CIRCULAR ENTRAPMENT:

TRACING THE (IN)FORMATIONAL CONTOURS OF F-TYPE HIGH

SECURITY PRISONS

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Sociology

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Mesut Açıkalın

Boğaziçi University

2019

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of F-Type High Security Prisons

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
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Mesut Açıkalın, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;

- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;

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ABSTRACT

Circular Entrapment:

Tracing the (In)Formational Contours of F-type High Security Prisons

This thesis is a multilayered inquiry on the phenomenon of isolation; isolation understood as a distinct situation and sense of (un)reality that stems from an obsessive dictum of its ontological impossibility as the sole condition of possibility. The F-type High Security Prison, together with the history of penal transformation that led to its formation, is the second central domain of concern. Taking the experience of community as the sole possible (un)ground(ing) of experience, and as an always already resistance to isolation, the thesis first aims to rethink the recent (hi)stories of penal transformation of Turkey in tandem with both antagonistic and cooperative forces that (are) in-formed (through) it. Situating the F-type Prison on the maxim of abstraction that both includes and exceeds disciplinary concerns over the body, it then tries to reimagine the general terrain of the prison as a scenery instituted by a fictional medium which strategically dictates an insistent denial of its own ontological impossibility. Lastly, the thesis attempts to account for the circular entrapment of experience and community that seemingly occurs when faced with this fictional medium enforced as the dictum and condition of existence. Its data composed by participant observations, conversations with prisoners and ex-prisoners, self-reflections, and other ethnographical data, the thesis tries to conceive and explore the field as a community exposed.

ÖZET

Döngüsel Kapan:

F-Tipi Yüksek Güvenlikli Cezaevleri'nin (En)Formasyonal Hatlarının İzini Sürmek

Bu tez, tecrit mefhumu üzerine çok katmanlı bir sorgulama niteliği taşımaktadır; tecriti ise, tecritin ontolojik olanaksızlığının, tek olanaklılık koşulu olarak dayatılması karşısında beliren gerçek(dışı) bir vaziyet olarak ele almaktadır. F-Tipi Yüksek Güvenlikli Cezaevi, oluşumuna önayak olan ceza infaz sistemindeki değişimlerle birlikte, tezin bir diğer odak noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Tez, ilk olarak, yakın dönem Türkiye ceza infaz sistemi tarihini, çeşitli ölçeklerde, tecrit ve beraber olma (cemiyet, *community*) deneyimi üzerinden tartışırken, yakın dönem hapishane ve cezalandırma tarihinin kısa bir izleğini sunacaktır. Daha sonra F-tipi cezaevlerini, beden üzerine kurulu disipliner kaygıları hem kapsayan hem de aşan bir soyutlaştırma düsturuyla beraber kısaca haritalandıracak; ve genel olarak hapishane topografyası ve kurumsallığını, tecritin ontolojik imkansızlığının stratejik inkarı üzerine kurulu bir saymaca olarak tekrar tasavvur etmeye çalışacaktır. Son olarak, bu inkarın hayatın temel ve tek gerçeklik düsturu olarak buyurulduğu bir durumda, varlık ve beraber olma deneyiminin kendini içinde bulduğu döngüsel kapanın izini sürecektir. Verileri katılımcı gözlemcilik, (bazen hikayeleştirilmiş) özdeneyim, mevcut ve eski mahpuslarla sohbetler ve mülakatlar, ve diğer etnografik bulgulardan oluşan bu tez, hapishane ve tecrit üzerine alternatif inceleme hatları açmaya dair bir çabadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Fercan Kaya…

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Full form
CPT	European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CTE	General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses (*Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü*)
TKP	Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*)
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The F-type High Security Prison has been one of the most debated penal settings in

the history of Turkey, especially in early 2000s. The heat of the debates was in a

great extent due the decades-long baggage of tortures, resistance-formations, military

operations, and hunger strikes, yet the content of arguments were hovering around

one general theme: *tecrit*. Adopted from the Arabic word *tacrīd*—or ديرجت, a

derivation from the second infinitive of the Arabic verse *taf'īl*—*tecrit* denotes not

only isolation and separation ("Tecrit", 1997), but also means to strip, being stripped,

abstraction ("Tecrit", n.d.), vacating, voiding, disentitlement, denudation, divestiture,

privation, deprivation ("ديرجت", n.d.), and the like. So from the beginning, the F-type

prisons were being questioned through a great extent of inquiries, from abstraction

from an assumed human essence to sensory deprivation.

In this thesis, I will attempt to trace *tecrit*, to which I will simply refer as

isolation heretofore, through the in-formational contours of F-type prisons. The

thesis was meant to begin with a mapping of the history of penal transformations that

led to the F-types; but it could not substantiate itself there somehow, resulting in

countless unfinished—or finished, but later found to be irrelevant—chapters on the

so-called history. It was only when I began to delve seriously into the performance of

torture that I gradually became able to think through my data, the present setting of

F-types, and the history of penal transformations in a relatively coherent manner.

This was most probably because of the possibility that was opened for me by Scarry

(1985), which made me re-think of torture as a fictitious scenery.

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I was detained and imprisoned multiple times, but I have to admit that I could never sense the isolation as a distinct reality. As a phenomenon, it may be said that there becomes a particular experience when one is isolated—sensibly, there becomes a distinct feeling of (un)reality when the isolation is enforced as the sole reality (or even sometimes as the sole condition of possibility); however, it always seems so unreal, so precarious, so breakable—and indeed breaks up on so many places—that even its experience is isolated from itself. One simply cannot *be* in isolation.

Even in the most isolated settings of confinement, there is this other being—of the concrete, of the bugs, of the iron—that cannot be isolated from the confined. Like, for instance, the news item that I bookmarked several years ago ("IŞİD'in çöldeki," 2015) which relays the cells where Yezidi women had been confined by the militants of the so-called Islamic State, which were some very narrow cells buried underground. When these were discovered, the news media was reporting that some scratches and drawings had been carved onto their doors by their former prisoners—trees, houses, what have you. No matter how isolated, however denied a life, as long as a being putrefies, it goes on to exist, and it does so with others. In this vein, for instance, Bukharin's (2003) thousands-page long manuscripts written while confined in a solitary cell all 'alone' for about a year, or like Joseph Pilates's physical exercises that was inspired by the movements of animals during his confinement in an internment camp (Vannin, 2016), and many similar instances have inspired and convinced me that, not (necessarily) through a work but, through every crack on an isolative artifact, community communicates.

I mention these here, of course, not to romanticize a relation, but simply to point out an ontological impossibility. On the one hand, the isolative institutions are total, and they are meant to be total (Goffman, 1990): they are founded on the

premise of absolute exteriority (and absolute interiority). The walls of the prison are meant to be eternal, or at least in denial of their finitude, in them being the material dictum of absolute demarcation; yet this is only a fiction, and it is bound to be a fiction—its fictitiousness is perhaps best known by the custodian: the walls corrode, the machines break down, and the whole setting always needs to be maintained.

That being the case, (at least) the modern prison is built upon the premise of identity—which depends on nothing but the ontological premise of the eternal—in more than many respects, of which the spatial identity is only a part; one of these is, for instance, the legal person that is convicted imprisonment (a person that is devoid of the element of putrefaction, able to be sentenced to multiple life sentences and/or hundreds of years of imprisonment), or another is the legal responsibility (which fixtures an identical framing to an act and a subject). Built on such a premise that is ontologically impossible, I thought perhaps the unreal sensation of isolation was emanating from this, and the more I looked into the issue in this manner, the more I became convinced. So in this thesis, I will attempt to trace the in-formational contours of isolation through the fictitiousness of isolation, and instead of taking isolation as a reality as such, I will take it as a denial of community and finitude. Following Bataille (1988a) and Nancy (1990b), I will frame finitude as a happening that only co-appears on the shared finitude of beings—lively or not—and the experience of being possible only as an experience of community. Absolute isolation, in this sense, can only be a metaphysical dictum that is enforced.

In the following chapter, I will begin my inquiry by tracing the fiction of isolation in torture. Despite the fact that my starting point will be Scarry (1985), I will then contest her theory with the above maxims of community and experience, and try to formulate more or less the general theoretical premises of the thesis.

Following the first part of this chapter, with the hope that I may situate the resistance around the maxims of community and finitude, I will begin to trace the in-formational contours of the F-types. This will be both through the history of antagonistic struggles as well as resistance (not in the manner of organized struggle, but in the manner of a possibility of *un-grounding*[1] that happens on the limits of identities), since both of these seem to have played notable formative functions in the history of F-types.

By tracing the in-formational contours of F-type prisons, my aim is twofold: First, I aim to look at the history of penal transformation of Turkey (as well as the resistance to it) in a manner that is not confined within identical wholes, with an eye towards questioning the possible extents of (prison) resistance that would otherwise be missed. Secondly, I aim to trace the experience of isolation within the F-types, which I believe is a specific formation of isolation that is—more intensive yet—not qualitatively different from the general experience of abstraction. In so doing, I will understand the prison as a 'yet another' space of isolation, and the F-type prison as a yet another prison, without overlooking the particular history with(in) which it is molded.

In the third chapter, for the most part, I will pursue a relatively detailed mapping of the general setting of F-types in relation to the classical study of Foucault (1995) on the disciplines. For a considerable section of the chapter, I will build upon

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[1] I use (un)grounding in this thesis to not to refer to relation between grounding and ungrounding (as in *Grund* and *Abgrund* in (Heidegger, 1996; James, 2006, p. 103)), but instead synonymous with groundlessness. The reason I adopt the term (un)grounding (or un-grounding) in some instances instead of groundlessness is mainly to highlight the corrosive effect of this groundlessness to any given ground; yet unlike an ungrounding that descends from grounding, this corrosive groundlessness of (un)grounding does not happen in contradistinction to grounding, but on the limits of it; as "passage or movement-to which would exceed any logic of grounding" (James, 2006, p. 103). "Groundlessness isn't a lack on the part of being that needs to be undergone, justified, originated. Rather, it is being's reference to nothing, either to substance or to subject, not even to 'being,' unless it be to a being-to, to itself, to the world as the openness, the throw or the being-thrown of *existence* [emphasis in original]" (Nancy, 2003, p. 9).

Foucault's understanding of the disciplines in mapping the terrain, and I will attempt to illustrate how the F-types, together with the general penal transformation that happened in concord with them, have disciplinary characteristics. Although I will raise on Foucault's (1995) shoulders in tracing the disciplinary relation with the body, I will for the most part think it in the context of abstraction (and the unitary-identical epistemology that in-forms it) which may equally belong to the constitutional/juridical power of an ideal (non-)existence of society and the disciplinary frame-working of human sciences, insofar as both are assumed to exist as, or through, identical framings of self-enclosed totalities. In this manner, seemingly contrarian penological aims of reformation and retribution, resocialization and exclusion, rehabilitation and management, *subjectivation*[2] and deprivation, etc. will not be regarded as antithetical relations to the body either, for they all hint the same impossibility of experience in their isolative relation with the body and finitude.

Towards the end of the third chapter, I will try to rethink the fictitious character of penal abstraction through Bentham's (1843a, 1843b, 1843c, 1876; Ogden, 1932) theory of fictions in the making of reality out of an ontological impossibility. This will, finally, carry me to the fourth chapter, where I will be tracing what I call the 'circular entrapment'—an experience of non-existence that is (forced to be) against and exterior to alterity, an unreal and circular experience that dictates a fictive tautology of ontological impossibility by an obsessive *feignment*[3] of its reality. I think this chapter is particularly valuable since it presents the liveliest

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[2] Subjectivation means "the process by which one becomes a subject" (Butler, 2011, p. 210). Despite I do not recognize the ontological possibility of any claim to identity (whether in the form of a process or a stasis), I will sporadically employ this term throughout the thesis, especially when/if an author I refer utilizes the concept.
[3] Feignment is the noun form of the verb "to feign" (Bauer, Lieber, & Plag, 2015, p. 198); to feign means to pretend and/or assert as if something is true.

data from the field and attempts to communicate with it through the most of the theoretical premises laid out in the thesis.

To my knowledge, there has not been a reading of prison history and experience that attempts to communicate with the afore-mentioned lines of thought in tandem, so I hope this thesis will be able to reveal some alternative possibilities for re-thinking a set of vital questions in the field.

1.2. Methodology

To trace the experience of isolation in its making has been the most complicated, yet inescapable task for me, since I believe I had made a serious mistake when I decided to write a master's thesis on my experience of confinement in an F-type prison. This idea first occurred to me as a disposable idea to apply to the masters program of the Sociology Department at Boğaziçi University. Prior to my application, I had already been imprisoned for several months before, so applying to the program with a research proposal on a topic that I experienced seemed to be a good idea. I never thought to pursue it though—I neither had a motivation nor enough experience to trace the topic; I was merely planning and hoping to find a better theme for the thesis while taking the master program courses.

Yet even before I finished my first semester, I found out that I was sentenced to two years of imprisonment due to a former trial where I was being adjudged for shouting a slogan. Frankly I was not expecting any sentence from that case; I had even forgotten the existence of it. However, after learning that I had been sentenced, suddenly it occurred to me that conducting a participant observation—albeit with too much participation—would be a great idea, so I decided to rethink my confinement (which would be around a year from then on) as a fieldwork. In this way, I thought I

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could also 'win' that year of my confinement 'back', by getting away with the work of data collection for the thesis. As an idea, it was interesting as well, and moreover, my previous confinement had been a psychological burden for me, and in this way I thought I could perhaps sublimate the experience into a productive work.

However, the further I tried to dig into the experience of isolation, the further entrapped I became. One of the most paradoxical of entrapments was that, the experience of isolation was also the experience of writing a thesis as an obligation in order to graduate from a program. Unfortunately, I was to make sense of this only after several years of studying the topic thoroughly—with regard to political history, history of punishment, criminology, sociology, etc. At first, I was reading the texts mostly with formalistic and analytical lenses, and I was becoming more and more puzzled by the 'silence' of my data in speaking with the works that I had been obstinately reading. When I at last found out that my general problem with isolation was not its modality per se, but its intensified enclosure without a possibility of withdrawal or return, I thought at last I had found an 'escape'. And it was here that I discovered this would render the writing of a thesis on this topic quite difficult—not only because the problem of escape was by itself the integral part of enclosure on which the concept of thesis finds its ground, but also because (as long as) I could not abandon the writing of the experience of isolation and went on to see it as an 'inescapable' task for me, the effort itself was to consist of an exponential experience of isolation through the entrapment of thought to a necessity of escape from itself.

At this moment I guess that I had to capitulate and find a new topic—I do not know 'why' I did not, but I guess the difficulty of leaving was due to a curious mixture of debt, sunk cost fallacy, and a hypnotic cadence of emptiness. While the 'theses' I wrote could not conclude themselves as proprieties and killed themselves

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in the pursuit of finding a possible route to escape, I think I had to capitulate; the whole experience, even from the beginning, was too much for a master's thesis. Yet I did not (could not) do this, as of now, when my literal deadline is slightly passed, and I am still writing the last words to it.

Hence this thesis is on a circular entrapment of isolation that is spoken through the circular entrapment of isolation, and this may be taken as one of the domains of data with which it communicates its silence. As to the data I referred, there are basically two sets of it. One is which I referred as (Fieldnotes, 2014), or when it is a personal correspondence, as (Personal communication, 2014). These consist of a broad spectrum of data from observational notes to self-reflections and transcribed interlocutions, which were all taken when I was confined. Since I already had the definite purpose of conducting this study prior to my confinement, I informed all of the interlocutors on the study. That being said, all of their names have been censored and all personal details are obfuscated (despite most of them explicitly said that they had no reservations about being mentioned by full names). In addition to these obfuscations, I sometimes mixed up the abbreviations of names with each other for further obfuscation, including mine, insofar as such a usage does not create any problems as to their facilitation. Lastly, the real date of these notes is not exactly 2014, it is the year I made a clean copy of them from various jottings and deciphered the texts. I also dated these notes to 2014 for further obfuscation. The second set of data, which is dated back to 2016, consists of several interviews that I conducted with some ex-prisoners outside the prison, especially after I sensed that my circular entrapment became a total enclosure, and I felt a need to speak with the others. Like my previous interlocutors, most of them said they had no problems with being mentioned with their full names, but I obstructed their identity in similar manner

with others. In all respects, this is a work of community with all my interlocutors—as well as friends, teachers, family, and all the people that I know, but mostly my interlocutors—and I hope that the thesis may expose this to the utmost extent possible.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND (UN)GROUNDING

2.1. A (re)assessment of isolation through torture

As İbikoğlu (2012) says, in Turkey, from its establishment until late 1970s, "prisons

mostly stayed off of the state's radar as neglected backwaters of officialdom" (p. 21).

This started to change especially after the 1980 coup[4], when the state of Turkey

started to pay a discrete attention to management of its prisons and 'rehabilitation' of

its (political[5]) prisoners.[6] On the one hand, this was signaling an introduction of

disciplinary practices to the prisons of Turkey for the first time[7] (İbikoğlu, 2012, p.

72); and in line with this, a series of military tools to 'educate' and 'reform' the

prisoners started to be commissioned and enforced: giving soldier salutes during the

counts, enrolling to religious and nationalist educational sessions, participating to

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[4] 1980 coup d'état of Turkey is a top-down putsch conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*; TSK) at September 12, 1980. With the putsch, all legal political parties were banned, and all syndicates and associations (except some state associations) were to shut (Mavioğlu, 2006a, p. 239), resulting in an almost decade-long political ban of almost all civil political figures. The coup's announced aim and operational focus was to contain civil conflicts between ultra-nationalist and radical leftist movements; yet as Aydınoğlu (2008, pp. 463-464) says, the coup's programmatic aim was mainly to eradicate socialist left and then-popularized syndicalist movements.
[5] As Eren (2014) says, the transformations of the prisons that had begun by the 1970s and 1980s were chiefly aiming to 'correct' 'political prisoners' rather than the general prison population or 'common prisoners' (pp. 217-218).
[6] In this thesis, I use the term "political prisoner" to refer to the prisoners who are confined because of an accusation of an outlawed political agenda. Despite I acknowledge that there are serious complications in distinguishing "political prisoners" and "common prisoners" because of the political nature of all 'crimes,' I simply need to use this distinction in this thesis to narrate historical and current transformations of imprisonment in Turkey more clearly, if nothing for it has been the very confinement of the political prisoner (in the narrower sense) that has been the main focus of concern in the transformations of penal system of Turkey at least until the year 2000 (as I will trace in the following parts of the thesis). Yet it would be fruitful to note that, the very problem inherent in this distinction soon exposed itself following a 'successful' confinement of the political prisoners, and the change of penal system that was initiated with the concern of confining political prisoners (with the inauguration of F-types) soon became a reformation of the whole system of confinement of Turkey.
[7] As I will mention in the Part 2.2.1, this is not wholly accurate, and it has instead been the 1971 memorandum governments that first attempted to introduce disciplinary techniques of the military (including to impose the soldier-status to the prisoners) to the prisons. That being said, despite setting a precedence for the management of the prisons of late 1970s and early 1980s, immediate practical effects of the attempts of 1971 memorandum governments were short lived; therefore, taking late 1970s and early 1980s as a starting point of the reformations would also be accurate.

collective military performances like sprinting by shouting nationalist slogans or singing anthems, complying with strictly planned military schedules of daily life, wearing uniforms, and the like: "tools of education and discipline", "imported" "from the barracks to the wards" indeed; to "instill a new subjectivity within" the prisoners; to make "soldier-prisoners" out of their bodies (pp. 60, 72). On the other hand, frequently and systematically, there began to be employed a broad array of torture practices to those non-conforming: strappado, chain-hanging upside down, pressure washing, sodomizing with truncheons or bottles, constraining in cesspools, crucifixion, bastinado, several forms of electrification, mock executions, oxygen deprivation, starving, mutilation, various forms of sexual assaults including rape and forcing each to rape, force-feeding feces, force-feeding living rats, and the like were continually administered against recalcitrant actions (Bargu, 2014, p. 172; Can, 2015, p. 51; Güven, 1998; Kısacık, 2011, p. 47). These were also unseen until the day (at least in their systematized forms) inside the 'neglected' prisons of the previous era; so the prisons of 1980s were being singled out not only by an introduction of disciplinary techniques, but together with this, by a systematization of torture practices inside the prisons (Baykam, 1998, p. 311). As such, these were being 'imported' from elsewhere than the military barracks:[8] from the torture chambers of detention centers. As Can (2015, p. 51) mentions, no later than early 1950s, these techniques were already being developed and deployed in a professionalized manner in the centers of detention, and these already were, as Öztürk (2010) notes, becoming harsher and more systematically employed after early 1970s (pp. 376-377)—all to find their utmost prevalence in early 1980s, both in the prisons and detention centers of Turkey.

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[8] Although they were soon to be entwined with them especially by the 1970s. See Parlar (1997).

In this thesis, I want to begin my inquiry with a (mostly theoretical) meditation on torture, because I think delving into it would greatly benefit my present focus in tracing the in-formational contours of isolative imprisonment in a number of ways. First of all, torture is not only by itself a form of isolation, but also one of the most blatant forms of it; so an exploration into it would at least present me with a number of theoretical framings where the in-formational contours of isolation may be laid more barely, rendering me able to develop no less than some of the basic theoretical premises that I will follow throughout the thesis. Secondly, I think an inquiry into torture would also be a propelling meditation in tracing the history of F-types insofar as torture has played significant roles in (re)shaping the bodies (or figures of bodies as exemplars) that in-formed both formations of prison resistance and of the political subjectivities that have in-formed that resistance. In this sense, if I follow Foucault (1996) and acknowledge that one of the main foci in tracing genealogical descent of things, in pursuing an "effective" history, would be to trace lively (con)figurations of the body as a "pretext" of "insurmountable conflict" (Foucault, 1996, p. 146); then, also the very body of the tortured prisoner, including his/her experience of isolation and pain, becomes a vital ground to trace the emergence of F-types.

Here, regarding torture as a focus of inquiry to trace a bodily experience and transformation briefly needs to be accounted for, especially given that Foucault (1995) famously considered torture and other forms of corporal punishment to be in distinct contrast with disciplinary techniques of punishment in regards to their concern over the body. In that reading, the corporal forms of punishment considered the body of the punished as an object to make an example of, and aimed to reinstitute the sovereign authority of the crown through the display of violence inflicted on the

body; while, on the other hand, disciplinary forms of punishment (whose principal

domain of arrangement was the modern prison itself) concerned the body as a surface

of training and production. Yet one should also note that the main domain where

these two types of approaches to the body differ was not the instruments they utilize

per se, but how they use it and to what purpose—the penal maxim of the crown was

different from the penal maxim of the disciplines because of their distinct approach

to truth and knowledge above all. The tortures conducted by the ancient sovereign

was especially exemplary to this difference: these tortures were inquisitional by

themselves, a means to find the truth regarding the crime. Torture was simply a tool

to extract information from the tortured; for instance, it was thought that if the

tortured died during the infliction without admitting to the crime, this was regarded

as a manifestation of the Divine judgment in declaring that the tortured was innocent

(by taking the body by its own side to relieve her/him[9] from pain). In short, it was the

outcome torture that would be the decisive moment on the process of inquiry, and the

inquisitors were bound with a higher right belonging to a transcendental-divine

regime of truth (Foucault, 1995, pp. 3-69).

On the scenery of torture that I will speak of in this chapter, interrogators are

not some truth-extractors, but instead they are by themselves manifestations of a self-

enclosed, tautological, and immanent truth. Following Scarry (1985), I will articulate

the scenery as a fiction that constitutes an absolute pretense; a pretense of absolute

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[9] In this thesis I will use the third person pronouns as they are used by the author, to not to interrupt their narrative rhythm. In addition to these, inasmuch as the context of my narration is particularly F-type prisons, I will use male pronouns for (despite there are women prisoners confined to other high-security prisons) the prisoners of F-type are males. Other than these, I will use him/her. I pondered on possible solutions to balance this excessive usage of male pronouns throughout the thesis such as replacing all third person pronouns with "she/her" as long as it does not particularly refer to a "he/him," but this was suggested to be changed because a sole usage of female pronouns also have their definite use cases in language. I also tried to replace all binary pronouns with third person plural pronoun "they/them" but it looked both informal and confusing. So I would like to apologize in advance from the reader both for my usage of the binary him/her and the excessive usage of the male pronouns throughout the thesis.

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power that becomes 'convincing' not through an interpellation to consciousness, but through its effects on the body. In that regard, torture is also a display of power, but instead of mutilating bodies and making an example of them to others, it aims to fictitiously assimilate them to it-self. For Scarry (1985), this becomes possible through a simultaneous infliction of an ever-intensified pain and a denial of its world-enclosing features, resulting in an objectification of pain's totalizing (un)workings that able a feignment of absoluteness to the power that inflicts it.

I think this reading of torture that becomes compelling through the forces of the body and experience has its merits on the discovery of the foundational element of a fictitious absolute in its (un)making. However, Scarry's (1985) reading is also founded upon a binary understanding of ontology between the imaginary and the real, objective and subjective, world and feeling, body and voice, and so on. Therefore, following Scarry's (1985) reading of torture without a reservation somewhat hinders a more thorough inquiry into the fictitious making of self-enclosed absolutes. One of these hindrances is a possibility of a bare multiplication, or a doubling of the fictive pretense of the absolute on and by the scenery of torture, that is to say, a possibility of counter-objectification of the scenery by the tortured her/himself through mythicizing the resistance. I will try to overcome this by Feldman's (1991) reading of the scenery as an exchange of violence between antagonistic inscriptions of the forces of the body, between 'case-hardened' tortured prisoners and the torturers. Yet another hindrance that comes with the binary schemes of understanding the scenery, which is I think more crucial both as to the experience of torture and the general framework of this thesis, is an obstruction or an impossibility to ponder on the very alterity and resistance itself that goes to (un)work the scenery of totalization. As to this inquiry, I think not only Scarry's (1985)

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essentialist reading of pain (and in an extent subject), but also Feldman's (1991) mechanical reading of counter-objectification fall short, and to overcome this I will finally introduce Bataille's (1988a) and Nancy's (1990b) readings of community. With their introduction, I will also try to rethink Scarry's (1985) narration of the scenery of torture in the making of a pretense of absolute order through the terms of community, which is an experience of resistance itself.

In doing these, one of my aims is to trace the experience of isolation (which is a non-experience, for the experience is only the experience of community, and isolation—whether in an apparent form of subjectivation or de-subjectivation which do not differ form each other in being essentialized inscriptions to experience—may only assume a dictum to form or in-form this experience) in regards to its relationship to resistance and community. I also hope that, after this inquiry, I will have sufficiently traced the phenomenon of resistance in its possibility of corroding the isolative dictum of the absolute. This is because I think that, as much as the absolutes have a force of in-forming exclusive totalities of antagonism, community (resistance) is an always already force to de-form (un-ground) these totalities and expose them to their limits. These two points will be the main theoretical framings that I will try to utilize in the second half of this chapter, where I trace the historical transformation of imprisonment and prison resistance in Turkey.

2.1.1. An absolute pretense, a pretense of absolute

One of the most (sometimes critically) acclaimed studies that traces the relations between body, experience, and torture has been Scarry's (1985) book *The Body in Pain*, and as I already mentioned, I will initiate my inquiry with her work as well. For Scarry (1985), "intense pain is world-destroying"; in it "the created world of

thought and feeling, all the … content that constitutes both one's self and one's

world" "cease … to exist" (pp. 29-30):

> Pain begins by being "not oneself" and ends by having eliminated all that is
> "not itself." At first occurring only as an appalling but limited internal fact, it
> eventually occupies the entire body and spills out into the realm beyond the
> body, takes over all that is inside and outside, makes the two obscenely
> indistinguishable, and systematically destroys anything like language or
> world extension that is alien to itself and threatening to its claims. … [I]t …
> exhausts and displaces all else until it seems to become the single broad and
> omnipresent fact of existence. (Scarry, 1985, pp. 54-55)

Then "[t]o acknowledge the radical subjectivity of pain is to acknowledge the simple

and absolute incompatibility of pain and the world. The survival of each depends on

its separation from the other" (Scarry, 1985, pp. 50-51). That is to say that, if one

tries to 'bring' the pain into "the world"—by articulating it, by isolating it, by

abstracting it of its felt content to make it sensible by utterance—one would discover

that "the pain itself is diminished and destroyed"; or when one tries to isolate the

pain by objectifying it through a denial of it, by making it to refer to something

'else', one finds that "in the process [of this denial], the world, or some dramatized

surrogate of the world, is destroyed" (Scarry, 1985, p. 51). Torture, which is a

specific procedure of inflicting pain in ever-intensifying ways, follows the latter

path: it is a unique operation by which the substantial attributes of pain— "its in-

contestable reality, its totality, its ability to eclipse all else, its power of dramatic

alteration and world dissolution"—are all fictitiously denied through "an obsessive

… display" and "mediation of agency", and forced to be read as if they are some

attributes of total power (pp. 27-28, 35, 56).

"On the simplest level, the agent displayed" to objectify pain and to create the

fiction of absolute power "is the weapon" (Scarry, 1985, p. 27). This refers to the

immediate weapons of the torturer like a directed gun or a hanger, yet it soon

becomes the torture room itself together with "all aspects of … [its] concrete

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structure", its "walls, ceiling, windows, doors", "furnishings", and ultimately the whole of the 'external world', i.e. every object that is physically in touch with the prisoner, which all in all converge "into an agent of pain" that "in the most literal way possible, made painful, made the direct cause of the pain." "[T]he world is … reduced to the crushingly blank and uniform wall, … [and i]t is itself the executioner's weapon; it is the world, the wall, that executes" (Scarry, 1985, pp. 40-41, 45).

This "external objectification of the psychic experience of the person in pain" at first renders a scenery whereon "[a]bsolutely everything but the prisoner himself stands present as a weapon" (Scarry, 1985, p. 45). Yet, the interrogation does not stop there, and goes to pursue its performance by deconstructing the prisoner's voice, splitting and claiming her/his body, objectivizing a weapon out of each. In so doing, ""[t]he goal of the torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically and crushingly *present* by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, *absent* by destroying it" (Scarry, 1985, p. 49, emphasis in original). To account for the former, it would be fruitful to initially mention that, for Scarry (1985), one of the main attributes of experiencing a physical pain is that, when an external object enters the body, like a blade or a broken glass, one feels not the object that enters the body, but instead "one's own body hurting one", and in this "not only the feeling 'my body hurts' but the feeling 'my body hurts me'" (Scarry, 1985, pp. 47, 53). During torture, this attribute becomes to assist the objectification of pain first in a sense that, throughout all forced exercises—through hangings, suffocations, days-long standings, etc.—one experiences that it is not the weapon per se, but the body, altogether with its forces, senses, needs, and wants, become an enemy against one, a hurting-self directed against one ('my body hurts *me*'), as yet another ends of a weapon. With this, now

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that it seems it is not the agency of the torturer nor the material artifact that s/he uses, but instead the prisoner her/himself that is responsible for the infliction of pain. A similar pretense is employed in the procedures of interrogation in such a way that, "[i]n forcing … [the prisoner] to confess or, as often happens, to sign an unread confession, the torturers are producing a mime in which the one annihilated shifts to being the agent of his own annihilation" (Scarry, 1985, p. 47) (e.g. as he refuses to answer the questions).

Throughout the performance, secondly, torture objectifies and weaponizes the voice[10] as well. To begin with, in torture, a prisoner is mostly forced to a point that s/he finds her/his voice—that is to mean, not only her/his remarks, statements, articulations, utterances, but also all "the sounds anterior to language" like screams, sobs, cries—is "broken off and made the property of the torturers", with either deliberate initiations and abruptions of inflicting the pain (i.e. by miming a 'switch' that turns the voice on and off), or else by simple recordings of the voice (e.g. of weeps, cries, murmurs) to be utilized as yet another objectifications to be directed against the captives as weapons (Scarry, 1985, pp. 49-50). Above and beyond these, one can as well say that any inscription of the voice during interrogation would in fact be a making of an objectified weapon-artifact; because, principally, a question of the torturer, rather than being a demand for intelligence, is always a tool of verbal objectification: "[t]he torturer's questions—asked, shouted, insisted upon, pleaded for—objectify the fact that he has a world, [and] announce in their feigned urgency the critical importance of that world" (Scarry, 1985, p. 36). Herein the question of

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[10] I hereby want to emphasize that I do not recognize any categorical difference between body and voice, and assume the latter only as an extension of the former. Yet to not to disrupt the integrity of Scarry's (1985) narration, I will stick by this distinction that she prefers to utilize, in the same manner I did regarding her assumed distinctions of the world and experience, or in general interiority and exteriority.

the torturer (that is, "whatever its content, … an act of wounding") obsessively demands the answer of the prisoner (which is, "whatever its content, is a scream"), and by this demand, interrogation at once dramatizes the power of torturer (for whom "voice, world, and self are overwhelmingly present" but "the body and pain are absent") over the captive (for whom "the body and its pain are overwhelmingly present" but "voice, world, and self are absent"), and "luxuriates" the former "in the privilege or absurdity of having a world that the other has ceased to have" (Scarry, 1985, p. 46).

With all the objectifications mentioned afore, on the scenery of torture, now everything— "everything human and inhuman that is either physically or verbally, actually or allusively present, has become part of the glutted realm of weaponry" (Scarry, 1985, p. 56); and as such, as a pretense of the 'whole world', this "weaponry" assumes a quality that is able to "refer equally to pain or power":

> As an actual physical fact, a weapon is an object that goes into the body and produces pain. As a perceptual fact, it lifts the pain out of the body and makes it visible or, more precisely, it acts as a bridge or mechanism across which some of pain's attributes … can be lifted away from their source, can be separated from the sufferer and referred to power, broken off from the body and attached instead to the regime. Now, at least for the duration of this obscene and pathetic drama, it is not the pain but the regime that is incontestably real, not the pain but the regime that is total, not the pain but the regime that is able to eclipse all else, not the pain but the regime that is able to dissolve the world (Scarry, 1985, p. 56).

Thus ensues the chimera of an absolute, omnipresent power.

2.1.2. Antagonistic inscriptions: Can, or how can, a body be '(re)claimed' during the practice of torture?

The above scheme of Scarry in tracing torture is important as it gives us an extent through which a body may be (de)subject(ivat)ed[11] through an ever-enclosing fiction of the absolute. However, for it to be furthered more extensively regarding the forthcoming inquiries, one more question needs to be raised in accordance with above findings: can, or how can, a body-in-pain be claimed, or re-claimed, *on* the scenery of torture, by another 'agency', which is at least not the arsenal of weaponry claimed by the torture(r) as its 'own'?

Scarry does not argue over this exact topic through torture, apart from implying that such a claim would merely be another attempt to objectify pain; by exemplifying how a reduction of the captive's response to whether him/her giving of a statement or not (by other captives or the captives' circles) may objectify pain in a similar vein with the torture(r)'s interrogation (Scarry, 1985, pp. 29-30).

Yet, as her work develops, Scarry begins to introduce another fiction of an all-encompassing power that also establishes itself over a denial of pain, to claim the attributes of pain as its 'own': the fiction of war. For Scarry (1985), this is also a fictitious (un)making of the body through a pretense of total(izing) power to be seemed one of the 'subject'—the making of 'the soldier'. Yet here, Scarry (1985) thinks that there is an elementary distinction between fictitious creations of war and torture—a distinction so fundamental that "the very existence of each requires the other's elimination" (p. 145). Because despite both of the fictions consider an (un)making of the body to reflect a totalistic projection of the regime, the former—

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[11] As I already implied in the introduction, in this thesis I do not recognize any distinction between subject and object, subjection and subjectivation, subjectivation and desubjectivation, in the sense that all are enclosing dictums of isolation.

the pretense of war—considers a fiction that is 'not-yet-true' while the latter—torture—creates an illusion that is 'untrue'. These refer to two distinct modes of reality for Scarry (1985), since for her the former one is in-formed by an ontogenesis that is at once material and self-substantiating (that is 'made-real', that has a 'vivacity', that can be confirmed by senses as an external stimulus), while the latter instead refers to that which is imaginary, 'made-up', experienced within and only within a particular body of the perceiver. To put it more clearly, for Scarry (1985), war's fiction is always 'made-up', but realized in a sense that for 'soldiers', "both the body and the belief (or, both the pain and the image) belong to the same person" and it is this body, still "own"ed by the same person, which confirms a 'not-yet-true' fiction of war; while in torture's fiction, "the belief belongs to a person other than the person whose body is used to confirm it", and in this process whereon the captive's "[s]entience and self-extension are […] wholly severed and work against each other", "torture not only deconstructs the 'products' of the imagination, but deconstructs the act of imagining itself" (pp. 145, 148-149).

This last point (the impossibility of imagination in torture) is especially important to reveal that if we insist following Scarry's terms strictly, it becomes more and more difficult to trace a counter-claim of the body at least during the process of torture, because as her work reveals, Scarry (1985, pp. 161-180) comes to formulate that an act of imagining on the pure realm of objects (since imagination is never able to operate without an object like a reflection of god, a mandala, a mantra, a tree, or else), counterposes it with the ultimately 'real' sensation of intense physical pain (which is completely devoid of a referential content, obstinately resists objectification, and always needs an 'as-if' content for expression), and goes on to argue that, it is essentially through a basic "relation" of pain and imagination that,

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not only can pain be raised into an intentional state, but also be "transformed from a wholly passive and helpless occurrence into a self-modifying and, when most successful, self-eliminating one" (Scarry, 1985, p. 164). Then all in all, for Scarry, pain needs imagination in order to be transformed to an occurrence other than itself. In addition, a body in torture, devoid of the powers of imagination, "at least for the duration of this obscene and pathetic drama" (Scarry, 1985, p. 56), cannot be reclaimed by the prisoner him/her'self'.

