

MAN-ANIMAL-MACHINE: EXPLORING THE POSTHUMAN LIFE IN
TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES AND LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER

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ABSTRACT

Man-Animal-Machine: Exploring the Posthuman Life in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Lady Chatterley's Lover*

In this thesis, I aim to present a Deleuzian posthumanist reading of Thomas Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and D.H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. In my research, I have mainly focused on how these two early 20th century novels disrupt the centrality of the human subject and explore the ways of alternative hybrid relationships formed through the human-animal-machine affiliations. This analysis has connected the posthumanist theory with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's writings in order to especially focus on the concepts of "becoming-animal" and "desiring-machines," which I present as the preliminary posthumanist gestures taking place in Hardy and Lawrence's novels. Subsequently, my interpretation sees both authors' works as prefigurations of a posthumanist stance, rather than a nostalgic one, as is generally accepted.

ÖZET

İnsan-Hayvan-Makine: *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* ve *Lady Chatterley's Lover*

Romanlarında Posthumanist Yaşamı Keşfetmek

Bu tezde Thomas Hardy'nin *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* ve D.H. Lawrence'ın *Lady Chatterley's Lover* romanlarının Deleuzecü posthumanist bir yorumlamasını sunmayı hedefliyorum. Araştırmamda bu iki 20. yy. başı romanının insanı merkeze koyan görüşleri nasıl altüst ettiğine ve insan-hayvan-makine bağlantıları aracılığıyla alternatif melez ilişkiler oluşturabilecek yolları nasıl keşfettiklerine odaklandım. Bu analiz posthumanist teori ile Gilles Deleuze ve Felix Guattari'nin eserlerini öncelikle "hayvan-oluş" ve "arzu-makineleri" kavramlarına odaklanmak için bir araya getirdi; tez boyunca bu kavramları Hardy ve Lawrence'ın romanlarında yer alan öncü posthumanist işaretler olarak ele alacağım. Sonuç olarak analizlerim bu iki yazarın eserlerini genel geçer nostaljik tutumlar çerçevesinde incelemektense, posthumanist görüşün ön belirtileri olarak sunmayı amaçlıyor.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES.....	9
2.1 Introducing <i>Tess</i> : At the lines of flight.....	9
2.2 Flux and reflux, or how to “deterritorialize” <i>Tess</i>	15
2.3 Tess of the land.....	19
2.4 Tess of the animal.....	25
2.5 Conclusion: Hardy’s “achromatic chaos of things”.....	32
CHAPTER 3: LADY CHATTERLEY’S LOVER.....	34
3.1 “No smooth road into the future”: Introducing <i>Lady Chatterley</i>	34
3.2 Unfolding the dynamics of the egg: <i>Body without organs</i> and <i>desiring machines</i>	40
3.3 <i>Lady Chatterley</i> and the vital nature.....	45
3.4 Twiddling machines and desiring bodies of <i>Lady Chatterley</i>	53
CHAPTER 4: UNFOLDING LANGUAGE.....	66
4.1 Introduction.....	66
4.2 Explaining the posthuman possibilities of novel.....	72
4.3 <i>Tess</i> , transversal roads and the chronotope.....	82
4.4 <i>Lady Chatterley</i> , chemistry of language and allotropy.....	90
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	98
REFERENCES.....	102

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the opening lines of his essay “Literature and Life,” Gilles Deleuze (1997) declares that “[w]riting is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience” (p. 225). Rather, it is “a process,” “a passage of Life that traverses both the living and the lived” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 225). As the notion of becoming, rather than being, is central to both Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s philosophy,¹ throughout their oeuvre they seek to reflect the importance of fluctuating, multiple, transforming structures against the strict framings and fixed positionalities of the world. Becoming means continually entering into new relations, which keep the flux of life going. For Deleuze and Guattari (2000), the world of the living being is always “in the process of becoming” which means “developing, coming into being or advancing, and inscribing itself within a temporal dimension that is irreducible and nonclosed” (p. 96).

The novels *Tess of the D’Urbervilles* and *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* both specifically focus on various becomings at their contextual and structural cores. These works create alternative paths—lines of flight—against the normative structures of the modern world, offering not-yet-fully-formed ways to resist the rigid political and social configurations of the early 20th century England. The anxiety for

¹ Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical path can be also situated within the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Their philosophy is largely formulated as more materialist, thus rather Aristotelian than Platonic, since they bear resemblance with Aristotle in terms of a “non-reductive,” “non-Platonic” hylomorphism which is “intended to embrace the insights of materialists” without separating the soul and body, putting the soul in every material existence, every single *body* (Shields, 2016, p. xviii). Yet, while Aristotle rejects Plato’s transcendental, idealist, monodic views on life, Deleuze and Guattari also incorporate monodic and transcendental—or virtual—paradigms into their project.

the modern state of the world has its roots in the Romantic period, as the Romantic reflection holds both the dream of “restoring nature to a state untouched by human hands” as well as the fearful “vision of a postapocalyptic world exhausted by humanity’s consumption of natural resources” (Schliephake, 2017, p. 3). This is more so apparent after the Romantics; subsequently, an intense de-centring of the human subject with an impulse to turn towards nature and nonhuman elements seems inevitable by the time Thomas Hardy and D.H. Lawrence produce their works. Therefore, it is no surprise that the discussion of Hardy’s and Lawrence’s aforementioned texts holds a significant place in French philosophers’ writings.

The lure of both novelists’ works for Deleuze and Guattari is simply undeniable, since in the fiction of Hardy and Lawrence, the human (non)subject² performs a flight from its overly-structured definition and finds alternative life lines in order to exist. These lines, in a way, represent the positions or instances that allow for going beyond the regulated territories. Deleuze and Guattari (2005) further explain the concept as follows:

Lines of flight, for their part, never consist in running away from the world but rather in causing runoffs, as when you drill a hole in a pipe; there is no social system that does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight. (p. 204)

Lines of flight cause “runoffs” and make the rigid political, aesthetical, social, cultural, and literary categories and systems “leak”. Hardy and Lawrence’s writings create these very leaks by refusing to be stabilized contextually as well as structurally; thus, in this essay, I aim to look at both of these fields of instability at

² The central human subject who thinks and understands everything around him, and attributes meaning to the world is completely diminished when we look at Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. If we are to talk about a subject in Deleuze and Guattari’s works, this subject is completely the product of a delusional mind, a subject who is “produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 17). Moreover, this subject “is not at the center . . . but on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000, p. 20).

the both. On the one hand, I will consider the plot and context of these works while analyzing how they can be perceived within a Deleuzian posthumanist stance; on the other, I will try to show how language and style function throughout Hardy and Lawrence's novels as they emphasize the ceaseless fluxes and de-centering foregrounded in Deleuzian philosophy.

Here comes the other philosophical question of this thesis: Why call Hardy and Lawrence's texts "posthumanist"? The immense discontent and restlessness towards the reality of the time and era emerge in both *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* quite strongly. Hardy (2008) senses "the ache of modernism" (p. 140), while Lawrence (1959), similarly, recognizes his time as "essentially a tragic age" (p. 37). Yet, within these superficially ominous, bleak sentiments Hardy and Lawrence both realize that a new kind of environment is being formed in the modern age. Neither of the two novels embodies a nostalgia for an idyllic past or dreams of an environment being restored to its untainted, pre-industrialized state; instead, I argue, the focus of the narratives lies in the entanglements between human and non-human bodies. That is how these texts reflect a posthuman stance rather than continuing to glorify the human form. Within Hardy and Lawrence's writings, human becomes a more complex concept; landscape, nature, and machines are experienced in terms of the same categories as human subjects, rather than within another set of non-human-specific classifications. Therefore, I consider Hardy and Lawrence as posthumanists in the sense that they are able to imagine a life that is not strictly human-centered, a life that exceeds the traditional categories and formulations of what is human, and what is not. In *What Is Posthumanism?*, Cary Wolfe (2010) formulates his posthumanism as a form of "anti-anthropocentrism," an anterior moment of humanism which is able to interpret the world without the tyrannical centralization of

the human life (p. 62). Read from this kind of posthumanist perspective, there is in the works of both Hardy and Lawrence the ability to see beyond the limiting order and to write with a sensibility that encompasses all that there is in life, without the separation of human and all else. Admitting that posthumanism is much more blatantly visible in the more contemporary works of fiction, here in this thesis my aim is to show that even in the more classical, canonical, seemingly more straightforward texts of *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* there exists a posthumanist gesture. Similarly to what Roland Barthes says in his analysis of Balzac's *Sarrassine* in *S/Z* (1974), even in the most classic narratives, within realism, there is "the infinite circularity of codes" and these "codes never stop" (p. 55). These unending codes address the infinite plurality of text,³ hence it is always possible rewrite, reframe and reinterpret the already existing codes of a work, which is what I aim to do by bringing posthumanism into this conversation. Although it goes without saying that their formulations of history and society are not perfectly posthumanist without any problematic moments, the texts of *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* are my examples to show how the more recent conversation of posthumanism is already traceable in the classic works of early 20th century.

There is a recognition of life as a pure *force* in Hardy and Lawrence's texts—an erratic, transformative, "irresistible," and "automatic" force—which remains at odds with the artificial, political formulations and stratifications of the modern industrialized world. The latter target the force of life as a free agent, in order to limit and control its power. I would suggest that these configurations in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* correlate with the clash between the Deleuzian "plane of consistency" (or

³ Again, referring to Barthes (1974), it is important to note that "with regard to the text, there is no 'primary,' 'natural,' 'national,' 'mother' critical language . . . the text is multilingual; there is no entrance language or exit language for the textual dictionary" (p. 120).

“immanence”) and “plane of organization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 269).

Following this, I would argue that the common overarching theme of both *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* is the clash between these two planes: life as a pure, uncontrolled force and life as a selective, politicized, limiting formulation. For the purpose of unfolding this theme, in the first two chapters of this thesis I will analyze the persistent maneuver of Hardy and Lawrence’s narratives between the understanding of life as an all-inclusive force—the plane of consistency—and the forces that posit organized, limiting forms, disrupting the flow of differences—the plane of organization. I hope to elucidate how Hardy and Lawrence’s favoring of the former and opposition to the latter develop in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* through posthumanist tendencies of deconstructing the human—by depriving the characters from a strong sense of subjecthood—and seeing a life beyond the human domain.

Thematically, the particular materialist receptivity and posthumanist suggestions in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* appear in the narratives in distinct modes, as a result of different kinds of connections formed between the human and environment. For instance, in *Tess*, Hardy proposes a hybrid nature that allows the horizontalization and merging of man and animal; this hybridity shares the vision of Deleuze and Guattari in connection with their concept of becoming-animal. In the first chapter, I will extensively discuss the concept of becoming and especially how becoming-animal enables Hardy to de-center the human subject, and dismantle the human and nature distinction. As becoming-animal is a very valuable concept in terms of looking at Hardy’s anti-humanist impulses in *Tess*, a similar anti-humanist angle is shared by Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley*. In his novel, Lawrence studies the human within his posthuman potentiality while emphasizing the process of production, both in man and machine; this ultimately turns into a vision in which

men become desiring-machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 2). In the second chapter of my thesis, I hope to elucidate how Lawrence manages to convey that “the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever” by embracing the mechanical, machinic bodies (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 2).

On the level of language, the final chapter of the thesis will foreground the discourse and style of both novels. Although Hardy and Lawrence’s texts are not particularly avant-garde and experimental, I would like to propose that even in the most classical narrative formulations such as *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley*, there takes place a dismantling of the human subject and univocality. This discussion will touch upon how novel as a strictly written genre—as opposed to the oral origins of epic or poetry or drama—both highlights the writing (the very physical, material element of language) and simultaneously incorporates multiple voices through various characters and discourses which are interwoven together. Even the more classic texts such as *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* have the potential to show that the form of the novel enables posthumanist connections more than any other form as it entails “a vast plane of composition that is not abstractly preconceived but constructed as the work progresses, opening, mixing, dismantling, and reassembling” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 188).

Again, the novel form is important to my discussion precisely because it begins in writing contrary to poetry, epic, or drama. By virtue of its origin, its materiality is much more predominant. For Derrida (1997), as opposed to speech, “the notion of writing, trace, gramme [written mark], or grapheme” cannot be merely “determined as human,” as it “name[s] the element” instead (p. 9). By focusing on the written form, physical voice (sound) and speech are now less connected to the human logos, but become traces, material phenomena which enable the incorporation

of what is beyond-human.⁴ Similarly, as he deems Derrida's deconstruction a proto-posthumanist movement, Wolfe (2010) states that this "trace structure of communication extends beyond the human to nonhuman animals and indeed exceeds . . . the boundary between the living and the mechanical or technical" (p. 6). While I am not claiming that works belonging to poetry, drama, or any other form cannot be posthuman, the novel genre's focus on the written element as well as its complex and multi-layered discourses reveal posthumanist tendencies much more clearly.

Keeping in mind Derrida's case for the importance of trace, the written word, and deconstruction as an early posthumanist gesture, I would also like to bring forth the works of Mikhail Bakhtin for a more specific analysis of the discourse of the novel and to show how *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* present similar gestures. In particular, through Bakhtin's ideas of dialogism and chronotope, I will look at how Deleuze and Guattari's posthuman approach can be applied to the literary texts through the stylistic elements of language. Bakhtinian formulations regarding the discourse of the novel are effective in terms of revealing the networks and entangled relationships (the absence of the authorial discourse, the plurality and synchronicity of the voices in the novel) in life in a similar way to how Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization show these shifting lines. As the French philosophers explicitly state in *What is Philosophy?*, "Bakhtin's theory of the novel goes in this direction by showing, from Rabelais to Dostoyevsky, the coexistence of contrapuntal, polyphonic, and plurivocal compound" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 188).

When we talk about the discourse of the novel and the different levels of speech produced within the written text, the material, stylistic, plastic level of

⁴ Trace, going back to Derrida (1997), is an "arche-phenomenon of 'memory,' which must be thought before the opposition of nature and culture, animality and humanity" (p. 70).

language gains importance (the words themselves materialize, in a sense) instead of solely looking at what the words mean. When discussing language, Deleuze and Guattari similarly foreground the certain effects that language manufactures rather than the importance of meaning:

What are the connections, what are the disjunctions, the conjunctions, what use is made of the syntheses? It represents nothing, but it produces. It means nothing, but it works. Desire makes its entry with the general collapse of the question “What does it mean?” No one has been able to pose the problem of language except to the extent that linguists and logicians have first eliminated meaning; and the greatest force of language was only discovered once a work was viewed as a machine, producing certain effects, amenable to a certain use. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p.109)

Following this, the production of words appears to be more significant for Deleuze and Guattari than the production of meaning. The representation and meaning do not matter while the production and work itself is given immense importance; hence, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of language is very much related to assemblages of words, the networks they form, the free-floating structure they built rather than communication or identification. For the French philosophers, Hardy and Lawrence are among the writers who “know how to leave, to scramble the codes, to cause flows to circulate, to traverse the desert of the body without organs” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 132-133). Henceforth, in the following chapters, I will try to show how in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley*, both Hardy and Lawrence’s use of narrative and dialogue oscillates between abstraction and embodiment, creating lines of flight and disruption of the dominance of meaning and signification, and how they ultimately carry subtle traces of the posthumanist thought of today.

CHAPTER 2

TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES

2.1 Introducing *Tess*: At the lines of flight

As noted by many critics of Hardy's work, his fiction is always located in between: historically, his writing is situated in between the late Victorians and early modernists; within the narrative, his characters are positioned in between fate and free will; his preferred setting, Wessex, is in between old customs and new times—a “border country,” following Raymond Williams (1973), which reflects “the complications of change” (p. 197). Borders, in every sense of the word, are crucial to Hardy's fiction, just as they are fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari's writings. The French philosophers explicitly formulate their theories through Hardy at various instances. Hardy's borders, for example, appear as “lines of flight” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, as Deleuze and Guattari (2005) emphasize how Hardy's work foregrounds endless change and becomings that destabilize the world and create hybrid identities, declaring that the author's novels engage in “drawing lines, active lines of flight or of positive deterritorialization” (p. 186). Hardy's drawing of these lines of flight is most apparent in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, whose eponymous character reflects a “break of continuity between her earlier and present existence,” always experiencing a border presence in the world (Hardy, 2008, p. 327). Following this, I propose a study of *Tess* through ecocritical posthumanist paradigms, within the well-established connection between Deleuze and Hardy; I believe this framing will offer a new understanding of how Hardy touches upon some remarkable ideas that anticipate Deleuzian philosophy.

In *Germinal Life*, while analyzing Hardy's *Tess*,⁵ Keith Ansell-Pearson (1977) proposes that "we don't need to read *Tess*, the becoming of a 'pure woman',⁶ solely in terms of a Darwinian pessimism or chronically as a straightforward exercise in genealogy" (p. 193). Yet, in the end, this noteworthy exploration tends to remain within a more traditional territory, since he returns to the historical determinism's prominence, and deems *Tess* as "[o]nly memory, no becoming" (Ansell-Pearson, 1977, p. 192). In order to complicate Ansell-Pearson's argument—or any reading that still offers a purely deterministic interpretation of *Tess*—I suggest exploring the following passage from Hardy's text:

The irresistible, universal, automatic tendency to find sweet pleasure somewhere, which pervades all life, from the meanest to the highest, had at length mastered *Tess*. Being even now only a young woman of twenty, one who mentally and sentimentally had not finished growing, it was impossible that any event should have left upon her an impression that was not in time capable of transmutation. (Hardy, 2008, p. 119)

In this passage from the novel, Hardy invokes one of the fundamental elements central to the text, the capacity for "transmutation." He sees "all life" being affected by this "tendency to find sweet pleasure somewhere"; from minute to vast forms, all things move in an "irresistible," "universal," and "automatic" manner. It is a sprawling transference of agency and sensibility, equally distributed in each and every direction. This tendency is a coherent force, since it is "universal" and "automatic"; yet, simultaneously, it is erratic and bodily, "irresistible" and aiming for "pleasure." Hardy delivers a totalizing vision, in which multiplicity of intense,

⁵ Ansell-Pearson's account is one of the significant attempts to read Hardy with Deleuze; his compelling work provides a thorough analysis of the "rhizomatic assemblages" in *Tess* and explores how Hardy can be read without a strictly rigid Darwinian perspective, whereas historical determinism is still seen as prevalent by many critics in Hardy's works (Ansell-Pearson, 1977, p. 191).

⁶ In the introductory part of Oxford World's Classics edition of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, Penny Boulmelha (2008) writes "[t]he greatest challenge to contemporary sensibilities, however, came in the shape of the novel's subtitle: 'A Pure Woman'" (xvii). While Hardy was applauded by the majority of feminist critics of his time, the novel was mostly disliked and deemed immoral by others. *Tess*' sensuality and sexual account were unacceptable for her to be deemed "pure" in the late 19th century.

material, ever-changing impressions and connections interact freely. In this configuration, any “event” delivers impressions, and any event has the capacity to leave marks on everything it touches. Life is not pre-determined; rather, it is unpredictable in its spontaneity, in its irresistible, impulsive tendency. Nothing, then, remains detached from the endless impressions of life, nothing is fixed, nothing is final. Tess can be no different; she exists amidst these connections, she is a part of “all life,” still “growing” as she is being affected by and embracing of the continual change. In life, as the text indicates, all is becoming.⁷

Hardy’s articulation of such a world gives a crucial insight into how life is imagined and what kind of possibilities it contains in *Tess*. The potential which he brings about here is an understanding of life that is intrinsically connected with human and non-human beings alike. Tess’ body becomes a vehicle of change, since it is “a space that seems constantly on the verge of erasure” in Hardy (Law, 1997, p. 245). Therefore, her body, maybe more so than that of the author’s any other character, emerges as one of the main spaces of deterritorialization as it never remains stable or temporally fixed; rather, Tess is always in the process of losing her territory. Nonetheless, this unfixing of the territories is not exclusive to human body; there is a deterritorialization of all environment in Hardy’s work. Only as a result of this deterritorialization, his imagined environment becomes full of collaborative landscapes⁸ and affects. There is a recognition of life as pure force in Hardy—an

⁷ The notion of *becoming*, rather than *being*, is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, as they seek to reflect the importance of fluctuating, multiple, transforming structures against the strict framings and fixed positionalities of the world throughout their oeuvre. Becoming is to continually enter into new relations, which keeps the flux of life going. For Deleuze and Guattari, the world of the living being is always “in the process of becoming” which means “developing, coming into being or advancing, and inscribing itself within a temporal dimension that is irreducible and nonclosed” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 96).

