



T.R.

ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND
TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE
MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE
ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS**

(MASTER DEGREE THESIS)

Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI

BURSA – 2018



T.R.

ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND
TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE
MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE
ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS**

(MASTER DEGREE THESIS)

Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI

Supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI

BURSA – 2018

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

T.C

Uludağ University Social Sciences Directorate

Major of International Relations..... Department: International Relations Student's number: 701416020 Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI who had prepared the topic of "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS" had defended his master's degree thesis on the date of: 19./06./ 2018, Around Date/ Time ...16:00..... According to the questions and answers that candidate was questioned had approved it yes / **no** and the chamber's of the consensus votes and Chairs had awarded him with the degree "Master of Art."

.....

Members (Dissertation and Research Chair Commissioner)

.....
Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI (supervisor)

Uludağ University

.....
Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ

Uludağ University

.....
Dr. Lecturer İsmail SARI

Bursa Technical University

19./06./ 2018



**ULUDAG UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE
THESIS/DISSERTATION PLAGIARISM SOFTWARE REPORT**

**ULUDAG UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Date:08/06/2018

Thesis Title / Topic: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East: The Case Study of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis

According to the originality report obtained by applying the filtering options (Turnitin)* stated below on 29/05/2018 for the total of 197 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 15 %.

Filtering options applied:

1. Bibliography excluded
2. Quotes excluded
3. Match size up to 5 words excluded

I declare that I have carefully read Uludag University Social Science Institute Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Name Surname: Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI

Student No: 701416020

Department: International Relations

Program: International Relations

Status: Masters Ph.D.

08/06/2018

Prof. Dr. Tayyar Ari

08/06/2018



SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS İNTİHAL YAZILIM RAPORU

ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 07/06/2018

Tez Başlığı: Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik Türk ve Endonezya Dış Politikası'nın Karşılaştırmalı bir Analizi: Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi Örnekleri

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 197 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 07/06/2018 tarihinde şahsım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan özgünlük raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı %15 'dur.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- Kaynakça hariç
- 2- Alıntılar hariç/dahil
- 3- 5 Kelimede daha az örtüşme içeren metin Kısımları hariç

Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Özgünlük Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

07/06/2018

Adı Soyadı: Noor Fahmi PRAMUJİ

Öğrenci No: 701416020

Anabilim Dalı: Uluslar arası İlişkiler

Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans

Statüsü: Y.Lisans Doktora

Prof. Dr. Tayyar Arı

Danışman


07/06/2018

LETTER OF OATH

I declared that my master thesis on the topic of: “A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS” has consisted of the scientific method of research; I followed the writing and ethics rules. Likewise, all the sources that were given are ultimately relevant to the thesis’ rules, therefore: I swear an oath with my dignity that I did not plagiarize paragraph on my thesis.

Date and signature

08/06/2018



Name/ Surname : **Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI**
Student’s Number : **701416020**
Department : **International Relations**
Major : **International Relations**
Status (Master degree) : **Master degree**

ABSTRACT

Name and Surname : Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI
University : Uludağ University
Institution : Institute of Social Sciences
Field : International Relations
Branch : International Relations
Degree Awarded : Master Thesis
Page Number : xxi + 229
Degree Date : /.... /2018
Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE STUDY OF PALESTINE ISSUE AND SYRIA CRISIS

This study aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis in particular. It also reviews both countries' foreign policy toward the Middle East since their declaration of becoming Republic states in general. As foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism is applied. It then discusses changing dynamics and analyses influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia policies of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international and regional systemic changing trends and pressures as well as state powers have become influential factors.

In case of Palestine issue, during 2004-2016, Turkish domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely *first* public opinion and civil society's roles influence the foreign policy. Before the AKP party came to power, a determinant actor of Turkey's foreign policy was the military. However, the military role then decline. Instead, the role of non actor states including civil society and non-government organizations have increased. Domestic public opinion has been marked by a re-emergence of common historical and cultural senses under Ottoman heritages. This factor then results in a re-active engagement of Turkey to the Middle East. *Second*, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy. The mechanism of foreign decision-making then shifted

following a decline of military influence. An active civilian control emerged and domestic political structure rebuilt. It resulted in multi-actor of foreign policy such as NGO, think tanks, etc. They contribute as the new tool of Turkish soft power. *Third*, leader factors. Leaders play roles in attracting international public opinion. Turkish leader's opinion perceives that no permanent peace of region without peace in Palestine. They also put an emphasis to a strategic importance of Muslim world. Therefore Turkey needs to re-engage into the regional issues. *Fourth*, an increase of Islamist factor. Re-involvement of Muslim groups into domestic politics serves a democratic equality for all parties. Turkish NGO with Islamist outlook also rises as a pressure group, thus it impacts on the concern to the Palestine issue. They put a large concern to the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for Muslims especially a concern to who will control that holy city. *Fifth*, a proactive foreign policy. the Israel-Palestine conflict that perceived as the heart of regional instability results in proactive foreign policy into the settlement of Palestine issue. In regional level, the main source of regional conflict is the Palestine-Israel conflict. In sum, Turkey conducts a balancing policy during the AKP administration regarding Palestine issue.

Indonesia sets the aspiration of an active engagement policy in the Middle East. It could be seen such as a presence of special of the Middle East diplomatic mission, Indonesia government recognition and support to Hamas after won the parliament election for Gaza strip, the efforts to be honest broaker in Palestine-Israel conflict, and an official representation in Ramallah. Indonesia also is officially consistent to adopt a non-recognition policy of the state of Israel. Indonesia has undergone several diplomatic efforts in regional and international level to support the recognition of the state of Palestine and proposed on humanitarian approach by providing a continuation of humanitarian aids for Palestinians.

In comparison with Turkey, during 2004-2016, Indonesia has undergone transition era to civil democracy era. It has turn into a democracy process and reach democratic stability in post-transition. In democratic era of Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as a historical basis of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, Indonesian government accomodates Muslim aspiration through the presence of Islamist considerations into the state's foreign policy. An increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion. There a high level of sensitivity upon the issues including the Jerusalem issue in which Al-Aqsa mosque

placed on as one of prominent issues, beyond Palestinian refugee issue and Israel occupation on Palestinian lands for the Indonesian Muslim groups and government. In other words, there interplay between Muslim groups and Indonesian government in regard to deal with Palestine issue. A major of Indonesian Muslims and government officially are united to struggle for Palestinians.

Other Islamist factors are Muslim groups as the moral force. Muslim groups put pressure if the government behave in passive response to the Islamist issues. An example of strong and harsh pressures of all segment Muslim groups over any initiative of opening diplomatic ties with Israel by Indonesian governments, so it is often suspended by eventually cancelled. In addition, an increasingly role of Islamist parties as well as new Indonesia's international orientation and identity have affected a continuity of non-recognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. In the level of international, the wave of democratization policy leads to the emergence of democratised foreign policy. Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts creating an active involvement of non-state actors.

After the Syrian revolution in 2012 escalated, it has turned into a civil war. The emergence of various non-state actors such the ISIS, the PYD-YPG, and other militant or radical groups, as well as direct intervention of regional and international powers sparked the conflict much more escalated. These have posed direct threat to Turkey and challenged Turkey's Middle East policy, notably in Syria. Therefore, Turkey's Syria policy has changed from soft power to hard power approach. Several domestic influential factors shaping Turkish policy *first* a humanitarian dimension of crisis namely the influx of refugees results in an open door policy. Since 2011, Syria conflict has sparked refugee waves to Turkey. As a direct neighboring countries, it had been demanded by international community and domestic humanitarian nature to open the borders and secure the people. *Second*, the security threat in Turkey-Syria's borders. Assad regime's military policy against the Syrian oppositions and the development of the crisis with an engagement various non-state armed groups (the YPG-PYD, ISIS, other moderate and radical groups) that began in 2013 have made the situation more complicated. Due to their activities strived to claim the sovereignty and conducted terror attacks, hence those have posed threats to Turkish national security and territorial integrity. Another risk is the influx of foreign terrorist fighters across the border through Turkey on their way to and from Syria.

Even, probably they reside in Turkey as a third country before returning to home countries. So, it also has to deal with the way to send them back to countries of origin.

In the international level, the most influential factors are *first* the international and regional actors' engagement into the conflict. Since 2015, there has increased the international interventions. Foreign countries and non state actors' involvement have created the strategic pattern of alliance and enmity among global and regional powers as well as non-state actors. *Second*, the rise of ISIS. This terror organization posed the threat to Turkish national security through multiple suicide bombings. *Third*, the emergence of the PYD threat. This group has taken benefits of Syria conflict through controlling the Syrian Kurds, self-proclaiming several cantons and establishing a sphere of influence or terror corridor in northern Syria bordering Turkey.

On the other hand, Indonesian government policy towards the Syria crisis can be explained through the influencing factors as follow. *First*, a commitment to non-alignment with any military bloc as one of basic ideas of the principle of Independent Foreign Policy. In Syria conflict, Indonesia prevents from any engagement of the multilateral and bilateral military pact with Syria and major powers. Instead, it prefers to strengthen ties rely on peaceful coexistence. Given, Indonesia has a critical and substansial roles in the establishment of the NAM, so it positions itself to commit the basic spirit of non-alignment. *Second*, the leader perceptions. Indonesia stance is sided with neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions while it adopts non-interference into Syria's domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia's official stance is neutral. This stance is meant it fighting against any colonialism and violation forms caused by the regime under the world peace and security. Indonesia government not interpret the neutral stance as a neutral politic that means not to care to the crisis but conducts policy in a way of achieving its national interest. *Third*, the protection of Indonesian citizens in Syria as a foreign policy's priority. In order to pursue this goal, Indonesian government is still opening diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. This representatives has main task to protect, defend and secure them until they are repatriated to Indonesia. No matter who rules, it will cooperate in line with its strategic interests still remain there.

Moreover, the influential factors in international level are *first* the ISIS and Indonesian foreign fighters dimension. Indonesia was also targeted by the ISIS through multiple ISIS-linked and inspired terror attacks. Besides, ISIS also is defined as a threat as the possible terror attacks conducted by Indonesia-originated foreign fighters return to home.

The potential threats of the presence of the ISIS' supporters and recruits in Indonesia is revival of local extremist groups' sleep cells that probably conducting terror attacks, promoting inter and intra religious conflict, fulfilling the lack of local militant group's capability, recruiting the new cadres targeting youth cadres. *Second*, Indonesia's role within the framework of the OIC. Despite, Indonesia is the world's majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, in fact, Indonesia has no significant role on Syria crisis. It has only played the limited role due to several factors namely a minor actor in term of regional geopolitics and the lack of experience upon the regional complex politics. It remains to manage limited bilateral ties with Syria government. In sum, it tends to conduct a passive foreign policy on Syria crisis.

In conclusion, Turkey has adopted and preferred to choose humanitarian and political-oriented approach towards Syria crisis. However, after several international developments rised which put risks to its national security, Turkish foreign policy has then shifted to propose a security-oriented approach. It combines soft and hard powers in formulating process of the foreign policy. Meanwhile, Indonesian government also has put forth primarily humanitarian approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Syria while suggesting such political solution stance in order to solve that crisis with optimizing the way of diplomacy. Indonesian leaders stance is to prevent a military approach. When it is evaluated on the basic principle of Indonesian foreign policy namely independent and active principle, Indonesia is independent but not active. In this context, these basic principles determine it not enter a formal alliance, further not interffering and involving into other state's domestic problems. Instead, it should actively encourage bilateral cooperations with other countries. In addition, it demonstrates a status quo of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in a pragmatic way. In this situation, it might recognise that there is a gap between its aspiration and capability to play wider global roles especially in participating to the conflict resolution of the Middle East region.

Indonesia government and Muslim group tend to stand in opposite in case of Syria crisis. Indonesian government tend to position in moderate stance and keep in status quo of non-interference policy upon the domestic problem of Syria. For Indonesian government, there several reasons why Indonesia still continue to open its diplomatic representative and develop bilateral ties in Syria while most countries closed their diplomatic office in Damascus. *First*, historical relations between Syria and Indonesia. Syria was the first countries which recognized Indonesia's independence. *Second*, Indonesia avoids to be

perceived by Syria regime of getting involved into Syria's domestic issue especially Syria's territorial sovereignty. *Third*, respect to Syria as a member of the NAM. In which the NAM adopts non-interfere policy as an agreement amongst member states. While Indonesia considers the NAM was birth and inspired by the Bandung Conference with its "Dasasila Bandung" whose an important principle is to respect other state territorial sovereignty. In other words, Indonesia has been trying to play a normative international role in case of Syria crisis. In sum, Indonesian political power might not be powerful yet in affecting the conflict resolution directly compared to other international and regional actors such as Turkey might be has.

Keywords: *Foreign policy, Indonesia, Turkey, Neoclassical realism, Palestine issue, Syria crisis*

ÖZET

Yazar Adı ve Soyadı	: Noor Fahmi PRAMUJI
Üniversite	: Uludağ Üniversitesi
Enstitü	: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Anabilim Dalı	: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Bilim Dalı	: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tezin Niteliği	: Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Sayfa Sayısı	: xxi + 229
Mezuniyet Tarihi	: .../.../2018
Tez Danışmanı	: Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI

ORTADOĞU'YA YÖNELİK TÜRK VE ENDONEZYA DIŞ POLİTİKASI'NIN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ: FİLİSTİN SORUNU VE SÜRİYE KRİZİ ÖRNEKLERİ

Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye ve Endonezya'nın Filistin Sorunu ve Suriye Krizi'ya yönelik dış politikasını karşılaştırmalı bir analizini amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca cumhuriyet devletleri olma ilan etmelerinden dolayı iki ülkenin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikalarını incelemiştir. Dış politika teorisi olarak neoklasik realizm uygulanmıştır. Daha sonra Filistin Sorunu ve Suriye Krizi'nin Türkiye ve Endonezya politikalarını birim ve sistematik analiz düzeyinde şekillendiren, değişen dinamikleri ve analiz etkenleri tartışılmıştır. Liderlerin uluslararası ve bölgesel sistemik değişen eğilimleri, baskıları ve devlet iktidarı üzerindeki algılarının etkili faktörler haline geldiğini özetlenmiştir.

Filistin meselesinde, Türkiye'de 2004-2016 yılları arasında iç siyaseti, içsel dönüşüme uğramıştır. İlk olarak kamuoyu ve sivil toplumun rolleri dış politikasına etkilenmesidir; AKP partisi iktidara gelmeden önce, Türkiye'nin dış politikasında asker belirleyici aktörü olarak olmuştur. Fakat, daha sonra askerinin rolü azalmıştır. Bunun yerine sivil toplum ve sivil toplum örgütleri de dahil olmak üzere devlet dışı aktörlerinin rolü artmıştır. Osmanlı mirası altındaki ortak tarihsel ve kültürel duyuların yeniden ortaya çıkmasıyla iç kamuoyunu dikkat çekmektedir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yeniden aktif katılımını sonuçlanmaktadır. İkinci olarak sivil liderin yeni dış politika aktörü olarak ortaya çıkmasıdır. Askeri etkinin azalmasından sonra dış karar vermenin

mekanizması değiştirilmiştir. Aktif bir sivil kontrolünü ortaya çıkmış ve iç siyasi yapımı yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla STK, düşünce kuruluşları, vb. gibi dış politikaları ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Türk yumuşak gücünün yeni aracı olarak katkıda bulunmuştur. Üçüncü olarak ise lider faktörleridir. Liderler uluslararası kamuoyunun çekme rolü oynamaktadır. Türk liderinin Filistin'de barışsız bölgenin kalıcı barışı olmadığını algılanmıştır. Onlar da Müslüman dünyasının stratejik önemine vurgulanmıştır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin bölgesel meselelerine yeniden girmesi gerekmektedir. Dördüncüsü, İslamcı faktörün artışıdır. Tüm taraflar için demokratik bir eşitliğe Müslüman grupların iç politikaya yeniden dahil olmasını hizmet etmektedir. İslamcı bakış açısıyla Türk STK'sı da bir baskı grubu olarak yükselmektedir. Dolayısıyla Filistin meselesine de etkilenmektedir. Kudüs'ün statüsü ve doğasının Müslümanlara karşı kutsal bir şehir olarak hassasiyetini, özellikle de kutsal şehri kimin kontrol edeceğine yönelik kaygısını dile getirmektedir. Beşinci olarak, proaktif bir dış politikasıdır. Bölgesel düzeyde, bölgesel çatışmaların ana kaynağı Filistin-İsrail çatışmasıdır. Bölgesel istikrarsızlığın kalbi olarak algılanan İsrail-Filistin çatışması, Filistin sorununun çözümü için proaktif bir dış politikasını sonuçlanmıştır. Özetle, Türkiye'nin AKP yönetimi sırasında Filistin meselesiyle ilgili bir dengeleme politikası yürütülmüştür.

Endonezya'nın Ortadoğu'da aktif bir katılım politikası arzusunu belirlenmiştir. Bunlar da, Orta Doğu diplomatik misyonunun özel bir varlığı, Endonezya hükümetinin Gazze şeridindeki parlamento seçimlerini kazandıktan sonra Hamas'a tanınması ve desteklenmesi, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasında dürüst bir aracı olma çabaları ve Ramallah'da resmi bir temsilcidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya İsrail devletinin tanınmayan bir politikasını resmi olarak tutarlı ile benimsemektedir. Endonezya'nın Filistin devletinin tanınmasını desteklemek ve Filistinlilere insancıl yaklaşımların sürdürülmesini sağlayarak insani yaklaşımı önermek için bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde çok sayıda diplomatik çabalarını sarf etmiştir.

Türkiye ile karşılaştırıldığında, Endonezya'da 2004-2016 yılları arasında, sivil demokrasi dönemine geçiş dönemi geçirilmiştir. Geçiş dönemi sonrasında demokrasi sürecine dönüşmüş ve demokratik istikrara ulaşılmıştır. Endonezya'nın demokratik döneminde, Endonezya'nın angajmanı tarihsel temeli olarak 1945 Anayasasının anti-sömürgecilik ruhunu devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin dış politikasında İslamcı faktör varlığının sayesinde Endonezya hükümeti Müslümanların isteklerini karşılamaktadır. İç siyasette İslamcı faktörün artması, iç kamuoyunda İslamcı odaklı hedeflenmiştir. Filistinli

mülteci meselesinin ve Filistin toprakları üzerinde İsrail işgalinin ötesinde, Endonezya Müslüman grupları ve hükümeti için El-Aksa camisinin yer aldığı Kudüs meselesi de dahil olmak üzere ön plana çıktığı önemli konular arasında yüksek düzeyde hassasiyet vardır. Başka bir deyişle, Filistin meselesiyle ilgili olarak Müslüman gruplar ve Endonezya hükümeti arasında karşılıklı etkileşim vardır. Endonezyalı Müslümanların büyük bir kısmı ve hükümetin resmen Filistinliler için mücadele etmeyi birleşmişlerdir.

Diğer İslamcı faktörlerin ahlaki gücü, Müslüman gruplarıdır. İslamcı meselelere pasif bir şekilde tepki gösterdiğinde Müslüman gruplar hükümete baskı yapmışlardır. Endonezya hükümetleri tarafından İsrail ile diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasına ilişkin herhangi bir girişimde, tüm müslüman gruplarının güçlü ve sert baskılarından dolayı çoğu zaman iptal edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, yeni Endonezya'nın uluslararası yönelimi ve kimliğinin yanı sıra İslamcı partilerin giderek artan bir rolü, İsrail'e karşı tanınmayan bir politikasının sürekliliğini etkilemiştir ve Filistin'i iki devletli çözümlere uygun olarak desteklemiştir. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, demokratikleşme politikasının dalgası demokratikleşmiş dış politikanın ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Endonezya'nın demokratik dış politikası, devlet dışı aktörlerin aktif katılımını sağlayan çeşitli diplomatik çabalarla gerçekleştirilmiştir.

2012 yılında Süriye devrimi arttıktan sonra bir iç savaşa dönüşmüştür. İlk olarak, IŞİD, PYD-YPG ve diğer militan veya radikal gruplar gibi çeşitli devlet dışı aktörlerin ortaya çıkması ve aynı zamanda bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin doğrudan müdahalesi, çatışmayı daha da tırmandırmıştır. Bunlar Türkiye'ye doğrudan tehdit oluşturup özellikle Süriye'deki Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu politikasına meydan okumuştur. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Süriye politikası yumuşak güçten sert güç yaklaşımına dönüş olmuştur. Türk siyasetini şekillendiren birçok içi faktör, öncelikle insani bir kriz boyutu, yani mülteci akının açık kapı politikasını sonuçlanmaktadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Süriye krizinin mülteci dalgalarını Türkiye'ye ateşlemiştir. Doğrudan komşu ülkeler olarak, Türkiye'yi sınırları açmak ve halkı güvence altına almak için uluslararası toplum ve yerel insani yardımlar tarafından talep edilmiştir. İkinci olarak Türkiye-Süriye sınırlarında güvenlik tehdidi oluşmuştur. Esad rejimi'nin Süriye muhalefetlerine karşı yürüttüğü askeri politika ve krizin gelişmesiyle, 2013 yılında başlayan devlet dışı silahlı grupların (YPG-PYD, IŞİD, diğer ılımlı ve radikal gruplar) durumu daha da kriziye karmaşık hale getirmiştir. Egemenlik iddiasında bulunma ve terör saldırıları yürütme çabaları nedeniyle, Türk ulusal güvenlik ve toprak bütünlüğüne tehdit oluşturmuştur. Başka bir risk ise, Süriye'ye gidip

çıkarken yabancı terörist savaşçıların Türkiye üzerinden sınır ötesi girişidir. Hatta, ülkelerine muhtemelen dönmeden önce Türkiye'de üçüncü bir ülke olarak yaşamışlardır. Bu yüzden, onları menşe ülkelerine geri gönderme yolunu da ele almak zorunda kalmaktadır.

Uluslararası düzeyde ise, en etkili faktörler öncelikle uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin çatışmaya girmesidir. 2015 yılından beri uluslararası müdahalelerini arttırmıştır. Yabancı ülkeler ve devlet dışı aktörlerin katılımı, küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin yanı sıra devlet dışı aktörler arasındaki ittifak ve düşmanlığın stratejik modelini oluşturmuştur. İkincisi, IŞİD'in yükselişidir. Bu terör örgütü, birçok intihar saldırısı ile Türk ulusal güvenliğine tehdit oluşturmuştur. Üçüncü olarak, PYD tehdidinin ortaya çıkışıdır. Bu grup Süriyeli Kürtleri kontrol ederek, birkaç kantonu ilan ederek ve Türkiye sınırındaki kuzey Süriye'de bir etki alanı veya terör koridoru kurarak Süriye çatışmasından yararlanmıştır.

Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizine yönelik politikası, aşağıdaki gibi etkileyen faktörler aracılığıyla açıklanabilir. Birincisi, Bağımsız Dış Politika ilkesinin temel fikirlerinden biri olarak herhangi bir askeri bloğa uyumsuzluk bir taahhüdüdür. Süriye krizinde, Endonezya, Süriye ve büyük güçler ile çok taraflı ve iki taraflı askeri paktların her türlü müdahalesini engellemiştir. Bunun yerine, barışçıl bir birlikteliğe güvenmek üzere ilişkileri güçlendirmeyi tercih edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Endonezya'nın Bağlantısız Hareketi kurulmasında kritik ve yardımcı bir rolü vardır. Bu yüzden uyumsuzluğun temel ruhunu yerine getirmek için kendini konumlandırmaktadır. İkincisi, lider algılarıdır. Endonezya'nın tutumu, ne Esad rejimi ne de muhalefetlerle karşı karşıya kalırken, Süriye'nin iç siyasetine müdahale etmemektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın resmi duruşu tarafsızdır. Bu duruş, dünya barış ve güvenliği altındaki rejimin neden olduğu sömürgecilik ve ihlal biçimlerine karşı savaşmak anlamına gelmektedir. Endonezya hükümeti'nin tarafsız duruşu tarafsız bir siyaset olarak yorumlamamaktadır, krize dikkat etmemek değildir. Fakat, politikasını ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda yürütmek anlamına gelmektedir. Üçüncüsü, Süriye'deki Endonezya vatandaşlarının korunmasının önceliğine bir bağlılık oluşturmasıdır. Bu hedefe ulaşmak için Endonezya hükümeti Şam, Halep ve Lazkiye'de diplomatik temsilcileri açmaya devam etmiştir. Bu temsilciler Endonezya'ya gönderilmeden önce onları korumak, savunmak ve güvenceye almak için temel görevlere sahiptir. Süriye'deki kimin hükümetleri olursa olsun, stratejik çıkarları doğrultusunda işbirliği yapmaya devam edecektir.

Daha sonra, uluslararası düzeyde etkili olan faktörler, ilk olarak IŞİD ve Endonezya'nın yabancı savaşçıları boyutudur. Endonezya'yı IŞİD'e bağlı ve ilham veren terör saldırılarıyla da IŞİD tarafından hedef alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Endonezya kökenli yabancı savaşçıların menşei ülkelerine dönmesiyle ilgili olası terör saldırılarından dolayı IŞİD bir tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. Olası terör saldırıları yürüten, iç ve dış dini çatışmaları teşvik eden, yerel militan grubun kapasitesinin eksikliğini yerine getiren, yeni kadroları işe almak genç kadroları hedefleyen yerel aşırı grupların uyku hücrelerinin yeniden canlanmasını kapsamakta Endonezya'daki IŞİD'in destekçileri ve temsilcilerinin varlığının potansiyel tehditleridir. İkincisi, Endonezya'nın İKT çerçevesinde rolüdür. Buna rağmen, Endonezya dünyanın çoğunlukta Müslüman nüfuslu ülkesi ve İKT'de aktif bir aktörüdür. Fakat, Endonezya'nın Suriye krizinde önemli bir rolü yoktur. Bölgesel jeopolitik terim olarak küçük bir aktör ve bölgesel karmaşık siyaset üzerine deneyim eksikliği gibi nedenlerden dolayı sınırlı rol oynamıştır. Suriye hükümetiyle sınırlı ikili ilişkilerin yönetiminde kalmaya devam ettiğini belirlemektedir. Özetle, Suriye krizi durumunda pasif bir dış politika yürütme eğilimindedir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Suriye krizine yönelik insani ve politik odaklı yaklaşımı benimsemiş ve tercih etmiştir. Fakat, ulusal güvenliğini tehlikeye sokan birçok uluslararası gelişmenin ardından, Türk dış politikası güvenlik odaklı bir yaklaşım tercih etmiştir. Dış politikanın formüle edilmesinde yumuşak ve sert güçleri birleştirmektedir. Öte yandan, Endonezya hükümeti'nin Suriye'deki insani krizle başa çıkmada insani yardım yaklaşımını ortaya koyarken, bu krizi diplomasi yolunu en uygun hale getirmiştir. Endonezyalı liderlerin duruşu askeri bir yaklaşımı engellemektir. Endonezya dış politikası'nın temel ilkesi olan bağımsız ve aktif ilkeleri olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Endonezya bağımsızdır ancak aktif değildir. Dolayısıyla bu temel ilkeler, diğer devletlerin iç sorunlarına müdahale etmemek ve bunlara müdahalede bulunmaktan ziyade askeri bir ittifaka girmediğini belirlemektedir. Bunun yerine, diğer ülkelerle ikili ilişkilerini aktif olarak teşvik etmelidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya'nın bağımsız ve aktif statükoyu bir dış politikasını pragmatik bir şekilde göstermektedir. Bu durumda, özellikle Orta Doğu bölgesinin çatışma çözümüne katılma konusunda daha geniş küresel rol oynama isteği ve yeteneği arasında bir uçurum olduğunu fark edilmektedir.

Suriye krizi durumunda Endonezya hükümeti ve Müslüman grup karşıt olarak durmaktadır. Endonezya hükümeti ılımlı duruşa yönelme ve Suriye'nin iç sorunu üzerine müdahale etmeme politikası'nın statüsünü korumaktadır. Endonezya'nın diplomatik

temsilcisini açmaya ve Süriye'de ikili ilişkiler geliştirmeye devam ederken, çoğu ülke Şam'da diplomatik bürosunu kapatmaya devam etmesinin birkaç nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, Süriye ve Endonezya arasındaki tarihi ilişkiler olmasıdır. Süriye, Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülkelerdir. İkincisi, Endonezya Süriye'nin iç meselesine özellikle Süriye'nin toprak egemenliğine dahil olma Süriye rejimi tarafından algılanmaktan kaçınmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üyesi olarak Süriye'ye saygı göstermesidir. Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üye devletler arasında bir anlaşma olarak müdahaleci olmayan bir politikasını benimsemektedir. Endonezya, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin önemli bir ilkesi olarak diğer devlet topraklarının egemenliğine saygı duyması gereken “Dasasila Bandung” ile Bandung Konferansı'nda doğup yaşandığını düşünmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizi durumunda normatif bir uluslararası rolü oynamaya denilebilmektedir. Özetle, Endonezyanın siyasi gücü Türkiye'nin sahip olabileceği gibi diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlere kıyasla çatışma çözümünü doğrudan etkilememektedir.

Anahtarı: Dış Politika, Endonezya, Türkiye, Neoklasik realizm, Filistin Sorunu, Süriye Krizi

PREFACE

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Cafer Tayyar Ari, for his advice, criticism, insight, guidance, and encouragement throughout the preparation of this Master thesis. Moreover, my gratitude goes to all teachers at International Relations Department and local staffs at Institute of Social Science of Uludag University, Bursa, Republic of Turkey.

I am also grateful to the financial supports I got from Turkiye Burslari as a master scholar for 4 years.

I am thankful to the participants of my research interviews namely Mesut Ozcan of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Siswo Pramono of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. The moral supports of my Indonesian friends who study in Turkey especially in Bursa; KYK Uludag Yurt staffs and my roommates; my friends in Indonesia who i can not mention one by one.

I have no more ideas to express my whole hearted feelings to my familiy. My mother, Ratnawaty binti Muhammad Amin and my father (alm.) Muhammad Jaiz bin Sewo are always my sources of strength and spirit for my life. In my deepest heart, i am truly sorry for not sided you, my lovely father as your final journey coming back to God, Allah SWT. Yet, i am truly sure, you always watch me though my eyes would not be able to reach you. My deepest thanks and gratitude to my sisters Noor Fauziatul, Noor Fadilah Romadhani, Noor Mansurya Utami, and my other family especially to uncle Abdul Majid who have always supported and prayed for me.

Noor Fahmi PRAMUJĪ

22.05.2018 - BURSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	II
LETTER OF OATH.....	III
ABSTRACT	IV
ÖZET	X
PREFACE	XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS	XVII
LIST OF TABLES.....	XXII
LIST OF FIGURES.....	XXII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	XXIII
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT.....	6
2. FOREIGN POLICY IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES.....	8
2.1. LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE	8
2.2. REALISM PERSPECTIVE.....	10
2.3. CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE	11
3. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY.....	13
3.1. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM: A COMPARISON WITH REALISM AND NEOREALISM.....	13
3.2. FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN NEOCLASSICAL REALISM THEORY	19
4 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY	22
4.1. INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY	22
4.1.1. Principle of Independent and Active Foreign Policy	22
4.1.2. Basic Considerations of Foreign Policy-Making	27
4.1.3. Concentric Circle Approach	29

4.2	TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY	31
4.2.1.	Principle of Turkey's Foreign Policy	31
4.2.2.	Basic Considerations of Turkey's Foreign Policy-Making.....	32
5.	FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN TURKEY AND INDONESIA.....	33
5.1.	A SHIFT OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN TURKEY.	33
5.2.	A SHIFT OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN INDONESIA.....	35

CHAPTER II

AN OVERVIEW OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1	TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY.....	38
1.1.	PRIOR TO AKP PARTY GOVERNMENT	38
1.1.1.	Ataturk Period (1923-1938): Westernization and Secularization.....	38
1.1.2.	Inonu Period (1938-1950): Active Neutrality and Approachment to the West.....	40
1.1.3.	Menderes Period (1950-1960): Pro-Active Western Policy	41
1.1.4.	Military Vesayet (1960-1973): Pro-Western and Diversification Policy	44
1.1.5.	Bulent Ecevit and National Front (1973-1980): Multidimensional Policy ...	45
1.1.6.	Military Coup (1980-1987)	47
1.1.7.	Ozal Period (1987-1993).....	48
1.1.8.	Coalition Period (1993-1999).....	50
1.1.9.	European Union Acsent the Government (1999-2002)	50
1.2.	DURING AKP PARTY GOVERNMENT.....	51
1.2.1.	First Term (2002-2010)	51
1.2.2.	Second Term (2010-2013)	53
2.	INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY	53
2.1.	SOEKARNO PERIOD	54
2.1.1.	The Revolutionary Period (1945-1950)	55
2.1.2.	The Liberal Democracy Period (1950-1958).....	56
2.1.3.	The Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965).....	59
2.2.	THE NEW ORDER (1966-1998).....	61
2.3.	B.J. HABIBIE PERIOD (1998-1999)	73

2.4. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (1999- 2001).....	75
2.5. MEGAWATI SOEKARNO PUTRI (2001 - 2004).....	78
2.6. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHAYONO (2004- 2014).....	80

CHAPTER III

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY ON PALESTINE ISSUE

1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT	87
2. TURKEY AND INDONESIA GOVERNMENTS’ VIEW ON PALESTINE ISSUE .	88
2.1. TURKISH GOVERNMENT VIEWS	88
2.1.1. Ottoman-Palestine Relations	88
2.1.2. Secularist Government Periods.....	89
2.1.3. The AKP Party Rule	90
2.2. INDONESIA GOVERNMENT VIEWS	98
2.2.1. Soekarno’s Anti-Colonialism Ideology.....	98
2.2.2. Soeharto’s Pragmatism Move: A Continuity of Pancasila Mandate’s Claim	98
2.2.3. Indonesia’s Democracy Transition Eras	99
2.2.4. SBY’s Active Conflict Settlement in Muslim World.....	100
3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE	104
3.1. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN TURKEY	104
3.1.1. Domestic Public Opinion and the Foreign Policy-Making.....	104
3.1.2. Civilian Leaders: A New Actor in Turkish Foreign Policy-Making	105
3.1.3. Leader Factor	106
3.1.4. An Increasingly Islamist Factor in Domestic Politics	107
3.1.5. Turkey’s Proactive Foreign Policy	107
3.2. INTERNATIONAL FACTOR	108
3.2.1. Palestine-Israel Conflict: the Heart of Regional Instability	108
3.3. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN INDONESIA	110
3.3.1. Islamist Factor in Domestic Politics	110
3.3.2. Islamist-Oriented Aspirations in Domestic Public Opinion.....	112
3.3.3. Muslim Group: A Moral Force.....	113

3.3.4.	An Increasingly Role of Islamist Parties	115
3.3.5.	Anti-Colonialism Spirit of the 1945 Constitution: A Historical Basis.....	116
3.3.6.	A Continuity of Non-Recognition Policy towards Israel	117
3.3.7.	A New Indonesia's International Orientation and Identity	120
3.4.	INTERNATIONAL FACTOR	122
3.4.1.	Indonesia's Democratised Foreign Policy in the Post-Soeharto	122
3.5.	GAZA WAR: TURKISH RESPONSES	124
3.5.1.	Mavi Marmara Incident	124
3.5.2.	Erdogan and Davos Meeting	125
3.5.3.	Ups and Downs of Turkish-Israel Relations	126
3.6.	GAZA WAR: INDONESIAN RESPONSES	128
3.6.1.	Muslim Group's Harsh Reactions	128
3.6.2.	Indonesian Government Respons	129

CHAPTER IV

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ON SYRIA CRISIS

1.	CHANGING DYNAMICS OF SYRIA CRISIS.....	130
1.1.	ARAB SPRING AND SYRIAN UPRISING	130
1.2.	TURNING INTO ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT	132
1.3.	REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES	135
2.	GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL STANCES.....	146
3.	A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY ON SYRIA CRISIS	156
3.1.	DOMESTIC FACTORS IN TURKEY	156
3.1.1.	Open Border Policy	156
3.1.2.	Humanitarian Dimension	158
3.1.3.	Turkey-Syria's Border Security Dimension	160
3.2.	INTERNATIONAL FACTORS	164
3.2.1.	Global and Regional Powers Engangement.....	164
3.2.2.	The Rise of ISIS	167
3.2.3.	The Emergence of the PYD Threat	168

3.3. SYRIAN REFUGEES CRISIS : IMPLICATIONS TO TURKEY	173
3.4. SPILLOVER OF THE CONFLICT : A THREAT TO TURKEY’S SECURITY	175
3.4.1. Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition War	175
3.4.2. Turkey’s Struggle against the PYD-YPG	177
3.5. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN INDONESIA	179
3.5.1. A Commitment to Non-Alignment Principle of Independent Foreign Policy	179
3.5.2. Leader Perception Factor	187
3.5.3. A Foreign Policy Priority: The Protection of Indonesian Citizens	191
3.6. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS	193
3.6.1. ISIS and Foreign Terrorist Fighters Dimension	193
3.6.2. Indonesia’s Role in the Framework of the OIC	197
CONCLUSION	200
REFERENCES	210

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1.1. Similarities and Differents of Neoclassical Realism, Neorealism and Classical Realism.....	18
Table 1.2. A Shift of Indonesia's Foreign Policy (1945-current).....	37
Table 3.1. The Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy on Palestine Issue.....	95
Table 3.2. The Dynamics of Indonesia's Foreign Policy on Palestine Issue.....	102
Table 4.1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Syria (2012-2018)	141
Table 4.2. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions for Syria (2011-2016).....	143
Table 4.3. State and Non-state Actors Relations in Syria Crisis.....	168
Table 4.4. Organizational Origin of the ISIS.....	168

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Foreign Policy Analysis in Neoclassical Realism Theory.....	21
Figure 4.1. Rojava Self-Administration of Cantons.....	171
Figure 4.2. Organizational Relationship Between the PYD and PKK.....	171

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Acronyms
AAC	Asia-Africa Conference
AFAD	Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AKP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</i>)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPT	National Agency for Combating Terrorism (<i>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme</i>)
CGI	Consultative Group on Indonesia
CIA	Central Intelligence Service
CONEFO	Conference of New Emerging Forces
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DFI	Direct Foreign Investment
DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FATAH	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPI	Islamic Defenders' Front (<i>Front Pembela Islam</i>)
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
HAMAS	Islamic Resistance Movement
HDC	Henry Dunant Consultation
HPG	People's Defence Forces
HRW	Human Right Watch
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICMI	Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i>)
IGGI	Inter Government on Indonesia
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization

IHH Insan Yardim Vakfi	Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (<i>Insan Hak ve Hurriyetleri ve Insan Yardim Vakfi</i>)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
JAS	Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah
JAT	Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union (<i>Koma Civaken Kurdistan</i>)
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KNIP	Central National Committee of Indonesia (<i>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i>)
KRG (KBY)	Kurdistan Regional Government (Kurt Bolgesel Yonetimi)
PUK (KYB)	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (<i>Kurdistan Yurtseverler Birliđi</i>)
MASYUMI	Council of Indonesian Moslems
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NSC (MGK)	National Security Council (<i>Millet Guvenlik Konseyi</i>)
MMI	Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (<i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i>)
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUI	Indonesian Ulemas Council (<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i>)
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NASSP	New America Strategies for Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFOS	New Emerging Forces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLFSV	National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
NU	Muslim Scholars Party (<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i>)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

OLDEFOS	Old Established Forces
ORSAM	Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (<i>Ortadogu Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi</i>)
PICC	Paris International Conference on Cambodia
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party (<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (<i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</i>)
PKS	Welfare and Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNI	Indonesian National Party (<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>)
PRC	People of Republic of China
PYD	Democratic Union Party
SDF	Syrian Democratic Force
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SOHR	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (<i>Turk Isbirligi ve Koordinasyon Ajansi</i>)
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (<i>Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi</i>)
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces (<i>Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri</i>)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNCCP	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WB	World Bank
YPG	People's Protection Units
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, is classified as a middle power country, that has population of about 250 million, the world's third largest democracy, the largest Muslim population, and a G-20 member. Meanwhile, Turkey is also a middle power country and a G-20 member. It is a successor state of the Ottoman Empire. It was the first Muslim-majority country to be democratized. Both countries also play as leading actors in the OIC. In case of the Middle East, both countries' leaders react in their ways on each regional conflict. They also much more concern to the Middle East issues particularly in recent years.

Following the defeat of Communist ideology of the Soviet Union that marks the Cold war was end, the concern of international change shifted on various issues including concern to the Middle East region. Several critical changes affiliated to the Middle East. For instances, at the beginning of the 2000s, following the 9/11 incident, the world was surprised. It then became an influential factor that contributes to the shift of state's foreign policy. By then, the world widely concerned to terrorism issue since what so called radical group was risen especially in the Middle East.

Another dramatical change of the Middle East is so called Arab Spring. A series of domestic revolutions arose. Most of the revolutions turned into the civil war that engaged major regional and international actors. Furthermore, a long-decades conflict of Israel-Palestine has coloured the regional conflicts to be continued. Indeed, since its geopolitical context, Turkey has undergone various foreign policy regard to the Middle East issues. Despite, Indonesia's geographical position is not near to that region, its historical context and the Muslim-majority aspirations make it concerns to the Middle East issue. Both state's policy makers also put their more concerns to the Middle East issue as one of the foreign policy's priorities in recent decades.

During the Cold war, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was passive, non-active engagement, and isolationist stance. As a west ally, Turkish policy towards the Middle East conducted in the framework of western alliance's interests. Yet, these changed significantly after the Cold war. Turkey shifted its foreign policy being an active engagement to the Middle East in particular. This shifting has been started widely since the AKP led the government. In comparison with Indonesia, since the independence of Republic of Indonesia, it also has developed ties with regional countries. With respect to the common issue as the colonized and majority-Muslim populated countries, the relations

are established. Islamist actors then rose as a new determinant actor in foreign policy-making particularly in post the reform era. This democratic change has been influencing it to act more in line with an aspiration to play greater role as a global rising actor.

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the dynamics of Turkish and Indonesia foreign policy toward Middle East, then analysing factors shape both state's foreign policy at level of domestic and regional and/or international through implying neoclassical realism theory. To simplifying the analysis, this thesis works on the Palestinian issue and Syria crisis. It also argues two countries' policy on those cases. In sum, the research question is "What the influential factors determine Indonesia and Turkey's Middle East foreign policy: in cases of the Palestinian issue and Syria crisis?".

Since the comparative researches that analyse about Turkey and Indonesia mostly to discuss and evaluate in the contexts of democracy and Islam, this work presents to enrich the foreign policy scholar's discourse of comparative perspective on those countries. The lack of academical writings both in Indonesia and Turkey that concern to the comparative study of the new emerging power or middle power for instances Indonesia and Turkey in regard with Middle East's foreign policy, it will have contributions.

Several transformation in domestic political issues such as military-civil relations, one-ruling party to multi-party system, the rise of domestic civil actors in the foreign policy-making have been experienced both countries. In sum, the dramatical changes in domestic level including more opportunities are given for new actors to participate into the foreign policy-making in effective, the rise of Islamist factor, the increasingly importance of public opinion and individual leaders and an accommodation of Muslim group's aspirations have led two countries to reconsider their relations with Middle East countries and significantly influenced on their foreign policy. In addition, the growing of Islamist influences in domestic politics also motivate their efforts to play a larger role in the Muslim world.

In addition, their status of Muslim countries will have consequence in dealing with the Muslim issues of the worldwide including in the Middle East, while they are also the OIC members. Two countries set themselves as a role model among Muslim countries that succeed passing the transition to democratic system, compared to other Middle East countries which are the monarchy-system rules in major. The democratization shift in the international level also affects on how they behave and attitude with others beyond their territories.

This work has five chapters. In introduction section, within which the general framework of the study on the conceptual framework are set forth. Next to the first chapter deals with theoretical framework, providing an explanation of neoclassical realism theory. The main concepts of the this theory and its links with foreign policy formulation are introduced. The development of realism such from classical realism, neorealism to neoclassical realism then the basic differences among these are discussed. The object of this research is a comparison on Turkey and Indonesia's policy in response to the Middle East issues especially in cases of the Palestine issue and Syria crisis. It also determines the influential factors in domestic, regional and/or international level of analysis, as well as the interplay relations in shaping states' foreign policy.

At the international level concerns on structural considerations and constraints shaping both states' foreign policy. Meanwhile, at the domestic level puts forward how the systemic pressures are translated through unit-level variables. These are the leader's perceptions such how the decision makers' policies and perceptions regardd to the international system's changes, as well as the domestic constraints and intentions. These analysies at the international and domestic levels to be applied into two case studies while comparing Indonesia and Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East. *The second chapter* deals with Indonesia and Turkey's foreign policy in general and in particular. It starts to discuss the dynamics of government's foreign policy since the independence of both countries in general. Then it continues to elaborate, two countries' policy on the Middle East.

As mentioned above, the focus of thesis is Turkey and Indonesia's Middle East foreign policy. Therefore, after dealing with the state formation rely on their historical context, the state's ideology and identity, and the leaders' perceptions in the line of interpretations toward the international changes and pressures would have influenced to the foreign policy-making process. Thus, a theoretical analysis of foreign policy dynamic is primary. In this section, the foreign policy output, the influential factors of the foreign policy decisions, foreign policy changes over times and cross-governments, and obstacle to foreign policy change are explained and analysed.

The third to fourth chapters focus on a comparative analysis of both states' foreign policy in two cases through neoclassical realism approach. That theory asserts a combination of domestic and international factors in shaping state's foreign policy. Thus, the next analysis of study cases examine those factors. *The third chapter* studies a

comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Palestine issue. It starts to discuss the roots of Palestine-Israel conflict. Since understanding to the main problem of the conflict, the main discussion is the views of Indonesian and Turkish within the framework of Palestine policy. This issue are discussed starting from the early Republic era to the AKP government in Turkey. Meanwhile, Indonesia's diplomatic ties with Palestine have been developed before Indonesia was independence. Palestine was a leading state recognizing Indonesia as an independent state. However, informal relations might been established through trade and cultural aspects. Hence, the explanation of Indonesian's view on Palestine issue is started from the Soekarno to SBY periods.

Another sub-section also is analysed with comparative perspective that influential factors in the level of domestic and international. At the level domestic in Turkey, changing dynamics in Turkish domestic policy are believed in shaping the policy makers concerning on Palestine issue. Public opinion, the rise of civilian leadership, leaders' perceptions, and an increasingly Islamist factors shaping Turkey's Palestine policy. Shifting of Turkey's passive and isolationist stances to proactive foreign policy also contributed on major roles that played in settling the conflict. At the level of international, since the conflict is perceived as heart of regional peace and stability, so the settlement of the conflict is important.

In other side, at domestic level, the Islamist factors in domestic politic consisting of Muslim aspirations in domestic public opinions, the existance of Muslim groups as a moral force, the rise of Islamist political parties in Indonesia. In formal, Indonesian governments commit with Palestine issue on behalf of anti-colonial spirit of 1945 constitution as the historical basis. By today, a continuity of non-recognition policy on Israel also shapes Indonesia stance on Palestine issue. Moreover, a shift toward a new Indonesia's international orientation and identity as well as a democratised policy to be considered contributed to an emergence of aspiration to play active role in the Middle East. A sub-study case of Gaza war is chosen to draw the response of both governments.

The fourth chapter discusses the case study of Syria crisis. Starting from Arab Spring to current situation (by 2016) are examined as introduction. The development of conflict started as a revolution of Syrian people to armed civil conflict, then the engagement of major regional and international actors, with the rise of non- state actors have escalated the conflict and sparked it more complicated. Yet, the regional and international initiatives have been still hold in order to settle the conflict. Since the conflict emerged as a spilled

over of democracy demand oriented-mass protest and led by domestic people against the monarchy government, hence a political solution must be implied by all parties. Both of countries have undergone the different methods in order to deal with the crisis. Since Turkish territory bordering with Syria's territory, so it must formulate policies and manage the implication of the conflict by reading the current crisis. Various policies have been undergone, began with soft power to hard power approaches. Humanitarian dimension, open border policy, and securing the Turkey-Syria border areas at the domestic level are evaluated. At the level of international, with the engagement of major regional powers, the rise of ISIS, and the emergence of national threats of PYD terror attacks are considered as influential factors shifting the foreign policy approaches. Next, the discussion examines the implication of Syrian refugees crisis, the coalition war against the ISIS, and Turkish struggle against the terror attacks of PKK-affiliated armed terror group in Syria, so called the PYD are covered to determine how Turkish foreign policy in response the crisis.

Meanwhile, Indonesian government reacts over the crisis in accordance with the principle of non-alignment policy. In attempt the settlement of the conflict and pursue the peaceful world, Indonesian diplomacy has been undergone with respect to the principle of United Nations of non-intervention. Independent foreign policy and leader perceptions in domestic politics, the protection of Syria-lived Indonesians as one of the foreign policy's priorities are considered as the domestic factors for Indonesia government to formulate the policy concern to Syria crisis. Indonesia role in the framework of the OIC and Indonesia-originated the foreign fighters issue become the reasons why it must concern to the Syria crisis at the international level.

To easy the analysis of two case studies, the periods are taken during 2004 to 2016. It covers the AK Party-led government in Turkey, whereas in Indonesia is from the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's two presidential terms to two early years of the Jokowi government. The foreign policy formulation considers national history, geography, demography, national interest, national ideology/identity, leader perception, these are summarised into domestic factors. Yet, the domestic one is not enough in shaping foreign policy of the state. International and/or regional changes also influence the way of state's behaviour. Hence, the interplay of domestic and international are discussed in the neoclassical realism of the foreign policy theory as an analysis tool in comparing Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Middle East in certain two cases.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1 FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT

The study of foreign policy is a study that bridges the analytical barriers between the international and domestic political systems.¹ Henry Kissinger argues the foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.² Domestic context as one of the background factors to policy-making. The domestic social and political environment play roles in influencing, perhaps determining foreign policy of the state. In this sense, the main focus of the policy formulation tends to concern in interest-group pressure, elite opinion, and partisan conflict.³

The phenomena of foreign intervention in domestic political process and domestic awareness of foreign states' interest in internal political decision resulting foreign policy as well as links between external policy of a state and foreign influences on its domestic political process. Not only the domestic context shapes in foreign policy-making, the international context also does. Foreign policy decision is a product of internal responses to both external factors and domestic political considerations operating in dynamic interrelation. The international environment can be a restraint factor that limits the policy-makers' choice in various ways. Such as a state's geographical position is accounted as the most permanent limiting factor. The power of other states (population, military and economic strength, the control of vital natural resources) and balance of national power in the international system are strong limiting factors. Foreign policy attitudes of other states also limit the range of strategic choice to the policy-maker.

Besides, international opinion, international shared-values, and international law are classified as the social restraints of international system. The state's external commitments (alliance, treaty obligations, foreign investment, trading interest, citizens resident abroad) also as the restraint factor. Lastly, international environment does not provide any clear or self-evident indication of the best or more rational decision-choice to take to the policy-

¹ William Wallace, **Foreign Policy and the Political Process**, The Macmillan Press, London, 1971, p.11

² Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau (ed.), **International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory**, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964, p.261

³ William Wallace, **Op.Cit.**, p. 13.

maker. In fact, the external world is not any objective or constant reality but those perceived by policy-maker.

Distinction between the terms of international politics and foreign policy take place on objectives and actions (decisions and policies) of states and the interactions between two or more states. If it analyses the actions of state toward external environment is concerned with foreign policy. While the international politics concerns to the processes of interaction two or more states. A discussion of state objectives, affecting variables of choice, and some techniques applied to achieve goals is related to the study of foreign policy. However, consideration of international system, deterrence, and behavior in conflict situation closes to the idea of international politics. While the term of international relations would include the analysis of foreign policies or political processes among nations.⁴

Foreign policy involves orientations, national roles, objectives, and actions, by which national governments conduct international relations with international actors.⁵ In fact, the reason why all national government engage in foreign policy, they want to influence the goals and activities of other actor who they can not completely control because they exist and operate beyond their sovereignty. Foreign policy consist of aims and measures that are intended to guide government decisions and actions with regard to external affairs, particularly relations with foreign countries. Government officials in leading positions (president, prime minister, foreign minister, defence minister, finance minister and so on, along with their closest advisers are usually the key policy-makers.⁶

Foreign policy is the government's strategy that used to guide their actions in the interantional arena. In general, International Relations scholars are interested in the foreign policy process (how policies are arrived at and implemented). Comparative foreign policy is the study of foreign policy in various states in order to discover whether similar types of societies or governments consistently have similar types of foreign policy (comparing across states or across different time periods for a single state). Foreign policy outcomes resulted from multiple forces at various level of analysis. Outcomes depend on individual decision makers, the type of society and government they are working within, and on the

⁴ K.J. Holsti, **International Politics: A Framework for Analysis**, Third Edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977, p. 21.

⁵ Tayyar Arı, **Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika Vol. 10**, MKM Publisher, Bursa, March 2013, p. 57

⁶ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, Fifth Edition, , Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 226.

international context of their actions. The study of foreign policy concentrates on forces within the state, its main emphasis is on the individual and domestic level of analysis. The differences in the foreign policy process among states are also influenced by the type of government.

2 FOREIGN POLICY IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

A primary concern of liberalism is collective norms and interests. It assumes that institutional norms can alter the conception of the state's leaders upon their own interests.⁷ Liberalism defines the interest of a collective security system in term of a community norm of peaceful resolution in the dispute. In other words, Betts concludes that "community of power replaces balance of power"⁸ of realism. For liberalist, alliance and multilateral institution represent the instruments of the state. The presence of institution encourages states to cooperate in the level of multilateral even their interests do not be converged. Because states work in context of an important value of themselves.⁹ States accept the group's decision on actions despite those are not the ideal of the states' foreign policy choice. In context of the foreign policy, state presents as a collective representative.

For liberalists, states are always binded in domestic and transnational society. The state's foreign policy may moderate or block depended on its interactions. The principal assumptions of liberal theory underlines that states prevail in the anarchic circumstance and in the foreign policy-making they act in a way of rational generally. Liberal views that states has role to provide individual freedom. Where in their perspective, freedom is produced by the rule of law.¹⁰

Liberalism underlines how individuals, their essential ideas, principles (for instances freedom, democracy, and human rights) and social forces (such as market and capitalism nature) affect directly to the state's foreign interactions. Liberalists accept that states

⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", in D.A. Baldwin (Ed.), **Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p. 271.

⁸ Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe, *International Security*, Vol. 17, 1992, p.203

⁹ Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2003, p.569

¹⁰ Jeffrey Lewis, "What a Real Liberal Foreign Policy Would Look Like", *Foreign Policy*, June 26, 2015, <https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/26/what-a-real-liberal-foreign-policy-would-look-like-obama-democrats/>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

prevails under anarchy circumstances but they refuse anarchy nature. Liberalism points out that liberal states tend to respect and maintain peaceful relations inter-liberal states. However, the competition among liberal states results either positive or negative sum game within the liberal zone of peace. Since the most implication of liberalism on the foreign relation amongst liberal states is a creation of zone of peace. In other side, within a complicated situation, a distrust to others may eliminate cooperation among them.¹¹ However the security dillema of inter-liberal states mainly is ended through strable accomodation, compared to realist prefers to conduct a possible temporary cooperation within an alliance or in other words an attempt to balance each others. Inter-liberal states do not perceive as a mutual threat, instead as an opportunity for mutual benefit within trade cooperation, while it is necessary, they establish an alliance against non-liberal states.¹²

An international respect for individual right and establishment trade cooperation can encourage peace among liberal states. So, the direct contribution of liberalism on the foreign policy is to ensure the need for international cooperation. It believes that both individu and collective conduct a struggle and survival for power. So, cooperation amongst states aimed to pursue their goals. Liberalist also understands that institutions, international organizations, adn regimes are essential instruments of international community. Those instruments are concrete manifestation of the need for international cooperations.