Given this framework as is, one can ponder: what would happen if this ideally depicted soldier (whose body is a projection of a 'not-yet-real' fiction of an absolute truth, and whose imagination 'confirms' this truth as s/he 'consents' to be 'made-up' as a 'soldier' out of his/her 'own' body), maybe even before a fight, is caught in the hands of a torturer, to be tortured? Now that s/he is a prisoner ('soldier-prisoner'), his/her own body negating him/her'self', the world collapsing in on him/her'self'—but even now, can there be some sense of a 'self', still 'owned'?— and his/her language, being 'deconstructed' until his/her voice collapses to a pre-language, 'becomes' only cries, screams—but even now, as hard as it seems, can there still be a sense of a 'will' of his/her 'own', to not to scream?—and, taken back from the chambers, re-confined in a cell, handcuffed to some rusty pipes in a way that s/he cannot even sit, s/he has to wait for uncountable hours, listening to screams of others, blindfolded—but even now, would not that 'imagination' of his/her 'own', that is of a 'not-yet-true' fiction of soldier, 'reflect' in on him/her'self', and re-'make', re-inscribe, and re-objectify him/her as a 'soldier'?

Over and over, we see this re-claim of the body by the tortured (mostly political) prisoners, that their 'not-yet-true' reality (which they fight for) 'overcame' the 'unreal' fiction of the torture(r)s, and even that the 'truth' of their reality

'overruled' the torture(r)'s fiction in the chambers through their resistance. These do not seem to be corresponding only to 'giving confession or not' as Scarry (1985, pp. 29-30) implies, but also, in some notable circumstances like Ayaşlı (1990) conveys, literally not screaming, not 'giving' any pre-verbal sound 'away' to the torturer in the face of an ever-intensifying pain—and maybe this alone would be enough[12] to suspect that, even during the mise-en-scène of torture, there may be a possibility of a space wherein neither of the fictive totalities, be it of a 'made-up' fiction of the soldier(-prisoner) or a 'made-real' fiction of the torturer, are conclusively real as definite and finite projections that (un)make the body, and that this fiction is always already contested, despite in an extremely disproportionate way, through the forces of the body.

At first, this contest may be understood as a conflict between two adversarial mythical fictions for an objectification of body, and to an extent, it is. Feldman's (1991) ethnography attests to this, as he narrates how "[c]ase-hardened paramilitaries can bifurcate the violence of interrogation" (p. 143). To summarize a number of narrations that are cited by Feldman (1991, pp. 139-142),[13] the 'bifurcation' of these 'case-hardened' prisoners are pursued either by, first, refusing any compliance to the orders (like 'sit down', 'untie your shoes') with doing the opposite of the order (like laying down right away), counter-ordering (like 'if you want my shoes untied, you untie them'), or doing nothing at all.; second, by raising and sustaining an uncaring stance in the face of beatings and other tortures and even intentionally aggravating them; third, (in some rare cases where the tortured has a technical knowledge on the

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[12] Enough, in the sense that it carries us to a point where we are left with no other option to acknowledge a domain of experience which is outside a framing of the experience of pain, whose one of the basic substantial characteristics is, as foretold, being an all-encompassing experience for Scarry (1985).
[13] I also do this because these are very similar to a great number of stories of resistance that I have listened and read from various tortured prisoners.

process) simply by 'naming' the technical term of the performance, so shattering the torture(r)'s fiction of boundlessness with a definiteness of the term; or fourth, by denying any friendly attempts of torturers to communicate with them, perceiving all of these as adversarial attempts, thusly unveiling their claim of community. Along these lines of counter-conduct over their bodies, some captives may raise a sense of control on the scenery and thus bifurcate the violence and objectification in-formed by it.

Feldman (1991) reads these counter-conducts not only as yet another objectification, but as the very same form of objectification with that of the torture(r)'s. To begin with, for Feldman, in a similar vain with Scarry (1985), torture works by rendering a body 'crushingly present': "[t]he performance of torture … manufactures … the 'raw' ingredient of the captive's body. The surface of the body is the stage where the state is made to appear as an effective material force" (Feldman, 1991, p. 115). As a response, what a counter-acting captive does in the first place is to 'mime' this manufacturing of the 'raw' ingredient by his/her own: "[the captive] mimics his death and transforms himself into a cipher … In this process, the prisoner literally autonomizes the body and sends it out into the space of interrogation as a detachable part of his political agency" (Feldman, 1991, p. 138). This "turns interrogation into a shared political arena … [and] bifurcates the violence" (Feldman, 1991, p. 139). Bifurcates, in the sense that the tortured body is now an object of "reversible instrumentation" of two different agencies, and in this way the "[i]nterrogation transforms the body into a bivalent instrument codirected by the interrogators and the paramilitary" (Feldman, 1991, p. 143). Here "'case-hardened' paramilitary", which means a prisoner who can successfully decipher and restructure interrogation, "[t]hrough the self-detachment of the body, … moves from

being the object of violence to the subject position of codifying agent"; and here

what s/he does is basically an "exploit[ation]" of the objectifying transcription of the

body-in-pain "in order to commit a clandestine act of inversion against the

interrogation which both simulates state violence and empties it of its ideological

content" (Feldman, 1991, p. 144). This 'inversion' essentially does not differ in any

way from the objectifying mise-en-scène of the torture as to its in-formation: a 'case-

hardened paramilitary' only bifurcates the act, simulates it, empties it of its content,

and re-directs it to its source. What s/he does is basically "an identification with the

aggressor"[14] (Feldman, 1991, p. 120), and like the aggressor, as an objectified

weapon of agency, s/he reifies[15] his/her body and makes of 'it' a weaponized body-

artifact. This weapon, as objectifying as the torturer's, now becomes to subsume the

act, decipher and restructure the spatiotemporal arrangement of the fiction of

interrogation as its own domain of objectification, and makes out of it a rite of

passage, for its own fabrication.

    I think Feldman's (1991) narration of torture as a domain of 'exchange of

violence' between antagonistic (re)inscriptions of bodies opens up a possibility to

rethink torture chambers and tortured bodies as spaces of antagonistic conflict, so, in

a sense, as exceptional spaces where the totalizing pretense of torture can be

contested (albeit to generate yet another one). If nothing, this perspective widens the

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[14] In the part of his work where he argues on the bifurcation through torture, he implies this identification by posing a rhetorical question, originally all in italics: "[w]as this exchange [of violence, during the torture, between the 'case-hardened paramilitary' and the interrogator] what Adorno searching for in the mimesis of reification—the extraction of a modicum of resistance in the death-like parody of domination?" (Feldman, 1991, p. 144). Here Feldman refers to a theory of Adorno (1973) and Cahn's (1984) reading of it, both of which were framed by Feldman (1991) elsewhere in the book as follows: "[T]he human acquiesce to thinghood originates in the miming of death as a camouflage strategy or an identification with the aggressor" (p. 120). Here Feldman means to rearticulate the classical Marxist notion of reification that refers in general to the process of economical production, and use it in a broader context that concerns the reification of the body by other political means including inscription and interpellation.
[15] See the footnote above, Footnote 14.

political context of the scenery, making us abler to ponder on further multiplicities

and multiplications of the objectifications during the mise-en-scène of torture. This

facade of the phenomenon particularly needs to be reckoned with regarding our

forthcoming inquiry in the history of the transformation of prison models of Turkey,

because as I will try to show in Part 2.2., these transformations are in-formed mostly

through the conflicts between outlawed Marxist organizations and the state; and as I

will ponder on briefly in the beginning of Part 2.1., I think there is also a possibility

that the antagonistic inscriptions made on and made by the scenery of torture have

played crucial roles in the in-formation of outlawed Marxist militancy of Turkey.

These being said, however, I think a reading of torture solely as "a

radicalizing experience" (Feldman, 1991, p. 143) by which binary inscriptions of

bodies 'exchange violence' to compete for a reification of the body bears the risk to

expel—like its subject matter—the excessive workings of violence and pain in

carrying some possibilities of resisting the totality of objectifications by

themselves.[16] So to the extent that Feldman (1991) traces the bodies' co-relation

through a representation of the bodies' forces—their inscription, their exchange, their

mimesis,—he paradoxically becomes entrapped within a similar logic of

abstraction.[17] At least regarding an inquiry into the experience of isolation, this

would mostly render me unable to trace the process in its (un)workings, if nothing,

for the inscribed experience is already isolated and objectified in the first place.

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[16] I say this because these two occasions are particular occasions of excessive consumption of energy, and in thus being have overabundant force that would threaten any utility calculation that would attempt to fixture them as calculated conducts. See Bataille (1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1991) and Lyotard (1993) among others for meditations on the possibilities of improductive expenditure or libidinal intensities in threatening the totality of self-enclosed structures.

[17] That is to say, Feldman's study, as accurate as it get as an ethnography of political inscriptions, generally too soon assimilates "the immediacy of the particular" that "harbor[s] historical shifts of great magnitude" into "a process … which … transform[s] … an emissary, a cultural donor and bearer of seminal political messages"; and it too soon confines violence that by "itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as something to be made", to "a mode of transcription" (Feldman, 1991, pp. 5, 7-8).

Secondly, having inscription and mimesis as the main epistemological tools to trace the fictitious objectifications seem to be have their shortcomings in their own right, as can be seen in the odd symmetrical equivalence assumed between the 'case-hardened' tortured and the torturer as to their objectifications of the bodily experience on the scenery, which are, at least as felt-experiences, are obviously not the same occurrences. As such a reading also equates an assumed self-distance of the 'case-hardened' captive to his/her body with the distance of the torturer to the same body, this reading also carries within itself another danger of assuming an immanence to the faculty of the mind or another consciousness as an ontogenesis of experience—an understanding which is otherwise not shared by Feldman (1991) himself.

For the ground of this equation is for Feldman (1991, pp. 120, 144) the captive's reification of his/her body through a mimesis of death, I think the underpinning problematic of such a symmetrical equation may partly be traced to Serin's (2013, pp. 30-31, 37-38) critique of his performative understanding of power as to conceptualizing one's relation with finitude as a constant. In other words, Feldman's (1991) understanding of dying and being already dead is one and the same, resulting in an identification of two distinct relations with death: the relation with death through an affirmation of its impossibility (its anticipation) with the (non)relation with death by its actualization (being dead). However, following Heidegger (1997), Serin (2013) asserts that despite being on equitable planes, these relations substantially differ from each other, because an anticipation of the (im)possibility of death is an opening to alterity that makes the singularity of beings possible in the first place, while an actualized relation with death is only the opposite of this (it is a being already-dead, a confinement of a being to its stases). Indeed,

would Feldman (1991) differentiate these two, it would not be that easy to equate a 'case-hardened' captive's mimesis of death[18] to an objectified deadness of a physical weapon of torture.

Yet, to think the possibility of singularity and relation to finitude solely in terms of an anticipation of one's death as an "ownmost possibility" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 243) would pose another ultimate—of solitude—despite it being a movement of differentiation by itself,[19] limiting at least the relational extent of an inquiry into isolation. In this regard, I find Nancy's (1990b) rethinking of the (im)possibility of alterity and singularity through the (im)possibility of community as a incalculable happening of the ex-position singular beings to an always already shared finitude—a rethinking of the possibility of singularity not implicated in the finitude of its 'ownmost' being but instead "in its being-with—in *Mitsein*" (Nancy, 1990b, p. 14) seem to me to be more valuable; as it both reserves the *co-responsive*[20] nature of being and is an ontological perspective, which would in turn render me able to read isolation through a whole extent of relations with the temporal, material, social, and other aspects of being. This thought was also a community with others

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[18] Here it would also be interesting to note that, the 'case-hardened' narrators of Feldman (1991, pp. 139-142) who 'bifurcate the violence' of interrogation through their resistance, also refer a similar affirmation while framing their experience by their own words: Once caught, it is true, one needs to 'pose' a 'careless' stance in the face of tortures; however, for the resistant captives (unlike the torturers,) beatings and pain are inevitable parts of the process, and instead of denying this, one needs to accept and affirm its possibility, if only and to raise the careless stance in the first place.

[19] Heidegger's (1997) account on the anticipation of one's own death as the impossibility that opens one to the very possibility of particularity in the first place has been variously criticized (or critically acclaimed) by a number of thinkers who found this rather too isolated claim, and highlighted variously, in ethical or ontological terms, the importance of one's relation with its other and outer in (or as) the possibility of singularity and alterity (Blanchot, 1988, 1993, 2001, 2015; Derrida, 1993, 1996, 2001; Lévinas, 1978, 1979, 1989, 1998, 1999; Nancy, 1990b, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2008). (See also Bataille, 1985, 2006; Geroulanos, 2006). Of these thinkers, for now, I will mostly build up on Nancy (1990b) and his reading of Bataille (1988a).

[20] Co-respondence here (and hereafter) is used in a broader sense than correspondence, not limited to, and in a sense "disengage[d] ... from signification" (Nancy, 1994, p. 23). "Language isn't a superior kind of conduct. It is the element in which conduct confirms itself as conduct of sense. ... Language responds to being as the *transcendens*: what it doesn't do is respond to it by assigning the *transcendens*; rather, it responds by co-responding to the transcendence of the *transcendens* and responds thus to transcendence by taking responsibility for it" (Nancy, 2003, p. 187).

including (and perhaps above all) Bataille (1988a), so in the next part, I will briefly trace their thought.

2.1.3. An insistent dis-appearance

"To face the impossible—exorbitant, indubitable—when nothing is possible any longer" says Bataille (1988a), "is in my eyes to have an experience of the divine; it is analogous to a torment"— "beyond known possibilities, an anguish so great inhabits the gray of the sky, in the same way that a monk inhabits the darkness of a tomb" (pp. 33, 39). Like Scarry (1985), Bataille (1988a) affirms that great pain (in this case, an anguish in the face of non-knowledge) resists objectification, dissolves a sense of subject and object, contests selfhood, and evades the will. However, before and above an 'as-if' power of the torture(r) that objectifies pain, here Bataille finds another force and possibility:

> What is strange is that, in evading experience, one doesn't see the responsibility which one has assumed; none can overwhelm more: it is *inexpiable sin*, the possibility glimpsed for once of abandoning it for the grains of a life without distinction. The possibility is mute, it neither threatens nor condemns, but one who, fearing to die himself, lets it die, is like a cloud disappointing the anticipation of sunlight. (Bataille, 1988a, p. 37, original emphasis)

The one that lets it die, sinks into despair—then all the meanings, all forms of knowledge become empty, absorbed into despair:

> I say "despair"—one must understand me: here I am defeated, in the depths of cold, inhaling an odor of death, at the same time lethargic, committed to my destiny, loving it—like an animal its little ones—no longer desiring anything. … I sense only death coming: I have of it only an anguished desire, but a desire and no other desire. Despair is simple: it is the absence of hope, of all *enticement*. It is the state of deserted expanses and—I can imagine—of the sun. (Bataille, 1988a, p. 38, original emphasis)

Here through an affirmation of despair, Bataille (1988a) chases not an absolute form of knowledge but non-knowledge, an experience of freedom that has no object other

than itself, a (sometimes mute) possibility of community that is always already open to its outside (that also shares a limit with and as its out-side) … This is an experience that be-comes (as) an experience of freedom and community as it defies objectifying (and self-fulfilling) forces of vanity, of project-realization, of salvation… (defies—sometimes in a sense that not negates, but surpasses, that puts them into its own service.) So in all respects, what he is after is not only the resistance to an objectifying and totalizing power of the torture(r), but also that of an 'overcoming' myth of the 'case-hardened paramilitary', and not least all political 'projects' that assume a community (pre)defined in stasis. At its heart, this pure experience defies objectifying powers of language and discourse, and, as non-knowledge, it communicates ecstasy:

> [In ecstasy, t]here is no longer subject-object, but a "yawning gap" between the one and the other and, in the gap, the subject, the object are dissolved; there is passage, communication, but not from one to the other: *the one* and *the other* have lost their separate existence.
> …
> The subject preserves on the fringes of its ecstasy the role of a child in a drama: surpassed, its presence persists, incapable of more than vaguely and distractedly sensing—presence profoundly absent, it remains off in the wings, occupied as with toys. … As if foreign to *man,* ecstasy arises from him, ignorant of the concern of which it was the object, as it is of the intellectual scaffolding dependent upon it (which it allows to collapse): for concern, it is nonsense; for the eagerness to know, it is non-knowledge.
> The subject … seeks ecstasy, it is true: never does it have *the will* for its ecstasy. There exists an irreducible discord between the subject seeking ecstasy and the ecstasy itself. However, the subject knows ecstasy and senses it: not as a voluntary direction coming from itself, but like the sensation of an effect coming from the outside. (Bataille, 1988a, pp. 59-60, emphases in original)

Abandoning one'self' to non-knowledge and ecstasy: "this is communication" (Bataille, 1988a, p. 51); or to put it in Nancy's (1990b) words, ecstasy is that which "take[s] place as the communication of community: both as what communicates within community, and as what community communicates" (p. 19). Here "[e]cstasy is intended to signify an ex-stasis. It is a rupture out of the stasis, or beyond and

outside of the hypostasis… [E]x-stasis (standing-out) vs. hypo-stasis (under-standing), i.e., standing-out from the understanding" (Bird, 2008, p. 6). This is at once a breaking-up of identities, of absolutes, of already-known comprehensions that in turn renders communication and community possible. And this "is a phenomenon which is in no way added on to [human reality] … , but [rather which] constitutes it" (Bataille, 1988a, p. 24): so it is a happening 'on the fringes' of the 'subject' as s/he pulls onto it: it is not some thing to be fabricated or replicated voluntarily by the will, nor a negating absolute that sublates everything other than itself to its own truth.

One can even say that ecstasy is an always already happening of alterity which is by itself an elementary *a*reality of beings. Here, even the notion of the subject, as Nancy (1990b) discerns, falls short in making sense of the ecstasy, neither as a force or a sense 'of' it, nor as a dissolution or fusion of it together with 'its' object. This is because "[t]he being-communicating … is above all being-outside-itself", but "[t]he subject cannot be outside itself: this is even what ultimately defines it—that its outside and all its 'alienations' or 'extraneousness' should in the end be suppressed by and sublated in it" (p. 24). Then ecstasy is not a happening that occurs inside the confines of subject, and not least on the limits of it, because even the assumed subject's limits that expose to its outside does not exist, for it is a self-enclosed assumption of absolute by itself (that does not exist). Likewise, communication cannot assume a connection between these absolutes—it is not, and cannot be, an 'absolute bond' of human-to-human (as in the examples of fraternity or unions). Instead, "one must say that ecstasy (community) happens *to* the singular being" (Nancy, 1990, p. 7, emphasis in original); and the (non)place of this

happening is an ever dis-locating alterity where singularities co-appear—or

compear[21]—and expose themselves to one another:

> [T]hese singular beings are themselves constituted by sharing, they are
> distributed and placed, or rather *spaced*, by the sharing that makes them
> *others*: other for one another, and other, infinitely other for the Subject of
> their fusion, which is engulfed in the sharing, in the ecstasy of the sharing:
> "communicating" by not "communing." These "places of communication" are
> no longer places of fusion, even though in them one *passes* from one to the
> other; they are defined and exposed by their dislocation. Thus, the
> communication of sharing would be this very dis-location. (Nancy, 1990b, p.
> 25, emphasis in original)

So there is a limit whereon these singularities are ex-posed (on a limit that space each

other as infinitely others, as singularities), and this is also a limit where singularities

are met with one another, as they are exposed *to* one another. Echoing Bataille,

Nancy (1990b) suggests that this compearance and exposition "is of a more originary

order than that of the bond. It does not set itself up, it does not establish itself, it does

not emerge among already given subjects (objects)" (p. 29). This is a 'groundless

ground' where, one may say, Nancy (1990b) finds an ontological precedence of

community, which may "simply" be defined as the singularities' very "being—their

being suspended upon its limit" (p. 31); a suspension upon a finitude that is always

other, and always shared. So this can also be interpreted as singular beings are

'simply' *beings*—not only humans, but birds, dogs, sculptures, scripts, rocks, walls,

weapons, what have you; every finite being—that are all singular thanks to a finitude

that simultaneously assimilates and separates them on and as their limits: an always

shared, always incomplete finitude that can only be sensed in the co-appearance of

singularities: 'fringes of ecstasy' where they are always already inclined to

exposition. So all in all, it is this community and the finitude that compears before

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[21] Compearance, or co-appearance, is "the common exposure of singular beings" that "consists in the
appearance of the *between* as such." "Finitude compears, that is to say it is exposed: such is the
essence of community" (Nancy, 1990b, pp. 28-29, 66).

and below all the absolutes of immanence (of individual, of communion, of judgment, of law)[22]—an always already happening of resistance to immanence, a transcendence deprived of any sacred meaning (Nancy, 1990b).

I guess this theory of community (ecstasy) as the foundational element in the compearance of finitude first renders me able to suggest that isolation can never exist as such (whether in an ontological, sociological, nor even—if not maybe architectural—physical sense) and it always needs to be dictated, fictionalized, and/or obsessively sustained. As to our torture-scene of isolation, Scarry (1985) already depicted the isolative fiction of the torturer: being him/herself the weapon, experiencing the 'whole' event as a weapon and by the side of the weapon (Scarry, 1985, p. 59), torturer him/her'self' *is* one of the displays of an all-encompassing fiction of power; an obsessive dictation of its 'own'. Yet its in-formation can only assume the form of an obsessive dictation if only for the immanence of 'the torturer' is a fictitious being itself and the community and communication, as a possibility, can never be fully suppressed: even on the most cruel torture chambers of detention centers, of prisons, or of concentration camps, we may see a torturer coming out of him/her'self' and compear on the fringes of her/his assumed identical being by, let

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[22] Immanence is used by Nancy (1990b) to refer to the formations of self-enclosed wholes that are assumed to exist as a totality of being detached from its outside, and whose assumed origin and possibility of being is a derivation of from it-self. This refers both to self-enclosed notions of society (communion) such as nation, vanguard party, workers' councils, or any other organization that assumes to share an essence of being, and to a self-enclosed (self-reflective) notion of the individual which is just "another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty" of its existence as it-self (Nancy, 1990b, p. 3). Yet the immanence of being also points to an ontological impossibility, if nothing for the notion of absolute consists in the refutation of its essence, and cannot exist as such: "The absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness, or not be at all. … The logic of the absolute violates the absolute. It implicates it in a relation that it refuses and precludes by its essence. … [:] an impossible interiority, the 'without relation'" (Nancy, 1990b, p. 4).

me say, a sudden intimate gesture, an incalculable assistance, or even collapsing in an excessive rage[23]—in all respects, community retains its possibility.

As the real suppression of community remains an ontological impossibility, on the other hand, I think it may somewhat be said that it is through a mimicry of the insistent resistance of the community's ever-with-holding possibility that torture (also) fictionalizes its scenery: it does not (only) mime an isolated death and pain, but together with (and as) them, it mimes the (un)workings of community: 'good police' 'feels for' a prisoner and 'tries' to 'communicate with' him/her, 'bad police' always 'happens to stay' on the brinks of his/her rage, one other police 'smuggles' water for the prisoner (but alas, it has detergent in it)… Through these sorts of simultaneous mimes and denials of community, one may begin to be 'inclined' to think that any gesture, any assistance, any excessive rage in the scenery cannot be 'frank' but instead just another 'play' of the weapons (and it mostly is); and the more the torturer insists on their 'reality', the more it becomes 'unreal' for the prisoner. Then on and by all 'ends,' it seems that it is the possibility of compearance that seems to be fictionalized as an impossibility in the scenery and fictionalized as calculations 'lying beneath', as a feignment for 'distinct ends'. So here despite an *a*real possibility of community retains, it *seems* that this possibility is an 'unreal' possibility, with 'real' motives that 'consist' it, 'behind' it, 'originates' it. (And it is probably where it becomes an antagonistic force.)

By denying the shared sense of finitude, torture creates an illusion that all beings are infinitely definite beings that are and have certain absolutes such as objectives, weapons, or motives—it inscribes them with indisputable identical

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[23] Excessive rage—beyond calculation—can also be taken as an experience that carries an assumed self-presence of being to its limits tear it open to its outside (see Bataille 1985, 1988a, 1991, 2004). Therefore it can also be taken as a moment of compearance of finitude.

meanings with an essentialized inscriptions that is immanent to itself. This is imposed not only to the bodies but in general all beings, including the singularity of material beings like those of guns, chains, walls, or the cell: Like others, these are, on the one hand, fix(tur)ed as definite ends (weapons) in themselves; and, on the other hand, their finitude is doubly denied by the fiction that composes them as ever-occurrences without any possibility of re-turn or absence ('this torture will *never* stop…'). So in a sense, torture makes out of a spoiled, rusty, de-forming mess a fictive pretense of uniformity that is devoid of weariness—a spatiality that *seems* as invincibility, a temporality that *seems* as eternal—and 'as such', they become negating absolutes that negates nothing other than (the simple being, the compearance of) beings (on and as their finitude); then 'as such', they become adversarial.[24]

Than it seems that Scarry's (1985) reading of torture that takes its starting point from an already-given binary separations of pain and imagination, of world and self, or of absence and and presence obfuscates the fact that these binary separations are also the product of the dictation of self-enclosed immanent absolutes as an insistent force on its sole reality in the face of its ontological impossibility.

And the torture (as is isolation) may be read as a fictitious denial of the compearance of finitude—as a compulsive dictation of the absolute immanence of

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[24] Here I guess they become to be experienced as adversarial because, as long as, and as far as they *seem* as uni-forms 'as such' (as are raised on the scene of torture by, and as, all 'means')—this is isolation: if the finitude is the compearance of beings to one another which is the ontological inclination of beings, when the absolute inscription (of a definite subjectivity, of a fixtured and confined spatiality, of an eternal time of 'never-ending captivity') becomes overwhelmingly present, at the moments when it succeeds in seeming as such, it captures the inclination of beings to expose to one another and confines it into (and as) a self-forming desire to negate, that is also a negation of itself. To clarify: This is an ever-with-holding existence captured and confined to, thus seeming as, an absolute command to escape. Here a calling of community outside the confines of the absolute—convincingly—seems as a dictation of absolute refusal, as an absolute command to 'escape', from 'everything' that seems as 'everything', i.e. the 'totality' of the world, reduced to the uniformity of confinement. I will also try to trace as to its compulsive making this within the F-type prisons in Chapter 4.

'the world' that ultimately collapses up against one's being(-with). This denial cannot be confined simply to a denial of intense pain or of its several 'attributes'; what is at stake is, including but more than this, a shared sense of finitude. In a sense, one can even say that an experience of intense pain may very well be a particular experience of ecstasy, and torture an ever-intensify force that pushes to this ecstasy (communication), to an exposition of compearance—yet what enacts the fictitious totality of torture is not exposition per se, but instead an insistent denial of a limit to this ex-position so of a *co*-appearance, resulting in an obsessive dictum of an apparent reality of absolute self-presence which, for it being an ontological impossibility, unavoidably becomes a 'crushingly' inescapable (non-)presence without a possibility of absence. (I understand the in-formational topography of the prison in more or less the same manner.)

Torture and isolation being rethought in this way, I think some problems in Feldman's (1991) symmetrical equation of the 'case hardened' captive and the torturer as to their objectifications of finitude may be rethought further. (This was mentioned in the ends of the last part, Part 2.1.2.) As to this, here it seems to me that what singles out 'the captive' (whether 'case-hardened' or not) during the performance of torture is that, simply, s/he cannot be singled out. I think once Feldman (1991) admits this, as he says that following the capture, "[t]he captive maintains his silence, and he is also stunned in silence" (p. 120). To build upon this, perhaps I can rephrase it as follows: beginning from the moment of the capture, the captive is stunned in silence (either through an incalculable captivation or a process of interrogation that dictates him/her a 'subjectivity' of a 'captive' and denies another possibility of being)—here s/he may or may not 'maintain' his/her silence (*i.e.*, give statement or not), but regardless of this, s/he *then again* finds him/herself

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already stunned in silence—'what is this non-sense'? It seems to me that this non-sense is an extreme senselessness similar to that of the dictum of absolute that is now assumes the fictive form of subject-formation (or subjectivation) that denies any possibility of being outside this totality.

As to the insistent refusal of the 'case-hardened' captive in complying with the absolute pretense of the scenery, there I see two subjectivities, or better put, one subjectivity and a singularity. One is a subject maintaining his/her silence: this is a subject who preserves his/her silence for (and as) an objective, a subject/mind who is seemingly 'detached' from his/her 'own' corporeal presence and politically reifies it by (and as) a 'will' that 'dictates' a definite discourse to it… Yet *then again*, s/he is 'stunned in silence', and there s/he finds him/herself *already* stunned in silence—here it seems to me that, unlike a willful maintaining of silence, this 'stunning in silence' is not a preservation (of the ground) but a perseverance (of the groundlessness): this 'stunning' is not peculiar to 'anyone', a dis-location where one is found irresolutely 'stunned', a no-thing-to-be-made (either as a will or any other 'work' of the subject), a singular being exposed to a compearance of finitude with a sense of supplication that immediately calls for a community as an emergence, happens before any calculation or subject-formation as a precipitant sense of a shared finitude that is both a singular happening and an happening to a singularity—here it be-comes a(s a) non-sense and all-sense (like that of intense pain), and as a supplicating-calling of a community, it (dis)appears—stunned in silence.[25] We know from Bataille (1988a) that, when one abandons one'self' to supplication in "*dénuement*"—in destitution, "being entirely without means"—and "surrender"s to

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[25] Even for those who have the will to not to cry or moan during torture, an inclination to supplicate persists—rarely goes away, and when it is gone, it goes with-holding a possibility of ever-coming-back, never 'done'. I believe 'stunning in silence' is a precipitant dis-appearance of this with-holding.

an "anguished desire" n in "supplicating joy" that is nothing other than itself, and as itself an infinite otherness that opens to its outside—here "non-knowledge lays bare": this is ecstasy (Bataille, 1988a, pp. 38, 52, 54)—a dis-location where neither an object(ive) nor a subject may be in total control. It is true that, like Feldman (1991) says, a discursive claim may be inscribed to it, but an 'inscription' can never 'grasp' that ever-with-holding *a*real and circular experience of 'stunning in silence' that re-turns, re-turns, re-currently overflows all subjectivity and objectification, suspends a sense of temporality and then again, it already compears, stunning in silence.

The resistance of the 'case-hardened' captive, before even being the resistance 'of' her/himself, is the insistent groundlessness of the compearance of finitude. It cannot be mimed, or better put, its mimicry is already the end of it, the denial of its limits—the resistance 'done' is the enclosure of action in upon itself, as it-self an immanent truth of self-presence, whether in a form of a myth or else—and this is just another form to which the resistance insistently resists with the happenings of the compearance of finitude. Yet before assuming an immanent or mythical form, the resistance is first a 'stunning in silence' that dis-locate the totalizing fiction of absolutes by exposing its to outside, and the resistance of the captive is first an affirmation of its possibility. To go with the examples of the counter-conducts of those 'case-hardened paramilitaries' (Feldman, 1991, pp.139-142) and mentioned in the Part 2.1.2.; if a torturer orders the prisoner to 'sit on this chair' with a technical and calculated plan in mind, a prisoner's counter-order, before even being 'counter' in the first place, is an affirmation of a with-holding passivity (*i.e.* a 'stunning in silence') by and as itself; because, any counter-conduct of the captive (be it a naming of technical concepts, counter-ordering, lying down, tearing down the walls, etc.) is first a stunning *of* the 'torture' and 'torturer' in silence—

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overcoming their expectations and calculations, ripping up the absolute inscriptions

of being, exposing them to their finitude. To quote a narration of one of these 'case

hardened' captives cited by Feldman (1991):

> The beating is inevitable. You're going to get it one way or the other. All you
> have left to defeat them is to show them you don't give a fuck and that you've
> psyched them out even to the extent that you know when and why they're
> going to beat you. They've lost their tool. (p. 141)

This is a display of indifference to beatings, but it *is* also an apathy to the beatings,

and by this apathy the scenery's enclosure is exposed to its limits, 'psyching' the

torture(rs) out to their finitude, tearing the confines of the absolute (of both the

enclosing scenery of torture and the assumed immanence of the torturer subject,

forcing them to be 'entirely without means'). Or to give another example from

another 'case-hardened' prisoner's narration:

> What I learned being in and out of interrogation rooms: you will always have
> a device or means to break any interrogation; what I had was an old television
> set sitting in the corner. What I had in mind: "If you go under big pressure
> here you're putting your head through that TV. All right you might carve
> your face up, but you'll go to the hospital right then and there." (Feldman,
> 1991, p. 141)

The possibility of a being (TV) that is fixtured and inscribed component of the

scenery is first exposed to its limits and possibilities of compearance, and through a

possibility of an excessive compearance with it, a way outside the fictive absolutes is

found.

On the one hand, these are also examples of an affirmation of a possibility of

death—an anticipation of death—despite in an implied manner: both the first

narrator's psyching the torturers out and the second narrator's self-harm carries

within themselves a possibility of a 'realization of death' that is anticipated and

affirmed as a possibility which in turn makes the conducts possible in the first place.

On the other hand, what is affirmed through these actions is not at its heart one's

'ownmost' death, but the shared sense of finitude of beings that shatters the fiction that mimes an absolute totality (such as the torturers' calculated beatings or the TV fixtured to the scenery as a weapon of torture). In them being exposed to their finitude, the moment of resistance is at its heart a shared moment of stunning in silence: the captives' resistance shatters—or stuns—the torture(r)'s to the limits of their calculations (and so to silence), in the same manner with the captive's stunning to silence with his/her captivation, making them able to compear outside the confines of immanent self-presence of 'the captive' or 'the torturer' or 'the scenery that fixtures the TV'. With the resistance, the torture(r) is forced to be 'psyched out,' or panicked enough to disrupt the scenery and hospitalize the prisoner, or broken as an objective part of the fictive totality, all of which ontologically emerge in the compearance of the finitude rather than in the isolation of being. However, again, it is the scenery that forces an antagonistic divide between them through its obsessive dictums, in these instances a self-presence of 'being' of a torturer, or a prescribed procedure of dispatch in case of injury. Through these dictums and others, the resistance both retains its possibility and is forced to be confined to a fictitious self-presence that, as argued above, creates binary sets of antagonisms as long as it in-forms a dictum of its self-presence as the sole possibility.

2.2. Resistance in context, resistance to context

The subsections of this part will have two objectives, both related to the readings I pursued in the former part. First is to trace the contours of architectural transformations of the prisons of Turkey that have led to the institution of F-types. The importance of above arguments as to this transformation is that the history of penal change in Turkey, at least until the year 2000, is heavily interwoven with the

conflicts between outlawed organizations (particularly extra-parliamentary Marxists) and the state of Turkey, leaving definitive marks on the transformations of the penal system. In other words, it has been an antagonistic divide and the conflict between two immanent forms of self-presence that are assumably exterior to each other has been the core ground of penal transformation. Then the fictive dictum of the absolute in consisting a compelling force to inscribe antagonistic inscriptions needs to be borne in mind through the reading of this history, as it becomes particularly important given that the domain of struggle between these forces has been— especially after the year 1980—the prison, which is by itself a dictum of the absolute. This considers the first subsection, which I would also refer to as 'resistance in context'. As to this section, the inquiries of the last part also have a more direct relevance: the very practice of torture in the making of antagonistic inscriptions which in an extent in-formed the forthcoming conflicts on the prison systems. It seems to me that this has been a domain that greatly in-formed the antagonism between the outlawed Marxist organizations and the state in its own right, and it was this antagonism which in turn in-formed the architectural (re)structuration of penal arrangements; so in the beginning of this subsection, I will try to briefly frame a history of torture and criminalization of socialist politics as well.

  As I also mentioned in the last part, 'resistance *in* context' is an oxymoron as long as the resistance finds its (un)ground(ing) on the dis-location where finitude compears, which is possible with the exposition singular beings to their limits. Otherwise, under-standing (inscribing) the resistance as a ground of action that consists its being either by being against something or by having its own self as its origin, has the effect of enclosing the resistance in upon itself, obfuscating its own condition of possibility.

The spaces of enclosure, the prison as much as the torture chamber, for being self-enclosed totalities, have a compelling force to enclose the resistance through and as the isolative dictums of absolute that makes a compelling pretense of absolute which obsessively dictates itself as the only possible condition of possibility while it is by itself an ontological impossibility which is founded upon the denial of finitude. This denial of finitude, from the resistance-formations to the prison itself, has been a recurring theme in the discourse of penal transformation and resistance. Yet this assumed immanence cannot be a real force of resistance and at most a retrospective inscription assigned to it. So after I trace the history of the prison briefly through the resistance formations and antagonistic confrontations through the ends of the first subsection, in the second subsection, I will try to look through the possible moments of resistance as happenings that occurred on the limits of fictitious absolutes (instead of on the absolute confrontation between them), to which I would refer alternatively as a 'resistance to context.' Taking the prison itself also as a fictitious making of the absolute, I will try to trace its totalizing spatio-temporality as much as the totalistic subject-formations (such as 'the prisoner,' 'the guard,' 'the custodian,' and the like) as fictive mediums of absolutes, where the resistance becomes possible on the torn off limits of these fictitious totalities. So in this part, departing from a number of narrations regarding the prison resistance and relationships, I will try to briefly trace the moments of emergence where the resistance found itself a possibility to compear on the finitude of these fictive totalities, as well as how the prison, as a dictum of totality, in-formed a force to contain and assimilate these moments into its routine. After tracing these, I hope that I will have enough mapping that would able me to inquire the present formations of F-types and of other models of incarceration more extensively in the following chapter.

