with ruling class white men, they have a vested interest in the continued exploitation and oppression of others. (1984, pp. 14-15)

In the above passage, hooks echoes both The Combahee River Collective's and Crenshaw's idea of the social "bottom" as a position Black women inhabit and which gives them an epistemological and revolutionary edge. But according to hooks, Black women have this advantage because they do not have an institutionalized other to oppress and exploit and therefore no vested interest in oppressing others—the assumption being that those who have no interest in oppressing others are in a best position to eradicate oppressive systems. What is remarkable about hooks's account is not only her treatment of oppression and exploitation as distinct yet related and always co-present but also her dialectical construal of members of oppressed social groups as not only oppressed and exploited but also as potential exploiters and oppressors of other groups lower on the social hierarchy. While the idea that (abled, neurotypical, straight, non-immigrant, non-refugee status) Black women have no institutionalized other(s) can be easily challenged, the idea that the oppressed are potential oppressors given a system of interlocking and mutually reinforcing oppressions is a truly dialectical and intersectional insight. For hooks, any given movement must aim to eradicate the oppression most associated with that group but also in tandem with other related oppressions. For instance, according to hooks, White feminism's call for equality with men reflects the movement's class interests,

as well as its dominant race, when one analyses which men they seek equality with. Instead, bell hooks suggests that feminism be a mass-based movement to end sexist oppression in particular and group oppression in general which includes class and race oppression:

> Focus on social equality with men as a definition of feminism led to an emphasis on discrimination, male attitudes, and legalistic reforms. Feminism as a movement to end sexist oppression directs our attention to systems of domination and the inter-relatedness of sex, race, and class oppression. (1984, p. 31)

Also this focus on oppressive systems, stirs any movement away from a strictly identitarian basis towards a mass-basis; the move from "I am a feminist" to "I advocate feminism in order to eradicate sexist oppression" that hooks suggests (1984, p. 29) no longer associates the revolutionary agent with a fixed or "natural" identity position but with a specific political commitment which is an achievement rather than an ascription, that is, an intersectional standpoint.

Building on this kind of work (exemplified by hooks, Angela Davis, Audre Lorde and others) Patricia Hill Collins, develops an intersectional analysis which also incorporates a sister term "matrix of domination":

> Intersectionality refers to particular forms of intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and nation. Intersectional paradigms remind us that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type, and that oppressions work together in producing injustice. In contrast, the matrix of domination refers to how these intersecting oppressions are actually organized. (Collins, 2000, p. 18).

According to Collins, U.S. Black women occupy a distinctive position "within a unique matrix of domination characterized by intersecting oppressions" (2000, p. 23). But this position is neither the bottom nor that which has no interest in oppressing others, rather it is a lens through which to understand and eliminate other systems of oppression: "Since Black women cannot be fully empowered unless

intersecting oppressions themselves are eliminated, Black feminist thought supports broad principles of social justice that transcend U.S. Black women's particular needs" (Collins, 2000, p. 22). Similar to hooks, Collins also finds Black women's position to be unique and important for developing frameworks for struggle across various dimensions of oppression but at the same time not a guarantee, by itself, for developing a revolutionary consciousness or practice:

> Historically, Black women's group location in intersecting oppressions produced commonalities among individual African-American women. At the same time, while common experiences may predispose Black women to develop a distinctive group consciousness, they guarantee neither that such a consciousness will develop among all women nor that it will be articulated as such by the group. As historical conditions change, so do the links among the types of experiences Black women will have and any ensuing group consciousness concerning those experiences. Because group standpoints are situated in, reflect, and help shape unjust power relations, standpoints are not static. . . . Thus, common challenges may foster similar angles of vision leading to a group knowledge or standpoint among African-American women. Or they may not. (Collins, 2000, p. 25)

Similar to the previous examples of intersectional thought, Collins also takes a non-metaphysical and politicized view on identity by making it a springboard to take us to the systems of oppression that build, and that are built around, that identity. This view is neither essentialistic nor anti-essentialistic; it neither reifies nor does away with identity. Rather, it is a position that complicates, historicizes, and politicizes identity in a non-essentialistic way, giving "the personal is the political" its full dialectical meaning. While all of the examples I reviewed began by centering a particular intersection of oppressions, they provide a framework that can be applied to other intersections and other oppressions. Intersectionality is a framework for understanding multiple interlocking and mutually reinforcing oppressions that centralizes the oppressed without necessarily becoming a parochial identity politics and without succumbing to a kind of relativism about identities or oppressions. The

particular identity at the intersections is not a fixed or natural category, and it is not enough to merely be situated at this intersection to have epistemological or revolutionary advantage. What is important to understand is that intersectionality in these examples is not an additive framework where gender merely becomes added to race, for instance, but rather they are, as Bannerji puts it, “mutually constitutive and diverse determinations" that cannot be easily de-articulated from one another (2011, p. 17); race is gendered and gender is racialized at their intersections. A final point about intersectionality is that it is a framework that is oppression-prioritizing. With the exception of hooks's take on oppression and exploitation as being paired, the rest of the accounts, either explicitly or implicitly, make exploitation a subset of oppression. For instance, Collins defines exploitation to be one dimension of the kind of oppression to be analyzed in her book:

> African-American women's oppression has encompassed three interdependent dimensions. First, the exploitation of Black women's labour essential to U.S. Capitalism . . . represents the economic dimension of oppression. . . . Second, the political dimension of oppression has denied African-American women the rights and privileges routinely extended to White male citizens. [5] . . . Finally, controlling images applied to Black women that originated during the slave era attest to the ideological dimension of U.S. Black women's oppression. (2000, pp. 4-5)

While only a crude exercise, it is telling to index the words “oppression” and “exploitation” to find that “oppression” occurs for 166 times in Collins's book, as opposed to “exploitation” appearing for 2 times. Exploitation is the crucial economic component of her definition of oppression, but once it is built into the definition, it is no longer employed separately, being subsumed under oppression.

From these beginnings, intersectionality has since become mainstreamed as a political buzzword and institutionalized in academic departments (Hancock, 2016). Many other movements adopted and adapted the framework, applying it across a

range of issues globally, engaging other parameters of oppression in addition to race, gender, class, and sexuality and interrogating new intersections (Hancock, 2016; May, 2015; Wilson, 2013; Lutz et al, 2011). Not only applications but critiques also proliferated, so much so that the applications in general began taking on a remedial form: "Intersectionality critiques have become something of their own genre—a form so flourishing, at times it seems critique has become a primary means of taking up the concept and its literatures" (May, 2015, p. 98).

As Garry notes, most of the critiques stem from attributing too great a scope to intersectionality, treating it as a full-blown methodology, as a grand theory (of oppression, of power, of identity etc.), as something that either dismantles or further reifies identity, or as something that has to include every category of oppression ever imaginable at all times (2011, p. 830). In a post-script she contributed to a recent collection of intersectional research, Crenshaw responds to such critique by pointing out that intersectionality "is a provisional conceptualisation . . . an analytical, a heuristic or hermeneutic tool" (2011, p. 231) which is how I tried to approach intersectionality in this chapter.

In some sense, Disability Studies has also engaged with intersectionality from a remedial perspective. For instance, one of the earlier and seminal works by Lennard Davis, a prominent figure in disability studies, begins with a chapter entitled "Disability: The Missing Term in the Race, Class, Gender Triad" (1995, p. 1). A more recent article by Erevelles and Minear aims to bring attention to the omission of disability as a critical category in intersectionality (2011, p. 128). When different fields and struggles adopt intersectionality, sometimes they are interested in defining their own constituency as the new, or the original, revolutionary "bottom,"—the

epistemologically privileged intersection. According to Erevelles and Minear, the critical standpoint of disability as a negative ontology or as the “embodiment of the disruption of normativity” gives it an edge in foregrounding the structural forces at work that constitute certain other categories of oppression such as race, class, and gender (2010, p. 143).

Erevelles and Minear are suggesting that the position of disability challenges normativity itself and is therefore in a better position to organize other parameters of oppression. In an earlier work, Erevelles claims that the ideology of disability is central to capitalism because by inscribing biological difference as a “natural” cause of all inequality it justifies all other oppressions: “[D]isability . . . is [therefore] the organizing grounding principle in the construction of the categories of gender, race, class, and sexual orientation” (1996, p. 526). In a similar vein, Davis writes: “Disability is . . . a social process that intimately involves everyone who has a body and lives in the world of senses.

Just as the conceptualization of race, class, and gender shapes the lives of those who are not black, poor, or female, so the concept of disability regulates the bodies of those who are 'normal'” (1995, p. 2). The construction of normalcy is in a dialectical relationship to the construction of disability; just as oppressive systems organize the lives of those who are not necessarily oppressed under the same paradigms, disability is the organizing principle of the ableist realm: “our construction of the normal world is based on a radical repression of disability” (Davis, 1995, p. 22).

Erevelles and Minear take intersectionality as a framework and identify three diverging practices among the plethora of work that emerged in the last two decades:

> (1) anticategorical frameworks that insist on race, class, and gender as social constructs/ fictions; (2) intracategorical frameworks that critique merely additive approaches to differences as layered stigmas; and (3) constitutive frameworks that describe the structural conditions within which social categories in the above models are constructed by (and intermeshed with) each other in specific historical contexts. (2011, p. 127)

The third framework, which seems to encompass the first two, characterize the works I reviewed above, as well as the works of scholars like Bannerji (2011), Yuval-Davis (2006), May (2015), and Erevelles and Minear themselves. While advocating a mutually constitutional, materialist and intercategorical approach, Erevelles and Minear, are at the same time, posing disability to be constitutional of all other categories in some sense, therefore making a prior category of oppression that must be "untangled" from others in order to reveal the underlying socioeconomic structure of interlocking oppressions. After this brief introduction as to how disability may figure into an intersectional framework, let me briefly go over the history of disability studies and what kind of oppression disability was characterized therein. The disability movement has gone through several phases which roughly correspond to the last three waves of feminism. In disability studies, these three paradigms are the individual (medical) model, the social model (social constructionist), and the current model which is more deconstructionist, but its best examples incorporate both impairment and disability in a dialectical fashion and are intersectional. The individual model locates the 'problem' of disability within the individual as a personal tragedy and sees the cause of this problem as functional limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability (Oliver, 1996, p. 31). The social model, on the other hand, locates the problem with society:

> [D]isability, according to the social model, is all the things that impose restrictions on disabled people; ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible public buildings to unusable

> transport systems, from segregated education to excluding work arrangements, and so on. Further, the consequences of this failure do not simply and randomly fall on individuals but systematically upon disabled people as a group who experience this failure as discrimination institutionalized throughout society. (Oliver, 1996, p. 33)

The social model identifies disability as an oppression, the disabled as an oppressed group and ableist institutions and societies as disablers. From the point of view of the social model, disability is caused by society on top of the original "impairment;" an impaired person is not disabled as long as social arrangements allow them to participate in society as a full citizen. The social model prescribes society to change rather than the individual "and this change will come as part of a process of political empowerment of disabled people as a group" (Oliver, 1996, p. 37).

The difference between the individual and social models of disability can be understood by examining two campaigns representing these points of view: campaign for disability income (which social model advocates see as nothing more than state charity, "the begging bowl in modern form") versus the demand for the reorganization of society so that "the right to paid, integrated employment and full participation in the mainstream of life" can be achieved (Oliver, 1996, pp. 24-25). According to one of the founders of the model, the definition of a disabled person requires the presence of an impairment, the experience of externally imposed restrictions, and self-identification as a disabled person (Oliver, 1996, p. 5).

Coupled with the focus on independence, citizenship, political and social rights, this set-up excludes cognitive disabilities (as well as very severe physical disabilities) which may preclude self-awareness and definition as a disabled person, may impede the exercise of citizenship rights, or may make independence unlikely. No matter how society is reorganized, some with severe cognitive or physical

disabilities may not be accommodated in such a way as to render them non-disabled (if, of course, the definition of non-disablement is independence, autonomy, and gainful employment). The idea that there is a state of originary, completely biological, impairment without any social meanings that precedes disability (which some have likened to the sex/gender distinction made by second wave feminists) as well as the idea that only ableist social structures disable have been challenged by newer generations of disability theorists and activists. Yet the social model is important to preserve in some form in order to keep the focus on oppression and to keep the movement politicized.

Davis writes that "the first wave of any struggle involves the establishment of the identity against the societal definitions that were formed largely by oppression" (2006, p. 231). The first phase features group solidarity for common political ends and the achievement of basic rights. In a second wave, however, group solidarity is not sought as much since there is already a firm sense of identity; the group can begin self-examining, finding intragroup diversity and coming up with more nuanced understandings of this identity (Davis, 2006, p. 232). As a relatively new field of study, disability studies experienced a first wave in the 1970s and 1980s and a second wave in 1990s:

> Both the first and second waves have had a strong interest in preserving the notion of a distinct and clear entity known variously as "people with disabilities" (PWDs) or "Deaf people." In the case of PWDs, the interest has been in creating a collectivity where before there had been disunity. In the past, people with disabilities did not identify as such. Medical definitions of impairments were developed with no need to create unity among diverse patient groups. Wheelchair users saw no commonality with people with chronic fatigue syndrome or Deaf people. (Davis, 2006, p. 232)

While the social model was developed mostly by Marxist British sociologists, in the U.S., the disability model was also inspired by the Civil Rights movement and the

Feminist movement, so it also had a minority model built into it: “people with disabilities were seen as minority citizens deprived of their rights by a dominant ableist majority” (Davis, 2006, p. 232). The minority model was particularly embraced by the Deaf community, who capitalize the first letter of the word “deaf” when they refer to their political and cultural community, but do not capitalize when they refer to the political disablement of deafness by an audist dominant culture that medicalizes deafness—Deaf/deaf maps onto the disability/impairment dichotomy. The Deaf community refer to themselves as a linguistic minority, united not on the basis of hearing status (or hearing impairment), but on the basis of sharing a minority culture which Lane refers to as DEAF-WORLD (this is how American Sign Language speakers refer to their community) (2006, p. 84). Lane argues that from the point of view of “Deaf culture, deafness is not a disability. . . . we are not disabled in any way within our own community. . . . there is no 'handicap' to overcome” (2006, p. 84) other than the economic, political, and social barriers set up by the dominant hearing society.

There are similar disability-as-minority, disability-as-ethnicity analogies in the literature which coming from Northern and predominantly White disability studies have been critiqued by disability scholars who foreground the global South (Grech, 2015, p. 6) as well as disabled scholars of color (Bell, 2006). The argument that the Deaf community is a linguistic or even ethnic minority seems to assume that the Deaf community is not already situated in some kind of national political entity and that the members of the Deaf community do not already have a race or an ethnicity (or another disability, for that matter). Bell critiques the characterization of disability as a minority category for making false analogies between disability and

other oppressions which is tantamount to ignoring the intersectionality and diversity of disability community and experience: “Disability Studies has a tenuous relationship with race and ethnicity: while the field readily acknowledges its debt to and inspiration by inquiries such as Black Studies, its efforts at addressing intersections between disability, race, and ethnicity are, at best, wanting” (2006, p. 275). Another example of comparing different oppressions comes from Garland-Thompson's article on feminist disability studies where she considers the idea of patriarchy disabling women:

> Western thought has long conflated femaleness and disability, understanding both as defective departures from a valued standard. Aristotle, for example, defined women as “mutilated males.” Women, for Aristotle, have “improper form;” we are “monstrosit[ies”]. . . . More recently, feminist theorists have argued that female embodiment is a disabling condition in sexist culture. Iris Marion Young, for instance, examines how enforced feminine comportment delimits women's sense of embodied agency, restricting them to “throwing like a girl” . . . . Young asserts that, “Women in a sexist society are physically handicapped.” (Garland-Thompson, 2006, p. 260)

The phenomenological point the example seems to be making is that norms tend to be literally embodied; oppression does not only have political consequences but physical ones. The condition of disablement described above, however, seems one of political disenfranchisement, limitation and dependency.

This interesting parallel drawn between gender and disability, perhaps in a model that brings impairment together with disability, would be complicated if the intersection of gender and disability were to be considered together. If gender is already a disabling condition, how would the oppression of a disabled woman differ from that of a non-disabled woman? What would be the similarities and differences between the disabling effect of gender oppression and the disabling effect of disability oppression? Do all oppressions disable? Is disablement equivalent to

oppression? These are some interesting intersectional questions to be considered when such analogies between different oppressions are raised.

To sum it up, while disability studies approached intersectional paradigms with a remedial perspective, disability studies itself has been critiqued from within for not making sufficient intersectional analysis. In addition to, and perhaps concomitant with, the different waves of disability research and activism, there can be discerned two seemingly opposing tendencies:[4] One of them is to liken disability oppression to other oppressions, the other is to characterize disability as a unique kind of oppression, unlike any other.

Another related pair of tendencies is the following: viewing disability as a minority condition experienced by a minority of people, on the one hand, and to view disability as a majority condition, on the other. I have already shown examples of the minority model (Lane, 2006), also models of uniqueness (Erevelles & Minear, 2011). The minority model would require a somewhat stricter definition of disability so it would more comfortably fall under the social model that took pains to come up with a neat definition as we saw above (taking care to distinguish it from illness and old age, etc.), whereas the majority model would require a more fluid definition of disability so it would more comfortably fall under the more recent waves of disability research where identity and essentialism are prone to be questioned or complicated further.

In the second iteration, disability can become an overarching identity that can cut across many other oppressions and perhaps in this sense particularly conducive to apply an intersectional framework. While I characterize these tendencies as

4 I say "seemingly opposing tendencies" because they are not like two opposing camps but can be easily found in the works of the same author, sometimes within the same work.

opposing, they would not be oppositional in an intersectional framework.[5] Also whether they work with such a paradigm or not, both tendencies feature in the works of the same authors, sometimes within the same work. For instance, in the introduction to *Enforcing Normalcy*, Davis (1995) has a section that shows analogies between deafness and ethnicity as well as a section that describes disability as a social process that involves everyone who has a body.

Against the view of disability as a condition that only characterizes the lives of a small number of people Siebers offers the following:

> Only 15% of people with disabilities are born with their impairments. Most people become disabled over the course of their life. This truth has been accepted only with difficulty by mainstream society; it prefers to think of people with disabilities as a small population, a stable population, that nevertheless makes enormous claims on the resources of everyone else. Most people do not want to consider that life's passage will lead them from ability to disability. The prospect is too frightening, the disabled body, too disturbing. In fact, even this picture is overly optimistic. The cycle of life runs in actuality from disability to temporary ability back to disability, and that only if you are among the most fortunate, among those who do not fall ill or suffer a severe accident. (2006, p. 176) [emphasis mine]

According to recent United Nations (UN) estimates, the prevalence of global disability is between 16 to 19 percent of world adult population (15 years of age and older) (United Nations, 2015, pp. 38-39). Given that there are 7.6 billion people in the world, this estimate puts the number of disabled between 1.2-1.44 billion people globally. The UN, bases its report on World Health Organization's (WHO) World Report on Disability which begins with the following remark echoing Sieber's point of view:

> Disability is a human condition. Almost everyone will be temporarily or permanently impaired at some point in life, and those who survive to old age

5 This tension between between being different/same is like the tension Crenshaw demonstrates in her court cases where Black women were either subsumed into the category women (same) or marked as too different to represent the larger categories of women or Black people. This becomes a contradiction for single-issue frameworks but not in intersectional frameworks.