⁸ Val Plumwood (2006) suggests this concept of a “collaborative landscape,” as opposed to cultural and biocultural ones in order to decenter the agency of humans and living beings. A collaborative landscape includes both human and non-human elements, not just the living entities, since the term emphasizes

erratic, transformative, “irresistible,” and “automatic” force—which remains at odds with the artificial, political formulations and stratifications of the modern industrialized world. The latter target the force of life as a free agent, in order to obliterate its power. I would suggest that this configuration in *Tess* correlates with the clash between the Deleuzian “plane of consistency” (or “immanence”) and “plane of organization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 269). Hardy sees the force of life not only as a benevolent, vital, active, and creative power, but also as a destructive and random one.⁹ Moreover, for him, there is an unending complexity and differentiability in life. In fact, this connects with how Deleuze’s plane of consistency operates: it includes “events,” “transformations,” “nomadic essences,” “continuous variations,” and “becomings” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 507). However, this transversal and composite life force interacts with an opposing force: the plane of organization, which “effectively covers what we have called stratification,” by which Deleuze and Guattari (2005) refer to any system which imposes borders, whether social, political, or religious (p. 269).

In *Tess*, this stratification of life does not remain unnoticed. On the one hand, Hardy sees the boundless, limitless, and impulsive arrangement of all life; yet, on the other, he senses the “feelings which might almost have been called those of the age,” more precisely, “the ache of modernism” (Hardy, 2008, p. 140). This “ache of

“multiple interacting and collaborating agencies which can include humans but is never exhausted by them” (p. 125).

⁹ The two forces of life Deleuze and Guattari outline throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*, which also appear in *Tess*, evoke Friedrich Nietzsche’s distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian forces discussed in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Apollonian mode—“the *principium individuationis*”—shares similarities with the plane of organization as it enables “measured restraint,” (Nietzsche, 2008, p. 21), “wants to bring individual beings to rest by precisely drawing boundaries between them” and “confine the Hellenic culture” (Nietzsche, 2008, p.58). On the other hand, Dionysian is much like the plane of consistency, for that a Dionysian state represents “the shattering of the individual and his union with the original being” (Nietzsche, 2008, p.51) via its “annihilation of the usual limits and borders of existence” (Nietzsche, 2008, p.46). Against the restrictive Apollonian forces, Dionysian is the uncontrollable, chaotic, unifying life force which assimilates and transforms everything: “. . . wherever Dionysian broke through, the Apollonian was cancelled, absorbed, and annihilated” (Nietzsche, 2008, p.32).

modernism” arrives precisely from the workings of the plane of organization as it tries “to interrupt the movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, reterritory them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 270). Hardy’s characters completely resist this organizing force and reject being “subjects in a dimension of depth”— as William A. Cohen (2006) suggests, there are many critics who observe that “Hardy’s attention to people works against the establishment of deep, round characters with vivid lives” (p. 437).

Following this, I would argue that the overarching theme of *Tess* is the clash between these two planes; life as a pure, uncontrolled force and life as a selective, politicized, limiting formulation. For the purpose of unfolding this theme, I will analyze the persistent maneuver of Hardy’s narrative between the understanding of life as an all-inclusive force—the plane of consistency—and the forces that posit organized, limiting forms, disrupting the flow of differences—the plane of organization. I hope to elucidate how Hardy’s favoring of the former and opposition to the latter develop in *Tess* through posthumanist tendencies of deconstructing the human—by depriving his characters from a strong sense of subjecthood—and seeing a life beyond the human domain. Indeed, human subjectivity is never the focal point of Hardy’s fiction, rather, the in-betweenness of his characters and border experiences taking place between the human body and nature as a “biopolitical assemblage,” as seen in *Tess*, occupy the heart of his works (Ortiz-Robles, 2016, p. 83).

If we go back to the first quotation, to the “irresistible, universal, automatic tendency to find sweet pleasure somewhere, which pervades all life,” it is evident that this wording foregrounds a complex structure of connections which reveals both the possibilities of countless differences and the singular totality embedded in life

itself. In that sense Hardy's life becomes "the production of potential relations," and it does not have "a process, development, or trajectory that unfolds in time taken or time lived; rather, there are random, unthinking, mechanical, and directionless changes that may or may not produce relations" (Colebrook, 2008, p. 73). Hardy's Tess feels the pains of tension, as she aches for the mankind conditioned to forget its rootedness in the world. As an act of resistance to this stratum of life, against the forces of the plane of organization,¹⁰ Hardy's narrative produces new potential relations and kinships between Tess and the environment, which gesture towards an affective, posthumanist vision of the ecosystem. Hardy understands the human in a way that breaks the human; he deconstructs the category so completely that there materialize new hybrid, deterritorialized, mutable becomings. In my analysis of this vision, I will concentrate on two main modes of contact through which Hardy dismantles and deterritorializes the pre-formulated borders between the human and the non-human. The first mode merges human and nature, land. The second mode appears when Hardy breaches the territorialized space between of both human and animal bodies by creating human-animal hybrids. These two modes escape the dialectically organized framings—or "binary machines"¹¹—as they keep negating previously established conceptual arrangements through creating new becomings and refusing to assume fixed positions; they reveal Hardy's recognition of the force of life as anarchic and totally liberating.

¹⁰ The most obvious example of how the plane of organization operates is the functioning of the state powers. Against the free-flowing force of life, the political categories imposed by the state limit the flux and endless differing of life. Institutions operate in a constantly organizing and arranging mode through politicized agendas they impose. Becomings and deterritorializing acts are resistance to the organized impositions; they flee from the margins, and "remain before all technics of identifiability, hence preserving [themselves] from all State preemptive violence" (Goh, 2009, p. 43).

¹¹ Binary machines of Deleuze and Guattari (2005) are "great machines of direct binarization" (p. 227). These machines are through which the plane of organization continues its effective regulations over life, as they function in order to "give us a well-defined status, the resonances we enter into, the system of overcoding that dominates us" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 212).

2.2 Flux and reflux, or how to “deterritorialize” *Tess*

If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe . . . This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 161)

Deleuze and Guattari suggest deterritorialization as a method, a way of producing “potential movements” against “the strata.” This method of deterritorialization go hand in hand with the notion of “lines of flight,”¹² a concept referring to “movements of deterritorialization and destratification” which cause “conjugated flows to pass and escape and bring[...] forth continuous intensities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 3, 161). Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari even associate deterritorialization with “creative flights” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 190); the latter encompass “power of becoming,” interrupt and suspend “familiar, confining, formal possibilities” and “their prescribed organic and social requirements” (Hughes, 1997, p. 46).

Deterritorialization is such a key method not only for Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, but for Hardy as well since the life he depicts involves constant “flux and reflux—rhythm of change” which “alternate and persist in everything” (Hardy, 2008, p. 371). Deterritorialization, expressed as “movement and becoming from which distinct things are actualized,” enables this constant flux Hardy deems

¹² These lines, in a way, represent the positions or instances that allow for going beyond the regulated territories. Deleuze and Guattari further explain the concept as follows: “Lines of flight, for their part, never consist in running away from the world but rather in causing runoffs, as when you drill a hole in a pipe; there is no social system that does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 204). Lines of flight cause “runoffs” and make the rigid political, aesthetical, social, cultural, and literary categories and systems “leak”. Subsequently, they work as opposed to the plane of organization. They can “also pertain to the trajectory of becoming-animal” since Deleuze and Guattari mention “animal lines of flight” (Goh, 2009, p. 54).

necessary for the force of life (Colebrook, 2012, p. 51). It is the event in which “becoming escapes or detaches from its original territory” that is critical for disrupting the order (Colebrook, 2012, p. 57-58). Without the constant flux of change—taking place between deterritorialization, which keeps the plane of consistency active, and reterritorialization, the opposing restrictive power of the plane of organization—movement and becomings in life would be rendered impossible. To keep the flux, Hardy’s *Tess* offers these life lines, lines of flight, in order to deterritorialize the strictly divided binaries operating on the environment by proposing a hybrid nature that allows a horizontalization and possibilities of becomings. Since territorializations (and reterritorializations) also actively take place through the plane of organization, in order to counter this, deterritorializations must take place in all life to undo the constantly organized strata and borders, and to keep all life at the plane of consistency.

To go back to the tension at the heart of *Tess*—which arises in between Hardy’s understanding of life as pure force which encompasses impressions and “irresistible” tendencies and the stratifications of the modern world—methods of deterritorialization that Hardy employs actively create lines of flight that offer potentialities to go beyond the human. It is crucial to foreground this concept as Hardy’s creation of these lines throughout *Tess* emerges in the moments when the narrative emphasizes becomings—modes of transformations, impressions, movements—through the merging of the human body, nature, animals, and land. By allowing becomings and deterritorializing acts in *Tess*, Hardy is able to oppose the strata of the plane of organization—the endless territorialization of life, inclusive of human and non-human bodies—and preserve the force of life.

Without a doubt, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is central to ecological posthumanist¹³ and affective materialist theories in its strong departure from human-centric discourse by turning towards the environment, matter, and all life rather than focusing only on the human subject. The concept of nature in posthumanist thought no longer refers to just the wilderness and landscape; instead, it is an all-embracing physical environment,¹⁴ all of oikos—home, habitation, hence “eco” in ecosystem—equally inclusive of animate and inanimate beings, living and dead bodies as well as objects and things. Similarly, a Deleuzian approach to the environment enables an affective, materialist turn towards the physicality of the world,¹⁵ with great importance given to forming new ethical relations with all beings, while acknowledging repercussions of man's relationship with the world. Both positions, at their core, stand out as critiques of the Cartesian dualism¹⁶ that opposes the privileging of mind over body, the human intellect over the animal, transcendent over material. They highlight “the unstable and processive nature of all environments

¹³ I am using the term “ecological posthumanism” to amplify the importance of nature, things and animals being tantamount to that of the human in both Deleuze and Guattari's, and Hardy's cases as their texts engage in the physical environment as a whole, which is uniform and inseparable from humans. For this equalizing impulse, and de-centering of the human dominancy of nature, I consider the posthumanist framing of Hardy and Deleuzian philosophy as an inherently ecological one.

¹⁴ Especially with the relatively recent focus on ecocriticism—Cheryll Glotfelty (1996), in her introduction to *The Ecocritical Reader*, defines ecocriticism broadly as “the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment” (p. xviii)—there has been a significant turn towards the non-human. Ecocriticism is among the prominent posthumanist fields in which more careful and attentive approaches to nature as a complex system and its agential forces have been formulated.

¹⁵ Examples that have particularly influenced my approach here include Jane Bennet, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Duke UP, 2010; Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Edinburgh UP, 2004; Stacy Alaimo, *Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times*, U of Minnesota P, 2016; Timothy Clark, *Ecocriticism on the Edge: The Anthropocene as a Threshold Concept*, Bloomsbury, 2015; Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Duke UP, 2002 and *Politics of Affect*, Polity, 2015; Alexa Weik von Mossner, *Affective Ecologies: Empathy, Emotion, and Environmental Narrative*, The Ohio State UP, 2017; Nicole Seymour, *Strange Natures: Futurity, Empathy, and the Queer Ecological Imagination* U of Illinois P, 2013 and *Bad Environmentalism: Irony and Irreverence in the Ecological Age* U of Minnesota P, 2018.

¹⁶ Against the “ontological dualism” of Cartesianism and its correlationist mode—the inability to acknowledging the world as something independent from the reflexive and conscious human mind—thinking mind becomes a part of the world as an active agent in new materialisms (Coole and Frost 8). Yet, historically, this materialist trajectory is not something completely distinct from the modern philosophy, since vital, generative materialism of Spinoza—a contemporary of Descartes—provides to be the roots of these new materialisms emerging today (ibid.).

and objects,” inclusive of human and non-human alike (Bladow & Ladino, 2018, p. 8).

In the case of the critical works written on *Tess*, it can be seen how they have studied in detail the representations and/or problematizations of man’s relationship with nature from the very start.¹⁷ Among the few Deleuzian readings,¹⁸ John Hughes in his book *Lines of Flight* devotes a chapter to Hardy, focusing on the notion of eternal return, and examines Hardy’s break with the conventional methods of the modern novel. The most detailed study comes from D.E. Musslewhite, whose “*Tess of the d’Urbervilles: ‘A Becoming Woman’ or Deleuze and Guattari Go to Wessex*” provides a reading of *Tess* specifically through the philosophers’ concepts of the signifying and post-signifying regimes. Later, Cohen’s “Faciality and Sensation in Hardy’s *The Return of the Native*” explores how Hardy is interested in people not as characters with deeply rich inner lives and sense of subjecthood, but “as material objects, as agents of sensory interaction with the world” (Cohen, 2006, p. 437).

However, I will follow a different path from these previous works and study the in-betweenness of *Tess*—the thematic opposition between life as an uncontrollable force

¹⁷ Studies of the physical environment in Hardy’s works which proved to be very helpful for this paper include essays such as Jed Mayer’s “Germinating Memory: Hardy and Evolutionary Biology,” *Victorian Review*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2000, pp. 82-97; Audrey Jaffe’s “Hardy’s Exclusionary Realism,” *Novel: A Forum on Fiction*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2010, pp. 381-400; Elaine Scarry’s “Participial Acts: Working: Work and the Body in Hardy and Other Nineteenth-Century Novelists,” *Resisting Representation*. Oxford UP, 1994, pp. 48-90; John Paterson’s “Lawrence’s Vital Source: Nature and Character in Thomas Hardy,” *Nature and the Victorian Imagination*, U of California P, 1977, pp. 455-469, as well as David Musselwhite’s book *Social Transformations in Hardy’s Tragic Novels: Megamachines and Phantasms*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, and a collection of essays edited by Philip Mallett in *Thomas Hardy: Texts and Contexts*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

¹⁸ I do not intend to suggest that reading Hardy through Deleuze is such an unprecedented path. Without a doubt, the connection between the two has been articulated many times within the literary scholarship surrounding Hardy. Nevertheless, there are only a few comprehensive critical works bringing the two together. As D.E. Musselwhite (2000) declares in his essay, although Deleuze quite frequently expresses his admiration for the work of Hardy, it is “rather strange that even recent studies of the latter’s novels rarely attempt to draw on the theoretical potential of texts such as *Anti-Oedipus* or *A Thousand Plateaux*” (p. 499). William A. Cohen (2006) also notices the strange lack of Deleuzian critical readings of Hardy as he acknowledges that “Musselwhite’s recent work is the only full-scale attempt to bring Deleuze and Guattari into relation with Hardy” (449n1).

and the organized modern life—by framing the novel with a Deleuzian posthumanist approach. This outline, I believe, will bring about a new nexus for an in-depth exploration of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in Hardy’s novels.

Lastly, I would like to note that although nobody would regard Hardy a posthumanist in a strict sense, it is not difficult to realize how his work implies a great departure from the vision which centers on the human who sees the world as his/her object. Instead, by perceiving nature, land, and animals as no longer categories existing in opposition to man, Hardy formulates affective narrative moments that go beyond the depictions of wilderness and the natural world. Precisely through these affective moments he is able to disrupt “the everyday and opinionated links we make between words and experience” (Colebrook, 2012, p. 23). *Tess* suggests posthuman possibilities by showing the world as “great passionate pulse of existence, unwarped, uncontroled, untrammelled” and by unleashing a life force that enables to go beyond the strictly defined framework of what constitutes human—in the midst of modern age’s turbulences (Hardy, 2008, p. 176). As *Tess* provides a disruption in the stabilized meanings attributed to human and to what he is not, I will center upon the tension between two poles of life and expose the moments of deterritorialization in the text to argue that these instances reveal the narrative’s privileging of a life that is a pure, automatic force, as opposed to the forces of a life whose purpose is to regulate.

2.3 Tess of the land

In *The Nature Novel from Hardy to Lawrence*, John Alcorn states that “[t]he topography of Wessex, its vegetation, its insect and animal life, and the physical attitudes of its human inhabitants, are the raw material of Hardy’s fiction” (1).

Indeed, Hardy depicts every single being (in the most generous sense of the word) occupying the land in extraordinary detail. Although the privileging of nature is a descendant of the Romantic view, Hardy subverts the Romantic stance by trying “to obliterate the observing, thinking, feeling first-person, the Wordsworthian ‘I’” (Alcorn, 1977, p. 4). Because the subject, in Hardy, is not the self-knowing, self-reflecting man, the Romantic contemplations of a thoughtful “I” are erased; there is no more wandering as a lonely cloud,¹⁹ no more meditations of the self. Deleuze even declares that Hardy introduces his characters through “[i]ndividuation without a subject” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 40). This subjectless character deprived of subjecthood is needed, since otherwise, subjectification would impose “on the line of flight a segmentarity that is forever repudiating that line, and upon absolute deterritorialization a point of abolition that is forever blocking that deterritorialization or diverting it” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 134). Therefore, it is imperative that the reflexive “I” of the Romantic vision be replaced; *Tess*, for instance, features an omniscient narrator whose “vision is often Olympian and panoramic,” which makes the novel devoid of any kind of human self-reflexivity (Alcorn, 1977, p. 9). The obliteration of the “I” makes room for equally distributed attention given to simply every single part and parcel—human, land, animal, and inanimate objects alike—of the novel as well as creating a disruption of the order in a world that privileges the human. Moreover, according to Deleuze, Hardy’s non-subjects are “packets of sensations in the raw” and they “run over the heath like a

¹⁹ For example, William Wordsworth’s famous poem “I wandered lonely as a cloud” is dominated by the human perception which governs the world as Wordsworth keeps emphasizing the active observation—“I saw”, “I wandered”, “I gazed”—of the static world by speaker. While the world is full of impression-bearing potentials, in the poem’s “pensive mood,” these impressions are reshaped by the speaker’s “inward eye” through a contemplation process, rather than a mutually shared, immediate experience between man and nature which can be found in Hardy and Lawrence (Wordsworth & Gill, 2004, p. 164).

line of flight or a line of deterritorialization of the earth” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 40). Following Deleuze’s remarks, in this section I will analyze how Hardy’s characters—in the form of fleeing, ever-changing “packets of sensations”—enable the narrative to produce affective, posthuman connections between humans and natural landscapes by creating lines of flight that amplify the force of life.

In the first chapter of the novel Hardy depicts a scene in which a group of villagers—Tess among them—walks under the moonlight, returning back from a night of celebration to their homes:

Yet however terrestrial and lumpy their appearance just now to the mean unglamoured eye, to themselves the case was different. They followed the road with a sensation that they were soaring along in a supporting medium, possessed of original and profound thoughts; themselves and surrounding nature forming an organism of which all the parts harmoniously and joyously interpenetrated each other. They were as sublime as the moon and stars above them; and the moon and stars were as ardent as they. (Hardy, 2008, p. 74)

The imagery Hardy provides is the merging of human and land into one another. What he describes here is full affect and sensations, which transform human to land, land to human: the two form “an organism of which all the parts . . . interpenetrated each other.” Hardy deterritorializes both the land and the human; they become parts of one another, no longer fitting to the strictly defined territories of either “human” or “nature.” People and land turn into new becomings, hybrid presences, which, from the outside, look like anomalies; they appear as “lumpy” and “terrestrial” mutant-like entities. The way people and the land merge, the way their mutual becomings take place, reveals an involuting;²⁰ there is no longer a division between the two, as they join together, they become one. There is no increase, no excess; instead, the people

²⁰ According to Deleuze, one of the essential properties of becoming is “a matter of involuting”; it moves towards “an increasingly simple, economical” life (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 29). This involuting happens “by loving, by abandoning, by reducing, by simplifying, even if this means creating new elements and new relations of this simplification” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 29).

and the land involute and become a single entity, a transmuted flow of sensations—it is a reduction, a simplification.

Elaine Scarry (1994) notes that a joining of human and land appears frequently in Hardy's narratives; she writes that Hardy makes the earth "an extension of the human body," and reciprocally, he sees "the human being as the earth's eruption into intelligence onto its own surface" (85n12). Although Scarry notices how land and human come together in Hardy's writing frequently, her interpretation is retrospective and mythical in the sense that it hints at the human body and the earth's primordial unity, as if they are always an extension of one other. I would argue against a nostalgic view of nature and human in Hardy; as Ortiz-Robles (2016) states, to suggest that "Hardy's project represents an attempt to reclaim nature for the sake of a 'new pastoralism,' . . . is to misstate the character of his brand of naturalism and to understate the role of nature" (p. 83). Hardy's concept of nature does not look into the past, but looks forward to an "evolving future," a futurity also observed by Alcorn (1977) (p. 23). In Hardy's texts, "between landscape and character," Alcorn (1977) writes, "a new sensuous grasp of space" emerges (p. 23). Through this affective and physical integration of the land and human that Hardy generates a deterritorializing movement which forms "strange new becomings, new polyvocalities" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 191). Indeed, the body is quite "paradoxical" in *Tess*, as it is "continually decomposed and refigured over the course of the novel" (Law, 1997, p. 267). Body is formed and reformed ceaselessly, so that human is no longer human—and land is no longer land—instead, a "strange" and "new" becoming is molded. By generating this new hybrid and paradoxical body, Hardy exemplifies the plane of consistency's "nomadic essence" and "continuous formations" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 507). This is life's complex transforming

force and Hardy is able to show a raw resistance that can escape the caging of any kind of regulated force. It's a thrust towards future, for "the wonder of a nonhuman life to be created" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 191).