2.2.1. A history of transformation

Sporadic employment of torture had been an issue in Turkey from its establishment until the end of the single party regime (which officially concluded in 1945), sometimes resulting in permanent afflictions and loosening of the senses (Öztürk, 2004, pp. 162-163). As Can (2015) mentions, however, these techniques were employed only occasionally and by archaic and coarse (non-professionalized) methods until around late 1940s and early 1950s, when several torture methods and the arsenal of weaponry began to be imported as a result of the politics of "westernization (*batılılaşma*)" (pp. 37-38; Öztürk, 2010, p. 405). The first extensive employment of these would be conducted following a crackdown against the Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP) on September 26, 1951. Detainees of this operation (numbered 184) had been in detainment for as long as two years before the first legal proceeding, and at the end of this period, at least 16 of the detainees were reported to have gone insane (Öztürk, 2004, pp. 278-284; Sayılgan, 2009). This was a confusingly harsh remark, because the then-TKP of its time was resembling more a legal organization trying to be legalized than a militant organization, and their organizational schema was known to a great extent by the state authorities (Erdem, 2014; Öztürk, 2004, pp. 277-278). On the other hand, when regarded not as an act of information gathering but a display of absolute power, this was making more sense—indeed, as Öztürk (2004, p. 278) observes,[26] this operation was meant more as a reassurance to the government's anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitude to the United States of America and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, than having practical concerns against the communists' organization and operation.

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[26] The former secretary-general of the TKP, Zeki Baştımar, also defended the same line in his plea (Erdem, 2014).

This operation marked a definitive point in isolating communism from the mainstream politics. Before the operation, the official stance of Turkey against the communists had been shaky, especially throughout the Second World War (in the face of which the government formally raised a neutral stance, despite de facto ideological line of it was inclined to be aligned with the Nazi Germany (Küçük, 1979, pp. 338-339)). Küçük (1979) says that this equivocality started to change as the war came to an end, and it came to the fore that the emerging tendency of the State was to be allied with the United States in the forthcoming conjuncture of the cold war. In line with this, after the year 1945, against a broadly-defined group of 'communists' (including left-inclined liberal intellectuals and legalist socialists), several attacks became to be systematically employed by several organized raids and forced exiles, as the so-called 'communist activities' were criminalized and their agendas were officially as enmities (pp. 280-343). Çavdar (1996) says this inclination against the left became even more powerful and formed as an indispensable part of national politics with the DP government (that first elected in 1950) (p. 32), whose one of the first orders after assuming the office was the conduct of above-called operation against the TKP.

Years-long torture ridden interrogations were also to result in the divide of arrested members of the TKP to three groups: first, as a group of repentants (*itirafçılar*), i.e. members who gave statements throughout the detainments and also became explicitly at enmity with the party and its ideology; second, as a group called notifiers (*çözülenler*), i.e. those who gave statements at interrogations but went on to defend the party line; and third, as a group consisting of the members who refused to give any statement during interrogations, and kept their silence in the face of tortures all through ("1951 TKP Tevkifatı," 2013). In so being, this operation was an almost

perfect example of a compelling force in the making of absolutes; both as to creating a fictive absolute divide between a so-called 'society' and 'communists,' and also in creating groups whose assumed ground of communion was a derived presence against the violence of torture.

Mihri Belli, the leader of the third group who refused to give any statement during the tortures, was to become a prominent political figure and intellectual leader during the 1960s. Belli has always been known around socialist circles more with his theories and less with his militancy, and never with his armed militancy. In the 1960s when Belli's influence as an ideological leader was at its peak, there was never formed a self-armed militant organization either. Belli himself was not in favor of self-armed militias, either—the most armed-militant action that was advocated by him has been a pro-democratic putsch from the ranks of the official military. All these being said, it seems to me that one point needs to be reckoned with regarding his leadership: All of the radical left organizations that advocated for an urgent formation of self-armed militias (which began to be formed beginning from early 1970s) was either a direct split from his political circle, or a split from one of these splits. This is even more interesting given that all of these splits show a great variety of theoretical affiliations from nationalism to Maoism.

In this light, I guess that Belli, as a 'figure' who had neither 'become' a 'notifier' nor a 'confessor' throughout the interrogations of the 1951 TKP operations, can be rethought as a product of antagonistic (counter-)objectifications compelled by the absolute dictum of the scenery of torture. This is to say that, regardless of the specifics of his ideological line or even intentions, he, as him'self', as a leader-figure, was in an extent a product the bifurcation of violence (and further criminalization of socialist politics) that was ensued by the scenery of torture; and as such, he was in a

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sense already carrying antagonistic inscriptions of torture by his 'image'. This, of course, is not to say that Belli was the only 'reason'—nor even 'a reason' for that matter—that ensued Marxist militancy and popularization of self-armed action by the early 1970s.[27] Instead, what I try to point out is that, as and by his 'own' image, Belli was apparently carrying a 'precedence' to future formations of self-armed militancy; so there is a chance that this played a role in the constitution of initial self-armed organizations and made the (moral) stance to raise an 'unbending attitude' in the face of tortures (and the possibility death) as, in a sense, constitutional in their formation.

Whether this was a definitive factor or not, the leaders of the self-armed organizations (that are mostly founded and led by the youth movement, and that had begun their actions in the early 1970s) would indubitably be epitomes of 'unbending struggle' for their followers. Indeed, while unique theoretical formulations posed by (at least a number of) them has also had considerable effects in their own right, their practical 'stance' of militancy has been acclaimed by quite more circles than their immediate ideological successors. In this, their 'unbending attitude', especially their insistence on fighting in the face of a very probable death—a death that could have most probably been avoided through a compliance with the authorities—played notable roles, and each were popularized all the more with their 'resistant attitudes' vis-à-vis a conceivable physical demise—some with their refusal to announce their repentance in exchange for a pardon from execution, and instead going to the

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[27] There were, if nothing, more than many factors and 'occurrences' that kept on pushing socialist politics to the margins of legal political life all throughout the late 1960s when, to give some examples, parliamentary immunities of 15 elected socialist deputies were waived (some of them even lynched inside the parliament); anti-communist militancy (consisting both of ultra-nationalist and Islamists) was becoming more and more professionally organized and beginning to orchestrate coordinated attacks against leftist mass demonstrations (sometimes resulting in deaths) as well as several assassinations while a number of government bodies cheering for them and legitimizing their actions; legal restrictions against striking and syndication were becoming more and more strict and resulting in an increasing marginalization of the worker movement, and so on.

scaffolds shouting their slogans (like Gezmiş, İnan, and Arslan);[28] some with their refusals to surrender even when they are blockaded and faced with an obvious death (like Cemgil, Yıldız, and others) some of whom even counter-summoning their adversaries (like Çayan, Bardakçı, and others) and killed in action; and some with an insistent rejection of conforming to the fiction of torture for extended periods of time, keeping silence against threats of execution, and eventually being killed because of their non-conformity (like Kaypakkaya) (Öztürk, 2010). And after the death of them, as Öztürk (2010) says, although very organizational bodies founded by them had fallen into a passivity not later than one or two years after their formation (sometimes for a while, sometimes for good), the figures of these founding militants were to be acclaimed by "a whole new generation (*yeni bir kuşak*)" of followers who embraced these figures as exemplars and epitomes of struggle (pp. 369, 428). Even until now, there have rarely been a formation of a self-armed Marxist group without referring to either one of them as their principal, or at least traditional, founder.

On the adversarial side of these figures, there was a number of (puppet) governments that were established following a military memorandum on March 12, 1971. This memorandum (that followed a failure of pro-socialist putsch on March 9, 1971) was strictly anti-socialist in its affiliations and all in all governed Turkey for around three years. Almost immediately after their claim to power, in addition to other restrictions on parliamentary and legal politics, they pursued an extended purge against a wide-range of left-oriented movements and individuals—not only of

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[28] Their refusal of pardon is also mentioned in (Öztürk, 2010, p. 395; see also Öz, 2010). In addition to this, there have been some popular examples that went live on the media, like the one in which a minister called Gezmiş (after his arrest) to join a live conference with him in order to scold and belittle Gezmiş, yet his plan was backfired when Gezmiş indeed attended the seminar but carried explicit rebuttals beneath contempt against the minister, making himself popular as an image of 'unbending attitude' even more (Öztürk, 2010, p. 307).

armed-militant Marxists, but also of leaders and members of legal socialist organizations, syndicalists, or other left-wing intellectuals (including left-oriented liberals and Kemalists) (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 316-317, 333).

One of the characteristics of this era was a prevalent employment of torture against the detainees. What is more, during these times, unlike before, tortures were not only being implemented in a harsher manner,[29] but especially beginning from early and mid-1972, they were being employed in a notably more organized fashion: for example, the techniques were practiced not only by some independent trained torturers, but also through a hierarchical structure between them (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 376-379). As Parlar (1997) conveys, this was also hinting that, by forming a kernel for counter-guerilla organizations, torture would then on be embedded within the ranks of the military—and so the state—in a persistent manner (pp. 55-142). Then for decades, torture-ridden interrogations were to perpetuate and garner further grounds of antagonistic inscriptions, as are the above emblems of struggle.

In coping with the self-armed militancy of the radical left the memorandum governments and the army were in now way falling short of raising an irreconcilable—or also an 'unbending'—attitude against all forms of socialist militant formations and actions, at all times sternly denouncing any possibility of a reconciliation or negotiation, and at all times doubling down. To give an instance, against one of the first militant actions of the radical left—a kidnapping of the consulate general of Israel to demand a release of all political prisoners—the

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[29] The techniques employed in this era were no less than bastinado, scorching, electrification, tormenting genitals, or dismantlement of nails. These were 'harsher' as to the previous era both for the techniques employed were of more variety, and for the style of their employment was more merciless. For instance, bastinado, which was also a method that had been present before, was beginning to be employed by stripping the captives naked, while in the former times this was not the case (detainees were left at least with their pains on while being caned) (Öztürk, 2004, p. 283; Öztürk, 2010, pp. 376-377).

government first rapidly denounced any possibility of reconciliation, and then doubled down with conducting mass arrests and passing retroactive laws into force to prolong the imprisonment of others that were already arrested (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 312-316). A similar attitude was raised whenever there occurred an armed action, and there not only the militants had always denied any reconciliation (no matter the stakes) and killed in action or captured severely wounded, or in some cases executed extrajudicially.

This era in general set the precedence for the traditional maxims of the antagonistic conflict between militant Marxism and the army, and it as well set the general framework of the prison reform that was to be pursued under the 1980 coup government.

In a parallel manner, the first attempts to reform the prisons were conducted soon after the first memorandum government assumed the office. On the one hand, following a martial law that was declared on May 13, 1971, it was ruled that the political prisoners were to be dispatched to military prisons from then on, instead of regular prisons (Öztürk, 2010, p. 318). Second, again soon after the memorandum, a law enacted to define the legal status of the prisoners as the lowest-rank privates (Eren, 2014, p. 213).

Unlike the instant employment of torture in custodies, the 'soldier-prisoner' status to the prisoners was not practically exerted for about a year, and both military and civil prisons went on to be managed generally at ease (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 317-332, 334-336, 343-344, 442). Yet by early and mid 1972, the so-called status was, gradually, began to be enforced (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 399-401, 410-411, 433). This, however, did not happen in the same manner at every prison, that is to say with the same amount of force and coercion. For instance, after early 1972, in the Mamak

Prison and its neighbor Yıldırım Bölge Prison (both in Ankara), a forceful imposition of this 'status' and further meddling to prisoners' daily life were began to be enforced, accompanied by a notable degree of physical and psychological coercion (which induced several prison riots and protests as well); while the prisons of İstanbul, wherein 'soldier-status' was also enforced on the year 1972, the impositions neither evolved to employments of critical corporeal assaults nor strict restrictions on daily life, and neither did they became an issue of notable struggles between custodians and prisoners (pp. 397-401, 410-411, 433-434).[30]

Attempts of the memorandum governance to alter the prison conditions were practically short-lived, and mostly reversed back after a pardon that passed into law in 1974 that released most of the political prisoners.[31] There had not been carried an architectonical modification to the prisons, so dorms (wherein dozens—from around 30 to hundreds—of prisoners are confined together) went on to be the main units of confinement. All in all, prisons went on to be "neglected backwaters of officialdom" same as before (İbikoğlu, 2012, p. 21), and usually stayed exempt from strict systematical coercions, and administered arbitrarily and divergently depending on particularities of prisons and managements (Öztürk, 2004; Öztürk, 2010; Eren, 2014).

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[30] Here I also feel a need to note that this difference was in part due to an increased attention raised by the media and the state to the prisons of Ankara following an escape that occurred on November, 1971 from the Mamak Prison, which resulted in a breakout of some notable figures of Marxist militancy.
[31] After the memorandum governments' step back from power, on October 14, 1973, a parliamentary election was held but came with fractured results, rendering any party to single-handedly govern the assembly impossible. Discussions went on for months, and at last the Republican People's Party (CHP) led by Bülent Ecevit (a left-inclined Kemalist and social democrat) and the National Salvation Party (MSP) led by Necmettin Erbakan (a moderate Islamist) could form a coalition government, and assumed duty on January 26, 1974. Following their governance, one of the first proposals to be raised was to issue a general amnesty that would include most of the political prisoners (both Islamists and socialists); and in the late March of 1974, the relevant draft was accepted to be discussed in the parliament. Despite some turbulences in its legalization and practice (Öztürk, 2010, p. 441), most of the Islamist political prisoners could be released on May 14, 1974, and most of the socialist political prisoners could be released on the July of 1974

Yet, however withered in the short term they practically were, these reforms laid a theoretical and programmatic base for the forthcoming prison arrangements.[32] This came to the fore most obviously with a declaration of a state of emergency on December 26, 1978, and with a martial law that was enacted soon after. In a very similar fashion to the previous example, one of the first orders after the enactments was to dispatch all political prisoners in and around Ankara to the Mamak Military Prison, and a simultaneous 'stiffening' of the prison's conditions—with reintroduction of strict restrictions over daily life (on letter counts, visits, *etc.*), and reinforcement of 'soldier-status' once more—all accompanied by brutal and degrading physical and psychological assaults (Eren, p. 2010, p. 216; Çalışlar, 2010). This was to become the national standard for the management of prisons, following the coup of September 12, 1980.[33]

As I already mentioned in Part 2.1., inside the prisons after the 1980s coup, we begin to see a series of systematic and militaristic impositions ranging from compulsory 'educational' sessions to roll-calls, all imposed by degrading and cruel physical coercions. In a similar vein with the plotters of the 1971 memorandum, one of the basic aims of the 1980 putschists were "to put an end to the 'terror' and 'anarchy' caused by the threat of communism and to bring order to … [the] country" (Bargu, 2014, 101). So in a similar vein with their successors, they—together with tortures, coercions, and executions[34]—went on to inscribe, and further, the

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[32] If one would also remember Parlar's (1997) afore mentioned highlight on the organizational embedment of counter-guerilla groups and techniques to the military through the kernel of torture, one would also be realize that this theoretical and programmatic lead have also had enduring practical effects on other scales of state organization as well.

[33] To give a hint on the extent of the detainment that followed the 1980 coup, it may be said that from its declaration on September 12, 1980 until its formal conclusion on November 6, 1983, the number of people who were officially detained was around 650,000; yet Mavioğlu (2006b) says that the actual number was even more, likely over 1,000,000 (p. 21)

[34] Throughout the days of official coup governance, inside the prisons or in the detainment centers, 7,000 prisoners were indicted for death penalty, and 50 of them were executed. In addition to these

antagonism. Along with these, unlike before, some modifications to the architectonics of the prisons were began to be employed as well.

Çolak and Altun (2008, p. 14) note that initial debates and plans on architectonical modifications of prisons had been carried all throughout the 1970s, but these could be actualized only by early 1980s. The first concrete outcome of these debates was E-type prisons, the earliest example of which, the Metris Prison, was opened on April 12, 1981 (Eren, 2014, p. 240). One of the chief traits of E-types was instituting narrower units—or *"small dorms (küçük koğuş)"*—as their main units of confinement, instead of the big dorms for dozens of prisoners (Çolak and Altun, 2008, p. 14). These small dorms were for 16 to 20 inmates (Mavioğlu, 2006b, p. 26). In addition to these units, E-types also had had 40 cells or 'observation rooms' (*müşahede odası*) on their entries[35] for short-time waitings of the prisoners on admissions (in the same manner as before); however, in the E-types, these cells were to be used more extensively to confine 'undisciplined prisoners' for prolonged periods of time, because as long as a prisoner would refuse to conform with the impositions, s/he was being denied to get outside of the units ever (*Tutuklu Aileleri Bülteni*, 2000, p. 9).

Conditions of E-types were to an extent differing due to a variety of factors such as the locality of prison, typology of the prisoners, and the like, but delving into these particularities would greatly go beyond the scope of the thesis.[36] That being

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legal executions, 171 prisoners were proved to be killed by torture, 14 died as a result of hunger strikes, 16 were shot dead allegedly for escaping, 73 reportedly 'died naturally', 43 supposed to 'commit suicide', and many more 'died' for 'questionable reasons' (like falling out the window or tumbling down the stairs) ("12 Eylül darbesinin," 2015; Cömert, 2009, September 11; "Rakamlarla 12 Eylül," 2018). Furthermore, there had also been numerous deaths due to tortures or ill treatment but did not reported as a 'prisoner death' because just before dying, the prisoners were 'released' (in a fatal condition). Similar to previous in-formations of emblematical figures, these killings cemented further mythologizations and epitomes of resistance.

[35] Observation rooms were ranged on four floors by 10, five cells on both sides of the floor.
[36] See (Mavioğlu, 2006b) for a number of differing accounts on various E-types of the era.

said, the impositions were yet in their most standardized and systematic fashion, and

effects of the militarization and were critically perceivable at each. Faced with the

coercions, socialist left's 'unbending struggle' began to in-form several resistance-

formations within the prisons (with some notable exceptions like the Mamak

Prison[37]). One of my interlocutors, B., who was also one of the prisoners of the E-

types, summarizes the general condition as follows:

> We were at Buca [Prison]. We never sang the national anthem. We never prayed for the supper. We never attended religion lessons. I am speaking on behalf of all [socialist] political prisoners. We never wore the prison uniform.[38] But there had been the ones who wore them, who attended the classes; their dorms were separated. ... They were separated, but considering from the massive [majority] point of view, we never accepted these things. Mamak accepted all of the impositions. Bayrampaşa [Prison], Sağmalcılar [Prison] refused to conform any. Now there are the ones who do accept them, everywhere there are, I want to stress this so that I'm not misunderstood. Diyarbakır [Prison] did accept them, but they went through the biggest horrors, and displayed great resistances. I mean ... the assaults are everywhere but their scales differ, and the resistance is everywhere but its scale is different. (B., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix A for the original)

In sum, these resistance-formations forced the state to reconsider general

effectivity of the E-types in confining political prisoners, so other models began to be

sought. Çolak and Altun (2008) mentions this as follows: "an increase in the number

of remand and sentenced prisoners of terror brought several difficulties as to their

custody [in early 1980s]; events such as escapes, murders, and riots multiplied, and it

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[37] The conformity of socialist political prisoners to the impositions were in such a degree that it resulted in a connotation of a new term in the socialist left jargon, mamakification (*mamakifikasyon*), to denote full compliance to forced disciplinary practices of the prison regimes (Eren, 2014, p. 227). That being said, this issue was about the men's wards of the Mamak Prison, and have overshadowed the situation in the women's wards wherein such a degree of compliance was not the case; see (Akbaş, 2011).

[38] In his thesis, İbikoğlu (2012) notes that "[the uniform] policy drew widespread criticism and resistance from political prisoners across all prisons. However, they [the uniforms] were eventually adopted in all military prisons except for Metris, where the prisoners' resistance continued" (pp. 63-64). However, this seems like a misinformed claim. It is true that the Metris Prison came to the forefront regarding the resistance to wear uniforms; yet this was mainly because it was the first prison where the uniform policy started to be forcefully implemented, and in a parallel manner with this, it was where the resistance-formations against it have started. However, this resistance soon spread to other prisons (Mavioğlu, 2006b, pp. 68-69, 268), including the prison S. was confined.

was understood that it would be impossible to confine the remand and sentenced prisoners of terror and other dangerous prisoners in dorm type prisons, therefore room type prisons consisting of one and three people units were brought into agenda [.]" (p.14, own translation; see Appendix B, 1 for the original). In accordance with this, an amendment to then penal regulations of Turkey was issued on August 3, 1983, which was also the first legal text to coin the term 'room type' prisons (Eren, 2014, p. 63). According to this amendment, some prisoners; "primarily those convicted of the crimes of anarchy and terror",[39] and also others who "resist rehabilitation and education programs"[40] and deemed incorrigible, or who "create trouble in penal institutions, put other prisoners' security of life in danger",[41] or who are sanctioned to higher-degree disciplinary punishments like solitary confinement for more than three times within a span of two years, were to be sent——"with a decision of the administrative council of observation and surveillance board of the prison, and with an approval of the Justice Ministry"[42]—to "special closed penal institutions … built as one-person or three-people rooms",[43] wherein "individualized rehabilitation and education [programs] are instituted"[44] ("Ceza infaz kurumları ile tevkifevlerinin yönetimine ve cezaların infazına dair tüzük," 1967, pt. 4, div. 2, art. 78/ B, own translation). While one of the later examples of these 'room types' were to be the F-type prisons, the earliest examples of these would be called the Special Type—formally H-type—prisons.

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[39] "*Anarşi ve terör suçlarından hükümlü olanlar başta olmak üzere*"
[40] "*iyileştirme ve eğitim çalışmalarına karşı koyan*"
[41] "*Ceza infaz kurumlarında olay çıkaran, diğer hükümlü ve tutukluların can güvenliğini tehlikeye sokan davranışlarda bulunan*"
[42] "*müşahede ve sınıflandırma merkezleri idare kurulu kararı ve Adalet Bakanlığının onayıyla*"
[43] "*tek ya da üç kişilik odalar halinde yapılmış … özel kapalı cezaevleri*"
[44] "*bireysel iyileştirme ve eğitim [programları] uygulanan*"

First of the Special Types, the Sağmalcılar Prison, was opened on July 6, 1983—even before the amendment—as a restoration of an existing prison (Mavioğlu, 2006b, p. 59); and the first one prison built from scratch, the Antep Special Type Prison, was inaugurated in late 1985. Principally, Special Types consisted of single 'rooms' and, (instead of triple,) four-people 'rooms'. As the prisoners were mostly those 'most disobedient' prisoners of the E-types, the Special Types were in a sense extensions of the 'observation rooms' of E-types. But unlike those 'observation rooms', solitary cells were not an exceptional but a constitutional part of the institutions. For instance, at newly erected Special Types like the Antep Special Type, two of the six blocks were consisting solely of one-person units. At the remaining four blocks there were also two solitary cells, but other units were for four prisoners. All blocks had their two floors of units arranged rectangularly; and on the middle of each block, there was a big ventilation space (around $300m^2$ or 3230 foot^2) shared by all units. (In theory it was envisaged that the prisoners of each unit would use the yards separately from each other; but through resistances and protests, the prisoners could mostly become able to use these in a more crowded fashion than planned.)

As also B. hinted above, for the most part, the prison resistance (in the sense of practical insistence on refusing coercive disciplinary practices) had been an issue of ebbs and flows rather than an unimpeded precision. In some prisons, a practical dedication to disobey the managements in-formed populous and consistent resistance formations, which in turn played significant roles in establishing somewhat institutional traditions of prisoner self-management (as in, for instance, Bayrampaşa Prison). On the other hand, in some other prisons like the Diyarbakır Prison, prisoners mostly complied with the coercive impositions of military regime, but there

had also been multiple occasions where a number of adamant prisoners pursued their protests in non-conformity, some to the point of their death. So not only from a prison to another, but also within a prison, there occurred less a clear-cut situation of 'total refusal' or 'total submission' than various scales between the two; there had also been a number of cases where some of the prisoners would partly accept to conform some of the rules, mainly to carry other disobedient tasks on other places (such as temporarily accepting to wear uniforms to get out of the cells and organize riots in small dorms).

Through these times and later on, prisoners grouped their resistance-formations into two: 'active resistances (*fiili direniş*)' and 'passive resistances (*pasif direniş*)'. Yet despite the concept's popular utilization to distinguish taking action to protest or not, here a passive resistance has mostly referred to hunger striking or death fasting, while an active resistance have mostly been used to refer all other resistance formations—not only hostage taking or rioting (which had rarely been occurred), but also resisting strip searches, refusing to be counted (or to stand at attention during the counts), refusing to wear prison uniforms, or in general refusing to comply with any disciplinary orders. S.[45] summarizes the process as follows:

> You gained rights with active resistances in [19]81, you gained rights this way in [19]82, and in the meanwhile you took rights towards improvements [on the prison conditions] by the way of hunger striking, in addition to active resistances. For instance … the February 1 circular[46] had been issued

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[45] This is a very experienced prisoner who had mostly been confined in prisons until early 1980s to early 2000s, and participated to all the resistance-formations during the times of his confinement; so while writing on the prison resistance, I will cite his narrations quite frequently. I find his narrations all the more important given that there has not been conducted any comprehensive study that has particularly focused on prisons and prison resistances between 1980 and 2000.

[46] Eren (2014) notes that the issuance of prison uniforms was first announced on March 25, 1981 by Kenan Evren following a series of group meetings that had been held by Nevzat Bölügiray—one of the head generals of the putsch government—from December, 1980 to March 1981 (pp. 218-220). However, as to the circular S. is referring, I could not find any circular that specifically dates to February 1, 1982 (or several days before or after it) which issues or mentions prison uniforms. While mentioning initial examples of hunger strikes that followed the 1980 coup, Bargu (2014, p. 173) does not mention this date either. I guess either S. is confusing the exact date of the circular, or he is talking

throughout Turkey, stating all [prisoners] at …[our prison] to wear prison uniforms … We did not wear them and what happened, they took us and put us in cells. They put us in cells and they made us wear them by brute force on our way to the court. What do you do then; you go in the [court]room; the moment they undo your hand[cuff]s you tear the clothing down. They even took your undergarments away so you would not tear them down. It didn't matter, we said [to the audience] … "close your eyes if you have to," and tear the uniforms down. It was in addition to these active resistances that hunger strikes were being practiced. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 1 for the original)

These formations of resistance mostly concerned the conditions of confinement, and they were indeed granting (temporary) times of relief.

Like I said, I don't want to be misunderstood: Hunger striking by itself will not improve anything. You will only be able to achieve any gains when it is combined with active resistances. It is basically like this: You ask for it, if they grant it, they grant it - if not, you [hunger] strike; and then later when they [the management] see that the things are taking a turn for the worse, they give you your rights. But these rights are never permanent. And the bar goes incrementally higher. At first, one week mattered to them, and then later, 10 days; and then they saw that the generals came for discussions on the 13th day—they really did; there was the regional Army Commander of …; he personally came and said directly [to the prison manager] "if one man dies… I will relegate you away." So he [the manager] comes and gives you your rights, and he speaks to you in such a way, saying "my son" and everything, acting the benevolent father et cetera. He puts you through torture and beatings, [but] once he understands that he will not be able to deal with you, he does this. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 2 for the original)

So for the army's part, such a 'care' on hunger strikes would, as S. says, decreased as the time passed; and while above was the situation during the early days of the coup when the Regional Commander to personally come on the 13th day of strikes;[47] later in 1982 and 1983, the hunger strikes (with a populous participation) would go on for around 30 days, and in 1984 would last 72 days (Bargu, 2014, pp. 173, 181). While

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about a specific date concerning the institution he was confined, or he is mentioning a decision date of the prisoners for a counter-action, or I just failed to find the circular.

[47] One would also consider changing demographics and scales of exclusion regarding such a 'sensation.' For instance, a death fast that was announced on March 1981 by the prisoners of the Diyarbakır Prison, a prison which was predominantly populated with Kurdish prisoners, went on for 43 days and resulted in a casualty; however, the prison conditions got worse than before (Bargu, 2014, p. 173). Here the prison where S. and his friends pursued the strike is a prison from the more 'western' parts of the country, so this would have played a role.

in these the most casualty had been in the latter with four prisoners; in the year 1985, the casualties from hunger strikes would increase to 12 (Can, 2015, p. 59)—and so set the bar to higher and higher increments, as S. put above.

General conditions of confinement were changing in cycles. After the first dispatches to the Special Types during early-to-mid-1980s, the conditions were mostly relieved in tandem with the protests (i.e. active and passive resistances). Yet the first hint of the cycle was given on 1988, August 1, with a Justice Ministry mandate that was ordering a wearing of prison uniforms (whose requirement had been de facto lifted until then), and in addition to this, it was pushing a considerably stricter daily life for the prisoners.[48] S. narrates these days as follows:

> They did not open the doors because you did not accept it [wearing the uniforms]. They did an operation. They gave everyone a good beating. They put people who they assumed were leaders or would resist into cells. During this, approximately 10-12 people were hospitalized, I was one of them. … And they took us to the court. They both beat us, and put us in cells. There were friends of ours who became disabled, who experienced temporary memory loss, or whose ribs were broken. … Of course we had arranged everything beforehand [regarding a possibility such as this] and the hunger strike began the moment we were confined to the cells. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 3 for the original)

The hunger strikes went on for 35 days (Eren, 2014, p. 242).

> Then later they gave us our rights back. But not all of them. For example, anyone whose surname does not match cannot come to the visitation—an example. [Going to] ventilations [together] became to be more separate, likewise. … They had taken our cooking gas away; which they then gave us back, so we could begin to cook inside [later on]. They had begun to permit us to receive food from outside only according to certain standards—during open visitation, and limited to a certain number. We took all these back again; we began to bring all food and beverages inside. … Then later, they agreed to allow lower floors and upper floors to use ventilation spaces together. … This

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[48] The mandate was also forbidding prisoners to grow hair or facial hair, limiting relative and lawyer visits, restricting durations of facilitating ventilation spaces, fixing a maximum number of receivable letters and their page counts, prohibiting any access to foods purchased from outside, banning every items of cooking, imposing various limits to retainable books and magazines, restricting articles receivable from the visitors, and seeking disciplinary sanctions against shouting slogans, refusing to wear uniforms, going on hunger strikes, singing anthems, or conducting any passive resistance like not responding to an order (*Tutuklu Aileleri Bülteni*, April 2000, pp. 16-17).

in time turned effectively to using ventilation by both of the floors at the same time; we took the right to use ventilation all day long. … Of course, the prison uniform was not worn under any circumstances. … [In time,] the limitation of visits only from the persons with your surname was lifted. In the meantime, there happened some escapes during open visits, so these were limited [again]. […] [In short] we took all our rights [that we had already gained before] from 1986 to 1988 back after the operation, incrementally, throughout the process [that followed 1988]. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 4 for the original)

This operation/resistance/relaxation/operation cycle would repeat until the opening of the F-types.

After 1991, two notable changes happened in the penal trajectory. First, the Anti-Terror Law ("*Terörle mücadele kanunu*," 1991) was passed. As to the rearrangement of the prisons, it was repeating and re-enacting mandatory confinement of political prisoners into single or triple units; and in accordance with this, after 1991, a new series of 'room type' prisoners were issued. The first example of them would be the Eskişehir Special Type Prison that had opened on November 2, 1991 (as a restoration of a former prison building) (Mavioğlu, 2006b, p. 270). One of the genuine aspects of this prison was that, its isolated—single or triple—units of confinement had all had their own ventilation spaces, all isolated from one another (instead of a big ventilation space that is shared by all the units of a block, as in the former Special Types). This was also hinting at an architectural practice that has endured in the architectonical structuration of the room types henceforward: the units were no longer to open towards any shared area. Instead, in the Eskişehir Special Type, the units were isolated in a linear fashion alongside a corridor, in the manner it is illustrated in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1. Corridors of the Eskişehir Special Type Prison. Source: ("5 Yılda 45 Ölü,"
2000).

The Eskişehir Prison's inauguration as a Special-Type had faced strong

popular and political opposition by many non-governmental organizations (NGOs),

parties, associations, trade unions, and others; and when this went hand in hand with

the resistances of the prisoners, after 28 days of hunger striking (that concluded

without a casualty), the Eskişehir Prison shut down, and the prisoners were sent back

to the former units of their confinement (Mavioğlu, 2006b, p. 271).

Yet after this occurrence, now the prison struggles of extra-parliamentary left

were to include a central element of "opposing attempts at introducing high security

prisons," alongside with "advancing prisoner rights" that had been the primary focus

of the former times (Bargu, 2014, p. 183). So in the year 1996 when the Eskişehir

Special Type was reinstituted, the hunger strikes to protest its inauguration were to

be particularly massive—with a participation of around 1500 prisoners from a broad

variety of extra-parliamentary leftist organizations[49] (Eren, 2014, p. 244). After 12

deaths and dozens of permanent injuries, the hunger strikes (now termed by the most

as the 'death fasts') ended in their 69th day of conduct, after an announcement by the

government officials that they were withdrawing the relevant mandate on the

dispatch of political prisoners to the institution. However, this time the Eskişehir

Special Type would not be closed, and was to confine other sorts of 'dangerous'

prisoners instead of political prisoners (Mavioğlu, 2006b, p. 272).

As the cycle of operation/resistance/relaxation went on, military

operations—mostly to reinstitute 'prison discipline'—were becoming harsher as

well. At the operations of 1984, 1988, and 1991, despite many injuries, there had

only occurred a few number of deaths in total. Then on, both the frequency of

operations and the casualties raised. On September 21, 1995 at Buca Prison, three

prisoners died; on January 4, 1996 at Ümraniye Prison, four prisoners died; on

September 24, 1996 at Diyarbakır Prison, 10 prisoners died; on October 8, 1998 at

Ceyhan Prison, 35 prisoners were seriously wounded; on September 26, 1999 at

Ulucanlar Prison, 10 prisoners died; on January 7, 2000 at Bandırma Prison, one

prisoner died; on January 25, 2000 at Metris Prison, one prisoner died; on July 5,

2000 at Burdur Prison, tens of prisoners were seriously wounded and a prisoner

crippled; on July 25, 2000 at Bergama Prison, many were seriously wounded (Bargu,

2014, p. 187; Eren, 2014, p.243; Sevimli, 2010, pp. 13-36; *Tutuklu Aileleri Bülteni*,

2000, pp. 21-42). So in all extents, the antagonization of the 'terrorist' prisoners had

been furthering through the prison operations all the more.

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[49] Bargu (2014, p. 185) claims the "hunger strike of the 1996 marked a qualitative difference from its precursors" in being conducted by a broad scale of extra-parliamentary organizations and by an organized body; however, there had already occurred massive and organized struggles before this such as the 1983 strikes which was also conducted with a participation of a broad scale of extra-parliamentary leftist organizations and 2000 prisoners (Can, 2015, p. 59).

The ultimate encounter between these antagonistic inscriptions regarding the room types would follow the F-type high security prisons' presentation to the public on the May of 2000 (Sevimli, 2010, p. 47). Against the developments, radical leftist prisoners carried debates on the possibilities of a unified struggle on death fasting; yet they could not form a consensus and were roughly split[50] in half;[51] between those who called for an immediate action and uncompromising fast unto death until the F-types' abolishment, and those who saw this more of a complicated and stratified encounter with the state whereby one should have been more tactical and prudent ("ÖO Süreci," 2018). In the last instance, the latter group could not convince the former on the timing of the initiation and form of the struggle, and the first teams of death fasters from the first group (around 99 prisoners in each team) had begun the course, while others who were hesitant on the impetuosity of the action began striking only in turns for solidarity (but announced that in case of a military operation, they would turn their course to death fasting as well). In the November of 2000, the toll of indefinite strikers increased with participations of other death fasters from outside the prisons (mostly consisting of family members of the prisoners) (Sevimli, 2010, pp. 51-52). At the end of the November and beginning of the December, second teams (composed of 103 prisoners) began death fasting (Akbulut, 2002).

Despite the fact that there had been a degree of support by various political bodies from NGOs to intellectuals, and despite the fact that there had formed a mediation initiative consisting of intellectuals, artists, and deputies that met with a

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[50] I think Bargu (2014, pp. 189-190, 198) downplays this split in an extent, focusing her line of inquiry on the death fasts solely to the other group (cf. Serin, 2013).
[51] Radical leftist prisoners were then 1920 in numbers ("Tantan kitle örgütlerini," 2000) and the ones who were in favor of immediate action were around 900, 817 of whom were the death fasters (Sevimli, 2010, p. 51).

delegation of death fasters in the hopes of mediation (Sevimli, 2010, pp. 47-49, 64, 72-78), none of the parties—neither the military nor the prisoners—stepped back an inch from their 'unbending attitude;' and at four a.m. of December 19, 2000 (on the strikes' 63rd day, when the first death of the 1996 strikes occurred), a military operation labeled 'Return to Life' was simultaneously conducted to 20 prisons. At the end of the nation-wide operation that went on for three days, 30 prisoners and two soldiers were killed (the latter by the bullets of other soldiers) (Şık, 2003; Söylemez, 2016), and many were critically wounded, some being amputated or crippled (Turgut, 2010). Sevimli (2010) notes that despite the operation was branded 'Return to Life,' the intervention's main aim was more to inaugurate F-types than to finish hunger strikes. Indeed: after the inauguration of the F-types' with an initial dispatch of around 490 prisoners following the operation ("'F tipi'ne nakiller," 2000), hundreds of prisoners, including those that were opposed to the striking in the first place, joined the death fast struggle. However, when the struggle was concluded in 2006 with more than 100 deaths and 500 permanent injuries as a result of the fasting, the F-types was being instituted still without a considerable change in their arrangements, let alone their closure—and they have stayed more or less in the same form until then.

