T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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EUROPEAN UNION'S CONTENDING SECURITY APPROACHES TO SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS SOCIETAL SECURITY

Master Thesis

GİZEM TUĞBA ÖZKUT

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Supervisor: ASST. PROF. ŞÜKRÜ YAZĞAN

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	Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı		**İmzası**
1.	Tez Danışmanı	Yrd. Doç. Dr. ŞÜKRÜ YAZGAN	
2.	Jüri Üyesi	Yrd. Doç. Dr. GONCA OĞUZ GÖK	
3.	Jüri Üyesi	Doç. Dr. DIMITRIOS TRIANTAPHYLLOU	

GENEL BİLGİLER

İsim ve Soyadı   : Gizem Tuğba Özkut

Anabilim Dalı   : Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Programı   : Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı   : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Şükrü Yazğan

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ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ KRİZİNE YÖNELİK ÇEKİŞEN GÜVENLİK YAKLAŞIMLARI: ULUSAL GÜVENLİK TOPLUMSAL GÜVENLİĞE KARŞI

2011'de başlayıp bir dalga halinde Kuzey Afrika'dan Orta Doğu'ya yayılan Arap ayaklanmaları bölgede emsalsiz dönüşümlere neden oldu. Bu çalışmada ayaklanmaların bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan Suriyeli mülteci krizine Avrupa Birliği'nin ulusal ve toplumsal güvenlik çerçevelerinden getirdiği yorumlamalar karşılaştırılmıştır. İki güvenlik anlayışının getirdiği farklı algılayışların kaynağına inmek amaçlanmıştır. Avrupa Birliği içinde hâlihazırda bilinen, demokrasi açığı gibi fay hatlarını Suriyeli mülteci krizi üzerinden incelemesi açısından çalışma, kurumun varoluşuna, devletler ve toplumlar ile olan ilişkilerine dair soru işaretleri uyandırması açısından önem arz etmektedir. Araştırmada niceliksel ve niteliksel analiz yöntemlerinden yararlanılmıştır. "Suriyeli mülteciler" olarak alınan örneklem 2011'de Suriye İç Savaşı ile başlayan dönemden, günümüze kadar geçen sürede Avrupa Birliği bölgesine giriş yapan Suriye vatandaşlarını kapsamaktadır. Bu gruba dair veriler göç üzerine çalışmalar yapmakta olan uluslararası örgütlerin, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve devlet kurumlarının veri bankalarından elde edilmiştir. Ulusal güvenlik ve toplumsal güvenlik kavramlarına dünden bugüne bir bakış ile kavramlara atfedilen farklı anlamlar incelenmiştir. Suriyeli mülteci krizi, üye ülkelerin böyle hayati bir olaya dair dahi fikir birliğine varamaması nedeniyle Avrupa Birliği'nin varoluşsal bir kriz yaşayıp yaşamadığı sorusunu tekrar gündeme getirmiştir. Çalışma ile Avrupa Birliği gibi uluslar üstü nitelik taşıyan bir kurumun üye ülkelerin güvenliklerine dair karar alma mekanizmalarına getirdiği kısıtlamalar bir kez daha gözler önüne serilmektedir. Ulusal ve toplumsal güvenlik kavramlarının tarih boyunca geçirdiği dönüşümler ve demokrasinin kalitesine dair mühim bir gösterge olan devletlerin toplumları temsil etme derecesi gibi sorunlara Avrupa Birliği geneli ve farklılıklara dikkat çekmek amacıyla, üye ülkeler özelinde yanıt aranmıştır.

GENERAL INFORMATION

ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN UNION'S CONTENDING SECURITY APPROACHES TO SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS SOCIETAL SECURITY

The wave of Arab uprisings, which started in 2011 in North Africa and spread to the Middle East, entailed unprecedented transformations for the region. In this study, interpretations from the national and societal security perspectives of the European Union for the Syrian refugee crisis which occurred as a result of these unrests, are compared with one another. It is expected to retrace the different understandings of the two security approaches. The study which examines the already existing fault lines of the European Union, such as the democratic deficit, over the issue of the Syrian refugees, has importance in terms of raising questions regarding the existence of the institution, and its relations with the states and societies. Quantitative and qualitative analysis methods are employed for the research. The sample which is taken as "Syrian refugees" contains the Syrian citizens whom entered into the European Union zone in the process starting from the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, until today. Data concerning this group is gathered from the databases of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the institutions of the states working on immigration. With an overview of the national security and societal security definitions from past to today, different approaches to the concepts are evaluated. Syrian refugee crisis revived the question on whether the European Union has been experiencing an existential crisis, due to the fact that the member countries could not reach a consensus on such a vital issue. The constraints put by an institution like the European Union with its supra-national characteristic, on the member states decision-making mechanisms operating for security, are unfolded with this study. Answers are explored for the significant questions on the transformations of national and societal security concepts throughout history and on the extent of states representation of societies which is an important indicator for the quality of democracy, by looking generally at the European Union, and specifically at the member states to remark the differences.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEAS	Common European Asylum System
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Dactyloscopy
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FRONTEX	European Border and Coastguard Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PM	Prime Minister
PYD	*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TOA	Treaty of Amsterdam
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
WWII	Second World War

INTRODUCTION

"Security is a social construct with different meanings in different societies."[1] The ambiguity of security as a concept leads to problems about formulating security policies. In the case of European Union (EU), this problematic issue of formulating security policies becomes even more complex, since the process is not only completed by a government of a single state, but the policies are collectively formulated by the member states of the organisation. The migration problem (with its legal and illegal forms) which has gained a new momentum in the post-1990 period, stands in front of the EU's self-structuring and stability-seeking attempts as a challenge that is hard to be controlled. Increasing political and cultural tensions related to migrants require careful steps to be taken and increasing illegal migration drives the EU to seek new policies. Particularly during the Syrian Civil War, the need for a more comprehensive security policy for the EU has become more evident, due to the sudden influx of immigrants to the EU countries. When the EU is mentioned, should not only be analysed at the institutional level, because national and societal levels are crucial aspects of analysis about the EU policies.

The EU's handling of the Syrian refugee crisis is an important topic, because understanding the shortcomings in the process of policy making in a time of such crisis, also brings deeper questions in one's mind about the relationship between the states and their societies and continuous problematic issues about the EU itself. With this objective in mind the following questions will be explained in this study: "Does security really mean the same thing for states and societies in the 21st century?", "Has refugee crisis become another indicator of the existing fault lines in the EU? Is the EU facing an existential crisis?", "Can refugee crisis turn into an opportunity for the EU to overcome its democratic deficit problem?", and "What are the main reasons for the variation between the responses of different countries to the refugee crisis in the EU?".

There seems to be two contending security approaches adopted to solve the Syrian refugee crisis that are evident at different levels of the EU: (1) national security, with its state-

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[1] Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability and International Migration," **International Security**, Vol.17, No.3 (Winter 1992-1993), p.103.

centric focus and (2) societal security, with its focus on the preservation of societal identities.

The reason why these two security approaches are considered as "contending" approaches of security is related to the sets of ideas behind these approaches. While the term "national security" takes its roots from the realist theory of international relations; the societal security approach, which emerged during the late phase of the Cold War represents a novel understanding of security which is based on a constructivist understanding of the world events and consequently it emphasises the importance of identities, norms and values in explaining these events.

As a two-sided analysis, this study aims at exploring the ideas behind these two security approaches towards the refugee crisis. It will be argued that a security policy which includes the concerns of all the actors involved in the European integration process would fit better to the democratic value system defended and promoted by the EU. It will also be discussed in the study whether the EU approaches to the refugee crisis from the perspective of one of the two contending security approaches, or has the organisation combined the two approaches for a comprehensive solution.

In the existing literature, the Syrian refugee issue is generally studied within the framework of migration studies perspective instead of security studies; and the studies analysing the problem by focusing on its security aspect are mostly built on the human security approach[2] which deals with the problems faced by the Syrian refugees; such as their physical and social needs. It seems that concerns and fears of European societies about the ongoing migrant inflows and their possible outcomes were disregarded both by the academic community and by a number of states which have influential roles in the decision making processes of the EU and are expected to represent the public. In this sense, this study will try to fill a gap by focusing on the problem from the European societies' perspective by analysing the issue's societal security ramifications in an analytical way.

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[2] Paris criticises that the elements of human security are too broadly defined, so it is difficult to decide what falls under its context. See Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", **International Security**, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall 2001).

This study will not try to make judgements about what is "right" or "wrong" in terms of the public opinion towards the refugee crisis, rather will try to point out how the European societies perceive the Syrian refugee crisis and to understand the possible reasons behind these perceptions. It may seem that the negative opinions towards the crisis are overemphasised or a "securitisation" approach is adopted when evaluating the crisis from a societal perspective; but it must be noted that perspectives of European people will be presented as objectively as possible through a cluster of statistical data used for the study. Additionally, the study will stress that ignoring the existence of such negative views would not make them disappear, instead suppressed segments of the population could become radicalised—as in the case of the EU, it has become evident with the growing support for the far-right parties and the increase of Euroscepticism.

Instead, this study will contribute to the academic literature with a more comprehensive approach on the security-related concerns regarding the Syrian refugee crisis, by approaching the issue from both national security and societal security aspects while evaluating the way it has been dealt with so far by the the EU. Although the arguments used by the extreme-right parties and groups are generally ignored and accused of having a racist-xenophobic tones, if such a discourse can find a base for itself and get the support of the public, the push factors for the people towards such parties must be examined carefully.

For the study, the main method that will be employed is the quantitative analysis method. Graphs and tables will be created by using the statistical data gathered from different sources and a simple correlation test and analysis will be conducted to check the relationship between individual wealth and negative views on the economic impact of refugees in 10 EU countries. The main objective of using the quantitative method is to make the study more reliable in terms of its objectivity about a subjective issue on "perceptions". In order to have a better understanding of how people in EU countries perceive the issue, public opinion polls will be widely benefitted from. The scope of the case will be limited to the Syrian refugees, since it would be too broad to study the whole illegal immigration problem to the EU. The time period that will be studied with this purpose ranges from 2011, the year in which the Syrian Civil War erupted, to 2016.

As supplementary research methods to the quantitative analysis, literature review and conceptual analysis will be utilised. The literature review will be conducted critically to emphasise the problematic areas regarding the issue. In addition to that, conceptual analysis will be carefully conducted in the first chapter of the study to clarify how national security and societal security concepts have been conceptualised.

The definition for the term "refugee" in international law is given by the United Nations (UN) Convention in 1951 as people who have

> "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[3]

Due to the elusive nature of the definition, it is not easy to decide who is a "genuine" refugee that is under the threat of persecution or who is a migrant driven by economic or other kinds of motives.

The main hypothesis of the study is that a national security oriented approach which has been adopted by several EU member states (which are highly influential in the decision making processes of the institution) do not correspond to the expectations of their societies under the framework of societal security and this provides a momentum to the rise of far-right extremism in Europe. It can be seen that there are differences among the responses given to the refugee crisis by the EU member states and these differences are interlinked with how much these states take into account the security concerns of their societies when forming their national security strategies. The group of states who adopts a societal security approach is more inclined to focus on the preservation of European identity while the other group is more concerned with the national interests which is highly dependent on the economic interests of the countries, in a capitalist system which operates with neo-liberal principles. However, it will be also argued in this study that, the

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[3] United Nations, "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva, 28 July 1951," Refugees and Stateless Persons, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1954/04/19540422%2000-23%20AM/Ch_V_2p.pdf (accessed March 3, 2017), p.14.

economic interests of the state are not equal to the economic interests of the native societies living in that state.

Neo-liberal globalisation favours the free movement of people, alongside with the movement of capital, goods and services. The proponents of such an ideal within the EU that is based more on economic concerns; such as access to cheap labour for lower costs of production, are more inclined to use a more tolerant discourse towards illegal migration, on the contrary of those actors among the EU that emphasises the preservation of "European identity". The EU was initiated as an economic union and its success on the political integration is still debatable. In addition to that, the dependence of the EU on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for its security makes it harder for the EU to form a fully independent foreign policy from the United States (US), which is the most powerful actor in today's capitalist world system.

Mainly, the answers for the following questions are explored with this study: "To what extent does the national security approach cover societal security issues in times of crisis? Or to what extent do national security priorities overlap with the societal security concerns in times of crisis?" and "How much do the states represent their societies in today's world?".

For this purpose, the concepts of national security and societal security, the scope of the refugee crisis in the EU and the EU refugee policy will be respectively examined in each chapter. The first chapter will provide a content analysis for the two security approaches (national security and societal security) by pointing out the conditions in which the concepts were built and transformed. Different understandings of the concepts and criticisms brought related to those concepts are also posed in this chapter. In the second chapter of the study the overall refugee crisis will be portrayed with a specific emphasis on how it unfolds in the EU. However, for giving a better picture of the scope of events, regional situation also will not be ignored. Statistical data on refugees and public opinion of the European people will be presented in the chapter as well, through visual materials. Finally, in the last chapter the EU's security policy regarding on Syrian refugee crisis will be examined, with a specific focus on the policy's national and societal security aspects, to see whether it reflects the concerns and interests of the European people or it fails to

do so. The differences among the national governments of the EU member states are evaluated in detail in this part of the study. These differences are considered as a challenge for the EU to reach a consensus about how to deal with the crisis. Also in this chapter, quantitative methods will be benefitted from to display the public opinion on the EU refugee policy and other aspects of illegal migration into the EU.

Currently, the EU has been harshly criticised for its ambiguous refugee policy. One of the most important reasons for this ambiguity is the lack of consensus among the EU member states on how to perceive the refugee issue and how to deal with it. It will be argued throughout the study that these divergences among the components of the EU, including the European societies, stem from how the issue is perceived. Today, the EU still needs to form an effective and comprehensive refugee policy, both to solve today's problem and to be prepared for possible forthcoming migrant crises; because instability and economic problems in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region do not seem to be overcomed easily in the near future.

The EU still has a chance to give voice to the actors who feel that they are not represented by the Union and thus become more and more Eurosceptic. These actors include most of national governments in smaller EU countries, like those in the Eastern Europe and considerably important part of the EU public. It is extremely important that the pro-EU parties sincerely listens to the concerns of the public and keep these concerns in their minds while forming a common refugee for the members of the Union. Otherwise, the rise of far-right parties in the EU countries would gradually increase as the people with these concerns see that their interests and concerns are not taken serious by the parties that are in favour of a further integration in Europe.

It must be noted that the Syrian refugee issue in Europe is more than just a trending topic that has been discussed for a couple of years. Apart from its immediate consequences, its long-term impacts will affect many issues on the societal level, state level and finally on the EU level. The Syrian refugee issue and the illegal migration that is related to it, pose great challenges to the EU, but this does not mean that the crisis cannot be turned into an opportunity for the EU to push for further integration. Keeping this in mind, long-term

projections on the impacts of the crisis would be very useful for the policy formulation on the EU level.

2. CONTENDING SECURITY APPROACHES TO REFUGEES

The historically dominant discourse on security is based on the national security conceptualisation. However, the question of security can be explored from a different ideational framework: Societal security, which is another concept which was introduced as a sub-sector of security studies by Barry Buzan in 1991, with the claim that the main security threats in the post-Cold War period was not related to conventional military threats, rather they were identity-related threats. The scholars from the Copenhagen Center for Peace and Conflict Research brought a new perspective to the security studies in the 1990s with the studies they had made on "the theory of securitization, the concept of security sectors, and the regional security complex theory."[4] When it was acknowledged that the state itself could become a threat, a weapon used against the societies, the need of a different security sector than national security, which was reduced to state security, was finally noticed. In the 1990s, this societal security concept was mostly evaluated within the context of ethnic-conflicts in the Balkans and Africa, yet today it can be re-evaluated with a different perspective by focusing on the impact of globalisation and rise of mass migratory movements associated with it.

National security, as a concept taking its roots from the emergence of nation-state concept in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia has been given different meanings depending on the interests and goals of each nation-state. The relativity and ambiguity of the concept is what makes it complicated to be studied.

2.1 NATIONAL SECURITY

Walter Lippmann, one of the first scholars who brought a definition to national security concept, stated that "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war."[5] Despite the long history of studies on security, mostly in relation with military power, due to the domination of

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[4] Branca Panić, "Societal Security – Security and Identity," **Western Balkans Security Observer**, No.13 (April-June 2009) (translated by Vesna Podgorac), p.30.
[5] Walter Lippmann, **U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic**, 1st Edition, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company and the Atlantic Monthly Press, 1950), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015003961672;view=1up;seq=10 (accessed March 3, 2017), p.51.

realist understanding in world affairs, national security concept had been the main focus of security studies, at least until the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, internal disputes had become the principal security concern, in places where there was a vast ethnic diversity, such as the Balkans. The dissolution process of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had set the ground for a second Balkanisation[6] process (the first had been experienced during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire) which paved the way for widening the scope of security studies.

The scope and shape of national security changes in accordance with the conjuncture but it maintains its survival.[7] In addition to the conjuncture, the methods employed and perception of national security may also be shaped depending on decision makers' understanding of security.[8] During the Cold War period, Western governments had defined the security concept from a narrow military perspective. On the other hand, the post-Cold War security environment's agenda seems to be based on the threats that exceeds the borders and areas of sovereignty.[9]

According to Paleri, the components of national security policy, which is a concept implying security of nation-states, are, (1) a threat security to be derived from, (2) the power to provide actual security by moving the threat away, (3) an action to exhibit this power, (4) interests to depict a teleological direction to these actions and finally policies to provide a base of legitimacy to the action. Threats towards national security, however, have always been considered on a relativistic and rather ambiguous understanding, thus perceiving who or what constitutes a threat in reality has changed depending on the subject in the centre of the values that are desired to be preserved. For instance, state-centric approaches perceive all kinds of initiatives towards damaging the organizational

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[6] The term was first used in 1918 by Walter Rathenau. H. T. Greenwall, "Sees German Ruin for Generations: Rathenau, Head of Great Industry, Predicts the "Balkanization of Europe."," **The New York Times,** 20 December 1918, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E0CE1DC133 9E13ABC4851DFB4678383609EDE (27 February 2017).

[7] **Yeni Güvenlik Anlayışı Kapsamında Birleşmiş Milletler'in Rolü ve Uygulamaları,** http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-162-2014040744n_ergul.pdf (21 May 2017).

[8] For the debates over national security concept, see Joseph J. Romm, **Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects**, 1ˢᵗ Edition, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), pp.1-8.

[9] **Güvenlik Sorunları ve Kamu Diplomasisi,** http://www.kamudiplomasisi.org/makaleler/haberler (21 May 2017).

structure of state and its routine operation as a threat, while it is not avoided to take measures at the cost of democratic and individual freedoms.[10]

On the other hand, human centric approaches bring democratic and liberal values to the forefront at the cost of downsizing of the state due to its understanding of the state as a tool for safeguarding individuals' interests and serving the individuals. In today's world, the "ideal" kind of democracy is based on liberalism and pluralism.[11] Another conspicuous aspect of today's democracy concept is that it is used with the concept of human rights due to the dominance of the pluralist, liberal and individualist understanding.[12] As Uluşahin points out, one of the most important developments that designated the post-Cold War period, was the supplanting of liberal democracy in the fields of political theory and international relations as the only acceptable type of political governance. Ironically, another development was about the dominance of a new climate which dries these territories on which the same democracy understanding was rooted and flourished. This climate started to weaken the classic liberal-democratic nation-state model through the waves coming from below and from above, almost simultaneously with the coming out of "liberal democracy" as the form of how "democracy" is understood in modern Western states.[13]

According to Uluşahin, among those pressures which comes "from above", there are phenomena which generate supra-national entities and identities, such as territorialisation and globalisation, which can be best exemplified with the EU. The establishment of the European market, Parliament, social security system and ultimately the constitution of a common identity has blurred the borders among the nation-states and strengthen the supra-national and regional approaches. Globalisation in economics, mass communication, tourism and culture has weakened the nation-states with defined territories while strengthening the global understandings and interests.[14] For instance, as

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[10] For the elements of national security, see Prabhakaran Paleri, **National Security: Imperatives and Challenges**, 1st Edition, (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008), pp.64-84.
[11] Bülent Yavuz, "Çoğulcu Demokrasi Anlayışı ve İnsan Hakları," **Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi**, Vol.13, No:1-2 (June-December 2009), p.283.
[12] Ibid, p.284.
[13] Nur Uluşahin, "Liberal Demokrasinin Çıkmazı: Çatışma Karşısında Barış için Azınlık-Çoğunluk İlişkisini Yeniden Düzenleme Gereği," **Anayasa Yargısı**, Vol.24 (2007), p.609.
[14] Ibid, pp. 609-610.

Kymlicka expresses, the standards developed for "the status of ethno-cultural minorities around the world … are largely based on Western models of religious tolerance and respect for ethno-cultural diversity, which other countries are now expected to adopt."[15] However, Kymlicka indicates that such an approaches towards the minorities in the West is not a traditional one:

> States assumed that these 'nations within' – groups with their own historic homelands and traditions of self-government – would be disloyal and potentially secessionist. It is only in the past few decades that we see a clear trend towards accepting the identity and institutions of such nations within.[16]

On the other hand, some other developments weaken the nation-state "from below", according to Uluşahin. The proceeding democratisation wave and the holding cultural and economic deprivations of native minorities bloat their nationalist feelings and strengthen their demands on political representation and cultural rights. In the example of Spain, it has been witnessed explicitly how the flow of non-assimilated migrants and the emergence of minority nationalism challenged the intolerance of nation-state towards ethnic and cultural differences under its homogenous structure.[17]

Both in the current and former understandings of the concept of national security, notwithstanding that the concept of threat is an important element of the term, contents and definitions are far from the clarity to prevent all kinds of misuse.

The concept of national security emerged after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), through which sovereign nation-states has become the main actors in IR.[18] Özkan states that, with the transition from the traditional state structure to the modern state, major functions of the states have been to maintain internal security and external security, to establish the law and judiciary order and to develop economic policies. However, today, administration and arrangement functions of the nation-state within its national borders are intensely discussed and it is suggested for the nation-state to enter into tighter relations with sub-

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[15] Will Kymlicka, "Universal Minority Rights?," **Ethnicities**, Vol.1, No.1 (March 2001), p.21.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Uluşahin, p. 610.
[18] Dilara Batırer, "Vestfalya Antlaşması," **TÜİÇ Akademi,** 21 March 2014, http://www.tuicakademi .org/vestfalya-antlasmasi/ (21 May 2017).

national and supra-national units and to cooperate with them. In is indicated that, otherwise, the nation-state would lose its capacity to solve problems gradually.[19]

The elements of national security are closely related to those which constitute the national power. The power analyses which enable states to compare themselves with other states in the international arena, represent at the same time how secure the societies are vis-à-vis the other societies.[20] Security of the individual takes an important place in providing and preserving the national security.

