

T.R.
GEBZE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

TURKEY-SOMALIA STRATEGIC
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RELATIONS

ABDULKARIM YUSUF ABDULLE
MASTERS THESIS
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE OF STRATEGY

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ADVISOR
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GEBZE

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SUMMARY

In this study, the economic and security perspectives of Turkey's engagement in Somalia were discussed. Almost all studies about this relation explore Turkey's humanitarian contributions to Somalia. Contrarily, the main objective of this dissertation was to determine the bilateral economic and security interests of both states from this relation. The study concluded that Turkey has contributed to the economic and security recovery of Somalia but obtained some economic and political benefits from its Somalia engagement as well.

It's urged in the study that Turkey's security interests in Somalia developed before the popular 2011 Erdogan visit. The study determined seven main economic and security interests Turkey obtains in its Somalia engagement. In return, nine main interests Somalia has in its partnership with Turkey has been determined in this study. It is also found that Turkey's economic gains are directly correlated with the aid it provided to Somalia. More on, the study investigated the current security situation of Somalia, examined the nature of the Turkish military facility and discussed the economic and security challenges facing Turkey in Somalia.

Key Words: Turkish Foreign Policy, Somalia, Economic, Security, Engagement, Relations.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye-Somali ilişkilerin ekonomik ve güvenlik perspektifleri tartışılmıştır. Bu ilişki hakkında yapılan neredeyse tüm çalışmalar, Türkiye'nin Somali'ye insani yardım katkılarını araştırmaktadır. Aksine, bu tezin asıl amacı her iki devletin bu ilişkiden ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkar ve beklentilerini belirlemektir. Çalışma, Türkiye'nin Somali'nin ekonomik ve güvenli toparlanmasına katkıda bulunduğunu, ancak Somali'nin katılımından da bazı ekonomik ve politik faydalar elde ettiği sonucuna varmıştır.

Araştırmada, Türkiye'nin popüler 2011 Erdoğan ziyareti öncesinde Somali'deki güvenlik sektöre ilgi gösterdiğini belirtilmiştir. Çalışmada, Türkiye'nin Somali'ye katılımında elde ettiği veya elde etmek istediği yedi ana ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkarları belirlenmiştir. Buna karşılık, Somali'nin Türkiye ile ortaklığında dokuz ana çıkarları da belirlenmiştir. Dahası, Türkiye'nin Somali ile ekonomik ilişkisinin büyümesinin Somali'ye sağladığı yardım ile doğrudan ilişkili olduğu da tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, Somali'nin mevcut güvenlik durumunu araştırılmış, Somali'deki Türk askeri üssün Somali güvenlik sektörüne karkısını incelenmiş ve Türkiye'nin Somali'de karşılaştığı ekonomik ve güvenlik zorluklarını tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Somali, Ekonomik, Güvenlik, Katılma, İlişkiler.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
CBS	Central Bank of Somalia
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Sham
ITC	International Trade Center
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFD	Northern Districts Frontier
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNA	Somali National Army
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
THY	Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları)
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Tükiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı)
TİM	Turkey Exporters Assembly (Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi)
UAE	United Arab Emirates

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	United Task Forces
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II



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INTRODUCTION

Since 1991, Somalia has been in anarchy, civil war and statelessness. The collapse of the central government has given a chance for warlords and other criminal networks to destabilize the country. It also caused the disturbance of all features of the state apparatus, followed by a period of two decades of absence of central authority. The destruction of the state infrastructure and the government institutions caused almost all public services to be provided by donors, international actors and in less amount by the private sector. Later on, terror organizations have risen to further worsen the crisis and haul the civil war to a new condition where the horizons of any possible solution have lost.

Under the leadership of the United Nation (UN), international humanitarian donors have been intervening to put an end the humanitarian crisis in the country. With the support of the UN, the United States of America (USA) along with its European allies have commenced different humanitarian and peacekeeping missions to Somalia between 1992-1994 to tackle and stabilize the country. The USA, the European Union and the Muslim World countries have been involved in Somalia for different purposes. Neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have never been absent from such interventions in stateless Somalia. Providing aid, engaging in economic relations, preventing a 'security threat' and supporting the desperate people were some of the reasons that led to those countries' interventions in Somalia. Turkey is one of the countries did not leave Somalia during these hard times.

Turkey's engagement in Somalia has firstly started with a wide humanitarian aid campaign in 2011. Within a short period of time, Turkey has won the public support of the local people. The effectiveness of the its aid campaign and taking a different track from the traditional donors have created an image of the donor that has no other agendas. After Turkey positioned itself as a key humanitarian actor in Somalia, its other political, diplomatic, economic and security interests come into play. Moreover, Turkish diplomatic interests are considered controversial and is a part of a wider development plan which includes public service and peace-building support. Turkey's opening up foreign policy in Somalia is considered to be a tiny domino of its broader strategy in Africa. Based on this background, this study will

examine Turkey's engagement in Somalia with a focus on the economic and security perspectives.

The organization of this study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will provide a timeline of Somalia's political and economic history starting from middle ages, through the colonial partition and the post-independence periods. This chapter explores the political and economic developments during the mentioned periods. Each period's political and economic condition is explored under a subtitle. The chapter gives more detailed information on Somalia's political history.

The economic perspective of Turkey's engagement in Somalia will be examined in the second chapter. The investments that Turkey made in Somalia, the supporting factors and the challenges ahead of these investments will be explored. Turkey's economic interests and motivations behind these huge investments will be determined. On the other hand, Somalia's gains from Turkish investments and how it contributes to the country's economic growth will be discussed as well. Somalia's economic interests in Turkish investments will be determined.

The third chapter will discuss Turkey's security involvement in Somalia. The timeline and the reasons behind this security involvement will be focused. Along with the Turkish engagements, there are other major security actors in the country. These actors and their activities will be elaborated in this chapter. Somalia has many security advantages with the Turkish engagements in the country. Somalia's security interests to deal with Turkey will be determined. Turkey not only involves in Somalia's security but also gives attention to play a leading role in Africa's peace and stability. Turkey's security engagements in Africa and its contributions to the peacekeeping missions will be discussed. The last chapter will present the findings of the study along with the brief discuss on the role of humanitarian aid in Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia will rather be addressed.

Research Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze and discuss the economic and security dimensions of Turkey-Somalia relations. The study aims to determine the security and economic interests of both states in their bilateral relations. Highlighting the

main economic and security challenges surrounding this relation is also focused in the study as well. Generally, the research concentrates on the role of Turkey's humanitarian and development aid projects in complementing its strategic economic and security interests in Somalia.

Objectives of the study

The study aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. To explore the security and economic perspectives of Turkey's Somalia policy.
2. To determine the economic and security interests of Turkey in Somalia.
3. To examine Somalia's economic and security interests in its relations with Turkey.
4. To find out the role humanitarian and development aid played in strengthening Turkey's economic and security engagement in Somalia

Research Questions

The study aims to answer the following questions:

1. What is the security and economic perspective of Turkey's Somalia policy?
2. What are the economic and security interests of Turkey in Somalia?
3. What are Somalia's economic and security interests in its relations with Turkey?
4. What role does humanitarian and development aid play in Turkey's Somalia economic and security policies?

Hypothesis

The study argues that Turkey's humanitarian and development aid campaigns in Somalia serves nothing other than a wider policy which Turkey pursues to attain economic and security advantages in Somalia. On the other hand, Somalia as well has political, economic and security motivations in its relation with Turkey and has benefited from these engagements in terms of economy and security. The study also hypothesizes that Turkey's security engagements have positively contributed to Somalia's intention to reestablish its army, tackle security challenges and stabilize

the country. One other hypothesis of the study is that Turkey's economic engagement is a crucial factor in reviving Somalia's economy.

Methodology

The nature and the hypotheses of study dictates to carry out qualitative research method to achieve the research objectives. Based on the research design and the questions of the study, secondary literature is the mostly used to seek responses for the research questions in the dissertation. Additionally, the study employed secondary data analysis and document review techniques in reaching conclusions. Interviews with members of Somalia business communities has been undertaken to find more details about Turkey's economic engagements in Somalia. Moreover, the study has reviewed agreements, protocols and Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) signed between the two states. It's also considered appropriate utilizing internet sites; radio programs, newspapers; speeches and press releases of Somali and Turkish authorities; and other online sources to draw conclusions on topics related to the bilateral relation of Turkey and Somalia. Additionally, academicians, policy makers and experts are consulted to formulate the research questions and shape the organization of the dissertation.

Significance of the Study

Turkey has been increasing its engagement in Somalia since 2011. This engagement has been kicked off with a wide aid campaign carried out by Turkish official, Non-governmental and private institutions. Academic literature about the bilateral relation between the two states has mainly focused on the humanitarian and development aid of Turkey to Somalia and that aid's contributions in the peacebuilding process. Little has been written about Turkey's economic engagements in Somalia. Turkey's security involvement in Somalia did not find the required space in the academic literature of Somalia and Turkish studies.

This study focuses on the economic and security perspectives of Turkey-Somalia relations. This focus bears specific significance due to the recently growing securitization of the Horn of Africa region by regional and international actors. The less-focus by the filed academicians on the economic and security perspectives of

this relation adds to the importance of this study. However, the study contributes in understanding Turkey's Somalia policy and paves the way for increased focus on the economic and security dimensions of Turkey-Somalia relations.



1. A TIMELINE OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

1.1. Introduction

Somalia's modern history and political situation cannot be studied without deep understanding of its past. Understanding the past of the Somali state gives researchers the basic features of the Somali society and the system mechanisms of the political apparatus. In this chapter, I shall give a brief introduction to Somalia starting from its prehistory era, through early and middle ages, and ending up with the its modern history. The colonial partition of Somalia; its struggle for independency; post independency political situation, the civil war era and post-civil war and the struggle for peace building will also be discussed in the chapter. I shall try to concise the political and economic situation, and the main characteristics of each era to contribute the easy understanding of the thesis.

1.2. A Background about Somalia

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, geopolitically a very strategic place which binds the Arabian Peninsula to the African continent. This strategic geopolitical location of Somalia not only indicates its importance in early dates but continues to the present. It's located at the center of the Horn of Africa, the crossroads of the ancient and the modern trade routes. It's situated in latitude-longitude coordinates of 5.152° N, 46.1996° E. it is bordered with Ethiopia in the west, Djibouti in the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the North, the Indian Ocean to the East and Kenya in the Southeast. With its 3,025 km coastline, it becomes the country with the longest coastline in Mainland Africa.

Somalia's population is estimated 14.32 Million as of 2016 by the World Bank. It's a homogenous country, all the people are ethnic Somalis, speaking the same language and professing to the same religion (Woldemichael, 1993). According to (Lewis, 2002) Somalis form one of the largest single ethnic blocks in Africa, and are sparsely distributed in a large area of territory from the highlands in modern Ethiopia, to the coast of the Indian Ocean, and from the Gulf of Aden to the Tana

river. This region forms a well-defined geographical and ethnic unit which Somalis see as a natural base for a sovereign state.

Somali or *Af-soomaali* is the official language and Islam is the religion of the Somali state. The people in Somalia are 100 percent Muslims, and as per the Somali constitution other than Islam, no religion can be spread in Somali territories.

1.3. Early and Middle Ages History

Somalia has been inhabited since early ages. The oldest known history for Somalia dates to thousands of years BC. The Laas Geel complex in the outskirts of Hargeisa is an evidence that Somalia has been inhabited long time ago. The complex has rock arts depicting both wild animals and decorated cows. Other classical arts and architectural paintings are found in different areas in Somalia. These are an evidence of ancient civilizations which once existed in the Somali peninsula, one of those civilizations was known as 'Punt'.

Historians now know that the [Somali] people's rich history and culture dates to several millennia, although details of that past have remained blurred as a result of the pervasive nomadic mode of production, which hardly supports solid and stable state institutions and the cosmopolitan lifestyle that comes with continuity and adoption (Njoku, 2013).

Some of the ancient Egyptian arts show that the Land of Punt enjoyed good trading relations with Egyptians. The Ancient History Encyclopedia states that the 'Land of Punt' is best known for Queen Hatshepsut's famous expedition in 1493 BC. This voyage of Punt was only the most famous, however, the evidence suggests that the Egyptians were trading with the Land of Punt as early as the reign of the pharaoh Khufu (c. 2613-2498 BC) and probably earlier. The Land of Punt was rich with different resources and used to supply the Egyptians with aromatic gums, gold, ebony, wild animals, animal skins, elephant tusks, spices, precious woods, ivory, and incense trees (Mark, 2011). Some other resources suggest that the Land of Punt was best known for the aromatic gum, which the Egyptians used for mummification of their Gods.

Somali people inhabit the horn of Africa where various sultanates and city

states were established in the medieval and the precolonial periods. Adal sultanate was one of those sultanates located in the heart of Zeila, the north western part of the Somali inhabited territories (Muhumed and Siraj, 1995). The strategic location of Somalia provided the means to maintain cultural and trade ties with the ancient world, particularly, the Egyptians, Southern Arabians and West Asians. Arabs and Persians established a very active trade relation with Somalia before Islam.

Studying Somali people's relations with the outside world requires also to observe the roots of Islam in the nation. According to (Mukhtar, 1995), Islam found its way to Somalia from the religion's very beginning and enjoyed a unique role in the history of Islamic Africa as the only country in the whole continent whose population is virtually all Muslim.

Somalis claim that Islam has reached the country from the first *Hijrah* 'Migration' to *Habashah* 'Modern day Ethiopia and Parts of Somalia'. when the prophet Muhammed allowed his companions to migrate from the Mecca, where they were oppressed, to *Habashah* they passed through Zeila and have built a mosque there. That mosque is still used and is called *Masjid-ul-Qiblateyn*, the mosque with two directions. That's when Muslims directed their prayers to *Quds* 'Jerusalem' before God later ordered them to direct to Mecca. For more information about Islam in Somalia.

Soon after the rise of Islam, Somalia has already set ties with Arabia and Islamic caliphates. Islamic scholars report that both Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates had sent troops to Somalia and East African coasts to spread the call of Islam in Africa. Muslim Somalis served in that armies and contributed in collecting taxes from East African tribes. Some Somalis believe they were the spreaders of Islam among the East Africa tribes, especially the Oromo tribe has converted to Islam with the efforts of Muslim Somalis.

As proposed by (Mukhtar, 1995), there are three possible scenarios to consider in early Arab-Muslim migrations to Somalia. *Hijrah* (voluntary or forced migration), *Fath* (conquest) and *Tijarah* (trade and commerce). Since Somalis have welcomed the prophet's companions on their way to *Habashah*, the conquest scenario is no way applicable to Somali community.

Somalis were always more civilized than other communities in East Africa. This is shown in the writings of the muslim traveler and explorer, *Ibn Battuta*, who visited Somalia in the 14th century. According to (Ibn Battuta, n.d.) they [Somalis] had Sultanates, foreign trades and diplomatic relations with other empires in the Arabia and Africa. Ibn Batuta stated that:

“Zeila is a big city and has large market”. “Mogadishu is a large city, its people has a lot of camels and goats. They are successful and strong businessmen. They produce clothes and textiles, from the leather of their animals and export it to Egypt and other countries”.

During the Middle Ages, the areas inhabited by Somalis were secure, and economically much prosperous. The local communities succeeded to establish sultanates. These sultanates included the Mogadishu Sultanate (12th to 14th century), the Ajuran Sultanate (13th to 17th century), Warsangali Sultanate (13th century), Ifat Sultanate (13th to 15th century), and Adal Sultanate (1415-1577). During the reign of Sultan Ahmed Gurey, was the time when the relationship between Turks and Somalis had firstly begun. Later in the 19th century, the Sultanate of Hobyo was the last sultanate before the colonial powers invaded Somalia.

These periods were marked by expansion of Somali sultanates to the neighboring Oromo, Afar and the Bantu communities in both northern and southern directions. Somali sultanate of Adal in particular and Somalis in general were in constant wars with neighboring empires and communities, mostly in the modern Ethiopia. Though Somalis were pushing others, but there were also times when Somalis have been defeated and their king been ousted to Kingdom of Yemen (Lewis, 2002). Historical evidences show that at the peak of the Adal Sultanate, Sultan Ahmed Gurey defeated Abyssinia Empire. It is also believed that Somali people prevented the Bantu and Galla from penetrating Somalia (Njoku, 2013). As stated by (Siradag, 2017) the Somali sultanates, especially the Sultanate of Harar, controlled over Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. However, At the peak of the wars between Adal Sultanate and Abyssinia Empire both sides sought a foreign aid, Abyssinians invoked to Portuguese, and Somalis asked for support from the Ottoman forces which was based in Eritrea (Lewis, 2002).

During these times, Somalia's economy was largely dependent on agricultural and pastoral activities, with less dependency on trade. As described by (Lewis, 2002) the Somali Sultanates used to export hides and skins, precious gums, ghee, ostrich feathers and ivory; and import cloth, dates, iron and weapons. The most important wealth Somalis could have is 'a camel'. Camel was, and is still, everything to Somalis.