2.2.2. Resistance and corrosion

Conducting his study against a background of a series of prison revolts that were taking place in the United States of America during 1950s, one of the conclusions of Sykes' ([1957] 2007, pp. 40-62, 109-130) classical sociological study on the prison was that, despite the prison's theoretical foundation of the prison on an assumed and enforced supremacy of custodians' authority over prisoners, in actuality this has

always been bound to be a fiction, and the prison has never been a space where an absolute order is successfully enforced. If nothing, for Sykes (2007), managing the routine and daily life of the institution would necessitate at least a degree of compliance and cooperation on part of the prisoners, at least for carrying the regular tasks orderly (such as dispatches, counts, searches, or even solely living behind the bars). To ensure the compliance, physical coercion or other systems of rewards and punishments can only go so far: pervasive physical coercion cannot assure an effective management in a prolonged manner, and rewards and punishments generally fall short to commensurately benefit or harm the prisoner who is already confined in a lamentable environment (punishments of the custodians may even mean achieving more prestige). Sykes (2007) asserts that in the real context of the prison, guards who carry most of the direct tasks of practicing the total authority over the prisoners, generally find themselves in contradictory situations. Not only, like prisoners, they suffer from the totality of power performed inside the institution (as they are also subjected to strict conditions and rules over daily life), but also their familiarity and intimacy with the prisoners grow over time, and they find themselves in reciprocal relationships with inmates whereby they make concessions to their assumed duties, at least in exchange for an assurance of order within the institution.

This has been a noticeable factor in the management of the prisons of Turkey throughout the decades that led to the opening of F-types. For instance, on early days of the Special Types' inauguration, S. counts their relationship with the guards, alongside active and passive resistances, as one of their 'weapons' in pursuing the task of the relaxation of the conditions of imprisonment:

> To take your rights you pursue first the active resistance, second the hunger strike. You have is no other weapons other than these. With these. Then there is also one that we call "the corrosion politics:" For instance, you assure [the guard] and say, "I'll just go over to this room and chat for a bit, because of [a

friend's] private issues, okay? I'll come back in half an hour". In this way the guards also melted [*eridi*]. Then they see that it does not cause an issue, [it becomes the routine]. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 5 for the original)

This corrosion politics is an interesting 'method' since it contains a double movement of a community's opening and closure. First, in forming a horizontal relationship with the prisoner, the guard who is inscribed with an immanent and professionalized role within the institution is exposed to his role's finitude whereby he touches the other. Then, on the corrosion politics' second (but in a sense, simultaneous) movement, this community is enfolded and confined; because here, as a "politics" of corrosion, the relationship is overdetermined by a strategical calculation (on part of the prisoner in relaxing the conditions, on part of the staff, ensuing the routine). This closure of course because of the institutional dynamics more than an 'intention' of the 'actors'—it is the prison's spatiotemporal and organizational arche-structuration that in-forms and dictates a constant closure and inscription to such a relationship. This becomes clearer with the following narration of S. on their initial days of confinement within the single cells of Special Types:

> After a while [the conditions of our confinement within the cells] began to relax, and, we created the position of taking two people out together at the same time [to the ventilation space, instead of one person at a time for 15 minutes]. But this was a practical situation. After a point you become familiar with the guards, you become like intimate friends (*ahbap-çavuş*). So he takes someone out while the other is already using 15 minutes and he lengthens the process of locking a little while, the guard waits there for a little bit not locking your door but only standing there, and you talk there [with your friend] and go inside only then, and like like. [And slowly this situation turns into the routine and furthers, resulting in more relaxation]. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 6 for the original)

Here, this close and friendly (*ahbap-çavuş*) relationship with the guard carries in itself some corrosive, or as Sykes (1956, 2007) would call, "corruptive" effects on the order by itself. In thus being, it reflects an insistent (im)possibility that always already retains its force of disrupting the order (despite not by itself aims for it). Yet

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this relationship of intimacy is bound to be routinized and framed by the institution's routine (its rules of conduct as well as its spatiotemporal organization, both of which inscribe immanent roles and relations to the bodies), through which the prison not only induces but also fixtures and prescribes the encounters.

This enforced prescription of isolative *relationality*[52] is not peculiar to interactions between humans, nor even to the relationships between humans. To give another example, on another instance, S. narrates the same days (of their initial confinement to single cells of the Special Types) as follows:

> The main features of the cell are these: They are solitary. There is a stone bench—no railing, no bunks, nothing. And there's a wooden piece attached to the head side of the bench. They will either give you a bed or not, with a high hand. Or there is no particle board in some, according to the punishment. It's all isolated, you cannot communicate with anyone. The ventilation windows are covered with these eyelets, these birds-eye screens. When you look through the eyelets, you can see a person partially and only if he stands or passes right in front of you … Now the first actions are pursued through widening these holes. You pierce through the first screen in this way or another and this first allows vision for your whole eye, and then you pierce a little more, and this goes on and on. Because you do this your confinement prolongs for vandalizing the state property—you are given additional time in the cell, your conditional release becomes rules out, et cetera et cetera. We stayed there for approximately 5 months, without ever being released. (S., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix C, 7 for the original)

The corrosion of the eyelets may be considered as another instance of corrosion that able the prisoner to form a counter-power that contests the absolute dictum of the institution. However, like the 'politics' of corrosion mentioned afore, the corrosion of the eyelets also becomes enclosed and enfolded, as the arrangement (re)shapes it and conditions it to be a calculated plan. As inscribed piece of the scenery, the eyelet is a 'constituent part' of the identical spatio-rhythmic terrain, and so is a compulsory and repetitive (fixtured) element of the scenery; then the relationality with it is

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[52] The entry "relationality" is not present in the *The Merriam-Webster dictionary* (2016), yet it is used in the literature in a distinct manner than the word "relation", and simply refers to the state of being relational; e.g. (Thrasher, 2014; Topolski, 2015)

inscribed by the routine, and this in a sense preordains an identity inscribed to it, even in corroding the fixture inscribed to it; and this, like the simultaneous opening and closure of a community with the staff, is both a community—on the dis-location of the eyelet's dispersal—and its closure—insofar as exposition becomes confined as a framed work by the repetitiveness of the routine, as a (re-work of the) identical arrangement.

This double movement of the opening and closure of community may perhaps be thought as a general frame of prison resistance. To begin with, in her thesis where she maps (the post-2000 struggles of) hunger striking thoroughly, Serin (2013) thinks the death fast struggle through a similar line: The very action of death fasting is not in itself solely a political theology based on a moralistic dictation of sacrifice and thus an actualization of death—as Bargu (2014, pp. 223-225, 236-242) would claim—but together with this, also a deferral of death: "[H]unger strikers do not simply give themselves, give their lives. They first and foremost give time; they give time to the other to allow a response" (Serin, 2013, p. 17). This creates an "inescapable anachrony between the two deaths—the passage of time … separates 'death' as possibility from death as event which comes either too early or too late"; so the act finds itself in-forming through an oscillation between two temporalities of the event of death (the actualization of death) and its deferral—on a "chiasmic temporal structure … where deferral and recurrence combine to invert end into endlessness, implying both power and impotence" (Serin, 2013, pp. 40, 45). So despite the death-fast movement—by "mistak[ing] … self-sovereignty for political sovereignty"—also became susceptible to a mythical reading of revolutionary "superhuman will which knows no limits" (Serin, 2013, p. 19), in the action's relation to temporality and finitude, there may also be envisaged "a different relation

with death that did not end in the sovereign consummation of the act" that moves

through the deferral of death. (Serin, 2013, p. 6). Here deferral is meant as a

movement of (and to) alterity—i.e. *différance,* which

> is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the
> opposition presence/absence. *Différance* is the systematic play of differences,
> of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are
> related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive …
> production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify,
> would not function. It is also the becoming-space of the spoken chain—which
> has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible
> both writing and every correspondence between speech and writing, every
> passage from one to the other. (Derrida, 1981 p. 27)

So in this sense, as much as it was a political project and strategy of inscriptions,

fasting onto death was also an exposition of identities to and on their shared spacing

that singularize them on and as their finitude; and as it is, it considers a relation of

one to(wards) the alterity of finitude as an eventful singularization of spatio-

temporality:

> The event is the taking-place of the being-there of the heart of things. *There* is
> a measure of space, of spacing, that gives time its origin, *before*time.
> Movements, histories, processes, all times of succession, of loss, of
> discovery, of return, of recovery, of anticipation—all this time essentially
> depends on the space opened up at the heart of things, of this spacing that *is*
> the heart of things. (Nancy, 1993, p. 172, emphasis in original)

Read through these lenses, mentioning an ex-faster M.'s words on the spatiality of

the F-types together with the underlying reasons of his death fasting against it would

be meaningful:

> If you ask me, for example, I say when I am in communication with them [my
> incarcerated friends, I say] that the F-type … has more comfortable
> conditions … relative to the dorms. But the problem there … is not the space
> per se. [For example when I] went on death fasting … I did not [go to the
> fast] to avoid the cell … only in terms of the space, but instead, because this
> attack was directly addressing our identity as a revolutionary … to completely
> divorce us from our own identity as a revolutionary. … So, not because of the
> mere space per se, but because … sociologically … this space is itself is an
> attack on the social identity, social personality [of the prisoner]. (M., Personal
> Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix D for the original)

Now this 'preservation of revolutionary identity,' or a preservation any social

identity for that matter, has indubitably a moralist element in it (as Bargu (2014, pp.

223-225, 236-242) would claim). Yet as much as the 'identity' is a moralist concept,

the 'revolution' before it may also be taken as an always already resistance to it, at

least when used in a manner which, for instance, Blanchot (1995) uses to refer the

periods "when everything seems put in question, when law, Faith, the State, the

world above, the world of the past—everything sinks effortlessly, without work, into

nothingness" (p. 318). Also having a similar concept of revolution in mind, despite

not at the exact moment following my above conversation with M., I multiply asked

to both M. and other ex-fasters (because the framing of M. on the reasons of his

fasting is a common perspective among the fasters) on their thoughts as to whether or

not this concept of 'revolutionary identity' is an oxymoron indeed, as the revolution

is at its heart a corrosion of identities. Maybe out of my luck, or biased sample—

because I very well know that there would also be many ex-fasters that would claim

a more moralist perspective on the issue—all of my interlocutors have affirmed me

on the intrinsic contradiction of revolution and identity; and while some justified this

contradiction according to their theoretical perspectives, others preferred to leave this

as an open question mark to be thought.

There seems a similar aporia (now between the routine and the community)

when we think the prison resistance. Again to go with the corrosion of eyelet (but a

similar relation would be at issue in other moments corrosion 'politics' as well),

physically speaking, the corrosion is also a spacing of materiality as its dispersal, and

it may also be thought as a compearance of 'the prisoner' (that breaks up of the limits

of the prison and his imprisonment) and 'the eyelet' (that breaks up of the limits of

its fixture as an arche-structural element of prison through its corrosion), and ex-

position of them on this compearance of their finitude, affirming the spacing that makes another possibility out of the assumed totalistic unity of their identities. However, in a similar manner with the forced antagonism and objectification during scenery of torture, an inscriptive isolation is charged as a dictum of immanence that dictates an objectifying denial of compearance and finitude; so secondly, as—again—the 'order' of the institution, the dictum of absolute is enforced, on the one hand, with the spatiotemporal totality of the routine (that includes the eternal exposure of the eyelet that is denied a limit) that makes the action of corrosion more as a necessity than an event, and on the other hand, with the organizational totality that compulsively reinstates the pretense of isolation with itself—so the more S. and his friends corrodes the institution, the more they are punished to further confinement and isolation (through the disciplinary punishments). In a similar vein with torture, these enforce an enclosure that fictitiously but forcefully reinscribe the possibility of community as an impossibility under the pretense of absolute routine and identical spatiotemporality; creating an artificial demarcation between dispersal and truth, or between life and imprisonment, culminating the fiction of isolated exteriority as the condition of being (whether as an abstract freedom or as an 'other' identity).

2.3. Impossibility of absolute order

To return to Sykes (2007), for him, the impossibility of ensuring the absolute order within the prison has several consequences. One of these is that, the more the custodians try to impose an absolute order within the prison, the more the prisoners are inclined to revolt, and thus threaten the pretense of absolute order. Yet the belief in the possibility and existence of the chimera of absolute order is in fact more fundamental to the prison's management than the order's absolute realization,

because the institutions of confinement derive their legitimacy of being from the pretense of order rather than their actuality—e.g. both 'punitive' and 'rehabilitative' characteristics assumed to be performed by it essentially rests on a fiction of absolute order. Therefore the prison needs to raise this pretense, especially to the public gaze. Then, fundamentally, prisoners' riots, revolts, and other forms of uproars threaten the authority of the prison not because they create disorder, but because they bring the prison's fiction of absolute order into doubt (especially when they attract the attention of media and public). However, practically, a series of emergencies and crises are always integral to the habitual life and order of the prison; so the managements' primary job is to contain these disorders before they 'infiltrate' to the outside, more than subverting them. But as the custodians try to contain emergencies, they find themselves transferring a degree of authority to the prisoners in the name of order. This is a ticking bomb, because as the prisoners' semi-official authority on ensuring the order becomes a habitual practice, its influence and power also increases over time, and an exposition of this would be no less scandalous than a riot—and indeed, there comes a point when this situation eventually attracts the public gaze (by, for instance, a reveal of an escape plan or an actual escape, a publication of conditions by a resentful guard or a disgruntled ex-prisoner, a rise in conflict within managerial ranks, a government body fastening on 'bringing' the institution(s) 'into line', and so on). On the occasion of one or another, administrative authorities after a while feel a need to stiffen the institutions' order, to bring them 'back to their nature'—so there begins a strict imposition of absolute authority over the prisoners. Yet this cannot be sustained for a long time either, because it sets the ground for incongruous riots and revolts through continual intensifications and assemblages of dissent, which not only threaten the imagery of order, but also generally succeed in

prisoners regaining a degree of control over prison life. Thus the structure of social life in prison seems bound to be managed in continuous cycles and degrees of order and disorder, never able to institute the order absolutely (Sykes, 2007, pp. 40-62, 109-129).

On the one hand, regarding the prisons of the era that I have been writing of in this chapter, these observations are as accurate as it gets. Firstly, in the (re)shaping of arrangements, the formations of cooperation between the guards and the prisoners are, as in the examples in S.'s narration, as effective as the formations of conflict. Secondly, as to the prisons of Turkey, despite the 1971 memorandum governments directed their radar to militant activism of the radical left, and despite there had emerged a distinct focus on the prisoners' bodies in detention chambers with professionalized torture techniques, the prisons stayed to be managed through differing degrees of self-management and cooperation until the point where some popular escapes occurred in the November of 1971 and caught the public's attention (which is succeeded with the help of self-governance of the prisoners in the first place) (Öztürk, 2010). Harshening of the conditions of confinement by the early and mid-1972 seem to be corresponding with this as well, especially given that the prisons where coercive practices of total order occurred mainly inside the Ankara prisons where the escapes had occurred. As Sykes (2007) also foresaw, in these instances, "cooperative" forces in the management of prisons had given way to "aggressive" and dichotomic ones and many prison revolts and riots occurred in Ankara prisons; while in Istanbul, even when there had been impositions of a 'soldier-status' over the prisoners, cooperation between prisoners and custodians was the main force that assured the order (Öztürk, 2010). Lastly, it is true that a coercive dictum of absolute order was imposed to the prisons beginning from the late 1978

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and especially early 1980s; however, these arrangements could not be "effectively" managed for a prolonged time as Sykes (2007) foresaw and crumbled after the year 1983, resulting in a search for different arrangements that would put those assemblages of 'conflict' in order; and it was this concern that brought the establishment of the Special Types into being. These types were, at least for the durations between the cycles of operations, were seemingly succeeding in ensuring the order through cooperation as well, as one of the then-prisoners of the Antep Special Type, C., notes the situation in general:

> When the Antep Prison first opened … they transferred who they deemed to be the most incorrigible, most rebellious there… But it opened with a different practice. … There was resistance for six months of course … [but] after a while they left us completely to our terms. … The management… started to receive commendation upon commendation from the Ministry [of Justice], because suddenly something happened to these rebellious prisoners, and there began to be no incidents within the prison. Because they gave everyone something; if one wanted to read books they gave it, or if he wants to build ships [models] they did it. … Open visits with families also commenced. Things like tea or such have started making their way easily into the prisons after six months. In the meantime an escape attempt took place, and the relaxed period made this possible; one friend was able to escape… leaving someone else instead of him. .. .What did the administration do, take initiative or something, I do not know, but the Ministry [of Justice] gave it a great deal of leeway; I suppose to keep the place quite no matter what. (C., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix E for the original)

Yet these conditions of relaxation for the sake of order carried its handicap with itself as the prisoners' self-managements ensued escapes as C. says (and S. also mentioned) that followed by a brought of the importance of the 'reinstitution' of the absolute order of the prisons into agenda, which was followed by the cycles of military operations and legal changes to reinstitute the absolute order, and this again fell back to the gradual transfer of authority to the prisoners through conflict and cooperation and the same cycle (see Part 2.2.1).

From a more general framework, Sykes's (2007) account does not need to be confined within the structure of the prison, as it generally attests the practical impossibility of withering community and resistance away. However configured, absolute power is deemed to be a fiction, and its actuality is variously co-figured by a multiplicity of forces that (de)compose it. Not only their adversarial conflicts but also co-respondences and, however inscribed in a binary fashion, their communication mark daily workings of the institutions where the pretense of isolation and absolute power is the dictum. On the penal arrangements where it is mostly the duty of humans—particularly the guards—to carry the direct tasks of practicing the total authority over prisoners (as is was through the 1950s in the USA, and mostly in Turkey until the 2000s), as Sykes (1956, 2007) hints, this particularly becomes visible. Despite he conveys his points through a narrow framework of prisons and interaction, it seems to me that these hint a broader situation regarding the ontological impossibility of absolutes that are exterior to one another, or in general the identical existence on which the prison theoretically and topographically arche-structurates itself. In this sense, for instance, the walls, the grounds, or the general architectonical structure of the prison is a chimera of the eternal, while in actuality it continues to corrode towards (and as) finitude. Likewise, the subjectivity of 'the guard' or 'the prisoner' or others are immanent, while in reality communication does not happen between but on the finitude of these assumed absolute subjectivities, and as it happens, their inscribed roles becomes "ex-scribed" as well (Nancy, 1990a). Through the insistent dis-appearance of community and resistance, and through the obsessive enclosure of it into the chimeras of the absolute power, the prison's (re)institutionalization sustains.

That being the case, after the year 2000, we start to see that the 'problems' posed by the corrosion, of both the spatiotemporal and the social totalities, have been abled to be—despite not expunged—contained in the models that followed the former systems of confinement. In a similar vein with others, they were to be built on an ontologically impossible premise as well; yet this time, their fiction of the absolute would be enforced through more technological means which would in turn minimize the factor of spontaneity and corrosion in exposing the ontological reality of the compearance of the finitude. This pursuit became more eminent as the F-types' opening were getting closer. As Bingöl (2007) mentions, during late 1990s, one of the prison prosecutors was framing the problems in confinement and possible solutions to it as follows:

> In order to overcome the problems, alongside the abandonment of the dorm model, measures such as transferring to a computerized system, minimizing the human factor in the management, using technology in supervision, surveillance and searches, and the principals to be selected from law school graduates and receive in-service training are the some of the measures to be taken. (p. 127, own translation; for the original, see Appendix B, 2)

With this, it was being hinted that the change was meant to be of more than a mere technological enforcement of the material, and would consider a whole grid of information, to which I will turn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE SETTING

3.1. The setting

With the institution of F-types after decades-long struggles, military operations, and

tortures, at last the state could achieve its aim of rendering manageable the

resistance-formations emanated from the horizontal relationships—an aim which, for

Foucault (1995), has always been one of the maxims of the disciplinary relation with

the body:[53]

> [Discipline] must … master all the forces that are formed from the very
> constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of
> counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the
> power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous
> organizations, coalitions—anything that may establish horizontal
> conjunctions." (pp. 219-220)

Indeed, the new institutions were at last being 'successful' in containing—if not

withering away—the formations of counter-power, therefore minimizing their

disruptions to the fiction of absolute order. On one hand, 'the active resistances'

would be doubly confined to the abstract temporality and segregated-rigid spatiality:

The active resistances of the following times as is pursued by the most of the

socialist prisoners would be follows: shouting slogans on regular times of the day

(concluding it with a collective thwack of iron doors), refusing to actively participate

to body searches (and shouting slogans whenever they occur), declining to stand on

feet on daily counts (and depending on differing phases, waiting them on upper stairs

and refusing to come down until a member of prison staff comes up), collectively

commemorating and protesting on particular days such as May 1st (similar to regular

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[53] Disciplines will be covered more broadly in the next part, Part 3.2.

protests, but also with reading poems and singing songs in sequence), writing collective requests of complaint and/or protest, and so on. In a sense, 'active resistances' are confined to the routine, unable to overflow the segregated units of confinement, most of which are even by themselves some forms of replication, devoid of the element of alterity. The 'passive resistances,' (i.e. hunger strikes) on the other hand, would go on to be pursued; yet at least regarding an abolition or reconfiguration of F-types', as mentioned in the former chapter, they would prove themselves ineffectual.

Since their institution, F-types had 59 single and 103 triple cells, with a total capacity of 368 (İşlegen, 2000, p. 41). Single units' surface area is around $10m^2$ (108 ft^2), toilet, shower, iron cabinets, sink, and bed included (and stationary). The triple ones were of two stories, and around $50m^2$ (538 ft^2) in total. All were opening to $50m^2$ ventilation spaces. For the triple cells, these were again private, in the similar fashion with all the room types instituted since the Eskişehir Special Type. For the single cells, ventilation spaces were being shared by two or three units.). These may be illustrated by the figures below. To give a general sense of their organization, I want to present the general plan of the F-types as well as a bird's eye view to it in Figures 2 and 3, together with the photos of the insides of the units and ventilation spaces in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 below.

Figure 2. The general plan of F-type prisons. Source: (Dokgöz, 2002, p. 107)

Figure 3. Bird's eye view of an F-type prison. Source: (Gündüz, 2012).

Figure 4. Ventilation space of an F-type prison. Source: (İbikoğlu, 2012, p. 7)

Figure 5. A solitary cell in an F-type prison. Source: (https://instela-static.info/m/f-tipi-cezaevleri--i252088.jpg)

Figure 6. The upper floor of triple cells. Source: (Erdoğan, 2012).

Figure 7. A photo of the ground floor of triple cells. Source: (İbikoğlu, 2012, p. 6)

As Serin (2013) notes, "[t]he 'F-type' was both an architectural model for the
entirety of carceral institutions in the country and a model of disciplinary apparatus"

(p. 1). The new models for this new carceral institutions would be labeled "room types (*oda tipi*);" then afterwards, the term "room type" was not only to denote the high-security models focusing on the confinement of the 'most dangerous' segment of the prison population, but in general to refer to the whole new generation of the prisons.

At around late 1999, there had already begun restorative compartmentalization of some E-types and Special Types (Ertosun, 2000, p. 270) wherein no resistance was faced by the authorities. The process of restoration accelerated and became a full-blown prison reform after the opening of F-types, and their institution were soon followed by D,[54] T,[55] and L[56] types followed F-types' launch (Eren, 2014, p.249). After first dispatches to L-types and T-types, the reform downright sprung to involve the 'common prisoners' (Eren, 2014, p. 249). In 2004, following an amendment to the penal law, the prisoners to be confined to the F-type prisoners also multiplied, and broadened to include not only political prisoners and the prisoners confined on the grounds of profit-oriented organized activities, but also any undisciplined prisoners in other institutions too ("Ceza infaz kurumları ile tevkifevlerinin yönetimine ve cezaların infazına dair tüzükte değişiklik," 2004, art. 2).

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[54] D-types, first of which completed in Diyarbakır on December 28, 2002 and opened on December 22, 2003 (http://www.diyarbakirdcik.adalet.gov.tr/hakkimizda.html), were the second high-security institutions that would be erected after the year 2000. There have been two D-types, in Denizli and in Diyarbakır, which consist of single cells and triple cells in 10 blocks.

[55] Most of the units of confinement in the L-types are two-tier units which measure around 209 m^2 (2250 ft^2), further divided to seven compartments inside (two at the ground floor and five at the upper floor) (http://www.corumlcik.adalet.gov.tr/kurumumuz.htm; http://www.ankara1lcik.adalet.gov.tr/tanitim/tanitim.html). Official websites of these institutions give different numbers on the capacities of these units; yet anecdotally, I can say that they keep on increasing. Around 2008-2010, my friends who were confined to these institutions were mentioning they were being confined to each room in three (making 21 people in total for each small dorm that consists of 7 smaller units). Yet recently, around early this year (2019), one of my friends who were confined in the L-types told me that now each room were confining around six people each, because of the overpopulation.

[56] T-type prisons predominantly consist of eight-people units. In addition to 72 of these, there were also eight triple cells and 16 single cells (http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/bilgidata/tip_T.asp).

The new models wherein the segregation to smaller groups was the maxim was being called "room-types," but being disciplinary institutions, as any "disciplinary space," they were "basically, cellular" (Foucault, 1995, p. 143). To account for the cellular characteristics of the new types as well as to map the general terrain of F-types, I am now turning to Foucault's (1995) famous formulation of the disciplines.

3.2. Disciplines and *The Panopticon*

Foucault's (1995) well-known book *Discipline and Punish* is a historical mapping of what he calls the disciplines; technologies and techniques of power and knowledge that shapes and trains the forces of the body while assembling and subjecti(vati)ng[57] them by an indiscernible gaze. The gaze has no center nor an apparent source; it processually operates through processual economical grasps of singular beings.

For Foucault (1995), disciplines in-form an imperceptible, astute, minute, and physical workings of a grid that is of an (implicitly coercive but) attentively inclusive leniency. Their point of genesis is hard to detect, if there has ever been any. They have a complex and trans-formational history that have traversed and materialized on multiple planes like military barracks, hospitals, orphanages, workhouses, proletarian housing estates, and even observatories (the latter being in a sense one proximal point of their foundation). But if one follows their in-formational contours, she sees that they are situated within a specific continuum of abstraction that carves out an

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[57] In Foucault (1995), mostly the term 'subjection' is employed to refer subjectivation, and 'objection' is used to refer subjection. See, i.e., (Foucault, 1995, pp. 184-185). To prevent confusion, I will employ 'subjection' by its dictionary meaning: "the action of subjecting a country or person to one's control or the fact of being subjected" ("Subjection," 2010); and to refer "the process by which one becomes a subject", I will use "subjectivation" (Butler, 2011, p. 210) as before. This employment is, simply, to prevent confusion regarding the former usages of objection, subjection, and subjectivation. As I already mentioned in the former chapter, I do not see an essential distinction between them, and whenever I speak of them, I use it interchangeably, in case they are not clearly differentiated by the writers I refer.

epistemological domain which is of positivistic human sciences like criminology, penology, psychology, or social work; all intertwined in an extent with population sciences like political economy, statistics, or even eugenics (Foucault, 2003, 2005, 2009). They compose and work through anthropo-scientific technologies of abstraction.

The techne-logical concern of the disciplines is particularly the body and its singularity—out of it, disciplines work to mold and inscribe an atomistic and unitary being that are put in (b)order(s), assorted with each other through a vertical hierarchization. In order to do such, disciplines mostly utilize spaces of enclosure which are structured spatiotemporally in correspondence with the disciplinary grids of knowledge.

To structuralize temporality, disciplines "[d]ivide duration into successive or parallel segments … which … end at a specific time", so that they can "[o]rganize … an analytical plan—successions of elements as simple as possible" (Foucault, 1995, pp. 157-158). Through analytical plans, they repeatedly "[f]inalize …temporal segments … and conclude [each] with an examination," so that they can formulate distinctive classifications and rankings of compartmentalized bodies (Foucault, 1995, pp. 157-158). Spatially, the "discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements" (Foucault, 2009, p. 35); because after all the "[d]iscipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements … [that] individualizes bodies by a location that … distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations" (Foucault, 1995, p 146). In thusly disposed spatiotemporal arrangements, disciplines produce a series of never-ending analytical inscriptions of singularities, and (re)mold axiomatic elements out of them; so that they can be comparably ranked on a unitary plane which in turn

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inscribes identities to them with which they 'become' 'functional' within disciplinary

systemics (so that it apparently operates 'for the sake of' bodies' functioning—'for'

their very own-selves, their 'proper,' 'well-being' entrapped within stases-tical[58]

planes).

For Foucault (1995) the emergence of the modern prison was a pivotal point

in in-formational technologies of the disciplines; because penality's adaptation of

disciplinary techniques (or the techniques' infiltration to and colonization of

penality) emerged as a moment of conjuncture that verged anthropo-scientific

technologies of abstraction with punishment and criminal code; eventually

fabricating contractual notion of personified 'citizen' together with formal axes of

freedom and duty in concord to it. While preceding techniques of penalty yielded

their way to disciplinary technologies of confinement, a "carceral archipelago"

(Foucault, 1995, pp. 296-308) was born: now the disciplinary gaze was ready to

align, assess, subject(ivate), examine, and all in all normalize a whole fabric of

'nation' (or 'society') by in-forming its citizen-subjects through the spaces of

enclosure.

If there has been any architectonical model of the disciplines for Foucault

(1995), it is Jeremy Bentham's (1791) *The Panopticon*. The material design of this

prison project is widely known: an all-seeing inspection tower, plunged in the

shadows, placed at the center of an annular building that is composed of individual

cells. These cells have two windows: one facing the tower, and the other behind. Due

to a distribution of light, any inspector located inside the tower is able to see and

observe each prisoner at any time, but its captives are never able to perceive the

inspector. This renders any real or constant presence of an inspector irrelevant:

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[58] Here I adopt the term "states-tical" as a hybrid term to doubly denote static and statistical.

perpetual darkness of the tower glaring at each individual unit, without a need for further attendance of a specific author, becomes the gaze itself. Bentham (1791) was believing that, with this architectonic and (non)authorship of the gaze, a physical coercion would no longer be a prerequisite for prisoners' penalization or reformation. Instead, the gaze, by itself, would be the main in-formational (and considerably more economical) force that traverses and fabricates (or "accommodates") the captives' bodies as orderly, industrious, hardworking citizens.

In a way, the model of Panopticon reflects modern forms of knowledge with which, as Foucault (2000) mentions, "it's not God that disappears but the subject in its unity and its sovereignty" (p. 10). Principally, this disappearance of the subject should not be understood as a total disappearance of subject-as-a-unit—contrariwise, its disappearance is a multiplication and proliferation of the atomistic, unitary subject. This is to say, there becomes to govern more (and less) than one subject who assumes all the responsibility of power by own-self; instead, by the traversals of the gaze, more than multiple subjects are 'made responsible' as and by own-selves (i.e. subjectivated). So through the (non)authorship of the gaze,

> The efficiency of power, its constraining force … in a sense, passe[s] … over to the other side—to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to a field of visibility … inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is always decided in advance. (Foucault, 1995, p. 203)

In thus manner the sovereign-subject turns inside out, multiplies, and cascades itself as a communal notion of 'society';[59] which in turn, by its 'own', for its 'own' sake, becomes to assume a 'constitutional right' to claim a moral superiority as well.

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[59] For an extensive and exploratory reading of invagination of the subject-sovereign to the communal identification of a population that consists of sovereign subjects, see (Santner, 2011).

Moreover, a disappearance of the unity of the subject also occurs in another sense: the human-body is no longer perceived as a monolithic unity (like a soul),[60] and instead of an already-rigid unity, it becomes to be perceived as an assembly of multiple surfaces, and "enter[s] … a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it" (Foucault, 1995, p. 138). So unlike before, rather than being taken for granted, the subjects' unity begins to be seen as a unification, a work-in-progress, that is aimed to be put in use and 'realized' in an economical fashion:

> [P]eculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities [of bodies] a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase *both the docility and the utility* [emphasis added] of all the elements of the system. (Foucault, 1995, p. 218)

Then in short, the discipline, "a political anatomy of detail" (Foucault, 1995, p. 139), works through a conjunction of two seemingly contrarian facets of morality (normalization) and utility (functional accommodation); on "the intersection of the two divergent lines of objectification [:] … that which rejects the criminal … from the side of a nature against nature; and that which seeks to control delinquency by a calculated economy of punishments" (Foucault, 1995, p. 103). In so doing, "the body and its forces" are considered both with "their utility and their docility," or both by "their distribution and their submission"; and as a body that simultaneously needs to be docile and functional, the training of its forces considers both an "increase … (in economic terms of utility) and [a] diminish[ment] … (in political terms of obedience)" of the forces (Foucault, 1995, pp. 25, 138).

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[60] Instead, with the disciplines, the accustomed notion of body-as-a-prison (of the soul) turns inside out, and rather "the soul" becomes "the prison of the body" (Foucault, 1995, p. 30).

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Then, the gaze of Panopticon concurrently employs; first, a "[h]ierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance"; and second, a "normalizing judgement" that "measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals" (Foucault, 1995, pp. 176-177, 183). These two occupations are conjured in Panopticon's 'inspection' tower by processes and procedures of disciplinary "examination"; a "combin[ation of] … the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth" (Foucault, 1995, pp. 184-185). And by thusly in-formed examinations' "documentary techniques" that are "at once ritual and 'scientific'"; not only "the economy of visibility [transforms] into the exercise of power", but also the notion of "individuality [is introduced] into the field of documentation". In this way, the disciplinary examination "makes each individual a 'case'"; a case that is both an "effect and object of power," or both an "effect and object of knowledge" (Foucault, 1995, pp. 187, 189, 191-192).

To sum up, the gaze of the Panopticon operates, as in Derrida's (2014) terms, a "seeing-punish [*voir-punir*]" (p. 43); *voir* being denoted in almost all its senses—watching, observing, receiving, noting, noticing, examining, studying, judging, realizing, figuring it out, comprehending, to have a patent understanding, and so on (*The Oxford-Hachette French dictionary*, 2007). And every point heretofore considered; the Panopticon epitomizes this seeing-punish by; first, its cellular arrangement, with which it reflects in-formational techne-logics of the disciplines whose maxim of disposition is to work singular beings as identical, concrete, and definite units; second, its tower's apparently consistent diligence, with which it manifests disciplines' ceaseless rigor to processually examine, order, classify, rank, objectify, train, and reform the bodies (economically); and third, its

inspection tower's (non)authorship and constant subject(ivat)ion of the bodies, with which it encapsulates the disciplines' assiduity to traverse, mold, and inscribe bodies as individualized subjects with apparent 'self'-agencies that function as and within self-enclosed circular wholes.

3.3. Disciplinary dispositions of the post-2000 changes

A number of studies pointed out various disciplinary impetuses in the arrangements of F-types (Serin, 2013, pp. 1-2; Bargu, 2014, pp. 130-132), while in some of these they are directly framed as typical panoptical arrangements (Kaptanoğlu, 2000; Özsoy, 2018, p. 271; Koçan & Öncü, 2006, p. 359). Indeed: not only F-types (which are the first scratch buildings that could be successfully established as room types), but also the prototypes of former room types (i.e. Special Types), and subsequent formations of established room types (especially other high security prisons like the D-types), a kinship between them and the Panopticon is hard to ignore. Even from the façade, for instance, the precept of these arrangements echoes some basic rules of Bentham's (1843a) panoptical ordering where "two rules present themselves: —1. *Put not in the same company, corrupt and uncorrupted*; 2. *The more corrupt the individuals, the less numerous make the company* [emphasis in original]. The choice as to numbers will be in general between *four, three, two* [emphasis in original]" (p. 139).

   Surely, this similitude in partitioning concern more than the numerals. As Foucault (1995) mentions, disciplinary "partitioning (.…) [a]void[s] distributions in groups, break[s] up collective dispositions (.…) [and arranges a] space [that] tends to be divided into as many sections as" possible because, above all, this partitioning is about to "organize … an analytical space" (Foucault, 1995, p. 143) whereon the

disciplines process, assess, order, and subject(ivate) singular beings. In this sense, considering above quote of Bentham; the classification of the bodies as 'corrupted' and 'uncorrupted'; the analytical utilization of these classifications in order to rank bodies as well as to gratify 'uncorrupted' with more numerous companies (this gratification is by itself one of the modalities of training[61]); and the moral implications of the word 'corrupt' and 'uncorrupted'—all these seem to be more remarkable foci in thinking through the workings of disciplinary arrangements than the bare numerals. Indeed: just a paragraph later than above quote, the importance of these in arranging the Panopticon is also echoed by Bentham himself:

> As to the principles which determined the characters of the several classes, I took them from the source that all principles are naturally taken from—common opinion and the authority of others. This in the first instance: but for a definitive choice, I have done by them as I do by all principles, as far as time and faculties permit—I have subjected them to the test of utility. The bulk of them have stood this test; others have given way. (Bentham, 1843a, p. 139)

So once again, we see the arrangement of the Panopticon illustrating general informational maxims of the disciplines: 'common opinion' (normalization), 'authority of others' ('established' knowledge of other disciplines such as penology, criminology, or jurisprudence), appreciation of these references as 'natural' sources of knowledge (as factual framings of crime and individual), and above all a continuous utilitarian examination of them (which ceaselessly and attentively subjects singularities to analytical grounds of measurable scales like 'usefulness', 'effectivity', or 'efficiency').

With all these stated, now I think I am ready to start reading room-types through disciplinary maxims. To do this in a nutshell, I will hereafter take the guidance of an encapsulated summary that narrates the post-2000 changes in the

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[61] Disciplines normalize bodies through "a double system: gratification-punishment. And it is this system that operates in the process of training and correction" (Foucault, 1995, p. 180).

penal system of Turkey, which is a short speech presented in the year 2007 by Kenan

İpek, the then-head of General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses (*Ceza ve*

Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü; CTE). In order to briefly read these changes through

the basic maxims of the disciplines, I will first translate each change as it is

mentioned in İpek's (2007) speech, and correlate these framings one by one with the

maxims, mostly in square brackets.