The new approaches, which question the traditional state-centric understanding of security, argue that even the international peace is boiled down to a type of relationship between states, thus it cannot reflect the approaches of human and societal security properly. An example of such a definition of national security can be found in the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, prepared by the US Department of Defence[21]:

> A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.[22]

Despite the inclusion of "national defence" concept to the definition, among the purposes listed in the definition, there is no direct relation to anything related to the protection of the nation or defending its vital interests. Rather, the approach adopted here suggests that national security can only be provided if a "state" has advantages over the other nations,

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[19] Gürsel Özkan, "Küreselleşme ve Ulus Devletin Geleceği," **İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi**, Vol.13, No. 1 (2000), p.370.

[20] For the relation between the weak states and human insecurity, see Overseas Development Institute, 'State Building for Peace': Navigating an Arena of Contradictions, 2009, https://www.odi.org/ (6 April 2017), pp.1-3.

[21] US Department of Defence, **Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf (7 March 2017), p.164.

[22] Arnold Wolfers, **Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics**, 1st Edition, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.84.

in militaristic and defensive terms and in IR. This sounds more like an introduction to national defence strategy than a national security definition.[23]

Another example of a state-centric definition of national security is provided by Conde: "The concept of national security refers to the protection of the very existence of the state from any internal or external threats or dangers and the measures taken to protect it."[24]

One of the main concepts that comes to mind, when talking about security is the concept of survival[25], which is accepted as the primary objective of states by the realist theory of international relations. When the concept of survival is taken within the context of national security, it is inevitable to face a critical question that is faced with is: "Whose survival?" The answer given to this question may change depending on how much does the state represent the nation or on the level of homogeneity of the nation. For instance, the state's representation level of the nation would not remain the same in a country with authoritarian regime and democratic one, even though democracy cannot be the only way to explain the distance of a state from its nation.

The second issue is the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the nation. It is not the same thing to represent a homogenous nation consists of people having a similar cultural, historical and linguistic background with representing a heterogeneous nation consists of people of different identities. Formulating a national security strategy for a homogenous nation of people with similar expectations from their state would obviously be way less complicated than doing it for a nation including a variety of differently identified groups, since it is not easy to reach a balance of representation.

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[23] For the difference between national security and national defence, see Loren Adler and Shai Akabas, ""Security" vs. "Defense" Spending," **Bipartisan Policy Center,** August 31, 2011, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/security-vs-defense-spending/.

[24] Victor Conde, **Encyclopedia of Human Rights in the United States**, 2nd Edition, (New York: Grey House, 2011), p.164.

[25] See Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.), in **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations** (141-161), (New York: Oxford University, 2001), pp.151-153.

2.1.1 Security Dilemma

The security dilemma, basically outlines a situation in which a state empowers itself with more military means for guaranteeing its security and this empowerment of the given state is perceived as a threat for the security of the other states. The main problem in such a situation is generally the lack of dialogue, which leaves room for the conspiracies of states who feel threatened by the empowerment of another state.

Jervis summarises the term as: "… many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of the others."[26] This realist, zero-sum game understanding of international relations considers one state's gain as the loss of the other.[27] Jervis states that: "… the security dilemma can not only create conflicts and tensions but also provide the dynamics triggering war."[28] He also claims that: "The security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated."[29]

Wolfers asserts that:

> The insecurity of an anarchical system of multiple sovereignty places the actors under compulsion to seek maximum power even though this may run counter to their real desires. By a tragic irony, then, all actors find themselves compelled to do for the sake of security what, in bringing about an all-round struggle for survival, leads to greater insecurity.

Prisoner's dilemma is a widely used strategic game for illustrating the importance of dialogue among actors. It is a theoretical scenario that is part of the game theory, explained by Tucker as follows:

> Two men, charged with a joint violation of law, are held separately by the police. Each is told that (1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a reward… and the latter will be fined… (2) if both confess, each will be fined… At the same time, each has good reason to believe that (3) if neither confesses, both will go clear.[30]

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[26] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," **World Politics**, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978), p.169.
[27] Ibid, pp.169-170
[28] Robert Jervis, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, 1st Edition, (Princeton and Chichester: Princeton University, 1976), p.67.
[29] Ibid, p.82.
[30] William Poundstone, **Prisoner's Dilemma**, Reprint Edition, (New York: Anchor, 1993), pp.117-118.

The outcomes of the possible decisions taken by two men are shown in Figure 1. Although the model is developed and applied to many other scenarios with more specific outcomes, below an adaptation of the original version can be seen.

Actors	Y		
	Options	**Confess**	**Does not Confess**
X	**Confess**	**Both Fined**	**X is Given a Reward Y is Fined**
	Does not Confess	**Y is Given a Reward X is Fined**	**Both Go Clear**

Figure 1: Prisoner's Dilemma
Adapted from: A. W. Tucker, "The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler", **The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal**, Vol.14, No.3 (June 1983), p.228.

Prisoner's dilemma is important for its function to present the options in front of the two actors facing a security dilemma situation. It shows the importance of cooperation for mutual gains. On the contrary of the realist assumption of states' relations as a zero-sum game, it is possible to see the benefits of dialogue between the actors, through the Prisoner's dilemma scheme which presents an option through which the both actors can gain.

When the model is applied to states, due to the influence of realist theory in traditional security studies, the security of a state is understood as a phenomenon that depends on its military capacity. So, if a state feels threatened because of the increase in the other ones' military capacity, the end result of this would be an arms race among the states that are subjects to the dilemma. Power accumulation would endlessly continue due to uncertainty under the anarchical state system, as long as states do not all together work for "collective security". Kupchans claim that collective security "… enhances stability by institutionalizing, and thereby promoting, cooperative behaviour, and by ameliorating the security dilemma."[31] They explain the term "collective security" as follows:

> Collective security rests on the notion of all against one. While states retain considerable autonomy over the conduct of their foreign policy, participation in a collective security organization entails a commitment by each member to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength. The

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[31] Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," **International Security**, Vol.16, No.1 (1991), p.116.

underlying logic of collective security is two-fold. First, the balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent war and stop aggression far more effectively than the balancing mechanisms that operate in an anarchic setting: At least in theory, collective security makes for more robust deterrence by ensuring that aggressors will be met with an opposing coalition that has preponderant rather than merely equivalent power. Second, a collective security organization, by institutionalizing the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of an international setting in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than through competition.[32]

Important differences have been observed in the study of security dilemma concept, after the end of the Cold War. One of the reasons for that was about the impact of new security threats on world politics. Among these problems, the often seen inter-ethnic civil wars in the early 1990s, appearance of crime syndicates in countries with weak state structures, trans-border characteristic of these organizations, increase of migration from periphery to core countries, the feeling of insecurity of migrant receiving societies, and terrorism can be listed.

2.1.2 Migration in National Security

International migration causes economic, societal and political problems and their impacts are experienced deeper in weaker states[33]. Under certain conditions, presence and activities of immigrants may cause instability[34] in the receiving weak states because of the fact that they increase the possibility of internal violence in such countries. Weiner states that refugees and immigrants may pose political risks to the host countries. He lists the threats that have been posed by the refugees to the host countries as: "Refugees have launched terrorist attacks within their host country, illegally smuggled arms, allied with the domestic opposition against host-government policies, participated in drug trafficking, and in other ways eroded government' willingness to admit refugees."[35] For

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[32] Ibid, p.118.

[33] Rice and Patrick define weak states as those states which "… are unable or unwilling to provide essential public services, which include fostering equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, and delivering basic services." For detailed information and index of weak states, see Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World," **Brookings Global Economy and Development**, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008.

[34] For a study on the impact of immigrants on political stability, see Tesfaye A. Gebremedhin and Astghik Mavisakalyan, "Immigration and Political Stability," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/ (accessed April 6, 2017).

[35] Myron Weiner, "Migration and Security," Christopher W. Hughes and Lai Yew Meng (Eds.), in **Security Studies: A Reader** (253-264), (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011), p.257.

instance, Hungarian security officials reported that the perpetrators of Paris attack on December 13, 2015 attacks "entered Europe while posing as migrants."[36] Created by these immigrant-related activities, receiving states mostly resort to make national security and defence arrangements to mitigate the damage caused by immigration.[37] According to Ağır, ethnic, religious or cultural identities of immigrants may boost the already existing problems in weak states that already suffer from low levels of socio-political unification. If a weak state falls into instability, this may also challenge the security of the region where that states is located. All in all, displacement of people bears the risk of becoming both a reason and a consequence of inter-state and intra-state conflicts.[38]

Besides voluntary migration phenomenon that is largely based on economic reasons, another type of migration is the forced migration. Forced migration generally occurs due to security-related problems. It can be defined as the translocation of people due to a political conflict, ethnic dispute, civil war or natural disaster.[39] For instance, governments may force individual adversaries or opposition groups within its political borders to emigrate from the state. Likewise, states may use forced migration as a tool of their foreign policy strategies to put pressure on neighbouring countries, to cause instability in those countries and to prevent the interference of others to its domestic affairs.[40][41] Greenhill defines a way of pursuing such a strategy by the states with the term "coercive engineered migration" as the "… cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states."[42] One of the most current examples of such a use of forced

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[36] James Rothwell, "Majority of Paris Attackers Used Migration Routes to Enter Europe, Reveals Hungarian Counter-Terror Chief," **The Telegraph,** 2 October 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/02/majority-of-paris-attackers-used-migration-routes-to-enter-europ/ (23 May 2017).

[37] For a summary of such arrangements in the US after the 9/11 attacks, see Lamar Smith, "Immigration Enforcement and Border Security Are the First Line Defense Against Terrorists," **Fox News,** 12 September 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/09/12/next-10-years-immigration-enforcement-and-border-security-are-first-line.html (23 May 2017).

[38] Bülent Sarper Ağır, "Güvenlik ve Göç Kavşağında Kosova Sorunu," **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol.69, No.3 (2014), p.459.

[39] "What Is Forced Migration?," **Forced Migration Online,** last modified January 27, 2012, http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm/what-is-forced-migration.

[40] To see the list of cases in which migratory pressures were used as a foreign policy tool between 1953 and 2006, see Kelly M. Greenhill, "Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion," **Strategic Insights**, Vol.9, No.1 (2010), pp.119-121.

[41] For the types of migration, see Abdurrahman Yılmaz, "Uluslararası Göç: Çeşitleri, Nedenleri ve Etkileri," **Turkish Studies**, Vol.9, No.2 (2014).

[42] Greenhill, p.116.

migration as a foreign policy tool can be given as the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU. Turkey wanted to get visa-free travel for its citizens to the EU countries, financial assistance for refugees in the country and opening of new headings in the negotiations relating to Turkey's accession into EU, in return of its role to keep refugees away from the EU.

Intrastate conflicts may cause large-scale migratory movements of people both in the form of internal and external migration. Mass refugee influxes which occurs as a result of conflicts may breed security-related consequences for the host countries. For instance, host countries may feel under threat and employ military power to protect their borders or to threaten the refugee-creating countries. For instance, it is reported that "16 countries on the Balkan route" have been working on a "border defence project" to protect the EU's external borders from the refugee influx with military means.[43] Refugee-receiving state may be concerned about the possibility that its internal stability and security would be disrupted[44] because of the large number of refugees. A horrible example where these concerned were materialised is the 1970 civil war, also known as the "Black September", between Jordan and Palestinian refugees which were weaponised in the refugee camps located in the country.[45] Thus, refugee crises should not only be considered as humanitarian emergency situations, as they may also cause internal problems in receiving countries which may even turn into civil wars. When a country hosts refugees, sometimes it does not only open its borders for refugees, but whether intentionally or not, it also welcomes armed groups, arms and ideologies that are among the sources of conflict in sending countries, as the Paris attackers were "welcomed" by France along with the asylum applicants that entered into the EU.

On the other hand, security threats posed by migration-related issues cannot be restricted to national security threats. For instance, depending on the demographic (such as the level of national homogeneity) or labour market dynamics of the host country (such as the

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[43] Lizzie Dearden, "Austria 'Preparing to Send Troops to Protect EU Borders' Against Refugees," **Independent,** 8 February 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/austria-send-troops-stop-refugees-protect-eu-borders-immigration-military-forces-migrants-a7568736.html (23 May 2017).

[44] Idean Salehyan, "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict," **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol.52, No.4 (October 2008), p.790.

[45] For detailed information about the war, see Tomáš Michalák, "The PLO and the Civil War in Jordan (1970)," **Asian and African Studies**, Vol.21, No.1 (2012).

unemployment rate) the type of security threat faced with may vary. In the first case, the refugee influx may be perceived both as national and societal security threat, while on the other it may be considered as both economic and social security threat.[46]

2.1.3 Critique of National Security

The first criticism that is needed to be mentioned here is about the problematic nature of the term "nation". Although "national security" is one of the key concepts of the security studies, there is still no consensus over the meaning of its core concept: the nation.

There are three contending theories of nationalism, which have differing views on the definition and source of the nation: Primordialism[47], modernism[48] and ethno-symbolism[49]. Primordialists consider national identities as the natural parts of human beings and claims that nations have existed since the beginning of human history and they put an emphasis on the antiquity of the "nation".

The modernist approach, which have challenged primordialist approach, considers nation and nationalism as products of the modern world and claims that it is a product "of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularism, and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state."[50] One of its leading theoreticians (along with Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm), Benedict Anderson, brought a widely used definition for the term "nation": "It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[51] Regarding the historical roots of nationalism, modernist approach argues that nationalism was accepted as the dominant ideology by Europe since the beginning of 19th century and by rest of the world in the

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[46] Mockaitis claims that "The real danger of migration lies in its destabilizing effect on fragile states and in the violent backlash it provokes." As an example of the perceived relation between migration and different types of security, see Tom Mockaitis, "The Real Refugee Threat," **The Huffington Post,** 29 January 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-mockaitis/the-real-refugee-threat_b_9108532.html (6 April 2017).

[47] See Sandra Fullerton Joireman, **Nationalism and Political Identity**, 1st Edition, (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), pp.19-34.

[48] Umut Özkırımlı, **Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction**, 2nd Edition, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.72-142.

[49] Ibid, pp.143-168.

[50] Ibid, p.72.

[51] Benedict Anderson, **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**, 3rd Edition, (London and New York: Verso, 2006), pp.5-6.

20th century. The birth of modern nationalist thought coincides with ideas of the French Revolution (1789-1799).

Finally, ethno-symbolist approach criticizes the modernist understanding[52] for not maintaining the continuity between past and present to explain the emergence of nations. It emphasises pre-existing sentiments and ethnic ties in the formation of modern nations.[53] Smith explains what is stressed by the ethno-symbolist approach as follows:

> An ethno-symbolic approach goes on to stress:
> 1 the need for an analysis of the persistence of collective cultural identities over *la longue durée*;
> 2 the importance of continuity, recurrence and appropriation as different modes of connecting past, present and future;
> 3 the significance of the ethnic type of collective cultural identity and of ethnic communities or *ethnies* in the formation of nations;
> 4 the importance of symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions for an understanding of ethnic and other kinds of collective cultural identity;
> 5 the peculiar role of memories of golden ages, myths of origin and ethnic election, cults of heroes and ancestors, homeland memories and attachments in the formation and persistence of national identities;
> 6 the different kinds of *ethnie* that serve as bases and points of departure for the formation of various kinds of nation;
> 7 the special contribution of the modern ideology of nationalism to the dissemination of the ideal of the nation and the role of nationalists as 'political archaeologists'.[54]

In addition to these traditional approaches to nation and nationalism, there are new approaches which emphasizes the roles of other factors such as globalisation, youth cultures and style, mass media, gender, etc.

Although nationalism has its own advantages, such as providing a sense of unity for the people in a given territory, national sentiments of those people can also be manipulated for political purposes. Leaders or political actors, may try to draw people's attention to a designed or exaggerated external threat, so that they forget about their internal problems, like an economic crisis. Using securitisation, the political actors may awaken nationalist sentiments in the society, to re-create the wholeness of the "nation". Such a strategy is explained by the diversionary theory of foreign policy. As Sobek explains it:

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[52] Özkırımlı, pp.120-136.
[53] Anthony D. Smith, **The Ethnic Origins of Nations**, 1st Edition, (Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell, 1986), pp.13-16.
[54] Anthony D. Smith, "When Is A Nation," **Geopolitics**, Vol.7, No.2 (June 2002), pp.14-15.

"Diversionary theory argues that leaders threatened by domestic turmoil manipulate the 'rally around the flag' effect by initiating conflict abroad. This conflict mitigates the negative effects of the unrest, saving the leader's position."[55] An example of that was encountered in Germany under the rule of Hitler. Kershaw asserts that while the economic problems had been deepening in Germany, Hitler and his ideology Gobbels were enthusiastically waiting for a war to break out in Abyssinia[56] to turn it into an opportunity to consolidate his power in the country, which was at stake due to domestic economic problems. He came to power in a time of economic crisis and turned this crisis into an advantage for himself by injecting nationalist feelings to people. However, he did not only unite people against an external threat, but also considered the Jewish residents of Germany as a national threat, which resulted with one of the most infamous incidents of history, the Holocaust.[57]

The concept of threat in national security concept is mainly regarded as something coming from outside of the borders, as in the example of the US. However, in today's world, these threats do not necessarily come from outside. The important point here comes with the question of what to be protected with national security. The values to be protected with the national security were specified by Baldwin as: "The concept of national security has traditionally included political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added."[58]

The second point of criticism about the national security is about the association of nation with state. It is possible to say that security and national security concepts have been used interchangeably in the literature. However, there is a reason why the word "national" was added to the concept of security. National security, as a concept created for the "nation-states", intrinsically emphasises the connection between the nation and the state. According to Bajpai, neo-realist understanding of security claims that: "… in a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security: if the state is secure, then those who

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[55] David Sobek, "Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.44, No.1 (2007), p.29.
[56] Ian Kershaw, **Hitler 1889-1936 Birinci Cilt**, Zarife Biliz (Transl.), (Istanbul: İthaki, 2007), pp.592-594.
[57] For the rise of Nazism under the rule of Hitler, see Joseph W. Bendersky, **A History of Nazi Germany**, 2nd Edition, (Chicago: Burnham, 2000), pp.18-30.
[58] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," **Review of International Studies**, Vol.23 (1997), p.13.

live within it are secure."[59] Then, the main problem here comes from the name given to the concept because nation is used for referring to the state.

Realist understanding of national security was mostly criticised for being too state-centric. This understanding takes the state as its referent object[60] and according to Fin, "it focuses on security relations among states (the unitary actor) and on the state's endeavor against external threats."[61] This understanding focus on the inter-state conflicts, thus, according to it, the only threat to national security could be a military threat. Despite the traditional security understanding which put state in the centre of security as the major and only security provider, by the end of the Cold War, it started to be discussed that the security providers, as well as security threats has been diversified. In this sense, new sectors of security were introduced by the Copenhagen School theoreticians who have critical views about the traditional realist understanding of security.

The focus of national security has been the state and the strategies developed for national security has been based on the political and military sectors. However, as pointed out by Roe: "[w]hile on the one hand nation can be defined in relation to 'citizenship', on the other hand it can also be defined in terms of 'ethnicity'. This distinction is often characterised by the terms 'civic nation' and 'ethnic nation'"[62] Due to the misuse of the national security concept, if nation is the unit to be focused, another sector could be used as a modifier, which is the societal sector.

Another point to be made is not directly a criticism against national security approach, rather it is a widely mentioned concern about the restrictions imposed in the name of national security. The restrictions and implementation of measures taken for national security purposes may sometimes seem to clash with the human rights which are under the surveillance of the UN. Nonetheless, according to the International Covenant on Civil

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[59] Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," Occasional Paper #19:OP:1 (Kroc Institute, August 2000), http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin/Kanti_Bajpai-Human_Security_Concept_and_Measurement.pdf (accessed 6 April, 2017).
[60] Bajpai.
[61] Leo S. F. Lin, "State-Centric Security and its Limitations: The Case of Transnational Organized Crime," RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 156 (November 2011).
[62] Paul Roe, **Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma**, (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2005), PDF e-book, p.45.

and Political Rights, human rights may be restricted if needed for the protection of national security.[63] This authorisation makes the intentions of political actors important, because it may be used for personal political purposes by breaching the international law or taking steps towards authoritarianism by using the national security as a pretext to take stricter measures.

2.2 SOCIETAL SECURITY

Societies and states are not homogenous as they include different social groups and structures together. Hogg and Williams report Tajfel's defition of social identity as "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership."[64] Individuals spend a significant part of their lives as members of different groups based on religion, language, race, gender and ethnicity. The individuals, who perceives themselves as members of a group, do not only act with their individual identities but they act also with their social identities. Hence, individuals who maintain their lives attached to certain groups and classes, act within the framework of this perception of reality. The individual gets identified with the group that he/she is a member of and this allows the creation of an awareness of "we".

The concept of societal security was first introduced by Barry Buzan as one of the sectors of security. According to his definition, "societal security is about the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and ethnic identity and custom."[65] Examples to such threats against security are generally taken from the nation-building processes of states, whose principal purpose is to homogenize the population through suppressing the identity of the minorities.

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[63] See Article 19 at **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,** New York, 16 December 1966, **United Nations Treaty Series,** vol. 999, No. 14668, available from https://treaties.un.org/doc/public ation/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf, p. 178.
[64] Michael A. Hogg and Kipling D. Williams, "From *I* to *We*: Social Identity and the Collective Self," **Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice**, Vol.4, No.1 (2000), p.87.
[65] Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, 2nd Edition, (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2009), p.112.

The concept has become quite popular, according to Theiler, largely because it "resides at the intersection of several theoretical turns in IR that had gained momentum in the early 1990s: a partial move away from the state as object of analytical and normative concern; a growing focus on identity; and, more broadly, the rise of social constructivism as an explanatory paradigm."[66]

The Copenhagen School, which provided one of the main approaches to security, deals with security under five main sectors: Military security, political security, environmental security, economic security and societal security. Buzan discusses the new types of security threats on the basis of three levels of analysis: individual, state and international system.[67][68]

It should be said that, these sectors are essentially intertwined and are not separated from one another by rigid lines. Despite the analytical differences among these threat types, they can be easily merged in practice. These threats may be intentional, programmed and political or may be undesigned and structural.