> will experience increasing difficulties in functioning … This issue will become more acute as the demographics of societies change and more people live to an old age. (World Health Organization, 2011, p. 3)

Likewise, the U.N. considers disability to be a continuum and accepts a definition that incorporates both the social model of disablement and an understanding of impairment:

> The overall experience of disability is diverse as it is the aggregate of limitations in functioning across multiple domains (e.g. walking, seeing), each on a continuum, or a spectrum, from little or no disabilities to severe disabilities, either within a particular domain or across multiple domains. For each domain, the level of functioning a person experiences [32] depends both on the intrinsic capacity of the individual's body and the features of his or her environment that can either lower or raise, the person's ability to participate in society. (United Nations, 2015, pp. 31-32)

Such nuanced definitions of disability found in UN and WHO reports attest to the success of the disability movement in making a paradigm shift with the social model, putting disability on the global agenda as a human rights issue (as well as a health issue). These global statistics are increasingly gathered using a universal framework developed for disability data collection called The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) which measures functioning on three domains: body functions, body structures, and activity/participation (United Nations, 2015, p. 31) which can encompass physical and cognitive disabilities, chronic illnesses, mental illnesses, and other disabling conditions.

As Eide and Loeb note, this promising framework is not globally in use yet: "In many low-income countries, data are scarce and of variable quality. Reported disability statistics are largely limited to measures of prevalence collected through the national census, and tend to be impairment-based, identifying only a small portion of individuals with disability" (2016, p. 52). So these global numbers will likely see a steep rise in the future as more accurate global data is collected. More

importantly: “There is little point . . . in 'counting cases' without the ability to meet the needs of those who are counted” (Eide & Loeb, 2016, p. 63). But even this incomplete picture tells an important story about disability and its prevalence that is closer to the second view of disability as a majority condition. This point about disability being a category that each one of us will inhabit at some point is one that is frequently raised in the literature, but there is also some dissent to this, as it seems to dissolve the specificity of the category altogether. According to Lennard Davis, the instability of the category is what makes it different and gives it an edge among other identities:

> . . . disability can capitalize on its rather different set of definitions from other current and known identities. To do this, it must not ignore the instability of its self-definitions but acknowledge that their instability allows disability to transcend the problems of identity politics. (2006, p. 237)

So the two tendencies, I wrote about earlier, “we are all (potentially) disabled”/disability resembles other oppressions vs “only some of us are disabled”/disability is unlike any other oppression, coexist in Lennard Davis's article about disability as an unstable category that is neither modernist nor postmodernist but “dismodernist”: an identity that connects all others in the fragility, mortality, and instability of the body (2006, p. 233).

Davis defines the dismodernist era as one where difference becomes what each has in common; identities are not fixed; the body and technology are not separate; dependence is the norm (2006, p. 239):

> Impairment is the rule, and normalcy is the fantasy. Dependence is the reality, and independence grandiose thinking. . . . The dismodernist vision allows . . . a clear notion of expanding the protected class to the entire population; a commitment to removing barriers and creating access for all. This includes removing the veil of ideology from the concept of the normal, and denying the locality of identity . . . (Davis, 2006, p. 241)

Davis's suggestion to use disability as an identity that could transcend identity politics (or transcend some of the problems with identity politics) was critiqued for remaining within identity politics while creating one common denominator (2013, p. 25).

Going back to the earliest intersectional frameworks and its affinity with standpoint theory, it is possible to rephrase Davis's move here as centering one kind of oppression as the intersection of many others and therefore as the position with epistemological and revolutionary advantage. However, if intersectionality is used strictly as a framework which can shift its focus from one intersection to another depending on context and need, it is then possible to use this identity position in a practical manner, as a springboard to get to the systems of oppression that have constructed this identity and others. Sunny Taylor (2004) also views disability as a unique kind of identity that "cannot be appropriated" precisely because of this connection to systems of oppression:

> One fact that makes disability so hard to understand is that there is no single model of disability; the human body can be impaired in an almost infinite number of ways, and people of all walks of life can become impaired. . . . The only thing impaired people have in common is their political disablement and the economic, behavioral, and emotional similarities that impairment can cause. Disability, partly as result of this intense differentiation of those people affected, may be the only branch of the civil rights movement that cannot be appropriated. Disabled people are an example of a movement and identity whose image and capabilities are infinitely various. (Taylor, 2004, p. 34)

In Taylor's account, not only is disability different from other social groups or identities that engaged in civil rights struggles, but there is also immense intra-group difference so much so that the only common thing disabled people have is their political disablement—that is, their oppression. While it seems that this can be said about any politicized identity group, perhaps we can provisionally say that disability

is particularly conducive to going from identity to oppression. One reason for this could be that disability as a category (or the transition from impairment to social disablement), unlike other identity groups, has been directly linked to the advent of capitalism (Davis, 1995; Gleeson, 1999; Taylor, 2004; Davis, 2006):

> Gleeson argues that with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, impaired people became unproductive members of society and thus disabled. … Markets introduced into peasant households an abstract social evaluation of work potential based upon the law of value; that is to say, the [37] competition of labour-powers revealed as socially necessary labour times. This productivity rule devalorized the work potential of anyone who could not produce at socially necessary rates. As households were progressively drawn into dependence upon the competitive sale of labour-power, their ability to host "slow" or "dependent" members was greatly reduced. . . . "The material context of feudal production allowed peasant households a great degree of liberty in designing everyday tasks that would match the corporeal capacities of each family member." (Taylor, 2004, pp. 36-37)

While this originary story about capitalism depends on a strict binary between impairment and disability in order to work, it is still interesting, how it seems to particularly bring to the fore the constructed nature of this identity (and perhaps identity in general). However, there is another aspect of disability and its relationship to oppression, which is the creation of literal impairment/disability by oppressive systems (by wars, colonization, violence, or capitalist workplace conditions, for example). Because of this, Taylor thinks that disability is an example for the need for radical change:

> We epitomize [43] many ways in which our political and social systems need to change. We are often born out of war, financial inequality, and environmental degradation. My disability is a birth defect caused by a U.S. Air Force contractor that illegally polluted my neighborhood's ground water. (2004, pp. 42-43)

While the history of capitalism creating the category of disability relies on the disability/impairment binary, this second instance of the creation of disability seems to dissolve it. Erevelles, for instance, argues that impairment is simultaneously

social, historical, and biological in her intersectional endeavor that centralizes disability as an analytic (2011, p. 36).

To conclude, both the social model and intersectional models of disability have mostly been oppression-prioritizing paradigms. While in earlier, intersectional work, exploitation was built into the definition of oppression(s) taken up by the framework, albeit subsumed under them, exploitation as a separate concept is barely featured in disability research. While disability studies has approached intersectionality from a remedial perspective, disability studies has been critiqued from within for ignoring how disability intersects with other oppressions. Inspired by civil rights and feminist struggles, disability studies has worked with a minority model of oppression and sometimes conceptualized disability oppression as being similar to other oppressions. On the other hand, disability has also been conceptualized as a unique oppression radically different from all others. More recent intersectional work on disability used both these ideas (disability as different and disability as the same, disability as minority and majority model) in order to argue that disability is a foundational or organizing principle that underlies all other identities/oppressions. Just as the non-metaphysical identity politics in early intersectional research, disability in this later intersectional phase seems to take us from identities to the systems of oppressions that produce them. It is in this sense that disability might be different from other oppressions and therefore more suitable for an intersectional framework which seeks to understand oppression by centralizing the standpoint of the oppressed. Disability may also be different from other oppressions as a kind of category that historically appears at the advent of capitalism (as a category to exclude from capitalist labour and therefore from exploitation).

CHAPTER 4

DISABILITY AS (NON)EXPLOITATON: SURPLUS POPULATIONS

In this chapter, I will try to understand how disability can be theorized through the lens of the concept of surplus populations which I take to be an exploitation-prioritizing paradigm of oppression. This chapter, like the previous one, will seek to answer three questions: 1) What is the concept of surplus populations? 2) How does disability figure into surplus populations? 3) What can we discern about (the relationship between) oppression and exploitation from how disability can be theorized within the context of surplus populations?

Unlike the dynamic academic and political dialogue between intersectional frameworks and disability studies, there is no organic connection between scholars of global surplus populations and scholars of disability. There are very few examples of disability scholars making explicit connections between surplus populations and disabled populations (Russell & Stewart, 2001; Charlton, 2006; Roulstone, 2012). Marx's concept of surplus populations has begun to draw more interest in the recent years and a body of literature is accumulating on this subject (Davis, 2006; Jameson, 2011; Standing, 2011; Denning, 2010; Ceruti, 2010; McIntyre, 2011; Cowen & Siciliano, 2011; Nast, 2011) but unfortunately very little of it directly concerns disability. So connecting surplus populations and disability will take some theoretical work. I would like to use the tentative conclusions reached by the previous chapter to help guide this theoretical work.

In the previous chapter, disability came to the fore as a largely non-exploitative oppression among other oppressions in intersectional paradigms and

disability studies albeit one with a special, almost originary, relationship to capitalism. Conversely, capitalism can be construed to be a system that is productive of disability (both as a category and as literal impairment). In this chapter, where disability will be examined as a form of oppressive non-exploitation, similar questions can be asked with regard to surplus populations: are surplus populations specific to capitalism, and conversely, is capitalism a system that produces classes of people who are superfluous to capital? Another line of questioning about disability was whether disability was a unique kind of oppression or whether it was similar to other oppressions, and a related line of questioning as to whether disability was a minority condition or a majority condition, the exception or the norm. The same questions can be asked of surplus populations as well and the answers will depend on how the categories are defined as it was the case with disability. Finally, a third line of questioning, which I haven't taken up in the previous chapter, that can apply to both disability and surplus populations is how they are dealt with by abled society and by capital. It seems that for both there are two routes: absorbing or managing/warehousing, the latter either through medicalization or criminalization.

In order to answer the first question of the chapter, I will explicate Marx's definition of surplus populations from Chapter 25 of Capital (The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation) with the help of some recent takes on the concept by Harvey (2003, 2010) McIntyre (2011), Benanav (2014), Hansen (2015) and The Endnotes Collective (Endnotes, 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b). This section will also answer the question about whether surplus populations are endemic to capitalism and the question about the prevalence of surplus populations, whether it is a minority or a majority condition. In the second section, in order to begin to understand where

disability may be found within the layers of surplus populations, I will survey several accounts that examine the relationship between employment and disability and several accounts that directly tie disability with the concept of surplus populations. This section will also answer the absorption/management question. In the third section, I will propose that while from the perspective of intersectionality disability was a non-exploitative oppression, from the perspective of surplus populations it turns out to be an oppressive form of (non)exploitation. In the interest of understanding the difference between the two, I will look at surplus populations and intersectionality as two dimensions through which to see oppression and exploitation. In conclusion, I will propose that what surplus populations, those at the intersections of multiple oppressions and the disabled, have in common is market-dependency on the one hand and being cut-off from the means of (re)production on the other, in other words, common needs.

The concept of surplus populations has been receiving more scholarly interest recently because the post-1970 neoliberal phase of capitalism makes Marx's predictions in Chapter 25 of the first volume of *Capital* more and more relevant (Endnotes, 2010a, 2010b; Harvey, 2010; Benanav, 2014). But because even some of those works (Standing, 2011; Denning, 2010, for instance) use only half of Marx's definition, Marx's account remains the most nuanced in terms of accommodating disability as well as other forms of oppression. While the main contradiction in *Capital* is between labour and capital, and exploitation consists in working to valorize capital and to enrich the capitalist, the misery of those shut out of this relationship of exploitation in a system where they have to reproduce themselves without producing capital, not only points to non-exploitation as a form of violent

oppression but also makes room for examining the nuanced differentiation of the proletariat into many of the oppressions taken up by more recent paradigms of oppression such as intersectionality.

In Chapter 25, Marx wants to show what capitalist growth means from the perspective of the worker. The General Law is, very simply put, that as capital grows so does the working class and so does a portion of the working class which is redundant to capital: "The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productiveness of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army" (2000, p. 519). This has everything to do with the particular capital-labour relationship in capitalism rather than overpopulation and scarce resources that the likes of Malthus had suggested to be the source of poverty, thereby naturalizing poverty and unemployment (Harvey, 2010, p. 274). What Marx is doing here, as he does all throughout *Capital*, is to denaturalize, historicize, and thoroughly politicize the capital-labour relationship by demonstrating that "capitalism produces poverty no matter what the state or rate of population growth. . . . [because] [a] permanent pool of unemployed labourers is socially necessary for accumulation to continue to expand" (Harvey, 2010, p. 274). According to Marx, surplus population is not just a necessary product of accumulation (or development of capitalist wealth) but such a population is at the same time the lever of capitalistic accumulation and the very condition of the existence of the capitalist mode of production (2000, p. 517). By the creation of a reserve army of labour to be absorbed during times of growth and shed during times of crisis or through technical innovation, this surplus population is not wholly dependent on the limits of any actual increase in population because it

fluctuates with the dictates of the capital-relation: “for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation” (Marx, 2000, p. 517). This can only happen in a mode of production where labour is captive to capital, that is, where the worker does not own the means of production and has to work for the valorization of capital in order to survive. In this sense, a rise in wages only loosens the golden chain around the workers' neck, as Marx says, because the capitalist is not only in a position to manipulate both labour demand and supply, but also a rise in wages does not automatically hurt the capitalist since what the capitalist class is concerned with is the proportion of unpaid surplus labour to the wage which still nourishes capital even when it diminishes a little bit (2000, pp. 516-17). But even then, the wages can only rise within limits that do not threaten the capitalistic system:

> . . . as soon as this diminution touches the point at which the surplus labour that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalized, accumulation lags, and the movement of rise in wages receives a check . . .
> (Marx 2000: 517)

At this point labour is shed, and either wages go down or those who remain employed are forced to work longer hours (so the proportion of unpaid surplus labour that can be turned into capital increases) (Harvey, 2010, p. 276). The reserve army of labour is also a disciplinary tool that makes the working class accept these conditions:

> The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active labour-army; during the periods of over-production and paroxysm it holds its pretensions in check. Relative surplus population is therefore the pivot upon which the law of demand and supply of labour works. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and to the domination of capital. (Marx, 2000, p. 518)

Since capital can only accumulate by turning the unpaid portion of wage-labour into capital, it needs wage-labour but accumulation also causes the creation of a portion of the labouring population into a surplus population so, ironically, the working population not only produces the accumulation of capital but also the conditions that renders itself superfluous to capital (Harvey, 2010, p. 273). According to the Endnotes Collective, this expresses the contradiction of the capitalist mode of production:

> On the one hand, people in capitalist social relations are reduced to workers. On the other hand, they cannot be workers since, by working, they undermine the conditions of the possibility of their own existence. Wage-labour is inseparable from the accumulation of capital, from the accretion of labour-saving innovations, which over time, reduce the demand for labour. (Endnotes, 2010b, p. 32)

This tendency to increase the productivity of labour in capitalist accumulation which ultimately reduces the contribution of direct labour is not an absolute one since there may be countervailing factors such as moving into the production of different use values, developing new needs for the former or expanding production (Endnotes, 2010a, p. 16).

Marx constructs two scenarios in Chapter 25, one with technological advance and one without, of a closed capitalist system taking the liberal utopia of free markets to its logical conclusion and finds that, in relation to the general law of capitalist accumulation, growth of capital on the long run will mean that the capitalist class will get richer and richer while the proletariat will get poorer and poorer, that the wealth of one pole means the immiseration of the other pole:

> The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital develop also the labour power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to

> its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazurus-layers of the working-class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation (Marx, 2000, p. 519).

This phenomenon has also famously been called the Immiseration Thesis; during the 1950s and 1960s when capital could absorb great amounts of labour and the very well organized labour was able to secure important rights and working conditions (in the Minority world), it appeared that this thesis had been proven wrong (Harvey, 2003; Endnotes, 2010a, 2010b). Today, however, the neoliberal restructuring of the global economy coupled with deindustrialization and deagrarianization has brought with it the wholesale surplusization of world populations to the extent that unemployment has become the norm rather than the exception (Harvey, 2010; Benanav, 2014).

Let me now turn to Marx's detailed breakdown of the surplus populations (and where we we may find disability) before I move onto some more recent work and recent global statistics about surplus populations. As we have seen above, the surplus population is a dynamic entity, swelling and shrinking with the accumulative cycles of capital, “every labourer belongs to it during the time he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed” (Marx, 2000, p. 519).

There are three forms that surplus populations take (the floating, the latent, the stagnant) and these three forms go between two poles: the relative and absolute surplus population. When Marx says that “the relative surplus population exists in every possible form” (2000, p. 519), he means that any worker can belong to it in times of crisis, that is, every worker is a virtual pauper. Virtual paupers become actual paupers when they are absolutely superfluous to capital; the industrial reserve army, a relatively redundant population, tends to become a consolidated surplus

population in time, that is, absolutely redundant (Endnotes, 2010b, p. 30). As we will also see below, where one appears in the three forms of surplus population is an indicator of oppressions other than class.

The floating surplus population consists of those already proletarianized, full-time wage workers who are temporarily out of work because of the conditions of accumulation and who will be the first to be re-absorbed once conditions improve; this population is what official unemployment statistics capture and it includes those classified as underemployed or discouraged from looking for work (Harvey, 2010, p. 278). In short, the floating segment of surplus populations are what we think of as the traditional industrialized working class with the most privileges and rights compared to other segments, enough to keep them "afloat" during times of temporary unemployment.

The latent surplus populations are those who have not been completely proletarianized. During the time Marx wrote, this mostly referred to peasant populations but since then deagrarianization, proletarianization of rural areas, the destruction of indigenous subsistence agricultural systems and so on has been pushing these populations into the work-force (soon to regurgitate them into surplus populations). This “huge and diverse category of people . . . is potentially available everywhere, and the geopolitics of access to it through imperialist and colonial practices can play a very significant role” (Harvey, 2010, pp. 278-79). This very interesting category corresponds to various social groups and their intersecting oppressions such as gender and race. This is a part of Marxist theory that can be developed and mobilized to respond to such differences and contradictions other than capital and labour although they are certainly mediated through it. For instance,

McIntyre (2011) finds that race is an indicator of being in latent and stagnant strata of surplus populations rather than floating. McIntyre takes race as a historical reality which has taken on the appearance of material reality as a consequence of European imperial expansion employed as an explanation and justification for both conquest and subjugated labour: “From the very beginning, then, 'race' marks populations whose labour is unfree and surplus-producing. With the abolition of slavery, race continues to mark formerly unfree labouring populations who now become the core of capitalism's surplus labouring population” (2011, p. 1502).

