

THREAT PERCEPTION, CONTACT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE:  
FACTORS THAT AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION ON SYRIANS IN TURKEY



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THREAT PERCEPTION, CONTACT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE:  
FACTORS THAT AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION ON SYRIANS IN TURKEY

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Threat Perception, Contact and Social Distance:  
Factors That Affect Public Opinion on Syrians in Turkey

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
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June 2019

## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, AŞKINNUR EŞİGÜL, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
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## ABSTRACT

Threat Perception, Contact and Social Distance:

Factors That Affect Public Opinion on Syrians in Turkey

This thesis examines the factors that affect opinion on Syrians. Relying on the literature, perceived threat is offered as the main explanatory variable, alongside contact with Syrians and social distance. A secondary analysis is conducted with KONDA Research & Consultancy's public opinion data. The results indicate that both perceived threat and social distance (proximity) are significant predictors of opinion. As perceived threat increases, support for rights decreases. However, as people tend to include Syrians in their social lives, they are more likely to support for rights for the Syrians. Moreover, employment status, political party preference, monthly household income are also significant predictors of support for rights for the Syrians, as well as perceived threat. Social distance, gender and refugee intensity in a city, are other predictors of perceived threat. Contact, on the other hand, is not a significant predictor in any of the models.

## ÖZET

### Tehdit Algısı, Temas ve Sosyal Mesafe: Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler Hakkında Kamuoyunu Etkileyen Faktörler

Bu çalışma Suriyelilere ilişkin kamuoyunu etkileyen faktörleri incelemektedir. Literatüre dayanarak, tehdit algısının yanı sıra temas ve sosyal mesafe bu çalışmanın ana açıklayıcı değişkenlerini oluşturmaktadır. KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık’ın sağladığı kamuoyu yoklaması verisi ile ikincil veri analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sonuçlara göre tehdit algısı ve sosyal mesafenin (yakınlığın) kanaatin önemli yordayıcıları olduğu belirlenmiştir. Buna göre, algılanan tehdit arttıkça, Suriyelilere haklar verilmesine destek düşmektedir. İnsanların Suriyelileri sosyal hayatlarına katmaya istekli olması, haklara desteği arttırmaktadır. Ayrıca, mesleki statü, desteklenen siyasi parti ve aylık hanehalkı geliri de hem haklara desteği hem de tehdit algısını açıklamada önemli yordayıcılar olarak belirlenmiştir. Sosyal mesafe, cinsiyet ve il bazında Suriyeli yoğunluğu tehdit algısına etki etmektedir. Öte yandan temas indeksi istatistiki olarak anlamlı bir etki yaratmamaktadır.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ABPRS	Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi/ Address-Based Population Registration System
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi /Justice and Development Party
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/ Republican People’s Party
DGMM	T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü / Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management
ESS	The European Social Survey
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi/ Peoples’ Democratic Party
IDP	Internally Displaced People
GEM	Geçici Eğitim Merkezi /Temporary Education Centre
LFIP	No. 6458 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Konunu/ Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi / Nationalist Movement Party
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics / İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflaması
PS: EUROPE	Political and Social Research Institute of Europe
SD	Standard Deviation
TPR	Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği (No: 2014/6883) / Temporary Protection Regulation (No: 2014/6883)
TURKSTAT	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu / Turkish Statistical Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US United States

VIF Variance Inflation Factor



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Right after the March 31, 2019 municipal elections in Turkey, a newly-elected mayor of Republican People's Party (CHP) in Bolu, a city which is in Western Black Sea Region of Turkey gave his very first directive: cutting of any financial and material support by the municipal budget to foreigners (İnternethaber, 2019). He also stated that, this was one of his two election promises regarding Syrian refugees, the second one was not warranting them to open any workplaces within the boundaries of the municipality (İnternethaber, 2019). He underlined that Syrians have been in the country for too long to be considered guests (İnternethaber, 2019). The mayor stated that, his aim is to prevent them from settling in Turkey (İnternethaber, 2019). After these directives became publicly visible throughout the country, 44 civil society organizations issued a joint declaration to criticize this directive and reminded that such an attitude leads to civil conflict and xenophobia (Sivil Sayfalar, 2019). As of May 2019, there are only a small number of Syrian refugees registered in Bolu, ratio of Syrians is less than 1% with respect to city's local population (Directorate General of Migration Management [DGMM], 2019a).

In September 2018, in Elazığ, Syrians and local residents of their neighbourhood had a fight, residents attacked the workplaces of Syrians and they stated that they do not want any Syrians in the neighbourhood (Bay, 2018). In December 2018, in Gaziantep, a city where the number of Syrians is very high, during a fight between locals and Syrians, one local was injured, and this triggered a lynching attempt targeting Syrians and their workplaces (Kırcı, 2018).

Unfortunately, these are not isolated incidents in Turkey but only a couple of examples of different degrees of conflict between locals and Syrian refugees.<sup>1</sup> Yet, they exemplify why this study is important. Syrian refugees are part of our lives, the “guests” discourse is long gone (cf. Kirişci, 2014; Danış, 2018). The situation signals a deeper problem than just disagreement between hosts and the guests. Borrowing Eder and Özkul (2016)’s words: “... their legal status is in limbo and their ‘incorporation’ into society has remained slow and insufficient at best.” (pp. 1-2). Hence, it is possible to discuss this situation within the boundaries of social exclusion (eg. Scheepers, Gijberts & Coenders, 2002, pp. 17,29; Deniz, Ekinci & Hülür, 2016).

Social exclusion is a concept that is discussed in its every aspect in the literature. It is defined over inability or limitation of “participation” (Barry, 2002, p. 16; Burchardt, Grand & Piachaud, 2002, p. 30). Although economic factors and especially inequality in terms of income is an essential part of the discussion, social exclusion goes beyond economy (Burchardt et al., 2002, pp. 5-6; Rodgers, 1995, p. 50) and refers also to a wide array of topics such as human rights and security (Rodgers 1995, p. 45-50). In the case of Britain, according to Burchardt et al. (2002), “integration” to different segments of the society is also a requirement for not being excluded, as well as “consumption”, “production” and “political engagement” (p. 31).

Sen (2000) conceptualizes social exclusion as “exclusion from social relations” (p. 4), and underlines that exclusion is “relational” (p. 6). Social exclusion

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<sup>1</sup> In this work, the term, refugee does not refer to legal status conveyed to people who fled Syria by the Republic of Turkey. Instead, it follows the wording of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which refers Syrian people in Turkey as refugees. Similarly, employing the term “refugee” in her work, Danış (2018) underlines the fact that word is used in its “sociological meaning”. (Türk usulü misafirperverlik, para. 7)



leads to poverty, which, drawing on previous works, is formulated as “the lack of capability to live a decent life” (Sen, 200, p. 4). Moreover, according to Sen (2000), some forms of exclusion decreases life quality by themselves while some others have rather an indirect influence on deprivation (p. 13). Another conceptual differentiation is made between passive and active exclusion (Sen, 2000, p. 14). In fact, denial of appropriate status for refugees, for example, is considered an active form of social exclusion (Sen, 2000, p. 14). Moreover, Zetter (2007) describes a similar phenomenon such that in the globalized world, states profiled refugee label as a scarce good so that it becomes a “legitimate” means of “*exclusion and marginalization*” in the first place (p. 189, emphasis original). As an implication, people who are in the host country with a different label which has negative connotations cannot access rights (Zetter, 2007, pp. 186-197) and refugees become reliant on their own communities as a short-term solution to accommodate their needs, which does not close the gap between them and integration (Zetter, 2007, p. 197).

In modern societies, refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers can be considered among the most vulnerable groups in terms of subjection to social exclusion. According to Wimmer (2008), such vulnerability of immigrants is a rather new phenomenon and it is rooted in “the rise of the welfare state and the political incorporation of the working class accompanying it” (p. 222). Hence both economy and politics took parts while social exclusion was in the making. Indeed, there is a link between social and political exclusion (eg. Barry, 2002, p. 22; Rodgers, 1995, p. 50), and exposure to political exclusion is related to marginalization in society (Sen, 2000, p. 16).

On the other hand, socially excluded groups would be an easy target for politicians to manipulate and polarize society (Barry, 2002, p. 25; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004, p. 47; Sen, 2000, p. 16) and refugees are part of such discourse, as Bolu example clearly indicates. Previous literature also shows a link between refugee/immigrant/asylum seeker exposure and support for anti-immigrant parties (eg. Vertier & Viskanac, 2018, p. 3) and support for exclusionary attitudes (eg. Hangartner, Dinas, Marbach, Matakos & Xefteris, 2019). Even if those individuals are not inherently anti-immigrant, it is possible to generate such attitudes through appropriate cues (Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004, p. 46). Failure of properly including refugees into the society may even lead to conflict between locals and the excluded (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006, p. 341).

All in all, social exclusion is an important phenomenon and earlier studies report that Syrians experience exclusion in Turkey (eg. Deniz et al., 2016). Thinking within Sen (2000)'s terms and Burchardt et al. (2002)'s social integration criterion of exclusion, it is possible to assert that if Syrian refugees are rejected by the Turkish society, then perils of social exclusion that have been discussed so far become a risk for Turkey, even if necessary institutional steps are taken fully by the officials. Moreover, there is a large literature on the impact of public opinion on policy making process (cf. Downs, 1957; Page & Shapiro, 1983), which further underscores the value of studying opinion.

Results of the public opinion studies highlight the alarming situation in Turkey. A recent study indicates that overall, 13.7% of the participants are contented with Syrian refugees and 14.8% are ok with having a refugee neighbour while 45.8% of them are not (Aydm et al., 2019, pp. 66-67). In 2017, 9.1% of the participants were considering Syrians as the most important problem of Turkey (Erdoğan, E.,

2018, p. 49). Both Syrian refugees as subjects, and researchers as observers, report unpleasant incidents that are results of exclusion and discrimination (Akçapar & Şimşek, 2018; Şimşek, 2015). Even the term “anti-Syrian racism” was used to define the situation (Şimşek, 2015, “Anti-Syrian racism in Turkey”).

Considering this complex situation, this study aims to understand the factors that influence peoples’ attitude towards Syrian refugees in Turkey, which is measured as support for granting rights to them to assess to what extent they might be willing to include Syrians in the society.

In the next section, first, I will discuss briefly concepts of migration and refuge. Later, I will introduce previous research on factors affecting attitudes toward immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Then, I will dwell on both the context and research on attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. In Chapter 4, I will present data and method of this research followed by the results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 5. The final chapter discusses the results, limitations and paths to future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Immigrants and refugees in the international context

People are familiar with the concepts of migration, seeking asylum and refuge for a long time in history of humanity, yet, recently migration took a new turn and became “global”, “political” and “influential” on both economies and societies (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014, pp. 5-6). Despite current intense discussions which instil fear about topics of economic migration, Triandafylidou (2016) states that this was not the approach towards migration in the first decade of the twenty-first century (p. 1). International terrorism as well as integration concerns were hot issues under consideration, yet until the effects of financial crisis is felt worldwide in terms of unemployment and proliferated number of “populist and xenophobic parties”, immigrants and asylum seekers were not target of discussions on “public order and security” (Triandafylidou, 2016, p. 2). By the time, more and more people had to flee their homes because of different forms of conflict all around the world and this deepened the problem (Triandafylidou, 2016, p. 2).

As of June 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019) reports that around the world, there are 68.5 million people who have been forced to move.<sup>2</sup> While 40 million of them are internally displaced (IDP), less than half of them, 25.4 million people are refugees while 3.1 million of them are asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2019). Figure 1 presents UNHCR, Population Statistics Database (2019) data on change in number of refugees in the world.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>




Figure 1. Change in number of refugees since 2011  
 Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database, (2019).<sup>3</sup>

Among three countries that 57% of the refugees move from, Syria has the largest share, 6.3 million people in total become refugees (UNHCR, 2019). While Turkey is the country which hosts highest number of refugees (3.5 million), Uganda (1.4 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1 million) and Islamic Republic of Iran (979,400) are other countries in the list (UNHCR, 2019). As the list already suggests, UNHCR (2019) also reports that 85% of the displaced people all around the world live in developing countries. Moreover, according to United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA, 2017), at the end of 2017, among 257.7 million total international migrant stock, 49.8 million live in the United States (US), which makes the country the host of the highest number of immigrants (UN DESA, 2017 as cited in Migration Data Portal, 2019).<sup>4</sup> Saudi Arabia (12.2

<sup>3</sup> According to UNHCR, Population Statistics Database (2019): “**Refugees** include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation.” (“UNHCR Statistics”, emphasis original). Retrieved from <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>

<sup>4</sup> [https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock\\_abs\\_&t=2017](https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2017)

million), Germany (12.2 million), Russian Federation (11.7 million) and the United Kingdom (UK) (8.8 million) are following the US (UN DESA, 2017 as cited in Migration Data Portal, 2019). The difference between the distribution of countries with the highest numbers of immigrants and refugees is an important indicator in terms of differentiation of immigrants and refugees (Betts & Collier, 2017, pp. 30-31), as I will discuss in detail later in this part.

After World War II, steps taken to deal with refugee situation in Europe within the international context, namely foundation the UNHCR in 1950 and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are still considered two major cornerstones of the “global refugee regime” (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 34). According to the Convention,<sup>5</sup> which was later modified to include people outside of Europe regardless of time as refugees in 1967 with the Protocol, refugees are people who are:

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1.2)

Hence, “well founded fear of being persecuted” is the main foundation for being a refugee, which is criticized later as a limited and unclear criterion that does not correspond to the necessities of the current developments (Betts & Collier, 2017, pp. 44-45). As the Preamble states, the basis of the Convention is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Consequently, the Convention also defines the rights of people who have a refugee status and “non-discrimination (Article 3), non-

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>

penalization (Article 31) and *non-refoulement* (Article 33)” are the basis of it (The Office of the UNHCR, n.d., p. 3, emphasis original). The scope of non-discrimination was enlarged later via international human rights law to include not only “race, religion or country of origin” but also “sex, age, disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination.” (The Office of the UNHCR, n.d., p. 3). Non-penalization clause, on the other hand, requires avoiding punishment of the refugees even though immigration laws of the country have been violated as a result of their actions (The Office of the UNHCR, n.d., p. 3). Yet, this doctrine is later on breached by the states through deliberately not labelling people who cross their borders as refugees because of their argument that such actions are “illegal” (Zetter, 2007, p. 186). In addition, non-refoulement stands for the idea that states cannot send refugees back to their countries where they are in danger (The Office of the UNHCR, n.d., p. 3). Although the Office of UNHCR (n.d.) underlines that non-refoulement is at the heart of the Convention (p. 3); according to Betts & Collier (2007), states do breach this principle as well via restricting the entrance of refugees to the country in the first place (p. 42).

Even though the Convention provides a definition of refugees, recent studies still discuss whether this definition is adequate. According to Betts & Collier (2007), it is not adequate, since it relies on persecution which is an outdated concept in the era of “fragile states” which lead to “mass violence” (pp. 25, 43-47). Moreover, people sometimes seek refuge because they are in extreme social and economic need which leaves them no option other than giving up their homes (Betts & Collier, 2007, pp. 44-45). They state that despite legal developments that enable stretching the interpretation of this clause to fit the needs of the current development in the country in question, this also creates inconsistency in terms of whom a refugee status should

be given to in different countries, which is the criterion to receive rights (Betts & Collier, 2007, pp. 46-47). Zetter (2007) also mentions this issue, according to him refugee label is the gate that opens to rights which are at the heart of the struggle, the reason of being a refugee in the first place (p. 188). This process itself is decisive in locating newcomers in the political and social structure of the host state (Zetter, 2007, pp. 186-197).

