WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION:

RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

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Women's Labour Force Participation: Rethinking the Role of Civil Society

The thesis of Sena Bilen Gürçay

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ABSTRACT

Women's Labour Force Participation:

Rethinking the Role of Civil Society

This thesis aims to explore the roles and responsibilities given to civil society organizations (CSOs) under welfare mix system and the implications of these roles over depoliticization of CSOs. To this end, this thesis focused on three women's CSOs working on the economic participation of women and analyzed how these organizations framed the problem of women's employment, the kinds of solutions they offered, and how they interacted with the state. Through in-depth interviews with representatives of CSOs and the analysis of the activities of CSOs this thesis found that when CSOs engage in activities in educational, economic and social welfare settings, they become depoliticized. This is because engaging in service-based activities decreases the capacity and interest of CSOs in developing rights-based discourses that could go against the state. This thesis contributes to the literature of civil society by way of pointing out the changing agendas and discourses of CSOs while developing service-based activities under welfare mix system in the context of Turkey.

ÖZET

Kadının İş Gücüne Katılımı:

Sivil Toplumun Rolünü Yeniden Düşünmek

Bu tez, refah karması modeline bağlı olarak sivil toplum kuruluşlarına verilen rol ve sorumlulukları ve bu rollerin sivil toplum kuruluşlarının apolitikleşmesi üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla bu tez, kadınların ekonomik katılımı üzerinde çalışan üç sivil toplum kuruluşunu vaka olarak seçmiştir. Bu soruyu ele almak için, bu kuruluşların kadın istihdamına ilişkin sorunları nasıl tanımladığı, bu sorunlara ne tür çözümler önerdiği ve bu konu özelinde devletle ne şekilde etkileşime girdiği sivil toplum kuruluşu temsilcileriyle yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının faaliyetlerinin analizi yoluyla incelenmiştir. Melez sivil toplum kuruluşlarının siyasi eylem geliştirebileceklerini iddia eden çalışmaların aksine bu tezin bulguları, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının eğitimsel, ekonomik ve sosyal refaha dair alanlarda faaliyetlerde bulundukları takdirde apolitikleştiklerini doğrulamıştır. Çünkü hizmet temelli faaliyetlerle uğraşmak sivil toplum kuruluşlarının savunu temelli faaliyetlere karşı kapasitelerinin ve ilgilerinin azalmasına sebep olur. Bu tez refah karması modeli altında hizmet temelli faaliyetler geliştirirken sivil toplum kuruluşlarının değişen gündemlerini ve söylemlerini vurgulayarak sivil toplum literatürüne katkıda bulunmaktadır.

to my son, Ali Kenan

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ABBREVIATIONS

AÇEV	Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı (Mother-Child Education Foundation)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
AKUT	Arama Kurtarma Derneği (Search & Rescue Association)
ALMP(s)	Active Labour Market Policy(s)
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organization(s)
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	The Gender Equality Model
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILOSTAT	International Labour Organization Database
İŞKUR	Türkiye İş Kurumu (Turkish Employment Agency)
KAFEM	Kamuda Fırsat Eşitliği Modeli (Public Gender Equality Model)
KAGİDER	Türkiye Kadın Girişimcileri Derneği (The Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey)
KEDV	Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı (The Foundation for the Support of Women's Work)
KEİG	Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi (Women's Labour and Employment Initiative)
LFP	Labour Force Participation
LLL	Life Long Learning
MoD	Ministry of Development of Turkey
MoLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Turkey

NES	National Employment Strategy
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SEE(s)	State Economic Enterprise(s)
SPF	Sosyal Politika Forumu (Social Policy Forum)
SPO	State Planning Organization
GNAT	The Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TİSK	Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations)
TOBB	Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)
TSO(s)	Third Sector Organization(s)
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜSEV	Türkiye Üçüncü Sektor Vakfı (The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey)
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association)
WB	The World Bank
WEF	The World Economic Forum
WLFP	Women's Labour Force Participation

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Unemployment first became a social phenomenon in Great Britain during Industrial Revolution, which led to a surplus of labour in cities (Beveridge, 1909). Until the early 1900s, individuals were blamed for their laziness and idleness in accordance with the New Poor Law-1834 (Garraty, 1978). Along with Unemployed Workmen Act in 1905, the sense of public responsibility for the unemployment issue came into discussion by gradually reversing the principles of New Poor Law (Beveridge, 1909). In those days, unemployment was regarded as one of the most important social problems the governments had to address. However, together with the dissolution of welfare states after the 1970s, governments transferred the responsibility for the unemployment issue to private actors. Hence, the surrender of public responsibility became a phenomenon.

Neoliberal restructuring has caused changes in who should have the responsibility to solve the social problems like unemployment. Removing the burden of public service from the shoulders of welfare states was one of the main targets of such policy context (Brown, 2006). Together with the liberation of the state from its responsibilities; the main question has become to find an effective solution to problems brought about by the erosion of state-guaranteed social rights, which was triggered by the privatization of public services and rapid marketization in social policy (Somers, 2008, p. 238). The cure was to shift away a heavy responsibility of social problems "… from the state and the market to the shoulders of civil society's 'little platoons' of family, church, and community" (Somers, 2008, p. 239). In other

words, delivering services and promoting development have become important goals to meet for civil society organizations[1] and thus they have been positioned as part of the welfare mix system.

Neoliberal policy context has also changed the way governments deal with unemployment. Firstly, the cause of unemployment has been attached to workers' attractiveness to employers "… in terms of costs, skill and flexibility" (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, spreading flexible employment regimes, and providing micro-credit support and vocational training programs have been presented as politically acceptable ways to deal with problems about women's employment in the neoliberal era. Secondly, CSOs have been encouraged to produce development projects and to provide training to women with the aim of empowering them and increasing their employability. That is to say, individuals and CSOs began to be held responsible for increasing Women's Labour Force Participation (WLFP) rates. Along with the redistribution of the responsibility of reforms related to women's employment, the functions attributed to CSOs and the normative values CSOs carry as part of the welfare mix system shifted toward service-based activities from rights-based activities.

The emergence of hybrid[2] organizations engaging in both rights-based and service-based activities has become an important topic for researchers and has been studied from different points of view. A group of scholars (Alvarez, 1999;

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[1] How civil society related notions such as the voluntary sector, TSOs, nonprofit/nongovernmental organizations, social capital and civil society organizations has been used with respect to their distinctive character in the literature result in a huge confusion. By adopting the suggestion of Edwards (2009), I will use civil society organizations notion. This is because, it "… covers a huge range of entities of different types, sizes, purposes, and levels of formality, including community or grassroots associations, social movements, labour unions, professional groups, advocacy and development NGOs, formally registered nonprofits, social enterprises, and many others" (Edwards, 2009, p. 7).

[2] I define hybrid organizations as those that "… carry out both contentious and non-contentious work, rights-based and service-based activities" (Zihnioğlu, 2018, p. 14).

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Chandhoke, 2003; Clarke & Newman, 1997; Somers, 2008) perceive hybrid organizations as managerial partners of state under neoliberal governance and argue that hybrid CSOs are depoliticized as a result of undertaking development projects and providing services. This is because, undertaking state's responsibility prevents them from politicizing the demands of women and so bringing women's issues into political agenda. On the other hand, other scholars (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Evers & Laville, 2004; Skelcher & Smith, 2015) defend that those organizations could successfully contain mixed functions of advocacy and development. That is to say, they can continue challenging state policies and defending the rights of people while at the same time providing service.

Based on this literature, my research questions are whether and how undertaking service-based activities depoliticize CSOs, whether undertaking service-based activities undermine rights-based activities of CSOs. Answering these questions requires a two-fold analysis: I will firstly investigate whether hybrid organizations are depoliticized or not. Secondly, I will scrutinize how undertaking service-provision as a mission leads to depoliticization of CSOs. In order to analyze the depoliticizing effects of hybridity over CSOs, I will examine both discourses and practices of CSOs.

1.2 Methodology

I benefit from Kurki (2011) and Jaeger (2007) conceptualization of depoliticization to analyze the depoliticizing effects of hybridity over CSOs. Both Kurki and Jaeger define depoliticization as removal of CSOs "…from the sphere of political decision making and fundamental political contention" (Jaeger, 2007, p. 260). I will trace depoliticization in two levels: discourse and institutional level.

In discursive level, lack of political contestation emerges as reconstruction of political issues as technical and managerial problems (Jaeger, 2007; Kurki, 2011), in other words the construction of problems in post-political condition (Mouffe, 2005; Žižek, 2009). As a result of the removal of issues from the political sphere, the political nature underlying social problems has been ignored and they have been approached as rather technical and managerial problems. Together with the disappearance of political discussion under neoliberal governance structures (Žižek, 2009), there emerges a consensus regarding nature of problems (Mouffe, 2005). Therefore, this leads to the absolutization of market-oriented solutions without imagining alternatives and thus depoliticization of issues (Paker, Adaman, Kadirbeyoğlu, & Özkaynak, 2013).

In the institutional level, depoliticization emerges as absence of CSOs from the political decision-making sphere (Jaeger, 2007; Kurki, 2011). This can be realized as either co-optation of CSOs by state or creation of rational consensus between CSOs and state. Together with construction of CSOs as service providers under neoliberal governance, participation in decision-making process has been associated with reaching a consensus among different stakeholders rather than challenging state policies. So, the language of consensus and cooperation between CSOs and state has been blessed and prioritized over the language of contestation and conflict together with positioning of CSOs as service-providers. Overall this consensus-making participation leads to depoliticization of CSOs because it does not leave space for political contestation (Mouffe, 2005).

In order to analyze whether CSOs that undertake service-based activities lose their contentious nature in both discourse and institutional level, I will examine two indicators. First of which is the way CSOs frame the problem and solutions and

second of which is the way CSOs interact with the state. In order to answer why undertaking service-based activities leads to depoliticization, I will examine state-CSOs relations. Even though funding is also determined in the literature as an important variable as having depoliticizing effects over CSOs, none of CSOs that I have studied are dependent on state in terms of funding, it becomes a secondary variable to analyze for this study.

The framing of women employment problem is important to study because it will show whether CSOs provide market-based and technical solutions in line with neoliberal agenda and state' framing or whether they provide alternative solutions. In that way, it will emerge whether CSOs approach to women employment as issue of effective management and cooperation or as a task of state and issue of political-decision-making and implementation.[3] "What is often presented as a purely technical, politically, and morally neutral solution to a public problem is, in fact, underpinned by a very precise view of social order that is based on 'moral and political choices' [of actors] …" (Marchildon, 2016, p. 48). These framings, therefore, have both political and normative functions. That is why framing style of the problem is an important indicator regarding the depoliticization of CSOs.

The interaction between the state and CSOs will show on the other hand whether CSOs are able to challenge state policies and bring their demands into political agenda. Besides, it will show why undertaking service-based activities leads to depoliticization of CSOs. This will be analyzed by pursuing their mode of interaction and the strategies they develop for their own demands.

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[3] I took this classification from Mühlenhoff (2015) study. In her dissertation, she makes a discourse analysis of CSOs working on human rights and examines the depoliticizing effects of neoliberal governmentality over CSOs by analyzing their approach to human rights (Mühlenhoff, 2015). In order that my study is focusing on how CSOs frame the women employment and this classification is valid for my results, I benefit from these conceptualizations.

In this thesis, I applied qualitative research methods in the analysis of documents and interviews. Initially, I collected data from some documents such as policy papers, activity and research reports, press statements and websites of women's civil society organizations. The relevant literature further informed me about both labour market policy in Turkey and different views on the roles of civil society actors.

While the analysis of policy papers points out how Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) governments frame the issues about women's employment and; the review of the activity and research reports, press statements and projects enable the analysis of CSOs' perspective about women's employment. I used the National Employment Strategy (Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Turkey [MoLSS], 2014), Ninth (State Planning Organization [SPO], 2006) and Tenth Development Plans (Ministry of Development [MoD], 2013), and Action Plan on Women Employment (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016) to analyze women's employment policies of AKP governments. Additionally, I benefited from certain reports and books to understand the discourse of government. In order to understand whether CSOs produce alternative discourses and alternative solutions to dominant discourse of state in regard to women employment, I specifically examined AKP governments' policies. To uncover CSOs' framing and missions, I utilized the activity reports, research reports and press statements of Women's Labour and Employment Initiative (Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi – KEİG), The Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Türkiye Kadın Girişimcileri Derneği – KAGİDER) and The Foundation for the Support of Women's Work (Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı - KEDV). Those documents helped me interpret their discourses and stances.

After the desktop research, I conducted semi structured in-depth interviews with the representatives of women's CSOs to get better insight about their framing of the problem and their mode of interaction with the state. Prior to the interviews with CSOs representatives, I conducted an unstructured expert interview. I talked to an expert from Ministry of Family and Social Policies. In this meeting with the expert, she accused CSOs since they were not pushing state to the right way and mentioned how CSOs changed their agenda in accordance with the state's agenda for reasons such as ideology, funding issues, legal requirements and so on. This interview provided valuable insights for my thesis.

I conducted nine semi-structured interviews in Istanbul from October 2018 to February 2019 with the representatives of the CSOs (see Appendix A). I asked the same questions (see Appendix B) to all interviewees to be able to make comparisons among CSOs but used the probes to give interviewees flexibility in expressing their opinions. The language of the interviews was Turkish. All of the interviews were one on one and face-to-face. However, I contacted one of those interviewees once again via Skype in two weeks following our face-to-face interview for getting further information about the relations of the institution with the state. The interviews lasted one hour on average. Except for two interviewees, I took the consent of interviewees for tape-recording. I kept the names of representatives anonymous for confidentiality.

In 2013, Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) invited various CSOs to hear their opinions on and solutions to the low WLFP rates and a report on Increasing Women's Employment in All Areas and Suggestions for Solutions[4] has been

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[4] For more information about this commission report, please see:
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/kefe/docs/komisyon_raporu_2014_1.pdf

prepared. I chose three women's organizations that participate in those commissions since representatives within GNAT recognize them as partners and thus have potential to influence political agenda about women's employment. Those organizations are KEİG, KAGİDER and KEDV. Firstly, among all civil society organizations that participated in the commission, organizations specifically interested in WLFP were listed. There was only one advocacy organization (KEİG) and the rest was both undertaking advocacy-based and service-based activities. I choose KEDV and KAGİDER among other organizations because they are the most well-known and influential ones. Overall, these three organizations are the most important women's CSOs working on the economic participation of women in terms of size, impact, and visibility.

KEİG as an initiative was established in 2006 to bring women's demands about employment policies into state agenda. It includes variety of local women organizations interested in WLFP. It actively performs advocacy function and rejects service provision or development promotion as a mission. An external actor named Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency mostly finances its activities. KEDV was established in 1986 to promote economic well-being of women coming from lower classes via micro-credit programs and various training programs. It develops various programs which aim to build capacities and empower women economically. It finances its activities through donations together with a small share from external funds. Female entrepreneurs that aim to develop female entrepreneurship ecosystem in Turkey established KAGİDER in 2002. It also carries out both advocacy-based and service-based activities. It has close financial ties with a private bank and its activities are mostly sponsored by various corporations. In other words, while KEDV and KAGİDER as "[h]ybrid organizations carry out both

contentious and non-contentious work, rights-based and service-based activities."

(Zihnioğlu, 2018, p. 14), KEİG only engage in contentious and right-based

activities.[5] None of these CSOs is government-friendly and they carry out their

activities regarding women employment with gender awareness. Besides, all three

organizations had certain levels of collaboration with the government agencies.

Since I focus on CSOs framing of the issues regarding women's employment

and CSOs relationship with the state, I used non-random sampling to reach the most

relevant people. It was difficult to reach people and talk to them in these times due to

the worsening of primary components of democracy. I used institutional e-mails and

telephones to contact people. When I could not get appointment, I used reference to

awaken their interests. After my first interviews, the interviewees helped me and

directed me to the most relevant persons in their institutions about my research

questions. It was interesting that I contacted with the representatives of KEİG easily

through e-mails and they did not hesitate in answering my questions and talking to

me about these issues even though KEİG was a critical organization. On the other

hand, contacting and convincing other two CSOs about interviewing took much

longer. I even had to go to one of them without informing when I did not get an

appointment via e-mails and phone calls. Additionally, the professionalization of

KAGİDER created a barrier to get information about institutions' past relations with

the state since most of the staff is newcomer and does not have adequate information

about the past relations of institutions. Moreover, interviewees requested to switch

off the recording for a few times while mentioning the relations of their organizations

with AKP governments. So, shrinking civil society sphere under such an altered

democracy was itself a barrier for my research.

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[5] I benefit in this classification from Zihnioğlu (2018) study.

1.3 Organization of the thesis

This thesis is composed of five chapters. In the second chapter, I present the literature about welfare mix system and the effects of neoliberal restructuring on the roles of civil society. The shift of CSOs activities from rights-based to service-based and thus depoliticization of CSOs are quite challenging issues. The opposite views of scholars on depoliticization of hybrid organizations are also elaborated. This enquiry contributes to analyze the information I verified from women's CSOs. Then, the status of civil society in Turkey is contextualized. This enables the reader to understand under which circumstances civil society tries to exist in Turkey.

In the third chapter, firstly the main features of labour market and women's employment trends in Turkey are uncovered. Then, the current policy developments related to women's employment in Turkey are addressed. Thereby, the official policy solutions of AKP governments regarding women's employment come in sight, which reveals how AKP governments frame the issues regarding women's employment.

In the fourth chapter, I analyze the framings of women's employment problem by KEİG, KAGİDER and KEDV to understand whether they frame it as the issue of effective management and cooperation or as task of state and as a process of political decision-making relying on my interviews and desktop research. In that way, I evaluate whether these organizations are able to maintain their politicization and political contestation.

In the fifth chapter, I scrutinize how undertaking service-based activities transform state-CSOs relations and so leads to the depoliticization of hybrid organizations. To analyze the relations among CSOs and state, I examine their mode of interaction and strategies of CSOs to bring their demands into agenda. In the sixth chapter, I discuss and summarize key findings of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

DEPOLITICIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA

"… [T]he shifting of the responsibility for social problems away from the state *and* the market, to the shoulders of civil society's 'little platoons' of family, church, and community" (Somers, 2008, p. 239) or the silent surrender of public responsibility in return for the increase of "… 'private' responsibility which includes individuals, the market and voluntary organizations" (Gilbert, 2002, p. 16) is one of the main phenomena that comes into the picture along with the transformation of the welfare state. The functions and missions which civil society actors undertake have evolved in tandem with the transition to the welfare mix system because the distribution of responsibilities shape the roles of social actors (Gusfield, 1981, pp. 6-16).

This thesis aims to explore (1) how the roles of CSOs in the issue of WLFP vary in Turkey and (2) how these roles affect the depoliticization of CSOs. For that purpose, this chapter provides a theoretical framework, which depicts the missions and normative values of civil society actors under the new welfare governance and the way these roles affect the depoliticization of CSOs.

In the first part of the chapter, the effects of the neoliberal governance over current welfare regimes are elaborated. Then the discussions throughout the literature regarding the results of this reconfiguration over the civil society organizations are reviewed. In the last part, the status of civil society in Turkey is contextualized.

2.1 Welfare mix system

The Washington Consensus which prescribes a new strategy of development against state-centered developmentalism portrays state interventionism as the main problem of economic efficiency (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). That is why the new development model, the so-called neoliberal strategy, has embraced the idea of the minimal state. This political agenda which aims to decrease state involvement in the economy requires the implementation of certain policies like deregulation of economic activities, privatization of state-owned enterprises and liberalization of the market from state interventionism (Larner, 2000, pp. 6-9). The erosion of the Keynesian welfarism with the extension of market relations to social policy formulation has become inevitable (Gilbert, 2002). As a result of this agenda, governments are forced to reduce the public spending and to retrieve from "… formulating policies to ensure full employment and an inclusive social welfare system …" (Larner, 2000, pp. 6-7). In that way, state intervention in the operation of the market has been prevented. This phenomenon is named as the retreat of state (Strange, 1996). However, certain problems such as financial crisis and persistent poverty have challenged the basic pillars of neoliberal orthodoxy and increased the pressure that comes from periphery (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). As it turns out, new strategies have become necessary to solve those problems emerging after unregulated marketization and the erosion of the Keynesian welfarism.

The Post-Washington Consensus, which defines the state as a complementary component of the market rather than as a possible replacement hereof, was put forward as a strategy to mitigate the implications of neoliberal orthodoxy both for the people and financial system (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). However, this does not imply a sort of return to Keynesian welfarism but the construction of a mixed system of

welfare. Deregulation, liberalization and privatization as the main principles of neoliberal economic policy still protect the very same status. As to this new model, the state must play a regulatory role in fostering the expansion and extension of the free market principles and in preventing the financial system from instability (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). Instead of minimal state idea implying that the state must draw back from the economy, governments are forced to adopt market-like mechanisms for increasing governmental efficiency. As a result of such policy, not retreat of the state but the welfare mix model began shaping the policies in most of the countries since certain problems like permanent unemployment, social isolation, homelessness etc. contain new risks that could not be passed over by governments. Because of the fact that such a political agenda aimed to rescue the state from public responsibilities just for more; the main question became finding an effective solution to the new risks posed by the privatization of public services and the recommodification of the labour (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). The solution was to transfer some responsibilities of the state to local authorities, private actors, civil society actors, and families.

The current organizational structure of the welfare system that is based on the inclusion of local authorities, private actors, civil society actors and families to welfare provision is called as the welfare mix. The decentralization, marketization, privatization and contracting out of social services are widely shared trends of this contemporary welfare system (Ascoli & Ranci, 2002, p. 3). Those different trends inherent in welfare mix system may take a variety of forms. The decentralization, which refers to the delegation of responsibilities to local administration, could be carried out on both the financial and decision-making level. The application of the market-like mechanisms to social services may involve different strategies such as "… introduction of budget constraints, reduction of guaranteed benefits, procedures

for monitoring performance…" (Ascoli & Ranci, 2002, p. 3). The scope of privatization ranges from the total transfer of responsibilities which refers to the ownership of public services by private actors to the partial transfer of responsibilities which implies the public funding of private services or private initiatives' involvement in fields once dominated by state agencies. Being carried out with private initiatives, non-profit organizations and families, contracting out of services refers to the delegation of service provision to other actors while the state continues holding the responsibility of finance and regulation.

Esping-Anderson (1990, 1999) emphasizes that mentioning a convergence in the patterns of welfare provision is not possible because of the differences in the institutional legacies of welfare regimes. However, it has been argued that there is "… a certain convergence in terms of overall philosophy …" (Van Der Veen, 2009, p. 179) and states have developed policies in accordance with this philosophy. Still the implications of this new logic will be different for similar welfare regimes. Even in the different fields of policy such as health care, education, social insurance, labour market, social assistance within the same country, varying degrees and kinds of application of new logic could be observed because public-policy reforms are also affected by the sets of actors and political opportunity structures. Regardless of regime types and political styles, one of the most important commonalities in this philosophy is the transformation of public responsibility and thus the change in the role of civil society actors. That is why the repositioning of civil society under the welfare mix is examined regardless of welfare regimes types in this chapter.

2.2 The current functions and normative values of CSOs

In the late 20th century, civil society concept rose along with the revolts in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America against authoritarianism (Reichardt, 2004). As a result of these successful civic movements like Poland's solidarity against authoritarian regimes, the civil society began to be discussed in terms of its contribution to the development of democratic social action and participatory citizenship. As organized entities of civil society, associations and social organizations undertake the task of putting pressure on state agencies to develop rights-based policies and of monitoring these agencies in order not to allow the state to abuse its power (J. C. Alexander, 2006; Somers, 2008). Remember that Cohen and Arato argue that a democratic and egalitarian public space can revive thanks to associations where deliberation, direct participation and transparency are promoted (Cohen & Arato, 1992, pp. 471-480). Neoliberal agenda on the other hand brought different roles for civil society. Rather than rights-based activities and advocacy function, civil society organizations have been assigned to provide welfare services and promote development under the welfare mix system.

A number of scholars perceive current CSOs engaging in service-based activities as managerial partners of the state (Chandhoke, 2003; Clarke & Newman, 1997) and criticize their transformation into bowling teams by abandoning their advocacy function (Somers, 2008). Not their responsibility toward society but their responsibility toward the state started to be discussed as a result of the restructuring of welfare states. Besides, their autonomy becomes questionable due to the change in power dynamics via funding mechanisms and partnership models with state. While these scholars argue that marketization phenomenon and currently attributed service role underestimate their role of advocacy and political voice; some other scholars

(Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Evers & Laville, 2004; Skelcher & Smith, 2015) advocate the mixture of rationality and functions in CSOs ranging from service role to advocacy role and from empowerment logic to market logic. Those who have been in second group also express their concern toward detrimental effects of newly emerging partnership arrangements over CSOs, namely instrumentalization of CSOs with the intent of reducing public service cost (Bode, 2014; Brandsen, Verschuere, & Trommel, 2014). However, these scholars claim that new partnership arrangements and co-production of services could offer new opportunities for both the improvement of democratic governance structure and inclusive service delivery (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Evers & Laville, 2004; Zimmer, 2010). In other words, these scholars envisage a different type of configuration regarding civil society-state relations based on cooperation instead of co-optation and contracting (Bode & Brandsen, 2014). This is because, these scholars argue that empowerment projects and social service provision could help in politicization of CSOs by increasing their awareness to politics behind the exclusion of citizens (Cruikshank, 1999) and by increasing their capabilities to mobilize citizens against state (Minkoff, 2002). In this section, I examine those two opposing views under the light of abovementioned arguments.

