

T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**FRONT NATIONAL AND SECURITIZATION OF
MIGRATION IN FRANCE**

Master Thesis

GÜLSEVEN BEKTAŞ

İstanbul, 2019

T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**FRONT NATIONAL AND SECURITIZATION OF
MIGRATION IN FRANCE**

Master Thesis

GÜLSEVEN BEKTAŞ

Supervisor: ASSOC. PROF. ERHAN DOĞAN

İstanbul, 2019



T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

TEZ ONAY BELGESİ

SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Anabilim Dalı
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) Bilim Dalı TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS öğrencisi
GÜLSEVEN BEKTAŞ'ın FRONT NATIONAL AND SECURITIZATION OF
MIGRATION IN FRANCE adlı tez çalışması, Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 08.05.2019 tarih
ve 2019-13/11 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oy birliği / oy çokluğu ile Yüksek Lisans
Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Tez Savunma Tarihi ...20.../05.../2019...

Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı

İmzası

Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı	İmzası
1. Tez Danışmanı Doç. Dr. ERHAN DOĞAN	
2. Jüri Üyesi Dr. Öğr. Üyesi İBRAHİM MAZLUM	
3. Jüri Üyesi Prof. Dr. AYHAN KAYA	

GENEL BİLGİLER

İsim ve Soyadı : Gülseven Bektaş
Anabilim Dalı : Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı : Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Danışmanı : Doç. Dr. Erhan Doğan
Tez Türü ve Tarihi : Yüksek Lisans - Mayıs 2019
Anahtar Kelimeler : Göç, Güvenikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Radikal Sağ Parti, Fransa, Ulusal Cephe Partisi

ÖZET

FRANSA'DA ULUSAL CEPHE PARTİSİ VE GÖÇÜN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ

Bu çalışmanın amacı Fransa'da göç olgusunun nasıl güvenlik konusuna dönüştürüldüğü ve bu göç-güvenlik ilişkisinin inşasında Ulusal Cephe Partisi'nin rolünü Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenikleştirme teorisi çerçevesinde incelemektir. Çalışmada Fransa'da göç olgusu etrafında meydana gelen tartışmalar tarihsel olarak ele alınacaktır. Kopenhag Okulu'na göre güvenikleştirme belirli bir konunun aktörler tarafından bir güvenlik meselesi olarak inşa edilmesi sürecine işaret eder. Kopenhag Okulu güvenliği bir söylem (speech act) olarak kavramsallaştırır. Fransa, Avrupa'da en çok göçmen ve Müslüman göçmen nüfusuna sahip ülkelerden biri. İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra Fransa'da göç, ekonomik kalkınma için zorunlu ve gerekli bir olgu olarak görülmüş ve bu nedenle olumlu karşılanmıştır. Fakat 1970'lerin ortalarından itibaren göç olgusu Fransız siyasi tartışmalarının önemli bir konusu haline gelmiştir ve toplumsal bir projeden ziyade ekseriyetle kimlik ve güvenlik ekseninde tartışılmaktadır. Batı'da olduğu gibi Fransa'da da göçün güvenikleştirilmesi Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde meydana gelen 11 Eylül 2001 terörist saldırılarından sonra derinleşmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Ulusal Cephe Partisi göç karşıtı söylemleri ile Fransa'da göçün bir güvenlik sorunu olarak inşa edilmesinde rolü olan başat aktörlerden biridir. Bu çalışma, Fransa'da göçün güvenikleştirilmesinin yeni bir olgu olmadığı, göç – güvenlik ilişkisinin çeşitli söylemler

ve ÷lkede uygulanan göç yasaları ile saęlamlaştığını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu çalışma Fransa'da göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin 11 Eylül saldırılarından öncesine dayandığı, 11 Eylül saldırıları ve 2000'li yıllarda Avrupa topraklarında meydana gelen saldırılardan sonra derinleştiğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, Ulusal Cephe Partisi'nin göçün Fransız ulusal kimliğine, kültürüne, ulusal ve iç güvenliğine bir tehdit oluşturduğuna dair söylemler inşa ettiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Marine Le Pen'nin göçmen karşıtı ve AB karşıtı söylemlerinin eleştirel analizi, göçü sınır kontrolü, terörizm ve suç ile ilişkilendiren ulusal ve iç güvenlik temalarının Marine Le Pen'nin göçmen karşıtı söylemlerinde yaygın olarak kullanıldığını göstermiştir.



GENERAL INFORMATION

Name and Surname : Gülseven Bektaş
Field : Political Science and International Relations
Programme : International Relations
Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Erhan Doğan
Degree Awarded and Date : Master - May 2019
Keywords : Migration, Securitization, the Copenhagen

School, Radical Right Party, Front National, France

ABSTRACT

FRONT NATIONAL AND SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN FRANCE

This study aims at exploring the securitization of migration in France and Front National's role in this construction process through analyzing the long- run evolution of immigration debate in France. To achieve the goal of this thesis, securitization theory of Copenhagen School is applied as a theoretical framework to this study. According to Copenhagen School securitization refers to a process through which a particular issue is politically and socially constructed as a security threat. France as an old immigration country has one of the biggest immigrant populations and Muslim population in Europe. Immigration was treated as a positive phenomenon and regarded as necessary and compulsory for its economic reconstruction and growth after WWII in France. However, migration issue has been a prominent topic in French political debates since mid-1970s and has mostly been debated as a security and identity issue rather than a societal project. Indeed, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the securitization of migration has been deepened in the West, as well as in France. Within this regard, French Front National is one of the crucial political actors in constructing migration as a security threat in France. This study reveals that securitization of migration was not a new phenomenon in France and migration is strongly securitized through various speech acts and immigration laws that have been applied in the country. In other words, this study investigated that migration was securitized in France long before the

September 11 attacks and deepened aftermath of September 11 attacks, and subsequent terrorist attacks occurred in European soils in 2000s.

The findings of this study demonstrated that migration was securitized through discourses of Front National. It is the French national identity, French culture, its national and internal security as well as its welfare system that is claimed to be existentially threatened by immigration. Analysis of the anti-immigration and anti-EU discourses of Marine Le Pen showed that national security and internal security themes, which links migration with border control, terrorism and crime, are prevalent in her anti-immigration discourses.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erhan Dođan for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements, insight and understanding throughout this research. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Assist. Prof. Dr. İbrahim Mazlum and Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, for their encouragement and insightful comments.

I would also like to extend my thanks to my friend Eren for his support throughout this process.

Last but not least, I wish to thank my beloved family members for their endless support and encouragement in every aspect of my live. I owe particular gratitude to my brother Kazım Bektař for providing me with continuous encouragement through the process of writing this thesis. My special thanks are extended to my sister Meral Bektař, who puts up with my whims throughout the writing of this thesis.

İstanbul, May 2019

Gölseven Bektař

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page Number
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
ABBREVIATIONS	viii
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis and Research Questions	1
1.2 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis	7
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	12
2.1 Introduction	12
2.2 Concept of Security: Reconceptualizing Security after the Cold War	13
2.3 Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School.....	16
2.4 Securitization of Migration.....	26
2.4.1 Discursive Construction of Migration as a Security Threat.....	31
2.4.2 The Role of Routines and Technologies	43
2.5 Conclusion.....	44
3 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN FRANCE	46
3.1 Introduction	46
3.2 Policies and Discourses on Migration in France in the Post-war Period: A Historical Overview	50
3.2.1 Immigration Policies Between 1945- 1974.....	51
3.2.2 French Politics of Immigration Between 1974- 2000.....	54
3.2.3 Politics of Immigration in France Between 2001 – 2017	62
3.3 French Response to European Refugee ‘Crisis’	79
3.4 Conclusion.....	84

4	FRONT NATIONAL AND ITS ANTI-MIGRANT DISCOURSES ..	87
4.1	Introduction	87
4.2	European Radical Right Parties	90
4.3	The Front National	96
4.4	Front National's Anti-Migrant Discourses	106
4.4.1	National Security and Internal Security Themes in the FN's Anti-Migrant Rhetoric.....	108
4.4.2	Societal Security Themes in the FN's Anti- Migrant Rhetoric...	113
4.4.3	Economic Security Themes in the FN's Anti-Migrant Discourse	119
4.5	Conclusion.....	122
5	CONCLUSION	127
6	BIBLIOGRAPHY	136

LIST OF TABLES

Page Number

Table 1: Main nationality groups as percentage of France’s foreign population...	58
Table 2: Immigrants by country of birth in 2014	65
Table 3: First Residence Permits: Top five third-country nationalities (2014-2016)	67
Table 4: Geography of origion of Immigrants that Arrive to France in 2016	68
Table 5: Characteristic of right-wing populist parties	96
Table 6: FN results in presidential elections since 1971	98



LIST OF FIGURES

	Page Number
Figure 1: Securitization as a Political Process	22
Figure 2: Main nationality groups as percentage of France’s foreign population .	58
Figure 3: Immigrants by country of birth in 2014	66
Figure 4: First resident permits, by reason (2014-2016)	67
Figure 5: Number of asylum applications and as a share of the total number of applications in the EU (2014-2017)	81
Figure 6: Asylum applications: top five third-country nationalities as a share of EU total per given nationality (2017)	81
Figure 7: FN results in presidential elections since 1971	98
Figure 8: National Front’s share of votes in French elections (1980-2015)	99

ABBREVIATIONS

- AfD** Alternative for Germany
- COPRI** Conflict and Peace Research Institute
- EC** European Commission
- EP** European Parliament
- EU** European Union
- FN** Front National
- FRA** European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
- EUMC** European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
- FRONTEX** European Border and Coastguard Agency
- IDP** Internally Displaced Person
- IOM** International Organization for Migration
- ISIS** Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
- M5S** Five Star Movement
- OIN** National Immigration Office
- PM** Prime Minister
- PVV** Party for Freedom
- TEU** Treaty on European Union
- TOA** Treaty of Amsterdam
- UN** United Nations
- UN DESA** United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- US** United States
- WWI** World War I
- WWII** Second World War
- RRPs** Radical Right Parties

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the Thesis and Research Questions

Migration is a complex phenomenon which has socio-political and economic impacts on both sending and receiving countries. It has been a hottest political debate since the oil crisis of 1970s, especially in Western Europe. Indeed, owing to the transformation that the concept of security undergone after the demise of Cold War, it has increasingly been associated with security issues by many governments, politicians and media across Europe. In other words, migration has considerably been designated as a security threat to host societies and represented as a negative phenomenon in Europe since mid-1980s. Given that, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, in the context of US ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, the securitization of migration has been deepened in the West through both exceptionalist security discourses of political agents and non-discursive practices. To understand this, there is a need to highlight the process of securitization. In this regard, securitization theory, first developed by Copenhagen School, refers to a process through which an issue becomes politically and socially constructed as a security threat.¹ According to Copenhagen School, securitization is a construction of a security threat through *speech acts*.² Thus, in the securitization framework of Copenhagen School securitizing actors plays a crucial role in this construction process.

Concerning *securitizing actors* in relation to migration, as Mehmet G. Özerim states “*radical right parties of today are the leading securitizing actors of migration in Europe.*”³ Indeed, due to their anti-immigration party programs and discourses, radical right parties are also named as anti-immigration parties. In this context, radical right parties and media in various European states have increasingly represented immigrants

¹ Rita Floyd, “Can Securitization Theory be used in Normative Analysis? Towards a just Securitization Theory”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42 (4-5), 2011, p. 427.

² Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 47.

³ Mehmet Gökay Özerim, “European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, *International Journal of Social, Education, Economics, and Management Engineering*, Vol. 7, No .8, 2013, p. 924.

as a threat to national security, cultural homogeneity/national identity, internal security, and welfare system of their relevant societies since the mid-1980s. Indeed, after the subsequent terrorist attacks occurred in European soils since the early-2000s (such as 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London attacks, 2015 Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks, 2016 Nice attacks etc.) the linkage between migration and terrorism has been enhanced in Europe by RRP, which contributed the existing unase and fear towards immigrants. They have been formulating anti-immigrant, racist and anti-diversity discourses, which has created politics of fear and shaped the perception of the public towards immigrants. Most importantly, they are mostly realized due to their anti-Islam and anti-EU rhetoric in comtemporary European politics. Indeed, hostility to immigration, anti-Islamic rhetoric and Eurosceptism are the common themes of European RRP. In that vein, they are against multiculturalism, which is actually the reality of their relevant societies. In this regard, through their anti-Islam discourses the stigmatization and securitization of Islam in their relevant political communities has been deepened, which ultimately results in the exclusion of already settled Muslims from their host societies.

By this account, the growing electoral success of RRP particularly since early-2000s in various European countries attracts the attention of a substantial number of scholar. This is because; given their anti-EU, anti-establishment and anti-immigrant stance, the rise of RRP is considered to pose a problem for European values such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law as well as for the European Union project.⁴ To clarify, their populist, anti-Islam and xenophobic discourses and anti-establishment stance endanger the peaceful co-existence of ethno-cultural and religious diversites in their relevant societies. Hence, in line with this rhetoric, populist radical right party leaders claim that “the peaceful coexistence between ethno-culturally and religiously different groups in a given society is impossible.”⁵ Again, by taking into account the UK’s decision to leave the EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum, these populist and anti-EU discourses signalize the challenges the EU will encounter. Hence, other European RRP

⁴ John W. P. Veugelers, “A Challenge for Political Sociology: The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Contemporary Western Europe”, **Current Sociology**, October 1999, Vol. 47(4), p. 78.

⁵ Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 2: The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity”, **CoHERE**, 01.02.2017, p. 5.

eagerly calls for leaving the EU, which they present as anti-democratic and totalitarian who violates sovereignty of their relevant states. Due to the challenges that RRP pose, this study finds it important to critically analyze how radical right parties frame their discourses regarding immigration at national level and their role in securitizing migration in their relevant political communities. In brief, examining the securitization of migration and the role of radical right in this construction process is the general purpose of this thesis.

To put it differently, this study puts emphasis on the importance of the analysis of the discourses of RRP regarding immigration in a critical perspective through exploring the evolution of politics of immigration in their relevant countries. This is because discourses are important in order to understand power relations and knowledge production in a given society. According to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), “knowledge, social roles, identities and interpersonal relations are constituted through discourse.”⁶ Discourses are “*socially constituted and socially constitutive.*”⁷ In other words, discourses shape the frames and are shaped by them. This point is stated by Ruth Wodak as follows; “*Discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, as being constituted by them.*”⁸ Most importantly, “through analyzing the historical and social context that discursive practices are embedded in and related to, discourse analysis provide an understanding how meanings are constructed and how a social reality is constructed, sustained and practiced by people.”⁹ In this context, through their discourses RRP constitute knowledge about immigration in their relevant societies; thus could legitimize the policy changes they offer. In other words, by (re)producing the information and frames regarding immigration through discourses, they have a role in discursive construction of immigrants as a security threat. Indeed, today, European RRP are more visible in the European politics, have reached massive audiences, thus have a great chance

⁶ Mona Moufahim, Michael Humphreys, Darryn Mitussis & James Fitchett, “Interpreting discourse: a critical discourse analysis of the marketing of an extreme right party”, **Journal of Marketing Management**, 2007, Vol. 23, No. 5-6, p. 542.

⁷ Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach”, in **The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction**, Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie and Todd Sandel (Eds), John Wiley & Sons: Chichester, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118611463/wbielsi116>, p. 5.

⁸ Ruth Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach” in R. Wodak and M. Meyer, **Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis**, London: Sage, 2001, p. 66. (cited in Mona Moufahim et al., Op. Cit., p. 542.)

⁹ Ibid, p. 541.

to get credibility through their discourses. By taking into account their growing electoral success across Europe, it can be said that their anti-immigration discourses have been normalized in their relevant countries. Moreover, the normalization of discourses that frames migration as a security threat is considered a crucial problem for human rights and democratic politics in Europe.

Within this context, different countries has treated immigration phenomena differently owing to the differences in their migration histories. To put it in a different way, European countries have experienced different migration flows in their history; therefore, the migration policies and the perceptions towards migrants may differ in each country consistent with their exclusion and inclusion rhetoric. In the similar vein, they have also different historical background of radical right movements in their political history depending on their contact with migration phenomenon. Thus, it seems necessary to investigate the securitization of immigration by RRP's at national level through exploring the long-run evolution of immigration debate in their relevant countries in order to demonstrate the existing situation in Europe in each country to cope with the prevailing populist and racist discourse across Europe. In other words, the linkage between democratic politics, migration and radical right's discourse should be underlined at national level in order to construct a ground for a humanitarian rhetoric regarding immigration.

By this account, France as an old immigration country and one of the founder fathers of the EU is one of the countries in Europe in which the linkage between security and migration has been maintained by both speech acts of political agents and non-discursive practices such as stricter immigration laws, policy tools, technologized, militarization of border controls, detention and deportation practices. Apart from others, we find France as an interesting case to examine the radical right parties in relation with securitization of migration. First, as noted earlier, it is an old immigration country having one of the biggest immigrant populations and Muslim population in Europe. Indeed, migration issue has been a prominent topic in French political debates since mid-1970s and has mostly been debated as a security issue, rather than a societal one. However, immigration was once treated as a positive phenomenon and regarded as necessary and

compulsory for its economic reconstruction and growth after WWII. Besides, securitization of migration has been an old phenomenon in France, dating back to mid-1970s. As Rodney Benson explores there is an increasing rise in framing migration as a security issue rather than an economic one in France.¹⁰ Moreover, Philippe Bourbeau examines the securitization of migration in France and Canada in his book *Study of Movement and Order* and explores that in France migration is strongly securitized through various speech acts and immigration laws that have been applied in the country.¹¹ Thus, the long-run evolution of immigration debate in France attracts our interest taking into account of its multicultural society and its migration history.

Second, it also has a long history of anti-immigrant radical right-wing parties. The Front National (FN) is the most prominent one among them, which was founded in 1972, under Jean-Marie Le Pen. Moreover, it is considered as the “*pater familias of the contemporary radical right in Europe.*”¹² Indeed, its political rhetoric, party program, and slogans have influenced other European RRP that were found after it.¹³ Besides, the FN succeeded to take the widespread attention of various scholars and media across Europe when it alone gained 21 seats at 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. Similarly, the success of FN was regarded as the success of the European radical right.¹⁴ To put it differently, its increasing electoral success in French presidential elections and its growing popularity in the contemporary European politics are other factors that catch our attention. Indeed, it has increased its popularity in French and European politics especially after Marine Le Pen took the leadership from her father in 2011 through her attempt to rebrand the image of the Party in order to mainstream it. Indeed, she tried to distance herself from the anti-Semitic and homophobic discourses that were traditionally linked to the Party. Worth noting that, the FN has renamed itself as the National Rally in June 2018, with an aim to “*gain power through forming coalitions with allies*”¹⁵ and to

¹⁰ Rodney Benson, *Shaping Immigration News: A French- American Comparison*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

¹¹ Philippe Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order*, London: Routledge, 2011.

¹² Cas Mudde, “The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America”, *Migration Policy Institute*, 2012, p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ Cas Mudde, “The far right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/?utm_term=.7485326d7d64, 30.05.2014, [accessed 12.11.2008].

¹⁵ BBC, “Europe and nationalism: A country-by- country guide”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006>, 10.08.2018, [accessed 10.10.2018].

*“revive and unify the party.”*¹⁶ In this thesis, the FN’s anti-migrant discourses articulated between 2015- 2017 will be analyzed. For the reason that the party was known as the National Front within this period, this study will use the name Front National instead of National Rally. In brief, by taking this account, the FN is regarded as an important radical right party not just in French but also in European politics. Therefore, for this study, in relation to immigration issue its discourses needs to be underlined.

More to the point, it can be said that especially in the last years France occupied the agenda of European politics due to the recent terrorist attacks carried out by Islamist groups in its territory, the rising electoral growth and increasing public popularity of Front National owing to its anti-migrant and anti-EU rhetoric, and the 2017 presidential elections. Indeed, the UK’s decision to leave the EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum and anti-migrant, populist Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections put a spotlight on the 2017 French presidential elections in the EU politics. This is because; Brexit was one of the key campaign issues of Marine Le Pen, which might cause a domino effect in other EU countries thus, threatening the EU’s future and its core ideas. Indeed, Euroscepticism and anti-migrants sentiments have increased in the French public, which can be also seen in the rise of Front National. Additionally, immigration has been a long-standing public concern and a key campaign issue in France. As noted earlier, the successive terrorist attacks occurred in France, the on going European migrant “crisis” and a weak economy have provided facilitating conditions for designating migration as a security threat in France by political parties and made immigration a central campaign issue.¹⁷ Stopping state medical care for immigrants, determining immigration quotas, no birthright citizenship to the children of foreign nationals born in France are some of the debates on immigration during the election campaign. Worth to mention, together with its tough stand on immigration and anti-EU rhetoric Marine Le Pen was a powerful, leading candidate in the 2017 presidential elections.

¹⁶ Kim Willsher, “Marine Le Pen sparks row over new name for Front National”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/12/marine-le-pen-row-new-name-front-national-rassemblement-national>, 12.03.2018, [accessed 15.10.2018].

¹⁷ France 24 English, “French presidential elections: Where do the candidates stand on immigration?”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbb1x5DyGFU>, 06.04.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

In this regard, the Front National as an anti-migrant, anti-globalization and anti-EU party formulates anti-Islam rhetoric and disseminates fear of Islam and fear of politics in France. Therefore, it is regarded as one of the prominent securitizing actors in constructing immigration as a security threat in France at a national level. To recap, this study focus on the Front National's anti-immigrant discourses and its role in securitizing migration through analyzing the long-run evolution of the immigration debate in France.

To this end, this study asks following questions: How did migration become a security issue in France? What are the main elements of the immigration debate in France? How has France responded immigration over decades? How has migration issue addressed in the FN's rhetoric? Which referent objects does FN present to be threatened by migration? Has FN's immigration program and anti-migrant discourses affected the mainstream parties' migration program, consequently the French migration policy?

1.2 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis

To reiterate, the aim of this study is to examine the security- migration nexus in France by analyzing the security discourses of Marine Le Pen, leader of FN, through applying the securitization theory of Copenhagen School as a theoretical framework. In agreement with this aim, the main hypothesis of this thesis is that the FN is one of the crucial securitizing actors of migration in France. In this context, France is chosen as the case study in order to examine the securitization of migration and the role of radical right in this construction process; thus, the scope of the analysis in this study is *micro* level, the national level analysis.

To achieve the goal of this thesis, the research methodology applied in this study is qualitative design. Multiple methods of data collection will be used in order to carry out this study. First and foremost, due to the language barriers, the secondary data will be selected for the purpose of this thesis. We will first review literature on securitization theory and existing research about politics of migration in France in order to examine the historical and social context that the discourses of the FN regarding migration have been embedded in and related to. Similarly, we will outline the existing literature on European

radical right party and the FN in order to understand the characteristics of the Party as well as its historical background. These data also include election campaign, party manifestos, speeches, interviews done by French political actors. In addition to providing qualitative data regarding the literature review on the topic, relevant quantitative data from previous surveys on public perception and on voting and migrant proportions in France will be also used as supplementary information to give a broad insights regarding the process of securitizing migration in France.

This thesis is structured into three main parts in order to achieve its main goal. In the first chapter, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be outlined. Considering the aim to examine the discursive construction of migration by the Front National in France, the securitization theory of Copenhagen School will be applied as the theoretical framework of this study. In the first section of this chapter, we will briefly outline the reconceptualization of security concept after the Cold War in order to provide information on the transformation that the concept of security has undergone after the demise of Cold War. Indeed, the concept of security has been widened and broadened in order to capture the migration issue, which is the focus of this thesis. Then in the following section, we will review the literature on securitization theory. The literature on securitization theory is mainly based on two logics: logic of exception, and the logic of routine (practices). The logic of exception, which is developed by Copenhagen School, lays stress on the role of discourse in a securitization process. In other words, it focuses on the discursive construction of a particular issue as an existential security threat to referent objects. Thus, as the theoretical framework of this thesis, we will outline the securitization theory of Copenhagen School in depth, investigating its contribution to our understanding of security. This theoretical framework will enable us to explore how migration has been securitized in France and which referent objects are claimed to be threatened by migration through Front National during this securitization process. In other words, the theoretical framework explained in this chapter will be applied to the anti-immigration discourses of FN party leader Marine Le Pen in the following chapters to explore how migration is discursively constructed as a security threat in France. This will be followed by a review of existing literature on securitization of migration in Europe. By examining the relevant literature on the migration- security nexus, the discursive construction of migration as a

security threat exploring the common security themes used by securitizing actors and the role of routines and technologies in the securitizing migration process, which is stressed by so-called Paris School, will be explored in this section. This is because, in order to have a broad understanding in the process of securitization of migration, we will also highlight some non-discursive practices (such as stricter immigration laws, policy tools, technologized, militarization of border controls, detention and deportation practices) taken by the French government at a point when it is appropriate in the second chapter of this thesis. In other words, the thesis will also contribute the existing research at a point by underlining the practices in this construction process. Nevertheless, analyzing the role of routines necessitates an in-depth empirical analysis, which can be a concern of another study.

In the second chapter, the securitization of migration in France will be examined. To achieve the purpose of this chapter, the long-run evolution of French immigration debate and the politics of migration will be investigated by examining the historical overview of French migration history in order to shed light on how migration has been turned into a security issue in France. As mentioned before, the discourses are socially constituted and socially constitutive. Thus, the historical and social context that the discourses of the FN regarding migration have been embedded in and related to needs to be put forward. To put it differently, radical right parties' discourses have been affected by the socio-political histories of their relevant societies, thus their current discourses can not be fully understood without exploring the historical, social and cultural characteristic of their countries. Given that, in the second chapter, first we will examine the historical overview of French migration history in order to capture the developments of immigration policies since WWII in France including the socio-cultural characteristic of France.

In this regard, aiming at analysing the immigration question of France within the security context in this chapter, the developments of immigration policies since the WWII will be outlined in three periods: 1) *1945- 1974*, 2) *1974- 2000* 3) *2001- 2017*. The transformation of immigration policies into more restrictive ones began early-1970s following to oil crisis of 1973 and immigration was halted in 1974, thus the first period will be taken as *1945- 1974*. The second period will be between *1974- 2000*. Since

September 11 attacks plays a crucial role in deepening the securitization of migration in West, considering the impact of the attacks on migration issue 2001- 2017 will be analysed as the third period.

Afterwards, France response to the European refugee “crisis” will be analysed in the last section of this chapter. This is because, the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ of 2015, in general Europe’s refugee “crisis” is another important development regarding the securitization of immigration in France. In this section, we will investigate whether/how this “crisis” affect the perception of French public on immigration and the representation of this development by French political parties and media by providing data from existing surveys and research concerning.

In the last chapter of this thesis, we will investigate the Front National and its anti-migrant discourses. This analysis will be conducted by analysing discourses of Marine Le Pen, the leader of the FN since 2011, in accordance with securitization theory of Copenhagen School. By doing so, we will explore how migration issue has been addressed in the FN’s rhetoric and which referent objects the FN has presented to be existentially threatened by migration. For the purpose of this thesis, first we will underline the core characteristics of European radical right parties. Then, after examining the FN historical background in the second sub-section, we will analyze the discourses of the FN regarding migration. Political speeches, FN election campaigns, posters, interviews and articles in the period of 2015- 2017 will be examined in order to carry this study out. More precisely, we will critically analyze the videos of interviews with Marine Le Pen and political speeches done by her with English subtitle/simultaneous translation. The justification for the selection of this period for this analysis can be given as follows; first, the year of 2015 was marked with several crucial events. The so-called Syrian refugee “crisis” started in 2015. Indeed, international and European politics drew widespread attention to this issue when a Syrian three-year-old Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi’s death body drowned in the Aegean Sea on September 2, 2015 in an attempt to flee from war in Syria. After that, the relocation of refugees and policies regarding European refugee “crisis” have been discussed at the EU affecting the migration policies of member states. Second, several terrorist attacks were carried out by radical Islamist groups in its territory starting

with 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, 2015 Paris attacks and 2016 Nice attacks. The hypothesis of this thesis is that these terrorist attacks provided a suitable ground for designating migration as a security threat and strengthening the linkage between migration and terrorism in France by the Front National.



2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of this research will be outlined. As the main concern of this study is the discursive construction of immigration as a security threat and the role played by radical right populist parties in this construction process, in France, securitization theory seems appropriate to be applied.

Securitization, first analyzed by Ole Waever in his chapter *Securitization and Desecuritization*¹⁸, refers to “a process through which an issue becomes politically and socially constructed and identified as a security threat.”¹⁹ According to Copenhagen School securitization is a construction of a threat through *speech acts*. The securitization approach of Copenhagen School has been used by researchers to emphasize the discursive construction of particular issues as security threats, which serves the purpose of this study mentioned above. As McDonald also states, this conceptual framework has been applied to issues such as immigration, health, political dispute and minority rights, particularly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that triggered ‘war on terror’ discourses of US.²⁰ Concerning *securitizing actors*, a significant term in this process of discursive securitization, Mehmet Özerim states that “*radical right parties of today are the leading securitizing actors of migration in Europe.*”²¹ Accordingly, this study reveals from the idea that through constructing security discourse regarding immigration, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the radical right Front National (FN), is one of the securitizing actors of migration in France, at national level. Indeed, the world witnessed the rise of Front National, thus Marine Le Pen at recent French presidential elections in 2017 linking immigration to security issues as one of her principal campaign themes.

In the light of above information, this theoretical framework will enable us to investigate how migration has been securitized in France and which security discourses

¹⁸ Ole Waever, Op. Cit., pp. 46-86.

¹⁹ Rita Floyd, Op. Cit., p.427.

²⁰ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.14 (4), p. 563.

²¹ Mehmet Gökay Özerim, “European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, p. 924.

are used by Front National during this securitization process. In other words, the conceptual framework explained in this chapter will be applied to the discourses of FN party leader Marine Le Pen in the following chapters to explore how migration is discursively constructed as a security threat.

It is also necessary to put an emphasis on the term of security, since it plays a crucial role in analyzing the linkage between migration and security. After the demise of Cold War the traditional meaning of security, which reduces security to military threat, were criticized as narrow and found inadequate by several authors.²² There was a call for widening and broadening of security concept to include non-military threats. As a result, the concept of security has undergone a transformation. Nowadays, “security concerns are linked to issues such as migration, ethnic revival, religious revival (Islam), identity claims and sometimes, to supranational entities such as the EU.”²³ Copenhagen School is one of the advocates of wideners’ debate. Indeed, as Barry Buzan states the securitization theory “*is the idea that the social construction of threats needed to be understood separately from traditional ‘objective materialist threat analysis’.*”²⁴ Thus, in this chapter, taking securitization as a theoretical base, the securitization approach of Copenhagen School will be outlined after the following section concerning the reconceptualization of security after the Cold War. The special attention will be given to the studies on the securitization of migration, for this reason a review of specialized literature in relation to the construction of migration- security nexus, especially in Europe, will be explained thereafter.

2.2 Concept of Security: Reconceptualizing Security after the Cold War

As Jef Huysmans mentions, the analytical framework of securitization is based on the constructivist worldview.²⁵ Applying the Copenhagen School’s framework of

²² Barry Buzan, **People, States & Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies**, 2nd Edition, ECPR Press, 2007, p. 2.

²³ Ayhan Kaya, p. 8.

²⁴ Barry Buzan, Op. Cit., p. 2.

²⁵ Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**, New York, 2006.

securitization theory for this study, therefore regarding security threats as socially and politically constructed through a discursive process, we need to shed light on the reconceptualization of the concept of security after the demise of Cold War and the constructivist approach to security studies.²⁶

At the end of Cold War, the concept of security has undergone a transformation. Since 1980s the meaning of security has expanded into wider areas from a focus on the military dimensions of security threats. The understanding of security has widened to economic, environmental, societal, and political insecurities and deepened to notions of individual, regional and global security.²⁷ At the same time, some scholars started to search “*how security practice itself constitutes insecurities and how security is not a question of a given threat but of a definitional process of securitizing issues*”.²⁸ This is a constructivist turn in security studies. Today, the security language plays an important role in transforming issues such as migration, the arms trade, or the environment into security problems.²⁹ At this point, it is noteworthy to mention the Copenhagen School, which will be explained in the next section, since the School has a significant role in broadening the concept of security, after the end of the Cold War, and in developing a framework to analyze how an issue becomes securitized or desecuritized.³⁰ To reiterate, the traditional understanding of security (a narrow interpretation of security) focuses on the state and its defense from external military attacks. The School widens the definition of security by identifying five different sectors: military, political, societal, economic and environmental securities, which are clarified in their book *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*.³¹

Although definitions of security have been expanding since 1980s to include areas such as crime, migration, rights, environment, health etc. there is no agreed

²⁶ Peter Shearman, “Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11”, in Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex (Ed.), **European Security After 9/11**, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004, p. 11.

²⁷ Jef Huysmans and Xavier Guillaume, “Chapter 2: Citizenship and Securitizing: Interstitial politics”, in Xavier Guillaume and Jef Huysmans (Ed), **Citizenship and Security: The Construction of Political Being**, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, p. 19.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

³⁰ Ralf Emmers, “Securitization”, in Alain Collins (Ed.), **Contemporary Security Studies**, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 132.

³¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework For Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998.

definition on what security means.³² In a broader term, security ‘*involves the alleviation of threats cherished values which threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future*’.³³ Various authors approach to the concept of security differently. As Barry Buzan indicates “identifying security issues is easy for traditionalists, who equate security with military issues and the use of force; however, it is more difficult when security is moved out of the military sector.”³⁴ In the Cold War era the traditionalist, adherents of the realist school of thought was prevalent. The state is the referent object of security in realist/neo-realist conceptions and national security is the main concern. Thus, for realism security is the “*state’s capacity to protect its territorial boundaries and its sovereign ability to act as it sees fit*”.³⁵ Accordingly, in the realist world the central threat to security is the threat out there or actual use of force. As mentioned before since 1980s there occur different approaches to security studies. Among others, this study will focus on the constructivist approach to security, since it aims at analyzing the discursive construction of migration as a security threat in France. Therefore, there is a need to put emphasis on the general assumptions of constructivism, often called social constructivism in order to clarify the understanding of security in this study.

Since its emergence in the 1980s constructivism has become increasingly prominent theoretical approach to IR.³⁶ According to social constructivism “*the international system is not something ‘out there’ like the solar system. It does not exist on its own. It exists only as an intersubjective awareness among people; in that sense the system is constituted by ideas, not by material forces.*”³⁷ In other words, according to constructivism, our shared perceptions, values, ideas, and understanding shape the reality that surrounds us. For constructivists, security is “*socially constructed in that threats are brought into being instead of meeting an abstract set of criteria needed for them to be considered as a security issue.*”³⁸

³² Kadir Sancak, “Güvenlik Kavramı Etrafındaki Tartışmalar ve Uluslararası Güvenliğin Dönüşümü”, **Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, 2013, p. 123.

³³ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), **Security Studies: An Introduction**, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 5.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, Op. Cit., p. 5.

³⁵ Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick Morgan, **Security Studies Today**, Wiley, 2000, p. 63.

³⁶ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), Op. Cit., p. 59.

³⁷ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, **Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2006, p. 162.

³⁸ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), Op. Cit., p. 63.