The stagnant stratum of surplus populations is the most difficult—although certainly not impossible—to be absorbed by capital; this is the sphere of pauperism. Marx further subdivides this sphere into those able to work (those who can be easier mobilized into latent and floating populations, including orphans and pauper children) and those unable to work. This latter category includes the disabled—not only in the sense of impairment because of illness or old age but also in the social sense of disablement that results from incapacity for adaptation to the division of labour and also because of the dangerous nature of work under industrialized capitalism:

> . . . the demoralized and ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation, due to the division of labour; people who have passed the normal age of the labourer; the victims of industry, whose number increases with the increase of dangerous machinery, of mines, chemical works, etc., the mutilated, the sickly, the widows, etc. (Marx, 2000, p. 519)

It is unfortunate that such a rich category that includes so many different ways and reasons for being excluded from work is absent from most consequent theorizing on surplus populations. Finally, Marx also includes (if by excluding) lumpen-proletariat into the stagnant pool of surplus populations; perhaps they must be categorized as

those who are able to but won't work—at least not in a formal or legal way: "vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in a word, the 'dangerous' classes" (2000, p. 519). While Marx was not a fan of this group of people, his insight of adding them to surplus populations excluded from the capital-labour relationship can prove useful in constructing a model of the informal economy that increasingly characterizes ways of surviving in late neoliberal capitalism in many places in the world (Ceruti, 2011; Hansen, 2015). Interestingly, just like surplus populations, the informal economy is also a new area of interest where ingenious ways of surviving without reproducing capital in a system based on reproducing capital by selling one's labour power is gathering attention. But sexworkers don't make the list:

> . . . even many scholars of the informal economy who've mapped the labour of trash pickers and street sellers, counterfeiters and smugglers have failed to give sex work its due— because it is criminal, because it is service work, and in many cases, because it is work gendered as female. . . . Journalist Robert Neuwirth, in *Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy*, seeks to delink underground work from criminality, yet not for sexworkers. (Grant, 2014, pp. 49-50).

Yet, we find them in Marx's lowest subdivision of stagnant surplus populations—in a negative light, and mentioned only in passing, but still there.

We have so far seen that surplus populations comprise a dynamic stratum that responds to the accumulative phases of capital. Additionally we saw that within surplus populations, there are many intersecting gradations. Marx uses metaphors of liquidity and fluidity in defining the different spheres of surplus populations—floating, latent, stagnant. They are not solid categories cast in stone; they are always at the brink of being 'stirred,' differentiated only by the levels of difficulty involved in being mobilized into the workforce. For example, it may be the case that some disabilities, some forms of severe physical or cognitive disabilities, might keep one

as absolutely redundant to capital, at “the lowest sediment” of stagnant surplus populations, whereas some disabilities might be easily offset by the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation, universal design and full accessibility such that many disabled people can move from stagnant to the latent and floating spheres of surplus populations, and even into the primary/active labour army (as some certainly have since the adoption of ADA and similar legislation in Majority world contexts). It could also be that capital may require the labour of the disabled when there is a shortage of abled workforce during such times as war mobilization. This has already happened in Britain during World War II where nearly half a million disabled people were recruited into the active workforce (Oliver, 1996) probably to be discarded once the abled returned from war, as what happened with women who were also recruited en masse during this time. Conversely, an abled person in the active labour army might have an accident, might be the victim of violence, or victim of a dangerous workplace accident, or might be disabled in war, and might end up in the latent or stagnant sphere of the surplus population after becoming thus disabled. Also where this person ends up in the surplus population will be further influenced by other factors such as race and gender. In short, the model Marx constructs here, of those relatively and absolutely excluded from the capital-relation to differing degrees, is a very productive place from where we might be able to study not only disability but also other oppressions and their intersections.

In Marx's account, we also received an answer to our subsidiary question that was carried over from the previous chapter (regarding the relationship between capitalism and disability) and applied to the relationship between capitalism and surplus populations: the answer is affirmative, that is, surplus populations are not just

necessary products of capitalist accumulation but one of the conditions for the capitalist mode of production. So, like disability, surplus populations can be described as a category defined by its relative exclusion from capitalist exploitation of labour by capital. In several works (Davis, 1995; Gleeson, 1999), disability is described as having an almost originary relationship with capitalism. The argument is that the disabled could have been better integrated to pre-capitalist societies which demanded a different version of the body and a different sense of time, a slower, more self-determined, more flexible mode of production than the speedy, disciplined, and highly productive factory work (Davis, 1995, pp. 89-90). In Disability and Difference in Global Contexts, Erevelles (2011) looks at historical and economic contexts like enslavement and colonization that, she argues, produce both racialization and disablement—which would extend the argument that an oppressive system can create an identity category to oppressions other than disability and also would extend the history of disablement to an earlier form of capitalism than full industrialization. Similarly, Kennedy contests claims about British workers being the first to experience disabling consequences of industrialization: "for enslaved labourers were regularly dismembered, burned, and maimed in sugar production" (2015, p. 41). This periodization does not become problematic in terms of the claim that disability as a category is specific to capitalism if Ellen Meikins Wood's characterization of capitalism is adopted which includes: "appropriation of surplus value from commodified labour power, creation of value in production . . . [the ethic of] productivity and profit, the commitment to increasing the productivity of labour, the ethic of enclosure and dispossession" that she traces to seventeenth century England (Wood, 1997, pp. 545-548). Within the context of the creation of surplus

populations, McIntyre (2011) explores the causal relationship between colonialism and capitalism. McIntyre notes that European colonization, especially the earliest waves such as perpetrated by Spain and Portugal, preceded capitalism by centuries and concludes that capitalism cannot be a necessary cause of imperialism and (again because of this lag) that imperialism also cannot be a sufficient cause of capitalism (2011, pp. 1493-94). However McIntyre suggests that imperialism might be a necessary cause of capitalism (2011, pp. 1493-94). Marx attributes the rise of industrial capitalism to primitive accumulation associated with colonization (in Chapter 33 of *Capital*) but as McIntyre notes, he does this after spending many chapters discussing primitive accumulation in England (enclosures and so on):

> Moreover, the dispossession of the free peasantry transforms agrarian class relations in a way that primitive accumulation in the colonies does not. In the absence of this transformation of class relations, colonial primitive accumulation, as in Spain and Portugal, provides no basis for the emergence of capitalism. . . . while all the colonial primitive accumulation in the world won't produce capitalist accumulation in a non-capitalist social formation, imperial expansion was a precondition for capitalist development in Europe. (McIntyre, 2011, p. 1494)

McIntyre then asks whether capitalism, while not a necessary cause, can be a sufficient cause for imperialism; he concludes that "There is . . . an observable correlation between imperialism . . . and declining rate of profit, but one does not cause the other. They are both caused by the over-accumulation of fixed and immobile capital" (2011, p. 1498). This is very similar to David Harvey's (2003) argument about accumulation by dispossession.

Harvey begins with Luxemburg's thesis that capital accumulation has a dual character: the first is a purely economic process (commodity market and the place where surplus value is produced) and concerns the relationship between the capitalist and the wage worker, whereas the second concerns the relationship between

capitalism and non-capitalist modes of production (colonial policy, international loan system, war) where the political violence may mask the laws of the economic process at work (2003, p. 137). Luxemburg says that these two are organically linked and must be taken together to understand capitalism (Harvey, 2003, p. 138). While Harvey takes from Luxemburg the idea that capital needs something outside itself in order to accumulate (such as cheap labour from colonies) as capitalism is seeking solutions external to itself, Harvey argues that the theory of overaccumulation (lack of opportunities for profitable investment) has more explanatory power than the theory of underconsumption which Luxemburg offers (2003, p. 139). Harvey proposes to investigate this inside-outside dialectic between expanded reproduction and the violent processes of dispossession to better understand the capitalistic form of imperialism and, ultimately, the historical geography of capitalism (2003, p. 142).

> As in the case of labour supply, capitalism always requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation. If those assets, such as empty land or new raw material sources, do not lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them. Marx, however, does not consider this possibility except in the case of the creation of an industrial reserve army through technologically induced unemployment. (Harvey, 2003, p. 143)

While Marx saw the primitive accumulation associated with colonialism to be a condition that jump-started capitalist expanded reproduction, this construction can make accumulation seem like an original state that is no longer relevant, whereas it is an ongoing process that is characteristic of capitalism; thus, Harvey proposes to call this process “accumulation by dispossession” and argues that since the 1970s, it has become more dominant than expanded reproduction (2003, p. 144). While Marx's model shows surplus populations to be an internal or local product of capitalist accumulation, Harvey extends the logic of enclosures and dispossession to the

geographical expansion of capital across the globe, creating international surplus populations by first forcefully proletarianizing them through deagrarianization, enclosures, dispossession, and appropriation of assets including natural resources, soon to regurgitate them through de-industrialization, a new round of enclosures, and new mechanisms of accumulation (such as privatization, enclosure of global commons, the credit system, structural adjustment programs, etc.) (2003, pp. 145-148).

According to Harvey, this latter phase or form of capitalism, which Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, engenders different contradictions than that between labour and capital and, in turn, engenders different kinds of struggles than those against expanded reproduction. The movements that took class relations and class struggles within the field of capitalist accumulation understood as expanded reproduction (the point of production) regarded the proletariat as agents of political change, the main contradiction to be that between capital and labour, and the primary instruments of proletariat organization to be trade unions and political parties; such organizing made some concrete progress in the 20th century in terms of living standards and social protections as seen in social democratic welfare states (Harvey, 2003, pp. 169-170). But this "single-mindedness . . . was bought at the cost of innumerable exclusions" as the traditional left remained unresponsive and dismissive of various post-colonial, anti-imperialist, feminist, environmentalist, and other types of struggles responding to accumulation by dispossession which for Harvey has now become the main contradiction within the imperialist organization of capital accumulation (2003, pp. 170-172). For instance, McIntyre suggests that new surplus populations created by the expansion of capital across the globe by imperialistic

accumulation by dispossession are “linked to the capitalist economy by exchange” rather than readily recognizable capitalist relations of production and this population “incorporates labour systems as diverse as slavery, sharecropping, encomienda, tenancy, indentured servitude, long-term labour contracts, and debt peonage” (2011, p. 1493). I think it would not be wrong to say that intersectional thought, which has its beginnings in the political practice of Black women who had experienced slavery, can be seen as part of struggles against accumulation by dispossession but also certainly responsive to struggles against expanded reproduction as we have seen in the previous chapter—especially when one considers the work of The Combahee River Collective who were socialists and Collins's work that connected the historical exploitation of Black women's labour under slavery to the composition of the Black working class in White America today (Collins, 2000). As Harvey suggests, “the two aspects of expanded reproduction and accumulation by dispossession are organically linked, dialectically intertwined” and thus the two struggles must be seen in a dialectical relation rather than opposition (2003, p. 176).

With this brief survey of Harvey's and McIntyre's works on the imperialist form of capitalism and surplus populations, I tried to show that the periodization of the relationship between capitalism and disability works, that is, whether it is in its industrial or imperialist form, capitalism is indeed a system that produces both disability and surplus populations. In addition, I wanted to enrich Marx's account of surplus populations by considering the geographical expansion of capital and its creation of global surplus populations in its wake. It was also helpful in grounding intersectionality as a form of political struggle not only as a part of the intellectual history of Western Marxism's move away from class as a unit of analysis and the

foregrounding of political oppression rather than economic exploitation but also as a form that evolved in response to accumulation by dispossession (Wood, 1997). We can conclude this subsection by restating that both disability and surplus populations can be products of capitalism through its expanded reproduction as well as its accumulation by dispossession forms. I will revisit this point after considering the relationship between disability and work. Now I want to add some more layers to Marx's surplus populations in tandem with the characteristics of the post-1973 form capitalism—predominantly characterized by accumulation by dispossession—as well as getting some world-wide statistics on surplus populations.

As I have stated before, newer treatments of surplus populations, even those that remain close to Marx's conception, tend to use only parts of his categorization, usually at the expense of the lowest layer where we may find disability. For instance Hansen offers the following breakdown of proletariat: Working class (employed, temporarily, under- and un-employed), Lumpenproletariat (the unemployable), Wage-earner-dependents (particularly women), Semi-proletarians (e.g. Indebted peasants, seasonal workers) (2015, p. 9). In Marx's vocabulary: working class would be subdivided into active labour force and floating section of the surplus population; Lumpenproletariat would be in the stagnant section. Wage-earner-dependents and semi-proletarians could be either in the latent or the stagnant section depending on the conditions of accumulation. However, Marx's definition also includes a category of those unable to work for a myriad of reasons (old age, impairment, illness, disability, unadaptability to new divisions of labour, etc.) which does not figure into this breakdown (unless Hansen is including inability to work under the category of "unemployable").

While Hansen's breakdown is modeled on the degree of proletarianization, Benanav's (2014) breakdown is modeled on both participation in the labour market and the state of support on the event of withdrawal from the labour market. Benanav, whose work I will revisit below for other useful categories and statistics, offers three categories of surplus populations: latent surplus population (those who temporarily or permanently withdraw from the labour market because they can get support from their families or limited support from the state), manifest surplus population (has no access to family support or state benefits so they cannot exit the market and must do with low rate of return because they cannot get enough work (involuntary part time) or they earn much less than a wage (super-exploitation); stagnant surplus population (they sell something besides labour power, something they can do or make with little capital in what Benanav calls labour-derivative markets (2014, pp. 13-14). In Marx's vocabulary: Benanav's latent surplus is Marx's floating surplus population; Benanav's manifest surplus population could be Marx's latent population; stagnant is the same, and looks like it could include lumpenproletariat but each category is less inclusive than Marx's. Like Hansen's categorization, Benanav's also only considers those who are able to work if given the chance.

Benanav analyzes unemployment into three further categories which seem to map onto the three categories of superfluity just outlined: unemployment, underemployment (including those discouraged from looking for work, as well as involuntary part-time workers), and informal employment (unprotected and untaxed production of goods and services in the informal sector as well as domestic services in the formal sector (2014, pp. 16-17). While Benanav's categorization of surplus populations lacks the stagnant layer, it has an advantage over Marx's in that it

includes informal employment and service work. The informal sector is a fairly recent concept that was first used in 1973 by Kevin Hart, an anthropologist working in Accra, Ghana at the time (Davis, 2006, p. 178). While perhaps it shared some of the illegality of the kinds of survival work Marx might have associated with lumpenproletariat, the informal sector as we know it did not exist in Marx's time, certainly not in the same scale; according to Mike Davis, during the 1980s "informal sector employment grew two to five times faster than formal sector jobs—has inverted their relative structural positions" to become "the new primary mode of livelihood in a majority of Third World cities" (2006, p. 178).

A further addition in newer studies of surplus populations is the consideration of service work, which is another sector that grew in the wake of deindustrialization (Endnotes, 2013b). While unpaid reproductive labour as well as paid service work existed during Marx's time with "a large class of servants making up some 15% of the mid-nineteenth-century workforce," Marx did not regard either of these as surplus-value producing (McIntyre, 2011, p. 1492). However, as McIntyre notes, "Consistent with capitalism's tendency to turn everything into a commodity, reproductive labour and personal service can also be turned into surplus-producing wage labour" (2011, p. 1492). The service sector is also interesting because it intersects with both formal and informal work as we have seen above with Benanav's categorization. Benanav places service work and informal work in the stagnant layer of his surplus populations. It seems that in Marx's characterization, both informal work and service work could go to either latent or stagnant layers.

To recapitulate, new studies of surplus populations offer different segmentations of surplus populations which usually lose the richness of Marx's

earlier characterization, particularly the stagnant layer where one could locate disability. On the other hand, newer accounts include the informal work and service work in their accounts which have become dominant modes of survival work for pauperized surplus populations around the world since the 1970s. The informal sector and the service economy will be important in our forthcoming discussion of disability and work. Before that discussion, however, I will briefly review another set of categorizations from Benanav's work which are relevant for the discussion of work and surplus populations today.

Along with deindustrialization, deagrarianization, and accumulation by dispossession, that marks the more recent decades of capitalism, a more fundamental change has been taking place which is the generalization of dependence on labour markets as a side-effect of the universalization and totalization of the capitalist mode of production across the globe. This is another way of expressing the proletarianization of the world population. While markets pre-date capitalism, total dependence on markets and the imperative to sell one's labour to survive are peculiar to capitalism. For instance in pre-capitalist modes of production, people tended to be market-involved rather than market-dependent: market-involved people can produce everything they need to survive without relying on markets (subsistence farmers, shepherds, foraging tribes, etc.) (Benanav, 2014, p. 28). They can sell what they have in excess of what they need so they are market-involved but not market-dependent (Benanav, 2014, p. 28). Those who are market-dependent, on the other hand, cannot produce everything they need so they are forced to sell some goods on the market in order to obtain what they cannot produce. This constrains one's mode of existence especially if they remain or become highly market-dependent which brings with it

the need to specialize, accumulate, innovate, move from line to line to get highest rate of return (Benanav, 2014, p. 28). The final category of labour-dependent is a sub-set of market-dependent. Since they are unable to move from line to line to get the best rate of return, they are forced to sell in a limited set of markets: in order to buy what they need to survive they either have to sell labour-power or some commodities in labour-derivative markets (Benanav, 2014, p. 29).

Labour-dependent, then, is another name for proletarianization and the majority of the world's population has been rendered labour-dependent (and increasingly superfluous) in the past couple decades. Using unemployment, under-employment and informal sector figures as indirect indicators of surplus populations, Benanav estimates the global surplus population to be "around 1.3 billion people, accounting for roughly 40 percent of the world's workforce. By contrast, only about 33 percent of the world's workforce is employed in the non-agricultural formal sector" which Benanav finds to be "a real de-centering of the world economy" (2014, p. 25). Looking at this data Benanav concludes that un- and underemployment are not marginal conditions but are rapidly encroaching the center. Here we also find the answer to our second subsidiary inquiry carried over from the previous chapter and applied to surplus populations instead of disability: are surplus populations the exception or the norm? The minority or the majority? In terms of the global workforce, 40 percent are rendered surplus; so in terms of the workforce, they outnumber the employed. In terms of the population of the world, the staggering number of 1.3 billion globally, which is nearly 1 in 6 people, cannot be considered a negligible minority. Interestingly, the global number of the disabled is almost around the same figure as the number of surplus populations: around 1.2-1.44 billion as we

have seen in the last chapter (United Nations, 2015). Since we roughly know the percentage of unemployment of the disabled, we can calculate the intersection of global surplus populations and global disability population. According to the UN "only 41% of the [disabled] population aged 18 to 49 with disabilities is employed, compared with 58% for persons without disabilities" (United Nations, 2015, p. 96). So even without the consideration of other layers of surplus populations, at least 800 million disabled people are unemployed which is about 60 percent of the global surplus population—making the majority of the global surplus populations disabled.This percentage may perhaps increase if we add those who are employed in the informal sector for instance, because when the disabled do find work, they tend to be marginalized within the workforce: people with disabilities are more likely to be self-employed, hold part-time jobs or "low-paid jobs with poor career prospects and working conditions" (United Nations, 2015, pp. 99-100).