2.2.1 CSOs as managerial partners under the welfare mix system

The shift toward neoliberal governance has led to the blurring of boundaries between the public and private spheres through the intrusion of the economic realm to the political realm (Newman, 2005). This change leads the public sphere to be occupied by the market rationality since the private sector's principles have been employed in the public administration for the sake of efficiency according to the New Public

Management (NPM). Then the state has been restructured around such principles as deregulation, decentralization, privatization and contracting out. Because of this restructuring, governments have given up to be interested in citizens' economic and social situation. In other words, state is not anymore responsible from delivering welfare to its citizens in order to maintain efficiency. Hence, the emergence of managerial state has become a phenomenon.

Along with the remaking of the state, the reinvention of civil society as managerial state's business partner became inevitable (Clarke & Newman, 1997) since the understanding of NPM underlines the necessity of decentralizing and devolving the power toward local and voluntary actors (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). By way of incorporating local and voluntary actors into public services, NPM aims to empower clients rather than serving them in order to forestall dependence (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 252). Clarke and Newman (1997) argue that decentralization of power which was one of NPM principles did not materialize as it has been claimed. While power is decentralized in operational management level, it did not disperse in decision-making level. Besides, while responsibilities and duties shifted toward communities and voluntary agencies, state continues to exercise power "… through regulation, contracting, monitoring and surveillance" (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 26). Clarke and Newman (1997) point out how the principle of more and better management is employed instead of decentralization on each scale as the new governing technique in the remaking of social welfare. Thus, civil society organizations become businesslike agencies by way of internalizing the managerial culture that prioritizes certain values of efficiency, flexibility, and professionalism. To sum up, these managerial partners of managerial states have acquired responsibilities for delivering services without having power for regulation and

monitoring, which results with the elimination of their advocacy roles according to Clarke and Newman (1997).

As a result of this shift in CSOs functions from advocacy of rights to delivery of services, the marketization of civil society organizations, which refers to the adoption of the methods and values of the market, becomes a phenomenon (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). The commercialization for additional revenue is an indicator of the current trend toward marketization (Weisbrod, 1998). To deal with the problem of fund-raising, these organizations start selling some products such as publications, uniforms, and certain services including education and consultation programs (Young, 1998). What is more essential is the sale of some additional services to beneficiaries in return for fees especially in the care-related services (Bode & Evers, 2004). Another strategy is to build connections with private organizations by engaging in cause-related marketing activities (Bode, 2003; Young, 1998). This dependence on commercial revenue has changed the type of clients to whom organizations target to serve. For this reason, CSOs prefer dealing with the demands of individuals rather than focusing on community issues that require much more energy and resource to solve (Kramer, 1994), which means that the missions of CSOs have been distorted because of the commercialization.

In addition to commercialization, contract competition comes to the fore following this governmental shift toward marketization (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Ryan (1999, p. 35) questions how those competing voluntary agencies which take new forms pursuant to demands of the private sector, international organizations and governments can strengthen society. This reconstruction also marked a change in the nature of interactions between the state and civil society organizations since it has transformed the old styles of relations based on co-determination and deliberative,

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expertise-based policy making to the new ways of partnership based on the contract culture (Bode, 2006). The pressure of performance-based contracts and measurable organizational output have made voluntary agencies fragile since it leads them to focus on the short-term outputs rather than coherent transformative policies (Bode, 2006). This performance measurement discourages voluntary agencies from creating projects about the rights of trapped communities, an issue needed to be worked on in the legal framework and also in the long run (J. Alexander, 1999, p. 68). Therefore, CSOs' focus has shifted to service-based projects from rights-based activities (Zihnioğlu, 2018).

Once the voluntary agencies were perceived as the partner of the decision-making process, their political voice began to be threatened because of the dependency to governmental agencies or actors of private sector (Kramer, 1994, p. 47). In other words, due to the competition for being funded, the autonomy of CSOs has become an important question (Kramer, 1994, p. 51). This is because; governments abuse funding for controlling CSOs and support them for projects that do not clash with their own agenda (Doyle, 2017; Paker et al., 2013). In order that the current pattern of coordination among state and voluntary actors has been shaped by short-term and contract-based projects, it does not necessitate regular contact but a call from the state. These arbitrary and inconsistent attitudes of governments also damage the relations among equals (Bode, 2006). CSOs rather stay in "… a weak and disadvantaged position when it comes to negotiating and influencing the course policies take" (Rossel, 2016, p. 150). As a conclusion of all these, it has been argued that the contract-based, temporary relations cause power asymmetry.

Another effect of marketization on CSOs alongside commercialization and competition is professionalization. The importance of resource and communication

management paves the way for voluntary agencies to professionalize. This professionalization harms the civic engagement rising from below and leads CSOs just to take state's or corporate stakeholders' demands into consideration (Young, 1998). To put it in another way, professionalization causes devoluntarization (Kramer, 1994, p. 47). In conclusion, when the voluntary actors adapt such values of marketization, their contributions to socially inclusive democratic regimes jeopardize and these organizations become "… just tools for achieving the most efficient and effective mode of service delivery" (Somers, 2008, p. 138).

The self-realization of citizens is intrinsic to the civil society since citizens could build inclusive solidarity through empowering members of society in such public sphere and thus contribute to the development of democratic citizenship regime (Chandhoke, 2003). This empowerment was once tied to challenging the institutions and structures which caused inequalities (Moser, 1989) and so to power itself. However, the meaning of empowerment has been associated with self-help which implies being not dependent to the help of others including state. As a result, it was narrowed down, functioned as a pathway for neo-liberal ideas (Batliwala, 2007), and thus lost its tie with political activity. And CSOs have become main institutions to make individuals and communities self-help thereafter (İpek, 2006). However, Chandhoke (2003, p. 2966) argues that "People are disempowered rather than empowered when highly specialized and bureaucratized 'professionals' tell them how they should resolve the problems of their collective lives." Rather, citizens are empowered when they collectively become aware of their own needs, rights and influence the policy agenda by way of representing their own demands. In other words, self-determination by engaging in political activity is important for

empowerment; otherwise, citizens become subject to what these organizations impose as the necessity (Chandhoke, 2003).

Another point that must be drawn attention is the dark side of these current communities and voluntary agencies. Chandhoke (2003) argues that although power is dispersed to a certain extent, accountability mechanisms that will check the activities of these organizations holding power in the management of services did not improve at the same level. While decentralization of the services already leads to the exclusion due to lack of centralized redistribution mechanism, lack of effective accountability structures reinforces social inequalities (Brenner, 2004). This is because public accountability replaced with contract accountability, which focuses on negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts (Kadirbeyoğlu & Sümer, 2012, p. 344). Therefore, this replacement leads to the abuse of power, which could be observed in the poor quality of services or the exclusion of some citizens from those services. Rather than the long route of accountability, which gives the main role to citizens and their elected represents so-called policymakers in checking providers against the abuse of power, short route of accountability, which makes consumers' voice into the center in checking providers against inefficiency, is presented as valid mechanism of accountability (Bergh, 2012, p. 311). However, the short-route accountability mechanisms fade away the political relationship between policy-makers and electorate and, turns citizens into a simple consumer (Kadirbeyoğlu & Sümer, 2012). That is to say, "… the assignment of key functions to complex mixes of the private sector and civil society agencies often further atomizes accountabilities" (Bergh, 2012, p. 312).

This new regime of accountability is supported in developed countries for the sake of efficiency; however, in developing countries, where competition among

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providers does not exist, leaving the public accountability mechanism aside has made

citizens much more vulnerable and deprived them of their democratic rights by way

of articulating their voice. Under these conditions, communities have become

dependent on voluntary sectors' delivery of services (Chandhoke, 2003). As a

consequence, Chandhoke (2003) puts it this way:

> Instead of self-confident citizens who are aware of their rights and who
> demand fulfillment of their basic entitlements, we may well find that people
> have been constituted as consumers of services. We may well discover that
> civil society has lost its potential for democracy because it has been
> depoliticized (p. 2966).

The implications of the neoliberal political project can be separated mainly

into two dimensions as for civil society and citizenship. Firstly, civil society has been

depoliticized because it is no more a site where people discuss and deliberate and;

the state has been held accountable. That is why its political power over state

disappeared (Newman & Clarke, 2009, pp. 45-68). Furthermore, politics is not

perceived as the art of deliberation and negotiation of different interests but rather the

languages of cooperation and consensus become prevalent (Chandhoke, 2003, p.

2959). As a result, community and civil society have become the site of solving

failures of the market. The boundary between state and community has been redrawn

and state is no more interested in citizens' economic and social situation namely their

rights and entitlements; but churches, women's societies, bowling leagues, city

councils appear to raise values of self-help, moral autonomy, and personal

responsibility (Somers, 2008, p. 244) for their members as necessary parts of their

civic duties.

Secondly, those duties on the shoulders of community and civil society imply

a shift from rights to duties in the understanding of citizenship. The essential act of

citizenship is described as participating in the voluntary activity as a duty of citizens

by converting the existing idea of citizenship that emphasizes the rights of citizens (Somers, 2008, p. 246). This new understanding of civil society so has created "… a radically antipolitical, anti-institutional, pre-social, stateless and *rightless* kind of citizenship" (Somers, 2008, p. 246). To put it in a different way, the self-realization of individuals is tied to delivering services when civil society quits engaging in politics. Once they were citizens who bear rights and demand fulfillment of their basic entitlements through representing their interests with the help of politics, but now they have become only consumers (Somers, 2008). And these consumers have been rendered as desperately dependent on welfare services, economic and social support from these organizations and communities so as not to hold them accountable as citizens who bear rights, which clearly signals the dark side of communities and CSOs.

2.2.2 CSOs as hybrid organizations under the welfare mix system

As seen in the previous section, a group of scholars (Chandhoke, 2003; Clarke & Newman, 1997; Somers, 2008) argues that hybrid CSOs engaging in service-based activities have been depoliticized. On the other hand, other scholars (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Evers & Laville, 2004; Skelcher & Smith, 2015) claim that hybrid organizations could successfully blend functions of advocacy and development. In this section, I examine some studies belonging to abovementioned scholars.

Young (2000) defines three roles of non-profit organizations as supplementary, complementary and adversarial. While supplementary model attributes a role to non-profit organizations, which make them to carry out production of services with private financing, the complementary model describes non-profit organizations as partners of government whose mission is to meet the demands for

delivering public services with financial support of the government. In the adversarial model, non-profit organizations undertake an advocacy role and thus hold the state accountable. Young (2000) argues that these roles undertaken by non-profit organizations are not mutually exclusive through examining how these kinds of government-nonprofit sector relations coexist together in The United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Israel. In a similar manner, Salamon, Hems and Chinnock (2000) outline four different roles described as service role, advocacy role, the expressive role, and the community building role. On the one hand, CSOs take the responsibility of distribution of goods and services and on the other, they are expected "… to push for changes in government policy or in societal conditions" (Salamon et al., 2000, p. 7). While they encourage pluralism among citizens by enabling individuals and cultural groups to express their diversity; they also carry out a unifying role through encouraging social interaction among members of the community (Salamon et al., 2000, p. 7).

A number of scholars describe the new process CSOs undergo as hybridization. Although certain differences exist in their definition of hybrid organization; they share the view that those organizations could effectively combine mixed sectoral elements, organizational forms and missions within themselves (Brandsen, van de Donk, & Putters, 2005; Evers, 2005; Minkoff, 2002; Skelcher, 2012; Smith, 2010). It is argued that the hybridization process has begun as a response to the blurred boundaries between state, market and civil society (Minkoff, 2002; Smith, 2010) and hybrid organizations provide protection against detrimental effects of the state's role shifting toward deinstitutionalization on the community (Minkoff, 2002).

Minkoff (2002) studies how combination of different missions, namely service and advocacy role, within hybrid organizations is realized through integration of traditional and innovative modes of collective organization. The organizations devoted to the identity-based service provision could facilitate advocacy of rights by politicizing demands coming from minorities according to Minkoff's study on identity-based organizations in the United States. For this reason, she puts forward that hybrid organizations which pursue social change through advocacy could also integrate service role into their organizational aims. To sum up, voluntary service provision, which is normally perceived as an apolitical organization form, could incorporate an advocacy function into itself. Similarly, Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005) point out the inadequacy of defining associations as having only one mission since peace and conflict resolution organizations in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa serve as models to explain how multi-purpose hybrid organizations integrate non-profit service and advocacy functions. While these organizations fulfill the needs of marginalized groups and contribute to the development of trust within members, they also struggle against coercive policies of governments.

A number of scholars on the other hand grasp hybridity as "… an inevitable and permanent characteristic …" (Brandsen et al., 2005, p. 758) of current organizations since, as a result of called shift toward governance, restructuring of such domains as state, market and civil society leads boundaries between state, market and civil society to blur. This ambiguousness poses an obstacle to characterize all these domains with definite values and missions. Therefore, those scholars call those organizations as the third sector organizations (TSOs). And TSOs involve mixed values once peculiar to the community, markets and the state itself (Brandsen et al., 2005; Evers & Laville, 2004). From such a viewpoint, it appears

that bureaucratic principles particular to public sector can be invaded by managerial principles of the market and thus shape social services accordingly. On the other hand, this process also paves the way for the intrusion of public services by "… the rationales and values and nourish civil society …" (Evers & Laville, 2004, p. 6) and thus eases the improvement of a more civil society. In conclusion, CSOs could incorporate inputs and rationales from different domains of state, market, and civil society.

Although most scholars equate civil society with organizations of associations (Corry, 2010; Edwards, 2011) and thus operationalize them as organized civil society (Salamon & Anheier, 1997; Viterna, Clough, & Clarke, 2015), which is separated from the state and market; Evers and Laville (2004) reject the idea which positions civil society as right against the market and the state. They argue that:

> … [O]rganizations in the third sector act in a kind of tension field; they are simultaneously influenced by state policies and legislation, the values, and practices of private business, the culture of civil society and by needs and contributions that come from informal family and community life (p. 15).

This repositioning of spheres changes the relationship between public sphere, market and third sector as well as between the state and citizens. In that way, this hybrid feature of TSOs paves the way for finding a third way to social problems, which have been accentuated by neoliberal globalization. Hence, European third sector-state partnership model does not undermine TSOs into economic dimension through instrumentalizing them but rather appreciate their moral and political values (Evers & Laville, 2004).

In his study, Borzaga (2004) shows that Italian CSOs dealing with service delivery become successful in redirecting public resources to social services and bringing the demands of people into political agenda, which were once ignored by the public welfare system. Combining social service production with advocacy

resulted in the development of civic engagement. As a result, the public sector has approached to civil societal values more than those of market.

Brandsen & Pestoff (2006) put forward that co-production which refers to involvement of the citizens and CSOs in service production transforms one-way relationship between state and citizen. In that way, co-production promotes the development and renewal of democracy (Pestoff, 2005). Instead of NPM principles, which turn citizens into consumers and exclude them from service production and governance (Pestoff, 2011), this understanding prioritizes co-production and co-governance of public services through collaboration of CSOs and citizens and thus gives citizens a more direct role in the governance activities. The underlying reason hereof is that this uncertain and fragmentary nature of public management can only be balanced through citizens' participation. That is why it is argued that new initiatives have to focus on co-production of services by users and communities rather than delivery of them through professional and managerial staff (Pestoff, 2011). Refusing long-established paths and channels of participation, Pestoff (2005) places co-governance and co-production in sub-politics and life-politics as valid ways for citizens to express their own demands. A case study on pre-school services in Sweden (Pestoff, 2011) shows that when parents involve in the production of services, their effects on decision-making process increase compared to times when production of childcare services is carried out by only municipalities and for-profit firms. The underlying reason hereof is such form of relationship that gives opportunity for regular contact between providers and citizens. When citizens are included in the management of services, they have an impact upon the improvement of future services. When relations between public authorities and citizens such as parent associations in France, Germany, and Sweden intensify, the direct citizen

participation, collective action and democratic control over the provision of publicly

funded services come out. If not so, limited ad hoc participation restricts citizens'

impact and render them passive participants.

Another body of work conceptualizes these hybrid organizations "… as

carriers of multiple institutional logics …" (Skelcher & Smith, 2015, p. 439) rather

than organizations that incorporate mixed sectoral elements and organizational

forms. However, this adaptation of various institutional logics creates sites of

contestation among competing logics (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). In other words, we

cannot mention an easy way of blending/combining different institutional logics. As

Smith (2010) says:

> For example, many nonprofits struggle to compete for contracts, fees, and
> donations while at the same time their stated primary mission is to [develop]
> a particular community of interest, creating a potential conflict between its
> market orientation and its community commitments (p. 220).

This insight is also reflected in the work of Hustinx and Waele (2015)

indicating that a nonprofit organization in Belgium encompasses different and

competing institutional logics. Examining everyday practices of this organization,

authors show how it incorporates different rationalities such as business, democracy,

social welfare, and community logic. Because of the fact that the organization

synthesized these called logics successfully, it created a hybrid and thus a new logic:

participatory social enterprise. This organization exerts a democratic logic because it

detects exclusion forms from the bottom-up and develops innovative small-scale

projects with the help of disadvantaged people's participation herein. Then it

conveys those innovative answers to the government for policy change. Besides

advocacy, this process enables people to emancipate from poverty by means of

incorporating them into the process of determining their own needs and demands,

which is a representation of community logic. The project of social grocery involves

marketing logic since the incentives for entrepreneurship have been provided as a part of the project (Hustinx & De Waele, 2015).

In conclusion, both groups of scholars accept the advocacy of rights as a must for CSOs and acknowledge the autonomy and political actions as a prerequisite. However, when it comes to the effects of hybridization on politicization, they oppose each other. In other words, scholars drift apart while interpreting the effects of welfare regimes' transformation on civil society. While a group of scholars set forth that those organizations dealing with delivery and production of services carry the potential for nourishing such civil societal values as solidarity, deliberation, and advocacy; other scholars argue that dealing with activities in the social-welfare settings destroy the political voice of CSOs and; diminish both their interests and capacities in engaging right-based activities.

This literature review helps understanding the different interpretation of civil society in circulation and the effects of neoliberal restructuring on CSOs. Taking both detrimental effects of this configuration and good examples of hybridity into consideration, I pursue how combining different missions affect the depoliticization of women's CSOs in Turkey.

2.3 Civil society in the context of Turkey

This section sheds light on how the concept of civil society and CSOs entered into agenda of Turkey and how the role and mission attached to them have shifted in time.

Tense relations between state and society constitute the basis of political and societal crises Turkish Republic has undergone. When the tradition of strong, centralized power dating back to the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1969) was combined

with the modernization project of Republican elites that built the nature of relations between periphery and center as vertical rather than horizontal, the development of civil society as an independent social force became impossible (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). The modernization project envisaged a top-down transformation of society in the direction of secularist and ethno-nationalist principles of the official ideology (Kasaba, 1997, p. 16). This state-controlled transformation results in the repression of culturally heterogeneous periphery (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 248) and voices that defend the alternative forms of societal and political institutions and regulations outside the ruling elite reforms (Kasaba, 1997, p. 29).

From the 1980s onward and especially after the 1990s, Turkey witnessed a range of economic, socio-cultural and political changes. After Özal came to power, certain policies were adopted in the name of liberalization of economic sphere, which allows agents in the periphery to build their own financial networks (Toprak, 1996). And then their upward social mobility gradually took place (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). On the other hand, the privatization of the mass media paved the way for the visibility of the new voices in public opinion (Toprak, 1996). Thanks to the 1995 Constitutional revision of Article 33, which prohibits associations to engage in political and economic activities, a more liberal environment for the proliferation of associations became possible (Kadıoğlu, 2005). Restructuring of relations between state and society and enlargement of civil society were two most important outcomes arising out of these changes (Göle, 1997; Toprak, 1996).

Firstly, the strong tradition of state was challenged in concurrence with the emergence of new actors, other than ruling elites, as political subjects (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003) which means penetration of the center and its vision of a good society by the agents coming from periphery (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 248). Secondly,

against top-down modernization project of the ruling elites, alternative languages of modernity emerged (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003). Rather than "… secular-rational thinking …" (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003, p. 222) and "… linear progress developmentalism …" (Gülalp, 1997, p. 59); the new meaning of modernity was connected with the civil society, human rights and democracy (Gülalp, 1997; Keyman & Icduygu, 2003). Those developments paved the way for revival of public debates on the issues of "… religious and ethnic identity, national unity, secularism, and democratic pluralism" (Göle, 1997, p. 47). As a result, "… alternative claims to identity, politics, and society …" (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003, p. 223) by new actors came to existence.

Abovementioned factors led to the emergence of politically motivated associations and movements, which question the state-centric political structure and the modernization rhetoric. Especially, as the main area between the periphery and the center, CSOs and movements working for identity rights led to the enlargement process of civil society as an autonomous societal space (Toprak, 1996). The articulation of cultural and political recognition for marginalized identities concerning the Kurdish, Muslim, women, etc. brought with the adoption of language of rights. The language of rights contributed to the distortion of the view of organic society, which was prevalent in the formation of republican state-society relations (Keyman, 2006). The main problem about this view of organic society is that it embraces the civic-republican understanding of citizenship, which emphasizes citizens' duties to state rather than their rights (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003, p. 231). Against the civic-republican understanding of citizenship, new movements brought the language of rights into agenda. So, the alternative citizenship understanding that defends the extension of the society against state power emerged (Keyman, 2006, p.

28). In conclusion, from the mid-1980s, the existence of those movements and CSOs was embraced as an opportunity for the formation of the civil society as an independent organizational site from the state and thus as the driving force for democratization.

The prominence of civil society consolidated along with 1999 Marmara Earthquake and European Union (EU) accession process (Kubicek, 2001). The tragedy of Marmara Earthquake led everyone to question the paternal state understanding in the public eye and brought the idea of the bulky state to the agenda (Akşit, Tabakoğlu, & Serdar, 2002; Kubicek, 2001; Özerdem, 2006). When state could not respond adequately to the problem with its own save-and-rescue teams and rather civic groups relive the damage by supplying necessary materials, the state legitimacy came under question. State had failed but CSOs visibility and legitimacy increased on the public eye. Most of the newspaper headings in those days was about the heroes of Search & Rescue Association (Arama Kurtarma Derneği - AKUT) (Kubicek, 2001). This process caused to emergence of "… civil society as a force from below that could engender political reform" (Kubicek, 2001, p. 34). On the other hand, the process of EU integration which initiated in tandem with the change in the status of Turkey as a candidate membership in 1999 Helsinki meeting eased the enlargement of the civil societal space (Kubicek, 2001). This is because, Copenhagen criteria required the adoption of certain principles, namely the rule of law, protection of human rights and democratization of the relations between state and society (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003, p. 234).

After AKP came to power, EU accession process and integration into the global economy accelerated. As a representative of the periphery, AKP demonstrated a strong political will for the implementation of the legal requirements, which

necessitated the enlargement of the political sphere, civil rights and freedoms in order to weaken Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite power from 2002 to 2007 (Öniş, 2016). The legal changes in association and foundation laws and financial grants of EU rendered improvement of associational life possible. Along with EU support, AKP government was eager to incorporate CSOs to the decision-making process (Göksel & Güneş, 2005, pp. 63-67). And thus, the prestige of CSOs in both domestic and international politics had increased in company with their rising ability in raising issues to the public opinion (Diez, Agnantopoulos, & Kaliber, 2005, p. 6). Such political environment created a legal foundation and legitimacy for civil society in Turkey (Diez et al., 2005; Göksel & Güneş, 2005; Sofos, 2000).

While some of the studies evaluate changes in Turkey politics and increasing quantity of CSOs as a sign of civil societal enlargement and democratization (Göle, 1997; Keyman & Icduygu, 2003; Toprak, 1996), on the other hand some attract attention to the undemocratic structure of existing CSOs. Some of those studies contend that civil society is an urban elite movement in Turkey. So, being neither spring from below nor spread toward public, Turkish civil society does not create the potential for public deliberation and constitute people as subjects (Bali, 2002; İpek, 2006). In a similar manner, Zihnioğlu (2013) associates the failure of EU policies while advancing civil society in Turkey to the lack of civic culture that springs from below. According to Heper and Yıldırım (2011), the interest groups rather than pressure groups such as Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği – TÜSİAD) and The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği – TOBB) were dominant actors in civil society for a long time because only those groups benefit from the freedom of speech while expressing their views thanks to their privileges of

liberalization in the economic sphere. However, those organizations cannot be called as a part of civil society organizations because they prioritize their own interests rather than common good (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011). Consequently, the qualitative impact of CSOs is limited in spite of their quantitative increase in recent years (Şimşek, 2004).

Other scholars, on the other hand, underline how identity movements abuse civil society for their own big societal vision/ideologies. Cases and ethnographic studies that were carried out with the representatives and directors of different organizations indicate that Islamists, Kemalists, and Kurds use civil society as a means to reproduce their own power/discourse rather than as a force against state (Akşit et al., 2002; İpek, 2006; Kadıoğlu, 2005; Keyman & Icduygu, 2003). For this reason, civil society appears as a sphere of political struggle in which each actor tries to succeed their own agenda rather than contribute to the development of democratic political society (Zihnioğlu, 2013, p. 395).

Because of the fact that the economic and political sphere where CSOs operate shape the effectiveness of civil society (Paker et al., 2013, p. 760); the state's approach to CSOs has become another subject of study in Turkish context (Doyle, 2017; Paker et al., 2013). It has been set forth that not only civil society actors as carriers of ideological orientation but also the state abuses CSOs by co-opting and controlling them in direction of its own agenda (Doyle, 2017). As the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Üçüncü Sektor Vakfı – TÜSEV) research indicates that "The majority of CSOs believe that the state engages with a selective group of CSOs on a needs-only basis (68%)" (TÜSEV, 2011, p. 124). Interference of state becomes visible through legal and financial punishments (Doyle, 2017, p. 415; Paker et al., 2013, p. 767). Imprisonment and intimidation of CSOs members, censorship of

CSOs materials and closure of organizations are main instruments that the state uses against dissident CSOs (Doyle, 2017, p. 416). It is stated that "CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations, and 78% of CSOs report being subjected to frequent illegitimate interferences" (TÜSEV, 2011, p. 124).