In the globalization era and interdependent world, states can not fulfill their needs by themselves even through cooperation and concrete acts, so the international institution prevails. Besides there are many problems states not able to resolve by their own, for instances, global financial crisis, global warming, non-proliferation, etc, so they need to address through cooperation within international institutions. In contrast to realists, liberalists put the importance of ideas. They emphasizes the power of ideas. Sometimes, a belief in ideas can guide to great violence.¹³ In other words, the ideas can force and shape states how to behave in the their relations with other states in a possible violence way.

¹¹ Michael.W. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1997, p. 217

¹² Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and Foreign Policy", in **Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases Second Edition**, Steves Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.65-66

¹³ Michael W. Doyle, 1997, *Op.Cit*, p. 220.

2.2 REALISM PERSPECTIVE

According to Realist, foreign policy decisions must be the best decision that serves security and power interests.¹⁴ The classical realism focuses on state's interests and power which represent key elements to understand the complex nature of the state's relation in their international affairs. In detail, the classical realism explores the concept of the state as the main actor in international relations, while the other actors such as international organizations transnational actors have limited roles and the secondary actors compared to the sovereign states on the international scene.

Besides, it also discusses the significance of power in world politics, the purpose of the state's power and the priority of the state's national interests, as well as the self-help nature of the state's foreign policy, of course, in case of states undergo an unpredictable situation and in order to secure its national interest, to ensure its vital national security as well.¹⁵ The classical realism states that the presence of anarchy in international relations results the state to prioritise its national interests. Due to the anarchic of international order, it determines that no any global power could be able to control over other sovereign states. This encourages states to concern their national interests in order to effectively reflected in the state's foreign policy. The anarchic nature of the international affairs also causes the self-help nature of the states' foreign policy, so state will collect full capacity and capability to achieve its national interests and to provide its national security.¹⁶

Another crucial assumption of the classical realism in anarchic international order is the military capability as an instrument of state power. The power might determine the effectiveness of state's foreign policy, so states attempt to increase their power and military capability. For many classical realists, the power becomes the main purpose of the state's foreign policy.¹⁷ In classical realism theory also, the nature of international affairs amongst the states remain conflictual. In world politics, the states pursue a such power politics. In such situation, the potential of conflict might rise amongst the great powers. It will result a zero-sum game within the competition of the great powers. While the logic of state's foreign policy is to create the sphere of influences.

¹⁴ Ozgun Erler Bayir and Faruk Sonmezoglu, "Dis Politika Analizinde Temel Ogeler", Faruk Sonmezoglu and Ozgun Erler Bayir (eds.), **Dis Politika Karsilastirmali Bir Bakis**, D&R Publishing, Istanbul, 2014, p.7.

¹⁵ Colin elman, "Realism", in M. Griffiths (ed.), **International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction**, Routledge, Oxon, 2007, pp: 12-13.

¹⁶ Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, "Foreign Policy: The Realism of Idealism", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No.2, June 1952, p.347

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Meanwhile, the structural realism in foreign policy context serves an analysis framework to explain the structural limitations that imposed on the state's foreign policy in the level of international system. It also stresses the essential role of anarchy in international order and the self-help character of state's foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz's neorealism theory describes the structure of international system and its power distribution in the level of international system. The structure of international system mainly determines behavior of the state on the international affairs.¹⁸ Structural realism also not more focus on the internal factors such as political leaders, domestic political regime or state ideology to effectively determine the state's foreign policy.

Structural realism also contributes to the explanation of defensive and offensive realisms, which both of them suggest the different assumptions to the state's military power and foreign policy. In defensive realism, the survival of the state is the principal objective, while the states have other aims beyond the power. The states pursue a moderate policy in deal with the international system's restraint. Furthermore, for offensive realists, the anarchic of international system encourage the states to expand and strive to maximize their relative power especially the states' military power.¹⁹ Zakaria points out that an expansion of the state's foreign policy considers its national interests, the coverage of actions, and the broadening goals.²⁰ If a state's capability increases, so the range of its national interests and desires will increase as well.²¹ However, when the state's capability is not balance to its desire, it results a self-interested actions. In contrast with classical realism, structural realism emphasizes the great powers strive to rule over other actors in the international system. While, the neoclassical realism assumptions will be explains further on next section. Since neoclassical realism theory as the main analytical concept to describe and evaluate of this thesis.

2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE

Constructivism argues that anarchy and power are not only important variables in foreign policy. It assumes that there are other variables more important than anarchy and

¹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, "Neorealism: Confusion and Criticism", *Journal of Politics and Society*, Volume. XV, 2004, pp. 2-5.

¹⁹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy, Defensive Realism Revisited", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000/01, pp. 128-130.

²⁰ Fareed Zakaria, **From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role**, Princeton University Press, 1998, p.19

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.18-20.

power for explaining state behavior.²² Material distribution of power and interests are not fully used to explain the international phenomenas. Instead it points out that social construction of state identities would help to analyse international relations of states.

Contrustivism emphasises a process of interaction between agents and structures. Human agents and social structures are interrelated and interdependent entities. For constructivism as well, the pre-existance of rules and norms in anarchical structure are essential for social action, in this case for controlling states behave. The term of structure is not only defined as anarchy and distribution of power. It must consist of rules, norms, practices and media which rational action is influenced. State behaviour could be understood through intersubjective relations with structure's components. In this context, states establish relation with others, then understanding to others through media of norms and practices. In anarchical system (with absence of norms, exercises of power or actions/ practices, would left states behavior to be meaningless.

Norms are collective understandings that result behavioral claims on actors (states). They construct actor identities and interests. In constructivism, states (agents) and international norms (structure) are interacting and mutually constituted. States can understand their interest through norms. The concept of identity serves as a link between environmental structures and interests.²³ States acquire identities by participating in collective actions. States may have multiple identities and which identity will be depend on the specific social context. States interpret the condition of external environment (international system) in accordance with their intersubjective norms and actions. In other words, different states have different and multiple interpretations to international system based on their own intersubjective understandings and practices.

Alexander Wendt develops the concept of a structure of identity and interest in the system. In this term, without defining the identity and interest of states in relations, thus cannot predict the dynamics of international relations/ phenomenas. He also defines structure is not only made of material capabilities but also social relationships.²⁴ He

²² Steffano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2000, p. 148

²³ Nilüfer Karacasulu, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde İnşacılık Yaklaşımları", in Tayyar Arı (ed.), **Postmodern Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Yaklaşımları**, DORA Basım Yayın Dağıtım, Bursa, October 2014, pp.118-119

²⁴ Uçel Bozdağlıoğlu, "Könstrüktivizm ve Rol Teorisi: Kimlik, Rol ve Dış Politika Analizi", in Tayyar Arı (ed), **Uluslararası İlişkilerde Postmodern Analizler-1 Kimlik, Kültür, Güvenlik ve Dış Politika**, MKM Publisher, Bursa, April 2012, p. 128

continues that social structures consist of three essential elements namely shared knowledge, material resources, and practices. Those elements are interrelated.

According to constructivism, identities define states' interests. That is why they have essential explanatory power in foreign policy analysis. States define interests in the process of defining situations. They formulate actions (policy) to unprecedented situations through institutionally defined roles. The absence or failure of states' roles affect defining situations and interests more difficult and may result identity confusion. Social identities imposed by states enable them to determine "who they are" in a situation and their "positions" in international system based on shared understandings (norms) and expectations.

Furthermore, structure and agent (State) relations are essential. In this context, state constructs normative structure. In process of construction, state make its identity. Then, it define national interests. State behaviors reflected in the foreign policy represent the result of social construction over the condition of international system. State identity has direct implication on state interests. In other words, the nature of state interest is changeable by times. Structural (systemic) factors influence foreign policy behaviors and in making process of state identity and roles.²⁵

3 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM: A COMPARISON WITH REALISM AND NEOREALISM

Neoclassical realism is a school of foreign policy studies that studying both structure of international system, domestic factors, and interplay of complex interactions. It embrasses the classic realism and neo-realism. It emphasizes that studying foreign policy of state in context of international system should pay attention to level of analysis of neorealism and to analytical strength of unit level of classic realism.²⁶ So that, it is also a theory attempts to combine factors of unit and systemic theories in aim to provide better explanation of states' foreign policy.²⁷

²⁵ Yucel Bozdaglioglu, "Konstruktivizm ve Rol Teorisi: Kimlik, Rol, ve Dis Politika Analizi", in **Uluslararası İlişkilerde Postmodern Analizler-1**, Tayyar Ari (Ed.), MKM Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2012, p.150.

²⁶ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steve E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy", in **Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy**, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steve E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p.10.

²⁷ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No.1, October 1998, p. 153, p. 159 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068>, (retrieved on November 19, 2017)

The aim of neoclassical realism is to understand how distribution of power in international system, motivations and subjective structure of states toward international system shape foreign policy of states. The primary subject of neoclassical realism works is the implication of relative material power on foreign policy of state. In other words, it is to be a basic parameters of state's foreign policy. For neoclassical realism as well, the principal factor to analyse foreign policy of state is the perception of foreign policy-makers upon systemic pressures. Foreign policy choices are resulted of how decision makers perceive to relative power. For neoclassical realists, power analysis is a must, hence it also evaluate the strength and structure of state relative to its society. These affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy choices.

In addition, neoclassical realism argues to understand how states interpret and respond to external environment, it should analyse how systemic pressures are translated by unit level of intervening variables namely foreign policy-makers' perceptions and domestic state power. Yet, foreign policy-makers are constrained by both international and domestic politics.

Neoclassical realism predicts an increase of relative material power which it will lead to an expansion sourced from ambition and scope of state's foreign policy actions. In contrast, a decrease of such power will also lead eventually to a constraction. However, those processes will not be gradual or uniform, since they depend on how decision-makers subjectively perceive the relative material power. Then, the perceptions eventually lead into what foreign policy are. Furthermore, neoclassical realism does not point out that power-related factors will lead all aspects of state's foreign policy.

Neoclassical realism provides a causal chain that has three phases such as relative power of states in anarchical international system as independent variable; structure of states and perceptions of policy-makers as intervening variables. They filter systemic pressures and threats; and behavior of states in international system or outcome of international politics as dependent variable.

Despite, neoclassical realism is a certain combination of the main assumptions of classic realism and neorealism, they have differents and similarities. Neoclassical realism accepts that scope and ambition of state's foreign policy is driven mostly by its place in international system and by its relative material power in particular. So, it is so called realism. It rejects the effect of such power capabilities is indirect and complex. Due to the

systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is so called neoclassic.

In comparison with neorealism and realism, it can be explained such follow. Neorealism is a theory of international politics that attempts to explain outcomes of international politics (state interactions).²⁸ In contrast, neoclassical realism tries to evaluate the behaviour of states. It is disagree with the idea of neorealism arguing of systemic pressures will immediately affect behaviour of states. It notes that the systemic pressures on states' behaviours rely on relative power and domestic factors of states in the anarchy system. Nevertheless, it looks for systemic analysis as neorealism, it does with analysing relative power of states and attitudes of decision-makers as a element of domestic power toward the situation faced.

Unlike neorealism, it presses the importance of the subjective (unit) attitudes and state's domestic power as well as systemic power. In one side, it recognises anarchy system as an important factor, in other side, it emphasizes on main assumptions of classical realism as well. In contrast to neorealism, it believes the different level of analysis are as important as anarchical structure of international system. Similar with neorealism, it mostly focuses on power and defines it in accordance with capabilities. While, realism only considers unit level of analysis and ignores systemic effects, in reverse neorealism anlayses on systemic level of analysis and ignores effects of national level. In comparison, it attempts the combination of unit and systemic level of analysis.

Similar with realism, neoclassical realism argues politics is a permanent struggle among states in order to reach power and security. It also presses that states participate in international system considering their own preferences through increasing power. Therefore, states that posses more power follow more ambitious foreign policy.²⁹ In other words, the primary goal of any state in anarchical system is power, not security as neorealism argues.

As emphasised that structure is important, thus anarchy is a main cause of struggle. So that, neoclassical realism accepts the effect of anarchy on behaviour of states and its assumption that the pressures of anarchical system affect choices of state's foreign policy. It means that the nature of anarchy of international system as a independent variable is a determinant factor of state's foreign policy.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.157

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.162

Neoclassical realism explains that state power or capabilities have indirect effect on state's behaviour since there systemic limitation and pressures that operated through intervening variables in the unit level. Those variables namely internal factors of states covering attitudes of decision-makers (their perceptions) and state power (domestic motivations and constrains) as connecting factors in shaping foreign policy.³⁰ So, the nature of foreign policy is rooted in state's relative power (domestic power). Furthermore, neoclassical realism also believes that perceptions of states, not existent realities have influenced how they react or behave or what choices are decided. Thus, perceptions of states' leaders are the main motive of specific foreign policy.³¹

As explained, neorealism tries to explain international politics through systemic analysis. Neoclassical realism analyses with considering independent variables of relative power and intervening variables namely state structures, perceptions, and evaluations of state's leaders about relative power.³² While neorealism argues that effects of structure on units in anarchical system occur without any intervention of other factors.

The key difference of neorealism and neoclassical realism is the presence of leader factors (such as beliefs and values of policy-makers) influencing relations between relative power and foreign policy.³³ Other distinctions, neorealism considers one independent variable such polar system and one dependent variable which is outcome of international political system. Meanwhile, neoclassical realism considers two independent variables namely unit, system, and their effects on which behaviour of states in foreign policy are.

Neoclassical realism understands behaviour of states in international system through cognitive variables of states in systemic pressures and threats as well as systemic variables such as distribution of power and state's capabilities. For neoclassical realism, idea factor is importance particularly when it is performed by powerful individuals. For instance, capability and personality of specific state's leaders directly impact to states' foreign policy.³⁴

However, it rejects assumption that states are the sole actor of international system as realism and the idea of systemic pressures are the principle that force specific results. In

³⁰ Randall Schweller, "The Progressive Power of Neoclassical Realism", in **Progress in International Relations Theory**, Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman (eds.), MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 327-328

³¹ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 240

³² Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds.), *Op. Cit.*, p. 15

³³ Gideon Rose, *Op. Cit.*, p. 159

³⁴ Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressure and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of A Grand Strategy Formation", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2010, p.120.

other words, structure strengthens specific behavior.³⁵ For neoclassical realism, understandings and perceptions of statesmen play a critical role in creating behavior of state. Thus, the effects of structure take place through understandings and perceptions of national leaders. They perceive informations based on historical backgrounds and understandings. In addition, dependence of state structures include civil society, political coalitions, organizational politics, and relations between military and civil. Those affect leaders in how to mobilize resources. So, they show that how importance role of intervening factor.

Foreign policy-makers engage in two-level game namely in which they react to international system and mobilize internal resources of state. States adapt to external environment accordance with internal conditions. That is why different states react to systemic pressures and opportunities differently.

Neoclassical realism accepts neorealism's assumption of anarchy, it also provide systemic, internal and individual (unit) level of analysis in analysing foreign policy. According to Rose, it uses both internal and external factors. It explains that foreign policy of states depend on their position in international system as interpretation or perception of state leaders and their relative power or domestic capabilities. It is more focus on power as theory of foreign policy and defining power in accordance with state capabilities as neorealism.

Neoclassical realism mainly focuses on how the intervening variables namely leader perceptions as main motivation of state behaviour and state domestic power constraining leader in perceiving international pressures and threats as independent variable in result of state foreign policy as the dependent variable. In short, it analyses how systemic pressures are translated through intervening unit-level variables.

In defining national interests and conducting foreign policy, leaders consider the evaluation of relative power and other states' intentions. However, they always subject to domestic constraints for instances the cumulative actions of other actors in state including policy-makers, lobbyists, citizen groups and businesses, as well as the process of bargaining with them.³⁶

³⁵ Robert O. Keohane, p. 277.

³⁶ Norrin M Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups", in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds), **Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy**, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 50.

In sum, neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy which integrate international system and domestic political environment to explain behavior of states as reflection of foreign policy. It also examine the state's interests, identity, and preference as intervening variables. The cognitive factor such leader perception or belief affect on foreign policy behavior, how measure of relations with other states, which impacts the domestic groups have on decision-making process, how decision-makers asses the international system and power of state while managing the crisis.

In addition, neocalssical realism analyses the sole relation of state and foreign policy on three sets of variables as follow. *First*, assessment of threats and opportunities of anarchical international system by states or specifically policy-makers. *Second*, strategic adaptation of states based on who is policy-makers and how they react to international threats; how internal actors affect foreign policy; which internal actor is more important; and in what conditions the policy-makers negotiate with internal actors. *Third*, mobilization of internal resources can be explained by three factors namely how states mobilize internal resources to achieve specific interests; to what extent they are able to change decision of leader; and what is the influential factor in bargaining with social groups.

Table 1.1. Similarities and Differents of Neoclassical Realism, Neorealism and Classical Realism³⁷

Theory	View of the International System (Independent Variable)	View of the Units (Intervening Variable)	Dependent Variable	Causal Logic
Neoclassical Realism	Important	Differentiated	State's Foreign policy	Relative Power Distribution (systemic as independent variable) → Domestic factors (intervening variable)

³⁷ Table is adopted from Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds), *Op.Cit.*, p. 20

				→ Foreign policy (dependent variable)
Neorealism	Very important (polar system)	Undifferentiated	Outcome of international political system	Relative Power Distribution (independent variable) → International outcomes (dependent variable)
Classical Realism	Considerably important	Differentiated	State's Foreign policy	Power Distribution → Foreign policy

3.2 FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN NEOCLASSICAL REALISM THEORY

Neoclassical realism is a foreign policy's theory that study both the structure of international system, domestic factors, and interplay of complex interactions. In understanding how states interpret and respond to external environment, should analyse how systemic pressures are translated by unit level of intervening variables namely foreign policy-makers' perceptions and domestic state power. However, foreign policy-makers are constrained by both international and domestic politics.³⁸ In other words, foreign policy of states depend on their position in international system as interpretation of state leaders and their relative power or domestic capabilities. For neoclassical realism also idea factor is important particularly when it is performed by powerful individuals.³⁹ For instance, capability and personality of specific state's leaders directly impact to states' foreign policy.

Neoclassical realism provides three variables such as relative power of states in anarchical international system as independent variable; structure of states (including

³⁸ Gideon Rose, *Op.Cit.*, p. 159

³⁹ Randall Schweller, *Op.Cit.*, p. 330

constraints and motivations), perceptions and evaluations of policy-makers over relative power as intervening variables. And behavior of states as dependent variable.⁴⁰ Leaders perceive international events based on historical backgrounds and understandings, the evaluation of relative power and other states' intentions. In addition, state structures include civil society, political coalitions, organizational politics, military-civil relations and the process of bargaining with them as domestic constraints.⁴¹

Neoclassical realism as a foreign policy theory analyses on the level of a state. For some neoclassical realists, the division between the systemic and domestic level of analysis is not necessarily needed. It strives to argue the state's foreign policy as a result of both international structure and domestic factors, which domestic one able to strengthen or weaken the influence of the structural systemic factor. The domestic factor of neoclassical realism is an extension of classical realism assumption, which is in term of the leader's dilemma to decide the state's foreign policy.

Some neoclassical realists underline the perception of the state over its foes' power and intention, the elite of the states' ability to maintain social supports for their political objectives, as well as to alter the states' national interests and preferences. Where in certain environments they may prefer the way of cooperation with other states in the international system.⁴² Neoclassical realism also serves the explanation of different roles that played by states on different level of the international system. Besides, it highlights that states to be acted rationally based on the calculation of costs and benefits such the flexibility to cooperate with other international actors. Moreover, neoclassical realists also put the importance of the international image of the states. In order to establish the sphere of influence on the international scene. Propaganda plays a role to be an important instrument to achieve it.

Zakaria articulates that despite a state may has an opportunity to increase the scope of its foreign policy thanks to an increase of its relative power capabilities, but the specific of when, why, and how it realizes not certain.⁴³ Neoclassical realist present to define these scope to the state's foreign policy. Neoclassical realism differ to neorealism due to it explains that a state more pursues its foreign policies rather than systemic outcomes. So,

⁴⁰ Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds), *Op.Cit.*, p.7

⁴¹ Norrin M Ripsman, *Op.Cit.*, p. 53


⁴² Charles L. Glaser, "Structural Realism in A More Complex World", *Review of International Studies*, 2003, Vol. 29, Issue 03, pp.409-411.

⁴³ Fareed Zakaria, *Op.Cit.*, p.12

neoclassical realism is a realist foreign policy.⁴⁴ However, states “often pursue misguided foreign policy because domestic politics intrude into the policy-making process and trump sound strategic logic.”⁴⁵

In sum, neoclassical realism helps leaders to measure of relations with other states, which impacts the domestic groups have on decision-making process, how decision-makers assess the international system and power of state while managing the crisis. The basic assumptions of neoclassical realism with its variables shortly is drawn in below graphic as follows:

Figure 1.1. Foreign Policy Analysis in Neoclassical Realism Theory



⁴⁴ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 2000, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: defensive Realism”, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.3., pp.132-134.

⁴⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, 2009, “Reckless States and Realism”, *International Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2, p.245.

4 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

This section attempts to describe Indonesia's foreign policy as detail. For getting the essential explanation about Indonesia's foreign policy, the explanation will be divided by sections as follow. In historical context, Indonesia foreign policy is hardly apart from the speech of Mohammad Hatta before the Central Indonesian National Committee on 2 September 1948. It was laying to the main principle of Indonesian foreign policy later is so called Independent and Active Foreign Policy. This matter will have explained at the next sub-section essentially. All the aspects also have shaped it that decolonialisation experienced for hundred years, fought and struggled against the colonial forces or nations transformed Indonesia to be a independent nation-state respecting and depending on struggle and diplomacy.

Furthermore, after getting the essential concept or main principle of Independent and Active shaping Indonesian foreign policy, later the next essential matter of basic consideration/ foundation in formulation of foreign policy is introduced. Its orientation and practices was shaped by historical legacy, particularly the experiences under colonialism. Eventually, foreign policy continues to change by times affected the the changes globally and locally. It also works to Indonesian foreign policy. Hence, shifting of actor and formulation process in Indonesian foreign policy also is discussed. In general, Indonesia foreign policy since independence in 1945 till 1998 (at initial time of reform era), it was more much based on the hard powers. However, turn into era of reform, Indonesia has conducted foreign policy by adopting soft diplomacy approach, while came to the democratisation era with putting more attentions into the international norms and values. In this sense, in dealing with the global changes and pursuing national interests, Indonesia is prefer democracy and negotiation approaches.

4.1.1 Principle of Independent and Active Foreign Policy

The historical legacy of Indonesia foreign policy of Independent and Active is originated from the speech of Mohammad Hatta in front of the Central Indonesian National Committee on 2 September 1948. However, another source also reveals that the fundamental principle had been delivered by Sultan Sjahrir on his speech of Inter Asian

Relations Conference in New Delhi.⁴⁶ Then, Hatta asserted that so called Independent and Active foreign policy.

Pancasila (Indonesian Five Fundamental Principles) is a guideline of independent and active politics. In essence, Pancasila is hardly accepted liberal concept led to put forward individual over collective interests. Likewise, it does not adopted communism concept only led to prefer communal value in the social life. Pancasila is basic Indonesian philosophy of life. It is not close to either liberal or communism ideology. The basic characteristics of independent and active policy such anti-collonialism, anti-imperialism, non-alignment, and serving national interests.⁴⁷

Before so far explaining the concept of Independent and Active foreign policy, as first this work presents a historical stage behind Indonesian predecessors had employed that policies as the fundamental principle remains shaping Indonesian foreign policy today. As a new independent state, Indonesia would had to maintain its independence of the colonial nations as the continued threats to the state's sovereignty. As a colonized nation for centuries shaped Indonesians to resisted of anything they perceived an effort to colonize it again by every means. Likewise, because of that, Indonesia always to pursue the friendship and peaceful senses of policy with all nations based on mutual respect and non-interference.

In atmosphere of Cold War, Indonesia remained to believe that struggle for world peace, a policy based on reality. Indonesia decided not to aligned with either U.S.-led bloc or Uni Soviet-led bloc. It also did not participate in any third bloc as it would spark new suspicions and enmities. Indonesia's policy had been associated with term of "Neutrality". However, in Hatta's article cited on *Foreign Affairs*, he expressed it is not that either.⁴⁸ He continues explaining "neutrality" has a precise meaning in international law, defining a condition of impartiality toward conflicted states in the war. He truly acknowledges neutrality in the world solidarity having mean as an anti-social status. However, this condition would contrary, if the world war broke out. Indonesia would not possible to be other than neutral. Since the war is a special case in relation with others.

⁴⁶ Tayeb, T.M. Hadi. **Sejarah Diplomasi Republik Indonesia Dari Masa ke Masa Periode 1945-1950**, Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 1996, pp. 117-121.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴⁸ Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Affairs", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1953, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/indonesia/1953-04-01/indonesias-foreign-policy>, (retrieved on October 30, 2017)

Unfortunately, Indonesia had to face a situation wholly different during the periods of Second World War. Indonesia had been stand under international pressures due to the western nations tend to assert the weaker nations that there was no middle position. Nevertheless, Indonesia's policy was not one of neutrality. Logically, a nation such Indonesia which has desire to enjoy the independence should choose a free world (in side with the Communist states). Indonesia argued its position was not constructed in reference to belligerent states, but for the aims to strengthening and maintaining peace. Indonesia did not favour two opposed blocs, it followed its own path.

Conditions mentioned above put term of "Independent" policy. In other side, the definition of "Active" policy is meant the efforts to preserve the peace and to relaxe the tension caused by the two blocs, through endeavors supported if possible by the majority the members of the United Nations. The foundation of this policy was laid by Indonesian government and delivered to the Working Committee of the Provisional Parliament on September 1948, as follows:

"Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian Government is of opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. . . . The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face. . . . The lines of Indonesia's policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interests to service."⁴⁹

Independent policy also defines a definite standpoint and strive to settle of the issue in order to preserve, protect, and while possible enhance and strengthen national interests. Essentially, the independence, sovereignty and territory of the state will not be threatened. While Indonesia does not get involved in any armed conflict except a direct attack threatening its independence and sovereignty. By implementing independent policy, Indonesia could both preserving from damage its own interests and permitting for having relations with all nations on a basis of mutual respect.

⁴⁹ Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs", *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1953, p.446

In short, Independent policy is a policy pursuing peace and aiming to guarantee freedom in the country. It also minimizes possibility of attack and prevents the outbreak of third world war as believed by Indonesians. For Indonesians, other reasons conducting Independent policy, *firstly* with considering the geographical factor. Indonesia is located lying between two continents, Asia and Australia, as well as surrounded by two vast oceans, the Indian and the Pacific. Given Indonesia's territory extends for more than 300 miles and is compounded by thousands Islands, small and large. Consequently, Indonesia must maintains properly security issue prevails. Indonesians believe the territory cannot only be defended by military measures. Maintaining peace and good relations can prevent possibility of attacks. *Secondly*, another reason behind having relations with diverse countries is economic factor. Indonesia's land is rich in raw materials and various natural resources. However, Indonesia is still dependent on export in large portion and not capable yet to convert its raw materials into finished industrial goods. Therefore, such economic factor shaping Indonesia's independent policy in order to safeguard its national interests.

In the beginning of 1945 Constitution, the principle of Indonesian foreign policy manifested into term of "Independent and Active". At the first paragraph of the beginning of 1945 Constitution said:

"...that verily independence is the right of all nations and therefore colonialism must be abolished from the face of the earth, for it is not compatible with humanitarianism and justice."⁵⁰

Then, at the fourth paragraph mentioned:

"Furthermore, to form a Government of Indonesia to protect the whole Indonesian Nation and the entire Indonesian homeland and to advance general welfare, to stimulate the nation and to participate in the implementation of world order founded on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, ..."⁵¹

According to the first and fourth paragraphs of the beginning of 1945 Constitution are likely containing the basic principles of Indonesian foreign policy namely. *First*, anti-colonialism; *Second*, upholding the equality among nations in the world; *Third*, national interests; *Fourth*, participating actively in settling global problems multilaterally and institutionally.

⁵⁰ For detail see at the beginning of 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

The principle of Active and Independent in Indonesia foreign policy can not separated of situation on international and domestic environments at that time. In his speech with title “Rowing Between Two Reefs”, Mohammad Hatta viewed that in addressing the situation of Cold War, Indonesia must be in a neutral party in term of no taking side in any of power blocs. The core meaning of that speech is Indonesia taking role as a subject or independent actor in deal with international problems. The principle of Independent and Active is response and strategy of Indonesia fight for its independence during the Cold War that dividing world into two conflicted ideological blocs.

Mohammad Hatta argues these principle is not a neutral politics due to Indonesia’s foreign policy not addressed towards two or more countries at war. Likewise, he points out, “Independent” has general definition reflecting a high level of nationalism and refuses engagement over any parties reducing Indonesia’s sovereignty.⁵² The principle of “Active” means Indonesia strongly attempting to manage peace and settle conflict among nations in accordance with the ideals of United Nations.⁵³

He emphasizes as well, the principle of Independent and Active firmly is held by Indonesia built on the four key assumptions. *Firstly*, the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy should be built on the principles of Pancasila as state ideology. *Secondly*, Indonesia’s foreign policy should be aimed at efforts to meet and protect national interest as it has been affirmed in Preamble of 1945 Constitution. *Thirdly*, national interests should be achieved through independent policies. *Fourthly*, Indonesia’s foreign policy should be implemented pragmatically in accordance with facts and situations faced.⁵⁴

Active and Independent policy, Indonesia’s non alignment policy as well could not be interpreted as Indonesia’s willingness for establishing another power bloc among Asia and Africa nations. He also affirmed the implementation of Independent and Active foreign policy represent an effort of Indonesia in managing friendship and mutual

⁵² Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Hatta dan Politik Luar Negeri”, *Kompas*, 1998, www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0208/09/nasional/hatt39.html, (retrieved on November 21, 2017)

⁵³ Mohammad Hatta, “Dasar Politik Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia”, in Endang Basri Ananda, Sori Siregar & Mien Joebhaar (eds.), **Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta: Buku 3, Perdamaian Dunia dan Keadilan Sosial**, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2001, p. 469.

⁵⁴ Rizal Sukma, **Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship**, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 20.

cooperation with any nations with different ideology and governmental system in behalf on mutual respects.⁵⁵

4.1.2 Basic Considerations of Foreign Policy-Making

The essential factor shaping Indonesia foreign policy is Pancasila (Five Principles). It constitutes the basic national philosophy of Indonesian's social life, in reference to the beginning of 1945 Constitution. In order to understand Indonesian policy, it must realise the essential of these principles for Indonesian's life. The Pancasila contains five fundamental principles and embedded in the Preamble of 1945 Constitution. It carries the acknowledgement of Indonesia is based upon belief on God as first principle, second to five principle are humanism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. The first principle means a declaration that majority of Indonesian people believe in God and acknowledgement the existence of basic moral values. Consequently, Indonesian national policy is formulated as well contains a strong moral base. The second to fifth of five principles (humanism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice) reflected from the ideals pursued of the Indonesian national movement and give spirit to the struggle.

Indonesians have accepted the Pancasila in light of enjoying prosperity, peace and freedom in whole society as well as in achieving completely sovereign and constitutional state of free Indonesia which shall be governed by justice. The Pancasila are embodied in 1945 Constitution with aiming to guide government and be incorporated in governmental programs. Achievement of the Pancasila's ideals of a free Indonesia and peace require the establishment of international relations partially.

Pancasila gave birth as a middle way to represent Indonesia's identity which is neither secular nor theocratic.⁵⁶ Given the Pancasila is the compromised solution, it has impacted to Indonesia's foreign policy with "double identity" in relations with the West and the Muslim world in different political regime of Indonesia.⁵⁷

The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia designed in harmony with the principles of Pancasila. It has ruled that in conducting the foreign policy, the executive and legislative branches of Indonesia's government will work out in a democratic manner. The

⁵⁵ Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia diantara Blok-blok Negara Besar", dalam dalam Endang Basri Ananda, Sori Siregar & Mien Joebhaar (ed), **Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta: Buku 3, Perdamaian Dunia dan Keadilan Sosial**, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2001, p.503.

⁵⁶ Rizal Sukma, **Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy**, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 37

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40

aim of Indonesia's foreign policy referred to the Constitution is to strengthen the principle of peace and international solidarity as written in the charter of United Nations. In achieving these aims, Indonesia's government shall work with participating in international organization and endeavor to solve the differences or conflicts with other states in a peaceful manner.

Indonesia's foreign policy of independence and active is an expression of these aims. In order to succeed that required internal consolidation. Indonesia will hold in international significance if only internal consolidation has been achieved. However, it depends upon the success of the independent policy. Indonesia realizes that it is a middle power and still has no effective influences on the relationships of the two opposed blocs (commonly among great powers) in international politics. But it believes in the moral strength of the conciliation's policy would be achieved.

Indonesia as a most populated Muslim country in the world is inevitable for the inclusion of Islam factor into its foreign policy's consideration. In terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation, Islam considered as a societal factor within state. Islamic factor is key in regard to relations toward Muslim world. Though Indonesia government never claimed that its relations with Muslim issues in behalf on Islam or religious considerations. In fact, participation in various foreign policy issues either in relations with Muslim world's issues or in response to Middle East conflicts, Islam as a societal and political factor not to be considered as political ideology factor, it influences its foreign policy.

In Indonesia domestic environment, Islam is paramount of social and political factors in shaping the Muslim political and social movements. Therefore, it is embedded in Indonesia's foreign policy. The existence of Islamic factor in the Indonesia's foreign policy presents pro and contra among scholars focusing Indonesian studies.

Scholars arguing Islam or religious consideration in the Indonesia's responses in Muslim world explain that its involvements on peace process and Middle East's conflicts were based purely on national interests. Indonesia's basic principle has been Pancasila and not Islam. So, as a political ideology, Islam is hardly found in any Indonesia's foreign policy decision. However, in dealing relations with Israel, Indonesia recognizes the influence of Islam factors and Islamic forces prevalent in the country.

In the meantime, other scholars claiming Islamic factor is a most determinant factor in Indonesia's relations with Muslim world. They explore the importance of domestic

forces influencing a country's foreign policy. However, it should be considered as well at the actors involved in and their motivations behind a particular foreign policy. In case of Indonesia, Indonesia's majority population is formed by Muslim community. Indonesia's domestic political variable which is Muslim community and the Muslim political movements. There distinction between Islam as a political ideology and as a social and political factors influencing foreign policy. Indonesian politics should be studied not by referring to Islam but by focusing at Muslims who form the majority of the population and who have played an active role in political activities. So that, Islam can not be ignored in Indonesia's politics and foreign policy by referring to Muslims as the domestic political variable.

Indonesia foreign policy has been built based on a strong idealism. Those consist of fundamental basis, principal and ultimate goals. Constitutional basis of Indonesia's foreign policy is 1945 Constitution and ideological basis so called Pancasila. 1945 Constitution contains Indonesia's national ultimate goals particularly mentioning at the second and four paragraphs. Implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy must be a reflection of national ideology, Pancasila. It is also a preference source of Indonesia in making and determining foreign policy choices and acts.

Indonesia's national ultimate goals is committing national developments. In this term, Indonesia will have strive to realize a conducive international environment in order to achieve national developmental goals as mentioned at the second and fourth alineas of the beginning of 1945 Constitution. Besides, as operational basis, all government in tenure release articles of constitution and presidential decrees which are in line with national interests.

4.1.3 Concentric Circle Approach

In the context of Indonesia, a complexity of domestic issues namley state border, democratisation, economic development and multidimensional aspects reflected in the Indonesia's foreign policy. In particular, a long with non-traditional issues such as terrorism and environmentalism issues, economic development, human rights, and democratisation completely making issues that must be solved becoming complicated. Then, the involvement of state and non-state actors eventually affect sources, capability,

and instrument of foreign policy.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the characteristics of Indonesia's geography and changing trends on external environments also contributed.

Using of concentric circle approach in Indonesia's foreign policy by Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims to better conceptualize prioritized goals and to give emphasis to detail issues. This approach is expected as part of a strategy to accelerate Indonesia's position in international politics. It is also based on geographical orientations, dominated by a geopolitical paradigm and to define the strategic foreign policy orientations.

The concentric circle approach in Indonesia's foreign policy consists of multiple circles. As a major pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy, the first circle is the ASEAN, the PIF, the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and the Tripartite Consultation between Indonesia, Australia, and Timor-Leste. The second circle consists of the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea), the United States and the major economic partners of Indonesia in the EU. The third circle includes cooperation with developing countries' groups namely the NAM, the OIC and the Group of 77. Besides, Indonesia's supporting on establishment of an independent state of Palestine and playing active roles in forums that bridging the gap between the developed and the developing countries such as the NAM, the OIC, the G-15, the G-77 and the D-8. The fourth circle consists of multilateralism cooperations through the United Nations. Indonesia's aiming is rejecting unilateralism and emphasizing the central role of the United Nations in resolving issues of international peace and security.⁵⁹

The articulation of these approach firstly was under Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. At that time, Indonesia focused on certain key regional and global institutions of which it was already a member. Whereas, at the era of President Soeharto was on domestic and regional political stability. As the first focus was on the ASEAN and second on the Asia Pacific region, the third on all the other countries and international organizations. In conclusion, the intentions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs applying the concentric circle approach in order to ensure a foreign policy that is both coherent and results oriented.

⁵⁸ Christopher Hill, **The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy**, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, 2003, pp.15-25.

⁵⁹ Aria Teguh Mahendra Wibisono, **Political Elites and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia**, Doctoral Thesis, Graduate School of Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 2009, p. 201.

4.2 TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.2.1 Principle of Turkey's Foreign Policy

Geopolitics is the most essential factor in determining Turkish foreign policy. Turkish geographical position neighboring an unstable region. This factor implies to the decision-makers to consider the regional changes especially the security context as a foreign policy issue that imposes security challenges. This position also affect with whom political affairs to be conducted. It also has prominent role to connect with historical roots, so that influence on the decision-making process. Mostly Turkish foreign policy in the region follows a realist foreign policy that demonstrates a balanced behavior between realism and idealism as well as economic factor and peace motivations. The economic factors is portrayed to encourage the ability of domestic politics aimed at shaping regional affairs.⁶⁰

On the one hand, Baskin Oran emphasizes the traditional Turkish foreign policy based on two essential pillars which namely the status quo principle and set up to maintain the western-oriented principle.⁶¹ It then continues to balance power that is seen fit with the western interests. On the other hand, basic principles of Turkish foreign policy are “a balance between security and freedom, zero problems with neighbors, a multidimensional foreign policy, a pro-active regional foreign policy, an altogether new diplomatic style, and rhythmic diplomacy”⁶²

Ahmet Davutoglu points out several principles of Turkish foreign policy. *First* a value based foreign policy. Given a democratization process run in the region, so Turkey set its foreign policy by maintaining a balance approach between pursuing its national interests and spreading democratic values. *Second*, a self-confidence attitude. In this regard, while Turkey has undergone a transformation process, so it will put all efforts confidently to face challenges and constraints. Besides, it also keeps to maintain coordination with its western allies, as long as not interfere its relations with neighbor countries and line with national goals.

⁶⁰ Nilufer Karacasulu, “Interpreting Turkey’s Middle East Policy in the Last Decade”, *All Azimuth*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2015, pp. 33-34

⁶¹ Turkey’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Old Alignments and New Neighbourhoods, International Conference St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, on 30 April-2 May 2010, South East European Studies at Oxford SEESOX, Oxford, 2011, p. 11

⁶² Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems in a New Era,” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 21 March 2013, <https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/21/zero-problems-in-a-new-era/>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

Third, a self-determination in conducting the state's foreign policy. In this context, Turkey will pursue an autonomous approach without strongly align with the foreign powers. In addition, Turkey conducts its foreign policy prioritising national interests and determines national visions and goals autonomously. In short, Turkey pursues to implement its own policies. *Fourth*, pursuit of a vision-oriented foreign policy to crisis management. Turkey strives to play an active role in undermining challenges within political transformation process in the regions. So, it pursues a balance harmonization between crisis and vision management.⁶³ It struggle to handle such regional transformation challenges by implementing its multi-dimensional diplomacy and sometimes it is headed by a crucial events that pose threats to its strategic national interests. So, it should adopt a security-oriented foreign policy.

4.2.2 Basic Considerations of Turkey's Foreign Policy-Making

As Baskin Oran argues Turkish foreign policy has established with two major systemic factors, as entailed *first* managing the national independence and achieving national security, *second* preserving the country's status quo, the identities of modernist and secularist, as well as national regime.⁶⁴

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, its foreign policy is mostly shaped and considered in accordance with the Western-oriented foreign policy. Since the Cold war, Turkey has been a NATO western ally, so it mostly guides the foreign policy in line with its western-oriented NATO alliance policy especially in term of security pillar. Besides, despite its EU membership dialogue is ups and downs, Turkish foreign decision-makers set the foreign policy in the line with the ideal of integrating with the EU.⁶⁵ Furthermore, being a NATO member, Turkey would bridge between the West and the regional countries. Especially the regions close to Europe including the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Black Sea. Thus, the background of its western orientation might lead its foreign policy to become a regional power.

The geographical location of Turkish territory around an unstable region as well as the problematic and complicated security issues with neighbor countries also affect to the

⁶³Ahmet Davutoglu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring", *Turkey Policy Brief Series Third Edition*, International Policy and Leadership Institute TEPAV, 2012, pp.3-5

⁶⁴ Baskin Oran (ed.), **Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, 12.Baskı, Cilt I, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.46-49.

⁶⁵H. Burc Aka, "Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy after Post-Cold War", *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, No.3, 2014, p.59

foreign policy that will be adopted. This such kind of situation situates it to adopted a security-oriented foreign policy. Turkey is a NATO member with a large Muslim population, neoliberal-oriented economy policy, and ruled by a secular democratic regime. With its uniqueness of western and eastern identity, it could leverage itself in establishing a bridge between the Muslim world and the West countries. The basis of complementary alliance policy has been taken into strong consideration of Turkish foreign-policy making.

Moreover, beyond the military dimension within the framework of NATO alliance policy, Turkey also motivated to pursue its political dimension of ideological-oriented policy. Yet, within the conflict and crisis situations, Turkey prioritizes to much more consider its survival and security concerns in natural. So, the main paradigm of Turkish foreign policy is western-oriented approach and policy. Turkey still strives to prefer its complimentary alliance policy with the West especially as a NATO alliance policy in military. Another factor is contributed to drive in foreign decision-making of Turkish foreign policy is the significant development of regional politics and the challenge of its domestic politics.⁶⁶ Given Turkish territory is close to an unstable region of the world.

5 FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN TURKEY AND INDONESIA

5.1 A SHIFT OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN TURKEY

In the context of foreign policy actor, the most significant change in Turkish foreign policy-making is a decline of military influence in shaping foreign policy. Since the most determined actor was the military. Instead, the rise of civilian actors including an increase of non-governmental organizations and independent research centers. In formulation process of Turkish foreign policy orientation, it has shifted by rebalancing its exceedly Western-centric orientation⁶⁷ to diversified-centric orientation. In other words, the rise of non-state actors emerged.

Turkey has experienced another domestic change compared to the past decades, namely Turkish rise to be an economic power. Turkish economic of gross domestic

⁶⁶Galip Dalay, "Report: Drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy: Part II Imperative of Regional Politics, not Personality or Ideology, Drives Turkish Policy", 9 April 2017, *Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies*, p.3

⁶⁷ Galip Dalay, "Report Turkish Foreign Policy after Davutoglu: Continuity vs. Rupture", July 14, 2016, *Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies*, p.4

product became quadrupled, which its export increased by a factor of five, the value of traded stocks by a factor of 40 and foreign direct investment by a factor of 25 since 1990⁶⁸ when Turkish has started to shift its economic policy to a neoliberal-centric policy. Turkey has integrated its domestic political challenge into its adopted-foreign policy. In short, it shows a drastically change from a prioritization of military strength (concerning to national security and foreign military threats) to global economic cooperation.⁶⁹ Besides, Turkey has strived to become an independent actor of its foreign policy. In this regards, Turkey seems that it set to decrease its alignment with the West countries. The ideas of western value within its foreign affairs also decreased slowly. In this context, Turkey and the West will establish cooperation when both countries' interests align rather than based on a shared values.

In foreign policy-making as well, as Pinar Ipek argues that there are an increasingly the role of ideas force and material interests⁷⁰, that in past decades were tend to be ignored. Those have been in line with the rise of soft power approach in conducting state's foreign policy. She describes that the ideas force regard to a shared normative values of Turkey's regional historical roots and cultural ties. While the material interests demonstrated through Turkish growing to be a trading state.

In the level of bureaucracy, the main foreign policy leadership is hold by the Prime Minister and the chief foreign policy advisor (Foreign Minister). Besides, the role of important political figures, a group of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coupled with other relevant state institutions. Those actors cooperate and involve into the foreign policy decision-making process.

Another major transformations are Turkish reconsideration to prioritise its regional and global roles in the foreign policy formulation process. Turkey position itself to take a global activism that pushed by the changing in international and domestic factors. Those all marked through conducting soft diplomacy that represented by a new broad range of investments, opening of diplomatic offices across the world, promoting a developmental

⁶⁸Svante E. Cornell, "Changes in Turkey: What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?", *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2012, p. 17

⁶⁹ Joerg Baudner, "The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.16, No.3, 2014, p.86

⁷⁰ Pinar Ipek, "Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No.11, 2015, pp.173-174

and humanitarian aid diplomacy.⁷¹ These shifts demonstrate that Turkey is building the independence within its foreign policy, going far from its traditional foreign policy namely an alignment to the Western power. In addition, it has been prioritising to secure its own formulated-foreign policy and pursuing an expectation to be a global rising power. Furthermore, Turkish soft diplomacy reached its successes with participating a large engagement of non-state actors coupled with the implementation of such cultural, public and humanitarian diplomacy.

5.2 A SHIFT OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND FORMULATION IN INDONESIA

At the beginning of declaration of independence in 1945, Indonesia's foreign policy was directed to maintain independence and attempted to get international support and recognition upon independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Independent and Active foreign policy aimed at preserving Indonesia's independence in the context of the Cold War, but it underwent change when President Soekarno issued Presidential Decree on July 5th 1959. At that time, dominant actor in foreign policy making was President Soekarno with introducing three different ideology namely nationalism, religion, and communism.⁷² Indonesia's foreign policy implemented in the form of nationalism and revolution spirits. It was reflected in attitude of anti neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism.

The orientation, practice and actor of Indonesia's foreign policy underwent changes during the new order under President Soeharto. Compared to the old order era of President Soekarno, in term of foreign policy orientation and practice, Indonesia began to shift by trying to engage actively at various international issues particularly by focusing to respect, promote and fulfill the citizens' rights. Its actions were manifested by joining international community. In response to the Global Financial Crisis at the new order era, Indonesia realised that need to have a broader view by binding itself to the international norms or values particularly human right issues.

During the old and new order governments, Indonesia's foreign policy could be categorized into hard and low profile. Meanwhile, in the early of reform era, its profile was often be simplified as just "no profile". The reason why was policy choices tend to not

⁷¹ Federico Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi, "Becoming Global Actor: The Turkish Agenda for the Global South", *Rising Power Quarterly*, Vol.1, Issue 2, 2016, p.109

⁷² Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, **Indonesia and the Muslim World: Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond**, NIAS Press, Copenhagen, 2007, p.11

clear and consistent because of transition of government creating domestic instability. Foreign policy mainly aimed at improvement of Indonesia's image on international world that was hit by domestic economic and political crisis.

In the President Soeharto era, political system tend to running elitist. It made foreign policy to be elitized and participation of public was much more limited. Since the fall of President Soeharto, domestic political system was altered significantly. There was opportunities to reformulate and institutionalize Indonesia's foreign policy. An opportunity of the birth of the spirit of populism provided by reforms. However, in fact, the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy sometimes seems elitist.

Since 1998, Indonesia refrained its foreign policy orientation and practice based on hard power resources to a more soft power based diplomacy such as more constructive attitude, image building, adaptive to the global issues namely human rights, environment, terrorism, multilateral approach and global scope as well. The changing international trends and pressures also altered Indonesia to make up the new identity of democracy.

As general, the dominant actor in formulation of foreign policy at the old and new order eras was President-centric actor. In the old order government, Indonesia's foreign policy was much more influenced by President Soekarno perceiving of Indonesia's position in the international world and world itself. So, Soekarno's view of anti-colonial implemented into Indonesia's foreign policy which was later much more opposed to the West. In line with the old order, the new order government, President was most influential actor in foreign policy making. Military also had more influence in decision-making process. On the contrary, the new order government built strong relations with Western countries in term of opportunities for economic development by opening widely foreign investments and receiving foreign aids.

After the reform era, a significant shift in formulation of Indonesia's foreign policy is a pattern of executive heavy to public heavy. In this context, at two prior governments (the old and new order), in formulation of foreign policy was a President-centric model in which it had much more influence or determinant actor. Due to the development of democratization process in Indonesia, public has become a new actor of foreign policy-making and President was no longer as a single actor. Public has a large space to participate at implementation of foreign policy through public opinions either on parliament or non-governmental organizations. In short, the shift of Indonesia's foreign policy actors can be summarised through below table:

Table 1.2. A Shift of Indonesia's Foreign Policy (1945-current)

	Orientation	Primary Objective	Actor	Profile
Old order (1945-1965)	Anti-colonialism and imperialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defending Indonesia's sovereignty from foreign power • Attempting to get international support and recognition upon independence from world 	President-centric (as a single actor)	Hard profile (hard power)
New order (1965-1998)	Began to actively participating in various international issues particularly human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focusing on economic development • Build image of Indonesia as a pioneer and leader in the Southeast Asia region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military and President (1967-1980s) • President-centric (1980-1998) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low profile to be assertive profile • Hard power and a little bit of soft power
Beginning of Reform era (1998-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Particularly human right issues • The new identity of democracy 	Maintaining domestic economic and political stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seems still elitist • Since the era of President Megawati, the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs fulfilled by diplomat career and MFA gained a large role of foreign affairs issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Often be simplified just a no-profile • Primarily soft power
Post-reform era (2004-current)	Multi issues (human rights, environment, terrorism, multilateral approach and global scope)	Improvement of national image in international stage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sometimes elitist • A large participation of public • Multi-actor (President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Parliament) 	Opportunities of populism back in Multidimensional diplomacy (soft power)

CHAPTER II

AN OVERVIEW OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1 TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

1.1 PRIOR TO AKP PARTY GOVERNMENT

1.1.1 Ataturk Period (1923-1938): Westernization and Secularization

After declaration independence of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was pointed as first Turkish Republic President. In his tenure, Turkey's foreign policy was shaped with the principles of western values and secularism. The main orientation was to secure independence, thus it focused on the domestic developments and to seek the way for solving the territorial disputes with neighbour countries. Turkey prevented to engage into the conflict with Western countries. It did not want to active opposite the west. In the line with its secularism and westernization, it kept distant with the Middle East region during 1920s and 1930s.⁷³

After the first world war, Arab world remained to be ruled by foreign power mandates. Syria and Lebanon were under France mandate, Iraq and Jordania to be ruled by British mandate, while Gulf countries and north Africa were not independence yet.⁷⁴ Turkish territorial disputes and security border with Irak resolved by Ankara agreement in 1926. While the Hatay issue with Syria had not yet been completely finished. Sanjak rule decided to join with Turkey in 1939. However Syrian rule did not recognize.

In relations with Middle East region, Turkey did not entirely keep distant to the region. For instances, Turkey enhanced relations with Iran. Turkey signed Sadabad Pact in 1937, to reassure security borders with Iran and Afghanistan and to settle territorial border dispute with Iraq amid the end of British mandate. In that situation, Turkish foreign policy was shaped by security concern and adopted defensive approach.

Meanwhile, since the independence war to before the second world war, Turkey was close to the Soviet Union. Ankara and Moscow signed a "friendship and brotherhood" agreement on March 16, 1921. Through this agreement, Soviet recognizes Turkish independence and entire territories within "Misak-i Milli", but not mentions the Soviet's

⁷³ Oral Sander, "Türkiye ve Ortadoğu", in Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, İmge Publishing, Ankara, 1998, p. 47.

⁷⁴ Mehmet Şahin, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası: Süreklilik ve Değişim", *Akademik Orta Doğu*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010.

financial and military assistances to Turkey during the independence war.⁷⁵ This close relations with the Soviet and the shift of military power to the west in bordering area with the Soviet had strengthen Turkey in facing the west countries, in case of Anadolulu's west region was occupied by Greece and its South region was under France and Italya powers.⁷⁶ After signing the "friendship and neutrality" agreement with Moscow on December 17, 1925, two countries upgraded their trade relations in 1927. By the middle 1930s, they continued their harmony relations.

In other side, the Mosul problem was resolved through the "Turkish-Irak Border and Good Neighbourhood" agreemeent between Turkey and British on June 5, 1926. This agreemeent explains that after Turkey left Mosul to Irak, it would get about 10 per cent of Irak's oil income. Since then, Turkey and British relations went away of tense following a full recognition of straits' legitimacy to Turkey through Lozan Agreement. This agreement covers Turkish military presence was not allowed in the straits and the traffic of trade and military ships through the straits would be managed by Strait International Committee.⁷⁷ The principal dynamic on Turkey's rapproached to British in 1930s was determined by Italya's enlargement policy to Balkan and Mediterranean regions and in order to balance these situation, Turkey closed to British.⁷⁸

Later, Italya was perceived as a threat to Turkish security amid Italya occupation on Arnavut and enhacing militarization activity in Aegea islands, wherein France and British remained to prevail in the region. Those changed the balance of power in Mediterranean and Balkan regions. In this situation, Turkey got an opportunity to ask the legitimation over straits that regulated in Lozan Agreement. Following the rising threats near to the war, Turkey requested a new straits order by sending a nota to involved countries of Lozan Strait Agreement on April 10, 1936. Eventually Turkey won the securitization right in starits through Montreux Agreement signed on July 20, 1936. This agreement permitted to undermine the straits committee and Turkish has legitimacy on securtysize (militarization right) the straits, nevertheless it has no permanent authority to order the traffic of trade ships and the warships during the peace. However, this agreement already broke Turkish and the Soviet relations.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Bulent Gokay, **Emperyalizm ve Bolsevizm Arasinda Turkiye**, Sermet Yalcin (translator), Agora Publisher, Istanbul, 2006, pp. 148-150.