The clan organization is very significant to the Somali people, it determines a major attribute of the Somali culture which never fades away and cannot be separated from their social life. The clan was playing a central major role in shaping the political arena and also social/economical activities. Moreover, the role of the clan was not only limited to 'military' and organizing the armies but extended to regulating the economics. It was the supreme decision-making mechanism which determines the kind of products to be exported and which ones to be saved for later use.

After the collapse of the Adal state, Zeila continued to be the commercial city of the horn, retaining its position as the main outlet of the ancient caravan routes. At the time, Lewis (2002) argues that both Zeila and Berbera were incorporated by the Ottomans. It's when the Imperial partition of Africa was about to begin.

1.4. Colonial Partition and Struggle for Liberation

The 19th century marked the period of Africa conquest by the Imperial powers. The ultimate goal of the imperial powers to conquer Somalia was to save the marine routes from East to West and to colonize the areas of energy reserves. Some scholars argue that by controlling East and North Africa, Ottoman Empire prevented colonial powers penetrating into the continent from these directions. Ottoman Empire's control over Somalia and Eritrea was one of the challenges the imperial powers faced, but according to (Akalin, 2014) Ottomans couldn't defend these important coastal towns because of its political turmoil with Egypt.

After the Berlin Conference in 1884, like all other African states, Somalia has been invaded by the colonialists. Britain, Italy and France were the European colonizers in Horn of Africa region. Some African countries, like Egypt and

Abyssinia, were also involved in the “expanding and consolidating realm of this period” (Lewis, 2002). Soon after their arrival, the lands inhabited by Somalis were divided into three parts at the first, one part for each colonial power. When the colonial powers took over the control, they subjected the Somali people to the second-class citizenship. Researchers like (Eno, Ingiriis, and Haji, 2012) argued that “the worst, most vicious, and most devastating of all acts of terrorism is slavery and colonialism”. As described by (Fanon, 2005) the bad acts of colonial administration on the local people included “deportation, massacre, forced labor and slavery”.

Abbink (2003) argues that the revolt and resistance is a main ingredient of the Somali people’s culture. The nature of the Somali society, which is fiercely attached to independency and rebellious towards outside interference, would have not accepted colony. This can be fully explained by the resistance of the Somali people to the Portuguese armies, which tried to seize the Somali coasts in mid-15th century. He believes that even clans could not unite Somalis in a single authority. He based his view on the norm of interclan conflicts between them. He adds that the only authority that had united Somalis was the religious authority under the leadership of the the Sufi scholars. The same scholarship that Islam is the only possible means to unite Somalis is suggested by many other scholars.

With the changes in international policy conditions, Britain has ‘given’ parts of Somalia to neighboring countries, Ogaden region to Ethiopia and later Northern Districts Frontier (NFD) to Kenya. Somalia has never recognized these lands as foreign territories, instead they symbolled for it in the five-headed star of the Somali flag. It’s worth noting that Somalia has not signed the Organization of African Unity (OAU)’s resolutions and agreements about ‘maintaining the colonial borders’. Later after the establishment of the OAU, Somalia’s border disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya was discussed. Somalia insisted that Ogaden and NFD are parts of its territories and cannot be separated from it (Touval, 1967).

In East Africa, colonial powers were confronted with armed anti-colonial movements in the first two decades of the 20th century. Like all other nations in Africa, Somali people started to resist the colony to liberate their territories. One of the most popular and most organized resistance movements in Somalia, and perhaps Africa in general, was that led by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, known as *Sayid* in the

locals and ‘*Mad Mullah*’ in the colonial archives. He led a resistance movement which was focused on unifying Somalia territories to establish ‘Greater Somalia’ state which he thought is the right and most suitable kind of state for Somalis.

Sayid Mohamed had begun his ‘reformist’ campaign soon after he came back from Mecca, where he met with the founder of the Salihya order of Sufi tariqa. His arrival to Berbera marked the start of preaching for the right of Somalis to determine their way of governance and to liberate the horn from the British and Italians. The Dervish’s movement was focused on resisting British Administration more than the Italians. Sayid Mohamed tried to negotiate with the British for some conditions including ‘not to interfere in local people’s right to live their religion, and not spreading Christianity in the Somali territory. At some times, Sayid Mohamed sent letters to the British to challenge them and delegates to negotiate with them in other times (Lewis, 2002).

Helen Chapin Metz (1992) described the Dervish movement’s resistance to be the longest and bloodiest ‘conflict’ in the Sub-Saharan. The dervish uprising was not crushed until 1920 with the death of Hasan, who became a hero of Somali nationalism. Deploying a Royal Air Force squad recently returned from action in combat in World War I (WWI), the British delivered the decisive blow with a devastating aerial bombardment of the dervish capital at *Taleex* in northern Somalia.

Sayid Mohamed was defeated after the Taleex bombardment, he ran away from his capital to Ogaden region and died there later for influenza. His Dervish resistance movement was not able to survive, and his supporters were not willing to carry on his struggle. However, for Somalis, that movement created a memory of how they successfully resisted for more than twenty years, and has left a great legacy (Slight, 2011).

Some researchers argue that the Dervish movement was a kind of Islamic movement, which used the religion as its main driving force to maintain its existence for long (Baadiyow, 2016; Lewis, 2002; and Slight, 2011). Such literature refers to the fact that Sayid Mohamed was an Islamic scholar and a poet. He studied in the local Islamic Madrasahs and travelled to Sudan, Palestine and Arabia for further studies. He was also a member of the Sufi tariqa of Islam and the leader of the

Salihiya sub-tariqa in the Horn of the Africa.

Sayid Mohamed's Dervish movement had nothing to do with being Islamic or not since the people it represented are all Muslims and hated the colonial powers' forceful invasion to their territories. It is such kind of justification that the imperial powers used to mark all resistance movements in the Muslim countries. Thus, trying to give a 'legitimacy' to their violations against locals.

Towards 1920, the social base of the Dervish movement declined due to the in-fighting, raiding of clan groups, religious leaders and regional chiefs who tried to work out of his control (Abbink, 2003) and due to his focus-expansion. At the first times, he focused on struggling against the British but finally expanded his targets to scope also the Italians. Thus, the dervish movement has begun to operate in the central and the south regions which was controlled by Italians.

Soon after the dervish's weakness and decline of its social base, the British and the Italians were out of the (WWI). These cumulative conditions paved the way for the British to organize a large grieve operation against the local resistance movements, where finally they bombarded the base of the Dervishes and finalized it after ousting Sayid Mohamed to Harar.

Pre-colonial Somali economics was majorly based on agriculture, livestock farming, fishing and trade. The main source of wealth was 'mobile capital' in the form of livestock and local trade, neither of which is easily controlled or taxed by authorities (Abbink, 2003).

The European colonization has disrupted the economic systems of the African communities. Africans were compelled to work on lands taken from them forcefully. The Western wealth boosted on the account of the African economy and resources (Eno et al., 2012). Unlike British Somaliland which was neglected, Italian Somaliland successfully created plans for plantations in the river filled areas. The arable lands between the two rivers produced sugar, cotton and bananas. Italians could not force Somalis to work in these farms for wage labor (Waterfield, 1958). Generally, these plantations were made only to cover the food shortage in Italy and to monopolize the potentials of the Somali lands. The former Somali president Siad Barre, in one of his speeches said, "*Italian colonialism could not see beyond*

bananas, it was short sighted”.

The period between 1920 until the second world war (WWII), the British and Italian colonies have notably increased their impact on Somali society. They focused on the development of the infrastructure and agriculture. According to (Abbink, 2003) only Fascist Italy promoted a real colonization settlements in Somalia where invested on transportation, agriculture and livestock trade. He adds that the colonial regimes did not make any major investment in formal, modern education in Somalia.

After the defeat of the Dervish movement in the North, Somali people tried to carry out peaceful resistance against the colonial administration, though the armed resistance movements continued in some parts of the South. There, finally the colonial powers' presence weakened, and their impact was strict in the main towns such as Mogadishu in the South, and Hargeisa and Berbera in the North. In the southern regions of Somalia, there were also other liberation movements led by religious leaders, like that of Sheikh Bashir and Sheikh Hassan Barsane. The period of 1940-1960 marked the birth of the Somali Political Parties. The first Somali political party, Somali Youth League (SYL) was formed in 1943 with the vision of liberating the country using peaceful resistance and lobbying in international political arenas. The political parties reached up to twenty-two in 1954 but later decreased to five in 1958 (Reyner, 1960). Most of those parties had a clan-based ideology and could not survive for long. On the other hand, SYL's main objective was to unite the Somali people in one state, *Soomaaliweyn*, Greater Somalia, which itself was an ideology originated from the dervish movement.

The aftermath of the WWII and the defeat of Italy created opportunities in Somalia. The British secured control on 'Italian-Somaliland', thus expanding its presence to the south. According to Samatar (2016) Somalia gained a loose unification of four of its territories, formerly occupied by different colonial powers. This became the first meaningful spirit of Greater Somalia agenda. After WWII, Italy relinquished control and, with the political lobbying of the SYL, Somalia's case was put on discussion in the United Nations (UN). For 10 years, Somalia was a UN trust territory under Italian administration until 1960, Somalia was granted independence and the Somali Republic was formed. During these 10 years Somalia was governed by a cabinet of Somali ministers, advised by Italian experts. The Italian experts' main

task was to contribute setting up governmental rules, development of bureaucratic system and training the Somali public workers.

1.5. Post-colonial Politics and Economics

July 1st, 1960 marks the Somalia's Independency day and the establishment of the new republic. The National Assembly has elected Aden Abdulle Osman as the first president of Somalia. He was one of the prominent SYL leaders who struggled for the independency. His childhood passed through harsh life conditions. He grew as an orphan, worked in low level jobs, studied in adult education, worked with the Italians and witnessed their brutal injustice, and worked as an entrepreneur. Later he engaged in anti-colonization movement and joined SYL in 1945, two years after its establishment. He was number thirty member of the SYL. As a successful businessman and pretty active politician who spoke three foreign languages, he became one of the most prominent Somali personalities in 1950s (Samatar, 2016).

Somalia was one of the African countries which have taken the two pathways of liberation: armed resistance movement (1900-1940) and peaceful liberation movements (1943-1960). This will later become a milestone for Somalia's administration system and will foster the ego of Somali nationalism in late 1970s.

Somalia faced a lot of political and socioeconomic challenges in post independency period. Some of them were that left behind by the colonial powers. According to Samatar (2016) the most important and immediate challenge of the republic in its first phase was how to transform the aspiration of the Somali people for freedom and unity into functioning democratic institutions. The budget deficit of the government and the underdevelopment of economic resources were also among the challenges (Reyner, 1960). Redesigning the set-up of citizenship, political inclusiveness and civil rights was also another main challenge (Elmi, 2016). In addition to these, there were also other challenges including the border disputes with neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia; and the lack of required infrastructure for economic development. Samatar also states that the birth of the new republic was simultaneous with a time when the Cold War was in full swing. Though, Somalia joined the Non-Aligned Movement, but it suffered from political and economic conditions that made it exceptionally vulnerable to the machinations of superpower rivalry.

Since most of the African states did not take its independency, Somalia became one of the leading countries for state-building and anti-imperialism efforts throughout Africa. Its role in establishing the Organization of African Unity and support for anti-colonial liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa shined its star in African politics. Though, it had border conflict with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, but this did not become a constraint for its very active and anti-imperialist foreign policy. In his book *Africa's First Democrats*, Abdi I. Samatar states that one of the most effective and memorable achievement of the first republic of Somalia (1960-1964) was that it has taken the pathway of democracy and multi-party system whilst most African countries have drifted towards a single-party system or was managed by dictatorships.

During the first republic, Somalia economy have a slight development in the sectors of livestock and agriculture. Somalia had a competitive advantage in the production of many agricultural goods and received grants and investment loans. During the periods of 1960-1966, Somalia was the leading livestock exporter to the Gulf and the leading banana exporter in the world (Strangio, 2012). In her book *The Reasons for Underdevelopment*, Donatella Strangio also describes that despite the early successes of the Somali economy, it could not free itself from external aid; Mogadishu was still dependent on external aid and finance; agricultural practices were still tied to the traditional farming methods and the backwardness of the subsistence level agriculture could not satisfy the needs of the growing urban population.

In 1967, with the end of the president's term, a presidential election was held in Somalia. That elections came whilst military coups were very popular in Africa, it was marking a turning point in Somalia's history to linger the democratic system or to drift its way to dictatorship and impunity. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was elected president by the National Assembly, which meant the sitting president was defeated by an opponent former prime minister. The 1967 election was described by (Samatar, 2016) in this way:

“June 10. 1967, marked the first time in modern African political history in which a democratically elected president was defeated in an election, gave up power with dignity,

and walked away freely as an adored citizen”

The loss of the sitting president and the transfer of power to the new president signaled the maturity of the Somali leaders at that time and how the first republic leaders were corrupt-free and decisive on national issues. It has taken nearly a quarter century for Africa to witness the same case. However, the corruption-free politics did not last for long. The new government of Abdirashid was blamed for nepotism, mismanagement and corruption, thus, paving the way for a possible coup which lastly happened when the President was assassinated in 15th of October 1969 by one of his guards and the military played out their game by carrying out a coup d'état led by Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre. The newly formed military government finalized the assassination case as an intractable clan rivalry over state power between contesting clan elites, but some researcher like (Ingiriis, 2017) concludes that the assassination was likely to be organized by the military officials aided by KGB officials from the Soviet Union. However, no strong evidence can be presented to support Ingiriis's scenario except that Somalia was receiving military support in the form of vehicles, small arms and technical assistance from the Soviet Union.

The military established a Supreme Revolutionary Council and promised to work on the establishment of Greater Somalia state by unifying the five Somali territories. The military government set up a very sound foreign policy by rebuilding the military and seeking for Somali Unification, but the internal affairs policy was such kind of mess because they imprisoned all the former government's active members, suspended the constitution and renamed the state as Somali Democratic Republic. Thus, Somalia moved from a democratic state to another dictatorship within three years. However, the military government made a lot of reforms in foreign policy, economy, education and health. Strangio (2012) states that the Somali economy went under the government control and boosted after shifting to Socialism in 1970. The banks, insurance companies and all industries were nationalized and most of the important industrial firms passed into the hands of the state.

Somalia's adoption of aggressive foreign policy towards Somali territories have paved the way for the independence of Djibouti and created political turmoil with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia and Kenya were insisting that

colonial borders must persist and deaf-eared the Somali government's call for right of the Somali people for self-determination. Finally, the aggressive foreign policy caused the 1977 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia was militarily more powerful than Ethiopia and pushed Ethiopia back, but the misunderstanding of Somalia with Soviet Union and closing ties with it caused the Soviets to side with and shift their military support to Ethiopia.

With the increase of the military oppression and the ruin of the economy, the regime eventually ceased to function effectively, clans began to fight each other whilst the government itself promoting some clans, and the foreign aid dried due to the human rights groups pressure. By 1991, president Barre has been driven away from Mogadishu by the rebels, and the marathon of atrocities didn't stop, thus marking the start of the Somali civil war (Haskin, 2014).

1.6. Somalia Civil War and Political Chaos

The accumulation of military regime's misuse of power, poor economic policies and significant violations of human rights led to political turmoil in Somalia during 1980s. In addition to that, the aftermath of the 1977 Ogaden war, the 1978 failed coup attempt and regime's use of military power against the opposition in the northern regions also contributed to the path of the civil war. According to (Metz, 1992) after the regime has faced an internal armed opposition at home and diplomatic isolation abroad, it turned inward and played its 'divide and rule' game by inflaming clans' passions. Starting from late 1980s, the opposition have armed their supporters, established training camps in neighboring Ethiopia and begun their guerilla war against the regime.

The opposition factions which got a lot of supporters in every region of Somalia, finally succeeded to overthrow the regime, after the United Somali Congress (USC) captured the capital city. Soon after the overthrow of Siad Barre, the opposition leaders, which mostly served in the military before, failed to develop a collective strategy that contemplates the governance of the state (Samatar, 1997). Samatar adds that the factions remained mired in sectarian politics and couldn't set new governance principles. Metz (1992) argued that the collapse of the Somali state resulted from certain features of lineage segmentation, such as the clan organization.

Mudane (2018) argues that clan itself was not the real cause of the destructive civil war.

Few researchers argued that, rather than clan organization, other factors fueled the civil war. For example, Marangio (2012) insists that Somali crisis is multi-dimensional, regional and international actors are also involved in destabilizing the country. A scholarship of (Kapteijns, 2004) resisted the *Lewisian* paradigms of the Somali clanship which endorses the idea that clanship organization is the root cause of all Somali crisis. She rather argued that the Lewisian perspective overemphasized the weight of the clan. Also Mudane (2018) claims that politicized clan identity; deprivation of basic needs; communal content; bad governance and state's repressive role and international linkage were the root causes of the Somali civil war. To conclude, the Somali civil war was not only an internal issue but also a result of cumulative domestic, regional and international factors.