The content of the issue has also an impact upon whether the state prefers engaging in dialogue (Paker et al., 2013, p. 766) because the state collaborates with CSOs that do not challenge its own redlines (Doyle, 2017, p. 253). The allocation of funds (Doyle, 2017, p. 416; Paker et al., 2013, p. 767) and distribution of legal permissions such as protocols (Doyle, 2017, p. 253) are the other ways of state to moderate CSOs. Ultimately, protocols are necessary to provide legal basis for running projects and this makes CSOs dependent to the approval of state. Doyle (2017) holds forth that CSOs even apply censorship to themselves and develop projects in only state-approved issues. Zihnioğlu (2018) on the other hand argues that short-term, activity-based funding coming from EU encourages service-based activities so leads to the depoliticization of CSOs. Besides co-opting and controlling critical CSOs, AKP government establishes its own CSOs and prefers studying with them rather than well-established independent organizations (Zihnioğlu, 2018, p. 417). As a result, when compared to 2006 report, there is "… a significant worsening of the CSO[s] perception of autonomy" (TÜSEV, 2011, p. 124).

Besides co-optative mode of interaction, Paker et al. (2013) put forward that this relation could be also collaborative and conflictual. In Turkish context, the state has incorporated CSOs into policy-making processes in order that Turkey's EU candidacy would compel the state to collaborate. Certain CSOs on the other hand have been able to develop collective action to challenge state policies. They did not stop adopting political discourses explicitly while continuing to cooperate for certain

problems. In a similar manner, Mühlenhoff (2015) argues that in spite of depoliticizing effects of neoliberal governmentality over CSOs in Turkish context, social service provision and cooperation with state provide opportunities to CSOs to politicize their demands.

There are also many studies specifically focusing on the roles of women CSOs and their relations with the state. It is argued that women CSOs become very effective in shaping gender policy in Turkey (Çaha, 2016; Marshall, 2013). On the other hand, Doyle shows how women organizations including feminist organizations are exposed to co-optation and this "… reduce their capacity to challenge and counterbalance the state" (Doyle, 2017, p. 243). Those studies mostly focus on the interaction of different women organizations such as feminist, Kemalist, Kurdish, Islamic with state while transforming gender policies and citizenship (Altan-Olcay, 2014; Çaha, 2016; Marshall, 2013). Besides, they study issues related to civic and political rights such as violence or political participation. On the other hand, the economic participation of women is seen as non-controversial issue (Doyle, 2017, p. 254) and thus disregarded. However, the policy architecture regarding women's employment also includes contradictory practices and discourses of state (Alnıaçık, Altan-Olcay, Deniz, & Gökşen, 2017). By examining women's CSOs framing of employment and their engaging into policy processes, this study will fill the gap in this field.

Other critical studies question the functioning of civil society as an independent site from the state in the neoliberal era and focus on how the state shares the responsibility of managing risks originated from excessive marketization with civil society organizations. The reconfiguration of CSOs as state supporter in the welfare-related activities has been one of the most visible outcomes of this process.

In unison with the integration into the global economy which requires the adaption of the principles of neoliberalism, the retreat of the state and the substitution of the free market with state-centered developmentalism form the main tenets of existing policy environment in Turkey (Keyder, 1997, p. 45).

Some (Akşit et al., 2002; İpek, 2006) argue how Marmara earthquake especially becomes the turning point for the increase in those principles. Being a repeated theme, the bulky state strengthens the idea of a minimal state and eases the positioning of civil society as a collaborative power of the state for the sake of decreasing obligations cast upon the shoulders of the state. As a result, the mission of civil society was discussed in terms of its responsibility as a stakeholder to the state rather than citizens. Those studies bring forward that AKP redesigns civil society as a part of its welfare mix system (Buğra, 2008; Eder, 2010; Massicard, 2014). Buğra (2008, p. 242) enounces that poverty reduction and delivery of social services have been main issues AKP governments have to deal with. One of the favorite solutions has been to encourage CSOs to run projects about the poverty relief and service provision. Other scholars draw attention that AKP extends its political power through transferring responsibility of poverty alleviation and social assistance to religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have a privilege on collecting donations and government funding thanks to legal changes (Eder, 2010, p. 179; Massicard, 2014, pp. 22-27). This change of welfare regime, the so-called institutional welfare mix is named as "… both retreat and extension of state's political power …" (Eder, 2010, p. 156) or as redeployment of state (Massicard, 2014, p. 6). The revival of waqif culture as a part of Ottoman heritage and the association of civil society with waqif culture during AKP rule were important signs of AKP's perception of civil society as service provider (Zencirci, 2014).

Another line of the studies focuses on how CSOs as institutions of neoliberal governmentality share the responsibility of governing citizens and managing the risks. Those CSOs reassert and rearticulate the discourses of state and construct citizens as empowering and self-satisfying individuals in accordance with neoliberal political rationality. And those studies question the political rationalities within civil subjectivity. İpek (2006, 2013) reveals how Turkish Educational Volunteers Foundation volunteers serve as governors with the feeling of duty to modernize the society in line with Kemalist-Republican concerns, so they try to construct a modern nation through education which facilitates the dispersion of Kemalist-Republican norms. As for Altan-Olcay (2014), KEDV and KAGİDER use techniques to construct self-governing and empowered women in line with neoliberal citizenship understanding.

In conclusion, while in one TÜSEV (2006) report the case of civil society looked promising, in another TÜSEV (2011) report its capacity especially in terms of state relations and autonomy was brought into question. As these reports point out, a dramatic change in its mission and role toward a state apparatus, a part of the welfare mix system and neoliberal governmentality in recent years has been closely monitored. While once upon a time the potential of civil society in Turkey for the development of a democratic society was discussed; its effectiveness as a counter-hegemonic force has been questioned a lot more in the last years especially after 2011, which is also a turning point for AKP's increasing authoritarian tendencies (Öniş, 2016).

CHAPTER 3:

CONTEXTUALIZING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN TURKEY

According to the Global Risks Report (World Economic Forum, 2018),

unemployment and underemployment are perceived as among the most important

global risks to shape global development in the next 10 years. The gender gap in the

labour market participation is another ongoing challenge that remains at the forefront

of the global employment agenda (ILO, 2018) for many years. Turkey has also been

suffering from gender gap in labour force participation (LFP). According to official

labour force statistics for 2019 January, only 33.6% of adult women in Turkey

participated in the labour market, compared to men's participation of 71.1%. In

addition to this, women unemployment rates increased from 9.4% in 2003 to 16.5%

in 2019 (TURKSTAT 2003, 2019).[6] However, it has been argued that these figures

signal a lower level than the real unemployment rate since Turkish Statistical

Institute's (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu – TURKSTAT) methods are erroneous.[7] The

report of World Bank (2009)[8] points out a dramatic decline in WLFP rate from

34.3% in 1988 to 21.6% in 2008. Besides, WLFP in Turkey is quite low in

comparison to the members of the EU and The Organisation for Economic Co-

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[6] TURKSTAT is a governmental agency conducting researches on various subjects and uses them to produce statistical results and publish reports. Labour Force Statistics is an online dataset of this institution. In this dataset, labour statistics for 1988-2019 from Turkey, is given in the form of dynamic tables. By using these dynamic tables, a researcher can access the reports that contain the appropriate data for her/his request.

[7] TURKSTAT defines unemployed people as "… people 15 years of age and over who were not employed during the reference period had used at least one channel for seeking a job during the last 4 weeks …" (TURKSTAT, n.d.). The necessity of actively looking for jobs within last four weeks to be counted as unemployed prevents to reach real unemployment rates because some of the unemployed people could be looking for jobs time to time, but not looking for work within the last month. Furthermore, "… such definition of unemployment does not count seasonal or casual workers, and 'discouraged workers' … as unemployed who are unemployed but are not looking for jobs due to loss of their expectations to find employment." (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 57). For a detailed analysis on the definition of the unemployed, see (TÜSİAD, 2002, pp. 15-22).

[8] This is a special report on the women labour force participation in Turkey.

operation and Development (OECD). While the average rate of OECD countries was 61.2% and that of EU-19 countries was 63.4% in 2007, Turkey's WLFP rate was 21.6% in 2008 (World Bank, 2009, p. 12).

These low WLFP rates and lack of progress in gender equality within Turkey labour market have triggered the interest of researchers in order to analyze the reasons underlying this phenomenon. Relying on this literature, this chapter aims (1) to provide background information on labour market conditions in Turkey and to introduce trends in WLFP, and (2) to present policies of AKP governments to those trends and problems. While the literature section shows main determinants of issues related to women's employment, section on AKP's political solutions will show how AKP government has depoliticized the problem and generated market-based solutions in accordance with neoliberal policy framework.

The main features of current labour market are shaped by the socio-cultural and economic changes the country has been going through since the 1980s. Thereby, trends regarding female labour force in Turkey are uncovered in relation to those transformations from a historical perspective. Firstly, the transformation of labour market between 1980 and 2002, and effects of this transformation on WLFP are discussed. Then how the combination of neoliberal restructuring and conservative ideology shaped WLFP during AKP era is addressed. Lastly, official policy solutions of AKP to low level WLFP rates are scrutinized beginning with 2002. Thus, the way issues about women's employment has been addressed by AKP governments come in sight.

3.1 Women's employment from the 1980s to early 2000s

Neoliberal globalization has stirred up a structural transformation in Turkish

economy. This economic restructuring brought about a considerable change of labour

market. This section reveals the effects of these structural changes on Turkish labour

market and WLFP from the 1980s to early 2000s.

3.1.1 Neoliberal economic restructuring from the 1980s to early 2000s

The policy package announced on 24th January 1980 by Turgut Özal introduced

certain structural adjustment policies as a response to economic crisis. This package

aimed to replace the interventionist and import-oriented model with the market-

based, export-oriented economic model (Pamuk, 2008, pp. 286-288). The adoption of

Washington Consensus principles involving privatization, deregulation, and

liberalization resulted in privatization of certain State Economic Enterprises (SEE),

liberalization of trade, and deregulation of the financial system (Şenses, 2012, p. 13).

While trade liberalization was undertaken to promote export-oriented production

during the period of 1980-88, the financial liberalization became the main

characteristic of the period between 1989-2003 so that domestic asset markets could

be integrated into global financial markets through elimination of regulations on

liquidity transactions (Yeldan, 2005, pp. 4-8). These transformations led to the

reduction in real wages, the deterioration in labour standards, and the persistent

unemployment. The military takeover of the government on 12th September in 1980

eased the implementation of these policies by restricting existing organized labour

movement (Pamuk, 2008, p. 288).

Adopting export-promotion policies led to the shift in the sectoral

composition of production from agriculture to industry and service sector after 1980

(Tunalı, 2003). The focus on agricultural sector's productivity dissolved because of neoliberal policy framework. While trade liberalization eased the importation of agricultural products, privatization eased the retreat of the state from support programs for agriculture sector (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, pp. 49-52). That is to say, the emergence of these competitive structures incurred a sharp decline in the proportion of agriculture within overall gross domestic product (GDP). "The average share of agriculture in GDP declined from 40.2 percent during 1963-79 to 15.6 percent during 1980-2009, while services increased from 37.4 percent to 54.2 percent of GDP over the same period" (Şenses, 2012, p. 17). This failure in sustaining agricultural production accelerated migration from rural areas to urban areas (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 50). While urban and rural population was equal in the mid-1980s, the urban population consisted 92.2% of total population in 2018 (TURKSTAT, 2018c).

This shift in the sectoral composition of the production from agriculture to industry and the service sector coincided with the change in the sectoral composition of employment. The shift from import-substituting industrialization to export-oriented industrialization and agricultural shedding affected the distribution of employment among agricultural, industrial and service sectors in Turkey. As Tunalı (2003) states in his report:

> According to the 1975 General Census, nearly 60 percent of the total workforce was employed in agriculture, 14 percent in industry, about 5 percent in construction, and close to 22 percent in services. … As of 2000, a little more than 34 percent of the workforce (of age 15 and over) [which was 20.1 million strong] was still in agriculture. Services had emerged as the new leader, at over 40 percent. Industry accounted for around 18 percent and construction for 6 percent (p. 93).

The very remarkable aspect of these figures is the dramatic decline in the share of agriculture in total employment. The share of agricultural employment in total

employment decreased from 46.5% in 1988 to 36% in 2000 (Dayıoğlu & Kırdar, 2010, p. 38).

3.1.2 Trends in women's labour force participation from the 1980s to early 2000s

WLFP has been influenced by abovementioned transformations the country went through. The way these structural changes shaped the basic features of the women's labour market will be discussed in this section.

Comparing participation rates between urban areas and rural ones, Özbay characterizes the migration from rural to urban areas as the main reason underlying the decline in WLFP rates after the 1980s. While 43% of females and 83.3% of males, at the age of 15 and older, were active in 1990, these figures were 72% and 95.3% respectively in 1955 (Özbay, 1994, p. 3). Moreover, when we came to 1990, 20 million women (aged 12 and older) were counted in Turkey, 59% of whose were living in urban areas. Quite interestingly, most of rural women were economically active (82%) whereas majority of urban women (71%) was housewives (Özbay, 1994, p. 5). So to speak, women's participation in agriculture as unpaid labour was included in statistics until this time. However, adequate development in nonagricultural jobs that may be found in urban setting could not be observed and thus emerging labour force could not be converted into the paid labour in urban areas.

In addition to migration to urban areas, Ecevit points out the privatization as an important reason for women's non-participation in labour force of urban life. While investments in manufacturing industry undertaken by public sector declined as a requirement of structural adjustment policies; the private sector investments failed to counterbalance this decline (Ecevit, 1998, p. 36). That is why, Ecevit (1990, 1998)

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focuses on the structural adjustment policies instead of socio-cultural variables as the main barrier before women's participation and argues that women demanded to participate in the labour market, but their employment opportunities were quite limited.

In the developing countries, which have adopted structural adjustment policies and engaged in export-oriented production activities, the need for cheap labour dominated the market so that competing in the world markets would be possible. In accordance with the feminization of employment thesis (Standing, 1989), both growing demand for unorganized and cheap labour force and growing supply originating from the decline in wages of male workers caused a global growth in female labour participation rate in developing countries. The fact that women can be paid lower wages than those of men constitutes the basis of this argument since women's earning their own money has been seen as secondary earning. Çağatay and Berik (1991) questioned whether the feminization of employment thesis applies to Turkey after engagement of export-led industrialization within the context of structural adjustment policies. Conversely, authors provided evidence that the share of female employment in large-scale manufacturing industry did not develop in Turkey based on the results of regression analysis on aggregate Turkish manufacturing data. So, these low rates of WLFP seem inevitable for Turkey.

How this transformation in the labour market from 1950s' import-substituting industrialization to 1980s' export-led strategies marginalized women in terms of employment trends and working conditions is another matter of debate. Marginalization thesis claims (Faulkner & Lawson, 1991) that in spite of the overall growth in WLFP, women are mostly employed in activities that require low-skill and high-labour intensity. Female labour intensity within agricultural sector despite

transformation toward export-led growth policies proves how women's labour are marginalized and so how women expose to gender inequality (Özar, 1994). Furthermore, although any noticeable increase in female labour's share could not be observed in the industry sector, women herein had mostly been employed in activities that require "… low skill-intensity, high labour-intensity, and export-orientation" (Çağatay & Berik, 1991, p. 158).

In a context where decreasing share of agricultural employment in total employment was not balanced by a considerable increase in the share of industrial employment, women were directed to informal sectors to find some other sources of employment. Rather than factory-settings, women's informal work mostly centered upon home-based jobs and small workshops (Dedeoglu, 2007). Subcontract manufacturing for lower costs in informal labour market eases Turkey's integration of into global markets (Aydın, Hisarcıklılar, & İlkkaracan, 2010). Quantitative studies focusing on the ratio of women in informal sector (Cinar, 1994) emphasize that women were employed informally in the small-scale textile garment and food-processing enterprises, which is quite typical. The cheap labour of women in these small-scaled sectors of low-productivity has gained Turkey a significant advantage in the global market. In conclusion, liberalization policies in Turkey led to the proliferation of marginalized forms of labour among female workers. The ultimate consequence was "… low-wage, sub-contracted, and non-unionized labour fragmented in small workshops or home-based production workspaces …" (Gürcan & Mete, 2017, p. 72).

The delay of Turkey's transition from the first stage of export-oriented industrialization based on basic consumer goods to the second stage based on durable consumer goods was addressed as another reason of women's exclusion from labour

market after the 1980s (Toksöz, 2011). This is because export-oriented industrialization achieves higher WLFP only if it provides a sustainable and high level of economic activity (Başlevent & Onaran, 2004). However, the production structure's nature in Turkey is lopsided due to the lack of necessary investments and incentives in agricultural and industrial sectors. As Şenses (2012) puts it:

> The average share of agriculture in GDP declined from 40.2 percent during 1963-79 to 15.6 percent during 1980-2009, while services increased from 37.4 percent to 54.2 percent of GDP over the same period. Meanwhile, there was little change in the share of manufacturing in GDP, which remained almost stagnant at around 17-18 percent; just as it was at the beginning of the 1980s (p. 17).

That is why the link between growth and employment has been disrupted and women's unemployment has emerged as an important problem in spite of abovementioned average growth rates.

In addition to these macro-economic variables, socio-cultural factors were also referred as important determinants behind low rates of women's employment. Gendered division of labour appears as an important factor that determines high rates of non-participation. The difference in the participation rates between unmarried and married women signals the impact of women's roles as wives and mothers (Özar & Günlük-Şenesen, 1998). Depending on the focus group discussion and in-depth interviews, Eyüboğlu, Özar, and Tanrıöver (1998) argue that unfavorable working conditions emerge as another important factor that leads women to quit their jobs. However, what makes these conditions unbearable is their responsibility at home. This brings women to both physical burden and feelings of guilt, which dictate them the idea of being a bad mother. Especially after giving birth, married women tend to quit their jobs (Dedeoglu, 2007). Along similar lines, İlkkaracan (1998) argues that along with these domestic responsibilities as a reason for non-participation in labour force, the permission of fathers or husbands seems an important obstacle for

women's participation in work force based on qualitative data from a field survey on migrant women in İstanbul, who came from rural areas to urban ones. Having said that, patriarchy comes to the foreground as a big obstacle in front of women's decision for working.

As a result, the structural changes, which cause agricultural shedding and rapid urbanization, worsen WLFP rates. Since export-based growth policy of the 1980s did not result in a more sustainable economy, increasing unemployment rates and unemployed women seeking low-paying jobs in the informal sectors mounted.

3.2 Women's employment after the 2000s

The falling trend in WLFP rates and the proliferation of informality among women were those main features of the women's labour market in the first period of neoliberal restructuring after the 1980s. In this section, economic and socio-cultural developments pertaining to women's labour market trends during AKP era will be examined.

Between 2004 and 2018, WLFP rate rose from 23.3% to 33.6%, and women employment rate increased from 20.8% to 28.1% (TURKSTAT 2004, 2018a). Despite the increase in WLFP rates during AKP era, existing rates are still well below the average rates of EU-28 countries, a very good amount of 67.4% and OECD countries, another good amount of 63.2% (ILOSTAT, 2018).[9] Also, the gender gap between female and male LFP rates, respectively 33.3% and 71.5%, is still big. What is more important than these quantitative data for evaluating AKP's performance in terms of gender equality in the labour market is the characteristics of employment that have been created for women (Toksöz, 2016, p. 72).

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[9] Like TURKSTAT, International Labour Organization database (ILOSTAT) is also an online statistics database which developed by International Labour Organization (ILO).

After 2001 crisis, the implementation of the neoliberal policies which aim to create budget surplus and sustain price stability via inflation targeting (Yeldan & Ercan, 2011, p. 3) accelerated under the surveillance of the Bretton Woods Institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank). As distinct from previous phase which overwhelmingly focused on liberalization of the markets, this new era is shaped in accordance with the key principles of Post-Washington Consensus which recognizes the necessity of regulatory agencies at domestic level in order to achieve a sustainable growth (Bakir & Öniş, 2010, p. 78). Having acknowledged the regulatory mission of state, this new line overlaps with AKP's discourse in favor of strong state (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005).

Although trade liberalization and financial liberalization were achieved to a certain extent after the 1980s, privatization process did not succeed until the 2000s. In accordance with budget surplus target, strategies were directed to "… reduce subsidies to agriculture, privatize, and reduce the role of public sector in economic activity" (Yeldan & Ercan, 2011, p. 3). And thus, the scope of privatization was expanded to cover natural monopolies and provision of public goods during AKP era (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 72). While a revenue of $8.4 billion was gained by privatization during the period before 2001, more than $30 billion was generated between 2001 and 2010 (Öniş, 2011, p. 6). Turkey has become one of the OECD countries, which has the widest scope of privatization (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 72).

These activities of privatization reduced the role of public sector in economy and so affected female laborers in a negative way. As Buğra and Yakut-Cakar (2010) put it:

Between 1990 and 2008, employment in SEEs declined substantially in absolute terms, from 595,794 to 145,340. This has affected women much

more than men since the remaining public enterprises are mainly located in sectors such as energy and mining which typically employ male workers (p. 527).

That is to say, contractionary fiscal policies leading to a decline in public employment took their effect on labours in terms of job losses and salary decreases (Yeldan & Ercan, 2011, p. 11).

Reducing subsidies to agriculture in line with contractionary fiscal policies aiming to decrease public expenditure led to the decline in the share of agriculture in overall employment, either. Having said that, while agricultural sector in Turkey corresponded to 36% of overall employment in 2000, it decreased to 27% by 2006 (Dayıoğlu & Kırdar, 2010, p. 38). Almost 25% of employment opportunities in this area disappeared between 2001-2007 (World Bank, 2009, p. 24). In other words, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by rapid internal migration and dissociation in the agricultural sector. However, agricultural sector collapsed in the 2000s as a result of agricultural reform programs intended for opening up the sector to market forces (Boratav, 2015, p. 5). Between 2004 and 2018, the share of agricultural sector for women's employment declined from 50.8% to 24.1%.

Despite the dramatic decline in women's employment in agricultural sector, the most drastic increase in women's employment occurred in service sector. Between 2004 and 2014, the share of service sector in women's employment rose from 33.1% to 58.9%. The increase in the share of industrial sector remains minimal for both women and men, with corresponding figures of 15.5% and 21.6% in 2004 and 15.9% and 21.8% in 2018 (TURKSTAT 2004, 2018a). This is a sign of jobless growth pattern in Turkey. The reason hereof is as follows: "[The] … shift out of agriculture has not been converted into an expansion of the industrial labour force.

The move was translated into '*marginalized /informal* labour' in the services sector"
(Yeldan & Ercan, 2011, p. 2011).

Aside from such slow pace of creating new employment opportunities,
another important problem female workers confront is increasing insecurity in
Turkish labour market (Yeldan & Ercan, 2011, p. 10). Printing on this era, the fact of
increasing insecurity can be observed through tracing new trends such as informality,
self-employment, flexible employment practices, and de-unionization. That is why
this era is also called as flexicurity (Dereli, 2014). As Boratav (2015) says:

> By the end of 2013, the flexibility of the labour markets was realized as far as
> it was politically possible. Trade unions had effectively disappeared from
> wage-determination. Sub-contracting had become pervasive and had even
> spread extensively into the public sector. Contractual employment within
> public administration and market-based provision of public services expanded
> significantly (pp. 5-6).

It has been estimated that in 2018, 28.2% of employed men and 44.1% of
employed women fell outside the social security system. While rates of informality
decreased in total for both men and women, the absolute number of women
employed informally increased in this period even though the number of such men
decreased (TURKSTAT, 2018a). Informality rates in the agricultural sector are
higher among women more than men since women working in this sector are mostly
unpaid family workers. Both absolute numbers and rates of informal employment
may be declining regardless of gender in agriculture, but they are still quite high.
98.6% of women and 82.9% of men in 2004 and 89.6% of women and 74.9% of men
in 2018 employed in agricultural sector were outside of social security coverage.
When it comes to other sectors, number of women employed informally in non-
agricultural sectors rose from 861,000 to 1.661 million between 2004 and 2018. And
number of men informally employed declined from 3.85 million to 3.561 million.
Therefore, Toksöz (2016) argues that new employment opportunities created for

women during AKP era are generally irregular jobs outside social security system. According to a study of Toksöz and Memiş (2016), these new opportunities are mostly in the sectors of service and manufacturing. According to their study, number of women employed continues to grow/doubled in textile, food-processing and garment subsectors, which have high levels of informality, due to inadequate industrialization during this era. In addition to high levels of informality in the manufacturing sector, self-employment within the service sector leads to an increase in the number of women employed informally. "The number of self-employed women in the sector almost tripled, increasing from 87,000 to 248,000 during the period, consequently increasing the rates of informality among women from 54.3% to 71.7%." (Toksöz, 2016, p. 75).

The initiatives to support small and medium-sized enterprises quickened during AKP era, either. This process aims to integrate small enterprises into production system with the help of subcontracting and outsourcing (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 73). The expansion of flexible production system in tandem with the proliferation in implementations of subcontracting and outsourcing necessitated the legalization of flexible employment practices. Flexible working arrangements were legalized during AKP era. Relevant labour laws are "… the inauguration of the 2003 Labour Act Number 4857, the adoption of the 2004 Private Employment Agencies Regulations, the passing of the Omnibus Act of 2011, and the 2016 Slavery Act" (Gürcan & Mete, 2017, p. 82). These laws institutionalize atypical forms of employment such as part-time work, temporary work and contract labour. Along with accelerating insecurity in labour markets, de-unionization was achieved through 1983 Laws and 2001 Laws, which prevent employees from organizing around labour unions by ways of restricting their rights to collective bargaining and strike. In other

words, this new phase of trade liberalization that promotes the incorporation of SEEs into global markets led to a spread of contractual employment practices among women workers in addition to the spread of informal employment among women workers during the 1980s. To sum up, not decent work conditions but tendencies for precarization in women's employment become widespread with these policies during AKP era (Gürcan & Mete, 2017).