⁷⁶ Ali Balci, *Turkiye Dis Politikasi: Ilkler, Aktorler, Uygulamalar*, Etkilesim Publishing, Istanbul, 2015, p. 35

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44

1.1.2 Inonu Period (1938-1950): Active Neutrality and Approachment to the West

After the second Cold War, Turkey got a guarantee to be an ally of the U.S. and British. It was followed with severing economic and diplomatic relations with German in August 1944. In other side, the Soviet saw the Balkan and straits as its influence spheres. In this context, Turkey should not be ally of the western countries in order to benefit itself. After the meeting between Stalin and Churchill in September 1944, the Montreux agreement would be changed. Of course, Turkey was suspicious that its western allies would leave it against the Soviet. This suspicious had reason behind, for examples, in case of the future of Twelve island, there was no serious initiative from the west ally. Even, Greece self-proclaimed the belonging of Meis and Twelve islands and took a guarantee from British. Due to the Soviet factor to take influence in Aegea and Mediterranean Seas, Twelve island decided to be owned by Greece. Later, Turkey was pessimistic to the Meis island.⁸⁰

The Soviet demanded an evaluation of Montreux Agreement in regard on Turkish position on the straits in Yalta Conference on February 10, 1945. However it was not be an agenda in the Yalta. As a west ally, Turkey also declared war on German and Japan on February 23, 1945. Eventhough Turkey had right to be a member of the UN as symbolic and been allowed to join Yalta conference, it did not provide a guarantee to Turkish security. While, Turkey had undergone a economic crisis due to its participation into the war and Soviet rejection on Montreux Convention led to be a threat for Turkey. Besides, its west ally had no serious response to Turkish's Soviet threat. Turkey-the Soviet immediately came into depth tenses. Eventually, the west began to provide security assistance to Turkey, especially the U.S against the Soviet threats. However, in return, Turkey became its key ally in relations with the interest in the Middle East and Mediterranean. For example, in case of the Soviet's military base in Libya.⁸¹ In particular, after the Moscow Conference, President Truman began harshly to oppose the Soviet in December 1945.⁸²

⁸⁰ Süleyman Seydi, "On İki Adaların Yunanistan'a Devrinde İngilizlerin Rolü", *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol. 140, 2005, pp. 50-57.

⁸¹ Süleyman Seydi, **The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreaux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947**, The Isis Press, Istanbul, 2003, pp. 211-212.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 212

In order to secure the U.S. interests in the region, the U.S. insisted to assist the regional countries. President Truman began to prepare a policy against the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The Soviet threatened Turkey and Greece. The U.S. and British declared war on the Soviet. And the U.S. immediately implemented the Cold War policy in the region. It provoked the Soviet by the “Missouri” of the U.S. warship passing the strait and would be stayed in Istanbul port by 9 April. Turkey perceived that the U.S. would side with Turkey.⁸³ The Soviet once sent a nota to Turkey on August 7, 1946 that the Soviet’s willing of common protection on the straits with Turkey. Eventually a long diplomatic debate on the straits came to end with the diplomatic stances of British and the U.S. on Turkey by sending a nota on September 18, 1946. Later, Turkey-the Soviet relations strained. In other side, Turkey rapidly integrated into the West ally.

1.1.3 Menderes Period (1950-1960): Pro-Active Western Policy

International system and global geopolitical structure had been reshaped after the second world war. Turkish has become the West ally, while its relations with Russia came to wide gap. A common threat of Russia, had encouraged Turkey to join a military pact of Western countries, the NATO. Initially, as a part of Truman Doctrine in 1947, Turkey got economic and technical assistance within Marshall Plan scheme, then officially joined the NATO in 1952. At that time, this choice led it to get opportunity and benefit for its national interest. Turkey perceived a security threat of Russia in which the Soviet’s demands on Turkish territory and the straits.

The U.S. interest in the Middle East, directly engaged its ally, Turkey. Eventhough, its relations with the Middle East nations more halted after the fall of the Ottoman Empire followed the westernization in Republic of Turkey, Turkey was back to arise relations with the region in line with the role of the Western ally (especially the NATO). Several nations in the Middle East achieved the independence. However, the situation in the region remained under the Cold War influence. Turkey pursued a parallel policy with the West countries in the region.⁸⁴ In this context, Turkey strived to secure its national interest namely to contain the Soviet threats on its national security. A containment of Soviet also was one of the Western policy in the Middle East.

⁸³ Süleyman Seydi, “Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.17, No.1, 2006, pp. 126-127.

⁸⁴ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye’nin Arap Ortadoğusuna Karşı Politikası 1945-1970*, (2nd edition), Ankara, Barış Kitap, 2010, p.

Several interests of the U.S. in the region such as *first* to prevent and limit the Soviet influence in the region in response the George Kennan, U.S. ambassador for the Soviet, containment policy, *second* to guarantee the west access to the region oil fields and *third* to secure Israel, the U.S. important ally. The west adopted status-quo policy and to maintain the regime presence which secured the U.S. and west alliance interests.⁸⁵ For examples, stepping down of Mossadeq regime in Iran, where the western interest was unsecure in Iran.

As a western ally, Turkish relations in the Middle East were mostly shaped by its ally interests, and sometimes Turkey denied itself interest. The most significant of Turkish roles in the Middle East during these period were the establishment of Baghdad Pact and relations with Israel. *First*, Turkish had significant role in establishment of military regional pact that pro-west stance against the Soviet and Communism influences threat. Turkey improved relations with pro-west regimes including Iraq. Together with Iraq established Baghdad Pact in 1955. Post Mossadeq, Iran got security guarantee from the U.S. and NATO against the Soviet. Thus, Iran was under Pahlevi applied westernization policy and joined Baghdad Pact.⁸⁶ Beyond Iraq, there was no Arab countries joining Bagdad Pact. They opposed Turkey after it claimed Hatay of Syria and Syria's close relations with the Soviet caused a tense relations with Syria and Egypt. Those moves reflected it as the main ally of the west.

Second, Turkey pro-western policy in the region also included within its good relations with Israel. The several factors increasing the anti-Arab sentiment in Arab world were the rise of Arab nationalism, the disappointment of Arab nationalists to the West that not meet the promise to provide the independence of Arab nations and the independence of Israel state. Due to the west ally in the region, Turkey became the first country that recognized the independence of Israel in the region. This move sparked the sentiment of Arab nationalist against Turkey, since Israel is a common foe and threat for Arab world. Turkish parallel relations with the west and Israel had resulted a negative image of Turkish in the eye of Arab world for long times. However, its relations was downgraded because of the call of Turkish Ambassador from Israel in response of western alliance's military

⁸⁵ Fred Halliday, **The Middle East in International Relations**, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 97-129

⁸⁶ İsmail Soysal, **Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları (1945-1990)**, Second Edition, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2000, p.501

attack on Egypt when President Nasser implemented a nationalization policy of Suez Canal in 1956. However, this event did not change Turkish western policy in the region.

Other pro-west policy could be identified on several events such as *first* Turkey deployed troops in the border areas with Suriah amid the tense of Jordania and Suriah that immediately increased to be the Soviet Union-the U.S. tension. In accordance with Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) that had aim to contain the Soviet Communism threat and to get the U.S. assistance, while the use of military measure if necessary, Turkey conducted military movements in Al Jazair and Lebanon crisis. Turkey also insisted by the Kruscev Doctrine in 1957 that threat its security so it enhanced relations with the U.S. In addition, Turkey also involved into regime change to pro-western regime in Iraq through preparing a military intervention into Iraq alongside the U.S. and British in July 1958. After the allies recognized Iraq regime, Turkey did as well. Turkey suffered due to its pro-active western policy. Therefore, it decided not to align in the Middle east later. Moreover, it became much more far away to the Middle East region.

Meanwhile, in the framework of the NATO policy, Turkey employed activities to weaken the Soviet influence in Balkan region and it also got its security guarantee. The way to provide security in the region was Yugoslavia's member candidate of the NATO. Later, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece signed a Balkan Pact on February 28, 1953. Following the Bandung Conference inspired the non-alignment movement among third world countries in 1955, while Yugoslavia agreed to neutrality and the end of Soviet threat, hence it adopted a neutrality policy. However, Turkey responded in different way to the spirit of neutrality that produced of the conference. Fatin Rustu expressed that neutrality policy is false and the cooperation with the west should be taken because of the Communist threat.

Besides, the conflict between Turkey and Greece related on Cyprus issue, so the Balkan pact was collapsed. In other side, the long conflict on Cyprus issue involved Turkey and Greece was resolved within the conference hel in Zurich and London that decided the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. After the conference, the Guarantee Agreement signed. This agreement reaffirmed that England and Greece must get Turkish guarantee in related to the constitution and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

1.1.4 Military Vesayet (1960-1973): Pro-Western and Diversification Policy

In 1960s, Turkey found that its foreign policy did not line with the west ally. For example, the west ally did not support Turkey as their ally in case of Cyprus issue. The U.S. harshly responded Turkish attitude in Cyprus. On June 5, 1964, President Johnson sent a letter to President Inonu that the U.S. opposes Turkish intervention in Cyprus and threats it will not provide more assistance for Turkey, and if Turkey has conflict with the Soviet, it will not support at any measure.

This situation led Turkey to diversify its foreign affairs in order to get support of its foreign issue. In attempt of foreign affairs's diversification, Turkey improved relations with third world countries and upgraded ties with the Middle East countries. The international tension of East and West bloc were slowly lower. It benefited Turkey to ease its foreign diversification policy.

Meanwhile, after introducing multiparty system in the parlementer, the Islamic politics became more effective.⁸⁷ It opened opportunity to Islamist parties to take role in the domestic politics. Immediately, Turkish foreign policy put the importance of Islamic world and the Middle East region. However, it would not change the pro-western as its foreign policy base and status quo. Therefore, Turkish foreign and security policies in the Middle East strived to be harmonize once with its position as a western ally.

The diversification policy had impacted negatively to its relations with Israel. In this regard, Turkey had taken a firm stance toward Israel in case of Arab nations-Israel of 1967 war. Turkey firmly refused the use of air bases to attack Arab nations during the war in aim at preventing the U.S. assistance to Israel. Besides, it also sent humanitarian aids to Arab nations. In other case, it voted in favour for Arab nations in international forums, for example, in favour of 242 resolution the UNSC. It became a benchmark of Turkey's policy on Israel-Palestine conflict. Turkey stands for only recognizing the Israel official territory initial to 1967 war. Furthermore, it also recognizes the self-determination right of Palestinians and supports the independence of Palestine state.⁸⁸

Regarding relations with Europe countries, Turkey registered of the EEC member on July 31, 1959. The factors led it such as to strengthen relations with west countries, to

⁸⁷Gökhan Koçer, "Türk Dış Politikasında Din Unsuru," *Akademik Orta Doğu*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2006, p.

⁸⁸ Sühâ Bölükbaşı, "Türkiye ve İsrail: Mesafeli Yakınlıktan Stratejik Ortaklığa," Ş. Çalış, İ. Dağı ve R. Gözen (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, Ankara, Liberte, 2001, pp. 250-53

accelerate economic development and to prevent more the tense relations with Greece.⁸⁹ Through Ankara Agreement, it became an official member. In addition, by this membership, Turkey tried to balance relations with the U.S., hence it had maintained relations with European countries for long term in its foreign affairs. Ankara agreement preserves that Turkish workers had freely to enjoyed the opportunity jobs around European countries within the EEC framework and had more chance to request financial assistance in order to preserve the economic harmonization during seven years.

Meanwhile, after having a downgraded relations with the Soviet, during the period 1960-65, they had approached once following the high level official visits. The factors behind were *first* by lower tension of cold war, the conflicted countries within cold war could easily improved relations each others without systemic obstruction. *Second*, the Soviet under Nikita Khrushchev did not matter if Turkey ties with the west countries while having chance to improve ties with the Soviet.⁹⁰

1.1.5 **Bulent Ecevit and National Front (1973-1980): Multidimensional Policy**

After oil crisis in the Middle East region in 1973 that had impacted across world, the oil price rapidly increased. Turkey suffered as an oil import country. It had affected to the foreign exchange reserves crisis to Turkey. It forcibly fulfilled its oil domestic needs by foreign debt from oil export creditors of Arab countries.⁹¹ This crisis also shook European economic so Turkey remained to find a new export market in order to pay for oil debts. Thus, the Middle East next became its export market orientation. Due to its economic political needs, Turkey had enjoyed a bit close relations with the region. In addition, Cyprus crisis led to tense ties with the west alliance, thank to multidimensional policy, hence it continued to enhance ties with the Middle East countries.

In regard to Cyprus issue, the U.S. and third world countries including world public opinion reacted with criticising the new development especially related to Turkish guarantee right. Therefore, it took in consideration to intervene the Cyprus island. Turkey then intervene into the islands in 1974. The conflict resolution strived to be achieved through the UN forums. In contrast, Turkey got negative public opinion related to the Cyprus issue. By the the UN General Council decision on November 1, 1974 calls for

⁸⁹ Meltem Muftuler Bac, **Türkiye ve ABD: Soguk Savas Sonrasi Iliskiler**, Simten Cosar(translator), Alfa Publisher, Istanbul, 2001, p.

⁹⁰ Ali Balci, *Op.cit*, p.125.

⁹¹ Oral Sander, *Op.cit*, pp. 227-29.

respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus which got independence in 1960 and all foreign military forces stationed in the islands should be withdrawn. Eventually, during the intervention, as *de facto*, recognition on the development of the conflict normalization through the division of two regions of the island. Firstly, Turkish Cyprus Federation State was declared on February 13, 1975 and after the meeting which held on February 21, 1976 between two conflicted parties, they signed “Population Exchange” Agreement. Therefore, by then, Turkish Cyprus policy has reaffirmed in establishment of federal order, there two nations and two different regions in the island.

The implications of Cyprus intervention to Turkish foreign policy in long term could be explained as follows. *First*, the opportunity in returning of Turkish armed forces’ respect that lost during military regime of 12 March in short time. *Second*, Turkey and the U.S. came to tension due to Turkish intervention to Cyprus. It became one of important factor behind the 12 September 1980 military intervention. *Third*, till 1974 intervention, the Aegea sea issue became the main agenda of Turkey-Greece relations, and by 1990s their relations based on security and threat principles.⁹² Eventually, because of no settlement constitutionally, the Cyprus issue has become one of principal issues of Turkish foreign policy and the agenda in the international level forums.

The real impact of Cyprus issue in Turkey-the U.S. ties, arms embargo of the U.S. during 1975-1978 to Turkey. Besides, it also suspended their defense cooperation agreement. The U.S. embargo also affected on Turkish-Israel relations to be much more halted. It triggered a support on Arab nations of Palestine issue, for instances, by allowing an open of PLO representative office in Ankara of 1979 amid the recognition on the PLO representatives across world, sponsoring the OIC ministerial level meeting in Rabat issuing the demolish of Al Aqsa mosques by Israel. However, the debate on public opinion regarding the question of western and secular identity, Turkey did not join the OIC high level conference for long term, and it participated in 1981 first time.⁹³ Furthermore, Turkey also would not favour Jerusalem as a capital city of Israel. In addition, Turkey ties with Iraq and Syria also had been challenged by water issue. In this case, after Turkey built a dam (Southeast Anadolu Project) in the areas of Euphrate and Tigris rivers originated from Turkey flows by Persian Gulf through Iraq and Syria, the volume of water flew to Syria

⁹² Ali Balci, *Op.cit.*, pp.140-41.

⁹³ Gökhan Koçer, *Op.cit.*, p.

and Iraq lower.⁹⁴ Eventually, following the Arab nationalism awakening to be continued and Turkish western identity policy, finally it challenged Turkish initiatives on the Middle East region.

1.1.6 Military Coup (1980-1987)

Two main issues shaping Turkish Middle East policy in this period were separatism issue in the southeast region in regard of war on the PKK terrorism in domestic politics and the supports of Iraq and Syria on the PKK led to a new problem. After the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the northern Iraq was situated vacuum of power, the PKK affiliated groups began to control that areas. In order to deter Southern countries of Turkey, especially Syria and Iraq supports on the PKK, Turkey strived to establish relations in good manner with those countries. Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement of border security and cooperation in February 1983. This agreement preserves a right for Turkey to follow the PKK activities in Iraq territory. Meanwhile, Turkey signed an agreement with Syria in July 1987 explains that a water sharing of Euphrate river.

After increasing terror activities by the PKK members toward Turkey, for the first time, it used self-right determination to secure national security without Iraq agreement and sent 7000 military forces to border areas. By this border military operation suffered other Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, then the PKK and the Barzani led-the KDP signed a cooperation protocol in July 1983. Due to this development, Turkey with Iraq and Syria signed “Border Security” Protocol in 1984 and 1985 in order to against the PKK terror attacks. With this operations, the PKK also developed close relations with the KYP (Kurdish Party in Iran).

The PKK increased its fight against Turkish military in 1987. Therefore, Turkey once held a border military operation toward northern Iraq in February 22, 1987 and Turkey-Syria signed again a security protocol firms that two countries will fight against terrorist activities in their territory and prevent to export into other countries territory. The KDP finally declared the PKK as a terrorist group in April 1987, so that the PKK closed to the KYP Iran. Moreover they signed coalition agreement in 1988. In short, among Turkey, Iraq and Syria, in tension cases of Euphrates and Tigris water resources sharing and the

⁹⁴ İbrahim Erdoğan, “Su Sorunu, Ortadoğu ve Türkiye: Bölgesel Bir Analiz,” İbrahim Dağı (ed.), **Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim**, Siyasal Publisher, Ankara, p.

PKK issue until the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan-led the PKK in 1999, had become the bargaining elements shaping their relations.

In other side, Turkey also developed other ties with Iran and Pakistan in economic sector, the OIC members as well, followed Turkish private investments into north Africa and gulf countries. Moreover, beyond the Middle East, its western orientation remained even with European countries, their relations became fruitfully by acceptance of Turkey to be full member of the EEC in 1987.

1.1.7 Ozal Period (1987-1993)

In 1980s, President Ozal replaced the import substitution model of development with an export-oriented by liberlizing the Turkish economy and adpting the precepts of the Washington Concensus. It led to the emergence of export-oriented Anatolian Tigers which seeking for markets abroad⁹⁵ especially in neighbor countries. This economic rise then had been processing to become a trading state in the mid-1990s. Export-oriented economy policy and outsourcing insisted Turkish relations with the Middle East as a huge market. President Ozal assures that the economic development in the region would effectively resolve intra-regional problems and ensure peace. In short, during his period economic-oriented Turkish foreign policy had been conducted.⁹⁶

During the Ozal period as well, the international system was reshaped by the end of Cold war. During the cold war was identified with dominant bilateral cooperations with military basis framework of the NATO and containment policy. It led an active role as the U.S. ally and sometimes Turkish national interests denied on behalf of alliance. Its roles were mostly determined by the U.S. and regional or global strategy. In this case, Turkey becomes a buffer state of the Soviet, Europe and the Middle East. It the shapes the foreign and security policy in the context of Turkish and the U.S. alliance conditions.⁹⁷ While a series of events led tensions between Turkey and the U.S. since 1960s, their relations sustained till the end of cold war.

However, post the Cold War, it was changes and continued. In the context of Turkey- the west alliance was still survived, while the Soviet Communism threat was disappeared.

⁹⁵ Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar, and Metin Toprak, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2004, p. 168.

⁹⁶ Ramazan Gözen, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası: Gelişimi ve Etkenleri," *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, 17.C., New Turkish Publisher, Ankara, 2002, p.

⁹⁷ Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, **Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change**, Routledge Curzon, Oxon, 2005, pp.104-106

Moreover, the new threat perception arised and followed economic concern, the search for stability to be focus as well. This situations guided to cooperation with the Middle East and Balkan countries. In 1990s, Turkey redefined “enhanced partnerships” to “strategic partnership” with the Gulf war. Meanwhile, it also developed a collaboration in Central Asia.

Meanwhile, in the context of the Middle East, Turkish and the U.S. relations, post cold war was no radical changes and maintained its strategic relations with the west ally. *First*, in case of the second Gulf war (Iraq invasion on Kuwait in 1990). Turkey supported actively the U.S. during the war. By a motion voted by Turkish parliament on January 17, 1991, Turkey sent troops abroad and allowed its bases to be used by the U.S. troops for attacking. Besides, it also provide humanitarian assistances and those continued till the late 1990s by the U.S. sanctions. The U.S. imposed no fly zone in northern Iraq airspace and trade embargo to Iraq. This put consequence on the plan over Iraq future, especially Kurdish population in northern Iraq that became a new emerging threat for Turkey.⁹⁸

Unfortunately, in return, Turkey did not get fair gains after actively support its ally. It suffered with deficit budget and an increasingly domestic security threats. After the establishment of Kurdish regional territory in northern Iraq, followed arise of the PKK terror attacks after the first gulf war, thus Turkey continued security-oriented foreign policy in the Middle East. The aim of such policy is a prevention attempt of broader Kurdish militant threat and fight against the PKK with Iran and Syria. However, Iraq and Iran remained to support the PKK, so that Turkey engaged the conflict with Iran and Iraq.

After the Soviet threat was disappeared, instead the main security threat to national security had came from the southern region namely the Middle East. It such perception had run for long time and majorly influenced to Turkish Middle East policy. Turkish military then started to take great roles in determining policy in the region as an active response to the threat presences.

Turkey took the firm measures in response to the Middle East threats. In this context, frequently conducted border military operation in Northern Iraq and joint military operation with Iran and Syria. Turkey also implemented a balance strategic with Israel in other side. In case of peaceful settlement if 1991, their relations fastly upgraded and turned

⁹⁸ Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, *Defence and Security Analysis*, Vol. 23, No.1, March 2007, p.44

into strategic relations.⁹⁹ This led eventually on a balance policy between the Arab nations and Israel. The increased relations of Turkey and Israel triggered critics from Iran and Arab world and prevent their relations. For example, Turkey harshly criticised by Arab world during the OIC High Level Summit held in Tehran of 1997.¹⁰⁰ Eventually the relations with Arab world was foul.

1.1.8 Coalition Period (1993-1999)

In March 1995, the largest military operation of Turkey had been launched to demolish the PKK camps and bases in northern Iraq by deploying more than 35.00 troops and heavy armies.¹⁰¹ Then in 1996, it came close to military intervention in Greece and Syria in 1998, in other side an attempt of military measure against Iran as well.

Meanwhile, the relations with Russia was strained due to it threat on Cyprus in 1997. In which Russia warned the s-300 missiles were to be deployed on the island. Eventhough, Tukey had conducted a series of military-oriented foreign policy in response several foreign issues, it also developed a fruit relations with the European countries. In 1996, Turkey joined the Custom Union. This served a conducive environment to the emergence of a trading state of Turkey.

1.1.9 European Union Acsent the Government (1999-2002)

In 1990s, Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East was shaped by security concern on terrorist attack that threat national territorial integrity. Turkey majorly security-oriented foreign policy to be conducted with Syria and the result came. In 1998, Syria kicked out Abdullah Ocalan. This security concern then altered to be a cooperation orientation.¹⁰² After arresting the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, Turkish perception threats over the PKK was lower. Therefore, it then concerned to normalize economy and political relations with countries in the region.

Ismail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister articulated that Turkey must develop relations with nearest regions with maximising all potential sectors including economy, culture,

⁹⁹ Şule Kut, "Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları," G. Özcan ve Ş. Kut (der.), **En Uzun On yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar**, Boyut Publisher, İstanbul, 2000, pp.45-64.

¹⁰⁰ Kemal Kirişci, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspective on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, p.31

¹⁰¹ Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1996, p.

¹⁰² Özlem Tür, "Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Gerilimden İşbirliğine," Zeynep Dağı (ed.), **Doğu'dan Batı'ya Dış Politika: AK Partili Yıllar**, Orion, Ankara, 2006, pp. 141-66.

historical matters of Osmanli heritages. Turkish slowly reoriented its presence in the region. In this context, Turkey was no longer prevail to support the foreign power. However, to protect the regional interest with encouraging the good relations with regional countries. Thus, it would led Turkey to be an important global power.¹⁰³ The first step to be taken was to restore political ties with neighbor countries such as Iraq, Syria and Iran, then turned to economical relations.¹⁰⁴

Turkey acquired a positive gain regarding its EU membership during Helsinki Summit in 1999. It the continued to a negotiation in 2005 for full membership. Due to the cooperative approach that economical relations influence the political attitude. Hence, Turkish neighborhood policy towards the EU and its approach to Middle East seemed harmony.¹⁰⁵

1.2 DURING AKP PARTY GOVERNMENT

It has been argued widely by many scholars that Turkish foreign policy in general and towards the Middle East in particular has changed significantly. Perthes argues that in the tenure of the foreign minister Ismail Cem (1997-2002) put some of the bases' changes in Turkish foreign policy. However, the major changes have appeared since 2002/2003.¹⁰⁶ In discussing this chapter, it will be divided based on the terms of the AKP rule.

1.2.1 First Term (2002-2010)

The AKP government came to power by winning majority of votes in the 2002 election. It paved the way a reform process which changed the status-quo and confronted with the bureaucratic-military in the level of domestic. The effect of the EU and the positive opinion of Turkish public accelerated the reform process. In this process, the AKP rule changed many laws and constitutional articles in support of domestic democratization. As Cavdar urged there was a political learning process which revealed that a decline of the

¹⁰³ İsmail Cem, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a Millenium," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, pp. 1-6.

¹⁰⁴ Mehmet Şahin, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası: Süreklilik ve Değişim," *Akademik Orta Doğu*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, pp. 15-19.

¹⁰⁵ Mesut Özcan, **Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, The European Union and the Middle East**, Ashgate, Avebury, 2008, p.

¹⁰⁶ Volker Perthes, "Turkey's Role in the Middle East: An Outsider's Perspective", Presentation at the Transatlantic Academy Conference in Ankara, June 10 2010, p.1, <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/turkey's-role-middle-east-outsider's-perspective>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

party as incompatible with the secular principles and system of the country, amongst the part of the elites of the AKP rule.

In addition, the significant change also occurred within the civil-military relations, followed reduction of the role of military in domestic politics by referring to the EU accession process. The AKP government also reduced the role of the military in foreign policy, by decreasing the number of generals in the MGK. The specific democratization steps started including in 2002, the emergency rule lifted, followed in 2003 were the MGK reform made, impacted to the military's influence to be limited, then in 2004 constitutional amendments made for women's rights, freedom of press, and the crucial one was the state security courts abolished. Since then, allowed the government to conduct the independent foreign policy in the Middle East. This policy is largely based on the culture, religion and identities that established close relations with the governments and countries in the Middle East.

From 2002-2010 was more towards democratic improvement, whereas After the year of 2010, there was less democratic improvement. The leader factor also can not be ignored in regard the change in Turkish foreign policy and what will be called as "Erdogan Factor". In this concern, the term of "Erdogan Factor" is related to his leadership on how charismatic and successful he is and how he has provided development and prosperity to Turkey. Heper analysed Erdogan as a leader in his writing and explained about "Erdogan's contribution" (he also defined as incorporating tradition and modernity)¹⁰⁷ as playing role to "an end to the undue influence of the military and the judiciary in politics."¹⁰⁸ In addition, at the period of 2002-2010, in general Turkey appeared as a model country in the Middle East. This argument based on the progress towards democracy in Turkey, cultural, political, and economic to the Arab countries, support of Ankara to the Palestinian cause.¹⁰⁹ The positive image or perception of Turkish in the Middle East widely in the dynamics of the Arab public opinion basically emerged starting with the refusal of joining and helping in the invasion of Iraq, mediation efforts between Israel and Syria, the Davos crisis, the Mavi Marmara, and the role played with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

¹⁰⁷ Metin Heper, "Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Ozal and Recep Tayyip Erdogan" *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.2, 2013, p.155.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.150.

¹⁰⁹ Ahmet Uysal, "Raport: Ortadogu'da Turkiye Algisi: Misir Ornegi", *Stratejik Dusunce Enstitusu*, March 2011, p.148.

Furthermore, it is all also caused the positive change in the policies of the AKP government, which includes active engagement with the region.

1.2.2 Second Term (2010-2013)

Some scholars of Turkish foreign and domestic policy argue that there is a decline in Turkish democracy in 2010 onwards of the AKP government. For instances, Onis argued “the later phase of the AK Party era is a kind of a limited or majoritarian understanding of democracy with new elements of exclusion built into the democratic system.”¹¹⁰ Later, he mentioned that: “this has manifested itself in terms of controls over the press and freedom of expression, the lack of tolerance for opposition, and the notorious malfunctioning of the judicial system.”¹¹¹

Onis added the AKP government’s loss of reform momentum occurred with the reason of limitation that “the dominance of the ruling party limits the space available for genuine pluralism.”¹¹² He was further argued that this dominance: “raises concern about creeping authoritarianism of the government, as domestic politics turn into a more conflict driven and antagonized sphere and elements of continued polarization also attempt to sidetrack the ongoing constitutional process towards the institutionalizations of a presidential system with weak checks and balances.”¹¹³

In sum, a decline of the democratization process during the periods of 2010-2013 marked with the actions and policies of the government including government’s spirit and enthusiasm for reforms waned, dominance of the ruling AK Party, restrictions over the freedom of expression, and fairness of the judicial process, the pressure over judiciary and media tended to increase, discussion of presidential system and plans to bring it to Turkey show signs of increasing the power of executive.

2 INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

This section will explain and evaluate Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives, initiatives, determinant factors driving Indonesia’s foreign policy through what the major issues that experienced, as well as internal dan external threats of Indonesia which also influence on Indonesia’s attitudes to others. It will explores Indonesia’s foreign policy

¹¹⁰ Ziya Onis, “Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.2, 2013, p.107.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.108

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

starting from the first period of the so-called “Old Order” (1945-1965) under President Soekarno, then the New Order (1966-1998) under President Soeharto, turning into Transition or Reform Periods consisting of the first period of President B.J. Habibie (1999-2000), the second is President Abdurrahman Wahid (2001-2002), and the third of President Megawati Soekarno Putri (2002-2004). Post reform era, the first democratically elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014).

2.1 SOEKARNO PERIOD

During Soekarno periods, Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation majorly focused on *first* seeking for international recognition toward Indonesia’s independence. *Second*, managing the independence of Dutch’s attempt to colonialize Indonesia once based on the Decralation of Queen of Wilhemnia on December 7, 1942. *Third*, seeking for solution of the disputes with Dutch through the role of mediator or international forums including the United Nations forum.

Under Soekarno government also, Indonesia had undergone the important shiftings in its foreign policy’s implementations in which either Westward or Eastward. For instances, during the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s, under the Cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviours was tend to westward. In this case, the domestic situation was the Indonesian Communist Party (sided with the east bloc) excluded from the cabinet eventhough won 16.4 per cent in 1955 general election due to the suspicious the national and Islamic parties. Then, under the first of Ali cabinet had became more less pro-western. After the Cabinet of Burhanuddin, Indonesia had turned to pro-western. Despite, coming to the second period of Ali’s Cabinet, Indonesia became much more anti-western and turned into eastward, particularly was aside of Soviet Union bloc until early in 1960s. The determinant factor was mainly due to Indonesia’s struggle for its “lost” territoy of West Papua. In this case, the Dutch was backed by the western bloc. In order to balance this situation and to pursue its aim, Indonesia would need other supports especially from the opposite party, that was the east bloc led by the Soviet Union. In reverse, while Indonesia’s confrontation policy over Federation of Malaysia, it came into a tense relation with Uni Soviet and much more side with the PRC by the fall of Soekarno regime in 1965. But, Indonesia still remained anti-west approach.

Later, the division of three periods during Soekarno era involve the characteristics as well as the determinant factors influencing Indonesia's foreign policy including the domestic situations and external systemic factors through the major relations with great powers and some significant countries following the major issues will be examined below in detail.

2.1.1 The Revolutionary Period (1945-1950)

Since this period is an early period of Indonesia's independence declaration, several scholars argue Indonesia was not fully and real independence of the Dutch, due to Indonesia's sovereignty had not been transferred officially by the Dutch.¹¹⁴ In other side, the nationalists argue that Indonesia had fulfilled the requirement of a sovereign state since the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945. In regards, Indonesia had has republic government, territories (the Dutch East Indies) and populations.

Unfortunately, after Indonesia declared its independence, it had to faced again a colonialist attempt led by the British which tried to return the Dutch as colonialist power in Indonesia. So that, Indonesia struggled to manage its independence. At that time, Indonesia's sovereignty only was recognized by several states in Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Palestine in 1947) and major powers (especially the Soviet Union in 1948).

After the declaration of Independence, the major characteristic in Indonesia domestic is a strong sense of nationalism. Indonesia gained its independence after passing a long struggle for independence, so it has learnt Indonesia that with a strong sense of nationalism, Indonesia community which is heterogeneous people of the former Netherlands East Indies could be united and gained the independence. Indonesia's first parliament was the KNIP with Soekarno as the President and Mohammad Hatta as the Vice President. In attempts to manage its independence, Indonesia's leaders through Soekarno, Hatta and Syahrir-led the diplomacy way and Tan Malaka led-the struggle way. In aim to firmly manage the independence and collecting the international recognition to the independence, between the Republic and the Dutch had reached several agreements the first through the Linggarjati Treaty (recognizes the Republic territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, as well as a joint government among them) in November 1946 under Syahrir

¹¹⁴ David Joel Steinberg (et al.), **In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History**, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 1975, p. 75.

cabinet. Second, the Renville Treaty under Amir Syarifuddin cabinet in 1948 (the reduction of Indonesia's part of Java and Sumatra).

Later, under Hatta cabinet, Indonesia continued its negotiation process with the Dutch in regards opposing the Dutch in the international level since the Dutch broke the Renville treaty and the UN's cease-fire by military occupation on December 19, 1948. Eventually, a Round Table Conference was held and resulted in the agreement of an establishment a Federal Republic of Indonesia with territories including the entire Dutch East Indies except the fate of Dutch Papua New Guinea (West Irian) which was determined later and the official form of "Republic of the United States of Indonesia".¹¹⁵ This conference on December 30, 1949 also marked an official transfer of Indonesia's political sovereignty from the Dutch.

So it could be summarised that the determinant factor influencing Indonesia's foreign policy behaviours within this period is majorly Indonesia relations with the West countries (mainly with the Dutch) and the Soviet Union. Due to the main orientation of Indonesia's foreign policy is managing Indonesia independence which is gained of the long bloody struggles through diplomatic ways as a commitment to oppose any form of colonialization and seeking for international recognitions upon its independence.

2.1.2 The Liberal Democracy Period (1950-1958)

In fact, the form state of the Federal Republic of Indonesia as a result of the Round Table Conference had sparked an instability in domestic politics. Some states within the federal had tendency to separate and declare own independence. The most one challenging was the self-proclaimed of the Mollucans in May 1950. In response this situation, the nationalist Republicans unilaterally led Indonesia to a unitary state and then came into a parliamentary democracy period, guided by the conventions of the 1950 Constitution.¹¹⁶ In this sense, political parties played as major actors and decision makers of the Indonesia's foreign policy.

The consequence emerging from this multi political parties system was the rivalry of any party's ambition to rule and a form of a coalition government with a combination of at least four or five parties), then guiding to the conflict of interest within the cabinet.

¹¹⁵ Taomo Zhou, "Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965", Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, August 2013, p.8

¹¹⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Social Science and Humanities*, Vol. 3, 2010, pp.41-42, <http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index>

Eventually, it had created an instability into the government and domestic politics. In this period, there were four main political parties in Indonesia such the PNI, the PKI, the NU and Masyumi.¹¹⁷

During the first Cabinet led by Mohammad Hatta (December 1949-September 1950), Indonesia developed diplomatic ties both with communist and non-communist countries. Indonesia's foreign policy allowed to pursue the any best choice to achieve its national interest without binded to external commitments it could not control.¹¹⁸ For examples, Indonesia refused to contribute into a anti-communist and pro-western regional organization in the Baguio Conference sponsored by Philippines in 1950. And it also refused to join as a SEATO's member, a organization to counter the Soviet Union influence in the region in 1954.¹¹⁹

While Natsir Cabinet (September 1950-April 1951) and Sukiman Cabinet (April 1951-April 1952) were tend to the western. The reason behind of these was the perceptio of leaders that believes China-favoured the PKI tried to step down the government. The western characteristic was marked by the signment of "mutual security" agreement with the U.S. in aim to keep the economic, technical and political aids of the U.S. Eventhough, in last, it was not ratified by parliament. The poin should be underlined from these situation is the sense of anti-western sentiment and the revolution's legacy still remained strong in Indonesia.

Later, the Ali Cabinet was characterised by the storng sense of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist during (July 1953-August 1955) and (March 1956-April 1957). In his period, Indonesia hosted the AAC of 1955 in Bandung and resulted the Ten Bandung Principles majorly suggests non-interference in other's domestic affairs and promoted Afro-Asian solidarity. It also raised the campaign opposing the Dutch and appeared again to the public the West Irian question.

The situation of domestic politcs (coalition cabinets) were going to be complicated due to the increase of separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi regions creating the oppositions tensed with the central government as well as the economic problems. In response, the martial law was introduced and President Soekarno's non-parties cabinet was

¹¹⁷ Daniel Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 8 No. 1, March 1967, pp. 52-67

¹¹⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, **Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism**, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1994, p.18

¹¹⁹ Anak Agung Gde Agung, **Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945-1965**, Mouton, The Hague, 1973, p. 196.

failed to solve the political and economic problems. Since the PNI, NU, Masyumi-led cabinets were failed to solve the national problems. This situation benefited the PKI after won the election of 1957 especially in East Java became more stronger.

The tense among the Islamic parties, the army and the PKI became increased. The Islamic parties and the army together was against the Soekarno government since they perceived the growing communist influence and should be countered in Indonesia. In this situation, the U.S. was indicated to support the Soekarno government's overthrow by the regional army officers, instead to propose them as the legitimate government.¹²⁰ Even the CIA claimed behind the opposition movement since Soekarno perceived sided with the east bloc. But an evidence supporting the CIA's allegation by the downing of an American pilot who spied for the oppositions. The government's military forces was succeeded to eliminate the PRRI-PERMESTA rebellions and resulted in an increase power of it. These had sparked more sentiment of anti-western and anti-America in Indonesia's domestic politics. This guided it to boost further ties with the non-western countries. Finally, this shift coloured the Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour.

In conclusion, the domestic situation such as the short term of government coalitions in which frequently changed had sparked political and economic problems. This situation then caused the emergence of PRRI-PERMESTA rebellions in several regions of Indonesia against the Soekarno government and put the threat on the Indonesia's territorial integrity. Since the success of the government's army eliminates the rebellions and the increase of the PKI influence after won the election of 1957, President Soekarno along with the PKI and the military were the significant actor of Indonesia's foreign policy in the end of this period.

The suspected allegation of the CIA into a failed military coup over President Soekarno, had sparked more sentiment of anti-America and anti-western in Indonesia. It then was reflected to Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour, which in the implementation was tend to the socialist and communist countries especially in the end of period. Eventhough, the basis idea of Indonesia's diplomacy in the international forum, Indonesia has strived to promote the concept of non-interference and non-alignment by hosting the AAC of 1955 in Bandung, that also aim at spreading the Afro-Asian solidarity.

¹²⁰ Brian May, **The Indonesian Tragedy**, Graham Brash, Singapore, 1978, pp. 79-80

2.1.3 The Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965)

In this last period, the major actors in Indonesia's foreign policy were President Soekarno, the army and the PKI. Indonesia adopted a much more anti-western and anti-America in its foreign policy by the end of the period.

President Soekarno intended to balance the army's power by cultivating the PKI and the air force. He firmly determined the orientation of Indonesia's foreign policy in his National Day Speech of 1959, that the so-called later as "Manipol or Manifesto of politics". In his "Manipol", Soekarno called Western colonialists and imperialist as the Indonesia's major threats and must be opposed. Unfortunately, he continued failed to solve the economic and political problems.

The factor of West Papua had emerged as a determinant factor of Indonesia's foreign policy since independence. In this case, an unwilling of the Dutch to met the Indonesia's demand upon West Papua in aiming to unite Indonesia. Even, the Dutch intended to create a free Papua state. In response, President Soekarno's approach was near to the Eastern bloc, with receiving the military assistance from the Soviet Union. The U.S. tried to gain Indonesia's attention by putting pressure to the Dutch to restore West Irian to Indonesia. Later, the U.S. intervened these situation and brought the conflicting parties to negotiation table resulting in a referendum in order to determine the status of West Irian. Finally, Indonesia and the Dutch signed an agreement of the return of West Irian to Indonesia in May 1963.¹²¹

In reflection of his anti-western and anti-imperialism approach and to unite international solidarity especially from Asia and Africa countries, President Soekarno determined the classification of the world into the NEFOS and OLDEFOS.¹²² Soekarno defines the NEFOS consisting of several of the new states of Asia and Africa, the Socialist and Communist countries. In addition, Soekarno voiced the theme of storming the bulwarks of imperialism, in Indonesia had room to play the key role.¹²³ This situation had created an increasing tense of Indonesia and the U.S. relations.

Another major issue that impacted to the tense relations between Indonesia and Western countries (mainly with the U.S. and British) was the establishment of the

¹²¹ Aria Teguh Mahendra Wibisono, "Political Elite and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia", Doctoral Thesis, Amsterdam University, 2009, p.68

¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 61

¹²³ Sukarno, "Storming the Last Bulwarks of Imperialism", 1965, in H Feith and L Castles (eds), **Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965**, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970, p. 79

Federation of Malaysia in 1963. In this case, a movement that opted by Malayan leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman with signing the London Agreement on July 9, 1963 aiming at the formation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963¹²⁴ had bothered the Manila Accord. This accord is originated from “Maphilindo”, a conference on the level of foreign ministers of Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia that held on June 7-11, 1963 in Manila in order to ensure the security in the region. President Soekarno slammed the Malaya move to make deal with western colonialist power (Great Britain). In response this move, Indonesia had intensified a policy of confrontation towards Malaysia up to the peak in 1966. The reason behind this Soekarno’s policy that he was suspicious with the presence of British military base in Malaya and Singapore. Since President Soekarno believed that the U.S. had utilized Malaya or Singapore to support the regional army oppositions in 1950s. While Indonesia also not to allowed the excessive presence of foreign powers in the region.

In regards to these case, it had triggered an increase relations of Indonesia and China. Since, President Soekarno requested military aid (the supply of small arms) to the PRC through the PKI in order to arm the “Fifth Force” and support Indonesia’s open military confrontation against Malaysia. In response to the Indonesia’s move was likely near to the PRC, the U.S. persuaded Soekarno by putting pressure to more enhance on Jakarta-Washington axis. In return, the U.S. continued the aids. However, Soekarno opted to guide Indonesia’s orientation towards the Eastern bloc especially with the PRC.

In order to show up its critics due to the UN seemed more likely steered by colonialist power and it was likely not care to Indonesia’s aspiration that included Malaysia into the UNSC’s non-permanent member, Soekarno decided it left the UN in 1965. With the support of the PRC, Soekarno proposed to established another international organization beyond the U.N. He formed the CONEFO in Jakarta.¹²⁵ Amid the willings of North Korea and Vietnam to involve into that group, a Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi was emerged and reflected an anti-Western orientation and implementation.

Jakarta-Peking relations then downgraded amid the Soekarno’s banning policy towards the Chinese ethnics that warned to trade in village areas as well China’s intervention. It impacted to the Chinese’s diasporas who lived in Indonesia. Some of them

¹²⁴ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations”, Doctoral Thesis, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Discipline of Political Science and International Relations, University of Western Australia, October 2009, p. 138.

¹²⁵ Lee Jones, “ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order”, *Nuffield College Politics Group Working Paper*, March 2009, pp. 12-13

returned to China and others moved to the cities. This situation led Indonesia to close more to the Soviet Union.

Eventhough the success of President Soekarno to achieve international recognition towards the sovereignty of West Irian as Indonesia's territory, domestic economic problems in fact had more suffered. Indonesia came into a deficit budget caused an increasingly inflation. The high inflation appeared during 1962-1965 up to over 600 per cent in December 1962-1963. By 1965, Indonesia's economy continued to deteriorate.

Political domestic situation was influenced, added with a rift between Soekarno and the military as a controversial policy of "Nasakom"¹²⁶ introduced into the military's structure in 1961. President Soekarno's policy aimed at balancing the power of the military and the PKI within his government. Thus, with an equilibrium it would stabilize and legitimize his power by accomodating the demands of all the important political parties (Nationalists, Islamists, and Communists).¹²⁷ Indeed, the military against this policy. It led to a coup then later known as 'Gestapu' that occured on September 30, 1965 (its acronym is G30S/PKI incident). This event affected the fall of President Soekarno and was changed by President Soeharto. There research argues the U.S. was behind these shifting political power by supporting the military which removed Soekarno and placed Soeharto in Indonesia's presidential.

In short, during the guided democracy period that placed President Soekarno, the military and the PKI as major actors within Indonesia's foreign policy. It also characterised with the major relations of Indonesia with China, the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Malaysia. The main issues that had direct implication into the orientation and action of Indonesia's foreign policy were the West Irian and the confrontation against Malaysia in 1963. Those issues had guided an up-down of Indonesia's relations with the U.S. and mainly with the Soviet Union and China. It could be stated that during this period Indonesia was close to the Eastern bloc in its foreign policy's implementation.

2.2 THE NEW ORDER (1966-1998)

Following the fall of Soekarno from the presidential position and ban of the PKI by the "G30S/PKI" incident, the transfer of power to General Soeharto was forcely conducted

¹²⁶ It is an acronym which is composed of the first letters of the Indonesian words that included nationalism, religion, and communism.

¹²⁷ Mohammed Ayoob, **The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World**, University of Michigan Press, 2008, p.101

through a presidential command, known as “Supersemar”, an acronym of “Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret/ 11 March Letter of Command” in 1966. Since then, the army had legitimate its authority within domestic and foreign policy, but Soekarno remained as a “symbolic” President (Chief Executive). The PKI was perceived as a major threat in domestic level.

Due to the dualism within the cabinet, lastly the assembly relieve the presidential position of Soekarno and appointed Soeharto as an acting President. Later, the army strengthened its power by demanding to have representatives into the government, administration and legislative body. Since then, the military has played role in both security and non-security areas. It is defined as a dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (the doctrine of *dwifungsi*).¹²⁸ In this context, the military had been given an excessive portion not only serving as armed defender of state from external threats, but also playing roles as socio-political force which has responsible to maintain internal administration and security.¹²⁹ For instances, it had leverage into the Military of Foreign Affairs and as the key foreign ambassadors to determine the country’s foreign policy, as well as had rights to be included into executive body of government ministries who manage the domestic policy. Besides, Soeharto consolidated power of the military forces by creating the Ministry of Defense and Security.

Soekarno left the complicated economic problems such high inflation up to 600 per cent, no foreign reserves and a high national debt (approximately US\$2.4 billion). Thus, after coming to power, the most ones focus of Soeharto was to relieve Indonesia’s economic. In order to solve these economic problems, Soeharto had opened a large opportunity to foreign economic assistances and investment capital. This served an increasingly relations with Western countries especially with the U.S. To support this mission, especially to develop an Indonesia’s economic plan, Soeharto created its economic powerful team by choosing American-graduated economic experts, was later popular with name “Berkeley Mafia”. They were also respected by international economic regime such the IMF, the World Bank, as well as had strong ties with the U.S. decision-makers. Indonesia’s relations became more dependent to foreign (Western) debts since President Soeharto decided Indonesia to be a member of the Dutch-chaired IGGI. Soeharto

¹²⁸Jorn Dosch, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines”, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2006, p.52, <https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-336978>, (retrieved on October 30, 2017)

¹²⁹ Terence Lee, “The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No.4, 2000, pp. 692-706.

perceives that economic development was essential to ensure national stability.¹³⁰ In other words, political legitimacy could be gained with placing economic above political development. So that, the Indonesia's decision makers was majorly President Soeharto and the military.¹³¹ During President Soeharto periods, Indonesia mainly established relations with the major powers such the U.S., the PRC, and Japan. While in regional level of ASEAN had strong ties with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam. In short, Indonesia's foreign policy was reoriented from Eastern countries to Western countries.

a. **Indonesia-the U.S. relations**

During Soekarno period, Indonesia established ties with the U.S. even was still pursuing Independence from the Dutch. An active relations with U.S. came after the Madiun affairs in 1948. It was associated with the U.S. strategy to counter-balance the communist influence in the region including in Indonesia. However, their relations downgraded following Indonesia's domestic politics was tend to the Eastern countries especially Soekarno government developed a Jakarta-Peking axis that marked an establishment of formal alliance with the PRC. Besides, it also built strong ties to the Soviet Union in some crucial events. Other reason why their relations deteriorated was Indonesia's foreign policy was characterized more nationalistic for example in relations with the confrontation policy against Malaysia in 1963 and in case of West Irian.

President Soekarno was never agreed to foreign military bases' presence in the Southeast region. For example, he was against the military base of America in Malaysia/Singapore. Since Indonesia has adopted independent foreign policy's principle and non-aligned with any military pacts. Indonesia hosted the AAC which emerges the spirit of non-aligned. To commit that principle of the "Dasasila Bandung", Indonesia could not be permitted to join any military alliance. Those were the reason why Indonesia rejected to join the military pact, the SEATO.

In the era of President Soeharto, Indonesia has refused to support for American bases in the Philippines when the Philippines government asked him to commit along with other ASEAN members in 1986. In comparison with Soekarno's self-reliance policy, Soekarno pursued open policy of international aid and foreign investment. This point had made

¹³⁰ Bantan Nugroho, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy and ASEAN", Master Thesis, Dalhousie University, Canada, 1996, p.50

¹³¹ Rizal Sukma, "Islam, Democracy and Foreign Policy in Indonesia", CSIS, June 19 2007, p.3

Indonesia heavily depend on Western foreign loan, assistance, and hibah. In fact, the U.S. aids were allowed the fulfillment of several conditions in domestic level. For instances, during the Carter government of the U.S. in 1978, the U.S. economic assistance had required human rights conditions in Indonesian domestic.¹³² At that time, Indonesia government was insisted to release several political detainees of the 1965 “Gestapu” incident. Since it was under pressure of the U.S. they were released in order to adjust with the U.S. economic assistance. Other case, an U.S. demand to the full investigation of Dili attack which happened on November 12, 1991. The investigation resulted in a dismiss of two military generals who was responsible to this incident. Another condition was the establishment of the CGI (a new consortium is set up by the WB instead of IGGI.¹³³ In that case, Indonesia’s aim was to secure the U.S. and Japan who were the largest donors to the Indonesia’s economic development. So, during President Soeharto administration, Indonesia-the U.S. relations was mainly determined in the issue of human rights. Both to foster the domestic democracy and to adjust the economic assistance conditions.

Prior to the East Timor Crisis, Indonesia and the U.S. had been involved into serious bilateral tensions due to the incidents. It had led to the suspension of the U.S. military cooperation and aid to Indonesia. *First*, Dili attack of 1991 which almost 300 civilians were death. *Second*, the U.S. Congress’ voting that results in cutting of the U.S, military traini aid in October 1992, *Third*, the U.S. cancelation in the the sale of F-5 fighter aircraft. Relations were normalized in 1995, but the second raltions’ friction happened in 1996.¹³⁴

b. **Indonesia-China relations**

Indonesia has opened diplomatic relations with China since October 1, 1949. The first diplomatic step was took by Hatta by requesting officially of China’s recognition towards Indonesia’s independence on January 11, 1950. Two countries increasingly improved since the formation of Jakarta-Peking axis in 1965. Through these improved relations, China put all institutusal and finance resources to support its alliance, Indonesia by trade and economic assitances and political supports. For instance, China received the request of President Soekarno to arm the “Fifth Forces” which is coordinated

¹³² Franklin B. Weinstein, **Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence from Soekarno to Soeharto**, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1976, p. 145

¹³³ Michael R.T. Vatikiotis, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 4, March 1993, p.359, retrieved on <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798170>

¹³⁴ Anthony L. Smith, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 3, ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute, 2000, p. 507, retrieved on <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798509>

by the PKI and to provide financial assistance to the establishment of the CONEFO headquarter in Jakarta. However their relations became deteriorated since the President Soekarno introduced a policy of ban to Chinese ethnics to trade in rural areas. In response, it attempted to intervene Soekarno so their relations came to downgraded. The peak of their hostility relations was occurred amid the “Gestapu” incident. In this case, Indonesia’s military strive to balance the over-influence of the China-supported the PKI in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, President Soeharto claimed China’s engagement into the 1965 coup by supplying military logistics to the PKI. By this, their relations came to end amid with Indonesia’s policy to froze its relations with China so that Jakarta-Beijing axis was collapsed. Later, China-Indonesia relations was in halted for twenty years. There several reasons why Soeharto government fraze its relations with China, *first* considering the military’s rivalry with the China-backed communist party during Soekarno period is possible to be repeated in Indonesia, thus it must be countered. *Second* preventing an expansion of communist influence in Indonesia that could threat Soeharto’s power especially come from China, *third* since Indonesia relations close to the U.S. and Japan, or Western axis, so it should make a distance with Eastern countries in order to secure Indonesia interest for economic development aids. *Fourth*, the military perceives communist threat from China that could destabilize politics and security of Indonesia. Considering the military believes the 1965 coup conducted by the PKI-linked rebellions with China’s support. Soeharto determined China as an external threat. Even in his Presidential speech repeatedly in 1967 and 1973, he expressed that anyone who will once carry out the PKI to Indonesia, the government will take a firm measure.

However, it was no longer since Indonesia rapproached once its ties with China in February 1989. Dewi Fortuna Anwar explains that China is indefinitely rising to be a major political power in the Asia-Pacific region and has potential to become a world power.¹³⁵ In response this situation, it seems that a determinant factor Indonesia’s rapproachment with China is Indonesia’s orientation to play an enhanced role within the Asia-Pacific region where in China is a major political power there. By opening once relations, Indonesia would be benefit both political and economic. In addition, Indonesia-China rapproachment’s reasons were Soeharto pursuing Indonesia broader engagement

¹³⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, **Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia**, CSIS, Jakarta, 1992, p.42.

into the APEC in end of 1970 and across 1980s.¹³⁶ The main issues further will fulfill the dynamic of two countries' relations were the South China Sea, Natuna Island and sea around, as well as Indonesia-Taiwan relations.

c. **Indonesia-Japan relations**

In comparison to Indonesia's relations with China, Soeharto government established ties much closer with Japan especially in economic relations. The government seemed applying a much more realistic approach in relations with Japan's economic role. The major reason that *first* Japan is a major economic power in the region (Asia-Pacific) which Indonesia would take more advantages for its economic development. *Second*, Japan is an America ally and Indonesia has built Jakarta-Washington axis, while its relations with China halted, it needed a major ally partner in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Japan sees Indonesia is a large potential market for its productions and investments.

Japan is a largest Indonesia's donor country than the U.S. In Soeharto era, Indonesia was the second largest recipient of Japan's investment across the world. Besides, Japan's DFI determined Indonesia as single most important foreign market in Asia. Indeed, it has created challenge for Indonesia. In this regards, Japan had became an economic hegemon within Indonesia economy. Thus, the up-down of Indonesia's economy had to much depend on Japan. This overwhelming dependence had sparked domestic critics to the government, for example, "the Malari affair-Disaster of January" in January 16, 1974.

A debatable issue of Southeast Asia including in Indonesia that related with Japan since the Soeharto administration is the possible re-emergence of Japan's military after the second World War II, Japan military has been guaranteed by the U.S. In fact, Japan has increased its military budget amid the U.S. encouragement. For Indonesia, Japan was an aggressive colonial power. Eventhough, Japan colonized it in 3.5 years compared to the Dutch colonialization, Indonesia had much more suffered under Japanese colonialist. Therefore, the possible re-rise of Japan's military has created worries for Indonesia.

d. **Indonesia-Malaysia relations**

During the Soekarno era, Indonesia-Malaysia relations were not in sense of neighborhood. Indonesia firmly took an anti-colonial stand, whereas Malaysia was reversed. Malaysia asided with the U.S. and United Kingdom. It then guided Soekarno implemented a policy of confrontation opposed Malaysia in 1963. However, since

¹³⁶ Natasha Hamilton and Dave McRae, "Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence", The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, New South Wales, November 2015, p.10

Soeharto to be President, Indonesia-Malaysia relations were re-normalized. Their relations has been improved in socio-cultural and security. For instances, Join Border Committed in 1972 to counter communist insurgency along the borders of East Malaysia. It was re-signed in 1984 with broader joint naval and air patrols along borders to counter smugglers and drug traffickers.