When it comes to labelling refugees, the distinction between refugee and immigrant comes to surface. Drawing on literature, Schuster (2016) underlines the futility of the emphasis put on conceptual differentiation of refugees and immigrants by “policy makers and multilateral agencies” (p. 301). According to her, why and how a person decides to move is a layered issue, hence it is very hard to draw conceptual borders (Schuster, 2016, p. 297). She adds that conceptual boundaries can be used by states as a measure of limiting the number of refugees; stating that such an approach compound the situation instead of healing it (Schuster, 2016, p. 301). Zetter (2007) also underlines this conceptual conundrum (p. 178). Betts & Collier (2017) on the other hand, emphasize differentiation, stating that “Migrants are lured by hope, refugees are fleeing from fear. Migrants hope for honeypots, refugees need havens” (p. 30). According to them, acknowledging this distinction would improve our understanding of and response to refugee crisis and reveal our misperceptions about refugees since “proximity” is the criteria for refugees to flee hence most of the refugees flee to developing countries (Betts & Collier, 2017, pp. 30-31). This is the reason why people mostly moved to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan when the crisis in Syria erupted (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 74).

As I mentioned above, according to Castles et al. (2014) one of the important characteristics of “age of migration” is how deeply international migration is



embedded in both intranational and international politics (pp. 16-17). For the purposes of this study, I would rather focus on intranational impacts. Scholars mention 9/11 as an important abuttal or rather an excuse for policy makers' approach to migration/asylum seeking/refugee as well multiculturalism as sources of "threat" which necessitates to be harnessed with strict policies (eg. Castles et al., 2014, pp. 6,19; Faist, 2007, pp. 27-29; Zetter, 2007, p. 185). Moreover, Faist (2007) states that such an approach paves the way for "meta-politics", i.e. a technique used by politicians to relate domestic problems such as unemployment and migration without proof to harvest support of locals (p. 30). However, Castles et al. (2014) mention that regardless of discourse or actions of politicians, immigrants and ethnic minorities are at the target of a group of people to accuse for hardships that they have to face because it is easier than dealing with a concept such as "neoliberal economic policies" (p. 19). Then, the question remains: which factors breed such an approach? In other words, what are the determiners of public opinion on immigrants/asylum seekers/refugees? These are the questions to be answered in the next sections.

## 2.2 The factors affecting public opinion towards refugees

Though this study aims to analyse the factors that affect the public opinion on Syrian refugees, it is important to state that in the literature, there is not a clear-cut distinction between factors that affect perceptions towards immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Theories that were constructed to explain attitudes toward immigrants were commonly referred to in order to understand attitudes toward refugees (cf. Esses, Hamilton & Gaucher, 2017). Another confusion is related to usage of concepts attitude vs. perception/opinion. While in some studies attitude refers to policy preferences (eg. Sniderman et al., 2004), in some others the word is

used to define emotions or perceptions (eg. Quilian, 1995). Ceobanu & Escandell (2010) also underline “the conceptual and operational haziness” in the field (p. 314). While preparing structure of this review, I have made use of Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (2018, 2019)’s studies.

### 2.2.1 Role of economy and realistic threat

Not unexpectedly, impact of economy, in both personal and group level, is one of the most commonly studied determinants of attitudes towards refugees and immigrants (eg. Citrin et al., 1997). Below, I will first discuss the arguments that emphasize individual economic traits as essential factors affecting attitudes towards immigrants, then I will continue with group level explanations and the logic of threat.

The first set of economic factors are termed as “labour market channel” in the literature (Facchini, Mayda & Mendola, 2013, p. 326). Scheve & Slaughter (1999) focus on individual traits that might affect attitudes toward immigration in the US. According to this, individuals’ “skills”, which is measured with respect to wage as well as years in education, has an impact on these attitudes (Scheve & Slaughter, 1999, pp. 11, 20). Specifically, lower levels of skills would generate higher levels of anti-immigrant attitude, regardless of the intensity of immigrants who cohabitate with those participants (Scheve & Slaughter, 1999, pp. 20-21). In later years, Mayda (2006)’s article discusses the impact of economic factors as well as non-economic ones, on local people’s preferences on immigration policy, in other words being pro-immigration or not. The results suggest both are influential (Mayda, 2006, p. 526). The main arguments are as follows: if the individuals are highly skilled (i.e. educated) and live in a country where natives are better educated than immigrants in relative terms, then they state a positive attitude towards immigration (Mayda, 2006,

pp. 526-527). Moreover, if a person works in a job that employs immigrants in high numbers relative to locals, then s/he tends to be anti-immigration (Mayda, 2006, p. 527). However, Facchini et al. (2013)'s findings do not support these arguments in South African context.

On the other hand, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) focus on "individual economic welfare" and conclude that in the US, if a state requires people to pay for high immigration via taxes, then people would oppose to immigration and this impact will be especially valid for people whose education level is high and consequently who pay more taxes because of the fiscal regimes in the particular state (pp. 3-5, 21-22). Moreover, Hanson et al. (2007) provide further evidence for impact of education level, the measure of skill, on preferences over immigration policies (p. 20). According to this, if the number of immigrants is high, yet people do not need to pay taxes to cover welfare expenditure for immigrants, then low-skill is an indicator of opposition to migration (Hanson et al., 2007, pp. 20- 21).

Yet, Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong (1997) claim that economic factors which have their roots in the idea of a "collective" triggers opposition to authorized immigrants in the US (p. 872). Not the individual economic situation or beliefs about the individual situation, but the concerns regarding economic problems at the national level and considering immigration as a bad thing for well-being of both economy and society would precipitate opposition to immigration (Citrin et al., 1997, p. 872).

Accordingly, there is a strand of research that underlines the importance of "group traits" instead of individual ones (eg. Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Quillian (1995)'s findings challenge the importance given to individual traits to explain the differences in anti-immigrant attitudes within and particularly between

European countries. According to him, how large the minority group is and how well the economic situation of the country is determine the level of perceived threat, consequently, the “prejudicial attitude” (Quillian, 1995, p. 586). The larger the minority group, the higher the perceived threat (Quillian, 1995, p. 592). Besides, the better the economic situation of the country, the lesser the perceived threat (Quillian, 1995, p. 592). The group conflict shapes individual’s level of prejudice (Quillian, 1995, p. 606). Kaya and Karakoç (2012), focus on prejudice towards immigrants and, their research analyses effects of specifically economic globalization on formation of such prejudice. One of their findings resemble Quillian (1995)’s, according to which there is an interaction effect of unemployment and number of immigrants on prejudice (Kaya & Karakoç, 2012, p. 37).

Semyonov, Rajjman & Gorodzeisky (2006) analyse the impact of intensity of “non-EU immigrants” in a country and the state of its economy on perceived threat regarding foreigners, and observe these relationships considering also the effect of time (pp. 432-435). Employing Eurobarometer data (1988-2000), the study also finds that living in countries intensely populated by foreigners as well as economic downturns has a positive and steady impact on “anti-foreigner sentiment” (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 432, 444). In addition, being economically disadvantaged in terms of unemployment and shorter period of education feeds this sentiment (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 443-444). The influence of education does not fluctuate in different years of measurement (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 440, 442, 444). The study also finds that in time, political stance become even more salient predictor of opinion (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 444). However, none of these predictors can provide a comprehensive answer to changes in time (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 444-445). Moreover, compared to 2000, in the late 1980s and early 1990s,

anti-immigrant attitude grew rapidly, and then slowed down later, and this finding is interpreted such that “threat perception” is tamed with time (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 442-445).

Weber (2015), on the other hand, argues that the impact of number of immigrants is based on level of analysis (p. 119). Different mechanisms are at work at national and regional levels, Weber (2015) claims (p. 119-120). While at the national level, data and media representations would be influential, at the regional level, interpersonal relations are expected to impact perceptions and leads to positive attitudes (Weber, 2015, p. 120). Looking at European Values Survey and other sources of data, Weber (2015) finds supportive evidence for his claims (p. 124). In another study, Hopkins (2010) argues that “politicization” of immigration, meaning presence of a heavy discussion on this issue at the national level in the media, is required for locals to consider increasing number of immigrants in their neighbourhood as threatening and become in opposition to immigrants/immigration (pp. 43, 56). In addition, Schneider (2008) notes that after passing a threshold, the higher number of unfamiliar immigrants does not generate ethnic threat and explains this as a function of intergroup contact (p. 63). Moreover, Citrin et al. (1997) state that immigrant intensity does not influence the inclination to support limiting the number of immigrants admitted to the country in their research (p. 876). A later cross-national research yields similar findings (Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Relying on “instrumental model of group conflict” by Esses, Jackson & Armstrong (1998), Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong (2001) state that as long as groups think that there is a shortage of resources, another group that openly tries to access them and capable of doing it, then the former group will feel threatened and develop a negative attitude towards the other group (Esses et al, 1998 as cited in

Esses et al, 2001, pp. 393-394). According to them, regardless of the presence of personality qualities that would favour perceived group competition, people express anti-immigration attitudes once they sense competition (Esses et al., 2001, pp. 389-390). The competition can be triggered with presence of both needy and self-sufficient immigrants (Esses et al., 2001, p. 397). Pereira, Vala & Costa-Lopes (2010) also underline the role of perceived threat in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes, yet, their causal path is different from other studies. They argue that threat is the means for a prejudiced person to find excuses for “discrimination” (Pereira et al., 2010, p. 1233). Moreover, they conclude that perceived realistic threat is stronger as a link between prejudice and attitude and claim that realistic threat is the driving force behind being anti-immigration, however, symbolic threat predicts better opposition to who is going to be included in the society through “naturalization”(Pereira et al., 2010, p. 1247).

Pettigrew, Wagner & Christ (2007)’s study finds that “subjective judgements” are important predictors of opposition to immigration in Germany rather than “objective” economic situation of individuals (p. 32). Furthermore, they claim that, it is possible to offer common explanations for being anti-immigrant across “industrial” countries because of generalizable logic of prejudice and threat for these countries (Pettigrew, Wagner & Christ., 2007, p. 36). They put emphasis on group related factors and summarize their findings under three major points: “(1) issues of *group power, dominance, and traditionalism* are especially critical; (2) *group relative deprivation* is a more important predictor than is *individual relative deprivation*; and (3) *collective threat* is more important than is *personal threat*.” (Pettigrew, Wagner & Christ, 2007, p. 36, emphasis original).

Stephan & Stephan (2000) provide a comprehensive approach to threat with their Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice. According to Stephan & Stephan (2000) “fear” is a critical reason why people have prejudice towards the outgroup (p. 24). They suggest that threat leads to prejudice which incorporates “negativity” and prejudice reflects onto both “emotions” and “evaluations” (Stephan & Stephan, 1993 as cited in Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27-28). Relying and adding on literature, Stephan & Stephan (2000) list four aspects of threat, namely “realistic threats”, “symbolic threats”, “intergroup anxiety” and “negative stereotypes” (pp. 25-27). Realistic threats are conceptualized as perceived fear that prosperity of ingroup, and related to this section of the literature review, both at the individual and group levels, is endangered because of the outgroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 25). Symbolic threats, on the other hand, refers to perceived threat to values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 26). The ingroup constructs a hierarchy among morals and places its approach to the top of the list (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 25). From that point onwards, the possibility of change that comes with presence of newcomers triggers the fear (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 26). Moreover, Stephan & Stephan (2000) also state, the worry about unpleasant consequences of interactions with the outgroup is also a source of perceived threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1985 as cited in Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27). Related to this, they mention that “negative stereotypes” also generate worries about bad interactions and consequently generate threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27).

Relying on their other studies, Stephan & Stephan (2000) also articulate that all four forms of threat are not always the predictors of all forms of prejudice (p. 39). In addition, they argue that people who are very attached to their ingroup, have more to lose in case of policies favouring the outgroup, had negative contacts with the

outgroup, have limited knowledge about outgroup and are either at the top or bottom of the hierarchy between the groups tend to feel more threatened (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 37-39). Conflictual history between the groups also increases perceived threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 37-38).

Scheepers et al. (2002), on the other hand, place threat, whether perceived at the collective or individual level, as a mediator between “ethnic exclusionism” measured in terms of support for rights to “legal immigrants” and individual factors that trigger “competition” (pp. 21, 30). Relying on previous theories, they present “Ethnic Competition Theory” according to which as competition between groups increases, so do support for ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 18). Competition can be analysed at two levels, macro and individual (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 18). Their results indicate that not only education, income and employment status but also multiplicative effect of intense “non-EU citizen” presence and being blue-collar worker has impact on opposing rights for immigrants (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 29). In addition, according to Scheepers et al. (2002)’s cross-national multi-level analysis, perceived threat in general, perceived collective threat in particular has a significant effect on denying rights for legal immigrants (p. 29). It is important to note that in this study, “perceived ethnic threat” encompasses not only economic but also culture and security related concerns (Scheepers et al., 2002, p.22). Moreover, study finds that despite their relation, support for exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and perceived ethnic threat are not the same concepts (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 29).

There are also works that compare individual economic characteristics of both locals and immigrants/asylum seekers to explain attitudes. According to Hainmueller & Hopkins (2015)’ conjoint analysis, on the other hand, when it comes



to “whom to admit”, regardless of the personal traits of the participant, everyone expects to receive immigrants fulfilling the same requirements: high level of education, strong language skills, will to work and his/ her presence in the country is legal (p. 545). Considering the criteria offered, the authors conclude that not the “material self-interest”, but considerations of national interests is the determinant factor in choices (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015, p. 542). Moreover, Bansak, Hainmueller & Hangartner (2016) also find that national economic interests are consideration for asylum-seekers to be admitted to the host countries in the public’s eyes across Europe, inhabitants prefer newcomers to be “contributing” not benefiting from the national economy (pp. 4-5, 8). In addition, “vulnerable” asylum seekers as well as the ones with “consistent asylum claims” are more likely to be admitted while being Muslim do not satisfy public’s conceptual admission criteria (Bansak, et al., 2016, p. 8). Bansak et al. (2016)’s findings suggest that these choices do not vary according to countries studied and regardless of personal characteristics of the participants; however, being left leaning can moderately tame opposition to Muslim asylum seekers and augment “humanitarian concerns” towards asylum seekers (pp. 6-7,9).

### 2.2.2 Role of security

Security concerns, on the other hand, can be considered another source of threat, both for individual and for the society, affecting attitudes towards immigrants or refugees (Sniderman et al., 2004, pp. 37-38). Loescher & Milner (2004) emphasize that refugees blamed as “scapegoats of crime” can create an “indirect threat” for the security of the host country (p. 12). However, as stated by Chiru & Ghergina (2012) the number of studies that focus particularly on the impact of security concerns on

individuals' policy preferences regarding immigration/asylum seeking/refuge is rather limited. Yet, relying on their analysis on the European Social Survey (ESS) data, Chiru & Ghergina (2012) state that, if a person feels physically unsafe - not necessarily because of presence of immigrants-, then s/he will express support for exclusionary policies and “perceived negative consequences of immigration” ( pp. 6-8, 15-16). Moreover, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) also test whether thinking crime rates rose because of immigrants has an impact on support for immigration policies and find that this belief decreases the support (pp. 430-432). In some other studies, security concerns are part of the dependent variable that measures perceived threat (eg. Weber, 2015; Scheepers et. al., 2002).