Language has a crucial role in social construction of issues in security themes. To illustrate, Copenhagen School use language theory in explaining their securitization concept, which will be explained in details later on. Some constructivists argue that “*security is constructed in the sense that different actors behave according to different discourses – ‘frameworks of meaning’- of security*”.³⁹ To illustrate, Roxanne Lynn Doty suggests that radically different approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different *discourses* of security.⁴⁰ For Doty from 1991 to 1994, the US government used different discourses of security to approach to the Haitian refugees who escaped from the coup crisis of the 1990s in their country. These different security discourses (she states as from a realist national security discourse to human security one) had completely different implications for the way refugees were dealt with.⁴¹ According to Doty these different discourses can be understood as a “change in the way security itself was understood, in other words, as a change in perceptions or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitization’ of Copenhagen School.”⁴² It is important to note here that this is a critic that R. Doty brings to Copenhagen School’s securitization approach.

As mentioned earlier, Copenhagen School’s *speech act* theory will be applied in order to figure out how migration is constructed as a security threat by political actors, at national level, in this case by Front National leader Marine Le Pen in France. Thus in the following part securitization theory will be outlined.

2.3 Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School

Copenhagen School which emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) of Copenhagen and is represented mostly by the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Kaap de Wilde “*offered a radically constructivist perspective on how security problems emerge and dissolve*.”⁴³ According to Copenhagen School, security

³⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

⁴⁰ Matt McDonald, Op. Cit., p. 578.

⁴¹ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), Op. Cit., p. 63.

⁴² Matt McDonald, Op. Cit., p. 578- 579.

⁴³ Ralf Emmers, Op. Cit., p. 132.

threats are socially constructed by security actors in a process called securitization. More precisely, securitization refers to a process, which transforms particular issues into a security threat through discourse. Barry Buzan (2010) points out that “securitization theory focuses on how security threats are politically and socially constructed, rather than on what kinds of security threats objectively exist.”⁴⁴ In this framework, “*the issue becomes a security issue- not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.*”⁴⁵

As mentioned earlier, language theory plays a crucial role in securitization approach of Copenhagen School, since for Copenhagen School issues become security issues through language. It is the language that situates issues as existential threats to a particular political community.⁴⁶ As mentioned before, securitization concept was first outlined by Ole Waever in his chapter *Securitization and Desecuritization*.⁴⁷ He located securitization in language theory and describes security as “*a specific way of framing an issue*”⁴⁸ and as a “*speech act*”.⁴⁹ In other words, in this process particular forms of language (spoken or written in a particular context) constitute security.⁵⁰ As Waever points out:

*With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to the something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.*⁵¹

As can be understood above, “these ‘speech acts’ do not simply describe an existing security situation; they constitute that situation as a security problem, they create it through successful representation.”⁵² To reiterate, “*the utterance itself is the act.*” Thus,

⁴⁴ Rita Floyd, Op. Cit., p. 427.

⁴⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Op. Cit., p. 24

⁴⁶ Matt McDonald, Op. Cit., p. 578

⁴⁷ Ole Waever, Op. Cit., pp. 46-86.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁵⁰ Matt McDonald, Op. Cit., p. 568.

⁵¹ Ole Waever, Op. Cit., p. 55.

⁵² Christopher Bajer Beall, “The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the ‘Migrant Other’, Securitization and Control”, **Journal of Contemporary European Research**, Vol. 5 (2), p. 191.

according to Copenhagen School security is not an objective condition, which can be achieved. Instead, for Copenhagen School securitization is discursive, socially constituted, and intersubjective. This is the security understanding of the School. As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever cite in their book titled *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* securitization refers to

*the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to threat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.*⁵³

Besides abovementioned role of speech act in securitization, *referent objects*, *securitizing actors* and *audience* are the other key terms in Copenhagen School's speech act approach to security. Thus, a process of securitization requires a securitizing actor, a referent object and an audience. As abovementioned definition indicates, throughout the securitization process, a securitizing actor articulates that a particular referent object is existentially threatened, thus claims a right to take extraordinary measures in order to guarantee the referent object's survival otherwise it will be too late. The issue is then removed from the realm of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where the audience tolerates actions not otherwise legitimate.⁵⁴ In other words, as Bezen Balamir Coşkun states "securitization is an attempt to legitimize the use of exceptional measures by securitizing actors in order to prevent an existential threat to referent object's survival."⁵⁵ Thus, for a better understanding, these terms will be explained.

*Referent objects: "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival."*⁵⁶ Security has many potential referent objects. It can be a state, a nation, an identity, a social group, individuals etc. For instance, whereas the threat to a state is to its sovereignty; for a society the threat is to its identity. In

⁵³ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 491

⁵⁴ Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol.9, p. 55.

⁵⁵ Bezen Balamir Coşkun, "History Writing and Securitization of the Other: the Construction and Reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli Security Discourses", **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 281.

⁵⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Op. Cit., p. 36.

Copenhagen School, the state remains the most important referent object of the security, at the same time society raised to equal level with it. Their concept societal security is important for analyzing the securitization of migration. For the School societal security is about “*the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolutions, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.*”⁵⁷ In this regard, migration is increasingly seen as a threat to national identity and cultural homogeneity of host countries. Migration has been articulated by political leaders and represented in media, etc., especially after the 9/11 attacks, as a reason for socio-political and economic problems of their (host) countries, which will be explained in the following section.

*Securitizing actors: “actors who securitize issues by declaring something- a referent object- existentially threatened.”*⁵⁸ It can be the government, state representative, political elite, political parties, military and/or society. Securitizing actor claims to speak or act on behalf of the nation.

This study critically analyzes how security is constructed through the discursive practices of the political actors. Ole Waever points out that “*power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it.*”⁵⁹ Karyotis points out that in Europe it is the political elites “who often see themselves as defenders of national identity and societal security” and treat migrants as a threat to the cultural identity of a given society.⁶⁰ In this regard, radical right parties along with their anti-immigrant stand and discourses are seen as one of the securitizing actors of migration at national level, thus taking into consideration of the success of French Front National in 2017 presidential election, it is regarded as one of the securitizing actors of migration issue in France. Thus, the scope of the analysis in this study is *micro* level, the national level analysis.

⁵⁷ O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (Ed), **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 23.

⁵⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Op. Cit., p. 36.

⁵⁹ Ole Waever, Op. Cit., p. 54.

⁶⁰ Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences”, in G Lazaridis (Ed.), **Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe**, Ashgate, 2011. p. 20.

Audience: As mentioned before throughout this study, securitization is a part of a discursive, socially constructed and inter-subjective realm. In this regard, Buzan *et al.* make a distinction between a *securitizing move* and a *successful securitization*. According to Copenhagen School presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object by an actor is a *securitizing move*. For a successful securitization, a securitizing actor must convince the relevant audience (public opinion, politicians, voters, military officers, or other elites) for extraordinary measures to deal with the security threat and make them follow or at least tolerate the actions that are not legitimate in normal political scope. In other words, the act of securitization is successful only once the audience accepts that something is an existential threat to the referent object (shared value) and requires emergency and extraordinary measures. Thus, it can be said that “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but the audience of the security speech act, in this sense it is inter-subjective.”⁶¹ In other words, the perception and the reactions of the audience are as important as the way an issue is articulated as a security threat. In the light of these information a successful (complete) securitization has three components: “*existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.*”⁶² By analyzing securitization of migration at the national level, it is easy to determine the audience; constituency (voter) and public opinion are the audience of this study. At this point it can be briefly noted that throughout the anti-immigration speech acts of radical right party leaders, these parties want to convince the relevant public to believe that migrants are threats to their national identity, to their welfare system, to cultural homogeneity and internal security.

Facilitating Conditions for Securitization

In the light of previously mentioned points all the attempts of securitization are not successful. Sometimes the audience accepts emergency arguments of securitizing actors and tolerates violations of normal politics, while in other cases they are not interested in these statements of security threats. The speech act works under some

⁶¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Op. Cit.*, p. 31; Rita Floyd, *Op. Cit.*, p. 428.

⁶² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Op. Cit.*, p. 26.

facilitating conditions. The Copenhagen School identifies *facilitating conditions* into two categories as internal and external conditions. *Internal facilitating conditions* are the internal, linguistic-grammatical conditions that enable audience consent on securitization. “Following certain grammatical rules of a security speech act, including a formal designation of existential threat, argumentation regarding its seriousness, indication of no return, suggestion of a possible way out are the most important ones.”⁶³ Indeed, in security discourse, “*an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority by a securitizing actor.*”⁶⁴ *External facilitating conditions* are “the external, contextual and social conditions which includes social capital of the securitizing actor (who must be in a position of authority) and threat related component. The social capital of the securitizing actor characterizes the relationship between the speaker and the audience, and therefore the possibility of the audience’s acceptance of the designation of threat.”⁶⁵ In this regard, according to Copenhagen School the position of the securitizing actor is important for a successful securitization. Securitizing actor has to hold a position from which the act can be made. As Waever argues, “*security is articulated only from a specific point, in an institutional voice, by elites.*”⁶⁶ Thus, security actor should have the position of institutional power and capability to influence and convince others (the relevant audience). Anyone can try to securitize an issue, however not everyone can succeed it. Besides, the historical background of the security problem is also important to convince audience.⁶⁷ Thus, “*the conditions historically associated with the threat*”⁶⁸ is one of the crucial facilitating conditions. To briefly outline, a successful speech act is based on the composition of language and society. The focus in the facilitating conditions is on the grammatical rules of the speech act, the social and institutional position of speaker (securitizer actor) and historical resonance of particular ‘threats’. Although securitization

⁶³ Dario Matika and Armano Srbljinovic, “Complexity of National Security”, in Katalin Martinas, Dario Matika and Armano Srbljinovic (Ed.), **Complex Societal Dynamics: Security Challenges and Opportunities**, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010, p.3-4.

⁶⁴ Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.47, 2003, p. 514.

⁶⁵ Dario Matika and Armano Srbljinovic, Op. Cit., p. 4.

⁶⁶ Ole Waever, Op. Cit., p. 57

⁶⁷ Bahar Rumelili and Sibel Karadağ, “Göç ve Güvenlik: Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar”, **Toplum ve Bilim**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, No.140, p.75.

⁶⁸ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), Op. Cit., p. 69.

is determined by these facilitating conditions to some extent, they are “never fully explained by these conditions.”⁶⁹

Securitization as a Political Process

In the light of previously mentioned facts/data, securitization theory of Copenhagen School examines how a specific issue is removed from the political process and placed into the security agenda. In this framework, Buzan *et al.* differentiate between nonpoliticized, politicized and securitized issues.

According to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde

*‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Security can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized.*⁷⁰




Figure 1: Securitization as a Political Process

Source: Jonna Nyman, “Securitization Theory”, in **Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods**, Laura J. Shepherd (Ed.), Routledge, 2013, p. 54.

⁶⁹ Dario Matika and Armano Srbljinovic, Op. Cit., p. 9.

⁷⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Op. Cit., p. 23.

To reiterate, according to Copenhagen School security is an extreme version of politicization. In respect to what Michael Williams points out “*focusing on the speech act highlights the decision to securitize an issue.*”⁷¹ Consequently, Williams argues that a “focus on decision emphasizes the *political* nature of this choice.”⁷² More precisely, securitization is a political choice and act of securitizing actor, thus cannot be explained only by the abovementioned facilitating conditions for its social success.⁷³ Williams also draws our attention to the fact that the role of decision in securitizations puts emphasize on “*the creative side of political action, interaction between the actor and the process, and on the intersubjective relationship between the speaker and the audience.*”⁷⁴ It is important at this point to reiterate (as can be also understood from the figure above), throughout securitization process the issue is transferred from the realm of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics where it can be dealt without normal (democratic) rules and regulations. This implies that security should be seen as “*a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.*”⁷⁵ Thus, in this framework the assumption of security politics is negative and exclusionary.⁷⁶⁷⁷ In this regard, some scholars refer the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization theory as an “exceptional”⁷⁸ approach to securitization whereas others use “the discourse” approach in line with speech act. Another important point to note here is that since according to Copenhagen School “*securitization is a phenomenon largely to be avoided*”⁷⁹ they develop a concept so-called *deseuritization*. For the School *deseuritization* refers to a process in which an already securitized issue is moved from the security agenda back into the realm of public political discourse by a securitizing actor.⁸⁰

⁷¹ Michael C. Williams, Op. Cit., p. 520.

⁷² Ibid, p. 520.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 520.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 520

⁷⁵ Dario Matika and Armano Sbrljcinovic, Op. Cit., p. 7.

⁷⁶ Matt McDonald, Op. Cit., p. 566.

⁷⁷ Rita Floyd highlights that “deseuritizations do not lead to politicization all the time and also not all securitizations have negative consequences, that the Copenhagen School’s *deseuritization* is one-sided and limited.” She argues that securitization can be both positive and negative. She underlines the fact that the adjectives “positive” and “negative” refer to the consequences of one security policy compared to another policy or to politicization rather than relative success of securitization. (Rita Floyd, Op. Cit., p. 427)

⁷⁸ Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis, “Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek Security professionals”, **International Migration**, Vol. 54 (2), 2016; Philippe Bourbeau, “Migration, exceptionalist security discourses and practices”, in Philippe Bourbeau (Ed.), **Handbook on Migration and Security**, Cheltenham and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2017.

⁷⁹ Michael C. Williams, Op. Cit., p. 523.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 523.

Copenhagen School's approach to securitization has been criticized by many scholars in the field of security studies, and consequently alternative approaches have been developed. Some scholars argue that the Copenhagen School's securitization framework does not sufficiently conceptualize the securitization as a *process*.⁸¹ They argue that in order to understand the securitization process a comprehensive securitization framework should focus on both the discursive and non-discursive practices such as the creation and functioning of bureaucracies, the development of public policies or the implementation of the procedures.⁸² Paris School of Security Studies lays stress on the non-discursive practices in the securitization process. According to Paris School, which uses a Foucauldian approach in their studies, an issue can be securitized in a routine and normalized way without discursive articulations, thus the School highlights the role of practices rather than speech acts in securitization process. This second approach to securitization is so-called *practice or routine* approach in the securitization literature. It is also regarded as the sociological approach to securitization. It may at this point be useful to briefly outline the logic of routine. In line with Paris School, Didier Bigo argues that

*It is possible to securitize certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse.*⁸³

Briefly, logic of routine regards security as “*a collection of routinized and patterned practices, typically carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which technology comes to hold a prominent place.*”⁸⁴ Bigo emphasizes the role of the professional security experts and their everyday practices in the security field in securitization process.⁸⁵ For Bigo it is the security experts, who manage the unease in a given society. These security experts do not just take measures against threats, at the same

⁸¹ Sarah Leonard, “The ‘Securitization’, Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School’s Framework”, paper presented at **the SGIR Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference**, 12-15 September 2007, Turin (Italy), p.13.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.14.

⁸³ Didier Bigo, “When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitization in Europe”, in Kelstrup, M. and M.C. Williams (Eds.), **International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power Security and Community**, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 194.

⁸⁴ Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 177.

⁸⁵ For more information refer to: Didier Bigo, “The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Securities”, in M. Albert, D. Jaconson and Y. Lapid (Eds.), **Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory**, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 91- 116; Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of Governmentality of Unease”, **Alternatives**, Vol. 27 (2), 2002, pp. 63- 92.

time they describe these threats and risks, give priority one over another by using their trained skills and knowledge. They gain their legitimacy and power from these skills and knowledge. Thus, they can securitize an issue even if they do not have any actual reasons just by claiming that they have secret information about the relevant policy problem. Unlike speech acts of political leaders, which are visible in public sphere, the competitions between different perspectives of professionals on an issue are less visible in public, even done explicitly in secrecy.⁸⁶ In Paris School's securitization approach the focus is on the technocratic based securitization, which is driven by bureaucratic and technological practices.⁸⁷ Bigo argues that "bureaucratic decisions and practices create a sense of insecurity and unease in a given society."⁸⁸ For Bigo, security is "*an attempt at insecuritization of daily life by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police potential for action.*"⁸⁹ In this framework, security is regarded as "*a technique of governing danger.*"⁹⁰ Likewise, as Toğral puts forward, Thierry Balzacq highlights the analysis of specific "*policy tools or instruments as empirical referents of policy*" in securitization process and emphasizes its non-discursive process.⁹¹ Another scholar, Jef Huysmans uses a Foucauldian approach in his book titled *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU* and demonstrates that securitization is not just a speech act, but a phenomenon that binds together sets of discourses of unease, bureaucratic and technical practices, as well as understanding of what constructs security knowledge and expertise.⁹²

To conclude briefly, the literature on securitization theory is mainly based on two logics: logic of exception and the logic of routine. As pointed out earlier logic of exception lays stress on the role of discourse in a securitization process. It has been argued by some scholars that issues can be securitized not only through speech acts but also through practices (logic of routine). Similarly, some research show that analyzing speech acts of securitizing actors on an issue in a particular political community may indicate

⁸⁶ Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**, New York: 2006, p. 9.

⁸⁷ Burcu Toğral, "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices", **Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations**, Vol.11, No. 2, Summer 2012, p. 66.

⁸⁸ Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis, Op. Cit., p. 178.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 178.

⁹⁰ Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**, p. 9.

⁹¹ Burcu Toğral, "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices", p. 66.

⁹² Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**.

that the issue examined is not discursively securitized, whereas, at the same time, analyzing non-discursive practices on the same issue such as restrictive border controls, implementation of surveillance, mandatory detention etc. may demonstrate the opposite.⁹³ It has also been argued that for a comprehensive analysis of a securitization process the focus of the relevant study should be on both discourses and everyday practices.⁹⁴ The logic of routine, in other words the non-discursive practices will be mentioned when appropriate throughout this study; however, the focus will be on discourses with an aim to analyze the discursive construction of migrants as a threat by the Front National in France.

In the following section the literature on securitization of migration will be briefly outlined and the discursive construction of migration as a threat will be explored in the context of national, internal, economic and societal security.

2.4 Securitization of Migration

Migration is one of the issue that has been treated as a security issue after the Cold War. Heisler and Layton-Henry put forward the migration- security nexus as such

*Immigration can present threats to security in the receiving countries, albeit generally not directly of a military kind. The capacity of social, economic, political and administrative institutions to integrate large numbers of immigrants, and the resistance of some immigrant communities to assimilation, affect the stability of society and therefore the ability of receiving states' governments to govern.*⁹⁵

Securitization of migration refers to a process in which migration is constructed as a security threat. As mentioned earlier according to Copenhagen School securitization is the extreme version of politicization. Regardingly, according to Philippe Bourbeau the

⁹³ As an example refer to Burcu Togral Koca, "Syrian refugees in Turkey: from 'guests' to 'enemies'", **New Perspectives on Turkey**, No. 54, 2016, pp. 55-75; Sarah Leonard, "The 'Securitization', Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School's Framework".

⁹⁴ Sarah Leonard, "EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices", **European Security**, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2010, p. 235.

⁹⁵ O. M. Heisler and Z. Layton-Henry, "Migration and the links between social and societal security", in O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (Ed), **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, London: Pinter, 1993, pp. 148- 166 (Cited in Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**, p. 45-46.)

*“politicization of migration extricates the subject from restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and injects it into the public arena; whereas the securitization of migration involves ‘integrating migration discursively and institutionally into security framework that emphasize policing and defence.’”*⁹⁶ Since mid-1980s there has been an increasing attempt for politicization and securitization of migration at both the national and the European Union (EU) level, consequently migrants have increasingly been perceived as a threat to the internal security, cultural homogeneity and welfare system of host states by virtue of anti-migrant discourses of political parties and of the media. In other words, migrants have been seen and portrayed as the reasons of socio-political and economic problems that host countries bear on.

At this point it seems important to mention that the securitization of migration in the West is not a constant throughout history. Migration was welcomed by European states at a time in its history. Thus, there is a need to shed light on the reasons of the shift from positive to negative attitudes of receiving states towards migrants. As already known, international migration is not a new social phenomenon in Europe. Historically, Europe is affected by immigration and has been one of the favorable final destinations for people- in movement in search of a better life or refuge. However, the attitudes towards migrants have changed over time in Europe due to socio-political developments in international era and emerging migration patterns. As mentioned earlier, migration has been turned into a security issue since mid-1980s in Europe. Priorly, migration was welcomed due to socio-economic and political reasons by European states. To illustrate, Israel and Germany have used migration to *“ensure the continuation and survival of an ethnically based view of their societies.”*⁹⁷ Indeed, for countries like Canada and Austria, immigration growth has been considered as an important issue for their societies. In addition, the patterns and characteristic of migration flows varied significantly across the continent, which affect the perception of “natives” towards immigrants in different European states. There emerged different kinds of migrants. The patterns of international migration have been changing since the 1970s in Europe. Due to economic crisis

⁹⁶ Cited in Anthony M. Messina, “Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror”, *World Politics*, Vol. 66, Issue 3, July 2014, p. 535.

⁹⁷ Scott D. Watson, *The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 16.

following to the 1973 oil crisis, negative attitudes towards immigrants raised in Western states, which priorly welcomed immigrants to fulfil economic need of their countries and help to boost their economy following to Second World War (WWII). They had been considered as “guestworkers” who would eventually return to their home countries, which did not happen. These questworkers settled in the host societies and started to bring their family members who stayed at home country, thus so-called family migration began. Family migration was considered important for successful integration of immigrants into the receiving countries.⁹⁸ As a result, public awareness of the immigrant population increased.⁹⁹ In addition, Watson argues that “*during the Cold War period, offering protection to individuals fleeing from communist and fascist regimes was seen as a form of power, enhancing the security of the receiving state by undermining the moral legitimacy of their home state.*”¹⁰⁰ However, after the Cold War the source countries of refugee flows changed and refugees from non-Europeans countries such as Africa, Middle East seek to refuge.¹⁰¹ These changes following to the end of Cold War were portrayed within the context of security issues by political and societal elites. Since then a strict border control policy has been applied in receiving countries.

It has been argued that attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US opened an important period with regard to securitization of migration. Indeed, “though securitization of migration has been undergoing quite some time, the events of September 11th reemphasized ‘security-migration’ nexus’.”¹⁰² Especially after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, in the context of US ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, the securitization of migration is deepened in the West and migration is linked to the issues of border control, drugs, organized crime and terrorism. Islam is constructed as an existential threat that necessitates an emergency political response outside the realm of normal politics through ‘war on terror’ discourse after September 11.¹⁰³ This led Western states to apply serious limitations on Islamic religious practices in their communities such

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 4.

⁹⁹ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, December 2000, Vol. 38, No. 5, p. 754.

¹⁰⁰ Scott D. Watson, Op. Cit., p. 5.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰² Margit Fauser, “Transnational Migration- A National Security Risks? Securitization of Migration Policies in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom”, **Reports & Analyses 2 /06**, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, p. 1.

¹⁰³ Jocelyne Cesari, “Securitization of Islam in Europe”, **Die Welt des Islams**, Vol. 52, No. 3-4, 2012, p. 430.

as 2004 French ban on wearing overt religious symbols like the *hijab* in schools. Several terrorist attacks in European soils accelerated this securitization of Islam in Europe. Migrants have increasingly been linked to threats and risks and seen as the source of insecurity and unease in European states following to 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London attacks.¹⁰⁴ Having these terrorist attacks in EU borders and events such as murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004 and cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2006 the fear of insecurity and prejudices towards migrants, especially Muslims, in Europe escalated. Radical right parties as well as right –wing parties in Europe take advantages of the anti-migrant sentiments and articulate migration as security threats to their political communities. As a consequence of constructing migration as a security threat, Western receiving states have started to take serious attempts in order to restrict immigration, especially illegal and/or unwanted immigration, in an effort to cope with organized crimes (such as human smuggling) and with terrorism (which is linked to immigration since September 11) and to protect the socio-political cohesion of their nations.¹⁰⁵ Thereby, management of borders arises as a response to these perceived threat and rising fear towards migrants. In this regard, since September 11, international and external control of immigrants has increased. EU strengthens its external border and European countries strengthen their internal border management and migration policies to prevent the unwanted and/or illegal migrants to access their borders. In addition, “technological devices such as radars, satellites, infra-red cameras, sensors are used to tighten the border surveillance and border control, which was initially developed to cope with the counter-terrorism.”¹⁰⁶ Consequently, as stated by Faist “*measures which try to handle the threatening migrant make him or her more visible as an alien.*”¹⁰⁷ “Unauthorized migrants”¹⁰⁸ become more visible in the public as a result of stricter border controls. The statistics about illegal/unwanted immigrants articulated by political agents and represented in media through negative portrayals of immigrants legitimizes the stricter border controls, which then, as

¹⁰⁴ Erhan Akdemir, “11 Eylül 2001, 11 Mart 2004 ve 7 Temmuz 2005 Terrörist Saldırılarının Ardından İslam’ın Avrupa’da Algılanışı, *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, Cilt. 8, No.1, 2009, p. 3- 4.

¹⁰⁵ Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration:...”, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Sarah Leonard, “The ‘Securitization’, Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School’s Framework”, p. 16.

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Faist, “‘Extension du domaine de la lutte’: International Migration and Security before and after September 11, 2001”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ The term “unauthorized” migrants mean “individuals who have crossed an international border without the permission of the receiving state and whose reasons for admission or rejection are not yet clear, whether for humanitarian considerations, employment or family reunification.” (Scott D. Watson, Op. Cit., p. 3.)

Faist points out, escalate the perception of the migrants as illegitimate and potentially criminal in receiving countries, although some politicians and journalists accuse the traffickers and portray migrants as victims.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, as Humphrey states “*by making migration a security problem, migrants are constituted as the object of policies directed at managing risks.*”¹¹⁰ Thus, the negative portrayal of migrants as the source of insecurity deepened in the relevant political community, which contributes the rise in the perception of insecure among ‘natives’ and fear towards immigrants. Hence, as Jef Huysmans highlights “*the inclusion of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in European societies becomes more difficult due to strategies of securitization supported by states.*”¹¹¹

In the light of previously mentioned role of discursive and non-discursive practices in the process of securitization, from different schools’ angle migration can be securitized both through exceptionalist security discourses of political agents and non-discursive practices. The securitization approach of Copenhagen School has been applied by various scholars to explore the discursive construction of migration as a security threat, especially through the speech act of politicians. This study aims at analyzing the discursive construction of migration as a security threat in France by analyzing the security discourses of Marine Le Pen and of other FN party members on immigration. In accordance with the Front National’s anti-immigration stand, Marine Le Pen’s speech acts portraying immigrants, particularly Muslims as a security threat can be analyzed in the context of national security, societal security, economic security and internal security. The role of routines and technologies in securitization of migration emphasized by Paris School will also be explored briefly in this part in order to capture a comprehensive understanding in the securitization of migration in France.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Faist, Op. Cit., p. 12

¹¹⁰ Michael Humphrey, “Migration, Security and Insecurity”, **Journal of Intercultural Studies**, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 179.

¹¹¹ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 753.

2.4.1 Discursive Construction of Migration as a Security Threat

Migration is one of the issues that are considered by the Copenhagen School in the framework of securitization theory. Within the Copenhagen School's framework securitization of migration refers to a process in which migration is constructed as a security threat through discourses of different securitizing actors at national, regional and international level. In other words, it is a process in which securitizing actors designate migration as a security threat that requires emergency measures in order to deal with it; thus legitimize the use of exceptional measures that will not be tolerated by the audiences otherwise in a normal political era. Regarding emergency measures to deal with the articulated security problem, as mentioned earlier in this study, "*speech act approach to securitization frames the options for solution from quick and coercive options, often police and military options and delegitimizes the longterm solutions and negotiations.*"¹¹² For instance, concerning securitization of migration, in Europe closing of borders, deploying troops, deportations, and mandatory detention have been some responses to immigrant and asylum-seekers, particularly in the post-September 11 context.¹¹³ Mostly, securitization of migration results in the implementation of restrictive immigration and asylum measures, and strict border control in relevant receiving states.

As mentioned before, in accordance with the Front National's anti-immigration stand, Marine Le Pen's speech acts portraying immigrants, particularly Muslims as a security threat can be analyzed in the context of national security, societal security, economic security and internal security. As Watson states the relative influence of these security dimensions depends on the receiving countries' social, cultural and historical backgrounds.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Paul D. Williams (Ed.), Op. Cit., p.126.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 70.

¹¹⁴ Scott D. Watson, Op. Cit., p. 9.

2.4.1.1 National Security

Migration is perceived and represented as a national security threat by the political elites of receiving states. The political rhetoric that links migration with national security has increasingly been used in the US and Europe particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. “Though migration was highly considered on the European security agenda throughout the 1990s, following September 11 events, the management of migration has become a top national security concern in the US and Europe.”¹¹⁵ The bombings of Madrid in 2004 and of London in 2005 accelerated the already existing fear towards migrants and migration has been perceived as a threat to survival of state. To put it differently, as Kicinger states after the September 11 attacks the migration issues were moved from “low politics” to “high politics” related to the state security, therefore migration become strategic issue in terms of national security.¹¹⁶ According to Fiona B. Adamson, international migration may have effect on national security with regard to state sovereignty or the overall capacity and autonomy of state actors.¹¹⁷ State sovereignty (or the capacity and autonomy) refers “*the ability of states to maintain control over their territory and national purpose*”.¹¹⁸ It has been argued that migration challenges the states’ autonomy to control their borders. National security concerns occur mostly in the context of illegal migration. It has been explored that the steady increase in illegal border crossing in Europe results in national security concerns in receiving states. Some migrants enter states through illegal channels without legal papers, including those who are smuggled or trafficked. Due to violation of their national borders, immigrants are seen and portrayed as illegal even in the case of forced migration in receiving states. Indeed, during large-scale migration as a consequence of forced migration “illegal” border crossing results in a rise in already existing unease and fear towards migrants and the governments are blamed for not privileging national interest of their political community and protect national borders. As a result, border management/ supervision of national borders has become core issue for the national states. Likewise, Fiona B. Adamson argues

¹¹⁵ Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security”, **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, p. 165.

¹¹⁶ Anna Kicinger, “International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to This Phenomenon”, **Central European Forum for Migration Report, CEFMR Working Paper 2**, Warsaw, 2004, p. 4.

¹¹⁷ Fiona B. Adamson, Op. Cit., p. 167.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 168.

that “border control can be seen as essential to maintaining a state’s capacity to regulate population flows.”¹¹⁹ The term sovereignty has a crucial role in political security concerns. Since, “sovereignty is the mechanism through which nationalism and the separation of the citizen from the immigrant takes place.”¹²⁰ States exercise its sovereignty in making migration laws and citizenship laws. In other words, states want to sustain maximum control over their territory and determine the rules of who can enter and who must stay outside their borders, therefore regulate population flows. Thus, migration and the migration policies are closely related to national security concerns. Indeed, states have regulated their immigration policies in respect to their security and economic concerns. At this point, it is important to underline the fact that economic security, which will be explained later in this section, is an important component of the national security. Indeed, it is argued that political, societal, economic and internal security concerns are overlapping concepts in the discourses of political agents.

With regard to radical right parties’ speech acts, as Özerim states radical right parties have frequently used national security themes within their anti-immigration discourses.¹²¹ Indeed, the concepts of occupation, invasion, raid, attack, influx with regard to war and borders are commonly used in the anti-immigration discourse.¹²² As mentioned above, national security themes are not just about border management. It is also related to migration policies of receiving countries. Therefore, “issuing asylum right, naturalization and citizenship, registration of foreigners, immigration quotas, work permit or any other related issue might be represented as a national security concern by radical right parties.”¹²³ These issues can be also considered in context of societal/identity security.

Watson explores that “mode of entry (economic migration, family migration, humanitarian migration), rather than cultural difference, appears as the most important

¹¹⁹ Fiona B. Adamson, Op. Cit., p. 180.

¹²⁰ Elspeth Guild, “Chapter 6: Cultural and Identity Security: Immigrants and the Legal Expression of National Identity”, in Elspeth Guild and Joanne van Selm (Ed.), **International Migration and Security: Opportunities and challenges**, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 106.

¹²¹ Mehmet Gökay Özerim, “European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, p. 2197.

¹²² Ibid., p. 2198.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 2198; Nazif Mandacı and M. Gökay Özerim, “Uluslararası Göçlerin Bir Güvenlik Konusuna Dönüşümü: Avrupa’da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göçün Güvenikleştirilmesi”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol. 10, No. 39, Fall 2013, p. 112.

securitizing discourse. The use of national identifiers in case of refugee arrivals is as much about calling into question their status as refugees as it is about indicating their cultural difference. Yet, mode of entry is clearly racialized.”¹²⁴ Accordingly, instead of their humanitarian concern, the refugees are represented as “illegal” or “illegally crossing the national borders” by the political elites and media in industrial Western states. Indeed, Watson argues that “*protecting the national security has become to predominate the discourse on humanitarian migration.*”¹²⁵

What’s more, migrants have been viewed as national security threats during times of war or crisis, because there is a possibility that they may seek the priorities of their country of origin or possess dual political loyalties. In addition, it is argued that migrants can also affect the foreign policies of both receiving and sending countries through lobbying movements and political demonstrations etc, thus cause instability in receiving countries.

2.4.1.2 Societal Security

The Copenhagen School argues that through “speech acts” of securitizing actors such as politicians, the media, and the public, migration can be designated as an “existential threat” to societal security. As Karyotis argues societal security is a common feature of migration discourses in Europe to underline the threat that migration might pose to the culture and identity of the host country.¹²⁶ The Copenhagen School defines societal security as

*the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats... [I]t is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religious and national identity and customs.*¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Scott D. Watson, Op. Cit., p. 6- 7.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

¹²⁶ Georgios Karyotis, “European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11, **Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2007, p. 9 (pp. 1- 17)

¹²⁷ O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (Ed), Op. Cit., p. 23.

Societal security is about collectives and their identity. As indicated by Buzan et al. the concept could also be considered as ‘identity security’.¹²⁸ Thus it can be said that societal security is related to the situation when states and societies perceived threats in terms of identity. Accordingly, Buzan et al. states that “societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community.”¹²⁹ They argue that “*threats to identity are always a question of the construction of something as threatening ‘we’ – and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of ‘us’.*”¹³⁰ More precisely, it is about actions which are taken to defend “we” identities. Within this context, migration was represented as a challenge to cultural composition of the nation in the 1980s and has increasingly been portrayed as such. In other words, migration has been articulated as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community. Especially in terms of large-scale migration, immigrants have been perceived as a threat to the cultural homogeneity and social cohesion of receiving states. They are seen as a societal threat that could alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the host country. In addition, there occurred discourses in receiving states which identify other cultures as endangering the survival of home culture such as Huntington’s *‘the Clash of Civilizations’*¹³¹ have escalated the differentiation between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in host societies which make the inclusion of immigrants into the host culture more difficult. To put it differently, these discourses establish dichotomies of “us” versus “them”, as Ceylan and Tsoukala argues, “*position(ing) the migrant as the ‘cultural other’ and shap(ing) the migrant’s relation to the society in a conflictual way.*”¹³² As also indicated by Buonfino “*securitization of migration is creating boundaries between us and others, between Inside and Outside and thus endangering the livelihoods of newly arrived and undocumented migrants while stigmatizing already settled migrants.*”¹³³ These discourses also identify multiculturalism as a reason for societal disintegration.¹³⁴ The fear of multiculturalism

¹²⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Op. Cit., p. 120.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 120.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 120.

¹³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22- 49.

¹³² A. Ceylan and A. Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies”, **Alternatives**, 27, Special Issue, 2002, p. 29.

¹³³ Alessandra Buonfino, “Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe”, **New Political Science**, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 2004, p. 24.