UN's (2015) findings are corroborated by scholars investigating the relationship between disability and employment (Roulstone, 2012; Wilson, 2006; Abberley, 2002). These authors not only find that when disabled people find work it tends to be peripheral, informal, part-time, low-paying, and temporary kinds of work but also that in contexts where welfare provision is available it tends to be pitted against work: disabled people are either deemed unable to work (and thus deserving of welfare) or able to work and receive work entry support (in the form of training and work placement programs) but usually no other support (Roulstone, 2012; Wilson, 2006; Abberley, 2002). Further, Wilson finds that "different people experience this growing precariousness in different ways . . . disability intersects with race, gender, immigrant status, and age to shape labour market experiences in

complex ways" (Wilson, 2006, pp. 146-47). For instance, while disability as a dimension of inequality depressed the privilege of masculinity it did not eliminate it altogether: "the gendered division of labour was still clearly visible in the differential rates of full- and part-time work, which means men on average are significantly better off materially" (Wilson, 2006, p. 146). The condition of disabled workers reflect the larger shifts in global capitalism like deindustrialization and shift to an informal and service economy but being a part of an oppressed group selects them for more marginalization in this regard—not to mention the compounded effect when people with disabilities are at the intersections of other oppressions. So either the disabled remain largely out of the workforce and thus non-exploited in the strict sense (remaining in the stagnant layer of surplus populations) or they are employed in informal, precarious, part-time work which—as we have added this kind of work to our definition of superfluity above—also selects them for fluctuating between latent and stagnant layers of surplus populations. While some of the authors studying work and disability mention surplus populations, their treatment remains very superficial and only takes into consideration the floating (industrial reserve army) layer of surplus populations which then leads them to suggest that the disabled are not a part of surplus populations (Roulstone, 2012 for instance), their data show that disabled seem to frequently navigate different layers of surplus populations, mostly going between floating and latent in the Minority World, and latent and stagnant in the Majority World (Roulstone, 2012; Wilson, 2006; Abberley, 2002). In this subsection I tried to show where disability may be found within the different layers of surplus populations especially after enriching Marx's categories with more recent tendencies of capitalism (such as the addition of informal work and service sector).

While scholars of surplus populations do not consider disability and thus are able to eliminate part of Marx's definition of stagnant surplus populations (i.e., the inability to work), Marx's definition could not have reflected the more recent tendencies of capitalist work such as informal and service sectors. Thus, I foregrounded Marx's richer definition whilst adding new sub-levels to it in order to accommodate informal and service work. This way, the model can capture what happens when the disabled are partially absorbed by capital from the lowest segments of surplus populations only to be distributed to slightly more dynamic but still marginalized segments therein.

Let me now turn to the third subsidiary question about how the dominant abled society and capital deals with both disability and surplus populations. We already have a partial answer from the foregoing discussion: capital absorbs surplus populations in accordance with the rhythms of accumulation and, in the case of disability, sometimes in response to certain limited legislation. While according to the General Law of accumulation, the surplus can never be completely absorbed, so the disabled remain largely unemployed and when they are employed they mostly remain within different layers of the surplus that respond to informal or precarious kinds of work.

There is, however, another way dominant abled society and capital deal with disability and surplus that is not explicitly captured in Marx's account, again because this is a feature of the accumulation by dispossession form of capital accumulation that has pre-dominantly characterized capitalism at least since the 1970s. When abled society and capital do not absorb/integrate surplus populations/disabled they increasingly manage these populations through warehousing and do so

predominantly either through the route of medicalization or criminalization. While during this kind of management the surplus or disabled are not exploited in the strict Marxist sense of extracting surplus value out of the unpaid portion of labour, capital extracts immense profit and value out of the warehousing of these populations through the privatization and marketization of the particular institutions involved and the services such institutions deliver. As Harvey notes, privatization is "the cutting edge" of accumulation by dispossession whereby "assets held by the state or in common are released into market where over-accumulating capital could invest in them, upgrade them, and speculate in them" (2003, p. 158).

Holden & Beresford's (2002) article, Globalization and Disability, provides an analysis of the internationalization and privatization of social care for the disabled as a characteristic of the era of capitalism defined by accumulation by dispossession where privatization becomes a new and important mechanism of accumulation. This development away from the state provision of these services, however, does not mean there is no state intervention: "rather, the form of state involvement shifted to subsidy and regulation. In recent years this shift towards state funded and regulated private provision has promoted internationalization, as the provision of social care in the private sector has become more concentrated" (Holden & Beresford, 2002, pp. 199). Holden & Beresford survey how the independent sector began to take over social care in the 1980s and 1990s: Major providers doubled their share of the for-profit care home market amidst a process of consolidation characterized by a series of mergers and acquisitions—all this facilitated by governments in the form of social security funding, restricting of local authority budgets, etc (2002, pp. 199-200). The shift towards private provision also facilitates internationalization:

> Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in services has increased even more rapidly than in manufacturing in recent years . . . [reflecting] . . . both the increased importance of services in advanced capitalist economies . . . as well as the preference of service firms for FDI rather than trade when expanding abroad. (Holden & Beresford, 2002, p. 200)

While multinationals, especially American care corporations, have moved into British health care market since the 1970s, British firms also began to internationalize such as the British United Provident Association (BUPA), largest provider of long term care in the UK: "BUPA claims to insure four million people from 115 different nationalities who live in around 90 countries" (Holden & Beresford, 2002, p. 202). Interestingly BUPA is technically a non-profit but it operates very much like a for-profit firm:

> . . . it must compete with other businesses, must do this in a cost-effective way, and has attempted to expand and gain market share throughout its existence . . . doubling its advertising budget . . . [expanding] into other areas of healthcare . . . [and borrowing] substantial sums in order to fund the expansion of its homeware operations. (Holden & Beresford, 2002, p. 202)

Not only provident organizations but all manners of NGOs, voluntary organizations and charities increasingly begin to operate according to the criteria of for-profit firms to capture and retain market share—not to mention their similar relation to governments in terms of receiving funding and even implementing government policies.

Holden & Beresford capture the way in which post-1970s capitalism brought about a different, market-based structuring of social care for the disabled, both increasingly privatized but also very much facilitated by governments. It is also striking that the marketization of social care has transformed non-governmental and non-profit organizations to the extent that they operate exactly like for-profit organizations.

Albrecht & Bury's (2001) article on The Political Economy of the Disability Marketplace presents a very comprehensive survey of the nature and growth of the disability business and the emergence of interlocked disability markets in an international context that supports the previous article while providing a very striking picture of just how profitable this business is although it is ultimately fueled by its very vulnerable customers thus also disproving the idea that the disabled are redundant to capital when they are not exploited in the traditional sense:

> In the United Kingdom in 1998, for example, £ 133 billion were spent by the government on social protection, the vast bulk of which went to the elderly and disabled (Office of National Statistics 2000). This is important economically because most of these recipients immediately return their benefits to the marketplace through living expenses and the purchase of goods and services. . . . The stakes are high because of the size of the marketplace and the amount of money involved in dealing with the problem. (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 587)

Disability is big business with nearly $400 billion a year enterprise a year in U.S alone in 2007 with similar trends in the UK, France, Sweden and other industrial countries (Albrecht & Bury, 2001). All of the corporations involved are big business and for-profit that have doubled their market stocks and as a result medical rehabilitation has experienced a growth spurt (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 590). The pharmaceutical industry, as well as managed care companies and insurance companies are a big part of the business making extraordinary profits (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 592).

The disability market is global with many of these kinds of firms operating on every continent, some making more profits outside than in the original industrial country of origin (Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 597). Albrecht & Bury state that the political economy of disability pertain to social class and other parameters of oppression leading to differing utilization of these services:

> Although most disabled people are poor and have little power, those who have good insurance coverage or adequate financial resources are able to access high quality medical services and purchase the best in assistive technologies, such as high-tech wheelchairs and prosthetics, voice activated computers and personal assistants, drivers, and exercise therapists.(Albrecht & Bury, 2001, p. 589)

Both these articles show that while the disabled are an oppressed and pauperized group who make up the majority of the world's surplus populations, this does not mean that capital does not profit off them somehow, if not as labourers then as consumers of the rising service economy and the disability business.

Russell & Stewart also show that while disabled people have been excluded from waged-labour this does not mean they were ignored as a source of profit:

> One corporate approach to non-productivity, institutionalization in a nursing home, evolved from the cold realization that financing "Medicaid funds 60 percent, Medicare 15 percent, private insurance 25 percent" guaranteed a source of entrepreneurial revenue. When a single impaired body generates 30,000-82,000 in annual revenues, Wall Street brokers count that body as an asset which contributes to, for example, a nursing home chain's net worth . . . from the point of view of the capitalist "care" industry, disabled people are worth more to the Gross Domestic Product when occupying institutional "bed" than they are in their own homes. (2001, p. 68)

As one of the very few works that directly connect disability and the concept of surplus populations, Russell & Stewart's article Disablement, Prison and Historical Segregation considers surplus populations, poverty and disability to be products of capitalism:

> [C]apitalism, the creator of poverty, simultaneously needs and is threatened by the poor . . . it has created the social condition which we are calling 'disablement' by excluding disabled persons from full participation in society through segregation, containment, and repression. (Russel & Stewart, 2001, pp. 62-63)

According to Russell & Stewart (2001) people with disabilities were excluded out of the workforce and turned into non-productive problem populations to be controlled through institutionalization and segregation. If some of this confinement is taking

place through the medicalization of disabled bodies and the disability care and healthcare business briefly surveyed above, some of it is taking place in prisons which are functioning as warehouse facilities for "surplus populations and poorest classes" (Russell & Stewart, 2001, pp. 62-63). As a result of the deinstitutionalization and criminalization of mental illnesses, the pauperization of people with disabilities, as well as the disability producing violent systems of racism and capitalism, prisons house a disproportionate number of people with disabilities, the poor and people of color (Russell & Stewart, 2001, p. 62; Rehmann, 2015, pp. 308-39). Not only are the disabilities of people who are already disabled when they enter the system are exacerbated (by such violations as the confiscation of all their accessibility devices and lack of any accessibility inside prisons), the prison experience itself, such as the overcrowding, violence, lack of work safety, healthcare and proper nutrition also produces disabilities (Russell & Stewart, 2001, pp. 71-73). Prisons are not only tools of social control and warehousing but also with their increasing privatization and marketization as well as cheap prison labour of their captive populations, they are also a source of profit (Russell & Stewart, 2001, pp. 66-67). Particularly, looking at race and class (but not disability) through a multi-faceted approach that also accounts for neoliberalization and privatization, Rehmann (2015) emphasizes the function of management and warehousing of prisons more so than that of exploitation and profit. What is characteristic of the U.S. prison system, according to Rehmann, "is the emerging neoliberal era along with its dismantling of the welfare state and the underlying deindustrialization combined with an orchestrated backlash against the achievements of the civil rights movement" (2015, p. 309). Rehmann argues against the "widespread reduction of the prison system to

the aspect of economic overexploitation" (2015, p. 309) and provides some empirical data to back this claim:

> It is undeniable that the absolute number of private prisons has grown and that a lot of private profits have been reaped, but for-profit lockups control only about 8 percent of all U.S. prison beds, whereas 92 percent of all prisons and jails are [310] publicly owned and operated. (2015, pp. 309-310)

The apparent disagreement between Rehmann and Russell & Stewart can be attributed to the fact that they are looking at different demographics (race and class versus disability, race, and class) and also because the latter also consider the health industry along with prisons. Rehmann's reminder that less than 10 percent of prisons being private and less than 5 percent of incarcerated people being exploited by prison labour seems to pose a challenge to Russell & Stewart's argument about the exploitation of incarcerated populations. However, as Cowen & Siciliano argue, while most prisons may remain public institutions, and thus not privatized, this does not mean that they are not marketized and that the state is not profiting from them; further, prisons do not only bring profit through prison labour but also through the construction and management of the facilities themselves (2015, p. 1517). By 'marketization,' Cowen & Siciliano mean "the incorporation of market rationalities into institutions that may remain public" (2015, p. 1518) just like the examples of medical non-profits and state institutions that acted like for-profits for market share that Holden & Beresford (2002) document in the foregoing discussion about the disability business.

In the foregoing subsection, I looked at how abled society and capital deal with surplus populations and the disabled through management and warehousing from the perspective of accounts that foregrounded disability. Now I would like to briefly look at how surplus populations are managed/warehoused globally—spatially

isolated to the urban fringe, or the slums—as documented by Mike Davis (2006) in *The Planet of Slums*. As we have seen above, deagrarianization, deindustrialization, accompanied by growing market- and particularly labour-dependence, was associated with the current large number of global surplus populations (Benanav, 2014). In Davis's study, we see that surplus populations are not only pauperized, left without their traditional means of (re)production, and excluded out of traditional wage-labour but also displaced. For instance, as rural communities world-wide lose their means of subsistence through deagrarianization and become market- and labour-dependent, ex-peasants migrate to the cities where they live in shantytowns and are forced to eke out a living in the increasingly competitive and exploitative informal sector: "the cities have become a dumping ground for a surplus population working in unskilled, unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and trade" (UN-Habitat, quoted in Mike Davis, 2006, p. 175). Patrick Chamoiseau describes these surplus populations displaced in slums as "a proletariat without factories, workshops, and work" (quoted in Mike Davis, 2006, pp. 174). The UN projects that there will be 2 billion slum-dwellers by 2030 and the rate of urban poverty to reach 50 percent (Mike Davis, 2006, p. 151). Urban poverty is not entirely the same as surplus populations; not all urban poor reside in slums since a portion is working poor in formal wage-labour whereas Davis specifically characterizes slum-dwellers to be forced into informality both in terms of labour and housing: "a slum [is] characterized [23] by overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation and insecurity of tenure . . . [as well as] economic and social marginality" (2006, pp. 22-23). By percentage, the world's highest number of urban slum-dwellers reside in Ethiopia (99.4 percent of urban population), Chad

(99.4 %), Afghanistan (98.5 %) and Nepal (92 %), and, by sheer numbers, in China (193.8 million) and India (158.4 million) (Mike Davis, 2006, pp. 23-24). Urban surplus populations, however, have been both a Majority and Minority world phenomenon since mid-20th century and every urban center has such a population known by a different name: *gecekondus* in Turkey, *favelas* in Brazil, *bidonvilles* in Algeria, *barrios* in Italy, *chawls* in India, *callejones* in Portugal, London's East End, Los Angeles's Skid Row, and so on (Mike Davis, 2006). Not all slum-dwellers are refugees of capitalism, deagrarianization, and neocolonial IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs—a significant portion are international refugees as well as internally displaced populations of wars and military conflicts: for instance, Gaza is described as the "world's largest slum . . . an urbanized agglomeration of refugee camps (750,000 refugees) with two thirds of the population subsisting on less than $2 per day" (Mike Davis, 2006, p. 48). While Davis does not specifically focus on disability, all of the conditions characteristic of slums are also disability-producing. Disability scholar Davidson suggests that a global consideration of disability requires taking into consideration the disabling effects of wars, poverty, violence, dangerous industries, national debts, labour migration and ethnic displacement as well as the global lack of access to adequate healthcare, safe drinking water, and nutritious food (2006, p. 118). All of these issues are also pertinent to the consideration of global surplus populations. Further, we have seen in the foregoing discussion that there is a large overlap between global surplus populations and global disability (United Nations, 2015; Benanav, 2014).

So far, I examined Marx's definition of surplus populations, compared it with some newer accounts and enriched it with new sublayers in order to make it capture

some of the new realities of the accumulation by dispossession phase of capitalism (such as the consideration of informal economies and service work). I also looked at two other aspects of surplus populations that were not explicitly included in Marx's: the warehousing/management aspect and also the way this aspect has been turned into sources of immense profit for capital. At each step, I also looked at where, in which layers of surplusness, disability can be found. I also tried to answer the three subsidiary questions of this chapter two of which I carried over from the final discussion of the previous chapter on intersectionality: the question as to whether capitalism is a system that produces disability and surplus populations got an affirmative answer. The question as to whether disability/surplusness were minority or majority conditions also received an answer: surplus populations make up the majority of the world's workforce and disabled persons are a majority within this population. Altogether 1 in 3 people world-wide are either disabled or surplus or both. The question as to whether disability is a unique oppression or an oppression that resembles all other oppressions also gets an indirect answer: unless the stagnant layer of surplus populations which has a sublayer of a demographic that cannot work no matter how the society is rearranged (such as severe cognitive and physical disabilities) is added (as in Marx's original account) disability cannot be completely captured by a theory of surplus populations (such as the newer renditions which omit this sublayer). So in a sense, disability has a unique place within the layers of surplus populations: disabled people make up the majority in these populations, yet they can easily be ignored by those who specifically study these populations, unless they include and carefully look at the stagnant aspect and absolute redundancy. Finally, the third subsidiary question also received an answer: both surplus populations and

people with disabilities are either absorbed by capital or integrated into abled society (only a portion of them and only temporarily) to be then regurgitated back into superfluity after which these populations are managed/warehoused. We saw this quarantining and spatial segregation on various levels through several institutions of social control and through confinement into slums on a global scale.

Let me now turn to the exploitation/oppression question. There is a very subtle but important difference between disability as a non-exploitative oppression and disability as an oppressive non-exploitation. In the previous chapter, I examined intersectionality as an oppression-prioritizing paradigm where exploitation was certainly taken up but ultimately subsumed under oppression. There, disability was theorized as an oppression among other oppressions (either as a unique one or as one that was very similar to others) that also seemed to have a special relation with capitalism especially one of exclusion. So in this paradigm too, disability was partially defined by its exclusion from capitalism. But when examined from the point of surplus populations which comes from Marx's work that is exploitation-prioritizing, the exclusion from exploitation itself becomes an oppression: because capitalism is characterized as a system that renders populations market- and labour-dependent for their survival—that is, a system that proletarianizes—exclusion from labour (and, thus, exploitation) signals violent oppression. Because capital-labour contradiction is the main contradiction of capitalism, the relationship between oppression and exploitation in the case of surplus populations becomes a causal one: surplus populations/disabled people are oppressed because they are not exploited: their "misery is in inverse ratio to [their] torment of labour" (Marx, 2000, p. 519). Whereas from the point of view of intersectionality this causality may not be this

apparent because from the point of view of intersectionality, capital-labour contradiction is not the main, or the only, contradiction. This set-up is of course built on a narrow Marxist definition of exploitation as surplus-value extracted from the unpaid portion of labour and becomes complicated in the presence of other forms of value extraction (such as institutionalization of people, and privatization/marketization of institutions, etc.) and forms of non-productive yet surplus-producing labour (reproductive, informal, service) which dominate the later imperialist stage of capitalism characterized by accumulation by dispossession.

Let me try to untangle, or rather further complicate, the non-exploitative oppression/oppressive non-exploitation dialectics by making use of Harvey's (2003) dialectical relationship between expansive reproduction and accumulation by dispossession on the hand, and Patricia Hill Collins's (2001) matrix of domination on the other. As I stated above, intersectional thought can be considered to be a movement that has developed as a response to the imperialist/colonialist form of capitalism created as it were by Black women who were descendants of slaves. Further, since I particularly focused on the modern iteration of intersectionality, which was developed after Western Marxism's decentering of class as a unit of analysis and because it was developed during the era of capitalism in its accumulation by dispossession form, this particular wave of intersectionality foregrounded political oppression more so than economic exploitation or at least economic exploitation was no longer the main contradiction. On the other hand, Marx's *Capital* in general and his General Law of Capitalist Accumulation in particular, were focused on the production point analysis of expanded reproduction, taking capital-labour contradiction as the main contradiction, and considering

colonialism as primitive accumulation that jump-started capitalism without, however, foregrounding oppressions other than class oppression. The modern form of intersectionality surfaced in sociology and took, at least at the very beginning, the oppression of Black women as the archetypical intersectional oppression, whereas the resurgence of the theory of surplus populations (which comes about a decade after intersectionality) took place in the field of geography, and found its archetypical figure to be the internally and externally displaced ex-peasants and new urban slum-dwellers.