Since "[m]odels of employment regulation have a close affinity to our welfare regime types …" (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 122), Turkey welfare regime also affected WLFP rates. When the abovementioned trends in labour market such as self-employment and informal labour practices etc. are coupled with a fragmented and corporatist social security system which ties health and pension benefits to full-time employment (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 212), precarization tendencies in women's employment increase. Because of the fact that self-employment, unpaid family labour, and informal employment practices are common among woman workers, their possibility to benefit from social security rights is quite low. Due to the fact that women mostly fall outside social security system, they are easily discarded during economic crises (Toksöz, 2016), one of the permanent-like effects of atypical employment models on women.

Low LFP rates and atypical employment models are not only rooted in structural changes of neoliberal globalization. Conservative policies of AKP have also affected women's working trends. While the existing patriarchal attitudes toward women's employment in society was already affecting the women working profile in accordance with their marriage and maternity status (İnce & Demir, 2006), discourses and policies have been put forward by AKP government on the basis of conservative values have deepened gender inequality. Since corporatist and

inegalitarian nature of the welfare regime in Turkey is grounded on the assumption of male-breadwinner model, responsibility of providing care to family members is assigned to women. Throughout AKP ruling, construction of womanhood as caregivers was reinforced by both governmental statements and policies. After 1983 Social Work Law, the state constructed a monopoly on the child protection services, in tandem with Return to Family Project initiated by Social Services and Child Protection Agency in 2005, which was followed by the shift from institutional care to family care that was accelerated afterwards (Yazıcı, 2012). The family was assigned with a duty of filling deficiencies in the social assistance schemes emerging as a result of budget cut in public spending, which has become the cornerstone of AKP's welfare regime (Buğra, 2012). In a similar manner, Uysal, Paker, Cansuz, and Kökkızıl (2015)'s research shows that the inner conflict and splitting women experience between mothering and working is indicated as one of the most important factors affecting WLFP decisions. So, this mystification of traditional family model as the glue of society and portrayal of women as the main constituent element of this family in accordance with conservative ideology generates pressure on women.

According to the existing literature, informal work, self-employment, and part-time work are preferred in order that it enables women to both keep up their familial responsibilities and participate in income-generating activities with secondary-earning status (Bora, 2005; Dedeoğlu, 2010; White, 2004). So, the gendered division of labour positioning women primarily as homemakers brings forward the phenomenon of disguised feminization of informality in Turkey. Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011) define this new mode of patriarchy as neoliberal conservative patriarchy because women are regarded as both cheap laborers and caregiver.

Being quite different from such studies underlying low level of female labour supply, Toksöz (2007) argues that low demand for female labour due to gender-based occupational segregation is an important determinant for low participation of women, either. Buğra (2010) also draws attention to discriminatory attitude of employers while employing female labour. In order not to deal issues of breastfeeding permission, maternity leave and kindergarten problems regarded special to women, employers do not prefer hiring female labour. Such association of children's needs with women is the reason why women are not preferred by employers. Following a similar line, Dedeoğlu and Şahankaya (2016) analyzed the attitudes of employers toward female employees in Malatya, Şanlıurfa, and Adıyaman by means of questionnaires. It has been argued that combination of patriarchy and capitalism aggravate women's working conditions in the study. On one hand, women are described as wives and mother, so it is necessary to maintain these roles in order to gain recognition in the society. On the other hand, the capital market forces women to work in the market so that they can also earn family's keep. Another study also draws attention to gendered outcomes of the contract between patriarchy and capitalist mode of development. The argument is as follows: "… the lack of demand-side challenge to the male-breadwinner family resulted in the institutionalization of gendered labour division and roles as binding constraints on women's labour supply" (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 1). In other words, the gendered division of labour affects both supply of women and demands of employer for women's participation in labour force. Both women's and employers' preferences are affected by gender segregation.

3.3 Women's employment policies during AKP era

These low rates of women's employment are considered as a problem and thus increasing participation of women in labour force has been declared as a policy goal in official policy documents after Turkey's status was approved as candidate to EU in 1999 (Toksöz, 2016, p. 69). Whenever this issue was recognized as a policy problem in concurrence with EU process, AKP governments became interested in framing it and determining certain policies to function as solution. Under this section, those solutions will be elaborated. This analysis is based on official policy documents of AKP governments and the relevant literature analyzing AKP governments' labour market policies.

In the Ninth Development Plan (State Planing Organization, 2006),[10] one of the development axis was to increase employment. Based upon this aim, improving the labour market, increasing the sensitivity of education to labour demand and developing active labour policies were determined as policy priorities. In the Tenth Development Plan (MoD, 2013),[11] one of the priority transformation programs was improving labour market effectiveness. One of the components hereof was to increase female LFP and employment. Three policies were determined for this purpose. These three policies were as follows: increasing effective implementation of care services, developing support program for female entrepreneurs, and providing vocational training (MoD, 2013, p. 164). As main public policy paper about employment, NES (MoLSS, 2014) identifies four main political axis that are "… [s]trengthening the links between education-employment, [e]nsuring security and

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[10] Development Plans are texts adopted by GNAT for a 5-year term. These texts contain basic moves which would apply to Turkey's development in this five-year period. So, these are the documents that reflect the future of the country. The Ninth Development Plan was originally adopted by GNAT on 28.06.2006. The State Planning Organization (SPO) then printed this text.

[11] The Tenth Development Plan was originally adopted by the TGNA on 02.07.2013. Later, the Ministry of Development made this text available.

flexibility in the labour market, [i]ncreasing employment of vulnerable groups, [s]trengthening links between employment and social protection …" (MoLSS, 2014, p. 2). In addition to all these, Action Plan on Women's Employment (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016) prepared by Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu - İŞKUR), put forwards two suggestions of policy to increase women employment, which are "… acquisition of vocational skills and orientation towards jobs …" and "… increasing women's means of access to labour market …" (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016, pp. 18-23).

The abovementioned texts indicate that two main policies were determined for increasing women's employment by AKP, one of which was to extend flexible forms of employment and another to increase employability of women by educatory means. Firstly, solutions to increase the employability of women by educatory means will be examined. Active labour policies and entrepreneurship support in favor of increasing employability of women through skill development will be examined throughout this section. Then, solutions regarding flexibility will be analyzed in relation to reconciliation of work and family life principles.

3.3.1 Active labour market policies and vocational training

The way the link between education, vocational education, and female employment has been constituted in Turkey will be reviewed through analysis of NES (MoLSS, 2014), the Ninth and the Tenth Development Plans (MoD, 2013; SPO, 2006) and Action Plan on Women Employment (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016). One of the four main policy axes of the NES is strengthening links between education and employment (MoLSS, 2014, p. 2). Increasing the sensitivity of education to labour market demand and developing active labour policies were identified as two of three

policy suggestions that would increase employment in the Ninth Development Plan (SPO, 2006, p. 14). In the Tenth Development Plan, developing the support program for female entrepreneurs and providing vocational training were determined as two main policies to increase female LFP and employment (MoD, 2013, p. 164). And, Action Plan on Women Employment determines "[a]cquisition of vocational skills and orientation towards jobs …" as one of the main targets (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016, pp. 18-20). This excessive focus on education as a solution within itself signals how AKP frames the problem. However, the examination of the abovementioned policies will contribute to understanding how the relationship between education and women's employment was built.

As a main public policy text prepared for employment policy in line with the targets of the Ninth and the Tenth Development Plans, NES states six policies with top priority in order to strengthen the relationship between education and employment (MoLSS, 2014). For that purpose, how these six policies were addressed herein will be examined up-close.

In the NES (MoLSS, 2014) under Strengthening the Relation between Education Employment and Employment, six policies with top priority were determined as follows:

> 1. For accessible education and training system, basic skills and competencies will be given to all starting from pre-schooling.
> 2. The quality and effectiveness of general and vocational education will be increased.
> 3. In the context of LLL [Life Long Learning], open learning environments will be ensured, and lifelong learning will be encouraged.
> 4. Compatibility between education and the labour market will be enhanced.
> 5. Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) will be prevalent and their efficiency will be enhanced.
> 6. Project-based innovation and entrepreneurship will be supported through the education system and ALMPs. (p. 27)

Despite the existence of positive inclusive proposals such as increasing schooling rates for disadvantaged groups facing with difficulties in accessing and continuing their education and extending pre-school education (MoLSS, 2014, p. 69), all other policy axes and measures target to increase the employability of workers in accordance of the requirements of business world. This is because the main objective of this strategy is "… to improve education and training system to meet the needs of labour market and enhance employability for all based upon LLL programs" (MoLSS, 2014, p. 25).

ALMPs have been developed to increase the employability of unemployed people. In the Ninth Development Plan (SPO, 2006), the third measure regarding increasing employment is to develop active labour policies, which is defined as follows:

> Active labour policies, which aim to increase employability by improving the skills and qualifications of the labour force, cover programs such as training the labour force, vocational education, and labour force harmonization programs, provision of vocational directing, vocational consultancy and counseling services, development of job searching strategies, providing disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, the disabled, women and the young with opportunities to find jobs, entrepreneurship training and employment-guaranteed education programs. (p. 49)

In other words, ALMPs are regarded as an effective tool to train the labour force as per market's requirements, to provide professional experience and job discipline to the unemployed in a short period of time. The reason underlying this focus on the employability is that when people cannot adapt market rules, they become unemployed.

In the current analysis part of NES, one of the basic assumptions regarding the workforce is the weakness in basic knowledge as well as poor skills. AKP governments so focus on developing occupational qualifications of employees and their behavior of job searching rather than striving for creating decent jobs for

people. ALMPs symbolize a radical change in the labour market policies. According to this approach, unemployment and dependence on social aid are rooted in individual inadequacy and preferences. Social insurance, unemployment insurance, and social benefits are criticized as passive measures, which weaken business ethics. This approach neglects the fact that unemployment and poverty depend not only on social and economic factors but also on individual factors. The strategy also embraces this approach and accepts unemployment as an individual problem and suggests developing much more active labour market policies. In other words, unemployment has been seen as a supply-based problem by AKP governments.

İŞKUR is the main authority to implement ALMPs. It mostly functions as a means of transferring public resources to employers participating in programs related to ALMPs, project subcontractors, private educational institutions rather than offering a job search process that protects human dignity and provides secure working conditions (Kapar, 2012, p. 68). In other words, the responsibility of providing services transferred from public to private sector and civil societal initiatives.

Given in the context of ALMPs, programs providing vocational training are quite popular. The main obstacle in front of the effectivity of those programs for women is the reproduction of gender-based labour division. Training offers of various institutions lead women to jobs related to traditional roles such as cooking, caregiving, hairdressing, sewing-embroidery etc. Because of the fact that courses given in these fields cannot be sustained and do not address regional needs, it has been argued that they create temporary employment opportunities (Ecevit, 2007, p. 43).

In the Action Plan on Women's Employment, second policy priority of İŞKUR was determined as increasing women's means of access to the labour market (Turkish Employment Agency, 2016). Nearly all measures related to increasing women's means of access to labour market in the action plan were about giving priority to women in entrepreneurship training courses and micro-credit support.

Presenting entrepreneurship as a miracle for women employment is a striking point. Toksöz (2016) argues that positive discrimination toward women's employment is limited with these entrepreneurship incentives (Toksöz, 2016, p. 46). The prioritization of the entrepreneurship as the only means for women's access to the labour market is a sign of how precarization tendencies are rising in women's employment. It is only preferable when women are unable to find any other paid job. Secondly, women apply micro-credit support in order to contribute to household income rather than establishing their own business. As a result, they generally lack any insurance. Thirdly, entrepreneurship promotion has thus come to be an area where low-paid jobs such as home-based work and small-scale contract manufacturing are encouraged for women. In order that these low-paid or home-based jobs ease keeping the work and family life together, which does not help transform gender roles. That is to say, even if female employment increases by way of entrepreneurship incentives, it seems that self-employment does not generate any kind of decent job opportunities. Rather than strengthening women against patriarchy, it leads women to construct themselves as entrepreneurial subjectivities (Altan-Olcay, 2014). Taking away the responsibility of creating proper job opportunities from the state and private actors, this solution of entrepreneurship also emphasizes individual responsibility and self-help. CSOs are also included in the process to provide support and guidance to women. Arranging educations and

designing development projects, CSOs contribute to women's employment. In addition, micro-credit incentives are provided by CSOs to foster entrepreneurship among women.

Underlining education as a reason of women's unemployment is a prevalent trend in contemporary global approaches to increase WLFP rates. It is a fact that women are less likely to benefit from training opportunities than men, which per se leads to inequality between two sexes. Therefore, such requirements as increasing resources allocated for training and ensuring that all children receive qualified, equal and unpaid education must be met. In addition, all necessary measures must be taken to enable women access to equal opportunities and all kinds of training. However, current statistics show that education and vocational training is not adequate to increase employment rates and decent job opportunities. The participation rates of women with same education levels are significantly lower than men. According to 2018 data, while participation in the workforce of women graduated from primary school turns out to be 33.9%, the very same figure ascends to 92.6% for men in the same category. While participation in the workforce of women graduated from high school turns out to be 34.7%, rates of men in the very same category are 72.3%. Participation in the workforce of men with higher education is 86%, whereas the women in the same category participate in the workforce in an amount of 71.6%. (TURKSTAT, 2018b). That is why İlkkaracan (2012) criticizes this overrated interest in women's education and job training as if it is the only solution and perceives it as shallow discourse.

In conclusion, addressing unemployment as a problem of education and skill inadequacy is a traditional political approach. Not concentrating on structural issues, active labour policies and the approach based on skill development frame it as the

supply problem rather than demand problem. As a result, Individuals are blamed for their under qualification and behaviors. On the other hand, CSOs and local partners are included to improve the qualification of laborers by means of training programs.

3.3.2 Labour market flexibility

How the link between flexibility and female employment was built in Turkey will be reviewed through analysis of NES and the Ninth and the Tenth Development Plans (MoD, 2013; MoLSS, 2014; SPO, 2006). Under the chapter of Improving the Labour Market, as one of the policy suggestions in the Ninth Development Plan, the arrangements to reduce employers' obligations were discussed in the context of approximation of the working life with family life and flexibility of the labour market (SPO, 2006, p. 4). In the Tenth Development Plan, enhancing flexicurity is determined as one of the main components of the program for improving labour market efficiency (MoD, 2013). In the NES that has been prepared in accordance with the Ninth and the Tenth Development Plans, one of four main policy axis is providing security and flexibility in the labour market (MoLSS, 2014, p. 2).

NES prescribes the legalization and proliferation of various flexible work arrangements. Those new flexible work practices include "[p]art time work, fixed term work, subcontracting, temporary work via private employment agencies, remote work, on-call work, homework, work share, and flexible work time model" (MoLSS, 2014, p. 28). In the strategy (MoLSS, 2014), it is argued that Turkey has the strictest regulations about temporary working modes. However, in order to adopt the competitive environment and solve chronic unemployment problems emerging as a result of globalization and rapid technological change, it is necessary to give up strict regulations in business life and adopt these flexible working styles according to NES.

Decreasing the informal employment rates is yet another justification to extend flexible working arrangements. Since social security coverage applies to full-time and continuous employment, people with flexible working conditions opt out the informality by foreseeing that they cannot meet the necessary conditions. To sum up the necessity of labour market's flexibility was not only associated with the demands of business world for the sake of increasing the competitiveness and efficiency, but it is also defended for the sake of providing a balance between work and family life for women. In other words, this perspective implies that women are able to undertake their responsibility in home properly while at the same time participating in the labour force thanks to flexible working arrangements. As Toksöz states; flexible forms of employment are recommended for actually women and young people. So disadvantaged groups are asked to be satisfied with their disadvantaged working patterns (Toksöz, 2012, p. 38).

The policies for reconciliating work and family life have been popular strategies to increase women's participation in employment. Its implication over women's employment trends is twofold. On the one hand, Policies of reconciliation of work and family life target to change the gendered division of labour. Since primary factors affecting women's business life are the assumed responsibilities of women at home, especially the childcare and other obligatory caregiving activities, those policies include legal mechanism related to work and leave periods and institutional mechanisms for care service. On the other hand, rather than targeting to transform gender roles, reconciliation of women's work and family life is used as a justification of proliferation of flexible forms of employment as it happened in the context of Turkey. Thus, measures related to reconciliation women and family life doubled the responsibility on women in Turkey. The recent changes in the legal

regulations about labour norms support women to work in a more flexible, semi-flexible and informal work environment let alone transforming gender division of labour. For example, while paternity leave is so restricted in Turkey, the measures to harmonize work and family life are targeting to encourage women to work as part-time or home-based. Besides, providing institutionalized childcare is rendered unnecessary.

The secure flexibility notion was employed in the policy documents. It is argued that while labour markets are becoming more flexible, the security of employees and the development of the social protection base are going equally sensitive. According to this approach popularized in European countries, flexibility and security in the labour market can be achieved together. While on the one hand it is aimed to increase the compliance of business with changes in the economy and production cycle in concurrence with labour market's flexibility, on the other hand employment and income security of the labour are targeted. Instead of job security, which expresses the assurance of staying in the same job, the protection of employment (employment security), which refers to the ability to keep working without depending on a single employer, has begun to gain importance. That is why ALMPs contributing to the employability of job seekers and even employees are rendered as ensuring employment security. The focus of the strategy on ALMPs and LLL programs is also related to this point. In European countries, income security aims to protect the income level of the unemployed by means of social insurance and social aids. However, there is not any positive measure in Turkey about income security. Even social aid is conditionally given provided that you participate in vocational training programs. And the way people will secure their income when they become unemployed is not explained by this point of perspective.

As to common arguments, the notion of job security replaced with the employability. Thus, job security is no more a legal security, but rather depends on the individual's own skills and capacity, namely on market conditions (Çelik, 2012, p. 22). The secured flexibility model on which this strategy leans is not similar to the flexicurity model implemented in European countries. When looking deep into the system of countries, it can be seen that the flexicurity model has been enforced in different formats and contents and the process functions along with the participation of both employees and unions within the social dialogue and reconciliation mechanism. In return for the consent of unions regarding the recognition of flexibility arrangements, employees demand certain protective measures and insurance regulations. However, in Turkey, this policy axis is entirely about fixing the demand-side of the unemployment problem. Çelik shows how the ideas and suggestions of TÜSİAD, Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – TİSK), and TOBB were taken into consideration while preparing the strategy rather than labour-unions (Çelik, 2012, p. 19). Strategy prescribes a model that the complete operation of the labour force market is left to the bargaining power of the employer. Accordingly, these new conditions lead to the institutionalization of informal employment. Therefore, not the notion of flexicurity but the notion of flexible security must be used for and in Turkey (Çelik, 2012, p. 19).

3.4 Conclusion

The literature points out to gender roles and structural problems existing in the economy as two main determinants behind low WLFP rates and offers some fundamental changes demanding for gender equality and macro-economy policies

that prioritize decent work and robust economic growth. However, it is clearly seen that rather than implementing transformative policies which target to solve the structural problems rooted in neoliberal conservative patriarchy and current economic model, AKP governments associate these low WLFP rates to abilities and educational level of women and strict employment regime. That is why AKP governments strive for legalization of flexible employment regimes which favor temporary, part-time, contractual employment and self-employment models. And for these purposes, they support the spread of micro-credit support and vocational training programs for women. In other words, rather than tackling the segregation on the basis of gender, inequality in wages or bad working conditions; these policies just look for quantitative increase. And accordingly, they drive women into labour market without providing any kind of legal job security.

CHAPTER 4:

WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AS ISSUE OF TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OR

AS TASK OF STATE?

In this thesis, I aim to analyze missions women's CSOs undertake in Turkey and reflections of those various missions on depoliticization of CSOs. In order to detect depoliticizing effects of undertaking service-based activities, I look at the way women employment has been framed by women CSOs. As shown in the third chapter, the state embraces flexibility and vocational training as two main strategies to combat with low WLFP rates and encourages CSOs to develop vocational training programs and to provide entrepreneurship supports. In other words, AKP governments position CSOs as a source for development promotion and service provision; and frame the women's employment as issue of effective technical management and as issue of cooperation. The study of framing shows whether CSOs frame the women employment as state does and so depoliticize the issue.

The shared and divergent framings of KEİG, KAGİDER, and KEDV are analyzed through examining their activities, their documents (including news, reports, websites) and interviews made with the representatives of the organizations. This chapter presents the findings under two headings: (1) framing the problem (2) policy solutions and activities.

4.1 Framing the problem

This section of the chapter presents CSOs' framing the issues about women's access to the labour market and staying in the labour market based on the analysis of interviews. These categories below are created in accordance with interviewees'

words while defining the problems about women's employment. However, those categories are also coherent with what literature indicates as important factors and solutions regarding issues of women's employment.

4.1.1 Socio-cultural factors

When the interviewees are asked questions about major problems women face in Turkey in terms of employment, all of them refer to cultural structure of the society as one of the major problems restraining women's participation to the labour force. However, what they address as problem varies. While some talk about the reason why women do not prefer working, others mention how cultural structure affects employers' preferences. On the other hand, while some mention increasing conservatism and the effects of collaboration between conservatism and neoliberalism on gender roles and thus women's employment; others keep quiet about the current political discourse and its effects on women's participation in labour market.

All interviewees (Interview 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) pointed out how care responsibilities become an important obstacle in front of women's participation in the labour force. One of KEİG representatives described the situation as follows:

> I can first mention the issue of childcare. Even though it is not the most important problem, it is still one encountered by all women at least. Even for female civil servants with the most secure rights, it is an issue that can cause problems in terms of continuing to work. In the private sector, this turns into a much more serious problem. While the legal framework that regulates permissions are incomplete, the idea that the woman has to take care of the child prevails in society and people perceive the working woman who does not look after their children as a bad mother, women's motivation for the employment decreases. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 1)

A representative from KEDV mentioned how care responsibilities create trouble for women in need of help and the vicious circle created by familialism.

The burden of care for women in need is much heavier. Since the state does not provide institutional care services it is impossible for these women to pay for private day-care centers, women are sentenced to stay at home. In fact, as an alternative to day-care centers, grandmothers enable women to work but when these older individuals also need care, women may still have to stay home. This is a big problem because when this responsibility is left to family members, women are forced to choose between their job and the home. (Interview 7) (See Appendix A, 2)

The second problem that was mostly mentioned and obstructs women employment under the cultural structure of society was husband's or father's permission (Interview 1,2,4,6,8).

Women are much more visible in business life than they used to be. But this is not because conservatism is over, we can say they are a little more modernized. How was it before? Women used to sit in the house and take care of the children. Now this logic has evolved into the idea that women work in women's jobs. Naturally, a distinction between jobs, wages and working conditions emerged between men's and women's occupations. I mean there are 'acceptable' professions for women. There are men accepting their wives' and daughters' working on condition that they are in certain workplace environments and engage in specific professions. For example, some of the women who came to interviews to get micro credit from us say that they want to obtain credit and start their own business for this reason. The husband lets her work but in workplaces where only women work or on the condition that working hours are not too long and no night shift is assigned. (Interview 8) (See Appendix A, 3)

One of the issues that was repeated a few times by interviewees (Interview 2,3,8) is sexual harassment as one of the main issues emerging as a result of gender segregation in social life.

Actually, one of the reasons women want to be self-employed is sexual harassment. Especially in jobs such as cleaning and textile work, where informal employment is widespread, women say that they get harassed or do not receive their wages, and as a result want to do jobs they can carry out from home. (Interview 8) (See Appendix A, 4)

All interviewees (Interview 1,2,3) within KEİG elaborated their thoughts regarding the changing cultural structure during AKP era. Their focus was on how coupling of neoliberalism and conservatism reproduced the traditional gender roles and the implications of this new policy influenced women employment. One of them explained this phenomenon as follows:

The form of conservatism has changed with AKP. The new trend is not that women should not work. It is that women should both work and keep up with their housework duties. So, they killed two birds with one stone. But this meant that women would be deprived of access to decent jobs. Many women who could not work before probably gained the opportunity to work with the help of the softening of solid conservatism due to neoliberal policies. But what kind of jobs were these women doing- that is the question. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 5)

The rest kept away from speaking about the effects of AKP's policies and discourses for reproducing the gendered structure of society and thus shaping women employment policy. They preferred emphasizing how bias within society towards women and gender roles makes harder for women to participate in labour force. One of the KAGİDER interviewees noted what she meant by cultural structure as follows:

This cultural structure is not completely related to being conservative. I mean, we would be lying if we said there is no problem for non-conservative people. It is a fact that there are certain prejudices in our culture. Even if you look at the most secular family, you can see that: When the woman comes home, she has certain things to take care about the house. Leave the chores aside, because there might be someone helping for all those, but women are expected to be home in the evening to take care of their children. It is ok if the man is not in home. He attends afterhours meetings, so that he can advance [in his career]. But women are held back at this point because she is a woman and the house is her business. (Interview 5) (See Appendix A, 6)

When I insistently asked how things changed during AKP era in terms of women's labour, one of the interviewees from KAGİDER talked about the good old days of EU accession process.

At one time, especially when the EU process was going well, the importance of women's employment for their empowerment and independence was debated. All these were discussed in the context of equality between men and women of course. Now, ensuring equality between women and men is no longer a very popular agenda. (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 7)

One of the KEİG interviewees emphasized that the business world's responsibility to promote women's labour was disregarded. It was argued that businesspeople just focus on what the state, civil society actors and women should do

but they do not take responsibility to encourage women into labour. They do not

consider the importance of working conditions for women's employment.