Speaking at a civil-society conference on prisons, İpek (2007) begins to

address the post-2000 changes on the penal system first by mentioning them in

contradistinction to former "prisons of our country that were, [back then,] occurring

to each and every one of our minds always with [sic.] negativity such as escapes,

murders, hostage-takings, or riots"[62] (p. 13, own translation). So even before

mentioning any changes, he first normalizes them as commonsensical progressions,

or as negations of commonsensical 'negativities' of the former times. Then

afterwards, in a matter of minutes, he (2007) begins to address the changes—each of

which are, in his words, "the works that carry a quality of reform"[63]—in the penal

system of Turkey: "the physical structure of the prisons is modernized and the

crowded dorm-system brought to an end"[64] [modern disciplinary techniques began to

be instituted through more cellular[65] arche-structurations of the disciplines]; several

national and regional training centers for prevocational and in-service training of the

personnel are instituted[66] [subjectivation of the personnel, particularly staff,

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[62] "*Bundan 6-7 yıl öncesine kadar ... ülkemizde cezaevi denilince hepimizin aklına isyan, firar, rehin alma, adam öldürme gibi hep olumsuzluklar [sic.] gelmekteydi*"
[63] "*reform niteliğindeki çalışmalar.*"
[64] "*[C]eza infaz kurumlarında fizikî yapı modernize edilmiş ve kalabalık koğuş sistemine son verilmiştir.*"
[65] For an elaboration of my utilization of the word the cell and some explanations of my choosing of this word to refer to both solo and triple units of the F-types, see the Part 3.6 and Conclusion of this thesis.
[66] The first central training center for the prison personnel was opened in Ankara on July 17, 2000, and began to issue prevocational training (to new-coming personnel) and in-service training (to

commenced and furthered by standardized—uni-formed and uni-formative—

disciplinary educations and trainings]; "regarding educational and rehabilitative

practices that are concerned with … [the prisoners,] standards have been identified

according to the particularities of each institution; and, by a system of standards,

these practices began to be monitored and supervised on grounds of efficiency,"[67] [a

series of disciplinary practices began to be pursued on multiple scales that both

inscribe singularities with stases-tically standardized denotations and incessantly

(re)evaluate them through utilitarian assessments]; "the Judicature of Execution is

instituted for a juridical superintendence of all the activities and operations

conducted within the prisons"[6869] [*disciplinarization*[70] of the penal institutions further

secured with a further intertwinement with the in-formational grids of jurisprudence];

penal institutions are opened for "inspections … on behalf of the civil society",[71] i.e.

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existing personnel) (İpek, 2010, p. 223; Taşkın, 2010, p. 406). Before this date, there were also various in-service and prevocational training programs, yet they were not standardized and uniformly instituted on a national scale (except, in an extent, administrative organs). With the enactment of the law on personnel education centers ("Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli eğitim merkezleri kanunu," 2002) and later on related regulations ("Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli eğitim merkezleri kuruluş," 2004; "Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri hizmet öncesi," 2004; "Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli hizmet içi," 2004); professional training of the prison personnel was further standardized and dispersed around the country. Today, there are five training centers located in Ankara, İstanbul, Erzurum, Maraş, and Denizli (Yücel-Atalay, 2015, p.23). (This information is still valid as of May 19, 2019. See http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/menudekiler/egitim_merkezleri/egitim_merkezleri.asp). Presently there are at least 36 professions employed in the prisons of Turkey that includes educationalists, principals, social workers, doctors, dentists, psychologists, inspectors, accountants, librarians, guards, and others (Taşkın, 2010, p. 404). Training centers provide in-service training to each personnel hired in penal institutions, prevocational training to administrative staff and guards (Taşkın, 2010, pp. 407-409; "Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli hizmet içi," 2004).

[67] "*Hükümlü ve tutukluların eğitim ve iyileştirme faaliyetleri için her kuruma özgü standartlar belirlenerek, bu çalışmaların takip ve denetimi, verimlilik esasına göre standartlar sistemi çerçevesinde yapılmaya başlandı.*"

[68] "*[C]eza infaz kurumlarındaki bütün eylem ve işlemleri yargısal anlamda denetleyen infaz hâkimliklerinin kurulması*".

[69] Bodies of the Judicature of Execution began to work in 2001 after enactment of the law (*İnfaz Hâkimliği Kanunu*, 2001)

[70] This word is not included in (*The Merriam-Webster dictionary,* 2016); however, it is technically used as a noun to refer to a process or activity of pursuing disciplinarian systemics in many studies such as (Depaepe, Simon, & Van Gorp, 2004), (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2003), (Jacob, 2008), (Lebeaume, 2015), (Taylor, 2010, p. 57), or (Wang, 2011); including Foucault (2006, pp. 66, 69, 15, 124; 2009, pp. 14, 119, 340-341) himself.

[71] "*[S]ivil toplum adına … denetlenmesi*"

by "monitoring councils"[72] that consist of "persons who satisfy legal conditions"[73] [this indicates a selection which is preconditioned by several criteria such as being legally suitable to apply as a public servant,[74] or "being acknowledged in [social] circles as an honest, trustworthy, and moral individual"[75] ("Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri izleme," 2001, art. 3, ¶ 3, own translation); so with the monitoring councils, the disciplinarization of the penal system furthered and strengthened with in-formational grids of legal propriety and socio-morality]; "several legal regulations were put into effect to guarantee the groups that are defined as fragile and in need of protection[—i.e.] women, children, and aliens[—]to benefit from basic convict rights without distinction in our [penal] institutions"[76] [a disciplinary pursuance of apparently inclusive leniency which works 'for the sake' of its subjects—subjects 'who' are already circumscribed through disciplinary groundings that inscribe, classify, and confine singular beings—further cemented its maxims by entailing the bodies to standardized notions of abstraction (like 'universal rights') even if to pursue their (already circumscribed) beings]; and lastly, probation programs are instituted and proliferated by an increasing number of "the Centers of Probation and Assistance (*Denetimli Serbestlik ve Yardım Merkezleri*)"[77] [although an employment of the institutions social control other than imprisonment (like probation) may sometimes be read as a diminishment of the disciplinary forces by substituting the prisons, in fact this employment generally means an expansion of the disciplinary

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[72] "*İzleme kurulları*"
[73] "*[K]anunda yazan şartları taşıyan kişiler*"
[74] "*İzleme kurullarına başkan ve üye seçilebilmek için 14.7.1965 tarihli ve 657 sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununda öngörülen genel şartlara [uygun olma] … niteli[ği] … aranır*"
[75] "*Kişisel nitelikleri ile çevresinde dürüst, güvenilir ve ahlaklı olarak tanınmış olmak*"
[76] "Kurumlarımızda hassas ve korunmaya muhtaç gruplar olarak tanımlanan kadın, çocuk ve yabancıların ayırıma [sic.] tâbi tutulmaksızın tüm temel mahkum haklarından yararlanmasını teminat altına alan gerekli yasal düzenlemeler yapılmış ve uygulamaya geçirilmiştir"
[77] These began to be instituted in late 2005 after enactment of the law ("Denetimli serbestlik ve yardım," 2005).

grids rather than their decline[78]] (pp. 13-14, own translation). "With these reforms briefly summarized",[79] İpek (2007) concludes, "now the institutions of penal execution have obtained the necessary infrastructure to perform their fundamental duty to resocialize remand and sentenced prisoners"[80] (p. 14, own translation).

The latter emphasis on resocialization as 'the fundamental duty' of a penal institution needs to be further underscored, since it has also been mentioned as one of the "primary aims (*temel amaç*)" of punishment in the penal code and the consecutive penal regulation[81] (as a part of general and special prevention which also aims to "protect the society against crime (*toplumu suça karşı korumak*)" ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, bk. 1, pt. 1, div. 2, art. 3, ¶ 1; "Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 2, art. 4, ¶ 2). For Eren (2014), this emphasis on resocialization, together with that of rehabilitation (*iyileştirme*), was especially important for it has been signifying a definitive remark on the ventures of penal execution in intervening and controlling daily lives of the prisoners—i.e. a series of ventures which had begun in 1971 (with the introduction of subjectivating soldier-prisoners as a principal aim of penalty), briefly interrupted from 1974 to 1978, accelerated with the 1980 coup, took different turns and forms by the mid-1980s, peaked with the successful establishment of F-types and consecutive room-types, and finalized with the enactment of the penal code (pp. 199, 216, 250; also see

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[78] This is because these institutions of "social control" mostly augments further tactics and technologies to control the bodies rather than substituting the ones before, and also because their operational domain is far more extensive than the penal institutions (which include, for instance, the neighborhoods by instituting 'community policing')—for a comprehensive study on these techniques' intertwined expansion with and of the disciplinary grids, see (Cohen, 2005, pp. 4-114).

[79] "*Kısaca ifade ettiğim bu reformlarla*"

[80] "*ceza infaz kurumları aslî görevleri olan hükümlü ve tutukluların topluma kazandırılmasına yönelik yapılan çalışmalar için gerekli altyapıya kavuşmuştur*"

[81] This regulation was repealed with statutory decree ("Anayasada yapılan değişikliklere," 2018) and the references to it in the penal code are amended; however, because it has been one of the most crucial legal texts as to the penal management of Turkey until very recently, I will go on to refer to it throughout the thesis.

Part 2.2.1 of this thesis). So in a sense, this was a furtherance of the process of penal disciplinarization that had been beginning with the professionalization of torture techniques,[82] integration of these to the disciplinary grids of the military, and a later incorporation of (and gradual succession by) civil associations and individuals that profess disciplinary human sciences (see (Bekaroğlu, 2006) for the latter transformation).

3.4. Disciplinary role distributions in the penal arrangements

The development of disciplinarization that is reflected in the penal code (together with a whole array of post-2000 penal legislations which form a constellation around the general framework of the code) may first be accounted by a multiplication of disciplinary professions that are prescribed by the penal code to be employed in penal arrangements. To give an instance; for securing the services of surveillance and classification, the penal code calls for a hiring of a wide range of disciplinary professions such as criminologists, penologists, behavioral scientists, executives specialized in juristic psychology or criminal law, psychiatrists, physicians, forensic scientists, psychologists, pedagogues, child development experts, social workers, psychological counselors, specialists in guidance services, and educationalists ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, bk. 1, pt. 2, div. 5, art. 23, ¶ 1.b). This was, if nothing, a significant advancement given that Bekaroğlu (2006, p. 219)—one of the first psychologists employed in the room types—mentioned an employment of only four bodies (educationalists, religious commissaries, educationalists, and a manager) in psychosocial services of the prison during the early and mid-1980s.

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[82] Which concern an appeal to a number of disciplinary professions that are no less than cognitive sciences, psychology, neurosciences, physiology, linguistics, pedagogy, positivist sociology, and so on.

In addition to this, as also İpek's (2007, 2010) above highlights on personnel trainings hinted, regarding the changes in the penal arrangements, not only there was an employment of more numerous disciplinary professions, but also a more disciplinary employment of existing professions. On the one hand, as Taşkın (2010) says, the requirements of being a prison staff were increasing (p. 405) in a disciplinary fashion: for instance, to be an administrative officer employed in a prison; in 1991, being eligible to be a public servant was enough by itself, and the selection was being conducted by sortition; in 1997, an employment of these officials would require a specialized written exam and an interview, and in those, to be employed as an administrative officer, an applicant had to be documented as a courageous, determined, honest individual who has had no connections with a foreign ideology or a separatist or detrimental movement; in 2000, in addition to a requirement of passing a national exam (this requirement was added in the same year as to the employment of any prison staff), the applicants had to be older than 30 years, officially documented to be courageous and coldblooded by a psychiatric institution, not to be shorter than 175 centimeters (for men) or 160 centimeters (for women), not to have a disability, to have a proper physical outlook, and to have at least a bachelor's degree in law, economics, business, finance, public administration, sociology, psychology, social services, educational sciences, or engineering ("Adalet Bakanlığı memur sınav-atama ve nakil yönetmeliği," 1991, pt. 3, div. 2, art. 53; "Adalet Bakanlığı memur sınav-atama ve nakil yönetmeliğinin bazı," 1997, art. 6; "Adalet Bakanlığı memur sınav-atama ve nakil yönetmeliğinde," 2000, art. 2, ¶ e; art. 4, ¶ B.17). On the other hand, as it became more eminent with the law on training centers ("Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli eğitim merkezleri kanunu," 2002), the post-2000 changes in the penal execution were also increasingly focusing

on utility maximization and disciplinary training of the staff: For instance, in the consecutive regulations on training centers; aims (*hedefler*) of the in-service training were being mentioned as improving productivity, efficiency and thriftiness of the management and the institutional practices, increasing knowledge and utility of the personnel, preparing and training them for higher positions, educating them on duties, powers, and responsibilities of civil servants, etc.; principles (*ilkeler*) of in-service training as being in accordance with the principles of productivity, efficiency and thriftiness [again], making continuous assessments during and after the activities of training, training the personnel according to the qualifications they gain in trainings and the position they are signing up to be trained, holding a supervisor responsible for training and coaching each personnel, etc.; aims (*hedefler*) of prevocational training as ensuring compliance of the students to the institution, procuring the students to adopt a common vision in comprehending and interpreting the purposes and principles of the penal system of Turkey, etc.; principles (*hedefler*) of prevocational training as organizing the programs suitable for pre-service training needs, continuously evaluating and developing prevocational training programs, cooperating with public and private institutions and organizations, etc.; and both of the regulations were framing the general interests of trainings (eg. criminal law, criminal procedure law, law of execution, criminology, psychology, business, martial arts, human rights, professional ethics, and others for in-service training; justice organization, administrative law, criminal law, law of criminal procedure and execution, criminology, social relations, social services, human rights, professional ethics, martial arts, and others in prevocational training) and the examinations that would assess them in a considerably disciplinarized manner ("Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri personeli hizmet içi," 2004, div. 2, art. 5, ¶ a - c; art. 6, ¶ a, c, e - f; div.

4, art. 15, ¶ f - l; div. 5, art. 21 - 27; "Ceza infaz kurumları ve tutukevleri hizmet öncesi," 2004, div. 2, art. 5, ¶ a-b; art. 6, ¶ a, d - e; div. 4, art. 16, ¶ c-k; div. 5, art. 24 - 34).

In accordance with the aforementioned dispositions, prisons became to be arranged in a more disciplinary fashion. Above all, not only the employed staff became more professionalized, but also their deployment became more fixtured and orderly. To begin with, in the relevant codes, the prison personnel is first organized as a number of "services (*servis*)", which are management services,[83] security and surveillance services,[84] technical services,[85] psychosocial services,[86] medical services,[87] education and training services,[88] workshops services,[89] and auxiliary services[90] ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.a-h; art. 24, ¶ 1).[91] Secondly, the general management of the prisons are arranged by four

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[83] These are provided by administrative staff, warehouse officer(s), and prison clerk(s) ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.a).
[84] These are provided by all the execution and protection officers [all the guards and their heads] employed within an institution ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.b).
[85] These are provided by engineer(s), architect(s), technician(s), and their assistants ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.c).
[86] These are provided by psychologists and social-workers; and later also sociologists and child development specialists ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.d; art. 24, ¶ 1).
[87] These are provided by prison doctor(s), dentist(s), chemist(s), veterinary(ies), dietitian(s), medical assistants, and animal sanitarian(s) employed in an institution ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.e).
[88] These are provided by all educationalists and librarian(s) employed in the institution ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.f).
[89] These are provided by the workshop manager, the treasurer, the cashier, the collector, warehouse officer(s), procurement officer(s), staff in charge of budget, marketing and similar tasks, personnel working in worker-status, and the regular personnel who takes salary from the budget when necessary ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.g).
[90] These are provided by switchboard operator(s), a shipman (or ship-persons), driver(s), technician(s) for heating, cook(s), and janitor(s) employed in an institution ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 18, ¶ 2.h).
[91] There can of course be variations or alterations in workings and organization of these services according to the particularities of each prison; for instance, a child development specialist may be lacking in a prison composed only of males, or some other bodies like a ship-person or an animal sanitarian may be lacking altogether. Moreover, some of these listed professions (like librarians, warehouse officials, or medical assistants like infirmary examiners) mostly are guards with specific professional interests or expertises, and also some listed professions (like drivers) may be prisoners classified as orderly and docile. Moreover, along with all this fixtured unitary arrangement, the execution and protection officers (i.e. guards) are also arranged and ranked in units such as shift units,

main bodies called the "boards (*kurul*)": the administration and surveillance board,[92] the workshops management board,[93] the disciplinary board,[94] and the board of education[95] ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 4, art. 34, ¶ 1; art. 35, ¶ 1; art. 36, ¶ 1; art. 37, ¶ 1).

These boards, all headed by the chief principal,[96] are the main panoptical bodies that deploy most of the disciplinary (re)assessments and (re)arrangements within the prisons: To give some instances; first, administration and surveillance boards allocate prisoners to suitable institutions through detecting their 'crime types', duly decide on a 'suitable' execution and rehabilitation regime for each individual, classify the prisoners, (ultimately) decide on the good conduct of a prisoner, determine and change the units where they stay, evaluate prisoners' compliance to rehabilitation programs and assess end-results of these, decide whether a prisoner can benefit from the facilities and activities or be employed in-institution jobs, decide whether to restrict rights of utilizing media for those that are classified as dangerous

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administrative units, or intervention units. (For a narration on the intervention units from a prisoner's perspective, see (Açan, 2006, pp. 278-280))

[92] The administration and surveillance board (*idare ve gözlem kurulu*) is headed by the principal of the institution, and consists of an administrative officer, the vice principal in charge of surveillance and classification, a prison doctor, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a social worker, an educationalist, the chief officer of execution and protection [the head of the guards], and a staff member selected from the technical staff by the principal ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 4, art. 34, ¶ 1).

[93] The workshops management board (*işyurdu yönetim kurulu*) is headed by the workshops manager, and consists of the second principal in charge of the workshops, an accountant, a workshops officer, an administrative officer, and a prison clerk ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 4, art. 35, ¶ 1).

[94] The disciplinary board (*disiplin kurulu*) is headed by the principal of the institution, and consists of an administrative officer, one representative selected by the principal from each profession employed in the psycho-social service, an educationalist, the workshops chief, and the charged chief officer of execution and protection [head of the guards] ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 4, art. 36, ¶ 1).

[95] The board of education (*eğitim kurulu*) is headed by the principal of the institution, and consists of the vice principal in charge of education, a prison doctor, a psychologist, a social worker, all educationalists employed in the institution, and the librarian ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 1, div. 4, art. 37, ¶ 1).

[96] The workshops management board may be seem as an exception to this; however, the chair of this board, the workshops manager, is nobody but the chief principal ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 19, ¶ 1).

or organization members, and decide whether a prisoner can go out of the institution for social, cultural, or sportive activities; workshops management boards direct all kinds of activities related to the development and general course of the workshops, ensure that the prisoners are employed within the framework of rehabilitation programs, determine the sales price of the products produced and sold in the institution, and so on;[97] disciplinary boards inflict disciplinary punishments[98] other than warning, censure, and restriction from some activities (these three are given through the sole authority of the chief principal), reward the prisoners according to their attitude and behavior, express opinions on good conduct (last decision is of administrative and surveillance board as foretold), and decide whether the letters, faxes or telegrams (that are found objectionable by the letter reading commission[99]) will be withheld or handed over to the prisoner; and lastly, boards of education determine the bases of training and rehabilitation programs, plan missions for the expenses of the programs, track, evaluate and analyze the workings and results of the programs, determine necessary alterations regarding them and ensure their implementation, guarantee a research is conducted, reports are prepared and evaluated on an arriving prisoner, inform individuals, institutions, or establishments on the prisoner and his situation if considered necessary, take missions to encourage

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[97] Workshops in the sense of work dorms (*işyurdu*) are mostly irrelevant to the prisoners of high security prisons, because there are only workshops in the sense of studios (*atölye*) to which inmates of good conduct can go and do some paintings or make small handiworks like wallets, trinkets, chandeliers, or what have you. So one can even say that the arrangement of workshops in high-security prisons are effected more by the other boards that classify and rank the prisoners, than the workshops boards. (These works done in studios can also be sold once a month or two months at open visits by the managements on behalf of the prisoners. They can make, if they are lucky, only modest sums of money through these sales, and *this is mostly the only possible income that the prisoners can make* in high-security settings.)

[98] There are six disciplinary punishments: "censure (*kınama*)", "restriction from some activities (*bazı etkinliklere katılmaktan alıkoyma*)", "deprivation from salaried work (*ücret karşılığı çalışılan işten yoksun bırakma*)", "deprivation or restriction from tools of communication and correspondence (*haberleşme veya iletişim araçlarından yoksun bırakma veya kısıtlama*)", "deprivation from accepting visitors (*ziyaretçi kabulünden yoksun bırakma*)", "solitary confinement (*hücreye koyma*)" ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 7, div. 1, art. 144-150)

[99] I will mention this commission soon below.

book-reading, raise public awareness on the prisoners' education and rehabilitation, determine which publications can be brought to the library, decide whether an arriving book will be accepted to the library, decide whether a publication contains a news, text, photograph, or comment is obscene or jeopardizes the security of the institution, determine who can be brought from outside the institution for a particular activity or an event together with the activity's subject and theme ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, bk. 1, pt. 1, div. 7, art. 47, ¶ 1; "Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 4, art. 40, ¶ 1.a-h, j; 3; art. 41, ¶¶ 1.a-b, d; art. 42, ¶¶ 1.a-c, f; made 43, ¶¶ 1.a-k).

In addition to these boards, within the institutions, there may also be some organized bodies given differing board names like "room selection board (*oda seçici kurul*)", "selecting commission (*seçici komisyon*)" (selection in the sense of deciding whether or not a prisoner is suitable to benefit from facilities or activities), or "publication selection board (*yayın seçici kurul*)" (Fieldnotes, 2014); yet these are just above boards convening with different names. Apart from these, there are also commissions which are less authorized but relate more immediately to the prisoners, such as the "letter reading commission (*mektup okuma komisyonu*)" that consists of a charged vice principal, an administrative officer, and two guards, or the "telephone monitoring unit (*telefon dinleme birimi*)" which is one of the units that consists solely of the guards (who are charged by the management for the task) ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 5, div. 5, art. 122, ¶ 1; *Adalet: Kontrol merkezi işlemleri*, 2016, p. 45).

With all the boards and the role distribution summarized, I think now we at least have a number of basic disciplinary framings such as trainings, filings, continuous assessments, classifications, and distributions of bodies; adherence to

unitarian in-formational grids of (many) disciplines that both subject and normalize

bodies on analytical planes and accordingly a professionalization and vertical

hierarchization of the subjects; constant utilitarian calculations regarding the tasks;

and so on. In these senses, I hope that Eren's (2014, pp. 199, 250) stress on the room-

type reform's interests in intervening prisoner's daily lives, and other studies'

framing of the F-types and other room type prisons as disciplinary or panoptical

arrangements, comes with no surprise.

3.5. Captures of the F-types

Henceforward, my writing will particularly revolve around the F-types, both for the

sake of compactness, and since the setting of my subsequent data will mostly be the

F-type prisons. In this part, I will try to briefly convey the general operational

workings of the F-types while keeping on to take the disciplinary framing of the

setting as my focus.

To begin with and to reiterate, like the Panopticon, a disciplinary machinery

subjects, with a careful scrutiny, all the zones where a body, any body, is exposed. In

the F-types, as in other high security prisons and closed prisons, there are various

means to observe and capture these zones, the most obvious of which are cameras

and other technological tools of surveillance. In these prisons, first of all, a closed-

circuit TV (CCTV) system that consists of 23 external and 137 internal cameras

monitor all the movements in corridors and other shared areas,[100] record and save

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[100] In F-types the coverage of the cameras do not include insides of the cells or private yards, but that does not mean that this has not being attempted. Especially in the last years, several F-type administrations started to include private yards into the CCTV system, which in turn faced with the resistance (especially of left-political prisoners) at every prison, and the projects provisionally concluded (alongside a series of disciplinary punishments, of course); but the attempts are still carried from time to time in differing institutions. That being the case, all private yards are still visible from at least four windows (two windows facing one another at both stories), and these are utilized by personnel to surveil the prisoners from time to time (especially when there is a collective protests or

images they capture for at least six months, transmit them simultaneously to 40 monitors positioned in a local (in-prison) surveillance center, and also relay them to a central system of the Justice Ministry (*Adalet: Kontrol merkezi işlemleri*, 2016, pp. 3, 5-6). A 'proper' arrangement of the institution is further guaranteed by other electronic systems like an internal switch system which restricts operativeness of the doors facing the corridors when another one of them is already open. In addition to a constant observance of watchtowers and touring sentries, rigid exterior securities like motion-sensitive cameras that record the roofs, razor wires that encircles the tops of the units, a ground built by multi-laminated concrete and bound to an excavation sensitive system, and the strict procedures and technological devices employed in entries and exists of the bodies such as x-rays and biometrical devices (in addition to detailed body searches and filings), all ensure a constant surveillance for the propriety of the institution's constant separation of its 'outside' and 'inside'.

Yet the captured footage of the cameras and other surveillance tools are only the most literal means of capturing a body. A prisoner, from his/her capture as a suspect to police investigation, from his/her legal registry to casing, from his/her trial to the psychosocial assessments pursued by the penal institution—all throughout the confinement to his/her release, and from his/her release to post-release (which is also a process of pre-detainment, whether the detainment actually takes place or not), the prisoner's movements, responses, voice, utterances, (re)actions and in general all the bodily forces are tracked and framed by the disciplinary weapons of subject(ivat)ion. In this manner, I think I can use the term capture to have a rather broader denotation than the capture of the cameras, and frame it to refer to a whole array of recordings and framings to be utilized analytically by the disciplinary means of in-formation—

an event). From the upper windows and partly through a little hole at the main iron door of the cell-entry, insides of the compartments are also visible in a good extent (but one needs to look one by one).

spatiotemporal divisions, classifications, examinations, prescriptions and inscriptions of actions, encapsulation of activities, captivations of life as a personage, the framing of life as grants or restrictions of formal rights, and so on—all of which are, in general, a multiplex of segmentary figurations and orders of beings assumed in their stases. In this sense, the prison's segmental walls and rhythms (routine), gratifications and punishments of actions and in general disciplinary sanctions, the constant observance and documentation of actions and activities, and all other means of unitary frame-works (or work-frames) that document, assess, inscribe, objectivize, and seemingly subjectivate a singularity can be framed as captures.

Then in the F-types, the captures begin even before the first footage is shot by the cameras. Before even entering the institution, the prisoner is already a body that is captured and frame-worked—not only by the executive and juridical organs, but also by the units of the institution themselves such as the board of education (which, as mentioned in the former part, frames and conveys a general report on the body-to-be-confined, and presents it to executive organs). Then afterwards the prisoner's entrance, the capturing and frame-working becomes the most eminent to him,[101] because now he becomes to be filed face to face with almost all the bodies and 'services' of the institution.[102] With all these filings and all other admission

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[101] As I mentioned formerly, I use male pronouns whenever I write of a point that happens in or is exclusive to the particular settings of F-type prisons, because these prisons confine males only.

[102] Upon his entry, the prisoner is first filed by the soldiers (who are responsible for external security). His photo is taken, then fingerprints, id information, blood type, 'crime' type, accomplices, foes, educational background, former address, and so on. Then begins a filing by the guards, and similar information is gathered and filed again; ID, crime, foe/friend relations, arrival date, if sentenced the length of sentence, original date of crime, to even the educational background of parents. Then afterwards his confinement, on initial days following the entry, a medical examination by the health units that documents his chronic illnesses, together with his physical characteristics, are conducted and recorded to a medical form. Afterwards, he will also be filed by an educationist, and his detailed educational background, if exists present attendance to a school, his prospections on education, educational interests, &c. will be interviewed and captured. Then there will be a filing by the psychosocial units, and whether he is a recidivist, dependent on any drug, suitable to or in need of any psychosocial assistance program, whether he thinks he deserves the sentence, whether he has a problem regarding his unit, together with his hobbies, interests, pursuits, and the like will all be asked,

procedures such as searches, now the prisoner comes to be introduced to the disciplinary machinery, and goes into a phase which Goffman terms "trimming", or "programming":

> [B]ecause in thus being squared away the new arrival allows himself to be shaped and coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smoothly by routine operations. Many of these procedures depend upon attributes such as weight or fingerprints that the individual possesses merely because he is a member of the largest and most abstract of social categories, that of human being. (Goffman, 1990, p.16).

During the prisoner's confinement, each channel through which he may correspond with others outside his cell is surveilled and captured. Until recently, only legal exception to these was accepting lawyer visits, listening and recording of which were restricted, and its surveillance was limited to a visual observance of a charged staff behind some 'noise-proof' glasses.[103] However, after an amendment enacted in early 2018 to the penal code, a series of exceptions that permit recording, examination, and restriction of lawyer visits of a broad array of prisoners, including every prisoner of every high security prison, are issued and legalized ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, bk. 1, pt. 3, div. 1, art. 59, ¶¶ 5-8, 10). With this addition, now each domain of interaction between the prisoners and others outside the cells is captured and examined formally: The prisoners' (at most) an hour-long weekly visits[104] and 10 minute weekly phone calls[105] are recorded, listened, and

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and if answered, captured. This will repeat once every six months. (His occupation and craftsmanship, together with his status or artifice, may also be documented by the workshop units, but for a possibility of waged working is nonexistent in high-security prisons, these are seldom done in the F-types and other high security prisons.)

[103] Yet even then, it would be difficult to say that this rule was being complied fully. For instance, during a lawyer visit, one could hear coughs of the guards that surveil the visit behind the 'noise-proof' glasses.

[104] Apart from those with lawyers and several state officials, visits with relatives or friends can be conducted only once a week, and at most an hour. There are two types of visits, open and close. Open visits (conducted without physical restrictions but on the watch of cameras and staff) are carried out on some national holidays and regularly once every two months, and close visits (conducted through protective glasses and a wired telephone between visitors and prisoners) are carried out all other

inspected. Each letter addressed to or written by them are read and delivered if only it is found 'appropriate', sometimes with scratched words or sentences, or cut images or parts. The same goes with books, magazines, newspapers, and other published material: even if they are legal, these can be rejected as 'inconveniently obscene' or 'jeopardizing security, or like the letters, they may be cut or scratched before being handed over (and because the phases 'obscene' and 'jeopardizing security' are ambiguous enough, virtually any material can be restricted by the relevant units). Formally, the prisoners of different cells may only interact with each other by writing letters; and like every other letter, these are examined and handed over by the discretion of the relevant commission and board.

Apart from these, the prisoners send notes to each other by attaching them to self-made balls and throwing them from a ventilation space to another; but if these are seen during the searches or counts which are conducted twice a day, they are confiscated and examined. Additionally, the staff searches the roofs for the stuck notes at least once a month, and hand them over to the relevant commissions for examination. The notes may be utilized for further filing, managerial segregation, mapping out in-prison(er) relations, issuing legal complaints against inmates, or even publishing in the media to expose inmate relations.

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weeks of the month. ("Hükümlü ve tutukluların ziyaret," 2006, pt. 2, div. 1, art. 5, ¶¶ c-e, g; art. 7, 10; div. 2, art. 13, 15, 17) The prisoners can be visited by three people of their choosing—chosen on initial days of their arrest, and can be changed only on several conditions (like death or dispatch). Apart from these three people, the prisoners can only be visited by their legal guardians and some kith and kin (only first-degree relatives and some second and third-degree relatives) ("Hükümlü ve tutukluların ziyaret," 2006, pt. 2, div. 1, art. 5, ¶ h; art. 9, div. 2, art. 14). The frequency and scale of the visits are further limited if the prisoner is sentenced to an aggregated life imprisonment ("Hükümlü ve tutukluların ziyaret," 2006, pt. 1, div. 2, art. 5 ¶ f; art. 11, 12; div. 2, art. 15).

[105] The prisoners can call his relatives to third degree, legal guardian, or wife once every week, at most 10 minutes; however, these can be restricted to the prisoners of high security prisons by the decision of the President as well as other disciplinary punishments ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," bk. 1, pt. 3, div. 2, art. 66).

The channels which the prisoner may reach and correspond with the personnel (except the counts, searches, or other regularities) also need to go through another mean of capture: letters of application. This is an irruptive rule that everyone faces with during their entry: "whatever done, can only be done through written requests (*burada her şey dilekçeyle olur*)" (Personal communication, 2014). Regularly, the applications are given to the guards on weekdays during the morning counts; and once all are collected, the first job of the day is to check, classify, and deliver the requests to their unit of concern. To see in-prison infirmary, to take books from the library, for a fixation of flushes or lamps, to hand over anything to visitors, to request a cell-change… To make weekly phone-calls, to buy any groceries, to purchase any item from the prison canteen…[106] To correspond with any personnel; be it an executive, a member of psychosocial services, an educationalist, a librarian, a warehouseman… All needs to be captured, classified, and issued by written requests (the writing styles of which are also utilized for further disciplinary examinations[107]). What is more, this requirement does not concern only regularities, but also emergencies. (For an emergency, there is an alarm switch, a button, next to each entry door of the units.) For instance, even when a prisoner is suffering a heart attack, after the button of emergency is pushed, his dispatch to the hospital or other health service first have to go through several procedures of coding and filing, and in these not only a request needs to be written, but also a whole array of bureaucratic proceedings from multiple detailed body searches to assigning a ring vehicle, needs to be conducted, and mostly cost hours.

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[106] These all have forms that has to be filled and handed over on predefined weekdays, which are then administered on other predefined weekdays. On the times of their delivery, canteen purchases and groceries are brought to the units; the prisoner is unable to go out.

[107] As to how a prisoner phrases his appeals, like whether he addresses the institution with 'respect' and in a docile manner or not, or like whether his phrasing is 'educated' enough to inform the media and authorities or not.

Each time a prisoner goes inside and outside the cell, he is stripped of his shoes, and a body search is conducted by the charged staff both by hand and with a detector. Once the prisoner is outside the cell, he is escorted by guards or soldiers[108] to wherever he goes, without exception, including any medical visit to any health unit, on his dispatch as well as the duration of his examination. The units of his confinement are also searched at least once a month by guards or soldiers, in front of the inmates, and by attendance and participation of the supervisory personnel such as the principal, vice principals, administrative staff, educationalists, psychosocial units, head(s) of the guards, high-ranking members of the military, and the like. These searches may be more relaxed or strict depending on the particularities of the management or the shift-units and soldiers conducting the searches,[109] as well as the classification of the searched prisoner. In its relatively relaxed forms the search may be conducted in several minutes, or in its intense forms it may take notably more time for it examines as much detail as possible.[110] In addition to the regular searches, the prisoners' cells may also be raided and searched at any time in the day and the night.[111]

Throughout the day, there becomes multiple possibilities of face to face encounters, especially with the guards, or other employed prisoners like food servers (mostly employed from open prisons rather than high securities), or other personnel

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[108] If a prisoner is being dispatched to an institution outside the prison, he is escorted by soldiers; if he goes somewhere inside the institution, he is escorted by guards.

[109] Shift units are another type of units that consist of the guards. In the F-types, there are three blocks, and three shift-units all headed by a charged guard; and the blocks they are assigned change monthly. These units are the ones who are most employed in the conduct of (at least regular) searches, so their particular attitudes against particular prisoners may greatly effect the rigidity of search, inasmuch as the search is not issued with a particular concern of the supervisory personnel.

[110] For instance, a strict search looks inside the envelopes, skips already-read letters, searches for in-prisoner correspondences at every possible place including the insides of the books and letters, diligently hammers the walls, scans everywhere with detectors, examines insides of the fridges, re-writes with the pens to check if anything is hidden inside the fillable components, and so on.

[111] In the times when a prisoner's unit is raided and searched, the search is mostly conducted in the strictest sense possible.

if they are met on prisoner's demand or their want. Most of these encounters occur not inside the cell, but behind the entrance door looking to the corridor, or in another part of the institution where the prisoner is taken with escort—so mostly the cameras observe and capture the situation and become in themselves a force to put everybody 'in place'. In addition to this, at every encounter, with seldom exceptions like a small number of meetings with psychosocial staff, the prison also counts on a surveillance of other staff. To give several instances; during the counts or closings of ventilation doors (of triple units[112]), the guards never enter the units one by one—they enter at least as three at a time, sometimes also with their heads and/or other supervisory personnel; other prison personnel or employed personnel (like plumbers or electricians) are always escorted by the guards and sometimes by other supervisory personnel. When they come to the units in small numbers for meetings, these occur not inside the cell but behind the entrance door; so also with other parts of physical setting, the propriety of the institution and the role distribution is ensured.

The documentation and capturing of life, and the assurance of capture by other means of capture, render the spatiotemporal plane very plain. The regular routinizes with repetitions of the sameness, and each day begins to look the same. At around six in the morning, the breakfast is distributed, if it had not already been distributed the night before. At around eight and a half, the guards count and collect the written applications. Roughly after two hours, a call— "bread!"—resonates on all the corridors, and two bread for each prisoner are brought. Then the newspapers and other publications—and if it is 'the letter day', letters—are handed. At around noon, another cry— "food!"—resonates, and towards the evening, another. Then close to sunset, whenever it is, the guards come and lock the doors of ventilation spaces. And

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[112] Single units' ventilation doors are closed from a second corridor, so the guards' entrance to these units are mostly unnecessary.

lastly, at every night around eight and a half, the prisoner is counted again. In addition, there may also be several other scheduled and programmed additions to this regularity like institutional activities, visits, weekly phone calls, and the like; all of whose restriction is possible by managerial decisions and disciplinary punishments.

3.6. Room or cell?

Then, the whole spatiotemporal and managerial arrangement of an F-type is isolative. Curiously, however, in the (already small) corpus written on the F-types, the question whether isolation (*tecrit*) exists or not corresponds to a notable part of the literature. Should we use the term 'room' to refer to the main units of confinement, instead of calling them 'cells'? Should we rather call them 'dorms' (*koğuş*)[113] and pull off of the argument altogether? As to the triple units, would it be more proper to use the term 'small-group isolation' instead of isolation? What if we say that an isolative regime is not present in F-types at all?