If we track disability within surplus populations via using the transition from expanded reproduction to accumulation by dispossession, we see the disabled first as a class largely excluded from labour (and relegated to the stagnant layer of surplus populations) during primitive accumulation. Then as a struggle that foregrounds expanded reproduction, we can see the first wave of disability activism (the social model) as fighting for the right of this group to be integrated into the work-force (to active army or labour or at least the floating layer of surplus populations). We see that legislation such as ADA incorporating a percentage of the disabled to the workforce but we also see that the disabled are likely to be employed in informal, part-time, low-pay lines of work where they are socially isolated and spatially segregated at the workplace. So in this second phase they are maybe in the latent layers of surplus populations. The third phase of accumulation by dispossession sees the destruction of welfare systems, where the disabled are to choose between subpar work or subpar welfare, in addition to privatization of disability services and disability turned into a business. This final phase of accumulation by dispossession again sees the disabled to be part of latent and stagnant layers of surplus populations.

So after a short period of absorption now capital deals with both global surplus populations and the disabled in terms of management and warehousing through new enclosures (such as that of public resources and welfare systems) and new mechanisms of accumulation (such as the privatization of healthcare or prisons).

If we track disability within surplus populations through intersectionality, we see that being at the intersection of multiple oppressions in addition to disability selects one to be at the lower layers of surplus populations. For instance McIntyre (2011) shows race to be an indicator of being in latent or stagnant layers of surplus populations. Similarly, Wilson (2006) shows that gender intersecting with disability selects one for further marginalization within the layers of superfluity. Taking Collins's matrix of domination as our inspiration, we can imagine intersectionality or multiple oppressions to be one dimension on the exploitation/oppression matrix and surplus populations and its many layers to be another dimension. Surplus populations are analyzed into segments (for example: floating, latent, stagnant) and segments within segments (able to work, unable to work, etc.) by Marx and others. Where one falls within these degrees of superfluity to capital is influenced by what intersections of oppression one is placed in. If one is at the intersection of many oppressions, then it is more likely that one is placed within the latent or stagnant segments of surplus populations. How or why does this correlation happen if capital is indifferent to whom it excludes or includes in the workforce as long as it can self-valorize? It seems that capital can appropriate pre-existing power structures to the extent that they aid accumulation and these power structures bring with them the oppressive effects of marginalization and surplusization that accords with their own hierarchy:

> The process of proletarianization, for example, entails a mix of coercions and of appropriations of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits

> of mind, and beliefs on the part of those being proletarianized. Kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations (including those exercised through religion and its institutions) all have their part to play. In some instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exist to suggest that they are just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to forge some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation. Primitive accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession… No matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the result is not the creation of a homogenous proletariat. (Harvey, 2003, pp. 146-147)

From this point of view it is possible to see that the systematic, structural and literal violence with which capitalist accumulation excludes, exploits and ghettoizes surplus populations tends to be drawn across lines of gender, race, nationality, ability and other social categories of differentiation and mediation. That is, surplus populations and intersectionality are compatible. While the study of surplus populations provides a global, historical geography of capitalism, intersectionality, as a species of standpoint theory, fleshes this out from the perspective of the oppressed themselves. Disability could be easily added to intersectional frameworks because disabled scholars made this intervention whereas recent scholars of surplus populations did not take disability as a unit of analysis even though the disabled made up the majority of surplus populations. While Marx's definition of surplus populations did include the disabled, Marx's theory was constructed against class decomposition, and served to quarantine certain segments of the surplus in order to draw the boundaries of working class proper. Hence the apt medical metaphor of confinement he uses: “Pauperism is the hospital of the active labour-army” (Marx, 2000, p. 159). However, Marx was so precise and meticulous in his detailing of what he excluded that by centralizing his definition of surplus populations (borrowing the method of intersectionality) instead of secluding them from the working class, we can unleash

the power of this analysis to understand exploitation and oppression from the lens of disability. Yet there is some more theoretical work needed in order to give a fuller dialectical account of oppression and exploitation. In order to do begin to do this and to transition into the next chapter on needs, I will briefly consider Hansen's (2015) article Surplus Population, Social Reproduction and the Problem of Class Formation which foregrounds the standpoint of the oppressed with the following question: "what does it mean to orient revolutionary practice from the standpoint of the problem of the proletarian condition and the manifold ways to live it?"(2015, p. 5).

According to Hansen what is interesting about re-actualizing the theory of surplus populations today is that it raises the issue of the generalized crisis of reproduction—the separation from the means of (re)production—which all proletarianized populations, that is the majority of the world, deals with in diverse ways (2015, p. 5). As Benanav (2014) also notes, the most striking difference between Marx's time and today is the pervasive and almost total proletarianization of the world population where market- and labour-dependence is the norm but finding wage-labour is not. By bracketing the word "(re)production" this way, Hansen points to this proletarian double-bind: the imperative to reproduce oneself despite one's separation from the means of production. This common problem is dealt with in highly diverse ways, making class formation just as important as class differentiation:

> from the limit condition of peasants fighting against becoming proletarianized to the classical figure of the wage-labourer on strike, lies a whole range of struggles to which feminist and anti-colonial writers are more attuned than most Marxists. Once we recognize this constitutive heterogeneity of the exploited and expropriated populations of the world, we recognize that any general theory of "the proletariat" as a revolutionary agent will have to start from the self-organization and composition of differences and particularly of different strategies of life and survival. (Hansen, 2015, p. 2)

Hansen's account is compatible with both struggles against expanded reproduction and those against accumulation by dispossession (such as intersectionality). In addition, Hansen suggests that considering surplus populations takes us beyond the strict definition of exploitation (of wage-labourers) and toward what he calls expropriation (and what I have called oppressive non-exploitation); this latter is what Marx captures in his theory of surplus populations, that is, the differentiation of the proletariat into the "pauper virtual or actual … the lumpen, the unemployed, unpaid reproductive workers" (Hansen, 2015, p. 8). The exploited and the expropriated alike share the same problem condition of separation from the means of (re)production: “Yet they live it differently, and these differences of daily practices, creates a differentiation of needs and desires, which is profoundly intertwined with processes of gendering, ableism and racialization, etc” (Hansen, 2015, p. 17). Hansen's account also sees intersections of oppressions within the segments of surplus populations, including disability but with the added perspective of foregrounding needs. Hansen also incorporates a very refreshing discussion of the lumpenproletariat, the “dangerous classes” that Marx singled out in the stagnant portion of surplus populations. Hansen's article is offering a close reading of Marx's 18th Brumaire to show that Marx did not necessarily see the lumpenproletariat or the peasants as counterrevolutionary or dangerous but recognized that they had different radical needs than the working class and the reserve army of labour. Looking at the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat as “not agglomerations of concrete individuals, but modes of life that individuals slip in and out of according to the need and availability of work or other strategies of survival” makes their distinctions blur (Hansen, 2015, p. 9). The two groups differ via their strategies (law-abidingly

looking for legal formal work vs hustling, stealing, sex work, etc.) of dealing with a common condition (of being separated from the means of (re)production and capital rather than only of being exploited as workers). The focus on needs and reproduction offers to connect the microanalysis of capital with the existential urgency of individual and collective strategies of survival, the structural and existential aspects of class formation as well as differentiation: “The problem of the revolutionary organization of proletarian difference is one of inventing common solutions to the common problem of the proletariat, whether lumpen, employed or unemployed” (Hansen, 2015, p. 17). In the next chapter, I would like to explore this needs perspective, particularly operationalizing Marx's concept of radical needs, in order to continue the theoretical work of understanding the relationship between exploitation and oppression through the lens of disability, intersectionality, and surplus populations.

CHAPTER 5

DIALECTICS OF OPPRESSION/EXPLOITATION: RADICAL NEEDS

In the previous two chapters I tried to understand the relationship between exploitation and oppression by studying disability from the point of view of intersectionality—an oppression-prioritizing framework, and from the point of view of the theory of surplus populations—an exploitation-prioritizing framework, respectively. The two frameworks yielded two paradigms with a subtle but important difference: disability as non-exploitative oppression and disability as oppressive non-exploitation. In the final section of the previous chapter, I tried to bring these two paradigms into a dialectical relationship by using the dialectics of Harvey's (2003) expanded-reproduction/accumulation-by-dispossession model and a matrix of domination model inspired by Patricia Hill Collins (2000). The difference between the models can be characterized as one between a more historical materialist, bird's eye view of oppression and exploitation versus a view from the ground-level, from the point of view of those who are oppressed and exploited. The purpose of this thesis has been to bring these two models, which are both crucial in understanding oppression and exploitation, together in order to get a better understanding of the whole picture. If these two models are the two sides of the same coin, my aim has been to attempt to grasp both sides at the same time. At the end of the previous chapter, inspired by Hansen's (2015) work on surplus populations, I gestured towards a needs framework in order to further facilitate the theoretical work of bringing the two models into a dialectical relationship. In this final chapter, I will begin to

construct a needs model which centers disability in order to further investigate the relationship between oppression and exploitation.

Hansen's treatment of surplus populations brought the discussion to the point where the proletarian condition as a whole, including all layers of surplus populations, was a common one of separation from the means of (re)production and market- and labour-dependence whereas the ways different segments of the proletariat experienced and struggled against this common condition were highly diverse. Hansen suggested that organizing through proletarian difference would acknowledge common needs and invent common solutions. Hence both class decomposition and difference as well as this commonality of need and dependence come out to be sources of strength rather than weakness. While dependency and need are rarely associated with power (Fraser & Gordon, 2013; Fraser, 2013), both are closely associated with disability (Charlton, 2004). In dominant discourses, the disabled tend to be coded as needy and dependent, an unproductive minority of people who are burdens to the general productive and abled population. Thus the needs of the disabled tend to be considered “special” rather than generalized, basic, relevant, or, radical. The category of “Special needs” is a product of such ableist attitudes. Because of this underlying attitude, many movements of people with disabilities also gravitated towards adopting a rights discourse rather than a needs discourse; this is indeed the impetus behind the individual/medical model versus the social model of disability since needs tend to be coded as individual, personal, and apolitical. The concept of need I will be operationalizing in this chapter, however, goes against the commonsensical understanding of needs as personal weakness or lack. I will instead be using the Marxist understanding of needs as powers and

capacities, needs as activity rather than only passivity. According to Marx, the wealthiest person is the person richest in needs. When needs arise, they demand satisfaction, and their satisfaction creates new needs, driving ingenuity and progress. Built on this concept of needs as powers, Marx also has a notion of radical needs, those needs whose satisfaction can overthrow the system that has created and yet cannot meet these needs. It was Agnes Heller (1976, 1993) who turned this concept into a full-blown theory. Connecting Heller's theory of radical needs with Sayers's (2003) notion of needs as empowerment, Khader's (2008) notion of interdependency as a precondition for agency, and with concepts from disability studies and activism such as universal design, I suggest that "special needs" are radical needs. Moreover, I suggest that any need can become politicized and radicalized or defused and depoliticized in different contexts (and through different struggles) as Fraser (2013) suggests. Keeping the core of Heller's and Marx's definition of radical needs as those needs that are created (but cannot be satisfied) by systems of subordination, I suggest that radical needs are system-shattering but world-building, that those who are richest in needs would be at the intersection of multiple oppressions, making radical needs intersectional, that radical needs are interconnected and following their in-order-to-chains lead to other more fundamental needs and to the roots of oppression and exploitation.

There will be some more theoretical translation work to do between the two disparate strands of thought introduced above which both treat needs and/or dependency as power. One strand consists of two interpretations of Marx's theory of needs: Sean Sayers's (2003) *Marxism and Human Nature* and Agnes Heller's (1976) *Theory of Need in Marx*. Another strand is a subset of disability studies where I will

again consider two examples: Lennard Davis's (2006) discussion of dismodernism in The End of Identity Politics and the Beginning of Dismodernism and Serene Khader's (2008) article Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice. This translation is necessary because the Marxist strand on needs does not engage disability whereas disability literature in general does not engage the concept of needs although there is considerable work on the concepts of dependence and independence. Before I discuss these four works, then, I will first take a detour through Fraser's (2013) Struggle Over Needs and Fraser & Gordon's (2013) A Genealogy of Dependency in order to establish a connection between needs, disability, and dependency.

In Struggle over Needs, Fraser examines the discourse on needs as a distinctive mark of late-capitalist political discourse (2013, p. 54), and in A Genealogy of Dependency which she co-authored with Linda Gordon, she traces the genealogy of dependency for the historical shifts in the meaning of this term again in order to understand how it became a dominant feature of the late-capitalist U.S. welfare state (Fraser & Gordon, 2013). Both of these articles were originally written in the early 1990s, just around the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, but neither of these articles critically engage with disability in terms of needs or dependency. Secondly, Fraser does not explicitly connect needs and dependency in her solo article or co-authored article. But Fraser must have also thought that the articles conceptually go together since she places them back to back in her 2013 book Fortunes of Feminism. The needs article, and conceptually the needs framework, precedes the dependency article as Fraser & Gordon write at the beginning of their genealogical work: “A crucial element of politics, then, is the

struggle to define social reality and to interpret people's inchoate aspirations and needs" (2013, pp. 84-85). In this subsection of the chapter, where I connect needs, dependence and disability, I will go over Struggle over Needs relatively quickly and spend more time on the genealogy of dependency as the latter further grounds some of my exploitation/oppression discussion and ties in well with the expanded reproduction/accumulation by dispossession timeline. I will come back to Struggle over Needs, particularly Fraser's in-order-to chains mechanism, in the foregoing discussion on needs.

According to Fraser, the politics of need interpretation consists of "three analytically distinct but practically interrelated moments":

> The first is the struggle to establish or deny the political status of a given need, the struggle to validate the need as a matter of legitimate political concern or to enclave it as a nonpolitical matter. The second is the struggle over the interpretation of the need, the struggle for the power to define it and, so, to determine what would satisfy it. The third moment is the struggle over the satisfaction of the need, the struggle to secure or withhold provision. (2013, p. 57)

Complex societies based on domination and subordination such as late-capitalist welfare states, are stratified into social groups with unequal status, power, and access to resources which are differentiated through lines of class, gender, ethnicity, race, age (Fraser, 2013, p. 58) and other markers of oppression and exploitation. In such societies, what Fraser calls "needs-talk" is a site of struggle where dominant groups and institutions compete with various subordinate groups in order to establish their own interpretations of legitimate social needs: "Dominant groups articulate need interpretations intended to exclude, defuse, and/or co-opt counter-interpretations. Subordinate or oppositional groups, in contrast, articulate need interpretations intended to challenge, displace, and/or modify dominant ones" (Fraser, 2013, p. 59).

Within the context of the struggle over needs, Fraser finds two senses of the political relevant: one is the official-political sense in which something is political if it is handled by institutions of the governmental system, the other is the discursive-political sense in which something is political "if it is contested across a broad range of different discursive arenas and among a wide range of different publics" (2013, p. 60). The two senses are related to the extent that an issue usually becomes subject to state intervention after it has been discussed across a wide range of publics (Fraser, 2013, p. 60). Fraser, finds that the separation of social life into "political," "economic" and "domestic" dimensions in patriarchal capitalist societies, and the ideological constructions of these domains, work against the politicization of needs; the latter two domains are constructed as if they are outside the official-political system, and defined in contrast to it, although they are in fact very much regulated by it (2013, p. 60). The two main groups of institutions that depoliticize needs are domestic institutions (such as the patriarchal nuclear family) and official-economic capitalist institutions: domestic institutions depoliticize by personalizing, familializing, casting issues as private, instead of public and political, whereas economic institutions depoliticize by economizing, for instance making something a matter of impersonal market imperatives (Fraser, 2013, p. 62). Fraser says that these principal depoliticizing enclaves must be exceeded in order for needs to be politicized discursively; Fraser refers to the needs that can break out of these confines as *leaky* or *runaway* needs (2013, p. 63). When runaway needs make it out of these enclaves they are carried into "the social" which Fraser defines as a domain where conflicting needs interpretations of various contestants meet (the proponents of politicization and those of (re)depoliticization) and "where successfully politicized

runaway needs get translated into claims for state provision" (2013, pp. 64-65). Fraser offers three main kinds of needs-talk: oppositional needs-talk from below (contributing to the self-constitution of new collective agents); reprivatization needs-talk which emerges in response to the former; expert needs talk which connects popular movements to the state (2013, p. 66). Politicization of runaway needs via oppositional discourses creates public discussion around needs previously deemed depoliticized, challenges boundaries separating "politics" from "economics" and "domestics," and disseminates their own need interpretations to a wider public (Fraser, 2013, p. 67). Reprivatization discourses contest all three of these attempts in order to (re)depoliticize them, and institutionally they tend to be: "initiatives aimed at dismantling or cutting back social-welfare services, selling off nationalized assets, and/or deregulating 'private' enterprise" (Fraser, 2013, p. 68). When runaway needs are successfully politicized despite reprivatization efforts, they encounter expert needs discourses which translate the needs into a format administrable by the state and in the process the needs run the risk of becoming decontextualized, abstracted, individualized, and depoliticized again.

These struggles are complex and ongoing but the basic structure Fraser lays out can be applied to the disability movement in the U.S., which culminated in the passage of ADA. Fraser says that "In general, there are no apriori constraints dictating that some matters are intrinsically political and others are intrinsically not" (2013, p. 60). Thus, we can apply her framework for the politicization of runaway needs to the disability movement. Prior to their politicization through the social model, the needs of the disabled are coded as private, personal, and medical, subject to charity and medical attention, rather than social programs, and the disabled are

coded as unfortunate impaired persons, victims of a tragic fate rather than an oppressed social group (Oliver, 1996). In the process of politicization, these definitions are contested from below, by the disabled themselves, through an oppositional disability discourse: for instance, the disabled are defined as disabled by the dominant ableist society and institutions rather than impairment; the social group, persons with disabilities, becomes a new political agent, a group of oppressed people; their access and accommodation needs become citizen entitlements that require state provision. In the late 1980s, the disability movement broke out from smaller enclaves to begin a discussion about disability issues in the wider public; finally, the needs of the disabled were politicized enough to be subject to state provision. However, at this stage, the expert needs discourse, translating politicized needs into administration, made a compromise with corporate capital that had the effect of diffusing the power of the movement (Robert, 2003). Robert suggests that corporate capital did not see the ADA as a threat to its general interests because when the law was first proposed by the National Council on Disability (NCD),

> a formally independent body charged with overseeing Federal disability policies, all of whose members at the time had been appointed by the corporate-friendly Reagan administration. The NCD suggested that the ADA, by promising to eliminate employment barriers, would lessen the need for social support programs for people with disabilities. (2003, p. 139)

The NCD, which in Fraser's vocabulary is the expert discourse producing institution here, redefined the claims of the disabled in anti-welfare language that would suit the interests of corporate capital (Robert, 2003, p. 139) Moreover, Robert says that the consensus over the legislation left possible points of social conflict intentionally vague to be resolved at the point of the implementation phase of the ADA: “Capital, both at the level of national politics and at the level of local workplaces, might then

be better able to assert its power" (2003, p. 140). In the implementation stage of the ADA, disabled workers are—as other studies also showed in the previous chapter—disproportionately hired to lower-level jobs, and often only as tokens (Robert, 2003, pp. 150-151). This compromise to corporate capital might have been replicated in other Minority world settings where similar legal provisions secured a modicum of work opportunities for the disabled, creating the work vs welfare dilemma taken up in the foregoing discussion of work and disability in the previous chapter (Roulstone, 2012; Wilton, 2006). There is another, related, way reprivatization institutionally and discursively attempted to depoliticize disability needs. As we also saw in the previous chapter, with the decline of welfare state, the subject of disability care became big business, so it has been further depoliticized through economization, individualizing the disabled person as a consumer of therapeutic services in a way that resembles a reversion to the individual/medical model. Fraser has shown in this article that needs, which are usually deemed apolitical and contrasted to rights and interests, can be politicized. I tried to show that the trajectory of the disability movement aligns with the basic structure of how needs can be depoliticized, politicized, and (re)depoliticized.