> In meetings with businesspeople for instance, I have begun to say: 'It is now your turn to grab the bull by the horns. Do you include women in your company, do you protect their rights?' We keep writing so many reports but the question asked is why women do not prefer to work? We should also ask why employers do not demand women in their workplaces? Yes, there are women who do not prefer to participate in the labour force due to the bad working conditions, but there are many women who have joined and given up or are reluctant in the first place to do so because of bad working conditions. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 8)

All interviewees (Interview 4,5,6) in KAGİDER within similar line

emphasized how women were exposed to discrimination in business life by

employers with reference to Gender Equality Model (GEM)[12] of KAGİDER. So,

they also attract attention to supply side of employment. GEM of KAGİDER targets

a change in the outlook of business world regarding women employment and

encouraging business actors providing equal opportunities in workplaces for women.

Those companies that prove their loyalty to the criteria determined by this model are

awarded by certification.

> The business world should definitely take steps to increase women's employment. Entrepreneurial women [members of KAGİDER] are all aware of certain difficulties because they previously worked in certain positions in other companies. So, they are also aware of how and why companies prefer men over women. For this reason, our certification program increases substantially as it creates awareness about the business world's responsibilities in terms of women's employment. (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 9)

It is obvious that all organizations take the responsibility of caregiving, laid

as a burden on the shoulders of women, seriously but only KEİG members question

its relation with current political discourse. KAGİDER and KEDV do not touch upon

neoliberal conservative discourse that has been reproduced by AKP governments.

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[12] For more information about this model, please see: http://www.kagider.org/en/corporate/projects-and-activities/projects/lists/projects/equal-opportunities-model-(fem)-a-gender-equality-certification

Additionally, as previous chapter put forward, government policy solutions (flexibility, entrepreneurship, vocational education) target to increase demands of women and so the government approaches women's employment as a demand problem. Therefore, the supply side of the problem – business world's responsibility- is mostly ignored by the state. Unlike the state, business world's responsibility has been brought agenda by KAGİDER and KEİG. However, KAGİDER's and KEDV's understandings of business world responsibility also differ. The way these organizations define business world responsibility and the implications of this approach will be discussed in following sections.

4.1.2 Lack of education

Crippling women's employment, another common problem articulated by the interviewees is the lack of education. But the way interviewees consider education as a means of increasing women's participation in labour force varies. While some of them regard it as a way to compensate for skill deficiency of women, others discuss education's general contribution to women's life.

A representative from KEDV mentioned how uneducated women are doomed to poverty since they do not have adequate capabilities to be employed. (Interview 9) That is why, KEDV provides vocational training for women and thereby women get a chance to improve their skills to produce certain vendible goods.

> Actually, women have potential to create and find jobs, if they can receive training. Training is important for this reason. I have seen that during our courses, women really develop new skills and they can turn it into a revenue-generating thing. Like the courses on making soap, making gift boxes and so on. (Interview 8) (See Appendix A, 10)

Another interviewee evaluated the training KEDV provides to women who apply to take micro-credit more than developing skills. Those training programs aim to

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develop their self-confidence and capacity for strategic initiatives and support them

in developing a dialogue with public and private sectors and finding resources:

> Women living in a very limited environment who have not had the chance to leave their own neighborhoods, are thrown into the world of commerce in a completely different world. The training we provide here is very important for this reason. As they explore a whole new world, we guide them on how to deal with the challenges they face. They explore the places they previously regarded as the world of men. This journey is another journey. Yes, you need to learn the basics of job when you work with someone, but you must have some other skills when setting up your own business. You need to get into the world of men. You have to deal with a lot of documents, that is, the bureaucracy, and while this interaction is more familiar for men in everyday life, it is not for women. So, our mission, is very important. (Interview 7) (See Appendix A, 11)

So, KEDV accepts increasing the employability of women as its mission. In a similar

manner, a representative from KAGİDER associates the empowerment of women

with education and economic participation and argues that providing training is an

important mission of civil society.

> Women must have economic freedoms for their empowerment and education is a must for this. Sometimes formal education is not enough. Women need to be supported in these situations. There are a lot of institutions that provide this. In addition to İŞKUR, civil society supports those training programs and is expected to do so… Our training programs are more oriented towards important entrepreneurs. We provide their mentoring in the business world. We help them develop ideas and find funds. We also encourage young women to study at university. Because education also gives women courage and confidence. (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 12)

KEİG representatives argued that education is important to be employed but

"to receive a diploma does not guarantee employment for people in Turkey

conditions"[13] (Interview 2). In tandem with this argument, another KEİG

representative claimed that education does not create an increase in WLFP rates

referring to a report they prepared.

> It was in one of our reports,[14] statistics say that simply increasing women's educational level is insufficient for ensuring women employment. At times

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[13] Translated from: "Türkiye şartlarında diploma sahibi olmak insanlara istihdam sağlamıyor."

[14] For more information about this report, please see: http://www.keig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2013-politika-metni-keig.pdf

when people migrated from villages to cities and institutional education was really low, being educated was an important opportunity for women to increase their employment rates, but now we have bigger problems than education. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 13)

Apart from formal education levels, KEİG representatives (Interview 1,2,3) argue that training programs arranged by İŞKUR, local initiatives and CSOs do not provide permanent employment for women. Even women's labour is being bought in the exchange of money well below its value. And those courses reinforce gender-based occupational segregation. This is because, courses for women usually take place in areas such as sewing, cooking, hairdressing, care services etc.

Within the scope of a project in ÇATOMs, women receive training and then can earn money from their handicrafts by piece working. But the wages are very low, and their monthly earnings are approximately 500-600 Turkish Liras. How can such a low payment contribute to them? They are simply paid during project and they never get the value of their labour... They continue doing jobs regarded as woman's job. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 14)

That is why KEİG proposed that both vocational training programs and education policy must be organized with a perspective that will sweep the distinction between women's jobs and men's jobs (KEİG, 2015a). Otherwise, increasing women's education level alone is not enough for increasing their participation in labour force. For example, in the technology field, men are predominantly employed, and the visibility of women is really low. The education system has to be organized to encourage women's interest in technology.

To sum up, both KAGİDER and KEDV undertake the responsibility of giving education as a strategy for women to increase their employability. They act in tandem with proposed strategies of the state. Doing a work with this approach, those organizations link the unemployment to women's skills and thus lay the burden of being unemployed on only women's shoulders dictating them to effort in their own individual ways to get a job. Besides, they position civil society as the supporter of

the state to provide training. KEİG, on the other hand, questions both the effect of formal education and vocational training on employment rates. It has been argued that training projects of those organizations create micro-level changes. "Those organizations (providing vocational courses) are proud of touching a few people lives (through training) but do not focus on the whole picture"[15] (Interview 2).

4.1.3 Macro-economic policies

As different from KEDV and KAGİDER; KEİG representatives (Interview 1,2,3) signal macro-economic policies as an important problem that discourages women from participating in the labour market.

> One of the most important issues relating to the employment of women in Turkey is the lack of a growth model that fosters employment. Since the state itself cannot grow such a model, it encourages women to establish their own business or work under flexible conditions. Or these women have already joined the informal economy. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 15)

In reports written by KEİG; privatization, agricultural shedding, export-based industrialization are pointed as main reasons underlying low female employment and informal employment rates (KEİG, 2013).

In conclusion, the ignorance of macro-economic policies by KEDV and KAGİDER shows that they frame the problem as outside of existing economic power structures. By not taking the macro-economic policies into consideration, they ignore the political nature of the problem and provide technical solutions like education. However, this policy neglects certain structural constraints that women face and focuses only on what women should do.

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[15] Translated from "Bunlar bir kaç kişinin hayatına dokunmakla övünüyorlar ama büyük resmi gözden kaçırıyorlar."

4.2 Policy solutions and activities

This section introduces both CSOs' representatives' policy proposals, and activities and projects run by those CSOs for the sake of addressing problems about women's employment. The solutions of those CSOs will indicate whether they raise opposing arguments against technical and market-oriented solutions of the state. Those solutions and activities are examined under three headings: work-family life policies (care-flexibility), entrepreneurship and training, gender equality policies.

4.2.1 Work and family life balance

Mediating the work and family life has been a central topic while talking about increasing WLFP rates. While some of CSOs representatives' regard the balance between the work and family life as a transformative force for eliminating gender injustice, others use it to condemn women to caregiving responsibility. The solutions of those CSOs regarding how work and family life must be balanced indicate whether they have an essentialist view on women's differences or not, just like the state does (Buğra, 2014).

4.2.1.1 Care-related solutions

The gendered discourse, which argues that women are responsible of housework and childcare while men earn money, results in either women non-participation in business life or participation herein while keeping all the chores done without sharing it with family members. Although representatives from each organization point out this responsibility of caregiving as an important problem, their solutions about this issue vary in accordance with various ideas on the people and the way to take off the workload.

For KEİG, shouldering of this workload by women is an important reason underlying not only the gap between male and female participation rates but also wage disparities, lower representation rates in executive positions and the impossibility of certain professions for women (KEİG, 2015b). So, it has been argued that the responsibilities of women and men should be re-considered with the perspective of gender equality and new mechanisms should be established to change the existing mentality and to redistribute this caregiving responsibility (Interview 2, 3).

To this aim, KEİG concentrates on three suggestions, one which is to extend parental leave. According to the report KEİG prepared, longer parental leave obstructs women to being excluded from labour market with the excuse of care responsibility (KEİG, 2015b). In Turkey, the early childhood education (ECE) services start around age three, but legal paid leave lasts just sixteen weeks while unpaid leave lasts two years, all of which are just for public employees. So, even though parents have the right to take unpaid leave for two years after birth, they have difficulty in accessing ECE services after that. The conditions of private employers are worse because they do not have permit for that much time as public employers do. Hence, parental leave should be designed in harmony with pre-school childcare and education services in Turkey in order to prevent women from falling outside of the labour force. Second proposal of KEİG is about working hours. It is argued that the length of working hours leads women to quit their jobs since they also work at home as a second labour of their second. As a result, working hours for all employees should be arranged in such a way that they can have time for their private lives and families.

The third one is about redistribution of care responsibilities. The organization of care services should be guided by mobilization of both public (central-local administrations) and private sector (small and big employers) resources. In addition to institutional care services, certain obligations should be imposed for both corporations and small employers. For example, breastfeeding rooms and nursery center should be opened in Organized Industrial Zones and Small Industrial Sites. Moreover, parents' different conditions for living and working must be taken into account and thus services must be diversified according to their durations and types to increase the options of families as to their needs. However, certain measures must be taken in order to avoid differences in the quality of care and education, which originate from the inequalities of parents' income levels. That is why, it has been set forth that the priority has to be attached public kindergartens that provide free, high-quality education in compliance with international standards. This is the reason why the private sector grounds on making profits, which hardens the situations for low-income families. In short, KEİG is against the idea that regards "… private kindergartens as a substitute for public ones" (KEİG, 2015c).

Intending for bringing these issues into agenda of women and state; KEİG firstly arranged workshops in order to determine the principles of how care responsibilities should be distributed. As an initiative, KEİG organized 14 workshops in 14 provinces with women's organizations, women from professional organizations, and unionized women.[16] Prior to workshops, women in those cities collected nursery data from their own city's local institutions in order to analyze care services in their cities. Throughout these workshops, they talked about the problems caused by social perception about gender roles, difficulties in accessing care services,

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[16] For detailed information about these workshops, please see: http://www.keig.org/kres-kampanyasi-atolyeleri-ocak-2013/

and women's care service demands from the state. In order to publicize women's demands for care services, Kindergarten is a Right Platform was founded. By means of this platform, women in local women organizations gather their power together and force the municipalities to include childhood care services into their strategic plans. They presented the analysis of their studies about care services during their meetings within local authorities. One representative from KEİG expressed the process with the following words:

> The start of the kindergarten-related campaign, in fact, followed our advocacy and public policy monitoring workshops with local organizations within the initiative in 2012. During these workshops, many topics were discussed such as how to collect data and monitor the relevant public institutions. Eventually the kindergarten issue was identified as the most common problem and we decided to start a campaign. Thanks to the Kindergarten is a Right Platform (Kreş Haktır Platformu), local organizations in our initiative have included other women's organizations in their cities to monitor municipalities, for example. By joining the city councils, they began expressing their demands and monitoring the activities of municipalities. The spirit of solidarity among women and advocacy was the biggest achievement of the platform. (Interview 3) (See Appendix A, 16)

The second step of this campaign in provinces was to convince mayor candidates to sign the social contract prepared by KEİG with the aim of reminding responsibilities of local authorities about care services during 2014 local election process. The contract was prepared in accordance with related principles of The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The disproportional number of children and kindergartens in the provinces and words of candidates about this issue, which will be effective after they are elected, were written in the contract (KEİG, 2015b). Even after the election, KEİG maintained its watchdog role over elected mayors that had signed the contract (Tahaoğlu, 2014).

In 2015, KEİG organized a panel[17] with various CSOs interested in ECE services to discuss the demands of women and existing policies about the issue. Being as an advocacy organization, KEİG regards the provision of institutional care service as rights of people so organizes campaigns to announce their demands and forces political authorities to meet these demands.

Two of KEİG representatives use the term "balance between work and personal life" rather than "balance between work life and family life" (Interview 1,3). When I asked the reason, one representative (Interview 1) emphasized that the usage of the term as balance between work and family life internalizing the norms AKP has been imposing. According to this mentality while women are expected to contribute to development of the country through working, they must also discharge their responsibilities in the house as caregivers. This usage as work and family life compliance means that where they have to spend their time apart from workplace is their home. That is why, they, in the reports, use the term balance between business life compliance carefully.

> The goal of work-life balancing policies must be to develop gender equality through a reform of the division of labour. But those policies do not promote radical changes in the division of labour. AKP simply threw women a bone by introducing minor changes. And then it became normal to spread flexible working arrangements and entrepreneurship among women. But, in practice, women began to shoulder a double responsibility. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 17)

To sum up, KEİG proposes alternative solutions to balance work and personal life as opposed to state's suggestions about flexible forms of employment. They even use different terms like work-personal life compliance instead of balance between work and family life. This usage of term in itself reflects KEİG's opposition to the state's perspective about women's roles. By means of alternative solutions such as

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[17] For more information about this panel, please see: http://www.keig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ErkenCocuklukBakimveEgitimHizmetleriPaneli-Web.pdf

extending parental leave, making arrangement in working hours and providing institutional care services, KEİG targets to eliminate injustices imposed by gender roles to women by redistributing care responsibilities of women. In addition to this, it encourages women to decide and struggle for their demands through their activities and campaigns and thus acknowledges the deliberation and advocacy as the mission for civil society.

KAGİDER representatives argue that regulations like long-term maternity leave make it difficult for women to return to their work and increase the cost of female employment for employers and so those "employer punishing practices constitute a danger to women's employment"[18] (Interview 4). Good quality, accessible and cost-effective care services rather should be provided to solve such problems of working women. (Interview 4). KAGİDER also defends parental leave rather than maternity leave. "The implementation of parental leave does not compel the employer to choose between men and women"[19] (Interview 5). Hence, this regulation prevents women from becoming disadvantaged due to childcare. KAGİDER considers part-time working mode until children begin primary school as an unfavorable position, which has been legalized in 2015 as generosity of governors and argue that this law includes a danger that workplaces may not favor employing women (Sakarya, 2015). In short, KAGİDER representatives do not approve a very long paternal leave and option of part-time working mode since those practices put employers into trouble. That is to say, it prioritizes the employer's costs behind women's rights.

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[18] Translated from "İşverini cezalandıran uygulamalar kadınların istihdamı için de sorun teşkil ediyor."
[19] Translated from "Ebeveyn izni uygulaması işverenin kadın erkek arasında tercih yapmasının önüne geçer."

As an organization, KAGİDER has organized different campaigns for bringing those solutions into agenda. In 2010, KAGİDER organized a campaign about women's employment with the motto We Want a Job in order to put forward their demands towards government and business world. According to this campaign, childcare services should be developed for working women and nurseries should be opened at workplaces (KAGİDER, 2008b). Thanks to this campaign, a public finance model of childcare services was developed and submitted to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. A representative described the process with these words:

> In 2010 we began campaign called 'we want to work'. Then the Minister of Labour and Social Security came to one of the activities. There was also AÇEV [Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı - Mother-Child Education Foundation]. The obstacles to women's employment were discussed and we began talking about care services. We pointed out that when a childcare model would be developed by the state, the employment of women in Turkey would increase. The minister said that we could develop such a model. We looked at what we could do with AÇEV, and in fact we developed something like a public finance model. It was not a model like 'that is going to be given much help, it is going to be given to that woman'. We assessed all possible processes such as employment growth, the transition to the formal employment including the number of working women, the number of current kindergartens and so on. And we said to the ministry: "If you add money from the fiscal budget as childcare allowance to the salary of working parents, in fact, this would be a benefit to the economy." (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 18)

In this public finance model of childcare services prepared with AÇEV, KAGİDER argues that incentive of 300 Turkish Liras from the state will return as 612 Turkish Liras thanks to income taxes that state will receive from kindergartens (Interview 5). Therefore, this incentive would contribute public budget, either. The employment opportunities to be provided by kindergartens for women and the contribution of state incentives for the spread of formality among women employers are also stressed by KAGİDER representatives (Interview 6).

One representative from KAGİDER strongly emphasized the importance of public funding and private provision of childcare services (Interview 6) since they, as

an institution, argue that local government's responsibility is not to open

kindergartens but to audit them (KAGİDER, 2015a). "Government should only

provide money as an incentive for working women. Then should leave everything to

the market for good quality and accessible kindergartens"[20] (Interview 5). As stated

in the press release:

> Another point is that municipalities open day care centers. We advocate that the task undertaken by the municipalities should be to determine and allocate the healthy and correct positions in which these houses can be opened, and it can create a clearer added-value when women entrepreneurs and/or women's co-operatives taking responsibility for opening these child care homes instead of municipalities. In this context, the most important issue is to ensure that the free market mechanism can provide women with healthy and reliable day-care centers so that we believe that the focus should be on achieving this goal and we will follow this issue as KAGİDER. (KAGİDER, 2015a) (See Appendix A, 19)

These statements signal that KAGİDER embraces market-oriented solutions for the

responsibility of caregiving. They defend to free the state and municipalities from the

responsibility of management and point out private sector for the management.

Secondly, even though they target to make a change in gender roles, they regard

women cooperatives as places to run care services, which confining women to

caregiving.

Besides, as intended for changing public opinion, they launched Glad that my

Mom is Working campaign with Danone. They prepared a research report about

positive effects of working mothers on children, women and family in general.

Representatives referred this study to explain why they opt for kindergarten services

rather than long leaves. In the second step of this campaign, they encouraged

companies for opening lactation rooms and developing mother-child friend programs

(KAGİDER, 2015b). This is because according to the outcomes of Danone Turkey

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[20] Translated from "Hükümet çalışan kadınlara maddi destek vermeil sadece. İyi eğitim veren ve ulaşılabilir kreşler için gerisini piyasaya bırakmalı."

2015 research on working mothers, only 9 percent of all companies in Turkey have lactation rooms and that is why KAGİDER and Danone Turkey launched The Lactation Rooms Are Not Luxury but Necessity campaign (KAGİDER, 2017).

KAGİDER's aim in arranging these gender sensitivity projects with business actors is "… to create good examples for inspiring people and companies"[21] (Interview 5). In other words, those activities of KAGİDER aim to improve gender equality practices in the business world but by motivating people thanks to good examples rather than demanding legal measures and sanctions from the state against anti-gender equality practices. Acting reluctantly for delegating legal obligations to private actors for ensuring gender equality; KAGİDER denies the state's position as a source of rights and entitlements of citizens (Somers, 2008). Quitting the language of rights, it condemns women to goodwill of private actors. In other words, it embraces the market-oriented solutions to problems of women's participation in labour force.

KEDV on the other hand puts the neighborhood and women into the center of ECE services and chases after the goal of a day-care center in every neighborhood. It proposes neighborhood-based ECE provision as an alternative. In this model, women living in poorer urban neighborhoods analyze the situations of both women and children and open a day-care center together. In accordance with their needs, KEDV supports women for getting education about how to provide education, how to run these centers, and how to mobilize local resources etc. In these centers, not only ECE and childcare but also various activities for women are offered.

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[21] Translated from "Diğer insanlara ve şirketlere ilham verecek iyi örnekler yaratmak…"

When I asked why they preferred neighborhood rather than workplace or institutionalized service by the state, one of the interviewees opposed to the setting of nursery in the workplaces as follows:

> Childcare is not something that can be solved with a nursery in the workplace since daycare centers are not only necessary only when women are working. Women (also) have to leave their children in a safe place to socialize. That is why the woman's life stops until her child starts primary school. Secondly, it is a challenge in itself to commute to a workplace with a child… Additionally, as we work with women in need, we are aware that for example subcontracted workers' children are not accepted into workplaces' nurseries, and their shift hours are not taken into account [when organizing the nursery]. These problems are difficult to solve. Obligations such as opening a nursery only in the mother's workplaces should be eliminated. There should be places in every neighborhood where mothers can leave their child, albeit temporarily, for the purpose of meeting their own social needs. (Interview 7) (See Appendix A, 20)

In the website of KEDV, the reason why they prioritize their neighborhood model over provision of care services by the state has been explained as such:

> … almost all programs aimed at poor women follow the traditional social services approach, treating them as passive recipients of services. This type of approach prevents these services from spreading to reach impoverished groups that are most in need, using those groups' creativity and finding alternative methods. In fact, under women's unrecognized leadership, there are unbelievable efforts and creativity to sustain families and communities.

> In some context women are considered to be natural educators, but with the spread of social services for children, education came to be seen as too important to be left to mothers and families, but rather the work of experts only, something reflected in existing regulations, and women's strength in this area was overlooked. (KEDV, n.d.)

So, it has been argued that since this model defends co-production and co-governance of services by women, it facilitates accession of disadvantageous women to these services. Thereby, running of these services by community/neighborhood empowers women.

The most distinctive feature of these places established by KEDV is their demand for low fees (Interview 9). Fees to be paid by families are determined as to families' income and costs of centers. In some cases, some families are not even

charged at all. In determining the fee to pay, parents' statements about their income and personal convictions of the managers of the centers are effective. Since managers of these centers and relevant parents live in the same neighborhood, they can easily know about their neighbors' economic situation. Some parents getting those services free of charge provide a variety of services such as housekeeping and cooking in return. In cases of financial difficulties, rather than demanding more fees from parents, fees are paid with the help of income-generating activities such as kermes and ravioli day, which are organized by women in the center within solidarity. In other words, women in the communities (cooperatives) finance day-care services on their own on a sliding scale as per their ability to pay; so those neighborhood nurseries become self-financed and self-run by the communities. While local governments sometimes provide certain resources like building for day care centers, the budget and management mostly depend on the support from community and labour of women.

Another distinctive feature of the KEDV kindergartens is that a group of parents runs the management, so parents participate in both training and management processes (Interview 9). In these centers, decisions are taken in the meetings held every other weekend and these decisions as well as problems are reported to parents in monthly-organized meetings. The understanding of transparent management and education, on the one hand, enables caregiving and training programs to continue in a more flexible manner as per the needs and demands of families. On the other hand, women who also run these centers gain certain skills like leadership and become able to transform their relations with the external world. Also, performing income-generating activities to ensure the financial continuity of housing creates a boosting effect on the neighborhood spirit. In other words, neighborhood or self-organizing

care centers eases public participation and makes people decide how to manage and raise their children. And, it has also been argued that women's collective efforts for setting budget, directing and organizing help them get included in public realm and serve for women empowerment.

To sum up, this model developed by KEDV proposes community-driven and mixed public-private financing of children education. In an environment, where public child-care is limited and private childcare options are costly, those community-driven initiatives function as a solution for affordable day-care services. This model of childcare services is innovative because it brings the co-production of services into agenda. Pestoff (2005) argues that the co-production of services eases co-governance of services. And citizens find a way for expressing their demands in a democratic way and thus participate in life-politics. In other words, running of these centers by women empower them through the transformation of one-way of relationship between citizens and local authorities. However, this model also reinforces women's positions as caregivers since women in the neighborhood are constructed as natural educators. Secondly, dependence on the resources of communities and local governments could create inequalities because each neighborhood's probability and facility to access resources is different (Social Policy Forum, Boğaziçi University, 2009). Additionally, lack of accountability in community-provided care services could lead the abuse of power, which may cause some citizens to be excluded from those services (Chandhoke, 2003). So, the community-provision of care services can deepen the inequalities.

In conclusion, KEİG defends the diversity in the provision of care services and categorizes them as public, private, neighborhood, local but it prioritizes the public-provision care services over private provision since care services must be free

for everyone according to KEİG. That is to say, KEİG senses the care services as the right of citizens and positions the state as the source of rights and entitlements. However, KAGİDER does not advocate the public provision but defend the publicly funded private provision of services since free market leads to emergence of good quality and accessible services, which makes them offer market-oriented solutions. Besides, as I have argued before, both KAGİDER and KEİG mention the responsibility of business world to promote women employment. However, while KEİG members define the business-world responsibility to open kindergartens and breastfeeding rooms as legal requirements, KAGİDER does not acknowledge the law as a force against business-world. Instead of law, it embraces the goodwill of business actors as a force. On the other hand, KEDV does not trust the state and business world or private sector to offer these services and believes in the benefit of educating children altogether within the community. On the other hand, excluding the state from service provision and including communities in service provision, it reproduces self-help discourse brought about by neoliberal discourse. Whether the KEDV model offers a potential for empowering women and transforming the social dynamics as opposed to the self-help discourse of neoliberal ideology will be examined in the following sections.