¹³⁴ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 757.

has revealed the argument of a lack of assimilation of migrants to the society.¹³⁵ As put forward by Givens the visibility of immigrants and concerns about cultural homogeneity, keeps the focus of securitization on the integration of immigrants.¹³⁶ Migrants are increasingly blamed not to meet their responsibility to integrate into the host society. To briefly outline the societal concerns in migrant receiving European countries, borrowing from Ellie Vasta

A number of concerns have arisen about identity and specifically concerning ethnic or religious identities versus a perceived homogeneous national identity. One fear is based on the premise that western democratic values will be destroyed by too many foreigners or by immigrants whose values perceived to be different or inferior. There is a perception among some that alleged different or inferior values may threaten national identity and have a damaging effect on social cohesion, leading to violence and to a loss of freedom. On the other hand, some contend that immigrants and ethnic minorities have not done what they were meant to do- that is, to become like 'us'. Many believe that immigrants have not met their responsibility to integrate, thus segregating themselves from the receiving society. An extreme argument is that multiculturalism supports a form of tribalism and that it segregates ethnic minorities and immigrants from the mainstream society.¹³⁷

As has been mentioned above, the securitization of migration has been undergoing before the events of September 11, however the migration-security nexus is reemphasized and deepened after these events. To reiterate, “securitizing migration makes culture more significant as a marker between natives and migrants, and establish dichotomies of “us” versus “them”.”¹³⁸ Thus, migrants represent the ‘other’ in host societies. In Europe, Islam generally serves as ‘the other’ in construction of the ‘self’. Islam is constructed as an existential threat to societal security of Western states in the context of “war on terror” discourses of post- September 11, thus Muslim immigrants have increasingly been targets of racist and xenophobic parties, and the anti-immigrant movements who portrayed them as the “alien” or incompatible with the Western identity and democracy. In addition, they are portrayed as aliens who are dangerous to the

¹³⁵ A. Ceylan and A. Tsoukala, Op. Cit., p. 29.

¹³⁶ Terri E. Givens, “Immigration and National Security: Comparing the US and Europe”, **The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations**, Winter/Spring 2010, p. 79.

¹³⁷ Ellie Vasta, “Accommodating diversity: why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point”, **COMPAS: Working Paper**, No. 53, University of Oxford, 2007, p. 3.

¹³⁸ Thomas Faist, Op. Cit., p. 12.

reproduction of the social fabric.¹³⁹ Indeed, “radical right populist parties in Europe such as AfD in Germany, FN in France, PVV in the Netherlands, M5S in Italy, and Golden Dawn in Greece employ the fear of Islam as a political instrument to mobilize supporters and mainstream themselves.”¹⁴⁰ As a consequence of their anti-Islam, anti-migrant and diversity-phobic discourses they are one of the securitizing actors who articulate migration as a security problem at national level. As Karyotis points out in Europe it is the political elites “who often see themselves as defenders of national identity and societal security” and treat migrants as a threat to the cultural identity of a given society.¹⁴¹ The radical right parties in Europe, take advantages of anti-immigrant sentiments and fear of Other/ stranger/ migrant in order to mainstream themselves while have a crucial role in the process of securitizing migration through utilizing securitizing discourse. As mentioned earlier, this study explores the relationship between securitization of migration and the radical right parties, their role as securitizing actors in this process, thus the political rhetoric of FN in France will be analyzed later in this study.

The important point to note here, as Stivaktis has argued “how and why migrants are seen as cultural threats is a complicated issue, involving primarily how the host society defines itself. Cultures differ with regard to how they define who belongs to or can be accepted into their societies. Thus, the most reasonable explanation for the willingness of states to accept or reject migrants is ethnic, cultural and religious identity and affinity.”¹⁴² In the light of this argument, it can be said that the process of securitizing migration that France has been passed through will be different from the other European countries. Since European countries have experienced different migration flows in their history, the legal status and the perceptions towards migrants, their exclusion/inclusion from/in host states might differ from one country to another in virtue of their citizenship laws.

Last but not least, as Guild argues “the representation of immigrants as a threat to cultural identity is based on the implicit idea that homogeneity of culture is a good thing

¹³⁹ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 758.

¹⁴⁰ Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 3: Islam versus Europe: Populist Discourses and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity”, **CoHERE**, 29.03.2018, p. 1.

¹⁴¹ Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration:...”, p. 20.

¹⁴² A. Y. Stivachtis, “International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security”, **Humanities and Social Sciences**, 2(1), 2008, p. 19.

and that persons with different cultural norms are threatening or a risk to the dominant group.”¹⁴³ Thus, it can be argued that societal security is problematic.

2.4.1.3 Economic security

Migrants have increasingly been portrayed as a threat to the economic security of the receiving state. To put it differently, they have been perceived as a threat to the welfare system of host states by virtue of anti-migrant discourses of political elites and the media that portrayed migrants as the reasons of existing socio-political and economic problems that the host countries bear on, thus perceived as a financial burden to the host society. In addition, some discourses highlight the idea that the “influx” of economic migrants might lower wages and create unemployment, and at the same time it will increase the cost of housing and other goods.¹⁴⁴ Thus, immigrants are seen as competitors for jobs in host countries and blamed for abusing the welfare state. As Huysmans states immigrants are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions.¹⁴⁵

In the 1950s and 1960s immigrants were welcomed to fulfill the cheap and flexible workforce need of domestic labor market in Western European countries.¹⁴⁶ In the late 1960s and the 1970s immigration was become a public concern due to rise in unemployment. Thus, following to the 1973 oil crisis the negative attitudes and intolerance towards immigrants raised due to economic concerns. As a result of these economic concerns, welfare chauvinism has been highlighted by political elites. Welfare chauvinism has been also supported by radical right parties in Europe. It refers to the idea that national citizens must be privileged in the distribution of social goods such as housing, health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services.¹⁴⁷ According to welfare chauvinists, “*immigrants and asylum-seekers are not simply rivals*

¹⁴³ Elspeth Guild, Op. Cit., p. 102.

¹⁴⁴ Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallacy of Securitizing Migration:...”, p. 10.

¹⁴⁵ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 767.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 753.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 767; Özerim, “European Radical Right: Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, p. 2198.

but illegitimate recipients or claimants of socio-economic rights."¹⁴⁸ Migrants are blamed to take advantages of the welfare systems although they do not contribute the economic growth of the host states. Thus, immigrants are seen as a challenge to the welfare system of receiving countries. In addition, welfare provisions provided to immigrants are presented as a core reason that makes the relevant state attractive for immigration. Therefore, it is also argued that cutting these provisions will result in a decrease in immigration rate of the receiving state.

Moreover, in the Western states migrants have increasingly been portrayed as having economic motivations even in the case of forced migration. Yet, it is the migrant who has to prove that they are in need of protection fleeing from persecution, oppression, or political conflict claiming refuge. It is relatively easy for refugees, however in the case of asylum-seekers, the situation gets even worse. To illustrate this point, at a press release on 7 October 2002 UK Home Secretary, David Blunkett's declared that

*The UK has a long history of protecting those fleeing persecution, but we know that many of those applying for asylum are simply economic migrants. I am determined to crack down on the widespread abuse of our asylum process- to build trust and confidence in the system, and ensure that it works effectively to support those who have genuine protection needs.*¹⁴⁹

As seen above, migrants are blamed to lie about their motivations and concerns immigration, consequently not having right to benefit from related international laws thus seen as an economic drain on national sources.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, refugees and asylum-seekers are viewed as providing almost no economic benefit to the host state.

As Huysmans argues the metaphors such as an "invasion", "influx", or "flood" of migrants/ asylum seekers/ refugees portray them as a threat to the survival of the socio-economic system while dramatizing the socio-economic problematic of welfare state. The public of host societies has a feeling that immigrants are already too numerous, too costly to taxpayers.¹⁵¹ This feeling is often supported by the political elites and by the media portrayal of immigration as a threat. To illustrate, Angus Roxburgh, a journalist,

¹⁴⁸ Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", p. 767.

¹⁴⁹ Elspeth Guild, Op. Cit., p. 104.

¹⁵⁰ Scott D. Watson, Op. Cit., p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Alessandra Buonfino, Op. Cit., p. 29.

stated that “*three million unemployed French people equals three million foreigners in the country.*”¹⁵² These political rhetoric that constructs immigrants as scapegoats results in the rise of fear and unease towards immigrants in receiving states.

It seems also crucial to underline the relationship between economic security and national security. Economic security is an important component of the national security. Givens states that the visibility of immigrants and concerns about cultural homogeneity, keeps the focus of securitization on the integration of immigrants.¹⁵³ Migrants are increasingly blamed not to meet their responsibility to integrate into the host society.

Taking into account the aging workforce, decreasing fertility and increasing emigration rate in Europe, it has been argued that European states will likely face socio-economic and demographic problem in the near future and need immigrants as a solution to these problem.

2.4.1.4 *Internal Security*

As Ceylan and Tsoukala explores “*migration is linked to the loss of a control narrative that associates the issues of sovereignty, borders, and both internal and external security.*”¹⁵⁴ Issues related to sovereignty and borders have been analyzed in the national security framework in this study. Undoubtedly, these issues are also related to internal and public security of societies. Indeed, the already existing fear of a loss of sovereignty, the fear of the weakening of border controls and the fear of crime in the public of host societies are reinforced by the anti-immigration, diversity-phobic discourses of political elites and of the media. Radical right parties are among other securitizing actors that utilize these themes in their discourses. It is worth to note that the word *border* plays a crucial role in the securitizing discourses. Since, as indicated by Malcom Anderson

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁵³ Terri E. Givens, Op. Cit., p. 79.

¹⁵⁴ A. Ceylan and A. Tsoukala, Op. Cit., p. 24.

*borders have highly powerful symbolic power: as institutions, they define a legal understanding of the sovereign state; and as processes, they are markers of identity, invested with mythic significance in building nations and political identities.*¹⁵⁵

Thereby the discourses on borders and the criminalization of migrants are closely related to illegal migration. Indeed, as has been noted earlier migration has been linked to issues of drugs, organized crime and terrorism, particularly after the September 11 events. Political elites and police officers, as well as media have been (re)produced the “criminal- migrant thesis”¹⁵⁶ by portraying them as a threat to internal security and public order of host countries. Through this criminalization process migrants are increasingly associated with urban violence, organized crime, money laundering, financial crime, drug trafficking, and fundamentalist terrorism. Migration is explicitly portrayed as a “*vehicle for importing terrorists and criminals, or for spreading infectious diseases.*”¹⁵⁷ As a result, the already existing prejudices, sentiments and fear toward migrants increased in receiving states, which make the integration of migrants in the host societies even harder. Since as a consequence of criminalization of migration, as Ceylan and Thousaka highlights all migrants (documented or undocumented) are seen as suspect of persons who must be controlled by the authorities.¹⁵⁸ Thus, this discourse endangers the civil rights of all migrants as well as all citizens of host societies. Moreover, as Koser argues such responses to migration flows as a consequence of securitizing discourses can result in driving more migrants into the hands of migrant smugglers and human traffickers.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, migrants and asylum seekers become victims of migrant smuggling and human trafficking industries, which take advantages of their situations. What Ceylan and Thousaka underlines as one consequences of criminalization of migration is also important. According to them, this discourse progressively weakens the distinction between migrant and asylum seekers.¹⁶⁰ As has been noted before, asylum seekers are increasingly perceived as economic migrants who has economic reasons for emigrate instead of a need in protection. Hence, right-wing parties’ anti-immigrant discourses

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁵⁷ Khalid Koser, “When is Migration a Security Issue”, 31/03/2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/when-is-migration-a-security-issue/>, [accessed 02.03.2018].

¹⁵⁸ A. Ceylan and A. Tsoukala, Op. Cit., p. 28.

¹⁵⁹ Khalid Koser, “When is Migration a Security Issue”.

¹⁶⁰ A. Ceylan and A. Tsoukala, Op. Cit., p. 28.

worsen the existing negative situations of migrants and asylum seekers as an illegitimate presence and scapegoat in host societies.

Since migration is linked to terrorism not just petty crime, it has been a hot topic and a public concern in receiving societies in recent years. Public fears related to terrorism, refugees, and criminality have grown in the West and the concerns about the effectiveness of the immigration policies and systems of states have been raised in host societies.¹⁶¹ Terrorist attacks in Orlando and Brussels in 2016 and Paris and San Bernardino in 2015 were linked to ISIS and Muslim extremists escalated fear toward migrants and refugees and calls for restrictive immigration policies. For instance, after these terrorist attacks some voices in the United States have called for a “*total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the country*”.¹⁶² Concerning European radical right parties, they take advantage of these existing fear and concerns in order to mainstream themselves. They utilize this criminal-migrant thesis to stop immigration and call for stricter visa requirements and identity controls as well as to justify greater surveillance, detention, deportation and more restrictive policies in relevant political communities. Özerim argues that these parties use these internal security concerns aiming at creating a perception in the public that “migrant” or “foreigner” is a potential “foreigner terrorist”.¹⁶³ Another point to be mentioned is that, while these parties welcome the European immigrants from an EU member state, other than their country, they portray migrants and asylum seekers coming mostly from countries in the Middle East and Africa as a threat to public safety and national security. Especially, Muslims are targeted of these internal security concerns of these discourses.

¹⁶¹ Sara McElmurry, Juliana Kerr, Theresa Cardinal Brown and Lazaro Zamora, “Balancing Priorities: Immigration, National Security, and Public Safety”, Chicago: **Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Bipartisan Policy Center**, 2016, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/oct16_immigrationandnationalsecurity_report.pdf, p. 4.

¹⁶² Sara McElmurry et al., *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶³ Mehmet G. Özerim, “Avrupa’da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göç Karşıtlığı: Güvenlik Temaları Ekseninde Göç Karşıtı Söylemin İnşası” (**Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi**, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi SBE, 2012), p. 96.

2.4.2 The Role of Routines and Technologies

As has already been mentioned the Paris School¹⁶⁴ prioritizes the non-discursive practices over discourses in the securitization process. For the Paris School,

*the (in)securitization process has not only to do with a successful political speech act transforming the decision making process and generating politics of exception often favoring coercive options. It has to do with more mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics, with Weberian routines of rationalization, of management of numbers instead of management of persons, of use of technologies, especially the ones which permit communication and surveillance at a distance through databases and speed of exchange of information.*¹⁶⁵

In line with Paris School of Security Studies Didier Bigo puts forward this as (Bigo, 2002, pp. 65-66)

*[t]he securitization of immigration (...) emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (...). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific habitus of the 'security professional' with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear and unease.*¹⁶⁶

For Bigo migration can be securitized in the absence of discourses through security technology, professional security knowledge and bureaucratic practices.¹⁶⁷ He argues that in an 'insecurity continuum'¹⁶⁸ migration, transnational terrorism, crime, political violence, and cultural deprivation are linked together. Therefore, migrants are treated as "'risky' outsiders".¹⁶⁹

Jef Huysmans is another scholar who examines the securitization of migration in line with a Foucauldian approach. Huysmans states that securitization of migration is a "combination of technocratic and political process in which professional agencies- such as police and customs- and political agents- such as social movements and political parties

¹⁶⁴ Didier Bigo, "Chapter 9: International Political Sociology", in Paul D. Williams (Ed.), **Security Studies: An Introduction**, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp.116-129.

¹⁶⁵ Didier Bigo, "Chapter 9: International Political Sociology", p. 126.

¹⁶⁶ Sarah Leonard, "EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices", p. 235.

¹⁶⁷ Burcu Togrul Koca, "Syrian refugees in Turkey: from 'guests' to 'enemies'", p. 58.

¹⁶⁸ Didier Bigo, "Immigration controls and free movement in Europe", **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol. 91, No. 875, September 2009, p. 585.

¹⁶⁹ Burcu Togrul Koca, "Syrian refugees in Turkey: from 'guests' to 'enemies'", p. 60.

has an important role.”¹⁷⁰ He argues that “even when not directly spoken of as a security threat, asylum can be portrayed as a security problem by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy framework that [emphasize] policing and defense.”¹⁷¹ For Huysmans securitization is a technocratic process, thus he lays stress on the role of technology in the process of securitization. Technology is important according to him, since he claims that technological devices are the instruments that both shape the alternative policies available for decision- makers as well as tools used to implement the policy decisions taken by them.¹⁷² Technological devices such as radars, satellites, infra-red cameras, sensors are used to tighten the border surveillance and border control, which was initially developed to cope with the counter-terrorism.¹⁷³

2.5 Conclusion

After the demise of Cold War, the concept of security has undergone a transformation and it has been widened and deepened to capture migration issue. In this context, securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School is one of the theories of Security Studies established after the Cold War. According to Copenhagen School security threats are socially constructed by security actors in a process called securitization. For Copenhagen School, securitization is discursive, socially constituted, and intersubjective. Thus, the School puts emphasis on the discursive construction of security threats.

The literature on securitization theory is mainly based on two logics: logic of exception and the logic of routine. As pointed out earlier logic of exception lays stress on the role of discourse in a securitization process. It has been argued by some scholars that issues can be securitized not only through speech acts but also through practices (logic of routine). Similarly, some research show that analyzing speech acts of securitizing actors on an issue in a particular political community may indicate that the issue examined is

¹⁷⁰ Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 751-752.

¹⁷¹ Jef Huysmans, **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**.

¹⁷² Sarah Leonard, “The ‘Securitization’, Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School’s Framework”, p. 16.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p. 16.

not discursively securitized, whereas, at the same time, analyzing non-discursive practices on the same issue such as restrictive border controls, implementation of surveillance, mandatory detention etc. may assert the contrary.¹⁷⁴

Migration can be securitized both through exceptionalist security discourses of political agents and non-discursive practices by different theory schools. The securitization approach of Copenhagen School has been applied by various scholars to explore the discursive construction of migration as a security threat, especially through the speech act of politicians. This study aims at analyzing the migration- security nexus in France by analyzing the security discourses of Marine Le Pen, the leader of FN, on immigration.

To conclude, acknowledging the role of practices in the securitization of migration process, this study will focus on the role of discourses on securitization of migration by analyzing the discourses of FN in France. In fact, this study seeks to explore the role of FN (as one of the securitizing actors) in the securitizing of migration process in France, thus its anti-migrant discourses needs to be analysed. In the meantime, in order to have a broad understanding some practices taken by the French government will be also mentioned at a point when it is appropriate in the second chapter of this study in which the securitization of migration in France will be assessed. Nevertheless, analyzing the role of routines necessitates an in-depth empirical analysis which can be a concern of another study.

¹⁷⁴ Sarah Leonard argues that analyzing practices rather than discourses is more important in securitization of migration in the EU through emphasizing that the “official discourses of EU institutions on asylum and migration policy, tend to frame migration mainly as humanitarian issues, however the EU migration policies that include restrictive border controls, visa requirements, mandatory detention etc. point out the securitization.” (Sarah Leonard, “EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices”, p. 235.)

3 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN FRANCE

3.1 Introduction

To talk about the history immigration is to talk about the history of France; it's history, our culture. That is how our history was made. Our country wouldn't be what it is today without this proliferation of talent and strengths. Of course this immigration has also, throughout its history, created frustration, rifts and friction; we must neither ignore the talent nor conceal the fear.¹⁷⁵

(President M. François Hollande, 15 December 2014)

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the history of immigration and the transformation of the immigration policy in France in order to shed light on how migration has been turned into a security issue in France. Radical right parties' anti-migrant, xenophobic and racist discourses have been affected by the socio-political histories of their relevant societies, thus their current discourses can not be fully understood without exploring the historical, social and cultural characteristic of their countries. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, there is a need to explore the historical, social and cultural characteristic of France, which will be explained in this chapter.

Moreover, mass migration has been considered as a major reason behind the rise of the radical right, particularly in Western Europe.¹⁷⁶ As mentioned earlier, European radical right parties are one of the securitizing actors of migration phenomenon while they also take advantage of the consequences of this securitization process to mainstream themselves in their states. Thus, it is worth mentioning that, though the reasons behind the rise of FN will not be explored in this study, analyzing the politics of immigration in France will provide some information behind its rise. Hence, it is argued that the recent success of Marine Le Pen, the leader of FN, at the latest presidential elections was due to its anti-migrant discourses integrated to their elections campaigns, party manifestos, slogans and posters by relating them with security issues, meanwhile taking advantage of

¹⁷⁵ Speech by M. François Hollande, "Immigration is part of France's national history- President", <https://uk.ambafrance.org/Immigration-is-part-of-France-s>, 15.12.2014, [accessed 05.02.2018].

¹⁷⁶ Cas Mudde, **Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 9.

already existing fear, unease and prejudices towards immigrants, particularly Muslims, which have been accelerated after the “January 7, 2015 satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo attacks with 12 deaths and 11 injuries”¹⁷⁷, “the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks with 130 deaths and 368 injuries, and the 2016 Nice attack, resulting in the deaths of 86 people.”¹⁷⁸ Following Paris attacks, France has been in a state of emergency that gives the police additional powers to search and arrest, contributing to the existing anti-immigrant sentiments, prejudices and fear (mostly towards Muslims). Recently migration has been one of the hottest topics debated in France due to the above mentioned attacks and the so-called 2015/2016 Syrian refugee “crisis”. In most of the European countries, media representation of this “crisis” together with the discourses of right-wing parties have paved the way for construction of refugees as a security threat to national and internal security of receiving countries by claiming that terrorists or ISIS supporters may enter their borders along with refugees, thus may cause insecurity in the host societies. Indeed, European Union has been criticized for their response to Syrian refugee “crisis” as being non-compliance with basic refugee and human rights norms.

France is an interesting case to examine the radical right parties in relation with securitization of migration. It is an old immigration country since about a quarter of its population has immigrant roots. Indeed, migration issue has been a prominent topic in French political debates since mid-1970s considering that “*immigration is a part of France’s national history.*”¹⁷⁹ France also has a long history of anti-immigrant radical right-wing parties. Front National is the most prominent one among them, which was founded in 1972, under Jean-Marie Le Pen. Though, migration has been constructed as a security threat by discourses of political elites and of media resulting in restricting migration policies, it was not treated as a constant security issue throughout French history. Besides, securitization of migration is not a new phenomenon in France. As Benson explores there is an increasing rise in framing migration as a security issue rather than an economic one in France.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, Philippe Bourbeau examines the

¹⁷⁷ Øyvind Bugge Solheim, “Are we all Charlie? Tolerance and immigration attitudes after the Charlie Hebdo attacks”, Paper prepared for the **ECPR General Conference** at the University of Oslo, Norway, 6-9 September 2017, Early Draft, 31 August 2017, p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ Emre Göksu and Arda Demirci, “Consolidating National Security & Changing Immigration Policies, Report, French Cabinet, 2017.

¹⁷⁹ Speech by M. François Hollande, Op. Cit.

¹⁸⁰ Rodney Benson, Op. Cit.

securitization of migration in France and Canada in his book *Study of Movement and Order* and defines securitization as the “*process of integrating migrants discursively and institutionally into security framework that emphasize policing and defence.*”¹⁸¹ By doing that, he applied both the logic of exception and logic of routine explained in the second chapter of this study to his research. According to him, in France migration is strongly securitized through various speech acts and immigration laws that have been applied in the country.

In this chapter, the immigration laws that were passed after the postwar period in France as well as some discourses of political leaders on immigration will be explored. By the end of World War I (WWI), in France immigration was free and spontaneous and most of the immigrants came from neighboring countries such as Italy, Spain, Belgium and Switzerland who were shortly assimilated into the French culture.¹⁸² Following to WWII, France required foreign labour in order to reconstruct its collapsed economy, thus received migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁸³ In the 1970s immigration increasingly became a public concern due to the economic recession following the oil crisis of 1973 that increased unemployment rates. As a result, the labour migration was officially stopped in 1974, and more restrictive migration policies were applied in France.¹⁸⁴ Migration policies have become more stricter over time in France. To put it differently, when immigration was halted officially in 1974 in France, France switched from permissive immigration policies to restrictive ones. Since then, French immigration policy has focused mainly on stemming and deterring migration.¹⁸⁵ As France has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe, for the purpose of this chapter, the attitudes/hostility towards Muslim communities in France will be also underlined. Though the debates about the incompatibility of Islam with French identity and democracy dated back to early 1980s, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the securitization of migration deepened in the West as well as in France. Since then, Islam has been securitized and served as the “Other” for the definition

¹⁸¹ Philippe Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order*, p. 43.

¹⁸² Encyclopedia Britannica, “France”, www.britannica.com/place/France, [accessed 25.03.2018].

¹⁸³ Ayhan Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition, 2009, p. 63.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁸⁵ Virginie Guiraudon, “Immigration policy in France”, www.brookings.edu/articles/immigration-policy-in-france/, 01.07.2001. [accessed 24.03.2018]

of “We” identity in France (as generally in West) and treated as the “alien” by far/extreme /radical right parties. As mentioned earlier, the European radical right parties have prominent role in shaping the perception of migration by discursively constructing this phenomenon as a security threat in their political communities and in particular Islam, thus Muslim immigrants have been constructed as a threat to their cultural identity and internal security by these parties and the media. To illustrate, the ex-French president, François Hollande told the Le Monde journalists that France has “*a problem with Islam.*”¹⁸⁶ Following terrorist attacks of Paris and Nice, the anti-migrant sentiments accelerated in France, paving the way for the rise of Front National in 2017 presidential elections. For the purpose of this paper, the socio-cultural characteristic of France will also be explained.

Last but not least, the European Union official documents, protocols, and treaties are also important in the securitizing migration in France besides national immigration laws. Since the member states are committed to EU treaties and protocols. Both the Schengen Agreement (1985), and the Dublin Convention (1990) institutionalize the securitization of migration in the EU. With the treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the community became fully responsible for immigration policy.¹⁸⁷

In the following section, the historical overview of French migration history will be explained in three periods in order to capture the developments of immigration policies since WWII in France including the socio-cultural characteristic of France. After that, France response to the European refugee “crisis” will be analysed in the last section of this chapter.

¹⁸⁶ Kim Willsher, “François Hollande: France has ‘a problem with Islam’”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/12/francois-hollande-france-has-a-problem-with-islam-french-president-book-nicolas-sarkozy-little-de-gaulle>, 12.10.2016, [accessed 04.04.2018].

¹⁸⁷ Philippe Bourbeau, **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, p. 25.

3.2 Policies and Discourses on Migration in France in the Post-war Period: A Historical Overview

“Immigration is a part of France’s national history.”¹⁸⁸ In fact, this point was stated by the former President M. François Hollande at the opening ceremony of the Museum of the History of Immigration held on 15 December 2014 in Paris

*France is a country with a long history of immigration, one of the European countries with the longest history of immigration. Begun in the second half of the 19th century to meet the needs of what was called the first Industrial Revolution, immigration continued throughout the 20th century and increased with the rebuilding of the country after the war, with decolonization and finally globalization. Today one in every four French people has at least one foreign grandparent. To talk about the history immigration is to talk about the history of France; it’s history, our culture.*¹⁸⁹

Hollande briefly summarized the history of immigration of France above. As also can be seen from the speech of Hollande, France has a long history of immigration dating back to mid-19th century. Even as an old immigration country, immigrants have posed a sensitive political issue in France since the early- 1970s. This section outlines an overview of history of immigration and French migration policies since the Second World War (WWII) together with political discourses around it and aspects of anti-migrant sentiments in the post-war period.

Aiming at analysing the immigration question of France within the security context in this chapter, the developments of immigration policies since the WWII will be outlined in three periods: 1) 1945- 1974, 2) 1974- 2000 3) 2001- 2017. As earlier noted, the transformation of immigration policies into a more restrictive ones began early-1970s following to oil crisis of 1973 and immigration was halted in 1974, thus the first period will be taken as 1945- 1974. The second period will be between 1974- 2000. Since September 11 attacks plays a crucial role in deepening the securitization of migration in West, considering the impact of the attacks on migration issue 2001- 2017 will be analysed as the third period.

¹⁸⁸ Speech by M. François Hollande, Op. Cit.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

3.2.1 Immigration Policies Between 1945- 1974

There is a need to shed light on the changing composition of the immigrants residing in France over time in order to understand the rising anti- migrant sentiments and hostility towards Muslims in French society. By the end of the First World War (WWI), in France immigration was free and spontaneous and most of the immigrants came from neighboring countries such as Italy, Spain, Belgium and Switzerland who were shortly assimilated into the French culture.¹⁹⁰ At this time period immigration was welcomed by French society. Indeed, France was regarded as “being the European country most open to immigrants, including political refugees in the early 20th century.”¹⁹¹ In fact, between 1921- 1926 France received more than one million immigrants mostly from European countries.

Following the WWII, France required foreign labour in order to reconstruct its collapsed economy, thus received migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁹² Due to shortage in workforce in order to recruit and place foreign workers in French economy, the National Immigration Office (OIN) was established by the ordonnance of November 2, 1945- the first act through which the French state coordinated immigration flow.¹⁹³ In other words, the French state wanted to control the increase in immigration and guarantee the selection of proper candidates according to age, medical and professional criteria by the OIN.¹⁹⁴ Hence, after the WWII, France welcomed foreign labour from southern European countries and its former African colonies through signing bilateral agreements. By the early 1960s European migrants had the greatest proportion in immigrant population in France. In between 1955- 1961, the source countries of immigration were mainly Italy and Spain. In addition, owing to bilateral agreement signed with Portugal in 1963, Portuguese immigrants considerably

¹⁹⁰ Encyclopedia Britannica, “France”.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ayhan Kaya, **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, p. 63.

¹⁹³ Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz and Florence Lévy, “Family Migration Policies in France”, **International Centre for Migration Policy Development and New Orientations for Democracy in Europe Research**, January 2010, p. 4.

¹⁹⁴ Maxim Silverman, **Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France**, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 40.

increased during the 1960s. In 1960s, France also received immigration from North and West Africa, consequently Muslim immigrants in France increased after 1962. Immigration from Algeria began in the colonial period and was followed and increased after Algeria became independent in 1962. Until the beginning of the 1960s, Algerians had the right to enter and stay in France, thus Algerians had the greatest proportion in immigrant population. To balance the number of Algerians, France signed bilateral agreement in 1964 with Algeria after its independence. Additionally, France signed agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Mali and Mauritania in 1963 and with Senegal in 1964. Moreover, bilateral agreements were signed with Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1965. In addition to this legal channel through bilateral agreements, private companies also recruited foreign labor from colonies, without state institutions' control. More precisely, it is clear that state's intention to control the immigration flow did not take place in practice. Thus, the number of immigrants from its colonies raised considerably during this period including mostly migrants from predominantly Muslim populated countries. Muslims. In the light of this information, it is clear that France received immigrants also from countries other than Europe since the 1960s, consequently the composition of immigrants in France changed since then. Indeed, while approximately two million European immigrants and 650,000 Africans lived in France by 1968, the number of African immigrants raised to 1,57 million where there were 1,75 million Europeans by 1982.¹⁹⁵

It is also important to underline the fact that this period was regarded as “‘spontaneous’ and ‘uncontrolled’ immigration”¹⁹⁶ since as mentioned above private companies also recruited foreign labor from colonies, without state institutions' control particularly between 1955- 1968. Moreover, a significant number of immigrants after entering France on a tourist visa over stayed then regularized later by ONI. Indeed, as Silverman states between 1965- 1970 approximately 65 per cent of entries were legalized *a posteriori* which means that they did not enter the country through the official channel.¹⁹⁷ Despite the considerable number of illegal migration during this period, this

¹⁹⁵ Hans-George Betz, “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe”, **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 25, No: 4, July 1993, p. 416.

¹⁹⁶ Maxim Silverman, Op. Cit., p. 44.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

was not seen as a problem by legal authorities and French society due to the fact that “migration was regarded as compulsory and essential to economic expansion and reconstruction of the country, thus as necessary.”¹⁹⁸ Indeed, regarding political discourse on immigration, to give examples, in 1963, Georges Pompidou (as the President) stated that “*immigration is a means of creating a certain flexibility in the labour market and avoiding social tension*”,¹⁹⁹ likewise the Minister of Social Affairs Jean-Marcel Jeanneney said in 1966 that “*Illegal immigration itself is not without a certain value, for were we to pursue a policy of strict enforcement of the rules and international agreements governing this area, we would perhaps lack the manpower we need*”.²⁰⁰

Another debate on migration issue was the desire to increase the French population that suffered demographic decline (The domestic birth rates in France decreased, thus the country facing the demographic decline as it is today), which required permanent migration. Indeed, the country faced with demographic crisis after the WWII. Thus, with the ordinance of 1945 the migration policy was determined as residence permits and work permits and the government opened its borders to workers and to their families. Kaya argues that due to this policy migrants view themselves as permanent residents instead of temporary workers.²⁰¹ It seems crucial at this point to mention that although France encouraged permanent migration after the WWII, the general expectation was that recruited labor was temporary in the country and would return back to their home countries.²⁰² It can be said that the discourse on the dichotomy between temporary and permanent was an important factor in the construction of the ‘problem’ of immigration in France since the realization that immigrants were permanent rather than temporary in early 1980s raised the anti-migrant sentiments in France.

Concerning their socio-economic and political conditions, immigrants were marginalized and excluded from the participation in French society. They often did

¹⁹⁸ Alec G. Hargreaves, **Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, politics, culture and society**, New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2007, p. 16.

¹⁹⁹ Maxim Silverman, Op. Cit., p. 44

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁰¹ Ayhan Kaya, **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, p. 63.

²⁰² Pamela Irving Jackson and Roderick Parkes, “The Securitization of Immigration Policy, Shifts in National Immigrant Integration Models and the Incarceration of Immigrants in Germany, France, and Britain 1970-2003”, **Humboldt Journal of Social Relations**, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 2008, p. 61.

unqualified jobs, were paid less salaries and their illegal situation (if any) was exploited by the employers. Since immigrants did not hold French citizenship, they did not have the same political and legal rights as French citizens. They were accommodated in the shanty towns ('bidonvilles') which were on the peripheries of the cities. In fact, the crisis in housing for immigrants during early 1960s made government to take official attempts aiming to cover the needs of immigrant workers regarding the problems of immigrant housing. It can be noted here that, as Silverman states, the state had to face with the social dimension of immigration by the virtue of this development.²⁰³

During the late-1960s the social problems caused by immigrants from Africa, and in particular from North Africa were expressed by some official units resulting in a call for a new immigration policy with a quota system that would privilege those who could easily adapt to the French society.²⁰⁴ In the 1970s immigration increasingly became a public concern due to the economic recession following the oil crisis of 1973 that increased unemployment rates. As a result, the labour migration was stopped in 1974, and more restrictive migration policies were applied in France.²⁰⁵ At this point, it seems necessary to mention that Front National (FN) was founded in 1972 under Jean-Marie Le Pen, but it did not get remarkable support until 1983.

3.2.2 French Politics of Immigration Between 1974- 2000

The economic downturns following to oil crisis of 1973 resulted in high unemployment rates in France and consequently in a change in political rhetoric on immigration issue. More precisely, high unemployment rates gave rise to xenophobic sentiments in public opinion and in political rhetoric. Due to the fear of rising unemployment, labor migration was banned in 1974 under the center-right presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974- 1981). Hence, in order to restrict the immigration flow to France, the government refused to renew immigrants' residency permits during Giscard presidency. Indeed, Kaya stated that "the governments of Jacques Chirac (1974-

²⁰³ Maxim Silverman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 46.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁰⁵ Ayhan Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization*, p. 64.