Identity, as the core of societal security, is about the self-conceptions of societies and individuals' definition of themselves as parts of a society. Sheehan argues that "Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival *as a community*."[69] Societal security deals with the identity groups that can reproduce themselves independently from the state.[70] The concept can also be taken as the security of identity.[71]

The societies that are subjects of societal security are those that can reproduce their identities. This is related to the ability of those societies to transmit their culture to the

[66] Tobias Theiler, "Societal Security," Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (Eds.), in **The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies** (105-114), (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.105.
[67] Buzan, **People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, p.112.
[68] Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations**, 1st Edition, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983), pp.75-82.
[69] Michael Sheehan, **International Security: An Analytical Survey**, 1st Edition, (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p.84.
[70] Ole Wæver, "Societal Security: The Concept," Ole Wæver et al. (Eds.), in **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, 1st Edition, (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p.23.
[71] For the use of "identity security" in place of "societal security", see Baldwin, p.23 and Ole Wæver, "European Security Identities," **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.34, No.1 (March 1996), p.115.

next generations of those societies. When they face with a threat of losing this ability, this may be named as a societal "insecurity" situation. Threats to reproduction are clearly explained by Roe, as:

> Threats to the reproduction of a society can occur through the sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity. If the institutions that reproduce language and culture, such as schools, newspapers, museums, and so forth, are shut down, then identity cannot easily be passed on from one generation to the next. Moreover, if the balance of the population changes in a given area, this can also disrupt social reproduction.[72]

According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde: "In the present world system, the most important referent objects of societal security are tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religions and races."[73][74]

In order these types of societies to be dealt with under the concept of societal security, they must be large, self-sustaining identity groups.[75] Nonetheless, in just the same way as defining nations, it is difficult to clearly define what a society is, since it is also a social construct, an imagined community.[76]

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[72] Paul Roe, "Societal Security," Alan Collins (Ed.), in **Contemporary Security Studies** (215-228), 4th Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2016), p.219.

[73] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analysis**, 1st Edition, (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p.123.

[74] Buzan divides the types of threats to security into five sectors, including societal security. The other four of these sectors are military, political, economic and environmental sectors. Nonetheless, these sectors are closely interlinked to one another, so that a type of threat can be directed to the referent object of the other. Threats in the military sector, which are also considered as the main concerns of national security, pose dangers to all components of the state. Naturally, societies, either it is a nation or an ethnic group, within the state is one of those components of the state that is threatened by the military action.

As Buzan points out, political threats mainly target "the idea of state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it". See Buzan, **People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, p.109. Thus, nation, one of those collective identities that is considered as a subject of national security, may fall under threat, in case of the presence of a threat against the political system of the state.

The linkage of economic security to societal one is actually one that is more systemic than the others. As indicated by Roe: "The capitalist system can undermine cultural distinctiveness by generating global products (televisions, computers, and computer games), attitudes (materialism and individualism), and style (English language), thereby replacing traditional identities with contemporary 'consumer' ones." See Paul Roe, "Societal Security," Alan Collins (Ed.), in **Contemporary Security Studies** (176-189), 3rd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2013), p.181.

Environmental threats are those concerning a specific part of land within a state. This kind of threats may become issues of societal security, when there is a society which identifies itself attached to this given piece of land that is under environmental threat.

[75] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, p.119.

[76] Benedict Anderson, **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**, 3rd Edition, (London and New York: Verso, 2006), pp.5-6.

The Copenhagen School does not base their understanding of identity on a primordialist assumption. Theiler states that: "Buzan, Wæver and their collaborators … explicitly reject primordialism and throughout their writings emphasise the socially constructed origins of nations and other identity communities."[77]

Depending on how the identities had been constructed, Achilles' heels of societies differ from one another. If one's identity was constructed on being different, distant and alone, then the arrival of even a small number of foreigners would be evaluated as a problem.

With the end of the Cold War, ethno-national conflicts have been embedded to the general security agenda. Besides the other factors, September 11 terrorist attacks against the US revealed the slowly developing religious conflict image.

The threats to societal security, as it is identified by the theoreticians from the Copenhagen school, do not have to be objective or verifiable. As societies are also socially constructed concepts; threats to societal units' security are based on the perceptions of the members of these societies. Thus, even potential threats are included in the conditions creating societal insecurity.

The differentiation between the state and societal security becomes more apparent in multi-ethnic countries. This is why when the concept of societal security was created it was initially presented as a sub-sector of state-security. The reason for that comes from its reference point, which was the "Balkanisation" process during and after the dissolution process of Yugoslavia. Thus, the concept originated from a European type of society understanding, which basically referred to nations. Even in this case, state security is not identified with societal security. This distinction between state and society is crystallized by Sheehan: "[t]he state is an administrative structure, based on fixed territory and formal membership. Society in contrast, is about identity, the way that communities think about themselves as members of a particular community."[78] Therefore, the concept later had become a separate sector of security from the state. This was related to the difference between homogeneity and heterogeneity of the cases studied within a societal security

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[77] Tobias Theiler, "Societal Security and Social Psychology," **Review of International Studies**, Vol.29, No.2 (April 2003), p.254.
[78] Sheehan, p.84.

perspective. For instance, it is easier to observe that a state advocates the interests of societies as part of its state's security in a country where the society is more homogenous. On the contrary, in a multi-ethnic country, it is more difficult for the states to defend the rights of all the groups in the society that are part of the nation within the framework of state security. That is mainly due to the differing threat perceptions of all those societies, depending on their distinctive cultural, linguistic and religious features.[79]

Saleh asserts that: "[t]ension between the state and its societal sub-groups undermines, for instance, the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the state, as well as the identity of the society."[80] This means that a societal security issue can easily become or come along with or be a cause of a national or political security issue. In order to show the close link between the two concept, this is an important point to be made, especially for those countries where there are group(s) within the society which are challenging the state authority by military means (through the formation of militia/defence force).

Another example where both national security and societal security threats may seem to exist is related to minorities. Those minorities with citizenship or attachment to another state than the one they live in, may cause societal and/or national insecurity, particularly when there are problems between the countries they live in and they are attached to. This is one of the arguments put forward in discussions for abolishing the dual-citizenship option in various European countries today. The recent example for possible tension between these states was observed in the diplomatic crisis between the Netherlands and Turkey, due to the unwelcomed (by Dutch authorities) visit of Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, Mrs. Kaya to Rotterdam, on March 11, 2017 and the subsequent events like the deportation of her from the country and unusually harsh police response to the crowd consisted of Turkish people living in the city who wanted to protest against

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[79] Regarding the challenges faced by multi-ethnic states, see Markus Thiel, "Identity, Societal Security, and Regional Integration in Europe," **Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series**, Vol.7, No.6 (April 2007), pp.4-5.
[80] Alam Saleh, "Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security," **Geopolitics Quarterly**, Vol.6, No.4 (Winter 2010), p.234.

the decision of the Dutch authorities for not allowing Turkish politicians for electoral campaign in the Netherlands.[81]

The reactions of societies against perceived threats may be presented in two forms. The first one of these reactions is given through the attempts of the society by putting pressure on the government for considering the issue as a priority in the national security agenda, whereas the second one is the self-defence of the societies. The means used for such strategies are divided mainly as military and non-military ones; each of them is generally countervailed by the same type of means: Military measures (by forming their own militia/defence force) for military threats, non-military measures for non-military threats.

The tensions between the state of Spain and *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, Turkey and PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*; Kurdistan Workers' Party) or the United Kingdom (UK) and IRA (Irish Republican Army) can be given as the major examples of where ethnic minorities choose to use military means to protect their identities.

The most recent and much different example to such a tension, can be considered as the war between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Iraq and Syria[82] (along with other forces working on behalf of or as partners to other states, such as the PYD (*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat)*). It would be convenient to give this example since the group which identifies itself with Islam and claim to represent Sunni Muslims. As societies are based on self-conceptions, the group can be considered as a part of Muslim society. This poses a unique example of such a tension because Wæver finds religion as the "only rival to nationalism as a social identity comprehensive enough and robust enough."[83] The reason for that is its ability to reproduce its "we" identity across generations. Religion is potentially more advantageous over nationalism due to its greater flexibility of

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[81] For the statements of the Minister Kaya and the subsequent developments after the incident, see Yusuf Özkan, "Hollanda'dan Sınır Dışı Edilen Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanı Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya: Acı Bir Gece Yaşadık," **BBC Türkçe,** 12 March 2017, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-39246740 (24 May 2017).

[82] For more information on ISIL and the current situation, see "Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps," **BBC,** last modified April 3, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.

[83] Wæver, "Societal Security: The Concept", p.22.

recruitment.[84] One can convert to Islam from Christianity for instance but an ethnic identity cannot be changed in this way.

2.2.1 Migration in Societal Security

The Copenhagen School lists migration as one of the main societal security threats alongside horizontal competition[85] vertical competition[86], and depopulation.[87] As Guibernau points out: "… [t]he visibility of certain minorities associated with 'alien' cultures, traditions and ways of life often fosters fear, a lack of trust, open hostility and, in some cases it results in xenophobia and racism against those regarded as different."[88] With migration, the identity of the native society changes due to the change in the population structure. Wahab, Odunsi and Ajiboye explains such a change with social change theory:

> … observations portray that society and indeed components of social structure change continuously though often imperceptibly. Social change could either bring about progress for the members of a society or visit them with retrogression. As human beings collectively adapt themselves to their environment, they bring about changes to their ways of life.[89]

From the societal security perspective, Robinson expresses that: "Mass immigration of people who do not share the culture of the recipient society may undermine its cultural identity and so threaten societal security."[90]

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[84] Ibid, p.22.

[85] Horizontal competition is a kind of fear based on the notion that a society's lifestyle would change because of the impact of distinguishing cultural and linguistic characteristics of another neighbouring society, whereas vertical competition implies the fear from a project either integrationist or separatist, with the idea that the society would not be able protect its former identity. These projects pull them to broader or narrower identities than their own identities. Finally, depopulation because of a pandemic, a war, poverty, a natural disaster or destruction policies is also considered as a threat to identity.

[86] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, pp.120-121.

[87] Ole Wæver, "The Changing Agenda of Societal Security," Brauch et al., (Eds.), in **Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century** (581-594), (Würzburg: Springer, 2008), p.584.

[88] Montserrat Guibernau, "Migration and the Rise of the Radical Right: Social Malaise and the Failure of Mainstream Politics," Policy Network: Paper (March 2010).

[89] E. O. Wahab, S. O. Odunsi and O. E. Ajiboye, "Causes and Consequences of Rapid Erosion of Cultural Values in a Traditional African Society," **Journal of Anthropology**, Vol.2012 (2012), p.2.

[90] Paul Robinson, **Dictionary of International Security**, 1st Edition, (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2008), p.120.

Buzan states that competing identities and migration are the main sources of threat to societal security.[91] Although these two are separate sources, they may overlap when the migrant community gets into the native society with its competing identity. This type of identities become a source of threat when both of them are mutually exclusive. Avvakumov exemplifies this as follows:

> Today's denominational world consists of solid and distinct blocs, "Catholic" and "Orthodox" among them. In the minds of most Christians in the East and West, these blocs are mutually exclusive: being Catholic and Orthodox are seen as two different cultural identities, or civilizations …[92]

As indicated by the Suny Levin Institute: "[a]lthough there is no consensus on the consequences of globalization on national cultures, many people believe that a people's exposure to foreign culture can undermine their own cultural identity."[93] This exposure of foreign culture can show its impact on the components of identities, such as language, religion and local cultural tradition. An example for this can be given as the impact of the expansion of English language over other languages which are parts of other societal identities.

In general, population movements cause short-term tensions and insecurities, and bring identity to the fore of politics.[94] Migration, also, raises concerns on the ability of the societies to preserve their cultural and national identities, during large-scale population movements which, according to Weiner, "… may lead to xenophobic popular sentiments and to the rise of anti-migrant political parties that could threaten the regime."[95] The sudden changes experienced in the distribution of ethnic and religious identities on the lands to which societies feel attached, due to legal and illegal migration, refugee influxes, or internal displacement of people, may be perceived as serious threats to societal

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[91] Barry Buzan, "Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation," Ole Wæver et al. (Eds.), in **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe** (41-58), (London: Pinter, 1993), p.43.

[92] Yury P. Avvakumov, "Ukranian Greek Catholics, Past and Present," Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer (Eds.), in **Churches in the Ukranian Crisis** (21-44), (n.p.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), PDF e-book, p. 29.

[93] Suny Levin Institute, Culture and Globalization, 2017, http://www.globalization101.org/uploads/File/Culture/cultall.pdf (25 May 2017), p.3.

[94] For more information about identity politics, see Cressida Heyes, "Identity Politics," **Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,** last modified March 23, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/.

[95] Weiner, "Security, Stability and International Migration", p.114.

identities due to the changes in the composition of the population. The way that Director-General of UNESCO, Matsuura defines cultural diversity seems to unintentionally justify such threat perceptions to a certain extent:

> Cultural diversity is related to the dynamic process whereby cultures change while remaining themselves, in a state of permanent openness to one another. At the individual level, this is reflected in multiple and changing cultural identities, which are not easily reducible to definite categories and which represent opportunities for dialogue based on sharing what we have in common beyond those differences.[96]

It would be reasonable to question such an understanding through the questions, such as, "How can a culture remain itself, while changing?" and "How can a claim be made about the survival of an identity as it is, where the emergence of "multiple and changing cultural identities" that cannot be easily defined are mentioned?"

As Sam and Berry put forward: "… when peoples of different cultural backgrounds come into contact with each other, they may (or may not) adopt each other's behaviors, languages, beliefs, values, social institutions, and technologies."[97] Accordingly, the native societies may go through a process in which their original identity values are eroded as a result of cultural pressures from immigrant society. These pressures do not have to be in the form of forcing the other society to change its identity. Even the demands of a society to express its own identity may be perceived as a threat by the other. According to Ünal, Kurdish identity demands in Turkey, in the 2000s were perceived as a threat to the regime of the Republic by the more secular and modern segment of the society and as a reaction to this, this segment of the society started to define itself with the Republican/Kemalist identity in a more systematic way.[98]

In case of a threat perception about a migrant society, the level of perceived threat by native societies may vary depending on the density of immigration, integration capacity of the native society, on how that society had built its identity, and the interaction of

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[96] UNESCO, **UNESCO World Report: Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue**, Paris: UNESCO, 2009, p.iii.

[97] David L. Sam and John W. Berry, "Acculturation: When Individuals and Groups of Different Cultural Backgrounds Meet," **Perspectives on Psychological Science**, Vol.5, No.4 (2010), p.472.

[98] Serdar Ünal, "Türkiye'de Seküler ve Dini Hayat Tarzlarına Dayalı Toplumsal ve Siyasal Kutuplaşmaların Gündelik Rutinler ve Etkileşimler Bağlamında Sosyolojik Analizi," (**PhD Dissertation**, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi SBE, 2013), p.11.

native society with the immigrant society. As Taşdelen points out: "If societies did not retain a certain degree of closure, it would have been impossible for a society to retain its identity, to enable the bonds of its individuals to persist."[99]

Past and present relations between the immigrant and native communities play an important role in the emergence of immigration based threat perception. Hayduk gives an example for a similar issue from the US:

> … throughout most of U.S. history, organized labor has been and continues to be largely anti-immigration (although often identified with progressive politics). Comprised and led by primarily ethnically dominant U.S. workers, unions have perceived immigrant labor as undercutting their hard won gains. Similarly, blacks and other "native" groups have often perceived newer immigrants as a threat to them, particularly low-wage and low-skilled immigrants or groups perceived as "different" or "illfitted" to dominant American culture.[100]

Immigrant community may be perceived as less threatening if they make an effort to be integrated with the way of life of the society in which it is included, but if it does not make an effort of integration and does not respect the native community's way of life, the presence of immigrant community may be perceived as a threatening element by the native community.[101] Vasta summarises the different concerns in migrant-receiving European countries:

> A number of concerns have arisen about identity and specifically concerning ethnic or religious identities versus a perceived homogenous national identity. One fear is based on the premise that western democratic values will be destroyed by too many foreigners or by immigrants whose values are perceived to be different or inferior. There is a perception among some that alleged different or inferior values may threaten national identity and have a damaging effect on social cohesion, leading to violence and to a loss of freedom. On the other hand, some contend that immigrants and ethnic minorities have not done what they were meant to do – that is, to become like 'us'. Many believe that immigrants have not met their responsibility to integrate, thus segregating themselves from the receiving society. An extreme argument is that

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[99] Demet Kurtoğlu Taşdelen, "A Positive Conception of Closedness in Favour of Openness," **First International Philosophy Congress**, Bursa: Asa Kitabevi, 14-16 October 2010, p.841.
[100] Ron Hayduk, "Immigration, Race and Community Revitalization," **The Aspen Institute,** https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/Hayduk.pdf (accessed 25 May 2017).
[101] As an example about the threat perceptions of native communities towards immigrants, see the study conducted in South Korea Shang E. Ha and Seung-Jin Jang, "Immigration, Threat Perception, and National Identity: Evidence From South Korea," **International Journal of Intercultural Relations**, Vol.44 (2015).

multiculturalism supports a form of tribalism and that it segregates ethnic minorities and immigrants from the mainstream society.[102]

Therefore, capacities of societal, economic, political and administrative institutions for integration of immigrant communities and objection of these groups against integration affects the stability of the community in which they are included and consequently the stability of the state. This affect is felt more intensely in places where important economic problems are experienced, where there are ineffective governments, political polarisations or rapid social changes.

Silberstein asserts that: "Derrida … argues that difference, rather than unity, simultaneity, or sameness, is the appropriate starting point for understanding Western culture in general, and the notion of identity and self in particular."[103] In this sense, social construction of identity is accompanied by practices of exclusion. Moreover, the societies that feel under threat may try to protect/preserve their identities from the influence of rival identities. A way of doing that is through strengthening their societal identity by "using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself effectively."[104] For instance, the Jewish society had been able to preserve its identity, even before they had been given a state.[105] According Wæver et al., culture and identity can be kept alive through "language and religious teaching, observance of special days and rituals, maintenance of cultural symbols and dress, and suchlike."[106]

However, such practices bear the risk of triggering anger among the other societies, or basically create a societal security dilemma and end up in terrorism. The difference is related to the actor implementing those measures for societal security purposes. When it is done by a minority in the society, it may result in secessionist demands of the group;

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[102] Ellie Vasta, "Accommodating Diversity: Why Current Critiques of Multiculturalism Miss the Point," COMPAS: Working Paper, No. 53 (2007).
[103] Laurence J. Silberstein, "Others Within and Others Without: Rethinking Jewish Identity and Culture," Laurence J. Silberstein and Robert L. Cohn (Eds.), in **The Other in Jewish Thought and History: Constructions of Jewish Culture and Identity** (1-34), (New York: New York University, 1994), p.6.
[104] Wæver et al. (Eds.), p.191.
[105] Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues," **Beyond Intractability,** last modified July 2003, http://www.beyondint ractability.org/essay/identity-issues.
[106] Wæver et al. (Eds.), pp.191-192.

whereas it led to homogenisation of the nation when it is done by a state. The impact of globalization, which had become a leading force for further migratory movements, resembles that of states when they take measures for homogenization of the nation, but with a huge difference. While states try to emphasise a specific, mostly dominant culture for all the societies under its authority for creating a bigger sense of "we" under the title of nation, globalisation is utilised for homogenisation of all the people in the world, by offering them an American way of life by infiltrating into their language, culture, economy etc. Howes states that according to global homogenisation paradigm: "… cultural differences are increasingly being eroded through the world-wide replacement of local products with mass-produced goods which usually originate in the West."[107] Such an impact of globalization obviously causes standardization of people and destruction of the nation, as well as undermining the importance of nation-states while worshipping consumerism and economic institutions. As indicated in the *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*:

> Continuous pressure to adopt global fashions, styles, behaviours, languages, ways of thinking, patterns of consumption, economic organization and suchlike corrodes local cultures by disrupting their generational reproduction. An internationalized market political economy requires states and societies to be relatively open, meaning that they must not treat the great bulk of economic and societal transactions as threats.[108]

The securitisation concept, which was developed after the Cold War, entered into the migration studies in the 2000s. The term is defined by Wæver as: "moving a theme or issue into the field of security, and thereby framing it as a "security issue."[109] In the post-Cold War era, a new security understanding has been shaped by intertwining international, national and individual security. Beside state security, concept of societal security was defined and this concept has been used to refer a society's protection of its own identity against existing or possible threats. One of the most striking non-traditional security subjects, which is linked to non-state actors, is international migration. The

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[107] David Howes, "Introduction: Commodities and Cultural Borders," David Howes (Ed.), in **Cross-Cultural Consumption: Global Markets, Local Realities** (1-18), (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p.3.
[108] Wæver et al. (Eds.), p.194.
[109] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.), in **On Security** (46-86), (New York and Chichester: Columbia University, 1995), p.75.

perception of migration as a phenomenon to be controlled, attaches it into the new security problematic. Lahav indicates that the first connection between international migration and security was developed by the scholars in the late-phase of the Cold War, in the 1980s.[110]

In terms of domestic politics, forced migration may be used to ensure cultural homogeneity or domination of an ethnic group over the other. As an example to that the forced emigration of Indians from their ancestral lands to (from the Southeast to the west side of Missisipi) can be given.[111] In fact, strict measures taken against opposition movements, human rights violations and ethnic cleansing practices may have cross-border effects by causing mass migration movements.

The end of Cold War and 9/11 terrorist attacks have strong effects on migration. Moreover, mobility is the most concrete and sensibly powerful trigger of the societal security concerns. As explained by Rudolph, neither economic nor social aspects would be effective enough alone, to have a grand security policy towards immigration for the industrialized countries: "The "national interest" of states can be defined largely along three dimensions: (1) geopolitical security, (2) the production and accumulation of material wealth, and (3) social stability and cohesion."[112] On the other hand, according to Tal, "[v]ital interests are a subjectively determined element in the totality of a nation's goals, and they derive from such background factors as the national political culture, dominant ideology, traditions, prevailing conditions, aspirations and circumstances."[113]

Within the context of societal security, which focuses on the third dimension of national interest, immigrants are considered as elements that disrupt the native society's identity by bringing "the traits and forms of behaviour that are not only strange to the national community but which, if brought by sufficient numbers, are also said to dilute or

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[110] Gallya Lahav, 2003, "Migration and Security: The Role of Non-State Actors and Civil Liberties in Liberal Democracies," Paper presented at the Second Coordination Meeting on International Migration, New York, 15-16 October, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf /2/ITT_COOR2_CH16_Lahav.pdf.

[111] For detailed information about the Indian removal, see Francis Paul Prucha, **The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians**, 1st Edition, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska, 1984), pp.179-314.

[112] Christopher Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration," **The American Political Science Review**, Vol.97, No.4 (November 2003), p.106.

[113] Israel Tal, **National Security: The Israeli Experience**, Martin Kett (Transl.), (Westport: Praeger, 2000), **Ebook Central,** Web, 24 Mar. 2017, p.3.

extinguish completely certain traditions and practices."[114] Also, the movement of immigrants bears the risk that they carry their security related problems into the host country. That is the reason why the immigrant communities are often blamed for increasing the crime rates in the host country, for bringing risk of terrorism, and for creating economic insecurity for the host society.