Fraser briefly takes up the juxtaposition between needs and rights in her conclusion and provisionally suggests that needs can be translated into rights. We can see this juxtaposition in the disability rights movement where the oppositional discourse strives to steer away from the image of the disabled as needy by translating their claims into rights of citizens, as can be evidenced even by the name of the disability law: Americans with Disabilities—citizens first, disabled second, and only ever because of social barriers and discrimination. For instance, in his book *Nothing*

About Us Without Us, disability activist and scholar Charlton says: “the needs of people with disabilities and the potential for meeting these needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and institutionalization” (2004, p. 3). According to Charlton, focus on needs is detrimental to the struggle: “We are not oppressed; we have neglected needs. . . . these efforts emasculate the essence of disability oppression. . . . They place disability in the 'needy' category (those who need) as compared to a 'have' category (those who have)” (2004, p. 157). Charlton contrasts this to the popular disability rights slogan “Nothing about us without us,” an embodiment of “the crucial tenets” of the disability rights movement: “empowerment, independence, and self-help” which must ultimately be a demand for self-determination (2004, p. 162). In a cultural and political milieu where being gainfully employed is the ultimate mark of empowerment and independence, this is precisely what the ADA prescribes, title by title: employment opportunity (for the “qualified”) (Title I); state and government services (such as public transport) (Title II); public accommodations (disability access to facilities) (Title III); and telecommunications (access to communication tech—such as close captioning) (Title IV) (The ADA National Network, n.d.). Seeing how it is constructed, as employment and education opportunities for the qualified and the design of public accommodations in order to access such employment (with no provisions for those who are not qualified for employment, those who will remain dependent despite these accommodations, and no mention of their care) it is possible to see how the act could not pose a threat to the interests of capital. Like Robert (2003) discussed above, Russell and Stewart note that the dire state of unemployment and impoverishment has not improved much since the

passage of the ADA because "by failing to acknowledge that capitalism produces disablement, the ADA has not fully confronted economic discrimination" (2011, p. 66). Similarly, Taylor questions the insistence on employment from a critique of capitalism and from the point of view of those who are superfluous to capital:

> Many, though by no means all, disabled people will never be good workers in the capitalist sense. . . . There is a small but significant percentage of the disabled population that has "made it.". . . These opportunities have everything to do with class and are not open to all impaired individuals. . . . The minority of the impaired population that does have a gainful employment are paid less than their able-bodied counterparts and are fired more often (and these statistics are more egregious for disabled minorities). To ensure that employers are able to squeeze surplus value out of disabled workers, thousands are forced into dead-end and segregated jobs and legally paid below minimum wage. . . . Why should working be considered so essential that disabled people are allowed to be taken advantage of, and moreover, expected to be grateful for such an opportunity? . . . Shouldn't we, of all groups, recognize that it is not work that would liberate us? (2004, pp. 39-40)

Taylor reminds the reader that, although this ideal of self-sufficiency is a by-product of economic self-sufficiency, no one under capitalism can remain independent (2004, p. 38). Taylor also suggests that disabled people may have a different notion of dependency: "ability to be in control of and make decisions about one's life, rather than doing things alone or without help" (Taylor, 2004, p. 38). This is a different understanding of dependency than the current commonsensical one. Let us now look at how the meanings of the term dependency has changed over time to attain the negative connotations associated with it today.

In A Genealogy of Dependency, Fraser & Gordon analyze the term dependency in the late-capitalist U.S. welfare state through a genealogy of the word, in order to denaturalize and historicize this highly ideological term, and to understand why it has come to mean specifically welfare dependency of a specific maligned figure (the single teenage black welfare mother) with extremely pejorative

connotations (2013, p. 84). Fraser & Gordon state that the original etymology of the word is a metaphor that denotes "a physical relationship in which one thing hangs from another" (2013, p. 86).[6] In current usage, however, Fraser & Gordon identify four registers where the meanings of dependency resonate (although not every form dependency will necessarily fit into a single category): economic, social, political and moral/psychological (2013, pp. 86-87). The economic register denotes dependence on another person or institution for subsistence; the social register denotes a socio-legal relationship where the dependent is subsumed under the legal person of another (such as coverture); the political register denotes subjection to an external ruling power (as in a colony); the moral/psychological register denotes dependency as an individual character trait (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 86-87). To translate it to the terms of this thesis, the economic register can be said to be more indicative of exploitation whereas the remaining three may be more indicative of oppression.

Fraser & Gordon track the shifting meanings of dependency through four eras: preindustrial, industrial, welfare, and post-industrial. Preindustrial dependency mostly connoted generalized subordination in a very hierarchical social context where dependency was the norm and independency was unusual and meant extraordinary privilege stemming from property ownership (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 87-88). The four registers were not differentiated at this time and the moral/psychological register did not exist (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 87). Dependency meant working for someone else for subsistence, whereas independency meant freedom from labour (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 88); in a context with no

6 Perhaps when Marx said that "Pauperism is . . . the deadweight of the industrial reserve army," he had this metaphor in mind (2000, p. 519).

market-dependency then, exclusion from labour, in the presence of enough wealth, meant the opposite of exploitation and oppression. Until the 17th century, dependence usually applied to aggregates like a body of servants (or serfs, slaves, or labourers) a colony, or a church congregation (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 88). Dependence was a social relation, not an individual trait, so it had no pejorative meanings or personal stigma attached to it (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 88). In a context where subjection, not citizenship, was the norm, the term was not specifically feminized as it was in later eras; it was a condition women shared with most subordinate men, children, and the elderly where their labour was valued in the household economy (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 88-89). Perhaps the disabled could also be added to this list in a way in which it fits quite well with the preindustrial characterization of disability from previous chapters.

Industrial era begins to distinguish between shameful dependency and natural/proper dependency (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 90). Especially in 18th and 19th centuries, gendered and racialized senses of dependency emerge where it is deemed proper for women but degrading for men, proper for certain races but not others (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 90). Now dependency is fragmented into the four registers and while it is still mostly a social relation, it can also be individual (the fourth register is born) (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 90). With these changes, the denaturalization of status hierarchies also brought successful radical movements (abolitionism, feminism, labour organizing) where the equivalence between citizenship and independence (which survives today as we saw in the forgoing discussion) was established (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 90). In this era, an icon of independence arises, the white working man, through the reorganization of the

economic register and the reinterpretation of wage-labour such that the latter is added to the definition of independence along with property ownership (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 90-91). In contradistinction to the wage-labourer, three icons of dependence emerge that are defined by their exclusion from wage-labour: the pauper (not subordinate within a system of labour but outside it); the colonial native and slave who personified political subjugation to justify colonialism/slavery (who was earlier deemed dependent because conquered, now conquered because dependent); the housewife (to create (white male) independence through labour, (white) female economic dependence was required) (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 91-93). As we saw in the previous chapter, these three icons with their superfluity to wage-labour, through their unpaid productive and reproductive labour, also made up the bulk of surplus populations, along with the disabled. So while Fraser & Gordon do not specifically mention disability, based on the discussion of previous chapters, we can see that the pauper category would likely include disabled persons, since as the previous chapters showed "disability causes poverty, and . . . poverty likewise causes disability . . . The distinction some might want to make between disability and poverty collapses at some level" (Davis, 1995, p. 85).

According to Fraser & Gordon, these three figures became "the underside of workingman's independence" as full citizenship meant distinguishing oneself from each of them (2013, p. 94). Fraser & Gordon suggest that dependency/independency was mediated through gender, race and class and was encapsulated in the ideal of the family wage premised on the new economic dependency (and continuing subordination) of women and contrasted with images of dependent men (such as the pauper on poor relief and the Black men unable to dominate Black women) (Fraser

& Gordon, 2013, p. 94). But more importantly, establishing the white male wage-labourer as independent required a major mystification within the economic register in order to mask their dependence on the reproductive and productive labour of women and children but also to mask their subordination to their bosses: “Thus, hierarchy that had been relatively explicit and visible in the peasant-landlord relation was mystified in the relationship of factory operative to factory owner” (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 94). This is the point where the social and political registers begin to be differentiated from the economic register; in the vocabulary of this thesis, exploitation is differentiated from oppression and the former becomes mystified/invisible whereas the latter becomes unacceptable between white men but naturalized in the case of women and certain dependent men (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 94). From this it followed that once socio-legal and political dependency were formally eradicated (as seemed to be case with white working men), no such dependencies could remain and any remaining dependency could be deemed moral/psychological (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 94).

The third era of dependency is specifically defined as a U.S. phenomenon between 1890-1945 (until the New Deal) when the economic register becomes further mystified, the moral/psychological register gets further emphasized, and a distinction emerges between good (associated with the household, women, and children) and bad forms of dependency (associated with those on poor relief and which depended on a further bifurcation between deserving and undeserving poor) both still defined by exclusion from wage-labour (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 95-96). The stigma associated with poor relief in the bad dependency category was further exacerbated by the New Deal through the two-track welfare system: first-

track programs included employment and old-age insurance which were coded as entitlement, funded through wage-reductions, were without stigma or supervision, and excluded minorities and white women whereas second-track programs continued to work as charity (trying to distinguish deserving/undeserving), were funded via tax revenue, included means- and morals-testing, supervision and low-stipends (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 97). All in all, it was made look as if the people in first-track programs were being compensated for what they contributed whereas those in second-track programs were made to look like free-loaders (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 97) First track programs (unemployment insurance and social security) along with other public provision (agricultural loans, home mortgage assistance, corporate bailouts and regressive taxation) were not considered welfare and only second-track welfare was considered productive of dependency (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 98). Hence, the new icon of dependence in this era turns out to be poor single mothers on first-track welfare, deepening the feminization and stigmatization of dependency (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 98).

In the post-industrial era, good dependency disappears and the moral/psychological register expands further due to two developments: formal abolition of social and political dependency (as housewives, paupers, colonized populations and descendants of slaves are no longer excluded from formal rights) and the re-structuring of the economic register due to deindustrialization (loss of male manufacturing jobs and feminization of low-pay service work) (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 100). With all forms of social and political dependency deemed illegitimate, wage-labour still remains associated with independency, thus continuing the invisibility of exploitation of the capital-labour relation, the invisibility of

reproductive labour, and the unacceptability of oppression (now this unacceptability expanded to groups other than white men) (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 100-101). With this set-up where all basis of dependency is supposedly eradicated, whatever dependency remains is considered to be the fault of individuals (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 101).

This point of the genealogy can be connected to previous discussions as the transitioning point between expanded reproduction and accumulation by dispossession in late capitalism where accumulation by dispossession begins to become dominant and when contradictions other than capital-labour contradiction begin to come to the fore; oppression-prioritizing paradigms begin to add oppressions other than class to their struggle, while unfortunately also deepening the mystification of exploitation and subsuming it under oppression. The differentiation of the four registers signals a differentiation of exploitation from oppression, mystifying the former, and naturalizing the latter (for certain groups). The economic register actually went through a double mystification: that of the capital-labour relationship as exploitation and subordination, and that of the reproductive labour of so-called dependents as work.

While unacknowledged exploitation in the supposed absence of oppression (because of formal rights) denotes independence (as in the case of the white male worker), the absence of exploitation (or the exclusion from wage-labour) coupled with unacknowledged oppression denotes dependence—not surprisingly this category overlaps with the latent and stagnant layers of the surplus population (where disability would also be found). From this perspective, Marxist struggles that centralize expanded reproduction can be viewed as struggles to de-mystify

exploitation whereas struggles that centralize accumulation by dispossession can be viewed as struggles to de-naturalize the oppression of groups largely cast out of the capital-labour relationship. In a sense, then, this genealogy of dependency can double up as a genealogy of the separation of exploitation from oppression.

The final phase of welfare dependency examined by Fraser & Gordon sees the pathologization of dependency, its further feminization and its racialization. Medical and psychological discourses in the 1980s begin to associate dependency with pathology; coupled with the anti-drug sentiment of the time, chemical addictions begin to be euphemistically termed dependencies; as welfare recipients were also thought to be drug addicts, rhetoric of drug dependency begins to seep into welfare dependency (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 101-102).

In a second development, new psychological meanings of dependency emerge which are strongly feminized: as a form of immaturity particularly associated with single mothers for instance (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 101-102). In a term popularized in the late 1980s, codependency, women were even blamed for enabling the dependence of others: “the increased stigmatizing of dependency in the culture at large has also deepened contempt for those who care for dependents, reinforcing the traditionally low status of the female helping professions, such as nursing and social work” (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 102). So, interestingly, dependency is not only likened to an addiction but it also seems to work as an infectious disease where those caring for dependents can also catch it.

Another concomitant development to this pathologizing discourse was the literal creation of an official psychiatric disorder by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) called Dependent Personality Disorder. This category first

appeared in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III) in 1980:

> The codification of DPD [Dependent Personality Disorder] as an official psychopathology represents a new stage in the history of the moral/psychological register. Here the social relations of dependency disappear entirely into the personality of the dependent. Overt moralism also disappears in the apparently neutral, scientific, medicalized formulation. Thus, although the defining traits of the dependent personality match point for point the traits traditionally ascribed to housewives, paupers, natives, and slaves, all links to subordination have vanished. (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 103)

According to Fraser & Gordon, the psychological discourse along with dependency as a psychopathology further feminized and individualized dependency (2013, p. 103). I would add that these developments have made dependency almost into a disability, since addictions, chronic illnesses and mental illness are associated with disability. Interestingly, at least the newest iteration of The Dependent Personality Disorder (which appears in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (the DSM-V)), makes a point of differentiating dependency from disability (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Pathological dependency is carefully distinguished from cases where dependency is "appropriate" such as children, the elderly, and especially, the disabled (the ultimate and chronic dependents):

> This need for others to assume responsibility goes beyond age-appropriate and situation-appropriate requests for assistance from others (e.g., the specific needs of children, elderly persons, and handicapped [sic] persons). Dependent personality disorder may occur in an individual who has a serious medical condition or disability, but in such cases the difficulty in taking responsibility must go beyond what would normally be associated with that condition or disability. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 676)

Impossibly then the APA defines dependent personality disorder (a mental illness and thus form of disability) as that which can be diagnosed in the absence of disability (and other "normal" dependencies). Perhaps realizing this contradiction,

the APA suggests that the disabled can also have this disorder if their neediness goes beyond what is considered appropriate to their disability. To sum up, dependence, in its newly pathologizing form, can also be defined as a disability.

If these developments further feminized and individualized dependency (and even made it into a disability), other developments racialized it (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 103). The post-industrial racialization of welfare dependency was a result of White women being moved to first-track welfare route since 1970 and so the second-track, dependent, welfare came to be associated with single Black women (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 103). Both insufficient and excessive independency were stigmatized and the norm was racially marked: White women were construed as overly dependent whereas Black women were in a double bind, construed as pathologically independent of Black men and pathologically dependent on the state (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 102-104). Finally, in the early 1990s all of the postindustrial discourses of dependency were consolidated into the figure of: “the Black, unmarried, teenaged, welfare-dependent mother. This image has usurped the symbolic space previously occupied by the housewife, the pauper, the native, and the slave, while absorbing and condensing their connotations” (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 104). This figure also brought together the pathological image of dependency as an addiction: “dependent on drugs and the narcotic of welfare” as voiced by the vice-president of the time (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 104).

Thus, beginning in the feudal period as a social relation that denoted generalized subordination as the norm with no stigma attached to it, the present day image of dependency is "an anomalous, highly stigmatized status of deviant and incompetent individuals" (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 108). While Fraser & Gordon

do not incorporate disability in their genealogy of dependency, the transition from generalized relations of subordination in the pre-capitalist era to the occlusion of market- and labour-dependency, the invisibility of reproductive labour, and to the stigmatization of certain forms of dependency primarily defined as exclusion from wage-labour, places the disabled in the dependent category. Those excluded from wage work are pauperized; poverty is also a creator of disability and vice versa. Similarly, the pathologized form of dependency makes dependency into a kind of chronic illness (and an infectious one at that), an addiction, and an official mental disorder—thus, a disability.

To tie in the discussion on needs, according to the post-industrial definition thereof, dependents are those who have depoliticized, pathologized, and individualized needs, much like the medical/individual model of disability. Efforts to politicize dependency may involve resurrecting the pre-industrial model of dependency as a social relation of subordination, divesting the term from its moral/psychological associations and also demystifying exploitation in the economic register such as the New Left school's dependency theory where they try to show how politically independent former colonies remained economically dependent (Fraser & Gordon, 2013, pp. 107-108) or to put it in terms of this thesis, how while they were formally not-oppressed they remained exploited. Other efforts to politicize dependency involve, in addition to these, demystifying the role of reproductive labour in the making of the independent/citizen category which relies on the double-mystification of capital-labour relationship and the reproductive labour of dependents:

> The vast majority of mothers of all classes and all educational levels "depends" on another income. It may come from child support . . . or from a

> husband who earns $20,000 while she averages $7,000. But “dependence” more accurately defines dads who count on women's unwaged labour to raise children and care for the home. Surely, “dependence” doesn't define the single mom who does it all: child- rearing, homemaking, and bringing in the money (one way or another). When caregiving is valued and paid, when dependence is not a dirty word, and interdependence is the norm— only then will we make a dent in poverty. (Pat Gowens quoted in Fraser & Gordon, 2013, p. 110)

Fraser & Gordon conclude their genealogy with the above quote from Pat Gowens pointing in the direction of a redefinition of dependency which involves politicizing it by reconnecting it to social relations of oppression and exploitation. In both Struggle over Needs and Genealogy of Dependency, then, there is a call towards the historicization and politicization of needs and dependency. But while there is a call towards redefining needs and dependency as at least political categories, there is not an explicit definition of needs and dependency as positive and empowering categories. In the foregoing discussion, I tried to connect needs and dependency to disability. Now I will look at accounts that view needs and dependency as powers. I will first explore the idea of needs as powers in Sayers's (2003) *Marxism and Human Nature* and Heller's (1976) *Theory of Need* in Marx. Sayers's Marxism and Human Nature is a book-length study of Marx's historical, non-essentialistic theory of human nature. The discussion of Marx's historical human nature revolves around the concept of needs as power and enrichment. According to Rousseau,who, Sayers's account, embodies the current understanding of needs as weakness or lack, “greater our needs, the weaker and more dependent, the more enslaved and unfree, we become” (Sayers, 2003, p. 66). Hegel and Marx, however, have the opposite view; they view the growth of human needs as an indispensable part of the development of human nature—not only as positive but also as a pathway to freedom (Sayers, 2003, p. 66). This is because human nature is social and historical, thus, subject to

evolution: “For human nature is social and historical in character. Human nature—human needs and human freedom—grows and develops historically” (Sayers, 2003, p. 66). As an example of the historicity of needs, Sayers offers the difference between necessary and luxury needs: with increasing productivity and changes in social structure, luxuries for one generation tend to become necessities for a later one, for instance (Heller, 1976, p. 37; Sayers, 2003, p. 66). This is possible because of the social character of needs that reflects the structure of the society that produces them: no specific product possesses the quality of being a luxury; that is, there is no qualitative difference between luxury and necessity but division of labour that produces poverty for one class and wealth for another, produces this opposition where luxury becomes articles that can only be exchanged for the surplus value expropriated by the capitalist class (Heller, 1976, p. 37).