1976) and Raymond Barre (1976- 1981) tried to stop family unification by denying visas and deporting family members.”²⁰⁶ As mentioned in the previous section, until the late 1960s immigration was presented as a need for an growing economy of France and for its weak demographic growth by political discourses. However, following to economic downturns in the 1970s, through political rhetoric the link between immigration, unemployment and economic crisis was established paving the way for securitization of migration. To illustrate, in January 1976, the Prime Minister Jacques Chirac said that

*“A country which has 900,000 unemployed but more than two million immigrant workers is not a country in which the problem of jobs is insoluble. It requires a systematic revalorization of the condition of manual workers in sectors which are being abandoned by French workers.”*²⁰⁷

As can be understood from Chirac’s words, he suggested a solution to unemployment of the French through undertaking the jobs of immigrants in sectors that they had not preferred to work yet. Shortly, immigrants were portrayed as the source of unemployment in the country, in other words, as a threat to their economic security.

The ban on labor migration did not necessarily mean that there were no immigration flows to the country. Hence, France has continued to receive legal immigrants, with approximately 100,000 new entries per year after the halt on labor migration in 1974.²⁰⁸ The legal immigration has continued through the movements of EU immigrants, family members of legal residents as well as refugees and asylum-seekers whose rights are protected by constitutional and international law.²⁰⁹ Thus, immigrant population has increased in France throughout the years although “zero migration” was intended to have been achieved since 1974. Immigrants has also been crossing the border illegally for decades in a search of a better life. The developments resulting in an increase in immigrant population; their effects on discourses on migration will be explained below.

²⁰⁶ Ayhan Kaya, **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, p. 68.

²⁰⁷ Maxim Silverman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 90.

²⁰⁸ Virginie Guiraudon, “Immigration policy in France”.

²⁰⁹ The rights of immigrants (for family reunification), asylum-seekers and refugees were protected by national laws and international agreements. Since the late 1970s, as Guiraudon states, “France’s highest administrative court naming Conseil d’Etat had a crucial role in defending these migrants against the French governments who have wanted to stop migration flows and issue more exculsion order.” (Virginie Guiraudon, “Immigration policy in France”.)

As mentioned above, although economic migration was banned in 1974, immigration in France continued through family reunification, thus despite the legal difficulties many women and children emigrated from North Africa, Central Africa, and Turkey in order to reunite their family members. On the one hand, family settlement of Italians and Spaniards were encouraged by the French government after the WWII as well as the family immigration from Portuguese was facilitated after the 1960s. On the other hand, immigrants from Africa and Asia faced difficulties regarding family unification. In France, family unification is generally seen as the source of unwanted North African immigration.²¹⁰ As Hargreaves stated it was hoped that the bad housing conditions of immigrants from Africa which were not suitable for families would persuade those immigrants not to bring their families to France to join them.²¹¹ However, it was not the fact and family reunification of immigrants from Africa and Asia increased considerably during 1970s. Consequently, the gap between men and women decreased and Muslim population in France increased. To put it differently, these developments resulted in a changing composition of immigrant population in France bringing immigrants into contact with the French on daily basis. Indeed, the presence of immigrants who stayed mostly in the 'bidonvilles' after work was not felt by the French. However, with family migration in the early-1980s migrants emigrated from Africa and Asia, mostly Muslims, became instantly visible in daily life because of their skin color and other somatic features.²¹² In the early 1980s permanent nature of immigration was realized, particularly the officials realized that non-European immigrants would stay in the country contrary to what they had believed. This public visibility of immigrants in daily life and their children entering at the schools resulted in a debate on integration of migrants into the French society in 1980s. At this juncture, it can be noted here that since 1980s the debates on immigration has mostly emphasized the inassimilability of non-European immigrants due to cultural differences contrary to assimilability of European immigrants.²¹³ Shortly, it has been believed in France that it was difficult to incorporate those non-European

²¹⁰ Martin A. Schain, **The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: A Comparative Study**, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd Edition, 2012, p. 68.

²¹¹ Alec G. Hargreaves, Op. Cit., p. 23.

²¹² Ibid., p. 26.

²¹³ Maxim Silverman, Op. Cit., p. 95

migrants, mostly Muslims into French society. The debates on integration of immigrants will be mentioned later throughout this section.

Besides immigration through family reunification since 1970s, the number of refugees and illegal migrants looking for a better life increased dramatically in the 1980s. Until the late 1970s those who were granted refugee status by France were mostly Europeans fleeing the Soviet bloc.²¹⁴ France also granted refugee status to asylum-seekers from South-East Asia (mostly Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians and Chinese nationals) during the 1970s. Hargreaves underlines the fact that although the refugees coming from South-East Asia faced little hostility in French society, the grievances and hostility considerably increased towards the refugees from Africa in 1980s.²¹⁵ This is because, during this period, there was a wide concern that those coming from Africa who had applied for asylum were mostly economic migrants rather than refugees.²¹⁶ This discourse has been articulated as today by the most European politicians, particularly by European radical right wing parties and media regarding Syrian refugees fleeing from the Syrian civil war of 2011. Furthermore, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in France has grown since the late-1980s due to international developments such as collapse of Berlin Wall, disintegration of Yugoslavia, Gulf War in the 1990s etc. To illustrate, in 1981, 20,000 people applied for asylum in France which increased to 61,000 in 1989. Meanwhile, the number of people whose application was rejected rose from 22 to 72 per cent by 1990.²¹⁷ It should be also noted that many of the people who was not granted refugee status remained in France illegally. Indeed, as stated by Halgreaves, approximately 100,000 people whose asylum applications were rejected continued to live in France illegally by 1990.²¹⁸ Besides, to give a broader picture, in the mid-1980s, Western European states decided to reorganise their asylum policy due to the dramatic increase of asylum-seekers in Europe. Indeed, in 1973, 13,000 people applied for asylum in Western Europe, this number had increased to 77,000 by 1979 and reached a peak in

²¹⁴ Alec G. Hargreaves, *Op. Cit.*, p. 27.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

1992 with 692,685 applications.²¹⁹ Consequently, the Single European act which aimed to abolish internal borders in the EU entered into force on July 1, 1987²²⁰.

In the previous section of this chapter, the changing character of immigrant population has been mentioned. To reiterate, by the early 1960 European migrants had the greatest proportion in immigrant population in France. Since the early 1960s when France received immigrants also from countries other than Europe, the composition of immigrants in France changed since then because of the developments mentioned above. The below-given table and figure show the main nationality groups as percentage of French foreign populations.

Table 1: Main nationality groups as percentage of France’s foreign population (Asians include Turks)

	1946	1954	1962	1968	1975	1982	1990	1999
Europeans	88.7	79.1	72.2	71.6	60.7	47.6	40.6	41.3
Maghrebis	2.3	12.9	18.9	23.6	32.3	38.8	38.7	34.8
Other Africans	0.8	0.1	0.8	1.2	2.3	4.2	11.8	8.7
Asians	4.0	2.3	1.7	1.7	3.0	7.8	6.7	12.5
Others	4.2	5.6	6.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	2.2	2.7
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Philippe Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order*, 2011, p. 12.




Figure 2: Main nationality groups as percentage of France’s foreign population

²¹⁹ Majid Tehranian, “Cultural Security and Global Governance: International Migration and Negotiations of Identity”, Jonathan Friedman and Shalina Randeria (Ed.), in book **Words on the Move: Globalization, Migration, and Cultural Security**, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 18- 19.

²²⁰ The Single European Act was the first attempt to have a Europe without frontiers by going further to ensure Union than had any agreements before it. (Britannica.com)

Since this study aims at discursive construction of migration as a threat in France by radical right parties, it seems necessary to mention the rise of radical right in France at this juncture. Both the sheer numbers and the increasing visibility of non-European immigrants in the public era resulted in concerns about national identity, assimilation, and ethnic balance debates around immigration which had contributed to the xenophobic sentiments in France in the mid-1980s paving the way for the rise of radical right parties. Indeed, France saw the rise of radical right-wing Front National in the 1980s. For instance, in 1984 Front National won municipal elections in Dreux, an industrial town in the west of Paris, through an election campaign on a call to stop immigration and the deportation of thousands of African immigrants.²²¹ As can be seen the racist, anti-immigrant discourses gained ground in the 1980s in France. It seems equally important to mention the effect of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on the perception of Muslims by European society. Hargreaves argued that West faced with an aggressive Islamic dimension during the Iranian Revolution and this perception continued in international politics ever after. This event together with a sudden rise in the visibility of Muslims in France gave a rise to a perception in the minds of many politicians and public that ‘Muslims’ were ‘fundamentalists’.²²²

Following these developments, during the 1980s and 1990s integration of these immigrants into French “melting pot” was the main concern of public debates. Debates on nationality in 1987 and the ‘headscarf affair of 1989’ were some examples among them. Regarding integration policies, France has followed assimilationist policies on international migration since 1980s, thus “expects all immigrants to leave their past national and cultural identities and melt into French culture.”²²³ However, although there are immigrants who have integrated into French culture, a significant number of immigrants want to preserve their religious, cultural and/or national identities in France as well as in other European countries. Thus, its assimilationist policies were questioned by immigrants, mostly by Muslims, who want to preserve their identities. We should underline the fact that their contemporary demands on preserving their identities and multiculturalism dated back to early- 1980s. To attest this, the second generation North

²²¹ Philippe Bourbeau, **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, p. 13.

²²² Alec G. Hargreaves, *Op. Cit.*, p. 108.

²²³ Majid Tehranian, *Op. Cit.*, p. 16.

African immigrants' movement occurred between October – December 1983 in France. Consequently, French public opinion started to pay more attention on question of immigration when other cultures were begun to be welcomed by French society.²²⁴ Regardingly, Kaya also emphasizes that there are notable challenges to the republican understanding in France by underlining the fact that there has been continuing demonstrations in the cities raised by North African origin Beurs since the early 1990s.²²⁵ It is worth noting that these 'second generation movements' since the 1980s have been paving the way for anti-immigrant sentiments in France. Furthermore, during this period, as Hargreaves points out, Muslim immigrants were blamed as being reluctant to adopt French culture and portrayed as a serious threat to French national identity, cultural homogeneity and social cohesion by not just radical right-wing political parties but also mainstream political parties, and media.²²⁶ To corroborate this, media gave a great attention to the 'ghettos' at the end of the 1980s in France aiming at stressing the inassimibility of non-European immigrants, mostly Muslims in French culture. To this end, the term 'ghetto' was portrayed as a new and alien phenomenon for France by media.²²⁷ This was pointed out by Silverman in the following way; in France "*the problems of the suburbs were represented as part of 'the problem of immigration' and 'ghettos' were used to refer the assimilation of European immigrants and the inassimilability of non-European immigrants in French society by media.*"²²⁸ To put it differently, the term 'ghettos' were used to imply the cultural homogeneity of France before immigration from non-European countries. It seems clear that media played a crucial role in the securitization of migration during this period through representing non-European immigrants as a threat to cultural security of French society.

The major debates around immigration during the 1980s and 1990s are pointed out in this section since these debates plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of public opinion on migration, and the way the political elites handle the question of migration affects the migration policies in relevant countries. Indeed, Silverman highlights that

²²⁴ Yvon Gastaut, "French public opinion of immigration since 1945, continuity and change", Université de Nice, <http://barthes.enssib.fr/clio/revues/AHI/articles/english/gastauteng.html>, 18.05.2001, [accessed 10.09.2018].

²²⁵ Ayhan Kaya, **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, p. 2.

²²⁶ Alec G. Hargreaves, Op. Cit., p. 4.

²²⁷ Maxim Silverman, Op. Cit., p. 98.

²²⁸ Ibid, p. 99.

*“immigration control in France during 1990s were influenced mostly by concerns about assimilation, ethnic balance and social cohesion.”*²²⁹ As pointed out earlier, France wanted to control migration flows to its border and reduce the immigrant population in the country, thus official rhetoric frequently put emphasis on the importance of controlling migration flows to France and fighting against illegal migration. Indeed, to illustrate, in 1991 Philippe Marchand stated that *“Uncontrolled migratory movement would be a threat against our fundamental national interests.”*²³⁰ Similarly, Charles Pasqua in 1993 said that *“France does not want to be an immigration country anymore. The objective is now “immigration zero.”*²³¹

In the light of above-mentioned developments during the 1990s the immigration policy were restricted, consequently restrictive laws were passed in France. The Pasqua Law (1993) and the Debré Law (1997) were the important ones among them. The Pasqua Law strengthens restrictive measures to prevent access of immigrants to French territory, and limits the entry and residence of many immigrants from different categories whereas the Debré Law (1997) hardens detention provisions and increase police powers.²³² It is also worth mentioning the France’s White Paper on Defence issued in 1994 since it discusses the link between migration and security stating that the large-scale migration movement poses threat to France’s security interests.²³³ According to the White Paper, bad economic conditions in developing countries could provoke mass migratory movements resulting in crisis and armed conflicts in receiving countries (Ministère de la Défense 1994: 11).²³⁴

Last but not least, the European Union official documents, protocols, and treaties are also important in the securitizing migration in France besides national immigration laws. Both the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Dublin Convention (1990) institutionalize the securitization of migration. The abolition of internal borders through Schengen Agreement within the community has followed by increased security measures

²²⁹ Maxim Silverman, Op. Cit., p. 77.

²³⁰ Philippe Bourbeau, **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, p. 52.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 52.

²³² Ibid., p. 25.

²³³ Ibid., p. 11.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 52.

and particularly by coordination on surveillance of borders.²³⁵ Immigration and asylum policy became a community matter with the entry into force of the treaty of Amsterdam (1997).²³⁶ As Bourbeau highlights the treaty of Amsterdam changed “*the nature of cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs among member states.*”²³⁷ As one of the object of the treaty is to

Maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security, and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration, and the prevention and combating of crime. (European Union 1997: Article B, p.5)

3.2.3 Politics of Immigration in France Between 2001 – 2017

11 September 2001, 2004 Madrid and 2005 London Attacks

2001 is an important year with regard to securitization of migration, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US opened an important period. As outlined in the second chapter of this study the events of September 11th reemphasized ‘security-migration nexus’ in the West. Especially within the context of US ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, the securitization of migration is deepened in the West and migration is linked to the issues of border control, drugs, organized crime and terrorism.

From this time on, Islam is constructed as an existential threat that necessitates an emergency political response outside the normal political bounds through ‘War on Terror’ discourse.²³⁸ To put it differently after the September 11 the idea that Islam must be altered in an attempt to be made compatible with democracy and modernization is constructed in European societies.²³⁹ Several terrorist attacks in European soils accelerated this securitization of Islam in Europe. Migrants, in particular Muslims have increasingly been linked to threats and risks and seen as the source of insecurity and unease in European states following to 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London attacks.²⁴⁰

²³⁵ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, “Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence”, **Journal Of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280, p. 3.

²³⁶ Philippe Bourbeau, **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, p. 25.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25

²³⁸ Jocelyne Cesari, *Op. Cit.*, p. 430.

²³⁹ Erhan Akdemir, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

Having these terrorist attacks in EU borders and events such as murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 and cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2006 the fear of insecurity and prejudices towards migrants, especially Muslims, in Europe increased. Regarding the political rhetoric at the EU level, extraordinary meetings were held after each of these terrorist attacks by the Council of Ministers in the area of Justice and Home affairs. The need to “strengthen controls at external borders” and the “risk of large-scale population movements” were stated after September 11 and a statement of “strengthening border controls” and a call for “creating an integrated borders management agency” were made after the Madrid and London attacks.²⁴¹ Protecting Europe’s external borders from unwanted migration and reinforcing the external borders against illegal migration have been one of the crucial topics in the agenda of the EU since the 9/11. As a consequence of constructing migration as a security threat, Western receiving states have started to take serious measures in order to restrict immigration, especially illegal and/or unwanted immigration, in an effort to cope with organized crimes (such as human smuggling) and with terrorism (which is linked to immigration since September 11) and to protect the socio-political cohesion of their nations.²⁴² Thereby, management of borders appears as a response to these perceived threat and rising fear towards migrants. In this regard, since September 11, international and external control of immigrants has increased. The EU strengthens its external border and European countries strengthen their internal border management and migration policies to keep out the unwanted and/or illegal migrants outside their borders.

In the lights of the above mentioned effects of September 11, 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London attacks on securitization of migration in Europe in general, France as a European country and a member of the EU is also affected by these attacks. Eventhough most of the Muslims are not extremist and they are not much different than the other citizens or residents from different religious or ethnic background, attacks of radical Islamists have paved the way for populist right to construct Islam as an alien and a threat to European societies. Considering that it has a significant amount of Muslim population, perceived threat and rising fear towards immigrants, in particular Muslims have increased

²⁴¹ Ayhan Kaya, **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, p. 15.

²⁴² Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration:...”, p. 2.

since these attacks in France. Indeed, research has shown that there was a considerable increase in the racist and xenophobic movements towards immigrants in France after these attacks. In particular, since these attacks were carried out by radical Islamists, raising violent incidents were mostly targeted against Muslims and mosques.²⁴³ To illustrate, in 2004, a total of 352 violent acts and threats against North Africans or Muslims were recorded in France.²⁴⁴ In 2005, 979 racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts and threats were reported by the French Ministry of the Interior.²⁴⁵ In addition, the violent urban disturbances of October- November 2005 in France also paved the way to strengthen negative representation of Muslim youth binding them to criminality.²⁴⁶ After cartoon crisis of 2006 there was a wide perception in European society that “*Muslims are making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon European states.*”²⁴⁷ The increasing fear against Muslims was also escalated due to the anti-migrant discourse used by the populist political parties and the media. Both mainstream and radical right parties have used the feeling of insecurity prevailing in French society for their electoral concerns. The debate on the incompatibility of Islam with Western values and democracy has been a prominent topic in France since the aftermath of these attacks. As a consequence of these integration debates, as well as anti-immigration (anti-Islam) media discourse and the political rhetoric, in 2004, France banned wearing religious symbols like the *hijab* in public schools. There have been applied serious limitations on Islamic religious practices in France to this day, which will be explained later in this section.

Characteristics of French Immigration Population

In order to understand better the anti-migrant sentiments and prejudices towards migrants, there is also a need to mention the cultural characteristic of French society. The changing composition of immigrants throughout French migration history was also mentioned in previous section. The current data on composition of immigration

²⁴³ EUMC, *The Annual Report on the Situation regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU*, 2006, p. 18.

²⁴⁴ EUMC, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p.73

²⁴⁵ FRA (the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights), *Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU*, 2007, p. 116.

²⁴⁶ EUMC, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p. 32.

²⁴⁷ EUMC, *Ibid.*, p. 32.

population in France will be given here since the integration policies and migration laws implemented in a country differs from others due to its historical and political background and the composition of its immigrant population. In 2016, 6.11 million Muslims residing in France make 9.6 percent of the total population of 63.6 million.²⁴⁸ In addition, according to the data given by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), in 2017, there is a total of 7.9 million international migrants living in France which constitutes 12.2 percentage of its total population. Considering these data, it can be clearly seen that most of the immigrant population in France are Muslims (mostly of those are Maghreb and sub-Saharan African origin). Another community that constitutes Muslims population is Turkish community whose number increases steadily. Indeed, France is an old immigration country having one of the biggest immigrant populations and Muslim population in Europe. These information can be also seen from the table given below which illustrates the immigrants by country of origin in France in 2014.

Table 2: Immigrants by country of birth in 2014

Immigrants by country of birth in 2014		
Country of birth	Metropolitan France	France
Portugal	615.132	615.573
Italy	286.187	286.709
Spain	246.409	247.019
Other countries of European Union (27)	719.324	722.238
Other countries of Europe	285.356	285.880
Algeria	773.742	774.266
Morocco	721.963	722.627
Tunisia	265.549	265.760
Other countries of Africa	833.032	848.958
Turkey	249.591	249.619
Other countries	852.030	948.709
Total	5.848.314	5.967.359

Metropolitan France and France (incl. Overseas territories)
Source: Insee, Population census 2014²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ Büşra Kepenek, “Avrupa’da İslam Düşmanlığı ve İslamofobi 2016”, in **Avrupa’da Göç ve İslamofobi**, Bünyemin Bezci, Soner Tauscher, Fikret Topal (Der), Sakarya Üniversitesi Diaspora Çalışmaları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi (DİAM), 2017, p. 134.

²⁴⁹ Immigrants by country of birth in 2014, https://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/data/france/immigrants-foreigners/countries-birth-immigrants/. [accessed 07.06.2018].




Figure 3: Immigrants by country of birth in 2014

It should be also noted that despite the legal difficulties family migration has the greatest proportion in permanent migration to France. The types of migration (whether economic, family, humanitarian, forced migration) also affect the governments' decision on integration policies and migration laws of the relevant countries. Diversity in culture, education and social capital within each immigrant population, which means various and/or different needs of each population make it more difficult for governments to manage the diversity.²⁵⁰ In this regard, in 2005, over 70 percent of family migration to France was from Africa, 48.6 of which are the migrants from Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia).²⁵¹ Besides, a growing Turkish community increases the number of Muslim community in French society. In addition, a migration flow to France from Central Europe and east varied already existing migrant composition making it even more complex.²⁵² Indeed, headscarf affairs in France in 2000s shows the difficulties in migration management and integration policies for France, which is committed to secularism.²⁵³

To give more recent data regarding legal migration and mobility to France the Figure 4 given below which demonstrates the reasons of the first residence permits given

²⁵⁰ Elizabet Collett and Milica Petrovic, **The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion**, Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014, p. 8.

²⁵¹ Hiroyuki Tanaka, "Immigration and the 2007 French Presidential Elections", **Immigration Backgrounder**, Migration Policy Institute, May 2007, No. 3, p. 2.

²⁵² Elizabet Collett and Milica Petrovic, Op. Cit., p. 8.

²⁵³ Kimberly Hamilton, Partick Simon, Clara Veniard, "The Challenge of French Diversity", <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/challenge-french-diversity>, 01.11.2004, [accessed 05.06.2018].

to immigrants and the Table 3 which shows the statistics for top five third- country nationalities who were given first residence permits by France between 2014- 2017 will also provide us adequate information about the composition of French immigrant population.²⁵⁴ As shown in the table, immigrants from Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) are still constituting high proportion of its total immigrant population. It is clear that the mobility of people from Africa due to family reunification/reasons increases the density of Muslim population in France, which is not welcomed by a significant number of French citizens.




Figure 4: First resident permits, by reason (2014-2016)

Table 3: First Residence Permits: Top five third-country nationalities (2014-2016)

2014		2015		2016	
Nationality	Number	Nationality	Number	Nationality	Number
Morocco	25 844	Algeria	26 507	Algeria	28 709
Algeria	25 442	Morocco	26 122	Morocco	27 184
China (incl. Hong Kong)	15 589	China (incl. Hong Kong)	14 459	China (incl. Hong Kong)	16 126
Tunisia	14 131	Tunisia	13 789	Tunisia	15 224
United States	7 202	Comoros	7 615	United States	6 867


In addition, the below- given table and graph show the geography of origin of people who arrived to France in 2016.

²⁵⁴ Table and Figure are taken from EC, **France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics**, 2017, p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/10a_france_country_factsheet_2017_en.pdf.

Table 4: Geography of origin of Immigrants that Arrive to France in 2016.

Geography of Origin	Entry in France in 2016	
	Population	Part (in %)
Europe	96.139	37,0
Africa	92.874	35,7
Asia	42.093	16,2
America	28.720	11,1
Total	259.826	100,0

Source: Insee, enquête annuelle de recensement de 2017.



Considering the given data, it is clear that immigrants from Africa and Europe continue to keep the highest proportion of total number of entry in France. Although the reasons of entries are not specified, the number of entry in France in 2016 demonstrates that France is an attractive county for people from Europe and Africa. These data make also sense considering that in France, the number of arriving immigrants who wants to stay for more than one year and who change their status from temporary to permanent are calculated in an attempt to evaluate its permanent migration waves. Hence, in 2016, 259.826 immigrants arrived to France, a notable number of whom might stay in France for more than one year, consequently may increase permanent immigrant population in France.

Aiming at exploring discursive construction of immigration by radical right party in France, the integration of immigrants (in work, education, health sector etc.) in France will not be explained in this study. Briefly, the diverse nature of French immigration population is mentioned here to capture the challenges for managing

diversity in France which sometimes leads to laws contradicting to secularism and human rights such a 2004 ban on wearing headscarf in public schools in France.

French Migration Laws

In relation to migration laws, it can be noted that integration and migration policies of France comprise mainly the migration – security nexus instead of sociocultural dimension of immigration.²⁵⁵ They generally aim to decrease the migration flow to France, and to control its borders from illegal/ unwanted migration. As has been mentioned throughout this study, political rhetoric on migration effects migration policies passed in a given country as well as national and international developments at that time. Indeed, the statistics about illegal/ unwanted immigrants articulated by politicians and negative portrayals of immigrants represented by media discourse resulted in stricter migration laws that legitimize the stricter border controls. Consequentially, it escalates the perception of the migrants as illegitimate and potentially criminal in receiving countries. With regard to this, more restrictive migration laws were passed in France owing to anti-migrant mainly anti-Islam discourses of political agents and the media. Radical populist right Front National leads the way in this race in France. The party program of FN and Le Pen discourses on immigration and insecurity affected the Sarkozy's immigration policy in the 2000s. Indeed, in 2002 French presidential elections FN and Jean- Marie Le Pen made it to the final round and shook the French public. The rise in the votes of FN made Sarkozy adopt FN's discourse on immigration with an aim to take its votes.²⁵⁶ Moreover, between the periods of 2001 – 2017 crucial international economic and political developments emerged affecting perception of immigrants, mostly Muslims, in France, thus the French migration laws. Other than September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, 2008 European economic crisis, Arab uprisings known as Arab Spring that began at late 2010 in several Muslim countries including Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Bahrain, 2011 Syrian civil war which has

²⁵⁵ Müşerref Yardım, "Göç ve Entegrasyon Politikaları Işığında Fransa'da Toplumsal Kabul", **Göç Araştırmaları Dergisi**, Vol. 2, No. 2, July- December 2017, p. 108.

²⁵⁶ Dr Sally Marthaler, "Nicolas Sarkozy and the politics of French immigration policy", **Journal of European Public Policy**, 15:3, p. 388.

created one the largest humanitarian crisis- the so-called 2015/2016 Syrian refugee “crisis”, and ISIS terrorist attacks all over the world are some of them. In addition to these important international developmnets, France faced with Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks in 2015. Following the Paris attacks, French government declared state of emergency, and after the Nice attacks in 2016 it extended the state of emergency which is officially ended on 31 October 2017. Due to state of emergency, the French government reintroduced internal border controls and strengthened checks especially in train stations and airports.²⁵⁷ All of these developments which escalated already existing fear, unease and prejudices towards immigrants, particularly Muslims in France, has provided a perfect environment for the radical right Front National to construct migration as a security threat, consequentially increase its votes. This point will also be mentioned in the fourt chapter of this study where the Front National’s anti-migrant discourses will be analyzed in detail.

It would not be wrong to say that the migration policy of France is mainly shaped by Nicolas Sarkozy whose parents are Greek and Hungarian. Before his presidency between 2007- 2012, he served as interior minister under Jacques Chirac presidency between 2002- 2004 and 2005- 2007. The two immigration laws that were driven by Sarkozy have changed the direction of French immigration policy. The so-called first Sarkozy Law (2003) which was titled as the MISEFEN Law on Immigration Control, Stay of Foreigners in France and Citizenship seeks to strengthen measures against illegal migration, and decrease the number of asylum-seekers.²⁵⁸ Besides, criminal phenomena were tied to illegal immigration with first Sarkozy Law. It accelareated the removal process of there unauthorized immigrants and make it difficult to get French citizenship via marriage.²⁵⁹ As stated by Marthaler, it was aimed to facilitate the integration of immigrants already living in France through more repressive immigration control;²⁶⁰ the political rhetoric was in this direction.

²⁵⁷ EC, **France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics**, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/10a_france_country_factsheet_2016_en.pdf.

²⁵⁸ Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 387.

²⁵⁹ Hiroyuki Tanaka, Op. Cit., p. 6.

²⁶⁰ Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 387.

At this juncture, it is worth to note that aiming at taking the votes of Front National, Sarkozy started to claim/ adopt the concerns of FN such as migration and insecurity. In this line, in 2002 and 2003 he participated in television debate with Jean-Marie Le Pen. Concerningly, he said in an interview that *“If the FN has made headway, it’s because we haven’t done our job. By refusing to talk about some of the subjects which Le Pen has taken ownership of, we have driven part of our electorate despair.”*²⁶¹ Some scholars argue that his decision to adopt the FN political concerns and to provide a platform for Le Pen to discuss his program helped to legitimate the party program of FN.²⁶²

The other important law which marked a shift in French immigration policy was Sarkozy Law II of July 24, 2006. With the second Sarkozy Law (2006) the selective immigration (*immigration choisie*) was emphasized rather than imposed immigration (*immigration subie*). Selective migration refers to a managed, high-skilled and demand-led migration policy, in other words selective in France’s economic interests whereas imposed immigration includes family reunification and asylum-seekers.²⁶³ After the 2006 immigration law was passed, Sarkozy said that *“selective immigration is the expression of France’s sovereignty. It is the right of our country, like all the great democracies of the world, to choose which foreigners it allows to reside on our territory.”*²⁶⁴ Regarding imposed migration, before in May 2006, during an interview he stated that *“There will not be an absolute and unconditional right for all the families of the world to settle in France, without plans for integrating, without work, without proper housing, without a future. It is within this perspective that I see the reform of family reunification.”*²⁶⁵ Briefly, as understood from Sarkozy’s words, the second Sarkozy Law (2006) was aimed to encourage high-skilled immigration, limit family migration through putting stricter conditions for family reunification, stop illegal flows, and promote integration of immigrants into French melting pot. Indeed, second Sarkozy Law made immigrants to sign a “Welcome and Integration” Contract, as of January, 2007, in order to get a

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 388.

²⁶² Aurelien Mondon, “Nicolas Sarkozy’s legitimization of the Front National: background and perspectives”, **Patterns of Prejudice**, Vol.47, No.1, 2013, p. 14; Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 388.

²⁶³ Özden Ocak, “Immigration and French national identity under neoliberalism: Sarkozy’s selective immigration politics as a performance of sovereignty”, **Patterns of Prejudice**, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2016, p. 85.

²⁶⁴ Özden Ocak, Op. Cit., p. 85.

²⁶⁵ Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz and Florence Lévy, Op. Cit., p. 6.

residence permit. This Contract sets conditions for immigrants to obey French law and respect its values and take civic and language courses (if needed).²⁶⁶ Considering the fact that most of the family immigration is from Africa whose immigration was not welcomed and who were represented as reluctant to integrate into French society, French government sought to exclude the unwanted immigration mainly family reunification and to increase highly-skilled immigration selected according to country's economic interest whose integration into French society would be easier.

As immigration has been one of the crucial public concerns in France since the early- 1980s, in the presidential elections of 2007, immigration and integration of immigrants were by no surprise important electoral campaign issues of Sarkozy. During the presidential elections of 2007, thanks to his discourses on immigration issue similar to Le Pen's, Sarkozy managed to get 38 percent of Le Pen's 2002 electorate votes in the first round.²⁶⁷

In addition, in 2007, Sarkozy, as the President, established the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Cooperative Development, which promoted national identity through linking it with immigration. The establishment of this Ministry was criticized by many historians, academics and leftist. The historians who took part in the process of establishment of a museum of immigration history since 2003 resigned and published a petition that indicated the following

*Associating 'immigration' and 'national identity' in a common ministry has no precedent in the history of the French Republic: it is a founding act of the new presidency, defining immigration as a "problem" for the very being of France and the French. As citizens, this link worries us because it can only reinforce negative prejudices towards immigrants. From our point of view, the national identity today constitutes a synthesis of pluralism and the diversity of the populations, and cannot be fixed within the parameters of a ministry.*²⁶⁸

In the same vein, Carvalho states that critics was due to to the fact that the Ministry legitimized perceptions of immigration, which posed a threat to national

²⁶⁶ Hiroyuki Tanaka, Op. Cit., p. 6.

²⁶⁷ Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 392.

²⁶⁸ Özden Ocak, Op. Cit., p. 83.

identity.²⁶⁹ This discourse was articulated by FN since its foundation in 1972²⁷⁰, thus it can be said that the discourses of radical right FN on migration or its stand on migration were in a way accepted by the French government. Despite the critics, another development that fuelled the anti-migrant sentiments in France occurred two years later. In November 2009, Sarkozy launched a 100-day ‘Grand Debate on National Identity’ by asking the question of “What does it mean to be French?”²⁷¹ Laurence and Goodliffe argue that this debate was a debate about integration, immigration and Islam although the Integration Minister Éric Besson, who was in charge of organizing the debate, said that “the debate would not focus on immigration and Islam.”²⁷² Indeed, the debate brought the question of immigration and Islam. Though, the debate took place just before the March 2010 regional elections in which the radical-right FN party increased its votes.²⁷³ Some scholars criticized Sarkozy that his aim was to awake anti-immigrant sentiment in France in order to guarantee to get the right-wing vote for 2010 regional elections.²⁷⁴

Muslims continued to be stigmatized under Sarkozy and through his immigration policies and political rhetoric on immigration the fear of Islam maintained in French society.²⁷⁵ Indeed, a fear of Islam is the main focus of the media and political debates when discussing immigration, integration, and multiculturalism.²⁷⁶ In addition to the before mentioned initiatives taken by Sarkozy, in June 2009, Sarkozy stated, “*The Burka is not welcomed on the Republic’s territory. It does not fit with the Republican concept of the dignity of women.*”²⁷⁷ Burqa was represented as unnecessary for a Muslim woman to practice her religion by Sarkozy and this focus of media resulted in a burqa ban in 2010.

²⁶⁹ Joao Carvalho, “The Effectiveness of French Immigration Policy Under President Nicolas Sarkozy”, **Parliamentary Affairs**, January 2015, p. 6.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁷¹ Jonathan Laurence and Gabriel Goodliffe, “The French Debate on National Identity and the Sarkozy Presidency: A Retrospective”, **The International Spectator**, Vol. 48, No. 1, March 2013 p. 35.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²⁷³ Jonathan Laurence and Gabriel Goodliffe, *Op. Cit.*, p. 36.

²⁷⁴ Robert Marquand, “France’s Sarkozy launches controversial national identity debate”, 03.11.2009, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2009/1103/p06s04-woeu.html>, [accessed 03.04.2018].

²⁷⁵ Yvan Gastaut, “The ‘Immigration Question’: Mainspring of Sarkozy’s Presidency”, **Contemporary French and Francophone Studies**, Vol. 16, No. 3, June 2012, p. 339.

²⁷⁶ Mette Wiggen, “Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utoya Terror Attacks”, **New Political Science**, 34:4, p. 593.

²⁷⁷ Yvan Gastaut, “The ‘Immigration Question’: Mainspring of Sarkozy’s Presidency”, p. 337-8.