Lahav & Courtemanche (2012) find that concerns regarding physical security increases the attention paid to immigration more than cultural or economic threat would do (p. 490). According to them, how immigration is framed significantly affects public opinion, and if the discourse of security threat rather than cultural threat is dominant, then people will be more supportive of constraints on immigration policies and interventions to personal freedoms (Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012, pp. 483-484,498-499). Moreover, Lahav & Courtemanche (2012) also reveal that despite their differences, people speak with a single voice regarding these constraints and interventions in case of security threat frames while the cultural threat leads to variation in opinion (pp. 493, 499). Hence, feeling of insecurity is another factor to be considered in analysis of public opinion towards refugees.

### 2.2.3 Role of culture, ethnicity, religion and symbolic threat

Despite frequency and relevance of “interest-based” explanations in the literature (Sides & Citrin, 2007), there is research that focus on cultural and ethnic factors to explain attitudes toward immigrants and/or refugees. Such factors constitute the

essence of Stephan & Stephan (2000)'s concept of symbolic threats, as mentioned above, as a source of prejudice towards "the outgroup" (pp. 25-26).

Comparing many hypotheses defending three main claims in the literature, Sides & Citrin (2007) find that even though economic interests are a significant element of explanation of attitudes toward immigration, alongside "national identities" and "information" regarding the number of immigrants, the latter two are more influential in explaining attitudes (pp. 477-478). Higher attachment to national identities and higher level of wrong information about the number of immigrants lead to higher level of anti-immigration (Sides & Citrin, 2007, pp. 477-478). Like the previous study (Citrin et al., 1997), not the personal worries but economic worries related to country (sociotropic), have a larger impact on attitudes (Sides & Citrin, 2007, pp. 489-491). In addition, Sniderman et al. (2004)'s study also provides experimental evidence supporting the importance of perceived cultural threat, specifically threat to national identity over threat to economy (p. 46).

Challenging skill-based explanations to negative attitudes towards immigration, Hainmueller & Hiscox (2007) claim that more educated people tend to give more support to immigration, however, origins of immigrants and how qualified they are does not influence this relationship (p. 436). Instead, what matters is that education makes individuals more open to different cultures and identities (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, p. 437). Moreover, they underline that being a university graduate fosters being "pro-immigration" to a larger extent (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, p. 429). Verkuyten (2009) on the other hand, studies the attitudes towards immigrants in terms of support immigrants' rights in the Netherlands. The results indicate that if the participant defines himself over national values than he will be more likely to feel threatened and withdraw support from rights, especially

from the ones that foster pluralism, to be granted to immigrants as well as ethnic minorities (Verkuyten, 2009, p. 48). In addition, Fetzer (2000)'s findings state that if an individual belongs to a "culturally marginalized" group, such as an ethnic minority, then s/he will have lower levels of opposition to immigration (p. 14). Overall, these qualities explain attitudes towards immigration better than "economic self-interest" (Fetzer, 2000, pp. 13-14).

Burns & Gimpel (2000) assess the impact of both economic factors and ethnic stereotypes on attitude toward different ethnic groups as well as immigration. Their results suggest that when ethnic stereotypes are included in the equation, economic factors, even if they are sociotropic, lose salience in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies (Burns & Gimpel, 2000, pp. 222-223). However, the higher level of economic vulnerability leads to relatively higher levels of racial prejudice, alongside a set of personal traits, yet this effect is limited (Burns & Gimpel, 2000, p. 223).

Schneider (2008) argues that in European countries, whether there are immigrants with "low-education" in high numbers does not matter, yet if their ethnic background is different, then the perceived ethnic threat will increase in the host country (p. 63). He underlines "unfamiliarity" of those people as a source of threat, in fact (Schneider, 2008, p. 63), this point was mentioned by Esses et al (2001) as a source of competition if the parties do not compete for material goods (p. 408). Among many interesting findings of the research, Schneider (2008) lists that regardless of presence of a high number of low education immigrants, people who are in low socio-economic status in the host country would already feel threatened (p. 63).

In addition, Dixon (2006)'s study finds that, according to the position of the ethnic or minority group in the society, the impact of threat and contact on prejudice will be different (p. 2180). For blacks, higher percentage of the minority group is associated with higher levels of prejudice, but this is not the case for Asians and Hispanics (Dixon, 2006, p. 2194). Whether prejudice is towards Blacks, Asians or Hispanics and level of contact affects how the level of prejudice changes under the same level of threat and controls (Dixon, 2006, pp. 2194-2195). It may not have any impact at all (Dixon, 2006, p. 2194). In addition, Dixon (2006) also analyses whether there is a multiplicative effect between contact and threat which is measured as "perceived percentage of blacks" in the society, and finds that as threat increases, prejudice increases if there is no close contact with the blacks and decreases otherwise (p. 2195). Moreover, according to Dixon (2006), higher number of people may trigger worries about culture and politics instead of economy (p. 2196).

Religion is another factor that can be taken into consideration within this discussion. According to Bloom, Arıkan & Courtmanche (2015)'s study in the US, Turkey and Israel, immigrants with a different religion generates even more negative attitude compared to the ones with different ethnicity (p. 16). An immigrant who is with a different religion as well as ethnicity, on the other hand, is the one who is the most susceptible to anti-immigration (Bloom et al., 2015, p. 16). However, they also find that under specific circumstances, "religious belief" can generate positive attitudes (Bloom et al. 2015, p. 16). Facchini et al. (2013) also suggest that, in South Africa, "religious dissimilarity between natives and immigrants" is the crucial factor affecting opinion on immigration (p.339).

#### 2.2.4 Role of contact

In the literature, contact is considered as another determiner of opinion towards refugees and immigrants. Most of the literature regarding impact of contact on forms of prejudice, including the ones related to immigrants/refugees, relies on Allport (1954)'s comprehensive study on *The Nature of Prejudice*. The most well-known argument of the book is that close contact with the outgroup may lead to a decline in prejudice via changing "beliefs" (Allport, 1954, p. 268), as long as four conditions are fulfilled "equal status", "common goals", "institutional support" and an environment of "cooperation" (Allport, 1954, p. 281). Pettigrew (1998) elaborates on the intergroup contact theory in a later article, underlining the significance of both friendship and time that is required for that friendship (p. 76). Moreover, relying on previous research, Pettigrew states that both characteristics of individuals and society in which individual lives need to be taken into consideration to comment on impact of contact (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 80).

In addition, Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner & Stellmacher (2007)'s findings indicate that indirect contact, given as "having an ingroup friend who has an outgroup friend" (p. 411), is as strong as direct contact to decrease prejudice towards immigrants in Germany (p. 421). According to their research, effects of direct and indirect contact is hard to separate since they are found together, in general in the same social and individual setting, both leading to lesser levels of prejudice (Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner & Stellmacher, 2007, pp. 418, 421). They stress the importance of large cities in terms of shared spaces (Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner & Stellmacher, 2007, p. 422), this finding may provide a supportive argument for why urban immigration is worth study. Regarding threat perception, they state that both individual and collective threat can be minimized through both forms of contact,

though indirect contact works better with the latter (Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner & Stellmacher, 2007, p. 419).

McLaren (2003)'s study measures factors that influence support for "expulsion of legal immigrants from the country" where participants live, finds that contact decreases this support despite taking into consideration the level of realistic and symbolic threats (pp. 909, 911). Study also finds that as percentage of immigrants increases, perceived threat also increases if people have no "minority friends" or have only a handful of them (McLaren, 2003, p. 927, 928). Moreover, according to McLaren (2003), neither percentage of immigrants nor personal qualities that relate to realistic threat perception has significant direct influence on support to expel immigrants (p. 925), but both impact perceived threat (pp. 926-927).

According to Barlow et al. (2012), there is a difference between effect of negative and positive contact on prejudice towards minorities in general. They provide a comparative research with evidence from the US and Australia (Barlow et al., 2012). According to the results, negative contact not only increases prejudice, but also its impact is way larger and stable in all through study, compared to decreasing effect of same amount of positive contact (Barlow et al, 2012, pp. 1639-1640).

Moreover, Crisp & Turner (2009) carry the contact theory one step further and argue that even "imagination of a positive contact" can generate positive attitude towards the outgroup via dropping levels of anxiety towards them (p. 231). They assert that imagined contact can pave the way for "actual" of contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009, p. 238). Even though imagined contact is not very influential, it is a useful practice especially when people cannot afford contact directly with the outgroups (Crisp & Turner, 2009, p. 238).

Homola & Tavits (2017) on the other hand, take one step back, focus on logic of “motivated reasoning” and explore whether being on the right or left of the political spectrum makes a difference on threat perception stemming from immigration after having positive contact with immigrants (p. 3). They conduct two studies both in the US and Germany and find that although contact declines the threat perception of a leftist person, it does not have such an effect on people with right-leanings (Homola & Tavits, 2017, p. 23). One very important implication of the study is that the more people with different political orientations contact with refugees in their daily lives, the more their opinions will differentiate, and it would be harder to find a common ground to deal with immigration (Homola & Tavits, 2017, pp. 3-4). All of these findings underline the importance of studying the impact of contact.

#### 2.2.5 Social distance

Social distance is also considered as a determinant of attitudes towards refugees (Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2018). Bogardus (1925) defines social distance as “(...) the degrees and grades of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each other.” (p. 300). According to him, people put some emotional distance between themselves and particular groups in society, and this is measured through how close they would like to locate those people within their social circle (Bogardus, 1925, p.300). Though Karakayalı (2009) argues that Bogardus captures only one dimension of social distance, this study will base its conceptualization of social distance to Bogardus (1925)’s theoretical approach. Triandis & Triandis (1962) also criticize Bogardus (p. 1), and state that “norms” of a group is an important predictor of social distance, while “personality” differences, such as how being



nurtured in childhood also has an impact, relying on data provided by their American and Greek participants (pp. 19-20)

Bogardus (1928) analyses immigration with respect to race and argues that if the presence of immigrants /racially different group risks the “status” i.e. favourable opinion, then prejudice will arise, so as social distance (pp. 30-31, 38). To measure anti-immigrant attitudes, Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (n.d.) use social distance as an indicator of “intolerance” (“Public Attitude toward Immigrants: the Turkish Case”, para.5). Özkeçeci (2017) considers social distance as an indicator of prejudice in her study. Moreover, Kokkali (2007) finds that, even if locals and immigrants live close to each other, this does not necessarily shorten social distance between the groups, as her study with Albanian immigrants in Thessaloniki indicates (p. 2, 30).

#### 2.2.6 Role of information and media

In the political science literature, the role of information and media in shaping public opinion is widely discussed (cf. Zaller, 1992; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Hence, in this section, I will briefly talk about them as factors that influence attitudes towards refugees/asylum seekers and immigrants.

Blinder (2015) provides an interesting study on perceived migration in Britain. According to him, discrepancy between perceived immigration and actual case might lead to a mismatch between what public demands and what policy makers provide in terms of migration (Blinder, 2015, p. 81). Moreover, imagery of immigrants in Britain reflects how public reacts to them; assuming that they are asylum seekers who came to the country once and for all as foreigners even if this is not the case in reality, citizens may demand reduction of number of immigrants (Blinder, 2015, p. 85). The research also suggests that demographic differences as

well as media representation might lead to difference in “immigrant image” in people’s minds (Blinder, 2015, pp. 92-95). Moreover, according to Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008), when “cues” regarding ethnicity is attached to information about negative effects of immigration, depending on the ethnic group in question, this information accelerates anti-immigrant attitudes or behaviour through generating anxiety in the society (p. 960). Hence, they conclude, shared information on ethnicity in the news can make a difference and via influencing emotions politicians and media can produce attitudes on immigration (Brader et al., 2008, p. 960).

Esses, Medianu & Lawson (2013) argue that under uncertainty, negative media portrayal of refugees and immigrants can cause negative perception of them by locals so that public stops attributing human qualities to those people (pp. 529-531). In the article, authors warn readers that such perception may turn into aggressive behaviour towards refugees, and threatening refugees image presented by the media may become the excuse for such behaviour (Esses et al., 2013, p. 531). Moreover, contact is underlined as a way to guard people against those images (Esses et al., 2013, p. 531). Burns & Gimpel (2000) also refer to information while explaining the differences in findings of 1992 and 1996 data analysis. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, media representations are critical to reshape public perception at the local level (Hopkins, 2010, p. 56). Yet, in the context of Turkey, a focus-group research does not find direct link between sources of information and perception of Syrian refugees (Political and Social Research Institute of Europe [PS: EUROPE], 2017).

To sum up, in the literature, there are many studies that investigate the facts that affect public opinion on immigrants/refugees/ asylum-seekers, analysing the issue on both individual and collective levels. One line of research focuses mainly on

economy and interests, which can be considered within the boundaries of “realistic threat” (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), while the other considers the impact of culture, ethnicity and values, hence “symbolic threat” (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). There are individual level demographic factors that may influence these relationships, such as education. Another approach takes into consideration the impact of contact with the “other”, contact can take different forms and may generate positive, negative or no effect, depending on the conditions. It may also interact with threat. Moreover, both media and information in general may affect public opinion in general and attitudes towards immigrants/ refugees and asylum seekers in particular. The next chapter will be focusing on Turkey and studies on opinion on Syrians in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 3

### IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey has a long history of immigration and emigration since its foundation. Many studies refer to Turkey as one of the hubs of immigration as well as asylum especially because of the developments in the last decades (eg. Kirişci, 2014, p. 45; Castles et al. , 2014, p. 19; Canefe, 2016, p. 22). According to DGMM (2019b), since the foundation of the Republic until March 2019, 6.5 million people arrived in as asylum seekers, refugees and people under temporary protection as flows.<sup>6</sup> 3.6 million people out of 6.5 million are Syrians who crossed the borders after 2011 (DGMM, 2019b). Moreover, DGMM (2019b) states that the number of people who migrates to the country for employment and education purposes is 3.3 million since 2004.

Although until the 1980s, people who migrated to the country were mainly Turks and Muslims, this trend has changed thereafter (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, pp. 13-15). Because of the political tensions in multiple Middle Eastern countries, Turkey had become a destination for people who would like to seek asylum in Turkey or move to Europe (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, p. 15). However, Turkey's geographical restriction on 1951 Geneva Convention that allows granting refugee status only to the ones who come from Europe and 1967 Protocol was in force (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, p. 15). This restriction still prevails despite expectations of removal during the European Union accession process (Danış, 2004, p. 15). Another development that triggered the inflow of irregular immigrants was the fall of the Soviet Union (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, p. 15). However, according to Kirişci (2014),

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-tarihi\\_363\\_380](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-tarihi_363_380)

migration of Syrian refugees is a different case because of its scope, as well as how this “*en masse* asylum” is handled by policy makers in Turkey (p. 8, emphasis original).