Marx envisioned a future society, the Society of Associated Producers, where this opposition would be eradicated, where individual property would take the place of private property and goods would be distributed according to individual needs (Heller, 1976, p. 39):

> Marxism envisages a society in which human beings can fully develop and realize their powers and capacities, an unalienated society which promotes all-round human development. This involves an ideal of the fullest possible development of human powers and potentialities, the vision of the human being 'rich in needs.' (Sayers, 2003, p. 157)

How would needs bring about the path to freedom or empowerment? According to Sayers, Marx's historicist account rests on the understanding of human nature developing with the growth of human productive power (2003, p. 161). Heller connects this to the dialectical correlation between need and the object of the need: “The objects 'bring about' the needs, and the needs bring about the objects” (1976, p.

40). Here object is not limited to material objects, since social relations and social products are also objectivations of humans; it it thus that Marx can claim that "highest of object of human need is the other person" (Heller, 1976, p. 40). While both needs and objects are different moments of the same complex, the moment of production comes first: "it is production which creates new needs"; humans create the objects of their need and also the means for satisfying them, so human needs emerge in the process of objectification (Heller, 1976, p. 40). It is this orientation towards objects that give needs their active character according to Heller: "Needs are simultaneously passions and capacities (the passion and capacity to appropriate the object) and thus capacities are themselves [41] needs" (1976, pp. 40-41). Similarly, Sayers says: "the human being 'rich in needs' . . . on Marx's view this is equivalent to the development of human powers and capacities, the development of human nature (2003, p. 164).

Capitalism produces new social needs and capacities at an unprecedented rate compared to other systems and in principle no one is excluded from the satisfaction of needs (as long as they have the purchasing power), so in a sense it creates the precondition for the human rich in needs but capitalism also reproduces poverty and "degrades its highest productive force, the worker" (Heller, 1976, p. 47). This is because in a commodity-producing society the worker's use-value-producing concrete labour does not serve to satisfy the needs of the worker but to valorize capital; accordingly, only needs that valorize capital and produce surplus value are developed (Heller, 1976, pp. 48-51).

These are needs connected to the possession of goods which can increase infinitely but only in a quantitative way (Heller, 1976, p. 52): "The need to have is

that to which all needs are reduced" (Heller, 1976, p. 57). While for the dominant classes this "having" is literally possession, for the worker it is related to mere survival; for the capitalist mechanism of production to continue, the worker must be deprived of every need except for the need to survive and deprived of everything except labour power (Heller, 1976, p. 57). According to Heller, consciousness of these unsatisfied, alienated, needs makes these needs into radical needs and the development of such non-capital-valorizing, qualitative, needs would make it impossible for capitalism to remain the basis of production (1976, p. 94).

Both Heller and Sayers, then, through Marx, give a positive account of needs where needs are capacities and powers that create the means of their own satisfaction as well as other needs. Also both accounts are productivity-prioritizing accounts; the power of needs is related to their orientation towards their objects but production is the first moment that leads to the multiplication of needs. While the notion of need as power and capacity is going to be important in the foregoing discussion on disability, the focus on human productive power above all, especially labour, makes Sayers's account less suitable for a disability perspective.

Also interestingly, while Sayers views needs as power and capacity, he views dependency in a negative light. Sayers's definition of dependence seems to rely on the criteria of exclusion from wage-labour that became dominant in the capitalist era. Thus, from a disability point of view, especially with an eye to cognitive disabilities, Sayers' account is not as promising as it could have been. In contradistinction to utilitarian theories that see humans primarily as consumers, as mere collections of needs and desires, Marx's theory, according to Sayers, views humans as "primarily and essentially active and productive beings" (2003, p. 30) (of both needs and the

means to satisfy them). Referring to the conception of utilitarian paradise as one in which everyone is a consumer whose every need is met without expending labour, Sayers says:

> Where nature fails, society can create this sort of paradise, at least for some of its members. For in the society, and only in society, as a result of the division of labour, it is possible to be a mere consumer, not involved in productive activity at all. . . . *The life of mere consumption is possible only for a limited and dependent group in society*, who must rely for the necessities of life upon the productive activity of others. (2003, p. 31) [emphasis added]

While Sayers doesn't specify here, this definition of the "limited and dependent group" that relies on others for the necessities of life could also be applied to the disabled—i.e., not only to those who do not need to work in order to live, such as the obscenely rich, but also to those who cannot work, or "act," to satisfy their needs, such as the disabled. This vision unfortunately makes the needs of the disabled into "special" needs and conflates them with the "luxury" needs of a small minority. While the word disability never once appears in Sayers's book and these quotes do not specifically refer to people with disabilities, the definition of productive labour as "the most fundamental and essential human activity" leaves people with cognitive and non-cognitive disabilities (as well as the abled and yet surplus populations of the world excluded from work) outside the definition of human:

> It is through the process of labour that we make ourselves into human and social creatures and transcend the conditions of mere nature. . . . productive labour . . . is the essential human activity, the primary avenue to development, self-creation and self-realization. (Sayers, 2003, p. 32)

Sayers does not think that all forms of labour are liberating or that labour is the only sufficient way to self-realization but still accords a great deal of moral value and dignity to productive activity (2003, p. 33). Sayers particularly defends work, mostly though not exclusively, in the form of employment (preferably an unalienated,

enriching, liberating kind but not just as creative autonomous activity) as a very important human need. The alternative self-realizing avenue is through leisure, which however is defined in relation to employment and ceases to be leisure in the absence of meaningful employment. Both these avenues seem to be closed to a majority of the disabled as well as the growing surplus populations. Given this background, Sayers's positive outlook on the growth of needs as a desirable phenomenon will not yield disability as an empowered category. This partially stems from viewing needs as powers while viewing dependency as the wrong way of satisfying needs (i.e., a way of satisfying needs sans productive activity or labour). However, both Heller's and Sayer's accounts of needs as powers can be used in a non-ableist way if production is decentered and coupled with a different kind of agency and relationality. Khader's (2008) article, which I will discuss next, achieves the latter by providing a positive account of dependency from the point of view of cognitive disabilities.

In Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice, Serene Khader (2008) politicizes both needs and dependency by employing some of the strategies outlined at the end of the section on the genealogy dependency above. First of all, Khader politicizes the needs of persons with severe cognitive disabilities (PSCD) by defining PSCD as an oppressed group. However, Khader's strategy differs from the social model of disability which, as we saw above, became limited to a formal rights discourse which favored independence as wage-labour (in tandem with the postindustrial meanings of dependency/independency). Khader, instead uses a model that accommodates both the social and the impairment aspect of disabilities, moving from merely having needs recognized as rights to the actual satisfaction of needs

which in the case of PSCD might require not only social arrangements but also assistance and care from dependency workers. The second strategy is of politicizing dependency through recognizing reproductive work, particularly care-work for the PSCD, as labour (rather than a virtue), thereby simultaneously de-centering work (or productivity) as markers of independency, setting interdependency, especially need for care, as the norm, while also demystifying the exploitation of care workers.

Against the dominant view that PSCD do not belong to the moral community of persons and therefore their flourishing needs are “special compensations” that are not a matter of justice, Khader suggests that it is possible to justify such entitlements according to the same logic applied to entitlements of abled persons (2008, p. 1). Khader first establishes a preliminary, but not exhaustive, set of criteria that theories of justice must meet in order to respect the personhood of those with severe disabilities:

> A theory of justice that successfully incorporates PSCD should A) understand PSCD as members of an oppressed group, B) use the same standard to evaluate what is owed to them as it uses for "normally" abled individuals, C) respect human diversity, and D) distribute the social basis of at least some type of flourishing as well as political liberty. (2008, p. 3)

A) This first criterion is very important. It requires a dialectical approach to disability as both socially constructed/imposed as well as a kind of impairment. Denying the social component, makes it possible to see disability as mere moral bad luck and thus making social compensation unnecessary, relegating it to the private realm and trivializing the needs of the disabled as extra resources and luxuries. For instance, rejecting the oppression component of disability has allowed society to view people with Down Syndrome as uneducable a few decades back whereas education tailored to their needs can greatly benefit children with Down Syndrome (Khader, 2008, p.

5). Khader suggests that the state maintain a kind of agnosticism when it comes to the relationship between impairment and disability while understanding their condition as resulting from oppression (Khader, 2008, p. 5).

B) Liberal theories of justice assume that people's entitlements stem from their status as rational contractors, pushing PSCD outside the scope of this kind of justice as non-rational (and thereby, subhuman) agents. In other theories, such as Marxism, productivity might be a criterion that grants membership in the moral community, as we have seen above. Khader suggests that a conception of justice that centralizes the needs of PSCD "must prefer a notion of personhood that can accommodate persons with a plurality of abilities without abandoning the single conception of what is owed to all persons as a matter of right" (Khader, 2008, p. 5).

C) This criterion introduces an important concept that I will use in the next section: flourishing. It is needs-satisfaction that goes beyond vital needs and I think it is similar to what Marx might have meant by individual needs ("to each according to need"); it is what allows a particular person to live their best possible life according to their specific needs. According to Khader, respect for human variation means acknowledging there are different ways to flourish as human; PSCD are owed not only bare necessities but what allows them to flourish "as persons with unique 'worlds' and 'imaginative possibilities'" (2008, p. 6).

D) This criterion continues from the former and clarifies what is meant by flourishing further by defining it as being closer to positive freedom than negative freedom (or classical liberal political freedom). Negative freedom might mean the establishment of a formal right such as voting but positive freedom would require additional provisions such as accessibility, transport, and adequate information that

would actually allow the exercise of that right. For instance, voting is a constitutionally protected right for all persons of age in Turkey but there are no social arrangements in place for disability access. To give a recent example in terms of the blind and visually impaired, the Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey has allowed the blind and visually impaired to use accessible braille voter ballot templates in elections but did not produce a budget for printing them, effectively disenfranchising 400,000 blind and visually impaired persons (a significant portion of whom must be of voter age) from voting in secrecy (Vardar, 2018; "Görme Engelli Seçmen", 2018). The PSCD, although political expression such as voting might never be part of their life-projects, often need even more positive support to exercise such rights or other analogous functionings and they may exercise them differently than the cognitively abled (Khader, 2008, p. 6). A positive freedom approach that centralizes PSCD must formulate social entitlements in a way that places the PSCD and cognitively abled persons on a continuum (Khader, 2008, p. 6).

Khader finds capabilities approaches in general to be able to meet the above criteria. However, these criteria are not sufficient to ensure that specific needs of PSCD are met. Next, Khader establishes three more criteria:

> E) the rejection of conceptions of personhood that would see PSCD as less than human, F) the refusal to privilege independent practical reason as the most important capability, and G) the need to secure nonexploitative dependency relationships for persons who must be dependent on others. (Khader, 2008, p. 8)

E and G are elaborations of B; all three have to do with personhood, agency, and thus membership in the moral community. G is a new category but can also be considered in relation to C and D as they both refer to the kind of positive support PSCD may need in order to flourish. I also find G to be in an interesting relationship with A,

closing the loop that began with PSCD's oppression with the care-taker's exploitation. As most capabilities approaches fail with either one or more of these categories, Khader develops a new notion of (relational) agency by making use of disability scholar Kittay's work. Khader argues that PSCD possess important human potentialities for flourishing, satisfactions most humans long for and make life worthwhile, such as developing meaningful relationships with human others (Khader, 2008, p. 8). According to Kittay, being a person,

> means having the capacity to be in certain relationships with other persons, to sustain contact with other persons, to shape one's own world and the world of others, to have a life that another person can conceive of as an imaginative possibility for [themselves]. (quoted in Khader, 2008, p. 9).

This description opens the possibility for viewing flourishing as being consistent with lifelong dependency on others and I believe it can be put in conversation with Marx's notion of the most human need being the need for other humans. Similarly, this dependency is not a minority condition but a universal one: all humans experience periods of what Kittay calls “radical dependency” throughout their lives (childhood, old age, periods of sickness, temporary or permanent disability, etc.) (Khader, 2008, p. 9). Considering that humans begin their lives in radical dependency, we become persons, and develop whatever kind of agency we have, only ever in relation/engagement with other persons who care for us: “Our moral personhood would not be possible without the care of others” (Khader, 2008, p. 9). It is in this sense that dependency emerges as a power, as that which makes all people a part of the moral community regardless of their cognitive ability. The kind of agency Khader wants to develop in conversation with Kittay's work is a relational agency, which involves recognizing the value of persons in relation to their constitution through care relationships and participation in affective ties:

> The conception of the person as an agent-in-relation does not arise out of a particular conception of a species norm. Instead, it posits agency and relationship as general desiderata that acquire different sorts of meanings in different types of flourishing lives. Nor does the conception of the person as an agent-in-relation presume that agency and relationship are only worthy of social and moral consideration in the domain of public reciprocity. It is open to agency and relation being valued in multiple incarnations and contexts. (Khader, 2008, p. 14)

With this new conception of agency as the ability to shape one's world and the world of others (and being in relation with others), instead of a thick conception of rationality, Khader proposes replacing the latter with agency and relationality as the most central human capabilities and have societies provide a threshold level of both, i.e., each person is owed the ability to achieve their own potential or threshold level (2008, p. 15). This way, a child with severe cognitive disability is not condescendingly "compensated" to make up for the fact that they flourish differently than a cognitively abled child but rather both are provided with a "field of life" to help them maximize their respective cognitive potentials (Khader, 2008, p. 15).

As discussed above, especially persons with severe cognitive disabilities may need life long support and care in order to reach their potential for such flourishing; that is, relationality, in the form of care relationships, is necessary for the sustenance of agency and understanding this necessity requires viewing such care-work as labour (Khader, 2008, p. 16). As we have seen above in Fraser & Gordon's genealogy, dependency work was seen as something that could make the dependency workers themselves seem dependent, stigmatizing and rendering their work as non-work or low status work (2013, p. 102). Viewing care-work as labour entails putting this kind of dependency relationship in the same level as relationships between political equals (Khader, 2008, p. 16). Furthermore, making care-work visible as labour, also makes visible the potential exploitation of such labour, politicizing and

demystifying the exploitation of reproductive labour by breaking it out of the "domestic" enclave by connecting it with the economic and political registers. Lastly, viewing care-work as labour requires that social distribution be responsive to both the care needs of PSCD as well as what is owed to the dependency worker which are related but not reducible to one another (Khader, 2008, p. 11). So, in this section, by centralizing the needs of persons with severe cognitive disabilities, Khader was able to reimagine both needs and dependency as powers, powers of agency and relationality, as well as an example of politicizing the oppression of persons with severe cognitive disabilities and the concomitant politicization of the exploitation of dependency workers. This connection is crucial as we have seen above in Fraser & Gordon's (2013) genealogy of dependency, the definition of dependency as stigmatized and deviant relied on the bifurcation between oppression and exploitation, by mystifying the latter especially that by capital on labour and also reproductive labour, while naturalizing oppression.

In Struggle Over Needs, Fraser says that needs claims have a "nested" character: "[needs claims] tend to be nested, connected to one another in ramified chains of in-order-to relations" (2013, p. 56). Politicization of needs requires constructing alternative in-order-to chains than those provided by dominant institutions. The longer the in-order-to chains are, the more politicized and more fundamental they become, because they illuminate more of the social structure behind these needs. Thus, a needs theory becomes thicker with longer chains and becomes more detrimental to systems and institutions of oppression and exploitation. Another way of putting it is that the longer the chains of in-order-to relationships the further we travel from negative to positive freedom. For instance, if you follow the

in-order-to chains from the needs of the homeless, you can end up at a critique of property relations in capitalism. Regard Fraser's brilliant line of questioning:

> What more "thickly," do homeless people need in order to be sheltered from the cold? What specific forms of provision are implied once we acknowledge their very general, thin need? Do homeless people need forbearance to sleep undisturbed next to a hot air vent on a street corner? A space in a subway tunnel or a bus terminal? A bed in a temporary shelter? A permanent home? Suppose we say the latter. What kind of permanent housing do homeless people need? Rental units in high rises in center city areas remote from good schools, discount shopping, and job opportunities? Single-family homes designed for single-earner, two-parent families? And what else do homeless people need in order to have permanent homes? Rent subsidies? Income supports? Jobs? Job training and education? Day care? Finally, what is needed, at the level of housing policy, in order to insure an adequate stock of affordable housing? Concentrated or scattered site public housing projects within a generally commodified housing environment? Rent control? Decommodification of urban housing? (2013, p. 55)

I think Khader's discussion of the needs of the severely cognitively disabled succeeds in moving from a negative to a positive conception of freedom and successfully politicizes the needs of both PSCD and their care-workers because Khader constructs long in-order to chains which goes all the way to questioning and re-defining personhood, agency, and even species membership, which is at the root of all political theories. If Khader's was a thin theory of need it would not be able to politicize these needs to the extent of connecting the oppression of PSCD with the exploitation of dependency workers but instead would be concerned only with the provision of certain pre-defined needs (Fraser, 2013).

Khader has accomplished another important theoretical feat, that of placing the cognitively disabled on a continuous spectrum of ability with the cognitively abled; similarly, a more general continuum can be established between the abled and the disabled, recognizing that one person can fall in different places within the spectrum throughout the course of one's life, going through intermittent periods of

“radical dependency” on others and relative independency. This is the micro-level of Hansen's macro-level assessment of dependency where Hansen established the common condition of the proletariat as that of being separated from the means of (re)production, the common dependency on the market and on labour, and the common need of (re)producing oneself despite that. In this section, I tried to show that we are as dependent one another as much as we are dependent on the market and that the two dependencies are interrelated and both can be a source of power as long as we can construct the necessary in-order-to chains, locate our common radical needs, and politicize them.