Shortly, it can be noted that Sarkozy aimed to take the advantages of existing fear of Islam, unease and prejudices toward immigrants in order to increase his votes by representing immigration as a threat to national identity, law and order and an economic burden on the country. Indeed, in France, immigrants have been represented as a threat to French employment, law and order, and national identity by political parties and media since the mid-1970s. This statement was also put forward by J. Fetzer. According to Fetzer,

*Immigration politics in France appears to turn just as much on whether the country's culture will remain primarily Catholic and European as on whether most native-born French workers will be able to find jobs. In other words, in the French mind Maghrebi immigrants represent at least as much of a threat to France's dominant culture as Muslims as they do to the French labour market as low-wage, relatively unskilled employers.*²⁷⁸

As stated by Bourbeau, legal instruments and some policy statements, which represented migration as a security threat have been developed in France.²⁷⁹ In France, “detention of immigrants as a security practice is well established and France has a high level of detention of immigrants.”²⁸⁰ To illustrate, the forced removals of irregular immigrants rised from 29,796 in 2008 to 32,912 in 2011.²⁸¹ Just, in 2012, 39,822 immigrants were forcibly removed from France under Sarkozy rule.²⁸² Considering these data on forced removals, during Sarkozy’s presidential term there was a significant increase in the detention of immigrants as a security practice. Similarly, the anti-migrant discourses have addressed mainly the immigrants from non-EU countries, mainly from Africa. However, in 2010, the politization of intra-EU immigration was escalated when “removal of illegal camps of Roma and Travellers communities and deportation of immigrants that was living in them, particularly those of Bulgarian and Romanian origins” discussed at an emergency meeting organized by Sarkozy aftermath the conflict between French police and Romas in Saint Agnain.²⁸³ Following the meeting, Interior

²⁷⁸ J. Fetzer, **Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 122. (cited by Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 384.)

²⁷⁹ Philippe Bourbeau, **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, p. 28.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

²⁸¹ Joao Carvalho, “The Effectiveness of French immigration Policy Under President Nicolas Sarkozy”, p. 8.

²⁸² Ibid, p. 8.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 10- 11.

Minister declared, “300 illegal camps or settlements will be closed within three months giving Roma camps priority” and “in total, around 700 Roma will be accompanied to their countries of origin.”²⁸⁴ This policy of Sarkozy got widespread opposition from the EU institutions and from French left wing parties. Consequently, French government stopped the enforcement of forced removals of EU citizens.²⁸⁵ Carvalho emphasized that stigmatization of an ethnic community as a national sovereignty issue was reflected through this policy.

During the presidential elections of 2012, Francois Hollande as the candidate of centre-left criticized President Sarkozy’s stand on immigration for promoting the division of the French people. In the meantime, he claimed to limit the number of a legal economic migrants and to decrease the number of annual immigration to France.²⁸⁶ In the electoral campaign Hollande claimed that “*There are too many foreigners in France. But that does not mean that we must expel those who are here on our territory. Hollande said those who are in France legally would be able to remain—but those who do not have the right to live there would be driven out.*”²⁸⁷ Carvalho argues that the Front National’s anti-migration discourse and its success on the first round made Hollande to take a more restrictive stand on immigration in the election campaign.²⁸⁸ Hollande was elected and became France’s first left-wing President since Francois Mitterrand left office in 1995.

There are approximately 20,000 Roma in France, most of whom have Bulgarian and Romanian origins.²⁸⁹ Regarding the displacement of Roma camps, a new governmental decree was issued on after the legislative election of 2007. Manuel Valls²⁹⁰ as the Interior Minister declared that because of the fact that “*Roma populations have a*

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁸⁶ Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s term”, 2018,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323935937_The_Front_National's_impact_on_immigration_policy_during_President_Francois_Hollande's_term, p. 7.

²⁸⁷ CNN World, “France: Hollande, Sarkozy quizzed on immigration”, 27.04.2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-election-campaign/index.html>.

²⁸⁸ Joao Carvalho “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s...”, p. 7.

²⁸⁹ Angelique Chrisafis, “European Union warns French minister over Roma comments”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/france-minister-warned-roma-comments>, 25.09.2013, [accessed 21.09.2018].

²⁹⁰ Manuel Valls was one of the socialists who supported the Burqa ban that was proposed by Sarkozy in 2010, thus nicknamed as the ‘Sarkozy on the left’ (Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration...”, p. 8.)

way of live that is extremely different from our own” they should be deported back to Eastern Europe and claimed that Roma could not be integrated into the French society.²⁹¹ As stated by Carvalho, the stigmatization and radicalization of the Roma community were deepened through the statements of Valls and according to him, this represented the influence of the FN’s cultural xenophobia on the immigration policy during Hollande presidency.²⁹² Needless to say, these statements were criticized by EU institutions and some left wing politicians in France. However, President Hollande supported Valls and said that “*The question that must be asked is whether France is meant to welcome all the most vulnerable.*”²⁹³ Similarly, in relation to a deportation of Dibrani Leonardo, a Kosovan Roma girl to Kosova with her family in 2013, Hollande said that she could return back to France without her family to finish her school despite the law on family reunification.²⁹⁴ On this issue, Socialist politicians warned the party that it had the risk of “losing its soul” due to tough deportations. However, upon the criticism, France has emphasized that “the measures which were taken to expel members of the Roma community are not discriminatory instead they are aimed to protect security and public order in France.”²⁹⁵ More precisely, France’s response to the critics demonstrate the construction of migrants as a threat to their national security. Furthermore, it can be said that there was not a shift in the migration management of center-left Hollande’s from the one of centre-right Sarkozy who pursued rough and restrictive practices on migration issue as explained before in this section. In fact, in 2013, Valls emphasized that the number of forced removals of irregular immigration increased comparing to numbers in 2012.²⁹⁶ As it is clear, migration can be also securitized through practices like deportation of immigration, thus under Hollande presidency these practices were also implemented as it was during Sarkozy’s term.

With regard to attitudes toward Islam/or Muslims, as it was during Sarkozy’s presidency, under Hollande, Muslims continued to be stigmatized through his

²⁹¹ Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s...”, p. 9.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 9.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 9,

²⁹⁴ Reuters, “Francois Hollande: Deported Roma girl can return from Kosova”, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/francois-hollande/10390840/Francois-Hollande-Deported-Roma-girl-can-return-from-Kosovo.html>, 19.10.2013, [accessed 20.09.2018].

²⁹⁵ Euractiv, “French minister accused of racism following Roma comment”, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/french-minister-accused-of-racism-following-roma-comment/>, 18.03.2013, [accessed 20.09.2018].

²⁹⁶ Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s...”, p. 8.

immigration policies and political and media rhetoric on immigration, consequently the fear of Islam maintained in French society. Moreover, stigmatization of Muslims deepened due to the terrorist attacks that were happened in France. More precisely, the already existing fear, unease and prejudices towards immigrants, particularly Muslims, have been accelerated after the “7 January 2015 satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo attacks with 12 deaths and 11 injuries”²⁹⁷, “the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks with 130 deaths and 368 injuries, and the 2016 Nice attack, resulting the death of 86 people.”²⁹⁸ It is worth to mention the speech of Hollande on first day of the Paris attack which was followed by a large public demonstraton with a slogan of “Je suis Charlie (We are Charlie)”. Contrary to “war on terror” discourse, he defined “the attacks as attacks on the Republic, and emphasized republican values such as liberty, equality, and fraternity, freedom of speech, tolerance and the principle laicite.”²⁹⁹ His discourse was also followed by other members of the party. According to European Social Survey that examined the effects of the attacks on attitudes towards immigration in European countries, the support for more restrictive immigration policy has increased in European countries like Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary etc., but no change in France.³⁰⁰ According to Øyvind Bugge Solheim, this is because the discourse articulated by Hollande, since the fear of Islam discourse was mainly articulated in other European countries.³⁰¹ In addition, following Paris attacks, France has been in a state of emergency that gives the police additional powers to search and arrest, contributing to the existing anti-immigrant sentiments, and fear of Islam in France. Although the speech of Hollande did not use anti-Islam rhetoric, the practices (as argued by Paris School) such as search and arrest by police, deportations of immigrants, internal borders controls maintained the securitizing of immigration in France.

Nonetheless, the existing fear of Islam was also put forward by Hollande, who told the Le Monde journalists in 2006 that France has “a problem with Islam” and that “there are too many illegal migrants arriving in France.”³⁰² Hollande said that

²⁹⁷ Øyvind Bugge Solheim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.

²⁹⁸ Emre Göksu and Arda Demirci, *Op. Cit.*

²⁹⁹ Øyvind Bugge Solheim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 5.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13- 14.

³⁰² Kim Willsher, “François Hollande: France has 'a problem with Islam'”.

*It's true there is a problem with Islam... and nobody doubts that. There's a problem with Islam because Islam demands places (of worship), recognition. It's not that Islam is a problem because it is a religion that is in itself dangerous but because it wants to assert itself as a religion on the Republic. What might also be a problem is if Muslims don't criticize acts of radicalization, if imams behave in an anti-republican way. Perhaps the veil is a kind of protection for her, but that tomorrow she will not need it in order to be reassured of her presence in society.*³⁰³

Considering the speech of Hollande, he acknowledged that an aggressive form of Islam constitutes a “problem” for France, not Islam as a religion.”³⁰⁴ Critics raised against Hollande and have accused him of Islamophobia and “appeasement” to Islam.³⁰⁵ In this regard, from right political spectrum, he was criticized that “*he appears to imply that Islam threatens to subvert the Republican principle of laicite, not the national security, thus refuting the notion that Islam inherently constitutes a ‘dangerous religion’.*”³⁰⁶ In the same vein, Brigitte Kuster said “*such a phase endangers the Republic.*”³⁰⁷ These critics justify the securitization of Islam in France and indicate the acknowledgement of anti-Islam discourse in France, especially by right-wing parties. Similarly, these critics also show that there is a wide perception of Islam as a dangerous religion in France as articulated within the ‘war and terror’ framing since September 11 attacks.

Besides, on immigration, in 2016, François Hollande said that “*I think there are too many arrivals, immigrants who shouldn't be there... we teach them to speak French and then another group arrives and we have to start all over again. It never stops...so, at some point it has to stop.*”³⁰⁸ These words of Hollande are important in relation to integration of immigrants to French society. Hollande emphasized the relationship between immigration control and immigrant integration as Sarkozy did. In 2014, Hollande stated that every immigrant would “*have to learn French and take civic courses*

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ France24, “Wear a veil or be French: Hollande shocks with views on Muslims and migrants”, <https://www.france24.com/en/20161012-french-president-hollande-book-islam-veil-sarkozy-trierweiler-gayet-migrants>, 12.10.2016, [accessed 21.09.2018].

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Kim Willsher, “François Hollande: France has 'a problem with Islam'”.

on Republican values, its rules, rights and duties.”³⁰⁹ As mentioned before, this rhetoric was also articulated by Sarkozy. Correspondingly, the 2016 immigration law introduced “Republican Integration Contract”. It is argued that through these discourses on immigration control and integration as well as immigration laws, integration became as a condition to receive an entry visa or residence permit instead of a long-term process.³¹⁰ In addition, Hollande represented integration of immigrants as a never-ending economic burden on the country, constructing immigrants as a threat to its economic security. Furthermore, the discourses that articulates the notion that “there are too many immigrants in France” fuel the anti-migrant sentiments. Similarly, according to Carvalho, “*this discourse reinforced the perception that French sovereignty is under threat by immigrants living in France.*”³¹¹ This discourse have been articulated by radical right FN for a long time in France, now shared by centre-left government.

3.3 French Response to European Refugee ‘Crisis’

Syrian refugee “crisis” / EU’s crisis of migration management

According to UNHCR, since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, over 5.6 million people have fled Syria to neighboring countries (mostly are accommodating in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan) and Europe. In addition, 6.6 millions are displaced inside Syria. Indeed, the UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi described the crisis as “*the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world.*”³¹²

Considering the above-mentioned data on the forced migration Syrian civil war caused, the number of application for asylum has been increasing in Europe. Additionally, there are significant number of migrants who crossed the EU external borders without authorization. In 2016, 1.2 million first-time application for asylum made in the EU, over

³⁰⁹ Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande...”, p. 10.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

³¹¹ Joao Carvalho, “The Front National’s impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s...”, p. 10.

³¹² UNHCR, “Syria emergency”, <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>, [accessed 21.09.2018].

a quarter of those came from Syria.³¹³ Afghanistan and Iraq are other main source countries for asylum applications in the EU. It should be noted that, the EU tried to keep these people seeking to reach Europe outside its external border through international agreements with other countries. That's why, more than 163,000 asylum seekers arrived Europe by the sea risking their lives in 2017³¹⁴; unfortunately, thousands were died in an attempt to reach Europe. In addition, 439,505 migrants were denied entry to the EU's external borders in 2017. As a result of unauthorised crossing of people reaching out EU borders by the sea, the internal border controls within the Schengen area increased. Indeed, like the EU's response to the Syrian refugee "crisis" is a "combination of deterrence measures, detentions and deportations."³¹⁵ The European Union has been criticized for its response to Syrian refugee "crisis" as being non-compliant with basic refugee and human rights norms. Difficulties also came from the fact that there is no consensus on the response to this issue among the EU member countries. In this regard, in 2017, EU relocation scheme was criticized by Poland as encouraging migrants to arrive Europe's borders.³¹⁶

Similarly, recently migration has been one of the hottest topics debated in France due to the terrorist attacks mentioned before and the so-called 2015/2016 Syrian refugee "crisis". In fact, statistics show that in 2016, France (84,270) is the third attractive country in Europe concerning the asylum applications; Germany (745,155) comes first and Italy (122, 960) the second.³¹⁷ The number of asylum-seekers has been increasing in France due to the European refugee 'crisis'. In 2015, the number of people applying for asylum in the EU was 1.32 million, and the total number of asylum applications in France was 84,270. To illustrate the rise, the total number of asylum applications in France increased from 64,310 in 2014 to 76,165 in 2015 and this number reached to 84,270 in 2016. In 2017, there were 99,330 asylum applications made to France indicating the 14.02 percent

³¹³ European Parliament, "Europe's migration crisis", <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78631/europe-s-migration-crisis>, 30.06.2017, [accessed 22.09.2018].

³¹⁴ Aryn Baker, "These Syrian Refugees Made It to Europe. But There Still Isn't an Answer to the Crisis", <http://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/5069832/december-25th-2017-vol-190-no-27-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/>, 18.12.2017, [accessed 22.09.2018].

³¹⁵ Aryn Baker, Op. Cit.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ UNHCR, Eurostat, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/welcomingeurope/default_en.htm, [accessed 02.04.2018].

of EU total. In addition, the French government would welcome 7,000 more Syrian refugees by 2019.³¹⁸ Three main nationalities of asylum applicants who applied in France are Albania (11.395 appl.- 13%), Afghanistan (6.555 appl. -7%), and Haiti (5.565 appl.- 6%).³¹⁹




Figure 5: Number of asylum applications and as a share of the total number of applications in the EU (2014-2017)

Source:³²⁰ France Country Factsheets, 2017

Moreover, the figure below shows the asylums applications to France as a share of EU total per given nationality in 2017.




Figure 6: Asylum applications: top five third-country nationalities as a share of EU total per given nationality (2017)

Source³²¹: EMN: France Country Factsheets, 2017 **Note:** The figure reads as: France received 12,130 asylum applications from Albania or 47.41% of all asylum applications launched by Albania in EU in 2017.

³¹⁸ Pascal Brice, “This is saving refugee lives”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/03/28/refugee-crisis/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.13ae91b31de2, 28.03.2018, [accessed 03.04.2018].

³¹⁹ EC, “First time asylum applicants in France (2017)”, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/visualisations>.

³²⁰ Figure is taken from EC, France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics, 2017, p. 2.

³²¹ Figure is taken from EC, France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics, 2017, p. 2.

In most of the European countries, media representation of this European refugee “crisis” together with the discourses of especially right-wing and far right parties paved the way for construction of refugees as a security threat to national and internal security of receiving countries by claiming that terrorists or ISIS supporters may enter their borders along with refugees, therefore may cause insecurity in the host societies. Another rhetoric was that the immigrants arriving EU external borders are economic migrants looking for better life instead of refugees or asylum seekers. It is clear that this discourse has been articulated since early-1980s in France.

In order to protect EU’s integrity *visa vis* te migration crises, Germany played a more constructive role. There was a serious danger that the EU member states would question the EU itself due to the increasing and unmanaged migration flows. Comparing to Germany, who has taken a more constructive approach to European migration crisis, France took a different position. The refugees have been constructed as a security threat to European societies by French politician as well as the media. In fact, in May 2015, European Commission proposal to resettle 40,000 asylum seekers was rejected by the French government through claiming that France had already taken more than its share of the burden.³²² In addition, in January 2016, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Manuel Valls said that “refugees fleeing wars in Syria and Iraq is a threat to the concept of Europe by making a call for an urgent action to control EU’s external borders.”³²³ When the crisis deepened, in February 2016, Valls announced that France would take 30.000 refugees this year and he said, “*We won’t take any more*”.³²⁴ The decisions on relocation of Syrian refugees among the EU member states and burden sharing of this big humanitarian issue took widespread opposition especially from National Front and right-wing parties in France. In other words, as an unpopular

³²² Maria Muzalevskaya, “Europe’s refugee crisis: A comparative analysis of Germany and France”, **Unpublished master thesis**, Boston University, (2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309764197_Europe's_refugee_crisis_A_comparative_analysis_of_Germany_and_France, p. 21.

³²³ Angelique Chrisafis, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor, “French PM Manuel Valls says refugee crisis is destabilising Europe”, 22.01.2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/french-pm-manuel-valls-says-refugee-crisis-is-destabilising-europe>, [accessed 21.09.2018].

³²⁴ Madeleine Thompson, “The Immigration Game: How the refugee crisis has affected French and German politics”, <http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/05/immigration-game-refugee-crisis-affected-french-german-politics/>, 12.05.2017 [accessed 21.09.2018].

President, French right-wing parties and organisations did not welcome Hollande's decisions on relocation of asylum seekers. Over 50 percent of French public opinion are opposed to taking more refugees to France.³²⁵

Precisely, the negative representation of Syrian refugees linking immigrants with crimes committed within the national borders, and abolishing the national sovereignty through crossing national borders without authorization resulted in a serious increase in anti-migrant and anti-Islam movements in France as well as other European countries. In fact, studies show that there is a considerable rise in far-right, neo-Nazi attacks toward immigrants since 2015. As a consequence, there have occurred anti-migrant, racist attacks that targeted Syrian refugees and Muslims in various European countries. Unsurprisingly, according to the report published by French Organisation for Racism Islamophobia Watch (ORIW), there has been a consequent increase of racist and anti-Muslim acts in France since 2015, a year remarked by Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks and so called 2015/2016 Syrian refugee 'crisis'.³²⁶ This report also asserts that after the Paris attack, "Muslims are pointed as targets and some mosques were attacked by racist movements and that public speeches that stigmatize Muslims as terrorist and the hijab as an attack to secularism affect the perception of public as well as actions of politicians and government's decisions on immigration."³²⁷

With regard to public attitudes towards the issue of immigration, "a survey done in October 2015 indicated that 67 percent of the French population believed that family and housing state subsidies should only apply to EU migrants and 61 percent would like the government to stop medical assistance for illegal migrants."³²⁸

Similarly, according to survey conducted by the Pew Research Center 2016, 45 percent of French see refugees from Iraq and Syria as a major threat in France.³²⁹

³²⁵ Angelique Chrisafis et al., Op. Cit.

³²⁶ Organisation Racism Islamophobia Watch (ORIW), **Report on Racism and Islamophobia in European French-Speaking Countries (2014- 2017)**, <http://www.oriw.org/oriw-report-on-racism-and-islamophobia-2014-2017/>, p.5, 08.03.2018, [accessed 21.09.2018].

³²⁷ ORIW, Ibid., 45.

³²⁸ Philippe Marliere, "French politicians are now marching to Marine Le Pen's immigration tune", <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/20/french-politicians-dancing-marine-le-pen-tune-immigration>, 20.11.2016. [accessed 012.09.2018]

³²⁹ Madeleine Thompson, Op. Cit.

According to same survey, a median of 59 percent in ten European countries were concerned that refugees would increase domestic terrorism, while 46 percent of French believed that refugees would increase domestic terrorism taking into account that the survey was conducted before the Nice attacks in France.³³⁰ In addition, 53 per cent of French said that refugees would have a negative economic impact.³³¹

3.4 Conclusion

Immigration and thus integration of immigrants have been a prominent topic in French political debates since mid-1970s. Though, migration has been constructed as a security threat by discourses of political elites and of media resulting in restricting migration policies, it was not treated as a constant security issue throughout French history. Besides, securitization of migration is not a new phenomenon in France. Following the WWII, France required foreign labour in order to reconstruct its collapsed economy, thus received migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1970s.³³² During the periods of 1945- 1968 immigrants were considered as temporary in France, and were regarded as manpower needs of its expanding economy that suffers demographic decline. Thus, immigration was represented as a positive issue for French economic growth by political agents and media; consequently, they were welcomed by French public. In addition, they accommodated in the shanty towns ('bidonvilles') which were on the periphery of the cities, thus not visible in the daily life in French society. In other words, they were excluded from the French society. The transformation of French immigration policies into a more restrictive ones began early-1970s following the oil crisis of 1973 that increased unemployment rates, as a consequence immigration was halted in 1974 in France. However, the legal immigration to France has continued through the movements of EU immigrants (intra-EU immigrants), family unification of already

³³⁰ Jacob Poushter, "European opinions of refugee crisis in 5 charts", <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/>, 16.09.2016, [accessed 22.09.2018].

³³¹ Pietro Castelli Gattinara, "Chapter 10: Europeans, Shut Borders! Anti-refugee Mobilisation in Italy and France", in Donatella della Porta (Ed.), **Solidarity Mobilizations in the 'Refugee Crisis'**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 277.

settled non-EU immigrants as well as refugee and asylum seekers. Thus, the immigrant population of France has increased throughout the years. Immigrants has also been crossing the border illegally for decades in a search of a better life.

The changing composition of immigrants by no doubt has affect on the French immigration policy with regard to integration of these immigrants into French culture. In 2016, 6.11 million Muslims residing in France made 9.6 percent of the total population of 63.6 million. There is a total of 7.9 million international migrants living in France which constitutes 12.2 percentage of its total population. Most of the immigrant population in France are Muslims (most of those are Maghreb and sub-Saharan African origin). Another community that constitutes a sizable part of Muslims population is Turkish community whose number increases steadily.

In the early-1980s it was realized that immigrants would stay in France, thus should be integrated to French society. The discourse on the dichotomy between temporary and permanent was an important factor in the construction of the 'problem' of immigration in France since the realization that immigrants were permanent rather than temporary in early 1980s raised the anti-migrant sentiments in France. The integration of immigrants has become a public concern since then. During the 1990s, the non-EU immigrants (mostly Muslims) have been portrayed as reluctant to integrate into French culture and as as a serious threat to French national identity, cultural homogeneity and social cohesion by not just radical right-wing political parties but also mainstream political parties, and media. Similarly, the immigrants were portrayed as a threat to its economic security; to its welfare system. It should be also noted that in the early-1980s the radical right Front National were visible in French public through increasing its votes in the local elections. The FN tried to convince the French public to believe that migrants are threats to their national identity, to their welfare system, to cultural homogeneity and internal security since its foundation in 1972. These discourses increased the anti-migrant sentiments, prejudices towards Muslim immigrant in France.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, in the context of US 'war on terrorism' discourse, the securitization of migration is deepened in the West and migration is linked to the issues of border control, drugs, organized crime

and terrorism. Following to 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London attacks in European soils together with the events such as murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 and cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2006 the fear of insecurity and prejudices towards migrants, especially Muslims, in France increased. Following to magazine Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks in 2015 and Nice attack in 2016, the fear of Islam maintained in France and Muslims continued to be stigmatized under Sarkozy and the Hollande presidencies through their tough immigration policies and political rhetoric on immigration.

The Syrian refugee 'crisis' of 2015, in general Europe's migration crisis is another important development regarding the securitizing of immigration in France. The negative representation of this issue and the discourses binding it as a threat to national security, stability of European societies and cultural homogeneity by political agents and media deepened the securitization of migration paving the way for an increase in the anti-migrant and racist sentiments in France. The FN took advantages of these unase and prejudices towards immigrants and increased its votes, in the meantime has fuelled these sentiments through its anti-migrant discourses.

4 FRONT NATIONAL AND ITS ANTI-MIGRANT DISCOURSES

4.1 Introduction

All across Europe, right wing populist parties are enjoying significant popular support. Led by charismatic politicians like Geert Wilders, they are exploiting fear of Muslim immigration and frustration with the political establishment- and are forcing mainstream parties to shift to the right. (Der Spiegel, 28 September 2010)

Although European radical right populist parties (RRPs) were first realized in the European political era in the early 1980s, they have been gaining electoral success across Europe since 1990s. Their electoral growth is increasing constantly across Europe especially since 2000s. For instance, at the European Parliament (EP) elections in May 2014, RRP's increased their representation in the European Parliament gained 52 MPs; and two "new" far right parties entered the EP for the first time (Greek Golden Dawn and Sweden Democrats).³³³ In addition, a far right group in the European Parliament called 'Europe of Nations and Freedom', which is led by French Front National, was formed in 2015."³³⁴ Their success at 2014 EP elections took a widespread attention of media and scholars. Since the rise of RRP's is a big challenge for European values such as human rights, democracy and rule of law as well as for European Union project, they have been under the spotlight of substantial number of scholars especially since 2000s. It seems necessary to note again that mass migration is considered significant reason behind the rise of the radical right, especially in Western Europe.³³⁵ 2008 economic crisis, which increased the unemployment rate across Europe, and ongoing European migrant "crisis" triggered anti-migrant sentiments in Europe, thus the rise of RRP's in Europe. Although there are different forms of RRP's, they embrace some common themes, such as hostility to immigration, anti-Islamic rhetoric and Euroscepticism. These core ideological features will be explained in this chapter.

³³³ Cas Mudde, "The far right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists".

³³⁴ Giorgos Charalambous, "Chapter 1: Introduction", in Giorgos Charalambous (Eds), **European Far Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives**, Oslo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Report 2, 2015, p. 1.

³³⁵ Cas Mudde, "The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America", p. 9.

This study argues that radical right parties (RRPs) have an important role in the construction and reconstruction of security discourses regarding immigration. As a consequence of their anti-Islam, anti-migrant and diversity-phobic discourses they are one of the securitizing actors who portray immigration as a security threat at national level. As Karyotis points out in Europe it is the political elites “who often see themselves as defenders of national identity and societal security” and represent migrants as a threat to the cultural identity of a given society.³³⁶ Indeed, one can easily come to the point that RRP are playing the role as defenders of their national/cultural identity (as a homogenous entity) and national security which they claim, are in danger due to upward trend in immigration rates in their relevant societies especially since 2000s.

Regardingly, French Front National belongs to radical right party family and considered as the “*pater familias of the contemporary radical right in Europe*”³³⁷ due to the fact that its slogans and programs have been embraced by many European parties.³³⁸ Similarly, FN alone gained 21 seats in the European Parliament elections of May 2014, and the success of FN is regarded as the success of the European radical right.³³⁹ To be more precise, founded in 1972, considering its anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, xenophobic discourses Front National is regarded as one of the securitizing actors of migration issue in France. As has been noted earlier, immigration issue has been central to political discourse in France since mid-1970s and articulated as a security threat to cultural, economic, political and societal axes. In more detail, immigration has been one of the key campaign issues at the French presidential elections since 2000s. It should be also stated that immigration issue is owned not just by radical right parties but also by other French mainstream parties. This is because, the success of FN in 2002 presidential elections shook the French public and made established right wing parties adopt concerns of FN such as migration and insecurity (as explained in the second chapter of this study). Front National under Jean Marie Le Pen moved to second round of the 2002 presidential elections for the first time in the party’s history. Although Jacques Chirac won 82 percent of the votes in the second round of the election, public concerns regarding immigration

³³⁶ Georgios Karyotis, “Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration:...”, p. 20.

³³⁷ Cas Mudde, “The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America”, p. 4.

³³⁸ Cas Mudde, *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³³⁹ Cas Mudde, “The far right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists”.

became visible in French society by the virtue of FN's electoral success. Likewise, immigration is the prominent campaign issue of Front National at the last French presidential elections of 2017. Even Marine Le Pen's anti-EU policies can be, by no doubt, linked to immigration, since she told Nigel Farage during an interview "*if she had been elected, she would have suspend Schengen agreement and restore France's borders, because France can no longer continue to leave with this pressure exerted by immigration.*"³⁴⁰ In fact, as a member of the EU, France is obliged to the rules of EU's migration policies.

As leader of the FN, Marine Le Pen is one of the prominent figures in media and in the French political era; and has been visible in European politics in relation to anti-immigration and anti-EU policies of European radical right parties. Regarding her political career in FN, Marine Le Pen joined FN in 1986 when she was 18 years old and since then she became a prominent actor in the management body of the FN; she became vice-president of the FN in 2003 and ran 2007 presidential elections campaign. Most importantly, she took the leadership from her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, who was the party leader since 1972 and became the president of the FN in 2011. It is argued that she tried to "*distance herself from the extrem views that traditionally has been associated with her father and FN*"³⁴¹ such as anti-Semitic, racist, homophobic discourses. Within this regard, she expelled her father from the party in August 2015 due to the fact that Jean Marie Le Pen spoke repeatedly out his Holocaust views by saying that "*the gas chambers were only a 'detail' of the history*"³⁴², thus making the party's anti-Semitic past been remembered again in the public. He first said this in 1987, and then repeated his views in European Parliament in 2009 and then later on. On the other hand, Marine Le Pen continued to present FN's anti-migrant, diversity-phobic and xenophobic views and articulate immigration, particularly from African countries, as a threat to France's national security, national/cultural identity and economic welfare. In other words, instead of anti-Semitism, she has been formulating anti-Islam discourses and targets Muslim

³⁴⁰ LBC (Leading British Conversation), "Nigel Farage Interviews Marine Le Pen exclusively", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXfvvXwgQy4>, 16.03.2017, [accessed 10.10.2018].

³⁴¹ Michael Ray, "National Front", <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Front-political-party-France>, [accessed 10.10.2018].

³⁴² Angelique Chrisafis, "Jean-Marie Le Pen fined for dismissing Holocaust as 'detail'", <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/jean-marie-le-pen-fined-again-dismissing-holocaust-detail>, 06.04.2016, [accessed 10.10.2018].

immigrants as a security threat and has disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics in France as well as in Europe. Indeed, in Europe, Islam is constructed as the “Other” in the construction of European identity. Shortly, in favor of a desire to mainstream herself in French politics, Marine Le Pen seeks to use more ‘modest’, non-sexist tone, and as stated by Nilüfer Göle, “*claims to embody republican values, defend secularism and adopt a feminist stance.*”³⁴³ However, she has articulated anti-migrant, racist, xenophobic discourses and disseminated fear against immigrants including refugees

In this chapter, first the core characteristics of European radical right parties will be explained. Then, after examining the FN historical background in the second subsection, the anti-migrant discourses of Marine Le Pen will be analyzed. Political speeches, FN election campaigns, posters, interviews and articles in the period of 2015- 2017 will be examined in order to carry this study out. The videos of interviews with Marine Le Pen and political speeches done by her with English subtitle will be analyzed.

4.2 European Radical Right Parties

RRPs emerged as a significant political actor who challenge to the European politics since mid-1980s³⁴⁴ adopting new political issues in relation to immigration (anti-immigration), European integration (Euro-scepticism) and functioning of a political system (political discontent). In other words, these parties and movements promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism and anti-system populism.³⁴⁵ They are anti-egalitarian and challenge the European Union project, are eager to leave EU which they claim to be anti-democratic and unfair entity favoring the interests of Germany.

Different definitions are made by different scholars in order to explain the same single party family such as “extrem right”, “far right”, “populist radical right”, “anti-immigration party”, “right-wing populist parties”. According to Cas Mudde, “far right”

³⁴³ Nilüfer Göle, “The new faces of the European far-right”, *The Immanent Frame*, <https://tif.ssrc.org/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/>, 11.05.2011, [accessed 11.10.2018].

³⁴⁴ John W. P. Veugelers, Op. Cit., p. 78.

³⁴⁵ Jasper Muis and Tim Immerzeel, “Radical right populism”, *Sociopedia.isa*, 2016, DOI: 10.1177/2056846016121, p. 1.

is an umbrella concept for both the extreme and radical right. The distinction between the two concepts is based on their acceptance of democracy. Mudde argues, “*while extremism rejects democracy altogether, radicalism accepts democracy but rejects liberal democracy—that is, pluralism and minority rights.*”³⁴⁶ In this study the term radical right party is preferred and mostly used since they accept democracy. On the other hand, other concepts are also used interchangeably to refer the same party family. The definitional debate on this issue is out of the scope of this study, thus it will not be mentioned here. However, it seems necessary to explain the core ideological characteristics of RRP in order to fully capture the FN’s discourse regarding migration. According to Cas Mudde RRP share a core ideology of nativism, authoritarianism and populism.³⁴⁷ Mudde defines nativism, a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state.”³⁴⁸ Their nativist position, “*exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship, is expressed in their slogan of ‘own people first’.*”³⁴⁹ In their ethno-nationalist discourse, “they utilize memory, myths, past, tradition, religion, colonialism and identity in order to create a perception of homogeneous unity.”³⁵⁰ Relatedly, migration and migrants are represented as multifaceted threats on cultural, religious, security, economic and political fronts. Indeed, the national, societal, political and economic axes used by political elites in the construction of migration as a security threat through discourses has already been identified in the second chapter in this study.

In addition, RRP share populist, anti-establishment rhetoric. Cas Mudde defines populism as “‘thin-centered’ ideology that divides society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.”³⁵¹ The people

³⁴⁶ Cas Mudde, “The Far Right and the European Elections”, *Current History*, March 2014, p. 98.

³⁴⁷ Cas Mudde, “The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America”, p. 9.

³⁴⁸ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, p. 19.

³⁴⁹ Jasper Muis and Tim Immerzeel, Op. Cit., p. 2.

³⁵⁰ Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 1: The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Theoretical Tools for Comparison”, *CoHERE*, 01.12.2016, p. 5.

³⁵¹ Cas Mudde, “The Populist Radical Right: a Pathological Normalcy”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 33, No:6, 2010, p. 1175.

should be “pure”, “good”, “homogenous” and always right, while the establishment should be “corrupt”, “evil” and “wrong”. Thus, it has an anti-elitist rhetoric. They argue that elitist and Eurocrats are corrupted and wasteful. As Kaya states “the people” is an imagined community for the populists as the nation for the nationalists.³⁵²

Furthermore, diversity is perceived as a prominent threat to the social, cultural, religious and economic security of European societies in a considerable part of the Europe.³⁵³ In addition, populism accuses multiculturalism for denationalizing one’s nation, and deconstructing one’s own people. Hence, RRP’s formulate diversity-phobic rhetoric. They disseminate the idea that the homogeneity of their relevant nations are in danger and diversity endangers the unity of the nation. This point is very well stated by Anton Pelinka

As the enemy- the foreigner, the foreign culture- has already succeeded in breaking into the fortress of the nation state, someone must be responsible. The elite are the secondary ‘defining others’, responsible for the liberal democratic policies of accepting cultural diversity. The populist answer to the complexities of a more and more pluralistic society is not multiculturalism... Right wing populism sees multiculturalism as a recipe to denationalize one’s nation, to deconstruct one’s people.³⁵⁴

As can be understood from above-mentioned text, elites are blamed for the existing diversity of European societies as a consequence of their discourse that promotes multiculturalism in Europe. In line with this rhetoric, populist radical right party leaders claim that the peaceful coexistence between ethno-culturally and religiously different groups in a given society is impossible.³⁵⁵ Islam is represented as incompatible with democracy and European values by RRP’s. Likewise; Islam is constructed as the “Other” in the construction of contemporary European identity. Apart from its Eurosceptic position, the radical right promotes European identity and constructs its notion of Western

³⁵² Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Theoretical Tools for Comparison”, 2016, p. 8.