What happened in the Somali civil war and how the warring sections disturbed any kind of governance feature and state apparatus were an extraordinary example in post-independency Africa politics. Moreover, the food shortage and the drought/famines deteriorated the condition to finally cause a catastrophic humanitarian disaster in the country. Local people fleeing from the war migrated to all the neighboring countries, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen. The United Nations has set up refugee camps for Somali refugees to help them recover from the shock. The largest refugee camp in the world was that of Dadaab Refugee Camp in 'Kenya's North Eastern region'. During the civil war, Somalia has passed through a very rude political chaos where any imaginable kind of violations have happened. Thus, causing Somalia to be marked as world's number one failed state.

The United States joined the UN's efforts to restore peace in 1990s by sending a peace-keeping forces to Somalia. None of the international military interventions (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II and UNITAF missions) succeeded to bring back the lost peace because it was confronted with compassion fatigue, where neither of the warring factions showed a public support for such interventions. After the withdrawal of the UN and US forces, the civil war took a new shape, clan-based warlords took the lead to determine the political situation of the country. The security situation did not improve; Somalia remained the most dangerous state in the world.

The UN contributed to most of the reconciliation conferences between the Somali combatant sections and delivered humanitarian aid to the needy refugees in Somalia as well as in the neighboring countries.

The warlords played the leading role in Somali politics during the periods of 1996-2005. As Maruf, Joseph, and Anzalone (2018) claim in their book “*Inside Al-Shabaab*”, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has recruited the Somali warlords to cooperate in capturing of fugitive terrorists who were suspected to be operational in Somalia. Meanwhile, the warlords’ violations against the civilians and targeting of Islamic scholars and institutions tremendously increased. This caused the local people, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and -even- educational institutions to arm themselves to avoid any potential abuses from warlords and armed clansmen. This self-armament of locals and institutions laid down the foundations for the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which later will arise in 2006.

With the rise of the ICU, the phase of the Somali civil war, the actors and the interests of that actors changed. The ICU in one hand faced an alliance of warlords who named themselves as Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). A deadly fighting between the two groups erupted in Mogadishu; the ICU finally secured the control of the capital, ousted out the warlords, and within a short period assumed control of almost all southern regions of Somalia. However, the Baidoa-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was a close ally of the warlords and supported by the neighboring countries and the international community, could not accept Mogadishu to be under the control of Islamists. After rounds of peace talks and reconciliation conferences between the ICU and the TFG in Sudan, an agreement has not been achieved, and the power sharing formula of the new government was the deadlock point. Civins (2010) argues that ‘the political power disparity between the ICU and TFG at the time, and the fragmented coalitions that made up both parties given each group’s relationship with Ethiopia’ were the two reasons that caused Sudan talks failure.

In December 2006, UN-supported Ethiopian troops together with the TFG fighters crushed the ICU and wiped them out of Mogadishu. The disband of the ICU and the overtaking of Mogadishu by Ethiopians led caused clan-supported civil revolt and rebel against the Ethiopian troops. By mid-2007, an African Union (AU)

peacekeeping forces were deployed to Somalia, to defeat the then radicalized Islamic groups including Al-Shabaab. For further details about Al-Shabaab and their operations, Chapter 2 will give some more information about their origins, operations and their affiliations.

With the rise of Al-Shabaab and other terror organizations, the Somali politics maintained a status quo in which the government, supported by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops struggle to defeat the terrorists, while Al-Shabaab also struggles to topple the government. This status quo may continue for long time, unless a very different, aggressive and dynamic politics are developed and applied by the government.

During the civil war, the economy has enormously boomed in almost every sector. With the lack of government regulations; taxes-free business; and under the tough haphazard conditions, the economy survived with telecommunication sector being the most boomed. The popular economic rule of Alex de Waal claims that when government institutions are absent, security and social services such as education and health care are often privatized. This fully applies to Somalia's economy during the civil war. Moreover, not only education and health care systems were privatized but also the public transportation. As Webersik (2006) argued, the tax-free business activities and the 'all-things imported' economy have created a very wealthy business class. Despite all the above-mentioned factors, the country preserves an informal economy which is based mainly on livestock, telecommunication and remittance/money transfer companies. Telecommunication infrastructure and mobile money transfer system are well developed in Somalia. A special report by the World Bank argues that, despite its fragile and underdeveloped financial institutions, Somalia has an active mobile money markets which have beaten the neighboring countries. It's estimated that 155 million transactions worth \$2.7 billion are recorded monthly (The World Bank, 2018). This report has clearly demonstrated the potentials of Somalia economy to revive in the periods ahead.

1.7. Post-civil War and Efforts of Peace-building

The civil war and political chaos in Somalia lasted for two decades and became one of the longest conflicts and the best suitable instance of complete state

collapse in post-colonial Africa. External mediators have convened several reconciliation conferences in different cities in the world for Somalis in to resolve the crisis. Starting from 1991, the international community have engaged in Somalia reconciliation process and have contributed in many ways to the efforts of peace-

Table 1.1: National reconciliation conferences.¹



building in Somalia. Djibouti have beaten other countries and international organizations in gaining the trust of Somali disputed parties and because of that trust it hosted the most reconciliation conferences. Table 1.1 shows the list of the national reconciliation conferences aimed to gather Somalis in one place and to conclude the civil war in Somalia.

¹ This table is adopted from Interpeace's *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988* report, released on May 2009. Interpeace is an international peacebuilding organization that supports locally led peacebuilding initiatives around the world.

Conference	Date	Host Country	Facilitator
Djibouti I	5-11 June 1991	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Djibouti II	15-21 July 1991	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Informal preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation	January 1993	Ethiopia	United Nations
Addis Conference on National Reconciliation	March 1993	Ethiopia	United Nations-Government of Ethiopia
National Salvation Council (Sodere)	November 1996-January 1997	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia
Cairo Conference	November 1997	Egypt	Government of Egypt
Somalia National Peace Conference (Arta)	May-August 2000	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret/Mbagathi)	2002-2004	Kenya	IGAD/Government of Kenya

None of these reconciliation conferences have succeeded to bring back a permanent peace and stability in Somalia, but each conference contributed to the peacebuilding process in some way. Elmi and Barise (2006) accepts that Downs and Stedman's eight determinants of peace accords apply, with no exceptions, to the Somali case². In addition to Downs and Stedman's, they proposed four main factors which contributed to the failure of the Somali peace building and reconciliation process. These factors are: the Ethiopian meddling, the absence of a major-power interest, the warlords' determination to maintain the status quo, and the lack of resources continue to haunt the Somali peace process (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

² Downs and Stedman's eight factors are: the number of warring parties; the lack of either a peace agreement before intervention or a coerced peace agreement; the likelihood of spoilers; a collapsed state; the number of soldiers; the presence of disposable natural resources; the presence of hostile neighboring states; and the demands for secession.

The later peace talks between the TFG and the ARS in Djibouti 2008-2009 created a merely locally accepted government led by former ICU leader Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Facing the political, economic and security challenges of the country, Sharif finally succeeded to enforce presidential elections inside Somalia for the first time since civil war. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-2017), who came to power on election, focused his efforts on institutionalizing and improvement of the federalism and established the remaining federal states. Though, there are a lot of challenges ahead but the political, economic and security situations are recovering day after day.

In the Somali case, different researchers suggested different peacebuilding models, most of which clan power sharing was given an extra space. Ignoring the role of Islam and Islamic movements in the peacebuilding process can be described as a short-sighted view. Rethinking the role of Islamic movements and religious beliefs of the Somali communities can be the best peacebuilding model for Somalia at this time (Baadiyow, 2017; Elmi and Barise, 2006; Ingiriis, 2018). However, Elmi and Barise (2006) also proposes that a lasting peace in Somalia can only be reached by creating a peaceful environment; enhancing the political institutions; ensuring social justice; economic development; and excluding the former warlords from politics. To design a long-term peacebuilding process and find a lasting stability in Somalia requires the Somali people to build their special model as they used before the colonial powers invaded Somalia, where local elders and Islamic scholars used to guard the peace and enforce the common laws accepted by all. The neighboring countries intervention in Somalia's peace seeking process will make the issue last for long. The neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya must be excluded in Somalia's struggle for peace and state building process.

Regarding Somalia economy in this period, recent studies show that Somali economy is recovering from the past challenges. A thorough analysis of growth, trade and confidence shows that Somalia economy is finally beginning to recover (Wilson, 2016). He states that the current political situations in Somalia may support the overall recovery of the Somalia economy, without ignoring the role of diaspora in flourishing the economy. Wilson also argues that that economic recovery can be an effective tool for Somalia peace-building process.



2. TURKEY-SOMALIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

2.1. Introduction

Africa occupied a very special place in Turkish Foreign Policy since 2000s. In the Strategic Depth doctrine of Davutoğlu, Africa is considered as the superpower of the second half of the 21st century. He literally stated that ‘It’s a bad mindset [for Turkey] to miss the resourceful Africa in our foreign policy although it’s gravely colonized by western powers but it is still a virgin land (Davutoğlu, 2001). Together with the African Action Plan of 1998, this doctrine laid a theoretical foundation for Turkish Foreign Policy’s need to get into a strategic partnership with Africa. The rising economies of Africa and its natural resources have attracted big economies’ engagement into Africa and Turkey was not get late to catch the opportunity.

Africa played a central role in Turkish foreign policy since the rise of AK Party in Turkish politics. It’s because of Turkish growing economy in one hand and the scramble of Africa on the other hand. Kabandula and Shaw (2018) argues that “Africa has become essential in Turkish economic, political, and foreign policy endeavors causing competition for the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa], especially China. And that is why Africa is one of the fastest growing export destinations of Turkish foreign trade. Additionally, the natural resources, especially petrol reserves, of Africa are also a critical factor in the economic relation between the two parts.

2.2. Overview of the Economic Situation in Somalia

Somalia state has collapsed in 1990 after it failed to meet the social needs and maintain stable economic policies. Some other factors have also contributed to the collapse reasons. A very harsh civil war erupted in the country, where all possible kinds of violence has happened. Yet, the economic situation of the country sustained, and the factors of production were actively operational. During the civil war, the economy has enormously boomed in almost every sector. The lack of government regulations; taxes-free business; and under the

tough haphazard conditions, the economy survived with telecommunication sector being the most boomed. The popular economic rule of Alex de Waal claims that when government institutions are absent, security and social services such as education and health care are often privatized. This fully applies to Somalia's economy during the civil war, where every aspect of the economy has been privatized. As (Webersik, 2006) argued, the tax-free business activities and the 'all-things imported' economy have created a very wealthy business class.

The country preserves an informal economy which is based mainly on livestock, telecommunication and remittance/money transfer companies (DEİK, 2018). Telecommunication infrastructure and mobile money transfer systems are well developed in Somalia. A recent report by the World Bank stated that, despite its fragile and underdeveloped financial institutions, Somalia has an active mobile money markets which have beaten the neighboring countries in terms of functionality and operationality. The lack of active Central Bank of Somalia (CBS), which is supposed to regulate the economic activities of the country, contributes to the improvement of informal economy. The current Ministry of Finance is struggling to restore the CBS to its operations actively, and there are discourses in the locals that a 'foreign expert' will be appointed by the current government to lead the CBS. The current government also endeavors to lobby for the cancellation of foreign debts from Somalia. It's in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. (FGS, 2017)

Regarding the Somalia economy in this period, and after more than two decades of civil war, conflicts, security uncertainty and political instability, recent studies show that Somali economy is recovering from the past challenges (Webersik, 2006). To add on, Leeson (2007) goes further to claim that a stateless Somalia performed better in terms of economics than the past governments. A thorough analysis of growth, trade and confidence shows that Somalia economy is finally beginning to recover (Wilson, 2016). Wilson also states that the current political situations in Somalia may support the overall recovery of the Somalia economy, without ignoring the role of diaspora in flourishing the economy.

2.2.1. Basic Economic Indicators

There is no official statistical office to record the required economic and demographical data necessary to undertake a useful analysis. Since the state collapse, the currently available data on Somalia is collected and/or estimated by international institutions, like the UN, the World Bank etc. Some international NGO also contributed to the course, with a self-limit to education, health, child care, food security, famine and droughts. Due to the lack of statistics, finding data on economic improvements is very difficult. For the first time since two decades, the ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia has undertaken a population census in 2014, with technical and logistical support from the World Bank.

To understand deeper the economic situation of Somalia, we need to look at the basic economic indicators. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated 7.1 billion dollars, GDP per capita is 500 dollars (The World Bank, 2019), and the expected economic growth rate in 2019 is 3.5% (IMF, 2019). Livestock is one of the main economic activities in the country, it accounts to 40% of the GDP and 65% of the exports (Leeson, 2007). Furthermore, according to The Global Economy (2018), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) composes 5.21% of the total GDP. Economic advance and improvement in public goods are two main factors which contributed to the economic growth in Somalia. Almost 70% of the economic growth is generated in the urban areas (Hassan, Mohamed, and Isak, 2018). Additionally, the effectively functioning private sector and assistance from the diaspora contributes efficiently to the economic growth in the country (Webersik, Hansen, and Egal, 2018).

2.2.2. Transformations of Somalia's Economy

Somalia's economy has been transforming from the wrecked condition since the collapse of the central government. Despite all the odds in the country, the private sector proved the possibility of economic development without a state. In comparing the economic situation of pre-war and post-war Somalia, Leeson (2007) has carried out a thorough investigation to describe if the stateless Somalia's economy was functioning well. He compared the performance of

Somalia's economy in the years of 1985-1990 with 2000-2005 years. He concluded that the country's economy performed more effectively and much more efficiently during the civil war than the pre-anarchy period. He added that Somalia's private sector has proved to be a relatively effective provider of key social services, such as water or transportation.

In a recent study, Ali, Dalmar, and Ali (2017) stated that Somalia's exports have been declining immensely since the civil war. The government's diplomatic ties with the neighboring countries and the other allies was the driving factor for the export activities. Stateless Somalia could have not continued to export more commodities, or due to the lack of statistics, it seems that way to the researchers. Strangio (2012) described that the banana plantation and exportation had contributed a lot to the export activities of the economy.

One of the factors to determine the growth of an economy is the GDP. Somalia's economic growth maintained a state of healthiness between 1970-1980. After the collapse of the state, the country experienced a huge decline in GDP, but resumed to recover between early 2001 and 2012 (Ali et al., 2017). The role of FDI, remittance from the Somali diasporas and the informal trade with neighboring countries are also critical factors in the Somali economy. The FDI in Somalia has been recently increasing as the country's political and security situations are heaving to be stable. The economic and financial reforms by the last two (Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Farmaajo) governments may have also contributed to the increase of FDI. The recently jointly proposed debt cancellation process by the Somali government and IMF is estimated to have a positive effect on the Somali economy through the next decade.

Somali diaspora contributes to the process of economic development through remittance transferring. They provide a strong support for trade promotion and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) development but poor government effectiveness limits the potential of diaspora communities to enhance to the economy (Carment and Calleja, 2018). In 2014, remittances from the Somali diaspora accounted for 35% of the total GDP (UNOCHA, 2014). According to the Global Somalia Diaspora (2019), the country receives about 1.3 billion dollars annually from the diaspora all around the world. This indicates how

the Somalia communities abroad contribute to the economy back home. The remittance economy was boosted by two main factors: rapid growth in migrant workforce and unrealistic fiscal and monetary policies (Ibrahim, 2018). The increase of financial institutions in Somalia, the recently proposed financial regulations, and global competitors are posing business threats to the industry, though it enjoys the opportunities of technology advancement and Somali people's dependency on it (SIPAM Institute, 2018).

Despite the economic growth, the challenges emanating from the local political, legal and security issues are deteriorating the sustainability of this growth. Hassan et al. (2018) argued that businesses in Somalia are not registered under the Commerce Ministry, and the current trade imbalance may have a negative impact on the economy in the future. Additionally, they found that 'export performance has a positive impact on the economic growth of Somalia'. However, due to the lack of industrial infrastructure, Somalia does not currently produce something to export except livestock and agriproducts in less quantities.

According to Hassan et al. (2018) an effective security policy is essential to boost an environment which attracts investments. More on, attracting FDI was one of the key foreign policy objectives for Somalia (Somalia MFA, 2015). An investment promotion paper released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion in 2016 defined food security, infrastructure, energy and finance as 'National Investment Priorities' (Somalia MFA, 2016). In short, Somalia's economy may be recovering, but sound policies and international support will be crucial in addition to a good fortune to capitalize on the current opportunities and emerge as a more powerful economy (Wilson, 2016).