The debates are revived every now and then, but the state and state officials generally have one distinct response: Isolation does not exist inside the F-type prisons, and the units where the prisoners are put need to be called rooms[114] instead

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[113] *Koğuş* is usually used to refer to multi-occupancy dormitories wherein no additional separated space is found for the prisoner other than her bed. It was, and mostly is, a term that indicates crowded spaces of confinement, which are apparently different from any uncrowded unit that is referred by the term room or cell. Nevertheless, inside the prison life, I multiply heard and read (in written conversations) that the term *koğuş* is in fact used by some to refer to a prisoner unit of an F-type, both by a number of prison personnel and (mostly common) prisoners. This makes sense in an extent when one thinks that the term *koğuş* had historically been the main unit of imprisonment in Turkey for a long time, so it may have become habitual for some prisoners and prison personnel to refer to the units as such. It would also make sense, in another way, when one thinks that the term *koğuş* literally means a space where someone is put; and thusly understood, it may also provide a sort of neutral definition to refer to the units. Furthermore, usage of the term *koğuş* to refer cells-for-three may also be technically feasible in an extent, because there are no additional private spaces in these units that separate the prisoners except their beds. However, in this thesis, I have stuck up with the formal and generally employed sense of the term *koğuş*, and used it interchangeably with the crowded multi-occupancy prison dorms, and when found in Turkish, I also translated it in this way.
[114] Given that the term room type has been employed before the F-types' inaugurations for decades, we can say also that this had already been the official position for a while; yet as the hunger strikes

of cells. The typical argument of these officials is conveyed and referred by Eren (2012, pp. 19-20) with a reference to the works of Sağlam (2003) (a former vice-chair of the CTE) and Taşkın (2004, pp. vii-ix)[115] (a judge): a cellular isolative structure is not existent either in the prisons of Turkey or F-types, because the prisoners of these institutions are able to leave their units in day times to join some 'activities'.

In the F-types, these may include accepting open or close visits from the outside,[116] utilizing prison gymnasium or sports field,[117] enrolling in educational

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and death fasts in early days of the F-types', as well as several other publication afterwards on strict restrictive practices employed in these prisons and other high securities, have attracted a distinct attention to and flared up this issue in a more intensified fashion than before and made it the center of these debates (Eren, 2012, p.19).

[115] Taşkın (2004) concedes that isolation (*tecrit*) in fact exists inside the F-type prisons and also every other prison, when the word *tecrit* is taken in employed in a sense to refer to its dictionary meanings "abstraction, purification, and separation (*soyutlama, arındırma, ayırma*) (p. ix). (With using the term purification (*arındırma*)—a meaning that is not referred in the dictionaries I skipped—he most probably implies rehabilitation and resocialization of the convict; and one can as well argue that the adoption of purification in this manner is not a coincidence as, historically and actually, the notion of normalization has a distinct affinity with purification; see Esposito (2015) for an insightful reading of this.) Yet Taşkın (2004) then claims that the popularly adopted usage of the word *tecrit* to refer to the regimes of F-type prisons denotes an "absolute abstraction, absolute purification, and absolute separation (*mutlak soyutlama, mutlak arındırma, mutlak ayırma*)" and thusly absolute isolation; and in this manner, *tecrit* does not exist inside the F-type prisons because the rooms are sanitary, the convicts have rights, and they are not absolutely isolated with other human beings because they have the rights to visit and participation to activities (p. ix).

[116] Usually, the visits are not referred as institutional activities, but I included them for Taşkın (2004) also included them as evidences of the non-existence of a cellular structure. Visits and conditions of visits are already mentioned before in the Part 3.5. In addition to those, I can add that these can be restricted on several grounds like when a prisoner receives a disciplinary punishment of loss of visits or of solitary confinement (except visits from lawyers and state officials, and in former case of a loss of visits, from legal representatives) ("Hükümlü ve tutukluların ziyaret," 2006, pt. 1, div. 2, art. 5, ¶ a). These punishments are, as also mentioned in Part 3.4., given with the discretion of administration and surveillance boards headed by the principle of the institution.

[117] There is one gymnasium and one sports field in F-type prisons. (Whichever to go mostly depends on weather conditions.) Utilizing (one of) these sports facilities is possible around two hours a week, in groups of at most 10. These groups and hours are determined (monthly) by psychosocial services ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 24, ¶ 2,), and approved by the administration and surveillance board ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 4, art. 40, ¶ 1/f). At most of the F-types, these weekly sports hours are canceled during open visit weeks, and they may further be canceled during special activities like searching. Moreover, a possibility to join these activities can further be restricted by a disciplinary punishment called "detainment from some activities (*bazı etkinliklerden alıkoyma*)", which can be sanctioned in cases such as "using improper language or acting in an improper manner against institutional personnel (*kurum görevlilerine karşı uygunsuz söz sarf etmek veya davranışta bulunmak*)", or "hunger striking (*açlık grevi yapmak*)" ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, pt. 2, div. 4, art. 40; "Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 7, div. 1, art. 146, ¶ 1), by the discretion of administration and surveillance board again.

programs or classes,[118] participating in workshops,[119] joining psychosocial training

or support programs,[120] benefiting from the prison library,[121] partaking in social

conversation hours,[122] and the like. For the officials, in as much as these activities are

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[118] These educational programs may concern primary education, secondary education, higher education, professional training and skills courses (like carpentry or barbering), religious education, and other social and cultural activities (like chess courses, painting courses, various exhibitions, seminars, and the like) ("Gözlem ve Sınıflandırma Merkezleri Yönetmeliği," 2005, pt. 2, div. 1, art. 29). Apart from primary, secondary, high-school, or graduate programs of open education (all of which may be passed by national examinations that are also conducted in the prisons when there is demand), or other nation-wide examinations like selection examinations, or the examinations of the undergraduate or graduate program if the prisoner is already enrolled before her confinement; the general framework of educational programs is designated by the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses, (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 3, § A, art. 1), their particular framework is shaped by the board of education ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 4, art. 43, art. 1, ¶ a) and announced to the prisoners. The prisoners may apply these with written requests, but whether the prisoner can participate in the programs (or not) is first determined by the educational service, and after their selections are finalized, it is subject to an approval of the administration and surveillance board (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 3, § A, art. 4).

[119] In the F-types, these workshops are on the upper floors of single-story (one-person) units, around eight in numbers. Particular compositions of the programs conducted in these units vary, but in general they include painting, trinket, woodworking, clay, ceramic, and the like. These are around six hours a week, and are subject to being canceled during open-visit weeks in some of the F-types (in the same way with other activities). Participation to these workshops is a subject to a selection of the psychosocial services and a decision of the administration and surveillance board ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 2, div. 2, art. 24, ¶ 2; div. 4, art. 40, ¶ 1/f).

[120] As mentioned before in Part 3.4 and 3.5, a prisoner who wants to see a member of a psychosocial unit may write a written request to do this (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 8, § A, art. 3). Apart from these individual visits, there are some psycho-social programs in accordance with a "rehabilitation map (*iyileştirme haritası*)" that is sent to the prisons by the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 8, § A, art. 1). These programs, like anger-management or narcotics awareness-raising programs, are carried in a separate room designed only for psychosocial group activities, and except the cases where the prisoner is convicted to an aggravated life sentence, or if the institutional security is not ruled to be in danger, these are conducted in groups (of at most 10) (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 8, § A, ¶ 2; § B, art. 1, 2, ¶¶ a-b). A prisoner's participation to these psychosocial programs are recommended by the psychosocial units, and decided by the administration and surveillace board (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, 2007, div. 8, § A, art. 3). Despite formally being support programs by themselves, the participants of these programs may be chosen solely on the ground of good conduct, so an attend to these group programs may sometimes be grounded as a de facto gratification.

[121] According to "Ceza infaz kurumları kütüphane" (2005), a penal institution, which has its own warden, has to have a library in a separate room (div. 2, art. 5-6). F-types, being one of the penal institutions which have wardens (the principal managers), also have their separate libraries established within themselves. Prisoners of the F-types can benefit from these libraries in the sense of borrowing books, but physically going to and utilizing the library is subject to a special permission of the administration and surveillance board ("Ceza infaz kurumları kütüphane," 2005, div. 6, art. 27), and practically this is even a rarer occurrence because the prisoner mostly needs a particular reason (like carrying a research) to do this regularly. (This is despite the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı (2007) states that the prisoners have to be able to go to a library at least once a week. (div. 2, art. 3, ¶ h).

[122] The prisoners of the F-type can partake in this activity, in groups of at most 10, with the purpose of communicating with each other. The groups of conversation activities are consisted with independent requests of the prisoners, and subject to the assignment and approval of the administration and

carried in the institutions, one cannot depict the F-type high security prison as a place wherein a truly isolative regime is structured and imposed. This line of argument, mostly in addition to a statement that the institutions are in concordance with the universal standards of confinement,[123] has been raised not only by Taşkın (2004, 2005) and Sağlam (2003), but also by the Justice Ministry of Turkey from day one of the F-types' inauguration[124] to more recent times.[125] For instance, close to their opening days, a press release of then-justice minister Hikmet Sami Türk was being published as follows:

> [Sami Türk said that] "F-type prisons have been constructed according to the minimum of the United Nations' regulations on prisons today. That anyone is isolated is out of the question, and these prisons have been constructed in European standards, as the ones that feature the best conditions for the remand and sentenced prisoners in the present conditions of Turkey." Türk also stressed that the remand and sentenced prisoners who may be in these facilities will have the opportunity of coming together in gymnasiums and workshops in addition to their resting times, noting that because of this it is completely out of the question that anyone would be isolated, as some people say. ("Bakan Türk: Cezaevleri," 2000, own translation; for the original, see Appendix B, 3)

In a parallel manner, Taşkın (2004, 2005) and Sağlam (2003) think that, roughly, if *any* human contact is officially permitted in a prison (other than the 'necessary'

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surveillance board ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının tahsisi," 2007, div. 3, art. 13). Legally, conversation hours can be conducted up to 10 hours a week ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının tahsisi," 2007, div. 3, art. 13), but in practice these are carried in far less than 10 hours—typically three to five hours—a week, depending on the F-type and its particular management. Before the ("Ceza infaz kurumlarının tahsisi," 2007) amended in January 22, 2007, as Bargu (2014) conveys, these conversation hours were envisaged as five hours a week, and participating these was exclusive only to the prisoners who have already been attending to other rehabilitation programs. The amendment changed this with abrogating the condition of participation to rehabilitation programs, and extended the maximum time to 10 hours a week (pp. 221-222). This amendment underpinned the end of the massive death fast struggle in 2006, so varying and mostly insufficient institutions of the conversation activities have frequently been a domain of dispute and contest.

[123] The system of universal standards of penal execution refers to "the global legal system that is developed through international legal agreements and the acceptance of the standards of penal execution (*uluslararası anlaşmaların ve infaz standartlarının kabul edilmesi ile gelişen global bir hukuk sitemi*)" (Türker, 2003, p. 48) and refers to the international texts such as (United Nations, 1977).

[124] See, for instance, the founding minister Hikmet Sami Türk's briefing in ("Bakan Türk: Cezaevleri," 2000).

[125] See, for instance, the justice minister Sadullah Ergin's statements in the assembly in ("Bakan Ergin: F-tipinde," 2013)

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services like food distribution or counting), the only proper way to refer to its main units of confinement is to employ the term room instead of the term cell. In fact claiming otherwise would particularly make no sense because in today's "contemporary world (*çağdaş dünya*)", cellular systems had totally been abandoned since hundreds of years ago, and wholly given way to the room systems (Taşkın, 2004, p. 227-228; Taşkın, 2005, p. 177; Sağlam, pp. 11, 16).[126] Claiming these, Taşkın takes a step further and asserts that the people who adopt the notion of cell to refer to these units are either misinformed or not aware of the prison life, or otherwise they are clearly and intentionally serving an agenda (Taşkın, 2004, pp. 224-227; Taşkın, 2005, pp. 175-177).[127]

However, apart from self-made claims, neither of these writers cite an additional source, nor they specify a location or jurisdiction wherein this so-called room system was born as a form of incarceration that is so distinct from the cellular arrangements. They just say that the room system has become the international norm. However, even when one skips their main references, the so-called contemporary texts of international standards of arranging prisons, one finds that there are neither a definition of a 'room-system' that is so distinct from a cellular system, nor a 'prison room' that is defined so differently from a prison cell. Instead, to denote the units where prisoners are put only during the night times, the term "room" is either not

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[126] Actually above all, it simply is not accurate to say that the cellular system is abandoned in the so-called contemporary world hundreds of years ago. The abandonment was peculiar to the United States of America "by the last decade of the 19th century" (Haney, 2005, p. 939), but even there, there soon emerged other cellular examples like Alcatraz and Marion; at at no point it was stopped to refer to their units as cells, despite notable extensions of 'social facilities' with the Marion—all resources still labels their units as "cells" (Davis, 1996, pp. 34-38; Haney, 2005, p. 939; Mears and Reisig, 2006, p. 35; Ward, 1996, pp. 56-63). These cellular systems were, as O'Hearn (2014) says, were to be significant sources of influence in the construction of more recent cellular systems like the supermax prisons. On the other hand, as Franke (1992) mentions, despite the systems that use 24-hour solitary confinement is abandoned in the United States of America in late 19th century, the maxim of 24-hour confinement began to be used by the European countries beginning from the year 1842, and used by many countries including France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and so on. These cellular models, instead of being abandoned, went on to be utilized and evolved in Europe throughout the time.
[127] This is blatantly wrong. See the footnote above, Footnote 126.

employed at all—i.e. the term "cell" is preferred (Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, 1987, art. 14, ¶ 1; Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, 2006, art. 18, ¶ 5)—or it is used interchangeably with the term "cell" (United Nations, 1977, art. 9 ¶ 1; United Nations General Assembly, 2015, art. 12, ¶ 1). On the other hand, the only sources that I could find which use the term room in this manner have only been a number of Turkish sources.[128] The earliest of them that I could find was a report of the Turkish Bar Association that dates 1983, where the term room is mentioned first as a reference to an already open debate which they label as "dormitory-room-cell debates [*koğuş-oda-hücre tartışması*]" (Türkiye Barolar Birliği, 1983, p. 21). In this source, neither the specifics of these debates nor the genesis of the term room are clarified or cited, yet this absence is most probably because of the obviousness of the fact that the term "room" had already been introduced to the penal trajectory of Turkey earlier that year, by an amendment to the penal regulation of the times.[129] So it seems to me that, employed in this sense, the term room had begun to be used not later than the early 1980s, and carried on through a series of debates later on. On the late 1990s with the announcement of the F-type projects, the foci of these debates were to be the F-type prisons (Eren, 2012, p.19).

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[128] This may also be due to my lack of knowledge or research; however, I think I can at least say that, in my experience, any English resource that frames the term 'room' in this way is very difficult to find.

[129] This amendment, as also mentioned in the Part 2.2.1. of this thesis, was preordaining several types of "the convicts" to be confined in "special closed prisons that are made of single or triple *rooms* [emphasis added] where individualized rehabilitation and education programs are employed", with a particular decision of the institution's "surveillance and classification boards, and an approval of [this decision by] the Justice Ministry" ("*... hükümlüler, müşahede ve sınıflandırma merkezleri idare kurulu kararı ve Adalet Bakanlığının onayıyla tek ya da üç kişilik odalar halinde yapılmış bireysel iyileştirme ve eğitim uygulanan özel kapalı cezaevlerine gönderilirler.*") "Ceza infaz kurumları ile tevkifevlerinin yönetimine ve cezaların infazına dair tüzük," 1967, pt. 4, div. 2, art. 78/B, own translation).

Several intellectuals and NGOs have variously responded to the officials' insistence on the employment of the notion of room, together with their rejection of the existence of isolation in the F-types. Some of them, like a well-known prison inspector Türker (2003, pp. 45-46, 48, my translation), have claimed that the arrangements of the F-types are in fact against "the requisites of the contemporary law of execution (*çağdaş infaz hukukunun gerekleri*)"; and despite being structured in a more relaxed (comfortable) fashion than the early prison models of solitary confinement, the F-types are cellular arrangements indeed, because their units are designed in such a way that the inmates are unable to see outside the reaches of their units' physical borders, except the sky. Structured in this way, a prolonged confinement in these units would be highly detrimental to its prisoners, and they should only be employed as temporary units of confinement where disciplinary punishments (of solitary confinement) are carried.

In addition to this critique, the discordance of the F-types with the international standards has also been stressed by several intellectuals and NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, 2001, p. 2; Eren, 2012, pp. 21-23; Human Rights Watch, 2001, pp. 9-10, 22) with a referral to the prison standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), especially in its recommendation to "aim at ensuring that prisoners in remand establishments are able to spend a reasonable part of the day (8 hours or more) outside their cells, engaged in purposeful activity of a varied nature" like "group association activities, education, sport, work with vocational value" and the like (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [CPT], 1991, p. 22, art. 62; CPT, 1992, p. 1, art. 47; CPT,

2019, p. 24, art. 25.4).[130] Moreover, a number of studies, presentations, and statements further criticized the arrangements and claimed that they contravene the international law and in general the legal codes, the legal system, and the general rules of jurisprudence (Tuğlu and Şahin, 2016, pp. 359-371; Istanbul Barosu, 2006; "Ankara Barosu: F tipi," 2000). Some of these, in a similar vain with Türker (2002), also emphasized emotional, behavioral, and in general neurophysiological complications that a prolonged exposure to these units would pose to its prisoners (Türk Tabipler Birliği, 2017; Koşan, 2000, pp. 138-139), and some even stated that the F-types' isolative regime, especially when the harms that it inflicts to human beings are considered, is in fact nothing but a form of torture by itself; so even before investigating whether it obeys any specific rule or code, the arrangement is against the basic human rights and the general principles of law from the beginning ("F Tipinde Tecrit," 2007;[131] Can, 2015, pp. 145-149; Cinmen, 2000).

Now I think above studies and statements have sound points in their own right, and they are valuable especially in public discussions. Yet it seems to me that they inevitably fall short as framings and criticisms of cellular arrangements, since they themselves also speak through the cellular dialect of the disciplines (of medicine, of jurisprudence, of penology, and the like). It seems to me that in thus in-formed critiques, framings of the cell are habitually inquired in a cellular manner, so

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[130] Eren (2012) also mentioned that an institution of this standard is very difficult to be imposed in the F-types due to some basic problems in the arrangement in organizational and architectural terms (p. 23). Indeed; in F-type prisons, even the most docile prisoners with good conduct may hardly benefit from the activities 20 hours a week, let alone eight hours a day. At best, they have two hours of gym, three to five hours of conversation hours, and five to six hours of small workshops; which makes the 13 hours a week at most. Add that to possible psychosocial programs and other educational workshops, the overall time of activities, in the most exceptionally optimistic scenario, would at most be 20 hours a week. Several other observers (Karakuş, 2010, pp. 34-35; Doğuç, 2010, p. 67) or governmental commissions like the Human Rights Investigation Commission of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (see Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, 2011, pp. 3, 5) also stressed several organizational shortcomings of F-types in ensuring a proper degree of socialization for both for the staff and the prisoners.
[131] This is a declaration signed by 27 academicians, 73 students, and 316 workers in psychic services (like psychologists and psychiatrists).

the concepts utilized are sometimes confined to an extent where an advocation of 'good cells' (rooms) over 'bad cells' (cells) becomes the main consideration of the inquiry, without having a considerable degree of correspondence with the general problem of cellularity posed by the the disciplines.

When thought with the general workings of the disciplines, on the other hand, we can first say that, it is "the disciplinary space", not this or that one but any disciplinary space, which "is always, basically, cellular" (Foucault, 1995, p. 143).[132] So it can be said that all the disciplinary units within a disciplinary arrangement— analytical units of utilitarian assessments, units of surveillance and supervision, units charged with specialized tasks and consists the professions, all the units of confinement from torture chambers and solitary units to small group confinement units, dorms, wards, hospital rooms, solitary cells, etc.—are all cellular by themselves; and the dispositions of isolation that work and operate through them are not essentially different from one another. So the disciplinary isolation is not a dependent variable of a particular space, but instead it refers to the unitary isolation of the individual, legal person, citizen, formal rights and duties, or of analytical and normative isolations of actions and activities as employed by juridical processes, police investigations, utilitarian calculations, and in general the isolation of classifications, ranking, professionalization, propriety, order, and so on.

Then briefly put, in a disciplinary arrangement, every unit of every kind— spatiotemporal units, operational units, units of assessments, or any other capture—is

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[132] It is true that a framing of isolation in this manner may in some extents limit the concept's utility in raising public discussions or other debates to (re)consider immediate configurations of disciplinary arrangements; however, if nothing, it expands the extent of inquiry on the in-formational contours and experience of isolation and imprisonment which is not peculiar to some single units, but whose context can also be more crowded units (Sykes, 2007, pp. 63-83), massive conglomerations (Dostoyevsky, 2001), torture chambers (see Part 2.1. of this thesis), hospital rooms, military barracks, schools, factories, and the like (see (Goffman, 1990, pp. 11-48) on the "mortifying" effects of these "total institutions" in general).

firstly a cell, and then a room, a dorm, a barrack, an office, a work place, a worker, a

prisoner, a guard, an executive, an activity, a program, a class… Between these, there

is not a binary opposition between being a cell and not being a cell, but work-frames

and rankings that consist analytically defined degrees and scales. Regarded in this

manner, isolation may also be frame-worked as 'degrees' by the disciplines; as

calculable units that are dependent on a variable, e.g. the extensiveness of isolation.

To give a few examples, 'all other conditions taken equal (isolated)', a student on

detention, a soldier on a compulsory night watch, a prisoner confined in a high

security prison, or a prisoner punished with a disciplinary sanction that imposes a

more extensive regime of isolation (like activity restriction, visit restriction, letter

restriction, etc.), may each be assumed as more dense experiences than the less

extensive modalities of the same condition—i.e., respectively, a student on a regular

schedule, a soldier on a regular day watch, a prisoner of an open prison, or a prisoner

of 'good conduct' not sanctioned to a disciplinary punishment. This assumption—

which is sometimes denoted as a calculated infliction of suffering for the sake of

deterrence—has also been, as Derrida (2014) reminds (pp. 93-94), one of the bases

of the legitimization of imprisonment in being the dominant form of penality

(however framed as a tool of leniency in other places): For instance, one of the

earliest reformists of the penal reform, the "prophet" of abolitionism, Cesare

Beccaria defends the life imprisonment as follows:

> [T]he intensity of perpetual penal servitude, substituted for the death penalty,
> has all that is necessary to deter even the most determined mind. … [N]either
> fanaticism nor vanity survives in fetters or chains, under the cudgel and the
> yoke, or in an iron cage; and the desperate finds that his woes are just
> beginning, rather than ending. (Beccaria, [1764] 2008, pp. 53-54, as cited in
> Derrida, 2014, p. 94)

Derrida cites this passage to rethink the so-called lenient bases of penal servitude—to

mention that since the beginning, imprisonment has been envisaged as a place that

only inflicts suffering, but also inflicts more suffering. Yet I think that this passage also opens a further line of questioning the analytical plane of confinement that able a gradation of suffering—as much as crime—in calculable degrees, on equitable planes of sameness; and the prison walls, as the more 'objective' tool to grade and rank. In this sense, it can also be said that confinement is by itself a tool of normalization that work as the degrees of gratification and punishment, and so it belongs to the "double system: gratification-punishment … [which is the] system that operates in the process of training and correction" (Foucault, 1995, p. 180). To put it more clearly, the punishment of imprisonment, and the gratification of release (or of not being imprisoned), are also by themselves trainings that analytically frame and rank the bodies—as calculable inflictions of suffering and release.[133]

Institutional activities that all of the above writers refer to are not abating but constituent elements of this calculable extensiveness of isolation, particularly utilized for grading and training. As objectivized encapsulations, activities become able to be utilized as trainings, as gratification-punishments. When we skip the disciplinary punishments sanctioned in room type prisons (that were also mentioned in Part , we see that there are six punishments: "censure (*kınama*)", "restriction from some activities (*bazı etkinliklere katılmaktan alıkoyma*)", "deprivation from salaried work (*ücret karşılığı çalışılan işten yoksun bırakma*)",[134] "deprivation or restriction from tools of communication and correspondence (*haberleşme veya iletişim araçlarından yoksun bırakma veya kısıtlama*)", "deprivation from accepting visitors (*ziyaretçi kabulünden yoksun bırakma*)", "solitary confinement (*hücreye koyma*)"

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[133] Thus to frame a managerial system as a disciplinary arrangement, there is no further need to determine strict scheduling, daily instructional sessions, physical trainings, or other particular tools employed particularly (unlike, for instance, İbikoğlu's (2012) framing of the F-types 'not' as disciplinary but 'managerial' institutions). An extensiveness of isolation framed as a calculable grading on an abstract time-space by itself a mean of disciplinary training, normalization, and ranking.
[134] As I already mentioned above, salary work is irrelevant for a prisoner of a high security prison.

("Ceza infaz kurumlarının yönetimi," 2006, pt. 7, div. 1, art. 144). Except censure (that is practically not a punishment but a warning), each of these disciplinary punishments (which are graded respectively) consider restrictions to the extents of correspondence with outside the cell, except the staff. As it goes to the worst, it increases the extensiveness of isolation, and lowers the possibilities of direct correspondence (letter and other 'tools of communication' are less direct means of correspondence than the visits, and solitary confinement—which also sanctions before two—is total deprivation from direct correspondence).

In so doing, the work-framing of activities doubly inscribe and encapsulate direct correspondence; first as formal ('limited') rights of the prisoner (such as the right to visit relatives, the right to visit lawyers, the right to write a letter, the right of education, etc); and second, as their permit or restriction through assessments (so their utilization as training). In utilizing activities as formalistic tools of training, they also fixture them as detached, defined, and granted 'forms' of out-sides. So frame-workings of activities are yet another means of capture, too: in a similar vein with filings, searches, cameras and other technological means, stratified surveillance, spatiotemporal segmentations and in general architectural and organizational structuring; with frame-working of activities, the possibility of encapsulation of the places of direct correspondences with others and outers is extended, and the disciplinary grid is further abled to access, define, segmentalize, inscribe, schedule, precondition, and rank the forces (activity) of the bodies.

So in general, it may be said that what makes an arrangement (more extensively) cellular is not a scarcity of activities, but instead a unitary enclosure of

activities;[135] and—just like the architectonical arrangement of the Panopticon that is built on extending the visibility as much as possible—an encapsulation of activities as the sole domain of correspondence with others and so-called outers (as much as possible) in turn makes the gaze able to observe, calculate, and train the bodies (as much as possible). Activities of a life are first segmentalized into domains—like sports activities, social activities, educational activities, rehabilitative activities, food, health—and these domains all became tools of utilization and calculation, both of economical efficiency and effectivity, and of normalization by calculable gratification-punishments. So with the work-framing of activities and the expansion of the gaze, F-type prisons has created a further enclosure and enfolding (isolation) of life that is reduced to analytical abstractions of panoptical organization and distribution.

At this moment, the question may arise as to why I insist on employing the term 'cell' to refer to the confinement units of the F-types rather than 'rooms': If all the disciplinary institutions—schools, armies, hospitals, and others—are cellular, then in the same manner as one would employ the terms 'classroom', 'military barrack', or 'hospital room', one would as well employ the term 'prison room' to refer to the isolative units of the F-types. I would, indeed—if the term 'room' had not been raised in contradistinction to the cell from the beginning. I am in no way

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[135] In a way this point bears similarities with other critiques of F types like that of Can (2015) who states that the activities conducted within the institution are arranged more as privileges than rights, and participating to rehabilitative programs are considered more as obligations than rights; and arranged as such, the activities and programs, instead of expanding the cellular units, force the prisoners to a sameness and standardization of a unitary kind, rather than "taking their personal traits, personal preferences and unique aspects into account (*kişilik özelliklerini, kişisel tercih ve özgün yönlerini gözardı etme[me]k...*)" (pp. 148-149). Now to the extent that he implies with his denouncement the cellular arrangements' denials of singular beings to and as their finitude, Can's indications are similar to the points above. However, as he frames his critique with other cellular and standardized concepts of sameness such as rights or personal traits or preferences (as much as with his call for their 'consideration' by the institution), he falls into the identical trap of sameness which he tries to avoid.

opposed to an employment of the concept of room to refer to the units otherwise.

This is why I insist on focusing on the notion of the cell, and insist on using the term

"cell" throughout this thesis, and use it interchangeably with other words such as

"unit" or "compartment"—if it was not raised in contradistinction to the term cell, it

would also make sense to use the term "room" interchangeably with "cell" as well.

Otherwise, the usage of the term "room" meaning "a prison unit that is not a cell"

would severely cripple any inquiry on the F-types and isolation, whether it be a

historical, technical, architectural, sociological, anthropological, psychological, or

other inquiry, as it obstructs the general maxim of disciplinary arrangements.[136]

Lastly, there is also a peculiar form of isolation in the triple cells, an intensive

form of isolation that is in-formed by a forced exposure that in turn becomes a

compelling force in the making of self-enclosed totalities. This definitely needs to be

reckoned with, if nothing for it is one of the distinguishing and most problematic

facets of isolation as it is lived in the F-types; however, to account for it more subtly,

I will inquire this in the last chapter (conclusion) where I sum up the general frame-

working of isolation and in general this thesis together with the narrations on the

affectivity of isolation.

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[136] In addition to this, in a slightly relevant manner, as several writers such as Eren (2012) highlighted, it can also be said that when the term room is framed in contradistinction with the term cell in regards to a difference in the possibility of a prisoner's participation to activities, it architecturally still makes more sense to employ the term cell to refer to both triple and single units of confinement, because the main doors of these do not open to a shared area but either to a private ventilation space or to a prison corridor. Taken together with the lack of shared areas in the institution (around eight small classrooms, three visit spaces, a gym, and a sports field) and the regulative codes which limit the possibility of their utilization with groups of at most 10, it is eminent that the institution gives en overwhelming importance of prisoners' isolation over their socialization; so using the term cell instead of other notions that are used to refer to the confinement units—rooms, small dorms, dorms, wards—makes the most sense as to both architectural and organizational arrangements of F-types.

3.7. Rethinking the Panopticon

Up until here, in this chapter, I wrote Foucault's (1995) formulation of the disciplines in a somewhat uncontested fashion, yet this does not mean that I take his words on the prison without questioning nor I agree with every points that he makes in *Discipline and Punish*: I just preferred to keep my silence on the points that I would contest, and wrote Foucault's (1995) framework in the extent that I agree, and to the extent that it corresponds to the arche-structuration of the setting. Yet I have to admit that I understand the model of the Panopticon in a somewhat loose fashion, and the general workings of the disciplines as only a fictive working that is, not only fictive as to its claims of correction (i.e. to create binary categories of normal and deviant), but also fictive in subjectivation and training. Second, despite I acknowledge that the panoptical arrangement is a fiction of in-formation that is of a different organization of truth than the sovereign knowledge of the crown (see Part 2.1.), I think that this is not in an essential contradistinction to the sovereign power itself; and the sovereignty [of 'people'] goes on to be reflected in the architecture of the prison that is (also) "the expression of … society's very being. . . . [But] only the ideal being … [:] the one that issues orders and interdictions with authority" (Bataille, 1970, pp. 171-172, as cited in Hollier, 1989, p. ix). So, as an establishment that aims to institute "prevention,"[137] it always needs to include a component of fear in itself, and in thus being, it needs to include the element of display.[138]

Where I value the model of Panopticon as a typical disciplinary arrangement is more in its organization of abstraction—the workings of its enclosing fiction to

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[137] This is the general aim of punishment according to the penal law of Turkey, which includes but not limited to resocialization. See ("Ceza ve güvenlik tedbirlerinin infazı," 2004, bk. 1, pt. 1, div. 2, art. 3, ¶ 1).
[138] For a particular summary of the element of display in the very model of the Panopticon itself, see (Božović, 1995).

create a pretense of abstraction—which, I think, meets "the society's ideal being" (Bataille, 1970, pp. 171-172, as cited in Hollier, 1989, p. ix) that is the constitutional sovereign, with the unitary subject and other abstract units of production such as legal personhood or other immanentist[139] forms of disciplinary production such as "the guard," "the prisoner," and the like. What meets them—abstraction—is also an ontological impossibility; so the "underlying truth" it speaks is not only of an empty content, but also in negation with reality.

This is why I think Bentham's theory of fictions is particularly important in understanding the panoptical workings. To begin with, as a utilitarian philosopher, Bentham,

> Far from promoting a "positivist" view of facts and factual knowledge … he [Bentham] accepted the fundamental principles of the tradition of fictionalist realism and the doctrine of adequacy, according to which facts are in essence fictions, a perfectly acceptable state of affairs, so long as the factual fabrications really are "sufficient unto the day." (Stolzenberg, 1999, p. 239)

In this tableau, what assures the adequacy of the fact refers to its utility instead of its truth value, and this truth value is "based upon probabilistic assumptions, and designed to serve the needs of the occasion" (Stolzenberg, 1999, p. 237). In a parallel manner, the Panopticon was an exceptional project for Bentham—so exceptional that he devoted a significant part of his life to it (Cooper, 1976, 1981)—mainly because it was way more economical: not only the management of the prison would be able to be conducted only by one inspector, but (as he always thought the inspector as himself) it was also to be a very profitable project for him as well.

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[139] In Devisch (2013)'s brief terms, immanentism is "the metaphysics of auto-production" (pp. xi, 36-40, 50, 159, 183). This is a term adopted by Nancy (1990b) in a sense similar to "totalitarianism" but (in the same vein with his adaptation of the term immanence) expanded notably in such a degree that it refers to any totalitarian enclosure that assumes the foundation of its being within its own.

The maxim of penalization and reformation of this project was meant to be an "apparent suffering" as opposed to the "real suffering" (Božović, 1995). Apparent suffering was first and foremost preferred over real suffering simply because it is sufficient; not only the expenses of inflicting real suffering were higher, but also its effects on the mind was lower—therefore inflicting real suffering was simply a "mischief" beyond necessary (Bentham, 1876). Both to deter and reform, the sole appearance of suffering would be enough. To give an example to the performance of this idea in the workings of the Panopticon; I can mention that, for instance, Bentham (1843a) writes that to prevent the transgressions conducted by the prisoners, what the inspector would do is basically, do nothing and wait for a day or two and meanwhile just note the transgressions down, and afterwards present the full list of the transgressor's actions to the her/himself, only to announce: "[a]nother time, you may have a rope for two days, ten days: the longer it is, the heavier it will fall upon you. Learn from this, all of you!" (p. 82). So the workings of the tower was not devoid of the element of display and fear, but interwoven with a specific version of it: its absence feigning its presence.

This idea had a strong relationship with his theory of fictions on the discursive creation of bodies, which may be summarized by this sentence: "By a fictitious entity, understand an object, the existence of which is feigned by the imagination, —feigned for the purpose of discourse, and which, when so formed, is spoken of as a real one" (Bentham, 1843b, p. 325). As Iser (1993) notes,

> Bentham's "fictitious entity" has a double root: first, everything that is brought to bear on reality must be unreal; second, this unreality must be "feigned" in order that discourse should be possible. … Whatever discourse deals with cannot condition its own organization; but at the same time it must not be subjected to any postulate. Therefore an agency has to be invented that will act as if it were real, although its fictitious character must never be suppressed… [This] duality enables the fictitious entity to organize without defining what is organized and yet remain totally bound to it… Without …

practical context, fiction would be pure phantasm, of which one could not say with any certainty that it even existed. (pp. 118-119)

The reality of the fictitious entity depends on its utility, or "suitability for use" (Iser, 1993, p. 119), and the invented agency is basically the assessment of its utility. Then from its ontogenesis, not only the fiction and truth work together, but also the truth invented is always tautological; but unless its tautology is admitted (so long as it stays as a strategical feignment of truth), it works as a reality.

With the power of strategical feignment, fictions could have a "prescriptive aspect… [, a] regulative power" with which "they … [can] induce people to behave in conformity with the announced norms. In this essentially legislative capacity, Bentham saw, fictions make statements about what is probable into self-fulfilling prophesies … literally turning fictions into facts" (Stolzenberg, 1999, p. 238). As Ogden (1932) notes, Bentham's thoughts on fiction and its prescriptive capacity is notably influenced by his fear of ghosts, or his belief in the haunt of the darkness:

> To this case I feel a very conformable parallel may be seen in the case of ghosts and other fabulous maleficent beings, which the absence of light presents to my mind's eye. In no man's judgement can a stronger persuasion of the non-existence of these sources of terror have place than in mine; yet no sooner do I lay myself down to sleep in a dark room than, if no other person is in the room, and my eyes keep open, these instruments of terror obtrude themselves; and, to free myself of the annoyance, I feel myself under the necessity of substituting to those more or less pleasing ideas with which my mind would otherwise been occupied, those reflections which are necessary to keep in my view the judgement by which the non-existence of these creatures of the imagination so often been pronounced. (Bentham, 1843c, p. 84, cited in Ogden, 1932, p. xvi)

Bentham finds in the fiction a possibility of creation that is beyond cognizance, and the power of this, as Božović claims, comes from its absence:

> [W]e are not afraid of ghosts in spite of the fact that they do not exist, but precisely because of the fact that they do not exist. … The fear of ghosts is perhaps the purest example of how an imaginary non-entity owes its real effects to its ontological status as a fiction; if ghosts were not fictitious, if they were really existing entities, then they would either not have any effects at all, or they would have different effects. (Božović, 1995, pp. 21-22)

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3.8. The dictum of absence

Reading the fiction of the Panopticon, whose (un)reality depends on sufficiency and accommodation, with Bataille's (1991) thought of sovereignty whose domain is "[l]ife beyond utility" (p. 198), a would be an interesting point of intersection to trace the panoptical fiction. To begin with, at the start of his text *The Labyrinth*, Bataille (2004) notes that

> [Men act in order to be, but] [t]his must not be understood in the negative sense of conservation (conserving in order not to be thrown out of existence by death), but in the positive sense of a tragic and incessant combat for a satisfaction that is *almost* [emphasis added] beyond reach. (p. 171)

The difference between Bataille's pursuit of satisfaction is that it is without an object. As the sovereign that lives a "[l]ife beyond utility" without a calculation (Bataille, 1991, p. 198), the combat for satisfaction that is *almost* beyond reach (un)works without an object-ive:

> "Being" increases in the tumultuous agitation of a life that knows no limits; it wastes away and disappears if he who is at the same time "being" and knowledge mutilates himself by reducing himself to knowledge.
> This deficiency can grow even greater if the object of knowledge is no longer being in general but a narrow domain, such as an organ, a mathematical question, a juridical form. Action and dreams do not escape this poverty (each time they are confused with the totality of being), and, in the multicolored immensity of human lives, a limitless insufficiency is revealed; life, finding its endpoint in the happiness of a bugle blower or the snickering of a village chair-renter, is no longer the fulfillment of itself, but is its own ludicrous degradation—its fall is comparable to that of a king onto the floor. (Bataille, 2004, p. 172)

Bentham's strategical feignment of truth can be read as a fictive trick that specifically *aims* to topple the king; to make the being an issue of acquisition and calculation. By feigning the dis-appearance as existence, and by trying to enclose and claim all possible almost-moments of sovereign satisfaction, it simply tries to transform these moments to expectational reflections.