³⁵³ Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity”, 2017, p. 5.

³⁵⁴ Anton Pelinka, “Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology”, in Ruth Wodak, M. Khosvanirik and B. Mral (Eds), **Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse**, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 8. (cited in Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity”, .2017, p. 6.)

³⁵⁵ Ayhan Kaya, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity”, 2017, p. 5.

civilization and Western values considering Islam as the “Other” in the definition of its own “self”. Indeed, as Hans- Georg Betz states “*Islam fits perfectly well into the radical right’s postmodern politics of difference. Islamophobia has therefore increasingly become a constituent element of radical right-wing populist ideology, both before and after September 11.*”³⁵⁶ Nilüfer Göle argues that through their anti-Islam discourses, contemporary far right parties “*make themselves out to be defender of sexual equality, feminism, and freedom of expression, as well as supporters of the fight against homophobia and anti-Semitism.*”³⁵⁷ FN, for instance, was anti-Semitic as well during the leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen. To give another example, according to Göle, Marine Le Pen uses “*a specific, and influential, form of feminism in order to get support for her fight against the Islamic veil and the perceived threat of Muslim communitarianism.*”³⁵⁸

In addition, European radical right populist parties such as AfD in Germany, FN in France, PVV in the Netherlands, M5S in Italy, and Golden Dawn in Greece use the fear of Islam as a political tool to mainstream themselves and increase their supporters.³⁵⁹ In other words, they have disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics across Europe in order to create perception of crisis or threat to a referent object. Muslims are blamed for the ongoing social, political and economic problems in European societies.

Authoritarianism refers stressing issues such as law and order and traditional values. In this relation, RRP’s favour strong leaders who reflect the ‘will of the people’.³⁶⁰ In fact, Marine Le Pen is regarded as a popular and a strong figure who takes her party to the second round of 2017 presidential elections. She also claims that she, as the leader of FN, represents the “will of the people” and express the realities of the contemporary world.

To reiterate, as mentioned throughout this study, mass migration is considered as significant reason behind the rise of the radical right, especially in Western Europe. In

³⁵⁶ Hans- Georg Betz, “Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe”, **Socialist Register**, 2003, p. 200.

³⁵⁷ Nilüfer Göle, Op. Cit.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Teçmen, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): Islam versus Europe: Populist Discourses and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity”, 2018, p. 1.

³⁶⁰ Jasper Muis and Tim Immerzeel, Op. Cit., p. 2.

fact, Klaus von Beyme defines the “*right wing extremism as a response to perceived threat of mass immigration and the consequent development of multicultural societies in Western Europe.*”³⁶¹ Thus, RRP are anti-migrant parties seeking to preserve homogeneity of their “own” culture from the rising ethno-cultural and religious diversity in their relevant societies. Hence, it can be said that immigration is a key reason of the ethno-cultural and religious diversity in European societies. In brief, hostility to immigration, anti-Islamic rhetoric and Euroscepticism are the common themes of RRP.

Concerning its anti-EU position, radical right blames EU for the financial crisis and for the ongoing European migrant “crisis”. They have been calling their governments for leaving the EU immediately in order to take the control of their borders and sovereignty over defence, migration and economy. After UK’s decision to leave the European Union, which is known as Brexit, demands on leaving the EU and call for exit EU in Europe such as so-called Frexit (withdrawal of France from the EU), Nexit (Netherlands), Oexit (Austria), Dexit (Germany) have been explicitly and constantly utilized by radical right party leaders. They are discontent with the functioning of political system and present EU as anti-democratic and totalitarian who violates sovereignty of their relevant states. For instance, during a speech at Oxford University on 14 September 2015, Marine Le Pen said that

*The independence of our nations is, however, the prey of an institution which considers itself to be a master power by wasting our sovereignties. This supranational authority is liberticidal and responsible for a great part of our miseries. You will have recognized the European Union, that same thing to which all the peoples of Europe are subjected and whose injunctions, dicta, and austerity measures, which strike without the least bit of pity, they all fear. It constitutes a complete historical aberration, a true prison of the peoples on a continent which has suffered too much from oppression and yokes in the past. This Europe is anti-democratic and, nevertheless, it governs our democracies. This Europe means to redefine the outlines of our territories, of our structural organization, of our regulated professions, from the grading of our fruits to the size of our fishing nets. It makes itself the judge, the censor, bailiff, and tax-collector. But today, the European peoples have had enough of kowtowing before Brussels baton or the German whip.*³⁶²

³⁶¹ Klaus von Beyme, “Right Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe”, **West European Politics**, 11 (2), 1988. (cited in Cas Mudde, “The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America”, p. 9.)

³⁶² OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A (English Subtitles), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVkJTcGcPLW8&t=98s>, 14.09.2015 [accessed 09.09.2018].

As can be seen from the above-mentioned words of Marine Le Pen, Front National is one of the significant radical right parties that utilize its Eurosceptic stance linking it both to its anti-immigration rhetoric and to its economic program. Indeed, the FN is harsh on immigration, and traditional on social issues. Its economic policy is conservative that favors protectionism. Some examples of these speeches of Marine Le Pen regarding her anti-EU rhetoric can be given: Regarding immigration issue- in 2015 at Oxford University she said, *“Our two countries remain both prisoners of European treaties that force us to open borders... The only efficient and perennial solution is to stop the flood of immigrants by freeing ourselves from legal obligations tied to the principles of free movement written in the treaties of the EU.”*³⁶³ and in relation to its economic program in 2015 during an interview she told Robert Peston that *“we need to gain our monetary sovereignty. We have the right to have a national currency and adopt it to our economy,”*³⁶⁴ and *“We protect losers of globalization which is the thing that we made to believe that it is good. No free trade. It is good for winners of globalisation.”*³⁶⁵ As can be understood, far right parties can link the E.U. policies to their core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

To sum up, the below-given table indicates the characteristics of radical right parties regarding their concerns, solutions to these questions, basic political orientation, communication style and internal party organization.

³⁶³ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

³⁶⁴ BBC News Channel, “The Power of Le Pen- Our World”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzn5CoEWWII>, 28.02.2015, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁶⁵ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

Table 5: Characteristic of right-wing populist parties

Bogeymen	(I) (Muslim) immigrants, asylum seekers, ethnic/religious minorities (II) Political, economic and cultural elites (III) EU procedures, structures and bureaucrats
'Therapy'	(I) Stop immigration, apply stricter immigration laws and welfare state benefits, deport immigrants who have a criminal record or who are unwilling to integrate (II) Break up the 'elite cartel' (III) Stop further EU integration and further financial transfers
Basic political orientation	Xenophobic, anti-immigration, anti-establishment, and anti-elitist
Communication style, including campaigning	Alarmist, vociferous, exclusionary, wildly oversimplified, taboo-breaking, deliberately misleading and opaque, subtle, opportunistic, confrontational ('us against them'), negative campaigning
Internal party organisation	Led by or tailored to one leadership figure with whom the public identifies (political entrepreneur), top-down decision making

Source: Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb, "Europe – No, Thanks?: Study on the Rise of Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe, Sankt Augustin and Berlin: Center for European studies and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, p. 18.

4.3 The Front National

In an attempt to analyze the Marine Le Pen's rhetoric on immigration as an actor in the securitization and stigmatization of migration in France, it is necessary to briefly explain the historical background of the French Front National and its characteristics.

The Front National was founded in 1972 by François Duprat, François Brigneau and Jean Marie Le Pen. Jean Marie Le Pen was the leader of the party from 1972 to 2011. Under his leadership, the party articulated anti-migrant, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and homophobic discourses and called for halt on immigration and/or more restrictive immigration policies. In relation to immigration, from its foundation until now, the party

has utilized anti-migrant discourses and is hostile to immigration, which has caused ethno-cultural and religious diversity in French society. It has supported French nationalism.

In 1970s, the FN adopting anti-migrant discourses did not get considerable support from electorates. It achieved political attention in the mid-1980s when the integration of those immigrants residing in France into French “melting pot” was the main concern of public debates; consequently, it received 11 percent of the votes at the 1984 European elections and increased its votes in 1988 presidential elections.³⁶⁶ For instance, in 1984 Front National won municipal elections in Dreux, an industrial town in the west of Paris, through an election campaign on a call to stop immigration and the deportation of thousands of African immigrants.³⁶⁷

Both the sheer numbers and the increasing visibility of non-European immigrants in the public era resulted in concerns about national identity, assimilation, and ethnic balance debates around immigration which had contributed to the xenophobic sentiments in France in the mid-1980s paving the way for the rise of radical right parties. Indeed, France saw the rise of radical right-wing Front National in the 1980s.

By the 1990s, the FN had become as a significant force in French politics.³⁶⁸ During the 1990s due to the changing composition of immigrants and sheer numbers of refugees, the unease and sentiments towards immigrants increased in French public (this point is explained in third chapter in detail). Under these developments the FN increased its votes by the virtue of its hostility to immigration. Concerns about inassimilability of Muslim immigrants in French culture were expressed by the radical right and media also played an important role in its rise. The electoral growth of the FN increased to “15 percent in the 1995 presidential and 1997 parliamentary elections. In 1998, the FN won 275 seats in the regional councils and achieved a 15 percent threshold in nearly half of the metropolitan departments.”³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ Marc Swyngedouw and Gilles Ivaldi, “The extreme right utopia in Belgium and France: The ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 2001, p. 2.

³⁶⁷ Philippe Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order*, p. 13.

³⁶⁸ Michael Ray, “National Front”.

³⁶⁹ Marc Swyngedouw and Gilles Ivaldi, *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.

The electoral support for the FN increased gradually between 1984 and 2007. The table and the figures given below indicate the FN's results in French elections. As can be seen from the Figure 5 that after Marine Le Pen, the daughter of Jean Marie Le Pen, took the leadership from her father in 2011, the FN's electoral support has increased significantly.

Table 6: FN results in presidential elections since 1971

	Vote in %	Of registered voters in %	Votes	Abstention
1974	0.75%	0.62%	190,921	15.77%
1988	14.38%	11.47%	4,376,742	18.65%
1995	15.00%	11.42%	4,571,138	21.62%
2002 1 st round	16.86%	11.66%	4,804,703	28.40%
2002 2 nd round	17.79%	13.41%	5,525,906	20.29%
2007	10.44%	8.62%	3,834,530	16.23%
2012	17.90%	13.95%	6,421,426	20.52%

Source: Aurelien Mondon, "The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?", *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol.22, No.3, 2014, p. 304.




Figure 7: FN results in presidential elections since 1971³⁷⁰

³⁷⁰ The Figure is calculated by the writer of this study based on the above-given Table 6.




Figure 8: National Front's share of votes in French elections (1980-2015)³⁷¹

It is also worth to mention the success of FN in 2002. The French public and mainstream political parties were shocked because of the success of Jean Marie Le Pen at 2002 French presidential elections. FN moved to second round of the 2002 presidential elections for the first time in the party's history. In other words, for the first time in French political history a radical party moved to second round in presidential elections. Although he was defeated to Jacques Chirac who obtained 82 percent of the votes, concerns and grievances regarding immigration and security became visible in French society. This made mainstream parties to adopt more strict immigration policies in their party programs in order to capture FN's votes.

As can be seen from the figure, at 2007 presidential election there was a dramatic decline in the support of FN. This is because, Sarkozy uttered tough migration policies similar to Le Pen's during his election campaign at the presidential elections of 2007. As a result, Sarkozy managed to get 38 percent of Le Pen's 2002 electorate votes in the first round.³⁷²

³⁷¹ Allez Marine, "The rise of France's far-right from the 1980s to today, charted, <https://qz.com/567247/the-rise-of-frances-far-right-from-the-1980s-to-today-charted/>, 07.12.2015, [accessed 10.10.2018].

³⁷² Dr Sally Marthaler, Op. Cit., p. 392.

Marine Le Pen, joined FN in 1986 when she was 18 years old and since then she became a prominent actor in the management body of FN; she became vice-president of FN in 2003 and ran 2007 presidential elections campaign. She is the leader of the party since 2011. It is argued that she tried to “*distance herself from the extrem views that traditionally has been associated with her father and FN*”³⁷³ such as anti-Semitic, racist, homophobic discourses. Within this regard, she expelled his father from the party in August 2015 due to the fact that Jean Marie Le Pen spoke repeatedly out his Holocaust views by saying that “*the gas chambers were only a ‘detail’ of the history*”³⁷⁴, thus making the French public to remember the party’s anti-Semitic past. He first said this in 1987, and then repeated his views in European Parliament in 2009 and then later on. Indeed, Front National is criticized for being anti-Semitic and racist; this is what Marine Le Pen wants to change in the mind of French public to mainstream themselves. In other words, she tries to “*detoxify the National Front’s image.*”³⁷⁵ Indeed, Florian Philippot, Marine Le Pen’s right- hand, who is incharge of rebranding the FN’s image, said that

*We have never wanted to be called a “far-right” party. It’s an insult. Being a “far-right” party means denying democracy, denying the republic. It reduces us to a racist vision which is not ours, we are way more pro-democracy...The party wants France to get its sovereignty back. We are patriotic. I think this is the correct term that should be used to qualify us and our party.*³⁷⁶

On the other hand, Marine Le Pen continued to present FN’s anti-migrant, diversity-phobic and xenophobic views and articulate immigration, particularly from African countries, as a threat to France’s national security, national/cultural identity and economic welfare. In other words, instead of anti-Semitism, she has been formulated anti-Islam discourses and targets Muslim immigrants as a security threat and has disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics in France as well as in Europe. She has been articulating that the French culture is under the threat of Islam. For instance, in 2010 she told FN supporters that “the sight of Muslims praying in the streets was similar to the Nazi

³⁷³ Michael Ray, “National Front”.

³⁷⁴ Angelique Chrisafis, “Jean-Marie Le Pen fined for dismissing Holocaust as ‘detail’”.

³⁷⁵ Hassina Mechani and Emilie Denetre, “France must fight against Islamism to restore civil peace, says National Front”, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/france-must-fight-islamism-restore-civil-peace-says-national-front>, 06.10.2016, [accessed 10.10.2018].

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

occupation in World War Two.”³⁷⁷ She used the concept of occupation, which is related to war and borders in order to create a “crisis”. In other words, it can be said that she implied that France is under the invasion of Islam.

At this juncture, it seems crucial to mention Marine Le Pen’s stance on French colonial past and France’s policies towards Jews during the WWII that were articulated during the 2017 French presidential election campaigns. On April 10, Marine Le Pen stated that “France as a nation was not responsible for the Vel d’Hiv roundup when around 13,000 Jews were arrested by French police officers in July 1942 and deported to the Nazis gas chambers.”³⁷⁸³⁷⁹ She was criticized by many politicians and Jewish groups in France and her statement was interpreted as an “echo of the FN’s anti-Semitic roots”.³⁸⁰ Indeed, Amanda Taub argued that “Marine Le Pen alluded to anti-Semitic stereotypes on the campaign trail while, at the same time, claiming to be the protector of French Jews.”³⁸¹ Again, Cecile Alduy, a professor at Stanford University, argues that “Le Pen’s discourses on ‘international finance’ and ‘globalized money’ refer to common features of anti-Semitism, thus revive these stereotypes.”³⁸² Another issue, French colonial history was debated during the 2017 French presidential election campaigns after Emmanuel Macron, the leader of *En Marche!*, told to Algerian TV station in February that “French colonization in North Africa was a ‘crime against humanity’.”³⁸³ Contrary to Macron, Marine Le Pen took a “hegemonist, unapologetic stance on French colonial past”³⁸⁴ by declaring, “Algeria owes a lot to French colonization”.³⁸⁵ In other words, she stated that colonialism is a positive thing and maintained revisionist colonial histories. Indeed, Jennifer Sessions, a professor at University of Iowa argues that “nostalgia for the colonies

³⁷⁷ BBC, “Europe and nationalism: A country-by- country guide”.

³⁷⁸ Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen Denies French Guilt for Rounding Up Jews”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/europe/france-marine-le-pen-jews-national-front.html>, 10.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁷⁹ Abraham Joseph, “It is time for France to face its past and debate crimes against humanity”, <https://theconversation.com/its-time-for-france-to-face-its-past-and-debate-crimes-against-humanity-74886>, 26.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁸⁰ Adam Nossiter, Op. Cit.

³⁸¹ Amanda Taub, “France’s Far Right, Once Known for Anti-Semitism, Courts Jews”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/europe/france-jews-marine-le-pen-national-front-anti-semitism.html>, 05.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Abraham Joseph, Op. Cit.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Morocco World News, “Marine Le Pen: ‘Algeria Owes A Lot to French Colonization’”, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/04/214755/marine-le-pen-algeria-owes-lot-french-colonization/>, 23.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].

complies with the FN's nationalistic, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic ideology."³⁸⁶ Sessions also underlines that "increasing fear of Islamist terrorism have accelerated the colonial revisionism on French Right."³⁸⁷

Furthermore, in favor of a desire to mainstream herself in French politics, she seeks to use more 'modest', non-sexist tone, and "claims to embody republican values, defend secularism and adopt a feminist stance."³⁸⁸ As mentioned before, in choosing Islam as a target, Marine Le Pen utilizes "a specific, and influential, form of feminism in order to receive support for her fight against the Islamic veil and the perceived threat of Muslim communitarianism."³⁸⁹ To give an example, on October 10, 2016 Marine Le Pen told Stephen Sackur at a TV programme on BBC Channel that

The burkini is not a swimming costume. The burkini is a uniform, an Islamic fundamentalism uniform. It goes against everything we believe in about a woman's place. Women's place in society and women's rights matter to me. The fact that women are relegated in how they dress and later may be relegated at a civil and legal level. The reality is that these women are being used by Islamic fundamentalists who are trying to implement a restrictive dress code.³⁹⁰

It can be understood from her above-mentioned words that she argues that Muslim women are suppressed by Islamic fundamentalism, implies that Muslim women should be "saved" and "given back their freedom". She can be criticized for underestimating the free will of Muslim women to wear in the way they want and for violating the core values of French republican values such as secularism and freedom. So known *biological racism* is one of the forms of racism that the superiority is based on the race. In addition, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein define *new-racism* that underlines cultural differences.³⁹¹ It is worth to mention that "discourse as a social practice plays an important role in the production, legitimation and reproduction of racism

³⁸⁶ Jennifer Sessions, "Why the French presidential candidates are arguing about their colonial history, <https://theconversation.com/why-the-french-presidential-candidates-are-arguing-about-their-colonial-history-75372>, 19.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Nilüfer Göle, Op. Cit.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ BBC News Channel, "Marine Le Pen: Brexit 'most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall' - BBC News", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUFlv-nSuGM>, 10.10.2016, [accessed 09.10.2018].

³⁹¹ For more information, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, **Irak Ulus Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler**, Nazlı Ökten(çev.) İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 6. Basım, 2017.

as an expression of ethnic dominance and exclusion.”³⁹² Le Pen discourses targeting Muslims and Islam would be regarded in the context of *cultural racism*. Thus, she articulates a new-racist rhetoric towards Muslims and Islam.

In relation to the FN’s commitment to secularism, most analyses argue that “the party has been used *laïcité* as a new issue to legitimize its old program and as a tool to reframe its anti-Muslim resentments in a more acceptable discourse.”³⁹³ Similarly, according to these analyses, “through adopting *laïcité* in its discourse using populist strategy the FN aims to portray itself as the defender of national ideals and its political opponents as betrayers of core Republican values.”³⁹⁴

“In the French presidential and parliamentary elections in May and June of 2012, the Front National, led by Marine Le Pen, received 18% and 14% of vote in the respective first rounds, which is a considerable increase considering the party’s low point in 2007.”³⁹⁵

It is also noteworthy to mention the FN’s success at 2014 EP election. The FN finished first and alone gained 21 seats in the European Parliament elections of May 2014. After EP election, Marine Le Pen increased the Party’s popularity in France and across Europe. She gathered together with other European radical right party leaders such as Geert Wilders, Nigel Farage etc. in order to talk about Islam and immigration in relation to security, considering that Islam is chosen to be the common enemy of the European radical right. With the help of this success, she did find a ground to disseminate her Euroskeptic discourse in France. Her anti-EU position should be mentioned here. She describes EU as anti-democratic, a totalitarian and a thoroughly corrupt bureaucratic model by which their sovereignty is worn down as can be seen her words given below at during a speech at Oxford University on 14 September 2015

³⁹² Ineke Van Der Valk, “Political Discourse on Ethnic Minority Issues: A Comparison of the right and the extreme right in the Netherlands and France (1990-97)”, **Ethnicities**, V. 3, No. 2, June 2003, p.186.

³⁹³ Dimitri Almeida, “Exclusionary secularism: the Front National and the reinvention of *laïcité*”, **Modern & Contemporary France**, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 250.

³⁹⁴ Dimitri Almeida, Op. Cit., p. 250.

³⁹⁵ Michael Minkenberg, “European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East: Trends, Patterns and Challenges”, in Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Eds.), **Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country analyses, counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies**, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013, p. 9.

Today, our peoples, our nations, aspire to freedom, the freedom to take their destiny in their hands and decide by themselves what is good for their children. A bunch of miserable technocrats are not going to control our lives! Can we leave the future of our children in the hands of these apostles of forced federalization?... What is political sovereignty without economic sovereignty? What is power without the means of power? An empty shell... The European peoples no longer want to be puppets of Brussels' technocrats and the toys of Frankfurt's bankers. They no longer tolerate any injustices, any injunctions coming from foreign governments which usurp the right to hand out lessons and punishments.³⁹⁶

At this juncture, it should be mentioned that there was a referendum, so-called as Brexit referendum, that took place on 23 June 2016 in the UK and 51.9 percent voted for leaving the EU. What is more, a populist, conservative, anti-migrant candidate, Donald Trump was elected as the President of the US in November 2016. For Marine Le Pen, these international developments showed that her right-wing populist ideas are accepted worldwide.³⁹⁷ It can be also said that these developments paved the way for the FN to attract more people and consequently, increase its vote. Indeed, on October 10, 2016 she told Stephen Sackur at a TV talk that

Brexit is the most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Through this vote, Britain has begun to bring down what I have called "the Brussels wall", a wall that is closing people within it and that is imposing policies on them that they don't want. I clearly said that when I am elected President, I will go to EU and say that I want four sovereignties back. Legislative sovereignty: Our laws are more important than EU directives. Territorial sovereignty: we decide who comes and stays in our country, we want borders. Thirdly, economic and banking sovereignty: I have the right to promote economic patriotism if I wish so. And monetary sovereignty.³⁹⁸

Last but not least, at the latest French presidential elections, Marine Le Pen made it to second round of 2017 presidential elections, however defeated by Emmanuel Macron who offered a more liberal approach in line with immigration and European commitment. He stressed that "asylum is a right and migrants are a strength for the economy."³⁹⁹ Unlike Marine Le Pen, he was a pro-EU candidate. Indeed, Marine Le Pen received 21.3% and 34% votes in the first and second round of 2017 presidential elections

³⁹⁶ OxfordUnion, "Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A".

³⁹⁷ BBC News Channel. "Marine Le Pen: Brexit 'most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall.'"

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Sarah Wolff, "Immigration: an issue in the French presidential campaign", <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/immigration-issue-french-presidential-campaign>, 19.04.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

respectively. This is the highest point that the FN has ever received in elections in its history. Even if Marine Le Pen did not win the elections, her success showed that one third of French citizens favor tough immigration policies which means that she managed to convince a significant part of France that immigration is a security threat for France. Shortly, the FN continues to be a challenge for immigration in France.

Immigration has been a prominent issue in the party program of the FN since its foundation in 1972. However, the growing success of the FN at the previous national and presidential elections forced French political parties to adopt FN's programme on immigration. Indeed, since the 2002 presidential elections immigration has been a one of the prominent issues in the French presidential campaign captured by all political parties involved a broad political spectrum. In the 2017 presidential campaign immigration was discussed as a security and identity issue rather than as a societal project.⁴⁰⁰ Shortly, immigration is mostly considered as a security issue by French politicians. Marine Le Pen issued a "144 presidential commitments"⁴⁰¹ promising to make France "free, safe, prosperous, fair, proud, powerful and sustainable".⁴⁰² The key themes her presidential commitment are "to leave both the Eurozone and the EU and to prioritise national interest over global forces. She wants to reduce immigration to nearly zero and fight against multiculturalism and strengthen secularism, to the point of banning the signs of religious belief in all public spaces, as one of the solution to fundamentalist Islam."⁴⁰³ She said that "*There is no more left or right. There are nationalists and globalists.*"⁴⁰⁴ Linking it to her economic programme, she defines "a new patriotic model" of "intelligent protectionism" which replaces free trade and which, she argues, reduces the unemployment rates in France.⁴⁰⁵ According to her model, "French workers will be favoured in the job market and French companies will be preferred for public contracts."⁴⁰⁶ Le Pen argues that French people suffered from globalization and that "*It (economic programme) is about*

⁴⁰⁰ Sarah Wolff, "Immigration: an issue in the French presidential campaign".

⁴⁰¹ <https://rassemblementnational.fr/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/>.

⁴⁰² Paul Smith, "What Marine Le Pen's 144-Point presidential plan for France actually says", <http://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-actually-says-72910>, 13.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018]; **144 Engagements Presidentiels Marine 2017**, <https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-engagements.pdf>, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴⁰³ Paul Smith, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ BBC News Channel, "The Power of Le Pen- Our World", 2015.

⁴⁰⁵ Paul Smith, *Op. Cit.*

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

getting France into a position where it can defend itself against globalization and to set some plain rules... And today globalization in the EU is completely deregulated.” Similarly, Florian Philippot, Marine Le Pen’s right- hand, said that *“Our programme is quite simple: not statism, nor liberalism, but a bit of both. The state has to be strategic: it has to protect strategic sectors from international unfair trading, to promote the ‘made in France’ thanks to protectionism laws. This strategic state has to encourage small businesses.”*⁴⁰⁷

After the 2017 presidential elections, in favor of its strategy of rebranding the image of the party, it has renamed itself as the National Rally in June 2018, with an aim to *“gain power through forming coalitions with allies”*⁴⁰⁸ and to *“revive and unify the party.”*⁴⁰⁹ In fact, while she tried to reach out with her message to the French people in the run up to the 2017 presidential election, Marine Le Pen did not use the name of the party, or the symbol of the flame.⁴¹⁰ In this study, the FN’s anti-migrant discourses articulated between 2015- 2017 will be analyzed, and the party was known as the National Front within this period. Thus, this study uses the name Front National.

4.4 Front National’s Anti-Migrant Discourses

Marine Le Pen as the charismatic and popular leader of Front National aims to convince the French public to believe that migrants are threats to their national, economic, cultural and internal security. To this end, she has been articulating anti-migrant, anti-Islam, xenophobic and diversity-phobic discourses constructing immigration as a threat. Considering the rising electoral success of the FN throughout years (as explained in the previous section of this chapter) and its impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande’s term (as explained in the third chapter), it clearly seems that she has managed to convince the French public and mainstream political parties of her concerns

⁴⁰⁷ Hassina Mechanī and Emilie Denetre, Op. Cit.

⁴⁰⁸ BBC, “Europe and nationalism: A country-by- country guide”.

⁴⁰⁹ Kim Willsher, “Marine Le Pen sparks row over new name for Front National”.

⁴¹⁰ BBC News Channel. “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’.

on immigration issue. Indeed, it is already mentioned that the FN's electoral growth has forced right wing parties adopt its immigration programme and employ tough migration policies. Indeed, "in 2017 surveys showed that 61 percent of the French people want to stop immigration from Muslim countries and in 2016, 57 percent thought that there were too many immigrants in France and 63 percent of the French believed that the majority of refugees will not be able to integrate."⁴¹¹ By no doubt, the historical background of the security problem is also important to convince audience in the process of securitization.⁴¹² Thus, "the conditions historically associated with the threat"⁴¹³ is one of the crucial facilitating conditions. Hence, the third chapter of this study analyzes the politics of immigration in France in order to identify the historical background of how immigration has become a security issue in France. In this sense, the already mentioned recent terrorists attacks happened in France soils, ongoing European migrant and refugee "crisis", financial crisis have facilitating conditions for Marine Le Pen to link refugees with terrorists, representing them as threats to France's national security.

To reiterate, the Front National is an anti-migrant, anti-globalization and anti-EU party, which articulates anti-Islam rhetoric and disseminates fear of Islam and fear of politics in France. Therefore, it is regarded as one of the securitizing actors in constructing immigration as a security threat in France at a national level. Indeed, Marine Le Pen has been blending already existing economic resentments and cultural resentments in French society in order to create a perception of immigration as a threat.

Marine Le Pen's speech acts portraying immigrants as a security threat can be analyzed in the context of national security, societal security, economic security and internal security. It has been argued in the second chapter of this study that national, societal, economic and internal security concerns are overlapping concepts in the discourses of political agents. Similarly, it is analyzed that Marine Le Pen's anti-migrant rhetoric has included these concepts overlapping each other. Hence, immigration,

⁴¹¹ Sarah Wolff, "Immigration: an issue in the French presidential campaign".

⁴¹² Bahar Rumelili and Sibel Karadağ, *Op. Cit.*, p.75.

⁴¹³ Paul D. Williams (Ed.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 69.

especially from Muslism countries, is represented as the main reason for all political, social and economic programs that France faces with.

In brief, this section tries to analyze the anti-migrant discourses of Marine Le Pen in order to assess the security themes uttered in the construction of migration-security nexus in France. Political speeches, the 2017 FN presidential election campaign, posters, interviews and articles in the period of 2015- 2017 will be examined in order to carry out this study. The videos of interviews with and political speeches done by Marine Le Pen with English subtitle will be analyzed.

4.4.1 National Security and Internal Security Themes in the FN's Anti- Migrant Rhetoric

National security is mainly about the state's control on its border and sovereignty. It seems noteworthy to remark Marine Le Pen's anti-EU rhetoric here, because it is also closely linked to immigration phenomenon. As a member of the EU, France has to comply with the EU's migration policies. This point is one of the main concerns of FN. Regardingly; as noted earlier, Marine Le Pen accuses the EU of violating French territorial sovereignty since she argues that France is to determine the rules of who can enter and who must stay outside its borders.

While articulating her anti-EU discourses, in the meantime, Marine Le Pen represents immigration as a national security concern rather than a societal project. In other words, through her Euroscepticism she puts immigration (linking it with border control) under the spotlight of French society and underlines the notion that immigration is a phenomenon that should be dealt within the context of border management. Indeed, it can be said that an "effective" border management makes a society feels "safe" in its relevant country. Through using this argument, immigration is represented as a phenomenon that violates French national borders, thus something to be stopped, controlled, deported, and assimilated by Marine Le Pen even when she criticizes the EU. To put it differently, immigration is portrayed as a negative phenemonen for French

society through her discourses. This point can be seen from her speech made in 2015 after Charlie Hebdo attacks at Oxford University

*We must rediscover the control and command of our borders. The dogma of free movement of people and goods is anchored so strongly in the minds of the leaders of the European Union that even the idea of national border control is considered a heresy. However, borders constitute our first form of protection against jihadism....95 percent of countries in the world have borders to protect themselves, to control and decide who can enter into their territory. No borders, no state, no security, no sovereignty, no independence, and no freedom!*⁴¹⁴

Similarly, she wants to suspend Schengen Area to recover the command and the control of French national borders. Indeed, during an interview with Nigel Farage Le Pen told that “if she had been elected, she would have suspend Schengen agreement and restore France’s borders, because France can no longer continue to leave with this pressure exerted by immigration.”⁴¹⁵ According to Marine Le Pen, Schengen agreement enables terrorist to move freely in its national borders and as can be seen below-given words of Marine Le Pen, she accused the EU of not protecting the EU borders efficiently.

*a technocratic European Union which has chosen as its objective the dissolution of nation- states...Every year, tonnes of weapons coming from the Balkans enter French territory without a real barriers to stop them, and hundreds of jihadist circulate around the Europe without hindrance. The machine pistol of the jihadist, Amedy Coulibaly, who killed five people, passed through Belgium, and his companion and accomplice, Hayat Boumeddiene, was able to flee calmly to Syria via Spain. These are the results of the submissions of national governments to the orders of Brussels. The EU weakens us by the fact that it imposes total open borders... Fewer personnel, less equipment, underperformance. If we had had the national borders, we would have probably been able to stop many of the terrorists who entered French territory, after having gone to fight in Syria or train in Yemen, as is the case with at least one of the fundamentalist terrorists killed on 9th January.*⁴¹⁶

Equally important, as noted earlier, national security and internal security are closely connected. Internal security themes are explicitly formulated through Marine Le Pen’s discourses. In other words, immigration has been argued to pose a threat to the France’s internal security by Le Pen. Hence, above-given speech act of Le Pen also underlined the perceived threat that migration poses to internal security in France. She

⁴¹⁴ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

⁴¹⁵ LBC, “Nigel Farage Interviews Marine Le Pen exclusively”.

⁴¹⁶ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

clearly mentioned that migration causes “tonnes of weapons”, and “hundred of jihadist circulate around the Europe”, consequently brings terror and ideology of Islamic state to France; thus is a “threat to French public order and domestic stability”. In other words, migration is explicitly portrayed as a “vehicle for importing terrorists and criminals”⁴¹⁷, thus a threat for France that should be stopped by her discourse. This argument is often used to justify restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies by FN. Regarding this, she said that

*The attacks by Islamic fundamentalists were in part carried out by French people born here. Do we also have to have the soldiers of the Islamic State who sneak in alongside the migrants? ... Just think of the horrible attack on the Bataclan, three of the terrorists had come here using migrant routes. In France we have a problem of Islamic fundamentalism to deal with. ..We don't want to add terrorists coming in alongside migrants to this serious problem.*⁴¹⁸

In addition, due to the fact that Paris attacks were carried out by those who are born in French soils, not by those immigrated through recent migration routes, Marine Le Pen has portrayed mass immigration as a reason for also creating Islamic fundamentalists among French people born in France. Indeed, in 2016 at the European Parliament she told that “*mass immigration has brought about sectarianism, and that “communitarianism/sectarianism” is the terrain on which the Islamist fundamentalism recruits their future soldiers.*”⁴¹⁹ Taking this into consideration, it can be clearly said that through her utterance a perception that “migrant” or “foreigner” is a potential “foreigner terrorist” is created, which ultimately results in a sense of fear and insecurity from the French public.

The concepts of occupation, invasion, raid, attack, influx with regard to war and borders are commonly used in the anti-immigration discourse.⁴²⁰ In 2016, Le Pen said that “*The reality of immigration is catastrophic...We are being submerged by migration. In Calais a few weeks ago, there were 2,500 migrants, and now there are between 11,000*

⁴¹⁷ Khalid Koser, “When is Migration a Security Issue”.