The most significant intersection where national security and societal security concerns overlap with each other is when an immigrant community made territorial claims over the host country. The establishment of Israel on Palestinian territories after the settlement of Jews escaping from the massacre in Germany, can be given as the best example to such an issue. The home countries of the immigrants, may use this community to intervene into the domestic affairs of the receiving country. As argued by Bauböck, "… sending states may consider emigrants as a domestic political force within the receiving country that can advance the former states' economic and foreign policy interests."[115]

There are also other types of threats to societal security that are argued to be present in European countries. Allegedly, there are "no-go zones" in several European countries, that even the police cannot enter and where the inhabitants live under their own laws.[116] The main feature of such areas is that they are composed of Muslim immigrants who want to keep their cultural characteristics alive without the interruption of state mechanisms and of the citizens who are abided by secular rules in the country they live in, despite the countries' Christian backgrounds. If such allegations are accepted as a reality, it would not be exaggeration to say that the authority of state is under the threat of such communities, along with the societal security of the nation.

Moreover, the immigrants are widely considered as an economic burden on host countries, mainly for the cost of integrating them into the receiving state.[117] Specifically

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[114] Roe, p.221.

[115] Rainer Bauböck, "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism," **The International Migration Review**, Vol.37, No.3 (Fall 2003), p.709.

[116] For examples from Britain, France and Sweden, see Fjordman, "Europe: Combating Fake News," **Gatestone Institute,** April 1, 2017, accessed May 31, 2017, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/10037/no-go-zones-europe.

[117] For the cost of recent refugee surge to Germany, Sweden, the US and Canada, see OECD, Who Bears the Cost of Integrating Refugees?, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf, p.2.

about the refugees, the UNHCR Standing Committee argues that "… the large-scale presence of refugees invariably constitutes a heavy burden for receiving countries."[118] Linguistic and educational differences are primary examples of problems about integration. When the latest huge influx of refugees (mixed with economic immigrants) into Europe considered, European countries have to spend for personnel who knows Arabic and for educating the immigrant children in their countries for them to integrate to the society they aimed to live with. If this is not done successfully, it may increase the risk of radicalisation among these immigrant societies, which stems from the feeling of marginalization and exclusion.

2.2.2 Critique of Societal Security

The subjective nature of threats for societal security (based on the perceptions of societies), raises ethical, humanitarian and political concerns over the use of the term for manipulation. An example for this potential of the term is given by Roe: "Politicians can use perceived threats to societal security to legitimize racist and xenophobic political agendas."[119] In addition to discursively using the fears of the people for their own political agendas, such political figures can also icrease the already existing discontent of the people, by exaggerating the threat and widening its scope.

Such an act of securitisation makes the issue bigger through political discourse and creates a security threat, even if there was not one before. Also, it is claimed that by benefitting from the threat perceptions of the societies, governments can implement policies which may "damage other values important for an advanced society, such as privacy, freedom of choice, freedom of movement, and respect for diversity."[120] This criticism presents a dilemma between security and freedom, that is not unique to the societal security concept. In any sector of society, the decision maker may face with a similar situation in which one would be forced to concentrate more either on security or freedom.

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[118] UNHCR, Standing Committee, Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, 6th Meeting, January 6, 1997 (EC/47/SC/CRP.7).
[119] Roe, p.226.
[120] Alyson Bailes and Þröstur Freyr Gylfason, "'Societal Security' and Iceland," **Stjórnmál Og Stjórnsýsla**, Vol.1, No.4 (2008), p.26.

Also, a specific point has to be questioned here: Would it be possible to respect for diversity by desecuritising societal security issues? If respecting diversity means supporting the notion that people from different societies must live together, then this may also become a factor that weakens diversity through homogenisation which undermines the unique characteristics of those societies. Inevitably, the cultures of the two or more societies living together would be affected from one another and be transformed throughout time, which theoretically would ultimately eliminate the differences between their cultures to a considerable extent and make them become a one single society with a common (transformed) identity.

A social psychology perspective can be used to explain why preservation of the societal identity is important:

> Social identity theory asserts that once we have internalised a group category and thereby acquired the relevant social identity, we generally want to preserve it. We want to do so because of the cognitive importance of categorisation and because the group is now part of us and bound up with our sense of self-worth. Consequently, perceived threats to the group – such as to its relative status or to its very existence – are also threats to the self, and for the individuals concerned protecting the former means protecting the latter as well.[121]

Another criticism for societal security concept is the distinction it created between state and society.[122] Regarding the representation of societies, Roe expresses a critical question about the issue: "… who speaks for society if not the state"[123]? However, due to differences between the composition of populations in different countries, there may be occurrences where state does not speak on behalf of a minority ethnic-group, for example. In this case, other actors take the lead for speaking up for the society, such as cultural intellectuals.

The members of the Copenhagen School were also criticized by the scholars of Critical Security Studies for the way they deal with the concept of society. They are "… accused

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[121] Tobias Theiler, "Societal Security and Social Psychology", p.262.

[122] Wæver expresses this as follows: "My colleagues and I have … suggested a reconceptualization of security field in terms of a duality of *state* security and *societal* security. State security has *sovereignty* as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has *identity*." See Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," p.67.

[123] Roe, "Societal Security," Alan Collins (Ed.), in **Contemporary Security Studies** (215-228), 4th Edition, p.226.

of making the same mistake with society that was earlier made with state—that is, to treat it as a single, fully formed, unproblematic entity."[124] Moreover, they were also objected for taking society as a stable unit that undergo a change in time. Such an approach is found in contradiction with the emancipatory approach of Critical Security Studies. It would not be fair to blame the Copenhagen School, however, for taking such a stance against "society", since the school adopts a constructivist perspective towards identities, since it acknowledges that society is a social construct[125] and it is handled like a stable concept for practical purposes. Still, it may be accepted that there are shortcomings of societal security concept in terms of explaining the motivation of societies and building their understanding of society on a robust theoretical framework, which could be overcome by leaning on a more social-psychological approach.

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[124] Sheehan, p.85.
[125] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," **Review of International Studies**, Vol.23, No.2 (April 1997), p.224.

3. EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Migration is a dynamic phenomenon, because it is open to social interactions, it occurs collectively and it affects both the source (migrant sending) and target (migrant receiving) countries. International migration is a process that leads to the questioning of the concept of nation and affects millions of people demographically.

The increase in the movement of people and migration across the world are evaluated as inevitable consequences of globalisation. As Li aptly points out: "

> Capitalist expansion and economic globalization encourage the freedom of movement of people. It is a freedom that is closely associated with free trade, within which investments, exports, imports, information and capital are encouraged to move and operate in relatively unrestricted ways within a common trading zone, or a block of trade partners. One of the outcomes of globalization is to soften national boundaries by internationalizing domestic markets and integrating them in production, distribution and consumption. Thus, the expansion of the market economy and the integration of world trade inevitably lead to a larger volume of human migration.[126]

Migration, as the human dimension of globalisation, has far-reaching effects over the culture, economy, and politics of particularly the migrant-receiving states. People leave their home countries for a variety of reasons and migrates to other countries. There is no country which can isolate itself from the implications of migration. Societal, economic, and political consequences of migration occupy the agenda of the societies at the international level and migration phenomenon increasingly becomes one of the basic problems of both states and non-governmental organizations.

There are also people escaping from the conflict zones within their own countries, which are known as internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, these people are not subject to the same international protection and assistance with refugees. While refugee situations fall directly under the UNHCR's mandate, IDPs can only be assisted in case of a "clear link with refugee or returnee populations", or "the potential for internal displacement to develop into external refugee movements."[127] This can be considered as one of the driving

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[126] Peter S. Li, "World Migration in the Age of Globalization: Policy Implications and Challenges," **New Zealand Population Review**, Vol: 33-34 (2008), p.3.
[127] Human Rights Watch, "UNHCR at 50: What Future for Refugee Protection?," Retrieved on 30 March 2017 from https://www.hrw.org/report/2000/12/12/50-years-what-future-refugee-protection.

forces for people to seek asylum in other countries, rather than moving to a safer place within the borders of their own countries.

3.1 IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

UNHCR's Global Trends 2015 reports illuminates the reality that nearly one in 113 people was forcibly displaced (meaning refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) by the end of 2015.[128] According to UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) data, 21.3 million of these forcibly displaced people are refugees and 53% of these people are from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. Countries which host the largest numbers of refugees are: Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan.[129]

Syrian refugee crisis cannot be considered as a unique one. The number of Afghan refugees and the longevity of the crisis related to these refugees should not be underestimated. Pakistan has been dealing with the Afghan refugee crisis and the threat it poses to the national security of the country through the means of terrorism since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Afghan refugee population around the world was estimated to be around 2.7 million at the end of 2015[130] and 1,560,592 of them are registered as Afghan refugees in Pakistan.[131] Expecting these refugees to return to their home countries would not be much realistic due to the further intensification of economic and political instability in Afghanistan and increasing influence of Taliban in the region.[132]

Another continuing refugee crisis is the Iraqi one. The country has been producing refugees since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War[133] and it seems that the civil war and consequently the refugee outflows from the country will not end soon, as long as the

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[128] UNHCR, "Forced Displacement in 2015," **Global Trends**, Geneva, 2016, p.6.

[129] UNHCR, "Figures at a Glance," 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (3 April 2017).

[130] International Organization for Migration, **2015 Global Migration Trends Factsheet**, Berlin, 2017, p.8.

[131] UNHCR, "Population Statistics," 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview (7 April 2017).

[132] Too see the Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan, see Sarah Almukhtar and Karen Yourish, "More Than 14 Years After U.S. Invasion, the Taliban Control Large Parts of Afghanistan," **The New York Times,** 19 April 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-maps.html
?_r=1 (7 April 2017).

[133] **Iranian & Iraqi Refugees in Turkey,** 2013, http://www.resettlement.eu/page/iranian-iraqi-refugees-turkey (7 April 2017).

turmoil persists within and around Iraq. According to UNHCR's data, by the end of 2015, there were around 260 thousand Iraqi refugees in different countries.[134]

Migratory movements cause cultural changes both for migrant and native societies during the process. The fact remains that within forced migration, the societal dynamics of being a refugee or an asylum seeker (those who applied for refugee status, until the decision is made about them as rejected or approved) differs from those of the economically motivated migration. Most of the asylum seekers who have to leave their countries or societies, because armed conflict and violence makes their lives unsustainable in their own countries; prefer neighbouring countries as first place of asylum. Emigration to countries which are offering better economic and social opportunities becomes possible only for a small minority.

Refugees and asylum seekers are the most vulnerable group of migrants because they try to find a shelter in another country and they need to be protected against the violations of human rights.

3.1.1 Conceptual Dimension of the Refugee Crisis

Throughout the history, people left the places they live due to various reasons. Migration is the population movements that take place within a country or by going out of the country.

"Forced migration" is defined in the Glossary on Migration as:

> A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).[135]

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[134] UNHCR, "Population Statistics," 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series (7 April 2017).
[135] Richard Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross (Eds.), **Glossary on Migration**, (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2011), p.39.

Apart from forced migration which occurs as a result of war, conflict, crisis, exile, and disaster, there is also voluntary migration which is driven by other reasons than those mentioned for forced migration.

Asylum is a method resorted by people from past to present. They are the people who leave the territories they live on with the aim of going to safer places. The 1951 UN convention on refugees define "refugee":

> As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.[136]

Owing to the term's high dependence on personal statements about relative concepts, migrants take advantage of it by entering into countries as asylum seekers and benefit from what is granted to them until finding a way to stay in economically promising countries before the authorities reach a conclusion about their applications.

Although the phrase refugee crisis reminds many people the Syrian refugee crisis; it is neither the first nor will be the last refugee crisis in history. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention came into existence as a result of the refugee crisis after the Second World War (WWII). Also, many Eastern European asylum seekers migrated to Western European countries with the fall of communism.

As the massive influx of immigrants inevitably places a burden on the receiving country, reluctance to accept refugees has been increasing. In time, host countries start to see refugees as a threat and try to send them back to their home countries through force or encouragement.

Apart from the massive influx of refugees, there is another problem concerning the host countries, which is their duration of stay. Protracted refugee situation is defined as:

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[136] **Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,** Geneva, 28 July 1951, **United Nations Treaty Series,** vol. 189, No. 2545, available from http://www.refworld.org/, p. 153.

One in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.[137]

The status is given to the people by "using a crude measure of refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries."[138] That is to say, the host countries does not only have to host rising numbers of refugees but also to allow them to stay for long years without being able to maintain their lives.

One way to classify contemporary refugees sociologically is to divide them into three categories as: the activist, the target and the victim. These characteristics of these categories are explained as:

The classic activists are dissenters and rebels who actions contribute to the conflict that eventually forces them to flee. The targeted refugees are individuals who, through membership in a particular group are singled out for violent action. And the victims are randomly caught in the cross fire or are exposed to generalized social violence.[139]

These three types of refugees more or less correspond to "state-in-exile", "persecuted" and "situational" refugees which were conceptualized by Lischer. The relationship between refugee types and their tendency towards violence caused by these groups are categorically listed in Figure 2. Lischer's conceptualization is more useful in terms of understanding the security risks that may be posed by different types of refugees.

Lischer describes situational refugees as those who flee from the conflict zone because of the combatants' possibility to kill them or destruct their means of existence. This type of refugees wants to go back to their countries when the conflict ceases. Their requirements to return to their countries of origin is not based on who becomes victorious in the end of the conflict. They do not expect or campaign for political or military changes, because they are not politically organized groups or parties of violence, rather they are victims of

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[137] UNHCR, **Protracted Refugee Situations,** EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (10 June 2004), available from http://www.refworld.org/.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, **Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World**, 1st Edition, (New York: Oxford University, 1989), p.269.

it. The type of violence from which they flee is generally conducted by a group with low popularity among the public.[140]

The second type of refugees described by Lischer is the persecuted refugees. These refugees are those who become subjects of persecution or oppression, because of "ethnic, religious, linguistic or political reasons."[141] Such refugees are more likely to be politically organised and get militarised. Thus, providing humanitarian aid to this group of refugees is different from helping situational refugees. For this type of refugees to return to their countries, political outcomes of the conflict matter for ensuring that their group would be safe when they go back there. That is to say, it is highly likely that such group of refugees would seek for political changes or gains to return. These refugees may transcend into state-in-exile refugees, if stay too long in the countries of asylum and lose their hope for a radical political change in sending countries. Under this conditions, they may become active parts of a political or military movement and engage in cross-border activities.[142]

Type of Refugee	Reason for Flight	Requirement to Return	Initial Political Organization	Propensity for Violence
Situational	War, Chaos, Deprivation	Peace and Stability	None or Very Loose	Unlikely
Persecuted	Group Based Persecution	Credible Guarantees of Protection	Weak, May Grow in Exile	Somewhat Likely
State-in-Exile	Defeat in Civil War	Political or Military Victory	Strong, Often Grows in Exile	Very Likely

Figure 2: Refugee Types and Propensities for Violence
Adapted from: Sarah Kenyon Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid**, 1st Edition, (New York: Cornell University, 2005), p.19.

Finally, state-in-exile refugees are those who gathered under a strong political or military leader. These leaders strive for a radical political change in sending countries and use refugees sometimes for this purpose, as a weapon. This type of refugees would go back to sending countries only if they gain a political or military victory. These refugees pose

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[140] Sarah Kenyon Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid**, 1st Edition, New York: Cornell University, 2005, p.20.
[141] Ibid, p.22.
[142] Ibid, pp.20-23.

a threat for the sending countries, as well as receiving countries, due to their likely engagement in violent cross-border activities. The flow of large number of refugees from a certain country with accusations against regime endangers the legitimacy of that country's regime.[143]

3.1.2 Security Dimension of the Refugee Crisis

Massey et al. argues that "migrant networks" are effective for perpetuation of population movements. These networks provide the continuity of liaison between migrants and expectant migrants. Common connections, "such as kinship and friendship"[144], being from the same geography, and coming from the same culture have an important place in framing this liaison. The cost and risks of migration decreases to the minimum level by virtue of social networks.[145]

One of the most relevant approaches to population movements is the "push-pull model".[146] According to this model, pull factors in target countries and push factors in source countries play a determining role in people's migration.

In the countries where there are already existing socio-economic problems, the attitude towards asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants is generally a negative one.[147] Leonard states that:

> The issue of migration has increasingly given rise to intense political debates after the official ban on labour migration decided by the majority of European countries in the 1970s. It has been linked to a wide array of socio-economic or political problems such as criminality, breaches of law and order, unemployment, abuse of social benefits, epidemics, cultural and religious threats, social unrest, and political instability. Some political leaders and media outlets have even described it as a security threat.[148]

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[143] Ibid, pp.24-25.

[144] Douglas S. Massey et al., "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," **Population and Development Review**, Vol.19, No.3 (September 1993), p.449.

[145] Massey et al., pp.448-450.

[146] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, **The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World**, 2nd Edition, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.20-23.

[147] Mike Berry, Inaki Garcia-Blanco and Kerry Moore, "Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries," **UNHCR,** http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf, pp.4-5.

[148] Sarah Leonard, 2007, "The 'Securitization' of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School's Framework," Paper presented at the **SGIR Sixth Pan-European**

According to Ceccorulli, with the attacks on September 11, 2001, security-oriented approaches have strengthened and securitisation of refugee and migratory movements have accelerated.[149] Increasing terror anxiety, had changed the perception towards asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants. Thus, within the context of the relation between migration and security, the issues of migration control and border security had come to the fore.

As indicated in the first section, immigrants can carry their conflict into the receiving countries, so they become transnational social actors. In time, immigrants may decide to settle in the receiving countries and may form or join the already existing diaspora communities. As Sheffer claims, diasporas "… wishes to maintain their ethno-national identities and contacts with their homelands and with other dispersed communities of the same ethnic origin."[150] The same situation may prevail for immigrant communities. When refugees are considered as a part of immigrants, it must be noticed that their connection to their home countries means that they may be involved in the conflicts/problems in their home countries, as they are not ordinary economic migrants, but they are people who left their home countries due to political reasons. Such connections that diasporas or immigrant communities have with their homelands, may remain as an unproblematic issue, as long as the host and home countries have friendly relationships. Lischer expresses that: "In the decades after World War II, the great powers viewed refugees as political actors and often abetted their militarization."[151]

Diasporas does not have to be composed of people from the same ethnic origin, they can also be based on different types of identities, such as a religion. For instance, the supporters of the idea of forming a Muslim diaspora claim that "despite the multiplicity of their countries of origin, Muslims have much in common and therefore should organize and act as a cohesive social-political entity in their host countries."[152] Such a network to organize Muslims could be built through the usage of mosques, for example, as a place

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International Relations Conference: Security, Politics, Critique, Turin, September 12-15, 2007, p.3.
[149] Michela Ceccorulli, "Migration as a Security Threat: Internal and External Dynamics in the European Union," GARNET: Working Paper, No. 65/09, (April 2009).
[150] Gabriel Sheffer, **Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad**, 1st Edition, (New York: Cambridge University, 2003), p.26.
[151] Lischer, p.2.
[152] Sheffer, pp.66-67.

for gathering Muslims from different ethnic origins together. As MacDonough and Hoodfar state:

> … many Muslims have learned to cross ethnic boundaries and see themselves as Muslims first. Mosques, Islamic associations, networks, camps, and schools, for example, gather people from various countries of origin; consequently, Muslims learn to emphasize the strong "universal" element of the faith and adopt a "transnational" form of Islam."[153]

Considering that Muslims from all parts of the world worship in Arabic, there is no need for Muslims from different ethnic origins to go to different mosques to practice their religion.

Lischer categorise different types of refugee-related violence as follows:

- Attacks between the sending state and the refugees
- Attacks between the receiving state and the refugees
- Ethnic or factional violence among the refugees
- Internal violence within the receiving state
- Inter-state war or unilateral intervention[154]

Terrorism is also another security threat which is widely considered as linked to migration, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Steven A. Camarota prepared a report about the linkage between immigration and terrorism, following the attacks. The report covers forty-eight foreign born, Islamist, al-Qaeda linked terrorists who had been involved in terrorist activities from 1993 to 2001, including three asylum seekers and at least three others who used the asylum system to remain in the country. The report shows that terrorists have tried every type of immigration to enter and remain in the receiving country to realize their terrorist activities.[155]

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[153] Sheila MacDonough and Homa Hoodfar, "Muslims in Canada: From Ethnic Groups to Religious Community," Paul Bramadat and David Seljak (Eds.), in **Religion and Ethnicity in Canada** (133-153), (Toronto, New York and London: University of Toronto, 2009), p.134.
[154] Ibid, p.12.
[155] Steven A. Camarota, "The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001," **Paper 21,** Center for Immigration Studies, 2002, http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf (31 March 2017), pp.5-59.

After the 9/11 attacks immigration has been emphasised as a national security issue. Refugees also were not exempted from this approach, for instance, the UN called states to:

> Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts… Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists[156]

Although some people in the US take the issue of immigration as a national security threat and suggest to solve it by stricter immigration policies, there are also others standing against restrictions due to their advocacy of political and economic liberalism.[157]

3.2 SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

The "Arab Spring"[158] started in Tunisia in 2010 and has spread to Northern Africa and the Middle East in a domino effect. Following the failure of the "Arab Spring" in all Middle Eastern countries, civil wars have erupted in countries like Yemen, Libya and Syria which have produced large numbers of refugees.

The Syrian crisis, which started in March 15, 2011 with demonstrations as a part of the "Arab Spring", dragged the country into a civil war as of April in the same year. As Syrian government tried to suppress demonstrations by using excessive military force, internal and external migration which have taken place as a result of the developments in the country caused one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Today, it is claimed

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[156] Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf, p.3

[157] See Donald Kerwin, "The Use and Misuse of National Security Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refugee and Immigration Policies," **International Journal of Refugee Law**, Vol.17, No.4 (2005). See also Kenneth Rogoff, "The Cost of Living Dangerously," **Foreign Policy,** November/December 2004, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/51_cost_of_living_dangerously.pdf.

[158] For analyses of the "Arab Spring", see I. William Zartman (Ed.), **Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat**, (Athens and London: The University of Georgia, 2015). See also Robert Springborg, "The Political Economy of the Arab Spring," **Mediterranean Politics**, Vol.16, No.3 (November 2011).

that there are more than 5 million Syrian refugees[159] in different parts of the world, most of which resides in regional countries.

When refugees from countries which had been dragged into civil war or instability even before the Arab revolts, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea are added to this number, the refugee issue has reached an unprecedented dimension.

3.2.1 Regional Refugee Situation

As of March 15, 2017, the number of registered Syrian refugees settled in regional countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) and North Africa reached almost 5 million people (exact number is 4.961.300). 51.5% of those registered refugees in the region are known to be males, while 48.5% of them are females. It seems that the proportions of refugees in the region between the ages of 0 and 17 and coupled with refugees older than 60 are nearly equal to those who are in 18-59 age group (See Figure 3). This means that these people have an age composition of mostly young people and adults, not children or elderly people. Instead the lower numbers of refugees in the region are composed of the elderly (60+ year olds) people and children (0-17 year olds).


Figure 3: Sex Distribution of Syrian Refugees in MENA
Data from: UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal", 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php# (27 March 2017).