A subtler example of deterritorialization happens when Hardy's narrative describes Tess within the landscape. In his article "Language and Disguise: The Imagery of Nature and Sex in *Tess*," John B. Humma (1983) claims that "[a]lmost every critic has noticed how the novel's nature imagery serves to describe or define Tess" (p. 64). However, looking at the descriptive instances in *Tess*, it is evident that Hardy's narrative functions in the opposite direction; the novel's nature imagery does not provide any help to define her, since Hardy depicts her as a part of the land, one with nature, indistinguishable and indefinable. When Tess is in nature, the vocabulary the narrator chooses to describe her is often quite elusive and imprecise; she is frequently portrayed as a vague "figure": "a fine figure," "white muslin figure," "stealthy figure," "feminine figure" (Hardy, 2008, p. 33, 82, 97, 301). Moreover, there are even moments when she becomes a mere "moving spot" or a descending "form" (Hardy, 2008, p. 406). When outdoors, in nature, Tess is "an integral part of the scene" (Hardy, 2008, p. 97). In his "empiricist experimental world," Hardy makes Tess imperceptible,²¹ rather than trying to describe or define her (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 40). When the narrator turns to her eyes, for instance, Hardy changes this simple moment into a word cluster that avoids precise designation—Tess has "large tender eyes, neither black nor blue nor grey nor violet; rather all those shades together, and a hundred others..." (Hardy, 2008, p. 103). The

²¹ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari consider becoming-imperceptible the ultimate version of all becomings—"[e]verything becomes imperceptible," they say, "everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane of consistency" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 252). Becoming-imperceptible is all there is in a free life force; there is no power to act upon imperceptible becomings, they cannot be seen, organized, or fixed.

narrative makes no clear signification; instead, the description is negative, with continual use of “neither” and “nor.” By keeping Tess free from a distinct subjectification, Hardy is able to keep her in a constantly unstable and indeterminate phase; away from the forces of the plane of organization. By remaining deterritorialized, Tess is able to “stay functionally autonomous” (Roden, 2015, p. 184).

Returning to Humma’s claim, it is evident that Hardy does not tend to exploit natural imagery in the service of describing Tess. On the contrary, especially in these moments when Tess is within nature, Hardy’s narrator employs a gaze which covers the whole surface of the land, and Tess never becomes its focal point; she is seen and described in a state of complete integration with the landscape. Hardy avoids any kind of signification that can make Tess a distinct subject: on the contrary, his writing shows her “against the wall of dominant significations,” and he avoids sinking Tess “in the hole of [her] subjectivity” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 45). By not providing the reader with an immediate and well-defined image of Tess, Hardy’s totalized perception breaks continuity and creates an alternative flow: the image of Tess flees, she is always in the process of becoming-imperceptible. This is to “produce the real, to create life” by not pinning her down, not territorializing her existence (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 49). For example, after characterizing Tess as “a field-woman,” Hardy’s description goes as follows:

. . . by reason of the charm which is acquired by woman when she becomes part and parcel of outdoor nature, and is not merely an object set down therein as at ordinary times. A fieldman is a personality afield; a field-woman is a portion of the field; she has somehow lost her own margin, imbibed the essence of her surrounding, and assimilated herself with it. (Hardy, 2008, p. 100)

Hardy’s ever-changing Tess can easily be assimilated into nature and absorbed by the environment, even lose “her own margin”; therefore, she carries no indicative

marks, no strict positionality in terms of an identity. A fieldman, for Hardy, is a “personality,” yet a field-woman is only a “parcel.” Through this divergence between a fieldman and a field-woman—notice how “fieldman” is a single word, while “field-woman” remains parted, carrying within itself both “field” and “woman,” but resembling neither of them—Hardy creates the complexity of Tess as well as the effacement of her humanity. She is not a “personality”; rather, she is a “portion of the field” and thus, she embodies no personhood on her own. By merging woman and field, Hardy’s “field-woman” generates “a means of undoing identity” (Baker, 2002, p. 68). Tess “imbibe[s] the essence of her surrounding,” assimilates both herself and the land. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the becomings of people and land take place as double processes, “an encounter between two reigns . . . where each is deterritorialized” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 44). Not only does Tess lose her margin, but also the land turns into a “heath-becoming”²² (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 50). As land and human both become destabilized by merging, earth mutates, deterritorializes, obliterates its fences, becomes full of fissures and openings.

2.4 Tess of the animal

Although Deleuze and Guattari deliberate on many various becomings operating on the plane of nature, becoming-animal shows itself as the most prevalent one in their philosophy. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze explains the process of this particular becoming as follows:

²² In *Dialogues*, it is impossible not to notice Deleuze’s admiration for Hardy as he continually compliments Hardy’s use of “lines of flight” for “deterritorialization of the earth” in his novels. At this moment in the text, Deleuze emphasizes how Hardy transforms the land: “. . . the heath-line of Thomas Hardy: it is not that the heath is the subject or the content of the novel, but that a flux of modern writing combines with a flux of immemorial heath. A heath-becoming...” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 50).

It is only when a flux is deterritorialized that it succeeds in making its conjunction with other fluxes, which deterritorialize it in their turn and vice versa. In an animal-becoming a man and an animal combine, neither of which resembles the other, neither of which imitates the other, each deterritorializing the other, pushing the line further. A system of relay and mutations through the middle. The line of flight is creative of these becomings. Lines of flight have no territory . . . through which life escapes from the resentment of persons, societies and reigns. (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 50)

Deleuze's words postulate becoming-animal as a non-identity; the combination of man and animal completely destroys territorialized notions of what constitutes "man" and "animal"—as a result, the becoming-animal resembles nothing of its predecessors. There is no imitation, no likeness; becoming-animal simply eludes definition. It is an undeniably radical concept as it undoes any kind of framing by "charting the possibilities for experiencing an uncompromising sweeping-away of identities, whether human or animal" (Baker, 2002, p. 67-68). As Irving Goh (2009) suggests, "becoming-animal cannot be pinned down by rational human discourse. Common sense and intelligible sense serve no purpose here; they are powerless before becoming-animal" (p. 46). In that sense, it is an anti-anthropocentric concept, that goes entirely beyond the human. Then, in order to defend life as an uncontrollable force beyond the organized, despotic regimes, becoming-animal proves to be an active line of resistance; it "reiterates the unconceptualizable secret of the animal, challenges any (State) politics that seeks to totalize and homogenize every human life as its knowable, singular, political subject" (Goh, 2009, p. 48). I propose that it is precisely this "unconceptualizable" nature of animal which establishes a contact point between Deleuzean becoming-animal and Hardy's *Tess*.

In the novel, the narrative generates an affection beyond the purposes of giving definitions or making comparisons between Tess and animals.²³ As both

²³ "For if becoming animal does not consist in playing animal or imitating an animal, it is clear that the human being does not 'really' become an animal any more than the animal 'really' becomes something

animals and Tess are positioned in the lines of flight, their connection serves to emphasize the fringe position of Tess, her in-betweenness, her complex phases, her transformations, and perhaps more than any other peripheral quality she has, her resistance to be fixed and stabilized. In order to highlight this, Hardy makes Tess' affection for a raw life force come to surface as he repeatedly associates her with a wild animal. On the one hand, this hints at an uncontrollable, untamed side of Tess; on the other, it indicates her ability to act outside the domesticated, regulated life. For instance, when "[a] fine spring came round, and the stir of germination was almost audible in the buds" it moves her "as it move[s] the wild animals," and makes her "passionate to go" (Hardy, 2008, p. 112). As Hardy talks about an excessive flow of life, with a "stir of germination" so loud that almost "audible," Tess is in accord with this powerful, abundant growth. Everything moves, so does she; without a doubt, it is the act of "irresistible, universal, automatic tendency to find sweet pleasure somewhere, which pervades all life" (Hardy, 2008, p. 119). Tess feels the need to change, to move, to shift, to transform again; as long as she is becoming, she is able to stay aligned within the plane of consistency. This perpetual movement she is in starts with an urge, a "stir," a thrust towards the incessant, passionate force of life. Tess' pilgrimage through the novel embodies the reality of becoming-animal: the "affect in itself, the drive in person" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 259). The *closeness* of the experience between the wild animal and Tess is fundamental for Hardy; by the intimacy of shared sensibility, they are able to merge together and affirm a "singular angle of mutually inclusive becoming" (Massumi, 2014, p. 50).

else. Becoming produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. . . . Becoming can and should be qualified as becoming-animal even in the absence of a term that would be the animal become." (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 238)

Both the wild animal and Tess move with the life force around them. Hence, rather than resemblance, affection and alignment become the dominant mode in *Tess*. Hardy does not shy away from going beyond the classical modes of employing animals in the narrative. He does not compare animal to human, or human to animal; instead, he foregrounds the shared experiences of the two. Resemblance has no place in Hardy's text. Tess is a becoming-animal because she experiences "being-at-the-edge," which is a "border experience . . . about *sensing* the animal, or the actualization of the force or *affect* of the animal" (Goh, 2009, p. 42). Indeed, becoming-animal is "a circulation of impersonal affects, an alternate current that disrupts signifying projects as well as subjective feelings" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 233). To focus upon the disruption of signifying projects and subjective feelings indicated by Deleuze and Guattari, another passage in which Hardy links Tess with the wild animal will be insightful:

. . . and there was something of the habitude of the wild animal in the unreflecting instinct with which she rambled on—disconnecting herself little by little from her eventful past at every step, obliterating her identity, giving no thought to accidents or contingencies which might make a quick discovery of her whereabouts by others of importance to her own happiness, if not to theirs. (Hardy, 2008, p. 295)

Here, the narrator once more connects the experience of the animal with Tess, rather than any other semblance. Again, the way Hardy composes this passage implicates his foresight of the posthumanist philosophy of animal-becoming; the passage draws attention to Tess' drive towards "obliterating her identity," and freeing herself from "accidents or contingencies" which may lead anyone to find her. Instead of a turn towards contemplation and reason—the high faculties attributed to human—she embraces an "unreflecting instinct." She blatantly rejects the determinant quality which separates human and animal. In a sense, she resists the already overly-drawn categorization of the human. Her innate desire is to become imperceptible, remaining

always on the move as she makes her flight from the stratifications of life's organized pole. In other words, by escaping, she refuses to be pinned down, or maybe, to be hunted—since the narrator states that her chief concern is to remove her own traces—following “her unreflecting instinct” to relocate herself. She desires to dissolve, to flee. Claire Colebrook explains the notion of desire in Deleuze's philosophy as “a productive and creative energy, a desire of flux, force and difference, a revolutionary desire that we need to think in ways that will disrupt common sense and everyday life” (Colebrook, 2003, p. xv). This view applies to Hardy as well, as Tess' desire sprawls from her wish to remain on the uninhibited, immanent plane of life, and her rejection of normativity. Hence, by disconnecting from her own past, by obliterating her identity, she will be able to remain in flux and experience the world just like a wild animal does: never being “subjected to the determinations, delimitations, and obligations that humans experience as ‘political animals’” (Goh, 2009, p. 42). Tess is willing to deterritorialize her human body, her subjecthood, her identity in order to create “animal spaces” which “escape the gaze and capture of politics” (Goh, 2009, p. 42).

The escape from the gaze of political, organized life is also created by another animal-human affiliation in *Tess*. In a similar manner, Hardy pairs Tess with a fly:

Not quite sure of her direction Tess stood still upon the hemmed expanse of verdant flatness, like a fly on a billiard-table of indefinite length, and of no more consequence to the surroundings than that fly. The sole effect of her presence upon the placid valley so far had been to excite the mind of a solitary heron, which, after descending to the ground not far from her path, stood with neck erect looking at her. (Hardy, 2008, p. 120-121)

This time, Hardy fuses a directionless Tess with the land, through the experience of feeling minute and inconsequential shared by both the fly and Tess. Again, Tess' spatial positioning, her territory—or rather, her escape from a territory—is the center

of the narrator's attention. As in the previous passage, Hardy exposes how Tess is aware of and concerned with the idea of partaking in a fixed territory—as a wild animal-becoming, she wishes to escape her designated space; whereas, as a fly-becoming, she realizes she can dissolve into it. She creates her own lines of flight as she relentlessly slips away from one space to another; as Alcorn (1977) notes, “like all Hardy's leading characters, she is on a continual pilgrimage” (p. 18). However, whereas pilgrimages are teleological, Tess is “not quite sure of her direction”—she has no purpose. Her becoming-animal is echoed in her directionless, drifting movement, given that this “[b]ecoming produces nothing other than itself” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 238). As her becoming-animality intensifies, she is on the threshold of becoming-imperceptible.

In fact, as Tess holds such a fluctuating, fringe position, she marks the desire to “disburden [her]self of identity, to become indiscernible” (Musselwhite, 2000, p. 513). Not having a direction, for Tess, only intensifies her slipping away from the territories and regulations of power. By this fly-becoming, Hardy renders Tess unobservable: she deterritorializes herself by being lost within the “verdant flatness” and “indefinite length.” Both Tess and the fly are individuated, minute animal-becomings in the midst of vast relations and multitudes, intensely circulated by the organized, controlling force of life, as well as the movements, sensations and emotions of all that uncontrolled life contains. The passage is all about exchange of affects and senses—the land's seemingly endless “expanse” makes Tess feel trifling and minor, while the heron becomes “excited” by her presence. Everything dissolves into one another; the heron's and Tess' experiences are equal at this plane, as the narrator postulates no difference between human and animal, indicating Tess' deterritorializing “from the anthropomorphic body” and her “traversing towards an

animal affect” (Goh, 2009, p. 44). As her becoming precipitates “an affectability that is no longer that of subjects,” Tess—just like the animal—evades the space in which life can be political, stratified and controlled (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 258).

Indeed, as the essence of all animal-human relationalities of Hardy’s novel, the circulation of emotions marks the animal-becoming, and it creates the lines of flight through which Tess escapes the “resentment of persons, societies and reigns” as Deleuze puts forth in *Dialogues* (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 50). Tess undoubtedly embodies this capability of transformation, as the novel shows how she registers “increased affectivity to a number of external fluxes” (Meillassoux, 2007, p. 101). Her ability to respond to the external fluxes not only creates her deterritorialization, but also gestures towards her continual shifts, moving from one phase to another, always coveting to remain imperceptible, invisible. Becoming-animal, intertwined with this imperceptibility, “involves an almost literal disappearance” (Goh, 2009, p. 44) as it postulates “an objective zone of indetermination or uncertainty” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 273). Thus, becoming-animal “disrupts the real,” or at least makes the real “problematic” (Goh, 2009, p. 44). It cannot be understood in visible terms, and as Goh (2009) argues, resists being seen (p. 44). Consequently, as explained, the regulatory forces cannot govern becoming-animal for its lack of territorialized existence. Hardy’s Tess is always in a state of deterritorialization, as she is but a collection of affects, a packet of “sensations in the raw,” a becoming. Therefore, Deleuzian becoming-animal reveals itself in the plot to show how she remains in the plane of consistency: Hardy depicts her escape from the plane of organization throughout the novel, and all along the way, becoming-animal proves to be one of her lines of flight that allow her to be indistinguishable vis-à-vis the powers of strata and regulation.

2.5 Conclusion: Hardy's "achromatic chaos of things"

As I demonstrated in my essay, these two strategies of undermining Tess' subjecthood—integration into environment and blending her humanity with animal qualities—are the chief approaches Hardy employs to develop a vision of the individual which transcends the traditional concept of the human and, consequently, reaches into the posthumanist way of thinking. In an instance of both of these strategies merging together to form an even more elusive image, Hardy depicts Tess and her friend Marian working in the field:

The sky wore, in another colour, the same likeness; a white vacuity of countenance with the lineaments gone. So these two upper and nether visages confronted each other, all day long the white face looking down on the brown face, and the brown face looking up at the white face, without anything standing between them but the two girls crawling over the surface of the former like flies. (Hardy, 2008, p. 304)

Hardy's positioning of Tess and Marian completely integrates them with the land as well as signaling their becoming-animality. In this vaguely impressionistic composition, faces do not belong to human, but to land—on which Hardy places the crawling humans, not flies. This bizarre imagery results in fully shifted territories of human, land, and animal. Hardy's way of using geography shows "an ethical implication," "the possibility of empathy across difference" (Sorum, 2011, p. 180). However, additionally, this empathy applies not only to the geography, but to everything existing on land in *Tess*. All takes place in a field of differing, a flowing continuity of sensations, empathy, and affect. Therefore, in her engagement with other elements around her, Tess becomes completely transformed by these impressions and affects, as she is "empathy incarnate" (Sorum, 2011, p. 192); or, to put it another way, she is a packet of "sensation[...] in the raw" (Deleuze & Parnet,

1987, p. 39-40). Tess is always readily capable of incorporating other perspectives and experiences within her; she is always transforming, always becoming.

As Tess inhabits “the between”—understood here as “a set of relations which are not separable from each other”—she travels road to road like a pilgrim, carrying the forces of life in their most vigorous form, free from any bordering executed upon her (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. viii). Therefore, she is the embodiment of a new human, a more-than-simply-human human, a posthuman. Her extraordinary contact with the world “transcends social time and personal history” both (Mayer, 2000, p. 93). In this sense, Hardy’s imagining of Tess resonates with Ihab Hassan’s evocative words in his article “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?,”²⁴ “We are the pain or play of the Human, which will not remain human. We are both Earth and Sky, Water and Fire. We are the changing form of Desire” (Hassan, 1977, p. 850).

Truly, as the tragedy of the plot unfolds, Tess becomes the pain and play of human, despite her immense capacity of affection and change; yet, she is also the embodiment of an indefatigable life force. Hardy celebrates this “pure” woman by endowing her with powers beyond human, gives her life lines—as he literally writes the lines of flight—on which she ceaselessly runs from one path to another in the entire novel. Death does not define her, it is only a part of her becomings.²⁵

²⁴ Hassan’s article is one of the first instances where the word posthumanism appears. He explains the posthumanism through the figure of Prometheus who, for Hassan, signals the figure of a new human emerging in the world.

²⁵ For Deleuze and Guattari, death is only one of the “instances of production” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 145). Moreover, the experience of death, since “it occurs both in life and for life, in every passage of becoming” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 330).

CHAPTER 3

LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER

“Vitality, the human race is dying. It is like a great uprooted tree, with its roots in the air.

We must plant ourselves again in the universe.”

—D.H. Lawrence, *A Propos of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”*

3.1 “No smooth road into the future”: Introducing *Lady Chatterley*

Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* is, perhaps, one of the most radical novels by virtue of using eroticism to tell the tragic consequences of war and industrialization during the early 20th century England. Lawrence’s text bleakly describes how the vanity of human beings who embrace the Enlightenment ideals destroys the modern world and modern man. The mind-body dichotomy, along with the privileging of the mind, is wholeheartedly rejected in his narrative; *Lady Chatterley* passionately attacks the most prevalent vertical structuring put forth by the Enlightenment thinkers—not only he rejects to think mind over body, he also argues against putting thought over matter, subject over object. Moreover, inevitably, Lawrence’s text opposes itself to Enlightenment humanism. Lawrence sees the sheer will to domination in the human species as “the accomplice of the mind and idealism, as the faculty that had steered civilisation in a sterile and destructive direction” (Monaco, 2008, p. 75). For Lawrence, man’s centrality and subjectivity leads to nothing but disaster, which show the whole humanist project of praising human centrality in the universe as a deceptive farce.

Numerous philosophers have already argued that, dominating the Western thought from Descartes to Kant, the humanist approach has resulted in “a narcissism

by which we cannot attend adequately to the importance of other human beings, the nonhuman environment, or even the non-subjective—embodied—aspects of ourselves” (Fleischacker, 2013, p. 143). Human subject’s dominance has been built upon the mastery of the thinking subject, whom “Descartes define[s] as ontologically other than the matter” (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 8). Following this, modern philosophy’s emphasis on portraying “humans as rational, self-aware, free, and self-moving agents,” has led to the understanding that subjects “are not only deemed capable of making sense of nature by measuring and classifying it from a distance but are also aided in such a quest by theories whose application enables them to manipulate and reconfigure matter on an unprecedented scale” (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 8). *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* questions the very concept of making sense of things through pure reason as well as subject’s dominance over matter, and brings a perspective perfectly in line with the posthumanist discussions that horizontalizes the power structures and network operating in the world.