2.3. Turkey-Africa Relations: Economic Perspective

Since 1990s Turkey was endeavoring to develop an opening policy towards Africa. It's argued that '1998 Africa Action Plan' developed during the tenure of Ismail Cem as a foreign minister, was the first effective step in Africa-Turkey economic coordination. Furthermore, Necmettin Erbakan, in his prime ministry tenure (1997-1998) has laid concrete foundations for the relations between Turkey and Africa (Bayram, 2014). In this period, Bayram states that Erbakan

tried to develop an ‘Islamic Union’ project starting with Islamic Common Market, Islamic Defense Treaty and D-8 Project which aimed to gather Islamic countries, including African ones, in a big intergovernmental organization. This is followed by the ‘2005 Year of Africa’ in which Turkey yielded to raise its presence in Africa. In the same year, Turkey was granted an ‘observer status’ at the AU. Since then, it was actively working to involve itself in African politics and engage in economic relations with the African countries.

On 18-21 August 2008, Africa-Turkey Partnership Summit has been held in Istanbul. This summit marks a turning point in Africa-Turkey relations. 49 African countries and 11 international organizations including the AU attended the summit and discussed the way forward to an economic coordination. In the 2008 Turkey-Africa Partnership summit, the ‘Istanbul Declaration for Turkey-Africa Partnership’ was announced in which AU declared Turkey as a strategic partner. A second Africa-Turkey Partnership Summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, on 19-21 November 2014. Other summits with regional economic entities including Economic Community of West African States




Figure 2.1 Turkey’s Exports to Africa
Source: TÜİK, *Turkish Statistical Institute*




Figure 2.2 Turkey’s Exports to Africa (North and Sub-Saharan)

(ECOWAS) have taken place between these periods.

According to Turkey Exporters Assembly, (*Türkiye İhraçatçılar Meclisi*, TİM), Turkey’s exports to Africa has been increasing since 2003 and totaled 14.4 billion dollars in 2018. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show 2009-2018 exports to Africa. In 2016, Turkey became the 9th largest exporter, and the 15th largest importer from Africa (African Union Commission, 2017). The trade volume between Africa and

Turkey was fluctuating between the years. It can be drawn from the figures that the trade volume has been decreasing in the period between 2013 and 2017. This may be due to two reasons: *First* a backlash effect of the Arab Spring on the economies of North African countries, and *Second* a regular usual impact from the decline of Turkish economy since 2014. According to TİM, the trade volume has recovered in 2018 and is expected to continue recovering in the coming periods.

From the statistical database of TİM, it can be realized that Turkey's exports to North African countries are two times larger than that to the Sub-Saharan countries. From 2009 to 2018, Turkish exports to North African countries and Sub-Saharan countries amounted to 8.3 billion dollars and 3.7 billion dollars respectively. It is maybe due to Turkey's intentional investments in countries formerly controlled by Ottomans. This is compatible with the Neo-Ottomanism foreign policy developed first by Turgut Özal (Laçiner, 2003; Yavuz, 1998) and sustained by AK Party governments later (Dine and Yetim, 2012).

Turkey does not only focus on technology, telecommunications, and infrastructure but also engages in traditional sectors such as agriculture and livestock. According to Sara and Dellal (2018), Turkish agricultural products trade with Africa was steadily increasing through years. In 2008, Turkish exports of agricultural products to the continent was 1.29 billion dollars but increased to 2.26 billion dollars in 2017 with an annual average of 1.86 billion dollars between these periods. Conversely, Sara and Dellal also noted that Turkey's imports of agricultural products from Africa totaled 687 million dollars in 2008 and increased to 1.4 billion dollars in 2017 with an annual average of 1.02 billion dollars. This signalizes and emphasizes the fact that Africa's agricultural and livestock resources can serve, if invested properly, as a food security and supply procurement source for other countries, and Turkey in particular. Turkey's imports of agricultural and livestock products from Latin American or Far East countries can be substituted and covered to imports from Africa because it's cheaper and logistically seems easier to import.

In this regard, under the theme of "Turkey-Africa Partnership on Rural Development for Achieving Food Security", the African Union and the Republic

of Turkey has together hosted 1st Turkey Africa Agriculture Ministers Meeting and Agribusiness Forum in Antalya on 27-28 April 2017 to address cooperation activities in the sector between the two parts. The objective of the summit was to discuss ways of increasing agricultural products trade between Africa and Turkey. Speaking at the meeting, Turkish prime minister Binali Yıldırım stressed that Turkey is committed to establish a strong trade partnership with the continent in the agriculture sector. “We are going to Africa not to discover its resources and take it, but to develop the continent by cooperating with the Africans themselves” Yıldırım added.

Turkish Airlines (THY) is a crucial element in Turkey-Africa’s economic relations. It facilitates the flow of businessmen from and to Africa. It is also a good source of revenue for Turkey and shows a perfect example of Turkish investments in the continent. Currently, Turkish Airlines flies to 55 destinations in 37 African countries (THY, 2018) and became the number one carrier from Africa to the world in 2018. Moreover, revenues generated from its Africa activities account for 9% of the national carrier’s total revenues, and 8% of its international passengers are Africans (THY, 2017). Turkish Airlines is to the economic relations between the two parties what petrol is to the economies of the Gulf states. Though it enjoys a monopolistic market share in some countries like Somalia, this doesn’t necessarily mean it will maintain secure profitability in the future.

It’s worth noting that Turkey preaches its engagement in Africa is at all about ‘economy’. Turkey looked at the continent from the economic perspective and have seen it as a potential cash cow for Turkish economy (Bayram, 2014). In his book *Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Century*, Turkish former foreign minister (2003-2007) and president (2007-2014), Abdullah Gül stated that Turkish foreign policy doesn’t and shouldn’t overlook the continent, given that it is the next destination for international investments. Davutoğlu went deeper and narrated that Africa will be a central economic and political power at the end of the 21st century (Davutoğlu, 2001).

Turkey’s interests in Africa were thriving since 2000s. Different studies have tried to define why Turkey is deeply concentrating in Africa? Turkish

officials narrate in almost every occasion that Turkey intends to build a reciprocal dependence with Africa. ‘Turkey’s main interest is to exchange competencies and technologies with Africa’ said a former president of Turkey-Africa Business Council (Afrol News, 2018). Additionally, Hammoura (2016) noted that Turkey desires to ‘extend its cultural and religious influence in the predominantly Muslim African countries’. Officials in Turkey don’t deny that cultural relation is an essential tool in their foreign policy. In this regard, TIKA plays a central fundamental role in fostering Turkey’s image as an international donor and a global political player. Additionally, Ozkan (2010) argued that Turkey’s Africa policy is driven by a long-term orientation of Turkey in international politics and can be understood within this context. Furthermore, Turkey is among the foreign actors which intend to utilize African energy resources (Ozkan, 2012). Obviously, security factor was never absent from the perspectives of both parties in developing their relations.

China’s substantial penetration to Africa markets and ‘the monopoly’ it maintains in Africa markets pose a deadly competition on Turkish economic investments in the continent. It is the largest exporter and importer from Africa (African Union Commission, 2017; Tepeciklioglu, 2017). There are also other emerging economies, like UAE, Japan and Brazil, which are ruthlessly determined to increase its economic presence in the African market. UAE, an able competitor in the African market, became the 10th exporter to Africa in 2016 (African Union Commission, 2017).

Security is, of course, another factor which effects the trade relations. The steady recovery and strengthening of terror organizations in some African countries like Somalia, the recently increasing protests in Sudan and Algeria, the democracy and human rights issue in some African countries may affect Turkey’s investments in the continent. The volatile political and security situations in the Middle East, which disturbs alliances and balance of powers marks also a potential threat to the economic relation between Turkey and Africa though the economic interests are likely to stay and grow (Hammoura, 2016).

2.4. Turkey’s Economic Engagement in Somalia

The economic and trade relation between Turkey and Somalia has been in a scratch level since 2000s. Despite the fact that this relation has been continuing, but it has grown tremendously after 2011. Soon after “Turkey positioned itself as a key humanitarian actor, other interests [including economic interests] came into play” (Wasuge, 2016). Turkey seems to have intention of investing in the long-term of its economic relations with Somalia (Abdulle, 2019). Moreover, Rossiter and Cannon (2018) noted that in the six years spanning 2011-2017, Turkey moved from being an economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports. The overall wider strategy that Turkey follows in its Somalia policy as (Abdulle, 2019) noted, includes for sure an economic and trade strategy. Somalia is in the close radar of Turkey, not only in politics but also in terms of trade, economic and culture (DEİK, 2017).

Before getting into the information about the trade volume between the two states, it’s better to present a general information about the exports and exports of Somalia. Table 2.1 presents foreign trade information of Somalia. As it can be seen in the table, for the last 9 years Somalia has a negative trade balance with Turkey and is expected to continue this because of the insufficiency in the infrastructure necessary to develop the economy and increase exports. Somalia’s economy is not yet industrialized, only little number of light factories are established in the country and the local businessmen seem not ready to invest in giant industrial projects. Thus, to fill this gap in industrial investments, it’s an opportunity for foreign investors to catch it and Somalia is required to seek and attract such interested investors if any.

Table 2.1 Somalia: Exports, Imports, Trade Volume and Balance (1000 USD).

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade Volume	Trade Balance
2009	190,680	813,326	1,004,006	-622,646
2010	293,906	919,051	1,212,957	-625,145
2011	398,884	1,196,865	1,595,749	-797,981
2012	505,113	2,169,853	2,674,966	-1,664,740
2013	644,924	2,521,830	3,166,754	-1,876,906
2014	643,785	2,349,488	2,993,273	-1,705,703

2015	691,623	2,512,531	3,204,154	-1,820,908
2016	628,311	2,732,660	3,360,971	-2,104,349
2017	389,384	3,334,273	3,723,657	-2,944,889

Source: International Trade Center (ITC)

In the next paragraphs, the data of the trade volume between the two states which is extracted from the statistical databases of ITC-Trade Map, Turkish Statistical Institute and Turkey's Ministry of Trade. Yet, 2011 remains a turning point in the history of the bilateral relation of Somalia and Turkey. Thus, the facts presented below provokes that argument. It's worth noting that due to lack of official statistical databases in Somalia, the Somalia perspective of this data is missing.

Table 2.2 Turkey's Exports to Somalia (2009-2018).

Year	Exports (1000 USD)
2009	3,546
2010	4,810
2011	39,548
2012	43,751
2013	58,315
2014	62,119
2015	71,035
2016	115,887
2017	142,946
2018	181,501

Source: ITC, TÜİK

As shown in Table 2.2, Turkish exports to Somalia has increased incredibly from 4.8 million dollars in 2010 to 39.5 million dollars in 2011, showing an increase of 846%. This is due to the 2011 Turkey's opening up policy to Somalia and the following financial and development aid support during the 2011 Somalia famine. This unusual increase in Turkey's exports to Somalia has no evident reason to describe. The only reason to explain this increase may be due to the fact that Somalia's market was in great shortage of goods and services. The rise of the terror organizations in one side and the booming of piracy off the Somalia coasts have crippled the flow of goods/services to Somalia. Another factor which contributed to the boom of Turkey's trade relations with Somalia is the positive image that Turkey received in its humanitarian mission in Somalia. To understand more about the relation between aid and exports in Turkish foreign

policy and particularly its economic relation with Somalia, we need to look at Turkish exports and development assistance aid given to Somalia. Table 2.3 compares Turkish assistance aid and exports to Somalia between 2007-2017.

The table shows that Turkish aid to Somalia has a direct relationship with the Turkish exports to Somalia. It's seen in the table that any increase in total aid has caused also an increase in exports. At the same time, decreases in total aid have also caused decreases in total exports. But, it is worth noting that aid is not the only factor that affected the increase/decrease of Turkish exports to Somalia. there may be also other factors stemming from the economic and political situations of the two states, and additionally, the security situation of Somalia.

Table 2.3 Comparison of Turkish aid and exports to Somalia (2007-2017).

Year	Turkey's aid to Somalia		Turkey's exports to Somalia	
	Values (Million dollars)*	Percentage Change (%)	Exports (Million dollars)**	Percentage Change (%)
2007	3.55	-	2.3	-
2008	7.5	111	8.4	265
2009	5.7	-24	3.5	-58
2010	5.8	2	4.8	37
2011	93.3	1509	39.5	723
2012	86.6	-7	43.7	11
2013	115.7	34	58.3	33
2014	74.4	-36	62.1	7
2015	314.8	323	71	14
2016	59.6	-81	115.8	63
2017	60.6	2	142.9	23


Source: * Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

** ITC

On the other hand, Turkey's imports from Somalia has been fluctuating through the years. Figure 2.3 shows Somalia's exports to Turkey between 2007 and 2018. It's seen from the figure that Turkey's imports from Somalia was declining before 2011 but begun to increase after the popular Erdogan visit to

Mogadishu. The businessmen that accompanied Erdogan in this visit have worked to lay the foundations for a lasting economic/trade relation between the two states. Perhaps the Somalia economy which is not still industrialized may have caused the country to lack something to export to other countries. The products that Somalia actively exports include, but not limited to, livestock, agricultural products, hides as well as sea products (OEC, 2018). Additionally, Turkey was not a desirable export destination for Somalia's economy till 2011. This was possibly due to the logistical distance between the two states and/or Turkish foreign policy's negligence of relations with Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa in general.

Regarding the Turkish investments in Somalia, it's worth noting that there are two kinds of investment types, *first* investments in public services such as that of the airport and the port, *second* investments in the private sector. Despite



Source: ITC

the huge risks and challenges, Turkish businessmen who are interested to invest in the country have been increasing since 2011 and they are committed to invest in various sectors such as energy, telecommunication and networking, furniture, textile, electrical appliances and aluminum (Nor and Masron, 2018). In addition to those sectors mentioned, construction, banking as well as security sector (in the form of private security companies) have been an attracting investment opportunity to Turkish investors. Nor and Masron (2018) have also argued that Turkish investments will create economic opportunities for local people, but at the same time may face challenges if these opportunities are not managed properly and shared equally among the community members.

The most notable Turkish firms that have investments in Somalia include Favori LLC and Albayrak group which handle the control of Aden Abdulle International Airport and Mogadishu Port respectively. Turkey and Turkish companies have been commended for competently upgrading and successfully operating this critical infrastructure (Cannon, 2019). Favori LLC took over the management of the airport on September 2013 from the UAE based SKA International Group, which its contract had not been renewed by the Somali government. Wasuge (2016) claimed that the Favori LLC contract has created controversy and generated a court case, media attention and a parliamentary debate. Additionally, Somalia's former president was allegedly a pro-Qatar and Turkey and has benefited from 'financial support' from Qatar during his presidential candidature in 2012 (Cannon, 2019; Şeker, 2017).

In light of these 'financial support', Cannon has claimed that Turkey, through Qatar, used its soft power influence to win the bid for the competition in managing Mogadishu port. In another article, Cannon (2016) has also claimed that Turkey won the contract in corrupted way in exchange of six to eight million dollars, citing a website material with anonymous sources. Fartaag (2014) also narrated such allegations, "the contract engagement was not carried out through competitive bidding and it was not a transparent process" Fartaag claimed. In the local contexts, there is no evidence to show that Turkey won these contracts by paying money in the form of bribe to the Somali government. Yet, there is no way to verify or deny it unless one party, Albayrak or Somali government, speaks out and/or publicizes the contract agreement. And Turkish media sources noted that "the contract's details and the share of revenues were not revealed" (Sabah, 2014).

Regarding the 20-years contract of Mogadishu Port, Albayrak has been commended for rehabilitation and development of the port. According to the contract, 55% of the revenues generated from the port will go to the Somali government and the remaining 45% will be for Albayrak company. On the basis of these percentage shares, Wasuge (2016) reported that the company has deposited some 9.4 million dollars representing the government's share into the Central Bank of Somalia during the seven-month period from October 2014 to

April 2015. According to Fartaag (2014), there were some irregularities in reporting the revenues from port. Fartaag claimed that “only the company [Albayrak] and former Somali president’s closely trusted friends had access to the actual revenue transactions carried out”.

The role of Turkish Airlines (THY) in Turkey-Somalia relation is remarkable. It was the first international airline to organize flights to Somalia, when other airline firms were not even thinking of entering the Somalia market. The Somali government’s politics on civil aviation have helped THY to sustain a monopoly over the market. According to local media discourses Turkey has allegedly used its influence on the Somali government to close the airlines market for them. Moreover, the national carrier makes incredible profits from its flights to Somalia with the opportunity of being the only international flights to Mogadishu till now. Turkish Airlines Kenya country director told Reuters once that “Somalia is one of our most profitable destinations worldwide” (Fick, 2017).

In 2014, International Labour Organization (ILO) noted that the three most competitive investment opportunities in Central and Southern Somalia was construction; services such as internet coverage, electricity supply and access to credit services; and supply/logistics sector (ILO, 2014). Banking and finance sectors are also attracting opportunity to international investors. The Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) has registered five new banks in Mogadishu on April 2018 in addition to the currently active banks. These sectors represent an immersing investment opportunity for Turkish investors. But Nor and Masron (2018) have suggested Turkish investors and businessmen to abstain from the financial sector due to the lack of proper regulations on the sector. Moreover, Informatics and digital sector also promises investment opportunities for foreign investors especially the digital services that the government should have provided. It seems that the Somali government cannot afford currently to provide public services digitally. This creates a promising opportunity for Turkish public and private contractors to invest in the sector.