Initially, during the era of Soekarno, Malaysia had hosted the foreign military base temporarily. In contrast, after re-organizing its foreign policy, Malaysia the proposed the concept of neutralization and the formation of the ZOPFAN. It against the foreign military bases' presence in Southeast Asia region.¹³⁷ Eventhough their relations have been more strengthen, several factors remain to become the source of conflict and influence the public opinion (critical reaction) of both countries. Within Indonesia-Malaysia ties, there several factors influencing the up-down dynamics both countries, such as *first* the issue of Indonesia's illegal migrant workers in Malaysia. Since 1970, the Indonesia's migrant worker had increasingny entered illegally to Malaysia. For examples, there were estimated more than 500000 migrant workers in West Malaysia in 1990 and up to 1.2 million in 1994. This number sparked the unemployment problem for Malaysian, other social problems, and created high wages of illegal and legal workers in both countries borders.

Second is territorial disputes, for instances, Sipadan and Ligitan case in Celebes sea. Indonesia-Malaysia had agreed to manage the status quo of those islands based on the 1969 agreement. However, Malaysia tried to violate this agreement by attempting to build the islands for economic tourism aim. In order to solve this dispute, two countries agreed to form a joint commission in July 1991. Two countries seeked for international arbitration to settle these long-standing territorial dispute. Eventually, in 2002, the International Court of Justice in favor of Malaysia in case of Sipadan-Ligitan islands dispute. It justified based on "effective" ownership and administration of islands by the U.K., which Malaysia was a former colony of the U.K. It was added the lack of stronger Indonesia's claims over the islands. Another cases are the conflicting claims over the Ambalat sea block and the maritime border around the Celebes sea of the eastern coast of Borneo (Kalimantan).¹³⁸ By today, those have not yet been settled definitely. Besides, the issue of fishing rights for

¹³⁷ Bama Andika Putra, "Indonesia's Leadership Role in ASEAN: History and Future Prospects", *International E-Journal of Advances in Social Science*, Vol. I, Issue 2, August 2015, p.190

¹³⁸ Yanyan M. Yani and Ian Montratama, "Strategic Value of Alliance Between Indonesia and the United States of America in Defending Ambalat Sea Block", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 12, No. 2, December 2015, pp.73-74

illegally Indonesian and Malaysian in each of their waters also has risk and source of conflict.

Third, the death execution (or hanging) of Indonesia citizens. For instance, an execution of Basri Masse was in charge of drug trafficking in Sabah court. This issue had been responded by Indonesian public by a chain of demonstration in Jakarta. Other cases, for instances, the case of Wilfrida Soik, was accused to kill her patron in December 2010 since he suffered violent acts by her patron, but was decided free of charge (death execution) in 2015. Indonesian migrant workers also experience violences from their patrons, for example, a case of Suyanti in December 2016. In February 2018, woman migrant worker (Adelina Lisau) died due to the violent actions by her patron. In short, Indonesia migrant workers who work in Malaysia, in fact, are vulnerable to the violent acts even died by their patrons, and several cases not end fairly for the victims.

e. **Indonesia-Singapore relations**

During the Soekarno administration, Indonesia-Singapore relations were not in good ties. Since the spirit of Soekarno government is anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, it considered Singapore as an ally of foreign colonialist power in the region. Indonesia ties with Singapore came to normalize phase as Singapore separated of Malaysia and declared independence in August 1965. In demography, Chinese ethnic makes up the majority of Singapore's national population. Two countries relations turned into tense in 1968 due to the death sentence of two Indonesian marines by Singapore court as the criminals who was responsible to the bomb exploded that killed a few people and many injuries. It sparked anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia.

In 1973, their relations normalized again amid the official visit of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. However, due to the military sentiment to China, Indonesia followed the Singapore-China relations. It also considered Singapore as a Chinese country that has risk to be used by China as a front base or satellite country in Southeast Asia. Since Singapore land territory is only a small island, based on MoU in February 1989, Singapore has started to train its military in the Indonesia's territory. In return, Singapore has allowed Indonesia to its military technology. An awkward situation had been faced by Soeharto when Singapore allowed the U.S. to use its military facilities. Indonesia opposes the presence of foreign military bases in the region in principal but at that time seemed Soeharto allowed the America military bases in Singapore but not to went public. The Chinese factor, in fact, determines the majority relations of both countries. Singapore was the sixth largest

investor country in Indonesia in 1995. As well as it was Indonesia's third largest trading partner.

f. **Indonesia-Philippines relations**

In the era of President Soekarno, a major issue which made up relations of Indonesia-Philippines was 'Maphilindo' organization. It was formed as a solidarity support to the issue of the Malay ethnic populated in three countries (Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia). However, it was collapsed due to the the conflicts among countries including the dispute of Malaysia-Philippines over Sabah and Indonesia's confrontation policy against Malaysia. Two countries relations downgraded as Philippines allowed the U.S. military bases in its territory that has meaning to allow the foreign military presence to the region. Meanwhile, in principal, Indonesia refuses it.

The bilateral relations restored to normal since Soeharto government. Due to long dispute of Malaysia-Philippines related to Sabah government was in favor over Muslim Moro in Southern Philippines, while the Philippines government engaged in conflict with Moro authority.¹³⁹ Indonesia then became a facilitator of the conflict by requesting of President Philippines, Marcos. This conflict later addressed in the OIC meeting in 1969.

In order to play its role as a conflict's mediator, President Soeharto proposed four proposals of the settlement the Moro problem¹⁴⁰ as follow *first*, the freedom of religion should be guaranteed and Muslim Moro should be protected, *second* the tolerance towards the Islamic tradition and culture belonging of Muslim Moro in Southern Philippines, *third* a greater opportunities of participation in national development for Muslim Moro, *fourth* the return of Muslim Moro's ancestors land by the government to the Muslims. Eventually the only last proposal to be rejected by President Marcos due to the majority of those lands were owned by the Filipino Christians who are the majority in Southern Philippines. This point is an essential issue of the Muslim Moro concern. Overall, the proposals were not fully succeed.

Indonesia also strived to settle the Moro issue through the OIC, alongside Malaysia, they put pressure to the MNLF related to Moro's independence demand. Eventually, after President Marcos experienced the legitimacy crisis following the Benigno Aquino's assassination, Indonesia-Philippines relations halted. However, since President Qory

¹³⁹ W.K. Che Man, **Muslim Separatism: The Moro of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand**, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1990, pp. 82-83

¹⁴⁰ Bantan Nugroho, *Op.cit.*, pp.76-77

Aquino came to power, their relations once normalized by the President Ramos. Indonesia then had continued its mediator role to settle Moro issue.

One of issue that determine the dynamic of Indoensia-Philippines is the presence of foreign (especially the U.S.) military bases in the Philippines territory. The U.S. maintains two military bases are Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. The major debates around Manila-Jakarta regarding this issue were a need to review the bases treaty and an attempt to acquire ASEAN supports.¹⁴¹ In the Soeharto era, the government had not openly showed to endorse its rejection of the U.S. military bases. Indonesia stands for absence of those presence in the Southeast Asia region. The factor behind this stand is Indonesia seemed preventing a direct confrontation with the U.S. with aim at securing the U.S. assistances in which it depended on it in fact. Besides, some Indonesian authority considered that those military bases could be a balancing factor and benefit to the regional security.

g. **Indonesia-Thailand relations**

Indoensia-Thailand bilateral relations were not in good manner during the Soekarno era. The U.S. factor determined the relations. Indonesia was not comfortable to the U.S.-Thailand close relations. Despite, their relations came to normalize since Soeharto was the President. One factor influencing the Indonesia-Thailand relations is Vietnam factor, also known Kamphucean issue.¹⁴² For two countries, in fact, have different perception of the threat in the region. In this regard, Thailand considered Vietnam as the major enemy in the region due to Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. In contrast, Indonesia admired toward the Vietnam's struggle for independence. It was more suspicious to China rather than Vietnam. However, its relations with Thailand improved especially in economic sector. They came together within Northern Triangle project with the China's foreign investment.

In order to solve this dispute, Indonesia facilitated Thailand and Cambodia leaders to discuss informally as the ASEAN Meeting in Jakarta in 2011. This aimed to lower tension among two countries through the Agency for International Arbitration.¹⁴³ This way then resulted a concrete step on the ownership and sovereignty over Preah Vihear temple.

h. **Indonesia-Vietnam relations**

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.78

¹⁴² Bama Andika Putra, *Op.cit.*, p. 191

¹⁴³ Agus Haryanto and Arry Bainus, "National Role Conception of Indonesia in ASEAN: Natural Leader, Mediator, and Collaborator", *International Journal of Public and Private Management*, Vol, 3, No. 2, 2016, p. 95

Indonesia-Vietnam established their diplomatic relations since the AAC of 1955 in Bandung. However, they had begun informal contacts since the 1940s. Eventhough, Vietnam is a socialist/communist state, Indonesia opened relations with Vietnam following the reason of a common historical story regarding their common struggle fight against the colonialists to get independence of country. In case of Vietnam War, Soekarno guided Indonesia to be involved into the anti-colonialist movement of thr North Vietnam (Hanoi). Since it considered the South Vietnam (Saigon) was the U.S. ally. Jakarta-Hanoi relations was upgraded amid the establishment of the Jakarta-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyonghyang axis. It was followed to the formation of the NLFSV in Jakarta.

As Soeharto came to power, Indonesia remained to maintain relations with Hanoi. Their relations did not sever due to several causes as follow *first*, Indonesian leaders (majorly President Soeharto) did not consider North Vietnam (Hanoi), which was an ally of China, as a major player of the 1965 coup in Indonesia. *Second*, Indonesian strived to reflect its non-aligned foreign policy towards Vietnam case as a socialist/ communist state. *Third*, a legitimate acknowledgement of common historical experience with North Vietnam against the Western colonialist.

Two countries dynamics are influnced by the Kampuchea/ Cambodia question. Indonesia plays role to solve and being a facilitator of Kampuchea/ Cambodia issue (Vietnam-Cambodia dispute) by sponsoring the Jakarta Conference in May 1970 on Cambodia. It was failed to be held due to the halt of Indonesia-Vietnam. Nonetheless, their relations eventually improved in 1984 amid Indonesian efforts to solve the Kampuchea issue. The next solution of Indonesia to solve this problem, it sponsored the JIM I in 1988, in Bogor. Then, the JIM II in February 1989. They had no resulted significant solutions. Next to July 1989, the PICC was co-sponsored by Indonesia and France. By the end of the Cold war had contributed largely to end this problem. In viewing Kampuchea issue, Indonesia leaders also had pro-contra statements, the MFA was asided with the ASEAN issue of withdrawal of Vietnam troops. Since Vietnam attitude to Cambodia had violated the Cambodia's sovereignty. On the contrary, the military urged every state has the right to self-determination.

Another issue involving Jakarta-Hanoi turn into tense was territorial dispute of the Natuna Islands and the Vietnam refugee issues. In April 1994, Indonesia-Vietnam representatives met to settle that territorial dispute based on international maritime laws. Vietnam was likely seemed taking a good manner to solve that disputes with Indonesia

probably aim to get its support in associated with Vietnam member candidate of the ASEAN.

To conclude above explanations that during the Soeharto administration, the determinant factor influencing Indonesia's relations with the U.S. and Japan was economic factor. Indonesia-the U.S.-Japan relations became more closer compared to their relations during Soekarno government representing a result of Indonesia's economic dependence on the U.S. and Japan. Besides, Indonesia also concerns to the the rise of Japan and China military roles in the Asia Pacific region. Meanwhile, Soeharto government remained to consider China as a major future challenge, so the relations with the U.S. and Japan are importance in related being a counter-balance over China, in politically, economically, and militarily. A diplomatic ties with China was freeze in order to attract the western countries' attentions. By setting an anti-communist image, Indonesia wished to get foreign assistance and loan from the western countries.¹⁴⁴

In regards to the Southeast Asian region, President Soeharto and its military determined the foreign policy towards the ASEAN states. Compared to Soekarno era, Indonesia relations with Souteast Asia countries were halted even with several countries were severed. However, Soeharto came to power, Indonesia adopted a neighborhood policy toward those countries. President Soeharto strived to guide Indonesia for playing major roles in regional affairs (including peace process) especially in the region where this attempts had frequently led to tense relations. His government seemed to promote regional cooperation within the context of ASEAN. Fo instances, Indonesia attempted to play role as a mediator/ facilitator in Moro issue and Kampuchea (Cambodia) question. In case of Moro issue, Indonesia stands on no tolerance of separatism and its commitment to the maintenance of peace in the region.¹⁴⁵

i. **Indonesia-the Middle East relations**

During the President Soeharto, Indonesia ties with the Middle East countries considered limited. Middle east region was not a priority of Soeharto's foreign policy agenda. In case of the Arab-Israel conflict, compared to Soekarno government, it tended to be moderate. It adopted such pragmatist policy. For instances, in aiming to solve the conflict, Indonesia proposed a direct talk between Arabs and Israel while it was a sensitive

¹⁴⁴ Franklin B. Weinstein, **Indonesia Foreign Policy and the Dillema of Dependence from Soekarno to Soeharto**, Equinox Publishing, Singapore, 2007, pp.226-227

¹⁴⁵Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, **Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond**, NIAS Press, Copenhagen, 2007, p. 57.

issue since they did not recognize Israel as a state. When oil embargo policy posed by Arab countries in 1973 especially to the west countries, Indonesian as a member of the OPEC did not participated to rise the oil export price up to 10% as it was agreed within the OPEC Conference in Doha in December 1976. Due to Indonesia-the U.S. axis, in this case the U.S. fully supported Israel. Moreover, President Soeharto had just replied the official visit of King Faisal from Saudi Arabia within five years later, in 1977, after the Arab-Israel war of 1973, the oil crisis in 1973-1974, and the world economic crisis in 1975-1976.

President Soeharto had just let an opening of the PLO representative office in Jakarta in 1989, after suspended for fifteen years. Soeharto government urged the reasons of the PLO attraction to the Indonesian extremist groups and the presence of Communist elites within the PLO. However, the strategic consideration of this policy is Indonesian government interests of being the chair of the NAM conference and gain supports of the Muslim world related to East Timor issue in the UN.

2.3 B.J. HABIBIE PERIOD (1998-1999)

Since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, his vice President, B.J. Habibie, directly fulfilled his Presidential post. When he was in tenure, the international system hugely suffered by Asia economic crisis 1998, it impacted widely in all aspect of Indonesia's life including economic and politics.¹⁴⁶ Indonesia domestic politics was moved and demanded toward democratization. To solve these multidimensional domestic crisis, Indonesia foreign policy concerned to maintain domestic issues. Habibie government put domestic economy recovery as a main orientation of the foreign policy. The domestic issues seemed to be more prioritized rather than foreign issues.

In continuation of Soeharto's western approach, added with the need of foreign assistance aids and investment, Indonesia under President Habibie remained more closer to Western countries majorly the U.S. and Japan as donor countries. In particular, the U.S. became more hegemonic in Indonesia through its economic instruments such as the IMF and WB¹⁴⁷. In fact, Indonesia's request of foreign debts to the IMF and World Bank accepted, while it got loan worthly \$43 billion. He also was accused to be more compromise on several conditions of foreign debts. His government had met and adjust the

¹⁴⁶ Jusuf Wanandi, "Indonesia: A Failed State?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.3, Summer 2002, p.135

¹⁴⁷ Edward Aspinall, **Opposing Soeharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia**, Stanford University Press, Standford, 2005, p. 270.

causal of human rights into the domestic law amid the strong international pressures. Nonetheless, his moves resulted a bit trust and foreign loan.

The most crucial issue which determined Indonesia's foreign policy during his power and attracted foreign attention and intervention is East-Timor issue. This issue had involved the U.S. and Australia in attempt of foreign intervention to Habibie government. For instance, the U.S. harshly criticized Indonesia in the context of the human rights cause of East-Timor issue during the forum of CGI in June 1998, Paris.¹⁴⁸ In accusation of human rights violations, the U.S. Congress voted to suspend its military equipment and train for Indonesian forces in October 1998. Prime Minister Australia, John Howard, sent a private letter to President Habibie concerned on his views over the East-Timor issue in December 1998.

In domestic politics, the separation of East Timor, parliament body and the military acknowledged not be involved into the decision-making, even the Foreign Ministry as well. President Habibie was accused giving an independence option to East Timor people through referendum vote without affirmation of other authorities held on August 30, 1999 in East Timor. The result of referendum represented a self-determination of independence with vote about 78%. Since then, East Timor officially was separated of the Indonesia's sovereignty. It was examined as a President single domination in translating the foreign policy.

In relations with ASEAN countries, Habibie government did not prioritized the ASEAN as President Soeharto treated seriously the ASEAN as the first concentric circle of Indonesia foreign policy's sphere.¹⁴⁹ Indonesian attitude was forcibly inconsistent on its regional role because of domestic politic and economic instability. In general, Indonesia engaged in tense relations with several major ASEAN countries. For examples, in the issue of Sipadan-Ligitan islands between Indonesia-Malaysia. In other case, President Habibie labelled Singapore as "racist" on the ground. His critic emerged because of the injustice measure took by Singapore governments towards Malay ethnic in domestic politics. In this context, the Malays were excluded from the higher echelon of the intelligence unit and the military in February 1999.

His only one year-Presidential tenure made President Habibie was unable to solve all domestic problems. Eventually, during his tenure domestic economic was not yet

¹⁴⁸Dave McRae, "Analysis: More Talk than Walk: Indonesia as A Foreign Policy Actor", Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, February 2014, p.6

¹⁴⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, **Indonesian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics**, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003, p.7

recovered because of several factors. Such as the weak of international trust originated from the acute corruption cases, most domestic investments went out abroad and the suspension of foreign investments.

2.4 ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (1999- 2001)

After less supports of international dan domestic towards President Habibie in case of his failed to maintain the East Timor problems, he could not been chosen once again to sit on the Presidential chair. Abdurrahman Wahid then was chosen through a coalition of several parties and finally set up as the next President by the People's Assembly Council in 1999. However, in the third year of his governance, he was impeached by the People's Representatives Council because of his inability to preserve stability in case of increasingly the movement of separatism groups, an economic unrecovery, and a frequent cabinet's reshuffle. His foreign policy implementation was reflected likely "crash with all reefs" due to embrace all parties and tend to severe the unwritten norms in conducting the international affairs. Presidential official visits were frequently conducted along his tenure.¹⁵⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs in his administration, Alwi Shihab articulated that Indonesia's foreign affairs would be conducted by keeping distant with all countries, good neighborhood, and encouraging the universal sense.

Similar with the initial President, during his tenure, he also included his first ones official visit to western countries especially to the U.S. and Japan. Indeed, the main objective was to continue and secure those countries' financial supports for Indonesia in need to the national economy recovery. Following his visit to the U.S., Indonesia once got financial loans by the IMF package of US\$43 billion.¹⁵¹ Besides, it had to signed three Letters of Intent with the IMF (in 20 January, 17 May, and 31 July 2000). Indeed, by those Indonesia essentially must met the loan's conditions for getting continued financial funding. It sparked Indonesia to be vulnerable to foreign pressure especially from donor countries including the U.S. For instance, a condition of implementing economic liberalism in Indonesia. Meanwhile, after came to Japan, Indonesia acquired a new assistance commitment and a guarantee of the loan reschedule thus those stricted Indonesia bill in order to recover economy.

¹⁵⁰ Humprey Wangke, "Kunjungan Luar Negeri Presiden wahid dan Pemulihan Ekonomi Indonesia," in Reasearch Team of International Relations, DPR-RI, **Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri Pemerintah Abdurrahman Wahid:1999-2000**, DPR RI, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 97-163

¹⁵¹Ratna Shofi Inayati (ed.), **Hubungan Indonesia-Amerika serikat 1992-2000: Masa Pemerintahan Clinton**, PPW LIPI, Jakarta, 2000, p. 23.

During President Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia had faced a rising of the separatism movements which put risks on the national territorial integrity and security. His government deeply concerned to the emerging resistance of Free Papua Organization in West Papua and the sectarian conflict in Maluku Province in Eastern Indonesia as well as Aceh Movement for Independence in Western Indonesia.¹⁵² In case of the East Timor crisis, Indonesia was under pressure to accept the INTERFET through the western financial instrument of the IMF by its donor country members including the U.S. In addition, because of the U.S. accusation of the human rights violations during the East Timor crisis, it concerned to bring a trial of Indonesian army officers who were responsible.¹⁵³ The U.S. Congress also insisted it with its the Foreign Appropriations Bill 2000/01 to include the return of East Timor refugees from West Timor. It reflected that Indonesian economic and military dependence to western countries led it to be vulnerable to foreign pressures, for example, in case of East Timor crisis.

In response such situation, President Wahid considered to diversify the military acquisitions and dependence not only with the U.S., perhaps from China and Russia. He also expressed to call for Indonesian breaking off the military reliance on the U.S. on March 28, 2000. Besides, in associated with East Timor problems, within the doctrine of Clinton's Enlargement particularly in behalf of democratization promotion, in early 2000, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. warned to impose a serious international consequences in the form of a military coup in Indonesia. Considering Indonesian government was failed to maintain the human right violations in East Timor. Indonesia also was pushed to implement economic and political reform by the CGI in October 2000 since it received foreign debt worthy US\$4.8 billion. Actually Indonesia had chance to opt a radical foreign policy stance and opposing to the international community which had intervened Indonesia domestic issue, but in fact, Indonesia power remained weak. Therefore to prevent a depth economic crisis and a communal tension, Indonesia opted to adjust the conditional set up by donor countries.

In other sides, Indonesian relations with Australia also came to strain in case of East Timor. For many Indonesian leaders, Australia has implemented "double-standard" attitude in response East-Timor problem towards Indonesia. Eventhough it recognized *de jure* for twenty-five years, it could likely change its stance in the right time. Its attitude

¹⁵² Budiarto Shambazy, "Poltik Luar Negeri Abdurrahman Wahid", *Kompas*, January 2, 2010

¹⁵³ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "Press Stakeout Following Bilateral Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Shihab", Bangkok, Thailand, 29 July 2000, released by the U.S. State Department.

towards Indonesia guided President Habibie to cancel the Indonesia-Australia Defence Agreement. Australia was claimed several times running its intelligence agency, military, and Australian NGOs in Indonesia territory, *for instances* before the UN Popular Consultation in August 1999 in East Timor, Australian intelligence operated before the referendum, a third of the official observers of the UNAMET operation were Australians. Hadi Soesastro, a CSIS researcher, explains that Australia supported and engineered the independence of East Timor, while it also has hidden mission that is a larger regional ambition.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile, in case of Papua, Alwi Shihab stated that Australia is an external threat for Indonesia's national integrity particularly in Papua as mentioned in Indonesia's foreign policy.¹⁵⁵

Learning from the impact of Indonesian dependence to western countries, Indonesia realized to balance it with establishing an "Asia Axis". In economy aspect, Indonesia joined a new economic alliance of Indonesia, China, India with financial supporting by Japan and Singapore in February 2000. Besides, he also proposed a West Pacific forum involving (Indonesia, East Timor, Papua, Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia-China-India Axis) to balance the U.S. hegemonic power.

Meanwhile, Indonesia relations with China in particular within the context of Asia Axis, in fact, was no concrete realization in the foreign policy,¹⁵⁶ though Indonesia had opened a consulate general in Shanghai, while China established a consualte general in Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia. Its relations with China was more prepared as a diversfication form of foreign affairs since Indonesia had strongly dependent relations (trade and military) with western countries. That situation caused Indonesia must compromise several conditions and suffered its domestic. So, Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cover a wider relations in politics, economics, tourism, and science and technology in May 2000.¹⁵⁷

In the meantime, its relations with Southeast Asia countries mostly halted. After announcing the policy of "Look towards Asia", Indonesia put Malaysia and Singapore as strategic core of the ASEAN. However, they were sometimes in tense relations in case of forest fires since 1997. Singapore was one of special ASEAN country to be included in the

¹⁵⁴ Hadi Soesatro, "Indonesia as Australia's Neighbour", in **Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis**, Chris Manning and Peter van Dierman (eds.), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p. 129.

¹⁵⁵ "Australia a threat to Indonesia, says Minister", *Strait Times* (Singapore), 30 May 2000

¹⁵⁶ Anthony L Smith, **Abdurrahman Wahid and the Indonesian Economy**, ISEAS, Singapore, 2001, p. 59

¹⁵⁷ Anthony L. Smith, *Op.cit.*, December 2000, p. 513.

list of that policy. However, its relations with Singapore came to strain since the High Level Conference of the ASEAN in November 2000, when Indonesia requested Papua and East Timor to be included as the new members. Singapore considered the ASEAN would not be benefited by those countries hence it rejected. In response, President Wahid would not only depend on the ASEAN, he seek for other cooperation beyond the ASEAN to cooperate and bind the solidarity. Therefore, the ASEAN was no longer a priority in his foreign policy. Meanwhile, in particular with Cambodia, they had tied closer relations. In response to Cambodia Question, alongside the Thailand Proposal, Indonesia participated into the ASEAN Troika to respect the recent Cambodia situation.

In short, Indonesia relations with the U.S. and Australia had strained particularly after East Timor Referendum. While, to balance the dependent relations with western countries economically and militarily, Indonesia strived to develop closer relations with China and Asia countries. While President Wahid announced “Look towards Asia”, which had not succeed overall, since it got the opposite stand from Asia countries who had allied with the U.S. Meanwhile, with Southeast Asia countries, their relations mostly halted, even President Wahid had announce the ASEAN was no longer Indonesia’s priority. Eventhough, Indonesia passed the reform process, in fact, the spirit of reform demanding a democratization changes the way back only to ‘the change of political figure’ or “transplacement”¹⁵⁸

2.5 MEGAWATI SOEKARNO PUTRI (2001 - 2004)

During her presidential era, Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation was still economic recovery. The way Megawati government ruled Indonesia much in common with Soeharto government in context of priority on western country (particularly with the U.S.) and the ASEAN. In case of economic recovery agenda, Indonesia had still pioneered the IMF funds. Even, Indonesia’s moneter was nearly collapsed due to met the IMF conditions by privatizing the national corporations assets to foreign corporations and liquiditas assistances. Indonesia also kept more closer relations with the U.S. where in it became the first non-Asia country destination of Presidential official visit after becoming a President particularly the cooperation in war on terror amid the 9/11 incident placed in the U.S. However, Indonesia once was blockaded militarily by the U.S.

¹⁵⁸ Samuel P Huntington, **Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga**, Penerbit Pustaka Grafiti, Jakarta, 1995, p. 231

In her tenure, Indonesia had undergone serious domestic situations consisting of a series of the bom attacks as a result of international terrorism threat's alarm amid the 9/11 incidents. The rise of extremist militants became a serious threat for Indonesia's national security and stability. For examples, Bali Bomb I and J.W. Marriot Hotel Bomb Attacks had occurred in Indonesia.¹⁵⁹ Those sparked international responses to the government since no prevention actions took to minimize such terrorism attacks that resulted casualties and death of foreign citizens. Australia was one of country which harshly criticized Indonesia government and condemned such attacks. Later, those incidents downgraded Indonesia-Australia relations. Even, Australia imposed a travel warning to Indonesia for its citizens and it impacted to the lower numbers of Australian visitors to Indonesia, while suffered its tourism income.

Besides, it also had to faced several threats of the separatism movements including in West Papua, Aceh, and a long sectarian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Those all have threaten Indonesia's territorial integrity. In order to solve the Aceh disintegration movements, Indonesia together with an international Hendry Dunant Foundation strived to mediate the government-separtism movement's leaders in peace talk hold in Swiss. However it was failed, and the movement remained to continue its moves in international level for getting supports.

Indonesia diplomacy seemed had no clear pattern in its foreign affairs. In ASEAN relations, Indonesia hosted the High Level Conference of ASEAN in 2003, Bali and decided an establishment of ASEAN Community in 2015. Indonesia emerged as a pioeneer country that proposed the ASEAN community to take large role and bargaining position in the international affairs. In other sides, to repeat the success of his father, President Soekarno, Indonesia within her official visits came to several Eastern countries with signing bilateral cooperations especially with Russia. It was a new innovation and colour in Indonesia foreign affairs. Her government paid for military equipments from Rusia namely SU-27 and SU-30 Sukhoi jets, and two units of MI-35 helicopters.

With China, Indonesia sold long term exploration agreement of Indonesia's oil and gas fields in Natuna bloc with lowest price. Besides, in case of South China sea dispute, in the level of the ASEAN, thanks to the Indonesia's annual track-two informal workshop which it has been conducted since 1990, it successfully brought China to negotiation table

¹⁵⁹ Athiqah Nur Alami, "Indonesian Foreign Policy and Non-Traditional Security Issues", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 12, No. 2, December 2015, p.89

with the ASEAN member countries. This negotiation resulted in an agreement on the DOC in South China Sea.¹⁶⁰ It draws the reaffirmations of both the claimant and non-claimant states into conflict resolution by peaceful means and preventing any actions which could sparked tension in the dispute areas. While, immediately she led Indonesia to take an attempt of Korea's reunification by visiting North Korea. A controversial step in domestic politics, while it was perceived a memorial backway of Indonesia's good relations with North Korea during President Soekarno.

2.6 SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHAYONO (2004- 2014)

President Susilo Bambang Yuhayono or popular called with the acronymn namely "SBY" ruled Indonesia in two terms, with first term during 2004-2009. While the second term during 2009-2014. He won the presidential position from the first general election in 2004 through its Democratic Party (a nationalist-secular party). In his period, Indonesia achieved democratization and could recover economy out of the Asian economic crisis over a decade.

During his presidential tenure, Indonesia conducted all direction foreign policy with "thousands friend zero enemy" policy.¹⁶¹ This such kind policy was examined no definite orientation or not focus because of multi direction foreign affairs must be chosen and conducted. In the global scale, Indonesia majorly established relations with the U.S. and Japan. Whereas in the regional scale with the ASEAN and APEC.¹⁶² Since Indonesia all complicated domestic plights damaged its national image in interantional level, SBY government prioritized a recovery of Indonesia image.

The first priority of non-ASEAN visit country in his term, President SBY visited intensively to the U.S. since in May 2005 especially in context of military cooperation. In the era of Megawati, the U.S. put military embargo to Indonesia especially sale for military equipments. President SBY strived to normalized Indonesia-the U.S. relations through security dialogue and bilaterla defence dialogue. After their relations normalized, they

¹⁶⁰ Derry Aplianta, "Indonesia's Response in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of the Soeharto and the post-Soeharto Era", *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015, p.14, retrieved on <http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/jas.v3i1.749>

¹⁶¹ Muhammad Tri Andika, "Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum", *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol.15, Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, 2017, p.49

¹⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa Tahun 2014", January 7 2014, Jakarta, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, p. 3

agreed common military training and weapon assistance. Of course the U.S. decided in line with its strategic interests namely its political and security stability as well as energy supply.

To be noted, Indonesia was blockaded in term of weapon buy. The U.S. imposed such embargo to Indonesia with considering the military officers violated serious human rights (in case of shooting charge that caused two the U.S. citizens death, while the investigation process conducted with the FBI), demanding a justice process in the military court conducted with cooperations among the Indonesian military, the UN East Timor Serious Crime Unit, as well as assuring a public transparency upon income and outcome budget of Indonesian military. Several military generals seemed such attempts as an intervention forms to internal issue of the Indonesian military that violated the independence of military.

Indonesia also was active in many international multilateral forums beyond ASEAN such as ASEAN+3 and APEC. Within active participation of those organizations considered as a bargaining power over super powers like the U.S. The good news was during SBY tenure was Indonesia eventually succeed to pay the rest of its foreign debts to the IMF in October 2006.

Indonesia relations with major regional powers, in short, to be explained, first Indonesia-Japan upgraded the relation with an new economic partnership agreement. While with China, Indonesia declared a strategic partnership in April 25, 2005. Meanwhile, Indonesia-Australia relations remained up-down since 1980. During President SBY, several factors determines their relations involving terrorism and transnational crimes and the rise of extremist militant groups in Indonesia. When the U.S. military invasion to Iraq, Australia was only one the U.S. ally joined coalition war in Iraq. Due to that Australian move, Muslim Indonesia community had negatively responded. The Australian government then more strictly imposed and continued the travel warning for its citizens to Indonesia amid the continuation of bomb attacks (Bali Bomb II) in Indonesia that targeted foreigners. In this case, Australian tourists were mostly foreign tourists who traveled for tourism to Indonesia. Of course, it affected to Indonesian tourism industry and negative perception for Indonesia. Regard to ASEAN development, Indonesia promoted Australia, New Zealand and India as the strategic talk partner of ASEAN beyond Japan, South Korea and China within the ASEAN+3. Indonesia considered that ASEAN needs other developed industry countries around the region.

In the level of Southeast Asia countries, President SBY prioritized its relations with Singapore and Malaysia. First, Indonesia-Malaysia concerns to the issues namely illegal logging, Indonesian workers (human) trafficking in the border areas, several territorial disputes (Sipadan Ligitan islands and Ambalat bloc island)¹⁶³. Eventhough they stand on good relations, thos issues sometimes fluctuatively influence two countries relations. Second, with Singapore, especially money laundry issue, forest fires, and Singapore's sea reclamations that considered carefully to expand territorial sizes entering to Indonesia territory. In case of money laundry, Singapore is considered as a safe heaven country to secure the corruption money by Indonesian corruptors. While the hard situation for Indonesia side, since Singapore-Indonesia does not have any extradition agreement.

President SBY signed a new defence cooperation agreement with Singapore on April 27, 2007 in order to extend the intial agreement. However, Indonesian People's Representative Council refused to ratify that agreement.¹⁶⁴ It considered that agreement would more benefit Singapore. In this context, Singapore would freely shooting manuver, self-military training, and engagement of third part into the common military training. Of course, it was perceived as a new sovereignty threat for Indonesia. Actually, in return, Singapore will sign an extradition agreement especially aiming at pushing back trillions of corruption money saved in Singapore. Eventually, the ratification of this agreement once suspended by no definite times.

SBY government also was aheaded with and had to tackle the continuing separatism movements and ethnic violence consisting of Free Aceh Movement, Ambon and Maluku sectarian conflict and Free Papua Organization. Indonesia is painfully concern to those conflict since in the development of conflicts have engaged the intervention of foreign powers. So that, it has to recover Indonesian image in the international level due to the negative campaigns voiced particularly by international NGOs, foreign journalists and foreign parliaments.¹⁶⁵

In Indonesian government perspective, in case of Free Aceh Movement, the essential problems are originated from injustice of development share, economic exploitation, and

¹⁶³Awani Irewati, "Reviewing the Mechanism of Border Disputes Settlement in ASEAN", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 2014, pp. 44-45

¹⁶⁴ DPR RI, "Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri", June 25 2007, Indonesian House of Representative, Republic of Indonesia, p. 2

¹⁶⁵ DPR RI, "Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri", September 16 2009, Indonesian House of Representative, pp. 1-2.

abuse violations of human rights conducted in the past. Those then provoked the aspirations for independence.¹⁶⁶ Province of Aceh is a integral territory of Indonesia and the government is determines to defend and secure Indonesian territorial integrity.¹⁶⁷ However, in the development of the conflict, this separatism issue had been driven by individuals who live abroad and contributed to provoke the conflict. Eventhough, no country which have diplomatic relations with Indonesia officially support and recognize movement, several foreign countries had became the bases such as in Malaysia, Australia, East Timor and Swedia. In order to solve this issue, Indonesia government, since President Megawati tried to involve a third party as a facilitator or mediator namely the HDC, a Swedia-based NGO. As her tenure, a peace talk or negatiation hold in Swedia facilitated by the HDC between the leaders of Aceh separatism movement and Indonesia government. Unfortunately, it did not reach agreement. Later, in the SBY government, the peace negotiation continued with mediation of other NGO requested by Indonesia government, namely Crisis Management Initiative. In next negotiation placed on Helsinki, Finlandia. Two conflicted parties reached an agreement and next peace talk to be agreed, continued and initiated by Vice President, Jusuf Kalla in Malino Village, South Sulawesi Province. Two parties ended with peace, by Aceh province was given the special autonomy rights.

In case of West Papua, Indonesia government views the principal problems rooted by a govenrment-sponsored Congress of the People of Papua in June 2000 that legitimized Papua people as a sovereign nation since December 1, 1961. It impacts on the cancelation to the New York Agreement of 1962 and the Act of Free choice of 1969, endorsed by UNGA resolution No.2504 (XXIV). Indonesia leaders have acknowledged the presence of Australian NGO representatives who have affiliated with the Free Papua Organization. In addition, the government will prevent any independence movements in domestic and foreign level.

Meanwhile, in case of Maluku and Ambon case, it was a much more complicated conflict. Alwi Shihab, former Indonesia Foreign Minister expressed that “the conflict in Maluku is essentially not a religious conflict. It is more of an inter-communal conflict driven by local economic disparities, instigated by certain forces bent on destabilizing the country.”¹⁶⁸ The international public put strong attention to the conflict claimed since 1998

¹⁶⁶ Alwi Shihab, “Briefing by the Foreign Minister H.E. Alwi Shihab to Foreign Ambassadors in Jakarta on Aceh, Maluku and Irian Jaya”, Jakarta, July 7 2000.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

had been casualties of 3000-5000 people. Eventhough, it was reacted by allowing an international intervention force into conflict areas, the SBY government determined to solve the conflict without military approach. In July 2000, Indonesia obtained the OIC support and recognition for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia. From all three conflict cases, it seemed that the separatism movements have developed the strategy on the formation of independence movement centre in Europe as opposition forces abroad.

The development of settlement efforts in case of South China Sea in peaceful way has been conducted, firstly since 2002 a negotiation of the ASEAN level, resulted in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), then in 2004 ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DoC which agreed to hold annual meeting in order to report and recommend the dispute's development through ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting. In 2011, it was agreed Guideline for Implementation of the DoC and to be continued in 2013 through Special ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting where in this meeting, Indonesian government proposed a "3+1 formula" as a basic of the CoC.¹⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Indonesia ties with Australia are shaped from the past by these issues. *First*, in relation with East Timor issue. After the separation of East Timor of Indonesia's national territory, Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste remain in dispute of Timor Sea whose the wealth of gas, mineral and oil energy. *Second*, terrorism issue. In this context, Australian citizens and officials suffered by multiple suicide bombings in Indonesia. For instances, 88 Australians deaths of Bali Bomb I in 2002, 4 of 23 deaths of Bali Bomb II in 2005. Moreover, the militant groups-originated Indonesia accused to pose terror attack's threat in Australia territory. *Third*, the asylum seekers issue. In this case, they pass through Indonesia's maritime territory toward Australia. While, Australian government reacts negatively to asylum seekers-originated of the regional conflict's areas and send them back to Indonesia territory. Unfortunately, Indonesia is a non-ratified refugee's convention country. *Fourth*, Australian government's espionage or spying row case. It downgraded their diplomatic ties and by today still creates mistrust to their relations. In reserve, Indonesia suspended information and intelligence sharing, joint military exercise, and people smuggling cooperation. Besides, Indonesia suffered by Australian citizens

¹⁶⁹ Deasy Silvy Sari, "Maritime Nexus and The Challenge of South China Sea", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2017, pp.183-184

engagement in case of narcotica abuse and sale. For instances, Corby case of 2006 and Bali “nine”.

Several factors encourage Indonesia’s ties with the Middle East, in general, *first*, Muslim solidarity of Indonesian Muslims. Since, it is the world’s foremost Muslim-populated country. *Second*, historical ties with particular countries of the Middle East region. In this context, several Middle East countries were the first earliest countries which recognized and supported the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. *Third*, the large number of Indonesian migrant workers in the region. In fact, this factor influences how Indonesian government’s response to the Middle East’s issues. They contributes to the foreign exchange reserves of Indonesia. For instances, as Indonesia Bank notes the total number of Indonesian migrant workers’ remittance to national reserves in 2015 was nearly US\$ 9 billion, while by October 2016 was close to US\$ 7,47 billion.¹⁷⁰

In response to a series of Arab Spring events occurred in several Middle East countries, Indonesian government’s response tended to passive stance especially the NATO military intervention to Libya. Perhaps, Indonesian government had worries to the Al-Qaeda supporters in Indonesia¹⁷¹ which had been responsible on several deadly terror attacks in Indonesia. Despite, Indonesia Muslim community in general demanded to the government to take a firm stance in response to the humanitarian crisis in that region, in fact, Indonesia government seemed to take a non-firm stance. This stance suffered Indonesia that it just only strengthened the rumor of Indonesia “fearness” to the U.S. Yet, Indonesia took more firm stance of opposing the U.S. stance in response to Hamas and Fatah political reconciliation in Palestine.

In sum, from the past to recent developments, the main challenges of Indonesia’s foreign policy can be issued as follow. *First*, rivalry between China and the U.S. in the Southeast Asia region, even in domestic level of Indonesia. Their rivalry not only in economic aspect, but also in politics and military aspects. *Second*, South China Sea conflict. In this case, the rise of military presence of China then followed by the U.S. military navy around that areas of the conflict. China also has increased its claim to belong the islands of the South China Sea. It risks to the Indonesia’s Economic Exclusive Zone. *Third*, territorial disputes with the neighbor countries. By today, Indonesia has unresolved

¹⁷⁰ Tempo.co, “TKI Pahlawan Devisa dan Problematikanya”, *TEMPO*, January 27, 2017, <https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/840572/tki-pahlawan-devisa-dan-problematikanya>, (retrieved on February 19, 2018)

¹⁷¹Riza Sihbudi, “Indonesia dan Dinamika Politik Timur Tengah (Januari-November 2011)”, 2011, p.243

maritime border's dispute with ten countries, whereas for land border dispute with three countries.



CHAPTER III

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ON PALESTINE ISSUE

1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

After the first World War was end with the division of the Ottoman Empire territories in the region, this had paved away for the Jews to come to Palestine land. In order to pursue its national interests, British had been ally with the Jews. In result, they got foreign supports. Then they had persuaded the British which had authroties as a Palestine mandate. British concerned to that issue with promising the Jews to establish a Jewish state in Palestine land.¹⁷² This promise covered in Balfour Decralation. Since then, the most first sensitive issue for Muslim community and an issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict which are al-Alqsa Mosque of Jerusalem. It had challenged the British, so that it might be a reason why British mandate initially allowed the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921.¹⁷³ The first struggle against the British authority by Palestinians occured in 1929 after the Jewish hostility of Muslims known as the al-Buraq revolution. This incident then has created a very serious consequence by today. In which Britain and its Zionist allies launched a deterrence policy that worsened the situation in al-Aqsa Mosque.

Following the 1948 war, it has resulted the division of Palestine lands into three parts namely Gaza strip under authorization of the Eygpt rule, the West Bank regulated by Jordanian administration, and an establishment of a new Jewish state of Israel. Since 1950, the sovereignty of the holy sites in Old City of Jerusalem and the authority of al-Aqsa Mosque has been handled by Kingdom of Jordan in particular the Ministry of Waqf and Islamic Affairs. However, during the Six Day war of Arab-Israel war in 1967, Israel tried to occupy the Old City of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque. However, the Muslim scholars opposed and formed the Supreme Islamic Council in July 1967 to safeguard over the al-Aqsa Mosque for Muslim. Eventually, those authority was back to the Jordanian Ministry of Waqf and remained the status quo, except the Moroccan Gate, which is still

¹⁷² Tayyar Ari, *Gecmisten Gunumuze Orta Dogu: Siyaset, Savas, ve Diplomasi*, Vol. I, 6th edition, Dora Basim-Yayin Dagitim, Bursa, p.248.

¹⁷³ Abdallah Marouf Omar, "Al-Aqsa Mosque's Incident in July 2017: Affirming the Policy of Deterrence", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 19, No.3, 2017, p. 69

occupied by Israel. Besides, the international community has not recognized the Israel occupation over Eastern Jerusalem.¹⁷⁴ The administration and maintenance of the holy sites of Jerusalem were regulated under a peace treaty of 1994 between Israel and Kingdom of Jordan. In short, this treaty preserves the status quo of al-Aqsa Mosque.

The second issue of Israeli-Palestine conflict is Palestinian refugees. By the end of the 1948 Arab-Israel war, Palestinians forcibly flee from their lands, were displaced due to the Israel harrassments and prevented from returning to their land. UN General Assembly Resolution 194 passed to resolve those issues in December 1948. It authorized the establishment of the UNCCP aimed to work on the Palestinian refugee issues. However, the role of the UNCCP counts limited by 1952 due to the lack of international community supports. And the Oslo Accords put the issue of the Palestinian refugees to final status talks.¹⁷⁵ The failure of any diplomacy or negotiations to solve those issues caused no real pressures put on Israel from states or international body, the lack of regular negotiation to push the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the lack of a unified stance of the Arab states and Muslim states in general to concern, and the refusal of Israel to take responsibility for the refugee issue, therefore the Israel official stance not to permit the return of refugee. Another issues are the continuity of settlements for Israelis in the Occupied Territories and the existents of the separation wall that raise the gap and restrictions for Palestinians travel to go beyond that wall.¹⁷⁶

2 TURKEY AND INDONESIA GOVERNMENTS' VIEW ON PALESTINE ISSUE

2.1 TURKISH GOVERNMENT VIEWS

2.1.1 Ottoman-Palestine Relations

The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) governed Palestine lands for four centuries. In fact, since the Ottoman's victory over the Mamluks in the Marj Dabiq battle of 1516, Turkish-Palestinians relations have been cultivated. The Sultan Ottoman ruled with the principle of religious autonomy for citizens and served in civil

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71

¹⁷⁵ Jinan Bastaki, "Who Represents Palestinian Refugees? The Sidelining of the Core of the Palestine Question", *Perceptions*, Vol. XX, No.1, 2015, pp.77-78

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.78

services equally.¹⁷⁷ In the 1880s, the influx of Jewish settlers that came in large number and illegally, while intended to construct a national Jewish settlement-separated identity, Sultan opposed. For serving peace and stability in Al-Quds, he employed well established-restrictions on Jewish settlement in the early 1890s. During 1882-1914, the various policies for restriction and prevention of Jewish settlement in Palestine lands and Jerusalem in particular.¹⁷⁸

The new phase of Palestine's history was set after the fell of Ottoman Empire and western allies' victory. As the Sykes-Picot Agreement¹⁷⁹ was approved on February 4, 1916, British started to occupy Palestine for 32 year (1917-1948). The largest territorial portion of the original Palestine mandate was severed in 1922 to form the state of Transjordan.¹⁸⁰ The Palestinian Arabs opposed the Balfour Declaration¹⁸¹ and the mandate. In conclusion, since the Ottoman Empire seems that the importance and sensitivity of Al-Quds was lived in the heart of Turks.

2.1.2 Secularist Government Periods

Since the independence of 1923, Turkish foreign policy's orientation was firmly westward policy.¹⁸² In decades, Turkish Middle East policy was only considered as a west ally. During the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy particularly only more considered the statute and nature of Al-Quds. Besides, it also concerned the "permanent solution" of conflict though Turkey's real actions was not much more active.

Turkish policy-makers had harsh responded to the conflict in various events. For instances, in the building of Jerusalem settlement in East Jerusalem in 1967, the fire of Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, and the declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital under the Basic Law of 1980. Further, since the mid-1960s, Turkey had shown its favours toward

¹⁷⁷ M. Yazbak, "Voices Crying in the Wilderness? Palestinian Responses to the Zionist Penetration of Palestine 1882-1917", in **The Symposium on Palestine Since the Ottomans 28-29 November 2013**, Vol. 2, Afsar Press, Ankara, 2014, p.55.

¹⁷⁸ See detail in Republic of Turkey, **Palestine in Ottoman Documents**, General Directorate of State Archives, Istanbul, 2009, pp. 17-19.

¹⁷⁹ The political map of the region is formed by the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 secretly by the Great Britain and France to divide the Ottoman-ruled territories in the Middle East and sphere of influences among great powers (in particular, British and France).

¹⁸⁰ Esber, R. M., "The Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) of 1948", in **The Symposium on Palestine Since the Ottomans 28-29 November 2013**, Vol.2, Afsar Press, Ankara, 2014, p.174

¹⁸¹ Following the First World War, to gain the Arab and Jewish supports, the British government made conflicting promises to the Arabs in 1915 and 1916 Mc Mahon-Hussein correspondence, and then to the Jews in 1917 Balfour Declaration

¹⁸² N Danfort, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Policy Quarter*, Vol. 7, No.3, p.87

Palestinians. For examples, Turkey did not allow U.S. to use the air-base to send aids to Israel in 1967 and 1973. In 1965 to 1992, no Turkish ministers visited Israel. In converse, Turkey allowed the PLO to open an office in Ankara in the 1970s. Following that events, the Likud Party of Israel downgraded diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1977 and in the aftermath of 1980 military coup, Turkey also did. In the 1980s was a decade of growing Turkish popular solidarity with Palestinians by all the Turkey's societal segments. In September 1980, National Salvation Party of Turkey launched a mass campaign in Konya titled "Free Al-Quds" against the Israeli annexation policy.

Since the Arab-Israeli rapprochement in the early 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations could develop easily. In aim at managing the conflict, Turkey has established bilateral relations with Israel on various occasions. During the 1990s, Turkey signed several agreements with Israel primarily on economic and military cooperations. The reasons were a strategic calculation of foreign and domestic challenges.¹⁸³ In fact, by Turkey's facilitator role, the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo accords as the part of peace process.¹⁸⁴

Following the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, their relations was downgraded. Since the 2000 Intifada, Turkey's sympathy towards Palestinian was already growing. This event was considered as the main stage of a beginning of Turkish policy-makers to respond more vocally in favour of Palestinians.

2.1.3 The AKP Party Rule

In the first term (2002-2007), as the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has built the commitment to provide peace and stability in the Middle East. The AKP government perceives that there is no peace in the region without peace in Palestine. Therefore, in order to establish regional peace, Turkish foreign policy-makers should attempt to settle the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Thus, it has started to intensify the diplomatic involvement of peace process. In short, they view the conflict is the major obstacle to establish permanent peace and promote democracy in region.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Özlem Tür, From Cooperation to Conflict-Turkey and Israel in the 2000s, *Israel Studies* Vol.17, No.3, 2012, p. 47.

¹⁸⁴P. Sadrin, **Turkish Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: From Securitising to Desecuritising Actor**, Doctoral Thesis, University of Westminster, London, 2010, p.10.

¹⁸⁵Bulent Aras, "Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *SETA Policy Brief*, No.32, 2009, p.5.

Turkey's active involvement has been considered as a responsibility to build a constructive role in the regional peace process.¹⁸⁶ Turkey stands for the two-state solution. Turkey played as a peace mediator. It still adopts a balancing policy. It strived to play role as a neutral peace mediator as possible. Turkey's priorities such as on the recognition of equal, respect and preservation of the sanctity, recognition of sovereign Palestine state, statute and nature of Al-Quds, and also the empowerment of Palestinians on every level to establish the state of Palestine.¹⁸⁷ But it was no longer since Freedom Flotilla incident occurred.

To playing role as a neutral peace mediator as possible, Turkish attempted to balance relations with both parties and to keep parties' trust. For instance, in 2005 PM Erdogan made a rare visit to Israel met Ariel Sharon. Then, it was followed a balancing visit to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.

In several previously events, Turkey has shown its sensitivity of the conflict. For examples, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit harshly reacted of the Israeli invasion of 2002 stated the *Jenin Operation of Israeli* as a "Genocide". Foreign Minister Erdogan criticised Israel as a "terror state" in response to the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in 2004 and the heavy civilian casualties in the Rafah refugee camp.¹⁸⁸

Besides, Turkey has also been proactive to the empowerment and state capacity building for Palestinians. For instances, in 2005, in the framework of Ankara forum, Turkey flourished the economic project through TOBB. Since a lack of progress in Gaza, the focus of forum moved to Jenin in the West Bank. TIKA has undertake various projects in the Palestinian-controlled territories.

In the second term (2007-2012), following the Israel's *Operation Cast Lead* to Gaza in 2008, Turkish leaders condemned and the government suspended facilitating role of Israel-Syria peace talks. In dealing with Gaza situation, Turkey had two-stage strategic plans. *First*, to broker a ceasefire and provide supervision by international peacekeepers, including Arab-Turkish forces. *Second*, to achieve a compromise among conflicting Palestinian groups to stabilise Palestinian politics and ensure a commitment to peace.

¹⁸⁶Yetim, H. T., "The Role of Identity in Turkey's New Middle Est Foreign Policy: The Case of JDP's Palestine Policy", Sakarya University, Sakarya, 2014, p.23

¹⁸⁷ ORSAM, "Panel Middle East Peace Process in the New International Setting: Palestinian and Turkish Perspectives", *Meeting Evaluation*, No.15, 2017, p 4.

¹⁸⁸Ziya Onis, "Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and A Critique", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13, No.1, p.52.

In international level, by utilising Turkey's two-year terms as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, PM Erdogan welcomed to the Arab League initiative calling for a U.N. Resolution for a ceasefire. Other diplomatic activities conducted Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs by attending the extraordinary meeting of the OIC's foreign ministers on January 3, 2009. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu also called for immediate international action to end the Israel aggression in Gaza. The final statement of the OIC meeting condemned "the ongoing barbaric Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza."¹⁸⁹ In the Global Economic Forum of 2009 of Davos were the stage of Turkey's rising involvement and the radical change occurred. Prime Minister Erdogan walked out of the debate and firmly opposed to Israeli President, Shimon Peres in behalf of Israeli's injustice to Palestinians.¹⁹⁰

The AKP peace-seeking efforts remained after Israel's Gaza occupation of 2008. In an attempt to open the Israeli's blockade over Gaza, Turkey sent a civil humanitarian aid flotilla. Unfortunately, there was occurred a shoot incident by Israeli force to Freedom Flotilla in May 2010. Further, Turkey-Israeli relations were more halted. Turkey leaders see Hamas as a democratic elected and legitimated Palestinian actor. Thus, it should be included into peace talks. It does not see as a terror organisation as seen by Israel and U.S.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, in various occasions, Turkey toned up over Israeli injustice policies toward Palestinians to the international public.

In the third term (2012-2016), Israel-Turkey normalised diplomatic relations after six years of Freedom Flotilla incident under Turkey provision of Israel with Israel paying compensation to Freedom Flotilla victim's families and allowing Turkey to carry out the humanitarian projects for Palestinians in Gaza.¹⁹²

Turkey's involvement reached at the level complexity which includes the intervention of regional alliances, diplomacy vis a vis with the U.S. and the E.U. Turkey proposes to include Hamas in the Palestinian political and peace process. Its aim is to persuade Hamas to declare the ceasefire and work for the political accommodation of different groups within Palestinian politics. Pursuing the Palestinian political stability

¹⁸⁹ D. Benjamin, "Turkey's Support for Hamas: A Bridge Too Far?", *Journal of the Oxford Center for the Study of Law and Public Policy*, Vol. 1, No.2, p.196.

¹⁹⁰ H.J. Barker, "The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *TESEV*, 2012, p.4

¹⁹¹ World Bulletin, "Palestinian Issue and Turkish Viewpoint", *World Bulletin*, <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news-analysis/67997/palestinian-issue-and-turkish-viewpoint> (retrieved on May 20, 2017).

¹⁹² Independent Turkey, "Decrypting Erdogans Palestine Policy", *Independent Turkey*, <http://independentturkey.org/decrypting-erdogans-palestine-policy/>(retrieved on May 21, 2017)

in order to step forward of the peace process. Turkey has already started to mediate Hamas and international actors while maintaining regular contacts with Fatah, the Palestinian Authority, U.S. and EU countries.