This enclosure is a work of deprivation (that is also one of the definitions of *tecrit*, as is mentioned in Part 1.1). By a simultaneous enfold of the gaze (its indispensability as a provider) and deprivation, it tries to create a gravitational attraction to its orbit through consumption.

> In the complexity and entanglement of wholes, to which the human particle belongs, … [a] satellite-like mode of existence never entirely disappears. A particular being not only acts as an element of a shapeless and structureless whole …, but also as a peripheral element orbiting around a nucleus where being hardens. … [I]n a given domain, if the attraction of a certain center is stronger than that of a neighboring center, the second center then goes into decline. The action of powerful poles of attraction across the human world thus reduces, depending on their force of resistance, a multitude of personal beings to the state of empty shadows, especially when the pole of attraction on which they depend itself declines, due to the action of another more powerful pole. … [A] devaluation is stronger if, in a neighboring country, the fashions of a more brilliant city have already outclassed those of the first city. The objective character of these relations is registered in reality when the contempt and laughter manifested in a given center are not compensated for by anything elsewhere, and when they exert an effective fascination (Bataille, 2004, pp. 175-176).

The play of effective fascination to re-orbit particularities revolves around their exuberant energies. For Bataille (2004) what composes and modifies an orbit is laughter. "Laughter intervenes in […] value determinations of being as the expression of the circuit of movements of attraction across a human field" (p. 176). Laughter is a theme that was reworked as destitution in (Bataille, 1988a), in the manner that is narrated in Part 2.1.3. Similar to the sinking into destitute without an objective, the laughter bears its ultimate excess in its very burst—it is both attractant and exorbitant—an ex-static working on the brinks of finitude; both a meeting and a melting point of the binary oppositions.

What we call (de)subjectivation, whether in the form of individualization or "sequester[ing] the agent from the source of terrorism" ("the separation of the agent from the source of the act by interrupting the communication between them"), or whether in the form of "carceral transformation of the individual" or "production of

the individual as such" (Serin, 2013, pp. 2, 4), is an (intrinsically discrepant) manipulation of laughter's excessive force of exorbitance to confine it into the circularity of the panoptical enfolding. In this sense, unlike Serin (2013, pp. 2, 4) implies, subjectivation and de-subjectivation does not differ in their in-formational arrangement of subjectivity. (Similar points that counterpose disciplinary subjectivation and managerial control, to favor the latter in the working of F-types are also raised by İbikoğlu (2012) and O'Hearn (2014))

This is because subjectivation is, ontologically, a fiction: There is no truth in its in-formational working other than a self-fulfilling prophecy which becomes a credo by its accommodation. In the disciplinarian-unitary scheme of things, this attraction assumes (or better put, presents) the dictum of self-enclosed absolutes as its truth—and indeed, as it deprives, it becomes to be seem as such, for 'the truth' is more than many times a pretense of survival (Nietzsche, 1997).

As an apparent suffering, the power of accommodation also works with fear, as much as gratification. For instance, L. narrates the situation he faced with following a series of raids searches as follows:

> Sometimes, 2-3 times a month, 4 times a month, even 5 or even 10 times a month, or even once every 2 or 3 days—think it—they would do what is called a 'partial search'. And with each partial search, you know, that it is completely arbitrary. … Not like the regular search. … It's spontaneous … and you do not know when they are going to come … You would fathom it. Most of the times, they would pick nights, on purpose. The evening hours. 8-9 pm were a general thing, but there were many times when they were coming even at 1 or 2 am. (L., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix F, 1 for the original narration)

Then afterwards, after narrating the arbitrary confiscation during these raids, he continues:

> So when these are taken away from you, after your products are taken away, you want to re-write again and again, but there is also always this fear. … In this process, you put in this labor; and when you cannot tell whether they are going to come, this state of mind is always present with that person. What if

he comes? What if he takes it? So I have written 3 pages, 5 pages, for example, I have written 10 pages. What if he takes these away too? What if all this is taken away from me? … Your mind is always busy in a way, and you always have this frame of mind in a manner. So you say, I look through 1-2 books, 3 books, and that is enough. You do not need the fifth, sixth or tenth book anymore in order to conduct a well-rounded study, the frame of mind I mentioned prevents this. … And then you are faced with much more routine things in life. (L., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix F, 2 for the original narration)

The ghosts that haunt as the dictum of immanence—the routine life, deadness. As an accommodational dictation, it compels compulsion; as an ontological fiction, it denies the compearance of finitude, and just like the torture, it creates an antagonistic divide between being and life, to which I will turn to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

CIRCULAR ENTRAPMENT

4.1. Suddenly the wall

Before beginning her inquiries into the death fast struggles, Serin (2013) briefly

traces a temporal duality in the prison, mostly to in-form a basis for her later

inquiries on deferral and death. Yet it inspired me quite an extent in thinking the

spatio-rhythmic terrain of the F-types, so I want to begin this chapter by mentioning

it.

This is the duality of *volta* and compulsion. To begin with, *volta* is

[A] particular form of walking … which involves cycles of pacing back and
forth longitudinally between the walls of a ward's yard or a cell's ventilation
space … More or less of a secret vocabulary or of an idiolect peculiar to
spaces of confinement, the term originates from the Italian word *volta* which
denotes time. Deriving from the verbal root *voltare* meaning to turn, *volta*
also refers to the number of times something happens to take place. It thus
inscribes within itself an understanding of time as *re-turn*. (Serin, 2013, p. 14)

This movement is a movement of mastery where the identical terrain of the prison is

emptied of its ever-present, anonymous content. (Despite Serin (2013) narrates this

movement rather too personally, *volta* is paced mostly with others.) Through this

movement of return, the absolute content of outside is also broken, and there

becomes an affectivity of exposition.

The repetitive cycle of walking enables the prisoners to overlook, as it were,
their real condition of confinement and spreads a feeling. It is only when this
movement of return bounds itself to the future as a moment of deferred
ending that it proves to be a mere illusion, and repetition then assumes the
form of compulsion and failure. (Serin, 2013, pp. 15-16)

Serin takes this duality that is inherent within the *volta* as reflecting a "double logic

of temporal recurrence and deferral [which] is the function of extreme form of

powerlessness" (Serin, 2013, p. 18). Yet instead of taking this movement as a double

logic inherent within powerlessness, I take *volta* and compulsion as separate relations to existence. As a time of re-turn, *volta* is the forgetting of analytical organization of time—as one of Serin's (2013) interlocutors say, it is a feeling as if one has "gone out and come back" (p. 15). This conditions a forgetting of absolute inside and absolute outside—the prison exposed to its finitude—and this is a compearance whether on the limits of the prison or on the other's (when done together). The second movement, compulsion, is the mechanical dictum of the self-enclosed absolute: it is the dictation of ultimate limits and the ultimate denial of finitude—the reflection of the identity of outside. It (does not happen, but) dictates compulsion when one *realizes* that s/he is inside.

And as such, it is not only the identity of outside, but it is the movement against the identity—the L.'s compulsive questions stuck in being depraved and the fear of being depraved, is the denial of the finite character of suspension, a conviction to the pretense of eternal as the sole (im)possibility, which in turn divides the sense of life. To account for this divide and conviction that carries us from the fiction of 'as-if' to the compulsion of 'what-if', I will begin with an event out of which I made a story, without changing the general framework of the event or without editing the utterances. I hope this story will also give more sense of the daily life of the prison.

4.2. Where is he?

One fine day, on the ventilation space of a triple cell, me and my friend Halil are moving back and forth alongside the walls, absorbed in a conversation over a book that we have both read. (For a while, we have been sharing this unit together alone.) Our steps halt and the talk is interrupted, when we hear a distant cry calling my

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name: "Barııııış!!". The sound is reaching us from no far off than fifteen meters straight, but the yell is distant, since it had to echo between the sound-proof walls, raise the air, and pass through until it resonates above us. We respond loud and diffusely for the same reason: "Yeeeeees?"[140] They hear: "One incomiiing!"[141] "Send ooon!"[142] After we yell back and forth, we see a small ball arriving from above, just to drop into the middle of the yard. We shout again: "Dooone!"[143]

The ball that reaches us is a ball that carries a note (*pusula*): a bulk of newsprint soaked in water and packed with a piece of nylon bag (for weight), which was then covered by a slice of plastic bottle (to preserve it against the barbed wires, and to allow it tumble over the roofs). As usual, there is a note between the plastic and the nylon: a folded and sealed note, whose point of delivery jotted on its outer layer. This time it reads "A-5-15 Barış"—my name and cell number—so I take the note off, unseal it, and read:

> Hello Barış, how are you? How is Halil? Regards to him, too. Barış, we heard something like Murtaza from A-1-1 is dead, or was taken to the hospital and such, we couldn't understand. Did you see or hear anything? Can you try to reach him around? Regards, Ali.

My friend who sent this ball, Ali, is in the cell A-10-29. A-10-29 is not very far away from our cell—A-5-15—but it is not directly neighboring either. We are, first of all, on the same block: "A". There are three blocks in F-types like this (namely A, B, and C), with the middle one also split in two (as B_1 and B_2). In all of them, there are parallel corridors, each of which contain three iron doors opening to a triple cell. As initial numbers of our cells indicate (A-*5*-15, A-*10*-29, and A-*1*-1), I am at the 5th corridor, Ali at the 10th, and Murtaza at the 1st. These different corridors are all

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[140] Eveeet?
[141] Bir tane geliyoor!
[142] Gelsiiin!
[143] Tamaaam!

entered through a big broad corridor, which is called *ana malta* in prison jargon. *Ana malta* is where the guardians and prison staff do a portion of their daily work, and where prisoners pass through—with an attentive escort—for all kinds of releases like hospital dispatches, court hearings, or visits. The one and only path which one can walk from *ana malta* to the corridors is by crossing the pale of another barred door, that is set up on the entries of each. On the corridors of A and B_1, the cell numbers go inversely (as 3-2-1, 6-5-4, 9-8-7) while at the blocks B_2 and C, they go straight (as 71-72-73, 74-75-76, 77-78-79). Then Murtaza's cell, A-1-1, is the undermost cell of the first corridor; while my cell, A-5-15, is at the very beginning of the fifth corridor. Ali's cell, A-10-29, is also the undermost of its own corridor—so he could also try to (and likely had already tried to) reach Murtaza by throwing balls through a series of parallel units leading to his cell, but for those are mostly empty this time, he would have (or already had) failed to reach Murtaza; so he asked us on Murtaza's whereabouts. Because although we are very far away from Murtaza's cell, our cell is at the beginning of an odd-numbered corridor, and this means, like one-sixth of all cells,[144] its ventilation space is next to *ana malta*. So unlike other ventilation spaces, ours has two extra barred windows that open *ana malta*. These windows are controlled from the other side by the guards, and are also above my height, but if I take a plastic chair and pull up with some force, I can look and skip around. Sometimes when guards open these to get some fresh air, I can clearly hear the corridor, too; so if they had been open and Murtaza were taken to a hospital, we would have heard some relevant noises. But this time, with no luck, the windows have been closed all along, and we had no reason or were not bored enough to pay attention or to look around the corridor; so we had not heard nor seen any dispatch or

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[144] Ventilation spaces of first cells on every other corridor (A-1-3, A-3-9, A-5-15; C-2-71, C-4-77, C-6-83, and so on) neighbor *ana malta*.

rushing around. In any case, I quickly grab a chair, pull up, and have a look: no, nothing unusual (which has almost always been "nothing, as usual").

Then to explore further, I go right to middle of the ventilation space. There is an iron lid there, soldered. It is a manhole: the drain of the ventilation space, leading to a sewer. When F-types were being built, transmissive possibilities of these probably escaped the attention of the planners, because these are like "telephone"'s, as many prisoners would call it: when one hits these lids with something, the sound echoes on the other lids, resembling a "call". And when the other answers the call—which means approaching close to the manhole and speak—his voice is heard[145] on the ventilation spaces sharing the same way to the canal (three for each). The number of manholes sharing a canal is limited, but as they extend perpendicular to the corridors, they connect three cells that would not be connected otherwise, so they are very valuable mediums of communication. This time, they are even more worthy ways of communication, because all of my manhole neighbors, A-1-3 and A-3-9, have windows that open to *ana malta*, too. Then to find out what may have happened to Murtaza, I first go right to the middle of the yard, hit the manhole hard, and call out the names of my sewer-mates. There is a chance that they saw Murtaza going to the hospital, or at least noticed a rush or some discord. Maybe, unlike ours, even the windows of their ventilation spaces were open. And one of my yard's sewer-mates, A-1-3, shares the same corridor with Murtaza's place, A-1-1. The main iron doors that lead to the cells from these corridors have their own small barred windows, and they also transmit some sound; in addition to this, there are two barred windows in

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[145] On the first years of F-types, the lids were made of plastics that would be plugged in and out, so a perfectly fluent conversation was possible. As the managements noticed the situation, in the pace of a few years, all F-types' manholes were changed, gradually, with iron lids that are soldered to the hole. The new lids were also with smaller holes, blocking the sound in an extent. But in so far as these are to discharge water, they are to deliver some sound as well, which is, even now, to a reasonable degree.

every ventilation space of F-type that see two parallel corridors, one of which is the one that opens to the cells; so all in all, Murtaza's corridor neighbor, A-1-3, positioned in the beginning of the corridor, has a good chance of knowing whether or not anything unusual happened in Murtaza's undermost cell.

Yet no matter how hard I hit the manhole lids, there is no answer from any of the cells. Who knows, maybe they are raided by the guards and are being searched, maybe they are watching TV in full volume so they cannot hear my calls, maybe they are out to see their lawyers, maybe they went to a court or are in the workshops… Usually, I would throw a ball for them to hear me calling, to learn whether they are inside the cells or not at least; but this time, unfortunately, the only ball we have is the one that came from Ali, and the it is very close to dawn, which means the yard doors are soon to be closed. When the yard doors are closed, we are not able send balls back and forth, and we will not be able to reach Ali. So I decide to keep our only ball for writing a quick note to him before the dawn, because in case my sewer mates are out of their cells now, I would be left without any ball, and without a sufficient time to prepare another one.

Meanwhile, Halil winds his way inside and goes upstairs, to check if our back neighbors heard anything about Murtaza. The triple cells are all approximately 50m^2 in total, divided to two 25m^2 stories; and from their ground floor they open to their private yards, which are also around 50m^2. If one looks at two back-neighboring cells-for-three and their yards from a bird's eye view, s/he would see a rectangular shape of 150m^2, divided in parallel by three equal compartments: a yard, two cells, and a yard again (see Figures 2 and 3 in Part 3.1.). These two cells are joined side by side, but open to opposite yards and parallel corridors. They are sound-proof and built as such, but high-pitch notes such as pipe and flush noises or violin sounds may

clearly be discerned from the other side. If a prisoner hits the connecting walls hard, this can be heard as well. For speaking through, sometimes insulation layers are holed, but these do not help with channeling much. The most fluid conversation can be held through the windows upstairs after closing them, and propping a naked ear to the window for better transmission. This is why Halil goes upstairs, hits the walls, and loudly talks with our neighbors to ask if they heard something about Murtaza. Their answer is negative, and they begin to try reaching around as well.

After Halil and I are both left with no immediate information, we give up for the time being, because the door of the ventilation space may be closed at any time. It is four and a half p.m. in the dead of winter, so close to the dawn. I begin to write a quick note for Ali, mentioning that we did not hear anything but that we keep on checking. I put my note in the ball, write his name, and now I have to send it back to reach Ali's yard. His cell-number is, as I told, A-10-29. Ideally, there are many ways to send the note, but the way ahead is filled with new-comers, ill or old people who experience difficulties in throwing the note along, and even prisoners who refuse to throw or take the notes and give them to the management. This is also the reason why Ali did not share his worries with a chain of prisoners straightly heading to Murtaza's cell. Now my back neighbors are busy attempting to reach Murtaza and I have to be quick, so I begin yelling the name of prisoners who are cross-neighbors of my back-neighbors. To make the note reach their hands, I have to make it pass over the roof of our cells, the roof of a corridor and another yard. Just like how we managed to take the note during its previous arrival. The walls are around seven to eight meters (around 25 feet), and the thresholds of all are wired, so I have to pass the note over these, too. I start to yell the name of a prisoner in the cell that I am aiming towards, as loud and diffusely as possible: "Seliiiim!" He hears: "Yeeeees?"

"One incomiiing!" We hear the ball drop, they shout "done!", and we feel relieved. The ball should go from yard to yard like this until it reaches Ali. It is late in yard-time, most prisoners are outside, so the note is likely to reach if it does not get stuck.

Shortly after, we discern some sounds: the barred iron doors that meet *ana malta* and the corridors are opening one by one, the doors of ventilation spaces are being shut. This evening, they began the closing of the doors with our side of the block, so we are even closer to be shut inside. On our last turns of pacing the yard, me and Halil try to figure out what would have happened, or if anything happened, to Murtaza. He is a friend of Ali, adjudged through the same case. I have had no connections or conversations with him, but Halil recalls that he saw Murtaza once, when they were both on a hospital dispatch. Murtaza was looking young and healthy, he says, but there had not been much of a chance to speak with him in detail (political prisoners and others are separated on dispatches). Luckily, they traveled to the hospital on one of those ring vehicles that permeates some sound between compartments. On the road, Ahmet heard that Murtaza was heading to the neurology department, complaining about several voices that he was hearing. Delirium? Delusions? After Halil recalls this memory, we begin to worry even more.

Not more than ten rounds of pacing, the iron door of our cell blasts blaringly, and the guards step in while we begin to move inside the cell. "Good night, guys!"[146] says one of the guards holding the yard door. They come in numbers of at least three, watching one another while one of them closes the door. "Good night to you, too. How are you?"[147] "Meh, nothing, work as usual."[148] After we are all inside, I ask one of them with whom I am more familiar: "Say, is anyone around dead or

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[146] *İyi akşamlar beyler*
[147] *Sana da iyi akşamlar, nasıl gidiyor?*
[148] *Eh işte, her zamanki iş koşturmacası*

something?"[149] With this, I see an instantaneous baffling on his face and tone: "Oh, how do you guys hear things *this* fast?"[150] "You don't say! Is he dead? But how?"[151] After I inquire, he just responds in a warm tone, half-smiling: "no, no, everything is fine; just regular stuff, nothing else."[152] After he closes the yard door, the guards all get out, one bids a farewell, and the main door is shut. (Storified from Fieldnotes, 2014)

4.3. What happened to Murtaza?

It seems that Barış could not hear any news from Murtaza. He will, just not yet. But he already learned the story, maybe not figured it out yet. Let me tell 'the truth' at once: Murtaza is not dead. He committed suicide, but failed. "Just regular stuff." 'The guard' was telling the truth. "Nothing else."

First: the guard is telling a truth; attempted suicide is "just regular stuff" here (of the dead-units, whose sense of physicality greatly taken away, to try to 'realize' death). Secondly, the guard is telling the truth; "everything is fine": Murtaza is not dead. So "nothing *else*"; if Murtaza was dead, "everything" would *not* be "fine". What is this "everything"? It may be the routine, routine of the prison, its propriety. Then maybe the actual death of Murtaza has an overabundant power to disrupt that propriety, some occurrence 'else' than that propriety (which is 'nothing'?). Here an actual death is excluded: the prison wants to make its bodies live and 'serve' their sentences, to wherever, whenever it gets (even the sentence is more than a life-span—the eternal). But it is *an* attempted death, putrefaction, or

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[149] *Yav etrafta birileri mi ölmüş, neler oluyor?*
[150] *Siz de her şeyi amma hızlı duyuyorsunuz ha!..*
[151] *Deme! Öldü mü? Ama nasıl?..*
[152] *Yok yok, bir şey yok; her zamanki şeyler işte.*

even anticipated death which is to be absorbed: 'just *regular* stuff;' nothing else, is all there is.

Herein lies another regularity: Barış cannot respond to an occurrence of death of an other. He is excluded from bearing a witness to it; not only by the whole material structure that compose the prison's propriety—its walls, manholes, razor wires, etc.—but also by the guard's obstructed communication: The guard does not, nor cannot say—on the watch of others—that what exactly happened: A 'proper' guard cannot say that "oh man, you have to know; when we were inside the place…" On the contrary, the prisoner can not, must not, know—and so he does not: "Everything is fine." The only 'thing' he knows on whether Murtaza is dead or not, in either case, the guard *could* have said "everything is fine; just regular stuff." So the only 'thing' the prisoner knows is that the regularity is all that he witnesses; the enclosure of the gaze: "everything is fine"—is the most possible utterance to be heard in return when one inquires an irregularity; "nothing else". 'The truth' is at the same time concealed. The norm of the proper relation with the prisoner: "everything is fine;" so any possible community needs to first disguise itself on—and so it becomes—a pretense of the routine.

Or else: This "everything is fine" could as well be a momentary sympathy to Barış; seeing him panicked on a possibility of death of another being, the guard could have felt a need to relieve him, to be a companion to his pain, even with an unmasterable smile, on a shared community on the limits of Barış's thrill that carried the guard to his limits for a moment as well. Or on another reading; after a shock of Barış learning the occurrence "so fast", he would have just acted "unprofessionally", and slip the word out of his mouth. Maybe not that much, but at least enough to communicate on a level. Yet with the closure of the door, a possibility of community

becomes enclosed into an ultimate limit of the concrete and iron, as the flow of responses shatters on an instant of a blare—the door shuts down—with a fastening of multiple locks 'against' an opening, an (im)possibility of a community 'contained'.

The door that shuts down and amplifies Barış's curiosity is the same door that shuts Murtaza down to his lonely death. The question asked—what happened, what happened, what happened to Murtaza—is bound to be an insoluble riddle: not a question to be responded, but a dis-solution miming a 'problem' enclosed. Murtaza's dying is absorbed by the routine, the materiality, the organization of the prison's arche-structuration—its denial of the dispersal as a facticity. The factual body of analytical composition (like their count, their escort, or the general work of an assurance that every body is in its stasis-tical place) is the only 'truth' of it; so if there will ever be a response of (and to) Murtaza's death, it will be through an absolute certainty of analytical facticity—date of death, formal reason, an autopsy report, maybe a legal investigation… But it will bury, or at least attempt to bury, the finitude of being in its singularity.

> What ... calls me into question most radically [is] ... my presence for another who absents himself by dying. To remain present in the proximity of another who by dying removes himself definitively, to take upon myself another's death as the only death that concerns me, this is what puts me beside myself, this is the only separation that can open me, in its very impossibility, to the Openness of a community. (Blanchot, 1988, p. 9)

The strategical feignment of death is the modality of ultimate (immanentist) distance which becomes an all-encompassing pretense that apparently conceals alterity. This is the force of the feignment's closure: a never-ending push towards an enfolded, (pre)disposed stasis. It gravitates to, pull *as*; an already-dead, a unit, a replication of itself; an enclosed and unreachable distance that echoes up against itself… To a facticity of death that already occurred in a prolonging instant without a pulse; to an absentee that fades without a farewell. So in a similar manner with L.'s paranoid

preoccupation, the question—what happened, what happened, what happened to Murtaza—becomes absorbed into, becomes, and echoes the plain reverberation of the routine, as an ever-amplifying compulsion.

4.4. He is already dead

In the pursuit of however dying, in concrete segregative conditions, there becomes a halt of co-responsive relationality with the other. A facticity of Murtaza being dead or not becomes the predominant fear for Ali, calculative evaluations precedes Barış's correspondence with his neighbors, or a tendency towards alterity becomes confined and preconditioned by analytical calculations of the Panopticon. Segregative walls infiltrate to community constantly, as an identical constant. Taken with Blanchot's (1988) emphases on the contestation of the other that communicates as alterity, what is at stake is also the sense of one's 'own' living:

> When Blanchot writes that the self places itself beside the Other in its dying, he means that the self is brought outside of itself and into the community by way of its relation to the Other's finite existence. I can only "experience" death by exposing myself to the Other in its finitude, and this exposure grants me a relation to mortality. Although I cannot know my own death, I can experience mortality *via* the other person in its finite existence—an existence that contests the self by exposing it to an infinite alterity. (Suglia, 2004, p. 76)

Indeed: through my times of confinement, I had observed that many long-time prisoners present themselves as-if they are of an age of their entry. To give two instances; a prisoner, who is 45 years old, introduced himself to me on our first encounter, as-if he is of the same age with me (25), with adding that "and there is that twenty more, here (*bir de yirmi, burası var*)" (Personal communication, 2014). Or on another instance; a prisoner who is 40 years of age, on a written correspondence after our first encounter, had written that "I do not give away my 40 years of age, right? I am a 20-year-old youngster! (*Hiç 40 göstermiyorum değil mi?*

Ben 20'lik delikanlıyım!)" (Personal communication, 2014). One may take these as mundane jokes; but one of my other interlocutors, L., connotes this situation as an (un)interrupted relation with one's body:

> In the F-type, time, as a figure of speech, does not fly; it does not operate, it stagnates. Perhaps this is the case for all prisons… It was as if I was as I had [always] been, … in terms of age, I always felt I was within the limits of that previous age. I mean, let alone the atmosphere of temporal change … it even impedes a physical sort of transformation and change. It's as if it's like you see yourself in your 30s if you had been that age then, whereas 4-5 years, 10 years have passed, and you remain stuck within a time frame. …It turns into a kind of stasis. … An abstract life, an abstract thought. (L., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix F, 3 for the original)

This abstract life—an (un)interrupted relation with other that encloses one to a sense of prolonging, (n)ever-occurring instant—may adopt a sense of being abstracted from life; and in thus being, one needs not be confined for years to have a sense of it. One example of this presented itself one day, when I was trying to console a short-time arrestee friend (a 'gang-related' prisoner who was confined only for around four months) following his court hearing, at which he is denied a release. I wrote to him to cheer him up, saying that we are still living and well, and that time passes no matter what. He replied by saying, "but life is passing too, are you aware? (*hayat da geçiyor, farkında mısın*?)" (Personal communication, 2014).

The handicap is the pretense of one's own unawareness of living as an awareness; the feignment of life as an already-dead. This awareness is not about a cognizance; it is the gravitation of the identical routine to a life that as if it is a frozen identity. And in thus being, it has its symmetrical twin on the 'outside':

> When inside, even the sense of mourning evoked by the passing of one's mother is distinctive to the prison. The people we left outside resemble generic, dull pictures; perceived to be suspended in emptiness, independent from the force of change inherent to life. Even if you know that they are not, you have to convince yourself [that they are not]. (Z., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix G, 1 for the original)

The 'distinctive' mourning seems as the impossibility of mourning the death of the other; the other who become a frozen image that confine the prisoner within a compulsive affectivity of a stasis—then even the sense of difference is a work to be done, a persuasion of oneself that the life goes on. The withdrawal of death in a witness of dying feigns itself as frozen as the solidity of the walls, and the solidification densifies through the self-same amplification of the experience of isolation. At a time when I recently learned an unexpected death of a significant other (my aunt), my self-reflections also attest this:

> The "pains of imprisonment"[153] are as if somewhat more solidified now. Yes, this is the correct term; solid (*katı*). But not in the sense of "definite (*kati*)", and definitely not in the sense of "palpable". More real? Not that, either. It is just that I feel the walls surrounding me, literally, more solid. In the same manner that I feel my inconsolable state, along with my inability to console. (Fieldnotes, 2014, own translation; see Appendix H, 1 for the original)

The densification and concretization of the other and outer freezes temporality and represents itself as the ultimate certainty—indistinctiveness of division—and creates an illusion of the impossibility of withdrawal. (After a while following my release, I went to visit my aunt's graveyard, and a day after I cracked up flat on my back for more than two weeks. A friend suspected that I only then became aware of the loss, and most probably she was right.) And the self-same, circular experience is introjected, beyond cognizance, as the ultimate distance between an inside and an outside—both 'already dead':

> When we were first captured, we were at the … Prison. … [There was an elder prisoner] who had been doing time for the past 15 years. He was not much of a talker, he had grown tired of prison in a sense. During a discussion, he once said "I do not believe that there is a place called the outside anymore". Perhaps he did not believe this theoretically, but he had said it with great conviction. (Z., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix G, 2 for the original)

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[153] With the term "pains of imprisonment" (2007, pp. 63-83), I vaguely imply the constant feeling of frustration that comes out of a fixed distance and deprivation during the confinement.

The 'conviction' of prisoner in believing the non-existence of an 'outside' despite 'theoretical' (cognizant) awareness of the fiction—the orbit of strategical feignment that gravitates to a fix(at)ed distance of identity, revolving around an objectively distant, insensible o(u)ther that alienates finitude and alterity, by the dictum of identity feigned as the truth of the non-existent absolute.

4.5. "Everything is fine"

When the feigned discourse attempts to become the truth, i.e. the sole discourse that exhaustively and compulsively attempts to absorb its never-ending exteriority—as in all examples above—the answer becomes all the same: "everything is fine". Until now, this traversed two degrees of as-if stases—an as-if stasis of the 'physical' (body) and an as-if stasis of the o(u)ther. Outside-ified dispersal, outside-ified other. And in their relation with each, a fixed distance of the walls became the dictum of strategical and/or obsessive calculations, so of the gravitation to a non-existent exteriority of the identical.

Now when the respondent is an 'outsider' by itself, the fiction of the confinement, on another degree, pulls towards this pretense— "everything is fine." It is not a coincidence that whenever a media reporter, an inspector, or a researcher comes to 'visit' the institution, the officials try to represent it in its 'finest' appearance while it is on display that "allow outsiders to see that everything is all right on the inside" (Goffman, 1990, p. 106). This, however, is not limited to the officials' keen concern on representing the institution 'properly'—it even traverses the arrangement of the spaces (the spaces of visit) where the prisoners meet the people with whom they are the most intimate. "It is a melancholy human fact that after a time all three parties—inmate, visitor, and staff—realize that the visiting room

presents a dressed-up view, realize that the other parties realize this, too, yet all tacitly agree to continue the fiction" (Goffman, 1990, p. 102). Below images of open visit spaces presented in Figures 8 and 9 may be given as exemplary illustrations to this spatial fictitiousness.

Figure 8. General outlook of the open visit spaces of F-types. Source: (http://www.ankaraf2.adalet.gov.tr/manset/index.html#)

Figure 9. A photo me and my friend Ekin on the visiting space.

The mountains, the lake—the whole of the painting is more than obviously fake; but it goes on to construct the 'fine' scenery of 'everything.'

The fictional medium of enclosure in the spaces of visits not only manifests itself on the spatial arrangement but also considers an interactive (un)relationality of between the prisoner and his relatives, forcing them as beings exterior to one another. For instance, after hearing a very distressful news about his from his visitors, Ç. narrates his handicap in communicating his feelings and with his visitors as follows:

> When your eyes well up with tears during the visit, you try to hide it with all your might so that "they are not worried or hung up on you"; and in turn, with the exact sentiment behind them, you hear the words "We are all fine, everyone is fine" … In those times, I sense that the walls are not just standing in front of me as they do now. (Ç., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix I for the original)

So the dictum of "everything is fine" becomes another isolative wrap that fixtures the 'most intimate' of the prisoner, of the 'loved ones', as yet another exteriority. And in thus being, it is not a particular but instead a customary, in fact a normative fiction of the visiting space. For instance, after an hospital dispatch following a head injury, I note a conversation with the doctor who stitched my head:

> After the stitches, I just said "I have a visitation tomorrow" to the doctor, to relay my wish to not to stay at the hospital that night, against the possibility of being held in observation at the night. Yet as a response to me, the doctor removed the netting on my head [and showed me some other removable cover] and said, "we may put this on instead, and during visitation you would remove this and cover the wound with your hair". Responding to this attitude of the doctor, I just said "Okay, thank you," I had already understood I was not staying that night anyways. (Fieldnotes, 2014, own translation; see Appendix H, 2 for the original)

Lastly, this normative fiction can become a ground of in-formation of isolation and strategic arrangement. For instance, knowing the normalized pretense, the personnel can strategically classify the visitors and "search" (harass) them accordingly to these

classifications to further isolation. For myself, I had seen one of my quota-visitors[154] during my imprisonment only once and despite I urged him several times to come, he did never come; and I got really frustrated with him and cut my relationship for a while when I was released. Yet when we begun to see each other, I learned that he was harassed by the personnel and could not tell me. I was utterly surprised because I was thinking he would tell me at the time, so I could confront and inform the management on the issue, talk to my lawyer about it, and also write an official complaint to the judges. Yet for seeing me wholly powerless, he said he decided to hide this issue to not to bother me for this occurrence be a reason for a further irritation for me. Yet he stopped coming again. My interviewee K. (and also other prisoners) says this mostly occurs with their first degree relatives; for they are mostly the ones who do not confront the situation and react to the situation right away:

> Now during the entrance to the visit spaces … during the body searches, there sometimes take place [some assaults] that amounts to atrocity such as forcing visitors … to take their bra off on the grounds that its clasp makes the x-ray beep [and search the visitor by hand after it]. At least I am recounting what I heard … if a revolutionary goes to visit, such things do not happen much, they seldom do. … But it happens to mothers quite often. .. Or I should put it like this; if a bra clasp beeps, so does the revolutionary woman's, but to her they never do the search thing [harassment], because they know that if they search her body [in that way], she will either push back, shout slogans, or even if they do such [a harassment], it will not create a feeling that would refrain her from coming to the visit. But it does create this feeling in the mother, it may. They oppress specifically with this thought in mind. To cut, to segregate. By instituting the isolation, the mother is also penalized, but it's the most is the son. Because, ah Mesut, we are people in the end—of course it's important to see our comrades—but emotionally, it's far more important to see one's mother, girlfriend, wife if they're married, or children if they have children. … This is an emotional reality, that's the way it is. If we say "no, this is not important at all," which some people do, we would be lying. So in that situation if they manage to prevent the mother, the wife, the child to come to visit in one way or another, it is in that moment it much more

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[154] See the Part 3.5 on details of the conditions of visits. Quota-visits are three people for each prisoner that a prisoner can choose once in his arrival to the institution, and consists the only people (in addition to legal guardians, lawyers, and officially approved people) who can visit a prisoner apart from his close relatives.

deepens the isolation, the psychology of isolation. (K., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix J, 1 for the original)

Luckily, my family was experienced and in a sense careless in reacting to similar situations, and once these tactics are tried and it is seen that they do not work as intended, they are mostly halted. However, in my case, a very similar occurrence (that I learned much later on) that happened to my friend, who was one of my quota-visitors.

Interestingly, I would also like to note that, when my visitor was harassed, I was in no relationship with any organization whatsoever, and my visitor friend was not a 'comrade' of mine either, and my 'independent' status was also known by the managerial personnel. So here the issue does not seem to be cutting ties ('sequestering') the prisoner from terrorism (see Part 3.8.). K. also highlights this complexity as he narrates how his letters from his mom were never being delivered while he was receiving the letters from his comrades 'like organizational introductions' without a problem:

> For instance... many friends were receiving letters, like organizational instructions; and when these were being handed out, other letters, for example, a letter from someone's mother or friend—which included nothing much except for "how are you, are you well"—was not being handed. So it's an entirely psychological attack, rather than the content of what you wrote. ... For example, I was receiving an instructive sort of letter from a comrade… for instance, it says "this needs to be done" or "that needs to be done". ... comrades convey [this] to me one way or another. But my mother can even not pass through a greeting from her. (K., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix J, 2 for the original)

This paradox in permitting the delivery of "organizational instructions" while restricting the delivery of his mom's letter may even be thought in contradistinction to the institution's in-formation of 'sequestering' the prisoner from terror (see Part 3.8.) and rather be seen as a force to confine the prisoner more and more to the organization.