2.5. Turkey’s Major Economic Interests in Somalia

Economic growth and export expansion are interrelated aspects that affect

each other. According to Beckerman (1997), the growth of exports has a favorable impact on economic growth because resource allocation and production efficiency can be improved by export expansion to foreign market. Additionally, Yucel (2009) found that trade openness has a positive effect on economic growth. Based on these conclusions, it is easier to underline that the growth Turkey's economy has been making for the last two decades created the need to find new markets to export Turkish products. Africa in general became a favorable destination for Turkish exporters and investors. In East Africa, Turkey could not have got strategically better market for its exports other than Somalia, which its economy is underdeveloped and non-industrialized.

Somalia represents a great potential market for Turkish exporters, which are in search of alternative export market, to achieve their economic interests. Perhaps, this is the reason why Turkey is ruthless about its economic relations with Somalia. Accordingly, Turkey's economic interests cannot be determined separate from its overall policy in the country. This is what Abdulle (2019) considered an overall wider strategy that Turkey pursues in Somalia which covers all aspects. Additionally, Bayram (2014) argues that Turkish contributions in Somalia security sector should be considered as an effort to create an environment where Turkey can grow its trade involvement and raise economic engagement. The general fact that Tepeciklioglu (2017) argued about Turkey's economic interests in Africa applies to Turkish interests in Somalia. She argued that Turkish exporters, in their search for alternative export markets, are considering Africa to have the potential to meet their economic interests. The same applies to Somalia where there is a shortage of imports in important products as well as sectors that require giant investments of which local investors cannot afford or may not interest to invest.

Genuine humanitarian concerns, at least initially, drove Turkey's engagement in its efforts to alleviate a widespread and devastating famine in 2011. Cannon (2019) argued that the prospect of economic gain has played an equally important role in Turkey's developing relationship with Somalia. Yet, it cannot be ignored that the regional power rivalry between Turkey and some Gulf states has always been a critical factor in Turkey's Somalia economic policies.

Additionally, Ozkan (2012) argues that Turkey's ambition to re-orient itself in global politics is one of the two factors that drives its substantial engagement in Africa. Turkey in its huge economic investments in Somalia formulated its policy to compete with the rival regional powers like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The overtaking of Mogadishu airport from a UAE-based firm hints about the kind of soft power and economic influence competition between Turkey and Gulf states. Thus, Turkish investors and investments should be seen, by Somalis particularly, as a Turkish soft power tool for future wider policies towards the country.

Somalia has an untapped natural resources and is believed to contain considerable unexploited reserves of oil. Walls and Kibble (2012) noted that estimates suggest that Somalia's offshore oil and gas fields could contain 110 billion barrels. Seismic surveys conducted by Soma Oil and Gas and Spectrum Geo, suggest that Somalia has promising oil reserves along the Indian Ocean coast of which total offshore deposits could be as high as 100 billion barrels (VOA, 2019). These reserves of natural resources have been an increasingly important factor for countries that interest strategic economic relations with Somalia. Turkey is not exceptional from the list.

According to Ozkan (2012), Turkey is considered among the foreign actors which intend to utilize African energy resources. Furthermore, Abdulle (2019) hinted that Somalia's non-processed natural resources can be one of the reasons Turkey has engaged in the country. This may currently seem shallow idea because of the Turkey's humanitarian and development aid championship in Somalia. Yet, it cannot be ignored that Turkey's ultimate goal in its engagement in Somalia is considered to be economic-centered. Bayram (2014) adds that Turkey always looks at the African continent from the economic perspective. Thus, it can be drawn from the combination of all these facts that Turkey is strategically interested in Somalia's natural gas and oil reserves in the future.

There are some other studies that support this argument. Walls and Kibble (2012) stated that Turkey, like Australia, South Africa and Canada, is interested in Somalia's oil and gas exploration activities. It's worth mentioning that in 2012, Genel Energy International, which is jointly owned by Turkish and British businessmen, has been awarded an onshore exploration license in Somaliland

with a 75% working interest. Later it acquired a 50% participating interest in Odewayne Production Sharing Agreement (Genel Energy, 2019). Additionally, the company has been awarded an agreement which gives it the right to explore oil and coal in Somaliland (Şeker, 2017).

Turkey's economic engagements in Somalia is motivated by *three* main interests. *First*, expanding the export markets for Turkish goods and services, *Second*, orienting itself as a regional economic power, and *Lastly*, future utilization of Somalia's untapped natural resources. This argument is supported by Korkut and Civelekoglu (2013) who concluded that "Turkey's rapprochement with Africa is motivated by a flexible and pragmatic pursuit of material gains". Furthermore, the aforementioned Turkish interests are considered matching with Somalia's short- and long-term economic ambitions and goals. This compatibility between the interests of the two states is what makes their bilateral economic relations laid on strong foundations.

2.6. Somalia's Major Economic Interests in Turkish Engagements

Turkish FDI in Somalia does not only contribute to the economic growth but also creates new job opportunities. According to Nor and Masron (2018) Turkey's investments in Somalia is expected to create new jobs, bring new technologies to the country, teach new skills to the domestic workers, enrich private sector, develop economic infrastructure of the country and provide adequate corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, the study revealed that Turkish FDI in Somalia possibly will lead to conflict reduction and peace building. Somali government's recent economic reforms are considerably aimed at creating an environment which supports foreign investments. Attracting foreign investments is at the top of these economic reforms.

Somalia has been under anarchy for two decades. The collapse of the central government in 1991 has caused the devastation of the state apparatus. There was no functioning government which can offer public services for long. The pre-anarchy socialist regime which led the country (1969-1991) has practiced socialism, which meant it controlled all the capital and the factors of

production. This will have its negative effect later in the country's economy. The state collapse has also created a haphazard situation of unbalanced market in which the economy is almost dependent on products/services imported from abroad. This unbalanced economy created shortages in necessary products and services and Somalia government's weak institutions are still unable to balance this economic haphazardness. Additionally, the non-industrialized economy of the country, the shortage of the necessary goods/products have created the need for giant investors to cover the shortage in the markets. This is where Turkey's role comes into play. Somalia currently is need for an investor which meet these shortages. Şeker (2017) argues that Turkish capital investments in Somalia creates value for Somalia economy.

Failed economies never recover easily. Somalia's economy is currently in need for quick recovery to synchronize with the political and security developments. The economic growth and openness that countries in East Africa countries are experiencing requires in turn Somalia as well to recover. Foreign investments and domestic entrepreneurship seem the best way for Somalia to grow its economy. However, local economic reforms and international intervention like the IMF and the World Bank may also play a crucial role. In this case, Turkey has a lot to of know-how to contribute to the process of recovering Somalia's economy. If Somali government intends to learn from the Turkish experience, it would be an opportunity of transferring know-how, industrializing and restructuring its economy.

Somalia's exports are dominated by livestock. It accounts for 65% of the total exports (Leeson, 2007). Most of Somalia's exports go to countries other than Turkey. Additionally, it maintains a negative trade balance with Turkey. Somalia's top exported products such as agricultural, live animals and fishes also come at the top of Turkey's imports (ITC Trademap, 2019). This creates an opportunity for Somalia to grow its exports to Turkey in the medium and long terms. Thus, increasing the exports to Turkey might be an incredible interest for the country's economy.

Concludingly, Somalia has *four* main interests in engaging economically with Turkey. *First*, Attract Turkish FDIs, *second*, cover the goods/service

shortage in the country, *third*, receive know-how to industrialize its economy and *fourth*, get a market to export Somali products. Furthermore, the political and economic ambitions of Somalia and the domestic circumstance are in favor of these interests. Thus, Somalia should utilize these interests and catch the opportunity on the gate. If these interests are achieved, it will move the economic relation between the two states into the next level, a strategic economic partnership.



3. TURKEY-SOMALIA SECURITY RELATIONS

3.1. Introduction

The relationship between Somalia and Turkey dates to the 16th century when Ottoman Empire used to support and cooperate with Muslim Somali states against the neighboring Christian states. The aim of that relation seemed defending Ottoman Empire's security and economic interests in both Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

This relation changed following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The newly established Turkey's pursue of western-oriented foreign policy and the partition of Somalia by the colonial powers were some of the reasons changed the relation. At the time, there was probably nothing that both states could have offered each other. The establishment of two embassies for the two countries in Ankara and Mogadishu in 1976 and 1979 respectively and Turkey's 10 million dollars contribution to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)'s aid to the East Africa region in 1984 famine (Erol and Altın, 2012) marked the resume of the bilateral relations between the two states. This relation did not last for long as Somalia's state collapsed in 1991.

During the Somali civil war, Turkey engaged in Somalia as a part of the international intervention to restore peace and secure the humanitarian aid. Turkey was a part of the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia. The Turkish humanitarian aid agencies contributed to the international humanitarian efforts in Somalia to minimize the harms of crisis. In addition to 1998 'Africa Action Plan' and announcing 2005 as the 'Year of Africa', Erdogan's visit to Somalia in 2011 has led finally to Turkey's opening to Somalia.

This chapter will discuss the security perspective of Turkish-Somali relations. At the first, an overview of the security situation and the security actors in Somalia will be given to gain a common understanding of the security sector in Somalia. Somalia-Turkey inter-security interests will be discussed later in the chapter. The engagement of Turkey in Somalia's security sector such as opening of a Turkish training camp in Mogadishu for training of the Somali National

Army (*SNA*), and contributing to the anti-piracy international efforts in Somalia's coasts will be explored. The course of Turkey's engagement in Somalia's security sector created challenges for Turkey Foreign Policy in Somalia, some of these challenges will also be discussed in the chapter.

3.2. Overview of the Security Situation in Somalia

Before the collapse of the Somali government in 1990, Security threats in Somalia were mainly caused by internal environment and state fragility. There were also persistent external factors contributed to the insecurity of Somalia, including the history of state building process, the colonial legacy and Cold War policies (Addow, 2016).

Since the uprisings against the military regime in mid-1980's, the security situation in Somalia was in a mess. The collapse of the central government in 1991 followed by the rise of warlords and factional armed conflicts directed the country to be marked as a failed state. As stated in Chapter 1, the rise of the ICU in 2006 changed the phase of the security situation in Somalia. However, Ethiopian military intervention in 2007 contributed to the publicity of Al-Shabaab and other terror organizations. Thus, the current security situation emerged. In one hand, Al-Shabaab and Islamic State (IS)-affiliated group work against the government where AMISOM, Ethiopian forces and *SNA*, on the other hand, work on eradicating these groups and 'securing the country'.

According to European Asylum Seekers Office (EASO) 2017 Report, the conflict between the *SNA*, supported by AMISOM, and Al-Shabaab is the main determinant of the current security state in Somalia. Clan conflicts, roads insecurity, floods, and land disputes are also common determinant factors. The repetitive inter-state conflict between Puntland and Somaliland also poses another major security threat.

Once a main security challenge, piracy in Somali coasts nowadays weakened, thanks to the international anti-piracy troops around the Somali coasts though there are still attempts of vessel hijackings off the coast of Somalia. Now, Al-Shabaab is the principal challenge in Somalia's security sector (UNSC, 2018a). The group has carried out 22 raids, 51 assassinations, 59 bombing

campaign in Mogadishu for the third quarter of 2018 (Hiraal Institute, 2019). Currently, the strongest actor against Al-Shabaab is United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), which has decreased the group's effectiveness in carrying out attacks (Hiraal Institute, 2018a).

3.3. Major Actors in Somalia's Security Sector

Our discussion about the security situation in Somalia leads to the importance of understanding security actors in the country. The major security actors include: Al-Shabaab, AMSIOM, foreign actors like United Arab Emirates, Turkey and USA. The role of European Union (EU) has been increasing recently, thus, making it a major actor in Somalia's politics and security. This section will focus on the nature, origins and the future of actors in Somalia's security sector. The section does not include Somali National Army because it's the major actor supposed to control the security, which due to its weakness, all these actors have arisen.

3.3.1 Al-Shabaab

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, shortly Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group based in Somalia which strive to overthrow the current government to enforce their radical views of Islamic Sharia in the country. Al-Shabaab's origin goes back to the Islamic movements which rose during the Islamic awakening period in 1970's. These movements later divided into *moderates*, represented mostly by Muslim-Brotherhood affiliated Islah Movement and *radicals* (A. M. A. Baadiyow, 2016). The radical subgroups later developed to become Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has risen into existence when the ICU took over the control of Mogadishu in 2006. The invasion of Ethiopian troops to Somalia caused the defeat of ICU. After the ICU reorganized themselves, and with the moral and financial support of the public, they started a resistance guerilla against the TFG and Ethiopian troops. The period between January 2007 and January 2009 marked the beginning of the Al-Shabaab's guerilla insurgency and gaining the control of the South and Central Somalia regions. It's widely accepted the Ethiopian occupation and brutality was responsible for radicalizing the movement and transforming it into a powerful armed group with a wide public

support (Wise, 2011). Others argue the group is a consequence, not a cause, of the prevailing security conflicts in the country (Ingiriis, 2018a).

Al-Shabaab's main violent activities occur against the government and AMISOM. Though it claims that it doesn't intentionally target civilians,³ but it occasionally causes harm to civilians and business people. Recent studies show that the group's distortion of 'taxes' from the business community in Somalia is rising tremendously, though there are efforts by the Somali government to stop such actions. These distortions offer the group a good opportunity to finance in operations against the government and AMISOM.

Apart from the general history of Islamic Movements in Somalia, the history of Al-Shabaab's development can be divided into three phases: *First* (2004-2007) period, where the main ideological developments and vision setting activities were happening smoothly without publicity. During this period, they collaborated with local businessmen and other Islamic institutions/movements to operate against the warlords. It also committed some assassinations to international aid workers. During this period, training camps were opened in and around Mogadishu to prepare for a future possible conflict with warlords; and that conflict finally happened in February 2006 between the ICU and ARPCT. According to Hiraal Institute's report *Al-Shabab's Military Machine* (2018) it's in this period when Al-Shabaab formed its first conventional military wing *Jabahaat*.

The *Second* period (2007-2011) starts with the rise of ICU, where Al-Shabaab was one of the ideologically-different groups within the ICU. During this period, Al-Shabaab maintained a de facto control over the ICU regarding the local policies and militia training issues. For example, the man who will later become the Amir (leader) of Al-Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, served as the secretary general of the Executive Council of the ICU. Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansur, who will later become the deputy leader and the spokesman of Al-

³ In an interview by Dalsoor Media published on January 5 2017, the spokesman of Al-Shabaab, Ali Dhere, alleged the hotels in Mogadishu as army bases and security operation centers for the government, he clearly stated that hotels are legitimate targets for them. He denied that they deliberately target civilians 'we try our best not to harm civilians' he added. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9OjzeTw66s>

Shabaab, also served as deputy for ICU's Internal Security Office. This can be a clear sign of how Al-Shabaab was controlling the ICU main decision-making apparatus. During the Ethiopian Occupation 2007-2008, Al-Shabaab's militia and public support increased because the local people never wanted Ethiopian troops in Somalia. The post-Ethiopian occupation period 2009-2011 marked the peak of Al-Shabaab's power, where they gained control of almost Central and South Somalia except few kilometers in the capital. They couldn't seize Aden Adde International Airport and the presidential palace in Mogadishu because it was guarded by AMISOM forces. Additionally, Al-Shabaab's finance and wealth increased during this period, as they were levying and collecting taxes, but in different names, from local people who live under their control; getting ransom from international aid workers; and charcoal exports. Overwhelmingly, during this period, Al-Shabaab recruited foreign fighters from different countries including USA, UK, Ethiopia and Kenya.

The *Third* period (2011-now) of Al-Shabaab's development history started with its defeat, or tactic retreat as it claims, in Mogadishu by *SNA* and AMISOM in 2011. After their defeat, it reconfigured its strategy from conventional posture to a guerilla strategy, where it doesn't attempt to capture territories, but struggle to control the urban areas virtually by harassing civilians and threatening them (Hiraal Institute, 2018a). Additionally, the frequency of assassinations, targeted bombings and explosives has tremendously increased during this period. Contrary to what the allied forces claim, Al-Shabaab's retreat from the capital made the group more aggressive, more operational, cost-efficient and financially much wealthier as they collect *zakat* and taxes from businesses in and out of their control.

For the past two decades Somalia was one of the dangerous places for humanitarian aid agencies to work. The non-state armed groups manifested aggression towards aid agencies, routinely extorting and harassing, expelling and attacking. Though Al-Shabaab permitted some aid agencies to work in areas under their control through their established Humanitarian Coordination Office (HCO) but it used to levy taxes and other fees or ban them from time to time. The group was dictating the terms of the negotiations which they got into with aid

agencies. Al-Shabaab used to search credit for the aids provided under their supervision (Jackson and Aynte, 2013). Late in 2011, the group seized offices of 16 international NGOs including Danish Refugee Council and Save the Children UK, thus, expressing their hostile face against the humanitarian agencies. On the other hand, the group accuses frequently aid agencies of carrying out spying activities on behalf of western intelligence agencies (Zimmerman, 2011).