According to İçduygu & Biehl (2012), until 1994, migration policy in Turkey was “ignoring” the fact that people who do not have Turkish origin may migrate to Turkey (p. 34). In 1994, as a result of complex internal and international developments, Turkey created its own regulation regarding asylum seekers and immigrants which gives authorities in Turkey the upper hand in deciding on refuge and asylum applications instead of UNHCR (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, p. 36): “Regulation on the Procedures and Principles related to Possible Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum From Another Country” (No. 1994/6169; amendment No: No. 2006/9938).<sup>7</sup> The regulation is criticized to be over-restrictive in terms of procedures required for receiving asylum and relative rights (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, pp. 36-37). After 2001, the European Union accession process was influential on following procedures (İçduygu & Biehl, 2012, pp. 34, 37-42) which requires strict controls on human movement (Danış, 2004, p. 11). Starting with the arrival of Syrian refugees, Turkey also welcomed other changes.

### 3.1 Syrians in Turkey

After the eruption of civil war in Syria in 2011, a wave of refugees began to arrive in neighbouring countries, including Turkey. The total number of people who fled the country and registered as refugees is 5,543,272 as of June 03, 2019 (UNHCR,

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/49746cc62.html>

Operational Portal, 2019).<sup>8</sup> Turkey received the highest number of refugees, 64.1% of all refugees reside in Turkey while the second, Lebanon, hosts 16.6% (UNHCR, Operational Portal, 2019). The increase of the number of people in Turkey since 2011 can be traced in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Change in number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey  
Source: DGMM, (2019a), by 29.05.2019<sup>9</sup>

3,497,690 of a total of 3,610,398 Syrian refugees in Turkey live out of 13 camps which are in eight different cities, and these people are unequally distributed throughout the country (DGMM, 2019a). According to İçduygu (2015), a high percentage of Syrian refugees live in cities instead of camps because they are high in number and able to survive outside of the camps through personal ties (p. 8). Moreover, some of them are not entitled to live in camps since they do not have a legal right to be in Turkey (İçduygu 2015, p. 8). Hence, the actual number of refugees in the country is unknown.

<sup>8</sup> <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma\\_363\\_378\\_4713\\_icerik](https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik)

As of May 2019, İstanbul is the city where highest number of Syrian refugees live (545,992 people), though ratio of Syrians to city's locals is 3.62% (DGMM, 2019a). On the other hand, in three cities that are close to the Syrian border, proportion of Syrians to locals is 80.58% in Kilis, 26.53% in Hatay and 21.53% in Gaziantep (DGMM, 2019a). Bayburt, where only 23 refugees live, is the city with the lowest number of refugees (DGMM, 2019a). Moreover, as of November 2018, the Minister of Interior announced that the number of Syrian babies who were born in Turkey is 405,521 (Euronews, 2019) and their legal status is even more complicated than their parents since they may end up stateless (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 26).

In 2013, Turkey took a new step and passed Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP; 2013) and established DGMM (Article 103).<sup>10</sup> The new law defined the status of “temporary protection” (Article 91) as

Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the orders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection. (LFIP, 2013/6458, Article 91.1)

According to Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR; No: 2014/ 6883),<sup>11</sup> Syrians are included in this category (Provisional Article 1.1). TPR (No: 2014/ 6883) states that people under temporary protection have right not to return to their country (Article 6), and sets the principles about services (Part Six) such as “healthcare” (Article 27), “education” (Article 28), “labour market” (Article 29), “social assistance” (Article 30), “translation” (Article 31) and access to wares (Article 32). Yet, this status is not the same as “refugee” status which is conveyed only to people coming from Europe (LFIP, 2013, Article 61), as briefly mentioned before. Another development

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/ingilizce-2.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/\\_dokuman28.pdf](http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman28.pdf)

regarding Syrians in Turkey is the Readmission Treaty between Turkey and the European Union in March 2016, according to which Turkey has to admit Syrians who cross the borders of Europe through Turkey and this is taken as an indicator of the fact that in Turkey, Syrians are protracted (Danış, 2018, “Türk usulü misafirperverlik”, para.2; Canefe, 2016, p. 18).

According to M. M. Erdoğan (2018), granting Syrians either “refugee status” or “citizenship” is the only way out to conceptual as well as societal confusion, because they have been in the country for a long while and they are here to stay (p.13). M. M. Erdoğan (2018)’s research supports his comments on the issue, revealing a snapshot of what public thinks. 70.5% of the participants state that either most or all of Syrians will stay in Turkey after the end of civil war (p. 76). In 2016, KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016a) found that the percentage of participants who disagree or totally disagree with the statement that “Syrian asylum seekers will return to their country when the war in their country ends” is 36.6 (p. 57, own translation).<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, 45.1% of the participants of Erdoğan (2015)’s 2014 study state that all of the Syrians will return to their country (p. 34). Hence, it is possible to infer that, the longer Syrian refugees stay, the lesser the public believes that they will return to their country. In fact, Kirişci (2014) claimed that Syrians’ stay in the country will be long-term and urged to be ready for “eventual incorporation of the refugees into Turkish society” (p. 2). Consequently, the public opinion about refugees as well as measures to be taken to tackle with the issue becomes even more important for both groups.

However, results of public opinion research draw a pessimistic picture in terms of public perception regarding living together with Syrian refugees. Annual

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<sup>12</sup> “Suriyeli sığınmacılar ülkelerindeki savaş bitince geri döneceklerdir.” KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016a, p. 57)



public opinion research by Centre for Turkish Studies finds that the percentage of participants who state that they are not content with Syrian immigrants ranges from 57.7 in 2016 to 54,5 in 2017 and to 66.6 in 2018 (Aydın et al., 2019, p. 66). On the contrary, in 2016, 10.5% of the participants stated that they were content, this percentage increased to 17.5 in 2017 and then decreased to 13.7 in 2018 (Aydın et al., 2019, p. 65). Moreover, in another study, 75% of the participants either disagree or totally disagree with the statement that “We can live with Syrians altogether in peace” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 77, own translation).<sup>13</sup> In fact, 81.8% of them support forms of segregation option posed in the question, ranging from “living only in camps” to “definitely be sent back to Syria” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 89, own translation).<sup>14</sup> Besides, results reveal that 62.9% of the participants feel “away (uzak)” or “far away (çok uzak)” to refugees in terms of social distance (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 62). Hence, M. M. Erdoğan (2018) comments on this situation as “‘grudgingly’ acceptance of a common future (ortak toplumsal geleceği ‘kerhen’ kabulleniş)” (p. 76, own translation). Similarly, according to Daniş (2018), after acknowledgement of the fact that Syrians are persisting in Turkey, steps taken towards integration was reluctant (“Türk usulü misafirperverlik”, para. 2).

M. M. Erdoğan (2018)’s study provides further information about support rights for Syrians. He states that 54.6% of the participants opposes any form of work permit to be granted to Syrians (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, pp. 72-73). Moreover, %85.6 of them state that “They should be granted no political rights whatsoever” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 81, own translation).<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, 25.7% of the participants also oppose the idea that Syrians being educated in Turkey (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 86).

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<sup>13</sup> “Suriyelilerle huzur içinde bir arada yaşayabiliriz.” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 77)

<sup>14</sup> “Sadece kamplarda yaşamalılar”, “Mutlaka geri gönderilmeliler” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 89)

<sup>15</sup> “Hiçbir siyasi hak verilmemelidir” (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 81).

Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (2018), on the other hand, find that while 51.3% of the respondents oppose healthcare for Syrians, this opposition increases to 60.1% in case of education in the native language without payment, to 73.4 % in case of Syrians' ability to work as they like, and to 79.1% in case of granting citizenship to Syrians (p. 16). These results also highlight the need to analyse reasons why people express such exclusionary attitudes towards Syrian refugees.

The results of a keyword search in Google search engine can also add on to this pessimistic picture. According to this, on 23.03.2019 at 19.55, a search turns with about 1,690,000 results in 0.28 seconds when “Suriyeli (Syrian)” and “kavga (fight)” are used while the number declines to about 862,000 results in 0.39 seconds when “Suriyeli (Syrian)” and “huzur (peace)” are the keywords. Though not as an exact measure, even this very quick research tells about atmosphere surrounding the discussions regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey especially in terms of social exclusion. Hence, it is important to understand which factors influence the public attitudes towards Syrian refugees by the locals. Only through this way an environment of reconciliation can be created (Esses et al, 2017, p. 78).

### 3.2 Opinion on Syrian refugees in Turkey

Since Syrians are an important part of the everyday reality of researchers in Turkey, it is not surprising that the number of studies that focus on refugees is numerous.

There are various research reports that are published by various civil society organizations and research institutes, focusing on different aspects of the issue. To illustrate, International Crisis Group (2018) focuses on the urban impacts of Syrian refugees. The methods they are using also differ, some of them are using country-wide public opinion surveys (Erdoğan, 2015), some others work with smaller number

of people with a limited scope and use focus groups (PS: EUROPE, 2017). Scholars analyse impacts of the Syrian refugees in many different aspects such as economy (Tümen, 2016; Esen & Oğuş Binatlı, 2017; Akgündüz, van den Berg & Hassink, 2015; Balkan & Tümen, 2016), security (eg. Ağır & Sezik, 2015) and working conditions of both locals and refugees (eg. Kavak, 2016). In addition, many academic studies on perception/attitudes towards refugees are mainly descriptive and focus on case studies (eg. Nielsen, 2016; Cengiz, 2015), yet quantitative studies were published as well (eg. Getmansky, Sınmazdemir & Zeitzoff et al., 2018a; Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, n.d.). Below, I will present a selection of recent studies that particularly address perception of refugees in the country.

Ünal (2014) provides an internet-based content analysis to grasp attitude towards immigrants in Turkey. Ünal draws a more pessimistic picture of immigrant perception, according to him, in Turkey, immigrants and refugees in general, Syrian refugees in particular, are considered as “others” (Ünal, 2014, p. 81). People express their security concerns as well as economic threat perception (Ünal, 2014, pp.77-78). Moreover, like Pereira et al. (2010), Ünal (2014) also evaluates this threat perception as a tool to “legitimize exclusionary, discriminatory discourse” (p. 79).

Yitmen & Verkuyten (2018) focus rather on how people would behave under different levels of “national identification”, “humanitarian concern” and “perceived threat” (p. 230). They conducted their study in six different cities in Turkey with different levels of Syrian refugee populations (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, p. 234) and find that stronger national identification as well as high levels of threat are linked to “negative behavioural intentions”, such as taking part in collective actions against Syrians (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, pp. 234-236). The opposite is true when it comes to “positive behavioural intentions”, such as helping a Syrian refugee in need

(Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, pp. 234-236). They claim that threat is the reason why national identification and types of intended behaviour are linked (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, p. 230). In addition, as the level of humanitarian concern increases, positive behavioural intentions also increase (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, p. 234). Moreover, as perceived threat, which is measured via symbols and security concerns, increases, people with higher levels of humanitarian concerns would have lower negative behavioural intentions but this situation also dishearten people to act positively (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018, p. 240).

Getmansky et al. (2018a) adopt an experimental design and test whether some positive and negative primes affect the perception of participants as well as their approach to peace process. Their results indicate that there is a significant difference between Kurds and non-Kurds in terms of expressed perceptions of refugees (Getmansky et al., 2018a, p. 503). Specifically, people who are not Kurdish are more likely to feel threatened as a reaction to primes (Getmansky et al., 2018a, p. 503). Moreover, governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters has lower threat perception (Getmansky et al., 2018a, p. 503). Likelihood of having a positive perception towards refugees increases if participants are living in areas which experienced state of emergency (Getmansky et al., 2018a, p. 503).

Studying public opinion data, Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (n.d.) find that compared to individual and group level measures of economic threat, cultural threat as well as values, especially participants' unwillingness to "tolerate" people who are the outliers in the society, significantly affects their attitudes ("Findings and Discussion", para. 4,6). Yet, interestingly, higher "media usage" triggers negative attitudes (Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, n.d., "Findings and Discussion", para. 4,6).

Altındağ & Kaushal (2017) on the other hand, question whether political party preference impacts attitudes towards Syrian refugees as well as influence of increasing number of refugees on people's electoral choices. They conduct analysis on the same data set that I employed for this study alongside other sources. They find that there is a difference in attitudes towards refugees on the basis of being a supporter of the AKP or not (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2017, pp. 3, 11). Moreover, they also find that the decrease in the voting share of AKP that is generated by proliferating number of refugees is "modest and temporary" (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2017, p. 13). Özkeçeci (2017) also finds positive association between attitudes and being a rightist (p. 43).

Balcıoğlu (2018)'s research adds information to the literature relying on interviews and a focus group with Syrian residents of Sultanbeyli. In this part, two points seem very interesting. First one is the discrepancy between integration of female and male Syrians because of the lack of accessible language courses for men compared to women (Balcıoğlu, 2018, p. 11). Balcıoğlu (2018) also discusses that people in general have no more opportunity to socialize than hanging out with their family members, yet women can meet with other refugees in those courses (p. 10-11). Second one is the finding that suggest the presence of religion as an active bond between refugees and locals (Balcıoğlu, 2018, p. 12). However, Lazarev & Sharma (2017)'s experiments reveal that once controlled for primes about economic costs, religion no longer generates positive perceptions (p. 203). Besides, the bond between Sunni Muslims are stronger than the one among Muslims (Lazarev & Sharma, 2017, p. 203).

Nielsen (2016) states her observation that people's attitudes have shifted since 2011 and turned to negative (p. 104). Cengiz (2015), on the other hand, aims to

understand influence of Syrian refugees in the city of Kilis as a space as well as on people living there. The results indicate that the city evolves in time with presence of refugees and people complain about societal and economic impact of refugees in the region (Cengiz, 2015, p. 101). To illustrate, Cengiz (2015) reports that “tenants, students, officers” experience hardships because of rapidly increasing housing prices (p. 115).

Genç & Demirkıran (2015) present the results of their interviews as indicators of negativity towards Syrian refugees (p.116). They claim that ethnicity of the refugees relates to threat and plays an important role in that (Genç & Demirkıran, 2015, p.116). They also add that possible influence of high number of immigrants on such perception (Genç & Demirkıran, 2015, p.116). Moreover, Keleş, Aral, Yıldırım, Kurtoğlu & Sunata (2016)’s analysis provides support for relevance of high level of education in having positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees among the young people who participated in their online survey (p. 161).

Aktaş, Kındap Tepe & Persson (2018), on the other hand, analyse the impact of feelings and values on attitudes of university students in Sivas towards Syrian refugees. They find that being empathetic with Syrians would decrease negative attitudes (Aktaş et al., 2018, “Abstract”). In addition, females approach refugees more positively (Aktaş et al., 2018, “Abstract”). They also look into the relationship between “blind patriotism, religiosity, and having nationalist/conservative orientations” and attitudes, and find that as these increase, so does negative approach (Aktaş et al., 2018, “Abstract”).