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[159] Dearden, "Syrian Civil War: More Than Five Million Refugees Flee Conflict as Global Support for Resettlement Wanes," **Independent,** 30 March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-five-million-refugees-conflict-resettlement-un-geneva-donald-trump-europe-migrant-a7658606.html (4 April 2017).

More than half of them (almost 3 million) is hosted by Turkey alone (See Figure 4). Turkey has been pursuing an open border policy for citizens of Syria since the beginning of the Syrian crisis.


Figure 4: Distribution of Syrian Refugees in MENA
Data from: UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal", 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php# (27 March 2017).

Number of registered Syrian refugees in the region seems to be increasing until 2014, after which it has been decreasing (See Figure 5). Although the data gathered for 2017 is only until March 15, with a basic calculation (assuming that there is not going to be a significant change about the situation in Syria), it seems that the number of registered refugees would be around 200,000 by the end of the year. Among these, only 10% of refugees stay in camps.[160] Furthermore, as the war prolongs in Syria, refugees' inclination to stay longer in host countries increases. Even if the war ends in Syria today, it is predicted that Syrian people in different countries would not go back to their country, until their residential areas are reconstructed.

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[160] UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal," 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php# (27 March 2017).

Figure 5: Registered Syrian Refugees in MENA

Data from: UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal", 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php# (27 March 2017).

3.2.2 Situation in Europe

Hundreds of thousands of people who have been fleeing from the conflicts and massacres in the Middle East have been attempting to cross into Europe through land (over the Balkans) or sea routes (over the Mediterranean). In 2016, 355,361 people arrived in Greece, Italy and Spain illegally, through the Mediterranean. Almost 60% of these people are observed to be men (see Figure 6).

What can be seen from the statistics is that refugees in Europe are mostly males. According to Pew Research Center's data: "Since 2013, the demographic profile of asylum seekers in the EU-28, Norway and Switzerland has become slightly more male (67% in 2013, 71% in 2014 and 73% in 2015)".[161]

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[161] Phillip Connor, "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/, p.5.

Figure 6: Demographic Distribution of Mediterranean Arrivals to the EU
Data from: UNHCR, "Refugee Situations", 2017, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (7 April 2017).

Also, almost 80 percent of the Mediterranean arrivals to Europe are from other countries other than Syria (see Figure 7). This weakens the argument that the source for the influx of migrants into EU territory is Syria.

**Figure 7:** Distribution of Mediterranean Arrivals to the EU by Nationality
Data from: UNHCR, "Refugee Situations", 2017, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (7 April 2017).

According to Eurostat's data, number of asylum applications to the EU countries constantly increased after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, until 2016 (see Figure 8).

The data on Syrian asylum applicants present a similar trend with the exception of 2012 when there was a decrease.

Figure 8: Number of Asylum Applications to EU Countries
Data from: Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration", 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).

Also, when the share of Syrian asylum applicants to the total number of applications is calculated, a constant increase can be seen until 2016 (see Table 1). An interesting point about the data is that, even when at its peak, the Syrians consists of less than 30% of the total asylum applicants.

Table 1
Proportion of Syrians in Asylum Applications to EU Countries in 2016

Year	Ratio
2008	1.87%
2009	1.80%
2010	1.93%
2011	2.64%
2012	7.19%
2013	11.59%
2014	19.47%
2015	27.85%
2016	26.95%

Data from: Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration", 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).

When the composition of these applicants by sex is considered, it can be seen that from 2008 to 2016, the number of female applicants have never been more than males (see Table 2). Instead, even in 2016, when the lowest proportion of males is seen, male applicants are more than 10 % higher than the female applicants.

Table 2
Proportion of Males in Syrian Asylum Applicants, 2008-2016

Year	Male
2008	79.38%
2009	76.42%
2010	69.46%
2011	68.88%
2012	64.25%
2013	65.48%
2014	72.77%
2015	71.03%
2016	61.53%

Data from: Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration", 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).

The EU, in addition to hosting refugees, also has provided assistance for the needs of refugees hosted in other countries (like Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq). The humanitarian funding provided by the EU to Turkey for refugees, since the beginning of the amounted to 664 million euros as of April 2017.[162] The economic burden of refugee crisis on Europe has been huge, as €10 billion have been spent under the name of "humanitarian assistance and development aid" only in two years (2015-2016).[163] However, not all the people entering into Europe are granted refugee status, as so many of them are considered as economic migrants. The reason for the migratory waves towards Europe is the belief among the migrants that the better living conditions will be available for them in the continent.

Whatever the cause of the migratory movements, it seems that increasing migration will have serious implications for politics of the EU countries. Already, in many EU countries,

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[162] European Commission, **Turkey: Refugee Crisis**, Brussels, 2017, p.2.
[163] European Commission, "The EU and the Refugee Crisis," **EU Law and Publications,** http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/refugee-crisis/en/ (accessed 13 Apr. 2017).

anti-immigration sentiments have been on the rise through the extreme-right parties. As a result of the increasing refugee numbers and ISIL-related attacks in EU countries, the Islamophobic and anti-refugee discourses started to gain wider audience among European societies. Apparently, this crisis may be posing one of the biggest challenges to the EU throughout its history. While the extreme right turns the refugee crisis into an opportunity to change the essence of Europe by keeping the fear of "Muslim invasion" alive, moderate politicians' incompetence to handle the crisis is also strengthening the trend. If the refugee issue cannot be brought under control, it is highly likely that the extreme right influence in European politics will increase to unprecedented levels.

For instance, Austria plans to have "tougher measures against refused asylum seekers" such as not providing food and accommodation.[164] Germany follows the same trend; as "[t]he German parliament has passed legislation making it easier to deport failed asylum seekers and monitor those deemed dangerous in a move that has been slammed by opposition parties and rights groups as an assault on the rights of refugees."[165] However, Merkel does not lean towards the demands for setting upper limit for the refugees coming to the country. In the speech she gave on October 15, 2015, at German Federal *Bundestag*, Merkel called for solidarity from the EU to manage the migration crisis and settle the refugees, and assessed that solving the refugee crisis is *a historic test of Europe*."[166] She has noticed that her plan to distribute refugees to European countries based on a quota has not succeeded. Among the EU countries, Germany has the highest number of asylum applications.

As it can be seen from Table 3, number of applications lodged to some EU countries (like Germany and Italy) are much more than the number of those lodged to others (like Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Among these, proportion of Syrian asylum applicants had been around one-fourth of the total number of applications lodged by people from extra-EU countries in the period from January 2015 to March 2017. The data shows that, the refugee problem is not created only by the war in Syria, as 73% of the

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[164] **Deutsche Welle,** "Austria Plans Tougher Measures Against Refused Asylum Seekers," February 2, 2017.

[165] **Al-Jazeera,** "Germany Approves Deportation of Asylum Seekers Law," May 19, 2017.

[166] "Merkel: Refugee Crisis a 'Historic Test of Europe'," **Deutsche Welle,** 15 October 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-refugee-crisis-a-historic-test-of-europe/a-18784341 (17 January 2017).

asylum applications to EU countries were lodged by people from other countries. This means that even solving the crisis in Syria, may not end the broader refugee crisis for the EU.

Table 3
Proportion of Syrians in Total Number of Asylum Applications Lodged by Extra-EU Countries' Citizens to EU Countries in January 2015-March 2017 Period

Country	Extra-EU	Syrian	Proportion
EU	2,699,815	724,140	27%
Belgium	67,430	13,540	20%
Bulgaria	40,600	8,785	22%
Czechia	3,130	225	7%
Denmark	27,800	10,025	36%
Germany	1,276,260	441,310	35%
Estonia	480	100	21%
Ireland	5,685	320	6%
Greece	70,660	32,485	46%
Spain	32,665	8,935	27%
France	167,940	9,795	6%
Croatia	2,420	350	14%
Italy	230,230	1,590	1%
Cyprus	5,205	2,240	43%
Latvia	745	195	26%
Lithuania	755	180	24%
Luxembourg	4,900	1,020	21%
Hungary	206,565	69,570	34%
Malta	3,905	785	20%
Netherlands	68,660	21,885	32%
Austria	134,700	34,990	26%
Poland	26,150	375	1%
Portugal	2,590	565	22%
Romania	3,235	1,400	43%
Slovenia	1,645	305	19%
Slovakia	515	20	4%
Finland	38,210	1,495	4%
Sweden	194,960	57,195	29%
UK	81,780	4,445	5%

Data from: Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration", 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).

When the data is analysed in detail, it is possible to see that the highest proportion of Syrian refugees applied for asylum in Greece, while the lowest proportion of Syrians asking for asylum were in Italy and Poland. It is possible that the high proportion of Syrian applicants in Greece stems from first, its geographical approximation to Syria, second the easy passage from Turkey to Greece either taking the sea or land route and finally, their inability to leave Greece and cross into another "preferable", northern European country, because of the reintroduction of temporary border checks by several EU countries or other kind of measures taken like the use razor wire fences in borders.

On the other hand, the low proportion of Syrian applicants in Italy is possibly because, it is a longer and more dangerous route for Syrians to go there by the Mediterranean. Finally, for Poland, the reasons may be its geographical distance from the area, wide anti-refugee sentiments of Polish people or it may be because of the higher numbers of other applicants coming from surrounding conflictual areas, like Ukraine. Also, Poland's economic conditions may not be appealing for asylum applicants, because the country itself sends emigrants to other EU countries due to its lower economic standards.[167]

There are three possible reasons for why such migratory movements have been taking place towards Europe in the aforementioned period (excluding Syria from the analysis): (1) instability in migrant-producing countries in political, economic or social spheres increased even further in recent years, so the number of people looking for shelter in Europe has increased, (2) number of migrant-producing countries have increased in recent years, due to newly emerging problems in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, and (3) people asking for asylum from EU countries have already been looking for an opportunity to take such an action and they took advantage of the Syrian refugee crisis for crossing into the European territory. Leaving room for the first two possibilities, by looking at Figure 7 to countries of origin of the Mediterranean arrivals into Europe. It can be seen that the countries following Syria in the list are not the ones that have been

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[167] Bart Bachman, "Diminishing Solidarity: Polish Attitudes toward the European Migration and Refugee Crisis," **Migration Policy Institute,** last modified June 16, 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/di minishing-solidarity-polish-attitudes-toward-european-migration-and-refugee-crisis.

destabilized suddenly and started to produce migrants in recent years. This makes the third possibility more acceptable.

Merkel may have earned many Europeans' respect for open-door policy when the crisis had erupted, but fear may replace mercy on the societal level, if people gets the impression that the number of refugees that may come to Europe is uncertain. This is the exact fear the extreme right is benefitting from recklessly.

On the other hand, right-wing conservative Prime Minister (PM) Orbán of Hungary has been pursuing a negative attitude towards refugees that is against the perspective of the EU. Meotti reports that Orbán said, about the refugees: "[m]ost of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity".[168] There are razor wire fences on Hungary's borders with Serbia and Croatia. Although Germany seems as the country to which most asylum applications were lodged in 2016, Hungary was the country where the asylum applications have the highest proportion compared to local population, at least in 2015.[169] In general, Merkel's plan for refugees to be distributed among the EU countries was opposed by "the Visegrad Four—an eastern European bloc of states that includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia."[170] Also, government of Slovenia is concerned about a new refugee influx; Šalamon expresses that: "A razor-wire fence was set up along parts of Slovenia's border with Croatia, and protests against new refugee centers have increased."[171]

Despite all these, the EU still could not deliver a solution for the crisis it faces with. The ongoing discussions related to the migrant crisis are about topics like whether the asylum

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[168] Giulio Meotti, "Eastern Europe: The Last Barrier between Christianity and Islam," **Gatestone Institute,** September 20, 2016, accessed June 2, 2017, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8972/eastern-europe-christianity-islam.

[169] "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts," **BBC,** last modified March 4, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.

[170] Justin Salhani, "Most Europeans Support Merkel's Plan to Distribute Refugees Among EU," **Think Progress,** 19 February 2016, https://thinkprogress.org/most-europeans-support-merkels-plan-to-distribute-refugees-among-eu-7b927719c2ce (2 June 2017).

[171] Neža Kogovšek Šalamon, "Slovenia Built a "Corridor" to Move Refugees Straight Through the Country," **Open Society Foundations,** last modified February 2, 2016, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/slovenia-built-corridor-move-refugees-straight-through-country.

requests are political or economic, the threat of Islamization of Europe due to the Muslim majority of the asylum seekers or that these people would carry diseases into Europe.

Apart from statistical facts about the refugee crisis and its importance on the EU as an institution, as well as the member states, at the societal level the important question remains to be on what the EU citizens think about the refugee crisis.

Wike, Stokes and Simmons, based on the data gathered by the Pew Research Center for their Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 10 EU countries, claim that many Europeans "[a]re concerned with security, economic repercussions of refugee crisis."[172] Based on the same survey, following conclusions can be reached:

Firstly, the average percentage of people from 10 countries agreeing with the statement that "[r]efugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country" is 58% (see Figure 9). The highest proportion of people agreeing with the statement are from Hungary, while the lowest are from Spain. In general, with the exception of two countries (Spain and France), most of the people in the rest of the countries where survey was conducted, agree with the statement.

When the proportions are considered, it can be seen that Hungary is the country where the highest ratio of people thinking that domestic terrorism is positively correlated with the presence of refugees can be found. This is interesting because Hungary is not one of those EU countries in which a terrorist incident take place after the refugee crisis hit Europe. However, this does not mean that Hungarian people are not afraid of the possibility of such incidents in Hungary, or in general in Europe. When the public opinion polls conducted by *Nézőpont Intézet* are examined, it is possible to witness the fear of the Hungarian people about the perceived relationship between terrorism and refugees, or in general, migrants. Some of the important conclusions reached through the poll are as follows: First of all, regardless of their political orientations, a high proportion of

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[172] Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs: Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-mino rities-refugees-common-in-eu/.

Hungarian people "are concerned about a new immigration wave."[173] Moreover, 65 percent of Hungarian people "consider it possible that Hungary can be the target of a terrorist act in the future."[174] When the responses given to the same question asked to people after different terrorist incidents in France and Belgium are compared with the Hungarian data, it can be seen that the fear increased concurrently with the number of incidents. This fear of people appears to be related to the perception of illegal immigrants among the Hungarian public because 81 percent of people "are concerned that there may be some terrorists among illegal immigrants."[175] This concern also seems to heightened over time, when it is compared with the responses given to the same question as part of a previous poll conducted by the same think-tank in in 2015 (from 70 percent to 81).[176]


Figure 9: EU Citizens' Opinion on the Relationship Between Domestic Terrorism and Refugees

     Data from: Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs: Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/.

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[173] "The Attitude Towards Immigration and Terrorism Is Not a Question of Party Preferences," **Nézőpont Intézet,** last modified September 26, 2016, http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/attitude-towards-immigration-terrorism-question-party-preferences/.

[174] "The Perception of Terrorist Threat Has Increased by 150 Percent Since Last January," **Nézőpont Intézet,** last modified March 30, 2016, http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/perception-terrorist-threat-increased-150-percent-since-last-january/.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Ibid.

It can also be seen that, although the Orbán government in Hungary has been subject to criticisms for xenophobia, 68% of the Hungarian people "are satisfied with the government's immigration policies."[177] Furthermore, 79% has declared that they "are opposed to the compulsory resettlement of migrants to Hungary."[178] In addition, 87% of the Hungarian people opposed illegal immigration and 55% of them support the border enclosure of the country at its border with Serbia.[179] There are some signs that societal security concerns are widespread among the Hungarian people which seems to be prioritised also by the Hungarian government in their approach towards the crisis.

Although the fear of terrorism associated with illegal migration seems quite significant, when people were asked why illegal immigrants should not have been accepted to the country, the proportion of people giving the reason as "terrorist threat" falls behind those who responds as "economic reasons".[180] This is an implication of the economic problems faced in the country and an evidence for the argument that the societal impact of immigration becomes more problematic in countries where there are already existing socio-economic problems than it would be under more stable economic conditions.

When the Hungarian society's views about the reasons of illegal immigrants for coming to the country are considered, it can be seen that 33% of the people believe that most of them are economic migrants, although there may be some war refugees among them.

Considering the data gathered on the Hungarian public opinion, it can be understood that Hungarian people's fear of terrorism have increased with the terrorist incidents in different European countries, which were conducted by people from non-European origins, who are associated with extremist views on Islam. It can also be seen that despite the widespread criticism about the Hungarian government's migration policies, those policies seem to be in line with the public opinion as they reflect their societal security

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[177] "Over Half of Opposition Supporters Satisfied With the Government's Immigration Policies," **Nézőpont Intézet,** last modified August 24, 2016, http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/half-opposition-supporters-satisfied-governments-immigration-policies/.
[178] Ibid.
[179] "National Unity Behind the Government Regarding Immigration Policies," **Nézőpont Intézet,** last modified September 24, 2015, http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/national-unity-behind-government-regarding-immigration-policies/.
[180] Ibid.

concerns. However, the role of economic situation in the country should not be ignored because it may be one of the driving forces for the widening feeling of insecurity among the Hungarian people.

Most probably, the reason for the affiliation of refugees with terrorism, in the minds of European people is highly related to the increasing number of jihadist terrorism within the EU countries since the refugee crisis hit Europe in 2015. For instance, according to data provided by EUROPOL, jihadist terrorism almost doubled between 2014 and 2015 from 395 to 687.[181] Some of the perpetrators of the attacks were just home-grown lone wolves, inspired by the propaganda of jihadist organisations, while the others were members of these organisations who even fought for ISIL in Iraq and/or Syria. Radical-jihadist terrorist organisations offer Muslims two options for "jihad": (1) come and fight for/with us, or (2) perpetrate a terrorist attack upon the "Crusaders":

> In a speech that marked the 14th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims living in the "Crusader coalition" countries to plan and conduct attacks in their places of residence, rather than risking detection when trying to travel to conflict areas.[182]

European Police Office claims that jihadist foreign fighters from Europe who joins the fronts of jihadist organisations, like ISIL in Syria and Iraq, go back to their countries with powerful motivation for killing the "infidels" and that they have enhanced capabilities for carrying out more effective terrorist attacks, due to the military training they got from the groups' militants on producing explosive devices. That was the case for the perpetrators of terrorist attack in France in 2015.[183]

Even if the refugees cannot be directly associated with the increasing jihadist terrorism in EU countries, the crisis seems to boost the phenomenon in different ways. First of all, jihadist terrorists benefit from the influx of refugees to Europe for entering into European states by infiltrating into the massive group of people who claim to be "asylum seekers". For instance, it was understood that the perpetrators of November 2015, Paris attack

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[181] European Police Office, **European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016**, The Hague, 2016, p.22.
[182] Ibid, p.26.
[183] Ibid, p.27.

entered into the European borders by passing through Greece together with "asylum seekers".[184]

Secondly, the average percentage of people from 10 countries agreeing with the statement that "[r]efugees are a burden on our country because they take our jobs and social benefits" is 54% (see Figure 10).


Figure 10: EU Citizens' Opinion on the Economic Burden of Refugees
  Data from: Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs: Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/.

The highest proportion of people agreeing with the statement are again from Hungary, while this time the lowest are from Germany. Although the overall picture shows that there is an equality in country numbers for agreeing (above 50%) or disagreeing (below 50%) with the statement; the average percentage of people who are concerned about economic consequences of refugee flow is more than those shows us that the discontent about refugees economically who are not much worried about their economic impacts.

In order to test the hypothesis that *people living in countries with relatively worse economic conditions are more inclined to consider the refugees as a burden on their*

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[184] Ibid, pp.28-29.

country, the data of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for these ten countries in 2015 are taken and checked to evaluate if there is any correlation between people's negative opinions on the refugees' economic impact on their countries and the GDP per capita values in each country. It is found out that the two variables hold a strong negative association (-0.8), which supports the hypothesis (See Figure 11).


Figure 11: The Relation Between Negative View on Economic Impact of Refugees and GDP per capita

Data from: World Bank, Web site, http://www.worldbank.org/ (accessed April 27, 2017). Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs: Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/.

This means that in the countries with lower GDP per capita values (which is taken as an indicator of economic well-being of individuals in the ten countries), people are more likely to consider refugees as an economic burden on their countries. People who already feel economically insecure in countries, like Poland, do not want to share the benefits provided to them by the state with people who come from other countries and are not able to contribute to their economic systems.

Thirdly, people's opinion was asked regarding the following question: "Do you think most Muslims in our country today want to adopt our country's customs and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger society?" From the responses, it

is possible to see that 63% of people, in average, said that Muslims in their countries want to be distinct from the larger society (See Figure 12). The highest proportion of people is from Greece with 78%, while the lowest is from Poland with 45%. The majority of people in other countries also believe that Muslims want to be distinct from the larger society.


Figure 12: EU Citizens' View on Cultural Tendencies of Muslims in Their Country
    Data from: Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs: Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/.

When the reason for most of the people in these ten countries to believe that Muslims in their countries do not want to adopt their customs and prefer to be distinct from the native societies is investigated, it is necessary to understand some basic differences between the communities that are subject to the question. First of all, according to the cultural map which was drawn by Inglehart and Welzel as part of an analysis of the World Values Survey's data, (which grouped societies in different countries by their cultural values), it can seen that Islamic communities which are from Iraq, Morocco and Pakistan are associated with survival and traditional values, while societies categorised as Protestant Europe, which includes countries like Sweden, Germany and Norway, and societies group under the name of Catholic Europe, which includes countries like Belgium, France and Italy are associated with secular-rational and self-expression values.[185] In this survey,

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[185]   "Findings   and   Insights,"   **World   Values   Survey,**   accessed   April   28,   2017, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.

traditional and secular-rational values are used as the opposite of one another. In addition, the term "survival values" is used for those values which emphasises economic and physical security and: "[i]t is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance."[186] On the other hand, "self-expression values" phrase is used for those values which focus on "environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life."[187] Based on this conceptualisation, it is possible to say that the Islamic societies who embrace values like religiosity and obedience are inclined to stand against women rights, abortion and euthanasia.

On the other hand, when their identity is considered from the perspective of survival and self-expression values, it is possible to state that Islamic societies are associated with rejection of homosexuality for instance, which is the opposite of what societies identified with self-expression values would defend.

All these shows that the fundamental values embraced by the refugee communities who consider Islam as an element of their identity, are almost completely the opposite of those which are embraced by the host societies in Europe. For instance, Nasser-Eddin indicates that the Syrian refugees that she interviewed in the UK

> … felt that the host community was much more "open-minded", "liberal" and "different" from them. They talked about their concerns in terms of "losing" their children to the host community: they were afraid that they would lose control because they did not have the strict boundaries they used to have in Syria … In my conversations with Syrian families these issues were raised with reference to both male and female children. However, they also said that the effect on women would be more acute because of their gender and the fact that they represent the "honour" of the family within their communities.[188]

Nasser-Eddin goes on by providing very important observations about the contradictions with the words on a Syrian refugee girl that she interviewed:

> "People from the Syrian community talk about me behind my back because I go to the college and I want to carry on with my education. They tell my father, "How do

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[186] Ibid.