Terror organizations rely on different forms of communications, mostly the social media, to recruit potential militants, plot an attack or communicate with each other. For Al-Shabaab the social media became ‘a crucial weapon in the communication war’ (Chukwuma, 2018). Al-Shabaab uses the media in a strategically well-organized means. The use of media as a marketing tool is reasonable for any terror organization to justify their goals and operations and ensure news coverage as much as possible. Additionally, Al-Shabaab has a grand Press Office, which serves as the Ministry of Information. This Office has departments such as the Military Press which deals with everything related to military and intelligence matters. Other departments may include that aimed at addressing the citizens of the AMISOM Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs), as the group often releases videos in English and Kiswahili. In general, the group has two spokesmen, one for the general issues and one for the military issues.

Mair (2017) analyzed how the group engaged in Twitter during the Wastage Attack in 2013. He identified that the group, in their tweets, has targeted six audiences which are: the general Kenyan population, terrorist sympathizers, the Kenya government, the West, emergency responders and the media. The general Kenyan population was the main target audience for the group’s tweets.

Experts in Counterterrorism believe that Al-Shabaab gains funds from various sources of income. These sources include [but not limited to] funds from other affiliated terror groups like Al-Qaida, state sponsors, Somali diaspora, charities, piracy, kidnapping, charcoal trade, smuggling contraband sugar to Kenya, and the extortion of local businesses and farmers (Felter, Master, and Sergie, 2019). It is estimated that Al-Shabaab collects 27 million dollars annually from tax revenues (Hiraal Institute, 2018b). It’s wide known locally that the group raised millions of dollars from Kismayo and Barawe port cities.

The targets of Al-Shabaab is not only restricted to Somalia but also poses a threat to the regional countries and AMISOM TCCs. This threat may not last in the short-term, as they continue to recruit foreign fighters mainly from neighboring countries. It frequently targeted civilian and military targets in Kenya; executed bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inside Uganda; and threatened other countries in the region.

However, the loss of major cities and drainage of their major income sources recently weakened the group, but it is still able to carry out targeted attacks, bombings and assassinations inside Somalia and the neighboring countries (Bacon, 2017). It also “continues to maintain its operational strength and capability despite ongoing and intensified ground and air strikes across the country” (UNSC, 2018a). Moreover, Maruf and Joseph (2018) state that though Al-Shabaab has been predicted ‘to vanish or go into sleep decline, but no end of the group is in sight within the following years’.

Though the group is in its weakest situation now, a political settlement with it should be thought off. Though high-ranking officials have been defecting from the group recently, an actual settlement with the group remains challenging as the group’s main justifications for insurgency include the presence of foreign troops in Somalia. A possible attempt of political settlement with Al-Shabaab should be taken very cautiously, because the group still seems able to overtake the government if AMISOM leaves without disarming or decomposing the group.

3.3.2 AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union in coordination with the United Nations Security Council. Established by African Union’s Peace and Security Council on January 2007, AMSIOM is an active entity in Somalia’s security sector since that time. AMISOM is mandated to offer support to Somalia government, and train security forces to combat Al-Shabaab and restore back the stability in Somalia. Its role changed from time to time according to the security situation and the capabilities of the armed opposition factions. According to (Williams, 2018) the mission is so far considered the longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation throughout the peacekeeping history of the African Union.

AMSIOM's initial mandate was articulated on PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX)-numbered AU Peace and Security Council Communique of January 19, 2007. This document indicated the mandate of AMISOM as (i) providing support for the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts to stabilize the situation in Somalia and to further dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) creating conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia (AUPSC, 2007). AMISOM's initial job was based on peacekeeping activities, this later changed to peacebuilding as its major opponent, Al-Shabaab, seemed ideologically rooted deep, and operationally non-beatable. The duration of the mission has been changed frequently in accordance with the Security Council resolutions. The latest extension of AMISOM operations was the Security Council's 2431 (2018) resolution of 30 July 2018. The resolution also authorized reducing uniformed personnel to 20,626 by 28 February 2019 and alerted against delays in troops reduction beyond that date (UNSC, 2018c).

Currently, AMISOM has around 22,000 uniformed personnel including military and police forces. The Troops Contributing Countries are Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. Sierra Leone was among the AMISOM TCCs, but later withdrawn its military forces due to internal challenges. AMISOM police forces are contributed by Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The first country to deploy forces (March 2007) and the largest TCC is Uganda. Williams (2018) considers preventing security threats from Somalia; institutional benefits; political advantages; and economic support as the reasons why TCCs are joining AMISOM.

Finding funding sources for AMISOM was challenging from the beginning. At first, a 'Burundi-Model', in which every TCC funds its operations by itself, was discussed. According to (Hull and Svensson, 2008) with the limited resources of African countries, the 'Burundi-model' seemed problematic and non-affordable to TCCs. Hull and Svensson argue that though AU officials always stress 'African solutions for African problems' but external financial assistance became inevitable for the AMISOM case. Since then AMISOM has been financed by AU member states, the AU Peace Fund, the UN Trust Fund for

AMISOM, and a range of AU/AMISOM partners, including the EU (Williams, 2017). So far, the EU has contributed around 1.5 billion Euros to AMISOM (Madeira, 2018) while the USA has contributed around 1.4 billion dollars between 2006-2016 (Williams, 2018). Repeatedly the EU announces cutting off finances due to allegations of underperformance, extension of operations etc. Williams (2017) states that By January 2016, the EU has reduced 20% of allowances from AMISOM.

The mission's most expected job is to handover the security responsibilities to the Somali forces after 'reducing' the threats of the terror groups and alleviating conflicts in the country. For many experts, the mission seems not permanent as its initial mandate was 6 months and later the mission operated with a continuous extension resolutions. It is working now with its 6th mandate, after a lot of mandate extensions from the Security Council and the AU. From the first year of the mission, a transition plan was on discussion to ensure a forthcoming transfer of responsibilities to the Somali forces, but these discussions never thrived to a concrete roadmap which guarantees a final exit. It's common in the international arena that peacekeeping missions never stick to transition and exit plans, any transition plan is/was challenged by a lot of interest conflicts within the partners. This can be clearly drawn from the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (Novosseloff, 2018), UN Mission in Liberia (Forti and Connolly, 2018) and the UN Mission in Haiti (Razza, 2018). The AU missions are not exceptional. Williams and Hashi (2016) suggested five scenarios for AMISOM's exit strategy notably (i) muddling through, (ii) political settlement excluding Al-Shabaab, (iii) political settlement including Al-Shabaab, (iv) AMISOM enabled, and (v) AMISOM reduced. these scenarios are most likely to fail as the neighboring countries and the TCCs have many economic and security interests in AMISOM's mission to continue.

After 12 years of operations, the mission is still in search of sound and well-planned transition and exit plan. The AU and AMISOM TCCs are now struggling to develop a 'realistic, phased and conditions-based transition with feasible dates, for the transfer of the security responsibilities to the Somalia security forces'(AMISOM, 2018).

AMSIOM's reputation as a peacekeeping force is in mess, it is alleged to have been frequently committing human rights violations, civilian killings, rape and mistreatment and illegal business deals with Al-Shabaab. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea alleged AMISOM on violating international laws, for example, the group recorded 88 civilian deaths between January 2016 and June 2017, 12 incidents of civilian casualties between September 2017 and August 2018 (Security Council, 2018b). Also, the Human Rights Watch's reports on Somalia clearly expose the mission's pitfalls in terms of human rights, and alleged AMISOM troops on civilian killings (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In December 2018, Harun Maruf's Investigative Dossier program of Voice of America (VOA)'s Somali Service investigated AMISOM's rape allegations in a displacement camp under the mission. In general, as Williams and Hashi (2016) believe, the mission's reputation among Somalis is damaged by the growing influence of the neighboring countries over the mission.

3.3.3 The European Union's Security Engagement in Somalia

Since the Horn of Africa region binds the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, it witnessed an intensive marine trade activity. Since early times, Somalia's coasts were playing a significant role in facilitating the trade between Arabia, India and Persia in one side and Africa on the other side. The security instability caused by the collapse of the central government and the rise of warlords in Somalia derived some local and international criminal spoilers to establish pirates which hijack vessels and extort ransom money from the crew.

There is no consensus on the reasons behind the rise of piracy. The root causes of Somali piracy are disputed. Most of the local people believe that 'piracy' began as a local resistance movement against international vessels which fish illegally off the Somali coast. It's estimated that a seafood costing around 300 million dollars were being stolen annually from Somalia seawaters (Tharoor, 2009). These illegal fishing activities caused the local people to organize themselves and try to defend their waters, although some criminal networks eventually took advantage of the local support for the resistance. With the rise of the pirate activities, the UN has agreed upon the need to counter it. From this response born the European Union's military engagement in Somalia coasts.

Currently, the EU runs Operation Atlanta, which is launched in 2008 to counter piracy off the Somali coast. This operation was launched in accordance with the European Common Security and Defence Policy and in line with Security Council resolutions on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. The mission is mandated to protect the humanitarian vessels, control illegal fishing, and support other EU and international missions in Somalia. The mission now has a mandate to operate until December 2020. According to the mission's official website, the contributing countries finance the operation by themselves by providing military assets and personnel, with any common costs being met by the EU. These common costs were budgeted to total 4.7 million Euros in 2018. The budget is decided and monitored by the Athens Committee of the EU.

The European Union also carries out military training and civilian capacity building missions. Through these missions, the EU strives to contribute 'something' to the peacebuilding process in Somalia. The capacity building mission is aimed at training, advising and mentoring the Somali National Army (*SNA*). According to Riddervold (2011) the EU has not engaged in this naval military operation to protect its shipping interests, rather to 'promote and uphold UN resolutions in a legitimate way'. It's worth noting that since the state collapse, EU has supported Somalia in different means, i.e. humanitarian, financial and military. In general, the EU's engagement was always based to defend its interests and show itself as 'a powerful actor' in Somalia.

So far, the mission Operation Atlanta has protected 139 AMISOM vessels; and 450 WFP vessels, thus, ensuring the delivery of 1,797,018³ tonnes of food/aid; and transferred a total of 166 'pirates' to competent authorities for prosecution. The mission also has disrupted 136 out of total 590 pirate attacks happened in the Somali coast between 2008-2018. A total of 138 attacks have succeeded to hijack, pirate or hold hostage a vessel during the same period (EU NAV-FOR Somalia, 2019).

3.3.4 UAE Military 'Bases' in Somalia

Since its independence, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was dependent on western powers in security and military matters, thus, playing as one of the west's key strategic allies in the Middle East. UK and USA were the main allies of the

UAE in economy, defense and counterterrorism. The death of the UAE founder Sheikh Zayed in 2004 and the rise of the second-generation leaders paved the way for major foreign policy transformations, shifting from a passive, humanitarian based foreign policy to an aggressive hard-power based policy. This directed the UAE to become an active actor in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa politics.

Motivated by the willingness to become an effective player in the regional politics, fight against the Houthi threats in Yemen and secure a corridor for its oil exports in the Bab al-Mandab, the UAE has recently adopted new instruments of foreign policy including establishing military bases overseas (Telci and Horoz, 2018). Within this framework, Somalia's strategic location has increasingly been in the focus of the UAE since the beginning of the civil war in 1990s. For the last two decades, the UAE became the hub of trade for the Somali businessmen, Abu Dhabi and Dubai were nearly the channel through which everything was exported to Somalia. This led to the UAE's strong influence in Somalia's politics.

With the transformation of UAE foreign policy during the Arab Spring and after the rise of the Houthis in Yemen, the UAE showed interest in building military bases in Yemeni islands, Eritrea and Somalia. It's military engagement in Somalia started with financial and technical support for Puntland region's security forces but later demonstrated willingness to establish naval base in Bosaso, with the promise to invest in the renovation of the region's major port, Bosaso port. The UAE continued with the same 'security forces support' activities in other regions until it finally launched a military training center in Mogadishu in 2015 and signed an agreement to build a military base in Berbera in 2017.

Under a questioned agreement, the UAE will maintain a \$442 cost military base and coastal surveillance system in Berbera for 30 years, train Somaliland military and police, and provide financial support for the region (Najah, 2017). The UAE will annually pay for the base, though by now, the details of the agreement remain confidential. Without the coordination of the central government, the UAE's military base in Berbera is currently under construction, dealing only with the self-declared autonomous region of Somaliland. The central

government of Somalia has shown concerns over the base in terms of its objectives and legal framework and the UAE has deaf eared the Somali government's calls to stop the deal.

As Telci and Horoz (2018) argue there are five motivations for UAE's military engagement in the Horn of Africa. *First* the UAE's strive to become an influential player in regional politics. *Second*, confronting the security threats in the region. *Third*, securing trade routes for Gulf countries' oil and gas. *Forth*, protecting the interests of its allies. *Lastly* competing with the regional political rivalries like Turkey, Qatar and Iran. They added that these goals will be achieved in coordination with other UAE military bases in Yemen and Eritrea.

On the other hand, the UAE currently faces many challenges from the Somali public and government, its prestige as an ally decreased dramatically after the recent training center crises with president Farmaajo's government. The UAE perceived the Somalia's neutral decision on the matter of Gulf crisis as siding with Qatar. This neutrality decision became 'unprecedented' for UAE and its Saudi ally, thus shifting their support to the regional states and challenging the central government on this stance (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This finally led to the shutdown of UAE military training center in Mogadishu.

The challenges against UAE policy exist not only in Somalia but also in the entire Horn of Africa, UAE-owned DP World contracts were terminated in Djibouti last year, thus, highlighting a potential policy failure or a need for policy revision. In a recent report, the Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea The UAE is also alleged to have violated the UN's two-way army embargo on Eritrea by expanding its military base in Assab, as stated in a recent report of (UNSC, 2018b). It also faces a critical challenge from the regional actors, i.e. Turkey, Qatar, Iran and Ethiopia (Telci and Horoz, 2018). These actors reacted to the UAE expansion in the Horn in different ways, for example, Turkey in 2017 established two military 'bases' in Somalia and Qatar; and is about to launch a third one in Sawakin Island of Sudan which its renovation and construction activities undergoes.

According to a recent policy brief released by SIDRA Institute in Somalia,

the UAE's prestige as an ally to Somalia considerably decreased after the Gulf. Its military interests will not last for long, unless it revises its current policy towards Somalia. Yet, its strong economic ties and humanitarian aid activities may serve as a tool of pressure, but the decline of public support will make its military and/or security engagement in question.

3.4. Turkey's Security Engagement in Somalia

Turkey's modern engagement in Somalia started since 1979, the bilateral relation between the two countries has not been deepened to a good level. Turkish domestic policy and the traditional western-oriented foreign policy have been key factors in Turkey's Africa policy. Since the rise of the ruling Justice and Development Party '*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*' (AKP) in Turkish politics, the focus of the Turkish foreign policy has been changing. East Africa has become one of the most focused regions in AKP's foreign policy, thus, putting forward a major area of cooperation in terms of trade, diplomacy and humanitarian development.

Consequently, the most concrete step towards Somalia relations was materialized by the visit of then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in 2011. The main objective for that visit is considered to contribute in alleviating humanitarian crisis existed in Somalia at the time. Probably, the prime minister wanted to draw world attention to the country, which was hit by a severe drought. This visit marks the turning point in Turkey's engagement in Somalia. Since that visit, Turkey was deepening its relationship with Somalia. Reopening Turkey's Mogadishu embassy in November 2011, hosting Istanbul Somalia Conference in May 2012 and spearheading the OIC's aid projects to Somalia were among the initiatives Turkey has taken towards strengthening its presence in Somalia.

However, security was never absent in any Turkish initiative in Somalia because the country's strategic location, the threat of terror organizations and the piracy were always among the determinant factors of the bilateral relations. Soon after Turkey positioned itself as a key humanitarian actor in Somalia, other security, diplomatic and economic interests come into play (Wasuge, 2016). However, Baird (2016) argues that the focus of Turkish engagement in Somalia

was ‘humanitarian aid, business and trade, and security sector reform’. Attaining a geostrategic advantage is considered also one of Turkey’s interests in Somalia (Yalçın, 2017). It can be argued that Turkey’s security interests in Somalia developed even before the 2011 Erdogan visit.

This can be drawn from the 2010 Military Training Cooperation Agreement between the two countries which came into effect in 2012. Participating in the meetings of the Joint Security Committee, where Somali government and its international partners used to coordinate the security sector reform, was also another evidence that Turkey was committed to involve itself in the security sector (Crisis Group, 2012). Turkey has also financially contributed to AMISOM operations. From 2009 to 2012, Turkey has contributed 2 million dollars to AMISOM (Turkey MFA, 2016).