There are also several theses that focus on attitude/perception/prejudice towards refugees and role of threat in this relationship. Here I will present a selected few. Relying on Stephan & Stephan (2000)’s “integrated threat theory of prejudice”,

Özkeçeci (2017) conducts her research and finds that different types of threat and prejudice are influenced by “quality of contact” with a sample that collects data in İstanbul and Şanlıurfa (p. 38). Negative stereotyping is the most influential measure on prejudice variables (Özkeçeci, 2017, p. 38). She also finds that “threat” links contact to prejudice, though this relationship functions differently according to types of threat and contact (Özkeçeci, 2017, p. 38) and underlines the importance of quality of contact (Özkeçeci, 2017, p. 42) Moreover, she also concludes that how much support Syrian refugees get for their rights is associated with to what kind of attitude the participant holds about them, relying on her finds about negative correlation between threat, prejudice and support for rights (Özkeçeci, 2017, p. 43). Padır (2019), on the other hand, works specifically on xenophobia. According to his study, threat-both general and cultural- triggers xenophobia. Moreover, as both forms of threat increases, people become less likely to have frequent and high-quality contact with refugees, hence, the level of xenophobia also increases this way (Padır, 2019, p. 71).

In another study, Geurts (2017) finds that people are more supportive of discriminatory attitudes even if they are in closer contact with Syrian refugees in Turkey compared to Turks out of the country (p. 56). Moreover, in contrast to expectations, as education level increases, religiosity decreases and people are identified with left-leaning political parties, their level of discrimination towards Syrians increase (Geurts, 2017, p. 62). Çatak (2019) on the other hand, conducts a case study on relationship between locals and Syrians in Mersin. The study finds that, even though Turks and Syrians encounter a lot, the relationship between them may not improve with removal of prejudice, in some cases the opposite is true (Çatak, 2019, p. 161). Based on previous research, Çatak (2019) concludes that

locals focus on differences between Syrians and themselves and exclude them on this basis (p. 162). Participants also express their security, economy and public service concerns related to presence of Syrian refugees (Çatak, 2019, pp. 163-164). Finally, Çatak underlines the negative impact of “uncertainty” on perceived threat (p. 164).

All in all, as this brief literature review indicates, in Turkey, attitudes towards Turkey is a topic that draws attention of many academics and researchers. The factors affecting these attitudes are also studied, yet, the number of studies that take a comprehensive approach and conduct multivariate analysis with public opinion data in Turkey is limited. As seen in the previous chapter, there are multiple studies that cross-sectional multivariate analysis to assess the determinants of public opinion in immigrants/asylum seekers/refugees yet, those studies mostly focus on European countries and the United States. Hence, this study contributes to the literature with the analysis it provides. Moreover, most of the studies focus on immigrants instead of refugees, this study also has a say regarding this understudied distinction. In the next chapter, I will present the data and analysis.



## CHAPTER 4

### DATA, METHOD AND HYPOTHESES

#### 4.1 Data

To analyse factors that affect perception of Syrian refugees by locals, I use data collected by KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016c), an organization that collects individual-level public opinion data regularly about various topics and regularly from across the country and shares collected data for analysis for academic purposes.

Hence, I have conducted “secondary analysis” (Babbie, 2008, p. 304).

The findings of this research are reported under the name of “Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Bakış, Şubat 2016” (A Look at Syrian Asylum-Seekers, February 2016 KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016a, own translation). As the name of the research report suggests, the data focuses particularly on perception of and attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Before introducing data, I need to note that the research defines Syrians as “asylum-seekers” instead of refugees. Acknowledging the difference between the terms, I will keep using the term “refugees” to keep consistency in the study. In addition, since this study is conducted in Turkish, information in data set and questionnaire is translated for this study by myself.<sup>16</sup>

According to KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016a), the research was conducted in 6-7 February 2016 with 2649 participants through face-to-face interviews (p. 47). The participants were collected via multi-stage sampling. Stratification relies on data from address-based population registration system (ABPRS, Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi) and village and district information gathered via election results (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016a, p. 47). Then,

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<sup>16</sup> Appendix A provides questions that are used in this study in Turkish.

the number of survey is distributed within 12 NUTS-1 regions according to metropolis/urban and rural quotas.<sup>1718</sup> Stratified districts are selected randomly, and then 18 participants were selected per district according to gender and age quotas.<sup>19</sup> Participants were over 18 and there were quotas for gender and age (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016a, p. 47).

Despite concerns regarding quota sampling (Babbie, 2008, p.205), the sample statistics resemble the population parameters and was used in previous research for analysis (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2017). Moreover, Mazzocchi (2008) states that cross-checking population parameters with the sample is the method to observe bias (p. 106). In Figure 3 and Figure 4, it is possible to see the comparison between population parameters in 2016 and sample statistics, though in the sample minimum age is 18. In the overall population, the percentage of females is 49.8% (Turkish Statistical Institute [TurkStat], 2017) while it is 47.7% in the sample. For males, the population parameter is 50.1% while the sample statistic is 52.9% (TurkStat, 2017).




Figure 3. Population parameters with respect to gender and age  
Source: TurkStat, ABPRS, (2016)

<sup>17</sup> Further information is gathered through personal communication, on March 19, 2019.

<sup>18</sup> Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)

<sup>19</sup> Further information is gathered through personal communication, on March 19, 2019.




Figure 4. Sample statistics with respect to gender and age

To avoid any possibility of a response set, the problem of receiving the same answers regardless of the content of the question (“response set”, n.d.), I have checked the data. My criterion for a response set was such that if the respondent gave the same answers to all questions in two batteries that I mainly used to construct my dependent and main independent variable, or only one answer to those questions was different, then I delete that observation. In total, there were 6 observations fulfilling this criterion and they have been taken off the scope of this study.

#### 4.2 Hypotheses

The theoretical background of this study will rely on the logic of perceived threat as the main mechanism that shapes attitudes towards refugees, following the literature (eg. Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Verkuyten, 2009; Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, n.d.). Since, as I will discuss in detail below, attitudes towards refugees is measured via support for rights that would induce further integration to the society, I will be mentioning concepts of exclusionary attitudes, support for rights and positive attitudes interchangeably.

As the discussion above presents in detail, threat is a factor that increases the likelihood of holding a negative attitude towards refugees and it may have many sources, yet economy (eg. Scheve & Slaughter, 1999; Quillian, 1995) and culture (eg. Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004) constitute essential components of threat. As mentioned by Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (2018, 2019), security can be added to this list. The literature also discusses the role of security (e.g. Sniderman et al., 2004; Loescher & Milner, 2004; Chiru & Gherghina, 2012). Moreover, in many case studies as well as in research reports, security concerns were expressed in Turkey (eg. Çatak, 2019; Cengiz, 2015; Orhan & Senyücel Gündoğar, 2015).

Accordingly, the first hypothesis is as follows:

*H<sub>1</sub>*: As the level of perceived threat increases, the support for rights for refugees decreases.

Contact is yet another factor that is expected to impact attitudes towards refugees and functions in many different ways and levels (eg. Pettigrew, 1998; Allport, 1954, Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Following the logic that expects contact to decrease prejudice (eg. Pettigrew, 1998; Allport, 1954), this study hypothesizes that:

*H<sub>2</sub>*: Higher levels of contact would increase support for rights for refugees.

Social distance, on the other hand, is considered as another driver of opinion, following Erdoğan & Semerci (2018). As I will explain in the next section, because of the coding structure of the variable, I name it social proximity instead of social distance.

*H<sub>3</sub>*: As people are more likely to include refugees in their inner circle, they would be less likely to hold negative attitudes toward them.

I will also include control variables to my model. Following the literature on economic threat as well as labour market explanations (eg. Scheve & Slaughter,

1999; Mayda, 2006; Hainmüller & Hiscox, 2007), I will include education level, employment status, and household monthly income. Mayda (2006)'s finding regarding the difference in attitudes between people who work in immigrant populated jobs and people who do not is relevant here (p. 527). In the context of Turkey, to illustrate, Tümen (2016) finds that with introduction of high number of Syrian refugees into economy of Turkey, increase in unemployment local people's informal sector, as well as decrease in prices of the products that are produced by informal labour are observed (p. 458). Other studies find similar results regarding declining employment in the informal sector (eg. International Crisis Group, 2018; Esen & Oğuş Binatlı, 2017). Moreover, Tümen (2016) does not detect any decrease in formal employment of the locals but a small increase (p. 458) while Akgündüz, van der Berg & Hassink (2015)'s findings suggest no influence on employment at all (p. 18). However, in a later study, Esen & Oğuş Binatlı (2017) find evidence suggesting that this might not be the case, instead they state that they detected a declining trend in both forms of employment (pp. 11-12). In my study, economic influence of education is highlighted instead of alternative cultural approach (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Besides, I will use two different operationalizations for employment status. According to Article 48 of Devlet Memurları Kanunu [the Law on Civil Servants] (1965, No: 657), being a Turkish citizen is the precondition for being a civil servant. I consider this category as secure job category, following Mayda (2006)'s logic. Hence:

*H<sub>4</sub>*: As education level increases, people will be more supportive of rights for Syrians.

*H<sub>5a</sub>*: Unemployed people will be less supportive of rights for Syrians.

$H_{5b}$ : People who have relatively insecure occupations will be less supportive of rights for Syrians.

$H_6$ : Higher household monthly income is expected to increase support for rights for Syrians.

Previous studies state controversial interpretations about the potential impact of living in an intensely refugee populated areas in Turkey (eg. Getmansky et al, 2018a; KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016a, p. 30). Depending on abovementioned literature which emphasizes the logic of both group threat theory and contact theory (e.g. Quillian, 1995; Weber, 2015), living in cities where Syrian refugees are highly populated is also added as a control.

As discussed earlier, influence of religion on attitudes toward Syrians is not clear in Turkey, yet being Sunni Muslim is also included as a control variable following Lazarev & Sharma (2017)'s findings about being Sunni Muslim as a factor taming the effect of "symbolic threat" (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and trigger further "familiarity" (Schneider, 2008, p. 63; Bloom et al., 2015, p. 16).

In addition, previous research on attitudes include gender, age and political preferences as control variables, so I also included them (eg. Geurts, 2017; Özkeçeci, 2017; McLaren, 2003; Scheepers et al., 2002). Overall, my base OLS model equation is:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_1 * \text{Threat} + \beta_2 * \text{Contact} + \beta_3 * \text{Social Proximity} + \Sigma * X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

In this equation,  $Y_j$  stands for the dependent variable, level of support for the rights of an individual. As I already mentioned, threat, contact and social proximity (social distance) are my explanatory variables.  $X_i$  represents the vector of individual level controls.  $\epsilon_i$  represents the error term. My unit of analysis is individual. Below, I will explain how these variables are measured in detail.

### 4.3 Dependent variable

As I set the model, now I will explain its components one by one. The dependent variable of the analysis, the attitude towards Syrian refugees is measured via level of support for granting rights for Syrian refugees, similar to previous studies (e.g. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2018). The measure is an index, which is composed of answers to three questions related to rights to be given to Syrians in Turkey. Both question availability in the data and discussion in the literature on social exclusion (eg. Rodgers, 1995; Sen, 2000) were taken into consideration in selection of the items, hence it is possible to claim that the index has face validity. Participants were asked if they agree or disagree with the following statements: “Work permit should be given to the asylum seekers”, “Residence permit should be given to the asylum seekers”, “Syrian children in Turkey should be able to receive education in their mother tongue, in Arabic.” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 2, own translation). All answers to these three questions were coded according to Likert-scale, from 1 for “Definitely disagree” up to 6 for “Definitely agree”. There is no option of “Neither agree nor disagree”. I have not recoded values except coding “No answer” option as missing.

To calculate the index scores, I run factor analysis with a principle-component model which is a mixed approach with methodological benefits for variable reduction (Mooi, Sarstedt & Mooi-Reci, 2018, p. 284). I also used “orthogonal varimax rotation” (Kaiser, 1958 as cited in “rotate”, n.d., p. 3). I ended up with a single factor, and only the third component of the index regarding the mother tongue has a uniqueness -i.e. unexplained variance in the variable by the factor and expected to be lower than 0.50 (Mooi, Sarstedt & Mooi-Reci, 2018, pp.

277-278)- score higher than .5 (0.5649). The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Results of Factor Analysis for Rights Index

Variable	Factor	Uniqueness
Work permit should be given to the asylum seekers	0.8862	0.2146
Residence permit should be given to the asylum seekers	0.8864	0.2142
Syrian children in Turkey should be able to receive education in their mother tongue, in Arabic.	0.6596	0.5649

Then, index scores are predicted with a regression using factor loadings, since scores are standardized, they range between -3 and +3. The index's reliability measure, Cronbach's alpha is 0.74, which is adequate for usage (Mooi, Sarstedt & Mooi-Reci, 2018, p. 289). Though the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.61, the value is still adequate (Mooi, Sarstedt & Mooi-Reci, 2018, p. 272). The distribution of the index results is provided in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Histogram of rights index



The distribution presented here gives the reader a good idea about presence of extreme opposition as well as support to rights for Syrian refugees in the sample. Frequency distributions of individual components of the rights index is presented in Appendix B, Figure B1, Figure B2 and Figure B3.

It is important to note that, as briefly mentioned earlier, TPR (No: 2014/6883) Article 29.2 states that people under temporary protection are eligible to apply for work permits, though there are limits on the terms of the permit.<sup>20</sup> Later, in 15.01.2016, Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection (No: 2016/8375) is issued, which specifies the conditions under which people under temporary protection can work.<sup>21</sup> Hence, by the time the survey is conducted and published, Syrian refugees already could obtain work permits, though according to Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection (2016), they can apply for it only after 6-months of stay in Turkey (Article 5.1), can work only in the province they are registered (Article 7.1). There are also limits and further permission requirements for some professions (Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, 2016, Article 6.2 and Article 6.3). Moreover, in 2016, Syrian children could attend both schools in Turkey and Temporary Education Centres (GEMs) where they could receive education in Arabic, though those centres were incrementally closed later due to lack of high- quality of education and problems in attendance, as well as adoption of a long term approach in education of Syrians (Erdoğan, M. M., 2018, p. 30). Consequently, the dependent variable only measures public predisposition to set the limits for rights that should be granted to Syrian refugees instead of the rights that they are legally entitled to.

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<sup>20</sup> [http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/\\_dokuman28.pdf](http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman28.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/582c71464.html>

#### 4.4 Independent and control variables

The main independent variable of this research, the level of perceived threat is also designed as an index. For this index, literature was the guidance during the item selection (eg. Periera et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2009). Despite acknowledging different forms of threat, like some examples of previous work, items are combined into single threat index (eg. Weber, 2015; Scheepers et al., 2002). Data availability was also influential in this decision. Answers given to following statements were included: “I think we are culturally alike with Syrians.”, “Asylum seekers damage Turkey’s economy.”, “The employment opportunities were decreased because of Syrian asylum-seekers.”, “The cities became less secure because of Syrian asylum-seekers.” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, pp. 2-3, own translation). Hence, this variable aims to measure a rather general concept of threat, which composes elements of group elements of economic threat, a rather indirect measure of cultural threat and concerns regarding security. Answers coded with a Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 6. Same as the items in the previous index, 1 means “Totally disagree” while 6 means “Totally agree”. However, I reversed the scores of cultural threat measure to ensure all variables measure threat in the same direction. The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Results of Factor Analysis for Threat Index

Variable	Factor	Uniqueness
I think we are culturally alike with Syrians.	0.5373	0.7113
Asylum seekers damage Turkey’s economy.	0.7657	0.4136
Employment opportunities decreased because of Syrian asylum-seekers.	0.7706	0.4061
The cities became less secure because of Syrian asylum-seekers.	0.8027	0.3556

Cultural threat component has the highest uniqueness score, which is 0.7113. I recoded “No answer” option as missing and preserved initial coding. I created the index and calculated factor scores following the same procedures as I did for the rights index. For threat index, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.6953 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score is 0.7171. The distribution of the scores is presented in Figure 6. The distribution is left-skewed, indicating the presence of very low values, far away from the average. For distribution of individual threat items, see Appendix C, Figures C1, Figure C2, Figure C3 and Figure C4.