Moreover, there seems to be an inherent disbelief in ideas of human progress and modern rationalism’s emphasis on reason and truth within Lawrence’s narrative, which can also be found on Hardy’s *Tess* as well. They both indicate that the very discourse of the Enlightenment humanism, along with the classical epistemological practices, appear to be threatening the survival of beings on earth, including the nonhuman along with the human. Lawrence most manifestly emphasizes the importance of the bond between human being and the cosmos in his “A Propos of *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*.” In this essay, the primacy of experience in his narrative and his critique of traditional Western epistemology are very much foregrounded. For Lawrence (2006), “[t]he rhythm of the cosmos is something we cannot get away from, without bitterly impoverishing our lives” (p. 328). He goes even further to say

that “to try to *know* any living being is to try to suck life out of that being”

(Lawrence, 1962, p. 40).

But modern man has already looked down upon the physical life and severed this bond, so “[w]e *must* get back into relation, vivid and nourishing relation to the cosmos and the universe” (Lawrence, 2006, p.329). According to Lawrence, as long as we focus on the mental life and institutionalized, structured way of living, we are dying; “we are perishing for lack of fulfilment of our greater needs, we are cut off from the great sources of our inward nourishment and renewal, sources which flow eternally in the universe” (Lawrence, 2006, p. 330). To refer back to Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of consistency—which is favoured by both Hardy’s narrative and the French philosophers’—the constantly flowing life force is similarly praised by Lawrence as well. Lawrence, too, understands life as an all-inclusive force rather than a dictated structures, fragmentations and dichotomies at play. Lawrence’s vitalism ultimately understands yet separates itself from the “passage of detachment and return in a manner” that Cartesian men embody (Colebrook, 2010a, p. 31).

Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley* is built upon the core notions of unity, passion, physicality; there is no detachment nor mannerisms preferred, instead Lawrence desires a lack of restrictions in life, a letting go of the flows of life forces.

Lawrence’s idea of life as an unrestricted force is quite similar to that of Deleuze and Guattari; for them “the problem with Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism or various other supposedly pernicious models is that life is submitted to an external and enigmatic normativity, rather than norms being actively generated from life” (Colebrook, 2010a, p. 132). In life, there should be no idealized model or norms, but instead, there takes place constant regeneration of different lines and systems.

Wolfe, in his *What is Posthumanism?* (2010), discusses that “Enlightenment rationality is not, as it were, rational enough, because it stops short of applying its own protocols and commitments to itself” and offers “deconstruction of the major concepts, texts, and figures in the Western philosophical tradition” as a post-Enlightenment—therefore, a “post”-humanist—gesture (p. xx). In connection to this description, deconstruction can be looked at a strategy serving to horizontalize the world around us, a force that democratizes all things; networks, objects, all beings and humans. Literature is something disruptive in itself as it always already foregrounds transformation of discourse and literature; creation of syntax, according to Deleuze (1997), not only “brings about not only a decomposition or destruction of the maternal language, but also the invention of a new language within language” (p. 5).

Within Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical framework, I would like to consider deconstruction itself as a line of flight, a tool for deterritorializing the configurations and ideal positionings enforced upon the world by the plane of organization. The act of deconstruction is radically against pinning down a concept, meaning, system or text in any way; moreover, deconstructive elements “refuse to locate meaning in the realm of either the human or, for that matter, the biological” (Wolfe, 2010, p. xxvi). Deleuze and Guattari’s escape from articulating an absolute system of meaning is also indicative of the process of differentiation and embracing of multiplying structures. In that sense, the notion of trace becomes an inextricable part of the system of signs Deleuze and Guattari puts forth. There are never fully defined lines but traces that help us find the lines; thus, the force of life, for Deleuze and Guattari (1984), always “escapes strata, traverses assemblages, and traces an abstract line without contour, a line of nomadic art and of itinerant metallurgy” (p.

12). These non-fixed yet traceable lines reach out to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of mapping and territories as well, which I will explain further in the following chapter.

From the first pages of the text, Lawrence's emphasis is on the lack of the physical connection between Clifford and Connie; Clifford is depicted as "so very much at one with her, in his mind and hers", yet they are bodily "non-existent to one another, and neither could bear to drag in the *corpus delicti*. They were so intimate, and utterly out of touch" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 52). This initiates Connie's turn to a more affective relationship with the world around her, inclusive of all bodies and matter, in her desire of forming a unity that is beyond the mere intimate connection of the two minds. In order to reveal the posthumanist tendencies of these newly formed material connections, I will analyse Lawrence's characters'—predominantly Connie's—entanglements with nature/animals and machines throughout *Lady Chatterley*, pointing out the corresponding and divergent elements the text has with Hardy's *Tess*.

Furthermore, how language is talked about within *Lady Chatterley* and Lawrence's stylistic choices throughout the text are among the quintessential lines of flight in Lawrence's text. On the one hand, within the novel, Lawrence devalues the power of Logos through Clifford and his friends' "attempt to shape experience by shaping words" (Friedman, 2000, p. 223). Connie is disturbed by the abundance of emphasis put into mental life by the men around her, and the utter lack of any physical relationship between Clifford and herself: "Their marriage, their integrated life based on a habit of intimacy, that he talked about: there were days when it all became utterly blank and nothing. It was words, just so many words. The only reality was nothingness, and over it a hypocrisy of words" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 89). The

intimacy Clifford favors is merely “talked about” not lived; underestimating the value of a lived experience empties out Connie’s world and precisely because of this, everything turns into “blank and nothing” in her life. On the other hand, his style and metaphorical structuring of the text is vitally alive; as Beatrice Monaco (2008) states, “Lawrence’s tactic was to write viscerally; to write the psyche and the world from ‘inside’ itself as if it were a fleshed body” (p. 55). Words are not all blank and nothing that reflects the emptiness of the world; rather, they make the world alive, revitalizing the connections formed between body and mind, matter and thought. Consequently, even though Lawrence’s rational man praises the power of the Word while Connie condemns the nonsensicality of a life filled with just words, “[w]hat matters is not. . . the opinions held by characters in accordance with their social type and characteristics,” instead “the relations of counterpoint into which they enter and the compounds of sensations that these characters either themselves experience or make felt in their becomings and their visions” are detailed greatly within *Lady Chatterley’s* narrative (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 188). The relations Lawrence’s characters formed with the world around them and how he depicts these relations reveals the proto-posthumanist tendencies in his text.

Lawrence’s style overtly aims to disrupt both the institutional norms of the modern man as well as attacking the logo-centricism of the enlightened Western minds. As Charles Burack (1997) suggests, there is “the destructive impulse, examining how the novel seeks to disclose, dissolve and purge the reader's debilitating sexual ideas and inclinations and to stymie the verbal and visual processes that produce them” in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* (p. 492).

3.2 Unfolding the dynamics of the egg:²⁶ *Body without organs* and *desiring machines*

It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said *the id*. Everywhere *it* is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal machine, a talking-machine, or a breathing machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy-machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. *A solar anus*. And rest assured that it works: Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 1-2)

The opening paragraph of Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (2000) sets out a machinic²⁷ configuration for functioning systems of the world: "Everywhere *it* is machines" (p. 1). The sentence starts with an unspecified subject, "it" and later this "it" is italicized; what is "*it*"? For Deleuze and Guattari, "*it*" is everything; it is everyone, every organic or inorganic system, every concept, every matter. Every producing body—or concept/system/organism—composed of machines (when we talk about more complex systems), or itself is a machine (in the case of more individualized organ[ism]s). These machines produce "flows" that the other machines interrupt (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 1). There is perpetual production

²⁶ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (2005) frequently refer the Body without Organs as an egg: "The BwO is the egg. . . The egg is the BwO. The BwO is not 'before' the organism; it is adjacent to it and is continually in the process of constructing itself" (p. 164). The concept of the egg also resembles to Aristotle's seed-plant analogy in connection with potentiality and actuality.

²⁷ Machinic here should be understood differently than mechanic since Deleuze specifically distinguishes between these two concepts: "Mechanism serves to designate specific processes in certain technological machines, or else a specific organization of a living being. But machinism is totally different: again, it is any system that interrupts flows, and it goes beyond both the mechanism of technology and the organization of the living being, whether in nature, society, or human beings. A desiring-machine is a non-organic system of the body, and this is what we mean when we talk about molecular machines or micro-machines" (Deleuze, 2004, p. 219).

which causes continuous interactions, generating always ongoing creation-disruption movements. This world building put forth by Deleuze and Guattari is radical by defining the beings—both human and nonhuman—not as having purely organic components, but rather as things that come together by way of machinic assemblages.

In order to deliberate further on desiring machines and machinic functioning of the world, another core concept, Body without Organs, is needed to be explained. First of all, the definition of body itself, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not simple: body is “any whole composed of parts” (Baugh, 2010, p. 35). There is the human body and the animal body, but “a body can also be a body of work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or even an idea” (Baugh, 2010, p. 35). A Deleuzian body is not defined by its material nature or physicality, rather, it is “defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu” (Baugh, 2010, p. 35). By way of not equating body with matter, Deleuze already escapes the bonds of any kind of Cartesian thought. Although, a definition which is not purely committed to the material nature of bodies may seem to be complicated, the emphasis on relationality rather than materiality forefronts affection and contact points between systems, instead of establishing new dichotomies. It follows that the BwO is what enables the transversal connections between the different machines, it allows the codes, connections and relationships to flow:

A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate. Still, the BwO is not a scene, a place, or even a support upon which something comes to pass. It has nothing to do with phantasy, there is nothing to interpret. The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is matter that occupies

space to a given degree—to the degree corresponding to the intensities produced. It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative about that zero, there are no negative or opposite intensities. Matter equals energy. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 153).

Here, again, it is evident that body is not something corporeal—it lacks “extension”—but it is matter, by which Deleuze and Guattari mean energy, not physicality. What is fundamental is that a body is collective system whose parts—organs—react both to the outside environment and its internal functioning. So, a BwO is a body which is not yet able to respond to its environment and in a state that is prior to having parts to form any relationalities. BwO is an empty plane where the connections and intensities of other machinic parts come together. It is an undefined potentiality, an “imageless, organless body, the nonproductive” yet it is “perpetually reinserted into the process of production” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 8),

According to Deleuze and Guattari (2000), Lawrence—along with Hardy—is one of the authors “who know how to leave, to scramble the codes, to flows to circulate, to traverse the desert of the body without organs” (p. 132-133). As the plane of organization creates stratification on life, BwO works as the contrasting force, since it is “opposed to the organising principles that structure, define and speak on behalf of the collective assemblage of organs, experiences or states of being” (Message, 2010, p. 38). Lawrence knows how the structuring of the modern world is problematic when it creates strictly controlled and systematized modes; just like Deleuze and Guattari who reject “slotting everything into polarised fields of the norm and its antithesis,” Lawrence sees the organization of life as something does not need to be polarized and he regards transference of production and, especially, desire as something consistently flowing within life (Message, 2010, p. 39).

Within the discussion of the tension between the plane of consistency and the plane of organization in both Hardy and Lawrence's texts, different ideas become fundamental in order to resolve in which ways these authors expose life as a free-floating force, standing against the notion of strictly organized and restricted form of life. The foregrounding of becoming in Hardy's *Tess* leaves its place to another highly influential concept of Deleuze and Guattari in Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley*; the desiring machine (or desiring production). The opening of *Anti-Oedipus*, for that reason, is crucial to see how the machinic configuration of the world in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy works and how it can help us understand Lawrence's posthumanist stance in *Lady Chatterley*. Lawrence's undeniable vitalism in *Lady Chatterley* is also connected with machinic functioning of the world since the concept of the 'machine' "allows Deleuze and Guattari to formulate what they refer to as a passive vitalism," a vitalism that "is capable of explaining the formation or genesis of relatively stable forms" (Colebrook, 2009, p. 11). Furthermore, the machinic formulation of the world also imagines matter as something that desires, something that is vitally alive. According to Claire Colebrook's (2009) introductory chapter of *Deleuze and History*, desire becomes a core part of the machinic assemblages:

Matter, as intensity, has a tendency of desire: this means that it is oriented beyond itself, not to something it lacks (for that would be the desire of one thing for another), but towards other intensities or forces of desire. It is through that entering into relation of material tendencies or desires that machines are formed. (p. 11)

Following this, it would be fitting to understand that it is through desire the machinic structures are formed and also through desire, the flows are created. Evidently, desire is one of the most fundamental notions in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, it lies at the core of all production, differentiation, creation of multiplicities, flows, lines,

traces. Against what psychoanalysis puts forth, for Deleuze and Guattari, desire “does not depend on lack, it's not a lack of something, and it doesn't refer to any Law;” on the contrary “[d]esire produces,” it is not created by absence, rather it creates abundance (Deleuze, 2004, p. 233). The production of desire is something ongoing and machinic, neither theatrical nor representational, rather “the unconscious has nothing in common with theatrical representation, but with something called a ‘desiring-machine’” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 232). Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari propose a theory which understands “life and process are completely unformed and immanent and in a state of optimum liberation” (Monaco, 2008, p. 11). Lawrence’s narrative, in a similar way, aims a state of optimum liberation as well, since it uses the act of making love and expression of sexuality as a path to reach emancipation, standing against the privileging of the activities of production and consumption the modern world dictates.

Yet, it goes without saying that Lawrence’s narrative gives conflicting accounts of the machines in relation to the force of life. On the one hand, the drives and desires come across as machinic, not because they are constantly produced but because—for some—they are seen as formulaic structures: “We drive ourselves with a formula, like a machine” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 76). On the other hand, Mellors, for example, almost completely mirrors the way Deleuze and Guattari argue desiring-machines as body parts by declaring that “[w]hat is cunt but machine-fucking!” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 278). Yet, in the midst of these conflicting opinions, Lawrence’s stance can be explained in a double way: Firstly, formulaic description of the machine is the conventional belief as seeing the machinic as an automatic, stable, mindless, inorganic, perfectly structured concept. Often times in the narrative, when man becomes like a machine, it means that he has lost touch with the nature, turning

into an automaton devoid of vitality: it makes all “the manhood taken away” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 282). Yet, under this surface reading of machine versus man dichotomy that industrialization of life foregrounds in *Lady Chatterley*, there is a deeper level which regards the human body—or any functioning system—as a whole made up by desiring machines as we see in Mellors’ words; Connie’s “cunt,” for Mellors, is a machine, a machine which has the purpose of “fucking” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 278). “Cunt” here is a desiring-machine, in that sense. It is the embodiment of desire which produces flow when it enters into contact with other machines continually.

3.3 *Lady Chatterley* and the vital nature

In *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, the clash between two planes of life—life as irrepressible force, the plane of consistency, and life as a strictly organized force, the plane of organization—continues as Lawrence’s favouring of the chaos and the uncontrollable dominates the text’s narrative. The institutionalized ordering of the modern world is what Lawrence principally discredits; rapid industrialization and a failed marriage become the two focal contact points of the text through which he reflects upon the modern condition of his characters. Both phenomena find themselves deeply in connection with nature in *Lady Chatterley*. On the one hand, we see that rapid industrialization—which sets the socio-economical conditions of Connie and Clifford Chatterley’s lives—is burdened by destroying forests and trees as well as increasing air and water pollution. On the other hand, we follow Connie closely, who is in the midst of her failing marriage, seeking solace in the woods near the Wragby Hall—an old town house which Clifford is “heir and responsible for”

(Lawrence, 1959, p. 44). Therefore, in Lawrence's narrative, nature establishes itself as a fundamental part of Clifford's and, especially, Connie's lives.

Going back to Deleuze and Guattari, it is clear that, in a truly posthuman fashion, the clash between man and nature is non-existent in their philosophy. Both nature and the human operate through the same principle; the process of continuous production. The discussion of BwO and desiring machines, thus, are crucial to establish how they deterritorialize the stratification of life and see everything as a unified process of production:

He does not live nature as nature, but as a process of production. There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 8)

Following this, there is no "man or nature now" since they both are a part of machinic figuration operating in the world. Along with eliminating the differentiation between man and nature, Deleuze and Guattari go even further to not distinguishing between inside and outside, self and the non-self. Everything exists in a plane of consistency full of flows and relationalities. Clifford, on the other hand, strictly separates between the life of the mind and life of the body as well as the human and nature, he is deep into the pitfalls of modern consciousness. Lawrence's narrative unmistakably works "against what he saw as the false separation of the spiritual life from the 'animal' instincts of humankind, such as were propounded in Freud's thinking" (Monaco, 2008, p. 56).

Unlike Clifford and his friends, Connie does not separate the spiritual life—the life of the mind—from her instincts. She wants to have both an intellectual, spiritual life and the life of the body. On the one hand even in her youth, to Connie "the talk that mattered supremely: the impassioned interchange of talk" (Lawrence,

1959, p. 39). On the other hand, she sees the sexual experience as having “a thrill of its own too: a queer vibrating thrill inside the body, a final spasm of self-assertion, like the last word, exciting” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 41). However, after being with Clifford in his mentally rich but a physically disconnected world for a long time, she acquires a perpetual desire to be consolidated by nature, by the woods, which is a reminder of how she still wishes to be in connection with the world around her. Clifford’s obedience to Enlightenment ideals and his privileging of mind over body leaves Connie with a “life of the mind” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 69). To Lawrence, the modern culture “makes us give to a word only those mental and imaginative reactions which belong to the mind,” thus, experience of the body is oppressed and overlooked (Lawrence, 2006, p. 307). This alone—favouring of the mental faculties—creates a separation between the mental and the physical, going back to the Cartesian dualism of the mind and body. For Clifford, the body and the physical senses are simply not needed; rather, to him, physical extension of the self is merely an adjunct, excess: “The life of the body” for Clifford, “is just the life of the animals” and he even goes on to say that “whatever God there is is slowly eliminating the guts and alimentary system from the human being, to evolve a higher, more spiritual being” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 298).

It is the very utopian notion of Enlightenment ideals Wolfe talks about as he suggests that at the highest point of Enlightenment humanism, the human is “achieved by escaping or repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether” (Wolfe, 2010, p. xv). Here in *Lady Chatterley*, Lawrence shows a similar tendency through Clifford. He wants to sever the bonds between the body and mind, leaving the body behind and transcending into

a higher, ideal, non-physical form. Contrarily, however, a higher human existence can be achieved by turning away from the mind for Lawrence; to him what “grounds human existence is to turn the mind away from itself and back toward the body from which the mind arose before it became conscious of itself” (Whiteley, 1987, p. 21). *Lady Chatterley* voices a desire that wants a return back to the body and achieve oneness with the universe. In order to expose how Lawrence sees his characters with regards to structures operating in the modern world and how he considers environment’s role, I will primarily analyse how the nature becomes a territory that is constantly moving and shifting, producing instability and change against the status quo of the modern world.

Similar to Hardy’s stance in *Tess*, Lawrence is also aware of the entanglements of human and nonhuman a great deal and *Lady Chatterley*’s text does accentuates the coming together of different forces—mental, physical, emotional, natural, mechanic; all is included—and how their multiplicity also point out to a unity. For Lawrence, modern men—like Clifford—have been taught to “separate the word from the deed, the thought from the act or the physical reaction” but nonetheless we “need, very sincerely, to keep a connection” (Lawrence, 2006, p. 307). Yet, Clifford is unable to keep a connection with the world around him; his physical reactions are incompetent for the reason that he is crippled. His body is completely inept to form or keep the connection between his mind and his actions, which ultimately strengthen his fixation with the life of the mind. Clifford’s obsession with the mental life, seeing his marriage as an intimate bond between the minds, not the bodies—this bond, for him, even becomes “a habit of intimacy,” a banal “habit” rather than something lively and active—leads their lives to a perfectly transcendental plane, involving no sensation or physical act. Connie unreservedly

resents the fact that she has to experience her life through the mental and intellectual faculties favoured by Clifford, yet she stubbornly desires a life of the body:

“Is that sort of idiocy the supreme pleasure of the life of the mind? No thank you! Give me the body. I believe the life of the body is a greater reality than the life of the mind: when the body is really wakened to life. But so many people, like your famous wind-machine, have only got minds tacked on to their physical corpses.” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 298)

Connie is bold enough to openly protest how constraining, idiotic and even ridiculous the life of the mind is. She directly demands the physical life: “Give me the body” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 298). There is undeniable impulsiveness and non-negotiated transaction embedded in Connie’s plea. However, Clifford cannot give her the body—his body—since it is broken; he is “a hurt thing” whose “bits seemed to grow together again” after the war (Lawrence, 1959, p. 49, 37). The break between Connie and Clifford results in Connie’s search for physical contact with the outside world, with someone who is not Clifford. This includes both connections formed with her surroundings—land and the animals, for example—and relationships she forms with other human bodies—Michaelis and Mellors, respectively. Yet, Michaelis is a reflection of Clifford with an able body, he is still dedicated to a life of the mind which ultimately causes him to fail his relationship with Connie. Mellors, on the other hand, is just the opposite of both Clifford and Michaelis—he has no capitalist desires nor an unhealthy obsession with intellectual life. Moreover, the dichotomy between Michaelis and Mellors is reflected through their surrounding by Lawrence; while we meet Michaelis within the absolutely confined and isolated walls of Wragby Hall, Connie finds Mellors in a secluded cabin in the woods. In the course of the text, the former’s relationship with Connie fails since it lacks the level of intimacy she seeks (Michaelis is almost an anti-thesis of Mellors—perhaps also a surrogate body for Clifford’s crippled body—as he is a

playwright constantly surrounding himself with words, privileging the money-driven, rational ideals of the modern industrialized England), whereas the latter (who outright rejects any kind of institutionalization and societal pressures, although effected by some of these) is able to provide her a purely erotic, bodily experience she craves for. What is foregrounded, however, is how Lawrence manages to awaken the image of Mellors in the woods as an object of desire for Connie. When she sees him, it is a “visionary experience,” “shock of vision” and it “hit[s] her in the middle of the body;” she is perplexed by the life force Mellors’ body exuberates as it is “a lambency, the warm, white flame of a single life, revealing itself in contours that one might touch,” it is “a body!” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 107).