Regarding the agreements between Turkey and Somalia, Wasuge (2016) states that as of February 2016, the two countries have signed or were in the process of signing at least 15 bilateral agreements. Turkey seems to have intention of investing in the long-term of its economic and security relations with Somalia (Abdulle, 2019). It comes very clear that such engagement necessitates a strong military presence on the ground, particularly in a country where foreign actors are striving to take advantage of its poor governmental institutions and state fracture. Within the light of these circumstances, Turkey has contributed forces to the anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast since 2009, continued with a pledge to contribute in Somalia’s military reestablishment and the training of its personnel, and finally signed different military training and security cooperation agreements with Somalia since 2010. Table 3.1 shows the military and security related agreements signed between Turkey and Somalia since 2010. The signing of these agreements clearly defines how Turkey was in the intention of military/security engagement in Somalia.

Table 3.1: Turkey-Somalia Military/Security Agreements 2009-2019.

Signature Date	Where	Agreement
17 April 2009	Ankara	Technical Cooperation Agreement
22 May 2010	Istanbul	Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Field

		(Framework)
13 April 2012	Ankara	Military Training Cooperation Agreement
25 January 2015	Mogadishu	Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement

Source: Collection from the Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey

In addition to the military, technical and cooperation agreements between the two states, Turkey has shown interest in Somalia security sector. According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a total of 144 Somali Police Forces has been trained in Turkey between 2012 and 2015; 24 police personnel has been trained in Suicide Attacks and Prevention Strategies in 2016; for the Somali National Army, 145 officers and 88 non-commissioned officers have been provided a long term training in 2014; an aid in-kind amounting 2,65 million dollars has been provided for the purpose of purchasing of goods and services to the SNA; and 4 unarmed coast guard boats has been donated to the Somali Navy (Turkey MFA, 2016).

The public's acceptance of Turkey as Somalia's strategic ally; the recently strengthening economic/trade ties; the shared Islamic identity; the successful humanitarian assistance model; the common consensus of the international community to reestablish Somalia's security forces; and the rivalry between the regional powers in Somalia are considered determinant factors in speeding up Turkey's intention to establish its military training facility in Somalia. However, some regional and international countries define the facility as part of Turkey's Neo-Ottoman foreign policy.

Some studies suggest that Turkey's military training center in Somalia should be considered as a military facility, rather than a "base". Regarding the nature of the facility and its declared objectives, Rossiter and Cannon (2018) argue that the facility does not correspond the characteristics of a conventional military base, they state that 'in functional terms, the Turkish military presence is not an overseas base, [...] it is a natural extension of Turkey's deepening

involvement in Somalia's development'. On the hand, Turkish officials always stress to define the facility as a training camp, not a "base".

The construction activities of the Turkish Military training facility or "base", whatever, were started in 2015 and inaugurated on September 2017. Speaking at the inauguration ceremony, then Turkish Chief of Staff and the current Defence Minister Hulusi Akar stated that the facility's main objective is training the Somali forces, "this facility will increase Turkish efforts in ensuring regional and international peace and security" he added. Moreover, Somalia Prime Minister also highlighted at the inauguration that this base is a part of Somalia's wider plan to reestablish its army. The "base" is expected to train approximately 10,000 Somali forces, with a capacity of training 1,000 soldiers at a time. The training will be carried out by 200-300 Turkish soldiers (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018). It is estimated that the construction of the facility costed around 50 million dollars. Somalis with dual citizenships are not accepted in the training center unless they show legally approved documents showing their renounce of the second citizenship (TURKSOM Training Center, 2018). This may indicate the commitment of Turkey to focus on the training output so that Somalia receives qualified military personnel.

Currently, the Somali people and government show a wide support and strong satisfaction with the Turkey's security policy in Somalia. Yet, a potential misunderstanding may arise at any time as Somali government is not strongly institutionalized, with most of the current bureaucrats have citizenships of foreign countries⁴ of which interests might go against the Turkey's, though (Cannon, 2019) notes that "Turkey has become one of the most significant actors in the calculations of Somali politicians". At the beginning, Ankara's intervention has gained a widespread public support, but that should not be "misinterpreted as a sign that everything is proceeding well" (Yukleyen and Zulkarnain, 2015).

Turkey's less coordination with the international community, and the less engagement with regional states may pose a potential challenge in the long run (Yalçın, 2017; Yukleyen and Zulkarnain, 2015). Additionally, Rossiter and

⁴ According to <https://wakiil.org/home> by June 2017, 38% of the House of the People members have foreign citizenship. UK, USA, Kenya and Ethiopia come at the top.

Cannon (2018) stressed on the fear that the Turkey trained army be as ‘Turkey’s proxy force’ and could find itself in conflict with other proxy actors, like the troops trained by other foreign countries. This may critically harm the currently semi-agreed upon national interests of both Turkey and Somalia.

Regarding the base, some regional countries like Ethiopia, UAE and Saudi Arabia feel concerned about the Turkey’s military presence in Somalia. These countries are probably worried about losing their longtime influence on Somalia politics. For instance, Ethiopia doesn’t seem satisfied to see Somalia military forces recover, hence, a strong Somalia army may finally project threat because of the Greater Somalia dreams which may never fade away from Somalis’ mind. Washington also shares this view with Ethiopia (Antonopoulos, Villar, Cottle, and Ahmed, 2017). UAE also describes Turkey’s base as a threat to its interests in Somalia. The rivalry between the two states Turkey and UAE can be deduced from their intentions to maintain military presence though UAE lost public support for its presence.

Apart from the training activities, Turkey is not militarily operational on the ground. However, Al-Shabaab and other terror groups in Somalia currently pose a challenge to Turkey’s military engagement in Somalia. The groups certainly assure ‘they don’t accept foreign presence in Somalia (Yalçın, 2017), and any facility, base and/or training center is a potential target for them. Al-Shabaab’s attack on Turkish embassy in Somalia on July 2013 (Yalçın, 2017), the discourses that Turkish Airlines and Turkish military training facility was the intended target for the 2016 Daallo Airlines Attack at Aden Abdulle International Airport (Mohamed, 2016; Vogt, 2016) and the deadly 14 October 2017 Mogadishu attack (Maruf, 2017) respectively affirms the existence of such kind of challenges. Thus, Turkey needs to develop strategies to deal with this challenge coming from terror organizations. Though it seems illogical, dealing with the group, like some international aid agencies do, can be a one alternative for the Turks to overcome the challenge.

3.5. Turkey’s Security Interests in Somalia

Turkey’s main interests in Somalia don’t seem, for now at least, to be military

or security centered. Abdulle (2019) concludes that Turkish security interests are part of a wider development aid plan including, “public service support, peace-building support etc.” The need of Turkey to strengthen its geostrategic position in the world reiterated its military engagement with the Horn of Africa. One of the main interests for Turkey is investing in Somalia’s political scene, thus, guaranteeing a strong influence in the politics at a high level. The fragile political state of Somalia and the interconnected western and Ethiopian influence on Somalia politics may hint that Turks can have the same level of influence.

The interests of Turkey in Somalia can be defined as sophisticated and multifaceted. Economic and security interests come at the top. Abdulle (2019) hints that Somalia’s non-processed natural resources can be one of the reasons Turkey has engaged in the country, though Turkish officials always stress their involvement is humanitarian. Somalia’s location on the edges of the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the world trade routes brought a strategic prominence for the country. From 2007, Turkey defined itself as an Afro-Eurasian country, thus, it strives to get the ability of protecting its trade ships and other economic interests in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. However, countering any potential threat will be a ‘possible objective’ for the Turkish facility in the future. Yet, by now it’s not clear if the military agreements with Somalia contains such issues but the weakness of the current Somali government may compel the Turks in the forthcoming periods to act solely against any entrenched threat.

Turkey’s defense industry has been recently growing, it has reached an export capacity of 1.65 billion dollars in 2016 (Presidency of Defence Industries, 2018). “Development of defense industry exports and creating new international cooperation fields to increase its competitiveness in international markets” is one of the strategic goals of Turkish defense industry (Presidency of Defence Industries, 2017). In line with Turkey’s 2023 Vision, the country endeavors to open new markets in Africa and Asia for its defense industry products. Of course, at the top of these markets comes Somalia. Rossiter and Cannon (2018) project that *SNA* “will be equipped with arms produced in Turkish factories” but the country now suffers 25-year old arms embargo, though the Security Council maintains occasionally a partial embargo lifting in one-year periods. In the future, if this embargo lifted, such as the

Eritrean case, Somalia will be a cash cow market for Turkey defense industry.

Concludingly, Turkey's security interests in Somalia can be limited to *four* points: Counter-Pirates, face competitive regional powers, protect Turkish economic interests in the region, and selling defense industry's products. It's worth noting that these goals can only be achieved with the integration of the work of Turkish training base in Somalia and the recently proposed base in Sawakin Island of Sudan. If Turkey achieves successfully these four goals at the end, it will become presented a significant effective policy in the Horn of Africa. A lot of supporting factors exist also on the ground, it depends how Turkey deals with the Somali governments and high-level bureaucrats. Achieving these goals, Turkey will be recognized as a model for other interested countries to engage with Somalia.

3.6. Somalia's Security Interests with Turkey

Since 2011, Somalia is in a very strong relations with Turkey, this relation lays the foundation for Turkey's success in its Africa policy. Some of this relation's short-term advantages has been seen recently and lots of returns are expected in the long run. The political stalemate, and the security instability caused by Al-Shabaab and other criminal networks are the main security challenges in the country. Somalia strives to deal with these challenges, though its security entities are weak to get into action alone. The support of the international community is a prerequisite for overcoming these challenges and paving the way for stable Somalia. Williams (2019) noted that interrelated political, contextual and operational challenges have caused the failure of Somali government to rebuild effective national forces. He concluded that interest asymmetry between international actors, insufficient focus on institutions, uncoordinated patterns, legacies of state collapse, clan politics, reforming while fighting, problems in military integration, and capability gaps are actual reasons that caused the failure to rebuild SNA.

The current [political] situation cannot be improved unless the security situation substantially stabilizes (Ozkan and Orakci, 2015). The Somalia Security Pact which is approved on May 2017 by the Somali government and endorsed by its international partners clearly defines the security priorities of the current

government. At the top of these priorities comes political stabilization and reconfiguration of the armed forces. The Somali army are required to prepare itself for immediate takeover of the security when AMISOM Transition Plan come effective in 2021. The planned drawdown of AMSISOM pushes the Somali government to speed up rebuilding its forces. Thus, Turkey can be seen an alternative to the current international actors in the security sector. However, Turkey will surely not mandate any of its forces to operate on the ground but its commitment to train and contribute to the SNA rebuilding process is useful for the Somalia's security priorities.

In this context, Somalia will surely benefit from the security experience and the military strength of a NATO-member and EU-full membership candidate Turkey, a country that contributed forces to more international missions, starting from the Korean War, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq and nowadays Syria (Sazak and Özkan, 2016). It also contributed forces to *five* out of six UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa (Bayram, 2014). If properly coordinated, this will obviously open new horizons for Somalia's security sector. In 1970's, Somalia's military was trained and equipped by the former Soviet Union. David (1979) stated that, by 1975, Somalia owned 52 Combat aircraft, 250 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers and 23,000 trained military personnel. With the expertise and weapons of the Soviets, Somalia became one of the strongest armies in overall Africa. The same case may be expected if Somalis utilize the Turkish engagement properly in a way that serves the strategic interests of both states. Rossiter and Cannon (2018) argue that Ankara's direct goal in training the SNA is to create a cohesive force strong enough to handle security duties in the country within and beyond the capital Mogadishu.

To defeat Al-Shabaab, Somalia requires very tough strategies and, of course, trained and equipped army. Given that AMISOM is currently unlikely to engage in aggressive operations against the group (CIA, 2019), the overall responsibility of defeating the group lays on the shoulders of the Somali army. Surely, the limited resources of the Somali government will make tough trade-offs necessary (Keating and Abshir, 2018). Currently, the Somali army is not supplied with the required weapons to defeat terror groups and other criminal

networks. The UN arms embargo on Somalia is another challenge facing the army. The embargo decreases the chances of Somalia army to own weapons, thus, cripples any potential effective offensive operation to uproot the group. Thus, Somalia needs to lobby for embargo lifting at the international platforms. In this matter, with its strong presence in the international diplomacy, Turkey may contribute to the process. Though, Somalia's weak management of its security entities is still a point of concern for international partners.

Turkey may probably become an alternative actor for the Gulf states and Ethiopian manipulation in the Somalia politics. Williams (2018) indicates that "Ethiopia has been the most important external actor in Somali affairs in the twenty-first century, having a bigger strategic impact on local politics than any other actor". It's widely clear the western partners including USA and EU members established their semi-failed Somalia strategies based on Ethiopia's point of view. The Gulf states also maintained a strong presence in the humanitarian and economic sectors for the last two decades and a little political influence recently. The neighboring countries and, perhaps, the Gulf states desire to maintain the political and security status quo in Somalia. This desire surely obliges Somalia to look for other partner and actors which have no interests in sustaining the current situation. Improving the relations with Turkey to the highest possible level will enable Somalia to find new powerful actor, which can play more positive role in the political arena. If Turkey has the will to be the alternative of the neighboring countries and the Gulf states; it has all the supporting factors to engage much faster and effective.

In short, Somalia's security interests in dealing with Turkey come in *five* Points. *First*, training the national army, *second*, finding weapons supplier for its army, *third*, compromise with an alternative actor to support its political, economic and security ambitions, *fourth*, finding an ally to lobby for lifting the arms embargo, and *fifth*, utilization of Turkish counter-terrorism model. From its cautious engagement in the security sector, it seems that Turkey is au fait with the Somali interests, though some of these interests may not be fully accomplished, for now at least, due to interconnected international and local constraints. The expectations of the Somali government from Turkey implies the nature the

strategic cooperation between the two states. Turkey, unlike the traditional actors such as the USA, UK and other EU members, always sees its relationship with Somalia as a strategic partnership, not a donor-patronage relation. The accomplishment of these interests will depend on how Somalia show its seriousness in fighting the terror groups and sustain meeting the expectations of its allies. (Gürpınar, 2013).

3.7. Comparison of the Security Trends in Turkey and Somalia

Turkey and Somalia share some issues trending in their security sectors, terrorism for example. Both states face threats from transnational terrorism and violent extremism. Yet, there is a significant difference in the level of the threat and the power of the state to confront. Turkey has the required military power and the economic support to deal with such challenges. In the case of Somalia, the issue takes a different path, as the state is not currently able to confront the terror threat. Consequently, it seeks an international support from its allies including the UN, EU, USA, AU and the Arab League.

Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes the major trends in Turkey's national security arena to include asymmetric threats such as terrorism, organized crimes, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and cyber war risks. As a result, Turkey 'takes these trends as serious and mobilizes its resources and potentials efficiently to counter these challenges in its near region and in wider geography'. Furthermore, it employs comprehensive approach, which combines military, economic, social and political policies, to counter these threats. Its diplomatic ties enabled to sign counter terrorism cooperation agreements with over 70 countries around the world (Turkey MFA, 2019a).

The Middle East is a double-edged sword for Turkey. It both poses threats and offers opportunities for Turkey's national security (Martin, 2000). Turkish security dimensions and perspective were dictated by two main elements: geography and the longstanding ties with the neighboring countries. Currently it faces security threats from terror organizations in the neighbors. These threat organizations include Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), Islamic State in Iraq and

Sham (ISIS) and others. Most of these organizations are sorted in the terror lists of the USA, UK and some of EU member countries. Furthermore, the instabilities in its neighboring compelled Turkey to initiate periodic military operations in Iraq and Syria. The main justification for such operations is defending its national security. Martin (2000) contends that 'traditional concept of national security emphasizes military security and focuses on the military capabilities of a state to deter or defend against threats'. For the last decade, Turkey seemed applying this traditional national security concept.

The existing literature on the security threats of both states demonstrate that there are some common shared attributes of the main threat organizations. Al-Shabaab and PKK are both alleged to receive its finances from external actors, human smuggling, and from illegal money generating activities i.e. drug trafficking.

According to (Martin, 2000) national security is defined as 'a state's ability to defend itself from enemies who, by external attack and/or internal subversion, would threaten the integrity of its borders or its very existence'. Within the scope of this definition, threats emanating from terror organizations in and around both states can be marked as a national security threat. Turkey, unlike Somalia, does not suffer military weakness, it has the necessary manpower, weapons and defense tools to combat such threats. In the contrary, Somalia security entities are almost outsourced to AMISOM and other international army groups such as the AFRICOM. It's believed that Such outsourcing will maintain the status quo unless the SNA take the responsibility by itself.

3.8. Turkey's Security Engagements in Africa

Turkey has been orienting its national security through realism mentality during the Cold War. According to Gürpınar (2013), national security has started to play a role in Turkish foreign policy discourses very late. She stated that between 1985-1991 only 19% of the Turkish National Security Council (NSC)'s press releases have been involved in foreign policy issues. The weight of foreign policy issues in the NSC's press releases has tremendously increased to reach to 60% and 88% in the periods between 1991-2003 and 2003-2011 respectively. In

Turkey, national security has transformed from a narrow closed concept which is only used by the military and the NSC in 1980s to a broad one which plays significant role in the foreign policy and used by political ruling parties in 1990s and 2000s (Gürpınar, 2016).