In the first annual conference of the Association of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds, held in Istanbul, President Erdogan called on all Muslims actively embraces the Palestinian issue and protect Al-Quds. He also asserted "a lasting peace in the Middle East can not be reached without a free Palestine based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital." He also voiced for fighting over the holy status of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, following the Israeli government proposed a ban on the Islamic call to prayer in the Jerusalem.¹⁹³

However, in recent years, a series of regional crisis (the refugee crisis, ongoing war against ISIS, and the failed state problems of Syrian and Iraq), Turkish efforts to settle conflict also challenged. Those have affected directly to national security, created instability and insecurity in the region. Besides, PKK terror attacks and the July 15 coup attempt have been challenging the capacity of the AKP to govern and provide national security. Therefore, those have delimited Turkish engagement and involvement in the Middle East.¹⁹⁴ Following the crisis resulted of Arab Spring (ISIS, failed states, the refugee influx, etc) impacted Turkish proactive foreign policy immensely.

In last two years, the present nature of Turkish proactivity seems to be more selective, focused, globally limited. Today, the regional and global engagements including Turkey is a much more concern to Syria and Iraq, in Africa as well, and operate on the basis of security priorities. Another factor that also influences to Turkish role as a peace mediator is up-down of Turkish-Israel relations. Turkish-Israel had a much more deteriorated. Though rapprochement was conducted in 2016 with pointing out new ambassador of both countries, political relations, in particular, has remained halt. In short, Turkish peace mediating role further is not much more intensive than initial periods.

During three terms of the AKP government emphasises some critical points concerning the conflict as follows. *First*, the importance of Jerusalem (Al-Quds). *Second*, the settlement issue. *Third*, solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will contribute to

¹⁹³Daily Sabah, "Middle East Peace Impossible Without Free Palestine Presiden Erdogan Says", *Daily Sabah*, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/11/29/middle-east-peace-impossible-without-free-palestine-president-erdogan-says> (retrieved on May 19, 2017).

¹⁹⁴E.F. Keyman, "A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Toward Proactive Moral Realism", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.1, 2017, p. 60.

regional peace and stability or all regional conflicts basically. *Fourth*, concerning the Arab Peace Initiative calls for ending of Israel's occupation of Arab territory in return for peace with the Arab world. It results in a recognition and normalised relations with the Arab world in particular and Muslim world in general. *Fifth*, Turkey asserts the two-state solution of the 1967 borders. *Sixth*, Turkey emphasises that Hamas should be included in peace talks as a legitimate actor in Palestinian domestic politics.



Table 3.1. The Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy on Palestine Issue

	OTTOMAN EMPIRE	PRIOR TO AKP GOVERNMENT	AKP GOVERNMENT (2002-2007)	AKP GOVERNMENT (2007-2011)	AKP GOVERNMENT (2011-2016)
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unstable politics (four military coups) • Economic worries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratization and political stability • Economic growth (open economy) • PKK threats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National economic growth suffered by global crisis of 2008 • An increasingly influential role of public opinion and civil society over foreign policy • The growth of nationalism sphere 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fragmentation and crisis in domestic politics → political fracture (2015 election) • High political polarisation • Stagnation of economy • Refugee influx • the increase of terror attacks by the PKK and ISIS • July 15 failed military coup (2016)
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political of Zionism • Sykes Picot Agreement • Balfour Declaration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World war • Cold war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratization wave in global stage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaza war (2008) • The early of Arab spring • 2008 Global finance crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional crisis (refugee crisis, war on ISIS terrorism, failed states of Syria and Iraq)
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE AND ORIENTATION (General)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ruling with the principle of religious autonomy for citizens and served in civil services equally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Westward policy • Security oriented policy • Isolation policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-dimensional policy (independence, openness, improving regional relations, regional mediator) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central state • Influential regional player • Playing a pivotal role in global politics (Islamic world in particular) • Prioritised ideological than 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian diplomacy • Roling as a leading country in the region • National security and economic-oriented policy

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional stability • International alliance • Proactive Foreign Policy (strategic depth) • Zero Problem Enemy Policy 	material interests	
<p>FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST (Palestine Issue)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restriction and prevention policy on the influx of Jewish settlement in Palestine lands and Jerusalem (Al-Quds) in particular 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey-Israel → mostly security-oriented bilateral ties • Restriction of regional political relations → only related to the interests of Turkish alliance with the West 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Balancing role policy (HAMAS, Israel and the West) • Mediator/ Facilitator of the conflict (during 2002-2008 of Gaza war → increasing after HAMAS won election) • Openess policy • Turkey-Israel → security, economic, political and social aspects • Rebuilding relations with Arab and Islamic countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prime Minister Erdogan walkout of Davos Summit (2009) • The low chair incident (2010) • Mavi Marmara (2010) • ideological and economic interest • Fulling the absence of Arab countries' effectiveness in settlement of the conflict • Downgrade relations with Israel (especially political and military ties) • A shift of mediator to influential actor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ideological interests by the end of periods, then attempt to balance the material and ideological interests • Highly proactive Foreign Policy that advocates the democratisation change in Arab Spring • In the early of Arab Spring → highly proactive policy • Normalisation relations with Israel (2016) then being halt again. • Selective engagement policy primarily in Iraq and Syria (post-Arab Spring), in north Africa as well

			(openess policy)	over the conflict (for instances: the Davos summit walkout of 2009, Mavi Marmara of 2010)	
KEY ACTORS (Foreign Policy Makers And Perceptions)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Much more military legitimacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prime Minister (Erdogan) • President (Abdullah Gul) • Minister of Foreign Affairs • Parliament • Press and Civil society • As a Bridge country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ahmet Davutoglu) • Prime Minister (Erdogan) • President • Parliament • Civil society (public opinion) • Media and Press 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President (Erdogan) • Prime Minister • Minister of Foreign Affairs • The AKP elites (Parliament) • Media and Press • Civil Society

2.2 INDONESIA GOVERNMENT VIEWS

2.2.1 Soekarno's Anti-Colonialism Ideology

In the era of President Soekarno, Indonesia had actively proposed and led to support the independence of Palestine state through Asia-Africa Conference, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Non-Alignment Movement. Yet, Indonesia's supports in that time was claimed as rhetoric due Indonesia was already in a post-war era and early phase of national development so that it could not able to give the real contributions to Palestine. He conducted the international diplomacy based on the spirit of anti-colonialism and Asia-Africa solidarity. The main pillar of Soekarno's policy was Asia-Africa conference held on April 1955 in Bandung, West Java.

The international situation was read by Soekarno as the era of colonialization of big powers and searching for less-power nations to be colonialized. In accordance with his live-principle ideas and background, he proposed anti-colonialism policy in Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia's self-experienced occupied by foreign nations nearly 300 years as a domestic consideration, resulting in a non-recognition policy of state of Israel. Israel was also perceived as a colonial entity while occupying Palestinians' land.

In historical context, Palestine is the first Arab recognizer country of Indonesia's independence on September 6, 1944. In aim to support Palestine, President Soekarno invited Mufti Jerusalem to attend the AAC 1955 in Bandung. While, he did not receive the participation of Israel in GANEFO. He also sent financial assistance in worth of US\$18000 for Al-Aqsa mosque restoration.

2.2.2 Soeharto's Pragmatism Move: A Continuity of Pancasila Mandate's Claim

Shifting of political power from old order to new order of political regime remained a much more economical and political problems. Indonesia's economic was vulnerable because of global economic crisis. In the aftermath of Soekarno's fell, Soeharto opted to close to the west power particularly U.S to counter Communism ideology-effect. For getting political support of regime survival, developmental foreign assistances and investments mostly from western donors, he proposed "westward" policy and introduced an "open-door policy". However, it was intended to national economic rehabilitation.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, **Indonesia and the Muslim World. Islam Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and beyond**, NIAS press, Copenhagen, 2007, p. 14.

Indonesia's Middle East policy was limited particularly on engagement to Palestine-Israeli conflict's peaceful efforts. Islamist issue had not been seen in the foreign policy's agenda of Soeharto. It had participated in the OIC since 1972, but it was only as an observer. So, the basic consideration of Soeharto's Middle East policy was not a religious factor. Instead it was seen a much more as a strategic position of Indonesia in international political arena and an attempt to kept the Muslim constituent in order to survival regime. For instance, President Soeharto invited President Arafat to attend the NAM conference held in Jakarta in 1992.

However, the limited relations was conducted in 1989, Indonesia opened a Palestine Embassy in Jakarta that was marked as a Indonesia-Palestine's approachment. However, the arrival of Palestine ambassador in Indonesia had just started on September 13, 1993. Further, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas revealed that it firmly would never to recognize the state of Israel as long as no-willingness and real actions to recover relations with Middle East countries.¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately, in construction of the real diplomatic and supportive's efforts of Indonesia to Palestine was not significantly to foster both countries' bilateral relations.

2.2.3 Indonesia's Democracy Transition Eras

Following the fell of Soeharto, Indonesia politics led to transtion era from authoritarian to democratic period. Indonesia could be categorised standing on unstable economically and politically during transition eras. In B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati governments because of domestic instability, it was no meaningful diplomatic actions in order to improve Indonesia-Palestine relations. However, the most significant policy that attracted the domestic response in case of Palestine issue was an attempt of opening diplomatic relations with Israel during President Wahid tenure. He perceived that with opening relations, in return, it would influence Israel government to smooth its policy over Palestinians. He joined with Simon Peres of Israeli President in a conference of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation on March 7, 1997. Finally, this move was cancelled due to harsh reaction of anti-Israel voiced by Muslim groups in Indonesia and Indonesia government final calculation of negative perception of Muslim world to Indonesia.

¹⁹⁶ Azyumardi Azra, **Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy. Dynamics in a Global Context**, Solstice Publishing, Jakarta, 2006, p.102.

2.2.4 SBY's Active Conflict Settlement in Muslim World

President SBY had attempted to show a pro-Islam image in foreign policy. In case of Palestine issue, Indonesia supported a democratic elected government based in Gaza, HAMAS that opposition to United States in particular. At the opening of D-8 conference held on June 14, 2006, he put more attention to more improve economic and politic cooperation of Indonesia-Middle East countries. Furthermore, he pointed out Alwi Shihab as a special representative to pursue this diplomatic mission in the Middle East region.

During its position as a non-permanent member of Security Council of United Nations in 2007-2008 period, Indonesia actively promoted the right of Palestinians, legitimacy and sovereignty of Palestine state. Eventually it succeeded to convince Security Council to adopted a resolution No.1850 about peace process in the Middle East particularly on Palestine-Israeli conflict. It was first time since 2004 and ratified on December 16, 2008.

In the framework of NASSP Plus Conference on Capacity Building Project for Palestine, Indonesia would train 1000 Palestinians in form of human-capacity building. Indonesia-Palestine agreed to foster relations in the areas of economy, capacity building, diplomacy and politics during 2008-2013.¹⁹⁷ Besides, Indonesia assisted to built Islamic-based bank, hospital in Gaza as well as humanitarian assistances for Gaza-lived Palestinians.

As a host country, a series of meetings were held in a need to embrace international community's supports. Through a mandate of Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People of United Nations hold United Nations Asian and Pacific Meeting on the Question of Palestine with theme "Strengthening International Consensus on The Urgency of Achieving a Two-State Solution" on June 8-10, 2009, then a public forum of United Nations Forum of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People on May 10, 2009.¹⁹⁸ Since 2011, Indonesia had shown its efforts on statue's improvement of Palestine as a non-member state of United Nations. At the 16th Non-Alligned Movement (NAM) Ministerial Committee was hold in Bali on March 23-27, 2011, Indonesia called

¹⁹⁷ Departemen Luar Negeri Indonesia, <http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/NewsKemlu.aspx?IDP=198&l=id>, (retrieved on October 31, 2017)

¹⁹⁸ Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/IIssueDisplay.aspx?IDP=15&l=id> (retrieved on October 31, 2017)

for supportive votes on Palestine as a non-member state of United Nations and approved by 112 countries.¹⁹⁹

At the General Council Meeting of United Nations hold on November 29, 2012 in New York, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa delivered a speech of support and vote for a non-member state of United Nations from initial observer entity with representative of the PLO. Indonesia played role as a co-sponsor of resolution. In short, Indonesia's Palestine policy in the era of SBY seemed as an improvement of foreign policy in form of real actions which was never occurred previously. Both officially and unofficially, the real supports and assistances to Palestinians also came from the heart of Indonesia society.

¹⁹⁹ www.embassyofindonesia.org/features/pdf/Diplomasi_2011.pdf (retrieved on October 31, 2017)

Table 3.2. The Dynamics of Indonesia's Foreign Policy on Palestine Issue

	SUKARNO (1945-1965)	SOEHARTO (1966- 1998)	TRANSITION ERAS (1998-2004)	SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHAYONO (2004-2014)
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post-independence war • Economic and politic structure vulnerable (limited democracy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited democracy (limited movement of civil society and Islamist groups and parties) • Security/military regime • Trilogy of development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional power • Economic crisis • transition to more democratic government • Separatism movements (threat on national territorial integrity) • Regional autonomy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic stability (an increasingly role of Islamist parties and Islamist oriented domestic public opinion) • Economic stability • Separatism threats • Social and political tensions
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second World War 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Economy Crisis • Cold war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asia Economy crisis • Trade liberalization • Humanitarian Intervention • Multi issues (War on Terrorism, Democracy, Human Rights, Environmental, Islam and the West) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great Power Politics • New Issues of the Foreign Policy • ASEAN Community (Integration process)
FP OBJECTIVE & ORIENTATION (General)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defending and maintaining national sovereignty • Attempting to get international supports and recognition upon independence of the world 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic development (open-door policy) • Regional stability and security (ASEAN-centric policy) • Westward policy (primarily with the U.S.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rally international support for economy recovery (the IMF) • International supports on democratic election • Territorial integrity • Democracy consolidation • Total diplomacy • Concentric circle formula (ASEAN, Pacific, East Asia) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pro-Islam international image • Dynamic Equilibrium • Million Friends, Zero Enemies • Navigating in Turbulance Ocean • All directions diploamcy

<p>FP TOWARD ME (Palestine Issue)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-recognition policy of Israel (mandate of 1945 Constitution → anti colonialism) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-recognition policy of Israel • Limited diplomatic ties → PLO Bureau's opening in Jakarta (1984), recognition of Palestine's independence by PLO (1988), Indonesia-Palestine diplomatic relations (1989) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-recognition policy of Israel • No meaningful diplomatic relations with the Middle East countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-recognition policy of Israel • An active engagement policy to the Middle East (for instances support to HAMAS, special representative of Middle East diplomatic mission)
<p>KEY ACTORS (FP Makers & Perceptions)</p>	<p>President (commonly as single actor) → Israel as <i>"The Outpost of Colonialist-Imperialist Forces"</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President • Military elites • Minister of Foreign Affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President • Minister of Foreign Affairs • Parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President • Minister of Foreign Affairs • Parliament • Press and Civil Society
<p>MILESTONES (Particularly Related To Palestine Issue)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asia Africa Conference of 1955 → solidarity of Palestine's independence • The NAM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAM Summit • ASEAN and APEC • the OIC (observer) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASEAN Community • The U.S. military embargo • West Pacific Forum 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASEAN • G-20 • Bali Democracy Forum • Closer relations with U.S. • Non-permanent member of UNSC (2008-2009) → SC Resolution No.1850 (peace process on the Middle East) • NAM Ministerial Meeting (2011) → call for vote on Palestine non-member of UN • Co-sponsor of resolution at GCM-UN (2012) → vote for a non-member UN • NASSP Plus Conference on Capacity Building Project for Palestine (2008-2013)

3 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE

3.1 DOMESTIC FACTORS IN TURKEY

3.1.1 Domestic Public Opinion and the Foreign Policy-Making

Since the AKP came to power, military has no longer the influential role and as a determinant factor of foreign and domestic policy. Instead domestic public opinion increasingly determines. In order to support the achievement of Turkish foreign policy, the AKP government has established state and non-state institutions as the public diplomacy tools²⁰⁰ of Turkish soft power.²⁰¹

Beyond state institutions, non-state actors namely NGOs emerged and get involved in succeeding of foreign policy's objectives. The importance's rise of non-state actor, the existent of NGOs also should be accounted. They play role and establish cooperations with both state and non-state actors. Civil society such NGO and think-tanks institutions plays on critical roles including as the peace mediator actor and serving as pressure groups into state's decision-making process particularly in the implementation phase. Civil society also influences to decision-making process for instances as adviser of governmental agency, conducting a series of policy-oriented academic research, and facilitate dialogue through international cooperations such as foreign think-tanks.²⁰² The opinion leaders, has also impacted by taking parts in citizen diplomacy initiatives, promoting global causes, raising awareness to a certain political issue.

In case of Palestine, industrial community namely TOBB's reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the Erez Industrial Area of Northen Gaza Strip and Jenin of West Bank. ORSAM, a Turkish think-tank which focuses to the Middle East-oriented researches, has contributed to advice the government in context of Turkish's Middle East policy including policy toward Palestine. IHH, a Turkish NGO, initiated the Freedom Gaza Flotilla that also embraced other states' humanitarian activists altogether brought aids to Gaza in response of Israel's siege of Gaza.

²⁰⁰In the level of governmental, those are TIKA, Ministry of Foreign affairs, AFAD, Directorate of Religious Affairs, TRT, Anadolu News Agency (AA), Kizilay, Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, etc. While in the level of non-governmental are think tanks, NGOs, opinion leaders, etc have been highlighted as the new instruments of foreign policy

²⁰¹ Cevik, B.S. and Philip Seib, "Introduction: Why Turkey's Public Diplomacy", B. Senem Cevik and Philip Seib (eds.), in **Turkey's Public Diplomacy**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2015, p. 6.

²⁰² G. A. Sancar, "Turkey's Public Diplomacy: Its Actors, Stakeholders, and Tools". B. Senem Cevik and Philip Seib (eds.), in **Turkey's Public Diplomacy**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2015, p.28.

In the AKP government, domestic public opinion increasingly has emerged as a determinant factor shaping foreign policy.²⁰³ In the same line, foreign issue has also appeared as a main instrument influencing domestic public opinion. In case of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, re-emergence of common historical and cultural sense under Ottoman heritages in domestic public opinion have reshaped Turkish Middle East's engagement as a political reality and in settlement's efforts.

In fact, the Palestine issue is a sensitive issue in Turkish society for long decades. It also gains a large majority sympathy among the various groups of Turkish society that touches the heart. The main subject of Palestine issue for most of Turks is the status of holy place Al-Quds and who will control.²⁰⁴ Turkish favours to Palestinians also came from a large segments of Turkish society that accumulated into domestic supportive public opinion. For instance, an anti-Israel sentiment emerging as a hard response of Turkish public opinion and domestic politics to Gaza tragedy of 2008 resulted in a cancelation policy of the joint military exercise and agreement with Israel²⁰⁵ and as a political attitude of Turkish leader, PM Erdogan walked out of the Davos meeting in 2009. Those draw that domestic public opinion has influenced foreign decision, decision-maker's action and attitude in response to Israel invasion to Gaza.

3.1.2 Civilian Leaders: A New Actor in Turkish Foreign Policy-Making

A significant transformation in Turkish domestic politics compared to governments before the AKP government is the emergence of active civilian leadership and democratically elected officials. It gives a gain of an active civilian control over military in decision-making mechanism. It also affects to attempt of stabilising the domestic political structure in which the current decision-making process conducted by multi-actors (IGOs, NGOs, think tanks, etc). Those have become as new tool of Turkish soft power.

During the AKP government, Turkey seems trying to rebuild the domestic political structure especially in decision-making mechanism through slowly undermining the overwhelmingly military influence in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Instead the emergence of multi-actor cultivating decision-making process. They raised to be a

²⁰³ K. B. Kanat, "Theorizing the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No.1, 2014, p.74.

²⁰⁴ Bulent Aras, "Turkey and Palestinian Questions since Al-Aqsa Intifada", *Alternatives*, Vol. 1, No.3, 2003, p.49.

²⁰⁵ Ali Balci and Kardas, "The Changing Dynamic of Turkish Relations with Israel: An Analysis of Securitization", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.14, No.2, 2012, p.115.

determinant decision-maker and the most important actor in national security and foreign policy.

For long years under military influences, it was tend to adopted the isolation policy that was mainly concern to domestic security, westward policy, and had “limited” relations with Middle East countries. It was altered as the transformation occured bringing the emergence of civilian leaderships. They seem to embrace the domestic public opinion including to actively engage into peace process of the conflict. The rise of civilian leadership consequently attracting international public opinion to pay attention to their policy and attitude, instead the official statement of Turkish military leader. So that, civil leaders also have been motivated to contribute and show their capacity to settle the conflict to international community particularly to the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

3.1.3 Leader Factor

At his tenure as Foreign Minister, Davutoglu pointed out that the Arab-Turkey rapprochement is a natural historical return. It is a continuation of Ottoman long history in the Middle East. He added that it makes Turki so possible to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the conflict has been and still is the main axis of regional security and Turkey will care for region's details.²⁰⁶ Turkish leaders also consider that no permanent peace can be found in the region without seeking solutions on the long decade's problems between Palestinian and Israeli. They already did not perceive its surrounded by unfriendly countries. Prior to Ozal administration, Turkish foreign policy was guided by the principle of "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad", adopted isolationism.²⁰⁷ Further, they realised the strategic importance of Muslim world and Turkey need to re-engage on this world. This understanding contributed of Turkish Middle East's engagement.

The AKP with identity of democratic-conservative perceives the Israel-Palestinian conflict in two dimensions. *First*, the conflict is a long decades conflict both in regional level and Muslim world particularly the status of Jerusalem (Al-Quds) and the Al-Aqsa mosque as a holy place for Muslim people. *Second* is Turkish-Israel relations. During the AKP rule, those relations are up and down. Even in order to settle the conflict, Turkey has taken risks in its relations with America and European countries. In the context of pursuing

²⁰⁶ W. K. Mujani and Ahmed Y.M, “Speciality of Relationship between Turkey and Palestine”, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 6, No.4, 2015, p.556.

²⁰⁷ V. Perthes, “Turkey’s Roles in the Middle East: An Outsider Perspective”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No.4, p.2

the permanent solution and the current real compromise solution for both parties is two-state solution of the 1967 borders.

In addition, Turkey proposes and emphasises to involve all parties including Hamas in peace talk. In consideration of Palestine politics' stability (with reconciliation of Hamas-Fatah faction) as a step forward of the peace process. As HAMAS is democratically elected government in Parliament election of Gaza strip since 2006.

3.1.4 An Increasingly Islamist Factor in Domestic Politics

The AK Party underlines itself a conservative-democratic party which respecting Islamic values, has brought successively Islam, secularism and democracy. In the same time involving Islamist groups into the political arena, in shaping Turkish national and foreign policy in order to serve a democratic equality for all parties of country. Those lead to the increasing role of Islamists in domestic politics.

The existent of civil society such as NGOs with a predominantly Islamist outlook has also been contributing to shape foreign policy. Their role might be considered as a political pressure group of decision makers in regard to Palestine issue. Since they might be perceived in regard to their strategic value's consideration as the AK Party's core conservative constituency. Their aspirations of Palestine issue have might be contributing to drive leader's perception and decision to engage in conflict's settlement. It also considers the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for all Muslim including in Turkish society for long years. It could be seen at the AKP leaders harshly reacted in any attempt of settlement buildings for Israeli in and around the holy city of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as well as Israeli's unfair policies over Arab Palestinians.

3.1.5 Turkey's Proactive Foreign Policy

In the end of the Cold war, Turkish foreign policy became more active in the Middle East. In the period of 2002-2010, Davutoglu's concept of "Strategic Depth", and his understanding of civilization mostly defined the basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy. It develops on the historical and geographical depth. Turkey should establish and provide security and stability in the region as its historical responsibility. Besides, it realised the strategic importance of region, so that it should engage to the region.

The AKP government has built commitment to provide peace and stability in the region. So that, Turkey has undergone a proactive foreign policy. By this foreign policy

choice, Turkey should play an active role as a mediator, facilitator, etc including to settle the regional conflicts. Since they consider that no lasting regional peace without finding the permanent solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey has engaged and get involved actively in the peace process.

Turkey's proactive foreign policy represents its vision, identity and strategy. Among of Turkey's visions are to establish Turkey as an influential regional actor and a peaceful regional order.²⁰⁸ Thus, its foreign policy choice has represented an attempt of establishing peace and stability in the region. Turkey plays a role as the peace mediator including settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey should emphasise on dialogue and negotiation to settle the disputes and the adoption of a win-win approach.²⁰⁹

3.2 INTERNATIONAL FACTOR

3.2.1 Palestine-Israel Conflict: the Heart of Regional Instability

Israel and Palestine conflict is a long-lasting conflict in the Middle East region. By this day, this conflict remains unresolved. It also involved all Arab countries *vis a vis* Israel. Since the root of this conflict also has come from the Arab-Israel conflict in the past years. Since Israel has occupied the land of Arab Palestinians (including East Jerusalem where in al-Aqsa Mosque remains), in response this situation Arab nations will not normalise relations with Israel. By this today, Israel has put restrictions especially for Arab Muslim Palestinians to come into the Old City areas frequently. Besides, Israel also has build and seized settlement for Israelis in the occupied territories especially in the West Bank and around of Jerusalem. Whereas the international law has determined the *status quo* of Jerusalem. And Israel control over al-Quds is illegal as it is reaffirmed in terms of the Arab Peace Initiative.²¹⁰ Under international law of UN Resolution 242, it is clearly and no ambiguity that a call for Israel forces' withdrawal from occupied territories during the 1967 Arab-Israel war or known as the Six Day War.

²⁰⁸Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, "Interview by Mr Ahmet Davutoglu", March 12 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-_on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (retrieved on October 30, 2017).

²⁰⁹ P. Carley, **Turkey's Role in the Middle East**, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995, p.20.

²¹⁰ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "The Heart of the Conflict in the Middle East", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 4, 2010, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/04/heart-of-conflict-in-middle-east-event-3086> (retrieved on April 27, 2018)

For Turkish officials, Israel has threatened the peace process in the world and the Middle East.²¹¹ It has always harassed the Palestinian people today and it is continuing. Turkish government under the AKP rule will never respond Israel policy towards Palestinians positively. The AKP government has led Turkey as a key player within the Middle East politics. The Palestine question has become a main issue for Turkish decision-makers. Turkish foreign policy's development has been influenced as well by the key factors at domestic, regional, and international levels.

Since this conflict has affected instability in the region, Turkey with its proactive foreign policy, has tried to play a third-party role. This way also aimed to enhance its existence in the Middle East region. Meanwhile, this conflict has been a key issue to enter and participate actively into regional politics. Meliha Altunisik has defined in the context of regional strategic competition that the actor who want to gain a popularity in the Arab world and become a regional power, it need to involve into the Palestine issue.²¹²

The Israel-Palestine conflict is placed at the heart of the Arab world and Islamic world. In this term, the AKP government has managed to boost its relations with Arab world through its active contribution humanitarilly and politically. In fact, the regional developments has caused Turkish isolation among its neighbouring countries especially during the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Turkey has participated actively by taking role as a regional mediator country for resolving this conflict, the AKP government has remained carefully to put its stance on this issue. It has played with regard to the regulations of the international political. It still seemed take role in line with the statue of a member of NATO.²¹³ Its limitation could be seen not exceed around the deal of the "two-state solution" and the Arab peace initiative, or contrast to the strategic interest of its Western allies.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Hurriyet Daily News, "Ankara Rebukes Israel as A Threat to International Peace", *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 18, 2014, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-rebukes-israel-as-a-threat-to-international-peace--69328 (retrieved on April 27, 2018)

²¹² Mohammed Alsaftawi, "Who Needs Whom? Turkey and Israel Agree on Normalization Deal", *Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Working Papers 16*, November 30, 2016, p. 5.

²¹³ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Release Regarding the Ceasefire Agreement between Israel and Palestine*, 21 November 2012, http://mfa.gov.tr/no_-264_-21-november-2012_-press-release-regarding-the-ceasefire-agreement-reached-tonight-between-israel-and-palestine.en.mfa, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

²¹⁴ Mohammed Alsaftawi, *Op.cit.*, p.5

3.3 DOMESTIC FACTORS IN INDONESIA

3.3.1 Islamist Factor in Domestic Politics

The factor of an increase of Islamist in domestic politics is described in form of the existent of Islamist-oriented aspirations of domestic public opinion, the emergence of Muslim groups as the moral force, and an increasingly role of Islamist parties.

Indonesia is inevitable for the inclusion of Islamist factor into the foreign policy's consideration. In terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation, Islam is considered as a societal factor within state. Indonesia government never claimed officially that its relations with Muslim issues in behalf on Islam or religious considerations. In fact, participations either in relations with Muslim world's issues or in response to Middle East conflicts, eventhough Islam as a societal and political factor is not considered as political ideology factor, it influences its foreign policy.

Domestically, Islam is paramount of social and political factors in shaping the Muslim political and social movements. Therefore, it embedded in Indonesia's foreign policy. In case of Palestine issue, particularly in dealing relations with Israel, Indonesia recognises the influence of Islam factors and Islamist forces prevalent in the country.

Analysing the increase of Islamist factor as a determinant factor in Indonesia's relations with Muslim world by exploring the existent of domestic forces influencing foreign policy. In case of Indonesia's domestic politics is formed by Muslim community and Islamist parties (political movements) as the representatives of majority population.

Since the beginning of independence, officially Indonesia's foreign policy set Pancasila as national ideology. Since Pancasila is believed as the middle way and a compromise among inter-faith religion in Indonesia. National leaders putting the basic of Indonesia's active and independent forein policy principles, had not mentioned firmly a certain religion driving the orientation and objective of foreign policy.²¹⁵ However, Indonesia respects to Islamic values and success to bring the Islamist, modernism, and democracy especially in era of SBY government.

In the aftermath of Soeharto's fell, domestic political conjuncture has been turn to a more democratic. It has opened a much more opportunity for Islamist parties and Muslim

²¹⁵ B. D. Arora, "Nature and Content of Indonesian Nonalignment", *International Studies*, 20(1-2), 1981, pp. 273-292.

groups to participate in domestic political arenas. They have started to play a influential role to influence decision-making process and foreign policy.

In case of Indonesian Palestine policy, since independence, Indonesia has adopted a continuous of non-recognition policy towards Israel, as a form of solidarity to Palestinians officially. When President Wahid was intend to open diplomatic relations of Indonesia-Israel, domestic public opinion that was constructed of majority Muslim people harsly responded with a refusal of Muslim groups including the moderat Muslim groups represented by Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as well as extremist Muslim groups. Because of getting a strong pressures of Muslim groups, Islamist parties, and the Council of Indonesian Ulama eventually the government canceled its intention.²¹⁶ This case indicates the influential roles of Islamist parties and Muslim civil society groups as the moral force or pressure group in influencing decision-making of foreign policy and playing a critical role in the conjonture of domestic politics.²¹⁷

President SBY reveled that Indonesia was ready to be a mediator of conflict. This was considered as an attempt of leading initiative embracing Islamist aspect, a clear aside of solidarity to Muslim world, and an anomali position to intial government's periods. However, it was self-proclaimed by some political observers on Indonesian foreign policy such as Greg Fealy²¹⁸ stated that such policy was reflected in context of domestic political perspective as a strategy of serving Muslim constituents of its coalition government. Since the general election of 2004, the Democratic Party only reached 5% voters and in a need of supports of Islamist parties such as PKS, PPP, and PBB.

Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel officially, so that its effort to be a peace mediator without the real political vehicle was likely unconsiderable. Eventually Islamist agenda is not be able yet as a essential component of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, compared to initial periods, Indonesia has shown the real contribution to Palestine issue and attempted to embrace the Islamist-oriented aspirations of domestic public opinion that got a much more limited response in Soeharto government.

²¹⁶ S. R. Panggabean, "Indonesia's Responses", in **Islamic Perspectives on the New Millenium**, Hooker, V. And A. Saikal (eds), ISEAS, Singapore, 2004, p.33.

²¹⁷ Mochammad Nurhasim, "The Future of Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 13, No. 2, December 2016, p.242

²¹⁸ G, Fealy, "Islam and Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Less than It Seems", in S. Harris & L. Elliott (eds.). **Religion, Faith, and Global Politics**, Australian National University, Canberra, 2006, p. 26.

3.3.2 Islamist-Oriented Aspirations in Domestic Public Opinion

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of long unresolved and the most sensitive issues in the United Nations. Indonesia government has concerned this issue since the state of Israel declared²¹⁹ and the Nakba, the most catastrophe of Palestinian refugees fleeing of their lands, in 1948. One of reason the Indonesia government managing this issue is the existence of domestic sentiment particularly Indonesian Muslims²²⁰ toward the struggle of Palestinians against the occupied state of Israel over their lands and the al-Aqsa Mosque's illegal control of Israel. Indonesian government's official stance regarding this issue covers two points. Those are Israel occupation over Arab Palestinian territories and supporting the independence of state of Palestine.

Rosenau notes the importance of the dominant social value orientation in a society influencing domestic public opinion and impacting on foreign policy-making. He argues it used to shape the basic principles of the external goals and the actions to achieve them. When those society's dominant cultural values turn into the foreign policy plans and means, it would impact to the dynamic of domestic public opinion in the foreign policy-making.²²¹ Moreover, Huntington stresses the role of culture in the global context of conflict within the scheme of international affairs.²²²

From the perspective of culture, Indonesian society is plural in terms of race, religion, and ethno-linguistics as well as the local and regional values of communalism. Approximately 85 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims. So that, it is inevitable to manage the Islamist-oriented sentiment within Indonesian Muslim society on the Israel-Palestine issue. Jerusalem is a holy city for Muslims (Arab and non-Arab) in the context of including the *Haram al-Sharif* or the Noble Sanctuary where the Prophet Muhammad SAW is believed to has passed in the Miracle Night Journey called as *Isra* and *Mi'raj* by Muslims.²²³ The *Isra* and *Mi'raj* event is celebrated by Muslim World Community. This event becomes one of Indonesia national holy days in the official Indonesian calender

²¹⁹ Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menlu: Kilas Balik 2008 dan Proyeksi 2009", 6 January 2009, http://www.deplu.go.id/?hotnews_id=4044 , (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

²²⁰ M. Muttaqien, "Domestic Politics and Indonesia;s Foreign Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Global & Strategis*, Vol.7, No. 1, January-June 2013, p.57.

²²¹ J.N. Rosenau, "The Study of Foreign Policy", in Rosenau, J.N., et.al.(eds.), **World Politics: An Introduction**, Free Press MacMillan Publishers, London, 1976, p. 22.

²²² Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-50.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

which is determined by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. For Indonesian Muslim, one of essential points within the celebration of this event is to remind Indonesian Muslims over what occurred in the earth during *Mi'raj*, which is meant Palestine. In other words, Indonesia Muslim's view influences the way Indonesia decision-makers formulate what kind of policy should be shaped in relations with the Israel-Palestine conflict.

As a democracy-prioritised country in domestic politics, Indonesian political decision-makers have to consider the Islamist-oriented sentiment amongst Indonesian Muslims, which makes up the majority of domestic public.²²⁴ For instance, during President SBY era, when HAMAS, a political movement in Gaza of Palestine, won the 2006 Parliament election sparked a wave of boycott by the West countries, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda expressed that Indonesia respected to the democratic choice of Palestinian people. Then, Indonesian government called on the international community not to confess to follow any prejudice against Hamas and focused to continue the peace process in order to resolve the conflict. Indonesian Muslim public opinion had imaged Hamas positively and gave sympathy to this political movement.²²⁵ Therefore, there claim articulates that Indonesian government's support on Hamas was to serve domestic public aspiration of Indonesian Muslims.²²⁶

3.3.3 Muslim Group: A Moral Force

When the first Gaza war erupted by Israel invasion in December 2008-January 2009, Indonesian public especially Muslim groups demanded to government to take firm against Israel military operation and called for *jihad* to Gaza. Indonesian government harshly condemned excessive and Israel military attack to Gazans. It also called on the international community to take measure aiming at stopping those wars. Islamic Defenders' Front, a militant Muslim group in Indonesia, planned to recruit volunteers fighting against Israel forces in the Gaza Strip in response to the death of more than 1380 Palestinians. While more than 1000 people rallied in protest against the Israel air strikes in Jakarta, the capital of Republic of Indonesia.²²⁷ President SBY also stated that Indonesia

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²²⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, "America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, HAMAS, No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China", 13 June 2006, <https://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ Reuters, "Indonesia group says to recruit fighters for Gaza", *Reuters*, 29 December 2008, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-indonesia-sb/indonesia-group-says-to-recruit-fighters-for-gaza-idUKTRE4BS20S20081229>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

preserves to aid worth \$1 million in cash for humanitarian efforts covering \$181.000 in medical aid for Palestinians.²²⁸

Furthermore, during the Israel invasion of Gaza in November 2012, a number of Indonesian people rallies again organized by Muslim organizations in order to firmly protest the Israel military air strikes. They demanded Indonesian government to take firm actions to stop that invasion. In response that, Indonesian government along with a number of NGO activists came to Gaza. In that time Indonesia House of Representative's Commission I sent a delegation to provide political, financial and moral supports to Palestine. This peace mission of Indonesian Parliament delivered the messages of Indonesia's support for a full membership of Palestine in the United Nations and the urgency for Hamas and Fatah to solve their political issue and unite to strengthen Palestine diplomatic efforts and struggle on the battle field against Israel.

Indonesian groups divided into two groups for demanding the concrete actions to the government. One side urged Indonesian government to send peacekeeping mission to Gaza in order to monitor the ceasefire of Hamas and Israel under the United Nations. In other words, no need to allow a military approach in Gaza. It was represented by several moderate Muslim groups such as the ICMI, the NU, the MUI. Another side asked the government to send Indonesian military troops to back Palestinians against Israel military forces. Those voices came from the FPI, the HTI in major.²²⁹

After Indonesia came to democracy era, the role of Muslim groups largely has opened to participate into decision-making process.²³⁰ In this context, their participation came in the way of public hearing forums held by the Indonesian Parliament. The representation of Muslim groups mainly of the NU and Muhammadiyah which make up major followers of Indonesian Muslims. The Indonesian Parliament used to invite the NU, Muhammadiyah and other Muslim groups into public hearing forums. Besides, sometimes the stakeholders visit the headquarters to consult and hear the Indonesian Muslim

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Fardah, "Indonesia's Parliament Sends Delegation to Gaza to Support Palestine", 29 November 2012, <https://en.antaraneews.com/news/85865/indonesians-parliament-sends-delegation-to-gaza-to-support-palestine>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

²³⁰ Robert Hafner, **Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia**, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, p. 117

aspirations. These have been working especially when the Parliament managed bills or any policies related with Muslims.²³¹

As long as the issue is not considered by the government to threaten Indonesia's most essential interest of national territorial integrity, the Muslim groups' aspirations and pressures will be accommodated by the government and will shape Indonesian foreign policy. The situation when the Muslim aspirations will be likely accommodated by Indonesian government is these Muslim groups' aspirations line with the interests and aspirations of the government. In case of Palestine issue, the official stances of Indonesian government and Muslim groups have mostly been united. In reverse, if the Muslim aspirations are contradictive with the most vital national interests of national territorial integrity, it would not be accommodated by the government.

The role of Muslim groups can be counted as substantial if their pressures and aspirations can alter or influence the official stance, attitude and decision of the government on the foreign policy. Those seem through the government's reflection or supporting on their aspirations and the increasingly influence of Islamist factor in the foreign policy of the government. In case of Palestine issue, the role of Muslim groups can be regard to essentially significant especially during democracy era. So, in case of this issue, the interplay between Indonesian government and Muslim groups has resulted an active foreign policy.

3.3.4 An Increasingly Role of Islamist Parties

However the Muslim concern and aspirations has only been accommodated by the government as long as those line with the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the basic principle of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy.²³² Eventhough, by the end of the Suharto administration that give a large room to participate in the Muslim international organization such as the OIC and to bolster diplomatic relations with the Muslim world, in fact, Muslim aspirations still could not freely showed in the form of formal symbols. Indonesian government seems to continue to disregard the Islamic factor. It is likely because of a prevention effort towards any recognition that led to allow an establishment of

²³¹ Mohammad Zakaria Al-Anshori, *The Role of Islam in Indonesia's Contemporary Foreign Policy*, Doctoral Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2016, p. 59.

²³² *Ibid.*, p.64

political platform for domestic political actor²³³ especially Muslim groups to much more control the way of Indonesia's foreign policy. Therefore, in response to the Muslim concerns, Indonesian government stresses the terms of humanitarianism and the economy in general.²³⁴

In other words, Indonesian government launched the policy that accommodates Muslim aspirations to fulfill the concern of Islamic issues. However it should accordance with the implementation of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution as well as the principle of Independent and Active foreign policy. By this way, Indonesia government articulates that it covers essentially the Muslim aspirations. But at the same time could not relate on the Islamic factors in the national official symbols and forms. Since the Indonesia places the Pancasila as national ideological form, which was agreed as political compromise or the middle way. It represents neither secular or religious form in normative contextual.

Although, the democracy atmosphere gave a momentum for Islamic parties to be established in large numbers in Indonesia, Azra pointed out²³⁵ that they have not made a significant changes in political attitude. He added that many of the new political parties could not compete and reach significant votes especially in the general elections of 1999 and 2004. Thus, he emphasises that the Islamists could not be able to seize political power gain in Indonesian politics. The most problematic features of Islamic politics in Indonesia are believed as the significant factor behind why they could not be able. In this context, the conflict and fragmentation among political elites of the Islamist parties prevail.²³⁶

3.3.5 Anti-Colonialism Spirit of the 1945 Constitution: A Historical Basis

Since the era of Soekarno, Indonesia has conducted foreign policy towards Palestine as a mandate of 1945 Constitution with anti-colonialism spirit. The fundamental conception of Indonesian foreign policy refers to the 1945 Constitution that is manifested at the fourth paragraph that containing the principles of Active and Independent. Independent means Indonesia should not involve in any foreign military alliance or

²³³ Azyumardi Azra, "The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia", in Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen (eds.), **Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis**, ISEAS, Singapore, 2000, p.310

²³⁴ Azyumardi Azra, **Indonesia, Islam, and democracy: Dynamics in A Global Context**, Solstice, Jakarta, 2006, p. 101.

²³⁵ Azyumardi Azra, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism", *CSCI Islamic Issues Briefing Paper Series 1*, Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam, Melbourne, Paper presented at Miegunyah Public Lecture, The University of Melbourne, 6 April 2005, p.5

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.6.

security pact. It is firmly reveals that nationalism nature of Indonesia and refuse to engage and depend on foreign powers in order to prevent foreign intervention and serve for sovereignty. Active explains that Indonesia should fight in any sense of occupation in the world and pursue the world peace.²³⁷

In implementation of principle of Active foreign policy, Indonesia supports to the independence of Palestine state. A spirit of anti-colonialism is embedded in 1945 Constitution at first paragraph. So, Indonesia has strongly commit to fight on any sense occupation in the world.²³⁸ It is reflected frequently support to Palestine issue as an importance agenda of foreign policy in particular since the era of SBY that seems to contribute in the real actions.

3.3.6 A Continuity of Non-Recognition Policy towards Israel

Islam makes up majority religion of Indonesian population. Despite, Islamic consideration had always not to be major factor in Indonesian foreign policy. It was including the Soekarno government policy towards the Israel-Palestine issue. Instead, his ideas of anti-colonialism and imperialism shaped Indonesian foreign policy. Under Soekarno administration, Indonesia was in favour to the struggle of Palestinians fighting against Israel. In President Soekarno perspective, Palestine had right to establish an independent state and Israel occupation on the Palestinian territories was illegal and based on motives of colonialism and imperialism. In short, the ideas that need to be shared by Soekarno was Indonesian supports for Palestinians due to anti-imperialism or post-colonialism reasons rather than pan-Islamic solidarity. He perceived that Israel which was backed by Western power, had tried to realize once their a new imperialism desire in the new emerging of Afro-Asian independent countries.

In the development, one of the crucial issues that always sparking the wave of large protest amongst Muslim groups regarding national policy toward Palestine issue is the initiatives of opening diplomatic relations with Israel. For many Indonesian Muslims, they will always favor the struggle of Palestinians to get independence and establish their own state as well as another important which is the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque as a holy

²³⁷Muhammad Hatta, "Dasar Politik Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia", in Endang Bwareasri Ananda, Sori Siregar & Mien Joebhaar (ed), *Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta: Buku 3, Perdamaian Dunia dan Keadilan Sosial*, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2001, p.469.

²³⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Hatta dan Politik Luar Negeri", *Kompas*, 1998, www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0208/09/nasional/hatt39.html, (retrieved on November 21, 2017)

place of world Muslim community from the illegal occupation of Israel forces.²³⁹ The other background of Muslim aspirations regarding the Palestine issue is a long Indonesian historical relationship with Palestinians. Therefore, in case of opening diplomatic relations with Israel, whenever Muslim groups and Islamist parties will always voice significant articulations against such policy if it would be prevail.

During President Soeharto era, the Islamist community thank the government policy was not much more concrete and significant to support Palestinians. For instance, Indonesia government took 15 years to give permission for PLO in 1989 to open its diplomatic mission in Indonesia. Indeed, that idea had been issued since 1974. It was claimed due to Indonesian need of the US approval to this issue. Other reasons influencing this postponed policy over the PLO were Indonesian military's excessive worries accused the terror activities conducted by the PLO, an accusation on the radicalization effect of the PLO presence to the Indonesian Muslim groups, and the communist presence within the PLO. In fact, during the Soeharto rule, Indonesian foreign policy majorly dictated by the western power especially the U.S. The pragmatic step conducted by President Soeharto to allow the representative office of the PLO eventually in 1989. The reasons were Indonesian desire for gaining political votes from Arab countries to be a chair of the NAM conference and the domestic political need of support to the Indonesian stance on East Timor issue in the UN. Finally, Indonesia hosted the conference of the NAM on September 1-6, 1992 in Jakarta, while it was attended including by Yasser Arafat as the leader of the PLO.²⁴⁰

In contrast, when Prime Minister of Israel came to Indonesia and met Presiden Soeharto in 1983. This visit sparked a wage of demonstrations by Indonesian Muslim society. They demanded to the government for the rejection on diplomatic relations with Israel by the withdrawal of Israel troops from Jerusalem (al-Quds). In this regard, the government argued that Indonesia would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel until it provided a political solution over the Palestine questions. In short, the government had maintained the foreign policy towards Palestine issue as the non-religious considerations. In particular, President Soeharto decision not to allow the opening of diplomatic mission in Jakarta as a preventive step to the possible reactions of Muslim society. In other words,

²³⁹ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, "State-Society Relationship: Assessing Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy toward the Muslim World Under Soeharto", Department of Asian Studies and Languages.

²⁴⁰ Leo Suryadinata, **Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership**, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1997, pp. 160-61.

this policy was decided based on such pragmatic interest. In this context, for gaining more political supports from Muslim community by designing Islamic factor as a decisive factor of Indonesian foreign policy in order to pursue domestic political aims. Besides, it seemed likely Islamic factor in Indonesian foreign policy was rather functioned as a political legitimation in domestic politics.²⁴¹

It is clearly that the New Order government put the Middle East as a minor concern within Indonesia foreign policy priority. Thus, when the Soeharto government, Indonesia tended to be more moderate stance regarding the issue of Palestine-Israel. For instances, when the 1967 Arab-Israel was collapsed, Indonesia called a proposal of direct talk between Israel and Arab countries. In this case, of course, this initiative was impossible and sensitive issue since Arab nations did not recognize the state of Israel. Furthermore, Indonesia also did not show full supported to Arab nations in case of oil export embargo that imposed to countries which favored Israel especially the U.S. Due to Indonesia political stance was clearly a pro-west oriented foreign policy.

Meanwhile, during the Habibie government, Indonesia had no specific and significant response in its foreign policy towards the Palestine-Israel issue. Since his government was much more concerned on Indonesian domestic political and economical problems. The only one importance event regard to the issue was the rise of anti-Jews and Israel sentiment in Indonesia because of an accusation toward George Soros, a Jewish investor, of being a determinant actor caused a great financial crisis in Asia region.

President Wahid and Megawati also had continued a supporting policy of Palestinian independence state and to demand Israel recognition on Palestinian self-determination in aiming to establish a Palestine state. Eventhough, President Wahid had initiative to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, in fact, during his governmental period, it had not come to be realized. Due to the large pressure from Indonesian Muslim society, he suspended his official visit to Israel while his Foreign Affairs Minister, Alwi Shihab, ensured that Indonesia will never open diplomatic ties with Israel until it returned the right of Palestinian and recognised Palestine as a independent state. In short, similar with President Soeharto, President Wahid also calculated the domestic Muslim aspirations and anti-Israel sentiment regarding his Israel initiative move. Whereas, President Megawati kept the commitment to support Palestinians. Her government solidarity for Palestinians was

²⁴¹ Rizal Sukma, **Islam and Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Internal Weakness and the Dilemma of Dual Identity**, Asia Foundation, Jakarta, 1999, p. 41

showed when Israel military attacks to Ramallah and Bethlehem in March 2002. She harshly condemned on Israel attacks and provided humanitarian aids to the Palestinian Authority.

In comparison to other regimes, President SBY publicly marked the Palestine-Israel issue as one of Indonesia's main concern in its foreign policy. Indonesia showed its commitment in various ways. From supporting the Palestine Embassy in Jakarta until actively consolidating international supports for Palestine in various diplomatic regional and international forums. Indonesian government also positively encourage and accomodate the aspirations of Muslim groups regarding the Palestine issue. His government took into consideration of Muslim groups' aspirations within the foreign-policy making process. To conclude, President SBY utilised these Muslim aspirations in his pragmatic way, led by Independent and Active principles of foreign policy.

3.3.7 A New Indonesia's International Orientation and Identity

Shifting to a more democratic in Indonesia domestic politics has impacted to emerged a democratised foreign policy. At the first official speech of orientation of Indonesian foreign policy in the meeting of Indonesian Council on World Affairs on May 19, 2005 in Jakarta, President SBY mentioned clearly a new national identity of Indonesia. He pointed out that Indonesia as a home of world's largest Muslim population where Islam, democracy and modernity running altogether.²⁴²

It was mainly marked as a turning point of a new orientation and identity of Indonesia's Muslim world policy. President SBY intended to reflect Indonesia a Muslim-moderate country in which bridging Islamic world and the west. Indonesia has Pancasila as a national ideology which plays as a foreign diplomatic tool bridging inter-faith religion dialogue. Compared to the initial long periods (particularly in the era of Soeharto) was limited to engage in the Muslim world's issues especially in Palestine-Israeli conflict.

Indonesia set clearly the orientation of foreign policy to commit actively in Muslim world especially in settlement of conflict in the Middle East since the SBY government. The government institutionally and regionally toned up the supportive actions on Palestine issue. Altogether, the Muslim groups intensively shown the solidarity to Palestinians especially post-Israel's Gaza invasion of 2008 and 2014.

²⁴² Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Independent and active foreign policy in the 21st Century", in **Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches**, Buana Ilmu Populer, Jakarta, 2005, pp. 124-125.

Since shifting to a new foreign policy's orientation, Indonesia government and legislative council have significantly contributed to the effort of Palestine's independence in various diplomatic actions as follow establishing Kaukus parliament for Palestine, condemning to political intern-crisis, releasing petitions to free Palestinian legislative members of Israel's detention, raising public funding for Palestinian, building Indonesian hospital in North Gaza, sending volunteers and public rallies for the independence of Palestine, Indonesian representative of United Nations calling for stop over Gaza's blockade, firming the rights of Palestinian to get turn into homeland, Palestine national's rights for preventing and serving of Al-Aqsa mosque, condemning the Israel unjustice policy over Palestinians.

Indonesia's successful diplomatic actions for Palestinians in the level international parliament as follow supposing Palestine as a member of Inter-Parliamentarian Union, as a APA President Standing Committee on Political Standing Committee and Vice President PUIC (Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States) 2010-2012 held "APA Troika Meeting" for addressing the conflict on May 31, 2010.

Indonesia always commits to consistently standing for freedom of Palestine over occupation, supporting a democratic government in Palestine, fully supports on reconciliation process in Palestine's domestic politics, proposing ASEAN member countries as well as the members of Non-Alignment Movement to recognise Palestine state.

However, in fact, there are the gap between its new international orientation of shifting an activism and engagement foreign policy towards the Muslim World especially in the Middle East and the reality. Several factors behind for this situation. *First*, Indonesia has no significant substantial capability since it is a "periphery" actor in context of geopolitical position. *Second*, It has had a lack of experiance record in the complex pilitics of the region. *Third*, Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel. Of course, while to portray its image to be a mediator of the conflict, it requires an official diplomatic ties aimed at encouraging and ensuring trust of the conflicting parties. *Fourth*, there was no Indonesian officer hold a strategic position such a commander of peacekeeping forces in the UN auspices, nevertheless it has had a large contingent of the UNIFIL peacekeepers'

missions²⁴³. It means that Indonesia has no much more leverage and strategic means in regional politics.

3.4 INTERNATIONAL FACTOR

3.4.1 Indonesia's Democratised Foreign Policy in the Post-Soeharto

Following the collapse of Suharto rule, Indonesia has been moving to democratic era. This shift triggered large opportunity for Indonesian society in term of freedom of expression including Indonesian Muslims to freely express their political and ideological aspirations. As Carnegie²⁴⁴ stated that the sphere of democracy implemented in Indonesia opened the opportunity for Muslim groups to return and involve largely into the domestic political competition. The democratisation process of Indonesia has involved and accommodated the Islamist aspirations represented and practiced by Islamic political parties.

Palestine issue has traditionally became the most sensitive issue for Indonesian society. This issue perceived in terms of injustices, human right violations and humanitarian crimes. Indonesian Muslim has established religious and educational ties with the Middle East since Islam arrived to Indonesia. Besides, the wage of Palestinian supports to Indonesians have existed since the beginning of their independence struggles. For many Indonesian Muslims, the Palestine issue is the religious sentiment. Since the sensitiveness of this issue around Indonesian Muslim constituents, it has been exploited for domestic political gains. For example, the PKS party, an Islamist party, whose constituents have mostly concerned to the Palestine issue. Even, the Muslim militant groups also benefited by using Palestine issue in order to consolidate their sympathisers and to increase the number of followers.

In the era of democracy, in which the freedom of media to express and spread information fastly, Indonesian public has been bombarded the news regard to Palestine issue. In order to spread the information about the Palestine issue, various ways utilised by the Muslim groups including street rallies, printed mass medias, and social medias. Those impact to high concern of Indonesian Muslim society to the Palestine. Hence, any incidents regard to Palestine will trigger massive domestic pressures from Indonesian Muslim

²⁴³ Giora Eliraz, "Activism and Engagement: Envisioning a Possible New Doctrine for Indonesia's Middle East Policy", July 9, 2015, *Middle East Institute*, www.mei.edu/content/map/activism-and-engagement-envisioning-possible-new-doctrine-indonesia's-middle-east-policy, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

²⁴⁴ P. J. Carnegie, "The political of Indonesia's Islamic identification", *Dialogue*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2006, pp.1-24.

groups and Parliament. Furthermore, thanks to the arrival of democracy wave in Indonesia, the Muslim groups have large opportunity to express their aspirations not only through Muslim organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, but also through Islamist political parties which also need to manage the Islamic issue to attract their constituents.

In the post-Soeharto, Indonesian public opinion has increasingly been more Islamized, thus the Indonesian support to Palestine issue of independent statehood has been more apparent. President SBY encouraged and attempted to step up the level of Indonesian foreign policy on Palestine which was not only reactive in nature but also adoption on active foreign policy. Since the President Soeharto era, Indonesia foreign policy could be regarded to reactive in general. In contrast, The President SBY attempted to show that Indonesian foreign policy on Palestine was not only in rhetorical context, but also took the concrete efforts to support Palestine.