While Clifford represents the ultimate modern man Lawrence resents and mocks, Connie stands for the resisting force—a line of flight—in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*. As Lawrence sees modernity as a destructive force that threatens both the human and nonhuman equally, Connie laments that “[p]eople are killing the very air,” to be more precise, people kill “the vitality in the air” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 136). Already, it is evident that the air is already something alive, a being, for Connie; for instance, here, the air has its own livelihood, energy, “vitality” which is being eradicated by human beings. Yet, Connie’s awakening and her progression towards a unification with other bodies around her—both human and nonhuman—takes place gradually. The tension between Connie and Clifford does not exist at the beginning of the novel, instead, there is utter lack of connection with the world and an undeniable indifference towards everything. When this indifference and disconnection shifts from reflecting upon the outside world to turn towards inside, her own body, Connie’s transformation begins:

“Connie went for walks in the park, and in the woods that joined the park, and enjoyed the solitude and the mystery, kicking the brown leaves of

autumn, and picking the primroses of spring. But it was all a dream; or rather it was like the simulacrum of reality. The oak-leaves were to her like oak-leaves seen ruffling in a mirror, she herself was a figure somebody had read about, picking primroses that were only shadows or memories, or words. No substance to her or anything...no touch, no contact!" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 53)

Connie, with a little shock, is no longer able to see her own body as a physical matter, a substance as "she herself" becomes "a figure somebody had read about" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 53). She is so out of touch with the reality of the physical nature that she is unable to perceive the woods around her as real: the life of the mind. Connie and Clifford lives separates them from their own vital existence. According to Jeff Wallace in his *D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman* (2005), the notion of "simulacrum" here alludes to Lawrence's critique of idealism as well as a critique of realist aesthetics and epistemology, and this call "for a return to 'substance' is also an appeal to the flows of 'touch' and 'contact'" in the Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-machines (p. 228).

What brings Connie back to her physical existence is the experience of her own sexuality freely. In *Lady Chatterley*, love making functions as a line of flight against the capitalist mode of production. Without a doubt, the production of desire is the prevalent in both systems—as in every system—however, whereas sexual acts (not within the confinements of the marriage institution) are looked as salvation in Lawrence, capitalism is a tricky desiring-machine as it also produces opposing poles and systems. While capitalism induces dichotomies of owner versus worker relationship, the capitalist class and the proletariat class, and the Marxist configuration of base and superstructure through the economic interactions. There is an ongoing production of these binaries in the industrialized capitalist form of life. Sex, against this kind of a production, offers an alternative way of disrupting the ongoing flow of life. As Deleuze and Guattari (2000) say in *Anti-Oedipus*,

“making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand” (p. 296).

Connie’s re-connection with her sexuality comes gradually, in connection with her desire to be in nature. As she continues her walks in the park, the indifference towards her physicality is replaced by attentiveness since she becomes “strangely excited in the wood, and the colour flew in her cheeks, and burned blue in her eyes” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 128). Lawrence likens her to “a Bacchanal fleeing through the woods,” as he connects the passion in her with the dynamic, uncontrolled life force of nature (Lawrence, 1959, p. 186). Finally, Connie herself becomes “like a forest, like the dark interlacing of the oak-wood, humming inaudibly with myriad unfolding buds. Meanwhile the birds of desire were asleep in the vast interlaced intricacy of her body” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 188). Lawrence’s associating Connie with the forest ultimately is an act of celebrating her composite, multiple nature; she is no longer a disconnected, non-physical entity as in the beginning of the novel, rather, Connie becomes a complex system inclusive of interlaced connections.²⁸ She is forming other relationalities and becoming manifold.

Towards the end of the novel, Clifford also begins to see the ridiculousness of the idea that there can be one composite ideal human being that humanism presupposes:

“The more I live, the more I realize what strange creatures human beings are. Some of them might just as well have a hundred legs, like a centipede, or six, like a lobster. The human consistency and dignity one has been led to expect from one’s fellow-men seem actually non-existent. One doubts if they exist to any startling degree even in oneself.” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 333)

²⁸ It is important to note that Lawrence uses this verb in two consecutive sentences, emphasizing its significance. The interconnecting systems, amalgamated beings and entangled bodies are fundamentally important for *Lady Chatterley* and Lawrence’s insistence of highlighting the vital materiality of the cosmos.

Of course, there is a certain level of demeaning and degrading feel to what Clifford says. He is not praising nor being in awe of the multiple forms of human beings; he remarks upon the strangeness of humans by comparing them with “a centipede” or “a lobster” which lack “dignity” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 333). He is even startled by coming to the conclusion that “human consistency” is “actually non-existent” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 333). He is also utterly disappointed by this revelation on his own part since his lack of physical abilities, since his parts—organs—fail to compose a functioning whole—a proper body. There is an inward realization in Clifford’s statement, through which he himself figures out that he lacks the very “human consistency” to begin with.

3.4 Twiddling machines and desiring bodies of *Lady Chatterley*

Raymond Williams, in his *The Country and The City*, specifically uses the word “border” when talking about Hardy’s and Lawrence’s works; the chapter titles are “Wessex and the Border” for Hardy and “The Border Again” for Lawrence.²⁹

Unsurprisingly, the concept of a “border” is exclusively reserved for these writers, showing the sense of inescapable liminality of their oeuvre from the very start.

Williams (1973), regarding Hardy and Lawrence, declares that “[t]here are always some writers who insist on the connections” as well as “complex interaction and conflict of values” (p. 204). The liminal, complex, referential and multiple nature of their work is always praised by Deleuze and Guattari as well, who see that Hardy and Lawrence are the writers of the borders, non-fixed systems, geographically and socially transitive environments. Their work brings out the complexity and flowing forces of life which is one of the more stimulating effects a literary work can

²⁹ Apart from Lawrence, Williams briefly analyses the Scottish novelist Grassie Gibbon’s work in this chapter as well.

present us: “The ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility of life” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 4). For them, literature is always intimately connected with life; thus, it is not a vicarious attempt to combine Deleuze and Guattari’s posthumanist philosophy with the examples of liminal literary works.

But how do the machines, bodies and desire enter into this conversation regarding literature and life in the first place? The concept of the machine, most importantly, generates a case for matter having “a tendency of desire” to begin with and it allows “Deleuze and Guattari to formulate what they refer to as a passive vitalism” which is “a refusal of both a subject of history and what they refer to as an ‘active’ vitalism” (Colebrook, 2009, p. 11, 17). Against this subject-centered and goal-oriented active vitalism, passive vitalism of Deleuze and Guattari formulates a case for desiring matter/bodies which are oriented towards “other intensities or forces of desire;” moreover, they are “not generated from anything else, and does not require anything else in order to ‘be’” (Colebrook, 2009, p. 11, 7). This self-producing matter that desires is a machine, therefore, even if we are to talk specifically about the human body, the essential feature of this body is always the tendency of desire; Deleuze and Guattari (2000) specifically say “[d]esiring-machines make us an organism” and “the organs of life are the working machine” (p. 8). Hence it is very significant when Mellors see the smaller system of body being composed of machines/organs “[w]hat is cunt but machine-fucking!” and this body being placed in a larger machinic system: “It’s all alike. Pay ‘em money to cut off the world’s cock. Pay money, money, money to them that will take spunk out of mankind, and leave ‘em all little twiddling machines” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 278). Seeing both Connie’s “cunt” as a “machine-fucking” and commenting on the

mechanical production in the industrialized capitalist system as men having “twiddling machines,” Mellors acknowledges that not only matter and bodies are machines, but *everything* is a composite machine, including all concrete material as well as conceptualizations, systems, abstractions, language, discourse, social systems, ideology. Life works in a machinic mode and its every element is a machine that produces and inclines towards other machines.³⁰

The force of life, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is “inherently innovative and social” while inheritance and creativity is “not articulated within an essentialist framework that places the emphasis on species, genes and organisms” but it is considered “a machinic mode of evolution that is productive in and of itself” (Parr, 2010, p. 60). Machinic production does not correlate with the plane of organization which tries to regulate others; on the contrary, machinic mode is self-regulatory and self-productive. Moreover, it should be noted that machinic does not mean mechanic, since it does not refer to the processes of habitual, automatic and non-organic compositions. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the word “machine” intrinsically remind us the more complex systems, amalgamations, assemblages that form a composite whole—just as the opening of *Anti-Oedipus* declares: “everywhere it is machines” and “it is at work everywhere” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 1).

Monaco (2008), in *Machinic Modernisms*, explores the term further:

Viewed objectively, the the machinic is a hermeneutic move, in which Deleuze and Guattari restore (an account of) vital function to its integral state of unity. It is the very term machinic, which exposes (a certain stage of) the intrinsic fluidity; the context in which both organs and machines (which inspire the organic-mechanical binary) are simply functional extensions of an integral, singular process. (p. 12)

³⁰ Deleuze and Guattari explain the machinic mode of life as the following: “Not man as king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 4)

Apart from relentless production and creation of life which are fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, the use of "machinic" brings out the importance of vitality and synthesis in their work. The term "desiring machines" merges the organic "desire" and the mechanical "machine" while Deleuze and Guattari avoid reinforcing binary oppositions; instead, they suggest a more synthesized, flexible, all-encompassing life force in a posthumanist disposition. There is no longer a clear separation between the organic and the mechanic, rather everything is both organic and mechanic. Deleuze and Guattari, with this hermeneutic move, aim to expose the complex inherent flows of life within the context of desire. In this part, I will explore how Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley* align with the posthumanist notion of bodies through the framework of Deleuze and Guattari's desiring machines and the machinic production of desire.³¹

In many different ways Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley* resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's works; yet, perhaps, one of the most evident connection is how they all stand averse to logocentricism and modern subjectivity by evoking the vitality of physical connections. Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is strongly connected to Spinozan materialism and vitalism at its core, as they denounce the "Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism or various other supposedly pernicious models" in which "life is submitted to an external and enigmatic normativity" (Colebrook, 2010a, p. 132). The transcendental conceptualization of these models clearly always privileges the mental activity rather than the physical life, matter and bodies. Similarly, Lawrence sees the tyranny of the abstract conceptualizations of life; he sees "the

³¹ Since Deleuze and Guattari's inclusion of the machine and the machinic in their philosophy is a hermeneutic act, I will be mainly talking about bodies as desiring machines and machinic production of desire in *Lady Chatterley's Lover* at large, instead of looking at how factories and machinery are depicted in the text. This would be misleading and shallow since the machinic lies at the very core of how Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize the flows of life and vitality of the matter/bodies.

Western project of Enlightenment... as a despotic enterprise in which the head subjugated all other organs and limbs” and as “a fetishistic project that endows undue power and prestige to head-driven activities” (Burack, 1997, p. 501). Hence, it is not unexpected that Lawrence’s attack on this “despotic enterprise” begins with centrality of bodies and desire in his works. In Hardy’s *Tess*, for example, we catch this stance against the modern subjectivity by way of Tess’ fragmentation, multiplicity through her affective relationship with nature, animals and landscape. Her desire to live does not come across in the form of sexual desire; the sexual acts, on the contrary, are in the domain of male characters as sex is used as a way of men declaring dominance over Tess’ body. However, while Hardy’s novel shows how sexuality becomes an entrapment for Tess, in *Lady Chatterley*, Lawrence shows how it frees Connie and restores her relationship with life:

...the human body is only just coming to real life. With the Greeks it gave a lovely flicker, then Plato and Aristotle killed it, and Jesus finished it off. But now the body is coming really to life, it is really rising from the tomb. And it will be a lovely, lovely life in the lovely universe, the life of the human body. (Lawrence, 1959, p. 298)

As Connie praises a return to the “lovely life” of the human body, she also expresses how it has been killed by Plato, Aristotle and Jesus—the philosophy and religion are both responsible for the intellectual capacities dominance over life. Therefore, for Lawrence, preserving the vitality of the bodies against a “modern,” disconnected and alienated life—or death, since life is destroyed—is a matter of survival.³² More so than Lawrence’s other novels, the direct connections between bodies, desire and

³² In his essay “Positive Inertia: D.H. Lawrence and the Aesthetics of Generation,” Andrew Kalaidjian explores the term “inertia” in Lawrence’s critical works which is closely connected with vital materialism in his fictional works. Kalaidjian analyses that inertia in Lawrence points out to unity and consistency of life. He further explains that “[i]nstead of the expenditure of energy that defines many forms of modernism, positive inertia focuses on the cultivation of energy. Far from being static, positive inertia is a source for new generation, both artistic and cultural” (Kalaidjian, 2014, p. 39). Ultimately, this positive inertia of Lawrence suggests the understanding of “an aesthetics of generation that focuses on growth, rhythm and sustainability” and helps to think about “the persistence of material changes” in life (Kalaidjian, 2014, p. 40).

machines are most blatantly depicted in *Lady Chatterley* as the text makes sexuality a powerful instrument while attacking the modern society and its regulations which governs bodies and life. The physical connections between bodies must remain active and free, for Lawrence. However, under the rules of the modern society, in the highly industrialized England of the early 20th century, bodies are subjected to many external control mechanisms—which Deleuze and Guattari call territorialization, which works through the plane of organization. The bodies are inscribed with social, cultural, political rules and regulations, so that ultimately, by way of intense territorializations, they become fixed and trapped. Connie experiences this kind of entrapment while living the “life of the mind” with Clifford; without the physical contact with other bodies, she loses her vitality; [h]er body was going meaningless, going dull and opaque, so much insignificant substance. It made her feel immensely depressed and hopeless. What hope was there?” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 111). Her loss of connection with her own body means a lack of meaning in her life; she feels the absence of a significant substance, vitality so that her own body becomes insignificant and meaningless. Without acting in line with the desire, in accordance with the flows movement and energy, one is cut off from life itself. Hence, Lawrence’s goal throughout the novel is to show how Connie’s body is revitalized.

Clifford and his friends are content with living an intellectual, mental life to an extent that they have the utopic trans-humanist goal of giving up their bodies completely:

So long as you can forget your body you are happy,’ said Lady Bennerley. ‘And the moment you begin to be aware of your body, you are wretched. So, if civilization is any good, it has to help us to forget our bodies, and then time passes happily without our knowing it.’
‘Help us to get rid of our bodies altogether,’ said Winterslow. ‘It’s quite time man began to improve on his own nature, especially the physical side of it.’
(Lawrence, 1959, p. 116)

This completely transcendent idealism—more inclined towards the Enlightenment ideals—serves man to “improve his own nature,” declaring that the utmost rejection of human physicality will lead to happiness. Under the rules of the civilized society, bodies are held responsible for the wretchedness and pain one experiences, therefore, instead of trying to improve our physical life, the modern man completely focuses on forgetting about it. Yet, this is not a lived life, and it only brings nothingness and emptiness, according to Lawrence: “Clifford’s mental life and hers gradually began to feel like nothingness. Their marriage, their integrated life based on a habit of intimacy, that he talked about: there were days when it all became utterly blank and nothing” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 89).

Again, revitalization of the bodies happens when the desiring machines work properly and allow the subject to be in a state of flux. For Deleuze and Guattari workings of desire go against the fixity of the subject as “there is no fixed subject unless there is repression” and this desire does not come from a lack but perpetual regeneration as “[d]esire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 26). Connie’s desiring machine-body deterritorializes as it experiences desire’s flows and let herself be transformed by them. At the end, both Connie and Mellors are transformed by desire while Clifford remains in a more static state. Connie being pregnant both revitalizes the body of hers and indicates the successful production of another life. They transverse through altered states of life without the bonds of organized and normalized sexual activity.

Connected with the notion of production, sexual activity is almost always suggests reproduction in Lawrence’s text—without alluding to love or marriage—

and points out to the regenerative power of sex. For instance, whenever Connie experiences a strong sexual feeling, Lawrence always associates it with her womb. In these moments, her womb becomes the focal point of the narrator's descriptions of her sexual desires towards both Michaelis—"...fixing his eyes on her with almost hypnotic power, and sending out an appeal that affected her direct in the womb"—and Mellors—"Connie had received the shock of vision in her womb, and she knew it" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 61, 107). This direct connection of womb and sexual desire indicates how Lawrence regards sexual activity's primary function as something reproductive above all else. Also, on another direct level, Connie's pregnancy from Mellors—not Clifford—is a sign of desire revitalizing life. At the end, Connie and Mellors are not fixed and repressed subjects as their actions regenerate life around them—a part of their machinic desire is to produce more desire, so their product is another machine desiring; a baby. Sexual activity of the two brings out the hope for life since the lack of physical connections and desire is catastrophe for Lawrence. In "A Propos," he laments that "[a]n England that has lost its sex seems to me nothing to feel very hopeful about" while talking about how his country should be regenerated (Lawrence, 2006, p. 327).

Hence, in *Lady Chatterley*, sex is heavily political and social, and intimately connected to production. This is further emphasized when he distinguishes between the concepts of what he calls "personal-sex" and "blood-sex" in "A Propos," stating that "the warm blood-sex that establishes the living and re-vitalising connection between man and woman" whereas the personal-sex is "destructive to the blood" and "is a process of impoverishment" (Lawrence, 2006, p. 327). Regenerative sex does not belong to the realm of personal-sex, and it has nothing but degenerative effects, and sadly, according to Lawrence, all of the modern marriages and sexual activities

fall into this category: “modern sex is practically all personal and nervous, and, in effect, exhaustive, disintegrative” (Lawrence, 2006, p. 327). What life needs, what bodies need is generative powers, vitalism, and therefore, non-personal sex. In *Lady Chatterley*, these sentiments are echoed by Mellors: “Sex is really only touch, the closest of all touch. And it’s touch we’re afraid of. We’re only half-conscious, and half alive. We’ve got to come alive and aware. Especially the English have got to get into touch with one another, a bit delicate and a bit tender” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 346). Mellors does not talk about love, passion, marriage, relationships or any other concept that comes with the individual, personal—or simply modern, perhaps—kind of sexual activity; rather it is all about touch, sensations, physicality, and forming connections. Sexual desire is a production and it is simultaneously producing other desires, other flows. There is nothing personal and individualistic about it; rather, it is communal and always linked to other desires, different flows. This is a kind of desire that organizes the body itself, since “bodies (social bodies, human bodies, political bodies) are consequences of desire” (Colebrook, 2009, p. 24). Deleuze and Guattari recognize this kind of de-personalized sexuality in *Lady Chatterley*:

Lawrence shows in a profound way that sexuality, including chastity, is a matter of flows, an infinity of different and even contrary flows. Everything depends on the way in which these flows—whatever their object, source, and aim—are coded and broken according to uniform figures, or on the contrary taken up in chains of decoding that resect them according to mobile and nonfigurative points (the flows-schizzes). Lawrence attacks the poverty of the immutable identical images, the figurative roles that are so many tourniquets cutting off the flows of sexuality: "fiancee, mistress, wife, mother—one could just as easily add "homosexuals, heterosexuals," etc.—all these roles are distributed by the Oedipal triangle, father-mother-me, a representative ego thought to be defined in terms of the father-mother representations, by fixation, regression, assumption, sublimation—and all of that according to what rule? (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 351)

Here, Deleuze and Guattari expose how they analyze the concept of sexuality in Lawrence as a “matter of ... different and even contrary flows” (351). Sexuality as

these “coded” flows move towards an aim, so the movement is toward something which brings out the notion of desire linked to it—this is crucial for the reason that desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, does not born from a lack but itself is pregnant with production of more desire. Sexuality is linked to a relentless, “mobile” and “nonfigurative” role as opposed to roles given by the plane of organization. Any kind of fixity, status quo and social/cultural roles that are forced upon beings are attacked by Lawrence, just as by Deleuze and Guattari. In the course of *Lady Chatterley*, Lawrence affirms his stance through showing how ineffective and dysfunctional the marriage between Clifford and Connie; although they are in love—a love of the minds—and married, they lack the necessary touch of their bodies, they are unable to produce flows, to form connections. On the other hand, Connie manages to revitalize her body through her sexual relationships with both Michaelis and Mellors. Their sexual acts are not framed and organized by socio-political powers acting upon life. Even in the very beginning of their sexual relationship, Lawrence openly states sex is not personal between Connie and Mellors as the latter “didn’t take the love-making altogether personally” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 64). Their sexual act is a mutual desire of their bodies towards each other, which produces more desire and new connections. It breaks off the authority of the plane of organization, since Connie’s infidelity towards Clifford goes against the structures of marriage, monogamy and devoted love. She interrupts the flows of a system of regulated by the authority, therefore, this interruption of control and regulation allows more room for free movements and connections. This way, Lawrence manages to create true de-personalized desiring machines; Deleuze and Guattari (2000) confirm this by indicating that in his work, “neither men nor women are clearly defined personalities, but rather vibrations, flows, schizzes, and ‘knots’” (p. 362).