[187] Ibid.

[188] Nof Nasser-Eddin, "Gender Performativity in Diaspora: Syrian Refugee Women in the UK," Jane Freedman, Zeynep Kivilcim and Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu (Eds.), in **A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis** (142-154), (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017), pp.149-150.

you allow your daughter to come back home late? How do you let her go to places on her own?""[189]

The contradictory positions of these societies on critical issues like divorce and abortion are also a part of their approaches to gender-related issues. Regarding gender-related issues, Inglehart and Norris expresses comparison between the Western and Islamic societies by claiming that: "[c]ompared with Western nations, Islamic societies prove highly conservative on issues of sexuality and gender equality, including support for egalitarian roles for women in the home, workforce, and public sphere."[190]

Therefore, the results of the Pew Research Center's poll about the cultural orientation of Muslim migrants in their countries is not surprising. As the value systems of the Islamic and Western societies seem to be radically opposed to one another, it is understandable that most of the European people living in these ten countries think that people from these societies would not adopt their customs and would like to be distinct from the native-societies. This negative perception about refugee/migrant communities, which makes the European people believe that these migrants do not want to be like them, live like them or even with them, can also be strengthened by the daily interactions and observations. There are some sources[191] claiming that there are "no-go zones" in different EU countries, in which Muslim migrant communities live and are ruled by the sharia law.[192] It is claimed that even the police forces do not want to pass through these areas, because they are afraid that the community who reject the state authority, would physically harm them. Combined with the protests of Muslims demanding changes from the states in favour of

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[189] Ibid, p.150.

[190] Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations," 2009, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, https://dash.harvard.edu / (28 April 2017).

[191] Not all of the sources that make these claims are "right-wing". The "Independent" newspaper of the UK can be given as an example of a "centrist" or even considered as "leftist" source reporting about the "no-go zones". See Leo Cendrowicz, "Paris Attacks: Visiting Molenbeek, the Police No-Go Zone That Was Home to Two of the Gunmen," **Independent,** 15 November 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo rld/europe/paris-terror-attacks-visiting-molenbeek-the-police-no-go-zone-that-was-home-to-two-of-the-g unmen-a6735551.html (6 June 2017).

[192] For allegations about the "no-go zones" in EU countries (Belgium and France), see respectively: Cendrowicz. David Ignatius, "Wake Up to the Problem: Separate and Unequal in France," **The New York Times,** 27 April 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/27/opinion/wake-up-to-the-problem-separate-and-unequal-in-france.html (7 June 2017). Donald Morrison, "What Does It Mean to Be French? The 'Charlie Hebdo' Massacre Complicates the Answer," **New Republic,** 8 January 2015, https://newrepublic.com/article/120714/charlie-hebdo-attack-challenges-frances-treasured-national-identit y (7 June 2017).

their culture (e.g. in the UK) and asking for sharia law to replace the British legislation (including those women in *niqaab* holding banners on which sentences like "Sharia will dominate the world,"[193] or "Islam will dominate the world," are written), this perception not only threatens the societal security of European people, but also the state authority in EU countries is challenged by Muslim migrants.

Finally, in average, 73% of the people from 10 EU countries think that being able to speak their national languages is very important to be a national of that country (e.g. to be a French). Majority of people in all of these 10 countries think in the same way and the least proportion of people answering this way is 59%, from Italy, while the highest proportion is from the Netherlands, with 84%.

The role of language knowledge for becoming a part of the nation, in the ten European countries where the survey was conducted seems to be highly important. Although refugees are not there necessarily as future members of the nations in the host countries, it is important to keep in mind that if the conflict in where they come from extended, they can stay in the host countries longer than expected and may take citizenship. Although there are many European countries that people cannot be granted citizenship at least without a beginner level of the national language, the responses given to the question about the importance of language in being a true member of the nation by the EU citizens, prove that the public opinion also finds it quite important that one knows their language as a prerequisite to be "one of them"; to share their identity. In addition to the public opinion and citizenship regulations, knowledge of national language is also important for the integration of migrants both into the social life and labour market. As indicated by the European Commission:

> Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration … Knowledge of the language of the Member State concerned is seen as crucial not only for migrant workers but also for their family members and for their children to ensure they do not fall behind in their schools. Introduction programmes play an important role in helping newly arrived

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[193] David Maddox, "Publicly Demanding Sharia Law and Hate Messages Towards Army Could Become Illegal," **Express,** 16 January 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/634802/New-law-Muslims-Sharia-prosection (28 April 2017).

third-country nationals to gain skills and knowledge needed for full participation in society.[194]

Another important factor regarding the refugee crisis, which is considered as a societal threat by EU citizens is refugees' religious affiliation. Although it is not possible to find the exact data about religious affiliations of these people, among the top nine countries from which the people cross into Europe over Mediterranean (see Figure 6), six of them have Muslim majority societies (see Table 4).

Table 4
Top Migrant-Sending, Muslim Dominated Countries (To Europe Through Mediterranean)

Country	Percent Muslim
Syria	92,8%
Afghanistan	99,7%
Iraq	99,0%
Guinea	84,4%
Gambia	95,1%
Pakistan	96,4%

Data from: Pew Research Center, **The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Major Religious Groups as of 2010**, Washington, D.C., 2012, pp.45-40.

This reveals a two sided risk: (1) people coming from these countries may have difficulties to adapt to dominantly Christian communities' lifestyles (dress code, eating and drinking habits etc.), (2) native population may feel that their religious identity is under threat from daily increase in the number of people who are members of the historically rival religion.

In order to understand this problem, first of all, it must be noticed that religion has not been as effective or important in many European countries, as it is today in the migrant-producing countries listed in table 4. For instance, according to Gallup's survey, for the nationals of the first three countries on the table, people stating that religion is an

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[194] European Commission, A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, 2005, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0389&from=EN (7 June 2017), pp.7-17.

important part of their daily lives respectively are 89%, 97% and 84% of the population.[195] On the other hand, the average proportion of people thinking in the same way in EU countries[196] is 49.5% in average. Among these there are countries like Estonia, Sweden and Denmark, in which more than 80% of people do not find religion as an important part of their daily lives. The way of life in these countries are not based on religious rules, due to secularisation of societies. It would be a hard process for those coming from Muslim-majority countries with high importance of religion in daily life to adapt to such a secular way of life, if their stay in those secular societies extended.

Secondly, although people in Europe are not generally very religious, they may feel that their religion is under threat because of the increasing number of Muslim population in their countries. Christianity, although cannot impose its laws on people living in European countries, is considered as a part of European culture and civilization, and thus, as a part of their identity. Therefore, Christianity is considered as an important element for the survival of European identity.

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[195] Steve Crabtree, "Religiosity Highest in World's Poorest Nations," **Gallup,** last modified August 31, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx.
[196] 20 countries in which the survey is conducted are: Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France, Malta, Romania, Cyprus, Poland, Italy, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, Lithuania, Germany, Latvia, Hungary and Luxembourg.

4. EU REFUGEE POLICY: NATIONAL SECURITY OR SOCIETAL SECURITY

Until the summer of 2015, the refugee issue was seen as a regional problem centred around Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Following Greece's reaction against its marginalisation in the refugee crisis within the EU by allowing refugees to cross into the north through the Balkan route, thousands of people were amassed in Hungarian border. These people have transformed the issue into a problem for Germany and for whole Europe. Thus, the unfolding events since the summer of 2015 have made the refugee crisis the topic of tripartite negotiations between the EU, Germany and Turkey.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the EU refugee policy to decide whether it approaches the refugee crisis from a societal or national security approach. However, first of all, it is important to make clear that what is called as the "EU refugee policy", does not constitute a holistic and consistent "policy", but rather it is composed of the attempts for creating a common and effective policy to deal with the current and possible future refugee crises.

4.1 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE EU REFUGEE POLICY

The European countries, which were "migrant sender" countries until the WWII, has become the "migrant receiver" countries since the second half of the 20th century; and the EU started its attempts to form its own migration policies, such as the *Terrorisme radicalisme et violence* Group[197] initiative which was conducted among 12 member states of the European Community. Most of the tasks of the "Group" have started to be undertaken by the European Police Office (EUROPOL) after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993. The integration process brought forward the harmonisation of the national migration policies within the body of the EU and it led to the formation of an EU-wide migration policy. The following areas were indicated as the matters of common interests in the Article K.1 of the Title VI on "Provisions of Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs" of Maastricht Treaty: 1) asylum policy, 2) "rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of

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[197] Georgios Karyotis, "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11," **Innovation**, Vol.20, No.1 (February 2007), p.4.

controls" and 3) "immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries" regulating:

> … (a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States; (b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, including family reunion and access to employment; (c) combatting unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States …[198]

In the aftermath of WWII, European countries encouraged immigration from the third countries to resolve the manpower deficit caused by the WWII and to carry out the processes of reconstruction and economic development. In this period, it was thought that immigrants were coming temporarily and there would not be any difficulty to stop their arrival. Kocsis et al. states that:

> In consequence of post-WWII reconstruction, dynamic economic development, local labour shortages, and the decolonization process, Western Europe received many migrants, initially from the Mediterranean region and subsequently (i.e. after the collapse of communism in 1989/90) from the post-communist European countries. Meanwhile, the core areas of the EEA became the main destination for migrants coming from predominantly Muslim regions in Asia and Africa (SW Asia, Muslim Africa). This decades-old process has recently accelerated and now constitutes mass migration.[199]

In 1970s, increasing unemployment rates, economic decline, and changes in labour profile needed by the newly developed production technologies, had made large-scale approval of labour migrants unsustainable. Therefore, some measures started to be taken by the migrant-receiving countries. The "Single European Act", signed in 1986, which was considered as an important step towards free movement within the Community, accompanied the intensification of inter-governmental cooperation over immigration movements.[200] The idea of free movement of people bred new needs and outcomes, alongside with the need of abolishing or reducing the internal border controls.

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[198] European Communities, Treaty on European Union, 1992, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf (9 June 2017), pp.131-132.
[199] Károly Kocsis et al., "Geographical Characteristics of Contemporary International Migration in and into Europe," **Hungarian Geographical Bulletin**, Vol.65, No.4 (2016), p.369.
[200] About the efforts for a common migration and asylum policy, see Emine Akçadağ, "Yasa Dışı Göç ve Türkiye," **Bilge Adamlar Kurulu Raporu**, Istanbul and Ankara: Bilgesam, 2012, pp.14-16.

Initially, EU[201] countries have tried to solve the immigration-based problems within the nation-state framework or they have resorted to inter-state cooperation, as they have done for many other problems they have to face. In parallel with the transformation of former EEC into the EU and the deepening political integration, there have been a rise in cooperation attempts to resolve the common problems in question. Until 1990s, it was observed that cooperation among the member states was more intense on the issues such as cross-border crimes and terrorism, due to the impact of a visible increase in the number of asylum seekers and the Treaty of Amsterdam's (TOA) coming into force in 1999. Thus, EU member states reached a consensus on which country to assess the asylum applications and for the first time, immigration and asylum problems has been accepted, as a common matter of the EU. However, Lu indicates that:

> The Treaty of Amsterdam not only increased the competence of the Commission and the European Court of Justice in migration related issues, but also stipulated that the

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[201] The EU is a political and economic organization consists of twenty-eight member states which cover most of the continent. The EU was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992) which is also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which added new fields of duty and responsibility to the European Economic Community (EEC) European Union. **The EU in Brief.** 2016, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/about/index_en.htm (09 May 2016).)

TEU was signed in 1992 and it entered into force in 1993. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Communities gained new dimensions; the three pillars of EU were constituted, and a new juridical structure was formed. The Treaty aimed at preparing for European Monetary Union and introducing elements of a political union such as citizenship and common foreign and internal affairs policy (European Union. EU Treaties.) TEU strengthened European Parliament's (EP) hand in decision-making mechanism of the EU, by introducing the co-decision procedure.

The three pillars of the EU were designed as follows: (1) European Communities pillar (the only supranational pillar) which includes European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Community, (2) Common Foreign and Security pillar, and (3) Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The supranational bodies of the EU (European Commission (EC), EP, and the European Court of Justice) were more influential on the first pillar. The others were structured more like intergovernmental pillars, because of the nature of decision-making in the EU, which is conducted by the committees that consist of representatives from the member states.

The history of European integration is full of crises as well as achievements from its very beginning. The WWII also implicated a crisis by revealing the fact the old balance of power politics was not working anymore. The Treaties of Rome and establishment of the EEC in 1957 can be understood as European states' responses to this challenge. Therefore, although the term 'crisis' in simplest terms implies a situation of uncertainty, depending on the responses and measures taken by the states to solve the crisis, the outcome of it may be positive. In this sense, a crisis does not necessarily need to have a negative meaning. A crisis signifies the change in existing types of relations and entering into a new period. One of the founding fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet considers crises as opportunities to take radical decisions through integration (Szele Bálint, ""Crises are Opportunities" Jean Monnet and the First Steps Towards Europe," **European Integration Studies**, Vol.2, No.2 (2003), p. 14.) Monnet believed that the solutions for the crises are what make Europe what it is.

Council has to ensure the absence of any controls on persons, including nationals of third countries, within five years after the Treaty enters into force.[202]

Nevertheless, TOA is considered as one of the most important milestones for the integration of the EU's migration management to the *acquis*.[203] With the Treaty, the Schengen Agreement was turned into a part of the Community's law for abolishing the border controls among member countries, except for England and Ireland which reserved their rights for controlling their borders. TOA changed the treaties that established the EU and it is foreseen that alongside with the abolishment of last obstacles for free movement, measures to provide living in a safe environment would be taken.

Beside the Geneva Convention, the legal framework on which the EU relies upon to shape its refugee policy is based on the EU regulations such as the Dublin and European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) regulations. As Bayraklı and Keskin indicates, Dublin Regulation can be seen as the first fundamental text to be implemented within the borders of the EU regarding its refugee policies. This regulation was signed in 1990 by the 12 members of the European Community and entered into force in 1997. In this document, the criteria and mechanisms for determining the responsible member state to assess the asylum application of the citizens of a third country to an EU country have been established. Later, this document was replaced by Dublin II Regulation in 2003. The most important rule in the regulation is that the asylum applications can only be assessed by a single country. The objective here, seems to be preventing asylum seekers to lodge their applications to several EU countries simultaneously or in a row, or to lodge it to the desired EU country. However, a closer look can reveal that in Dublin Regulation, nearly all of the political and economic responsibility of asylum seekers are crashed down about the borderland countries in the EU – as it has become apparent today.[204]

As stated in the European Commission's website, "the EU has been working" on building a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) since 1999, to form a common policy

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[202] Chien-Yi Lu, "Harmonization of Migration Policies in the European Union: A State-Centric of Institutionalist Explanation?," **ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference**, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2-5 June 1999, p.1

[203] Georgia Papagianni, "EU Migration Policy," Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas (Eds.), in **European Immigration: A Sourcebook** (376-388), (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), p.380.

[204] Enes Bayraklı and Kazım Keskin, "Türkiye, Almanya ve AB Üçgeninde Mülteci Krizi," **SETA Analiz**, Vol.143 (November 2015), p.11.

regarding refugees.[205] Within the context of CEAS, it is aimed to harmonise the EU countries' legislations on refugees and apart from the cooperation among member states, it is also aimed to increase the solidarity and sense of responsibility among the non-EU member states.[206] Minimum standards that are expected to be implemented by the member states were determined for 1999-2005 period, which was called as the first step of CEAS. The system is "based on the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of January 1967 Relating to the Status of Refugees."[207]

Within the period of 1999-2005, European Refugee Fund was created and Temporary Protection and Family Reunification directives were adopted.[208] Negotiations for the second step of the EU regulations, which will allow further harmonisation of legislative regulations on refugees,[209] are still ongoing today.

Even if it is envisaged by the Dublin Regulation that, in principle asylum applications were to be assessed in the first country of arrival, a member state has the right for not to implement this rule and for assessing and concluding the applications—as it has been seen in the example of Germany.[210] Apart from the EU member countries Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland also implement the Dublin Regulation. EU member countries made a legal arrangement in 2013 by adopted Dublin III Regulation in place of the Dublin II, which made it more difficult for asylum seekers to lodge their applications to the EU countries.

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[205] "Common European Asylum System," European Commission, last modified April 25, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/.

[206] European Commission, Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection Across the EU, 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0360&from=EN (12 June 2017).

[207] **Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees**, New York, 31 January 1967, **United Nations Treaty Series,** vol. 606, No. 8791, available from http://www.refworld.org/, p. 267. Theresa Papademetriou, "Refugee Law and Policy: European Union," **Library of Congress,** last modified June 21, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/.

[208] "Common European Asylum System."

[209] For further information, see European Commission, Green Paper: On the Future Common European Asylum System, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0301&from=EN (12 June 2017).

[210] Steve Peers, "The Refugee Crisis: What Should the EU Do Next?," **EU Law Analysis,** last modified September 8, 2015, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.tr/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-eu-do-html.

There are two EU institutions that are active in coordination and making arrangements for refugees. These are the European Border and Coastguard Agency (FRONTEX, established in 2005, headquartered in Warsaw) and European Asylum Support Office (EASO, established in 2010, headquartered in Valletta).[211] The main duty of the EASO is to support the member countries in asylum matters and to contribute to constitute a common European asylum system, while the FRONTEX is responsible for the coordination of member countries for the protection of EU borders.

In the Dublin system, there is a supplementary databank, in addition to EASO and FRONTEX, called EURODAC[212] for the system to work effectively. EURODAC is a system which allows identity information transfer of asylum seekers who are above fourteen years of age, among the member states through computerising the fingerprints of them. Apart from the EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland also use the EURODAC, which has been active since 2003.

Although the EU has been trying to resolve the refugee crisis by formulating action plans, most of the attention paid to the EU's refugee policy was about the deal reached by the EU and Turkey. The EU has tried to convince Turkey for not allowing asylum seekers crossing into Europe from the Turkish territory. Finally, in 2016, the EU succeeded to reach an agreement with Turkey which aims at "exchanging" refugees. According to the deal, for every Syrian migrant sent back to Turkey, one Syrian in Turkey would be resettled in Europe.[213]

Apart from the agreement with Turkey and broadening the mandate of the FRONTEX, the communication adopted by the EC contains several other measures to respond the refugee crisis: the creation of "hot spot" areas, temporary relocation plan, "creation of a

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[211] For further information about the EU action on asylum, see European Commission, EU Action in the Fields of Migration and Asylum, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-862_en.htm (12 June 2017).

[212] For further information on EURODAC, see "Identification of Applicants (EURODAC)," **European Commission,** last modified June 12, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants_en.

[213] "Migrant Crisis: EU-Turkey Deal Comes into Effect," **BBC,** last modified March 20, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413.

permanent relocation mechanism for all EU member states"[214], "adoption of a common European list of safe countries of origin"[215] and formulation of a return policy.

4.2 NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

One of the main reasons for the EU's inability to give a common response to the refugee crisis stems from the different national understandings of the crisis. While some of the European countries consider the refugee crisis as a security concern for their nationals, others approach to the issue from a more humanitarian perspective and adopt a more welcoming attitude towards refugees.

In the last section, the differences among societal understandings of the refugee crisis have been discussed. In this section the focus will be more on the concerns of the societies and the reasons for public discontent towards refugees and policies of some EU countries which welcome refugees.

As the number of refugees, along with illegal immigrants increase in the EU countries, European people show their discontent with the EU policies, particularly with Merkel's approach towards refugees. There are different reasons which trigger this discontent of people. For instance, many people believe that rising numbers of immigrants are interrelated with increasing sexual violence in Europe.[216] Higgins report that there are programs for coaching asylum seekers in "sexual norms and social codes" in several European countries (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Germany).[217] Regarding the goal of such programs, he interviewed with a clinical psychologist, Per Isdal, who stated

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[214] Papademetriou.

[215] Ibid.

[216] For such allegations, see "'Cologne Is Every Day': Europe's Rape Epidemic," **News.com.au,** last modified March 12, 2016, http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/cologne-is-every-day-europes-rape-epidemic/news-story/e2e618e17ad4400b5ed65045e65e141d. Richard Orange, "Swedish Music Festivals Hit by Reports of Rapes by 'Migrants'," **The Telegraph,** 4 July 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/04/swedish-music-festivals-hit-by-reports-of-rapes-by-migrants/ (12 June 2017). Samuel Osborne, "Mass Sexual Assault Reported at Germany Music Festival," **Independent,** 31 May 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-sexual-assault-music-festival-cologne-darmstadt-a7057416.html (12 June 2017).

[217] Andrew Higgins, "Norway Offers Migrants a Lesson in How to Treat Women," **The New York Times,** 19 December 2015, https://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/world/europe/norway-offers-migrants-a-lesson-in-how-to-treat-women.html (12 June 2017).

that: "[m]any refugees "come from cultures that are not gender equal and where women are the property of men … We have to help them adapt to their new culture."[218]

After the sexual assaults in Germany, Finland and Austria on the celebration of New Year's Eve (on the night of December 31, 2015), especially, after the incident in Cologne, in which it was claimed by the city police chief Wolfgang Albers that the Arab or North African background[219] immigrants assaulted women during the new year celebrations, many people protested against EU's refugee policy and Chancellor Merkel's stance towards the crisis. The absence of reliable data on such developments and the correlation between immigrants and sexual crimes have strengthened European people's negative perceptions towards Muslim immigrants. After the reactions given to Merkel's policies by the people in the streets shouting "Take your Muslims with you and get lost!", she admitted that they are not able to provide security for European people facing the refugee crisis, by saying that: "Now all of a sudden we are facing the challenge that refugees are coming to Europe and we are vulnerable, as we see, because we do not yet have the order, the control, that we would like to have."[220] Inability of several EU member states to protect their citizens has led to questions about their ability as security providers.

The economic impact of the refugees is also widely discussed among the European societies. There seems to be two contradicting approaches to the issue. The first one is shaped around the idea that the European economies may benefit from refugees, due to the demographic problems (meaning the ageing of population) that are faced in these countries, while the second approach claims that refugees are a burden on European nations, because their expenses are covered by the taxes paid by European people. In addition to that, it is claimed that refugees will increase the unemployment rates: "On average, it takes refugees up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate as the native-born." According to a study on refugees in European labour market, it is also revealed

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[218] Ibid.
[219] "Germany Shocked by Cologne New Year Gang Assaults on Women," **BBC,** last modified January 5, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35231046 (12 June 2017).
[220] Keiligh Baker, "Now Even Merkel Admits European Refugee Crisis Is 'Out of Control': Thousands Take to the Streets of Germany Shouting 'Take Your Muslims with You' After Mob Sex Attacks," **Daily Mail Online,** 12 January 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3394896/Merkel-admits-Europe-lost-control-refugee-crisis.html (17 April 2017)

that refugees have the lowest rates of employment among all types of immigrants in the first 5 years after their arrivals.[221]

Moreover, based on the latest information released by the authorities in Austria and Germany, educational level of the latest arrivals is very low. The statistics gathered by the Austrian Public Employment Service reveals the fact that only 15% of refugees completed an apprenticeship or higher education. When the data for Syrians is analysed, it can be seen that the people with higher education degrees is only 26% of the total.[222] Federal Labour Office of Germany also gives important information about the employment of refugees which found out that "[t]he level of education and training among the nearly 300,000 refugees who are registered as jobseekers in Germany" is "lower-than-expected."[223] The Office also illuminates the fact that among the new arrivals to the country, only 4% is highly-qualified.