After the collapse of the Soeharto government, Islamist factor has played an instrumental role in the domestic politics and even in foreign-policy making process. The governments after Soeharto especially Habibie and Wahid represent the figure of moderate Islamic group's leader. They also advocate for pluralism and democratic values in Indonesia. Eventhough, their governments' foreign policy might not be shaped by a strong Islamist orientation, but their legacy in developing democracy value has influenced to the foreign policy of Indonesia. Iniatially, President was the central actor in the foreign policy. The presence of the other stakeholders remained minor. Thank to democratisation process has allowed the involvement of other stakeholders into the foreign policy-making. It has resulted to the engagement of various actor in the foreign policy decision-making. The presence of these various actors has led to a democratic foreign policy in Indonesia.

In a democratic foreign policy, the MFA, as a central and dominant actor in Indonesian foreign policy after Soeharto period, has utilised diplomacy as the vehicle in pursuing of national interest and in articulating international dynamic to a domestic public. The government also has strived to channel international and domestic factors. Through the concept of diplomacy total allows various actors to have an equal opportunity to participate and express their aspirations in order to be accomodated and turned into a decision of the government policy. In total diplomacy as well, all parts of society are engaged into foreign policy decision-making and implementation phases.

In Indonesia context, the MFA actively and frequently held the public hearings. Those aimed at to manage inputs and arrange what kind of proper policy, idea, concept and

proposal by hearing and sharing between the MFA and other stakeholders mainly the Parliament members and Muslim groups especially in regard to the relevant issues for Indonesian Muslims. Nevertheless, a democratic system of foreign policy-making has been increasingly advocated, the government has sometimes tried to ignore other stakeholder's views and aspirations on certain issues. Those have resulted in opposition stance to the government. For instance, when President Wahid advocated to open diplomacy ties with Israel, his move got a harsh response and criticism from Muslim groups. While the Parliament was sided with the Muslim groups to voice the refusal of such proposal. Thus, in post Soeharto of the democracy era, if the government does not involve other relevant foreign policy-stakeholders in the decision-making process, it will spark a frequent criticism of the public and parliament.

3.5 GAZA WAR: TURKISH RESPONSES

3.5.1 Mavi Marmara Incident

For Turkish leaders, the Mavi Marmara incident, it was the worst crisis of foreign troops, in this case was Israel troops, killing Turkish civilians during Turkish history. Passing years after this incident, both countries took steps to try to normalise their relations. For examples, while the Israel underwent a deadly forest fires in December 2010, Turkey sent planes to help to fight those in Northern Israel.²⁴⁵ In return, when near Van City of Eastern Turkey faced an earthquake in October 2011, Israel sent an offer of humanitarian aid.²⁴⁶ In response to this tension, the U.S. took a mediator role to prevent an escalation of Turkish-Israel crisis. Finally, it guided to a public apology of Netanyahu to Erdogam in March 2013. It was a first step to rebuild their relations. Through both sides signed an actual agreement, Turkey demands three conditions for this normalization to Israel. First, a formal apology of Israel over the attack on the Mavi Marmara. Second, Israel is available to compensate financially for victims and their families, and lastly is the end of Israel blockade on the Gaza Strip.²⁴⁷ Moreover, Israel accepted two conditions unless the last was. On Turkish side, the end of Gaza siege by Israel is much more essential for Turkish domestic people and the wider Arab nations. If Turkey was success, the AKP

²⁴⁵ Al Jazeera and Agencies, "Israel Battles Deadly Forest Fire", *Al Jazeera*, 3 December 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/12/20101238363661534.html>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

²⁴⁶ Barak Ravid, "Israel Offers Aid to Turkey in Wake of Massive Earthquake", *Haaretz*, 23 October 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.391552>, (retrieved on January 19, 2018)

²⁴⁷ Mohammed Alsaftawi, *Op.Cit.*, p.8

government would get a wider leverage in domestic politics as well as a honour in the eyes of Arab world.

3.5.2 **Erdogan and Davos Meeting**

The deterioration of Turkey-Israel relations continued to intensify in 2009. It was pointed out when Prime Minister Erdogan was out of Davos meeting. At that time, he had a public confrontation with President Israel, Shimon Peres during the World Economic Forum in Davos. He delivered his disagreement to Shimon Peres over his over-confidence in Israel policy towards Palestinians especially blockade on Gaza. Besides, he reacted to the situation that preventing him to reply the President Shimon Peres' comments that his refusal to recognise the humanitarian casualty because of Israel military operation of "Operation Cast Lead" to Gaza. For Erdogan, Israel military operation to Gaza was perceived as a war crime.

This incident created a wider political tension between Israel and Turkey. For instances, Israel did not allow Davutoglu to visit Hamas officials in Gaza, while as a response then Davutoglu cancelled his official visit to Israel in Spring 2009. In addition, Erdogan rejected Israeli participation in the *Anatolian Eagle* joint military exercises that hosted at the Konya air base in October 2009. Besides, this incident also affected to spread and develop a mistrust sphere within Israel and Turkey relations. Erdogan's reaction in this meeting by Hasan Kosebalaban also contributed to escalate tension, but in other side, it had showed a strong side to Palestinian suffers following the Israel attacks on Gaza. He mentioned:

"A proud and charismatic leader, Erdogan has a low tolerance for being humiliated and deceived, as demonstrated by his actions during several events, including Davos. He is known as a politician who can not hide his true feelings. His own perception of having been cheated by his Israeli partner, who promised him peace just two days before the Gaza attacks, made him angry."²⁴⁸

In addition, this incident also remained as a prominent factor then shaping further Israel foreign policy towards Turkey. As it is pointed out by Ufuk Ulutas:

"For Israel, it was understandably harder to get over such a public critique from a friendly nation. Since that incident, Israel's policy towards Turkey has been shaped

²⁴⁸ Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No.3, 2010, pp. 36-50.

by what one may call the Davos syndrome. This syndrome combines Israel's initial shock as a result of the Davos incident and its shaken trust in Turkey."²⁴⁹

Furthermore, this Erdogan moved out from Davos meeting also sparked a positive response in Turkish domestic politics. Erdogan as a leader of the AKP Party with his criticism to Israel could be able to contribute positively for the AKP gain in Turkish local election of 2009. On constitutional amendment referendum in 2010, the AKP got 58% voters in favour and 42% were against. It gained positively influences in the heart of the AKP supporters. Erdogan was welcomed greetly after his arrival came back from Davos. So, this directly contributed on the Turkish public opinion positively in large. It had proved that Erdogan figure and his political discourse effectively influences to Turkish public opinion. Eventually, this event affected a continuation of popular supports to the AKP goverment especially for Erdogan in domestic level, even in Muslim world. Specifically, the Arab public opinion in various level of society background also attracted to demonstrate their support at Davos event. As Aylin Senol underlines:

“Davos affairs has made the Prime Minister Erdogan a champion of the Arab masses and made Turkey highly popular in the Arab world. The Arab press was full of praise for Erdogan who has begun to be called as the new Nasser and had done more for Gaza than all the Arab leaders combined. Even the Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad even acknowledged that Erdogan was probably the most popular leader in Syria.”²⁵⁰

3.5.3 Ups and Downs of Turkish-Israel Relations

Turkey was amongst the first countries recognised the establishment of the State of Israel in 1949. There are two reasons why Turkey took this move, *first* Turkish position of the Western strategic alliance in the Middle East and *second* a consilidation effort aimed at fostering its historical good ties with Jewish groups in the region.²⁵¹ Two countries diplomatic relations reached the golden era in the 1990s. During this eras, the most significant background of their improvement ties was the military issue. Israel and Turkey's golden era ties were marked Turkish encouragement on the Oslo Process of preserving a solution for Israel-Palestine conflict, Turkish-Israel ties on weaponry sale, Turkish efforts to make alliance with Israel lobbying groups in the U.S senate against the campaign of Armenian diaspora for the U.S. official recognition of 1915 Armenians incident as a genocide. In 1996, two countries signed a security partnership that rose their

²⁴⁹Ufuk Ulutaş, “Turkey and Israel in the Aftermath of the Flotilla Crisis”, *SETA Policy Briefs Book*, Vol. 43, 2010, p. 15

²⁵⁰Aylin Şenol, *Understanding The New Activism Of Turkey In The Middle East: Turkey As An Emerging Soft Power*, Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, December 2010, p. 52.

²⁵¹ICG, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints”, *International Crisis Group*, Europe Report No.203, 7 April 2010, p.2

diplomatic ties. This partnership included allowing the Turkish air spaces to be used for Israel aerial exercises, intelligence and counter-terrorism activities as well. Besides, this security partnership included the agreements of military training cooperation and defence industry field.²⁵² Even they bolstered economic relations by signing a free trade agreement in 1996. Moreover, they also flourished cultural and educational networks.²⁵³

Initially, Turkey prevented to publish openly its political and military ties with Israel. However, after the Cold war, the military cooperation grew since the security concern became dominant in the perception of Turkish political and military elites. Altunisik argues that in the post Gulf war, the changes in the level of regional and international system had motivated the dynamic of their relations. Meanwhile, Turkish domestic security and political factor have become the determinant considerations in shaping two countries relations by the mid-1990s.²⁵⁴ In this context, there a shift from an extension factor of western ally to the redefinition of threat perceptions posed to the domestic security.

In other side, the fact of Turkish domestic sympathy on Palestine issue also shaping two countries relations. Israel move on declaration of Jerusalem as Israel abiding capital sparked a tension in its relations with Turkey. Their relations came to low points after the Arab-Israel war in 1967 and in 1980. In addition, the tense escalated again during the Israel invasion on Gaza twice in 2009 and 2012. When Turkish politics put forth much more concern to the domestic public opinion over Palestine issue²⁵⁵, it has implied on a deterioration of two states relations.

Turkish relations with Israel began to downgrade following Israel invasion to Gaza in 2008. After Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, came from his official visit of Ankara in 2008, it was followed with the Gaza war erupted. In that time, Turkey leadership felt that Israel had planned against Gaza. Israel move also considered as a serious affront to Turkey as a mediator of Israel-Palestine conflict. Ozlem Tur defines that on the Turkish side this situation was a point of Israel-Turkey relations take a new turn.²⁵⁶ It continued then to the low diplomatic stance when the Davos incident in 2009, and came to the

²⁵² Meliha Altunisik, "Turkish-Israeli Rapproachment in the Post-Cold War Era", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.36, No.2, April 2000, pp.186-187

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.172

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.172-173

²⁵⁵ ICG, *Op.cit.*, p.3

²⁵⁶ Ozlem Tur, "Turkey and Israel in the 2000s: From Cooperation to Conflict", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Fall 2012, p. 56.

Marmara incident in 2010 became the peak of their deterioration of diplomatic ties by 2016, despite there several efforts to normalise including a mediation effort by the third party of the U.S.

3.6 GAZA WAR: INDONESIAN RESPONSES

3.6.1 Muslim Group's Harsh Reactions

In response to Gaza war, several Muslim groups perceive the Gaza war oppositely from Indonesian government particularly militant groups. They againts with Israel occupation on Palestinian territories and the U.S. foreign policy, in regard the U.S. full support for Israel. They believe that there is a Zionist-Israel conspiracy to eliminate Islam and Muslims. When the Gaza war erupted, several militant groups have called, recruited, and trained Muslims who were interested in waging *jihad* against Israel forces in Gaza Strip. For examples, the FPI opened recruitment of volunteer and fighter to send to Palestine.

Moreover, other Muslim groups involving of the HTI and PKS called the Indonesian government to take concrete step by seeking a coalition against Israel or support of deployment Indonesian military troops to Palestine. In other words, they favor a such military approach to help Palestinians, not only political rhetorics. In fact, there were 200 volunteers tried to reach Palestine via Batam-Johor-Kuala Lumpur.²⁵⁷ However, they were halted by the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Eventually they could not even leave from Southeast Asia region. The volunteers recruited under Indonesian Volunteers for Gaza including medical professionals, builders, mechanics, chefs and drivers who will assist Palestinians in various ways. Besides, a number of non-violent campaigns to be held in order to express their solidarity and symphy to Gaza victims by holding mass protests, demonstrations organized by youth students and boycotts against the U.S. and Israel products.

Nevertheless, Muslim moderate groups also express their sympathy and solidarity to Palestinians in different way. Sometimes, in opposite stance with the militant groups. Following the ceasefire effort between Hamas and Israel during the second Gaza war in November 2012, the ICMI Chairman, Nanat Fatah Natsir, articulates that Indonesia does not need to adopt a military measure in support of Gaza. In order to monitor the ceasefire,

²⁵⁷ Nhina Le Thi Minh Huong, "The Gaza Crisis: Impact on Southeast Asia", *RSIS Nanyang Technological University*, 10 February 2009, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1173-the-gaza-crisis-impact-on-sou/#.WuYMSDaEa2e>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

Indonesia should join peacekeeping mission and send peacekeeping troops under the United Nations. While the NU called a harsh condemnation and the MUI demanded the international organizations such the UN to take concrete moves and to call the U.S. to stop in supporting Israel.

3.6.2 Indonesian Government Respons

In the perspective of Indonesian government, the Israel-Palestine conflict is not a religious conflict. It is a conflict rooted by fighting for land authority between Arab Palestinians and Israelis. In which Israel has occupied the land of Palestinians by force since the 1948 and 1967 wars after the British mandate ended in 1948 over Palestine land. So, before the immigration of Jews to Palestine during the British Mandate era, those lands belonged to Arab Palestinians. Indonesia has been in favor of UN Resolution 242 that affirms a two-state solution for both nations. This solution also known as a “land for peace”. This resolution adopted by the UN when the 1967 war erupted. It is specially point 1 (ii) points out that:

“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁸ See Document 6-3: UN Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967.

CHAPTER IV

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ON SYRIA CRISIS

1 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF SYRIA CRISIS

1.1 ARAB SPRING AND SYRIAN UPRISING

In the aftermath of 9/11 event, Islam has appeared to be an importance subject of global politics' discourse. Democratisation has emerged as a political instrument including in the Muslim countries. A crucial phenomenon reflecting an effort to pursue democratic reform had been experienced across the Middle East region. Those phenomenons were initially occurred in the Spring of 2011, in response to the authoritarian regimes and aimed at stepping down the regime through civil demonstrations eventually known with the notion of "Arab Spring".

It started in Tunisia, spillovered to Egypt that marked by Husni Mubarak's overthrown who ruled for 32 years from the Presidential power in 2011. This events demanded a political and social reform across the region involving Libya and Yemen. Inspired by those similar events, January 26, 2011 appeared the protest wave against Assad regime in Syria. This protest rapidly spread across Syria. On March 15, 2011, a peaceful civil protest broke out in Daraa city after the students were accused and detained for anti-government political graffiti. Then state security forces responded this actions with violent measure and killed four civilians. It is believed that four civilians killed caused uprising.²⁵⁹ The protests had continued for several days, followed the military crackdown by security forces. This events caused casualties and material loss. President Bashar al-Assad also rejected the access of humanitarian aids for civilians, therefore the conflict was worsen.

In response to the protests, Bashar Assad government had planned several political and economical reforms. Yet, any significant changes were undergone in Syria. On April 21, 2011, Assad government lifted the 48 years' state of emergency.²⁶⁰ In response to the

²⁵⁹ "Deutsche Welle, "Syrian Civil War Timeline: A Summary of Critical Events", *Deutsche Welle (D.W.)*, <http://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-timeline-a-summary-of-critical-events/a-40001379>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁶⁰ CNN, "Syrian Civil War Fast Facts", *CNN*, October 17 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

continued protests and violent actions occurred, the UN Secretary General called for an end of violence, a sending of UN team to observe the humanitarian situation in Syria on May 9, 2011.

Following the Syrian uprising, on May 18, 2011, the U.S. imposed sanctions on President Bashar Assad and six senior government officials. It continued to impose a new economic sanction on Syria including Syrian government's assets to be frozen and prohibit transaction of Syria products, called for President Bashar al-Assad's resign on August 18, 2011. The EU then followed the U.S. to ban Syrian oil's import on September 2, 2011.

Turkey as nearest neighbor country of Syria, strived to mediate the civil-government conflict in Syria. It provided the Syrian civil groups to hold the meeting in Antalya and Istanbul in June 2011. At the first months of the conflict, Ahmet Davutoglu as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs traveled to Syria and met with President Bashar al-Assad in order to ensure him about the political reform in Syria. Since this last Ankara's initiative found not succeed, it then influenced Turkish political behavior towards Syria government. On October 4, 2011, the UN addressed a draft resolution sponsored by France, Germany, Portugal and the UK which condemns Syrian government crackdown on protestors and threatening sanctions on Syria government. Eventually it was failed due to Russia and China veto it.²⁶¹ The Arab League suspended the Syria's membership on November 12, 2011 then it imposed economic sanctions on Syrian government following it was failed to meet the Arab League initiative on November 27, 2011. Turkey also took several measures against Syria including financial sanctions imposed on November 30, 2011.

Due to the violent actions of government to civilians, in domestic level Free Syrian Army was formed to protect the civilians in Syria on August 27, 2011.²⁶² In August 2011, the FSA began to attack the state security forces with deploying full power and triggered a violent conflict aimed to overthrow Assad regime and end the widely attacks over civilians.²⁶³ Furthermore, a continued meeting held in Turkey resulted in the creation of Syria National Council which is a new alignment of Syrian opposition groups in

²⁶¹ Security Council Report, "Chronology of Events on Syria", *Security Council Report*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁶² Ari Tayyar, **Gecmisten Gunumuze Orta Dogu: Siyaset, Savas ve Diplomasi**, Vol. I, 6.th edition, Dora Publishing, 2014, p.148.

²⁶³ Security Council, "The Crisis in Syria", *International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect*, 2005, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

September 2011. Besides, another opposition group also founded since the of effect of the conflict namely National Coordination for Democratic Change. They aim to demand an end of the government-led President Bashar al-Assad, instead the establishment of a democratic system in Syria.

Since August 2011, a continued Syrian crackdown have impacted to fleeing of Syrians to Turkey. Several regional countries began to show their responses related to Syria uprising. For instance, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Quwait have incorporated with supporting the opposition groups. In contrast, Iran and Russia have been aside with President Bashar al-Assad government as its importance ally. While at the beginning, Western countries-led by the U.S. chase to engage actively into the conflict.²⁶⁴ On February 6, 2012 the U.S. closed it embassy, followed by the GCC member states recalled the diplomats. Syrians conducted a vote on a constitutional referendum in polling centers across Syria on February 26, 2012. The result showed that almost 90% voters allow the constitutional referendum in order to reform the possibility of a multi-party system in Syria. Since the only one powerful ruling party was the Syria-Baath Party that won the Assad family.

The bloodshed civil-government conflict have been continued. It has turned into civil armed conflict involving not only President Bashar al-Assad government and the coalition of opposition groups. Other non-state actors then arised and engaged into the conflict in Syria. The survival of power, influence and conflicting on controlled areas further have been continued. Therefore, the conflict further has turned into civil armed conflict.

1.2 TURNING INTO ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT

At the beginning, Syrian uprising was an ordinary peaceful civil movements. Civil activists and the people had very simple demands and almost similar with the slogans of the Arab Spring namely freedom and honor. However, in response the protests across Syria, Bashar al-Assad regime used the military force, so that the violences escalated between the civil protestors and state security force. Eventually, the protests turned into an armed conflict.

Following the escalated conflict, the opposition groups formed a military unit so called the FSA. It launched an armed fighting against Bashar al-Assad regime. Until the

²⁶⁴ Ali Balci, **Turkiye Dis Politikasi: Ilkeler, Aktorler, Uygulamalar**, 4th edition, Etkilesim Publisher, Istanbul, September 2015, p.308

end of 2012, Bashar al-Assad government was no longer controlling whole Syria territories and withdrawing from rural areas to urban centers. In February 2012, Bashar al-Assad regime deployed the tank forces attacking Deraa and Homs cities. The opposition groups replied with rocket and artillery attacks. Further the conflict reached into Damascus. Bashar al-Assad regime acquired a serious threat in Damascus. The presidential palace was targeted by the opposition groups. The conflict then rapidly spread to Aleppo, the second-largest city of Syria on July 19, 2012.

Syrian conflict were being more complicated with the non-state groups' presence. Overall, there are four main factions have got involved into the conflict across Syria namely Bashar al-Assad regime, Syrian-Kurdish military force (PYD-YPG), ISIS, and other opposition groups (such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, etc.). Jabhat al-Nusra announced its formation as al-Qaeda official affiliate in Syria on January 23, 2012. Beside of the domestic opposition groups included in the Syrian uprising and the emergence of various opposition groups have divided the initial opposition movements, in an ORSAM interview with Ahmet Yildiz notes the Syrian people also polarized due to the foreign Shiite militias continue undertaking operations on the ground.²⁶⁵

In other words, since 2013 the conflict in Syria has been turned into armed civil conflict. The important civil actors emerged on both side of the war with the rise of Islamist groups in opposition side especially an Al-Qaeda affiliated group Jabhat Al-Nusra and coalitions, Hizbullah group and Iraq Syiah militants are side of Bashar al-Assad regime. In northern Syria, PYD has declared an autonomy area unilaterally. Besides, the rise of ISIS in Syria territories, following it succeed to control the significant areas in Iraq including Mosul.²⁶⁶

Two months after Hezbollah militants undertook of Qusayr city in June 2013, Bashar al-Assad regime accused using chemical weapons and massacred people in Ghouta. On July 23, 2012, the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jihadi Makdissi stated that Syria threatens to use chemical and biological weapons against the foreign forces by his expression, "No chemical or biological weapons will ever be used...unless Syria is exposed to external aggression." Further, the Syrian civil conflict began a new phase of the conflict, that was marked the possible use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad regime

²⁶⁵ ORSAM, "Turkey's National Interest Entails Peace and Stability in Its Region", ORSAM Interviews On Regional Affairs with Ahmet Yildiz, No.40, January 2017, p.5

²⁶⁶ Ortadoğu Yilligi, Sakarya Üniversitesi, Ortadoğu Enstitüsü, Sakarya, 2013, pp. 209-213.

supported military forces killing estimated more than 1400 people beyond of Damascus, mostly women and children.²⁶⁷

Initially, on March 19, 2013, a gas attack caused 26 deaths in the northern city of Khan al-Assal, in Aleppo province. It was the first majorly-known chemical attack since the conflict broke out. It used nerve gas as the conclusion of a UN investigation. Bashar al-Assad government and the oppositions accused each other of employing chemical weapons. On August 21, 2013, A sarin gas attack killed the oppositions in the Damascus suburb. It was the second fatal chemical attack case. Medical Charity *Doctors Without Borders* recorded 355 deaths of more than 3000 patients treated who were suffering “neurotoxic symptoms” in three hospitals near Damascus. Meantime, in order to avoid the U.S. military strike, by mid-October 2013, Syria forcibly decided to sign on the Chemical Weapons Convention that prohibits from producing, stockpiling or using chemical weapons. On September 14, 2013, the U.S. and Russia deal to the framework of elimination Syria’s chemical weapons.

After controlling the significant areas in Iraq in short time, the ISIS moved further to Syria. The ISIS factor also took into account in relation with the escalation of armed civil conflict in Syria. After fighting for four days, the ISIS seized the second largest city of Iraq, Mosul on June 10, 2014. It gained a significant power, then seizing the biggest military unit of Raqqa in Syria, the military airport and lastly Tedmur in May 2015. In short movement, the ISIS had the control over 90% of the oil fields in Eastern Syria and sold oil and natural gas to the regime as the regular income.²⁶⁸

Meanwhile, following the involvement and fighting all parties, the landscape of Syria territory has been changed regularly. By 2015, the FSA controlled the south and north of Syria’s areas. Coastal area and Damascus underruled by Bashar al-Assad regime. Fleeing refugees from the east and north affected demographical balance altered in favor of Sunnis. While in Damascus, due to Iran-Hezbollah militant group controlled Homs and Hama cities, so demographical balance changed in favor of Iran.

Besides, in periode of 2014-2015, indeed, the ISIS undertook the control half of the Syria’s territories. However, it should be noted that beyond Raqqa in the Western Syria, the areas the ISIS controlled have no population density. During September 2014 to

²⁶⁷ United to End Genocide, “Syria Backgrounder”, *United to End Genocide*, 2014 <http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/syria-backgrounder>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁶⁸ ORSAM Interviews on Regional Affairs, No. 18, “Khaled Khoja: Political Solution In Syria Should Begin Where Geneva-II Ended”, August 2015, p.3

January 2015, the ISIS launched a violent attack on Kobani city, Syria. The defence efforts of the city had become a symbolic of the fight against ISIS. It involved the FSA, pro-Western coalition airstrikes, and the PYD-YPG fighters. Eventually, the ISIS factor has caused an active engagement of the foreign security forces and the fighting in Syria were going to be worst. On September 22-23, 2014, western coalition-led by the U.S. launched airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, on the Raqqa city in particular. Russia also announced it supports along with Bashar al-Assad government fighting against ISIS on September 14-15, 2015. Russian air forces actively entered the conflict since September 30, 2015 after supporting military aids to Bashar al-Assad regime initially. Since the Syrian conflict began in 2012 and have been deadlock for four and a half years, it changed to move steadily in support of Bashar al-Assad regime. In term of the ISIS, eventually it was defeat and had to lost its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa in Syria on October 17, 2017. It had been occurred through a major military operation of US-backed Kurdish militant groups mainly the PYD-YPG fighting against the ISIS forces.

Kurdish militant fighting also has contributed to make the conflict escalated. Eventhough, the internal splits and such a fragmentation within the Kurdish militant groups, the PYD had temporarily formed its cantons, which are no territorial link among the cantons, and created a *de facto* separatist situation. For instances Afrin, Ayn al Arab, and Qamishli cantons might continue to exist separately. In side of Bashar al- Assad regime, it might plan to unite Damascus and the coastal region in order to the consolidation of a new government. A different the FSA controlled Southern Syria and a moderate the FSA ruled in Aleppo until the end of 2016. Due to al Nusra, Jundul Aqsa, adn Ahrar presences, Idlib is being a different administration as *de facto*. After Turkey deployed military operation in Jarabulus, Al Bab of the northern Syria in order to form the safe zone, those areas undertaken by moderate the FSA.²⁶⁹

1.3 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

Since Syrian war broke out in March 2011, the escalation of conflict has been spread steadily across Syria. The effect also has been spillovered in the regional and international levels. Therefore, all community has been strived to apply the regional and international peace initiatives to resolve the Syrian war that could be summarized as follows:

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6

1. **The Group of Friends of the Syrian People**'s first meeting held in Tunisia on February 24, 2012. In its first meeting, the group which is a collection of more than 100 countries and organizations including Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Turkey proclaimed the Syrian National Council as a legitimate representative of Syrians in attempting a peaceful democratic change. The second held in Istanbul on April 1, 2012. In this second meeting, it pledged economic supports for opposition forces. In other side, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states decided a new fund support for the FSA. The third meeting held in Paris on August 6, 2012 with 17 participation of states.²⁷⁰

2. In November 2011, Arab League seek to carry out both Bassar al-Assad government and the opposition group to negotiation table. The **Arab League Plan** that applied in December 2011 requiring the withdrawal of the state army force and armed opposition groups' forces across Syria. Unfortunately, the Arab League observers ended the mission on January 28, 2012 due to various violations occurred on the plan.²⁷¹

3. After the Arab League plan failed, the UN and Arab League attempted to mediate the Syrian conflict. The UN and Arab League then formed a joint mission for Syria. On February 29, 2012, **Kofi Annan** was appointed as **the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria** due to the situation in Syria was deteriorated. He then briefed the UNSC members and submitted a **six-point peace plan** to the UNSC on March 16, 2012. A six-point peace plan also requires the Syrian government and the opposition groups to announce a ceasefire. It also forces the Syrian government to apply some reform as the request of the opposition groups. Besides, both sides should work along with the UN in an "inclusive Syrian-led political process".²⁷² In April 2012, both sides had allowed the ceasefire. However, both sides had violated the plan several times as Kofi Annan announced in May 2012. Since the plan could not able to secure a lastinf ceasefire, he resigned of his mandate as a mediator and the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria in August 2012.

4. Based on Annan Peace Plan, the foreign ministers of the UNSC's five permanent members and invited Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar ("the Syrian Action

²⁷⁰ Tayyar Ari, *Op.cit.*, p. 150

²⁷¹ Handan Kazanci, "Infographics- The Syrian Diplomatic Crisis: A Timeline", *Anadolu Agency*, October 14, 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/infographics-the-syrian-diplomatic-crisis-a-timeline/665109>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁷² Al Jazeera, "Syrian Diplomatic Talks: A Timeline", *Al Jazeera*, September 15 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/syria-diplomatic-talks-timeline-170915083153934.html>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

Group”) meet in Geneva, Switzerland on June 30, 2012, then known as **Geneva I Conference**. The UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan convened the Geneva Conference and chairs the Syrian Action Group issued the “Geneva *Communique*”, a road map for peace in Syria. That document calls for all parties to recommit on the six-point of Annan Peace Plan.²⁷³ It also envisions a Syrian-led political process. It encourages the establishment of transitional government involving the government and the opposition. Yet, the plan was failed due to debate on whether to include Bashar al-Assad into the transitional government.

5. In January 2013, **President Bashar al-Assad** proposed a **peace plan**. It includes a national reconciliation conference, the establishment of a new government through election, a new constitution, and ready to enter to the dialogue with requirement.²⁷⁴ This peace initiative was rejected by the Syrian oppositions.

6. **Geneva II Conference** with first and second rounds that hold on January 22-31, 2014 following the discussion between the U.S. and Russia. This second Geneva peace talk took place in Montreux and Geneva, attended by Bashar al-Assad government and the National Opposition Coalition. It was held to discuss how to implement “Geneva *Communique*”. Annan position was replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi on August 17, 2012. He moderated the second Geneva Conference that also was failed to result an agreement. Due to a deadlock between the oppositions and Bashar al-Assad government. The UN accused the Syrian government that refused to entertain the demand of oppositions.

7. On October 30 to November 14, 2015 hold the first and second round of **Vienna Process**. This peace talk bringing the foreign ministers of 20 states to end the Syrian conflict on the first round of October 2015. A second round was held on November 14, 2015 with participation of ISSG, 20 powers and international organizations co-chaired by Russia and the U.S) resulted an agreement deciding to restart peace talk between Bashar al-Assad government and the oppositions into the formal negotiation table under the UN auspices with deadline on January 1, 2016. Besides, it also recommit to the “Geneva *Communique*” in order to achieve a political transition and a nationwide ceasefire. After Lakhdar Brahimi’s resignation, his position as the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy

²⁷³ The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), “Intra-Syrian talks- Key dates of the Peace Process”, [https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/\(httpPages\)/E409A03F0D7CfB4AC1257F480045876E?OpenDocument](https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpPages)/E409A03F0D7CfB4AC1257F480045876E?OpenDocument), (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁷⁴ Brian Larkin, “Syria-Timeline of Peace Process”, *Peace and Justice*, June 1, 2013, <http://peaceandjustice.org.uk/newsletter/peace-and-justice-news-syria-issue/syria-timeline-of-peace-process/>, (retrieved on January 19, 2018)

was replaced by Staffan de Mistura on July 10, 2014. He then led the EU Security Council-supported a negotiation to the ISSG's transitional government in Syria.

8. **Geneva III Conference** began on the first round of Intra-Syrian Talks on February 1-3, 2016. It was suspended by UN Special Envoy for Syria on February 3, 2016 due to disagreement between Bashar al-Assad government and the oppositions over the priority of humanitarian issues, the continued violences, the lack of humanitarian relief on the field. Then the second round of Intra-Syrian Talks resumed on March 14-24, 2016 with aim to carry out both parties to discuss the formation of a transitional governing body within next six months.

9. **Geneva IV Conference** was held in April 13-27, 2016. In the fourth peace talk, the oppositions walked out of the conference due to the violence escalated including around Aleppo, the lack of progress on humanitarian issues including prisoner issue. It was also called as the third round of Intra-Syrian Talk concluding a summary of setting out an account of development and the work plan.

10. **Ceasefire deals of 2016.** Foreign ministers of the U.S. and Russia deal with a new ceasefire between Bashar al-Assad government and a US-backed coalition of opposition groups on September 9-10, 2016 but not including ISIS and al Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra, and ended on September 17, 2016 due to the U.S. airstrikes on Syrian forces then replied by Russian attacks to Aleppo city. On December 30, 2016, Turkey and Russia brokered a nationwide ceasefire and agreed by the Syrian government and the opposition groups.

11. **Lausanne Meeting.** On October 15, 2016 Russia, the U.S. and foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt meet in a peace talk meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland. It was aimed to revive the peace in Syria. At conclusion, the meeting reached no agreement.

12. **Astana I Peace Talk.** A Russia, Turkey, and Iran-sponsored Syrian Peace talk was held in Astana, Kazakhstan on January 23-25, 2017. Russia, Turkey, and Iran agreed to serve a trilateral monitoring body aimed at enforcing the ceasefire in Syria.²⁷⁵ It would run effectively on December 30, 2017. It was the first time the representatives of the armed oppositions met head to head with a Bashar al-Assad government delegation. The peace talk concerned to open the dialogue channel between parties and ceasefire as high

²⁷⁵ Paul Antonopolus, "Timeline of Syria Peace Talks held in Astana", January 23, 2017, *AMN News*, <https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/timeline-syria-peace-talks-held-astana/>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

requirement of peace. The ceasefire was not included ISIS, Jaesh al-Fatih, and YPG. It also proposed Syria as a democratic country with territorial integrity, independence, united, and sovereignty, as well as non-sectarian. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the continuation of ceasefire and war on terrorism (ISIS and al-Nusra).

13. Astana II Peace Talk. In February 16, 2017, the peace talk was attended by representatives of Russia, Turkey, Iran, as well as Syrian government delegation and the oppositions. While the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura could not attend and represented by his technical team. Algeria also was presented into this meeting for first time as a guarantor state. In this meeting, the oppositions and Syria government did not sit face to face. It adopted a document to monitor the Russia-Turkey's broker ceasefire of December 2016.²⁷⁶ It also continued to discuss a mechanism of forces and prisoners' exchange, including children and women.

14. Geneva V Conference. The fourth Intra-Syrian Talk held in Geneva on February 23 to March 3, 2017 with all parties agreed to endorse the next talk rounds based on the UNSC 2254 resolution, which underlines the basis of Syrian-led political transition concerned on a new constitution, accountable government, and elections under the UN supervision within 18 months. Then the fifth round of Intra-Syrian Talk on March 23-31, 2017 with all parties work based on Geneva Communique and UNSC Resolution 2254.

15. Astana III Peace Talk was held on March 14-15, 2017. The peace talk was attended by representatives of Russia, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, the U.S. and the UE on March 14, 2017. While the opposition refuses to attend due to the accusation to the government's fail to secure the ceasefire of December 2016. Russia, Iran, Turkey decided to strengthen the initial mechanism in order to provide the implementation and continuation of ceasefire in Syria.²⁷⁷

16. Astana IV Peace Talk was held on May 3-5, 2017. In this meeting the opposition delegation suspended its participation since the Syria government's bombardment to the opposition-controlled areas. Russia, Iran, Turkey agreed on a plan for the establishment of de-escalation zones in the opposition-controlled territories. It also called for the cessation of hostilities between Bashar al-Assad government and armed oppositions in four safe zones with aim to carry out peace for Syrians.

²⁷⁶ ORSAM, "Astana Sonrasi Suriye", *Ortadogu Analiz*, Vol. 9, No.79, March-April 2017, p.14

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

17. Geneva VI Conference. The sixth round of Intra-Syrian Talk was held on May 15-19, 2017 with collapse after four days with the lack of detailed discussion on the peace talk agenda. However, beyond the political discussion, the UN Special Envoy for Syria also established a technical consultative process aimed at preparation on constitutional and legal issues for Syria.

18. Astana V Peace Talk. Russia, Iran, Turkey was failed to secure along boundaries and to realize the initial four safe zones that agreed.

19. Geneva VII Conference. The peace talk was ended with no agreement the UN accused Bashar al-Assad has no willing to further discuss on political transition.

20. Astana V Peace Talk. Russia, Iran, Turkey agreed to redraw the de-escalation zones of Syria within six months, which is possibility extended in next meetings. The de-escalation zones including the opposition groups-controlled northern Homs, the opposition groups-controlled Eastern Ghouta, the province of Idlib, and Jordan-Syria borders (Latakia, Aleppo and Hama).

21. Sochi Agreement. Russia, Iran, and Turkey, despite their differences, these three nations have been collaborating on diplomacy aimed to end the war in Syria. A peace talks had been hosted by Russia in Sochi, the Southern Russia resort town. In this peace talk, Russia has invited numerous Kurdish representative to Sochi since it has been eager to include Kurdish group in peace talk. While Russia's intention has been favored in the UN peace talk held in Geneva. Turkey responded that idea by contrast. The forty opposition groups would not take part into Sochi peace talk. Sochi peace talk was held on January 30, 2018 adopted 12 points explaining the Syrians' future hopes. The document was adopted by Syria National Dialogue Congress involving an enforcement to the Syrian territorial integrity, non-interference, Syrian self-determination, Syria is a democratic, independence and non-sectarian country, recommitting on national unity, law enforcement, war on terrorism and sectarianism, having a strong military army, right on equality, life value highly placed on Syrian community and national identity, protection on national heritages, and eradicating poverty. It also announced a formation of constitutional committee involving of the government and opposition delegations. This committee will draft a constitutional reform as a contribution over political solution under the UN supervision based on the UNSC resolution 2254.²⁷⁸ Besides, the regional and international

²⁷⁸ Ani Nursalikhah, "Kongres Suriah di Sochi Hasilkan 12 Poin Pernyataan", *Republika*, January 31 2018, <http://republika.co.id/berita/internasional/timur-tengah/18/01/31/p3er9h366-kongres-suriah-di-sochi->

peace initiatives above, in particular the UNSC and the UN General Assembly also adopted the resolutions as following in detail:

Table 4.1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Syria (2012-2018)²⁷⁹

Issue Date	UNSC Resolutions for Syria	Resolution Contents
April 14, 2012	S/RES/2042 (2012)	UNSC is unanimously adopted resolution authorizing observer team (30 unarmed military) to monitor ceasefire in Syria and requests proposal for a UN supervision mechanism.
April 21, 2012	S/RES/2043 (2012)	UNSC is unanimously adopted resolution authorizing the UN supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with members of 278 military observers and 121 civilian staff, aimed to observe the implementation of Annan Plan (the six-point peace plan for Syria)
September 27, 2013	S/RES/2118 (2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNSC unanimously adopts resolution on requiring the verification and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. • Calls for the convening of the Geneva II peace talks • Endorses the formation of a transition of Syria's ruling body with full executive power
February 22, 2014	S/RES/2139 (2014)	UNSC unanimously adopts resolution on demanding all parties, particularly Bashar al-Assad regime to allow humanitarian aids' access to Syrians in besieged areas, across conflict lines, and across border
July 14, 2014	S/RES/2165 (2014)	Authorizing the UN and its partner to deliver humanitarian assistances cross border and cross-line in Syria without state consent and to monitor a mechanism within 180 days.
August 15, 2014	S/RES/2170 (2014)	Condemning ISIS and al-Nusra FTF's recruitment and listed six individuals related with those groups under the 1267/1989 sanctions on al-Qaeda.
September 24, 2014	S/RES/ 2178 (2014)	UNSC adopts resolution on expansion of the counter-terrorism framework to be obligated by member states in response of FTF's threats
December 17, 2014	S/RES/ 2191 (2014)	Renewing authorisation on humanitarian aids' access cross-border until January 10, 2016

[hasilkan-12-poin-pernyataan](#), (retrieved on February 18, 2018)

²⁷⁹ This informations are summarised from Security Council Report, "UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions", <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15tag=%22Security%20Council%20Resolutions%22+AND+%22Syria%22&ctype=Syria&rtype=Security%20Council%20Resolutions&cbtype=syria>

February 12, 2015	S/RES/ 2199 (2015)	Related to counter-terrorism addressing on ISIS and Al-Nusra's illicit funding via oil exports, traffic of cultural heritage, ransom payments and external donations.
March 6, 2015	S/RES/2209 (2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNSC condemns the use of chemical weapon such as chlorine gas in Syria and threatens sanctions • Recalls resolution 2188 • Supports the decision of the OPCW of February 4, 2015
August 7, 2015	S/RES/2235 (2015)	UNSC unanimously adopts resolution on establishing a UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify responsible perpetrators using chemical weapons in Syria
November 20, 2015	S/RES/2249 (2015)	Calls for member states to take all necessary measures on the ISIS and other al-Qaeda affiliates terrorist groups-controlled territories with aim to prevent terrorist acts.
December 18, 2015	S/RES/2254 (2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNSC unanimously adopts resolution on setting out a road map of peace process in Syria: UN-mediated political talks between the government and the oppositions, a nationwide ceasefire, and a two-year timeline to reach a political transition plan of the ISSG. • 2254 resolution underlines the UN supporting a Syrian-led political process that credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance. While it manages a process for drafting a new Syrian constitution within six months. • This resolution endorses the Geneva Communiqué of June 30, 2012 and the Vienna statements in aim to pursue the Communiqué as the basis for a Syrian-led political transition to resolve the conflict. • It also mandates the UN Special Envoy for Syria to organize Intra-Syrian Talks in Geneva, Switzerland.
December 22, 2015	S/RES/2258 (2015)	UNSC unanimously adopts resolution on renewing the authorisation to ease the humanitarian aids into Syria until January 2017.
February 26, 2016	S/RES/2268 (2016)	UNSC unanimously adopts resolution endorsing a cessation of hostilities accord to end bloodshed in Syria. The U.S.-Russia agreed to exclude controlled territories of ISIS and al-Nusra front.
October 31,	S/RES/2314	Extension the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint

2016	(2016)	Investigative Mechanism to November 18, 2016
November 17, 2016	S/RES/2319 (2016)	Renewing the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism for a further year
December 19, 2016	S/RES/2328 (2016)	UNSC adopts unanimously resolution on UN access to eastern Aleppo in aim to monitor evacuations.
December 21, 2016	S/RES/2332 (2016)	Renewing authority for cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries until January 10, 2018
December 31, 2016	S/RES/2336 (2016)	UNSC adopts unanimously resolution supporting efforts by Russia-Turkey agreement to end violences in Syria and acknowledgement of the Astana talks as an important step ahead of UN-facilitated talks in Geneva on February 8, 2017 to provide a political process for Syria.
December 19, 2017	S/RES/2393 (2017)	Renewing authority for cross-border and cross-line of humanitarian aid deliveries
February 24, 2018	S/RES/2401 (2018)	UNSC adopts resolution unanimously on demand 30 days cessation of hostilities in Syria to allow weekly humanitarian aid delivery and medical evacuations of the critically wounded and sick people.

Table 4.2. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions for Syria (2011-2016)²⁸⁰

Issue Date	UN General Assembly Resolution for Syria	Resolution Contents
December 19, 2011	A/RES/66/176	Condemning the violence in Syria and calling for the full implementation of the Arab League initiative in November 2011
February 16, 2012	A/RES/66/253 (137 in favour, 12 against, 17 abstentions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • condemning the violences in Syria • favoring the Arab League Plan of 22 January decision facilitating a Syrian political transition and the resignation of Bashar al-Assad • requesting the UN Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy for Syria.
August 3, 2012	A/RES/66/253 B (133 in favour, 12 against, 31 abstentions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploring the SC's failure to act on Syria (Assad's use of heavy weapons in Aleppo and Damascus) • Calling for a political transition
May 15, 2013	A/RES/67/262	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strongly condemning Bashar al-Assad

²⁸⁰ This informations are summarised from Security Council Report, "UN Documents for Syria: General Assembly Documents", <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22General%20Assembly%20Documents%22+A+ND+22Syria%22&ctype=Syria&rtype=General%20Assembly%20Documents&cctype=syria>

		<p>government's violences against civilians</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welcoming the establishment of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in order to provide a political transition
December 18, 2013	A/RES/68/182 (drafted by Saudi Arabia, 127 in favour, 13 against, and 47 abstentions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condemning human rights violations in Syria (Bashar al-Assad government's airstrikes in Aleppo) • Calling for the SC to take measures to end the conflict in Syria
November 2, 2015	A/C.3/70/L.47	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condemning Bashar al Assad regime and the ISIS • Expressing a regret on the SC's draft resolution of May 2014 related the situation of Syria to the ICC not to be adopted
December 9, 2016	A/RES/71/130 (drafted by Canada, 122 in favour, 13 against, 36 abstentions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expressing excessive violences, particularly in Aleppo • Demanding an immediate end of all attacks on civilians and complete end to all blockades across Syria.
December 21, 2016	A/RES/71/248 (drafted by Liechtenstein, 105 in favour, 15, against, and 52 abstentions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of the international and independent mechanism to help the investigation and prosecution on responsible parties for the most serious criminals committed in Syria since March 2011 under international law.

Mediation through the UN has been tend to failed due to the members of the UN Security Council not resolve yet the internal debate and no united view among members related to Syria conflict. For instance, Russia and China used to veto against the resolution that provises the sanctions on Assad regime. Until today, Russia has used its veto right for eight times against resolutions that not aside with Assad regime. In particular, during the Syrian war began in March 2011, over 20 the UNSC resolutions have been passed, which are mostly with unanimous backing. In the meantime as well, the UNSC has been failed to pass the resolutions due to Russia and China vetos²⁸¹ for eight times as follow:

1. October 4, 2011, A UNSC draft resolution on expressing grave concern to the Syrian crackdown on protestors and pushing the only one solution to the

²⁸¹ Euan McKirdy, "8 times Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria", *CNN*, 13 April 2017, <https://edition-m.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-uns-c-syria-resolutions/index.html?rm=1>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

conflict is an inclusive and Syrian-led political process aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and population concerns. It was sponsored by France, Germany, Portugal, and the UK.

2. February 4, 2012, A UNSC draft resolution on condemning the deteriorations in Syria and favoring the Arab League in facilitating a Syrian-led political transition. It was voted in favour by all other the UNSC members.
3. July 19, 2012, A UNSC Chapter VII draft resolution on condemning the Bashar al-Assad government's use of heavy weapons in Houla, the continued human rights' violations by all parties, and other armed violences involving armed opposition groups.
4. May 22, 2014, A UNSC draft resolution on ensuring the responsible perpetrators of the violences and condemning the continued human rights' violations by Bashar al-Assad regime and armed opposition groups. It was drafted by France and co-sponsored by 65 the UNSC member states.
5. October 8, 2016, A UNSC draft resolution on grave concerning at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria. It was vetoed only by Russia.
6. December 5, 2016, A UNSC draft resolution on calling for all parties to cease all attacks in Aleppo city with aim to allow humanitarian aids for seven days.
7. February 28, 2017, A UNSC draft resolution on calling for imposing of sanctions on parties have been involved in the production or the use of chemical weapons across Syria.
8. April 12, 2017, A UNSC draft resolution on condemning the gas attacks and calling for an international investigation to the responsible perpetrators of the gas attacks on Khan Sheikhoun city in Idlib Province, Syria. It was vetoed only by Russia.

In sum, Syrian war can be resolved by taking the Geneva Decralation as the basis, forcing the parties who left the table to get back to the formal negotiation table. The only way to achieve stability in Syria as a source of stability in the region is through a negotiated political transition. It requires game-changing diplomatic engagement and ultimately political will of all engaged parties within the conflict altogether talking in a

negotiation table.²⁸² The talks as the part of a grand strategic approach should not essentially concentrate on security approaches and should include nations aligned with the major international and regional power as well as the official representative of opposition groups.²⁸³

2 GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TURKEY AND INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL STANCES

Explaining Turkish and Indonesian official stances on Syria crisis, we would also talk about Indonesia and Turkey's Syria policy. For the first, I would like to explain the dynamics and significant changes within Turkey's Syria policy representing how Turkey's official stance since the Syrian conflict began.

1. In the first year of Syrian conflict (**2011**) to **mid-2012**, Turkey perceived the Syrian crisis was the spillover of "Arab Spring" that occurred across the region. In this case, what had been happening in Syria covered within a discourse of civilian versus authoritarian regime. From 2002 to initial the outbreak of Syrian Uprising, Turkish-Syrian maintained an increased mutual economic relations within "zero problems with neighbours" foreign policy. However, the continued conflict between civilians and the government, in case the government against civilian protests with violent repression had guided Turkey to considerate in re-evaluating the relations with Bashar al-Assad government. Initially, Turkish had strived to mediate the crisis. In August 2011, Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan expressed that Turkey will send Ahmet Davutoglu in order to voice the Turkish decision over the conflict. He also articulated that in the context of Turkish-Syria depth relations, the essential situation in Syria was the domestic problem beyond the external problem prevail. He added that the Syria problem was Turkish domestic problem as well since Turkish-Syria boundary line was nearly 850 kilometres.²⁸⁴ Turkey's approach tried to play a mediator role between Syrian and Assad government could be seen of Erdogan's statement that "he had spoken with Assad and counseled quick implementation of social, economic, and political reforms, while offering Turkish help to achieve the changes."²⁸⁵ Unfortunately, Bashar al-Assad government seemed not met the

²⁸² Kevin Brown, "The Syrian Crisis of 1957: A Lesson for the 21st Century", CPD Perspective on Public Diplomacy, Paper 4, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2013, p.28

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.29

²⁸⁴ Ozlem Tur, "Turkiyenin Irak ve Suriye ilişkileri" in the *XXI. Yüzyılda Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi*", Faruk Sonmezoglu, etc (eds.), Der Publishing, Istanbul, September 2012, p.614.

²⁸⁵ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3

Syrian demands. It encouraged Turkey to take measure against Bashar al-Assad government. Syria-Turkish relations was found halted and emerged supports on the Syrian opposition. Turkish permitted to the Syrian opposition to open the office in Istanbul with aim to stop the humanitarian crisis through continuously supporting efforts on every framework. Therefore, in this period, Turkish official stance has been in favour of the Syrian opposition and calling for the stepping down of Bashar al-Assad government (regime change).

2. In the development, the conflict continues to pose serious risks for Turkey, the more threats emerged. It had challenged Turkey's Syria policy. **From mid-2012 onwards**, an early instance, Syria Airforce downed a Turkish Airforce jet in summer 2012, then Ankara requested for NATO Patriot missile assistance. It impacted to worse Syria-Turkish relations. Following several dynamics within the region influencing Turkish concern, but not changed Turkish priorities related to Syrian crisis (regime change) such the dimension of the PYD-YPG within Syrian civil war. PKK's branch in northern Syria, the PYD-YPG emerged as a new threat for Turkey. Initially, Turkey's threat perception towards the PYD was less following the Kurdish Peace Process with Turkish government in March 2013. Prior to the Syrian conflict, the AKP had reached a reconciliation with Kurdish demands such a greater autonomy including linguistic rights. A ceasefire was achieved in 2013. In the beginning of Syrian conflict, Turkey adopted a moderate stance towards the PYD, a Kurdish Party in Syria.²⁸⁶ Ankara maintained a dialogue with the PYD, endorsed the formation of the KNC (an affiliation of the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan Regional) which is a rival of the PYD, and mediate a power-sharing negotiation between the KNC and PYD in July 2012. Turkish approach towards Rojava (Kurdish region in Syria) was changed later. Due to the PYD accused the KNC allied with Syrian opposition who attacked the Kurdish cities in Syria. Besides, the PYD also accused the Turkish government backed for ISIS during the blockade of Kobani, a Kurdish city.²⁸⁷ Since dozens of Turkish activists' death within the Suruc bombing on July 20, 2015, the violence in the conflict was escalated. Turkish stance versus the PKK-YPG worsened since the

Summer 2012, p. 137, <http://brook.gs/2bvVMPs>

²⁸⁶ Francesco D'Alema, "The Evolution of Turkey's Syria Policy", *IAI Working Papers*, Vol. 17, No. 28, October 2017, p.8

²⁸⁷ Richard Spencer, "Turkey Accused of Allowing Islamic State Fighters to Cross Its Border in Kobane Attack", *The Telegraph*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11699969/Turkey-accused-of-allowing-Islamic-State-fighters-to-cross-its-border-in-Kobaneattack.html>, (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

foundation of the SDF in Northern Syria on October 10, 2015. It has been supported by US-led anti-ISIS coalition. It affected the U.S. and Turkey relations came into tension. The SDF presence has worried Turkish government, due to it is essentially a subsidiary of the PKK-YPG. Eventhough, a new threat of the PYD-YPG has been emerged in this period, Turkish official aim still remained a regime change.

3. In fast forward to 2014, a regional dynamic of the rise of radical-militant groups in the region. ISIS presence had become a major attention of all parties involved within Syrian conflict. It created the consequence of a radical shift in international priorities particularly the Western countries. It added then a new threat for Turkish Syria policy. Immediately, the Syrian conflict turned into a conceptualisation of “war on terror”. The ISIS phenomenon within Syrian conflict posed a series of threats to Turkey including several terror attacks into Turkish territories and a transit point of ISIS FTF who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the ISIS. The US-led anti-ISIS western coalition was formed. It gave a significant shift on western countries foreign policy including a new challenge to Turkey’s Syria policy that has become the theme of “war on terrorism”. Turkey also concerned to the fighting against the ISIS siege of Kobani, a Kurdish city in Syria, between September 2014 to January 2015.

4. During 2015, Turkey had suffered due to the situation in domestic and several events produced by Syrian conflict. The outbreak of Turkish government and the PKK in July 2015 has alarmed its national security. Due to the PKK’s urban warfare strategy that inspired of Syrian conflict applied in Turkey’s east and southeast region populated by Kurdish majority. The development in 2015 also was marked by an increasingly intervention of international and regional major powers such Russia, France and Arab countries that launched airstrikes to Syria. The direct involvement of Russia into the conflict in favouring Bashar al-Assad regime since October 2015 expanded tension with Russia. It also had shifted the balance of power in Syria conflict, back in favour of the pro-Assad regime. After a shot down a Russian jet violating Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015, this event affected Turkish-Russia relations to high tension.²⁸⁸ Russia imposed sanctions on Ankara including limits on Turkish imports, the suspension of visa-free travel to Russia, a high-warning of tourism travelling to Turkey. Until this period, Turkish official stance was in a complicated position related to Syria conflict, and Turkey began to

²⁸⁸ The Guardian, “Turkey Downs Russian Jet: What Do We Know?”, *The Guardian*, 24 November 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/nov/24/turkey-downs-russian-jet-what-do-we-know>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

severe those threats and challenges by adopting a new strategy. In this case, Turkey adopted a fighting against the PKK-YPG stance.