⁴¹⁸ BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

⁴¹⁹ “Marine Le Pen speaks at the European Parliament on Islam and terror Subtitles”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeSEE5qsAs8&t=191s>, 26.01.2016, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴²⁰ Mehmet Gökay Özerim, “European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, p. 2198.

and 12,000.”⁴²¹ Similarly, on 5 February 2017 during her campaign speech, Le Pen said that “*We do not want to live under the yoke of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism... Islamic fundamentalism is attacking us at home.*” As stated by Kaya, complementing this idea of “invasion” and “attack”, Marine Le Pen claimed that mass migration and the rise of “Islamic fundamentalism, [was] an ideological “enemy of France” to settle on its territory.”⁴²²

In addition, as underlined earlier, Marine Le Pen has been criticizing the EU for opening its borders to sheer number of Syrian refugees and for the quotas determined by the EU that member states obliged to accommodate in their states. She has articulated that mass migration, which results in entry of terrorists, should be stopped as can be seen from her speech done at the European Parliament in 2016

*The EU announced that three million migrants will arrive in Europe next year. Of course, we do not equate ALL migrants with terrorists. However, what I denounced in September in this parliament, the infiltration by Jihadists, in the middle of this wave of migrants, is a reality, and last Friday this reality killed. You can pretend not to see this, but this reality is here and one cannot ignore it. Continue to let this flood of migrants, uncontrolled, when you know very well that the EU and that the countries at the European borders are totally incapable of controlling anything whatsoever and even less the identity of those who arrive, and you forego the means to fight against this terrible danger.*⁴²³

She constantly states that France should privilege its national interest of French people. For example in 2016 she said that “ ‘*I am defending interest of French people*’, ‘*We cannot welcome them (refugees) here in France, we do not have the means to do that*’, ‘*we have a huge amount of migrants that we cannot manage, all the more since we have seven million people unemployed*’.”⁴²⁴ To give another example, after the Paris attacks talking about halting immigration she said that “*So given this kind of huge threat and which is literary a declaration of war to France. We cannot take the risk. It questions the safety; it challenges the safety of France. I am here to fight for the safety of the*

⁴²¹ BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

⁴²² Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Teçmen, “Critical Heritages (CoHERE): Islam versus Europe: Populist Discourses and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity”, 2018, pp. 11- 12.

⁴²³ “Marine Le Pen Speaks at the European Parliament on Islam and terror”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeSEE5qsAs8&t=191s>, 21.01.2016, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴²⁴ BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

French.”⁴²⁵ It can be clearly seen that she has utilized the fear of politics denouncing that migration endanger the safety of France.

Furthermore, as noted before, during large-scale migration as a consequence of forced migration “illegal” border crossing may result if the countries do not pursue an “open door” policy. Regarding Syrian refugees or asylum seekers, instead of its humanitarian character, the refugees are represented as “illegal” or “illegally crossing the French national borders” by Le Pen. Indeed, instead of using the term of “refugee” she uses the term “migrant” with an aim to connote that they are migrants who come to France for economic reasons, and to create a perception that they commit a crime by “illegally” crossing French borders. More precisely, through declaring migrants as criminals and abusers of the asylum system, the migration- crime nexus was constructed. In addition, by using the term of ‘migrant’ she overlooks the human right and international right of those who are fleeing from their countries due to persecution, war, ethnic strife etc. To illustrate, on 10 October 2016 during a TV interview at BBC News Channel she told Stephen Sackur that

In reality, everyone comes without any rights and when we tell them they cannot stay, they do stay all the same, and all of that means that we have a huge amount of migrants that we cannot manage.

*We are not faced today with people who are entitled to asylum. Most of the people who come are young men between the age of 20 and 40, they are economic migrants. For those who flee from countries at war, we have to set up humanitarian camps in their countries under international protection, but we cannot welcome them here in France... Now those who are persecuted by the government of Bashar al-Assad are members of Al Qaeda and of the ‘Islamic State’. I don’t want to welcome them in France. In reality they are war refugees.*⁴²⁶

In brief, through her anti-migrant discourses that frames migration as a threat to France’s national and internal security, Marine Le Pen reinforces the already existing fear of a loss of sovereignty, the fear of the weakening of border controls and the fear of crime/insecurity among French public in order to create a perception of crisis. In order to

⁴²⁵ CNN Channel, “Paris Terror: Marine Le Pen on Halting Immigration”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=McpIwmjXMSY>, 21.07.2016, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴²⁶ BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

justify restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies the migration- terrorism nexus is often produced through FN's rhetoric. Discourses of Le Pen that identify migration with terrorism create a sense of insecurity and unease towards immigrants in French society. To put it in different way, she has disseminated fear of politics in France and called for strict border control to prevent "illegal" migration and terrorism. Indeed, during her 2017 presidential election campaign, she articulated anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric. According to her 144 presidential commitment, she would "recruit an extra 6,000 frontier police in order to control its borders from illegal migration, to reduce legal migration from 200,000 people to 10,000 per year and make it more difficult for immigrants to bring their families to France."⁴²⁷ In addition, she wants to "end birthright access to citizenship, which means being born on French territory would not guarantee French nationality."⁴²⁸ Furthermore, it would be impossible for undocumented/ illegal migrants to legalize their stay in France and asylum applications would be made outside France at French embassies.⁴²⁹

4.4.2 Societal Security Themes in the FN's Anti- Migrant Rhetoric

Regarding societal security, immigrants are seen as a societal threat that could alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the host country. In this context, migration has been articulated as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community. Concerning, Marine Le Pen has been formulating societal security themes through her anti-migrant discourses in order to shape the French public perception on migration, presenting it as a security threat. Indeed, mass migration, especially those from Muslim countries, is represented as a threat to the cultural homogeneity and social cohesion of France by the FN. For instance, in 2015 speaking at Oxford University Marine Le Pen stated that "*France has to stop immigration now, it is because immigration has been unreasonable for 30 years in France. This has caused*

⁴²⁷ Paul Smith, Op. Cit.

⁴²⁸ Nicholas Vinocur, "Marine Le Pen's plan to make France great again", <https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pens-plan-to-make-france-great-again/>, 04.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴²⁹ Paul Smith, Op. Cit.

problems not only for our finance, for our social situation, but is a problem now for national unity as well."⁴³⁰

Similarly, the “threat” that migration poses to the national cohesion was stated by Le Pen on July 1, 2013 at a TV program with Sophie Shevardnadze. Marine Le Pen said

*We are subject to absolutely massive levels of immigration which are only destructive including the national cohesion and our ability to live side by side. The immigration comes from Africa, from North Africa has been going on quite a long time. Now it is accompanied by a new type of immigration which is immigration by the Roma coming from Eastern Europe. We now need to be reasonable and get our borders back. I think freedom for people comes from control over its borders... We are not a hotel full of open doors for everybody can come in and do whatever they likes and sell whatever they likes.*⁴³¹

Multiculturalism is also related to societal security. As mentioned earlier, the FN is against multiculturalism which is presented as a reason for societal disintegration, thus as a societal threat that could alter ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of France by Marine Le Pen. As she said in 2016 that

*For many years we have stood for the same principles: the independence of the nation. The principles that are enshrined in our constitution: France is an indivisible Republic. We fight against communitarianism. We fight against multiculturalism because we believe that it brings multi-conflicts. We fight for a secular, democratic, and social Republic which, we no longer have in France.*⁴³²

Islam has been securitized and served as the “Other” for the definition of “We” identity in France and treated as the “alien” by the FN. Ideed, Marine Le Pen utilizes anti-Islam rhetoric and puts a great attention to fight against “Islamic fundamentalism” in her discourses. She claims that Islamic fundamentalism is not just a threat to French national security and internal stability but also is the enemy of French culture, French way of live and secularism. She defines Islamic fundamentalism as

⁴³⁰ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

⁴³¹ RT, “Marine Le Pen: France plagued by bankruptcy & mass migration”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nm9rbDCz3vc>, 01.07.2013, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴³² BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

The terrorism that we confront today is in the service of a totalitarian ideology, medieval, obscurantist, and inhumane: Islamist fundamentalism. France, the home of freedoms and human rights, was attacked on its soil by Islamist fundamentalism. This ideology is armed: it trains, and mobilises Islamist terrorists; finances and develops international jihadism; and fuels religious fanaticism. These are the people who attacked Paris on 7th, 8th, and 9th January 2015.... They come to destroy and annihilate everything that we are and everything that they hate: our freedom, our way of life, our culture, and, in France, our secularism.⁴³³

Besides, assimilation of migrants is another concern of Le Pen, which, indeed, has been a prominent political concern in France since the mid-1980s. Instead of integration, the FN favours Republican assimilation. This is because, FN claims that integration results in multicultural society that create conflicts. According to Marine Le Pen

Assimilation imposes the idea of letting go of one part of oneself. You give up something that makes you what you are in order to ground yourself in the national community, to adopt its rules, cultures and codes. It is indeed suffering. ...as it is the sacrifice of one part of oneself, which actually is understood by the national community as the superior expression of the will to belong to the national group. Integration is a radically different concept. It is like when you go to McDonald's; come as you are, keep your habits, cultures, ways of life, codes of conducts, values, principles, and we shall live alongside each other. I don't believe in this type of idea. I don't think it works because it separates communities and isolates them and encourages communities to actually regroup according to race.⁴³⁴

Le Pen articulates that mass migration, especially from Muslim countries, prevents assimilation of immigrants to the French culture, thus creates conflicts in French society. This discourse is also produced in order to justify her call for stopping mass migration to deal with this threat. Hence, she claims that “France has to stop mass migration.” The question here is the assimilation of Muslim migrants, since, according to her, immigrants from European countries managed to assimilate to French culture as can be seen from her speech in September 2015

Mass immigration, legal and illegal, which our country has known for decades, prevents the putting in place of a real policy of assimilation. Without a policy of restricted immigration, it becomes extremely difficult, indeed impossible, to fight against the withdrawal of communities into themselves and the development of

⁴³³ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

⁴³⁴ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

demands for different ways of life specifically for certain people- it has to be said- that contradict secularism and other laws and values of French Republic... It is therefore urgent that we stop this mass immigration and return to a sustainable level of immigration with 10.000 people coming in per year instead of the 200,000 which we currently have. Generations of Polish, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese immigrants have overcome their frustrations and difficulties by assimilating. Today, the system is broken because of too many immigrants in France, coming primarily from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, and the culpable resignation of French governments over the last thirty years. Mass, anarchic immigration prevents proper assimilation. Assimilation constitutes the shield against communitarianism, which is, I say, one of the breeding grounds of Islamist fundamentalism... The National Front has always fought relentlessly against all forms of communitarianism. It has always rejected even the idea of communities at the heart of the Republic, which is one and undivided in terms of its constitutions. It is true that it is a particularly French thing, with communitarianism being more easily accepted in Anglo-Saxon law. Thus, because the words have a general meaning and then a political one...

To fight against Islamist terrorism does not only bring military response or security. It reminds us of and reaffirms our principles: secularism, assimilation, rule of law... It is about our unity, the persistence of our values, our way of life, but also civil peace. How, indeed, can we not notice that multicultural societies always become multi-confrontational societies in the end?⁴³⁵

At this point, it seems noteworthy to reiterate that since 1980s the debates on immigration has mostly emphasized the inassimilability of non-European immigrants due to cultural differences contrary to assimilability of European immigrants. Shortly, it has been believed in France that it was difficult to incorporate those non-European migrants into French society since 1980. Indeed, this argument has been articulated by FN since its foundation. The assimilability of European immigrants is due to their Christian heritage of their home countries. It can be said that these debates on assimilation creates the dichotomy between Christianity and Islam in France. In this context, the former represents the Western identity. In this way, Islam is secutitized and stigmatized in French society, which makes the integration of Muslims to French society even more difficult. Considering the current situation in France, its assimilationist policies were questioned by immigrants from Muslims countries, those want to preserve their religious, cultural and/or national identities. As discussed so far, their contemporary demands on preserving their identities contributes the rising fear of vanishing French way of life in French public. As a result, the level of prejudice and hostility towards immigration, particularly

⁴³⁵ OxfordUnion, "Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A".

Muslims, increased in French. This gives credibility to FN to formulate diversity-phobic rhetoric discourses.

What's more, as stated by Ayhan Kaya "*assimilated immigrants were welcomed by FN, while those who remained within their own community's cultural parameters, were unwelcomed. FN's hostility is both immigrants of a certain ethnic or racial background, and also the sheer number of immigrants.*"⁴³⁶

It can be said that through Le Pen's discourses that blames Muslim immigrants, those who are not willing to assimilate into the French culture, for not meeting their responsibility to melt into French culture, creates a perception of a threat to homogeneity of French culture. Her anti-migrant discourses formulating societal security themes establish dichotomies of "us" versus "them", which divides the society between natives and migrants, and more specifically between Christian heritage and Islam. "In this context, the former represents the secular ideal while the latter refers the Muslims who refuse to assimilate, particularly in terms of accepting and adhering to gender-equality, are regarded as fundamentalists."⁴³⁷ Thus, a negative perception on Muslim migrants and stigmatization of Islam are maintained and a narrative that Islam is a threat to French republican values, French way of life, and French culture is constructed through her discourses. To illustrate the dichotomies, She said in 2016 to a BBC News Channel reporter that

*We come from a civilization that has its roots in Christian teachings. That is why we believe in free will and therefore in the right to change religion. Islamic fundamentalists do not believe in the right to change religion, they believe that to be punishable by death. Because we believe in free will, we oppose forced marriage. They do not believe in individual free will. In France, because of our Christian heritage we have opted for secularism. People around the world may find it difficult to understand because it is a very French notion that we are attached to. To us, religion is something private, not something to be publicly imposed or displayed.*⁴³⁸

Concerning, as stated by Ayhan Kaya "*FN is against the idea that France/French nationals should 'adapt [to Islam], which can not be reasonable or*

⁴³⁶ Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Teçmen, "Critical Heritages (CoHERE): Islam versus Europe: Populist Discourses and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity", 2018, p. 10- 11.

⁴³⁷ Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Teçmen, *Ibid.*, pp. 11- 12.

⁴³⁸ BBC News Channel, "Marine Le Pen: Brexit 'most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall'.

conceivable'. Because France was built on its Christian heritage which was being hijacked by Islam."⁴³⁹ For instance, "in 2010, she told the FN supporters that the vision of Muslims praying in the streets was similar to the Nazi occupation in World War Two."⁴⁴⁰ Indeed, "occupation" refers to military sector. In other words, it can be said that she claimed that France is under the invasion of Islam, thus should be protected from Islam.

Again, during her presidential election campaign in 2017, Marine Le Pen articulated anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric. "She warned that French civilization was under threat and she aimed to suspend all legal immigration to protect French way of life".⁴⁴¹ To illustrate, on April 17, 2017 in Paris, during her presidential election campaign, she said

In France, we drink wine whenever we want. In France we do not force women to wear veil because they are impure ... In France, we get to decide who deserves to become French.

This is our home, because French people feel strangers in their own country... because they have fewer rights than immigrants, even then illegal ones ... The French want to live in France like Frenchmen, without being subjected to mores and laws that are not theirs... France has a right to its national identity, that is to say to its deepest being, it has the right to perpetuate itself.⁴⁴²

Concerning her anti-Islam discourses, in the the first televised debate on 20 March 2017, the elected President Emmanuel Macron criticized Le Pen for dividing the French society through her anti-Islam rhetoric and he said

It (burkini) has nothing to do with secularism. It is not about the culture, it is a matter of public order. So, for the burkini, I am in favor of avoiding the traps set by those who want to divide society. To make it a great debate on secularism. The trap you are falling into Ms Le Pen, with your provocations is to divide French society. To make the more than four million French people whose religion is Islam, and the great majority who are not into communitarianism but who live in our Republic, is to make them enemies of the Republic. For me, it is no.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁹ Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Teçmen, *Ibid.*, pp. 11- 12.

⁴⁴⁰ BBC, "Europe and nationalism: A country-by- country guide".

⁴⁴¹ Harriet Agnew and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, "Le Pen step sup anti-immigration rhetoric ahead of French election, <https://www.ft.com/content/967daaae-2412-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16>, 18.04.2017, [accessed 10.10.2018].

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ Wall Street Journal, "French Elections: Le Pen and Macron Spar in First TV Debate", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=557XWLXt9r4>, 21.03.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

To sum up, Marine Le Pen articulated anti-immigration discourses on concerns about French national identity and its culture, thus escalated the existing fear of vanishing French way of life in France, the perception which has been shaped through her diversity-phobic discourses. It seems crucial to underline that Le Pen's anti-migrant rhetoric that portray migration, especially Muslims immigrants as a threat to the homogeneity of its culture, its national identity, its Republican values, secularism as well as to national security is endangering the livelihoods of newly arrived and undocumented migrants as well as refugees. At the same time, her anti-migrant discourses are stigmatizing the already settled immigrants in France, which consequently results in social disintegration.

Last but not least, to capture the Marine Le Pen's anti-Islam stance it seem worth to mention what Mohammed Heniche- Union of Muslim Association Seine-ST Denis, who blamed Marine Le Pen for the rise of Islamophobia in France, said during an interview after Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015:

The big problem in France is the economic crisis. If the crisis continues like this, then with the attacks or without attacks – the FN will become the biggest party in France. Jean Marie Le Pen was bad for the Jews, for the homosexuals, for the blacks, and for the Muslims, but Marine, his daughter, she changed. She decided to direct all the hate towards the Muslim community. Her message is “Be careful France, Islam is dangerous.”⁴⁴⁴

4.4.3 Economic Security Themes in the FN's Anti-Migrant Discourse

To recap, immigrants have been perceived as a threat to the welfare system of host states through anti-migrant discourses of political elites and the media that portrayed migrants as the reasons of existing socio-political and economic problems that the host countries bear on, thus perceived as a financial burden to the host society. Marine Le Pen's anti-immigration discourses highlight these economic security concerns as well. In

⁴⁴⁴ BBC News Channel, “The Power of Le Pen- Our World”.

other words, she has been presenting immigrants as a threat to their welfare system and financial burden on French society and as competitors for jobs.

Putting an emphasis on unemployment rates in France she said that *“immigration only worsens mass unemployment in France. With 6.1 million unemployed people and 9 million people living in poverty, France no longer has the capacity to receive any new migrants.”*⁴⁴⁵

Since Le Pen wants to stop immigration, legal or illegal, in order to make France less attractive for immigrants she argued that France should put an end to give welfare provisions to immigrants. In addition, immigrants are blamed for abusing the welfare state by Le Pen since she argues that although they do not contribute the economic growth of France, they take the advantages of its welfare system and earn money even without working. Indeed, as given below, in the first televised presidential debate that took place on 20 March 2017, she clearly articulated this point

*The best way to send a signal, an honest signal that says, “We can not welcome you anymore,” is to cut off all the suction pumps of immigration: state medical care, access to social housing, and do on. We understand they want to come. Sometimes, in France they earn, without working, five or ten times more than they earn in their country of origin.*⁴⁴⁶

What’s more, with her speech given below, Le Pen connotes that distribution of social goods such as housing, health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services should be made on “national priority”. In other words, national citizens must be privileged. To illustrate, October 10, 2016 Marine Le Pen said at a TV programme on BBC Channel that

*What divides France is the massive arrival of migrants. What creates a feeling of great injustice is that we have thousands of homeless people in the streets and we tell them we can’t give them any housing, however we do find tens of thousands of homes for migrants. My responsibility, as a French leader, should be first and foremost to think about the wellbeing of my own people, about their security, about their prosperity.*⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁵ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

⁴⁴⁶ Wall Street Journal, “French Elections: Le Pen and Macron Spar in First TV Debate”.

⁴⁴⁷ BBC News Channel, “Marine Le Pen: Brexit ‘most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall’”.

Furthermore, according to her 144-point presidential plan issued in 2017 presidential campaign, she would stop giving free basic healthcare to illegal migrants and it would be impossible for undocumented/ illegal migrants to legalize their stay in France.⁴⁴⁸ She put emphasis on this point while giving a speech at Oxford University in 2015

I think that France is one of the only countries, which takes full responsibility for the care of the illegal immigrants in its country. Most countries do not take care of these people until there is a serious infection or serious problem or vital risk that is involved, which is quite legitimate, but state medical care means that, like a lot of measures in France, it is a country that has become much too attractive for illegal immigration. Free schooling for children, with a whole load of associations helping out, free healthcare, freely given aid, the hope to become legal migrant even when one has entered illegally are what illegal immigration has led to and has meant that the country has become too attractive for it.⁴⁴⁹

It can be said that a perception of injustice/unfairness in the distribution of welfare provisions was created through her discourses, which increase the anti-migrant sentiments in France. Indeed, by analyzing her speech given below it can be said that “illegal” migrants is portrayed as “illegitimate” recipients of socio-economic rights. Again at Oxford University she said

I think that is scandalous that illegal immigrants do not pay a single penny to be looked after when there are millions of French people now, particularly the elderly, who cannot look after themselves properly because they don't have the means to do this, despite having worked their whole lives and having paid their contributions to social security throughout their lives. In spite of that, they are less well treated in their own country than immigrants who have entered without authorization. I think that we must be fair here because, if we are not, we create legitimate resentment amongst the population.⁴⁵⁰

To conclude, migrants are represented as a threat to welfare system of France through abusing it and thus as a financial burden on French economy. In the context of economic security, she connotes that national citizens must be privileged in the distribution of social goods who have contributed to French economy contrary to

⁴⁴⁸ Reuters, “Factbox: France’s Le Pen sets out presidential election plan”, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-fn-manifesto-factbox-idUSKBN15J0GB>, 04.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

⁴⁴⁹ OxfordUnion, “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A”.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

undocumented immigrants, thus claiming that they “deserve” to benefit from welfare provisions. According to her 144-point presidential plan issued in 2017 presidential campaign, in order to overcome the need for migrant labor in the French economy, the birth rate among French families would be promoted through a state policy and there would be legal regulations in order to protect French workers and French industries.⁴⁵¹ This is because to cope with cheap labour that immigrants cause.

4.5 Conclusion

European radical right parties emerged as a significant political actor who challenge to the European politics since mid-1980s. They have been gaining electoral success since 1990s across Europe. Although there are different forms of RRP, they embrace some common themes, such as hostility to immigration, anti-Islamic rhetoric and Euroscepticism.

Different definitions are made by different scholars in order to explain the same single party family such as “extrem right”, “far right”, “populist radical right”, “anti-immigration party”, “right-wing populist parties”. In this study, the term radical right party is preferred and mostly used, however other concepts are also used interchangeably to refer the same party family. According to Cas Mudde, the core ideological characteristics of RRP are nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

Mass migration is considered as a significant reason behind the rise of the radical right, especially in Western Europe. They are anti-immigrant and claim that immigration is a key reason of the ethno-cultural and religious diversity in European societies, which creates conflict in these societies. RRP formulate discourses that frames immigration as a threat to national, societal, economic and internal security of their relevant political communities. Thus, due to their anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric RRP have a crucial role in the discursive construction of migration as a threat in Europe. In other

⁴⁵¹ Paul Smith, Op. Cit.

words, they are regarded as one of the securitizing actors in the construction of security-migration nexus at national level.

Founded in 1972, the Front National is a radical right party, which has inspired other European parties in Europe; its party programs and slogans have been adopted by many RRP. By the 1990s the FN had become as a significant force in French politics. The electoral support for the FN increased gradually between 1984 and 2007. FN moved to second round of the 2002 presidential elections for the first time in the party's history. Its electoral success at 2002 presidential elections made right wing parties to adopt more strict migration policies similar to FN's. However, at 2007 presidential election there was a dramatic decline in the support of FN. This could be explained by the discourses of Nicolas Sarkozy that embraced the concerns of French society on immigration issue, thus echoed rhetoric similar to FN. Indeed, he won the presidential elections owing to his tough migration program.

The FN has increased its public popularity and political engagement in France after Marine Le Pen took the leadership from Marie Le Pen, her father, who was the leader of the party from 1972 to 2011. Under his leadership, the party articulated anti-migrant, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-Islam, racist, and homophobic discourses and called for a halt on immigration and/or more restrictive immigration policies. As the leader of the party Marine Le Pen tries to "rebrand" the party image and distance herself from the anti-Semitic and homophobic views that traditionally has been associated with her father and FN. On the other hand, she continues to present FN's anti-migrant, diversity-phobic and xenophobic views. Instead of anti-Semitism, she has been formulating anti-Islam discourses and present Muslim immigrants as a security threat and has disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics in France. Indeed, Islam is chosen as the common enemy of European radical right parties and serves as the "Other" in the construction of Western identity. The securitization and stigmatization of Islam in France has been deepened through her anti-Islam rhetoric.

Under her leadership, FN increased its support between 2011- 2017. For instance, The FN finished first and alone gained 21 seats in the European Parliament elections of May 2014. Le Pen made it to second round of 2017 presidential elections,

however was defeated by Emmanuel Macron, the leader of *En Marche!*, who is pro-EU and offered a more liberal approach in line with immigration. Indeed, Marine Le Pen received 21.3% and 34% votes in the first and second round of 2017 presidential elections respectively. Indeed, this is the highest point that FN has ever received in elections in FN's history.

Front National is an anti-migrant, anti-globalization and anti-EU party, which articulates anti-Islam rhetoric and disseminates fear of Islam and fear of politics in France. Therefore, it is regarded as one of the securitizing actors in constructing immigration as a security threat in France at a national level. Indeed, Marine Le Pen has been blending already existing economic resentments and cultural resentments in French society in order to create a perception of threat regarding immigration.

Marine Le Pen's anti-migrant rhetoric portraying immigrants as a security threat can be analyzed in the context of national security, internal security, societal security, and economic security. Analyzing her anti-immigration discourses between 2015- 2017, immigration was represented as a phenomenon that violates French national borders, thus something to be stopped, controlled, deported, and assimilated. After the Paris attacks, through her discourses migration was explicitly portrayed as a "vehicle for importing terrorists and criminals", thus as a threat to national security, French public order and domestic security that should be immediately stopped. In addition, "illegal" immigrants were represented as abusers of asylum system.

Through her anti-Islam discourses that identified migration with terrorism, she reinforced the already existing fear of a loss of sovereignty, the fear of the weakening of border controls and the fear of insecurity in the French public in order to create a perception of crisis regarding immigration. To put it in a different way, she had disseminated fear of politics and fear of Islam in France and called for strict border control to prevent "illegal" migration and terrorism. Islamist fundamentalism was represented both as a threat to national security and domestic stability and as the enemy of French culture, French way of life and secularism.

In the context of societal security, which is a common feature of migration discourses in Europe, national identity and culture are the referent objects. Thus, assimilation of immigrants into French culture plays a crucial role in immigration discourse. Indeed, French immigration policy has been influenced mostly by concerns about assimilation, ethnic balance and social cohesion since mid-1980. Similarly, assimilation and ethnic balance are main concerns of Marine Le Pen. She has claimed that lack of assimilation of Muslims to French society and increasing number of non-European immigrants coming from Muslim countries constitute a threat to French cultural homogeneity and national identity. Through its discourses on assimilation and national identity, FN disseminated the narrative that the homogeneity of French culture and identity are at stake. In this context, Marine Le Pen had been articulating discourses claiming that the French culture is under the threat of Islam.

Furthermore, in the context of economic security, she presented immigrants as a threat to their welfare system and a financial burden on French society as well as competitors for jobs. Le Pen blamed immigrants for abusing the welfare state. Immigrants were also portrayed to be so numerous and poor that would worsen French economy by underlining the unemployment rate in France. In addition, she connoted that distribution of welfare provisions such as housing, health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services should be made on “national priority”.

Analysis of the discourse of Le Pen showed that national security and internal security themes, which link migration with border control, terrorism and crime, are prevalent in her anti-immigration discourses. Islamic fundamentalism was at the center of her discourses. Targeting Muslims who refuse to assimilate her anti-Islam rhetoric frames Islam as the enemy of French national identity and culture. In brief, she articulated discourses that frame mass immigration as a phenomenon that should be stopped, controlled, deported, and assimilated, as a negative phenomenon that destroys socio-political cohesion of France. She repeatedly dramatized the number of legal immigration entries every year in France with a claim of endangering the socio-economic structure underlining the rise of unemployment.

With the help of recent terrorist attacks in its soil and unemployment rates, Front National's anti-Islam discourses by linking immigrants with terrorism had accelerated the existing fear and sentiments towards immigrants, mostly Muslims in France. Le Pen's anti-migrant and anti-Islam rhetoric that frames immigration as a threat to its national security, national identity, its core values and public order would endanger the peaceful co-existence of diversities in French society. Indeed, already settled immigrants have faced difficult situations in their lives and faced prejudices and hostility, thus portraying them as potential terrorists worsens their situation. Thus, by means of FN's anti-Islam and anti-immigration rhetoric securitization and stigmatization of Islam and immigration were deepened in France. As securitizing immigration leads to the exclusion of immigrants from the French society, it makes integration more difficult, which may eventually lead to social conflicts.

5 CONCLUSION

The aim of this study is to examine the security- migration nexus in France by analyzing the security discourses of Marine Le Pen, leader of FN, through applying the securitization theory of Copenhagen School as a theoretical framework. In this context, the Front National's anti-immigrant discourses and its role in securitizing migration are the focus of this study. For the purpose of doing that, this study is structured into three main parts: the theoretical framework, the transformation of the immigration policy in France and the analysis of FN's discourses whilst examining the historical background and characteristics of FN. Thus, the concept of security, securitization theory of Copenhagen School, French migration history and the long-run evolution of the immigration debate in France are put forth in this study in an attempt to analyze how migration issue has been addressed in the FN's rhetoric regarding immigration. This last chapter will provide the findings of each chapter of this study.

First, the theoretical framework of this study was outlined. The securitization theory of Copenhagen School was applied as the theoretical framework to this study. Exploring the securitization theory contributed to our understanding of the concept of security and enabled us to explore how an issue is transformed to a security problem. According to Copenhagen School, securitization is a construction of a threat through *speech acts*. Here the emphasis should be on the fact that, any issue can be transformed from political process to security agenda through discourses. Thus, it can be a perceived threat not necessarily a real existing security situation that is articulated to threaten a referent object by securitizing actors. To put it differently, securitizing actors (can be the government, state representative, political elite, political parties, military and/or society) construct this threat through a successful representation. Thus, for the School securitization is discursive, socially constituted, and intersubjective. In this framework, the assumption of security politics is negative and exclusionary. Moreover, by exploring the literature on securitization theory, it was examined that issues can be also securitized through non-discursive practices such as the creation and functioning of bureaucracies, the development of public policies or the implementation of the procedures. In this regard,

so-called Paris School lays stress on the non-discursive practices (routines) in the securitization process. Thus, this study provided us a broad understanding of securitization theory; it was argued that a study exploring the securitization process of any issue should focus both on discourses and routines for a comprehensive analysis. This point underlines the fact that an issue may not be portrayed as a security threat through discourses, however, at the same time, it may be constructed as a threat through everyday practices. Thus, the logic of routine, in other words the non-discursive practices was mentioned when appropriate throughout this study, however the focus of this study was on the FN's discourses regarding immigration.

Moreover, selecting securitization theory of Copenhagen School as a theoretical framework enabled us to critically analyze the discursive construction of migration in France by the FN since migration is one of the issues that has been represented as a security problem after the Cold War. It has been turned into a security issue since mid-1980s in Europe. By reviewing the literature on the securitization of migration, it was analyzed that migration can be securitized through discourses of different securitizing actors at both national, regional and international level. In this regard, in this study, securitization of migration is analyzed at national level, as France and the FN (as securitizing actor) were focus of this study. Thus, the scope of the analysis in this study is *micro* level, the national level analysis. In addition, regarding logic of exception (developed by Copenhagen School), it was analyzed that migration is perceived and represented as a threat to the national security, cultural homogeneity, internal security and welfare system of host states by the political elites of receiving states. Similarly, it was analyzed that Marine Le Pen's speech acts portraying immigrants, particularly Muslims as a security threat can be explored in the context of national security, societal security, economic security and internal security. Moreover, the role of routines in securitization of migration emphasized by Paris School such as restrictive border controls, implementation of surveillance, deportation of immigrants, mandatory detention etc were also explored briefly in this part in order to capture a comprehensive understanding in the securitization of migration in France.

It was also outlined that, concerning securitization of migration, in Europe closing of borders, deploying troops, deportations, and mandatory detention have been some responses to immigrant and asylum-seekers, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Securitization of migration mostly results in the implementation of restrictive immigration and asylum measures, and strict border control in relevant states.

Second, the evolution of immigration debate in France was analyzed. Since each chapter of this study has its own conclusion section outlining a brief summary of the relevant topics analyzed, in this chapter, the key findings will be explored. By analyzing the transformation of the immigration policy in France, this chapter provided us a broad understanding of how immigration phenomena had been addressed, the main elements of the immigration debate, and how it was turned to a security threat in France. Indeed, by exploring the historical, social and cultural characteristic of France, it provided us the historical backgrounds that had affected the FN's anti-migrant and racist discourses, thus shaping its stance on immigration. By no doubt, different countries has treated immigration phenomena differently owing to the differences in their migration histories. To put it in a different way, European countries have experienced different migration flows in their history, therefore, the legal status and the perceptions towards migrants may differ in each country consistent with their exclusion and inclusion migration policies. Given that, France has a long history of immigration and radical right. Immigration and thus integration of immigrants have been a prominent topic in French political debates since mid-1970s. A key finding of this chapter is that the attitudes towards migrants have changed over time in France due to socio-political developments in international era and emerging migration patterns. This chapter enabled us to have an insight that immigration was not treated as a constant security problem throughout French history. Besides, it was investigated that securitization of migration is not a new phenomenon in France. According to this analysis, until the early-1970s immigration was welcomed and encouraged by French political agents and media; thus, represented as a positive issue for French economic growth and as compulsory for its growing economy due to demographic decline. However, immigrants have been designated as a threat to French culture, national identity, law and order, and its welfare system by political parties and media since the mid-1970s. Indeed, following the 1973 oil crisis the French immigration policies has been

transferred into more restrictive ones. Consequently, due to increasing unemployment rates, labour immigration was halted in 1974 in France.

In this regard, by analyzing the migration history of France, this chapter advanced our understanding of evolution of immigration debate in France because of changing composition of immigrants residing in France over time. Until the mid-1960s, the immigrants from European countries dominated the international migration population of France. However, the patterns of international migration have been changing since the 1970s in France, which has resulted in a rise in the number of non-European immigrants, mostly Muslims. It was analyzed that during the 1970s owing to family reunification of immigrants from Africa and Asia, the composition of the settled immigrants changed resulting in a significant increase in Muslim population residing in France. Indeed, in 2016, 6.11 million Muslims residing in France make 9.6 percent of the total population of 63.6 million.⁴⁵² Recently, France is an old immigration country having one of the biggest immigrant populations and Muslim population in Europe. Besides immigration through family reunification since 1970s, the number of refugees and illegal migrants looking for a better life increased dramatically in the 1980s.

Another key finding of this chapter is that the discourse on the permanent character of immigration in early- 1980s was an important factor in the construction of the ‘problem’ of immigration in France. Indeed, the anti-migrant sentiments increased in France due to this realization that immigrants were permanent rather than temporary. The integration of immigrants has become a public concern in France since then. Hence, in the early-1980s, the integration of non-European immigrants was the main concern of immigration debate in France. The inassimibility of Muslim immigrants in French culture was the focus of these debates, expressed by the FN and by the media. In other words, Muslims were blamed not to meet their responsibilities to melt into French culture. During the 1990s and the 2000s taking into account the rising refugee inflows and growing concerns on integration problems, the immigration issue has become a more prominent issue in France. According to this analysis, since the mid-1980s the concerns about national identity, assimilation, ethnic balance and social cohesion have been the

⁴⁵² Büşra Kepenek, *Op. Cit.*, p. 134.

center of immigration debate in France. These debates play a crucial role in shaping the perception of public opinion on migration, and the way the political elites handle the question of migration affects the migration policies in relevant countries.