Another problem about refugees is their duration of stay. UNHCR estimates the average duration of stay as 26 years[224] and the data for EU countries look similar: 2014 EU Labour Force Survey provides the fact that more than 40% of the refugees stay in the host countries more than 20 years.[225] This long duration shows that refugees need more than temporary protection or a shelter, that they need to be integrated into the society they live with. However, due to severe differences between their identities, it seems that it is not going to be easy for the EU and its member states to integrate Syrian refugees into the European societies, due to their severe differences between their identities. These societies differ from one another in many aspects, including their languages, religion and culture.

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[221] European Commission and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, How Are Refugees Faring on the Labour Market in Europe?: A First Evaluation Based on the 2014 EU Labour Force Survey Ad Hoc Module, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/social/home.jsp (18 April 2017), p.6.

[222] Michael Bernstein, "First Data on Education Level of Refugees Released," **Metropole,** 13 January 2016, https://www.metropole.at/ams-study-refugees-education/ (18 April 2017).

[223] Chris Cottrell, "Many Refugees in Germany Lack Training or Education: Report", **Deutsche Welle,** 20 July 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/many-refugees-in-germany-lack-training-or-education-report/a-194140 51 (18 April 2017).

[224] UNHCR, "Forced Displacement in 2015," p.20.

[225] European Commission and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, pp.10-11.

The impact of inability of EU countries to integrate refugees can be catastrophic as the long time period that refugees stay in the host countries can breed long-lasting problems and clashes among the societies. These refugees, without the knowledge of the language of the host countries[226], low education level (See Figure 13) and a different way of life (due to high level of religiosity) are likely to build their own communities with the people that have similar backgrounds and thus, they will eventually be isolated from the native societies.


Figure 13: Educational Attainment of Refugees in EU Countries
Data from: EC and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, How Are Refugees Faring on the Labour Market in Europe?: A First Evaluation Based on the 2014 EU Labour Force Survey Ad Hoc Module, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/social/home.jsp (18 April 2017), pp.14.

In addition, they will start demanding more rights from the state, as the time period they spend in the host country gets longer. For instance, they will ask for having their own mosques, for being able to work with clothes that symbolizes a religion, for getting more social benefits etc. These demands can be considered unacceptable by the host state and society. For example, an increase in the number of mosques may be perceived as threatening change by the European societies as the Islamic gathering places in Europe

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[226] "In total, less than half (45%) of refugees in the EU reported to have at least an advanced knowledge of the host-country language.", see Ibid, p.15.

started to be viewed as places used by radicalisers and recruiters for terrorist organizations.[227]

As the duration of stay extends, refugees generally acquire citizenship of the host country. After ten years of stay, around 60 percent of the refugees becomes the citizens of the countries they reside in[228], which may strengthen their claims for more rights.

After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, it is observed that the EU member countries started to evaluate the refugee crisis increasingly from a security-oriented perspective. Girit states that the possibility of one of the attackers to be one of those people who were welcomed with "Refugees, welcome!" exclamations and with flowers was enough to deter not only France but all of the members of the EU, after mentioning the claim that one of the attackers had Syrian passport.[229] In addition to that, as a result of the increasing refugee numbers and terrorist attacks of ISIL, it is witnessed that the "Islamophobic" and anti-migration discourse of the extreme right started to gain wider support among the European societies. Two possibly dangerous consequences of the rise of "Islamophobia" and extreme right are: (1) radicalisation of a higher number of European Muslims due to marginalisation of Muslims as a result of the rising Islamophobia and (2) replication of extreme right wing's discourses and policies by the mainstream parties who wish to curtail the rise of extreme right wing movements and parties.

Despite the national differences of EU member countries in terms of their approaches and responses towards the refugee crisis, when the numbers of asylum applicants from extra-EU countries in the fourth quarter of 2016 are examined on the basis of those whose applications are rejected and those who were given a "refugee" status (as specified in the 1951 Convention), it can be seen that only in 4 countries the number of decisions for giving "refugee" status to applicants are more than the decisions of rejection (see Table 5): Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria and Romania. In Malta, the number of decisions to

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[227] European Parliament, Religious Fundamentalism and Radicalisation, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-briefing-551342-Religious-fundamentalism-and-radicalisation-FINAL.pdf (19 April 2017), pp.4-5.

[228] European Commission and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, p.29.

[229] Selin Girit, "Paris Saldırıları: Fatura Mültecilere Mi Kesilecek?," **BBC Türkçe,** 17 November 2015, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/11/151117_parismulteci_selin (12 June 2017).

reject or grant refugee status are equal. This shows that, despite the discourse used by some European governments like Germany and Sweden, which is welcoming refugees for applying to refugee status, the numbers of those who were granted refugee status point that they do not make the situation easier for applicants than those governments (like Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary) which are blamed to take "xenophobic" stances against the refugees.

Another important point here is that, although the Northern countries of the EU are known with their positive and welcoming approach towards the refugees, the integrationist policies they have been following seem not to work well so far, when the terrorist incidents that have taken place in recent years are considered. Most of those incidents are known to be perpetrated by non-European origin people and these people did not target the people in those countries like Hungary, who are known with their anti-immigration policies, rather they have targeted those in countries like Germany[230], who are praised for their pro-refugee attitudes. Although the anti-immigrant discourse of Mr. Orbán is generally blamed for having xenophobic overtones, his concerns seem to be in line with the societal security concerns of the Hungarian people, as the polls regarding the popular support for his government's immigration policies have shown.[231] There are two main points that are emphasised in his rhetoric related to migration: first, the threat of terrorism and second, preservation of the European identity.[232] In addition, he also blames the EU

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[230] In 2015, Iraqi Rafik Yousef stabbed German police, see "'Islamist' Shot Dead in Berlin After Knife Attack on Policewoman," **Deutsche Welle,** last modified September 17, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/islamist-shot-dead-in-berlin-after-knife-attack-on-policewoman/a-18721009.
In2016, German-Moroccon Safia S. stabbed German police, see "Hanover Teen Stabbed Police Officer 'On Orders from Isis'," **The Local,** last modified May 31, 2016, https://www.thelocal.de/20160531/teen-who-stabbed-police-officer-linked-to-isis. ISIL member, unaccompanied Afghan refugee Riaz Khan Ahmadzai attacked German people with axe, see "German Train Attack: Afghan Knifeman 'Wanted Revenge' for Friend's Death," **BBC,** last modified July 19, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36837109. ISIL member, Syrian failed asylum seeker, Mohammad Daleel exploded himself, injured 12 people, see "ISIS Claims Suicide Bomber Who Attacked Music Festival in Germany, Injuring 12," **Time,** last modified July 25, 2016, http://time.com/4421119/bomb-bar-germany-ansbach/. ISIL member, Tunisian failed asylum seeker, Anis Amri, killed 12 people and injured 56 people with a truck, see "Police Memo on Berlin Truck Attacker Published in German Media," **Deutsche Welle,** last modified January 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/police-memo-on-berlin-truck-attacker-published-in-german-media/a-37141902.
[231] "Over Half of Opposition Supporters Satisfied With the Government's Immigration Policies," **Nézőpont Intézet.**
[232] Jim Brunsden, "Orban: EU's 'Christian Identity' Under Threat from Muslim Migrants," **Financial Times,** 30 March 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/7ecde2c2-af12-329a-9133-29a7bee08e31 (12 June 2017).

member states for worsening the situation in Libya and Syria, by supporting regime change in these countries.

Table 5
Numbers of Decisions on Asylum Applications in EU Countries in the Last Quarter of 2016

Country	Geneva Convention Status	Rejected
EU	89,705	136,800
Belgium	2,540	2,810
Bulgaria	275	870
Czechia	10	185
Denmark	650	1,375
Germany	59,300	70,770
Estonia	10	20
Ireland	125	440
Greece	1,145	2,660
Spain	130	1,260
France	5,045	15,730
Croatia	35	60
Italy	1,345	12,265
Cyprus	65	190
Latvia	10	20
Lithuania	115	25
Luxembourg	250	150
Hungary	25	2,135
Malta	30	30
Netherlands	640	2,265
Austria	7,215	3,930
Poland	40	570
Portugal	35	65
Romania	280	130
Slovenia	50	20
Slovakia	0	15
Finland	1,510	4,675
Sweden	6,560	9,050
UK	2,260	5,100

Data from: Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration", 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).

Besides, Orbán's stance against mass migration with cultural, societal security-related arguments are shared by some other leaders and countries. Slovak PM Robert Fico, for instance, asserted that Islam has no place in Slovakia, with his concern about the migrants to change the face of the country.[233] Also, the "German policy on refugee crisis" is not supported by the whole society, or all the members of German government. For instance, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who is a member of the same party with the Chancellor Angela Merkel, stated that "Germany made mistakes with an open-door policy that saw more than a million migrants enter Germany over the past two years."[234] More interestingly, Merkel herself implied that her policy was a mistake several times, after realising that her popularity was decreasing as the polls conducted for September 2017 elections have shown. Since then she seems to be trying to get her popularity back by taking "more aggressive steps to send back migrants who are refused asylum"[235] to cover up her "mistaken" refugee policy initiatives or by mentioning some restrictions which will be liked by the people in Germany who are against more rights to be given to Islamic communities. With restrictions like banning burqa, she wishes to get votes from the people who are concerned that the massive influx of people from a totally different cultural background would risk put their national/societal identities at risk. Scholz reports that the interior ministers from Merkel's Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) party, brought up the very popular domestic security topic to the agenda and issues like ban on burqa, dual citizenship, more police forces and the instant deportation of foreign criminals have been debated in the way that they could take the media's attention. He adds that the right-wing Alternative for Germany party was shocked about such developments, as the domestic security was one of the most important topics that AFD has been working on for months.[236] A similar picture was apparent in the Netherlands, before the Dutch elections in March 2017, while the PM Mark Rutte, from the Liberal Party, had been trying to win against Geert Wilders from the Party for

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[233] Vince Chadwick, "Robert Fico: 'Islam Has No Place in Slovakia'," **Politico,** 27 May 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/robert-fico-islam-no-place-news-slovakia-muslim-refugee/ (8 May 2017).

[234] Andrea Shalal, "Germany's Schaeuble Admits 'Mistakes' in Refugee Policy," **Reuters,** 29 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-idUSKBN15D0CO (2 May 2017).

[235] Ibid.

[236] Kay-Alexander Scholz, "Merkel'i Düşündüren Seçim Anketi," **Deutsche Welle,** 2 September 2016, http://www.dw.com/tr/merkeli-d%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCnd%C3%BCren-se%C3%A7im-anketi/a-19522512 (13 June 2017).

Freedom, which is known with its anti-Islamic discourse. Rutte "warned immigrants to "be normal or be gone" — adding that people who seek freedom in the Netherlands but "reject our values" should leave."[237]

Apart from the political differences between the national governments, there are also legal differences among the EU countries in terms of their refugee policies covering the refugee status and resettlement programmes. For instance, Beirens et al. argue that Finland, Romania, Sweden implement temporary protection statuses to Iraqis, while Germany does the same to Syrians.[238] Furthermore, van Selm puts forward that regarding the resettlement of refugees, as of 2005 there were in fact only six countries within the EU having such programs: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK.[239] Apart from those, there are also differences between the member states in terms of the benefits provided for asylum seekers and refugees in EU countries, which makes countries like Sweden, Germany and the UK that offer better conditions for asylum seekers[240] attractive destinations.

4.3 EVALUATION OF EU REFUGEE POLICY FROM NATIONAL AND SOCIETAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

Despite the existing legal framework and practical precautions, EU countries have not been able to adopt a common refugee policy yet. Recent developments seem to underline the inability of the EU to produce common solutions.

The non-existence of a common EU refugee policy can be easily understood from the lack of standards towards refugees. Differing proportions of approvals for asylum applications from country to country and the variation in minimum health and shelter

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[237] Todd Beamon, "Dutch Prime Minister to Migrants: 'Be Normal or Be Gone'," **Newsmax,** 3 March 2017, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/duth-prime-minister-mark-rutte-migrants/2017/03/03/id/ 776816/ (8 May 2017).

[238] Hanne Beirens et al., "Study on the Temporary Protection Directive," **Final Report**, (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p.4.

[239] Joanne van Selm, "European Refugee Policy: Is There Such a Thing?," **New Issues in Refugee Research: Working Paper No. 115**, (Geneva: UNHCR, 2005), p.8.

[240] To make a comparison between the EU countries in terms of the benefits they provide for asylum seekers, see Mark Trevelyan, "Factbox: Benefits Offered to Asylum Seekers in European Countries," **Reuters,** 16 September 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-benefits-factbox-idUSK CN0RG1MJ20150916 (13 June 2017).

services provided to refugees can be given as examples of this non-existence of a common standard across the EU countries.

The root of the problem is not technical incompetence, but it is the lack of political will. Some powerful European countries like Germany, France and the UK are reluctant to reform the Dublin system for a long time, from which they have been benefitting. However, as it is obvious that it is not working properly, Bayraklı and Keskin argues that countries like Germany, who has been resisting for the system to change for a long time, had to come up with new proposals like the quota system to overcome this crisis.[241]

However, the proposed quota system was not considered acceptable by some Eastern European countries like Hungary and Poland[242], whose authorities repeatedly emphasised their concerns over the societal security issues related to mass migration of Muslims into their own countries. Even a referendum was held in Hungary (although with low turnout – less than 50%), regarding the mandatory EU quotas for migrant relocation and it turned out that 98 percent of the people who had voted, was against the admission of migrants.[243]

Eastern European countries' concerns are also shared by some wealthy European countries. For instance, Denmark (one of the wealthiest countries in the EU) passed a law in 2016, to change the direction of asylum seekers to other attraction centres which imply the seizure of assets and valuables of the applicants. BBC reported that the "[p]olice will be able to seize valuables worth more than 10,000 kroner (1,340 euros; £1,000) from refugees to cover housing and food costs."[244] It is possible to see concerns over preserving the Danish identity against the mass migration of Muslim people into Denmark as the source of such a legislation. For instance, in a Danish town called Randers, the town council took a decision for pork to be served in all public buildings, as a reaction to the "Muslim-friendly" menus: "Randers City Council in central Denmark said it wanted to

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[241] Bayraklı and Keskin, p.12.

[242] In the press release of the Commission, it is stated that: "Although most Member States are now active and pledging and relocating regularly, **Hungary**, **Poland** and **Austria** remain the only Member States that have not relocated a single person", see European Commission, Relocation and Resettlement: Commission Calls on All Member States to Deliver and Meet Obligations, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1302_en.htm (14 June 2017), p.1.

[243] "02.10.2016 National Referendum," National Election Office, accessed June 14, 2017, http://www.valas ztas.hu/en/ref2016/481/481_0_index.html.

[244] **BBC,** "Denmark Approves Controversial Migrant Assets Bill," January 26, 2016.

ensure public institutions, including nurseries, provide "Danish food culture as a central part of the offering - including serving pork on an equal footing with other foods."[245] The debate actually started in 2013, when the former PM Thorning-Schmidt "criticised childcare centres that dropped pork from their menus."[246] It is also reported that, according to a survey conducted by a tabloid newspaper, *Ekstra Bladet*, that there were also institutions who switched to *halal* meat.[247] The local decision was also supported by the Danish People's Party whose spokesman expressed that the party was "working nationally and locally for Danish culture, including Danish food culture, and consequently we also fight against Islamic rules and misguided considerations dictating what Danish children eat."[248]

Although Merkel government has been calling for solidarity among the EU members to share the burden of the refugee crisis, the other governments have not been willing to answer these calls. The EU countries that have not been involved in the internal affairs of Syria (like Germany has done, by supporting the rebels explicitly), or have not profited from the civil war in the country (like Germany has done, through its arms sales)[249], are not willing to share the responsibility of those who have done these.

Generally, it can be argued that the EU countries' policies on immigrants, towards integration or exclusion, are shaped by various factors, such as the immigrants' duration of stay in the country in question, their economic and social levels of development and their cultural similarities or differences with the native population. Mainly three models draw attention regarding the integration or exclusion of non-EU citizens.

The first one of those is the "assimilationist model"[250] which projects the implementation of policies to fasten the excepted development with the idea that immigrants would

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[245] Alexandra Sims, "Danish Town Says Public Institutions Must Serve Pork as Country's 'Meatball War' Continues," **Independent,** 20 February 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/danish-town-says-public-institutions-must-serve-pork-as-countrys-meatball-war-continues-a6822521.html (8 May 2017).

[246] Ibid.

[247] Ibid.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Ben Knight, "Weapons Go to Conflict Zones, The Money Comes to Germany," **Deutsche Welle,** 21 October 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/weapons-go-to-conflict-zones-the-money-comes-to-germany/a-18798104 (8 May 2017).

[250] Castles and Miller, pp.245-248.

accommodate themselves to the society they live with, in terms of language, culture, and social character. It is based on conferring citizenship to all migrants who have residence permit and thus implementing policies towards assimilation. The second one is the "multicultural model"[251] in which migrants are granted equal economic, social, and political rights with the native population, without expecting them to lose their linguistic, cultural, and social differences. Finally, in the "differential exclusionary model"[252], governments and native population do not accept immigrants as members of their nations and they are given limited economic, social, cultural, and political rights.

Aforementioned models have a role both in the EU countries' determination of policies towards immigrants and in the arrangements on granting citizenship to non-EU immigrants. However, EU's increasing attempts towards determining common policies, changing policies of the countries with the changing governments, and the impact of globalisation comlexified the situation ad thus all countries started to get away from the systems (explained above) which can be limited clearly. With its policy of constantly pushing asylum and immigration issue out of its geography and passing the buck to neighbouring countries, EU seem to be prioritising its interests over the institution's core values. Costello argues that:

> In the complex multi-level system of the EU, the buck is passed and refugees suffer. The sheer disregard for basic human needs continues to shock. Daily calls for basic shelter, medical care and food supplies through volunteer networks are testament to many institutional and political failures, but also to much local effort and dynamism.[253]

In March 2016, after six months of negotiations, the member states reached an agreement which includes a solution that goes beyond the borders of the EU. The balance between the contending interests of the European states was found only by including Turkey into the solution of the crisis. According to the agreement, Turkey would take back all migrants who crosses into the EU through the Aegean Sea without the right for asylum.[254]

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[251] Castles and Miller, pp.248-250.
[252] Castles and Miller, pp.244-245.
[253] Cathryn Costello, "It Need Not Be Like This," **Forced Migration Review**, Vol.2016, No.51 (January 2016), p.13.
[254] European Commission, "The EU and the Refugee Crisis."

In return for readmission of each illegal immigrant into Turkey, EU countries would accept another registered Syrian asylum seeker who resides in the refugee camps in Turkey. The plan aimed to block human smugglers and to regularise the migration into Europe. Turkey, in return, demanded visa-free travel for its citizens to the EU countries, financial assistance for refugees and opening of new headings in the negotiations relating to Turkey's accession into EU, in return of the refugee deal.

EU was criticized for making the deal which puts humans in the centre of an "exchange". Furthermore, the success of Europe's refugee policy has become highly dependent on the its relations with Turkey. The problem is that the EU cannot rely on Turkey because its internal tensions, as well as due to the fact it is a neighbour to countries that experience several crises. The crisis also forced the EU countries to moving out of political statements, aid conferences or the supporting the UNHCR, and to directly involve in providing the needs of millions of refugees in the Middle East. With the Turkish-EU deal, provision of stability in Europe has become dependent on the protection of stability in Turkey. Although the deal weakened the refugee flow, it does not solve the internal problems within the EU. The institution still needs a common and effective border security framework to which all member states will contribute.

Apart from that, the deal seems to be unreliable and fragile for the EU as Turkey and the EU has had a problematic relationship for long years and Turkish authorities have been accusing the EU for not keeping its promises within the context of the deal and they are willing to play the "refugee card" against the EU. The difficult relationship between Turkey and the EU leaves a gap for a possible inflow of refugees over the Aegean route in the future. Pierini and Ülgen explains the current situation in this difficult relationship between the two actors by expressing that:

> The bare political reality is that Turkey's EU accession is more problematic today than at any point since negotiations started in October 2005. On the one hand, a number of blockages introduced by the Council of Ministers in December 2006, and by Cyprus and France later on, are still in place, preventing real discussions on key aspects of the accession negotiations. On the other hand, Turkey has not made sufficient progress toward opening some of the difficult technical chapters that are not subject to a blocking decision, for example, competition policy, public procurement, employment, and social affairs. For the Turkish government, in domestic political terms, the reforms necessary to open these chapters have a higher

price than the benefit they would bring to the overall accession process. In addition, on the governance side of the talks, it is beyond doubt that Turkey now meets fewer of the most important standards for a candidate country than in the past.[255]

The deal, some experts claim, has affected something else: the decision of the UK's population to leave the EU through the referendum held in 2016. Although the decision was not just about the deal itself and it was an issue that was discussed for a long time within the UK, the fear of mass migration both from conflict zones like Syria and from Turkey (if the visa-free travel right was given to the Turkish citizens) had been utilised by the "Brexit" campaign. Erlanger reports that the British former secretary of state for justice, Michael Gove said that: "[w]ith the terrorism threat we face only growing, it is hard to see how it could possibly be in our security interests to open visa-free travel to 77 million Turkish citizens and to create a border-free zone from Iraq, Iran and Syria to the English Channel."[256]

The problems associated with the Turkish-EU refugee deal has been the reason why the EU does not only rely on the deal with the Turkey, but also tries to take measures to protect its external borders. For instance, FRONTEX's mandate was broadened in 2016[257], upon the recommendation of the Council of the EU in the same year.[258] The European Council reached a conclusion on the issue and indicated that:

> We need to get back to a situation where all Members of the Schengen area apply fully the Schengen Borders Code and refuse entry at external borders to third-country nationals who do not satisfy the entry conditions or who have not made an asylum application despite having had the opportunity to do so, while taking into account the specificities of maritime borders, including by implementing the EU-Turkey agenda.[259]

Different legal arrangements and practices in the EU member countries, as well as populist policies dominating domestic politics, continue to hinder the creation of a

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[255] Marc Pierini and Sinan Ülgen, **A Moment of Opportunity in the EU-Turkey Relationship**, 1st Edition (Washington, D.C. and Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2014), p.9.

[256] Steven Erlanger, "Britain's 'Brexit' Debate Inflamed by Worries That Turkey Will Join E.U.," **The New York Times,** 13 June 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/world/europe/britain-brexit-turkey-eu.html?_r=0 (14 June 2017).