5. **During 2016 to present.** In this period, Turkey primarily adopted a security-concern approach. Turkey had three main goals in Syria during this period such pushing back ISIS from Syria-Turkish borders, the prevention to the establishment of the PYD-ruled Kurdish region in Syria particularly along Turkey-Syria borders, and the regime change. However, the most priority for Turkey is the prevention to the rise of a PYD-ruled autonomy Kurdish region along Syria-Turkish borders. In order to achieve those goals, Turkey launched military operation (Euphrates Shield Operation) in 2016, with goal to push back the ISIS from borders, strategically to refrain the PYD efforts to seize territories and to prevent an emergence of PYD-administrated Kurdish region along shared-borders of Turkey and Syria. Initially, Turkey rapprochement with Russia, the normalization relation process with Israel, downgraded tensions with Iran. Besides, the rift between Turkey-Qatar and Saudi Arabia-UEA-Egypt had significant impact to the regional scenario (particularly in Syria conflict). In this context, it has weakened the capacity of opposition forces in order to establish a strong united opposition front against Assad regime. In this situations, Turkey had adopted a large pragmatist stance. It had been reflected of several policy actions such more engaged into the fight against the ISIS and PYD-YPG, has compromised to participate and sponsor Astana Peace Talk with Russia and Iran aimed to settle the conflict, the diminishing the capacity of the opposition to topple the regime. Therefore, Turkish stance could be summarised that it has no longer adopted the Syria policy with the main objective such the removal of Bashar al-Assad regime. Instead, the major objective is undermining the ISIS high alarmed-threat (a series of terrorist attacks in Turkish territories and FTF acrossing Turkish border to Syria in the last two years) and the strengthening of the PYD power in northern Syria that has given a high-potential risk to Turkish territorial integrity, due to the PYD is considered as the PKK's branch in northern Syria. While, to realize those main objectives, Turkey has struggled to establish a de-escalation zones in Turkish-Syrian borders through military measures. Unfortunately, Turkey has found itself isolated in the regional and international level concerning this issue. The importance aim of the safe zone is to provide a living zones for Syrian refugees who has been displaced internally since Turkey has suffered of the excessive influx of Syrian refugees. In particular, Turkey also might avoid the PYD presence as a main beneficiary in the safe zones. Due to the memory of 1990s such the

most significant drive factor leading to the establishment of the KRG is the U.S.-initiated no-fly zone in Iraq. In other words, the current stance of Turkish primary concern is preventing the emergence of an autonomous PYD-ruled Kurdish region along Turkish-Syrian borders. Since it may provide logical support for the PKK and inspire a separatism movement to the national integrity in Turkey.

In conclusion, in the beginning years of the conflict, Turkey's official stance clearly supporting the Anti-Assad opposition groups as well as a legitimate representative of Syrians, namely The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. The main pillar of Turkey's Syria policy in the period of 2012-2016, was a regime change to more democratic regime in Syria as the Syrian demand. Yet, in 2016 Turkey's Syria policy has a major shift as the era of Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim rules. It remains Bashar al-Assad regime to be included into a Syrian-led political process such a formation of Syrian transitional government in pursuing a peace settlement. As explained by Yildirim, "...for a transition government, it is possible... It is obvious that, whether we like it or not, Al-Assad is an actor." He then adds that "... they (Al-Assad and the opposition) are the counterparts... Fixing an issue to one thing or person means you consenting to the deadlock." The main reasons for the shift of Turkey's Syria policy due to the new reality of the rise of ISIS and the outlawed of PKK. Those added with the fact that the U.S. has backed the PYD-YPG. While Turkish government's perspective the PYD is simply the PKK's branch in northern Syria. Yildirim pointed out, "the (extension of the) war in Syria returns to us in terms of separatist terror."²⁸⁹ Hence, Turkish government official stance definitely puts on the unity and sovereignty of the Syrian state, supports the transition regime by talking with all actors involved in the conflict including the Assad regime as an actor. As well as Turkey acts and makes alliances with the parts who support its mission of war on terrorism due to the existential threat to its border created the separatist terror.

Meanwhile, Turkey's Syria policy has experienced a significant change that influences several factors in detail could be summarised as follow:

1. The real politics of the Syria conflict for years. In this regards, the major objective of Turkey and the U.S.-led western coalition to provide a democratic environment in Syria through a regime change, that is also a primary demand of Syrians to

²⁸⁹ Murat Yetkin, "Turkey Changes Syria policy with Al-Assad Move", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 22, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/turkey-changes-syria-policy-with-al-assad-move-103087>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

the Bashar al-Assad government. In fact, President Bashar al-Assad still remains in power due to the economic and political supports as well as the military involvement of its major allies, Russia and Iran. Following the emergence of the ISIS also has changed the major focus of Turkey's western allies shifting to fighting against the ISIS and away to concern on regime change in Syria. Indeed, Turkey is likely standing alone to pursue that objective and added with a series of terror attacks in its domestic territories, which those were conducted by PKK and ISIS. So, those could contribute to shifting on Turkey's Syria policy from a stepping down of Assad regime, which is responsible on much more casualties in Syria.

2. **PKK/KCK/PYD/YPG factor.** Since Bashar al-Assad regime could not able to rule whole Syria territories and got the continued fighting from oppositions that based along Turkey-Syria border, the government forcibly moved away to urban areas. So those areas had came into vacuum power areas, through a series of struggle of parties, by the post-ISIS, the northern areas of Syria bordering with Turkey, mainly has been controlled by US-backed PYD-YPG, where in those areas PYD has self-proclaimed as a legitimate rule. Due to the rise of PYD-YPG, which is a Syria-based and PKK-affiliated armed group in Syria, it has become a more crucial issue for Turkish government. The PKK is a terror group and has been campaigned the violent terror attacks against Turkish government. The PYD-YPG activities has sparked the natural security concern for Turkish government. In addition, after the Turkish government-PKK ceasefire broke out, an increasingly terror attack of the PKK within Turkish territories has been appeared. Furthermore, Turkey's allies such the U.S. and European countries majorly have backed and supporting militarily the PYG-YPG against the ISIS. In fact, it sparks an increasing international recognition and legitimacy to the PYD-YPG and affected Turkish-the U.S. relations in a tension. While, the PYD-YPG seems likely took benefit of those supports and situation by seizing its territorial gains particularly in northern Syria bordering with Turkey. Indeed, the U.S. military support to the PYD-YPG has carried out the natural worries to Turkey. Since it could create the possible violent acts by the PYD-YPG on Turkish national integrity and security, in particular against Turkish government. Meantime, Kurdish the PYD/YPG issue also shares the possible security threats equally with Syrian government. This similar threat presence may forcibly lead Turkish government to engage in dialogue with Bashar al-Assad government. Given, Turkey and Syria sharing a long border area of nearly 800 kilometres. However, until today, Turkey has been already aside with FSA against the

PYD-YPG and Bashar al-Assad regime alike. In conclusion, all this situations has shaped a shift of Turkey's Syria policy from Bashar al-Assad regime change towards a containment effort of the PYD-YPG possible violent acts, in which Turkey and Syria government shared a common security concern.

3. An excessive influx of Syrian refugees fleeing to Turkey also shapes a major impact to the transformation of Turkey's Syria policy. In this case, Turkey hosts approximately four million Syrian refugees. This excessive figure has suffered it in the sides of economic and social. Turkey already is no longer accepting the Syrian refugees come into Turkish territories. Instead, along with the Syrian Peace Talks, an immediate need to establish de-escalation conflict areas along border lines is required. To realize it, Turkey and major powers (the U.S. and Russia in particular) should incorporate to establish it. In order to provide a safe living-areas for Syria refugees who has been displaced internally especially in northern Syria due to the conflict escalated. Eventhough, in the implementation process, Turkey has found itself isolated in the level of Middle East region and international community. Turkey need immediately to realize the safe zones that aimed to met its international humanitarian responsibility over Syrian refugees, to handle further the situation left by influx of Syria refugees in domestic level, to fight for national security from the possible threats of the PYD-PKK-YPG. As a calculation of those situation has made Turkey come into account of a transformation on its Syria policy towards a regime-reform agenda. It is through taking place the military operations in northwestern Syria.

In comparison with Turkish official stance toward Syrian conflict, Indonesian official stance that reflected from its policy as well is found a bit low-intense and primarily soft power approach in the context of the peace dialogue, and preferring to humanitarian diplomacy. Whereas Turkey as explained above adopts a soft-power to mix of soft and hard power policy due to the inevitable regional dynamics and push factors. In the era of President SBY, Syrian crisis had became the agenda of Indonesian diplomacy. As of Presidential official speech delivered by SBY relates to Syria, Palestine and Egypt in 2013. SBY firmly articulates that in case of the usage of chemical weapon, the international community should refrain and wait until investigation team of the UN announcing the invesigation report. He also harshly condemns the usage of chemical

weapon over innocent civilians.²⁹⁰ As a continuation of the initial Indonesian official stance, since 2014 Indonesia (President Jokowi era) has preferred to pushing for a peaceful diplomatic solution to the conflict in Syria.²⁹¹

Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2011-2014) firmly expresses the Indonesian official stance and determination such: *first*, Syria conflict would not be solved by military measures, but through peace way such diplomacy in order to pursue consensus and agreement as political solution that comprehensive and inclusive for all conflicted parties. He argues that the military measure only causes casualties and long-term sorrowness for Syrians. So, it needs the optional choice such as political action in term of the UN mandate to allow the ceasefire and allow the Syrians themselves in self-determination. This solution also articulated directly by President SBY to General Secretariat of the UN, Ban Ki-Mon. *Second*, the key priority is stopping the use of weapons towards civilians because of humanitarian tragedy occurring in Syria and suggest to prefer a political move such as Intra-Syrians open dialogue. *Third*, Syria government must open access and allow the humanitarian aids for civilians who are victim of the conflict fleeing from homeland and becoming refugee, in domestic and abroad.²⁹²

For its official stance above, Indonesian government (President SBY era) shapes the foreign policy²⁹³ as follows: *first*, Indonesia votes for abstain in resolution of the UN about recognition of national coalition or Syrian opposition groups. *Second*, Indonesia prefers to stop the violent actions in Syria through the UN. It becomes a country requested by the UN to send observer team to Syria. 16 Indonesian officials of the national police and Indonesian national army had worked as observer team in Syria. *Third*, Indonesia was ever calling back Indonesian ambassador for Syria to Jakarta. In response to the humanitarian crisis occurring in Syria. *Fourth*, Indonesia still manages diplomatic relations with Syria, considering the number of Indonesia citizens reaching approximately 80.000 lived in Syria.

Indonesia as active country promoting peace world, in case of Syria crisis, it also has joined to condemn the military measure over the civilians and supporting the UN effort to

²⁹⁰ Annual Presidential Speech on the Ceremony of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia LXVIII, on August 16, 2013

²⁹¹ Annual Press Statement Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, January 7, 2014, Jakarta, p.7

²⁹² Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, "Wawancara Drs. Djoko Ahrjanto MA, Dubes RI Untuk Suriah, dengan TV SATELIT Suriah", April 1 2015, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/damascus/en/berita-agenda/berita-perwakilan/Pages/Wawancara-Drs-Djoko-Harjanto-MA-Dubes-RI-Untuk-Suriah-dengan-TV-SATELIT-Suriah.aspx>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁹³ Adirini Pujayanti, "Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Krisis Suriah," *Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi*, Vol. IV, No.11, 2013, p.

seek peace solution in Syria. Thus, in the beginning, Indonesia called back its ambassador in Syria aiming at a form of condemning upon the situation in Syria. However, based on the good relations that belong both countries prior to the conflict began, Indonesia send back its ambassador to Syria. It considers that crisis' situation turning into a much more burden, the only one way to find peace solution for Syria is keep communicate among two countries. Furthermore, SBY government carefully articulated the official stance on the implementation of military intervention in Syria as a humanitarian protection mission under the norm of responsibility to protect (R2P).

Indonesia foreign policy also had been reflected through vote for abstain on a resolution. On July 1, 2016, a vote for an annual resolution draft of Human Rights Council of the United Nations is related to the human rights issue in Syria entitled "The Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic was held in Geneva, Swiss. Voting resulted 27 countries in favour, 6 countries against, and 14 countries abstain. Indonesia was abstain to this resolution.²⁹⁴ The reason why Indonesia was abstain that Indonesia's commitment to the Active and Independent foreign policy embedded in 1945 Contitution. Indonesia chase not aligned or undercontrolled a party. In this case, a draft resolution that proposed by Saudi Arabia and the United States was only objected to the human rights' abolition of Assad regime and the other hand not covered other the human right's abolition of opposition groups and non-state actors. Given Assad regime is favoured by Russia involvement, while the opposition groups are supported by the United States. It is accordance with the statement of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi that "the United States and Saudi Arabia criticizes the human rights only from one side,.. but if it has been aligned, so we would not."²⁹⁵ She stresses with adding that "Indonesia calculates based on its national interest. In this case, Indonesia still has thousand of citizens lived in Syria."²⁹⁶

Besides, Indonesia gives an active support on the "Annan Plan" containing the withdrawal of military forces and war tools from the cities of Syria, determining a permanent ceasefire, political negotiation, allowing the humanitarian aids' access,

²⁹⁴ OHCHR, "Session meeting of OHCHR on 32ed", retrieved on December 26, 2016 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁹⁵Danu Damarjati, "Ramai Dibahas, Ini Penjelasan Menlu Tentang Abstainnya RI soal HAM di Suriah", *Detik News*, December 19 2016, <https://news.detik.com/berita/3374686/ramai-dibahas-ini-penjelasan-menlu-tentang-abstainnya-ri-soal-ham-di-suriah>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

releasing of detainees, and issuing legitimation of media activities.²⁹⁷ As a part of its support, Indonesia sent 16 personels of Indonesian National army joining Observer team to control the implementation of ceasefire in Syria to met a immediate requesting of General Secretary of the UN, Ban Ki Moon and approved by Assad government. Indonesia also attended an International Conference of the Friends of the People of Syria in Tunisia on February 24, 2012. This conference was attended by 60 countries and international organizations. In this conference, Indonesian Ambassador to Tunisia, Muhammad Ibnu Said confirms Indonesian stance that demanding immediately terminated the violent actions on civilians and calling for political inclusive dialogue, in order to respect on national unity and territorial integrity of Syria. Indonesia also invites international community to take diplomatic way to resolve the crisis peacefully. Indonesia favored the appointment of Kofi Annan as a special envoy of the UN and Arab League to Syria.²⁹⁸

In sum, Indonesia has not played significant and influential role practically within the settlement's efforts on Syrian crisis. In fact, Indonesian political power has not been yet powerful in affecting directly the situation within the crisis compared to other international and regional actors such as the US, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Yet, it has conducted active diplomacy through the international forums including the UN and Arab League. The result was insignificant since Indonesia has not playing an influential role and becoming a mediator of the conflict. Besides, Indonesian official stance wherein the foreign policy shaped of the Active and independent principle in fact constraining Indonesian political choice. Due to Indonesia must be consistent in term of no-bias or subjective in foreign policy-making process related to the case of Syria conflict. Many Indonesian scholars argue that the soul of Indonesia foreign policy is embedded in the beginning of 1945 Consitution namely anti-colonialism and added with the principle of Active and Independent much more guides the Indonesia's Syria policy.

To simplify, Indonesian official stance on Syria crisis definitely in line with the practical of NAM principles consisting of non-interference in each other internal affairs, mutual respect for each other territorial integrity and sovereignty in the international

²⁹⁷ Josephus Primus, "Kofi Annan Bahas "Rencana Annan", *Kompas*, 30 May 2012, http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2012/05/30/17043357/Kofi_Annan_Bahas_Rencana_Annan, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

²⁹⁸ Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, "KBRI Tunis: Delegasi RI Tegaskan Posisi Indonesia Soal Konflik Suriah", <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Embassies.aspx?ID?=7678&1=id>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

relations, non-aggression, prefer to international cooperations based on the equality and mutual benefits, peaceful coexistence. As Marty Natalegawa delivered in his speech:

“An evolving situation across the Middle East including in Syria, provides examples on how peace and security between countries can be affected by internal development within a country. Referring to it, Indonesia continues to speak forcefully in favour of diplomatic means in addressing various disputes or conflict situations. Indonesian foreign policy will be steadfast in promoting diplomacy and dialogue as the preferred response to resolve the conflict or dispute. To protect and promote its national interests. And to contribute to a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice.”²⁹⁹

3 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY ON SYRIA CRISIS

3.1 DOMESTIC FACTORS IN TURKEY

3.1.1 Open Border Policy

Turkey has adopted the open-door policy in 2011, which is with this policy, Turkish territories has welcome Syrian refugees who suffered from the violent effect of Syria conflict. Furthermore, in the framework of this policy as well, Turkish government has provided other supports to the opposition groups in order to fighting against ISIS for instances arm supports to the Peshmerga who come from Iraqi Kurdistan incorporated along with Syrian Kurds. Besides, as a part of this policy, it has allowed the Peshmerga to pass through Turkish territory.

Today, Turkey hosted about 3.5 million refugees who fled from Syria and Iraq. Concerning the Syrian refugees, in March 2016, Turkey and the EU agreed a refugee deal amount \$6.8 billion aid package with aim to discourage illegal migration to Europe through the Aegean Sea and to enhance the condition of Syrian refugees in Turkey.³⁰⁰ The EU pledged to pay \$3.5 billion in the first projects for Syrian refugees, but the EU has been failed to met it as the Turkish politicians criticized.

Within the implementation of open border policy for the refugees hosted in the country, Turkey has financed \$30 million since 2011.³⁰¹ Despite, the lack of international

²⁹⁹ Annual Press Statement Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, January 7, 2014, Jakarta, p.11

³⁰⁰ Daily Sabah, “Turkey to Continue Open-Door Refugee Policy, Despite Lack of International Support, Erdogan says”, *Daily Sabah*, Desember 18 2017, <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/12/18/turkey-to-continue-open-door-refugee-policy-despite-lack-of-international-support-erdogan-says>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁰¹*Ibid.*

support, particularly European countries, Turkey will continue its open door refugee policy. In contrast, a HRW report released in 2015 notes Turkey border policy was shifted in March 2015. And until early March of 2015, the Syrians whose valid travel documents were able to cross through the Cilvegözü crossing near Reyhanlı and the Öncüpınar crossing near Kilis. Bakri Azzin, a Syrian humanitarian worker and activist from Aleppo accuses, "...Only doctors, some of humanitarian workers and all injured people can pass... They stopped legal and illegal crossings simultaneously. Since the beginning of April 2015 the border was closed completely..."³⁰²

A director of Migration Research center of Koc University in Istanbul strives to explain the situation, "Before Kobani, Turkey genuinely had an open door policy for Syrian refugees. Yet, when the situation in Kobani caused a crisis within Turkey and the number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey reached 1.5 million, the government decided to minimize the number of refugees allowed in the country. In all practical terms, Turkey's open door policy ended there."³⁰³ He adds that there are no recent binding international agreements that obligate a single state towards refugees. While Turkey is not bound to allow everyone including refugee intake. He underlines that countries may choose a consensus related to the necessity of opening borders during a major refugee crisis due to an insufficiency of domestic social and economic resources to accommodate that reached the maximum number of refugees. Several analysts urge that the main goal of Turkey border policy is to establish a safety zone in northern Syria and eventually intake a large number of refugees in there.

Referring to the excessive number of Syrian refugees displaced to Turkey and it has suffered internally in many dimensions of the events produced by Syrian conflict, meantime, the lack of sufficient international aid supports, indeed, it should take measures to minimize the fleeing refugees to Turkey and seek a solution for such situation, like the establishment of safety zones in the border areas. In other hand, Turkey must deal with the challenges that produced by the refugee crisis involving mobilizing international support, contributing to a political solution based on realism and diplomacy and the polarization of Turkish public opinion regarding the excessive presence of Syrian refugees placed in

³⁰² Birce Bora, "Analysis: Is Turkey's 'open door policy' an illusion?", *Al Jazeera*, November 24, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/analysis-turkey-open-door-policy-illusion-151124084706365.html>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

Turkey.³⁰⁴ In fact, every countries have their limits in managing an issue, and they should not ignore their national interests as well in other hand, including Turkey is.

3.1.2 Humanitarian Dimension

Since 2011, the civil war's outbreak in Syria has caused the biggest refugee crisis since the second world war. In regard to the Syrian refugees, the head of the Turkish Emergency Relief Effort stated, "Syrian refugees are not a problem to solve. They are a reality to manage."³⁰⁵

Turkish Foreign Minister on World Refugee Day in 2016 articulates that Turkey has conducted every means available to treat refugees based on conditions deal with human dignity. Besides, he points out that Turkey has met the international duties in refugees' protection and strived to achieve the high humanitarian ideal in an attempt to solve the refugee crisis.³⁰⁶

In discussing a humane sample of the humanitarian management to Syrian refugees applied by Turkish government, it could be found at Gaziantep. A Turkish city is placed on the Syrian-Turkish border and hosted 600000 Syrians, nearly 40000 is live in the five camps of Gaziantep, while the rest in Gaziantep city itself. It has become a global model in term of how to embrace the refugees. Gaziantep mayor, Fatma Sahin, also signed a policy on the safeguarding of refugee rights. In which, they are permitted to work and have free access on health care and schools, while pledged the Turkish citizenship within the framework of integration.

A reflection of Turkish humanitarian dimension in deal with Syrian refugee issue could be seen in Jarabulus, Syria. A city in northern Syria which are liberated from ISIS control under the Euphrate Shield Operation in 2016. After the liberation, Syrian refugees are able to start a new life there. In this case, through the humanitarian project fo Syrians, a hospital is built with maternity ward and schools are rebuilt. In the context of government administration, currently a new local council prevails. In order to attempt the refugee relief,

³⁰⁴ "FMHT: Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Open Door Policy", *Boston University Pardee School*, April 15 2016, <https://www.bu.edu/pardeschool/2016/04/15/fmht-syrian-refugees-and-turkeys-open-door-policy/>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁰⁵ Rula Jebreal, "How to Treat Refugees With Dignity: A Lesson From Turkey", *The New York Times*, September 27, 2017, retrieved on <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/turkey-syrian-refugees.html>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁰⁶ Hurriyet Daily News, "Turkey Highlights Open-Door Policy On World Refugee Day", *Hurriyet Daily News*", June 19 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-highlights-open-door-policy-on-world-refugee-day-100667>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

Turkey has managed a more humane refugee policy. According to the International Organization for Migration, 600000 Syrians who displaced internally have returned homes in Syria.³⁰⁷ However, it would produce the refugees again as if another violence emerged. Given, there several contested areas including Idlib city, is undercontrolled by opposition groups. Many refugees argue that a return to Bashar al-Assad-administrated regions is a death choice. Hence, Turkey may host a large number of refugees for years and generations to come.

In deal with the management of Syrian humanitarian crisis including the refugee issues, there an official institution works and has responsible called AFAD. It provides the services through the Disaster Temporary City Management System (AFKEN), which won “Best Public Services” of the UN in 2015. Refer to the 2017 Global Humanitarian Aid Report, Turkey is the second largest contributor to humanitarian relief and donor in the world.³⁰⁸

In response to the humanitarian crisis, AFAD has housed 233400 Syrians in 21 camp facilities completed with schools, hospitals, and spor facilities. As of August 2017, 80742 children have been reintroduced to schools. Within the scope of free of charge healthcare services and medicines, 953466 operations have been brought, 1143393 patients got treatment in the hospitals. 222869 Syrians have gotten jobs through vocational training.³⁰⁹

In fact, Syrian refugees in Turkey, compared to who are lived beyond the camps, the refugees who are placed in the camps remain to continue daily life with getting more opportunity of social and wealthy access. In comparison with the camp’s conditions of other Syria’s neighbors, the camps which are built by the Republic of Turkey AFAD remain in sufficient condition in terms of the social fields, education, healthy care, accomodation, security, hygienist, etc. Despite, the high number of refugees who are stayed alive beyond the camps with several factors entail as the presence of refugees who migrate to Turkey illegally and not want to be placed in anywhere, the willing of refugees to separate the camps despite the condition is well, for who are wealth financially or the private reasons prefer to live beyond the camps, the full capacity of the camps so the

³⁰⁷ Rula Jebreal, *Op.cit.*

³⁰⁸ AFAD, “Turkey Response to Syria Crisis”, August 2017, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis> (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

refugees should wait outside, and the relative reason so they prefer to live at the places pointed by their family.³¹⁰

Besides, in regards to the Turkey's Syrian Refugee Policy adopts an approach of returning the refugees to home. However, in other plan, Turkey has provided an integration mechanism for refugees by committing Turkish citizenship. In order to achieve that goal, Turkey has managed a preparational education of Turkish language, work permittance, and AFAD services for who lives beyond the camps.³¹¹

3.1.3 Turkey-Syria's Border Security Dimension

As the Syrian crisis turned into an armed conflict, Turkey had to change significantly its border security policy. In regard to Turkey's border security policy, after August 2011, Turkey's Syria policy had undergone a radical change when Assad regime took the military measures towards the Syrian opposition. In response the Assad's policy increasing military threats to create a security vacuum, Turkey adopts a new engagement policy into the conflict. To realize it, Turkey requested the deployment of anti missile defence system from its traditional allies, the NATO against possible Syrian government attacks. Meantime, Turkey's border security policy has been shaped since 2013. During 2013, Islamist groups has begun to dominate the opposition. In other words, an increasingly various moderate and radical groups have made the conflict to be complicated, particularly in early 2013, thousands of al-Qaeda affiliated groups emerged.³¹²

In the development of the conflict, the increasingly military conflict along the Syria-Turkey's border lines, has caused an acute border security issue. Turkey has had difficulty managing the issue since the rapidly rise in number of Syrian refugees and the lack of international supports, although it has attempted to resolve the issue through an integrated institutional strategy. In deal with border security issue, Turkey has called for the formation of a safety zone and a no-fly zone that has been responded differently by international community. Considering the country's control of its national border, Turkey continued to solve the situation that turned into a problem security and further national

³¹⁰ Oytun Orhan, "Suriye Ic Savasinin Insan Maliyeti: Multeci Krizi", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, pp. 36-37

³¹¹ Suna Gulfer Ihlamur and Oner, "Turkiyenin Suriyeli Multecilere Yonelik Politikasi", *Ortadogu Analizi* Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, p.45

³¹² Tayyar Ari, "Cenevre II Neyi Degistirdi?", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, p.54

security's threat on its own way.³¹³ A no-fly zone or safety zone in northern Syria is so importance to enhance security in the Turkish-Syrian borders.³¹⁴ Yet, Turkish call was mostly undermined due to disagreements on the issue of Syria's future among the constested powers within the conflict.

Several dynamics influencing Turkey's border security policies toward Syria. *Firstly*, the presence of non-state armed actors that increasingly attracted into Syria after the effect of Syrian crisis' spillover in 2014. In this regard, the rise of the ISIS that after strengthening power in Raqqa, taking over Mosul in Iraq in short time and its transformation into a geo-political actor in the region. Before the fall of the ISIS in 2017, the ISIS had controlled the longest borders neighboring Turkey, so it posed the biggest threat to Turkey's border security. *Secondly*, the security risks emerged and posed by the Syrian regime. Despite the regime is no longer controlling the areas in the border, in reverse, controlled by the opposition, it would regain the contested region, for example Idlib city. *Thirdly*, an ethno-sectarian dimension of the Syria conflict. In this context, since the conflict turned into armed civil war, it sparked the polarization of ethnic and military groups along the border. Within the entire Turkish-Syrian border, the Kurdish region, the Arab region and the ISIS region prevail. Before the civil war in Syria, there was only the state of Syria across the border, but currently it has been replaced by various non-state armed groups such the YPG, the ISIS, and the Syrian opposition (Islamist and moderate groups) claiming sovereignty and having different ideologies, structures and long-term strategies. They have started to see themselves as states, therefore posing the security threat on Turkey.

Fourthly, the revival of Kurdish nationalism in the region because of the Syria conflict and the fight against the ISIS. The continuing relationship among the Kurdish ethnicity in the region and geo-cultural dynamics originated by the presence of the Kurdish regions serve to consolidate Kurdish nationalism and create resistance including to Turkish government. Before the ISIS' defeat, the PYD/PKK was the second most dangerous group poses the security threats to Turkey. The PKK controls the region enclosed by Afrin, Kilis, and Reyhanli. While Turkey and the PYD are neighbors in Kamishli and some other small regions. *Fifthly*, the most frequently seen security risk on Turkey's border is illegal human

³¹³ Murat Yesiltas, **SETA Analysis: Neighboring A Civil War Turkey's Border Security With Syria**, No.17, Turkuvaz Matbaacilik Yayincilik, Istanbul ,October 2015, p. 14.

³¹⁴ Zenonas Tziarras, "Turkey's Syria Problem: A Talking Timeline of Events", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.11, No.3, 2012, p.133

transits particularly the phenomenon of foreign fighter. After the Cold War era, Turkey's border security policy began to be shaped not only to prevent the attacks from terrorists or other countries but also along with the global problems such as mass migration and smuggling. Since the Syria conflict escalated into a military conflict, the influx of foreign fighters across the border prevails. Turkey is defined as one of the "target countries" for FTF on their way to and from a conflict zone. Furthermore, the FTF who decides to leave from the the conflict zone might prefer to reside in Turkey as a third country. This conditions make the danger to Turkish national security and country's border security to be vulnerable.³¹⁵

In order to response the military presence along its border, Turkey adopted the "zero tolerance" policy including within scope of the fight against the ISIS. In the implementation phase of the policy, Turkey promptly took a series of military and political measures to minimize the threat posed by the ISIS in the border. In addition, Turkey also has implemented more military precautions including physical measures and a new security technology for military security purposes and attempted to form an integrated policy. Considering the geographical nature and the length of its border especially Turkey's very long border (911 km) with Syria make it difficult to control, so Turkey prefers to serve a more technology-intensive tools especially after the military presence of ISIS along border. To counter the dynamics produced by the PYD-PKK against the border security regime, Turkey's effort to build a wall along the border areas populated by Kurds, the Nusaybin border region in particular. In short, Turkey prioritised a border security regime which has " zero tolerance policy" as its cornerstone.³¹⁶

In aim of war on terrorism, Turkey has been deploying the military operations along with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Since the violent effect of ISIS terror attacks in Turkish domestic, Turkey had to prioritize the fight against the ISIS. Despite, the military operations apply within Syrian territory, Turkish foreign policy still remain to defend Syria's territorial integrity and advocates non-interference in their domestic affairs since Syria belongs Syrians.³¹⁷ Turkey will only attack the terrorists, then creating the safety zones for returning Syrian refugees. Within the scope of the safety zone's plan, Turkey deploys the airforce attacks and supports logistic to the moderate opposition in the field.

³¹⁵ Murat Yesiltas, *Op.cit.*, pp. 14-19.

³¹⁶*Ibid.*, p.14

³¹⁷ ORSAM, "Turkey's National Interest Entails Peace and Stability in Its Region", ORSAM Interviews On Regional Affairs with Ahmet Yildiz, No.40 January 2017, p.7

After cleaning the regions from ISIS' control, the remaining vacuum power will be filled by Turkey affiliated-the moderate opposition.

In the development of Syrian civil war, since three years later, the PKK's Syria-based branch, the PYD-YPG and ex-al Qaeda affiliated terror group, the ISIS have emerged the influential non-state actors and gained more powers. Both actors has posed the emerging threats in Turkey due to they are success to control the Syrian-Turkish border areas particularly in northern Syria. In order to counter the further possible ISIS terror attacks the TSK, anti-ISIS coalition, and the FSA launched the "Euphrates Shield Operation" in the northern Syria on August 24, 2016. It was deployed in coordination with the U.S., Russia and other regional actors. This operation covers between the Euphrates river to the eastern and Azaz to the western areas. Since 2016, Turkey has a much more demanded an establishment of safety zone. Beyond targetting to eliminate the ISIS influential areas, it also to prevent the PYD-YPG to connect Afrin and Kobane cantons, in order to keep territorial continuity of Rojava. Since the Kobane has fallen into YPG-PYD's control after the US-backed anti-ISIS operation. Where, the U.S. and the PYD-YPG alliance strongly and strategically has begun after the massive war on the ISIS in Kobani. As a result, the Turkish Army and FSA that collaborated in this military operation has captured Jarabulus, al-Bab and several villages. It also prevented the connection of the rest of PYD-controlled areas with the Afrin canton. Turkey could not expand its operation toward Manbij, due to the pressure of Russia and the U.S. Eventually, Raqqa was the ex-capital of the ISIS, has fallen into the U.S. and its strategic ally, PYD-YPG's control.

The goals will try to be reached by launching that military operation are *first*, to prevent the formation of YPG-administrated autonomy region by uniting the PYD-controlled regions. *Second*, to minimize or eliminate the possible terror attacks and any attack to border cities within Turkey by pushing back ISIS from the border areas. *Third*, to refrain the new wave of the fleeing refugees to Turkey and to prepare the opportunity of returning Syrian refugees stayed in Turkey. *Fourth*, to guarantee the long-term interest of Turkey's Middle East and Arab countries. *Fifth*, to strengthen the bargaining in the Syrian political process/ negotiation.³¹⁸

However, by time goes and so far, the U.S. is more prefer to strategically incorporated with the PYD-YPG since it has willing to establish and take control areas that

³¹⁸ Oytun Orhan, "Firat Kalkani: Hedefler, Firsatlar, ve Riskler", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol.8, No.77, November-December 2016, p.12

is essentially under the U.S. influence. It may realize that in order to keep the U.S. power in the Middle East particularly in Syria, it has to establish the U.S.-controlled regions. While the YPG-controlled areas could be counted as the U.S.influential regions. Given, Russia and Iran has backed Bashar al-Assad regime. In other words, Assad regime-controlled areas is Russia influential areas.

3.2 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

3.2.1 Global and Regional Powers Engagement

The Syrian conflict is one of the most crucial conflict in world politics. It is a spillover of the Arap Spring, which began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010 before reaching out across the Middle East countries. However, in case of Syria, the revolutionary process has come into a complex civil war involving global powers, regional powers, non-state actors such terrorist organizations.

Since 2013, the Syrian conflict became much more bloodshed and complicated. It was occurred following the chemical attack in Ghouta, then to Damascus in August 2013 accused Assad regime as the responsible actor. Despite, the increasingly pressures such the choice of military intervention into Syria, eventually Bashar al-Assad regime remains in power and a deal on the disarming with Assad's chemical weapons reached. Due to the diplomatic efforts of Assad regime's international allies such Iran, Russia and China.

The presence of foreign actors that divided the opposition within the Syrian conflict began with the formation of al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria on January 23, 2012. Then, ISIS terror militants self-proclaimed "caliphate" in the area of Aleppo (Syria) to eastern Iraq, Diyala province in June 2014. Meantime, since September 2014, US-led anti-ISIS coalition (including five Arab countries) has launched airstrikes fighting against ISIS for the first around Aleppo and Raqqa in Syria.

During 2015, the international interventions increases. Kurdish forces kicked the ISIS out of Kobane on Turkish-Syrian border in January 2015 with the U.S. supports. In May 2015, the ISIS captured Palmyra city and al-Nusra-led Jaish al-Fatah took control of Idlib Province. But Syrian government retook Palmyra from ISIS in March 2016. Russia, France and Egypt began to launch their first airstrikes later. Before providing direct intervention aside with Bashar al-Assad regime on September 30, 2015, Russia has supported military aids for Assad military forces. On October 2015, Egypt announced to support the Russian intervention. Turkey deployed its troops in August 2016 to push back

the ISIS and YPG-PYD from the borders. Assad regime troops along with Iran supported-militias and Russian airstrikes recaptured Aleppo in December 2016. In May 2017, the U.S. announced to support arm logistics to the YPG and alongside with the SDF, they took control Tabqa dam from the ISIS. The ISIS was lost and transferred the control Raqqa city in October 2017. Whereas, Assad regime recaptured the control of Deir al-Zour from the ISIS in November 2017.

Following the end of 2017, Russia alongside Assad regime reclaimed the areas in north-western Idlib province from oppositions. And the last, in January 2018, Turkey sent troops across border in Northern Syria (Afrin city particularly) in aiming to clean the borders from the PYD-YPG, then establishing safety zones for Syrian refugees.

The foreign power's direct involvement into Syrian civil war definitely have particular objectives in calculation. They engaged to secure their interests within Syria post conflict. Indeed, both the opposition and Bashar al-Assad regime have taken advantage of foreign countries presence through the supports of military, domestic, and financial. Besides, foreign countries and non-state actors (including terrorist organizations) engagement also has resulted in the strategic patterns of alliances and enmities among global powers, regional powers, and non-state actors. It also could be shifted along with the crucial events within Syria even the regional events. So, in the international level, this factor has influenced to the Turkish attitude in Syrian conflict from prefer to the use of soft power come into the combination of soft and hard power. As Mehmet Sahin and Bugra Sari try to simplify the relations among global powers, regional powers, and non-state actors that involved within Syrian civil war through a table is drawn below.

Table 4.3. State and Non-state Actors Relations in Syria Crisis³¹⁹

	Assad regime	Moderate Group	Islamist Group	ISIS	PYD-YPG
Assad regime	In favour with military action	Against with military action	Against with military action	Against with military action	Not clear or Against with military action
Iran	In favour with military action	Against with military action	Against with diplomacy or logistics	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics
Russia	In favour with military action	Against with military action	Against with military action	Against with military action	In favour with diplomacy or logistics
The U.S.	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	Against with military action	Against with military action	In favour with diplomacy or logistics (<i>military action</i>)
Turkey and Qatar	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics (<i>military action</i>)	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	Against with military action	Against with military action
The U.K.	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	Against with diplomacy or logistics	Against with military action	In favour with diplomacy or logistics
France	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	Against with diplomacy or logistics	Against with military action	In favour with diplomacy or logistics
Saudi Arabia	Against with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	In favour with diplomacy or logistics	Against with military action	Against with diplomacy or logistics

³¹⁹ Mehmet Sahin and Bugra Sari, "Turkey in the Syrian Crisis: The limits of A Middle Power Foreign Policy", *Ortadogu Etutleri*, Vol.8, No.1, July 2016, p.18

3.2.2 The Rise of ISIS

The ISIS is one of the most prominent organizations which had risen within Syrian civil war. It fights against both the regime and other opposition groups and declared unilaterally as a sovereign state. It was a part of Al-Qaeda in the period of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and strengthened its power in Iraq. Thank to the chaotic situation caused by the civil war, it moved to Syria then intensified its power there. It posed a more dangerous threat against the world compared to the Al-Qaeda. Turkey considers the fight against the ISIS as a war on terrorism with a common objective. Ersin Aksoy summarises where the ISIS is originated and how the phases it emerged as seen in the table below:

Table 4.4. Organizational Origin of ISIS³²⁰

Organization	Period	Founder
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad	1999-2004	Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)	2004-2006	Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Mujahedeen Shura Council	2006	Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	2006-2013	Abu Umar al-Baghdadi
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)	2013-2014	Abu Umar al-Baghdadi
Islamic State	2014-2017	Abu Umar al-Baghdadi

The rise of ISIS, which is originated from Iraq, caused several factors as entail *first* the power vacuum and violence that Syrian civil war sparked. Thanks to the rising specter of the Syrian civil war, initially the group diverted the strength to Iraq, moved through Kirkuk, Salahaddin and Diyala towards the Iranian border, after conquering Mosul within short periods. *Second*, the presence of the power gap in Syria during the continued conflict while it has benefited of it. In this regards, the Syrian constitutional system, which Assad regime had sworn to change was against every contemporary norm. *Third*, the fertile ground resulted from the exclusionary and repressive policies of Syrian and Iraqi governments, so that the ISIS could strengthen the power.³²¹ *Fourth*, the sectarianism resulted from regional conflict which has been developed by past few years and *fifth*

³²⁰ Ersin Aksoy, "DAIS ve Suriye Ic Savasinda DAIS'in Rolu", *Uluslararası Politik Arastirmalar Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No.2, 2016, p.31

³²¹ Oytun Orhan, p.7.

political cleavages also contributed to the rise of ISIS. All factors had enabled the ISIS to recruit and establish control alongside the border.

The significance of ISIS' rise to Turkey beyond the territorial threat is the challenge of Turkey's Syria policy. Oytun Orhan, a researcher of ORSAM, articulates that there are several dimensions of these challenge³²² namely *firstly* ISIS benefits from the regime. In this context, as the ISIS fighting the moderate opposition forces, so that the regime is no longer fighting against the ISIS and employ its power. *Secondly*, to strengthens the popular supports for Assad. In regards these, ISIS massacres are largely in the areas lived by minorities (Christians, Arab Alawites, Druzes and Armenians). Besides, the popular supports also come from the Sunni Arab people and some tribes who are initially have cooperation with ISIS. By then, those are realigning with the Assad government.

Thirdly, the Assad regime seeks to capitalize on the rise of ISIS to gain international legitimacy. The risk created in these sense that the regime would be considered an ally by the West in the fight against terrorism. *Fourthly*, the Syrian people are forced to flee the homeland and refuge on a mass scale. In this situation, Turkey hosts a large number of refugee and further creates economic, social and security problems for Turkey. According to SOHR, there more than 70% militants who fighting in Syria are foreigners.

Turkish's fighting against the ISIS within the framework of war on terror began in July 2016 then accelerated in October 2016. The ISIS posed major threats to Turkish national security due to its bloody terrorist attacks since 2015. A ISIS bombing attack in 2016 killed more than 100 civilians in Ankara city, a Turkish capital. The ISIS has made a record of deadliest terrorist attack in Turkish history.³²³

3.2.3 The Emergence of the PYD Threat

In conducting its activities, the PYD is the PKK branch in Syria. It has incorporated with the Assad regime on the basis of common interests. It established a military-wing which is supported by the PKK so called the YPG. The PYD has gained several benefits from the conflict in Syria such the PYD could manage in controlling the Kurds who initially line with the Syrian opposition, self-proclaim several cantons, and establish a sphere of influence in the northern Syria. In fact, the PKK has began to implement the self-

³²²Oytun Orhan, "Struggle against ISIS, Border Crossings and Turkey", *ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs*, No.11, September 2014, p.5

³²³ William M. Arkin and Robert Windrem, "Why ISIS Attacks Turkey", *NBC News*, June 29, 2016, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis>, (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

administration model in that cantons, which it also will be implemented in Turkey.³²⁴ The PYD has taken advantage of ISIS' presence in Syria. In this context, it has become a strategic partner of the U.S. to oppose ISIS in military action. In which, since May 2017, the U.S. decided to arm the YPG-PYD. It also has used that benefit in expanding and connecting the cantons under its control.

The PYD has managed pragmatist relations with the Assad regime, the U.S. and Russia. It also implements a policy of forced migration within its controlled-regions. Its "Rojava Revolution" has the risks to diminish the aspirations of groups in the region. However, within that relations, the PYD with its Rojava plan (Democratic Federation of Northern Syria) has made its relations with the Assad regime come into a large scale conflict. For instance, in Jazira and Hasakah, where the PYD shares the parts with the Assad regime. Furthermore, the PYD's engagement with the U.S. also threatens its relations with Russia. Turkey has tried to counter that PYD's plan with applying the Euphrates Shield Operation in aim of preventing the PYD to unite the cantons beginning with Afrin in the western Euphrates.³²⁵

The northern Syria has geopolitical significance since it is the Turkey-Syria border. It also is heavily populated with Kurdish Syria and the place of critical oil reserves especially in northeast Syria. The Kurdish Syrian is perceived as a threat by the Assad regime due to the right demands. The Assad regime strived to move its Kurdish issue to Turkey, while creating the Syrian Kurdish issue as a counter position oppose the Turkish economic and political expansion to northern Syria.³²⁶

Due to the normalization of the Turkey-Syria relations and in order to oppose that new development and to keep its influence on Syrian Kurdish, the PKK established a Syrian branch with titled the PYD in 2003.³²⁷ The PYD has began to be a leading actor in the northern Syria after 2011, fulfilling the vacuum power that left by the Assad regime, controlled Qamishli, Afrin, Ayn al-Arab (Kobane), and al-Hasakah.

In short, following the outbreak of Syrian Uprising in 2011, with the support of the Assad regime, the PKK-KCK established an administrative structures in the name of PYD

³²⁴ Can Acun and Bunyamin Keskin, "The PKK's Branch in Northern Syria: PYD-YPG", *SETA Report*, Turkuvaz Publishing, Istanbul, 2017, p.55

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.56

³²⁶ Can Acun and Huseyin Oner, "ISID-PYD Catismasinin Sicak Cephesi: Kobani", *SETA Perspektif*, Oktober 2014, p.76

³²⁷ Diwan, "The Kurdish Democratic Union Party", *Carnegie Middle East Center*, March 1, 2012, retrieved on <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48526?lang=en>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)


structure in Syria. It means in that period, the Assad regime accepted the presence of political and armed structure of the PKK-KCK in the frame of PYD in Syria. Meanwhile, the PYD maintained good relations with the Assad regime and ruled the Hasakah city along with the Syrian intelligence agency, *al-Mukhabarat* and *Shabbiha forces*, contrary to other Kurdish political entities in northern Syria.³²⁸ After deal and negotiation, the Assad regime flee from the Kurdish region and gave control the territory to the PYD-YPG.

After Ayn al-Arab (Kobane)'s siege by ISIS, the U.S. airforces and PYD-YPG has begun to involved within a military engagement. The strategic aim of the PYD related to its relations with the U.S. and the Assad regime is to unite the cantons under PYD-YPG's control. To realize, it capture Tal Abyad, then to draw a line from Jazira to Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) in order to connect Afrin with other cantons. The PYD-YPG also developed contacts with Russia since the direct intervention of Russia into Syrian civil war on September 30, 2015.

Some parts of the northern Syria were announced as an autonomy region of the PYD on January 30, 2014. Whereas it also self-declared the cantons of Jazira, Ayn al-Arab and Afrin that are along the Turkish-Syria border to be included in the Syrian Kurdistan Federation, then followed the PYD proclaimed a federal system governance in the northern Syria on March 17, 2016. Besides, the area between Azaz and Jarablus also may be included into the federation. **Since the areas of federation are to be located along the Turkish-Syrian borders, it would create the risks and threats of terrorist acts in Turkish territories.** If the Azaz-Jarablus line of the Turkish and Syrian border had undercontrolled of the PYD-YPG, there would have been a terror corridor in northern Syria in nature. In the development, the Afrin, Jazira and Kobani cantons have owned legislative, executive and judicial bodies and systems within the framework of Rojava (Democratic Federation of Northern Syria) as a figure below:


³²⁸ "Syria Kurdish Parties Trade Blames", *KurdPress*, May 23, 2013, retrieved on <http://www.mesop.de/syria-kurdish-parties-trade-blames-pyd-cooperates-with-assad-regime/>

Figure 4.1. Rojava Self-Administration of Cantons³²⁹



Meanwhile, the PYD and PKK relationship could be understood from the diagram of the PYD's organizational structure drawn as follows:

Figure 4.2. Organizational Relationship Between the PYD and PKK³³⁰



³²⁹ Can Acun and Bunyamin Keskin, "The PKK's Branch in Northern Syria: PYD-YPG", *SETA Report*, Turkuvaz Publishing, Istanbul, 2017, p.26

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.14

From the diagram above, to simplify the PYD is a subdivision of the Kurdistan People;s Community (*Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK*), which referring to the rules of procedures, it acts as a subordinate of the PKK’s executive council, the acceptance of Ocan as a leader of all Kurdish people,³³¹ and similar with the PKK has a armed-wing, the HPG, the PYD also has called the YPG, as a military unit. Besides, another similirity between the PYD and The PKK in term of tactic. The PKK has benefited of the YPG weapon’s supports and from the YPG’s experience in urban warfare ob behalf of “the revolutionary people’s war”

Furthermore, as written within the PYD bylaws confirms that “Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the PYD, the KCK, the people of Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel and the Kurdish community in Rojava (northern Syria)”.³³² Meanwhile, in fact the HPG is the pioneer of all other armed Kurdish organization.³³³ As the announcement of the PYD stated in th PYD bylaws is sufficient to prove the presence of a such affiliation of the PYD-PKK. Furthermore, an increase of the PYD-YPG terrorist attacks following the Syrian Uprising can only be explained as a result of the PKK support. In contrast, a significant decrease of terrorists in Turkey due to the successful of country’s counterterrorism acts in 2015 and after the July 25, 2016 failed coup attempt.³³⁴

Other potential threat is posed to the Turkish national legitimacy of the PYD-YPG is the presence of the PYD office and representatives in Europe. In this context, the PYD has run a diplomacy in the level of international in order to serve its aims and to get the international support and legitimate. For instance, the Europe countries respond the PYD differently. However, the real potential risk of the PYD representative in Europe is the communication of the PYD with the European Parliament which was the latest contact in September 2016. In that time, the PYD seeked for the EU’s support with aim to oppose the Turkish militer operation, the Euphrates Shield Operation.³³⁵

³³¹ The PYD Official Rules of Procedure.

³³² Can Acun and Bunyamin Keskin, “The PKK’s Branch in Northern Syria: PYD-YPG”, *SETA Report*, Turkuvaz Publishing, Istanbul, 2017, p.15

³³³ *Ibid.*, p.33

³³⁴ “Anadolu Ajansi, “Başbakan Yıldırım Çukurca’da Askeri Birlikleri Ziyaretetti”, *Anadolu Ajansı*, September 5, 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/basbakan-yildirim-cukurcada-askeri-birlikleri-ziyaret-etti-> (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³³⁵ Yeni Safak, “Avrupa’nın Teröristi”, *Yeni Şafak*, September 1, 2016, <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/avrupanin-teroristi-2520592>, (retrieved on January 19, 2018)

The PKK-PYD relationship also could be observed through the PKK's exploitation over the foreign states' weapon and ammunition supports to the YPG. Since the illegal delivering areas of weapons and ammunition aid held by the PYD-YPG to the PKK in Turkey including a large part of the Turkish-Syrian border, the delivers became easily to be determined. Those most common areas which are used include Amuda-Qamishli and Mardin/Nusaybin border, the Sirnak/Cizre-Syrian border, the Afrin-Amanos mountains, and the Ayn al-Arab-Suruc border. Whereas the ammunition and weapons from the PYG to the PKK sent accross the Amuda, Afrin, al-Malikiyah, Ayn al-Arab, Qamishli, and Hasakah.

A fact of the military relation for example, in 2015, the PYD-YPG provided some of the ammunition to the PKK through the borders such antiank missiles, hand grenades, M-16, AK-47 rifles and ammunition, heavy machine guns, etc.³³⁶ Besides, the PKK members based in Sirnak confirmed a PKK's request of weapons and ammunition to the PYD in November 2015, then received in December 2015.³³⁷

In operation the fight against ISIS, the U.S.-led coalition beyond Turkey, has seen the PYD-YPG as an alternative strategic partner. Thank to this partnership, the PYD-YPG has won the international legitimacy and symphaty. As a result, the PYD-YPG has got the military support from the U.S. in northern Syria since May 2017. Since the PKK is marked as an terrorist organization by the U.S. and the EU, thus it cancels the relations with the PYD on purpose. Since then, the number of illegal weapons and ammunition delivers to Turkey was increased.³³⁸ Therefore, the U.S. military supports including the weapons and ammunition support to the PYD has posed a direct threat to Turkish national security.

The Syrian Kurds issue not only shapes the shift of Syria's policy between the U.S. and Turkey, it also has came into effect between the relations of Turkey and Russia. The current increasingly military situation in the border area has been forcing Turkey to shift its Syria's priority policy which from removing President Assad to preventing the YPG from maintaining a semiautonomous area in northern Syria.

3.3 SYRIAN REFUGEES CRISIS : IMPLICATIONS TO TURKEY

Turkey is the country where refugees enjoy the best conditions. The reason that creates the refugee problem is the chaotic environment in Syria. According to Khaled Khoja, former President of FSA that the regime will exterminate the Syrian people in order

³³⁶ Can Acun and Bunyamin Keskin, *Op.cit.*, p.34

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ Can Acun and Bunyamin Keskin, *Op.cit.*, p.35

to keep Assad in power. Such problem will be reproduced by the Syrian regime again. The regime uses barrel bombs, chemical weapons, and chlorine gas. That is why refugee crisis keeps growing.

The Syrian conflict has been escalated since 2013, the number of refugee also rapidly increased and emerged as the international extremely problem that mostly fleeing to Turkey. Since then, in order to prevent the refugee crisis to be much more complicated and the further attacks as Reyhanli attacks, Turkey government has been heavily seeking to settle the conflict with the solution of Assad's regime change and supporting the opposition groups consistently.³³⁹

The influx of Syrian refugees has resulted in a significant financial challenges and various problems stemming from complex demographics, deep political polarisation and rising security threats for Turkey as a host country of Syrian refugees. In order to seek for solution of Syrian humanitarian crisis, Turkey has prepared an integration plan of the refugees. Yet, the Syrian integration into Turkish society is complex on many levels. One side that affected from the Syrian refugees crisis is Turkish political polarisation and the tensions with the EU in term of refugee's crisis management. Furthermore, Turkey hosts the most refugees has reinforced Turkish political demands regarding developments in Syria. Creating a safe zone in the northern Syria bordering Turkey has been a priority. An Euphrates Shield Operation launched in August 2016 incorporated with Free Syrian Army. One of the aim is accordingly to establish a territory where Syrians could stay if another refugee wave comes.

Turkey expected neither an influx of the refugee size nor for the conflict to continue so long. The conceptual and institutional shifts necessary to integrate Syrians in a sustainable way. A challenge that started as "guest" being housed in camps and given emergency help in 2011 under "temporary protection". Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's adviser pronounced the concept of "temporary permanence" in December 2015.

Turkish authorities highlight the need to balance Syrian preferences and needs with security considerations and economic interests of the country at large. In response to the criticism of international community that Turkey are not managing the crisis well enough, the Prime Minister's public diplomacy coordinator explained that Turkey gets complain from a large young population and many unemployed less access to jobs and services

³³⁹ Nebi Mis and Omer Behram Ozdemir, "Suriye 2013" in *Ortadogu Yilligi*, Kemal Inat and Muhittin Ataman (eds.), Acilim Kitap, Istanbul, 2013, pp.205-208

because of Syrians' prevail. It is also bordering an unstable neighbourhood, struggling against the PKK terror group. While there is just so much Turkey can do. However the integration takes time and can only realize with political consensus as well as more support to develop the capacity.

Particularly after the 2014-2015 influx, the anti-refugee sentiment has been grown. In 2013, closely 60 per cent of the population perceives immigration negatively impacted tourism, labour and the economy largely. A seminal 2014 study underscored these findings. Over 80 per cent of voters opposed citizenship, nearly 70 per cent voters wanted more restrictive policies, even returning Syrians home.³⁴⁰

The impacts consisting of the burden on services, declining job opportunities, deteriorating trade relations in regions nearest to Syria and fear of refugees as a security risk. Given the high rate of Syrian children not going to school and will exponentially join crime waves.³⁴¹ For example, refugees as an economic burden that affects economic gap and anti-refugee sentiment. Turkish citizens unemployed is approximately 3.5 million, resentment is high about Syrians competing for jobs, mostly in the informal sector, and the problem of cheap labour. For instance, in Izmir, shoemakers used to hire out for 80 TL but Syrians do the work for 12 TL. Besides, Syrians get support in public services, for instance enjoying health facilities for free and without paying into social security unlike citizens. *Second*, refugees as a security risk. Eventhough the official statistics revelas that the impact of refugees on crime rates is low.

3.4 SPILLOVER OF THE CONFLICT : A THREAT TO TURKEY'S SECURITY

3.4.1 Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition War

The reason why the ISIS poses a direct threat to Turkey is for geographical reasons. The fact is almost all of the ISIS-controlled areas in Syria are on the border area, very close to the border of Turkey-Syria, and even some of the border gates were under the control of ISIS. According to Oytun Orhan, the dimensions of geographical links between Turkey and ISIS that create problems³⁴² are *firstly* the ISIS makes Turkish territories much more

³⁴⁰ GMF, "Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data", *The German Marshall Fund of the U.S.*, 2013, <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends-2013/>, (retrieved on January 17, 2018)

³⁴¹ German Marshall Fund, "Turkish Perceptions Survey", *The German Marshall Fund*, 2015, pp. 12-13, www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/TurkeySurvey_2015_web1.pdf, (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

³⁴² Oytun Orhan, *Op.cit.*, p.3

vulnerable for ISIS terror attacks. *Secondly*, Turkey is facing multi-dimensional security risks due to the instability and fighting for territorial integrity in the southern border.