4.2.1.2 Labour market flexibility

In the campaign We Want a Job, KAGİDER also demands from the government to develop a flexible working model regulated by the labour law numbered 4857 in order to increase women's employment (KAGİDER, 2008b). One representative told why they supported the development of such a flexible working arrangement with those words:

The recognition of flexible forms of employment by law and the extension of their scope means the reduction of informal employment and unemployment. There are currently a lot of women working informally because they work part-time or home-office as per their needs. That is to say, women's needs and working preferences vary. The most accurate thing is to create a social security system compatible with these differences. (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 21)

On the other hand, KEİG prepared two different reports to show the disadvantageous of spread of flexible working arrangements for women, one of whose title was Women's Labour and Employment in Turkey, in the Snare of Flexibilization and Informalization: An Analysis within the Frame of Policy Documents (KEİG, 2014b), and another was Precarization Tendencies in Women's Employment and The Agenda of Atypical Employment Models (KEİG, 2014a).

Main focuses of these reports were suggestion of flexibility in the axis of work and family life balance and strengthening of family. The main reason KEİG opposes to spread of flexible working arrangements is the disappearance of decent job opportunities for women. As stated in the report (KEİG, 2014a):

Part-time work refers to bad working and poor employment conditions, meaning low income and inability to benefit from the social security system. It often coincides with the temporary work and also includes disadvantages of this mode of work. (p. 10)

The government's presenting flexibility as the only choice for women in every text from development plans to employment strategy documents is another striking point emphasized by KEİG:

Temporary work for women emerges as a non-alternative form of employment, decreases the possibility of transition to good jobs in the following years, creates uncertainty for the future due to lack of job security and income disorder, corresponds to a disadvantaged working life in terms of social security and occupational health and safety, does not contribute to human capital (in contrast can lead to its loss) and limits the possibility of organization (KEİG, 2014a).

Depending on those arguments, KEİG in every platform ranging from commissions to party group meetings warns about the risks of flexibility for

women's employment (Interview 3) and demands the "… legal care leaves, the right to a guaranteed job following leave periods, and access to social rights …" (KEİG, 2014b) to provide balance between work-personal life. The encouragement of flexible and insecure forms of employment as a policy for reconciliating work-personal life rather than spreading care services deepen the gender inequality (Interview 3).

As a conclusion, while KEİG targets women's participation in the labour force with the very same conditions of men in terms of security coverage, wages etc. KAGİDER focuses on the participation of women in labour force in any form. This is because, according to KAGİDER representative earning even one lira is very important (Interview 6). In other words, KAGİDER is interested in the qualitative increase in WLFP rates just like the state itself. However, as literature points out, flexibility increases the vulnerabilities of women to precarious job opportunities (Akkan & Serim, 2018) rather than empowering them, which renders it as a market-oriented solution.

The prioritization of flexibility by state as a policy to reconcile work and family life without making any improvement for the provision of care services is a sign of how the state "… regards cultural norms and labour market relations as natural phenomena …" (Buğra, 2014, p. 148). With this understanding of flexibility, the state both confines women to caregiving jobs and presents atypical employment models taken for granted. Although KAGİDER strives for spreading publicly financed caregiving services, it also prioritizes the flexibility as the necessary policy to increase women's employment rates. So, it also obliges women to the current labour market relations and existing cultural norms. On the other hand, KEİG

defends change in both current labour market relations and gender roles and thus it poses systemic challenges to what is introduced as a natural phenomenon.

4.2.2 Entrepreneurship and vocational training

Both KEDV and KAGİDER conduct certain activities related to women entrepreneurship. However, the scope of their activities and their approach to entrepreneurship differs. KEDV under MAYA[22] offers micro-credits to women with low incomes to make them set up their own businesses and gives training to increase their knowledge and skills on the way of establishing economic initiatives.

On the other hand, KAGİDER focuses on developing women entrepreneurship ecosystem and its actions can be classified into two groups. First one is to strive for developing proper legal framework to ease women's entrance into entrepreneurship world (KAGİDER, 2008a). For this purpose, KAGİDER launched a campaign named Buy from Women, Make Country Win.[23] As a part of this campaign, they suggested that the private and public sector would purchase from female producers. Female supplies would be involved in procurement process that way. Developing female entrepreneurs' capacity and augmentation in the number of female suppliers require a positive discrimination in the public or private sectors, which brings about the necessity of including at least one female entrepreneur in the procurement process according to demands of the organization. KAGİDER also organized two conferences on international women entrepreneurs with Turkish Ministry of Economy for the purpose of bringing all parties (state, private sector,

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[22] MAYA is Turkey's first micro-credit institution that has been established by KEDV to provide loans to economically disadvantaged women. For more information, please see: http://www.kedv.org.tr/maya/?lang=en

[23] For more information, please see: https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/son-dakika-haberi/kagiderden-kadindan-almali-memleket-kazanmali-kampanyasi-1719384/

women entrepreneurs, CSOs) together to discuss what to do for developing women's entrepreneurship ecosystem in Turkey (KAGİDER, 2008a). In those conferences, KAGİDER also brought up their demands to the state and private sector such as establishing special women entrepreneurship funds, making new arrangements in taxes for women entrepreneurs and so on.

The second one is to encourage and support women to enter into the entrepreneurial world. For this purpose, the organization offers comprehensive training in business start-ups and development processes, as well as incubation, consultancy and mentoring support for female entrepreneur candidates; and develops network among female entrepreneurs (Interview 6).

According to representatives of KAGİDER, a successful entrepreneurship requires a creative business idea and sustainable business plan that will assess all risks in the long-term. When the capital and ideas meet, entrepreneur becomes able to set up the business (Interview 6). In addition to the abovementioned, those entrepreneurs create employment opportunities not just for themselves but also for others and thus entrepreneurship means more than earning a livelihood. On the other hand, KEDV offers loan for disadvantaged women in order to help them engage in income-generating activities. One representative from KEDV argues that the reason for encouraging women to have their own jobs is the lack of job opportunities in labour marker for them (Interview 7), which can be deemed as related to the realities of labour market realities like unemployment. Therefore, in this scenario, women who could not find jobs are directed to receive micro-credits and set up their own business. As Buğra (2014) argues:

> The tendency to take unregulated labour market relations as given has led some of the women's NGOs to endorse and support official policy attempts to develop the income-earning potential of women without encouraging them to seek paid employment outside their homes (p. 162).

Rather than women's demand, entrepreneurship emerges as the only option for those women. However, it is also set forth that in contrast to supply-driven programs, demand-driven programs based on the target group's request succeed (Ecevit, 2007).

Another difference between KEDV and KAGİDER when it comes to entrepreneurship is that KEDV encourages collective cooperatives rather than individual entrepreneurship since it assumes that collectivity empowers women while MAYA still offers personal loans to women.

KEDV's cooperative project deserves a detailed examination because it provides an organization model for women combining social care, entrepreneurship, and empowerment altogether. In 2001, KEDV launched a workshop to develop a model for poor women's needs that focused on working with local women. In this framework, the cooperative was presented as a suitable form of organization (Akçar, 2016). Then, KEDV prepared a sample contract. The establishment and development of cooperatives have been supported by KEDV since 2001. For this purpose, many activities were also carried out by KEDV. For example, they prepared a cooperative handbook and established a cooperative support center. This Co-operative Support Center provides support, training and consultancy services in a wide variety ranging from writing projects to get resources from national and international institutions to giving neighbor mother education; from teaching to keep accounts to pursuing strategies about developing a dialogue with local authorities. In order to increase capacities and interaction among cooperatives, KEDV started organizing cooperative meetings. Bureaucrats were also invited to those meetings to convince them to change the legal structure about cooperatives (Interview 9). Finally, KEDV led the establishment of SİMURG Union of Women Co-Operatives to gather women

cooperatives under one roof. The goal of SİMURG[24] was to make women's cooperatives articulate their demands.

The emergence of this model actually dates backs to the centers of women and children, founded to support women during 17 August. All those samples were signs of KEDV members that how women coming together for practical needs such as childcare could develop their capacities for strategic needs. One representative of KEDV announced the process as such:

> Different needs of women coming together in these centers were started to be discussed in time. We started working on new topics. ...Some of the mothers who could not find work started saying "If we had money, we would do something ourselves. Our problem is lack of money". Therewith, we started small pilot applications and gave micro-credit to women to set up their own business. (Interview 8) (See Appendix A, 22)

During all those studies in poor regions, the aim of KEDV "… was not to provide charity but development"[25] (Interview 7). That is why financial initiatives of women within those cooperatives were supported. Women have the opportunity to market their own products and create new business areas thanks to various training programs KEDV offers. A representative expressed that those cooperatives contributed to both creating new employment opportunities and new ways of income generation. Women in those cooperatives earn income between 500 and 1000 Turkish Liras monthly (Interview 9).

Those cooperatives are not only economic initiatives but also offer a new model of social services. Additionally, they help needy and battered women get over with violence. The contribution of co-operatives to new social services approach was put forward in the 5th co-operative meeting report (KEDV, 2015) as such:

> When we look at women's co-operatives, they are not basically concerned that the three or five of us will come together to make money or make more money. This can be a self-directed demand, but also women's co-operatives

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[24] For more information, please visit: http://simurg.org.tr/test/
[25] Translated from "… hayırseverlik değil kalkınma sağlamak."

are doing something for others. For society itself… When we look at it, the co-operatives offer a very effective social service in their neighborhoods. Because social services in Turkey are expert oriented. The state employs them, and they travel home from home. However, when you look at these cooperatives, they do it as institutionally and provide a serious public service. Women who are beaten in their homes, women who suffer from poverty but do not know what to do, can reach these cooperatives, look for a way, find guidance and recover, are rehabilitated. Then they come out in other ways by supporting others, sharing with each other and empowering. There is no better approach to social service (pp. 12-13).

Therefore, KEDV has chosen ECE strategically as a starting point for their organizational vision. The reason underlying is obvious: Service provision is actually a tool for empowering women.

Some social services have the potential to bring everyone in the community together by nature. They can create a platform of dialogue and democracy among that neighborhood's residents when they are designed differently, that is, not organized, isolated from society. For example, women may be the main leaders of a dialogue and reconciliation process with all segments together with the organization of a new understanding of ECE services that open to mothers. They may have the opportunity to influence local governments for pro-women and pro-child urban policies. (Interview 9) (See Appendix A, 23)

In other words, an important mission of those cooperatives is to make women active citizens through including them in local politics. An important program run for this purpose by the KEDV is local administrations' budget analysis. To that aim, a committee is set up in each neighborhood and primary needs of women living in this neighborhood are analyzed. Then, at the same time, they look at the budget of municipalities and analyze how much resources are transferred to women in the budget. Afterwards, they bring forward their own proposals and start negotiating with the municipality. This process enables them to participate in public sphere with a legal rationale for children, which is empowering for women (Interview 9). As stated in the 1st co-operative meeting report (KEDV, 2005):

The political meaning of analyzing local budgets by women is very significant. Women within cooperatives have difficulties in creating resources. However, there are a number of international conventions for

women to benefit equally from the resources of local government, but in practice this cannot be achieved. Within the scope of the budget study, women in cooperatives looked at the municipal budget and analyzed, 'How women can benefit directly and indirectly?'. By this way, municipalities are encouraged for developing services to meet the needs of women in the future. Such a study is very positive and important for Turkey (p. 4).

It has been exerted that women's cooperatives have a direct impact upon women's life. Thanks to cooperatives, they participate in production process and have their own economic freedom. They gain new skills and capacities. Besides, social services tandem with their needs are offered. With the help of cooperatives, women access social networks and learn about their rights. In addition to all these, interacting with local authorities, women play active roles in making decisions while developing policies and services for the elimination of poverty. Two factors that are of great significance to empower women in these centers is providing solidarity with each woman and helping them make their own sentences. So, "[r]ather than being passive recipients, they determine their own needs and speak for themselves. Thanks to this space within the neighborhood, they come together frequently, discuss their problems and as a result create independent policies"[26] (Interview 8).

KEİG (2013), on the other hand, challenges this promotion of women's entrepreneurship with the argument that the gender roles are essentialized this way. As stated in the report (KEİG, 2013);

> Women entrepreneurship is proposed with a vision of primary responsibility of women's care as harmonizing forms of family and business life; thus, both the domestic labour of women and the continuation of Elderly-patient care services continue and also under the pressure of harmonizing labour relations with women domestic responsibilities women are sentenced to and flexible working conditions. (p. 22)

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[26] Translated from "Pasif olmaktansa kendi ihtiyaçlarını belirleyip kendileri adına konuşuyorlar. Bu merkezler sayesinde sık sık bir araya gelip sorunlarını tartışıyorlar ve sonuçta herkesten bağımsız kendi çözümlerini üretiyorlar."

One of the interviewees from KEİG questioned this turbulent entrepreneurship spirit

for especially women in the last years as such:

> If women want, the way for entrepreneurship should be opened and positive
> discrimination should be given to women. But why this is so encouraged by
> the state should also be questioned. The notion of entrepreneurship all over
> the world is fashionable. [This phenomenon], presented as a miracle, as the
> panacea to all employment problems in Turkey. Why? Because the state's
> responsibility to create employment is eliminated. It is aimed to support
> women with funds and training and make women set up their own businesses.
> But on the other hand, it does not question how successful it is. All projects
> base on American way of success stories. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 24)

In conclusion, both KAGİDER and KEDV accept the state's framing of the

problem as lack of education and offer training programs to women to increase their

knowledge and skills under the guidance of the approach that women equipped with

professional skills can find jobs or set up their own businesses in the labour market.

The main objective here is to increase the employability of women. So,

unemployment has been associated with the incapableness of women. Not

questioning the government's labour market policies but accepting the labour market

relations as they are, those two CSOs propose the vocational education to increase

opportunities for women's employment, which mean they both produce technical

solutions. All of these efforts about education can be evaluated within the framework

of active labour force policies. The second axis of active labour force policies is to

encourage women to set up their own businesses in order to make income-generating

jobs. With this solution, CSOs also hold women responsible for their employment.

As state does, KEDV sees the entrepreneurship as a strategy to cope with poverty

and it proposes the self-employment as the only choice for women rather than

leading them for waged employment. This means KEDV, too, takes the current

labour market relations for granted and that is the reason behind its supply-driven

micro-credits. On the other hand, KAGİDER does not try to replace self-employment

with waged employment but create opportunities for women with creative ideas about business to put into practice and that is why its programs are demand-based. However, this whole pumping of the entrepreneurship as a miracle for women's employment as it happens throughout the world is a sign of how this problem is framed outside existing power structures.

On the other hand, KEDV's cooperative model provides a transformative agenda because it carries a potential for empowering women. As the literature discusses, it regards empowerment as a long-term process and believes in the leadership of women rather than telling them what they must do. KEDV supports women's inclusion in decision-making process by means of budget analysis and positioning them as decision-makers in care centers. In that way, it tries to transform cultural norms of gender roles and eradicate structural constraints for women. An important structural constraint for women is their association with the private realm and losing connection with the public realm. That is to say, this project seems promising since it offers an opportunity to development of democratic practices and empowerment by means of combining service-based activities with advocacy. However, it needs to be searched whether this empowerment project really mobilizes women to change demand from state in order to understand. On the other hand, this project reproduces gender roles for women by putting them into the center of caregiving service and defining them as neighborhood mothers. Moreover, KEDV ignores another structural constraint which is competitive market forces. It encourages women to take economic initiatives and offers them micro-credit, but it does not question the possibility of being successful with such a small budget in this competitive economic structure. At this point, it only provides technical solutions such as marketing analysis and capacity development rather than targeting change in

the economy policies of the state. Besides, women's production in those cooperatives is mostly contract manufacturing. In other words, the employment provided for women is still not regular and secure. Overall, the transformative power of cooperatives is limited.

4.2.3 Gender equality policy

As arguments of KEİG and KAGİDER representatives, gender equality perspective has to be embraced by both the state and business world to increase women employment, (Interview 1,2,3,4,6) since women are discriminated in every area of life and this problem of low WLFP rates can only be solved with a holistic gender equality approach.

KEİG deals the issue of women's employment on the basis of gender equality with a perspective of decent job. One KEİG representative argued that since gender equality perspective was not embraced by the state, the solutions for women's employment were directed into entrepreneurship and flexibility (Interview 2). Since women employment is regarded as a secondary earning status, the government prioritizes atypical practices to increase employment rates of women (Interview 2). It is considered "… only in terms of ensuring a quantitative increase, not on the basis of creating decent jobs" (Akkan & Serim, 2018, p. 180). Thus, those policies do not target to create jobs for women in equal conditions with men.

> Our main concern is to convince politicians to write the development plan with a gender equality perspective. In this way, state would focus on how decent works could be created for women rather than atypical forms of employment. Job opportunities that are special to women will not be created so that women can adapt family life. Instead, we will discuss how the institutionalized care service is best provided. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 25)

In this context, according to KEİG report (2012), projects and activities that aim at women are planned under the category of the disadvantaged throughout local policy texts, which render these projects as subjects of social policy. However, it has been set forth that all strategy plans and projects within public institutions on each level (varying from central government to local administrations) must be prepared in accordance with gender equality concept. Most importantly, the implementation of decisions in both central and local settings have to be monitored since gender equality approach is included in some of the institutional policy texts of central government. But neither at local level nor at institutional one, could these plans be implemented effectively. Secondly, gender-sensitive analysis of all income and expenses should be conducted and gender-sensitive budgets should be prepared at all levels from municipalities to ministries since the budget is an important tool for service provision to citizens. And the budget reserved for women's needs is quite limited.

KEİG has made several studies for those purposes. For example, it tracked how 2010 prime ministerial circular that brings gender equality into agenda is implemented in local settings (KEİG, 2012). One interviewee mentioned these studies as such:

> We have seen the importance of data collection and monitoring in our study on Prime Ministerial Circular dated 2010. Despite the existence of good policies come with the help of circular, the practices were problematic... For example, we were directed to different units by each institution we demanded information from during the research... This whole process showed us the importance of the work of advocacy and monitoring. By doing this, civil society organizations will add more to women than giving micro-credit to a small number of women. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 26)

So, public policy monitoring is an important mission KEİG assumes. Moreover, in 2015, KEİG runs a project[27] with local women's organizations in 14 cities to include women in the process of municipalities' strategic plan preparation. They joined the meetings and made their suggestions in order to change the language of plans in accordance with gender equality perspective and increase the budget amounts reserved for services that target gender equality such as ECE services. In other words, by consolidating its members, KEİG made them use their rights as citizens and representatives of CSOs to participate in local governance processes. In conclusion, the equality approach, from planning strategies to setting budget amounts should be placed within a framework of policy according to KEİG.

Similarly, one representative in KAGİDER emphasized that tackling discrimination of women in business life requires a holistic approach. "Equal opportunities cannot be reached only through quota applications"[28] (Interview 5). What they put forward is the necessity of perspective change of private actors, which will lead certain arrangements to provide gender equality. For this purpose, they develop a certification model.

GEM has been developed by KAGİDER under the technical guidance of World Bank in order to promote equal opportunity practices for men and women in the business world. Private sector firms that comply with the model's requirements are awarded by a KAGİDER's certificate. The model promotes changes in six key areas, such as job recruitment process, access to training, career development opportunities, balance between family life and business life, prevention of harassment and mobbing in the workplace (sexual harassment policies) and

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[27] For more information, please visit: http://www.keig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/belediyelerin-stratejik-planlari-kasim-2015.pdf and http://www.keig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/str.-plan-on-rapor_web-subat2015.pdf
[28] Translated from "Sadece kota ugulamasıyla fırsat eşitliği yaratılamaz."

constructing sexist-free communication and advertisement language. In other countries such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Colombia where GEM is implemented, government is the responsible partner. (WB, 2012) However, in Turkey, KAGİDER takes the responsibility to run this program.

This certification model is also an example of KAGİDER's strategy for creating good examples to inspire people and companies (Interview 5). This strategy for creating good examples to functions as incentive is among neoliberal strategies. Rather than demanding legal mechanisms from the state to ensure gender equality, KAGİDER liberates the state from its role as the protector of citizens' rights and entitlements and sentences women to goodwill of business world.

Besides, KAGİDER signed a protocol with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies for implementing Public Gender Equality Model (Kamuda Fırsat Eşitliği Modeli – KAFEM) ("Kadın istihdamında bakanlıktan KAFEM müjdesi!," 2012). The protocol's aim was to disseminate the principles of GEM to public institutions and promote gender equality in the public sector across the country. However, this protocol was interrupted when executives changed within the ministry and did not go far (Interview 5).

4.3 Conclusion

The issues that organizations are silenced about and the issues that they constantly talk about signal their way of framing the problem, which shows whether they discard the political dimension from their discourse and activities or not (Zihnioğlu, 2018). Findings show that KEDV and KAGİDER ignore the effects of AKP governments' macro-economy policies and neoliberal-conservative discourse over women's employment, so they discuss the problems regarding women employment

outside existing power structures. Since they ignore the cultural and economic constraints women face, they propose technical and market-based solutions such as increasing quotas for women entrepreneurs, giving training to women for capacity development, providing micro-credits women to establish their own jobs, motivating business world to develop mother-friendly programs and so on. Especially the prioritization of flexibility and the presentation of entrepreneurship as a miracle by state as a policy to balance work and family life confine women both to caregiving role and to atypical employment models. Rather than demanding the creation of waged, secured and decent jobs from state, CSOs are also interested in the quantitative increase in WLFP rates just like the state itself. However, as literature points out, these atypical jobs increase the vulnerabilities of women (Akkan & Serim, 2018) rather than empowering them. This is because "… struggles against gender injustice need to be carried out with a transformative agenda that addresses the economic as well as cultural dimensions of underlying framework that generates such injustice" (Buğra, 2014). Besides, the ignorance of structural problems and the concentration to technical solutions show that rather than trying to eliminate structural problems through implementing gender equality policies, they believe that technical management of services by CSOs can increase the rates of women employment.

In accordance with their framings, KEDV engages in activities to promote development for women-in-need via cooperatives, whereas KAGİDER performs activities to promote entrepreneurship and offers training programs. All these tasks that CSOs take on, point out that both KEDV and KAGİDER position civil society as the supporter of the state. That is the reason why they share the responsibilities of the state in offering training programs and promoting development. So, those CSOs

approach the women employment as an issue of technical management and as issue of cooperation rather than as a task of the state and issue of political decision-making so they depoliticized the issue without challenging those power structures (Kadirbeyoğlu, Adaman, Özkaynak, & Paker, 2017; Zihnioğlu, 2018).

Along with the consensus on the solutions to women's employment, hybrid CSOs also function as claimants that advocate the rights of women and try to offer alternative agendas to the state. KAGİDER strives for the legalization of the publicly financed caregiving system and performs activities for the spread of gender equality perspective in both the private and public sector. On the other hand, KEDV's project of cooperatives has the potential for women's empowerment since it combines democratic practices and gender equality practices. How these demands and projects were responded by the state is an important question in order to understand whether hybrid organizations that take on various missions are able to contest the state for their demands and so politicize their demands. In the next chapter, this question will be investigated.

Ultimately being an advocacy organization, KEİG puts alternative arguments forward against state's framing of the issue on the basis of gender equality and decent job. Its solutions aim at redistributing of care responsibilities among men and women and spreading of institutional care services. It also defends the usage of gender equality language in policy papers and the implementation of gender-sensitive budget. Besides, it opposes the proposition of vocational training as solution for women and rather points out how training programs of those organizations create in micro-level changes. This is because, those courses on cooking, dressing and embroidery etc. sentence women to jobs that have been seen as women's jobs; so reproduce gender roles. To give voice to these demands, KEİG

creates public space for women to discuss their demands, monitors public policies to control the state and municipalities; and participates in the decision-making process to bring their demands into the agenda of municipalities and ministries. KEİG does not take on other missions like giving training or promoting development. This is because, CSOs have to set up a system of check and balance according to a representative from KEİG (Interview 3).

To sum up, KEDV and KAGİDER combine different missions like promoting development and advocacy and generally embrace the way the state frames the problem, which lead them to depoliticize issues. On the other hand, KEİG politicizes issues by focusing on structural problems rooted in neoliberal conservative patriarchy and macro-economy policies of AKP governments and as a CSO positions itself as an advocacy organization. Taking these analyses into consideration, in the next chapter I analyze whether KEİG, KEDV and KAGİDER are able to protect their autonomy in front of the state and to bring their demands into political agenda; so, I trace their depoliticization in institutional level.

CHAPTER 5:

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND

CONTESTATION

As discussed in the second chapter, autonomy and political contestation are

constituent elements of civil society. In order to detect depoliticizing effects of

undertaking service-based activities, I look at the strategies CSOs use vis a vis state

and their mode of interaction with state in this chapter. It shows whether they

approach women employment as issue of cooperation or issue of political-decision-

making; so, their depoliticization. This examination of CSOs-state interaction also

elaborates why undertaking hybrid missions leads to depoliticization of CSOs.

This chapter analyzes whether hybrid CSOs are able to protect their critical

attitude to the state while involving in welfare-related activities within collaboration

with state. Can they object to the state when their agendas conflict with each other?

Do they explicitly adopt political discourses and strategies?

5.1 Mode of interaction with state

In this section, I question the way those three CSOs interact with the state while

pursuing their own agenda in the same breath. Co-optation, cooperation and conflict

are different modes of interaction. The way these organizations are getting

interactions with state shows whether and how CSOs depoliticize in institutional

level.