On another level, the hermeneutic use of machinic production also explains how Deleuze and Guattari consider literature itself is a machine which produces lines of flight that enable deterritorialization. Work of art, including a literary work, is a machine which “is essentially productive—productive of certain truths” (Deleuze, 2000, p. 146). Following this, for Deleuze and Guattari, novel-machine intrinsically explores how “bodies and ‘life’ are textual” since “all the features of textuality—such as dispersal, nonlinear causality, nonidentity, and an ongoing instability—mark life as such” (Colebrook, 2011, p. 710). Textuality of life is further emphasized by Deleuze, as he indicates the importance of writing with regards to life by stating that “[w]riting is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 225). The idea of writing as an incomplete process, a passage of life that foregrounds becoming correlates with the transitional nature of Lawrence’s texts. The literary work of Lawrence, as Williams suggests, insists on foregrounding the connection points, borders and liminality in life. This liminality and border experience allow his texts to be always unstable and non-territorialized; thus, *Lady Chatterley*’s merging of organicism and mechanism, cityscape and countryside, the mind and the body shows the text’s regenerative nature in its ability to perpetually produce diverging flows.

Not only Lawrence’s subject matter opens up the liminality in his work. Also, his style brings out the necessary “machinic” elements of textual production which exemplifies the Deleuze and Guattarian vitalism (Wallace, 2005, p. 115). Since the machinic is always associated with a merging, assemblages and couplings, it is best reflected in *Lady Chatterley* through the description of sexual acts and the metaphors

Lawrence employs. Jean-Jacques Lecerle (2002) suggests that for Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy favors the literary text which "insists on the reality of those metaphorical machines" (p. 12). The more vital the metaphors are, the better the literary machine works. For instance, after a conversation with Clifford, Connie contemplates:

But the day after, all the brilliant words seemed like dead leaves, crumpling up and turning to powder, meaning really nothing, blown away on any gust of wind. They were not the leafy words of an effective life, young with energy and belonging to the tree. They were the hosts of fallen leaves of a life that is ineffectual. (Lawrence, 1959, p. 89)

Words become dead leaves, meaningless, lifeless, flowing away without any will to live. The leaves are, like words, are completely cut off from life, no longer connected with the branch/tree. There is a double articulation Lawrence brings forth here; firstly, words are likened to dead leaves and this lifelessness brings out the impotency of the conversation Connie makes with Clifford. Clifford's words, specifically, do not mean anything to her since he has no bonds with the physical life itself, always encumbered by his purely mental life. He loses meaning completely. Secondly, likening words to dead leaves helps Lawrence to articulate the separation between the words and actions. There is a clear distinction between the world of the words and life itself in *Lady Chatterley*, as Connie keeps lamenting "[h]ow she hated words, always coming between her and life: they did the ravishing, if anything did: ready-made words and phrases, sucking all the life-sap out of living things" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 137). Here, for Lawrence, words are monstrous, vampiric, and almost evil. Words belong to the life of the mind and the life of the mind is already a mode of existence Connie stands against, as she has already suffered from a dysfunctional marriage with Clifford, forgetting her physical self.

Destructive impulses Lawrence embraces in his language also reconstructs newly formed relationalities, making a dynamic style that oscillates from structure to chaos, old to new. To follow John B. Humma (1983), in *Lady Chatterley*, the figures of speech “have a way of overlapping, of crossing boundaries, indeed of becoming at times cross-references taking us forward or backward from one scene or passage to another. They almost always make connections beyond themselves” (p. 78). This extended referentiality of the language in Lawrence’s text, I would argue, offers another Deleuzian line of flight: his peculiar style—especially allotropy, which I will extensively talk about in the next chapter—deterritorializes the text persistently, which, in turn, allows Lawrence to create hybrid relationalities which surpass their point of origin.

CHAPTER 4

UNFOLDING LANGUAGE

4.1 Introduction

In *Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols*, Claire Colebrook and Tom Cohen (2016) make the statement that “language is material in a radical sense” and it is “not the medium through which thought communicates” but rather, it is “a multiplicity of relations and traces that enables what comes to experience itself as thought” (p. 13).

Following this, language involves a tracing and a relationality which connects experience and thought—this assertion very much resonates with Derrida (importance of the trace) as well as Deleuze and Guattari (primacy of affect, experience). Following this argument, language exists as an entity, a network of “relations and traces” in itself. John Hughes (1997), in his book *Lines of Flight*, he describes how writing functions according to Deleuze and Guattari:

Writing itself becomes a matter of becoming, an aesthetic composition which incarnates through sensation affects which reiterate and make actual virtual potentials of relation. In this way, the reader is drawn into the implicit and hitherto unimagined community which the text anticipates through its matter of expression. (p. 22)

Here, Hughes reframes the importance of becoming for Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy for the act of writing. Language’s most concrete, material state appears in writing. The lines of a novel arrange an aesthetic composition which brings out the “potentials of relation” and enables the reader to participate in an “unimagined community.” Following this, the task of writing allows new becomings to be generated since novel implicitly creates new bundle of relationalities, new sensations by way of its “matter of expression.” Then, what I aim to do in this part of my thesis is to look at this very “matter” of expression: the genre of novel and language.

Now, the first question I would like to engage in is why novel happens to be particularly attractive for Deleuze and Guattari. Considering its form, novel is very difficult to define, especially compared with the forms of literary writing such as poetry, drama and epic. The flexible nature of the novel genre is an aspect of the novel highly emphasized and praised in the prominent works of Mikhail Bakhtin. What Bakhtin sees in the novel is “an indeterminacy, a certain semantic openedness, a living contact with unfinished, still evolving contemporary reality (the opened present)” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 7). For him, the novel has a unique nature because it is “the sole genre that continues to develop, that is as yet uncompleted” and therefore, “[t]he generic skeleton of the novel is still far from having hardened, and we cannot foresee all its plastic possibilities” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 3). Hence, the novel, by the virtue of its fundamental characteristics, is a liminal genre, according to Bakhtin. In Deleuzian terms, it is not yet territorialized and moulded into a fixed formal state, since it does not have the hardened “generic skeleton” and still full of “plastic possibilities.” These qualities inherently allow novel to become a shifting, not determined, “opened” genre. The novel is, then, a *becoming* in itself, which gives way to what Deleuze and Guattari call “incorporeal transformations” through the voice and language (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 84).

The “openedness” of the novel and its “plastic possibilities” make the novel exciting, full of new potentials for Bakhtin. Similarly, these assets of the genre correlate with Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of literature as they state that “[l]iterature is an assemblage” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 4). The idea of seeing literature as an assemblage fundamentally changes the prevalence of the singular, subjective, individual characteristics dominating the text. Instead, the idea of assemblage foregrounds the multiple, collective, united set of voices, plots,

narratives, realities. For Deleuze and Guattari (2005), in literature, “[t]here is no primacy of the individual; there is instead an indissolubility of a singular Abstract and a collective Concrete” (p. 100). On the same note, Bakhtin emphasizes the significance of the collective against the “primacy of the individual” through showing how dominant the carnivalesque, as well as dialogic and the heteroglossic³³ elements are in the novelistic discourse. He states how authoritative discourse loses its function within the novel, since “it cannot enter into hybrid constructions” and therefore becomes “completely deprived of its authority” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 344). The dialogism of the novel always requires the multiple, compound relationalities, resulting in the downfall of despotic singularities within the genre. Then, in order to talk about any kind of posthumanist tendencies implicit in the 19th century literature, we need to specifically engage with the genre of novel as an intricate, undetermined and complex form which enables the incorporeal transformations, becomings, hybrid entities.

The novelistic discourse is characteristically “pregnant with an endless multitude of dialogic confrontations, which . . . illustrate this endless, deep-lying dialogue of languages” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 365). This dialogue of languages Bakhtin talks about is another feature that foregrounds the novel as a total assemblage, and it also reflects the prominence of becoming as the discourse of the novel depends on continuous interactions, reflections, affections and change through endless “dialogue of languages.” The language of the novel and the act of writing then, for Bakhtin, are

³³ According to Michael Holquist, in his “Introduction” to Bakhtin’s *Dialogic Imagination*, heteroglossia is “Bakhtin’s way of referring, in any utterance of any kind, to the peculiar interaction between the two fundamentals of all communication” (Holquist, 1981, p. xix). Also, he states that Bakhtin “stresses the speech aspect of language, utterance, to emphasize the immediacy of the kind of meaning he is after” in order to “highlight his contention that language is never—except for certain linguists—what linguists say it is;” consequently, for Bakhtin “[t]here is no such thing as a ‘general language,’ a language that is spoken by a general voice, that may be divorced from a specific saying, which is charged with particular overtones” (Holquist, 1981, p. xxi).

not only related to the inscription but also the voice and speech. Similarly, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (2000) suggest “writing implies a use of language in general according to which graphism becomes aligned on the voice, but also overcodes it and induces a fictitious voice” (p. 240). There is so much plurality in writing itself: formal graphism is overcoded by the merging of voice and inscription—again, this goes back to the idea of assemblage they foreground. Nothing is purified content or purified expression, which makes it impossible to formulate hierarchies. As Bakhtin states, novel’s dialogic nature creates layers of voices, none of which possess any authority over the other—this is, without a doubt, one of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari find the novel genre special. To exemplify, we can look at a passage from *Tess* to see the layers of voices—the dialogism—Bakhtin talks about:

However, when she found herself alone in her room for a few minutes—the last day this on which she was ever to enter it—she knelt down and prayed. She tried to pray to God, but it was her husband who really had her supplication. Her idolatry of this man was such that she herself almost feared it to be ill-omened. She was conscious of the notion expressed by Friar Laurence: “these violent delights have violent ends.” It might be too desperate for human conditions, too rank, too wild, too deadly. “O my love, my love, why do I love you so!” she whispered there alone; “for she you love is not my real self, but one in my image; the one I might have been.” (Hardy, 2008, p. 233)

The voice of the omniscient narrator describes Tess, her thoughts and surroundings in very close detail while talking about Tess’ present—it describes her being at that moment, in her room—and future—the narrator knows she is never to be in that room again—simultaneously. On the one hand, the reader is presented with Tess’ inner thoughts in the form of free indirect discourse; we know that how she feels (she fears) or what is in her mind (the line from *Romeo and Juliet*). Afterwards, the narrator makes a commentary on the line Tess thinks, and finally, the passage ends with Tess talking to herself—actually to Angel Clare—begging for her husband’s

love. Even in this small portion of the text, there takes place an array of voices which articulates the multi-layered composition of the novel. The heteroglossic structure is also very prominent: first, we have the narrator's voice, with a very distinct literary style, from the perspective of an all-seeing entity; then, there is the line from Shakespeare's text, a sentence uttered by Friar Laurence, given directly with quotation marks, bringing the discourse of a 16th century work into Hardy's universe; lastly, Tess' own voice delivers her desperate thoughts, as she whispers and prays for Angel's love and affection, which differs greatly from both the voice of the narrator and the saying of Friar Laurence. All three are, in themselves, are distinctive types of speech and therefore, distinct languages; the stylistic and personally detached language of the educated narrator, the didactic, religious language of the Friar and the emotive, quotidian language of the milkmaid Tess. In Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley*, the interaction between the different layers of discourse is even more noticeable:

"'Elp yerselves!" he said. "'Elp yerselves! Dunna wait fr axin'!"
He cut the bread, then sat motionless. Hilda felt, as Connie once used to, his power of silence and distance. She saw his smallish, sensitive, loose hand on the table. He was no simple working man, not he: he was acting! Acting!
"Still!" she said, as she took a little cheese. "It would be more natural if you spoke to us in normal English, not in vernacular."
He looked at her, feeling her devil of a will.
"Would it?" he said in the normal English. "Would it? Would anything that was said between you and me be quite natural, unless you said you wished me to hell be fore your sister ever saw me again: and unless I said something almost as unpleasant back again? Would any thing else be natural?"
"Oh, yes!" said Hilda. "Just good manners would be quite natural."
(Lawrence, 1959, p. 308, 309)

Here there is a stark difference between the narrator, Hilda and Mellors' way of speech, a heteroglossic symphony, reflected in the writing of Lawrence. As Mellors starts speaking in Derby dialect, Connie's sister Hilda cannot help but object to the change of tongue: "Why do you speak Derby? You spoke natural English at first"

(Lawrence, 1959, p. 308). Hilda is perplexed by the fact that Mellors, who previously speaks in “natural English” in the first minutes of their conversation—i.e. “Can I make you tea or anything, or will you drink a glass of beer? It's moderately cool”—abruptly switches talking with his own dialect (Lawrence, 1959, p. 307). On the one hand, it is possible that Mellors uses his speech here in order to deliberately “overwhelm Connie with an awareness of their backgrounds” (Martz, 1998, p. 207). On the other hand, besides pointing out difference between Connie and Mellors’ socio-economic conditions, Lawrence’s use of dialect also works for collapsing “the distinction between narrative and dialogue style” (Leith, 1980, p. 247). Therefore, while Lawrence’s emphasis on the dialect marks one difference, it eliminates the other. This change between dialect and natural English is very much connected to Lawrence’s allotropic style³⁴ through which he achieves “a kind of textual becoming which puts heterogeneous things together and generates becoming and ‘aparallel’ evolutions by way of these conjunctions” (Monaco, 2008, p. 60). I will talk about this style and how it functions to reflect the Deleuzian machinic of language in detail later on. What is more, another incredibly important aspect here is how the dialect marks a territorialism on behalf of Mellors, while simultaneously deterritorializing it, since he is able to switch between the two registers easily. Lawrence’s writing foregrounds the geographical and political consciousness he presents for his characters. Mellors’ dialect comes both from his class and his land—

³⁴ According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology*, allotropy is “the phenomenon of a substance, especially an element, existing in more than one physical form (allotrope), usually in the same phase.” Lawrence’s allotropic style allows him to create continual changes, transformations, shifts in many levels—regarding both the grammar, discourse, style and the contextual, philosophical concerns—of the text. Through allotropy, he both affirms a unitary plane by which all life functions, and the endless shifts within the force of life itself by emphasizing the changes in form. allotropy. Retrieved from <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198529170.001.0001/acref-9780198529170-c-829>.

Derby—so by seeing these changes, we follow his movements within the social structure and the land. He can shift between country and the city, woods and factories, just as his language can change from King’s English to Derby dialect, as Lawrence shows the move between these two poles as he goes back and forth between them throughout the novel. I would say that his intention is not to highlight a difference and creating binaries, but rather, it is to show how one can alter his/her path between or through these lines.

4.2 Explaining the posthuman possibilities of novel

Through these examples, we can see in both Hardy’s and Lawrence’s text that there takes place the symphony of multiple distinctive discourses, different kinds of speech existing simultaneously. As Tim Beasley-Murray (2007) suggest in his book *Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin*, Bakhtin and his circle’s philosophy of language emphasizes “neither the individual utterance nor the system of language but rather the interaction of utterances, the utterance in reaction to, with reference to, or in pre-emption of another’s utterance” (p. 92). What they focus on is a relationality, a network of utterances taking place, coinciding and interacting with one another. If we look at Bakhtin’s concepts of heteroglossia and chronotope, the relationality and interactions taking place within the novel’s discourse creates not an arboreal but rhizomatic structure, in Deleuzean terms. Heteroglossia—which is, as defined by Bakhtin, “*another’s speech in another’s language*, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way” and “[s]uch speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 324)—is an inherent quality of the novel genre and presents its polyphonic nature. Heteroglossia, then, is a form of diversion, another point of departure from the grammatical language and general linguistic

structures, since it functions as a “speech” first and foremost. Bakhtin is, then, stating that the narrative of the novel is indeed a kind of *speech*, a distorted, altered language, a “double-voiced discourse.” Quite similarly, Deleuze and Guattari take language itself as something circumlocutory as they suggest;

Language in its entirety is indirect discourse. . . Direct discourse is a detached fragment of a mass and is born of the dismemberment of the collective assemblage; but the collective assemblage is always like the murmur from which I take my proper name, the constellation of voices, concordant or not, from which I draw my voice. . . My direct discourse is still the free indirect discourse running through me, coming from other worlds or other planets. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 84)

For the French philosophers, all language is indirect discourse; even one’s own (direct) voice is a free indirect discourse which runs “through” him/her, as it is always a part of a “collective assemblage,” as opposed to belonging to one’s own. Here, Deleuze and Guattari’s the idea that one’s direct discourse “coming from other worlds or other planets” also opens up the hybridity and presents language as a separate entity on its own. This is the very posthumanist gesture they attribute to language—as well as the act of writing and literature—as they indicate that language does not belong to the human, it does not a property owned by human beings. It runs through them, coming from “other worlds”—even “other planets” as if language is something alien. Then, since the language cannot be limited to human, Deleuze and Guattari destabilize the concept of a rational, thinking, talking human subjectivity existing above and beyond all other beings once more. Moreover, this unitary plane of the collective assemblage is full of diverse, individual utterances—as Bakhtin would say—which, again, emphasizes the hybrid and multiple nature of discourse.

Considering my aim to explicate why specifically the genre of the novel—as well as Lawrence and Hardy’s particular texts—have the power of illuminating the more recently popular posthumanist affiliations, the use of Bakhtin’s theories here

may seem to be an unusual choice. While I certainly avoid calling Bakhtin's theories posthumanist in a strict sense, the connection of cosmic elements and the body—the grotesque body, bodily material stratum, laughter, etc.—in his *Rabelais and His World* calls the transitional, destabilizing elements of the body in question. By complicating the human body and its relationship with the environment, social structures, ideology and the cosmic universe, Bakhtin foregrounds the ambivalent connections formed between the human and all other elements. Furthermore, his essays in *The Dialogic Imagination* elucidate how novel works as a complex and peripheral genre helps my linking of *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical ideas—especially by way of employing his terminology of heteroglossia, chronotope and dialogism.

When Deleuze and Guattari talk about the novel, they are rejoiced by the fact that “[e]verything is in there” and they celebrate the erratic, carnivalesque nature of the novel by stating that the novel “has always been defined by the adventure of lost characters who no longer know their name, what they are looking for, or what they are doing, amnesiacs, ataxies, catatonics” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 173). This unpredictable quality of the novel—whether it comes from its characters or the multiplicity of layered voices—exposes the medium of language itself as something unpredictable and unstable; correspondingly, for Bakhtin, “[e]very novel, taken as the totality of all the languages and consciousnesses of language embodied in it, is a hybrid” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 366). The novel is the ultimate hybrid, deterritorializing form. It habitually breaks the totality of the subject, monodic nature of authoritative voice, and decentralizes the “verbal-ideological world” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 368).

Nevertheless, by all means, the conclusion here is not that all novels are posthumanist. Yet, the openendedness and indeterminacy of the genre gives it a

favorable medium to communicate the hybridity of all entities—including language itself—both in the real world and within the world of the novel. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari not only favour the novel because of its hybridity, they also specify in their writing that the Anglo-American novel is distinctive from the others; rather than spending time “plotting points,” these novels are “drawing lines, active lines of flight or of positive deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 186). As I often point out, the lines of flight—if interpreted quite literally, these are the extended, continuous lines of the novel that run through pages without interruption, as opposed to the lines of a poem, play or epic—are one of the most prominent ways to interrupt the stratification of the life force, for Deleuze and Guattari. For them, while creating these lines of flight, the Anglo-American novel is simultaneously aware of how challenging this task is:

From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to Miller, the same cry rings out: Go across, get out, breakthrough, make a beeline, don't get stuck on a point. Find the line of separation, follow it or create it, to the point of treachery. . . They know how difficult it is to get out of the black hole of subjectivity, of consciousness and memory, of the couple and conjugality. . . For it is through writing that you become animal, it is through color that you become imperceptible, it is through music that you become hard and memoryless, simultaneously animal and imperceptible: in love. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 186-187).