Figure 6. Histogram of threat index

My second independent variable is contact, which, in fact measures the frequency of contact under specified circumstances since it combines answers one question in the questionnaire with seven choices, each coded separately as if they are separate questions. The question asks: “Do you encounter Syrian asylum seekers in your daily life? At which conduits/places?” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 2, own translation). The choices are at the participant’s “neighbourhood

or/and street, at the shopping district, at the workplace, at school, at mosque and in the public transportation vehicles” and “no encounter”, and it was possible to give multiple answers (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 2, own translation). Since each answer is coded separately, no encounter was excluded from the analysis. Originally, answers were coded as 1 if the participant encountered a Syrian refugee in that place, 2 otherwise. However, I recoded them and generated new variables as “0” if the participant did not encounter Syrian refugees in that place and “1” otherwise. Because of the way question is asked, this variable is formulated as an additive index which measures in how many different places the participants encounter Syrians. After adding the answers, I have normalized the values so my contact values range between 0 and 1. Hence construction of this index resembles Getmansky et al. (2018b)’s “*Refugee Exposure index*” (pp. 10,13, emphasis original) The Cronbach’s alpha for contact index is 0.53. The distribution of the contact index is provided in Figure 7. The frequency distributions of the items in the contact index are available in Appendix D, Table D1.




Figure 7. Histogram of contact index

The third explanatory variable is social distance. In the questionnaire, one main question asked to get answers for four categories which were coded as separate questions in the data set (1 =Yes, 2 =No, 3 = No answer). Then I recoded these and generated new variables (1 = Yes, 0 = No and “.” = No answer). The question is: “What can be the level that you can have relationship with Syrian asylum seekers? Can they be in the places that I will list?” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 2, own translation). Options were: “In the same city, in my neighbourhood, workplace or school, in my building, as my neighbour or as a part of my friend circle and in my home or my family” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 2, own translation). In this measure, higher scores indicate being open to include Syrians in different parts of life, hence, I rather use the term social proximity instead of social distance.

Same procedures are followed to compute factor scores. For this index, Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.796 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score is 0.696. Moreover, only one of the variables has a uniqueness value higher than 0.50. The distribution of predicted scores for social proximity index is provided in Figure 8. In Table 3, it is possible to see factors analysis results. The frequency distributions of the individual items in the index are available in Appendix D, Table D2.

Table 3. Results of Factor Analysis for Social Proximity Index

Variable	Factor	Uniqueness
Can Syrians be in the same city as yours?	0.7891	0.3774
Can Syrians be in the same neighbourhood, workplace or school as yours?	0.8923	0.2037
Can Syrians be in your building, as your neighbour or be your friend circle?	0.8518	0.2745
Can Syrians be in your home and in your family?	0.5766	0.6675




Figure 8. Histogram of social proximity index

The rest of the variables are used for controls, as in the line with literature.

Age is an interval/ratio level variable. The youngest participant is 17 years old while the oldest is 88 in the dataset. The mean value is 41.01 and median age is 40 (n=2,647). The distribution of the variable can be seen in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Histogram of age

Another variable that is measured at the interval/ratio level is the monthly household income of the participants. I prefer to take natural logarithm of this variable to deal with its skewness. In the original version of the variable, mean household income is 2,224.444 Turkish Lira, median income is 2,000 Turkish Lira. Since 20 participants reported to have “0” as their monthly household income, when I took the natural logarithm of the value, I have lost 20 observations (n= 2,478). The distribution of the current version of the variable approximates a normal distribution as seen in Figure 10. The mean value is 7.539.




Figure 10. Histogram of the monthly household income

Education level is an ordinal variable. In the sample, while being a high school graduate is the modal category, being a primary/middle school graduate is the median category (n=2,636). Being Illiterate is coded as 1 while being MA or PhD graduate is coded as 7. Figure 11 shows the distribution.




Figure 11. Frequency distribution of education levels in percentages

Employment status is a categorical variable. Employment status has 13 categories, coded from 1 to 13, as shown below. I have recoded “No answer” category as missing and preserved the rest of the coding. As I mentioned earlier, I operationalized this variable in two ways. For the first one, I recoded the variable as “1” represents being unemployed and “0” for all other categories. Secondly, I included this variable in the model as categorical variable Table 4 presents coding structure of the original variable as well as the recode.

Table 4. Coding Structure of Employment Status

	Original	Recode		Original	Recode
Civil servant	1	0	Employed, other	8	0
Private sector	2	0	Retired	9	0
Worker	3	0	Housewife	10	0
Shopkeeper	4	0	Student	11	0
Merchant/Entrepreneur	5	0	Unemployed	12	1
Independent profession	6	0	Cannot work	13	0
Farmer, Agriculturist, Stockbreeding	7	0	No answer	14	0



As seen in the Figure 12, in the sample, being a housewife is the modal category (n= 2,632). Besides, there are 133 unemployed people in the data.




Figure 12. Frequency distribution of employment status in percentages

Political party support was measured by answers given to the question that “If there is a general parliamentary election today, to whom, for which political party would you vote for?” (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p. 1, own translation). In the questionnaire, this is an open-ended question, “Undecided” and “No vote” were also given as options. In the data set, answers were coded as in Table 5. I have recoded “No answer” category as missing and made no changes otherwise. As seen in Figure 13, being an AKP supporter is the modal category, overall, 45.81% of the participants state that they would vote for the governing party (n = 2,554). This variable also included as a factor variable.

Table 5. Coding Structure of Supported Political Parties

Justice and Development Party (AKP)	1	Other	5
Republican Peoples' Party (CHP)	2	Undecided	6
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)	3	No vote	7
Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)	4	No answer	8




Figure 13. Frequency distribution of support for political parties in percentages

I have recoded gender variable from 1 = Female, 2 = Male, 3 = No answer into 1 = Female, 0 = Male, “.” = No answer. Percentage of males in the sample is 52.86 (n = 2,637).

Moreover, I have dummied out religion variable to create Sunni Muslim dummy variable. People who express that they are Sunni Muslim constitute 92.97% of the sample (n = 2,589). The coding procedure is provided in Table 6.

Table 6. Recoding Religion Variable

	Original	Recode		Original	Recode
Sunni Muslim	1	1	Other	3	0
Alevi Muslim	2	0	No answer	4	“.”

To investigate the influence of Syrian refugee intensity on attitudes, like previous studies (eg. Weber, 2105; Quillian, 1995), I have also included a continuous variable. To create this variable, I gathered February 2016 data from website DGMM (2016), archived by another website.<sup>22</sup> I made this choice because the date coincides with KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016a, p. 47)'s data collection process. In addition, I gathered data from ABPRS (2015) for the year 2015 at the city level.<sup>23</sup> Then, to find refugee population per city, I divided the number of registered Syrians per city to 2015 population of that city, hence calculated the ratio of Syrians to locals and then multiply the result with 100. This is how DGMM (2019a) makes comparison with Syrian population per city and local population. Since there is no such comparison in February 2016 webpage, I manually calculated these numbers. Hence my variable indicates the ratio of Syrians per 100 locals in each city, which I call refugee (Syrian) intensity. Among 27 cities included in the dataset, average refugee intensity per city is 3.68. However, the distribution is uneven, as can be seen in Figure 14. While in Hatay, there are 25.18 Syrians per 100 local people, in Antalya, it is only 0.004.

It is important to note that, I have also included a media variable which classifies television channels that people were watching in 2016 as pro-government and not according to ownership information provided by Reporters Without Borders and Bianet (2019).<sup>24</sup> I have later excluded this dummy variable from the model since this variable does not improve the model significantly.

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<sup>22</sup> [https://web.archive.org/web/20160227180719/https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma\\_363\\_378\\_4713\\_icerik](https://web.archive.org/web/20160227180719/https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik)

<sup>23</sup> <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=tr>

<sup>24</sup> <https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/>




Figure 14. Syrian intensity per city in the dataset

## CHAPTER 5

### ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 Preliminary analyses

Before moving forward to multivariate analysis, I will first briefly discuss bivariate analysis between the variables in the model. In Table 7, it is possible to see relationships between dependent variable and continuous/ordinal independent and control variables. According to the results, there is no statistically significant relationship between contact and perceived threat at 95% confidence level, though the relationship is significant at 90% ( $p = 0.0693$ ). Moreover, contact and support for rights for the Syrians are not related. Both results contrast with my theoretical expectations. However, it is possible to observe that as perceived threat increases, support for rights decreases and social proximity decreases and vice versa. In addition, as social proximity increases, so does support for rights.

Moreover, it is possible that there is a significant positive relationship between monthly household income and support for rights while perceived threat and monthly household income are negatively related. As income increases, so does amount of contact and social proximity. As refugee intensity increases, on the other hand, support for rights for Syrian refugees and social proximity decreases, and vice versa. However, not unexpectedly, amount of contact increases. Moreover, we do see there is a significant negative relationship between age and contact as well as education level.

When I regress (OLS) rights on gender, I do not find any statistically significant relationship between variables. Being unemployed, on the other hand decreases the support for rights (one-tailed). However, except for shopkeepers and

unemployed people, I cannot find any significant relationship between employment status when all 13 categories are included in the regression. Being a shopkeeper and being unemployed decreases the support for rights (one-tailed). Besides, the results indicate that compared to AKP supporters, CHP and MHP supporters, undecided people and non-voters are less supportive of rights for Syrians while HDP supporters are significantly more supportive. Being Sunni Muslim, on the other hand, increases support for rights. For regression results, see Appendix E, Figure E1, Figure E2 and Figure E3.

Table 7. Bivariate Relationships between Dependent Variable and Independent and Control Variables

	Rights	Threat	Contact	Social proximity	Education level	Age	M. H. income	Refugee intensity
Rights	1.000 (2573)							
Threat	-0.420* (2518)	1.000 (2559)						
Contact	-0.025 (2573)	0.036 (2559)	1.000 (2643)					
Social Proximity	0.415* (2524)	-0.447* (2506)	0.046* (2580)	1.000 (2580)				
Education level	-0.007 (2566)	0.004 (2552)	0.016 (2636)	0.028 (2573)	1.000 (2636)			
Age	0.005 (2571)	0.001 (2557)	-0.074* (2641)	-0.034 (2578)	-0.382* (2634)	1.000 (2641)		
M. H. income	0.053* (2416)	-0.078* (2405)	0.085* (2478)	0.058* (2419)	0.436* (2571)	-0.101* (2477)	1.000 (2478)	
Refugee Intensity	-0.047* (2573)	0.149* (2559)	0.161* (2643)	-0.068* (2580)	-0.157* (2636)	-0.019* (2641)	-0.120* (2478)	1.000 (2643)

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$ , Observation numbers in parentheses

## 5.2 Models

I ran a linear regression model (OLS) with Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013). In my first model, I included only perceived threat, contact and social proximity indices as independent variables. Then I added the controls. Summary statistics of the variables are available in Table 8. The results of the regressions can be seen in Table 9. Since Stata puts stars of significance according to critical values of two-tailed tests, I have adjusted them in the tables according to my hypotheses.

Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Regression

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Support for Rights (Index)	2207	-0.01	1.004	-1.438	1.887
Threat Perception (Index)	2207	-0.0007	1.012	-2.827	1.285
Contact (Index)	2207	0.293	0.216	0	1
Social Proximity (Index)	2207	0.001	0.996	-1.303	1.512
Household Monthly Income (logged)	2207	7.542	0.573	4.605	10.021
Education level (ordinal)	2207	4.211	1.307	1	7
Unemployed (dummy)	2207	0.048	0.213	0	1
Refugee Intensity (per 100 locals)	2207	3.809	6.384	0.004	25.183
Age	2207	40.865	14.649	18	88
Gender (dummy)	2207	0.472	0.499	0	1
Sunni Muslim (dummy)	2207	0.928	0.258	0	1
Political Party (categorical)	2207			1	7

As presented in Table 9, in Model 1, it is possible to see that both threat and social proximity are statistically significant drivers of rights. As predicted, as threat increases, support for rights decreases while as social proximity increases, support for rights increases. To be specific, one standard deviation (SD) increase in perceived threat leads to 0.293 SD decrease in the support for rights. Social proximity, on the other hand, leads to a slightly smaller effect, 0.288 SD increase in support for rights. Contact, on the other hand, seems to have no effect and its sign is in the opposite direction to my expectations. For Model 1, adjusted R-squared is 0.244.

Table 9. Base Models

	(1)	(2)
Perceived threat	-0.293 (0.020)**	-0.280 (0.021)**
Contact	-0.111 (0.081)	-0.150 (0.089)
Social proximity	0.288 (0.020)**	0.278 (0.021)**
Monthly household income (logged)		0.0782 (0.037)*
Education		-0.00207 (0.018)
Unemployment		-0.196 (0.089)*
Refugee intensity		0.00157 (0.003)
Age		0.00196 (0.001)
Gender		0.0689 (0.038)
Sunni Muslim		0.111 (0.076)
<b>Political Party</b>		
CHP		-0.0906 (0.055)
MHP		-0.226 (0.077)**
HDP		0.260 (0.081)**
Other		-0.0399 (0.147)
Undecided		0.00439 (0.060)
No vote		-0.0152 (0.080)
Constant	0.0282 (0.029)	-0.742 (0.279)**
Observations	2471	2207
Adjusted $R^2$	0.244	0.250

Standard errors in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , For both models:  $Prob > F = 0.0000$

Base categories: Gender = Male, Unemployment = not unemployed, Sunni Muslim = not Sunni Muslim, Political Party = AKP

In Model 2, after adding my control variables, both perceived threat and social proximity are still significant predictors of support for rights for Syrian refugees. One SD increase in threat index leads to 0.280 SD decrease in support while as social proximity increases one-unit, support for rights also increases 0.278 SD. Both coefficients have almost the same strength, yet in the opposite directions. Contact, on the other hand, is insignificant since the sign of its coefficient is in the opposite direction than my expectations. As predicted, higher household monthly



income increases support for rights. Moreover, unemployed people tend to be less supportive of rights for Syrians compared to others. Hence, it is possible to assert that having relatively better economic conditions in life generate positive opinion about Syrians, supporting previous findings about the importance of personal interest (eg. Scheepers et al, 2002). Yet, surprisingly, education level does not have any influence on support for rights.

Political party preferences also make a difference in terms of support for rights. Compared to AKP supporters, MHP supporters are significantly less supportive of rights for Syrians, being a MHP supporter leads to 0.226 SD decrease. Being an HDP supporter, on the other hand, increases support by 0.260 SD. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (2018) also find that compared to being an AKP supporter, being a MHP supporter decreases support for rights even after controlling for “perceived threat, positive perceptions, social distance” and “contact with Syrians”, though being an HDP supporter does not seem to have any effect (p. 21). Refugee intensity, age, gender and being a Sunni Muslim, on the other hand, do not have a significant effect on support for rights. This model fits relatively better, it has a higher adjusted R-squared score, which is 0.250.