4.6. Circular entrapment

My above quoted correspondence with Z. (in Part 4.4) as to the distinct (non-)sense

of morning in prison in the face of the death of an other (who is 'outside') was

actually a more extensive narration concerning the experience of isolation, to which I

am particularly indebted because it inspired me heavily in thinking the experience of

isolation as formulated in this thesis, including the headline I give to it. Finishing the

thesis, I would like to quote it more extensively:

> I believe more and more that the flow of time inside the prison is like a circle.
> It's a strange thing. We released [N.] [his cell mate] … It's a situation we are
> happy about, too. But the sense of emptiness it leaves in this cycle is strange.
> I haven't been able to get used to the empty bed across mine. When I take
> meals for two people [instead of three], I sense a strangeness that has not
> subsided in its effect. Time outside is more "linear" You change with your
> surroundings, you witness every change, you live it. You do not feel a
> diminishing or deficiency in your sociability. When you are inside, even the
> sense of mourning evoked by the passing of one's mother is particular to the
> prison. The people we leave outside resemble generic, dull pictures; they are
> perceived to be suspended in emptiness, independent from the force of
> change that is inherent to life. Even if you know that they are not, you have to
> convince yourself [that they are not]. But any sort of small change
> experienced in prison creates an emptiness that is more substantial than it
> really is. ... The life that becomes cyclical has a tendency to instigate a
> narrowing of life both emotionally and intellectually, also feeding traits such
> as lack of trust and suspiciousness. … This is the crux of isolation (*tecrit*), so
> to say. (Z., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix G,
> 3 for the original)

I think this cyclical time and in general circular nature of the experience of isolation

as a panoptical effect in being bounded and necessitated to an identical dictum of a

self-enclosed monolith (totality), of which the F-types are only a part (despite a more

intensive one for sure). As to the prison, I see this cyclical experience and

arrangement of time that is, as I tried to mention in the last chapter, the temporal

facade of the disciplinary arrangement and accommodation, as the kernel of the

disciplinary training itself. Indeed, interestingly, only the routine and the sense of

cyclical time sometimes seems enough by itself in ensuring a disciplinary training of

the body:

> That's the routine of the prison for you. … It knows no gap (vacancy, *boşluk*).
> It turns everything into a habit. You brush your teeth the same way, at the
> same time every day, you sleep on the same side of the bed, you get used to
> the same sounds. ... Once you inhibit one habit for a couple of days, once you
> relax, a new cycle forms again. It's good to resist the power of the routine, to
> make small changes every once in a while. (Z., Personal Communication,
> 2014, own translation; see Appendix G, 4 for the original)

The unitary spatio-temporality by itself generates and forces routinized loops as

temporal frame-works. So in the F-types, despite there is not a strict scheduling of

daily life and military training like the prisons of the early 1980s (see the Part 2.2,

2.2.1), the abstract spatiotemporal framework by itself generates these loops and in-

forms a force of self-enclosure. This also resembles the entrapment of D. to the plain

reverberation of the routine by a constant possibility of waiting a raid (see Part 3.8).

Like L. also narrated as a follow-up to his disconcerted waitings of the haunt, the

routine that haunts always needs to be (un)worked for an escape:

> Both generally, and within the individual cells we were confined … we were
> trying to prevent … the process of things turning into the routine. … We
> were, in a way, in order to clean ourselves from that space; in order to avoid
> that mood, that atmosphere … we were reviving ourselves again and again, so
> to speak… and give ourselves a certain liveliness. (L., Personal
> Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix F, 4 for the original)

Whether in the form of resistance (in the manner of shifting them, as Z. mentions), or

in the form of its haunt (as in the manner mentioned in the Part 3.7), the life is pulled

into a form, as a form, and it is this form itself that makes the circular spatio-

temporality of the panoptical arrangement. As such, it is the general experience of (or

better put, against) abstract time, which is also the crux of punishment by itself:

> The prison time is the … form of punishment in our world. … Punishment
> equals time. … Prison wastes time, destroys time, empties time. ... The time
> is empty because of the repetitiveness of the prison schedule and routine. …
> Time moves at a snail's pace; the day is never-ending. … Look back at those
> days from a distance, however, and they are indistinguishable. … Time spent

seems to have no duration … because of the precise repetition of its component parts, the homogeneity, the lack of novelty." (Hardt, 1997, pp. 64-65).

This is the experience of entrapment, the dictum of the identical routine. A day follows another day, a counting follows another counting, a meal follows another meal… Replications of moments merge, decelerate, and start to whirl, slowly. If you look at them, you cannot recognize the difference. If you do not look at them, they enfold and duplicate whatever they find. The resistance against it converges into another replication—this may also be thought as to why the 'organized resistance' assumed the form of replication (shouting slogans on determined times, writing identical requests to protest, etc), devoid of *the* resistance, i.e. compearance to finitude, and of its force of exposition of ultimate limit to its outside; a dead resistance, without the possibility of dying. So everything seems to prolong: you write the notes again and again, you wait for canteen-deliveries for days, you stuck a ball and exhaust for an hour to drop it. Devoid of the differential context, the time apparently goes nowhere; it becomes a strip that surrounds one, a spiral that duplicates; the same spiral, the same waiting, the same exhaustion, again and again. The sameness—the ontological impossibility—is a rhythmic pretense: a rhythm that beats so frequently that it becomes impossible to be discerned from prolongation. The (non-)sense claiming the reality.

In the same manner with torture, the denial of finitude creates an illusion of antagonism that creates a feignment as if one can only be alive against it, with an escape from it (see Part 2.1.3). As the pretense of abstract sameness becomes the compulsive dictum, it does not kill me, but it suffocates me, so that I become depraved to a point where I try to breath any amount of oxygen: any input anywhere, that is 'not the cell', becomes the force that I incline towards. As one of my

interlocutors told me inside the prison, when we were together in a social activity of

conversation (see Part 3.6):

> Do you notice that; when you go to the court, the hospital, and when you see
> people [the prisoners see a glimpse of outside there]—do you notice their
> eyes? They all look like crazy; their eyes all open and continually looking
> from here to there, all as if they are trying to catch anything that they can
> find. Like, you know, when you are for a while all-sick, very near to dying,
> and when someone binds your nose and your mouth to an oxygen tube, and
> the first moment when you breathe some oxygen freely, your eyes look
> exactly the same. (T., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see
> Appendix K, for the original)

This is how, affectively and sensibly, it is created an illusion of "an exile from life, or

rather from the time of life" (Hardt, 1997, pp. 65-66), despite it is obviously an

ontological possibility (to *be* dead while living). The pretense that the life is outside,

the freedom is outside, the feeling of time and space is outside—all in their abstract

(non-)sense, becoming a compulsive dictum of reality.

CHAPTER 5

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: ACCUMULATION

In this thesis, I tried to trace the in-formational contours of isolation through the historical and arche-structural in-formation of F-type high security prisons. In so doing, one of my basic assumptions that I tried to convey with my data has been the ontological impossibility of isolation which, phenomenologically, has finally founded itself in the experience of compulsion. This was simply because the prison, as a specific topography of isolation, is founded upon the absolute reality of self-presence, which is nothing but a negation of presence, insofar as there is nothing absolutely interior (or exterior) to itself. The experience can only happen as a communication, as the compearance of the finitude of singular beings, which is by itself the resistance to the fiction of absolute.

Such an enclosure, despite being an ontological impossibility, may assume the form of fiction that is founded upon a tautological principle, typically the principle of accommodation and utility. In this sense, its dictum is never real, but it does not need to be—as long as it succeeds in denying its fictitious character and goes on to feign an absolute reality, it may in-form a dictum of self-fulfilling prophecy instead of an obvious tautology. The maxim of this prophecy—utility—that concerns more probability than possibility can never be self-present, but force the truth of its self-presence through spatiotemporal and organizational arrangements that seemingly confines the possibility of life to itself. In so doing, its practical movement is obsession, while its phenomenological effect is compulsion—the former because of its ontological impossibility, the latter because the experience is

only communication, which seems as a compulsion when faced with (believed in) an absolute absence or presence.

In tracing these, I hope I could have been able to map, at least to an extent, the (non-)experience of isolation as an ultimate interiority and/or exteriority. I particularly value this, because—despite the fact that I have discussed throughout the thesis through more particular and local scales—I suspect that this is a (non-) experience against which the body reacts (and may only re-act) in the face of a dictum that feigns its absolute order as the necessary condition of life. In so being, this absolute dictation may assume any immanent forms of self-enclosure, and may concern a broad array of ache-structures, from nation to vanguard party, from gender identity to abstract individuality. The F-types were, on the broader scheme of things, only a more intensive dictum of such a totality.

I would like to conclude this thesis with one last inquiry, which I guess corresponds with the many facets of isolation that I have traced, but to which I could not find a suitable place in the thesis. This is the problem of accumulation, and the possibility of it in the making of individual. This problem was first posed to me by a prisoner while we were both on the 'social activity' of 'conversation hours' (see Part 3.6). Acknowledging my interlocutors that I had an aim to conduct a thesis on F-type prisons, every now and then we were speaking about the F-types or in general about prisons. At one of those times, T., a long-time prisoner himself, suggested to me to trace the 'real' reality of imprisonment, and not to study anywhere outside the cell; and to do this, he posed me the issue of suffocation, with which I concluded the last chapter (see Part 4.6).

Thinking on the possibilities of inquiring this question, I first found myself irresolute—if there was nothing to say, what could I really think about it, let alone

write a whole thesis on it? Yet time and time again, I reposed this question to myself, and the first meaningful answer I could entertain was through a reading of Lyotard (1993), and in his narration of the libidinal band as a möbius strip that has no dualities or distinct ends (like love and hate, kindness and aggression, and the like) (see also Williams, 1998, 2000). Libidinal band instead has intensities on the surface of its strip which are, despite being on the same surface with other intensities, do not need to have any relation with them. They had the energy to intensify and explode—this or that intensity could explode at any moment, and when it does, the möbius strip breaks off for a while, soon to in-form a new surface, again a möbius strip, but with a different composure.

Lyotard's (1993) main problematic in writing his narrations was to rethink systemics without binary dualities. Yet when I thought this with the suffocations of T. (and of myself, and others), I began to consider the affective terrain of imprisonment as a libidinal band without a possibility of breaking up and re-forming a new strip. Intensities could blow but could never break up the identity of its surface, so capable only of accumulation, and accumulated more and more, in-forming a pretense of eternal. Thinking with the phases that I heard like "the prison has tired me after all this time (*hapishane artık beni yordu*)" as an excuse from long-timers regarding their impulsive reactions, I thought (and still think) this affectivity seems as a good ground of inquiry into the experience of isolation.

On the one hand, this was also the idea with which I thought I could narrate the problems of isolation posed by the triple cells. Typical life in these triple cells are interwoven with a slow building up of tenseness which gradually becomes a more compelling force in dividing the inmates. As one of my interlocutors who was also a long-time prisoner, A., claims, the possible duration of enduring the triple cells is

At most, at the utmost, ten months. Then everything begins to stick out like a sore thumb. It is not because of a bad will or anything but, you know, even a father and a son cannot stay that much together, what else can I say?"[155] (Y., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation)

These accumulative amplifications seem to be in effect beyond cognizance, and as the time prolongs, they began to amplify even at the most mundane of the issues—the cell-mate's footsteps, voice tone, eating habits, daily looks… "For instance we had some friends, they were sensitized to the extreme. Especially those who had been staying for a long time. They had left no tolerance whatsoever. They could have like instant reactive snaps at any time" (L., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation).[156]

Accumulative enclosures of these exposures can form in various ways. On an affective-compulsive level, L. relays:

You cannot pursue your studies. What happens when this sense of loneliness, this sense of solitude is born within one, is that one is left on the outside, … the possibility of a creative, beneficial output is rendered out of the question. The mind does not work in an active manner under these circumstances, it is inhibited, it becomes reticent. … As the saying goes, it splits hairs. … In such cases … the thought mechanism is interrupted. The processes in which you would focus on and create a work cannot develop. [Me: What do you focus on more instead?] In these situations there is an intensification towards inside, an intensity. … Obsessive sorts of moods. (L., Personal Communication, 2016, own translation; see Appendix F, 5 for the original)

On on a more interactive level, F. narrates:

And there is also something that happens within this cell system. The man separates his fork and knife. You see that he seems pleased in the dorms with so many people, with everything being communal and shared, with so many people; but then you see that when he comes here, he marks his fork and knife, sets them aside. […] Or you see that he is annoyed with everything you do, every single thing about you bothers him, he judges and criticizes everything about you; "don't do it like that, don't do this like that" … He takes everything personal. For instance, he gets mad at you because you are

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[155] "*En fazla, taş çatlasa on ay. Sonra yanında kalanın her şeyi batmaya başlıyor. Yani, kötü niyetten ya da karşındakinin kötülüğünden değil de, işte; baba-oğul bile kalamıyor be!*"
[156] "*Mesela bazı arkadaşlarımız vardı, müthiş derecede hassaslaşmışlardı. Özellikle uzun süre cezaevlerinde kalan arkadaşlar. En ufak bir şeye tahammülleri kalmamıştı. Anında böyle tepkisel bir çıkışları olabiliyordu.*"

asleep at noon. Especially if he tried not to sleep until noon but cannot achieve this, he gets all the angrier. (F., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation; see Appendix L for the original)

The problem formulated by F. was that "In the dorm system, you can just turn your back and go; yet here, even the slightest thing is understood as an attack to personality, and any dispute assumes the form of war" (F., Personal Communication, 2014, own translation).[157]

Doğuç (2014) claims that small-group isolation qualitatively differs from the cellular isolation. The accuracy of this proposition depends on that so-called quality of course; however, at least regarding the suffocation of T. (who were speaking through the single cells), as to the accumulation of intensities, they seem similar. In-forming a compelling force of absolute distance through a denial of limits (eternal exposition), it seems similar with each and every inquiry of isolation that was pursued in this thesis, too. The self-enclosed totality that is sensed through the compulsive affectivity also seems similar. In short, I could not find a difference of this and the other in-formations of isolation, all of which include an excessive exposition to a circuitry without a possibility of re-turn.

The question left—the isolation, and the heterotopic non-place of the prison which, like a mirror, despite existing outside the society, reflects a crux of societal organization (Foucault, 1986)—where is it? I tried to locate it at the heart of the ontological impossibility of abstraction. I also tried to show the accumulative affectivity that comes with the dictum of absolute as the only possibility. So maybe it is around a point of conjuncture of three (non-)relations. The moralist relation to truth as a re-action that is devoid of action, finding its affective principle on resentment (Nietzsche, 2006), the problem of pressure created by the excess energy

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[157] *"Koğuş sistemi olsa sırtını döner gidersin, ama burada en ufak bir şey kişiliğine hakaretmiş gibi algılanıyor; anlaşmazlık, savaş halini alıyor"*

that the world overabundantly receives but, at least by the human beings, cannot be consumed because of the utilitarian understanding of economics that focuses on scarcity and preservation (Bataille, 1988b, 1991), and the total enclosure of confinement to a single performance of being that is refused to get outside her/his role which results in the mortification of the confined (Goffman, 1978, 1990)—respectively; the truth, the accumulation, and the dictum of sameness that are concurrently performed—perhaps, this may consist a fruitful line of inquiry with which the fictive process of modern punishment and in general societal arche-structuration may be considered.

Either way, this text attempted to be a thesis on the (re)production of isolation despite the impossible ontology that lies beneath it, and the circular entrapment of experience (community) when faced with its feignment of eternal enclosure as the only condition of possibility—I hope it was able to provoke sensible questions on the reader.

APPENDIX A

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF B.

Buca'da kaldık. Hiçbir zaman İstiklal Marşı okumadık. Hiçbir zaman yemek duası yapmadık. Hiçbir zaman din hocasının eğitimlerine katılmadık. Bütün [sosyalist] siyasi tutsaklar açısından söylüyorum. Hiçbir zaman [tek tip] elbise giymedik. Ama elbise giyen oldu, din dersine katılan oldu, onların koğuşlarını ayırdılar. … Onları ayırdılar ama kitlesel [çoğunluk] boyutuyla düşündüğünde [Buca'da] biz onların hiçbirini kabul etmedik. Mamak bütün yaptırımları kabul etti. Gene Bayrampaşa, Sağmalcılar hiçbirini kabul etmedi. Edenler var her yerde var bak bunu özellikle söylüyorum, yanlış anlama olmasın. Diyarbakır kabul etti ama en büyük vahşeti onlar yaşadı ve büyük direnişler de ortaya koydular. Yani … saldırı her tarafta var ama boyutu değişik, direniş de her tarafta var ama boyutu değişik.

ORIGINAL VERSIONS OF TRANSLATED CITATIONS

1.

"1980'li yıllardaki terör suçundan cezaevine konulan tutuklu ve hükümlü sayısındaki artış bunların muhafazasındaki güçlükleri de beraberinde getirmiş; firar, öldürme ve isyan olayları artmış, koğuş esasına dayanan cezaevlerinde terör hükümlü ve tutukluları ile tehlikeli suçluların muhafaza edilmeyeceği anlaşılmış, üç ve tek kişilik oda sistemli cezaevlerinin yapılması gündeme gelmiş …" (Çolak and Altun, 2008, p. 14)

2.

"Sorunların aşılabilmesi için koğuş sisteminin terk edilmesinin yanısıra bilgisayar sistemine geçilmesi, yönetimde insan faktörünün asgariye indirilmesi, denetim, gözetim ve aramalarda teknolojiden yararlanılması, cezaevi müdürlerinin hukuk fakültesi mezunlarından seçilerek hizmet içi eğitime tabi tutulması gibi önlemler alınmalıdır." (Bingöl, 2007, p. 127)

3.

"[Sami Türk dedi ki] 'F tipi cezaevleri günümüzde, Birleşmiş Milletler cezaevleri minimum kurallarına uygun olarak inşa edildiler. Kimsenin tecrit edilmesi söz konusu değil ve Türkiye koşullarında Avrupa standartlarında hükümlü ve tutuklular için en iyi koşulları bünyesinde toplayan cezaevleri olarak inşa edildi.' … Burada bulunabilecek olan hükümlü ve tutukluların dinlenme saatleri dışında da spor salonu, iş atölyeleri gibi çeşitli ortamlarda biraraya gelebileceklerini kaydeden Türk, bu nedenle bazılarının söylediği gibi insanların tecrit edilmesinin asla söz konusu olmadığını söyledi." ("Bakan Türk: Cezaevleri," 2000)

APPENDIX C

ORIGINAL NARRATIONS OF S.

1.

[19]81'de de fiili direnişlerle hak aldın, [19]82'de de fiili direnişlerle hak aldın ve aynı zamanda fiili direnişin yanı sıra açlık grevleriyle iyileştirmeye dönük haklar aldın. Mesela … 1 Şubat genelgesi gelmişti Türkiye genelinde, … [Hapishanesi'nde] tek tip giydirilecek … Elbise giymedik ne oldu bizi aldılar hücrelere kapattılar. Hücrelere kapattılar ve mahkemeye giderken zorla giydiriyorlar. Bu defa ne yapıyorsun; [mahkeme] salon[un]a çıktın, elini [kelepçeyi] açıyorlar ya hemen elbiseyi yırtıp atıyorsun. Elbiseyi yırtıp atma diye iç çamaşırını bile soyuyorlardı. Farketmiyordu artık millet diyordu … gerekirse gözünüzü kapatın, indiriyordu çamaşırlarını. İşte bu fiili direnişlerle beraber ek olarak açlık grevi yapılıyordu.

2.

Dediğim gibi, şu yanlış anlaşılmasın, açlık grevi tek başına bir kazanım elde etmez. Fiili direnişle birlikte gündeme geldiği an kazanım alabiliyorsun ancak. Temeli öyle. Söylüyorsun, veriyorsa veriyor vermiyorsa [açlık grevine] giriyorsun, ondan sonra [idare] bakıyor durumlar kötülüyor, sana haklarını veriyor. Ama bu haklar da hiçbir zaman kalıcı değil. Ve çıta sürekli yükseliyor. İlk önce bir hafta önemliydi onlar için, sonra on gün, baktılar onüçüncü gün generaller geliyor görüşmeye—hakikatten generaller geldi. … Ordu Komutanı vardı, … Ordu Komutanı [cezaevi komutanına] direkman diyor ki "bir tane adam ölürse … hepinizi sürerim". Adam da geliyor senin haklarını veriyor, bir de sana öyle bir konuşuyor ki evladım falan... Güzel babacan ayaklarında tabi. İşkence de yaptırıyor, dövdürttürüyor da, [ama] onunla başa çıkamayacağını anlayınca bunu yapıyor.

3.

Bunu sen kabul etmediğin için kapıları açmadılar. Operasyon yaptılar. Herkese iyi bir dayak attılar. Kendilerince elebaşı olduğu ya da direneceğini varsaydıkları insanları hücrelere attılar. Bu ara yaklaşık 10-12 kişi hastanelik oldu, bir tanesi de benim zaten. … Ve bizi mahkemeye verdiler. Hem bizi dövdüler, hem hücrelere attılar… Sakat olan, geçici hafıza yitiren, kaburgaları kırılan arkadaşlarımız vardı. … Tabi biz [böyle bir ihtimale dair] her şeyi önceden ayarlamıştık, hücrelere girer girmez açlık grevi başladı zaten.

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4-

Ondan sonra bizim haklarımızı geri verdiler. Ama hepsini değil. Örneğin açık görüşe soyismi tutmayan giremiyor, örnek. Havalandırma parça parça yine. … Tüplerimizi almışlardı, içeriye tüplerimizi geri verdiler, yemek yapabiliyorduk. Dışarıdan içeriye yiyecek belli bir standartlarda aldılar; açık görüşlerde olmak kaydıyla, onun da sınırlı sayısı olmak kaydıyla. Bunları yeniden elde ettik. Bütün yiyecek içecek serbest oldu içeriye girmede. … Sonra her koğuşta alt kat üst kat ayrı ayrı havalandırmaya çıkmayı kabul ettiler. ... [Bu da] tekrar süre içersinde şeye dönüştü fiili olarak, bütün alt-üst kat aynı anda kullanıyor. Yani havalandırmadan gün boyu yararlanma hakkını elde ettik. ... Tabi elbise giyilmedi hiçbir biçimde. ... [Zamanla] dışarıdan gelen açık görüşte ailede soy isim sınırlaması kalktı. Tabi bu arada açık görüşte firarlar oldu ondan dolayı [tekrar] kısıtladılar. ... [Kısaca] 86-88 arasındaki haklarımızın hepsini 88'deki operasyondan sonra sürece yayarak tekrar elde ettik.

5-

Hakkını alabilmek için bir fiili direniş yapıyorsun, iki açlık grevi. Bundan başka silahın yok. Bunlarla. Bir de aşındırma politikası dediğimiz; mesela güven veriyorsun; diyorsun ki "Ya, ben şu odaya geçeyim tamam mı, yarım saat sonra çıkarım oradan, hani bir sohbet edeceğim, [arkadaşın] bir özel sorunu var" falan. Öyle gardiyanlar da eridi. Sonra bakıyorlar [ki] bir sıkıntı olmuyor, [rutin haline geliyor].

6-

[Hücrelerde kalma koşullarımız bir müddet] sonra bir dönem gevşedi, ve biz [havalandırmaya kişi başı teker teker 15'er dakika çıkartılmak yerine] iki kişiyi bir arada çıkartma pozisyonunu yarattık. Ama bu fiili bir durum oldu. Gardiyanlarla artık şey gibi oluyorsun, ahbap-çavuş gibi oluyorsun. İşte oradan onu alırken ötekisi 15 dakikayı kullanırken bu içeriye girme süresini biraz fazlalaştırıyor, gardiyan bekliyor orada birazcık, hani o kapını kilitlemiyor orada duruyor, sen orada konuşuyorsun sonra içeri giriyorsun [ve durum böylece yavaş yavaş o gevşeme pozisyonuna geliyor].

7-

Hücrelerin özelliği şu: Her biri tek kişilik. Musalla taşı var; ranza yok, demir yok, hiçbir şey yok. Musalla taşının başına bir sunta atmışlar kafalarına göre; ya yatak veriyorlar ya vermiyorlar. … Her taraf kapalı, iletişim kuramıyorsun. Havalandırma pencereleri şu peteklerle örülmüş, şu kuş gözü petekleri var. Dışardan kuş gözünden baktığın zaman sadece işte önüne çıkan insan tam önüne gelirse bir kısmını görebiliyorsun, ama anca önüne geldiği zaman görüyorsun. ... Şimdi ilk eylemler o petekleri büyüterek oluyor. Orayı deliyorsun bir biçimde iç peteği gözün çıkıyor sonra biraz daha açıyorsun,

böyle böyle. O petekleri açtığın için devlet malına zarardan kaynaklı hücre cezan bitmiyor; ek ceza veriliyor, infazın yanıyor vesaire vesaire. Biz yaklaşık 5 ay hiç çıkmamak kaydıyla orada kaldık.

APPENDIX D

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF M.

Bana sorarsan mesela ben şey söyleyeyim mesela [mahpus olan] arkadaşlarımla …iletişimim olduğunda [onlara da söylüyorum ki] F-tipi'nin …. yatma koşulları çok daha konforlu … koğuşa göre. Ama sorun … orada mekan değil. [Mesela ben] ölüm orucuna girerken … mekansal olarak sadece … aman … hücre olmasın … diye değil, asıl olarak bu saldırı tamamen bizim devrimci … kimliğimize yönelik, yani bizi o devrimci kimliğimizden koparmak için [yapıldığından dolayı ölüm orucuna girmiştim]. … Yani, o yüzden, mekandan çok … sosyolojik olarak [düşündüğümüzde] bu mekanın kendisi … onun [mahpusun] sosyal kimliğine, sosyal kişiliğine yönelik bir saldırı [olduğundan]

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APPENDIX E

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF C.

Antep cezaevi açıldığında ... en asi, uslanmayan mahkum dedikleri tipleri oraya naklettiler. … Tabi Antep cezaevi farklı bir uygulamayla başladı yani. … Altı ay direniş vardı tabi … [ama] tamamen bizi serbest bıraktılar bir süre sonra. … İdare … bakanlıktan takdir üstüne takdir almaya başladı, çünkü bu en azılı mahkumları bir anda şey oldu, cezaevinde olay çıkmaz oldu. Çünkü herkesin eline bir şey verdiler; isteyen kitap okumaya başladı, isteyen gemi yapmaya başladı. … İşte ailelerle açık görüşler başladı. Cezaevine çaydır yani onlar çok rahat bir şekilde girmeye başladı yaklaşık altı ay sonra. Zaten orada firar girişimi falan oldu o rahatlık bunu sağladı; bir arkadaş firar edebildi … yerine birisini bırakıp içeriye. … İdare yani ne yaptı, kendi inisiyatifini mi kullandı artık bilmiyorum ama Bakanlık ona epey paye verdi. Sen burayı sakin tut da n'olursa olsun diye herhalde.

ORIGINAL NARRATIONS OF L.

1.

"Bazen ayda işte 2-3 kere 4 kere hatta 5 kere hatta 10 kere yani ne bileyim 2-3 günde bir bir düşün yani, kısmi arama dediğimiz şeyleri yapıyorlardı. Ve her kısmi aramada, biliyorsun o yani, keyfidir. […] Rutin aramanın dışındadır. […] Anlık yani, […] ne zaman gelecekleri de kestirilemiyordu […] Kestirilemiyordu. Çoğu zaman zaten özellikle geceleri seçiyorlardı. Akşam saatlerini. Yani 8-9 genel bir şeydi ama çoğu zaman 1-2'de bile geldikleri zamanlar oldu."

2

Dolayısıyla onlar elinden alındıktan sonra, o ürünler eliden alındığı zaman sonraki süreçlerde yeniden yazmak istiyorsun, yani sürekli bu korku bu şey de var yani. Anlık yani, dedim ya sana, ne zaman gelecekleri de kestirilemiyordu yani. […] Bu süreçte o kesitirilemediği için sen bir şeyler yazıyorsun orada emek veriyorsun, o ruh hali sürekli o kişide zaten mevcut oluyor. Ya şimdi gelse? Şimdi alsa? E ben 3 sayfa yazmışım, ben 5 sayfa yazmışım; örnek, 10 sayfa yazmışım. Bunları da alıp götürse? Bu kadar şey elimden alınsa? […] Kafa bir anlamda meşgul oluyor yani diyorsun ki ürünün alınacak, bir anlamda öyle bir ruh hali var sende. Sen de orada diyorsun ki ya işte ben 1-2 kitap bakıyorum, 3 kitap bakıyorum, e bu yetiyor. Beşinci, altıncı, onuncu kitaba da gerek duymuyorsun yani daha derinlikli bir çalışma yürütmek için, o söylediğim ruh hali bunu engelliyor yani. […] Daha rutin bir yaşam şeyleriyle [temposuyla] karşı karşıya kalınıyor. (Interview with L.)

3

Zaman, F-tipinde, deyim yerindeyse, akmıyor; işlemiyor, durağanlaşıyor. Belki bütün cezaevlerinde böyle bir şey vardır… Sanki [hep] ben ilk geldiğim gibiydim, .. yaş itibariyle hep kendimi o yaş sınırlarında hissettim. Yani bırak onun zamansal değişim atmosferlerini… fiziksel anlamda bile bir değişim dönüşümü sekteye uğratıyor. Sanki böyle kendini işte 30lu yaşlardaysan 30lu yaşlarda görüyorsun oysa aradan bi 4-5 sene geçmiş, 10 sene geçmiş sen hala orada zaman diliminde çakılı kalmışsındır. … Öyle statik bir hal alıyor yani … Soyut bir yaşam, soyut bir düşünme.

4.

> Hem genel alan olarak, hem de bulunduğumuz özgün hücrelerde …
> rutinleşmenin … önüne geçmeye çalışıyorduk. … Bir şekilde yine kendimizi
> oradan arındırmak için; o ruh haline, o atmosfere girmemek için kendimizi …
> yeniden yeniden diriltip, deyim yerindeyse, … tekrardan bir canlılık
> kazandırıyorduk yani.

5.

> Çalışmalarını yürütemiyorsun. Bu sefer yalnızlık hissi, yalnızlık duygusu
> kişide doğduğu zaman, böyle dışta kalma duygusu geliştiği zaman ne oluyor,
> … herhangi bir faydalığın çıkarıcı yaratıcı bir ürünün önüne de geçilmiş
> oluyor. Zihin orada aktif bir durumda işlemiyor, sekteye uğruyor,
> ketumlaşıyor … Deyim yerindeyse kılı kırk yarıyor. … Öylesi hallerde …
> düşünsel mekanizma sekteye uğruyor. Böyle herhangi bir şey çıkaracağın
> ürünün üzerine de yoğunlaşma odaklaşma durumları gelişemiyor. [Ben: Neye
> odaklanıyorsun daha çok?] O tür durumlarda biraz daha içe dönük bir
> yoğunlaşma, yoğunluk alıyor. … Takıntılı ruh halleri.

APPENDIX G

ORIGINAL NARRATIONS OF Z.

1.

İçeride insanın annesinin ölüm haberini aldığı vakit bile ortaya çıkan yas hapishaneye özgü oluyor. Dışarda bıraktığımız insanlar genel donuk resimler gibi, boşlukta asılıp yaşamın değişim gücünden bağımsızlarmış gibi algılanıyor. Öyle olmadıklarını bilsen bile, kendini [öyle olmadıklarına] ikna etmen gerekiyor.

2.

Yakalandığımız ilk dönem … Hapishanesi'ndeydik. … [Yanımızda yaşlı bir mahpus vardı.] 15 küsur yıldır yatıyordu. Pek konuşkan sayılmazdı, hapishane yorgunuydu biraz da. Bir tartışma esnasında "ben dışarısı diye bir yer olduğuna inanmıyorum artık" demişti. Belki teorik açıdan bu söylediğine inanmıyordu, ama bunu büyük bir kararlılıkla söylemişti (Personal communication with Z., 2014).

3.

Hapishanede zamanın akışının kuvvetli bir biçimde döngüsel olduğuna daha fazla inanıyorum. Tuhaf şey. [N.]'yi tahliye ettik. Sevindiğimiz de bir durum. Ama bu döngüdeki yarattığı boşluk hissi bir tuhaf. Karşımda duran boş yatağa henüz alışamadım. Yemeği iki kişilik alınca henüz etkisini yitirmeyen bir gariplik sezinliyorum. Dışarıda yaşam daha 'lineer' akıyor. Çevrenle birlikte değişiyorsun, her değişime tanık oluyorsun, yaşıyorsun. Toplumsallığından bir eksilme, yoksunluk hissetmiyorsun. Ama içeride insanın annesinin ölüm haberini aldığı vakit bile ortaya çıkan yas hapishaneye özgü oluyor. Dışarda bıraktığımız insanlar genel donuk resimler gibi, boşlukta asılıp yaşamın değişim gücünden bağımsızlarmış gibi algılanıyor. Daha doğrusu öyle olmadıklarını bilsen de kendini [öyle olmadıklarına] ikna etmen gerekiyor. Ama içerde yaşanan en ufak değişim, olduğundan kapsamlı boşluk yaratıyor yaşamında. … [D]öngüsel hale gelen, içine kapanan bir yaşamın duygusal ve entelektüel açıdan darlaşması, insanlardaki güvensizlik, kuşkuculuk gibi özellikleri beslemesi söz konusu. … Tecritin özü bu biraz da.

4.

Hapishanin rutini böyle işte … Hiç boşluk tanımıyor. Her şeyi bir alışkanlık haline çeviriyor. Dişlerini hep aynı şekilde aynı saatte fırçalıyorsun, yatağın aynı tarafına yatıyorsun, aynı seslere alışıyorsun … Bir de bir alışkanlığa birkaç gün ket vurunca, gevşeyince tekrar yeni bir döngü oluşuyor. Rutinin gücüne ayak diremek, ara sıra ufak-tefek değişikliklere gitmek iyi oluyor.

APPENDIX H

ORIGINAL VERSIONS OF CITED SELF-REFLECTIONS

1.

Mahpusluğun acıları şimdi daha bir 'katı' sanki. Evet, doğru kelime bu; katı.
Ama 'kati' anlamında değil, 'hissedilir' anlamında hiç değil. Daha gerçek?
Yine değil. Sadece çevremdeki duvarları, literally, daha katı hissediyorum.
Ve teselli edemez-edilemezliğimi de.

2.

Dikişten sonra "yarın görüşüm var" diyecek oldum doktora, yatmama
isteğimi belirtmek için, yani hastanede müşahede altında tutulma ihtimalime
karşın. Bunun üzerine doktor, fileyi çıkartıp [yerine başka bir şey gösterip],
'şunu takarız, görüşün gelince bunu çıkarır, saçlarınla örtersin' dedi.
Doktorun bu tavrı üzerine sadece "tamam, teşekkürler" dedim, gece
kalmayacağımı da anlamıştım nasılsa.

APPENDIX I

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF Ç.

Hani görüşte, gözlerin dolduğunda, bunu "aklın sende kalması" ihtimaline karşın var gücünle belli etmemeye çalışırken, karşılığında da en az beş-altı defa, aynı kaygıyla edilmiş, "biz iyiyiz, herkes iyi" cümlesi duymak… İşte o zamanlarda, duvarların böyle önümde durduğu gibi durmadığını hissediyorum biraz da.

APPENDIX J

ORIGINAL NARRATIONS OF K.

1.

Görüşe girerken şimdi F-tipi'nde ... aramalarda bazen vahşete varacak [çeşitli tacizler oluyor,] mesela sütyeninin kopçası ötüyor diye onu da … çıkarttırarak [elle arama gibi]. En azından duyduğumu söylüyorum, … görüşçü olarak devrimci bir kişi gidiyorsa, bu tür şeyler olmuyor pek, çok az oluyor. … Ama analara sık sık oluyor. … Şöyle söyleyeyim, sütyenin kopçası ötüyorsa devrimci kadınınki de öter, ama onda o arama şeyini [tacizini] hiç yapmıyorlar; çünkü şunu biliyor; onda arasa bile, ya karşı tepki verecek, slogan atacak, ya da arasa bile aradığında en azından olumsuz yani öyle aman görüşe bir daha gelmeyeyim gibisinden bir şeye yol açmayacak. Ama anneye yol açar, açabilir. Bunu düşünerek o tür bir baskı uyguluyor. Kesmek için. Tecriti keserken anneye de bir ceza vermiş oluyor, ama en çok ceza oğluna. Çünkü, ya Mesut, biz sonuçta insanız; elbette yoldaşlarımız, onları görmek önemli ama pek çoğuna şimdi annesini, sevgilisini eşini, evliyse çocuğu varsa çocuğunu görmek çok daha önemli geliyor duygusal olarak. … Duygusal olarak böyle, bu gerçek. "Yok, bu önemsiz" dersek, ki diyenler oluyor, yalan söylemiş oluruz. Yani o durumda annesinin, eşinin, veya çocuğunun görüşe gelmesini şu veya bu biçimde engellerse, işte o anda tecriti daha çok derinleştirmiş oluyor; tecrit psikolojisini.

2.

Mesela… bir çok arkadaşa mektup geliyordu, örgütsel talimat gibi mektuplar; onlar verilirken, örneğin birisinin annesinden arkadaşından mektup—mektup olarak da "nasılsın, iyi misin"den öteye geçmiyor—o mektup verilmiyordu. Yani yazdığın şeylerden çok, tamamen psikolojik bir saldırı … Bana mesela yoldaştan gelen mektup oluyordu talimat gibi bir şey … mesela "şu yapılması, bu yapılması gerek" … bana [bunu] bir şekilde yoldaşlar … iletir. Ama annemin bir merhabasını annem iletemez.

APPENDIX K

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF T.

Hiç dikkatini çekiyor mu bilmiyorum; mesela mahkemeye veya hastahaneye giderken insanların gözleri… Deli gibi bakıyorlar, gözleri fıldır fıldır oluyor, sanki her yakaladığını kapmak istermiş gibi. Mesela şey, hani çok hasta olduğunda oksijen tüpü takarlar ya, nefes alamadığında, sonra tüpe bağlandın mı bi gözlerin bi açılır, fıldır fıldır olur, aynen öyle.

APPENDIX L

ORIGINAL NARRATION OF F.

Bir de mesela bu hücre sistemiyle gelen bir şey var. Adam çatalını, bıçağını ayırıyor. Mesela bakıyorsun koğuş modelinde o kadar kişi var, herkesin her şeyi birleşik, orada gayet memnun gözüküyor, ama buraya gelince çatalına bıçağına işaret koyup bunları ayırıyor. […] Ya da bakıyorsun, adam her şeyine gıcık oluyor, her şeyin ona batmaya başlıyor, her şeyini yargılayıp eleştiriyor; "şunu şöyle yapma, bunu böyle yapma" … Her şeyi kişisel algılıyor. Mesela sana kızıyor, neden öğlen uyuyorsun diye. Hele kendisi öğlen yatmamaya çalışıp bunu yapamıyorsa, daha bir kızıyor.

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