The Anglo-American novel strives for movement; to “go across, get out, breakthrough”—but this movement also indicates an escape from captivity, restriction and enclosure. Just as Bakhtin points out, there is a need to create the “openendedness” and “indeterminacy” in these novels rather than being unchanging through the movement. It is a movement for freedom, a movement for separation which designates one of the most fundamental elements of both Hardy’s *Tess* and Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley*. The characters, Tess and Constance, continuously try not to “get stuck on a point” as they resist the stratified economic, social and

historical consciousness and customs, while their lines help them “go across” “get out” and “breakthrough” their entrapments. In Hardy’s text, Tess is forced to feel a conflict with life only because of the social regulations operating on the rural England of late 19th century: “Feeling herself in antagonism she was quite in accord. She had been made to break an accepted social law, but no law known to the environment in which she fancied herself such an anomaly” (Hardy, 2008, p. 97). Tess has found a separated line “to the point of treachery” as she is no longer in accord with the “accepted social law”—yet, what Hardy emphasizes here, the treachery here is only a matter of breaking through the artificially made regulations. Her movement in the world is shifting continuously, but never against the flows of life. Tess’ frustration comes from seeing the force of an order which supresses what’s already harmoniously exists in the environment. What she needs is not enclosure, but openness.

Similarly, in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, Connie is quite disturbed to see that “[e]verything went on in pretty good order, strict cleanliness, and strict punctuality; even pretty strict honesty” because “to Connie, it was a methodical anarchy. No warmth of feeling united it organically” (Lawrence, 1959, p. 51). Again, what we see here is an order that is not dictated by the natural, having no organic connection with life itself. Connie’s life is, by all means, “strict” from the exterior appearance of the house—“cleanliness” and “punctuality”—to the interior “honesty” of the relationship between Connie and Clifford. Yet again, Connie sees this as a “methodical anarchy” since it lacks an underlying “unity” binding these “strict” rules and regulations. While orderliness brings method to Connie’s life, she feels contrarily disconnected, existing in a mayhem, a desperation. What she desires is an “organic connection with life itself” but rather, she feels the absence of the touch as well as the animate natural

life, consequently finding herself within the horror of an anarchic *modus operandi*. Her break—point of departure—with this “methodical anarchy” comes later in the novel, through her regaining the awareness of her own body.

As we can see, both Hardy and Lawrence present the reader with a preference towards “openendedness” by showing that these characters are completely in despair without the lines of flight that runs through their novels. It is pivotal to emphasize that such a flight is not “an escape from reality” but it is “a production of and engagement with it, a movement out in which the participating bodies are drawn along new vectors in experimental ways” (Hughes, 1997, p. 46). Returning back to the novels, we can see how both Hardy’s and Lawrence’s key achievement is finding new ways of engagement with life for their characters. Tess’ discord arises by way of her acknowledging the social law and her awareness of the fact that she has breached it, perhaps treacherously, although she sees that natural life bears no such connotations; Connie’s discord, however, is a result of her unfortunate yet inevitable disconnection from what is natural, as she exists only in the complete anarchy of the presupposed social order, at least at the very beginning of the novel. Thus, they go along their own ways—Tess murders Alec, Connie starts an affair with Mellors. Along the way, Hardy and Lawrence aim to show the fluidity and movement foregrounded in the content (subject matter) of their works, it is no surprise that they chose the form novel as the best form of expression. As stated earlier, novel is an assemblage and just like every assemblage, it has a double articulation—content and expression—which Hardy and Lawrence masterfully play with and distort in order to express the borderline, shifting, indecisive nature of life and text both.

The posthumanist tendencies in Hardy and Lawrence’s novels are not blatantly visible at the first glance. These authors, to refer Alcorn here, write “nature

novels;” yet, it is important see how they diverge from simply reflecting and representing nature. They challenge a human-oriented perspective as well as questioning what we call “human” and problematizing how the human formulates relationships with its environment. This is a posthumanist move if we take posthumanism as a “set of questions confronting us, and way of dealing with those questions, when we can no longer rely on “the human” as an autonomous, rational being who provides an Archimedean point for knowing about the world” as opposed to humanism (Pollock, 2011, p. 235). Dealing with the text and language within posthumanist parameters is necessary here; questioning authority brings out the fact that we as humans can no longer continue seeing ourselves at the centre of meaning making practices, and rather we should start seeing the arbitrary and supplementary nature of any kind of signification process. If we are to follow this point of view, “what is called ‘anthropos’ as proper name, now projected as a future anterior inscription, is anything but a natural or even species reference” and “human” is “always a verbal construct created as an exclusionary foreclosure” (Cohen, 2016, p. 62). There is no natural autonomy or authority of the human, as we only construct this relationality.

Again, Deleuze and Guattari favor the texts of Hardy and Lawrence over the many other writers, as they see this immanent escape from realistic representation along with a generous attempt in using language as “a tool for the controlling of bodies and the defining of subjects and knowledge in relation to the exigencies of circumstances” (Hughes, 1997, p. 77). The very dialogic style, the indirectness of the novel—“the process of selectively assimilating the words of others”—is, according to Bakhtin, “[t]he ideological becoming of the human being” (Bakhtin, 1981, p.682). While the language materializes as voice—the text is dialogic, related to speech,

voice, utterances which makes it become something audible, having sensible properties—in their works. Hence, they are able to organically mark the relationship between life and language—all life, including the nature, animal, nonhuman, inorganic, machinic—by emphasizing transformation, becomings within the two.

Writing is, in Deleuzian sense, “a matter of becoming” as stated in the beginning of this chapter; it functions by involving “experimental activity” that upsets “an image of thought” in order to “become adequate to the thought involved with the inimitable experimental activity of the body, and to the production of distinctive affects” (Hughes, 1997, p. 14). In “Literature and Life,” Deleuze suggests that style, or syntactic creation, is “the becoming of language” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 229). If writing is a matter of becoming, for Deleuze, it is in its truest state when it is the most transitional and less structured:

To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferenciation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and non-preexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 255)

The novel, as the most indeterminate form, allows writing to embody transitions, and to disrupt stabilized identifications, imitations or representations. Following and returning to the idea of becoming, both *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* can be read as a nomadic exercise in life in order to make an escape, to challenge what it means to “be” as Hardy and Lawrence write to practice the ways of becoming.

Tess of the D'Urberville and *Lady Chatterley's Lover* are completely formed, transformed and reformed through the transitional relationalities inherent in language and life. I would argue that these two novels are the most successful ones reflecting the borderline experience at all levels including the main characters, the socio-economic change of the time (human agriculture facing the machines), and language

(tension between the dialect and a regulated version of English language). *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* are perhaps the most ambivalent works within their authors' oeuvres. Considering Hardy, we can find much clarity in, for example, *The Woodlanders*, *The Return of the Native*, *Far from the Madding Crowd*, or *The Mayor of Casterbridge* in terms of mapping out the relations between human life, social structures and the role of predetermined rules and laws. The characters in these novels are depicted in much more precise details; they physically manifest on the page more directly—not presented as a shapeless “figure” like Tess herself—and they are able to exert their individuality through the course of novel which is something Tess escapes in her process of becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible. While Hardy is always quite aware of the entanglements between different components of life and the nature of textual discourse, the hybridity and ambivalence of human life is never expressed as successfully as in in any other works of him than in *Tess*.

Lawrence's works, on the other hand, have always been more problematic in their reception and analysis, compared to Hardy's. However, *Lady Chatterley* is without a doubt his most debated novel to this date, not only for the reason that the sexual elements of the novel made it highly stigmatized, but for the puzzling and inconclusive nature of the work as a whole. Many critics have argued on the moral aspects of the novel; for example, T.S. Eliot (1934) has attacked the novel emphasizing its “distinct sexual morbidity” and how “spiritually sick” Lawrence's work is (p. 58, 60). Contrarily, F.R. Leavis (1993) expressed his praise for Lawrence by saying he shows “a vital capacity for experience, a kind of reverent openness before life, and a marked moral intensity” as he does not remotely consider Lawrence immoral or sickening but rather praises his moral strength (p. 8). However,

I would suggest that the trajectory of the novel goes much beyond the conversations surrounding the moral nature of the text: *Lady Chatterley* is neither morally didactic nor immorally sick—while it does engage with a visceral sexual imagery, it de-sexualizes sex and vitalizes the life of the characters. The novel works within complex structures in order to stimulate life by merging inanimate and the animate, inorganic and the organic, machinic and human relationalities. It is, in that sense, Lawrence’s most superior novel. Many of his works focus on a central contrast; for instance, in *The Rainbow* “the contrast is between things as they are and a promised transformation of being” or in *The Plumed Serpent* “it is between a Europeanized and an aboriginal Mexico” in *The Lost Girl* “it is between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ selves” (Moynahan, 1959, p. 75,76). Yet, in *Lady Chatterley*, the contrasts “impinge on one another, which co-exist at the same time, in the same district. There is no appeal to the strange and far to fix either side of the contrast and no appeal to the future” (Moynahan, 1959, p. 76). As we can see, *Lady Chatterley* expresses the immediacy of the present rather than being thrust towards future, and deals with the entangled contrasts without taking a side, moving betwixt and between them.

Tess and *Lady Chatterley* are ultimately structured by ambivalence and fluctuation in all their glory, as Hardy’s and Lawrence’s writing echoes the continuity of life and discloses many becomings and unfoldings, which are intrinsically posthumanist tendencies. Returning to Wolfe (2010) again, he indicates that the formulation of posthumanism:

. . . forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, including the normal perceptual modes and affective states of *Homo sapiens* itself, by recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living beings and their own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a world’—ways that are, since we ourselves are human *animals*, part of the evolutionary history and behavioral and psychological repertoire of the human itself. But it also insists that we attend to the specificity of the human—its ways of being in the world, its ways of knowing, observing, and describing—by

(paradoxically, for humanism) acknowledging that it is fundamentally a prosthetic creature that has coevolved with various forms of technicity and materiality, forms that are radically “not-human” and yet have nevertheless made the human what it is. (p. xxv)

Following Derrida, he also notes that “the most fundamental prostheticity of all” is “language” (Wolfe xxv). As a matter of fact, this resonates with the moment when Deleuze and Guattari say language is something alien that comes to us “from other worlds or other planets” in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The novelistic discourse has the potential to reflect this prostheticity, along with its power to bringing forth a world which does not center around the human. To explore this further, in the following chapters, I will analyze *Tess* in connection with Bakhtin’s idea of chronotope in novel, and *Lady Chatterley* through the concept of allotropy and Bakhtinian dialogism, including the discussions of both Lawrence’s own “allotropic style” and Deleuze’s idea of differentiation.

4.3 *Tess*, transversal roads and the chronotope

They put a stock of candle-ends into the lantern, hung the latter to the off-side of the load, and directed the horse onward, walking at his shoulder at first during the uphill parts of the way, in order not to overload an animal of so little vigour. . . Abraham, as he more fully awoke (for he had moved in a sort of trance so far), began to talk of the strange shapes assumed by the various dark objects against the sky; of this tree that looked like a raging tiger springing from a lair; of that which resembled a giant’s head. When they had passed the little town of Stourcastle, dumbly somnolent under its thick brown thatch, they reached higher ground. Still higher, on their left, the elevation called Bulbarrow or Bealbarrow, well-nigh the highest in South Wessex, swelled into the sky, engirdled by its earthen trenches. From hereabout the long road was fairly level for some distance onward. They mounted in front of the waggon, and Abraham grew reflective. (Hardy, 2008, p. 36)

In Hardy’s *Tess* the importance of the road is undeniable. Throughout the novel, Tess moves from one place to another, being in touch with the world around her; the constant movement provided by the roads enable her the act out, move and give her a

chance of flight. Additional to these roles, in this scene, the road functions as a space of gathering for numerous elements—Tess, his brother, their horse, the stars, the sky, trees, the land, the other towns they pass by—it is a common ground upon which all bodies intertwine. The road does not designate a particular geography, but expose an assemblage, reflecting the “living presence”³⁵ of the novel (Derrida, 1973, p. 6). But why roads are such an important part of the narrative in Hardy’s text and how do they function in relation with the concept of chronotope?

In his essay “Form of Time and of Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin introduces the term chronotope, exact meaning of which is “time-space” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84). In artistic chronotope, “[t]ime, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84). Similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari, time-space is essential since “space itself is never neutral to the particular assemblage in which it appears or that produces it as its 'a priori' condition” which makes it always intensified with meaning (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005, p. 5). Just as Bakhtin says, space is always “charged.” The French philosophers also formulate the importance of intensified time and space interactions through the act of deterritorialization (and reterritorialization) in their writings. For instance, while describing the forces of the plane of organization, Deleuze and Guattari extensively talk about how “the social space is constituted by territorial and lineal segmentations” and this leads to “a rigid line, which brings about a dualist organization of segments, a concentricity of circles in resonance, and generalized

³⁵ Derrida argues that “living presence in all its forms is living speech, the spirituality of the breath as *phōnē*; and, on the other hand, that phenomenology, the metaphysics of presence in the form of ideality, is also a philosophy of life” (Derrida, 1973, p. 10). Again, this is significant for the reason that it foregrounds the potentiality of voice; however, at the same time, it should be noted that the scope of this “philosophy of life” does not only involve the human, but animals as well, for Derrida. It involves life, all nonhuman beings are also included.

overcoding” only to be disturbed by the lines of flight, which are “defined by decoding and deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 222). However, as I previously explored deterritorialization and its significance for an affective, posthumanist approach to these novels, in this chapter, I will lay more emphasis on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomad spaces and Bakhtin’s chronotope in relation with *Tess*.

For Bakhtin, the road appears as one of the most important motifs appearing in literature in term of reflecting the prominence of chronotope. In the chronotope of the road, Bakhtin (1981) suggests, “the unity of time and space markers is exhibited with exceptional precision and clarity” (p. 98). Moreover, Bakhtin explains how the road encounters open up space-time flows within the text, which allow characters to find themselves in complex relations and chance events within the compositional structure of the novel:

“The chronope of the road is both a point of new departures and a place for events to find their denouement. Time, as it were, fuses together with space and flows in it (forming the road); this is the source of the rich metaphorical expansion on the image of the road as a course: "the course of a life," "to set out on a new course," "the course of history" and so on; varied and multi-leveled are the ways in which road is turned into a metaphor, but its fundamental pivot is the flow of time.

The road is especially (but not exclusively) appropriate for portraying events governed by chance” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 243,244).

As the road is formed by time fusing together with space, it becomes an important motif for the multiplicity that the genre of novel highlights. The literary motif of the road also connotes a movement, flexibility and energy flowing through time and space. As a text full of chance encounters and narrative structured around its eponymous character wandering through the fields, *Tess* is perhaps one of the most substantial work reflecting the potentials of Bakhtin’s time-space formulation.

Bakhtin puts forth that the encounters on the road are often characterized “by a somewhat lesser degree emotional and evaluative intensity,” which, at first, may seem to be a devaluating statement. Granted that these happenstances occur momentarily, as chance events, bearing a somewhat overbearing unpredictability, this perception is understandable. Yet, in *Tess*, encounters on the road are consist of both seemingly superficial interactions and immensely important emotional events that happen to be key plot points in the narrative. In both cases, they lead to Tess’ journey of becoming, destabilize her identity and subjectivity and form hybrid relationalities. Returning to Deleuze, while he conceptualize a hybridity residing in the shifting forces in life, he places the foundation of being in “both on a corporeal and a mental plane, in the complex dynamics of behaviour; in the superficial interactions of bodies” (Hardt, 1993, p. xiii-xiv). These “superficial” interactions are often overlooked, more so when it the interacting “bodies” are other than human. Yet, the posthuman opening of the world takes place through these dynamics, as we can see in Hardy’s text.

Within Tess’ odyssey, roads are often offer an openness and freedom to her—except from their family horse Prince’s death at the beginning of the novel—as she is not stuck in a specific place at a specific time when on the road. Conventionally, the events occurring at a particular place and time are localized and historicized—i.e. territorialized—however, the chronotope of the road in *Tess* breaks any kind of stabilizations and produces cross-contacts. Again, in *Tess*, Hardy’s writing touches upon such Deleuzean potentialities of the road:

Then these children of the open air, whom even excess of alcohol could scarce injure permanently, betook themselves to the field-path; and as they went there moved onward with them, around the shadow of each one’s head, a circle of opalized light, formed by the moon’s rays upon the glistening sheet of dew. Each pedestrian could see no halo but his or her own, which never deserted the head-shadow whatever its vulgar unsteadiness might be; but

adhered to it, and persistently beautified it; till the erratic motions seemed an inherent part of the irradiation and the fumes of their breathing a component of the night's mist: and the spirit of the scene, and of the moonlight, and of Nature, seemed harmoniously to mingle with the spirit of wine. (Hardy, 2008, p. 77)

This is a scene from the chapter “The Maiden” in which Tess is on her way returning from Trantridge village to Marlott, his hometown, with a group of other villagers at night. In the road, along the path, Hardy depicts the villagers as if they are a part of both the earth beneath their feet and the sky above them. They blend with the land and firmament, the moon rays become a part of their bodies. In their “vulgar unsteadiness” and “erratic motions” they are still somehow harmonious. In the road, within this mixture of human and land, there is an undeniable coherence in the “spirit of the scene” Hardy describes. Extremely segregated, privileged and denaturalized human bodies of the villagers are in the process of re-naturalized, blend with the nonhuman elements. This is an ethical posthumanist move, tearing down “the ontological privilege of the subject” (Wolfe, 2010, p. 194). Following this, in *Tess*, the road is where all come together without a designated hierarchical structure; there occurs, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, the “spatiotemporal relationships” which are “not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 263). Thenceforth, the road becomes the melting pot of all beings, systems, things since it does not indicate a refined, singular, monodic contour. In every sense, it escapes being marked or stratified.

Hardy’s road is similarly free from all markings; there is no specific place name or timeframe given; he only foregrounds the contact points between human and nature. The road is, then, a continuous, fluctuating entity; it is an “unmarked space”—a space outside of the architectural structures, to refer Wolfe—therefore, it is not subjected to the dominance of organizational powers and institutionalized

forces (Wolfe, 2010, p. 211). The road brings out and brings together things that are random, mixed, arbitrary; as Niklas Luhmann (2000) states in *Art as a Social Space*, when “one transgresses this boundary and steps from the unmarked into the marked space, things no longer happen randomly” (p. 148). Marked spaces—houses, landmarks, institutionalized buildings—are the physical manifestations of the structural powers, they act as the agents of the plane of organization, dependant on the human dominancy; however, on the contrary, roads are where no power can manifest since they remain indefinable. Consequently, this is the reason why the time-space of the road renders a posthumanist experience. It is a “postontological space”—a space in which “the human and the non- or anti- or ahuman do not exist in fundamentally discrete ontological registers”—through which “mutual relations of intrication and instability” occur (Wolfe, 2010, p. 219). If we look at *Tess*, we see that when the free, open-ended road meets with an architectural (“marked”) structure, it is where Tess meets her demise. This is most blatantly visible in the scene where Tess and Angel’s flight end in their encounter with the relics of Stonehenge:

Though the sky was dense with cloud a diffused light from some fragment of a moon had hitherto helped them a little. But the moon had now sunk, the clouds seemed to settle almost on their heads, and the night grew as dark as a cave. However, they found their way along, keeping as much on the turf as possible that their tread might not resound, which it was easy to do, there being no hedge or fence of any kind. All around was open loneliness and black solitude, over which a stiff breeze blew.

They had proceeded thus gropingly two or three miles further when on a sudden, Clare became conscious of some vast erection close in his front, rising sheer from the grass. They had almost struck themselves against it. “What monstrous place is this?” said Angel. (Hardy, 2008, p. 415)

Hardy depicts the open road as bearing no danger; first, “some fragment of a moon” helps Angel and Tess, then later on, the meadows guide the two lovers since there is “no hedge or fence of any kind” that may obstruct their movement. Yet when Angel

suddenly faces the pillars of Stonehenge, Hardy describes the structure as a “vast erection,” a somewhat ominous and abominable landmark that blocks their flight. Just as what Angel says, it is a “monstrous” marked space, as Hardy foreshadows their tragic end; without a question, the interruption of Tess’ flight causes her death in the end.