[257] "European Border and Coast Guard Agency Launches Today," European Border and Coast Guard Agency, last modified November 6, 2016, http://frontex.europa.eu/.

[258] Outcome of the Council Meeting, in European Council Press Release 5936/16 of 12 February 2016, **Schengen Evaluation of Greece.**

[259] European Council Conclusions of 18-19 February 2016, **Migration.**

common refugee and asylum policy in Europe. It is not possible to talk about a holistic and progressive refugee and asylum policy in Europe when implementation of asylum procedures in each EU country is considered. These procesures vary accordingly with the political, cultural and economic approaches of the member countries. The rights of both the people with refugee status and those whose asylum applications are in the process of assessment differ from one country to another. As mentioned by the European Commission:

> Recognition rates still vary between Member States and the type of protection status granted also differs from one country to another (Geneva Convention refugee status versus subsidiary protection status). In addition, there is a considerable disparity in the duration of the residence permits, as well as in the access to specific rights, especially social assistance.[260]

One of the most important problems that the EU needs to solve seems to be related to the sharing the burden of refugees. Due to the current refugee regime, which is generally based on the Dublin regulation, asylum applications are needed to be done in the first safe country that the migrants arrive, although there are more attractive northern European countries for the asylum seekers. Relocation attempts within the EU has not been successful, since it is not a legal requirement for member states, rather it is based on their consent to accept refugees into their countries.[261] The significant point to be focused on here is that, as it is pointed out in the last section, Northern/Western European societies look at issues related to refugees more positively, while Southern/Eastern societies are pretty much concerned about the refugee issue due to different reasons, such as the perceived threat for their societal security or economic conditions in their countries. The EU must take these differences into account and promote the relocation of these refugees in accordance with the threat perceptions of people in different member states. As long as relevant measures are not taken, it is possible to see that the conditions will get worse for refugees in those less developed EU countries, both because of the public discontent with acceptance of more and more refugees into their country, and because of the

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[260] European Commission, Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2436_en.htm (14 June 2017), p.5.
[261] About the developments on the resettlement and relocation commitments of the EU countries, see European Commission, Questions and Answers: Commission Calls for Renewed Efforts in Implementing Solidarity Measures Under the European Agenda on Migration, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-349_en.htm (14 June 2017), pp.1-3.

inevitable response given to the demands of people for political reasons. Considering that refugees' average duration of stay in 26 years[262], people's negative perception of refugees may end up with serious integration problems for these people and make them hostile against the native-people and the state under whose authority they live.

The EU has been facing a dilemma between upholding human rights, which is considered as one of those values which makes Europe what it is today, and the security of its citizens. For instance, the EU was harshly criticised for its deal with Turkey by human rights advocates like Human Rights Watch[263] for making it difficult for asylum seekers to enter into Europe. However, leaving aside the deal's effectivity, by making the Aegean route useless for illegal migrants to enter into Greece, the EU achieved a drop of migrant boat tragedies taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean sea route, (according to IOM's data) from 376 people in January 2016, to 37 in May 2017.[264] Despite the controversy created by the deal in terms of ethics, obviously, it seems to be working (at least) for preventing the deaths in sea for the aforementioned route. However, as long as similar measures are not taken for the central and western Mediterranean routes, the death numbers are unlikely to decrease, since migrants now prefer those routes more than the eastern one in order not to be sent back to Turkey. It is also another issue that due to the geographical distance, it is less likely that Syrian refugees take these routes.

When the regional origins of the migrants died in the Mediterranean in 2017 are studied, it can be seen that (following unknown and mixed categories), the largest proportion of people trying to enter into Europe was from Sub-Saharan Africa[265], which increases the possibility that these people were economic migrants. If it is compared with the nationalities of those arriving into Greece and Italy in 2016, this difference becomes more visible (See Table 6). According to the data provided by the UNHCR, the top nationality of arrivals into Greece was Syrian in the first quarter of 2017, while they are not even

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[262] UNHCR, "Forced Displacement in 2015", p.20.

[263] "Leading Rights Groups Slam EU-Turkey Refugee Deal," **Ekathimerini,** last modified June 20, 2016, http://www.ekathimerini.com/209753/article/ekathimerini/news/leading-rights-groups-slam-eu-turkey-ref ugee-deal.

[264] "Mediterranean," **Missing Migrants Project,** accessed May 4, 2017, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/.

[265] Ibid.

among the top ten nationalities of arrivals into Italy. Instead, the data shows that the largest group of arrivals into Italy were Bangladeshis.

Table 6
Nationalities of Sea Arrivals into Greece and Italy in the First Quarter of 2017

Greece		Italy	
Origin	Proportion	Origin	Proportion
Syria	44%	Bangladesh	15%
Iraq	11%	Nigeria	14%
Afghanistan	4%	Guinea	10%
Iran	2%	Gambia	10%
Pakistan	1%	Côte d'Ivoire	8%
Others	38%	Morocco	7%

Data from: UNHCR, "Mediterranean Situation", 2017, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations (5 May 2017).

This data can be interpreted as a sign that the migration crisis that the EU has been facing in recent years cannot be oversimplified as the "Syrian refugee crisis". When we look at the overall picture is considered, it is possible to see that most of the countries from which people are trying to escape, have structural economic or political problems (e.g. ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, human rights violations and security concerns in Pakistan, Morocco and Iran). This implies that short-term solutions will not be effective enough to solve the crisis for the EU: As long as the deeply-rooted problems in those countries are not resolved, their nationals will continue to flee from their countries to where they think they can live under better conditions. However, the first priority of the EU, as a rational actor which exists to protect the interests of its member states and their societies, must be to protect its external borders, without violating the 1951 Refugee Convention.

In the Title I, Article 2 of the TEU, the values on which the EU was founded are listed as "[r]espect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights" and also in the Article 3 under the same title, it is clearly expressed that the EU,

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.[266]

Pursuing an open door policy for any kind of migrants from problematic countries, would do nothing but making the situation worse in those countries. Instead, those countries must be supported for reaching better levels at human development[267], which consists issues relating to education, economics and health. In line with its objectives indicated in the TEU, the EU should also promote the values like human rights, freedom and democracy in those countries without getting directly involved in their internal affairs.

When the refugee crisis in the EU is examined, the impact of the challenges it posed to the EU as an institution, individual member states and the societies living under these structures cannot be ignored. However, it would be more accurate to consider that the refugee crisis has become a trigger that revealed the already existing fault lines within the EU. One of the most important of these is the EU's inability to take actions which concerns all of its members in a holistic manner. It can be seen that there are differences among the approaches of governments of the individual member states, as well as different perceptions of societies living in the EU countries. It is also possible to see that the EU, although it is inadequate, have been attempting to take some measures for the national security concerns of its member states (such as the protection of its external borders). There is a lack of similar measures taken on the EU-level for relieving the societal security concerns of the European citizens. Although it is not possible to draw a general picture about the societal security concerns of "European people", it is possible to see that a huge variety of people from different countries concern about the societal impacts of the mass migration and particularly the refugee crisis on other societies. The

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[266] European Union, **Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht,** 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European Union C 326/13; 26 October 2012, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT [accessed 14 June 2017], p.5.
[267] "Human Development Index (HDI)," United Nations Development Programme, accessed May 5, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/en.

rise of far-right and Euroscepticism[268] in EU countries which are quite different from one another in terms of their economic conditions and political culture can be given as the best indicator for that. Sheehy pictured the situation in EU countries, a couple of months ago:

> Austria almost saw the Austrian Freedom Party gain the presidency, the National Front is making great political strides in France, and the Party for Freedom is ahead in the Netherland's presidential polls. Additionally, the Golden Dawn has been a strong force in Greece, while in Germany, the Alternative for Deutschland party is expected to gain seats in its state's parliaments.[269]

The polls on the public opinion of EU citizens show the widespread discontent with the EU refugee policy more clearly. According to the Pew Research Center's survey in 10 EU countries, it is possible to see that in average 75% of the EU citizens disapprove "the way the EU is dealing with the refugee issue"[270] (See Figure 14). Among these, the people that show the highest proportion of discontent with the EU policies on refugees are Greeks, while the lowest proportion of discontent are shown by Dutch people. Nonetheless, even the lowest proportion is not less than 63%. It is possible that the negative views of an important part of the EU citizens towards refugees stems from their suspicions about the reasons for the entry of illegal migrants into the European territory.

Calculations based on the Eurostat's data reveal that only 42% of the people who have been residing on the EU territories illegally were returned to their own or to a third country in 2015. This proportion increases to 50 percent in 2016. Despite 8% improvement in the enforcement on extraditing illegal migrants, the picture shows that,

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[268] Pew Research Center's survey results show the decline of EU favourability among the European public clearly. Results of EU favourability in several EU countries are as follows:
1)Poland: from 83% in 2006 to 72% in 2016,
2)Italy: from 78% in 2006 to 58% in 2016,
3)Germany: from 58% in 2004 to 50% in 2016,
4)Spain: from 80% in 2006 to 47% in 2016,
5)The UK: from 54% in 2004 to 44% in 2016,
6)France: from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2016,
7)Greece: from 37% in 2012 to 27% in 2016.
See Stokes.
[269] Audrey Sheehy, "The Rise of the Far Right," **Harward Political Review,** last modified February 11, 2017, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/rise-of-far-right/.
[270] Bruce Stokes, "Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit: Significant Opposition in Key European Countries to an Ever Closer EU," **Pew Research Center,** http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/#eurefugees.

only in 2016, around 246 thousand illegal migrants did not leave the EU territory.[271] If EU creates a more effective system for the extradition of people whose asylum applications are rejected or who stay in European countries illegally to their countries of origin, people's negative opinions towards refugees could also be replaced by those that are more emphatic.


Figure 14: Level of Disagreement among the EU Citizens with the EU's Handling of the Refugee Crisis by Country

Data from: Bruce Stokes, "Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit: Significant Opposition in Key European Countries to an Ever Closer EU," Pew Research Center, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/#eurefugees.

Another main point of criticism is the conditions of illegal migrants in the "hotspots". These are located in Greece and Italy, and were designed as the reception centres for illegal migrants, to identify them and take their fingerprints. However, human rights advocates consider these as "detention centres" because of the prolonged stay of migrants in such centres. In the 2017 World Report of the Human Rights Watch, it is argued that:

> Most asylum seekers entering Greece came through the Aegean islands, and were processed in EU-mandated asylum centers known as hotspots. More than 16,000 asylum seekers and migrants staying in the islands' hotspots face appalling detention and reception conditions, including severe overcrowding, significant shortages of basic shelter and unsanitary, unhygienic conditions.[272]

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[271] Eurostat, "Asylum and Managed Migration," 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-manag ed-migration/data/database (7 April 2017).
[272] Human Rights Watch, **World Report**, New York, 2017.

Women, children and people with disabilities are particularly affected. Due to the high number of migrants, the difficulties of identifying them (considering that some even do not have identity documents), and lack of physical capabilities (e.g. efficient number of personnel) these processes take time. While some of these conditions can be enhanced in Greece and Italy with the further support of the EU (financial and operational), some of them are not that easy to be solved, like identifying those without identity documents or getting information from their home countries.

The cooperation with UNHCR is also of vital importance in dealing with the crisis. Wnukowski suggests that this could be done "[b]y such means as deploying permanent EU representatives to refugee camps to monitor the situation on the ground." He argues that the travels of refugees into Europe must be prevented before the verification processes are completed in the UNHCR's camps. He asserts that: "[w]hen refugees become aware of opportunities to get to the EU via the camps in the Middle East they should be less eager to take on the dangerous trip to Europe or to pay smugglers."[273]

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[273] Damian Wnukowski, "Australia's Asylum and Migration Policy: Lessons to Apply to the European Refugee Crisis," **The Polish Institute of International Affairs**, Vol.1, No.142 (January 2016), p.8.

CONCLUSION

This study aimed at evaluating the EU refugee policy by looking into its elements from national security and societal security perspectives. The objective was to find out whether the EU refugee policy was more national security oriented, societal security oriented, both or neither. For this purpose, these concepts were briefly defined and a summary of how they have been interpreted and implemented is provided. Also, the problems of framing national security solely as the security of the state by using a traditional state-centric approach (rooted in the realist theory of international relations) are pointed out and a brief summary of the societal security approach (based on the constructivist theory of international relations and developed by the Copenhagen School upon the need of addressing the newly emerging inter-state problems in the Balkans after the fall of Yugoslavia with the collapse of the Soviet Union as a result of the Cold War) is given. It is explained that, although the concept was introduced as one of the five sectors of security by Buzan, it has become the most popular of all and has been associated with the issue of migration when it was used for Europe.

Secondly, the background of the refugee crisis is portrayed, by looking at the situation both in the larger Middle East region and Europe. In order to show the scope of the crisis, statistical data is used and to present the perceptions of EU citizens about Syrian refugees, the results of some important surveys are utilised.

Finally, in the last section, the formation of the refugee policy in the EU was chronologically summarised and the problems faced by the EU members during this process are outlined. Also, differences between national governments in terms of their understandings and their consequent responses towards the refugee crisis are examined. In the end, refugee policy of the EU was analysed from national security and societal security perspectives to see which one of these approaches were adopted in formulation of the EU policy on refugees. The conclusion reached is that the EU refugee policy does not include societal security elements and concerns adequately. However, it includes, to a certain extent, elements and concerns of national security, such as the protection of external borders.

Although the European leaders had held several official meetings to determine the magnitude of the refugee problem and to designate the collective measures to be implemented against it; differences at the national level responses given to the crisis continued to exist as a consequence of the varying ways that the national governments had approached the issue. Countries like Germany, Austria and Sweden approached the issue from a humanitarian perspective and they chose to keep their doors open to high numbers of refugees, and thus ignored the general practices of the EU. On the other hand, the borders of many other EU countries have been surrounded with razor wire fences to prevent refugees from arriving into their countries. Thus, it can be seen that there is a clash between EU member states which prioritise the humanitarian or security approaches.

When the issue is examined at the EU level, it is possible to see that, although it has not been effective enough, the EU, as an organisation (apart from its humanitarian concerns), approached the issue from a national security perspective. This can be understood by looking at its attempts for the protection of external borders and the agreement it reached with Turkey to deter migrants taking the Eastern Mediterranean route to enter into EU. However, when the individual member states and the societies in the EU countries are considered, it is possible to see that there are also other concerns for which national security perspective would not be adequate to provide responses. From the opinion polls, local or national level implementations and rhetoric used by the authorities, it is possible to see their concerns which cannot be explained with a concept other than societal security. A considerable proportion of European people seemed to perceive the refugee crisis as a threat for their identities. It is possible that the incompatible identities of the Syrian refugees and the European societies have caused such a fear in the minds of European people.

Another reason for that spreading fear is the substantial increase in the number and magnitude of terrorist attacks in European countries in recent years, which had been generally perpetrated by people from migrant backgrounds. Apart from its national security aspect, societies may feel like their physical existence is under the threat of the "others" in their own countries, and so acceptance of huge amounts of Syrian refugees

along with other migrants from different countries that also have clashing identities with European people may be perceived as a threat for the survival of the European identities.

It is also possible to observe that fears of European people which are attributed to Syrian refugees may be related to their already existing fears about the migrant communities in Europe. Some of these communities are not only perceived as a threat by the European societies, but they also pose a challenge for the authority of states, by their demands to live according to their own values regardless of constitutional framework of the receiving society and state. The allegations of "no-go zones" in several European countries like France and the UK, which are claimed to be ruled by the Sharia law, do not only frighten the native societies in these countries but they are also considered as a serious threat for the state. The protests organized by radicals within the Muslim communities in countries like UK, for the dominance of Islam and Sharia law in Europe raise these concerns to a higher level.

The socio-political discourse with anti-immigrant overtones, used by some right-wing political actors may also be counted as a factor that heightens the threat perception of people. By securitising the migration and refugee issues, members of the far-right parties seem to be seeking political benefits from the fears of their voters. The right-wing discourse on refugees, asylum seekers and migrants have been strengthened by the fact that terror-related individuals have infiltrated into Europe among the masses of migrants arriving into the continent. It is not surprising that ill-intentioned groups and individuals may have also been benefitting from the chaos created by the refugee influx, to conduct their actions in Europe.

When the differences at the EU level, national level and societal level are evaluated it is possible to reach several conclusions. First of all, although the future of the EU has been more widely discussed since the Syrian refugee crisis erupted in the summer of 2015, it is not the first time that its survival has been questioned. In the past, EU has succeeded in turning many crises it had faced into opportunities; with the refugee crisis and the UK's decision to leave the EU, it can be seen that without solving the already existing problems within the EU (such as the democratic deficit), it would not be as easy for the EU to deepen its integration process. It seems that careless and unilateral decisions made on

issues that may affect all EU members are endangering the willingness of EU countries for delegating more power to a supranational body by relinquishing their national sovereignty. German Chancellor Merkel's co-called "open-door" policy towards refugees is proved to be one of these decisions which has strengthened the hand of Eurosceptic actors.

Furthermore, if national differences are examined from an economic perspective, it can be seen that although the economic impact of refugees is perceived more negatively by the people living in low-income countries, the economic factors cannot be used alone to explain the overall discontent of the people with the refugee crisis in Europe. As it was seen in the example of Denmark concretely and as it can also be observed with the rise of far-right parties in several EU countries with high per capita income levels (like the Netherlands), people's negativite attitude towards the refugees and mass migration, has to be explained with factors beyond economic conditions.

Within the context of societal security, threat perceptions which stem from the cultural differences between the native societies and the refugee population are needed to be emphasised in explaining the fears of EU citizens. On the other hand, within the context of national security, people's association of terrorism with the refugee crisis is worth mentioning because among the Syrian refugee population in Europe, it is highly-likely that there are both situational and persecuted refugees among the Syrian refugee population in Europe. The main difference between these two categories of refugees is that the persecuted refugees are more likely to be politically organized and get militarised than situational refugees. This difference stems from the varying causes that force 2 different categories of refugees to flee from their own countries: While the situational refugees are only the incidental victims of conflicts, persecuted refugees are people who are targeted because of their identities, so they are integral part of the conflict in their native countries. As this type of refugees expects for a political change in their own countries as a condition to return back, it can be inferred that they will carry the political disagreements and conflicts of their native countries into the receiving countries.

On the other hand, despite the national differences in terms of understanding of the refugee crisis and Syrian refugees, there seems to be a consensus among the EU citizens

in different countries in their evaluation of the EU's approach to dealing with the refugee crisis. The reasons for such a discontent may vary; but the overall picture showed that in average, three-fourth of the EU citizens do not approve the way the EU deals with the refugee crisis. This can be considered as another proof of democratic deficit in the EU, which does not show itself on the ground of national governments, but on the ground of the relation between the societies and the EU. Although the EU is supposed to seek its citizens' interests through its members, it seems that it does not represent these interests properly.

Regarding the first possible reason for that, it is known that at the institutional level the citizens of the EU are represented more directly by the European Parliament. However, in spite of the increase in legislative and budgetary powers of the European Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council is still the most important and effective decision making body. For the second reason, it can be said that in general national governments within the EU could not act in accordance with each other in terms of their responses towards the crisis. It seems that the governments of EU countries generally ignore the concerns of the people and they follow a policy claimed to be based on their own consciousness and discretion.

As the main purpose of this study is to explore the question of whether the EU refugee policy has been national security or societal security oriented, a three-level analysis is used to understand the issue. In this respect, institutional (the EU), state (EU members), and societal levels were employed as the layers of analysis to fully apprehend how the refugee issue is evaluated by actors at each level. The conclusion that is reached signified that; the refugee policy of the EU is not based on a societal security perspective; despite the widespread societal security related threat perceptions of the EU citizens and/or the emphasis put by some political actors from many member states on societal security related issues that are caused or may be caused because of the Syrian refugee issue. It seems that since the very beginning of the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, the EU has dealt with the issue through an approach that has been based on a national security conceptualisation which emphasises the protection of external borders.

This focus on national security means that the EU has not been able to represent the interests of (at least) a considerable number of its members and the EU citizens, because of the inability of its policies to touch upon the societal issues in dealing with the crisis. Inability of the EU to deal with the refugee crisis led to questions about the possible outcomes of such a refugee policy pursued by the EU. First of all, it can be claimed that such a policy would further increase the Eurosceptic sentiments both on the societal and member state levels. EU citizens already seem to be disappointed with the policies adopted by the EU to deal with the crisis, for different reasons, and at the member state level, countries which are in favour of the EU, have witnessed the rising popularity of the far-right parties after the crisis, which raises their concerns for the future of the EU. Although in 2017, the critical elections both in the Netherlands and France did not end up with victories for Eurosceptic, far-right parties; the leap of public support for such parties has given a negative signal for the pro-EU, pro-globalisation parties in the EU; next time, they may not be that lucky, as long as they do not take the security of societies in EU countries into consideration.

On the other hand, the decline of trust on the EU policies on refugees, has already started to threaten the gains of integration, as it has become evident with the prolonged border controls among member states that raise questions about the future of free movement of people among the EU countries. It can be argued that the European elites should stop ignoring the societal concerns of their citizens by accusing far-right parties of securitising the refugee crisis; and should realise that the increasing support for extreme groups stems from their inability to represent the EU citizens and respond to the refugee crisis in an effective way. If the mainstream parties would have paid attention to the demands and fears of their own citizens, most probably such a sharp rise in the support for these extreme movements would not be observed.

Based on the findings of this thesis, it can be argued that for a better understanding of societal security concerns of people in EU countries, face to face interviews with people from different EU countries can be much more useful than trying to guess what may be exactly triggering people's fear about Syrian refugees based on survey questions or on the media sources. Simply because the survey questions are also based on predictions of

the people who prepare the questionnaire and the news that can be found on the media about refugee related societal fears are mostly from sources that present far-right's perspective.

It is also necessary to conduct further studies on the refugee issue in the following years, since it is not easy to find reliable statistical data about many issues related to the Syrian refugees and about the effectiveness of the EU policies to deal with it in the long term. The lack of transparency of the public institutions is another problematic issue. For instance, in spite of the claims from the far-right movements on the correlation between migrants and crime, it is almost impossible to find reliable reports and data about the role of refugees in crime. EUROPOL seems to be the only reliable source to be used in this issue and it provides an overall picture about the relation between refugees and terrorist activities.

Considering the widespread discontent among the EU citizens about the EU policies to deal with the refugee crisis, the first step for EU policy makers can be the acknowledgement of the inadequacy of a policy that only focuses on the national security aspects of the crisis, to meet the societal security related needs and expectations of the European societies can be a first step of self-criticism for the EU policy makers. The second step should be formulating a new policy framework that is based on the concerns and needs of the European societies to gain their support. This would also contribute to the future integration of EU countries, which would come to a dead-end without the support of the people. It would also be useful for national parties seeking power in national governments, so that they could come up with effective policies that convince people about these parties' intentions to serve the native societies' interests.

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