The low level WLFP rates in Turkey were involved in the reports of EU and

were implied as an important problem about which EU warns Turkey. Thereupon,

various researches about this issue were done and meetings were organized to gather

different parties e.g. unions, employers, local authorities, ministries, CSOs together. The reason behind it was the compulsion of EU directed at the inclusion of different parties and especially the civil society organizations into the decision-making processes for strengthening the culture of democracy (Göksel & Güneş, 2005). However, even the inclusion of women's CSOs in these meetings as the representatives of women came true as a result of women's own efforts. In a separate interview, one of the KEİG members talked about this process as such:

> In 2006, [T]İSK prepared a large conference. As it turned out to be, the main problem in the conference stated by women presenting at this conference was that women were very uneducated, and they should definitely be educated, and women's employment could only be increased this way. We criticized the fact that women's organizations with varying views on this issue, were not present at the conference, and that this argument was not correct. … After the press conference we learned that there was an institution called the Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee in Turkey. This is a kind of advisory committee deprived of any sanction power, but offers recommendations, prepares reports on technical issues and works as a pressure group. … We learned that they also prepared a report on women's employment and submitted it to the government… and we wanted to be involved in the report. We said that we prepared a press release before. The European side was very positive about this, they wanted us to get involved in the report. We made a study on this and gave them. … At the same time, [the European side] suggested that women should have a representative at the meeting. Because we attended the meeting only as an audience. … [This proposal] was positively passed on the committee. Then we applied immediately, we proposed a representative name. Of course, we had applied to the Turkish side, so we had to do. They didn't answer for a long time. … We rewrote and republished the letters, which took serious time. As a result, we got an answer: "The Economic and Social Council has not been convened, and we will submit your request when it is convened." Soon after, the Council was convened by the Prime Minister. We learned that, in this process, the platform had been formed and instead of us KAGİDER was proposed to represent the platform directly. We would be in the platform but would not represent the platform. (Güre, 2009, pp. 7-8) (See Appendix A, 27)

Therefore, increasing the legitimacy of CSOs in the international arena with the help of EU process forced government to collaborate with CSOs. However, even in those days, the state chose which CSOs it will work with and it chose KAGİDER as a

suitable actor for the abovementioned council. The selective inclusion was only one of the reflections of the co-optative relationship between the state and CSOs.

Hierarchy shapes the whole web of interactions between the state and CSOs because the state chooses the organizations it wants to work, the time it wants to meet and the issues it wants to talk about. This hierarchical relationship generates a disorganized mode of interaction because although the state and CSOs come together frequently via commissions, their interaction has not had a routine in terms of time, issue and actor manner, yet. As a result, CSOs were mostly included in decision-making process as experts not as partners. The main motivation behind inclusion of CSOs was to meet the procedural necessities.

> Until recent years –probably until Gezi (Park protests in 2013)-, we were invited to many meetings on women's employment and we had the opportunity to express our thoughts. We became members of various commissions while preparing the Development Plan. We had institutional meetings with ministries; we expressed our ideas, showed our studies. We presented our ideas in various committees within the body of the Assembly. But how much of these proposals were taken into consideration must be questioned. We were mostly seen as experts. They ask for our opinion, but still do what they have been doing. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 28)

In other words, with the help of intense relations after 2000s, CSOs in Turkey found a chance to defend their opinions and convince others for supporting their positions. However, this exchange of information mostly remains on paper (Paker et al., 2013) yet do not turn into practices. "What we are saying is recorded, and the procedure is over"[29] (Interview 7). Therefore, more than co-determination, expert-based role of CSOs prevails. That is to say, CSOs are not treated as equal partners in decision-making process but are regarded as consultants.

Another reflection of co-optative relation between the state and CSOs is the selective inclusion of issues in agenda. CSOs representatives claim that while it is

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[29] Translated from "Söylediklerimiz kayıt altına alındı ve prosedür tamamlandı."

easy to cooperate with state on some issues such as flexibility and entrepreneurship, they cannot access to the state when it comes to other issues like care services (Interview 2,3,4,5,9). One KAGİDER representative argued that:

> There are many projects that we are collaborating in. For example, we organized the meeting of the international entrepreneurs together with the Ministry of Economy… They both asked us for support and supported us. We presented the public-maintenance financing model to public actors in many meetings, and we received positive and even really exciting feedback, but unfortunately it did not come to life. It is true that we see more countenance for entrepreneurship related activities. (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 29)

Even though those issues have been brought into the agenda, implementing them is difficult. This is because, some agendas conflict with each other such as gender mainstreaming and familialism and so gender mainstreaming agenda is subordinated to familialism. In other words, the policies which put gender equality into agenda were considered as formalities just like 2010 prime ministerial circular. In 2010 circular, very progressive measures were taken to ensure gender equality in economic participation on paper. However, they were not implemented successfully (KEİG, 2012). One of KEİG interviewees talked about this process as such:

> Yes, a circular has been published and, in our research, we have seen that it has not been implemented. We need to ask the reason behind this. Because the state's main point of view on women is family [oriented], and this is reflected in all its policies. Inevitably, corrections about gender equality are regarded as some kind of formality. (Interview 3) (See Appendix A, 30)

The failure to implement KAFEM protocol which aims to carry out GEM of KAGİDER in public was another indication hereof. As one representative puts forward, ensuring gender equality in the public sector is not a priority. And thus, the application of such project was not welcomed (Interview 6) and not renewed, either.

The lack of institutionalization in public sector also causes the inconsistency in the relations between the state and CSOs and implementation of transformative policies into policy-making process. Due to the lack of organizational culture, the agendas of public institutions change whenever administrations change. That is why,

people such as bureaucrats and ministers are of great importance while determining the agendas and priorities of public institutions. When a whole network of relations depends on the individuals, the process of negotiation is interrupted in any case of change. In other words, the prioritization of people rather than institutions creates inconsistencies in policy design and distorts relations between the state and CSOs. For example, Fatma Şahin is mentioned by different representatives in KAGİDER and KEDV as an important name who takes action for projects of CSOs such as KAGİDER's KAFEM and care service projects and KEDV's cooperative project. (Interview 5,6,7,9). However, after Fatma Şahin left, these projects did not come to fruition and the process was interrupted (Interview 5). One of KEDV representatives argued that;

> Every bureaucrat, every minister does not understand your concern. Fatma Şahin was someone, who understood us and allowed us to communicate with other ministries in order to remove legal barriers. So, getting a bureaucrat to understand your needs can be more functional than attending a lot of meetings or making a press release. (Interview 7) (See Appendix A, 31)

Interviewees also repeatedly point out fragmented nature of the state as another important reason of inconsistencies during the decision-making process and the drawbacks in the implementation of gender equality policies. There are hierarchies among ministries and directorates within ministries and each of these institutions pursues their own agenda against each other. Three ministries come to forefront when it is about women's employment: Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Development and Ministry of Family and Social Policies[30] (Alnıaçık et al., 2017). However, the priorities of those ministries are different from each other. While Ministry of Labour deals with the demands of employers, Ministry of Development

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[30] In 2018, Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Family and Social Policies merged as Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services. However, two different general directorates administer labour division and family and social services division.

elaborates budget constraints (Alnıaçık et al., 2017). Thus, reaching a compromise with these institutions on regulations for gender equality is not that easy. However, The Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Development are superior to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in terms of institutional power (Alnıaçık et al., 2017), which causes certain drawbacks in the implementation of gender equality policies. As a KEİG representative expressed:

> Of course, the process changes a little when it comes to women's employment. Most of the time, the responsible person comes from relevant committees of the Ministry of Labour. And these person's perspective of gender equality may be very troubling. Their priority is not to create decent jobs for women, but rather to achieve a quantitative increase without bringing costs over employees. The Ministry of Family has different problems like its name, but ultimately, the necessary arrangements for working women are supported. However, no matter how much free child-care services are mentioned, since the word of others (Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Development) are against the word of the Ministry [of Family], these arrangements simply do not come to life. (Interview 1) (See Appendix A, 32)

In a similar manner, a KEDV representative pointed out the fragmented nature of the state as a reason of flaw in decision-making process:

> At the time, Fatma Şahin was very impressed by our women's co-operatives project, and she offered to put us in contact with the Ministry of Customs and Trade about this matter. But despite all these efforts, we have seen that the Ministry of Family and Social Policies was not expected to deal with women's co-operatives. The responsible organization was ultimately the Ministry of Customs and Trade, and the moves and demands we expected about women's co-operatives were not included in the strategy. (Interview 7) (See Appendix A, 33)

> In conclusion, although CSOs are included in various meetings and

commissions until 2013, state does not exhibit participatory and inclusive attitude but assumes arbitrary and inconsistent tendencies. Those interactions did not happen regularly but depended on the state's request. That is to say, not cooperative but co-optative mode of relations has been existing even in the brightest days of AKP.

5.2 Strategies

The strategies CSOs employ while pursuing their own agenda and their reactions to certain situations where their interests and demands were not met by the state are important indicators of their depoliticization. That is why, their strategies and reactions to state are examined in this section.

Exchanging information and being a part of decision-making process is important for CSOs. However, at certain times, their agendas are not welcomed, and they cannot interfere in policy decision. Then, they use different strategies to attract attention to the issue and bring it to the table. Those strategies give a clue about the politicization of CSOs. This is because; it is a sign whether CSOs risk their relations with the state by challenging the state's policies.

KAGİDER developed a public finance model for childcare services and publicize their demands regarding this proposal through certain channels. They even got promises out of ministers for the implementation of this model. For years, important bureaucrats and even ministers referred this model as a project of government to be put into practice. Although nothing changed in all those years, KAGİDER did not make any overt criticism about the adjournment of this project. One of KAGİDER representatives expresses the arbitrariness of state with those words:

> We saw some news about our public funded private provision care incentive model in the media. However, we really do not know what happened. We have never come together in a regular manner and never received any update, and no one ever consulted us about the process. (Interview 5) (See Appendix A, 34)

In spite of this arbitrariness of state on the issue of care services, KAGİDER did not make any overt criticism or any protest, just continue going to meetings when the state call. This is because, they see making protest as an inefficacious strategy.

> We are the only representative of civil society in the Board of
> National Monitoring and Coordination of Women's Employment. We have a
> chance to express our view and do not want to ruin all our achievements just
> because of this issue … Rather we are lobbying to reawaken the issue.
> (Interview 4) (See Appendix A, 35)

KAGİDER as a well-known organization, in very different issues had collaboration with state. Breaking off the relations seem meaningless for a professionalized CSO. This is because, for that much visibility, they need to maintain their cooperation with state. So, the strategies of KAGİDER are soft and do not attempt challenging or forcing state to develop gender equality policies.

KEDV's strategies mostly target to lobby with concerned bureaucrats, parliaments and make advertisement of the projects with the help of good examples (KEDV, 2015) since it must get along with the state. It strives for legislative changes in the status of cooperatives and take actions accordingly but never crosses the red lines of the state because it depends on the state for the continuity of cooperative projects and caregiving centers. One representative expressed this fact with such sentences:

> Our biggest problem is that the cooperatives offering ECE do not have a
> necessary legal basis. Childcare and education services are regulated by the
> Ministry of National Education or SHÇEK. Our project does not fit the
> current regulations. For example, a highly qualified trainer is requested, but it
> is impossible for poor families to pay for it. At the same time, it is an
> important question that to what extent this trainer will match our model of an
> educator- mother. The sustainability of these centers opened by cooperatives
> is only possible thanks to the protocols signed by the KEDV with the relevant
> public institutions. That is why we want to make legal arrangements as it is
> not clear under which conditions these protocols will continue. (Interview 8)
> (See Appendix A, 36)

In other words, their hands and feet are bound. They have to go by the book and should not conflict with the state. Employing protocols, the state chooses the organizations they want to work with, which makes it a field for the state's co-

optative actions. KEDV do not demonstrate or protest but prefer lobbying and petition singing.

The establishment of KEİG was the result of the protests against the ignorance of women's words in a meeting TİSK organized. KEİG expresses its demands, formulates its criticisms toward existing policies via reports and public statements, and uses alternative channels such as protests and activism to attract the attention to their own agendas.

It is obvious that state has chosen with whom it will work as it happened in 2006. This selective inclusion is an important strategy of the state leading to co-opt and punish CSOs which do not follow state policies or criticize the state overtly. Although in the beginning of the EU accession process Turkey took important steps to provide safe ground for the civil society via 2004 Association Law and 2008 Foundations Law, "… the AKP's openness to the demands of women's NGOs gradually decreased as the party consolidated its power in its second term, when EU and Turkey began to be at odds" (Akkan, 2017, p. 4). Findings also show that cooperation was only on paper, so just formality even in AKP's first term. This is because; AKP governments always adopt arbitrary and inconsistent attitudes toward CSOs. One of the KEİG interviewees talked about this as such:

> I am looking at our history with the AKP. At first, we had made a lot of effort to get accepted. Then we went not only to the Assembly, Ministries, local administrations, but also to the AKP's women's branch meetings. We were welcomed very nicely. We conveyed our demands frankly. We were convinced that they tried to understand us. But I see it very clearly that after Gezi when the EU accession talks began to fail and democracy started to regress, our objections began to cause discomfort because they did not need us anymore. (Interview 2) (See Appendix A, 37)

5.3 Conclusion

As an alternative to AKP governments' solutions to increase WLFP rates, while KAGİDER develops a publicly funded private provision care service model, KEDV develops a cooperative model. Even though as hybrid CSOs, KAGİDER and KEDV have some tendencies to engage in rights-based activities and develop alternative solutions against the AKP governments' framing, they cannot contest against state for implementation of those policies because undertaking service based activities changes their interest and limits their capacity to engage in advocacy-based activities. On the other hand, KEİG as an advocacy organization was dismissed from the circles close to the state due to their protest attitudes and critics against AKP governments' policies after 2013.

Findings show that 2004 Associations Laws and 2008 Foundations Laws did not provide a safe ground for the civil society even in the brightest days of AKP governments since these laws did not legalize the inclusion of CSOs in the policymaking process as policy partners. In other words, the inclusiveness of CSOs has always depended on AKP in spite of the increasing collaboration between AKP and CSOs until 2013. The unwillingness of government officials to include KEİG even in the brightest days of AKP in 2006 to relevant commissions in spite of all their efforts is most important proof of this. Besides, increased participation in policy-making processes has not contributed to the development of co-determination culture in Turkey in order that political participation was associated with consensus building. However, political decision-making process requires contestation of stakeholders. And, AKP governments did not open space to civil society for political contestation. As a result, what emerges was an artificial consensus.

Overall this process did not strengthen the organized mode of interaction between state and CSOs rather they are exposed to arbitrary and inconsistent attitude of state. Besides, Selective inclusion of CSOs and issues, the positioning of CSOs as expert-based and inconsistencies in implementation of gender equality frameworks were also common in these years. After 2013, a co-optative mode of interaction between state and CSOs become visible by replacing it with this artificial cooperation. When CSOs cross the red line of the state, they are punished by the state with certain obstacles put on their way. For example, the exclusion of KEİG after 2013 was related to this.

In order not to face with co-optative threads of state, KAGİDER and KEDV did not adopt critical attitude and political discourse when their demands have not been implemented. This is because, KEDV and KAGİDER see their service-based activities (related to entrepreneurship and training programs) as valuable to increase women's employment rates. They frame women employment as the issue of technical management and cooperation, and they prioritize keeping their relations with state proper in order not to ruin all achievements. Cooperation among stakeholders is necessary to continue managing these projects. However, within this process, they lose their interest in engaging in advocacy-based activities. In other words, this selective inclusion of issues by the state led CSOs to work in some acceptable areas, which led them to move away from rights-based issues by changing their motivation and interest. Besides, the dependency on the state in terms of protocols force them to soften their discourses and take redlines of the state with a grain of salt. Otherwise, they face with exclusion and cancellation of their protocols. In conclusion, undertaking service-based activities also weakens CSO's capacities by making them dependent to state.

To sum up, the service-based activities of hybrid organizations require cooperation with the state if these organizations want to keep their activities. While KAGİDER and KEDV lose their voice in front of AKP governments, KEİG protects its autonomy. This is because as an advocacy organization, it has succeeded in developing strategies to resist and preserve its critical position with the help of conflictual mode of interaction.

CHAPTER 6:

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I mainly examined the roles and responsibilities given to CSOs under the welfare mix system and the implications of those roles over depoliticization of CSOs. To this end, I focused on three women's CSOs working on the economic participation of women.

It is argued that following the Washington consensus, civil society has transformed into a site where social problems are tackled from a site for democratic social action (Somers, 2008, p. 18). So, in addition to advocacy activities, service-based activities have been added to CSOs' missions. In contrast to the studies putting forward that CSOs with hybrid missions could politicize their demands and challenge state framings; findings of this thesis confirmed that when CSOs engage in service provision activities in educational, economic and social welfare settings, they become depoliticized. This is because, the shift toward the service-based activities have been limiting CSOs' capabilities and interests to bring their demands into political agenda and to challenge against state policies.

In order to contextualize women's employment policies in Turkey, I firstly presented the historical background of the labour market conditions and women's employment trends. In that way, cultural and economic restraints women have to overcome in Turkey are revealed. Then, I discussed AKP government's policies about women's employment so as to disclose AKP governments framing of women's employment problem. As a result, it appeared that the state does not offer transformative political agendas intended for eliminating cultural and economic constraints but concentrate on technical and market-based solutions. Those solutions

increase the vulnerabilities of women because they confine women to care-giving

responsibilities and to atypical employment types. AKP governments also encourage

CSOs and private initiatives to share certain responsibilities of state by embracing

those solutions. In other words, it requires the cooperation with different

stakeholders. To sum up, AKP governments frame women employment as issue of

technical management and cooperation not as a task of state and issue of political

decision-making.

In order to justify my arguments, I presented the literature on the welfare mix

system and the changing roles of civil society actors. First of all, I presented the

claim that CSOs have become managerial partners of the state by assuming the

responsibilities of the state under neoliberal governance and thus depoliticized

(Alvarez, 1999; Clarke & Newman, 1997; Somers, 2008). According to this

literature, CSOs are positioned as supporter of the state rather than opponent to it.

This is because, positioning of CSOs as service-providers leads to the constitution of

CSOs as managers that target to effective delivery and provision of services. In line

with this idea of effective management, CSOs adopt the market rationalities and

strategies that are professionalism, competition, contracting etc. (Clarke & Newman,

1997; Jaeger, 2007; Kurki, 2011). All in all, these CSOs start to professionalize to be

able to compete with each other in getting funding and contracts from the state for

carrying out development projects (Bode, 2006; Kramer, 1994). This has transformed

the relationship between state and CSOs. This is because; the management of

services requires the cooperation and this led them to embrace the language of

cooperation rather than language of contestation (Chandhoke, 2003; Mouffe, 2005).

Besides, they become dependent to state for carrying out their projects. As a result,

rather than claimants that demand the fulfilling of citizens' needs from state and

bringing people' issues into political agenda; CSOs turn into state's managerial partners. In other words, by assuming state responsibility, they paved the way for the state to instrumentalize them, hence for depoliticization.

Secondly, I depicted the opposing approach that considers hybrid CSOs as important actors enabling the democratization of society bottom-up with the help of co-production and co-governance of services (Pestoff, 2011). It is argued that these roles (service provision and advocacy) of CSOs are not mutually exclusive (Young, 2000). That is to say, they can keep monitoring public policies and defending the rights of people while at the same time providing service. Some argue that by providing services CSOs can increase the awareness of citizens in the way of being right-bearer citizens (Minkoff, 2002). Besides, CSOs awareness regarding the politics behind the exclusion of citizens could increase and they can start to demand change from state (Cruikshank, 1999). In other words, the hybridity of CSOs could offer new opportunities both for the improvement of democratic governance structures and inclusive service delivery.

During desktop research, it seems that hybrid CSOs could be both claimants and service producers and the interaction of CSOs with the state could be sometimes cooperative and sometimes conflictual. This is because, KAGİDER and KEDV produce alternative solutions to state' framing and bring their alternative demands to political agenda. However, my interviews with the representatives of hybrid CSOs and the analysis of discourses and activities of hybrid CSOs refute the initial idea of this thesis. This is because, hybrid organizations were not able to engage in advocacy-based activities effectively and also lost both their interest and capability in contesting against state. While analyzing their discourses and activities, I found that hybrid CSOs' framing of women's employment comply with the state framing and

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their solutions are mostly market-based and technical. Rather than focusing on structural problems rooted in neoliberal-conservative patriarchy and macro-economic policies, they focus on the practical needs of women such as skill and resource deficiency. In other words, they believe that through effective service delivery and development projects women employment rates can increase. In other words, they frame women employment as individual responsibility and as issue of technical management.

On the other hand, KEİG as an initiative concentrates on structural problems preventing women from participating into the labour market. They argue that these problems can be solved only through structural changes and hence, KEİG puts pressures on state to implement gender equality policies. In other words, they frame the problem as a task of state and the issue of political decision-making. In order to challenge state policies, it is necessary to push state to solve structural problems behind low WLFP rates, as a strategy they prefer political activism in order to bring their demands into political agenda. That is to say, by focusing on structural problems and framing women employment as issue of political decision-making, they prioritize contestation over cooperation.

KEDV and KAGİDER as hybrid organizations develop alternative solutions that carry potential for transformative and gender equality agendas but they do not develop strategies to bring these solutions into political agenda. Even they do not assume critical positions when their demands were not met in order not to be co-opted by the state. This is because, undertaking and maintaining service-based activities require cooperative mode of interaction. That is to say, they prioritize cooperation over contestation. However, cooperation stayed in the management level and so did not reverberate into the policy-making level as Clarke (2004) argues so it

was artificial. After all, undertaking service-based activities decrease CSOs' interests and capabilities to develop rights-based activities.

This result is interesting because even though none of these CSOs are government organizations and produce some alternative agendas with gender awareness; while KEİG did not depoliticize; KEDV and KAGİDER depoliticized. All these CSOs make great efforts and actively perform to pave the way for women's employment and empowerment. However, which problems they focus (structural or practical) on and how they frame the problem (as issue of technical management or as issue of political-decision making) shape their mode of interaction with state. While KEDV and KAGİDER focus on practical problems such as skill and resource deficiency, embrace technical and market-based solutions, and undertake service-based activities; KEİG focuses on structural problems such as macro-economy and neoliberal-conservative patriarchy, proposes gender equality policies, and undertakes advocacy-based activities. As a result, hybrid organizations embrace the language of cooperation not political contestation and the strategy of lobbying not political activism because they believe that this would help in accessing to national policy microphones. However, their cooperation with state was artificial because cooperation was valid only in management level not in policy-making level. After 2013, KEDV and KAGİDER felt pressured to use less ideological language and to focus less on political activities to be able to continue their collaboration with state. As a result, they are silenced, do not engage in public debate and become depoliticized. In other words, the shrinking of civil society space in Turkey after 2013 has threatened the autonomy of CSOs. On the other hand, KEİG has continued to monitor and to criticize AKP governments' policies and is excluded since 2013 as it happened in 2006. However, by adopting conflictual mode of interaction, it

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continues to publicize the demands of women and to criticize AKP governments' policies.

I suppose that my findings deriving from my micro-level interaction with three women's CSOs are related to the general situation of Turkish CSOs. That is why, this thesis contributes to our understanding of civil society by way of pointing out the decreasing capacities and interests of CSOs in developing political action and conflictual political positions under AKP governments. Additionally, this thesis is of importance in that it contributes to corresponding literature by detailing how CSOs' undertaking service-based activities become depoliticized in return.

Lastly, this thesis aimed to enrich the literature on women's employment by discussing existing policies and alternative agendas. Today, women's employment is still mostly discussed by referring to education and flexibility. Nevertheless, the structural dynamics like gender roles and macro-economy policies are much more important problems that keep WLFP rates at a low level. And this thesis suggests that the called problem should be treated with a holistic approach by means of considering the power structures.

This thesis emerges from my enthusiasm about learning about civil society within Turkish context. I believe that the revival of civil society as a space of political action, deliberation and solidarity could maintain a balance against the centralization of power in Turkey. Therefore, political action is a must for civil society. If service provision of CSOs increase the awareness of civil society organizations about exclusion of marginalized groups and encourage CSOs to demand change from political authorities, it can contribute to development of democratic processes. However, with the lack of autonomy, positioning CSOs as a part of the welfare mix system diminishes their capacities and interests in rights-

based activism. All in all, advocating rights, engaging in public debates and

challenging policies must be a priority for CSOs if they desire to have a

transformative role.

APPENDIX A:

TRANSLATED QUOTES IN TURKISH

No.1

Öncelikle çocuk bakımı meselesinden bahsedebilirim. En önemli sorun olmasa da, bir gün tüm kadınların karşılaştığı bir problem. En güvenli haklara sahip kadın memurlar için bile işe devam etmelerini engelleyecek bir sorun bu. Özel sektöre gelince, çok daha ciddi bir probleme dönüşüyor tabi bu. Ebeveyn izinlerini düzenleyen yasal çerçeve tam değilken ve kadının çocuğa bakması gerektiği düşüncesi toplumda hakimken ya da işte insanlar çocuklarına bakmayıp çalışan kadını kötü anne olarak görürken, kadınların istihdamda kalmak için motivasyonları azalıyor.

No.2

İhtiyacı olan kadınların üstündeki bakım yükü çok daha ağır. Devletin sağladığı kurumsal bir bakım hizmeti olmadığından ve bu kadınların özel kreşlerin parasını ödemeleri de mümkün değil. Bu yüzden kadınlar eve mecbur kalıyor. Alında kreşlere alternatif olarak çocuklara bakmaya gönüllü bir büyükanne de kadınların işe dönmesine imkan sağlıyor. Ama bu yaşlı bireylerin de bakıma ihtiyacı olunca yine kadınlar eve dönmek zorunda kalıyor. Yani bu sorumluluk aileye kalınca kadınlar bir gün iş ve ev arasında tercih yapmak zorunda kalıyorlar.