As Hardy sees “an opposition between the spontaneity of nature and the legal rigidities of social institutions and conventions” the vast amount of time Tess spends on the road is an indicative of her need to break away from conventions and customs (Alcorn 16). Granted the abundance of the roads and Tess’ pilgrimage from beginning to the end, I would argue that *Tess* is intrinsically a nomadic novel. “Nomadicism” is a concept Deleuze and Guattari formulate, and it is quite central to their philosophy. Colebrook, in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, explains that nomadicism is crucial since the nomad escapes to be “limited by some notion of common sense and sound distribution” and nomadicism “allows the maximum extension of principles and powers” (Colebrook, 2010b, p. 186). In *Anti-Oedipus*, nomad is someone who has “no habitation” and “no territory” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. xxi). Moreover, Colebrook describes nomadic space as:

not as a space with intrinsic properties that then determine relations (in the way chess pieces determine how movements might be enacted), but as a space with extrinsic properties; the space is produced from the movements that then give that space its peculiar quality (just as in the game of Go the pieces are not coded as kings or queens but enter into relations that produce a field of hierarchies). . . On nomadic distribution there is not one law that stands outside and determines space; law is produced in the traversal of space. (Colebrook, 2010b, p.187)

Nomadic space is a smooth and unmarked space which “is constantly reproduced in the process of production, but has not yet appropriated this process” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 148). Following this, the nomad evades pre-determined relations and movements, just like Hardy’s Tess uses the roads as lines of flight to escape the

laws and regulations of the socio-economic structure of her particular geography. Majority of the land/space is already determined by laws and customs, yet the nomad's road is "produced from the movements"—just as there is a reciprocal and transitory interaction between people and their path in the scene depicted earlier in *Tess* as the movement of people gives the space (road) its qualities: "Nature" becomes "an inherent part" of the "pedestrians" through their "erratic motions."

Being on the road in order to move from one place to another requires a loss of regulation and position—rich or poor, human or animal, everyone takes the same road. As I suggest, the nomadic space of the road is compound, it is an intermixture that defies rigidity in any sense. Hardy uses this equalizing and indifferentiative aspect of the road in order to make *Tess* imperceptible by the institutional laws and regulatory powers surrounding her:

The tape-like surface of the road diminished in his rear as far as he could see, and as he gazed a moving spot intruded on the white vacuity of its perspective.

It was a human figure, running. Clare waited, with a dim sense that somebody was trying to overtake him.

The form descending the incline was a woman's, yet so entirely was his mind blinded to the idea of his wife's following him that even when she came nearer he did not recognize her under the totally changed attire in which he now beheld her. It was not till she was quite close that he could believe her to be *Tess*. (Hardy, 2008, p. 406)

As the narrator observes *Tess* through Angel's perception, Hardy emphasizes that *Tess* is only a "moving spot," an indistinguishable "human figure," a mere "form." Angel is not able to identify her, since Hardy depicts her as someone barely perceptible. With this, Hardy's implication here is that without borders, enclosure or structures, *Tess* is barely individuated. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari argues that nomadic space resists individuation and definition:

The nomadic trajectory. . . distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating. . . It is a very special kind of distribution, one without division into shares, in a space without borders or

enclosure. The nomos is the consistency of a fuzzy aggregate: it is in this sense that it stands in opposition to the law or the polis, as the backcountry, a mountainside, or the vague expanse around a city. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 380)

In this “fuzzy aggregate” of people, animal and land, Tess is purely indefinite. By this, she is also beyond laws or politics that aim to regulate her body. Here, it is necessary to note the connection between nomadicism and “nomos”. The Greek concept of “nomos” refers to social customs and conventions, “logos”, on the other hand, refers to reason or a sovereign law; nomadic traditions and authoritative laws do not go hand in hand as “there is an opposition between the logos and the nomos, the law and the nomos” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 369). Since logos is connected with a sovereign power—either divine sovereigns like gods or human sovereigns like kings—it brings forth a hierarchy, and inevitably, the human dominancy. Consequently, while the marked space of the human regulations belongs to the logos, the unmarked space of the nomad creates the possibility of posthuman connections. Nomads, by way of this essential conflict between nomos and logos, stand in opposition with any sovereign law, any external force on life. Through this logic, Tess being imperceptible enables her to escape the despotism of logos.

4.4 *Lady Chatterley*, chemistry of language and allotropy

In his essay “Lawrence, ‘Being,’ and the Allotropic Style,” Garrett Stewart (1976) extensively discusses Lawrence’s “allotropic style” a specific literary and philosophical choice. He explains that:

Frequently set in motion by the presence of an unstable syntactic bond, a paratactic loosening of structure for instance, words are alchemized into their own ambiguous allotropes, phrases and clauses into their grammatical alter-egos. This is the eccentric chemistry of lexicon and syntax in Lawrence's style, and suggests a private linguistics in which ambivalence finds its model in chemical valence, paradox in nuclear polarization. . . (p. 229)

Following Stewart's essay, not only Lawrence's highly metaphorical style and abundance of figurative language but also the ambiguity embedded in his narrative structure and phrases in his works highlight this allotropic style. For example, Lawrence's allotropy in the narrative and contextual scope of the events can be seen clearly in the moments characters grow reflexive:

He thought with infinite tenderness of the woman. Poor forlorn thing, she was nicer than she knew, and oh! so much too nice for the tough lot she was in contact with. Poor thing, she too had some of the vulnerability of the wild hyacinths, she wasn't all tough rubber-goods and platinum, like the modern girl. And they would do her in! As sure as life, they would do her in, as they do in all naturally tender life. Tender! Somewhere she was tender, tender with a tenderness of the growing hyacinths, something that has gone out of the celluloid women of today. But he would protect her with his heart for a little while. For a little while, before the insentient iron world and the Mammon of mechanized greed did them both in, her as well as him. (Lawrence, 1959, p. 167)

Though it seems like a plain and simple reflexive moment, there is a rich transmission of thoughts between the narrator's and Mellors' voices. First, it starts with Mellors thinking the "infinite tenderness" of Connie. Then, we are presented with narrator's voice for a bit ("oh! so much too nice for the tough lot she was in contact with") and again, Mellors's mind takes over, pondering upon the tenderness. After, the narrator becomes reminiscent of the fact that "[s]omewhere" Connie is tender, then we switch back to Mellors. At last, there comes sentences through which the narrator comments on the state of the two lovers ("But he would protect her with his heart for a little while. . .) and the part ends. The section is composed as a dialogue between the two, since Lawrence's "fused perspectives" as "the paragraph oscillates between soft and hard, heart and greed, flowers and iron" (Squires, 1995, p. 485). The part proposes no conflict, yet there is an undeniable movement, a trading back and forth between Mellors and the narrative voice. As Michael Squires suggests, "[i]n their dialogue of sensibilities, Mellors's reaches inward, the narrator's

reaches outward” which portrays the different “registers of the character ‘inside’ with darker and deeper tones” (Squires, 1995, p. 485). Lawrence turns the act of simply narrating Mellors’ thoughts into a movement of shifting chain of tones.

Moreover, Lawrence’s allotropic style comes with broader implications which involve the Deleuzean posthumanist connections. I would argue that Lawrence’s allotropy simultaneously points out to how language works in Deleuzean minoritarian literature since it foregrounds the motions, transformations and differences in the linguistic structure. As opposed to the major usage of language—which “limits, organizes, controls and regulates linguistic materials in support of a dominant social order”—the minor usage of a language “induces disequilibrium in its components, taking advantage of the potential for diverse and divergent discursive practices already present within the language.” (Bogue, 2005, p. 168) As Stewart says, Lawrence’s allotropy composes a similar kind of “disequilibrium” that of the minoritarian literature opens up, by employing “unstable syntactic bond,” and it diversifies language by producing “grammatical alter-egos.” The altered states being presented in Lawrence’s writing—whether within the structure of the narrative (the shifts in perspectives), or of the context (distinct nuances of the actions and drama taking place) or of the discourse (the way characters speak, the grammatical changes—all go against the strict ordering and controlling of the linguistic material.

Then, the concept of allotropy in Lawrence seeks an irrefutable cataclysm of the orders and limits by way of effectively displaying the diversions and transformations. This method intensely takes place in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* as mind and body, thought and word, natural and industrial come together in a clash of borders pre-placed between these dyads. This is “Lawrence’s experimental way of overthrowing the egotistical and moral exigencies of humanism embedded in

conventional novel writing” as he finds new experiences and hybrid relationalities through his style (Monaco 56). In Lawrence’s own words, allotropic style is formulated as “another ego, according to whose action the individual is unrecognisable, and passes through, as it were, allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we’ve been used to exercise, to discover are states of the same single radically-unchanged element” (Lawrence, 2002, p. 183).

Following this, if we are presented with a world in which the individual is unrecognizable, then we can see Lawrence’s allotropic style as “a kind of textual becoming,” since it “puts heterogeneous things together and generates becoming and ‘aparallel’ evolutions by way of these conjunctions” (Monaco, 2008, p. 60). Lawrence’s style helps to shatter the notion of a unitary idea of the self and disrupts the human subjecthood. In order to explicate more on allotropy in connection with this textual becoming and its posthuman implications, I would like to bring out Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on the machinic production and the concept of desiring machines once more. The organic integrity and the pure image of the human is broken in each case. First and foremost, if we look at the function of allotropy in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, the style turns the novel into a “machinic textual practice” which “allows Lawrence to ‘become’ with the mechanical age” (Monaco, 2008, p. 60, 73). As the human bodies become machinic, the purity of the being is no longer sustainable and the organic must fuse with the inorganic; by extension, human now incorporates inhuman elements in its being:

And he would sit alone for hours listening to the loud-speaker bellowing forth. It amazed and stunned Connie. But there he would sit, with a blank, entranced expression on his face, like a person losing his mind, and listen, or seem to listen, to the unspeakable thing. Was he really listening? Or was it a sort of soporific he took, while something else worked on underneath in him? Connie did not know. She fled up to her room: or out of doors to the wood. A kind of terror filled her sometimes, a terror of the incipient insanity of the whole civilized species.

But now that Clifford was drifting off to this other weirdness of industrial activity, becoming almost suddenly changed into a creature with a hard, efficient shell of an exterior and a pulpy interior, one of the amazing crabs and lobsters of the modern industrial and financial world, invertebrates of the crustacean order, with shells of steel, like machines, and inner bodies of soft pulp, Connie herself was really completely stranded. (Lawrence, 1959, p. 156)

The section here starts with Lawrence describing Clifford's habit of listening to the radio; Connie is quite "stunned" by Clifford's fondness of this routine, since she sees the interaction between the radio and Clifford as something mysteriously vile. She thinks Clifford is "entranced," and "losing his mind" by spending hours listening to the radio; her reactions suggest that Clifford becomes less and less human as he spends more time being in contact with this mysterious "unspeakable thing." She even thinks that there may be "something else" working on "underneath in him;" Lawrence's description and Connie's perspective expose Clifford as almost like a hybrid of machine-human—underneath Clifford's interior there may be something working on; be it a machinery, an inhuman entity, or a system. He is no longer what he has been before, and this change—triggered by the "unspeakable thing" radio—makes Connie afraid. The scene reflects how Connie's suspicion reaches a purely paranoid level, which leads her to experience an immense fear—"a terror"—coming from the very presence of Clifford and she finds resolution only by fleeing away from him. Yet, she anticipates that what she sees in Clifford—the "incipient insanity"—is a part of "the whole civilized species." Consequently, now Connie (and Lawrence) considers the humankind as no longer something pure, but rather, humans are merely hybrid bodies that are becoming one with the mechanic age, as Monaco puts it earlier.

Lawrence's heterogenous merging increases with the next paragraph as he depicts Clifford; the man is "becoming" as he has "suddenly changed into a

creature.” Not only he is no longer in his old form, Lawrence’s description shows this new hybrid Clifford is a mixture of man, animal and the machine.

Metamorphized body of Clifford is, on the one hand, resembles that of a crab, or a lobster “with a hard, efficient shell of an exterior;” on the other hand, this is also an entanglement with the machinic as the “shells of steel” are quite “like machines.” The external animal-machine shells are brought together with the inner “bodies of soft pulp.” This is pure allotropy, as Lawrence shows Clifford in his altered states, the most striking one being this creature-like form as he transmutes himself through the machinism of his radio.

Apart from the concept of becoming and leaving behind the figure of the human as a purified concept, allotropic style of Lawrence also finds itself in connection with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “alloplastic strata.” For the French philosophers, deterritorialization take place on the alloplastic strata, which is the most complex one among the three strata—the other two are organic and inorganic strata—they put forth in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Like all strata, alloplastic strata is a combination of “content and expression”; yet it differs from organic and inorganic strata greatly since the human is not the centre of alloplastic strata. Instead, it is where external elements come together and modifications appear the most.

Deleuze and Guattari explain the alloplastic strata as the following:

There is a third major grouping of strata, defined less by a human essence than, once again, by a new distribution of content and expression. Form of content becomes “alloplastic” rather than “homoplastic”; in other words, it brings about modification in the external world. Form of expression becomes linguistic rather than genetic; in other words, it operates with symbols that are comprehensible, transmittable, and modifiable from outside. What some call the properties of human beings—technology and language, tool and symbol, free hand and supple larynx, “gesture and speech”—are in fact properties of this new distribution. It would be difficult to maintain that the emergence of human beings marked the absolute origin of this distribution. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 60)

Alloplastic strata is less interested in relating to a “human essence” and more about articulating the symbolic expressions and regime of signs. The biologic or material expressions are replaced by “linguistic” and it deals with discursive practices that are happening on the exterior, outside, “external world.” Alloplastic strata’s focus on exteriority also brings forth the external qualities of language—“gesture and speech”—which are not inherently human elements. Deleuze and Guattari, while emphasizing the social and symbolic qualities of the alloplastic stratum, they suggest that, contrary to what we think, language is something exterior to humans as well; voice and speech are not originated in the human species, they come before the “emergence of human beings.” Words, then, are utterly arbitrary and they do not have to symbolize precise signs nor the meaning should not be attributed to a symbolic order in play; Wallace (2005) states in *D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman* that “[w]ords, like machines, mean nothing in themselves, are never ‘last’, but function only in their appropriations and relations” (p. 231). Then, the words are, by themselves, merely temporary and abandoned sounds and they only work in connection with other sounds, within a system, by relationality. The attention to the exteriority of sound—just voice, or speech—alters the way we experience language. These fluctuating and transitioning—allotropic—qualities of words and discourse are most apparent in Mellors’ speech:

"Tha mun come one naight ter' th' cottage, afore tha goos; shall ter?" he asked, lifting his eyebrows as he looked at her, his hands dangling between his knees.

"Shall ter?" she echoed, teasing.

He smiled.

"Ay, shall ter?" he repeated.

"Ay!" she said, imitating the dialect sound. "Yi!" he said.

"Yi!" she repeated.

"An' slaip wi' me," he said. "It needs that. When shalt come?"

"When shall I?" she said.

"Nay," he said, "tha canna do't. When shalt come then?" " 'Appen Sunday," she said.

" 'Appen a' Sunday! Ay!"
He laughed at her quickly.
"Nay, tha canna," he protested.
"Why canna I?" she said.
He laughed. Her attempts at the dialect were so ludicrous, somehow.
"Coom then, tha mun goo!" he said.
"Mun I?" she said.
"Maun Ah!" he corrected. (Lawrence, 1959, p. 233)

Here, Lawrence creates an excessive display of sounds taking place between Connie and Mellors. The allotropy of language is clear here—similar to allotropes of carbon diamond and coal, which have the same basic unit (carbon); yet, under different circumstances they form two different elements—the same words are forming two distinct, almost unrecognizable discourses, King’s English and Mellors’ dialect, respectively. Although they have the same basic unit—same language, English—the dialect Mellors speaks in is not visually or audially similar to the “natural” English. In this scene, Connie and Mellors participate in the rather machinic production of words and sounds, which is unfamiliar, bizarre and even uncanny in the sense that they are so similar to the sounds and written language we hear and see, yet they are in a completely different form and shape. Without a doubt, through Mellors’ talk, the words “are transformed in a way which makes them unrecognizable and at the same time loci for new modes of thinking” (Wallace, 2005, p. 231). We see both the narrator’s standard English and the dialect following one another, yet this interaction is very much stranded since the narrator’s grammatical, standard sentences are exhausted by dialect’s intensive sounds, as lots of vocatives or exclamations take place (“Ay!”s and “Yi!”s are abundant). This and similar passages of *Lady Chatterley* show the transformative nature of language and exteriority of sound which foregrounds something other than human within the language itself; subsequently, this is one of the reasons why Lawrence’s allotropic style is fundamentally a posthumanist gesture.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As I explained at the beginning of this work, the purpose of my thesis has been to offer an alternative, less acknowledged perspective for tackling Thomas Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and D.H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. As the end of the 19th century has manifested an intense de-centering of the human subject due to industrial, social, and economic shifts, both Hardy and Lawrence have anticipated a world where we can rethink the human subject's positioning among other beings and elements by not concentrating on subjective experience. This position draws close to Guattari's suggestion that the subject is not "a straightforward matter" as "all sorts of other ways of existing have already established themselves outside consciousness" (Guattari, 2000, p. 35). Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, in my opinion, provides the terminology—assemblages, becomings, machinic productions, deterritorialization, lines of flight, the planes of consistency and organization, to name some—which is most helpful in rediscovering and (re)contextualizing what these novels are capable of imagining, as well as grasping the hints of their anticipated posthumanist stance. Therefore, the discussion of connections between man, animal, and machine in the narratives of *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* as formulated in the previous chapters of this thesis which shows the posthuman possibilities in the midst of modern age's turbulences.

Rather than focusing solely on the human subject and subjective experience, both of these novels demonstrate a predominance of thinking about the relationship between the subject and the object, the interaction between man and his environment. Through the tension between the Deleuzian planes of consistency and organization,

through constant shifts between freedom and restriction, life is portrayed as something that reaches beyond the human subject in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley*, as I have attempted to show in the first two chapters of this thesis. In *Tess*, Hardy's focus on geography, land, and Tess' becoming enables the reader to see how these forces move within the narrated world of the novel. In Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley*, the similar connections are made visible by foregrounding of bodies as machines as well as de-sexualizing and de-individualizing the human subject. As a result, what appears exceptionally clear in both novels is a dismantling of the stark distinction between the human and all other. Lastly, in the final chapter of the thesis I have analyzed, with the help of Bakhtin's works, how the genre of the novel enables the posthumanist connections to be much clearer within the trajectory of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, as well as how language functions *posthumanly* if we are to look at Hardy and Lawrence's styles.

While the framework I have presented shows the ways in which these two novels can be assessed as posthumanist through the scope of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, there remain countless other outlines and possible frames through which the posthumanist inclinations of *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* can be explored.

Especially, I am aware of the fact that many arguments presented in this thesis largely intersect with ecocritical and new materialist viewpoints, especially with agential realism and affective materialism. It is possible to read Hardy and Lawrence through these new ontological perspectives as the overarching theme; nonetheless, throughout this work, I have preferred to avoid addressing these in a more straightforward manner since the outline I have proposed already shows how environment and nonhuman elements are foregrounded in Hardy and Lawrence's prose. I believe Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy provide a much more specific

frame to talk about the posthumanist tendencies and potential radicality of the human and non-human interactions in these novels.

In the meantime, I would like to add that although Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical works strongly touch upon the sociological and political connotations of a posthuman world, my thesis is rather inexhaustive in this regard. It would be interesting to see how Hardy and Lawrence's writings—or any other early 20th century novels that anticipate the posthumanism—can be formulated within a politically charged posthumanist reading, which would possibly branch out to the territories of ethics, biopolitics and transnationalism. The jarring lack of such interpretations is what struck me most during the research I conducted for my thesis. With the exception of articles I referred throughout this thesis and more extensive works such as Beatrice Monaco's *Machinic Modernisms*, Jeff Wallace's *D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman*, and John Hughes' *Lines of Flight* no attempts have been made to read Hardy and Lawrence's works within the perspective I outlined above. For reasons of objective length and scope limitations, my thesis cannot, obviously, fill the interpretative void I am referring to; however, I do hope that it can constitute a preliminary step in this direction.

Yet, without a doubt, further studies might explore many more robust ways of looking at posthuman connections in Hardy and Lawrence's works—or other early 20th century British novels, as these links between man-animal-machine irrefutably manifest themselves within many other texts. There are various other ways to discover the mechanisms of how the narratives present the “forever decentered” subjects and how a preliminary rejection of anthropocentrism takes place in the modern novels besides looking at the significance of human-landscape, human-animal, human-machine entanglements (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, p. 20). Nonetheless, the eminence

of the new human in the Deleuzean posthumanist sense brings along the possibility of living a life in which change prevails over everything, resists being fixed, goes on and off at tangents, open to transformations. I hope my thesis has successfully explored these ideas and demonstrate that, in this sense, the posthuman in *Tess* and *Lady Chatterley* grabs the principle of life, that is, in Hassan's (1977) words "[e]verything changes, and nothing, not even Death, can tire" (p. 850).



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