Moreover, between the periods of 2001 – 2017 crucial international economic and political developments emerged affecting perception of immigrants, mostly Muslims, in France, thus the French migration laws. Other than September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, 2008 European economic crisis, Arab uprisings known as Arab Spring that began at late 2010 in several Muslim countries including Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Bahrain, 2011 Syrian civil war which has created one of the largest humanitarian crises- the so-called 2015/2016 Syrian refugee “crisis”, and ISIS terrorist attacks all over the world are some of them. In addition to these important international developments, France faced with Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks in 2015. Following the Paris attacks, French government declared state of emergency, and after the Nice attacks in 2016 it extended the state of emergency which is officially ended on 31 October 2017. Due to state of emergency, the French government reintroduced internal border controls and strengthened checks especially in train stations and airports. All of these developments which escalated already existing fear, unease and prejudices towards immigrants, particularly Muslims in France, has provided a perfect environment for the radical right Front National to construct migration as a security threat, consequentially increase its votes.

Furthermore, by investigating the politics of immigration in France, it provided us an understanding that the electoral growth of Front National made established parties adopt more strict immigration policies in their party programs in order to capture FN’s votes. Indeed, the success of FN in 2002 presidential elections made Sarkozy adopt FN’s discourse on immigration with an aim to take its votes; hence, he won the 2007 presidential elections. It was also analysed that the party program of FN and Le Pen discourses on immigration and insecurity affected the Sarkozy’s immigration policy in the 2000s. Similarly, the Front National’s anti-migration discourse and its success on the first round in the 2012 presidential elections made Hollande to take a more restrictive stand on immigration in the election campaign. Hollande was elected and became

France's first left-wing President since Francois Mitterrand left office in 1995. One could expect a shift in the French migration policy under a center-left presidency; however, it was analysed that there was not a shift in the migration management of center-left Hollande's from the one of centre-right Sarkozy who pursued rough and restrictive practices on migration issue. It was also analysed that the securitization of migration in France maintained through practices like deportation of immigration, under Hollande presidency as it was during Sarkozy's term. Indeed, although the speech of Hollande did not use anti-Islam rhetoric following Paris attacks, the practices (as argued by Paris School) such as search and arrest by police, deportations of immigrants, internal borders controls maintained the securitizing of immigration in France.

With regard to attitudes toward Islam/or Muslims, as it was during Sarkozy's presidency, under Hollande, Muslims continued to be stigmatized through his immigration policies and political and media rhetoric on immigration, consequently the fear of Islam maintained in French society. Moreover, stigmatization of Muslims deepened due to the terrorist attacks happened in France.

In brief, the third chapter of this study introduced these findings: The immigration, which was regarded as compulsory and positive phenomena for French economic growth, has become a public concern in France since mid-1970s. To put it differently, it has been designated as a security and identity issue rather than as a societal project in France since the oil crisis of 1970s. Indeed, the findings of the research demonstrated that migration was securitized in France long before the September 11 attacks and deepened aftermath of September 11 attacks, and subsequent terrorist attacks occurred in European soils. In the same vein, it was analysed that migration, mostly from Muslim countries has been securitized through discourses of different actors and immigration laws that have been applied in France. Radical right parties are one of the securitizing actors that build the linkage between migration and security. Hence, it was investigated that immigrants have been designated as a threat to French culture, national identity, law and order, and its welfare system by political parties and media since the mid-1970s and stricter immigration laws and deportation practices have been applied in France since then. Additionally, the long-run negative representation of migration has

increased existing unase and prejudice towards immigrants paving the way for the rise of French radical right. More importantly, the electoral growth of Front National made established parties adopt stricter immigration policies in their party programs. In this regrad, FN's anti-immigrant discourses that disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics have affected the French immigration laws and policy tools. It was also revealed that not just under center-right presidency but also under center-left presidency, the securitization and stigmatization of Muslims were deepened in France. The discourses and practices applied aftermath of subsequent terrorist attacks occurred by Islamist groups in French territory provided a suitable environment for maintaining the link between terrorism and migration in France fueled the fire of existing anti-immigrant sentiments in France.

Third, in an attempt to analyse the role of FN in the construction of the migration-security nexus in France, the anti-migrant and anti-EU discourses of Marine Le Pen were analyzed in the fourt chapter of this study. For the purpose of doing this, the core characteristics of European radical right parties, the historical bachground of FN were analysed in order to investigate their stance regarding immigration and the EU. By analyzing the core characteristics of European radical right parties, it provided us an insight that nativism, authoritarianism and populism are the core characteristics of RRP in Europe and, more notably, they have been gaining electoral success across Europe since 1990s, thus attraching the interest of many scholars. To reiterate, hostility to immigration, anti-Islamic rhetoric and Euroscepticism are the common themes of European RRP. In addition, they claim to be the defenders of their national/cultural identity (as a homogenous entity) and national security. Similarly, the FN is an anti-immigrant, anti-EU and anti-globalization party, which is against of multiculturalism. In this study, it was revealed that the FN achieved political attention in the mid-1980s when the integration of already settled immigrants into French "melting pot" was the main concern of public debates and became one of the significant actors in French politics by the 1990s. Additionally, it was analysed that it has increased its electoral success since its foundation in 1972, except the dramatical decrease in its votes in 2007 presidential elections. As Marine Le Pen took the leadership from her father in 2011, this study questioned whether the discourses of Marine Le Pen differed from those of his father Jean Marie Le Pen, who was the leader of the Party between 1972- 2011. However, it was

investigated that Marine Le Pen tried to rebrand the FN's image by distancing herself from extreme views such as anti-Semitic, racist, homophobic discourses in an attempt to mainstream the Party in French politics. However, she continued to present FN's anti-migrant, diversity-phobic and xenophobic views. Hence, instead of anti-Semitism, she has been formulating anti-Islam discourses and targets Muslim immigrants as a security threat and has disseminated fear of Islam and fear of politics in France as well as in Europe. Indeed, she articulates a new-racist rhetoric towards Muslims and Islam.

The hypothesis of this study is that the FN is one of the securitizing actors that portray migration as a threat to various referent objects in France. Indeed, the findings of the research demonstrated that migration was securitized through discourses of Marine Le Pen. It is the French national identity, French culture, its national and internal security as well as its welfare system that is claimed to be existentially threatened by immigration. Analysis of the anti-immigration and anti-EU discourses of Le Pen showed that national security and internal security themes, which links migration with border control, terrorism and crime, are prevalent in her anti-immigration discourses. Indeed, in order to justify restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies the migration- terrorism nexus is often produced through FN's rhetoric. Discourses of Le Pen that identify migration with terrorism create a sense of insecurity and unease towards immigrants in French society. In this vein, Islamic fundamentalism was at the center of her discourses. Targeting Muslims who refuse to assimilate, her anti-Islam rhetoric frames Islam as the enemy of French national identity and culture. In brief, she articulated discourses that frames mass immigration as a phenomenon that should be stopped, controlled, deported, and assimilated, as a negative phenomenon that destroy socio-political cohesion of France. She repeatedly dramatized the number of legal immigration entry every year in France with a claim that migration endangers the French socio-economic structure through underlining the rise of unemployment.

By investigating the discourses of Marine Le Pen, it was revealed that the securitization process and the negative representation of migration by several political agents and media, which eventually result in exclusion of immigrants from French society hamper the integration of immigrants to French culture. Indeed, already settled

immigrants have faced difficult situations in their lives and faced prejudices and hostility, thus portraying them as potential terrorists, by no doubt, worsen their situation. Thus, by means of FN's anti-Islam and anti-immigration rhetoric securitization and stigmatization of Islam and immigration were deepened in France.

This study provided a broad understanding of securitization of migration process in France with a focus on the role of the radical right Front National though taking the securitization theory of Copenhagen School as a theoretical tool. The role of practices (migration laws, detention and deportations practices, militarization of border controls etc) applied in France also briefly mentioned in an attempt to have a comprehensive analysis of securitizing migration in France. In this regard, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature on securitization of migration at national level. As mentioned earlier, the radical right parties have been gaining electoral success across Europe since 1990s, and it can be said that 2000s are palmy days of these parties. As one of the founding fathers of EU, the FN's call for Frexit through blaming the EU of multicultural societies of Europe is a rhetoric that may endanger the peaceful co-existence of European states that suffered wars and conflicts for years in its history. At the same time, the securitization of migration both through discursive and non-discursive practices endanger the peaceful co-existence of diversities in European societies. These discourses and practices contradict with the democratic political discourse of these liberal states. Thus, for further studies, the rhetoric of other European radical right parties could be chosen for the analysis of securitizing migration process at relevant national level in order to critically explore the status at national level in the EU. By revealing the securitization of migration process in different European states, especially those in which radical right is a political force, at national level or in a comparative basis, these analyses would contribute to demonstrate the existing situation in Europe, which may eventually help to cope with the racist discourse prevailing in Europe and call for a more humanitarian rhetoric.

6 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. **Irk Ulus Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler**, (çev.) Nazlı Ökten İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 6. Basım, 2017.
- Benson, Rodney. **Shaping Immigration News: A French- American Comparison**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Bigo, Didier. “Chapter 9: International Political Sociology”, in Paul D. Williams (Ed.), **Security Studies: An Introduction**, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 116-129.
- Bigo, Didier “The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Securities”, in M. Albert, D. Jaconson and Y. Lapid (Eds.), **Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory**, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, pp. 91- 116.
- Bigo, Didier. “When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitization in Europe”, in Kelstrup, M. and M.C. Williams (Eds), **International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power Security and Community**, London: Routhledge, 2000, pp. 171- 204.
- Bourbeau, Philippe. “Migration, exceptionalist security discourses and practices”, in Philippe Bourbeau (Ed.), **Handbook on Migration and Security**, Cheltenham and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2017.
- Bourbeau, Philippe. **Securitization of Migration: Study of Movement and Order**, London: Routledge, 2011.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. **Security: A New Framework For Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998.
- Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Buzan, Barry. **People, States & Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies**, 2nd Edition, ECPR Press, 2007.
- Emmers, Ralf. “Securitization”, in book **Contemporary Security Studies**, Alain Collins (Ed.), 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 131-189.
- Fetzer, J. **Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

- Gattinara, Pietro Castelli. "Chapter 10: Europeans, Shut Borders! Anti-refugee Mobilization in Italy and France", in Donatella della Porta (Ed.), **Solidarity Mobilizations in the 'Refugee Crisis'**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 271-297.
- Guild, Elspeth. "Chapter 6: Cultural and Identity Security: Immigrants and the Legal Expression of National Identity", in Elspeth Guild and Joanne van Selm (Ed.), **International Migration and Security: Opportunities and Challenges**, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 101- 112.
- Grabow, Karsten and Florian Hartleb. "**Europe – No, Thanks?: Study on the Rise of Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe**", Sankt Augustin and Berlin: Center for European studies and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014.
- Hargreaves, Alec G. **Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, politics, culture and society**, New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2007.
- Heisler, O. M. and Z. Layton-Henry. "Migration and the links between social and societal security", in book **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (Ed), London: Pinter, 1993,
- Huysmans, Jef and Xavier Guillaume. "Chapter 2: Citizenship and Securitizing: Interstitial Politics", in Xavier Guillaume and Jef Huysmans (Ed), **Citizenship and Security: The Construction of Political Being**, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 18-34.
- Huysmans, Jef. **The Politics of Security: Fear, migration, and asylum in the EU**, New York: 2006.
- Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen. **Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2006.
- Karyotis, Georgios. "Chapter 1: The Fallace of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences", in G Lazaridis (Ed.), **Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe**, Ashgate, 2011.
- Kaya, Ayhan. **Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization**, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, First Edition, 2009.
- Kepenek, Büşra. "Avrupa'da İslam Düşmanlığı ve İslamofobi 2016", in **Avrupa'da Göç ve İslamofobi**, Bünyemin Bezci, Soner Tauscher, and Fikret Topal (Der), Sakarya Üniversitesi Diaspora Çalışmaları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi (DİAM), 2017.
- Matika, Dario and Armano Srblijinovic. "Complexity of National Security", in Katalin Martinas, Dario Matika and Armano Srblijinovic (Ed.), **Complex Societal Dynamics: Security Challenges and Opportunities**, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010, pp. 1-12.

- Minkenberg, Michael. "European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East: Trends, Patterns and Challenges", in Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Eds.), **Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country analyses, counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies**, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013, p. 9.
- Mudde, Cas. **Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Pelinka, Anton. "Right-Wing Populism: Concept and typology, in Ruth Wodak, M. Khosvanirik and B Mral (Eds), **Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse**, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 3-22.
- Schain, Martin A. **The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: A Comparative Study**, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd Edition, 2012.
- Shearman, Peter. "Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11", in Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex (Ed.), **European Security After 9/11**, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004, pp. 11-27.
- Silverman, Maxim. **Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France**, London: Routledge, 1992.
- Terriff, Terry, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick Morgan. **Security Studies Today**, Wiley, 2000.
- Waever, Ole, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (Ed). **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, London: Pinter, 1993.
- Waever, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization", in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.). **On Security**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Watson, Scott D. **The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats**, London: Routledge, 2009.
- Williams, Paul D. (Ed). **Security Studies: An Introduction**, New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Wodak, Ruth. "Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach", in Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie and Todd Sandel (Eds), **The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction**, John Wiley & Sons: Chichester, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118611463/wbielsi116>, pp. 1- 14.
- Wodak, Ruth. "The Discourse-Historical Approach" in R. Wodak and M. Meyer, **Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis**, London: Sage, 2001, pp. 63-94.

Periodicals

- Adamson, Fiona B. "Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security", **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 165- 199.
- Akdemir, Erhan. "11 Eylül 2001, 11 Mart 2004 ve 7 Temmuz 2005 Terrörist Saldırılarının Ardından İslam'ın Avrupa'da Algılanışı, **Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi**, Cilt. 8, No.1, 2009, p. 1-26.
- Almeida, Dimitri. "Exclusionary secularism: the Front National and the reinvention of laïcité", **Modern& Contemporary France**, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 250.
- Bajer Beall, Christopher. "The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitization and Control", **Journal of Contemporary European Research**, Vol. 5 (2), p. 191.
- Betz, Hans- George. "Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe", **Socialist Register**, 2003, pp. 193- 210.
- Betz, Hans- George. "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe", **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1993, pp. 413- 427.
- von Beyme, Klaus. "Right Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe", **West European Politics**, 11 (2), 1988.
- Bigo, Didier. "Immigration controls and free movement in Europe", **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol. 91, No. 875, September 2009, pp. 579-591.
- Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of Governmentality of Unease, **Alternatives**, Vol. 27 (2), 2002, pp. 63- 92.
- Buonfino, Alessandra. "Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe, **New Political Science**, Vol.26, No.1, March 2004, pp. 23-49.
- Carvalho, Joao. "The Effectiveness of French Immigration Policy Under President Nicolas Sarkozy", **Parliamentary Affairs**, January 2015, pp. 1- 20.
- Carvalho, Joao. "The Front National's impact on immigration policy during President François Hollande's term", December 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323935937_The_Front_National's_impact_on_immigration_policy_during_President_Francois_Hollande's_term, pp. 1- 21.

- Cesari, Jocelyne. "Securitization of Islam in Europe", **Die Welt des Islams**, Vol. 52, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 430- 449.
- Ceylan, A. and A. Tsoukala. "The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies", **Alternatives**, 27, Special Issue, 2002.
- Çoskun, Bezen Balamir. "History Writing and Securitization of the Other: the Construction and Reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli Security Discourses", **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 281-298.
- Faist, Thomas. "'Extension du domaine de la lutte': International Migration and Security before and after September 11, 2001", **International Migration Review**, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 7- 14.
- Fausser, Margit. "Transnational Migration- A National Security Risks? Securitization of Migration Policies in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom", **Reports & Analyses 2 /06**, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, pp. 1- 19.
- Floyd, Rita. "Can Securitization Theory be used in Normative Analysis? Towards a just Securitization Theory", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42 (4-5), 2011, pp. 427-439.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. and Esra Dilek. "Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence", **Journal Of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280, pp. 1- 18.
- Givens, Terri E. "Immigration and National Security: Comparing the US and Europe", **The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations**, Winter/Spring 2010, pp. 79- 88.
- Göksu, Emre and Arda Demirci. "Consolidating National Security & Changing Immigration Policies, Report, **French Cabinet**, 2017.
- Humphrey, Michael. "Migration, Security and Insecurity", **Journal of Intercultural Studies**, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 178-195.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilization", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993.
- Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, December 2000, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 751- 777.
- Jackson, Pamela Irving and Roderick Parkes. "The Securitization of Immigration Policy, Shifts in National Immigrant Integration Models and the Incarceration of Immigrants in Germany, France, and Britain 1970-2003", **Humboldt Journal of Social Relations**, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 2008, pp. 39-82.

- Karyotis, Georgious. "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11, **Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1- 17.
- Kaya, Ayhan and Ayşe Tecmen. "Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 3: Islam versus Europe: Populist Discourses and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity", **CoHERE**, 29.03.2018, pp. 1- 27.
- Kaya, Ayhan. "Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 2: The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity", **CoHERE**, 01.02.2017, p. 1-20.
- Kaya, Ayhan. "Critical Heritages (CoHERE): The use of past in political discourse and the representation of Islam in European Museums Work Package 2- Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 1: The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Theoretical Tools for Comparison", **CoHERE**, 01.12.2016, pp. 1- 19.
- Kicinger, Anna. "International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to This Phenomenon", **Central European Forum for Migration Report, CEFMR Working Paper 2**, Warsaw, 2004, pp. 1- 10.
- Koca, Togrul Burcu. "Syrian refugees in Turkey: from 'guests' to 'enemies'", **New Perspectives on Turkey**, No. 54, 2016, pp. 55-75.
- Kofman, Eleonore, Madalina Rogoz and Florence Lévy. "Family Migration Policies in France", **International Centre for Migration Policy Development and New Orientations for Democracy in Europe Research**, January 2010, pp. 1- 35.
- Laurence, Jonathan and Gabriel Goodliffe. "The French Debate on National Identity and the Sarkozy Presidency: A Retrospective", **The International Spectator**, Vol. 48, No. 1, March 2013, pp. 34- 47.
- Lazaridis, Gabriella and Dimitris Skleparis. "Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek Security professionals", **International Migration**, Vol. 54 (2), 2016, pp. 176-192.
- Leonard, Sarah. "The 'Securitization', Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School's Framework", paper presented at **the SGIR Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference**, 12-15 September 2007, Turin (Italy).
- Leonard, Sarah. "EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices", **European Security**, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 231-254.

- Mandacı Nazif and M. Gökay Özerim. “Uluslararası Göçlerin Bir Güvenlik Konusuna Dönüşümü: Avrup’da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol. 10, No. 39, Fall 2013, pp. 105- 130.
- Moufahim, Mona, Michael Humphreys, Darryn Mitussis & James Fitchett. “Interpreting discourse: a critical discourse analysis of the marketing of an extreme right party”, **Journal of Marketing Management**, 2007, Vol. 23, No. 5-6, pp 537-558.
- Marthaler, Dr Sally. “Nicolas Sarkozy and the politics of French immigration policy”, **Journal of European Public Policy**, 15:3, pp. 382- 397.
- McDonald, Matt. “Securitization and the Construction of Security”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.14 (4), pp. 563-587.
- Messina, Anthony M. “Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror”, **World Politics**, Vol. 66, Issue 3, July 2014, pp. 530-559.
- Mondon, Aurelien. “The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?”, **Modern & Contemporary France**, Vol.22, No.3, 2014, p. 301-320.
- Mondon, Aurelien. “Nicolas Sarkozy’s legitimization of the Front National: background and perspectives”, **Patterns of Prejudice**, Vol.47, No.1, 2013, p. 22-40.
- Mudde, Cas. “The Far Right and the European Elections”, **Current History**, March 2014, pp. 98- 103.
- Mudde, Cas. “The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America”, **Migration Policy Institute**, 2012, p. 1- 42.
- Mudde, Cas. “The Populist Radical Right: a Pathological Normalcy”, **West European Politics**, Vol. 33, No:6, November 2010, pp. 1167- 1186.
- Muis, Jasper and Tim Immerzeel. “Radical right populism”, **Sociopedia.isa**, 2016, DOI: 10.1177/2056846016121, pp. 1-18.
- Ocak, Özden. “Immigration and French national identity under neoliberalism: Sarkozy’s selective immigration politics as a performance of sovereignty”, **Patterns of Prejudice**, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2016, pp. 82- 95.
- Özerim, Mehmet Gökay. “European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration”, **International Journal of Social, Education, Economics, and Management Engineering**, Vol. 7, No.8, 2013, pp. 2196- 2200.
- Rumelili, Bahar and Sibel Karadağ. “Göç ve Güvenlik: Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar”, **Toplum ve Bilim**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, No.140, pp. 69-92.

- Sancak, Kadir. "Güvenlik Kavramı Etrafındaki Tartışmalar ve Uluslararası Güvenliğin Dönüşümü", **Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, 2013, pp. 123-134.
- Schain, Martin A. "Managing Difference: Immigrant Integration Policy in France, Britain, and the United States", **Social Research**, Vol. 77, No. 1, Spring 2010, pp. 205- 236.
- Solheim, Øyvind Bugge. "Are we all Charlie? Tolerance and immigration attitudes after the Charlie Hebdo attacks", Paper prepared for the **ECPR General Conference** at the University of Oslo, Norway, 6-9 September 2017, Early Draft, 31 August 2017, pp. 1- 36.
- Stivachtis, A. Y. "International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security", **Humanities and Social Sciences**, 2(1), 2008, pp. 1- 24.
- Swyngedouw, Marc and Gilles Ivaldi. "The extreme right utopia in Belgium and France: The ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National", **West European Politics**, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 1- 22.
- Tanaka, Hiroyuki. "Immigration and the 2007 French Presidential Elections", **Immigration Background**, Migration Policy Institute, May 2007, No.3, pp. 1-9.
- Taureck, Rita. "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 9, pp. 53-61.
- Tehrani, Majid. "Cultural Security and Global Governance: International Migration and Negotiations of Identity", Jonathan Friedman and Shalina Randeria (Ed.), in book **Words on the Move: Globalization, Migration, and Cultural Security**, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 3- 22.
- Toğral, Burcu. "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices", **Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations**, Vol.11, No. 2, Summer 2012, pp. 65-77.
- Van Der Valk, Ineke. "Political Discourse on Ethnic Minority Issues: A Comparison of the right and the extreme right in the Netherlands and France (1990-97)", **Ethnicities**, V. 3, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 183-213.
- Vasta, Ellie. "Accommodating diversity: why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point", **COMPAS: Working Paper**, No. 53, University of Oxford, 2007, pp. 1-39
- Veugelers, John W. P. "A Challenge for Political Sociology: The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Contemporary Western Europe", **Current Sociology**, October 1999, Vol. 47(4), pp. 78 - 100.
- Wiggen, Mette. "Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utoya Terror Attacks", **New Political Science**, 34:4, pp. 585- 604.

- Williams, Michael C. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.47, 2003, pp. 511-531.
- Yardım, Müşerref. “Göç ve Entegrasyon Politikaları Işığında Fransa’da Toplumsal Kabul”, **Göç Araştırmaları Dergisi**, Vol. 2, No. 2, July- December 2017, pp. 100- 136.
- Yvan, Gastaut. “The ‘Immigration Question’: Mainspring of Sarkozy’s Presidency”, **Contemporary French and Francophone Studies**, Vol. 16, No. 3, June 2012, pp. 333- 346.

Internet Links- Sources

- Agnew, Harriet and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany. “Le Pen step sup anti-immigration rhetoric ahead of French election, <https://www.ft.com/content/967daaae-2412-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16>, 18.04.2017, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- Aljazeera, “Hollande: ‘France has a problem with Islam’”, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/hollande-france-problem-islam-161013073501962.html>, 13.10.2016, [accessed 21.09.2018].
- Baker, Aryn. “These Syrian Refugees Made It to Europe. But There Still Isn’t an Answer tp the Crisis”, <http://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/5069832/december-25th-2017-vol-190-no-27-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/>, 18.12.2017, [accessed 22.09.2018].
- BBC. “Europe and nationalism: A country-by- country guide”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006>, 10.08.2018, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- Brice, Pascal. “This is saving refugee lives”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/03/28/refugee-crisis/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.13ae91b31de2, 28.03.2018, [accessed 03.04.2018].
- Chrisafis, Angelique. “European Union warns French minister over Roma comments”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/france-minister-warned-roma-comments>, 25.09.2013, [accessed 21.09.2018].
- Chrisafis, Angelique Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor. “French PM Manuel Valls says refugee crisis is destabilising Europe”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/french-pm-manuel-valls-says-refugee-crisis-is-destabilising-europe>, 22.01.2016, [accessed 21.09.2018].

- Chrisafis, Angelique. “Jean-Marie Le Pen fined for dismissing Holocaust as ‘detail’”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/jean-marie-le-pen-fined-again-dismissing-holocaust-detail>, 06.04.2016, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- CNN World. “France: Hollande, Sarkozy quizzed on immigration”, 27.04.2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-election-campaign/index.html>.
- EC. “First time asylum applicants in France (2017)”, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/visualisations>.
- Encyclopedia Britannica, “France”, www.britannica.com/place/France, [accessed 25.03.2018].
- Euractiv. “French minister accused of racism following Roma comment”, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/french-minister-accused-of-racism-following-roma-comment/>, 18.03.2013, [accessed 20.09.2018].
- European Parliament. “Europe’s migration crisis”, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78631/europe-s-migration-crisis>, 30.06.2017, [accessed 22.09.2018].
- France24. “Wear a veil or be French: Hollande shocks with views on Muslims and migrants”, <https://www.france24.com/en/20161012-french-president-hollande-book-islam-veil-sarkozy-trierweiler-gayet-migrants>, 12.10.2016, [accessed 21.09.2018].
- Gastaut, Yvon, “French public opinion of immigration since 1945, continuity and change”, Universite de Nice, <http://barthes.enssib.fr/cli/revues/AHI/articles/english/gastauteng.html>, 18/05/2001, [accessed 10.09.2018].
- Göle, Nilüfer. “The new daces of the Euroepan far-right”, **The Immanent Frame**, <https://tif.ssrc.org/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/>, 11.05.2011, [accessed 11.10.2018].
- Guiraudon, Virginie. “Immigration policy in France”, www.brookings.edu/articles/immigration-policy-in-france/, 01.07.2001, [accessed 24.03.2018]
- Hamilton, Kimberly, Partick Simon, Clara Veniard. “The Challenge of French Diversity”, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/challenge-french-diversity>, 01.11.2004, [accessed 05.06.2018].
- Hollande, M. François. “Immigration is part of France’s national history- President”, <https://uk.ambafrance.org/Immigration-is-part-of-France-s>, 15.12.2014, [accessed 05.02.2018].

- Immigrants by country of birth in 2014, https://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/data/france/immigrants-foreigners/countries-birth-immigrants/. [accessed 07.06.2018].
- Joseph, Abraham. “It is time for France to face its past and debate crimes against humanity”, <https://theconversation.com/its-time-for-france-to-face-its-past-and-debate-crimes-against-humanity-74886>, 26.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].
- Koser, Khalid. “When is Migration a Security Issue”, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/when-is-migration-a-security-issue/>, 31.03.2011, [accessed 02.03.2018].
- Marine, Allez. “The rise of France’s far-right from the 1980s to today, charted”, <https://qz.com/567247/the-rise-of-frances-far-right-from-the-1980s-to-today-charted/>, 07.12.2015, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- Marliere, Philippe. “French politicians are now marching to Marine Le Pen’s immigration tune”, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/20/french-politicians-dancing-marine-le-pen-tune-immigration>, 20.11.2016, [accessed 012.09.2018].
- Marquand, Robert. “France's Sarkozy launches controversial national identity debate”, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2009/1103/p06s04-woeu.html>, 03.11.2009, [accessed 03.04.2018].
- Mechani, Hassina and Emilie Denetre. “France must fight against Islamism to restore civil peace, says National Front”, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/france-must-fight-islamism-restore-civil-peace-says-national-front>, 06.10.2016, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- Morocco World News, “Marine Le Pen: ‘Algeria Owes A Lot to French Colonization’”, <https://www.morocroworldnews.com/2017/04/214755/marine-le-pen-algeria-owes-lot-french-colonization/>, 23.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].
- Mudde, Cas. “The far right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/?utm_term=.7485326d7d64, 30.05.2014, , [accessed 10.10.2017].
- Nossiter, Adam. “Marine Le Pen Denies French Guilt for Rounding Up Jews”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/europe/france-marine-le-pen-jews-national-front.html>, 10.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].
- Poushter, Jacob. “European opinions of refugee crisis in 5 charts”, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/>, 16.09.2016, [accessed 22.09.2018].

- Rassemblement National, “Les 144 engagements présidentiels”, <https://rassemblementnational.fr/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/>.
- Ray, Michael. “National Front”, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Front-political-party-France>, [accessed 10.10.2018].
- Reuters, “Factbox: France’s Le Pen sets out presidential election plan”, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-fn-manifesto-factbox-idUSKBN15J0GB>, 04.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].
- Reuters, “Francois Hollande: Deported Roma girl can return from Kosova”, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/francois-hollande/10390840/Francois-Hollande-Deported-Roma-girl-can-return-from-Kosovo.html>, 19.10.2013, [accessed 20.09.2018].
- Sessions, Jennifer. “Why the French presidential candidates are arguing about their colonial history”, <https://theconversation.com/why-the-french-presidential-candidates-are-arguing-about-their-colonial-history-75372>, 19.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].
- Smith, Paul. “What Marine Le Pen’s 144-Point presidential plan for France actually says”, <http://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-actually-says-72910>, 13.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].
- Taub, Amanda. “France’s Far Right, Once Known for Anti-Semitism, Courts Jews”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/europe/france-jews-marine-le-pen-national-front-anti-semitism.html>, 05.04.2017, [accessed 09.10.2018].
- Thompson, Madeleine. “The Immigration Game: How the refugee crisis has affected French and German politics”, <http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/05/immigration-game-refugee-crisis-affected-french-german-politics/>, 12.05.2017, [accessed 21.09.2018].
- UNHCR, Eurostat, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/welcomingeurope/default_en.htm, [accessed 02.04.2018].
- UNHCR, “Syria emergency”, <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>, [accessed 21.09.2018].
- Vinocur, Nicholas. “Marine Le Pen’s plan to make France great again”, <https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pens-plan-to-make-france-great-again/>, 04.02.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].
- Willsher, Kim. “Marine Le Pen sparks row over new name for Front National”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/12/marine-le-pen-row-new-name-front-national-rassemblement-national>, 12.03.2018, [accessed 15.10.2018].

Willsher, Kim. “François Hollande: France has 'a problem with Islam’”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/12/francois-hollande-france-has-a-problem-with-islam-french-president-book-nicolas-sarkozy-little-de-gaulle>, 12.10.2016, [accessed 04.04.2018].

Wolff, Sarah. “Immigration: an issue in the French presidential campaign”, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/immigration-issue-french-presidential-campaign>, 19.04.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].

Reports

Charalambous, Giorgos. “Chapter 1: Introduction”, in Giorgos Charalambous (Eds), **European Far Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives**, Oslo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Report 2, 2015.

Collett, Elizabeth and Milica Petrovic. **The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion**, Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014.

EC. **France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics**, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/10a_france_country_factsheet_2017_en.pdf.

EC. **France: European Migration Network Factsheets: Main Developments in Migration and International Protection, Including Latest Statistics**, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/10a_france_country_factsheet_2016_en.pdf.

EUMC. **The Annual Report on the Situation regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU**, 2006.

EUMC. **Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia**, 2006.

FRA (the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights). **Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU**, 2007.

International Organization for Migration, **World Migration Report 2018**, Geneva: IOM, 2017, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf.

McElmurry, Sara, Juliana Kerr, Theresa Cardinal Brown and Lazaro Zamora. “Balancing Priorities: Immigration, National Security, and Public Safety”, Chicago: **Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Bipartisan Policy Center**, 2016,

https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/oct16_immigrationandnationalsecurity_report.pdf.

Organisation Racism Islamophobia Watch (ORIW). **Report on Racism and Islamophobia in European French-Speaking Countries (2014- 2017)**, <http://www.oriw.org/oriw-report-on-racism-and-islamophobia-2014-2017/>, 08.03.2018, [accessed 21.09.2018].

Thesis

Muzalevskaya, Maria. "Europe's refugee crisis: A comparative analysis of Germany and France", (**Unpublished Master Thesis**, Boston University, 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309764197_Europe's_refugee_crisis_A_comparative_analysis_of_Germany_and_France.

Özerim, Mehmet Gökay. "Avrupa'da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göç Karşıtlığı: Güvenlik Temaları Ekseninde Göç Karşıtı Söylemin İnşası" (**Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi**, Dokuz Eylül üniersitesi SBE, 2012).

Videos

BBC News Channel. "Marine Le Pen: Brexit 'most important event since the fall of the Berlin Wall' - BBC News", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUFIv-nSuGM>, 10.10.2016, [accessed 09.10.2018].- 24:35 min

BBC News Channel. "The Power of Le Pen- Our World", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzn5CoEWW1I>, 28.02.2015, [accessed 09.10.2018]. – 23:15 min.

CNN Channel. "Paris Terror: Marine Le Pen on Halting Immigration", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=McpIwmjXMSY>, 21.07.2016, [accessed 15.10.2018].

France 24 English. "French presidential elections: Where do the candidates stand on immigration?", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbb1x5DyGFU>, 06.04.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].- 11:08 min

Marine Le Pen speaks at the European Parliament on Islam and terror Subtitles", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeSEE5qsAs8&t=191s>, 26.01.2016, [accessed 15.10.2018].

LBC (Leading British Conversation). “Nigel Farage Interviews Marine Le Pen exclusively”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXfvvXwgQy4>, 16.03.2017, [accessed 10.10.2018]. -39:54 min.

OxfordUnion. “Marine Le Pen- Full Address and Q&A (English Subtitles)”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVkJcGcPLW8&t=98s>, 14.09.2015 [accessed 09.09.2018]. -1:29:06 min

RT. “Marine Le Pen: France plagued by bankruptcy & mass migration”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nm9rbDCz3vc>, 01.07.2013, [accessed 15.10.2018].

Wall Street Journal. “French Elections: Le Pen and Macron Spar in First TV Debate”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=557XWLXt9r4>, 21.03.2017, [accessed 15.10.2018].



Annex:

**French Presidents
Fifth Republic (1959- Present)**

<u>Charles de Gaulle</u>	1959–69
<u>Georges Pompidou</u>	1969–74
<u>Valéry Giscard d'Estaing</u>	1974–81
<u>François Mitterrand</u>	1981–95
<u>Jacques Chirac</u>	1995–2007
<u>Nicolas Sarkozy</u>	2007–12
<u>François Hollande</u>	2012–17
<u>Emmanuel Macron</u>	2017–

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica (www.britannica.com/place/France)