Since the dependent variable is measured with standardized scores, a visual representation of the influence helps to grasp the impact of the explanatory variables. It is also useful for understanding if the impact is just statistical. Figure 15 provides information about change in the predicted level of support for rights as perceived threat changes, produced by using Stata’s “margins” command (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 100). I plugged in values ranging between 1.29 and -2.83, in accordance with values of the perceived threat index that are included in the regression (see Table 8). As clearly seen, area between confidence intervals, the indicator of actual

impact, is very narrow around a steep line and increasing threat leads to a decrease in predicted positive attitude. Relatively larger areas at upper and lower ends of the confidence intervals can be attributed to low number of cases at those points. To illustrate, there are only 45 observations which are more than -2.5 SD away from the mean.




Figure 15. The impact of threat perception on predicted level of support for rights

As seen in Figure 16, social proximity has the opposite impact, as people are more willing to allow Syrian refugees be part of different aspects of their social life, they become more supportive of rights. The area between confidence intervals are also narrow for these predictions, except upper and lower ends.




Figure 16. The impact of social proximity on predicted level of support for rights

### 5.2.1 Alternative model

As I mentioned in the hypothesis section, employment status is operationalized in two ways. In Model 2, the dummy variable for unemployment is included. In Model 3, I included all categories of employment status variable. The results are presented in Table 10.

It is possible to observe that according to Model 3, threat perception and social proximity are still significant predictors of support for rights for Syrians, regardless of how I measure an indicator of labour market competition, employment status (eg. Mayda, 2006; Citrin et al., 1997). Coefficients of both variables are changed very little. In Model 3, one unit of increase in perceived threat leads to - 0.281 SD decrease in support for rights while one unit of increase of social proximity increases this support by 0.277 SD. Contact index has no significant influence.

Table 10. Alternative Model

	(3)
Perceived threat	-0.281 (0.021)**
Contact	-0.132 (0.089)
Social proximity	0.277 (0.021)**
Monthly household income (logged)	0.0712 (0.037) *
Education	-0.0109 (0.019)
<b><i>Employment Status</i></b>	
Private sector	-0.0884 (0.109)
Worker	-0.173 (0.108)
Shopkeeper	-0.196 (0.103)*
Merchant/Entrepreneur	-0.0264 (0.219)
Independent profession	0.00839 (0.165)
Farmer, agriculturist, stockbreeding	-0.0596 (0.124)
Employed, other	-0.0424 (0.100)
Retired	-0.0695 (0.100)
Housewife	-0.0970 (0.099)
Student	0.151 (0.105)
Unemployed	-0.244 (0.118)*
Cannot Work	-0.153 (0.277)
Refugee intensity	0.00146 (0.003)
Age	0.00360 (0.002)
Gender	0.0700 (0.052)
Sunni Muslim	0.118 (0.076)
<b><i>Political Party</i></b>	
CHP	-0.0982 (0.055)
MHP	-0.226 (0.077)**
HDP	0.263 (0.081)**
Other	-0.0608 (0.147)
Undecided	-0.0118 (0.060)
No vote	-0.0268 (0.080)
Constant	-0.659 (0.320)*
Observations	2207
Adjusted $R^2$	0.253

Standard errors in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ,  $Prob > F = 0.0000$

Base categories: Gender = Male, Employment status = Civil Servant, Sunni Muslim = not Sunni Muslim, Political Party = AKP

The coefficient of monthly household income decreases slightly to 0.0712, yet it is still significant at 95% confidence level (one-tailed). Compared to civil servants, who have relatively secure form of employment, being a shopkeeper and being unemployed decreases the support. This finding is consistent with the findings in Model 2. It is also in line with the existing literature which emphasizes the influence of individual economic conditions (eg. Scheve & Slaughter, 1999; Mayda, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002). Moreover, like Model 2, compared to AKP supporters, MHP supporters are reluctant to granting rights to Syrians. However, HDP supporters are more supportive of rights for Syrians. Interestingly, education and refugee number intensity are both insignificant, so are gender, age and being a Sunni Muslim. Hence, the results presented in Table 10 provides supportive evidence for  $H_1, H_3, H_{5b}$  and  $H_6$ , however,  $H_2$  and  $H_4$  failed. Moreover, adjusted R-squared value of this model is slightly higher than Model 2, it is 0.253.

### 5.2.2 Perceived threat as the dependent variable

In Model 1, 2 and 3, I could not find any significant relationship between opinion about Syrians i.e. support for rights for them and contact. Moreover, education level and refugee intensity, both highly cited predictors of opinion in the literature (eg. Blalock, 1956; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006), are also unrelated with rights for Syrians.

In the literature, Blalock (1956) mentions that though high number of “outgroup people” may escalate prejudice, it may not activate the act of discrimination (p.584). Furthermore, according to Citrin et al. (1997), once “beliefs about the impact of immigration”, which correspond to perceived threat according to my conceptualization, are taken into account, then individual differences in terms of

education level, occupation and living in refugee populated areas loses its significance in explaining anti-immigration attitudes (pp. 875-876). Moreover, as mentioned above, Scheepers et al. (2002) argue that “perceived ethnic threat” and “ethnic exclusionism” are two related yet separate phenomena and claim that threat perception is “the mediator” between objective traits and attitude (pp. 21, 29-30). In addition, according to McLaren (2003)’s findings, a person’s subjective economic condition or subjective evaluations and immigrant intensity may not be influencing the attitudes, they do affect perceived threat (pp. 926-927).

Considering all these findings and claims, I ran regression analyses that treat threat perception as the dependent variable to look deeper into the relationships between these variables. I made no changes in conceptualization or operationalization of neither dependent variable nor independent/control variables. In Model 1 and 2, Stata’s post-estimation tests for heteroskedasticity, which makes Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests, reveals that there is a high chance that residuals may vary (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). This can be a problem since heteroskedasticity is related to problematic standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 100). As a solution, robust standard errors are put forward (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p.100). Stata can compute these measures (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 84). That’s why, for these new models, I used robust standard errors. The results are presented in Table 11.

In Model 1a, I included unemployment as a dummy variable. The results suggest that as social proximity increases, perceived threat decreases. To be specific, one unit increase in social proximity leads to 0.414 SD decrease in perceived threat. Figure 17 clearly depicts this relationship. Considering the values of threat index ranges between 1.01 and -2.82, it is easy to observe how powerful social proximity

as a predictor of threat perception. Moreover, it is possible to state that the impact of social distance is not limited to attitudes, threat perception is also impacted by social distance.

Compared to models that measure support for rights, the coefficient of monthly household income suggests that this variable is more influential on threat perception than opinion on Syrians. As monthly household income increases one unit, threat perception decreases 0.144 SD. Surprisingly, another indicator of personal economic traits (eg. Scheepers et al., 2002), unemployment, does not have any significant effect on threat perception, neither does education level.

Females, on the other hand, are more likely to feel threatened by Syrians compared to males. It is interesting since gender has no influence on support for rights for Syrians. Refugee intensity is another variable which has a significant effect on threat. According to results, the higher the intensity of refugees, the higher perceived threat. This finding is in the same lines with the findings of previous studies (eg. Scheepers et al., 2002, McLaren, 2003, Semyonov et al., 2006).

In Model 1a, findings propose that compared to AKP supporters, supporters of CHP, HDP, MHP perceive higher levels of threat, so do people who are undecided or do not prefer to vote. Since HDP supporters were less likely to express exclusionary attitudes compared to AKP supporters, it is intriguing to see they, in fact, feel more threatened. Similarly, CHP supporters also express higher perceived threat but being a CHP supporter does not increase support for exclusionary attitudes.

Table 11. Models on Perceived Threat

	(1a)	(2a)
Contact	0.159 (0.085)	0.157 (0.086)
Social proximity	-0.414 (0.019)**	-0.413 (0.019)**
Monthly household income (logged)	-0.144 (0.035)**	-0.148 (0.036)**
Education	0.0229 (0.018)	0.0162 (0.019)
Unemployment	-0.0750 (0.083)	
Refugee intensity	0.0202 (0.003)**	0.0209 (0.003)**
Age	-0.000127 (0.001)	-0.000330 (0.002)
Gender	0.0952 (0.038)*	0.171 (0.052)**
Sunni Muslim	-0.0465 (0.071)	-0.0363 (0.071)
<b>Political Party</b>		
CHP	0.466 (0.053)**	0.459 (0.054)**
MHP	0.426 (0.075)**	0.422 (0.075)**
HDP	0.234 (0.076)**	0.235 (0.076)**
Other	-0.00607 (0.155)	-0.0260 (0.157)
Undecided	0.292 (0.058)**	0.287 (0.059)**
No vote	0.252 (0.076)**	0.254 (0.077)**
<b>Employment Status</b>		
Private Sector		0.0485 (0.116)
Worker		0.0803 (0.113)
Shopkeeper		0.0672 (0.110)
Merchant/ Entrepreneur		0.104 (0.170)
Independent Profession		0.304 (0.158)*
Farmer, agriculturist, stockbreeding		0.0172 (0.133)
Employed, other		0.00121 (0.108)
Retired		0.0822 (0.104)
Housewife		-0.0763 (0.103)
Student		0.0560 (0.106)
Unemployed		-0.0499 (0.118)
Cannot Work		-0.309 (0.232)
Constant	0.685 (0.271)*	0.689 (0.314)*
Observations	2239	2239
$R^2$	0.262	0.266

Robust standard errors in parentheses,  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , For both models:  $Prob > F = 0.0000$

Base categories: Gender = Male, Employment status = Civil Servant, Sunni Muslim = not Sunni Muslim, Political Party = AKP, Unemployment= not unemployed



Education, age and being a Sunni Muslim, on the other hand, does not have any significant influence on threat perception. The sign of coefficient of contact variable is positive, hence it is also insignificant.




Figure 17. The impact of social proximity on predicted level of perceived threat

In Model 2a, we can observe a very similar picture. Social proximity, monthly household income, refugee intensity are all statistically significant predictors of perceived threat. The influence of political party preferences is also steady despite different operationalization of the employment status. There is a slight increase in coefficient of gender variable, indicating that being female increases threat perception by 0.171 SD. Education, age and being a Sunni Muslim also do not have any effect on threat perception. The coefficient of contact, on the other hand, is still positive which contradicts with my theoretical expectations.

Among 13 categories of employment status variable, only having an independent profession, meaning being a doctor, lawyer etc. (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016b, p1.) has a statistically significant impact on threat perception (one-tailed). Compared to civil servants, having an independent profession increases threat perception by 0.304 SD. The implications of all these findings will be discussed in the next chapter in detail.

However, before moving on to the next chapter, I would like to mention briefly the results of the postestimation tests. For all models, I ran tests for Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and heteroskedasticity with Stata commands. In all these models, I received a mean VIF score that is smaller than 2. Some variables had relatively higher VIF scores, however since they are components of factor variables, they do not signal a serious multicollinearity (“Variance Inflation Factor”, 2018). Moreover, in my models on support for rights, there was no heteroskedasticity problem.

## CHAPTER 6

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 Implications of findings

In accordance with the line of literature that argues that perceived threat would lead to negative attitudes towards immigrants/ asylum-seekers/refugees (eg. Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Citrin et al., 1997; Esses et a., 2001), this study's main hypothesis was that the higher levels of threat would lead to negative opinion, which reflects in the form of lesser level of support for rights for Syrian refugees. Findings support this hypothesis. Instead of differentiating forms of threat (eg. Citrin et al., 1997; McLaren, 2003), this study uses a single index of perceived threat. Nevertheless, results provide supportive evidence for the argument. In the models that I ran; threat is an important predictor of the support for rights. My findings also reinforce KONDA Research & Consultancy (2016a)'s claim that locals perceive rights for refugees as a zero-sum game in Turkey (p. 43). Moreover, previous studies present similar findings in terms of role of the perceived threat (eg. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2018; Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018). Hence, threat perception is a matter to consider when relationships between two groups in the society are under scrutiny.

Similarly, social proximity measure is the second variable that can initiate higher level of support. Social distance, as a measure of prejudice for previous studies (Özkeçeci, 2017; Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, n.d.), becomes an indicator of positive attitude in this study because of its coding structure. The results show that people who are willing to include Syrian refugees in their different social environments, hence allow Syrian refugees to be part of their lives, are more likely to support them to enjoy rights. I have also found that, social proximity decreases threat

perception. Though these are interesting findings, they are not so surprising. It is reasonable for people who are likely to enjoy having refugee friends, to illustrate, to also be supportive of rights for their friends. These findings are also in accordance with previous studies in Turkey (eg. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2018).

Contact being a non-significant factor, on the other hand, tells a different story. Despite the vast literature on impact of contact on attitudes, both directly and indirectly, (eg. Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Dixon, 2006; Erdoğan & Semerci, 2018; McLaren, 2003), coefficients of the OLS regression turned out to be not significant in Model 1, 2 and Model 3 when I was testing the impact of contact on support for rights. The very first reason why contact does not make a significant effect both before and after controls can be attributed to its operationalization. Perhaps, measuring contact via how many times participants encounter in specified places does not capture the impact of contact. In other words, such measurement falls short to observe intimacy (eg. Pettigrew, 1998) or other qualities of contact (eg. Barlow et al., 2012; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner & Stellmacher, 2007; Allport, 1954). That would also explain why the coefficient of the contact variable was almost in the opposite direction to my expectations. While testing drivers of opinion on Syrians, contact had a negative coefficient, in my models for threat perception, it was positive. Further exploration about the nature of this relationship is required.

For control variables, the most unexpected finding is that education is not a significant predictor of either support for rights for refugees or threat perception. This finding contradicts with the literature that emphasizes the role of education in terms of hierarchy in the labour market (eg. Scheve & Slaughter, 1999; Mayda, 2006) and of culture (eg. Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). In my study, I treat education as a continuous variable. Earlier, Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci (n.d.) also

reported that education was not a significant predictor of attitudes in their model in the context of Turkey (“Findings and Discussion”). On the other hand, M. M. Erdoğan (2018) stated that education plays a role in people’s level of support for work permits in his bivariate analysis (p. 73). This finding contradicts mine, since my bivariate analysis does not indicate any relationship between rights and education.

Though my hypothesis regarding education level is failed, my other two hypotheses regarding individual level economic explanations for support for rights for Syrians are partially supported. The analysis also shows that higher monthly household income significantly increases the level of support for rights for Syrians as well as decreases threat perception. This result supports arguments on the line with economy-based arguments in the literature (eg. Scheve & Slaughter, 1999).