No.3

Kadınlar eskisine kıyasla iş hayatında çok daha fazla görünür. Ama bu muhafazakarlık bittiği için değil de biraz daha modernleşti diyebiliriz. Önceden nasıldı; kadın çalışmaz evinde oturur, çocuğuna bakar. Şimdi bu kadın çalışmaz mantığı biraz daha evrilip kadınlar kadın işlerinde çalışıra dönüştü. E doğal olarak da işler arasında kadın-erkek işi ayrımı ve ücret ve çalışma koşulları ayrımı oluştu. Yani kadınlar için makbul meslekler var. Eşinin, kızının çalışmasını belli meslekler için belli çalışma ortamları karşılığında kabul eden erkekler var. Bizim mesela kredi almak için mülakatlara gelen kadınlardan kimisi bu yüzden kredi çekmek istediğini kendi işini kurmak istediğini söylüyor. Kocası çalışmasına izin veriyor ama sadece kadınların olduğu yerlerde ya da çalışma saatleri çok uzun olmadığı, vardiya olmadığı durumlarda.

No.4

Aslında kadınların kendi işlerinde çalışmak istemesinin bir sebebi de taciz. Çünkü özellikle kayıt dışı çalışmanın yaygın olduğu temizlik, tekstil gibi işlerde kadınların tacize uğradığı ya da parasını alamadığı bu yüzden kendileri evden yürütebilecekleri işler kurmak istediklerini dile getiriyorlar.

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No.5

Muhafazakârlığın biçimi AKP ile değişti. Yeni moda kadınlar çalışmasın değil kadınlar hem çalışsın hem ev içindeki görevlerini sürdürsün. Bir taşla iki kuş vurdular böylece. Ama bu kadınların decent işlere ulaşma imkânlarının elinden alınması demekti. Önceden olsa çalışamayacak olan birçok kadın katı muhafazakârlığın neoliberal politikalar ile yumuşatılmasıyla çalışma imkânı edindi belki. Ama bu işler nasıl işler, asıl soru bu.

No.6

Tamamen muhafazakar olmakla da alakalı değil bu kültürel yapı. Yani muhafazakar olmayanlar için hiç sorun yok dersek yalan söylemiş oluruz. Şöyle bir gerçek var bizim kültürümüzde belli ön yargılar var. En seküler ailede bile bakarsanız kadın eve gelince bir noktada eve dair belli işlerle ilgilenmek zorunda. Ev işini geçtim hadi onu yapacak bir yardımcı olduğu noktada kadın çocuğuyla ilgilenmek için bir şekilde akşam evde olmalı gözüyle bakılıyor. Erkek olmasa da olur, o mesai sonrası toplantıya katılır, böylece yükselmesi mümkün olur. Ama kadın bu noktada geride kalıyor çünkü o kadın ve ev ondan sorulur.

No.7

Bir zamanlar, özellikle AB süreci yolundayken, kadınların istihdamı kendi empowermentı ve bağımsızlıkları için ne kadar önemli olduğu tartışılırdı. Bütün bunlar, kadın erkek arasındaki eşitliği bağlamında konuşuluyordu tabi. Şimdi kadın erkek eşitliğini sağlamak çok da revaçta olan bir gündem maddesi değil.

No.8

Ben artık mesela iş dünyası görüşmelerinde bizi çağırdıklarında söylüyorum biraz da siz elinizi taşın altına koyun. Siz mesela şirketinizde kadınlara yer veriyor musunuz, onların da haklarını koruyor musunuz? O kadar rapor yazıyoruz ediyoruz ama neden hep kadınlar işe girmiyor diye soruluyor acaba işveren niye talep etmiyor diye de sormak lazım. Evet, kötü çalışma koşullarından dolayı işgücüne katılmayan kadınlar var ama katılıp vazgeçen ya da kötü çalışma koşullarından dolayı zaten baştan hevesi kırılan birçok kadın da var.

No.9

Kadınların istihdamının arttırılması konusunda iş dünyası da kesinlikle adım atmalı. Girişimci kadınların hepsi de zamanında bir şirkette belirli pozisyonlarda çalıştıkları için zorlukları biliyorlar. İş yerlerinin nasıl kadın yerine erkek tercih ettiğini, bunu hangi sebeplerle yaptıklarını vs. Bu sebeple bizim sertifika programı aslında ciddi bir farkındalık yaratıyor iş dünyasında da sorumluluklarına dair.

No.10

Kadınlar aslında eğitim alabilseler kesinlikle iş yaratma, bulma potansiyelleri var. O yüzden eğitim önemli. Ben şunu gördüm ki gerçekten bizim düzenlediğimiz kurslar sayesinde kadınlar yeni beceriler geliştiriyor ve bunu gelir getirici bir şeye dönüştürebiliyorlar. Mesela sabun yapımı, hediye kutusu yapımı konusunda verdiğimiz eğitimler gibi.

No.11

Daha önce çok dar bir çevrede yaşamış, kendi mahallerinden dışarı çıkmamış kadınlar bambaşka bir dünyaya ticaret dünyasına atılıyor. Bizim burada verdiğimiz eğitimler o yüzden çok önemli. Yepyeni bir dünyaya keşfe çıkarlarken biz onlara takıldıkları zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkabilecekleri konusunda rehberlik ediyoruz. Erkeklerin dünyası olarak gördükleri yerleri keşfe çıkıyorlar. Bu yolculuk başka bir yolculuk. Evet, birinin yanında çalışmak için de o işin eğitimini almak gerekiyor ama kendi işini kurarken bambaşka becerilere sahip olman gerekiyor. Erkeklerin dünyasına girmen gerekiyor. O işi kurarken birçok belgeyle yani bürokrasiyle muhatap olmak zorundasın. Bu etkileşim gündelik hayatta erkek için daha alışıldık, bilindik bir şeyken kadın için değil. O yüzden bizim misyonumuz çok önemli.

No.12

Kadınların güçlenmesi için ekonomik özgürlüklerine sahip olmaları şart ama bunun sağlayıcısı da kesinlikle eğitim. Bazen formel eğitim yeterli gelmiyor. Kadınlara bu durumda destek gerekiyor. İşte bunu da sağlayan bir sürü kurum var. İŞKUR'un yanında sivil toplum da bu işe destek atıyor atmalı da… Bizim eğitimlerimiz daha çok yüksek girişimcilere yönelik. Onların iş dünyasında mentörlüğünü sağlıyoruz. Fikir geliştirme, fon bulma konusunda yardım ediyoruz. Bir yandan da kızların üniversite okumasını teşvik ediyoruz. Çünkü eğitim aynı zamanda kadınlara cesaret veriyor, kendilerine güvenmelerini sağlıyor.

No.13

Bizim yayınladığımız raporların birinde de vardı. Sadece eğitim düzeylerinin artması kadınların istihdam edilmeleri için yetersiz kalıyor istatistiklere göre. Bir dönem için köyden kente göçün olduğu dönemde kurumsal eğitim-öğretimin gerçekten düşük olduğu zamanlarda eğitimli olmak kadınların istihdam oranlarının artması için önemli bir kaynaktı belki ama artık eğitimden daha büyük sorunlar var.

No.14

Çok amaçlı toplum merkezlerinde bir proje kapsamında kadınlar eğitim alıyor ve ardından ürettikleri el işlerinden parça başı para kazanıyorlar. Ancak ücretler çok düşük, aylık kazançları yaklaşık 500-600 Türk Lirası. Bu kadar düşük bir ödeme onlara nasıl katkıda bulunabilir? Proje süresince sadece ödeme alıyorlar ve asla emeklerinin karşılığını değil... Kadının işi olarak kabul edilen işleri yapmaya devam ediyorlar.

No.15

Türkiye'de kadınların istihdamı ile ilgili en önemli sorunların başında istihdam yaratan bir büyüme modeli olmaması var. Devlet bunu sağlayamadığı sürece kadınları kendi işlerini kurmaya ya da esnek koşullarda çalışmaya teşvik ediyor. Ya da bu kadınlar çoktan enformel ekonomiye katılmış oluyor.

No.16

Kreşle ilgili kampanyanın başlaması da bizim 2012'de girişimdeki yerel örgütlerle yaptığımız savunu ve kamu politikaları izleme atölyeleri sonrasında oldu. Bu atölyeler sırasında bilgi edinme başvurusundan veri toplamaya, ilgili kamu kurumları nasıl izlenir gibi birçok konu konuşuldu. En sonunda kreş sorunu en temel ortak sorun olarak belirlendi ve bir kampanya başlatmaya karar verdik. Kreş Haktır Platformu sayesinde bizim girişimimizdeki yerel örgütler kendi şehirlerindeki diğer kadın örgütlerini de dahil ederek belediyeleri izleme çalışmaları yaptı mesela. Kent meclislerine katılarak kendi taleplerini dile getirmeye başladılar. Bu dayanışma ruhu ve savunu çalışması platformun sağladığı en büyük kazanımdı.

No.17

İş ve özel hayatı dengeleme politikalarının amacı, iş bölümünde reform yaparak toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliğini geliştirmek olmalı. Ancak bu politikalar iş bölümündeki köklü değişiklikleri desteklemiyor. AKP kadınlara küçük değişikliklerle sözde kadınların önüne kemik attı. Sonra kadınlar arasında girişimciliği yaymak normal hale geldi. Ama pratikte kadınlar iki kat sorumluluk aldılar.

No.18

2010'da "çalışmak istiyoruz" diye bir kampanya yapmıştık. Bu kampanyanın etkinliklerinden birine dönemin çalışma ve sosyal güvenlik bakanı gelmişti, AÇEV de vardı. Kadın istihdamının önündeki engeller konuşulurken konu bakım hizmetlerine geldi. Türkiye'de devlet eliyle oluşturulacak bir çocuk bakım modeli olduğunda kadın istihdamı artacaktır dedik. Bakan da böyle bir model geliştirebileceğimizi söyledi. AÇEV'le ne yapabileceğimize baktık ve aslında bir kamu finansman modeli gibi bir şey geliştirdik. Şu kadar yardım verilecek, şu kadına verilecek gibi bir model değildi bu. Çalışan anne ve babaya maaşa ek bir çocuk bakım teşviği verildiğinde bunun yaratacağı istihdam artışı, kayıt içine geçiş, mevcut kreş sayısı vs. gibi bütün süreçleri hesaplayıp, bakanlığa "Eğer siz maliye bütçesinden böyle bir bölüm ayırırsanız, aslında ekonomiye böyle bir faydası olacaktır." dedik.

No.19

Bir diğer husus, belediyelerin gündüz çocuk bakım evi açmaları noktasındadır. Belediyelerin üstlendiği görevin bu evlerin açılabileceği sağlıklı ve doğru konumların belirlenmesi ve tahsisi hususunda olması gerektiğini ve onların yerine kadın girişimcilerin ve/veya kadın

kooperatiflerinin bu çocuk bakım evlerini açma sorumluluğunu üstlenmesinin daha net bir katma değer yaratabileceği önerisini savunmaktayız. Bu çerçevede, en önemli konu, piyasa mekanizmasının kadının sağlıklı imkânları olan ve güvenilir gündüz çocuk bakım evleri bulabilmesinin sağlanmasıdır ki, esas olarak bu amaca ulaşılmasına odaklanılması gerektiği inancındayız ve KAGİDER olarak bu konunun takipçisi olacağız.

No.20

İş yerlerindeki kreşle çözülecek bir şey değil çocuk bakımı. Çünkü kadın sadece çalıştığı zaman çocuğunun kreşe gelmesi şart değil. Kadınlar sosyalleşmek için çocuklarını güvenli bir yere bırakmak zorunda. İlkokul dönemine kadar o yüzden kadının tüm hayatı duruyor. İkincisi çocukla işyerine seyahat etmenin bile kendisi başlı başına bir zorluk… Ayrıca biz yoksul kadınlarla çalıştığımız için de biliyoruz ki işyerleri kreşlerine taşeron çocukları alınmıyor, vardiya saatleri dikkate alınmıyor. Bu sorunların çözülmesi zor. İlla çalışan annenin fabrikasında kreş açılacak gibi şartlar ortadan kaldırılmalı, her mahalleye annelerin sosyal ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak üzere, geçici bir süre bile olsa çocuğunu bırakabileceği yerler olmalı.

No.21

Esnek istihdam biçimlerinin yasalar tarafından tanınması ve kapsamının genişletilmesi enformel istihdamın ve işsizliğin azalması demek. Hali hazırda kendi ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda yarı zamanlı ya da evden çalıştığı için kayıtsız şekilde çalışan bir sürü kadın var. Yani her kadının ihtiyaçları ve çalışma tercihleri farklı, bunları kapsayıcı şekilde sosyal güvenlik sistemi oluşturulması en doğrusu.

No.22

Bu merkezlerde bir araya gelen kadınların farklı ihtiyaçları konuşulmaya başladı ve zamanla yeni konular üzerinde çalışmaya başladık... İş bulamayan annelerden bazıları "Paramız olsa kendimiz bir şeyler yapardık. Asıl eksiğimiz para." demeye başladılar. Bunun üzerine küçük pilot uygulamalar başlattık ve mesela kendi işlerini kurmaları için mikro kredi verdik.

No.23

Bazı toplumsal hizmetlerin doğaları itibariyle toplumdaki/mahalledeki herkesi araya getirme potansiyeli vardır. Farklı bir biçimde tasarlanmaları durumunda, yani toplumdan izole, ideal kurumlar olarak düzenlenmedikleri durumlarda mahalle halkı arasında diyalog ve uzlaşma ve demokrasi platformları yaratabilirler. Örneğin, erken çocukluk eğitim hizmetlerinin yeni bir anlayışla düzenlenmesi, kadınların/annelerin katılımına açık olması durumunda, kadınlar çocuk sorunları etrafında tüm kesimlerle bir diyalog ve uzlaşma sürecinin asıl liderleri olabilirler. Yerel yönetimleri kadın ve çocuk yanlısı kent politikaları için etkileme fırsatı elde edebilirler.

No.24

Kadınlar isterse girişimciliğin yolu açılmalı ve pozitif ayrımcılık tanınmalı. Ancak bunun devlet tarafından neden bu kadar teşvik edildiğinin de sorgulanması gerekiyor. Tüm dünyada girişimcilik moda. İstihdam sorunlarına her derde deva olarak sunuldu. Niye? Çünkü devletin istihdam yaratma sorumluluğu ortadan kalktı. Kadınların fon ve eğitim ile desteklenerek kendi işlerini kurmaları amaçlanıyor ama diğer yandan, ne kadar başarılı oldukları hiç sorgulanmıyor. Tüm projeler aslında klasik Amerikan başarı hikayelerine dayanıyor.

No.25

Temel meselemiz bizim kalkınma planının cinsiyet eşitliği perspektifiyle yazılması. Böylece esneklik, mikro-kredi gibi eğreti istihdam biçimleri değil düzgün işler nasıl oluşturulur kadınlar için buna kafa yoracak devlet. Aile hayatıyla uyum sağlasın diye kadına özgü işler yaratılmayacak onun yerine kurumsallaşmış bakım hizmeti en iyi nasıl sağlanır bunu tartışacağız.

No.26

2010 tarihli Başbakanlık Genelgesi ile ilgili çalışmamızda veri toplama ve izlemenin önemini gördük. Genelgenin getirdiği iyi politikalara rağmen, uygulamalar sorunluydu... Örneğin, Araştırma sırasında bilgi almak istediğimiz her kurum tarafından farklı birimlere yönlendirildik. ... Bu süreç bize savunuculuk ve izleme çalışmalarının önemini gösterdi. Bunu yaparak, sivil toplum örgütleri az sayıda kadına mikro kredi vermek yerine kadınlara daha fazla katkıda bulunacaktı.

No.27

2006 yılında TİSK tarafından Kadın İstihdamı zirvesi düzenlendi. Bu zirvede işçi sendikalarından, bakanlara, işveren örgütlerinden kadın STK'lara, Avrupa Parlamentosu, Avrupa delegasyonuna kadar temsili kuvvetli taraflar vardı… Biz bu konferansta sunum yapan kadınlar tarafından, hem bu konuda farklı bakan kadın kuruluşlarının olmamasını eleştirdik, hem de bu önerilerin doğru olmadığını ifade ettik. … Basın açıklaması sonrasında öğrendik ki Türkiye ve Avrupa Karma İstişare Komitesi isminde Türkiye'de bir kurum var. Bir tür danışma komitesi bu, aktif olarak yaptırım gücü yok ama öneriler sunuyor, teknik konularda raporlar hazırlıyor ve baskı grubu olarak çalışıyor. …Onların da kadın istihdamı konusunda hükümete sunmak üzere bir rapor hazırladıklarını öğrendik ve biz de rapora müdahil olmak istedik. Öncesinde bir basın açıklaması hazırladığımızı bildirdik. Avrupa tarafı bu konuda çok sıcak yaklaştı, bizim rapora müdahil olmamızı istedi. Türk tarafı bu konuda çok direnç gösterdi. … Aynı zamanda o raporun sunulduğu toplantıda bu komiteye kadınların temsilcisinin de burada olmasının gerektiğini önerdiler. Çünkü biz sadece izleyici olarak katılmıştık... hemen başvurduk, bir temsilci ismi önerdik. Tabii ki Türkiye tarafına yaptık, öyle yapmamız gerekiyordu. Bize uzun süre cevap gelmedi. Yeniden mektuplar yazdık, yeniden ilettik. Bu ciddi bir zaman aldı. Bunun sonucunda bize şöyle bir cevap verildi: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Konsey toplanmadı, toplandığında sizin isteğinizi

dikkate sunacağız. Aradan şans eseri çok kısa bir süre sonra Başbakanın başkanlığında Konsey toplandı. Öğrendik ki, o ara platform oluşmuştu, platformun içinde olan ancak platformu temsilen değil, bizim dışımızda direk olarak platformu temsil etmeye KAGİDER önerilmişti.

No.28

Son sürece kadar aslında muhtemelen Geziye kadar kadın istihdamıyla ilgili birçok toplantıya davet edildik ve düşüncelerimizi aktarma imkânı bulduk. Kalkınma Planı hazırlanırken çeşitli komisyonlarda üyelik yaptık. Bakanlıklarla kurumsal görüşmelerde bulunduk, fikirlerimizi, yaptığımız çalışmalarımızı ilettik. Meclis bünyesinde yine çeşitli komisyonlarda fikirlerimizi sunduk. Ama bu önerilen ne kadarı dikkate alındı, bunu sorgulamak lazım. Bize çoğunlukla uzman gözüyle bakılıyordu. Görüş alıp rapor yazdırıp yine kendi bildiklerini okuyorlar.

No.29

Ortaklaşa çalıştığımız birçok mesele var. Uluslararası girişimciler toplantısını Ekonomi Bakanlığı ile birlikte düzenledik mesela… Bu konularda bizden hem destek istediler hem de destek oldular. Kamu bakım finansman modelini birçok toplantıda ikili görüşmeler de dahil kamu aktörlerine ilettik, olumlu ve hatta çok heyecanlı geri dönüşler de aldık ama maalesef bir türlü hayata geçmedi. Bu konuda daha fazla teveccüh gördüğümüz doğru.

No.30

Evet, bir genelge yayınlandı ve bizim araştırmamızda biz bunun uygulanamadığını gördük. Peki, niye sormak lazım? Çünkü devletin kadına dair asıl bakış açısı aile merkezci ve politikalarda da yansıyan bu. İster istemez eşitlik üzerine gelen düzeltmeler formalite olarak görülüyor.

No.31

Her bürokrat, bakan sizin derdinizi anlamıyor. Fatma Şahin bizi anlayan ve önümüzdeki yasal engellerin kalkması için diğer bakanlıklarla da iletişim kurmamızı sağlayan bir isimdi. O yüzden bazen bir bürokrata derdinizi anlatabilmek bir sürü toplantıya katılıp konuşmaktan ya da basın açıklaması yapmaktan daha işlevsel oluyor.

No.32

Kadın istihdamı olunca mesele süreç biraz değişiyor tabi. Genelde ilgili komisyonlarda sorumlu çalışma bakanlığından biri oluyor. Ve bu kişilerde cinsiyet eşitliği perspektifi çok sıkıntılı. Aile bakanlığı da isminden mülhem olarak farklı sorunları barındırıyor ama en nihayetinde kadının çalışması için gerekli düzenlemeler destekleniyor. Buna rağmen ücretsiz bakım olanakları ne kadar dile getirilse de bakanlık tarafından onların sözüne karşılık diğerlerinin sözü geçerli oluyor ki bir türlü bu düzenlemeler gelmiyor.

No.33

Bakım teşvik modeli ile ilgili haberleri sürekli medyada görüyorduk. Her yerde bizim de ismimiz geçtiği için insanlar da bize soruyordu ama açıkçası ne olup bittiğini biz de bilmiyoruz. Düzenli bir şekilde bir araya gelip süreçle ilgili bir bilgilendirme ya da danışma yapılmadı hiçbir zaman.

No.34

Bizim kadın kooperatifleri projemiz Fatma Şahin'i o dönem çok etkiledi ve o dönem bu konuda Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığıyla iletişime geçmemizi de kendisi sağladı. Ama şunu gördük ki tüm çabalarına rağmen Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığından beklenen kadın kooperatifleriyle ilgilenmesi değildi. Sorumlu kuruluş en nihayetinde gümrük ve ticaret bakanlığıydı ve o süreçte kadın kooperatifleriyle ilgili beklediğimiz hamleler ve talepler stratejide yer almadı.

No.35

Kadın İstihdamı Ulusal İzleme ve Koordinasyon Kurulundaki tek sivil toplum örgütü biziz. Görüşümüzü ifade etme şansımız var ve sadece bu konu için tüm başarılarımızı, ilişkimizi mahvetmek istemiyoruz… Bu konuyu yeniden uyandırmak için lobi yapmayı tercih ediyoruz.

No.36

Bizim en büyük sorunumuz erken çocukluk eğitimi veren kooperatiflerin gerekli yasal altyapıya sahip olmaması. Çocuk bakım ve eğitim hizmetleri Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ya da SHÇEK tarafından yönetmeliklerle düzenlenir. Bizim projemiz mevcut yönetmeliklerle uyuşmuyor. Mesela çok nitelikli eğitici isteniyor ama bu eğiticinin ücretini yoksul ailelerin karşılaması imkansız. Aynı zamanda bu eğiticinin bizim eğitici anne modelimizle ne kadar uyuşacağı da ayrı bir soru. Kooperatiflerin açtığı bu merkezlerin devam etmesi ancak bizim ilgili kurumlarla imzaladığımız protokoller sayesinde devam edebiliyor. Bu yüzden de yasal düzenleme yapılmasını istiyoruz, bu protokollerin hangi şartlarda devam edeceği belli değil çünkü.

No.37

AKP'yle olan geçmişimize bakıyorum. Başta önce çok çaba sarf ettik kabul görmek için. Sonra sadece meclis, bakanlıklar, yerel idareler değil Ak parti kadın kolları toplantılarına bile gittik. Hem de çok güzel ağırlandık. Taleplerimizi açık sözlülükle ilettik her seferinde de bizi anlamaya çalıştıklarına da ikna olduk. Ama şunu çok açık görüyorum ki Avrupa Birliği ile süreç bitmeye başladığında, totalde demokraside düşüş başladığında bizim yaptığımız itirazlar rahatsız edici olmaya başlamıştı çünkü bize ihtiyaçları kalmamıştı.

INTERVIEW INFORMATION

Interviewee ID	Interviewee	Place	Status	Length
Interview 1	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 25/10/2018	1 hour 30 mins
Interview 2	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 19/11/2018	1 hour 30 mins
Interview 3	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 14/12/2018	1 hour 30 mins
Interview 4	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 23/10/2018	1 hour
Interview 5	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 20/12/2018	45 mins
Interview 6	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 04/02/2019	1 hour 30 mins
Interview 7	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 20/11/2018	1 hour
Interview 8	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 20/12/2018	1 hour 30 mins
Interview 9	CSOs Representative	Istanbul	Conducted in person 05/02/2019	1 hour 30 mins

APPENDIX C:

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Kendinizi tanıtabilir misiniz?
   (Can you tell me about yourself?)

2. Bu derneğin kuruluş amacı nedir?
   (What is the founding purpose of this association?)

3. Bu derneğin faaliyet alanları nedir?
   (What are the fields of activity of this association?)

4. Kadının iş gücüne katılımı sizin için ne ifade ediyor?
   (What does the participation of women in the labour force mean to you?)

5. Sizce Türkiye'de kadınların iş gücüne katılımı konusunda karşı karşıya bulunduğu en önemli sorun ya da sorunlar nelerdir?
   (In your opinion, what are the most important issues or problems faced by women in the labour force participation in Turkey?)

6. Bu sorunların çözümünün ne olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
   (What do you think is the solution to these problems?)

7. Bu sorunların çözümüne dair dernek/vakıf olarak geliştirdiğiniz projeler, çalışmalar nelerdir?
   (What are the projects and practices that you develop as an association / foundation for the solution of these problems?)

8. Bu sorunların çözümünde hangi kurumların ve mekanizmaların etkin rol alması gerektiğini, eksik kaldığını düşünüyorsunuz?
   (What institutions and mechanisms do you think should take an active role in solving these problems and they have failed to do so?)

9. AKP hükümetlerinin bu alandaki geçmiş ve mevcut politikalarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
   (How do you evaluate the past and current policies of AKP governments in this area?)

10. Sizin bu alanda AKP hükümetleri döneminde politika yapım sürecine katkınız oldu mu? Evet ise, ne tür katkılar bunlar?
    (Have you contributed to the policy-making process during the AKP governments in this area? If yes, what kind of contributions are they?)

11. Çalıştığınız STK'da etkinlikleri yürütürken devlet organları ile karşı karşıya gelerek sorun yaşadığınız oldu mu?
    (Have you had any problems in dealing with the state bodies while conducting activities in the CSOs you work with?)

12.   STK'ların topluma ne tur etkileri vardır? Siz bu etkileri nasıl
        değerlendiriyorsunuz?
        (What are the effects of CSOs on society? How do you assess these effects?)

13.   STK'ların devlete ne tür etkileri vardır? Siz bu etkileri nasıl
        değerlendiriyorsunuz?
        (What effects do CSOs have on the state? How do you assess these effects?)

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