In line with the transformation of the national security concept, Turkey has become troops and personnel contributor for numerous UN and NATO peacekeeping missions. Sazak and Özkan (2016), state that Turkey instituted a legitimacy of a rising actor which is committed to the facilitation of peace and stability in the world. Additionally, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that Turkey “attaches a particular importance to ensuring peace and stability in Africa” (Turkey MFA, 2019). Furthermore, Turkey started to name itself as an Afro-Eurasian country which its security is interdependent on the security development of the three continents. Moreover, Turkey has adopted to use its armed forces as ‘a soft power tool’ which serves the goals of the foreign policy (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018). However, the accumulation of these facts has paved the way for Turkey to involve in peacekeeping operations in Africa starting from UNOSOM in 1992-1994.

Table 3.2: Turkey’s Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

#	Country (Mission)	Number of Personnel
1	Sudan/Darfur (UNAMIS)	40 Police
2	Liberia (UNMIL)	27 Police
3	South Sudan (UNMIS)	18 Police
4	Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	12 Police

5	DRC (MONUSCO)	7 Police
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Source: United Nations Database

Turkey is currently involved – militarily or financially, in seven of the existing nine peacekeeping missions in Africa. It is providing a total of 104 personnel to five of the peacekeeping missions in the continent and contributing financially to the other missions. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of Turkish personnel in peacekeeping missions in Africa. It’s worth noting that Turkey also provides training to the military personnel of some African countries. By the end of 2014, 2202 African trainees have been received in Turkey, and an additional 570 were also provided training in Turkey in 2015 (Turkey MFA, 2019). Sazak and Özkan (2016) reported that, for the last two decades, personnel from Libya, South Sudan, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Sudan has been trained in Turkey.

The personnel contributions seems mostly symbolic and the realistic justification for it in the arena of Turkish foreign policy is questionable. Search of regional power, creating the image of the international peacekeeper state or taking a its pie from the international actors’ competition for Africa can justify such contributions. Turkey demonstrated to have moved from basic peacekeeping operations to ‘a holistic, Security Sector Reforms (SSR)-oriented peace assistance to conflict-affected countries (Sazak and Özkan, 2016).

4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

Since the establishment of the republic, Turkey's foreign relations was labelled as reactive, conservatism, isolationism, protectionism, passive, balance of power and caution (Dahir, 2018). The Cold War and bipolar global system have been trundling Turkish foreign policy towards Africa. During 1960's and 1970's Africa has come into Turkish foreign policy's agenda because of the Cyprus issue and the Turkish need to lobby in international platforms. However, the accumulation of Turkish interior political and economic conditions and the international conjuncture could not make possible a better relation between Turkey and Africa. The transformation of Turkish foreign policy during 1990s and 2000s have enabled it to strengthen its engagement and opening up to new regions including Africa.

Based on the main sections of this thesis, this chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis and presents the conclusion of the study. The first section of the chapter discusses briefly Turkish foreign policy in Somalia, its determining factors and the role of aid in Turkey's Somalia policy. This section outlines in general the composition of Turkish foreign policy in Somalia and the transformations it undergone since 2000s. The second section analyzes the nature and the characteristics that the relation between Turkey and Somalia will have in future based on the economic and security contexts. The final section will conclude the main findings of the study and answers the research questions of the thesis.

4.2. Turkish Foreign Policy in Somalia

As stated in chapter one, Somalia's relations with Turkey dates back to the era of the Ottoman empire. The three periods that Özkan (2012) stated in Turkey-Africa relations also apply to Turkey-Somalia relations. Ozkan stated that Turkey's relations with Africa have passed through three period. *First*, the period of the Ottoman empire. *Second*, The period between 1923 and 1998. The *Third* period starts from 1998 to present. Between 15th and 19th century, the Ottoman empire has shown presence in Somalia, strategically in security and economics dimensions, because of the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the country. Thus, paving the way for the Ottomans to incorporate the strategic port cities of Zeila and Berbera (Lewis,

2002).

The pursuit of the western oriented policy has changed the priorities of Turkish foreign policy after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, the partition of Somalia by European colonial powers has also contributed to the discontinuity of this relation. Apparently, there was nothing that both states could have offered each other. The Cyprus problem and, later on, the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the transformation of Turkish foreign policy for the last three decades have caused Turkey to open up to Somalia and Africa in general. Apart from little humanitarian aid amounts provided through intergovernmental and international organizations (Erol and Altın, 2012), Turkey maintained a distance politics from Somalia. Furthermore, Somalia's alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War has also been an obstructing factor in Turkey-Somalia relations. Turkey has also contributed 320 forces to the UN-led UNOSOM mission in 1992-1994.

With the acceptance of Africa Action Plan in 1998, Turkey's intensions to engage with Africa has been increasing tremendously, especially in terms of economic cooperation and humanitarian aid. The rise of AK Party on Turkey's political scene on 2002, the growth of Turkish economy and the pursue of Neo-Ottomanism policy has speeded up Turkey's intension to engage in Somalia. Since the collapse of Somalia government, the first time Turkey and Somalia hold bilateral official talks was in 2007 when Somalia president Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed met Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the sidelines of the AU meeting in Addis Ababa (Siradag, 2017). The Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepts that its relations with Africa has moved from opening up policy to a full partnership. The ministry refers its current relations with Africa to have moved to a fourth period in which 'institutionalization of relations' will be focused (Turkey MFA, 2019). Turkey's engagement in Somalia have been motivated by economic, political and security interests (Abdulle, 2019; Siradag, 2017; Wasuge, 2016; Yukleyen and Zulkarnain, 2015). Aid have played an important role in Turkey's Somalia policy. The next subsection will highlight this issue.

4.2.1. The Role of Aid in Turkey's Somalia Policy

Internationally, different actors are involved in providing aid to different beneficiary states. At the top of these actors include international organizations, non-

governmental organizations and states. The emergency of humanitarian aid dates back to ancient history of the world and is motivated by religious teachings and the formation of the codes of wars (Dahir, 2018). With the evolution of the bipolar system in the world, each polar has set out to use aid as an effective tool to maintain influence on other countries. Within, during and post-Cold War period, humanitarian aid has been used as a foreign policy tool and a soft power mechanism to respond to a crisis or to influence ‘weak and poor states.’

Regarding Turkey, it is been since the last two decades that Turkey was endeavoring to use foreign aid in its foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu (2013), humanitarian diplomacy has recently been one of the most significant exploratory principles of Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, Davutoğlu argued that Turkish humanitarian diplomacy has three dimensions: citizens of the Turkish Republic, country’s human-oriented attitude in crisis zones and an inclusive humanitarian perspective at the global level. Additionally, NGOs, universities, think tanks, the public and business sectors have actively taken part in developing and shaping Turkish foreign policy (Siradag, 2017). Based on that, aid has been one of the strongest elements in Turkey’s Africa policy and it has been part of a wider soft power strategy (Ozkan, 2010).




Figure 4.1 Turkey’s Aid to Somalia (2007-2017)

In 2011, Turkey’s prime minister has landed in Mogadishu in an official visit to acknowledge for a significant aid campaign to rescue Somalia which was hit by a severe famine. Following this visit, Somalia experienced Turkey’s largest ever humanitarian aid campaign overseas and has been with flooded millions of dollars in aid. Dahir (2018) noted that for the next two years starting from 2011, Turkey has

focused on providing humanitarian aid before it finally shifted to development aid. In 2013, Turkey’s aid to Somalia has surpassed the overall aid provided by Turkey to the Sub-Saharan African countries (Turkey MFA, 2016). Furthermore, in a 2016 report, Turkish Ministry of foreign Affairs stated that between 2011 and 2015, Turkey provided 370 million dollars in humanitarian and development aid to Somalia. This number has reached 1 billion dollars in 2017 (Dahir, 2018). According to TIKA’s Annual Development Assistance Reports, Turkey provided 805 million dollars to Somalia through TIKA and other Turkish NGOs in the period 2011 to 2017.

Turkey realized that only humanitarian and emergency relief will not rescue the country in the long term (Dahir, 2018). Thus begun to provide development aid which is aimed to contribute to the education, health, transportation, agriculture, infrastructure, government institutions and direct budget support (Abdulle, 2019; Dahir, 2018; Wasuge, 2016). The development aid provided to Somalia has been through TIKA, IHH, Doctors Worldwide, Turkish Red Crescent, TRT World, Diplomatic Academy of Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish Ministry of Justice and other NGOs (Turkey MFA, 2016). According to TIKA, Turkey’s aid to Somalia is shown in Figure 4.1. To describe more Table 4.1 shows the percentage change in Turkish aid to Somalia. Dahir (2018) has concluded that Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is positive and effective; contributed to the Somalia recovery process; and monumentally impacted on Turkey’s image as an emerging global player. Furthermore, it’s widely accepted among the Somali Studies specialists and academicians that Turkey used its humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia as a model to engage in other African countries.

Table 4.1 Percentage Change in Turkish Aid to Somalia

Year	Aid (Million USD)	Change (%)
2007	3.55	-
2008	7.5	111
2009	5.7	-24
2010	5.8	2
2011	93.3	1509
2012	86.6	-7
2013	115.7	34
2014	74.4	-36
2015	314.8	323

2016	59.6	-81
2017	60.6	2

Source: TIKA

4.3. Future Prospects of Turkey in Somalia

Turkey has shown an extraordinary commitment in its Somalia policy. Starting from its 2011 aid campaign, Turkey’s policy in Somalia is considered one of the most effective engagement in the context of Somalia politics and Turkish foreign policy. The public acceptance it won from its humanitarian and development aid campaign necessitates Turkey to strengthen its presence in the long term. The strategic priorities of the Turkish foreign policy is highly focused on developing its relation- especially economic ties, with African countries. The Turkish Foreign Ministry states that its relations with Africa has moved to its fourth period, the period of strategic cooperation and institutionalization of the relations.

Turkey enjoys the status of the ‘most trusted ally in Somalia’ where almost all classes of the Somali community feel positive about its engagement. This will surely extend the commitment for a strong partnership between the two states. As Abdulle (2019) noted Turkey seems to have intention of investing in the long-term of its economic relations with Somalia. Somalia represents Turkey’s best engagement model in Africa, because of its multidimensional involvement in state building, economy, politics as well as security perspectives. Moreover, any decrease in the pace of these engagements will not serve Turkey’s long-term interests in Somalia and will surely nullify its decade long efforts in the country. Thus, maintaining at least the current pace for this relation becomes a responsibility created by the current strategic relation.

Economically, Turkey’s products have wide acceptance among the Somali customers. Obsiye (2019) argues that Somali business community lean to Turkey as an export destination instead of the traditional exporters. “Where once Somalis only focused on importing from China and Middle Eastern countries, today the focus is on buying Turkish for quality and design... Turkish companies are starting to become household names with Somali consumers everywhere.” he noted. Thus, the growing economic relation should be kept growing to a higher level of bilateral dependency, and Turkey must increase its imports from Somalia by contributing in the creation of

opportunities for Somalia's economic growth to achieve that.

In the security dimension, Turkey's is internally considered a 'strategic ally' which is committed to offer its expertise to Somalia security sector. Despite the security challenges Turkey faces in the country, but its continuing efforts to reestablish Somalia security institutions are becoming indispensable for a quick recovery of Somalia. (Dahir, 2019) states that Somalia-Turkey ties will triumph despite the security challenges in the country. "Turkey's efforts in Somalia have forged a bond that cannot be derailed by terror attacks... Somalia and Turkey have been partners united by values and strategic interests, the alliance between both states are now forged in blood, steel and hope" he noted.

Finally, Turkey will continue to be involved in Somalia for, at least, the next two decades. The growing economic relations, the security partnership, and the expectations from the fruits of the last decade's efforts will necessitate moving the current cooperative relationship to a new level of a strategic partnership. Turkey's rational, economic-focused foreign policy towards Africa will, and should, never overlook the geopolitically strategic location of Somalia which comes complimentary or a basis for its interests in the other African countries. On the other hand, Somalia has lots of expectations and responsibilities towards Turkey but the dynamic political and security developments in the country requires very cautious planning of the kind of partnership required to move to the strategic cooperation level.

4.4. Conclusion

This study was intended to discuss and analyze the security and economic perspectives of Turkey-Somalia relations. This relation has revived upon the 2011 Turkish aid campaign to Somalia. The study has thoroughly analyzed Turkey's engagement in Somalia and focused on determining the bilateral economic and security interests of the both Somalia and Turkey. In the study, it has also been discussed the challenges facing this relation. Accordingly, the study's main findings are discussed in this section.

Based on the nature and the organization of the thesis, it has been explained the

timeline of political and economic history of Somalia in the first chapter. The second chapter has discussed Turkey's economic engagements in Somalia, its timelines, its main investment, the challenges ahead, the supporting factors and main institutions that contribute to this engagement. The third chapter has also discussed the security engagement of Turkey in Somalia and the inter-state security interests, the security challenges that Turkey is facing in Somalia and the nature this engagement will have in the future. Additionally, the chapter has discussed Somalia's security situation and the major security actors in Somalia to provide a thorough understanding of the Turkish engagements. Thus, the main findings of this study have been concluded from the observations and the discussions made in the first and the second chapters.

The study has concluded that Turkey has contributed to the economic and security recovery of Somalia but obtained some economic and political benefits from its Somalia engagement as well. Among the political benefits is that Turkey has acquired prestige and the image of the effective donor which is can counted upon. Somalia presented a pilot and adventurous project for Turkey's foreign policy. The success Turkey attained in its Somalia policy has paved the way for further engagements in Africa, especially in economics and security terms. The study also concluded that Somalia in turn has economically and politically benefited from Turkey's engagements. Receiving the world's attention, tying up with other actors which are endeavoring to get in relations with Somalia, and finally hatching out from the narrow system of the neighboring countries and the west to a wide integration with Islamic and Eastern economies.

The main objective of the study was to determine Turkey's economic and security interests in Somalia. the study has concluded that Turkey has three main economic interests in Somalia. 1) expanding the export markets for Turkish goods and services, 2) orienting itself as a regional economic power, and 3) future utilization of Somalia's untapped natural resources. In return, Somalia's economic interests in its relation with Turkey are also determined as: 1) attracting Turkish investments, 2) cover the goods/services shortage in the country, 3) receive know-how to grow and industrialize its economy, and 4) get a market to export Somali products. The study's other main findings is that Turkey's economics investments in Somalia is directly correlated with to the aid provided. In comparing the aid provided

and the exports value of Turkey in Somalia, it's found that exports increased as the aid increased and decreased as aid did. Presumably, this is due to the fact that Turkey's development aid projects are awarded to Turkish private contractors. Thus, some of the aid dollars go back to Turkey as an economic gain.

Additionally, the study discussed the security relation between Turkey and Somalia. It's urged in the study that Turkey's security interests in Somalia developed even before the 2011 Erdogan visit. The main conclusions in this regard state that Turkey has four main interests in its security engagements in Somalia, 1) To counter pirates off the Somalia coasts, 2) face competitive regional powers, 3) establishing a forward operating base in the Horn of Africa regions, and 4) finding a client state for its defense industry's products. On the other hand, it's determined that Somalia is motivated by five main security interests in its relation with Turkey. These interests are 1) reestablishing the national army, 2) finding weapons supplier for its army, 3) compromise with an alternative actor to support its political, economic and security ambitions, 4) finding an ally which can lobby for lifting the arms embargo in the international platforms and, 5) utilization of Turkish counter-terrorism model.

In addition to the above-mentioned interstate economic and security interests, Turkey represents its way to become Somalia's indispensable ally which contributes, or is willing to contribute, to the country's overall short- and long-term economic and security ambitions. The current relation between the two states is seen strengthening on the basis of strategic foundations because of Somalia's geopolitically strategic location, the transformations that Turkish foreign policy has made in the last decade and the emerging role Somalia is ought to play in the politics of the Horn of Africa region for the next periods. It is no doubt that Turkey-Somalia relation is facing some challenges from regional and/or international actors but the foundations this relation has been built on implies the strategic depth it will have in the future.



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BIOGRAPHY

Abdulkarim Yusuf Abdulle was born in Beledweyne, Somalia in 1989. He studied his bachelor's degree in Business Administration at Beledweyn University, Somalia and graduated with honors degree being the first in 2013 class.

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APPANDICES

Appendix A: Somalia Political Map



Source: UN Geospatial Information Section

<https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf>

Appendix B: Publications within the Scope of This Thesis

Abdulle A.Y., Gurpinar B., (2019), “Turkey’s Engagement in Somalia: A Security Perspective”, *Somalia Studies*, vol. 4.

Abdulle A.Y., Gurpinar B., (2019), “The Future of Al-Shabaab: Opportunities and Challenges”, *International Congress on Afro - Eurasian Research V*, Nicosia, Cyprus.