So far, in this chapter, I tried to show how needs (Fraser, 2013) and dependency (Fraser & Gordon, 2013) can be politicized, how needs (Sayers, 2003; Heller, 1976) and dependency (Khader, 2008) can be construed as powers by making oppression and exploitation visible on the one hand, and by de-centralizing certain forms of independence like productivity or wage-labour, on the other. The point perhaps is not to eradicate dependency but de-stigmatize it and turn it into a source of collective power—a base on which we can build a world where we can all flourish, where all our needs are political and personal. Not necessarily a Society of Associated Producers but A Society of Interdependent Caretakers. In this final section, I would like to go from one half of Marx's formulation of needs “To each according to need,” to the second: “from each according to ability” (Marx, 2000, p. 615). I tried to show, especially with Sayers's, Heller's, and Khader's work, the needs and abilities are dialectically related. Especially with Khader's work, I tried to show how the needs of the most vulnerable can be met using the same principles for the cognitively abled as well as disabled (the first part of the formulation).

Now I would like to attempt to show, how that place of abject vulnerability and need can be a source of ability, power and positive freedom (the second part of the formulation) by making use of Heller's re-telling of Marx's concept of radical needs. This will turn some of the conclusions of the previous chapters on their heads: those most oppressed/exploited, those at the intersections of multiple oppressions, those at the lowest sediments of the surplus populations, those with the most radical dependency, i.e., those who are richest in needs, will turn out to be those with the most "ability" and potential to challenge the systems designed to oppress and exploit them, if we can find our common base, recognize and politicize common needs and begin to formulate common solutions.

Heller says: "Radical needs constitute the uniqueness, the idiosyncrasy of single people, and also of communities" (1993, p. 35). Consideration of needs can be useful in bringing together micro- and macro-analyses, the individual and the social, reproductive and productive spheres, struggles against expanded reproduction as well as those against accumulation by dispossession. A negative conception of needs and dependency would place the disabled, those at the intersections of many oppressions, and those at the stagnant layers of surplus populations to a category of heightened needs and/or superfluous abilities, those who presumably cannot stand on their own but who "hang" (as the original connotation of the word dependency suggests). A positive view of needs can construct a world out that place of suspension, the dialectical point between non-exploitative oppression and oppressive non-exploitation, the point from which we hang by the threads. This is the point where disability by impairment and disability by oppression/exploitation also hang together. As Lennard Davis says "It is too easy to say, 'We're all disabled.' But it is possible to

say that we are all disabled by injustice and oppression of various kinds" (2006 , p. 241). Similar to Khader, Davis also imagines a type of agency based on interdependence but goes one step further than Khader's inclusion of the severely cognitively disabled into the moral community to re-imagining a moral and political community where such forms of dependence would be the norm:

> Impairment is the rule, and normalcy is the fantasy. Dependence is the reality, and independence grandiose thinking. . . . Universal design becomes the template for social and political designs. . . . a clear notion of expanding the protected class to the entire population; a commitment to removing barriers and creating access for all. (Davis, 2006, p. 241)

While Davis offers this as the vision of a possible utopia, in some sense, disability, dependency, and dispossession are very close to being the norm, as we have seen in the previous chapter that disability and surplus populations together comprised nearly one in three people globally. In another sense, dependency, disability, and dispossession are the norm, given our global dependence on the market and the universalization of capitalism. Finally, those remaining two people out of three are only temporarily abled, independent, or financially secure—until the next capitalist crisis, until the next wave of accumulation by dispossession, or until the next war. While disability, dependency, and dispossession are fast becoming the norm, or are already the norm, universal access (to means of (re)production, to resources, etc.) and universal design (of the built world including public/private spaces, buildings, tools, etc.) are not the norm. This is another way of expressing the contradiction that we already explored in previous chapters. So could universal access and design be imagined as radical needs?

According to Marx "A radical revolution can only be a revolution of radical needs, whose presuppositions and breeding-ground seem precisely to be lacking"

(2000, p. 78). Built on his concept of needs as powers, radical needs are those needs whose satisfaction can overthrow the system that has created yet cannot meet them. At the time, however, Marx was unable to find many concrete examples of radical needs of the sort, perhaps other than free time which seems to give rise to radical needs and is a radical need itself when capitalism at some point becomes incapable of shortening labour time further (Heller, 1976, p. 90). In later works, however, Marx maintains that capitalist alienation gives rise to radical needs only if the consciousness of alienation takes place through the politicization of needs (Heller, 1976, p. 93). Both of these radical needs (or rather, generators of radical needs) are "constituted from labour" as Heller says (1976, p. 90) and therefore not suitable to a consideration from the point of view of disability which is largely defined by exclusion from labour, and in the case of cognitive disabilities, consciousness of alienation might be ruled out as well. In her earlier work of Marx's theory of needs, Heller (1976) does not offer any other radical need alternatives but in her newer article Radical Needs Revisited, Heller offers a concise definition: "radical needs . . . are qualitative and remain unquantifiable; second, they cannot be satisfied in a world based on subordination and superordination; third, they drive people towards ideas and practices that abolish subordination and superordination" (1993, p. 33). In her earlier work, Heller had stated that capital-valorizing, quantitative needs, especially those connected to the possession of goods (which could be quantified infinitely without turning qualitative), would only make the capitalist mechanism of production to continue (1976, pp. 51-52). In Theory of Needs Revisited, Heller doesn't find the quantification of needs as problematic on the level of social-political need-allocation: "as long as the person re-translated the quantities into qualities so that the qualities

manifest uniqueness and difference" (1993, p. 34). Radical needs are those that necessitate qualitative satisfaction but they are not a special category of needs, i.e., any need can be satisfied qualitatively (Heller, 1993, p. 35). This fits in well with the above discussion on the politicization of needs; in some sense, politicization of a need can turn it into a radical need and any need can be politicized depending on context, becoming one that requires qualitative satisfaction or a quantitative satisfaction that can be translated into qualitative terms.

As examples of qualitative needs (but not necessarily radical ones), Heller offers life and freedom, to survive in a way which befits human dignity, and also autonomy (1993, p. 31). Sayers (2003) offers self-realization and human productive power, especially labour in the form of employment, as the most important needs, if not radical. Let us now look at the second criterion: Radical needs are those needs that cannot be met within the system of subordination that created them. The attempt to satisfy them threatens to shatter the system. To give a few examples: Ableist society creates disability but is unable to meet the needs of the disabled. Patriarchal society creates misogyny and is unable to meet the needs of transgender and cisgender women, and non-binary individuals such as safety from violence, reproductive justice, etc. Heteronormative society creates homophobia, biphobia, transphobia, and is unable to meet the needs of LGBTQAI+ people, like gender-affirmative surgery, employment, civil rights, etc. Capitalism creates surplus populations and is unable to meet their radical needs. These particular oppressions and the unsatisfied needs they generate are interrelated and they are connected to capitalism as well, not to mention that they tend to be intersectional. While not every oppression and exploitation can be traced to the advent of capitalism, as we have

seen in the previous chapters, capitalism latches on to pre-existing systems of subordination within any given context and exploits them to the extent that they can be made to valorize capital. The needs created within these intersectional systems of oppression and exploitation can be quantified but also politicized (by making oppression/exploitation visible through the lengthening of in-order-to chains) and satisfied in qualitative ways, thus they can lead to movements and actions that have the potential to abolish such systems.

Thus, according to this criteria, universal access (to the means of (re)production, public resources, care, education, etc.) and universal design (of the built world including public/private spaces, buildings, tools, etc.) can be major components of the radical need of flourishing. Flourishing as a radical need, as it is envisioned here, is based on relational agency developed by Khader. Therefore it encompasses powers such as rationality, self-realization, unalienated production, and dignity, but is not limited to them and does not centralize them, thus making space for those who may not be able to exercise them, or may exercise them differently than the abled. Ted Benton says that human flourishing needs (qualitative, cognitive, aesthetic, spiritual) are built on common natural needs of physical survival needs satisfaction which we share with all natural beings (although each species has species-specific ways of satisfying them (2004, pp. 266-69). Capitalism can satisfy the survival needs of workers (to some extent) but does not provide the conditions of confirming their powers and potentials specific to their species life (Benton, 2004, pp. 264-65). Benton defines flourishing needs as the following:

> Organisms can 'confirm' or 'manifest' their essential powers only within the context of their species life, and so can be said to flourish only when the conditions for the living of the mode of life characteristic of their species are met. (2004, p. 263)

When the living mode of life characteristic of the human species is defined as relational agency developed through non-oppressive/non-exploitative caring relationships, this definition can be applied to flourishing as a radical need. The satisfaction of flourishing as a radical need, devised as it was with those most marginalized in human societies (such as the severely cognitively disabled, those at the intersection of many oppressions, those at the stagnant layers of surplus populations), may help build a world where the needs of those who are different from them can be satisfied. With these in mind, we can expand Heller's criteria of radical needs thus: Fourth, radical needs are intersectional; those at the intersection of many oppressions are the richest in needs. Fifth, the needs of those who are richest in needs are can potentially liberate all. Sixth, the radical need of flourishing is system-shattering but world-building.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis, in which I tried to understand the relationship between exploitation and oppression, has largely been a work of translation between various different traditions of thought through the connecting concept of disability. Beginning by comparing three different approaches to oppression/exploitation, I first tried to create a 6-point provisional framework of oppression: 1) Oppression is systematic, structurally reproduced and intention-independent; 2) Oppression takes place at the level of the social group. The oppressed are oppressed as a member of at least one (or more than one) oppressed group; 3) Oppression has a penalizing, prohibiting, limiting, immobilizing, molding and reducing effect on the oppressed. Oppression is embodied and internalized by the oppressed. 4) Oppression under capitalism often takes the form of exploitation that can be captured by Marx's conception thereof: appropriation of one class's surplus labour for the benefit of a dominant class. Oppression is intimately tied to division of labour. 5) Oppression is made possible and maintained through actual or threatened, overt or covert, direct or structural, economic or extra-economic violence. 6) Oppressive systems tend to be intersectional, interlocking, simultaneous, and in some cases, mutually constitutive.

This thesis particularly explored items 4, 5, (Chapter 4) and 6 (Chapter 3), that is, the objective characteristics of oppression/exploitation, especially as to what mechanisms it operates with (division of labour, intersectionality, etc.). But on the whole, and especially in Chapter 5, I tried to argue for a dialectical account of exploitation where all of the aspects of oppression/exploitation can in principle be

incorporated, including the more subjective aspects. In Chapter 3, I tried to understand the relationship between exploitation and oppression by studying disability from the point of view of intersectionality (an oppression-prioritizing framework). In earlier, intersectional work, while exploitation was built into the definition of oppression(s) taken up by the framework, it was subsumed under oppression. Exploitation as a separate concept, however, was barely featured in disability research which through the social model of disability, foregrounded disability as oppression. Inspired by civil rights and feminist struggles, disability studies has worked with a minority model of oppression and sometimes conceptualized disability oppression as being similar to other oppressions taken up by intersectional paradigms. On the other hand, disability has also been conceptualized as a unique oppression radically different from all others. More recent intersectional work on disability used both these ideas (disability as different and disability as the same, disability as minority and majority model) in order to argue that disability is a foundational or organizing principle that underlies all other identities/oppressions. In connection with this claim, disability also came to the fore as a category that historically appears at the advent of capitalism as a category to be excluded from labour (and from exploitation). On the whole, at the end of this chapter, disability emerged as a form of non-exploitative oppression.

In Chapter 4, I tried to understand how disability figured in the theory of surplus populations, an exploitation-prioritizing paradigm, and what we could discern about the relationship between oppression and exploitation by looking at disability from the point of view of surplus populations. This chapter also sought answers to some of the questions raised Chapter 3. For instance, in Chapter 3,

disability was suggested to be an oppression among others in intersectional paradigms but one with a special, almost originary, relationship to capitalism. In Chapter 4, I tried to understand if this was indeed the case and if capitalism was indeed a disability-producing system. I applied the same line of questioning to surplus populations: whether surplus populations are specific to capitalism, and, whether capitalism is a system that produces classes of people who are superfluous to capital. Another line of questioning about disability (a unique kind of oppression or similar to other oppressions, a minority condition or a majority condition, the exception or the norm?) was also applied to surplus populations.

The questions about capitalism received affirmative answers for both disability and surplus populations: capitalism turned out to be productive of both disability and surplus populations. Further, it turned out that surplusness and disability were both majority conditions: surplus populations make up the majority of the world's workforce and disabled persons are a majority within this population (about 60 %). According to data from United Nations (2015) and from Benanav's (2014) work, altogether 1 in 3 people world-wide turned out be either disabled or surplus or both. The question as to whether disability is a unique oppression also got an indirect answer: unless the stagnant layer of surplus populations which has a sublayer of a demographic that cannot work no matter how the society is rearranged (such as severe cognitive and physical disabilities) is added (as in Marx's original account) disability cannot be completely captured by a theory of surplus populations (such as the newer renditions which omit this sublayer). I also looked at how dominant society deals with both disability and surplus populations; both surplus populations and people with disabilities turned out to be either absorbed by capital or

integrated into abled society (only a portion of them and only temporarily) to be then regurgitated back into superfluity after which these populations are managed/warehoused in either institutions of social control or through spatial confinement in slums on a global scale.

From the point of view of surplus populations, disability turned out to be an oppressive form of non-exploitation, whereas from the point of view of intersectionality it had turned out to be a non-exploitative oppression. The difference between the two is subtle but important. Both in intersectional paradigms and in the theory of surplus populations, disability was partially defined through its exclusion from capitalism. But when examined from the point of surplus populations the exclusion from exploitation itself becomes an oppression: because capitalism is characterized as a system that renders populations market- and labour-dependent for their survival exclusion from labour (and, thus, exploitation) signals violent oppression. Because capital-labour contradiction is the main contradiction of capitalism, the relationship between oppression and exploitation in the case of surplus populations becomes a causal one: surplus populations/disabled people are oppressed because they are not exploited. Whereas from the point of view of intersectionality this causality may not be this apparent because from the point of view of intersectionality, capital-labour contradiction is not the main, or the only, contradiction. From the social model of disability, it can even be said that the disabled are oppressed because they are not exploited, because they are shut out from the system of labour.

I then tried to untangle and further complicate the non-exploitative oppression/oppressive non-exploitation dialectics by making use of Harvey's (2003)

expansive reproduction/accumulation by dispossession model on the hand, and Patricia Hill Collins's (2001) matrix of domination on the other. Tracking disability within surplus populations via using the transition from expanded reproduction to accumulation by dispossession, on the one hand, and tracking disability within surplus populations through intersectionality, on the other, we saw that being at the intersection of multiple oppressions in addition to disability selects one to be at the lower layers of surplus populations. By using this matrix, it became possible to see that the systematic, structural and literal violence with which capitalist accumulation excludes, exploits and ghettoizes surplus populations tends to be drawn across lines of gender, race, nationality, ability and other social categories of differentiation and mediation. That is, surplus populations and intersectionality turned out to be compatible. But the compatibility of the theory of surplus populations and intersectionality was not enough to put them into full dialectical conversation. In Marx's model of surplus populations, the latent and stagnant parts were constructed against class decomposition. In order to unleash the power of this analysis, which happened to be contained at the point where Marx excluded certain layers of the surplus population from working class proper, we needed to centralize these layers instead of secluding them. Hansen (2015) brought class composition and class differentiation together through the concept of common needs (such as access to means of (re)production).

In Chapter 5, I tried to construct a needs model inspired by Marx's understanding of radical needs as those needs which are created but cannot be satisfied within systems of oppression/exploitation and the satisfaction of which threatens such systems. But differently than Marx, Heller, and Sayers, who all view

needs as powers and capacities, I centralized disability which tends to be associated with need and dependency but not power. In Struggle Over Needs, Fraser showed how needs claims can be depoliticized, politicized, and redepoliticized; it was also possible to show how this trajectory can be followed in the disability movement in the US after the conceptual revolution of the social model successfully politicized disability as an oppression. Fraser (2013) also showed how needs claims tend to be nested and how needs can be politicized by constructing long and rich in-order-to chains from the personal to the political. As such, the needs model also promised to capture the subjective aspects of the oppression/exploitation framework from Chapter 2. Further, in A Genealogy of Dependency, Fraser & Gordon showed how the concept of dependency, a neutral term in pre-capitalistic societies which denoted the general social relationships of subordination became in post-industrial capitalism a highly stigmatized, depoliticized, pathologized and individualized category completely devoid of social relationships of subordination. In their genealogy, the differentiation of the four registers (the social, the political, the economic, the moral/psychological) of the meaning of dependency importantly signaled a differentiation of exploitation from oppression, mystifying the former, and naturalizing the latter (for certain groups). The economic register went through a double mystification: that of the capital-labour relationship as exploitation and subordination, and that of the reproductive labour of so-called dependents as work. From this perspective, Marxist struggles that centralize expanded reproduction can be viewed as struggles to de-mystify exploitation whereas struggles that centralize accumulation by dispossession, such as intersectionality, can be viewed as struggles to de-naturalize the oppression of groups largely cast out of the capital-labour

relationship. In a sense, then, this genealogy of dependency can double up as a genealogy of the separation of exploitation from oppression.

While Fraser & Gordon did not incorporate disability in their genealogy, the transition from generalized relations of subordination in the pre-capitalist era to the occlusion of market- and labour-dependency, the invisibility of reproductive labour, and to the stigmatization of certain forms of dependency primarily defined as exclusion from wage-labour, placed the disabled in the dependent category. In both Struggle over Needs and Genealogy of Dependency, there was a call towards the historicization and politicization of needs and dependency but there was not an explicit definition of needs and dependency as positive and empowering categories. So at this point I turned to the accounts of Heller (1976) and Sayers (2003), who, through Marx, gave a positive account of needs. While Sayers's and Heller's notion of need as power and capacity is important in a discussion on disability, the focus on human productive power above all, makes their accounts, especially Sayers's account which views dependency in a negative light, less suitable for a disability perspective. By centralizing the needs of persons with severe cognitive disabilities, Khader (2008) was able to reimagine both needs and dependency as powers, powers of agency and relationality, as well as an example of politicizing the oppression of persons with severe cognitive disabilities and the concomitant politicization of the exploitation of dependency workers. Through a needs model then it was possible to capture the dialectic between oppression and exploitation, by demystifying and making them visible and connecting them through in-order-to-chains.

The point of understanding oppression and exploitation is to dismantle them. Hence, the final chapter also contained the seeds of a utopian vision. Inspired by

Davis's vision of a world where disability, dependence, and dispossession are the norm, I proposed universal access (to the means of (re)production, resources, spaces, etc) in particular and flourishing (based on relational agency) in general as radical needs and expanded Heller's formulation of radical needs by adding that radical needs are intersectional; those at the intersection of many oppressions are the richest in needs; the needs of those who are richest in needs are can potentially liberate all; and that the radical need of flourishing is system-shattering but world-building. Perhaps the society of the future is not a Society of Associated Producers as Marx imagined but a Society of Interdependent Caretakers where disability and dependence are the norm and the sources of our strength. A society built from the sit-point of the most vulnerable. This is a society where the two models of oppression/exploitation are dialectically intertwined and no longer opposed.

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