In Model 2, I found that being unemployed significantly decreases the support for rights for Syrians. Esen & Oğuş Binatlı (2017) assert that unemployment levels are influenced by Syrian refugees (p. 11), hence it is reasonable for unemployed people to be holding a rather less support for rights for refugees. In Model 3, where I tested all categories of employment status with a base category of being a civil servant, I found being a shopkeeper and unemployed decreases support for rights. These results make sense in terms of arguments about labour market competition (eg. Mayda, 2006, Citrin et al., 1997), since only citizens of Turkey can work as civil servants (Devlet Memurları Kanunu [The Law on Civil Servants], 1965, No: 657, Article 48), and previous studies report locals’ concerns regarding “unfair competition” after arrival of Syrians (eg. Orhan & Senyücel Gündoğar, 2015, p. 8; International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 13). However, in my models on perceived threat, I could not find any relationship between being unemployed and threat

perception. Moreover, compared to civil servants, only people who hold an independent profession are more likely to feel threatened. Looking at these results, it is hard to offer a labour market explanation (eg. Mayda, 2006). Instead, we can state that employment status is not powerful enough to provide explanation for threat perception, because other concerns dominate this effect, such as political party identification (eg. Altındağ & Kaushal, 2017).

Differences in political party support, to be specific, whether people do support MHP or HDP leads to a statistically significant difference between the level of support for rights for Syrians. Compared to being pro-AKP, being pro-MHP means lower level of support for rights. However, compared to AKP supporters, HDP supporters tend to be more pro-rights. In terms of perceived threat, compared to AKP supporters, except people who vote for political parties other than the ones listed, all other political groups tend to be more threatened by Syrians. In the literature, Altındağ & Kaushal (2017) underline the fact that being an AKP supporter makes a difference in attitudes, while Getmansky et al. (2018a) state it decreases the perceived level of threat (p. 503). Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci (2018) also find that political party preference is a strong predictor of threat, and relatively weaker predictor of support for rights (pp. 21-22). Moreover, in terms of support for rights, the impact of being AKP or HDP supporter is listed as an indicator of having a more positive attitude in terms of integration (KONDA Research & Consultancy, 2016a, p. 39). Hence, the findings of my models on perceived threat provides further evidence for these findings in the literature. Despite being an indirect interpretation, these findings can be evaluated from a perspective of national identification (eg. Verkuyten, 2009; Yitmen & Verkutyen, 2018; Aktaş et al., 2018, Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004). Since some political parties in Turkey can be

identified with their degree of nationalism, such as MHP, political party preferences can be treated as indicators of individuals' nationalistic approach. Hence, following Verkuyten (2009) and Yitmen & Verkuyten (2018), it is possible explain the difference between MHP and HDP in terms of their support for rights with their supporters' degree of nationalistic identification. However, since this claim is not empirically tested, it is necessary to be cautious about this interpretation and urge for further evidence.

In addition, the variable that was created to grasp regional differences does not show any statistically significant effect on support for rights. However, like previous studies that claim that the number of immigrants is matter of concern in terms of threat, consequently the negative attitude (eg. Blalock, 1956; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006), I found that as refugee intensity increases, so does perceived threat. McLaren (2003) also finds a similar result. Yet, we also know that the level that refugee intensity is measured can make an effect (Weber, 2015). Hence, the results need to be replicated with district-level data to elaborate on the findings.

Similar to refugee intensity, gender is also not a significant predictor of support for rights for Syrian refugees, yet it predicts perceived threat. Though females are likely to feel threatened, they are not expressing any opposition to rights for Syrians. When we look at the employment distribution of females and males, it is possible to see that 60.11% of female participants are housewives. It is possible to argue that as housewives, they are less likely to receive first-hand information about consequences of Syrians' presence in Turkey, hence may feel threatened especially because of "politicization" of the issue (Hopkins, 2010, pp. 43, 56). Yet, since they are not in competition for employment, they might not be considering giving rights to Syrians as harmful for their interests (eg. Mayda, 2006, p. 513).

In none of my multivariate models, being Sunni Muslim has any effect. Yet, bivariate regression result assert that there is a significant relationship between being Sunni Muslim and support for rights. Hence, results undermine the explanations of positive impact of religion (eg. Balcıoğlu, 2018; Facchini et al., 2013) and instead support Lazarev & Sharma (2017)'s findings that other concerns eliminate the positive effect of religion (p. 203).

## 6.2 Limitations

This study adopts a secondary data analysis approach. This type of research has advantages such as time finances, there is always more to learn from one data set (Babbie, 2008, pp. 304, 306). However, since the data is collected for other purposes, it is relatively harder to adjust it for a new purpose (Babbie, 2008, pp. 304, 307). To illustrate, it is not possible to add a new question in the questionnaire or change level of measurement or wording; hence it is possible to question the validity of the measurement (Babbie, 2008, p. 307). That's why, this study is limited in this sense.

## 6.3 Conclusion

After 8 years since the beginning of tensions in Syria, millions of people have been displaced. Some decided to stay within the country while some moved to other countries. According to DGMM (2019a) data, 3,610,398 people arrived in Turkey and registered as of May 29, 2019.<sup>25</sup>This number corresponds to 4.4% of the overall population of Turkey, mostly living in the urban cities instead of camps (DGMM, 2019a). As we have discussed in detail in this study, neither researchers nor public believe that they will be leaving soon. They are in the country, yet they do not seem

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<sup>25</sup> [https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma\\_363\\_378\\_4713\\_icerik](https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik)



likely to become a part of the society, instead they are standing right at the cliff of exclusion if they have not fallen already.

This study investigates specific factors that influence attitudes towards refugees in terms of public's support for rights for them. It finds that perceived threat as well as social proximity are the main predictors of those attitudes, alongside individual level differences such as monthly household income, unemployment and political party preferences. Besides, the study also finds that high refugee intensity in a province may foster perceived threat. It can be considered as another step during the process of understanding factors that may contribute to reconciliation of the tension between locals and Syrians in Turkey.

The study treats Syrian refugees as a single group, and accordingly, analyses the behaviour towards all of them ignoring people's ethnic and religious differences. However, it is known that Syrians in Turkey have different ethnic and religious backgrounds, and ethnicity and religion of the newcomers is one of the factors that affect opinion (eg. Schneider, 2008; Dixon, 2006; Bloom et al., 2015). In the future, researchers may conduct a country-wide research to see if this causes any variation in attitudes.

In addition, in this study, the effect of media on public opinion is not studied in detail. In future, researchers may conduct experiments to see if information and source of information makes a difference in attitudes in Turkey. Besides, this study provides a cross-sectional multivariate analysis, however, comparing findings of different studies as discussed in detail in the previous chapters, we can state that opinion changes in time. However, there is a very limited chance to trace changes in time because of data availability. Attempts for longitudinal data collection in Turkey, the country that hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees, should be encouraged.

This study shows that perceived threat is the virtual cliff between locals and Syrians. If the cliff cannot be bridged, it seems very unlikely for newcomers to be part of the society. Hence, policy makers, academics, media, civil society and local people should collaborate to initiate a mutual understanding to avoid probable future conflicts and establish peace in the society.



APPENDIX A

SELECTED QUESTIONS FROM KONDA RESEARCH & CONSULTANCY'S

QUESTIONNAIRE (2016b)

Q. 1 Konuşulan kişinin cinsiyeti (*Gender of the participant*)

- Kadın (*Female*)       Erkek (*Male*)

Q. 2 Kaç yaşındasınız? (*How old are you?*) .....

Q. 3 Eğitim durumunuz, yani son bitirdiğiniz okul nedir?

(*What is your education level, I mean the most recent degree that you received?*)

- Okuryazar değil (*Illiterate*)     Diplomasız okur (*Literate without a diploma*)  
 İlkokul mezunu (*Primary school graduate*)  
 İlköğretim / Ortaokul mezunu (*Primary/ Middle school graduate*)  
 Lise mezunu (*High school graduate*)  
 Üniversite mezunu (*University graduate*)  
 Yüksek lisans / Doktora (*MA or PhD*)

Q. 4 Geçen hafta para kazanmak için bir işte çalıştınız mı? Çalıştıysanız mesleğiniz nedir?

(*Did you work to earn money as an employee last week? If you did, what is your occupation?*)

ÇALIŞIYOR İSE (If s/he works)

- Devlet memuru, şef, müdür vb. (*Civil servant, chief, manager etc.*)  
 Doktor, mimar, avukat vs. (Serbest meslek)  
(*Doctor, architect, lawyer etc. (Independent Profession)*)  
 Özel sektörde memur, müdür vb. (*Private sector, as officer, manager etc.*)  
 İşçi (*Worker*)  
 Çiftçi, ziraatçı, hayvancı (*Farmer, Agriculturist, Stockbreeding*)  
 Küçük esnaf / zanaatkâr /şoför vb. (*Small shopkeeper, craftsman, driver etc.*)  
 Tüccar / sanayici / işadamı (*Entrepreneur, industrialist, businessman*)  
 Çalışıyor, diğer (*Employed, other*).....

ÇALIŞMIYOR İSE (If unemployed):

- Emekli (*Retired*)     Ev kadını (*Housewife*)     Öğrenci (*Student*)  
 İşsiz, iş arıyor (*Unemployed, looks for employment*)  
 Çalışamaz halde (*Cannot work*)

Q. 8 Bugün bir GENEL MİLLETVEKİLLİĞİ SEÇİMİ yapılırsa oyunuzu kime, hangi partiye verirsiniz?

(*If there is a general parliamentary election today, to whom, for which political party would you vote for*)

Parti adı (*Name of the party*): ..... ( ) Kararsız (*Undecided*)  
( ) Oy kullanmaz (*No vote*)

Q. 16 Suriyeli sığınmacılar ile gündelik hayatta karşılaşıyor musunuz? Hangi mecralarda/mekânlarda?

(*Do you encounter Syrian asylum seekers in your daily life? In which conduits/places*)

- [ ] Mahallemde, sokağımda (*In my neighbourhood, street*)  
[ ] Çarşıda, pazarda (*At the shopping district*) [ ] İş yerinde (*At the workplace*)  
[ ] Okulda (*At school*) [ ] Camide (*At mosque*)  
[ ] Toplu taşımada (*At public transportation*)  
[ ] Temasım olmadı (*I had no contact*)

-Aşağıdaki cümlelere ne ölçüde katılıyorsunuz?  
(*To what degree do you agree with the following statements*)

(1 = Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum, 6 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum).  
(*I = Definitely disagree, 6 = Definitely agree*)

Q. 19 Sığınmacılar Türkiye'nin ekonomisine zarar veriyor.  
(*Asylum seekers damage Turkey's economy.*)

Q. 20 Sığınmacılara çalışma izni verilmelidir.  
(*Work permit should be given to the asylum seekers.*)

Q. 21 Sığınmacılara oturma izni verilmelidir.  
(*Residence permit should be given to the asylum seekers.*)

Q. 22 Türkiye'deki Suriyeli çocuklar anadilleri olan Arapça ile eğitim alabilmedirler.  
(*Syrian children in Turkey should be able to receive education in their mother tongue, in Arabic*)

Q. 25 Suriyeliler ile kültürel olarak benzediğimizi düşünüyorum.  
(*I think we are culturally alike with Syrians.*)

-Suriyeli sığınmacılarla ilişkiniz hangi seviyede olabilir? Şu sayacağım yerlerde bulunabilirler mi?  
(*What can be the level that you can have relationship with Syrian asylum seekers? Can they be in the places that I will list?*)

Q. 28 Aynı şehirde (*In the same city*) ( ) Evet (*Yes*) ( ) Hayır (*No*)

Q. 29 Mahallem, işyerim veya okulumda (*In my neighbourhood, workplace or school*) ( ) Evet (*Yes*) ( ) Hayır (*No*)

Q. 30 Apartmanımda, komşum olarak veya arkadaş grubumda ( ) Evet ( ) Hayır

(In my building, as my neighbour or as a part of my friend circle) (Yes) (No)

Q. 31 Evimde veya ailemde (In my home or my family) ( ) Evet (Yes) ( ) Hayır (No)

-Suriyeli sığınmacılarla ilgili aşağıdaki cümlelere ne ölçüde katılıyorsunuz?  
(To what degree do you agree with the following statements about Syrian asylum-seekers?)

(1= Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum, 6= Kesinlikle katılıyorum).  
(1 = Definitely disagree, 6 = Definitely agree)

Q. 32 Suriyeli sığınmacılar yüzünden iş imkanları azaldı.  
(Employment opportunities decreased because of Syrian asylum-seekers.)

Q. 33 Suriyeli sığınmacılar yüzünden kentler artık daha güvensiz oldu.  
(The cities became less secure because of Syrian asylum-seekers)

Q. 49 Haberleri seyretmek için en fazla hangi TV kanalını tercih ediyorsunuz?  
(Which TV channel would you prefer to watch news?).....

Q. 52 Hepimiz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyız, ama değişik etnik kökenlerden olabiliriz; Siz kendinizi, kimliğinizi ne olarak biliyorsunuz veya hissediyorsunuz?  
(We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but we may have different ethnic origins. Who do you feel like or know yourself, your identity?)

( ) Türk (Turkish) ( ) Kürt (Kurdish) ( ) Zaza (Zaza)  
( ) Arap (Arabic) ( ) Diğer (Yazınız):..... (Other, please write it down)

Q. 53 Kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz dininiz ve mezhebiniz nedir?  
(What is the religion or religious sect that you feel like you belong to?)

( ) Sünni (Hanefi veya Şafii) Müslüman (Sunni (Hanafi or Shafii) Muslim)  
( ) Alevi Müslüman (Alevi Muslim)  
( ) Diğer (Yazınız): .....(Other, (Please write))

Q.55 Son olarak, bu evde yaşayanların aylık toplam geliri ne kadardır? Herkesin her türlü kazancı dahil evinize ayda ortalama kaç para giriyor?  
(Finally, what is the total income of this household? Including everyone's all kinds of income, how much money do you earn in this household in a month?)  
- ..... Türk Lirası (Turkish Lira)

APPENDIX B

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN RIGHTS INDEX




Figure B1. Frequency distribution of support for work permit for Syrians




Figure B2. Frequency distribution of support for residence permit for Syrians




Figure B3. Frequency distribution of support for Syrian children's education in their mother tongue

APPENDIX C

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THREAT INDEX




Figure C1. Frequency distribution of support for cultural similarity




Figure C2. Frequency distribution of support for item that Syrians damage Turkey's economy






Figure C3. Frequency distribution of support for item about loss of employment because of Syrians




Figure C4. Frequency distribution of support for item that security concerns because of Syrians

## APPENDIX D

### FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS IN CONTACT AND SOCIAL PROXIMITY INDICES

Table D1. Frequency Distribution of Items in the Contact Index

Do you encounter Syrian asylum seekers in your daily life? In which conduits/places			
	Yes	No	
Neighbourhood/Street	1,325	1,318	2,643
Shopping District	1,707	936	2,643
Workplace	287	2356	2,643
School	95	2,548	2,643
Mosque	320	2,323	2,643
Public Transportation	816	1,827	2,643

Table D2. Frequency Distribution of Items in the Social Proximity Index

What can be the level that you can have relationship with Syrian asylum seekers? Can they be in the places that I will list?			
	Yes	No	Total
Same City	1,892	721	2,613
Same Neighbourhood	1,489	1,117	2,606
Neighbour, friend	1,058	1,538	2,596
Home, Family	2,232	353	2,585

## APPENDIX E

### GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSES




Figure E1. The results of dummy regression analyses for gender and being Sunni Muslim

Note: 95% Confidence interval (two-tailed)




Figure E2. The results of regression analysis for political party preference

Note: 95% Confidence interval (two-tailed)




Figure E3. The results of regression analyses for unemployment and all employment status categories

Note: 95% Confidence interval (two-tailed)

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