Regarding war on terrorism (ISIS), one of the major issue was the FTF. The increasing number of European fighters in the ISIS raised security concerns of Western countries. Turkey had started the intelligence cooperation collaboration with France and to other European countries resulting in 6000 banned people from entering Turkey.³⁴³ In addition, Turkey had acted as constructive in both political and humanitarian dimensions. In aim to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters through its territory. It initiated entry bans and deported those who were detected.

Besides, since the emergence of the ISIS threat, Turkey increased also security measures along the border with Syria particularly the controlled areas by the ISIS. Several of the border crossings had been closed by Turkey for instances Karkamis and Akcale which are located in front of Cerablus and Telabyad border crossings.

The ISIS had gained strength not only due to the military skills and the weapons and firepower, but also the fertile ground resulted by repressive policies of Assad government. In the struggle against the ISIS, there are economic, social and political dimensions. Besides, by using social media effectively and making effective propagandas, the ISIS succeeded to pull a lot of new foreign members to the join the organization. The ISIS has fought not only with local actors in Syria but also carried out suicide attacks in many different countries and contributed shifting on the policies of regional and global powers toward Syria.

In regard to fighting against the ISIS, the former U.S. President Barack Obama preserved the country's strategy that has four elements namely airstrikes, supporting the forces fighting against the ISIS on the ground, intelligence cooperation and humanitarian assistance. However, the importance strategy is incorporating all groups into political processes in Syria. Since without that, the ISIS or similar organizations will continue to gain breeding ground in the medium and long term.

As of 2014, a coalition led by the U.S. has been created and begun to carry out air strikes fight against the ISIS. The coalition had fought against the ISIS in Syria, by carrying out air strikes and organizing some opposition groups.³⁴⁴ Officially, starting on August 8, 2014 led by America carrying out air strikes particularly in the northern Syria. In

³⁴³Oytun Orhan, *Op.cit.*, p.8

³⁴⁴ Ersin Aksoy, "Dais ve Suriye Ic Savasinda Dais'in Rolu", *International Journal of Political Studies*, Vol.2, No.2, 2016, p. 36

collaboration with the local groups, the coalition forces deployed airstrikes in Kobani and Tel Abyad. In the development of war on terrorism on the ISIS, it lost some of controlled areas including Palmyra due to the the collaboration of Russia's airstrikes and Assad regime power. Finally, the control shifted under the Assad regime. On the June 2016, the SDF and other opposition groups gave supports continued to the coalition force's airstrikes led by America in Manbij. Other local forces (Islamist groups) also strived to fight against the ISIS involving Ahrar Sam, Islamic Front, Syria Front, Jabhat Al-Nusra. In the name of Fatih Force, those Islamist groups fighting against the ISIS outside of coalition force's strategy due to the different ideology. Less power of the FSA and the different ideology with Islamist groups made America to decide and seek another strategic partner or capable ally to fight the ISIS. Hence, America incorporated with the PYD-a PKK branch in Syria.³⁴⁵

3.4.2 Turkey's Struggle against the PYD-YPG

During author is writing these dissertation, Syria crisis has come into seven years. For seven years, the political and military map have been altered dramatically in the northern Syria particularly along of border areas with Turkey. As written in the report of the International Crisis Group on May 2017³⁴⁶ the most dynamic local actor is the PYD and the YPG which has the political affiliates of the Iraq-based PKK in Turkey and take control major portions of the Syria-Turkey border while have declared a federal region and created local rule. The YPG has continued to subordinate its Syria project to fight against Turkey and prioritise more Kurdish self-rule in Syria.

In July 2012, after the Assad regime security force's withdrawal unilaterally from Kurdish areas especially in the boreder areas, these condition allowed YPG fighters to take over positions and border lines. While since mid-2015, after a Turkey-PKK ceasefire broke down, Ankara has struggle to fight against the YPG-PYD. By rapprochement with Moscow enabled Turkish troops to enter Syria in August 2016 employing Operation "Euphrates Shield". Fighting beside Syrian oppositions, the aim was to defeat ISIS and to halt the YPG's expansion west of the Euphrates. Then, in February 2017, this operation succeeded leaving the YPG dependent on Assad regime for movement among majority-Kurdish districts.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp: 37-38

³⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, "The PKK's Fateful Choice in Northern Syria", *Middle East Report*, No.176, May 4th, 2017, p. 23

After struggle for eliminating the ISIS was almost finished, Turkey government continues to struggle for another terror groups namely the PYD-YPG that carry out security threat to Turkey especially in border lines with Syria. Following the Firat Kalkani military operation that succeed to establish and maintain stability and wealth by developing the local order (Turkish public and civil organizations serving education, healthy, administration service, civil settlement, and sosyal services as the basic needs), another operation has been continued in order to expand the establishment of secure/ peaceful areas in the PYD-YPG controlled border areas including in Munbij.

In August 2017, Turkey deploys an Euphrates Shield Operation aimed at eliminating and reducing the possibility of any terror attacks in domestic and external threats targeting to Turkey. This operation completes in Al-Bab with first aim to clean the shared border areas with Syria controlled by the ISIS. The second aim targets to counter the external threats of the PYD-YPG which has controlled the areas in the northern Syria. After employing the military operation to Al-Bab, next aim was Afrin that is eventually stopped due to the increasingly power of the PYD-YPG supported by America. However, the operation that deployed in fighting against the PYD-YPG continues to Munbij. In aims to prevent shifting power to Assad regime in the northern Syria, disagreement to the way of Russia and Turkey in maintaining the border areas, and the issue of Kurdish, America decided to backing the PYD-YPG.³⁴⁷

The U.S.-backed military support has triggered the PYD-YPG to seize its controlled-areas. After capturing the control of Manbij and stepping up to western Euphrates, the YPG-SDF has strived to move towards the western and northern Syria. The YPG-SDF's capture of Afrin, later seizing control to al-Bab city have created the potential risk to security and stability along Turkish-Syrian borders. In term of providing territorial integrity and uniting the cantons in northern Syria. The negative effect posed by the frequently terrorist attacks by the PKK and ISIS, had led Turkey to take a military measure through launching of the Euphrates Shield Operation in August 2016. Turkish official defines this operation as "Turkish right of self-defense codified under United Nations Charter Article 51. The operation's objectives are to eliminate terrorist organizations, contribute to the increase of border security and at the same time prioritize and support Syria's territorial integrity."

³⁴⁷ Oytun Orhan, "Turkiyenin YPG ile Mucadelede Secenekleri", *Ortadogu Analiz*, Vol. 9, No. 80, May-June 2017, pp. 48-49

This operation is the Joint Special Forces consisting of TAF's air and land forces, MIT's special military forces and units, supported Turkish-backed oppositional groups. The first stage of operation to undermine the ISIS and SDF-YPG from Jarablus along the Sancir river. It is continued to eliminate ISIS from the border line between Azez and Jarablus, eventually moved towards al-Bab and Manbij. The significance of this operations also to prevent the unity of the PYD-YPG cantons that has potential threat to create terrorist attacks in Turkey, as well as producing the security instability in the Syria-Turkey border particularly from the PYD-YPG controlled areas.

3.5 DOMESTIC FACTORS IN INDONESIA

3.5.1 A Commitment to Non-Alignment Principle of Independent Foreign Policy

After the second world war, many international problem were prominent, mainly the birth of the West bloc led by the United States and the East led by Soviet Union that triggered the Cold War. Besides, many countries were still occupied by colonial nations. When the first NAM took place, the world was divided into two blocs namely the eastern and western blocs. The AAC and NAM is a chain of struggle to build an equal, secured, and peaceful world of the new civilization. Both of them advocate the new world order that is free from all forms of colonialism. Finally, the AAC and NAM results preserve a strong influence and inspiration to countries from Asia and Africa to promote the ideology interests and the practical importance of these countries.

The AAC of 1955 held in Bandung, Republic of Indonesia was a historical landmark which helped set the path to the establishment of the NAM. In other words, the NAM was originated from the spirit of the AAC. The NAM offered a new direction or color which was different, not black or white or East or West. It enhances every country must have the courage to determine their own fate and future.³⁴⁸

The conceptualization of *neutrality*, *neutralism*, and *nonalignment*, are often perceived as a common in all situations. In one hand, they reflect the same type of foreign policy orientation. In this context, they will not commit their military capabilities or diplomatic supports to another states' purposes. The main concept of nonalignment as a

³⁴⁸ The Archived of the Asian-African Conference and Non-Aligned Movement as UNESCO Memory of the World. A collaboration project amongst National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, The Centre for Documentation and Scientific Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian National Commission for UNESCO, Indonesian National Committee for Memory of the World, and UNESCO.

foreign policy strategy of state is a commitment not to engage into a military capabilities of other's purposes. However, in one point, due to several situations around the circumstances, a state adopts a nonaligned policy. This point becomes a distinct point of neutrality, neutralism and nonalignment.³⁴⁹

Meanwhile, neutrality defines a *legal status* of a state within an armed conflict. In this context, a nonbelligerent has certain rights and obligations not shift to be a belligerent during the conflict under the international law of neutrality. For example, under a neutrality situation, a state which own a neutrality, it may not permit other belligerent state to use its territory as a military base during the military operation of the conflict. Whereas, in contrast, a neutralism obligates a state becomes a belligerent. However, during peace, it also must not engage into military alliances with other states. A state is often neutralized when the great powers commit to guarantee its nonaligned status through a multilateral agreement. In addition, under neutralization agreement, the state must commit not to allow foreign troops on its territory or not to compromise its position by engaging into a military treaty or providing military supports to other states on its lands. Instead, the guaranteeing powers must not violate the national territorial integrity or the neutral state's rights in all situations (during the conflict and peace).³⁵⁰

According to Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Non-Aligned Movement defines “a foreign policy orientation that has been widely adopted within the current international system by states of the Third World; ... seeks to avoid blocs, coalitions and alliances; ... a rejection of the system of competitive groupings established around the Cold War confrontation zones in the post-1945 system...”³⁵¹

The NAM was born inspired of the “Spirit of Bandung”, the result of the AAC of 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia appears as the contribution of several pull factors involving the extremely situation of the Cold War created the great powers, the sense of traumatic that is experienced from colonialism and imperialism, and a common sense as the colonized nations among conference participants.³⁵² In the era of President Soekarno, the Asia-Africa Conference results five peaceful coexistence principles that so called

³⁴⁹ K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Third edition*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1977, pp.112-113.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.113.

³⁵¹ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and Institutions*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1992, pp. 224-225

³⁵² Roeslan Abdulgani, “Sekitar Konferensi Asia-Afrika dan Maknanya Bagi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia”, *Analisa*, No.4, April 1985, pp. 311-328.

“Spirit of Bandung” namely as the first mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, secondly non-aggression, thirdly non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, fourthly equality and mutual benefits, and fifthly peaceful coexistence.³⁵³ The conference that was initiated and led by Indonesia (President Soekarno, as the main actor of Indonesian foreign policy) altogether with India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Burma effectively presents 30 the newest independence countries and enhances Indonesia’s prestige among those countries in particular.

In the aftermath of the AAC I, President Soekarno reveals to held such second conference. Yet, eventually he was agree to joined with the idea of President Tito (Yugoslavia) to held a conference which is not only involved Asia Africa countries. This movement’s conference also is similar to the principle of Bandung meeting and in accordance with 1945 constitution mandate. So, Indonesia (President Soekarno) works with India (Prime Minister Nehru), Egypt (President Nasser), President Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah) and Yugoslavia (President Tito) as sponsor countries for the first High Level NAM Conference held in Kairo, Egypt on 5-12 June 1961. Since the first conference, today these movement officially includes 120 member countries, predominantly in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Meanwhile, the conflict between the West and East blocs rapidly escalated in the end of 1950s. The conflicting parties namely the East bloc-led by the Soviet Union and the West bloc-led by the U.S. insisted each other. In response to the escalated conflict, five leaders of non-aligned countries namely President Tito, Nehru, Nasser, Soekarno, Nkrumah was agree to call for a meeting in the United Nations forum aimed at halting the escalated conflict. President Soekarno delivered a speech in the United Nations forum titled “To build the world a new” on September 30, 1960. However the conflicting major powers ignored these peaceful initiative calling. Hence, upon initiative of President Tito and other four countries, thanks to the Spirit of Bandung (resulted in the AAC), held and sponsored the first the NAM conference in Beograd on September 1-6, 1961.

The NAM holds meeting every four years. Since it is not an organization, only a movement, so it has very little structure with no formal contitution or permanent secretariat. The host of the NAM Summit’s leader is appointed as Chair during the conference, and the country’s foreign missions effectively play role as the voice of the

³⁵³ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, *Op.cit.*, p.28

NAM at the UN and other IGOs. The resolutions passed by the NAM are non-binding to the member countries.

Riza Sihbudi criticises the movement that since the beginning, not to be ignored the involvement of Middle East countries in the agenda of conference seem likely prominent. He argues that several of those countries “utilise” these movement with aimed at not only to collect supports in confrontation against Israel-West ally majorly USA, but also to mutual confrontation among conflicting-member countries. So, he concludes that the NAM has still not been capable to represent its existence as a countable “pressure group” within global political constellation.³⁵⁴ As M.S. Rajan articulates “non-aligned states are both military weak and accutely divided in their attitude to the conflicts involving non-aligned states.”³⁵⁵

Yet, in the implementation of foreign policy, the biased to the one side had ever been shown by President Soekarno. In the end of 1965, Indonesia and China was strongly rapproached. The foreign policy of Soekarno looking at the left makes the jealousy of the Western countries. Yet, Soekarno approaches the communist block as an attempt to equalize the military power in the Indonesian politic. In contrast, President Soeharto expresses “As the peaceful world threatened, independence of developed countries as well, people aspirations not met, economic injustice are still continued, by times the NAM should prevails as the frontier fighting for those.”

The NAM has ideal political principles namely non-aligned in the context of west-east confrontation, aligned in fighting against colonialism, non-engaged into the multilateral military pact, non-engaged into the bilateral military pact with a major power, and no-space for the military base of a major power in the sovereign territories. The basic background Indonesian engagement into the NAM is the principle of Indonesia Active and Independent Foreign Policy. The ideas of active and independent including anti-colonialism, independence, peaceful, non-aligned with any military bloc, cooperation based on peaceful coexistence. Moreover, Indonesia has a critical and substantial role in the AAC that is significant to the origin of the NAM as a third bloc in the world order separated and dominated by the West and East blocs. Furthermore, the basic principles and

³⁵⁴ Riza Sihbudi, “Timur Tengah dan Gerakan Non-Blok” in “Timur Tengah Mencari Orientasi?”, *Analisis CSIS*, XXIV year, No.3, (May-June 1995), pp. 193-199.

³⁵⁵ M.S. Rajan, “The Conflict in the Gulf and the Non-Aligned Movement”, *Review of International Affairs*, September 5, 1990

critical values of the NAM are similar and accordance with the mandate of 1945 Constitution and Pancasila as the national ideology.

Indonesia consistently strives to manage the humanitarian principle based on social justice in mutual relations with others. Non-interference principle as the right of each nations and people, and the principle of peaceful coexistence that actively contributed to established the peace world based on independent, peaceful, and social justice. The principle of humanity of Indonesian contained at Pancasila as a synthetic of Declaration of American Independence and Communism Manifesto. One of the characteristic of active and independent politic is non-aligned politic. In this sense, Indonesia freely to determine the own way in the world politic without internal and external pressures. Indonesia stands with neither the West bloc nor the East bloc. Indonesia strives to stand in the middle and neither both sides. Since standing with one side will eliminate the spirit and definition of “independent”.

In a speech delivered in the United Nations titled “To build the world a new”, President Soekarno expresses that ... “more than thousand million people predominantly in Asia and Africa, and might be in Latin America not to believe neither the Communism Manifesto nor the Decralation of American Independence...”³⁵⁶ While he adds that Indonesia is not lead by those ideology, not following liberal and communism ideas by expressing “ ... From our historical experiences growing a much more suitable idea that we call as Pancasila. It includes the national ideas and goals. It has been appeared within our lives and culture for two thousand years before imperialism comes. ...”³⁵⁷

In the political situation of Cold war and fighting for peaceful co-existence, Mohammad Hatta constructs the way of Indonesian foreign policy of Active and Independent, that is written at his book entitled “Mendayung Diantara Dua Karang”. The interpretation of that principle as delivered by Hatta in his first speech as a Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia on September 2, 1948 as follows:

“Independent defines freely to determine its own way, not influenced or intervened by any part. While Active means toward peaceful world and have relations with any nations ...”³⁵⁸ The government argues that the position must be taken is not to be an object

³⁵⁶ Soekarno, **Pancasila dan Perdamaian Dunia**, CV Haji Masagung, Jakarta, 1989, pp.63-64.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ Mohammad Hatta, **Mendajung Dua Karang: Keterangan Pemerintah Diutjapkan oleh Drs. Mohammad Hatta Dimuka Sidang BPKNIP**, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Yogyakarta, 1948, p. 29.

in the international political constellation, nevertheless Indonesia must be a subject that has right to self-determination, right to struggle the national interest namely the freedom of Indonesia at all aspects.³⁵⁹ Before Hatta, Sjahrir delivers his speech in front of Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi on October 25, 1947 as follows: “the world seems likely force us to decide a choice between Anglo-Saxon and Soviet Rusia blocks. Indeed, our refusal stand to be forced. We seek to find the international reflection that is suitable to our domestice live ...”³⁶⁰

Since the beginning of independence of the Republic of Indonesia, it stands with the spirit of non-aligned politic, even initially the establishment of the NAM in international political arena. Eventhough, in that time the non-aligned discourse has not been defined. Throughout the NAM meetings, Indonesia has been consistently and commitment to manage the basic principles and the aims of these movement in foreign policy decision and implementation (action).

Indonesia host and pointed to be chief of the NAM X on September 1-6, 1992. The NAM that was under leadership of Indonesia in the era of President Soeharto strived to show the real achievements through strengthening the South-South cooperation and reviving the North-South dialogue that tend to preferable partnership approach than confrontative-traditional approach. It should be definitely known that the NAM is not a position to create an official position as an organization. The most significant of the conflict that must be addressed by the international community is the issue of refugee crisis. In fact a comprehensive strategy to respond the refugee crisis has not been formed by developing countries. In this sense, the NAM has an opportunity to play the role for the developing countries in this international crisis.

Indonesia as a pioneer to held of the AAC that put basic principle of the world peace and inspires the establishment of the NAM. The idea of NAM “dicetuskan” in 1954, Colombo. It was fostered of the AAC of 1955 in Bandung. And it is officially get momentum in 1961, Beograd. In fact, the AAC effectively spills over the seed of non-aligned as a firm of developing countries’ sovereignty in the international relations.

In his speech at the first conference of the NAM in Beograd, President Soekarno clearly draws the definition of non-aligned politic as follows:

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ Tim Balai Pustaka, **Kumpulan Pidato Presiden Soekarno, Wakil Presiden Drs. Moh. Hatta, Perdana Menteri Sutan Sjahrir**, Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1946.

“Do not misinterpret. Non-aligned is not neutrality... Non-aligned politic does not seek the neutral position if the war prevails, non-aligned politic is not a neutral politic as well without itself colour. To be non-aligned does not mean that to sustain the two major blocks. Non-aligned is an active loyalty to the idea of independence that is consistent to peace, social justice, and freedom of independent.”³⁶¹

Similar to Soekarno, Nehru and Tito firmly argue that non-aligned is not a neutral politic, neutrality or passive politic. In contrast, it is an active politic, positive and constructive that attempts to establish a common peace as the only one basic of common security.³⁶² Furthermore, Nehru adds in his speech in the first conference of the NAM in Beograd as follows: “ ... non-aligned also defines the countries that resist the bloc grouping aimed at the war, military alliance, etc. Because of that, we go far not to meet our international responsibility to build peace. In fact, if the crisis might fall into war, as the non-aligned countries should encourage to prevent the war comes.”³⁶³

The NAM has essentially not economic and military powers. It is basically a moral force power, but its movement involving global issues. For instances, it strongly advocates the apartheid politic as an aspiration of Africans, anti-Zionism as an spirit of Arabians, anti-colonialism and imperialism regarding the issue of “2/3” world people.³⁶⁴ In case of Syrian crisis, the presence of the UNSC basically has been disfunction. In this context, it can not run the role of peace creation or humanitarian mission. In fact, the major powers who hold the veto right have been engaged into the conflict and prefer to neglect the peace efforts. This situation that creating a global governance vacuum should warn Indonesia. President Jokowi as an influential Muslim figure of the world should strengthen the movement starting to voice the peace settlement in Syria through the NAM in particular, while consistently favoring Palestine in the international forums. Indonesia must build a global awareness o rejection on fighting for influence through creating political chaos and social instability in other states.

According to Retno Marsudi in her speech of the NAM Conference XVII on September 17-18, 2016 in Venezuela in response to the challenge of the NAM’s existence, she stresses “the world today need a NAM XXI century, which is broadminded, pragmatist, innovative, and efficient.” A challenge should be resolved by the NAM is

³⁶¹ Muhammad Sabir, *Quo Vadis Nonblok*, CV Haji Masagung, Jakarta, 1990, p.21.

³⁶² *Ibid*, pp: 20-21.

³⁶³ *Ibid*, pp: 22-23.

³⁶⁴ Arifin Suryo Nugroho, “Soekarno dan Diplomasi Indonesia”, *Sejarah dan Budaya*, Tahun X, No.2, December 2016, p. 130.

reorganizing and fixing the internal concerns related to methods of work of the NAM in order not to get stuck into a talk shop organization.

In May 2012, the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Egypt and adopted the “Final Document”. This document addressed four major crucial issues becoming a source of conflict between the NAM states and Western countries. The crucial one is the urgent need to replace the unipolar management of international politics with collective management. As the realisation form, the NAM states have repeatedly called for multilateralism and the reform of the UN system. They reject the fact that the Security Council has more power than the General Assembly and criticize the veto rights of its permanent members. In this regards, the internal conflict and the lack of the same view among the UNSC members also contributed to worse the Syrian crisis. Due to the usage of the veto rights to fail the conflict resolution. This meeting also proposed solutions for the Syrian crisis with the cooperation of the UN.

In case of Syria, Indonesia conducting the foreign policy line with the commitment of the NAM members. In this regard, all measure has been taken by Indonesia government in order to realize the three pillars of the UN consisting of peace and security, development and human rights. It also reaffirms the commitment of the NAM that the respect of the Syrian sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, the sovereign equality of Indonesia and Syria, the non-intervention in the internal affairs of Syria, the peaceful settlement of Syria conflict, and the abstention from the threat or use of force including the conflict resolution on the use of military intervention into Syrian territory.

The 17th summit of the NAM in Venezuela also addressed the case of Syrian civil war. In dealing with the situation in Syria the NAM lines with the peaceful settlement that proposed by the UN. In this regards, as written of the 17th Summit of the NAM’s results so called “Final Document”, at the point of 454 that related the Syrian crisis underlines that the NAM invites all parties to engage in the process to find a peaceful political solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on Geneva *Communique* of 30 June 2012. The NAM members also called upon all parties to allow the safe provision of humanitarian assistance to all those in need in accordance with relevant UN resolutions.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁵ “Final Document”. 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement. Island of Margarita, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 17-18 September 2016, p.122.

Besides, that summit also concerned at the increasing number of refugees caused by the Syrian crisis. All member states should respond to the growing humanitarian needs including providing direct support to the host countries. In this regard, it called for fulfilling the commitment on the pledges totalling \$3.8 billion at the 3rd International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria on 31 March 2015 hosted by Kuwait.³⁶⁶

3.5.2 Leader Perception Factor

From historical dimension, Syria is first Arab countries that recognizes the independence of Indonesia and through its permanent representative in the United Nations, Syria also struggling for settling the conflict between Indonesia and Dutch on the Dutch's military aggression in Indonesia. Syria's effort aims to bring that issue becoming the discussion of the UNSC. Eventually, it is succeed through peaceful way that is negotiation won by Indonesia. Besides, Indonesia and Syria has strong relation wherein both countries are members in international forums such as the NAM, the OIC, etc.

Since the Syrian revolution started in the middle of March 2012, Indonesia attitude has been consistent over the revolution. Syria crisis must be solved only through dialogue, political process not violation or military measure to civilians. Indonesia emphasizes that an immediately need to stop violent action in Syria and encourage political process in order the Syrians' aspiration could be respected. On February 10, 2012, Minister of Foreign Policy of the RI, Hasan Wirajuda expressed Indonesian basic stance on Syria crisis in his meeting with Minister of Foreign Policy of Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu. This effort aims to raise international community's awareness and foster the unity of view and attitude of international community upon the development of Syria crisis particularly in putting the stop off violent actions including a possible hosting of international conference. As he states: "We emphasize to host an international conference discussing the development of Syrian crisis that naturally inclusive and presenting an unity of international community's view."³⁶⁷ Initially these Indonesian position has been communicated with the General Secretary of the UN in Hasan Wirajuda's visit to the secretariat office of the UN in New York on February 6, 2012.

President SBY highlights that the dispute in Syria has been increasingly alarming. Indonesia government has four recommendations related to the conflict settlement in Syria.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ Departemen Luar Negeri Indonesia, "Indonesia Desak Penghentian Kekerasan Suriah", <http://www.deplu.go.id/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=5447>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

First, a much more immediately putting the stop off on violations. As President SBY argues in the State House on July 19, 2012: “the situation in Syria could be said as a civil war”. *Second*, If a current mandate is not enough to stop off all violations, so Indonesia believes that it is time to consider the mandate adaptation based on Article 7 the UN Charter. The key change is transformation of the key mission of the UN, from managing peace to establishing peace. *Third*, President also suggests the peace attempt ultimately aimed to establish peace that currently not lived in Syria. “However, the peace effort should not used to related on the change of political power or the continuation of current government ruled in Syria.” He adds that after the peace settlement is succeeded, the political process reflecting and respecting the willing and aspiration of Syria people without any intervention could be immediately realized. *Fourth*, for sake of the successful peace mission, Indonesia urges that it is possible the creation of peacemaking force under the UN mandate by five members of the UN Security Council. He states as follow: “Building peace in an integrated way in Syria certainly should be guided by the principles implemented within the UN peace operation.”³⁶⁸

For Indonesian leaders perceiving the Syrian revolution means defining democracy. According to Marty Natalegawa, the development in the Middle East including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, all constitute that democracy deficit prevails and less development in those countries. He firms that whether like or not, they must develop institution and democracy capacity. It is importance to Syria conducting democracy inclusively. The nature of authority or dictatory genuinely against with the democracy value. Syrian revolution reflects an attempt of Syrians to demand a change towards a democracy system completely. Given, since Hafez to Basyar Al-Assad, military had significant role and played as a main actor in domestic politics.

Since the Syria revolution erupted, Indonesia determines the reason behind revolution in Syria due to democracy not to be implemented completely. Indonesia has not perceived the revolution caused by the U.S. politics, as revealed by Iran. Indonesia perceives a revolution that has been experiencing in Syria is something naturally happening in a country. However, it is unfortunately as the foreign actors involving and conflicting atmosphere in behalf of interests. President SBY explains the conflict resolution in Syria becoming a common moral responsibility. He emphasizes the

³⁶⁸ Hindra Liauw, “Empat rekomendasi SBY untuk konflik Suriah”, *Kompas*, July 19 2012, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/19/2304197/Empat.Rekomendasi.SBY.untuk.Konflik.Suriah>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

importance of the unity of the UN Security Council view in order to decide the peace resolution in Syria.

For Indonesian government, driving out Syria envoy not an effective attitude to protest over Bashar Assad regime. Indonesian government still believes that in the worst situation of a crisis, the most importance is negotiation and dialogue intensively. In various forum and meeting, Indonesia used to suggest, promote, and request to the UN Security Council immediately solving its internal debate and deciding what must be done in Syria, in the context of humanitarian dimension. While regarding the political dimension, let Syria people determine itself.

Indonesia government argues every state has right in controlling and determining the internal dynamics including the situation in Syria crisis. Marty underlines that Indonesian government recognizes state sovereignty not considering who is the figure ruled. Indonesian political stance only recognizes the state, so the change of ruling party within the state, not become a responsibility to Indonesia in term of recognition or not to any ruling party.³⁶⁹ Related to the conflict between the Assad regime and the oppositions, Indonesia builds the relations with all parties.³⁷⁰ It is line with the principle of the NAM and the Bandung Spirit of the AAC shaping Indonesian foreign policy case by case.

As explained above, it is clear that Indonesia uphold highly the principle of non-aligned to any parties. In case of Syria crisis, Indonesia has been aside neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions. Indonesia attempts not to intervene on the Syrian domestic issues. Syria has right in self-determination. For Indonesia, in Syrian case, neutral means Indonesia still fighting against any form of colonialism and violations caused by the oppositions or the regime in the name of the world peace and security.

The neutrality in the Syria crisis represents that Indonesia conducting the foreign policy in accordance with the principle of Active and Independent. Active and independent has definition of a firm in determining and conducting the foreign policy independently. In this case, active defines not aligned to any parties neither the regime nor the opposition, while active means Indonesia engages actively into international relations, and encourages the world peace's attempt to establish the world security. This policy employs to the national interest not to neutral politics that is not care to the issues. National interest here

³⁶⁹ Ardyan Mohamad, "Indonesia Tolak Akui Pemberontak Suriah", 9 April 2012, <http://www.merdeka.com/dunia/indonesia-tolak-akui-pemberontak-suriah.html>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

constitute an attempt of Indonesia to avoid the nation from any intervention form that harms sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of a state and affects the world tension.

Similar to the Marty Natalegawa, Retno Marsudi emphasizes a inclusive step is needed to solve the problems in Syria. It is including dialogue among all engaged parties, indeed, including President Syria, Bashar Al-Assad. As she stated, “We explain the target is similar, but the approach is different. We used to talk from the victim side (humanitarian dimension) ... Indonesia is consistent with soft-power approach. This will be more long-lasting rather than hard-power approach...”³⁷¹

According to Djoko Harjanto, Ambassador of Indonesia for Damascus of Syria, the causes why the conflict erupted is both domestic politic and international conspiracy factors.³⁷² He argues the political context because of the Arab Spring agenda and it does not separate from international conspiracy consisting of Israel, the U.S. and its allies. While the anti-Assad regime factor in context of domestic politics is Assad’s poltical background of Baath party. Which this party has ruled in Syria since 1970s after the coup to legitimate power of the party. It is Arab-Socialist party³⁷³, in historical record of Syria, as long as it rules, it has tended to seek support and help to Russia. Whereas, Russia has its own national interest especially economical interest. For example, its oil pipeline goes through Tartus, near Latakia with worth US\$ 20 billion. And others are both countries has long strategic friendship ties and Russia has maintained its military bases around the west regions of Syria especially bordering Medditeranian sea regions. It is significant to secure its vital strategic stance and other interests in the region.

Indonesian government official considerations to maintain to operate representative offices in Syria can be articulated as follow first Syria is the first most countries of recognizing Indonesia independence. When it united with Egypt within Republic of Arab United. Second, in case of the East Timor issue, Syria fully supported Indonesia. Syrian envoy to the UN forced forum to put agenda of the East Timor issue in order to support Indonesia. Third, both countries are Muslim and the member of the NAM countries.

³⁷¹ Fajar Nugraha, “Suriah dan Peran Indonesia dalam Atasi Konflik”, *Metrotvnews*, October 3, 2015, <http://m.metrotvnews.com/read/2015/10/03/176539>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁷² Nasih Nasrullah, “Dubes RI untuk Suriah Angkat Bicara Soal Assad dan Suriah”, *Republika*, March 21, 2016, <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/timur-tengah/16/12/17/o4cg87320-dubes-ri-untuk-suriah-angkat-bicara-soal-assad-dan-suriah-part2>, (retrieved on January 18, 2018)

³⁷³ Jason Langley, “Politics and Religion in Iraq and Syria: What is the Baath Party?”, January 16, 2013, *Center for Research on Globalization*, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-baath-party-as-the-west-doesnt-want-you-to-know-it/5319120>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

Indonesia encourages peaceful negotiations for Syrians. It has not engaged with any party. It puts importance on diplomacy, beginning with mutual trust, confidence building measures, then resolution of conflict. No preference for military measures. Political and peace solutions should be determined by Syrians, not any other countries. And Indonesia respects it.

3.5.3 A Foreign Policy Priority: The Protection of Indonesian Citizens

According to Muhammad Iqbal, General Director of Indonesian Citizens Protection and Law Council in March, 2016 that Indonesia government had returned nearly 12,217 of 12,500 citizens that were repatriated by Indonesian government in 273 times since 2011 to March 2016. Even though Indonesian government has warned to send Indonesian workers to Syria since 2011, but the number of those people in Syria did not drop to approximately 200-300 people. In fact, it was increased to nearly 1,100 Indonesian workers. This number is up-and-down due to the presence of Indonesian illegal workers sent by human trafficking networks.³⁷⁴ Besides, AM. Sidqi, Social and Culture Staff of Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Damascus explained that the reason why the Indonesian illegal workers still sent to Syria is that the Syrian government still recognizes Indonesia as a country of legal workers' sender. He states as follows: "We regularly suppose the Syrian government to release a decision to come out of Indonesia from the list of the legal workers' sender to Syria. In a similar situation, Indonesian government in Jakarta conducts the same way as well."³⁷⁵

Given the importance of the efforts in order to protect the Indonesian citizens in Syria, so the existence of Indonesian Embassy in Syria is ultimately needed. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia's spokesman, Amanta Nasir in December 2016 that Indonesia is one of the few countries that still open the embassy office in Damascus. It constitutes a real effort of Indonesia government to protect the Indonesian citizens in Syria.³⁷⁶

In February 2012, Indonesian Embassy to Syria in Damascus called for registration on an evacuation plan for all Indonesian citizens placed in Syria.³⁷⁷ To simplify the repatriation

³⁷⁴ Arungbudoyo Wikanto, "Banyak Dipulangkan Jumlah WNI di Suriah Malah Bertambah", *Okezone*, 2016, <http://news.okezone.com/read/2016/04/11/18/1360126/banyak-dipulangkan-jumlah-wni-di-suriah-malah-bertambah>, (retrieved on January 19, 2018)

³⁷⁵ Hanna Azarya Samosir, "KBRI Damaskus Repatriasi 27 WNI dari Suriah", *CNN*, 2016, <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20160915140345-106-158511/kbri-damaskus-repatriasi-27-wni-dari-suriah/>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

³⁷⁶ Sindonews, "Pemerintah Tak Tahu Pasti Jumlah WNI di Suriah", *Sindonews*, 22 December 2016, <http://video.sindonews.com/play/28996/pemerintah-tak-tahu-pasti-jumlah-wni-di-suriah>

³⁷⁷ <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/12/05/31/m4w2d3-dubes-ri-wni-di-suriah-mulai-dievakiasi>

process of citizens, Indonesian Embassy to Syria opening two consular representative offices in Aleppo and Latakia. In 2013, for instance, no less than 40.236 Indonesian nationals had received protection through repatriation to Indonesia.³⁷⁸ This effort had been focus on three related objectives: prevention, early detection and protection. As the protection effort by Indonesian Embassy to Syria in Damascus, the repatriation of Indonesian nationals from Syria to Indonesia including within that number.

In fact, Indonesia whose the only working consular general office in Aleppo. The one of most reasons is an increasing number of human trafficking victims travel to Syrian before the conflict collapsed. Djoko Harjanto, an Indonesian extraordinary envoy to the Damascus, a capital of Syria states that “the legal ones may have left, while the illegal ones keep on increasing.”³⁷⁹ By today, there are still about 2600 Indonesian citizens including illegal channel comers, many of whom work as household assistances. They are located in Hama, Damascus, Homs even in Aleppo, while most of them are still in Damascus. The situation is there has been no opportunity yet to repatriate them home due to several factors including their salaries have had not yet to be paid by employers. Besides, there are still Indonesians trapped in dangerous areas and could not be able easily to be reached. So, the official representative officers has main responsibility or task to protect and secure them by all repatriated home. However he emphasized that the presence of Indonesian envoy there does mean the alignment to the Assad regime. He claimed that Indonesia just only to take a practice move. No matter who rules, Indonesia will support as long as its strategic interests remain there.

Meanwhile, to ease the repatriation process, Indonesia is still operating an embassy in Damascus, consulate general offices in Aleppo and Latakia. The coverage of task of Indonesia consular office for Aleppo governate is extended to reach even eastern Syria including Raqqa, which has a heavy damage after became of the self-proclaimed capital of ISIS in Syria.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁹ Tempo, “Djoko Harjanto: Indonesians are Still Coming to Syria”, *Tempo*, January 3, 2017, <https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/01/03/241832222/Djoko-Harjanto-Indonesians-are-still-coming-to-Syria>, (retrieved on January 20, 2018)

3.6 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

3.6.1 ISIS and Foreign Terrorist Fighters Dimension

The ISIS is defined as a threat to Indonesia since it had experienced several attacks linked and inspired of ISIS. Therefore, Indonesia is among the countries beyond the ISIS-controlled territory that poses the threat should be taken into account by Indonesian government.

Indeed, how to understand the real threats that ISIS posed to Indonesia. Sydney Jones, a director of the IPAC in Jakarta, assumes the threats could come into Indonesia by the ISIS *first* the potential of Indonesian foreign fighters who joined with ISIS to return home, then revive the sleep cells of terrorist group whose the lack of skills and leadership. *Second*, the potential of violences emerging from who could not come in Syria, for instance, engaging into terrorist activity in Indonesia as a favour and loyalty to ISIS. *Third*, the appeal of ISIS which uses the narations against those categorised as “kafir” (non-believers,etc) could impress the fanatic or extremist groups even student groups in particular.

As mentioned above, the phenomenon of foreign fighters originated of Indonesia also appeared as the indirect implication of the conflict in Syria. In comparison of the origin of foreign fighters, based on data of the MFA, Republic of Turkey that presented in *the State of Affairs in Foreign Terrorist Fighters Research Workshop* on January 23rd, 2015 in Ankara, during 2011-2015 Asia-Pacific region was only 2%, while the most ones were North Africa of 28%, the European Union of 22%, Ex-the Soviet Union of 21%, and Gulf and the Middle East of 18%. In particular, discussing about the foreign factor, Indonesia might less to worry compared to other countries beyond Asia Pacific region due to few reasons. *First*, the number of Indonesian foreign fighters were lower. The most reliable figure took from Detachment 88, a counterterrorism unit of Indonesian national police, noted 202 fighters in Syria in early June 2015. Whereas the BNPT documented the more higher figure was 500 fighters. Sydney Jones explains the figure of 500 and more tend to count individuals who has returned home and came to Syria aimed at humanitarian mission of Islamist organizations. Indeed, it was not accurate to the figure of fighters. She adds the low figure of 202 fighters from national police due to it only includes people had been

identified by name not count who had gone. Furthermore, the accuracy of police data favoured by new arrests' information.³⁸⁰

Second, Indonesian foreign fighters leaved for Syria, mostly fighting for the ISIS and dying at the battlefield. They attracted to join and support the ISIS caused by various pull factors including ideological factor. This situation is different compared to the goal of estimated 300 Indonesians went to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the late 1980s and early 1990s that attracted due to main push factor namely political repression of Suharto towards Muslim. So, returned home fighters later engaged into the violent acts even terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

The potential of real threats of the presence of ISIS supporters and recruits in Indonesia consisting of the division of Indonesian extremist groups. The division appeared mainly between pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS, its splits as well. The pro-ISIS faction in Indonesia appeared of the ISIS teachings introduced by Aman Abdurrahman, an ISIS ideolog of Indonesia. The most of extremist groups whose the activities committed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia supporting and pledging alligence to ISIS. For instances JAT and its affiiated small group, MIT, MIT, etc. Aman as ISIS' ideologue succeeded to attract an ex-main leader of the JI (an Al-Qaeda-linked group operating in Southeast Asia including in Indonesia aimed at to build Islamic state), Abubakar Ba'asyir. His implication was importance to the spread of ISIS teaching to followers and gaining the increasingly support among his followers through the instruction. While the contra-ISIS groups such as the JI, the MMI and the JAS. Furthermore, the ideas of ISIS teaching influences the dynamic of the extremist groups such as, *first* local extremist group re-emerged and managed the violence acts even the prior localized terror acts. In this case, the phenomenon of ISIS caused the sleep cell of the extremist group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia was revived and re-managed its cadres and strategy³⁸¹. Indonesia suffered the ISIS's inspired terror attacks during 2016-2017 for seven times. One was the Thamrin bom attack in January 14, 2016 that the first ISIS' terror attack was experienced in Southeast Asia. The main actor behind the bomb attack was Bahrum Naim, Syria-based an Indonesian foreign fighter. *Second*, the different views among the extremist groups resulted in the emergence

³⁸⁰ Sidney Jones, "ISIS in Indonesia: Understanding the real threat", *Strategic Review*, July-September 2015, <http://www.sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/isis-in-indonesia-understanding-the-real-threat>, (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

³⁸¹ The Straits Times, "Jemaah Islamiyah Active Again in Indonesia, Recruiting and Collecting Funds," *The Straits Times*, February 15 2016, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jemaah-islamiyah-active-again-recruiting-and-collecting-funds>, (retrieved on January 21, 2018)

of the splinter group. For instance, the JAS is a splinter group of the JAT (an extremist group founded by Abubakar Ba'asyir). The JAS splintered off from the JAT due to a disagreement to the strategy and method adopted by the ISIS aimed at establishing an Islamic state. *Third*, the rivalry dynamics among the extremist group. The rivalry tends to aimed at gaining recruits and influential power within the small extremist group faction. This situation may lead to an increase the risk of violence acts against the government in particular.

The understanding of the ISIS' prevail in Indonesia is by the presence of the extremist groups pledge allegiance or support to the ISIS and radicalised-individuals. Another the potential threat of the ISIS is the return of the FTF (especially the real risk of Marawi FTF). ISIS officially declared its presence in Southeast Asia particularly by establishment of ISIS province in Marawi, South Philipines. The potential risk could emerge by the returned home FTF that further conducting various local acts. *First*, it might lead to establish a greater cooperation with Southeast Asia extremist groups and create a new leadership of the pro-ISIS cells. *Second*, it could promote inter and intra-religious conflict. *Third*, planning and execuing domestic terrorist attacks considering the skills and field experiences. *Fourth*, the fulfillment of the lack of capacity and capability of local militant group. *Fifth*, the recruitment of the new generation of the militant group's cadres especially targeting youth cadres. *Sixth*, not only group that insipired, but individual also radicalised to be the militant in fact.

Eventhough the potential threats of the ISIS prevails, the fact of returnees also is interesting to be explained. Most of the FTF are not returning yet to home countries, including Indonesian FTFs. Indonesia returnees are essentially deportees whom are not able to enter to Syria. Since the defeat of the ISIS in the levants, the remaining fighters had called for a new front to be established in other Levant for instance in Libya. Indeed, they would have to strength the power of the ISIS force. Thus, the FTF remains in the battlefield. They might prefer to fight and die as the martyr in the battlefield.

The appeal of Indonesian recruits to join the ISIS is various and more complex compared to other recruits of Southeast Asia³⁸². *First*, ideological factor had led to attract and radicalize individual and group. The ISIS' claim as a *Daulah Islamiyah* implementing Islamic Law, a believe that "Syria war is a great battlefield for all Muslims at the end of

³⁸² Joseph Chinyong Liow, "ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism in Southeast Asia and The Threat To The Homeland", *Brookings*, April 27 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/isis-in-the-pacific-assessing-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland/>, (retrieved on October 30, 2017)

time”, the notion of a “Just War”, the ISIS success and legitimacy had encouraged the recruits to fight for ISIS in the levant. *Second*, the characteristic of the extremist groups’ cadres in Indonesia also contributed as the attracted factor to the ISIS’ recruits in term of informal network involving the personal contact of the member with the leader of an extremist group or in situation of a family group recruiting each other within the family. Another form is the kinship network and loyalty to the local extremist group. In order to express the loyalty of the follower of ISIS-supported or affiliated group to the group particularly to the leader, they follow the instruction and the rule within the group. In the framework of international rivalry of the Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and the ISIS-linked group affecting the competition of follower’s recruitment. In this case, thank to the consolidation power of ISIS in short time more attracts the recruits to join the ISIS. The last is personal and pragmatic factors especially economic interest. The mature of ISIS’ financial ultimately pulls the recruits.

The main significance of the ISIS phenomenon is the existence of *Katibah Nusantara (Majmu’ah Persiapan al-Arkhabily)*. It is basically a Malay Archipelago Unit for the ISIS. It is officially launched on September 26, 2014 based in al-Shadadi, al-Hasakah Province of Northeast Syria. Initially, this unit was founded due to the presence of Malay-spoken including Indonesian fighters within foreign ISIS fighters. Further, following the global ambition of ISIS and planning for Southeast Asia in particular, it intended to prepare the Southeast Asian militants if one day returns to the home-countries and contribute to the creation of a linked-wilayat or ISIS province in the region. Besides, it provided a social network to manage Southeast Asia recruits of settle in, training, and communications with the network of pro-ISIS groups operated in Syria. An Indonesia Foreign Fighter, Bahrum Naim had self-proclaimed as a head of Katibah Nusantara. He had the crucial role to link the ISIS, elite group, frontfighter and cells in Indonesia. An Indonesian known-militant, Santoso, was a first prominent Indonesian who declared loyalty to al-Baghdadi in 2013. He led East Mujahedeen Indonesia, a pro-ISIS group placed in Poso, Central Sulawesi that utilised as a transit of fighter. It had role to provide the military training to fighters before leaving for Syria. IPAC notes around 60 Indonesian and Malaysian fighters of Katibah Nusantara died and was probably 20 percent killed of suicide bombers. It should be known, the fighters within Katibah Nusantara were not all originated Southeast Asia region, though it was formed to preparation of ISIS’ Southeast Asia province.

In international context, the increasingly potential threat of the ISIS global influence has made a concern to Indonesia as the largest Muslim-majority country in the world. In this context, Indonesia interest is to halt a broader spreading of ISIS' extreme ideology and secure the Indonesia youths to touch and join these such kind of radical groups as ISIS. This global phenomena and negative effect of the ISIS may be argued as a motive behind the interest of Indonesian government to envision a role in the Syrian conflict, which is the ground battle of the ISIS. It may led Indonesia to keep its official representative such as embassy and consulate general aimed at encouraging cooperation and coordination with regional countries including Syrian regime. In order to anticipate and ease the repatriation process of Indonesian citizens in the conflict areas when there is still diplomatic ties.

3.6.2 Indonesia's Role in the Framework of the OIC

In term of the OIC, Indonesia could play more significant role in the OIC. Indonesia has opportunity to play a bigger role in the OIC from participant to key actor. Several reasons could be considered to realize that opportunity in case of Syria crisis as follow.

Firstly, Assad government acknowledge and respect to Indonesia. *Second*, Indonesia has good bilateral relations with almost all OIC members. Almost all aspects consisting religious, political, historical, social and economic bonds between Indonesia and the OIC particularly among Middle East countries. Several of the countries were inspired by Indonesia's independence in 1945 and initiatives to build organizations of developing countries. In historical context, interaction between Indonesia and Middle East countries has occurred since the early development of Islam in the archipelago as early as the ninth century. *Third*, Indonesia is the largest democratic Muslim-dominated country in the world. Indonesia has considerable religious freedoms and notable achievement in human rights, women's empowerment, freedom of the press and religious harmony. In addition, supported with relative political and economic stability, Indonesia might capitalize on these potentials to heighten its contribution to the OIC. *Fourth*, Indonesia is home to religions of the world. Although Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, it is not an Islamic state. Under the Pancasila state ideology, people of different faiths experience religious plurality within a largely open environment. This religious factor is one of the key aspects making Indonesia acceptable to other Muslim countries. It could increase the bargaining position of Indonesia to take a certain leadership at the OIC. *Fifth*, Indonesia has adequate worldly human resources and organizations. Indonesian prominent figures

have international reputations. Indonesia also has solid Islamic civil society organizations like Muhammadiyah and the NU, the country's largest Islamic organizations, which would strengthen Indonesia's leverage at the OIC.

One of the challenge of the OIC is the internal weakness of the OIC which did not have strong internal cohesion among its members. According to Saad S. Khan³⁸³, other challenges of the OIC are consisting the increasingly number of the OIC members up to 57 countries that would met forcely to determine a consensus, the different interests between the developing countries and less developing countries, the OIC charter that perceived could not enough present clearly the organizational structure and the pattern of organizational relations and less financial power of the OIC.

Necessary measures must be taken by the OIC to end the Syrian conflict. Since the OIC is the biggest institution after the UN. The presence of the OIC has to important symbol and could be mobilize to carry out the significant contribution to the end of Syrian conflict. *First*, with 57 member states, the OIC has large opportunity to draw support from, gathering and declaring a significant intention to the end of the conflict. *Second*, it has potential to provide the humanitarian aids for Syrian refugees and host countries because it has financial aid packages.

The extreordinary summit of the OIC held in Saudi Arabia on 2012 addressed the situation in Syria. This summit affirms the full support for the Arab initiative aimed at ending the violence in Syria and seeking for a peaceful solution. It emphasizes the principal responsibility of the Syrian government for the continued bloodshed. It welcomes the UN General Assembly resolution of 3 August 2013. It also suspends Syria's membership in the OIC and all its organs.³⁸⁴

Eventhough, Indonesia had aspiration to play an active role to solve the Syrian crisis in the beginning of the conflict, but Indonesia recognised that it only played a very limited role. In fact, there was a gap between expectation and reality. Although, it is a majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, it does not make Indonesia has more leverage in negotiation context, a minor actor in term of geopolitical dynamic in the region and a lack of experience within the complicated politics of the Middle East. In other

³⁸³ Saad S. Khan, **Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions**, Oxford University Press, December 20 2001, p. 177

³⁸⁴ OIC/EX-SUM-4/2012/RES/FINAL. Resolutions Adopted by The Fourth Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 14-15 August 2012, pp.7-8

words, Indonesia has no significant role in contributing to the regional politics of the Middle East.



CONCLUSION

This thesis reviews Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Middle East in general. To ease the explanation of two countries' policies, it takes two case studies while comparing Indonesia and Turkey's foreign policy in those cases. This thesis also wants to see how the policy of Turkish and Indonesian governments take part in those case studies during 2004-2016 period in detail. Besides, it is aimed at analysing the factors that shape two countries in conducting their foreign policy in cases of Israel-Palestine issue and Syria crisis. For analysing, this thesis applies a neoclassical realism theory in which this theory underlines the prominent role of domestic and international and/ regional factors in shaping the state's foreign policy.

During 2004-2016, Indonesia has undergone transition era to civil democracy era. It was marked by the first general election of Indonesia in 2004 and resulted a win of SBY figure to be the first democratic elected President of Indonesia. This gives an explanation that Indonesia has turn into democracy process and reach democratic stability in post-transition. In this democratic era, there an increasingly number of Islamist parties, an increase role of Muslim groups compared to the prior SBY government, and the role of non state-actors such as various civil society. When SBY ruled Indonesia (2004-2014), Indonesia foreign policy objective and orientation was objected to build an image of pro-Islam. The international sphere was still built and influenced by the terrorism issue of the 9/11 incident. In this situation, Indonesia intended to built an image as a moderate state stance that aimed to bridge the West and the Muslim world. Thus, it motivated Indonesia to wider the scope of its foreign policy broadly to the Middle east region. Thanks to the all direction diplomacy, it paved way an collaboration of government-civil society to contribute in achieving an effective policy that also accomodate the aspiration of Indonesian Muslim society as long as in the line with the Pancasila, 1945 constitution as well as active and independent foreign policy.

During the SBY government, Indonesia sets the aspiration of an active engagement policy in the Middle East. It could be seen such as a presence of special of the Middle East diplomatic mission, Indonesia government recognition and support to Hamas after won the parliament election for Gaza strip, and an effort to be honest broaker in Palestine-Israel conflict. Indonesia also is officially consistent to adopt a non-recognition

policy of the state of Israel. Indonesia has undergone several diplomatic efforts in regional and international level to support the recognition of the state of Palestine and proposed on humanitarian approach by providing a continuation of humanitarian aids for Palestinians. This policy then to be continued to the era of President Jokowi till 2016. In order to demonstrate his campaign commitment to his Muslim constituents in Indonesia, his government met his Presidential campaign of opening an official representation in Ramallah.

In case of Palestine issue, Indonesian government accomodates Muslim aspiration as the presence of Islamist consideration into the state's foreign policy. *First*, in this regard, the high level of sensitivity upon this issue for Muslim groups and the government (the Jerusalem issue that Al-Aqsa mosque placed on is a prominent issue for Muslim world, beyond Palestinian refugee issue and Israel occupation on Palestinian lands). *Second*, the Palestine issue also is line with the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution which mention the independece is the right for all nations, therefore it must be abolished from the face of the world, as well as the independent and active principles. This causal is appropriate for Palestine case, therefore it stands for the independence of the state of Palestine and against for Israel occupation over Palestinian lands. Despite, in the Israel-Palestine conflict, major powers involved such the U.S. strongly supports to Israel, the Palestinian efforts to get independence also hugely supported by most of major powers in the worldwide related with the Palestine cause is seen as a human right violation and long-lasting humanity crime. *Third*, the most importance is the unity of Muslim world especially the Arab world against Israel upon its injustice behaviors in dealing with Arab Palestinians. In other words, there interplay between Muslim groups and Indonesian government in regard to deal with this issue. The effective influence of the Muslim groups' aspiration and pressure to the government demonstrated through an adoption over their aspirations to be the state decision and policy. It can be clearly concluded that the Muslim groups and Indonesia government officially united to struggle for Palestinians. During the SBY administration, Indonesia still adopts a humanitarian approach and active diplomacy in every level to fight for Palestine cause. However, a fact that SBY government carefully to show their policy, avoiding an official condemnation of the U.S. supports over Israel. Because of the significance of the U.S. factor within Indonesian foreign policy-making process during the SBY administration.

During 2004-2016, there several influential factors shaped Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine issue in the level of domestic and international. **In the level domestic**, namely *first* anti-colonialism spirit of the 1945 Constitution. Since the independence, Indonesia's foreign policy towards Palestine issue, viewed by Indonesian leaders as a mandate of 1945 Constitution with anti-Colonialism through various ways rely on the interpretaion of each government. However, the continuation of non-recognition of Israel policy is the most seen policy conducted by each government. **Second**, an increase of Islamist factor in Indonesia's domestic politics. It includes (i) the existent rise of Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion. Indonesian public opinion makes up by the majority of Muslim population of Indonesia. Therefore, it effectively remains to influence domestic public opinion in democratic era. However, the government will tend to accomodate the Muslim groups' aspiration as long as viewed in line with the Pancasila, 1945 Constitution as well as the independent and active foreign policy. And in case of Palestine issue, it is seen appropriate, thus creating an result of Islamist-oriented policy as a foreign decision policy. Then (ii) the emergence of Muslim groups as a moral force. In this regard, Muslim groups put pressure if the government behave in passive response to the Islamist issues. In case of Palestine issue, an example of strong pressure of Muslim groups that has continued to be given in response of any initiative of opening diplomatic ties with Israel by Indonesian government. Indeed, this such initiave always sparks hardly response through a series of mass-protest by all segment Islamist gropus, so often suspended by eventually cancelled. In addition, (iii) a shifting to the new international orientation and identity. In this regard, Indonesia intended to shift broadly its foreign policy on Muslim concern resulted in Indonesia's Muslim world policy. **In the level of international**, the wave of democratization policy led to the emergence of democratised foreign policy. This such foreign policy put importance of all engagement parties beyond the government, that encourages to the emergence role of non-state actor in influencing foreign policy-making and in the implementation phase of succeeding the goals. In this context, for instance, Indonesian humanitarian NGOs and Muslim groups' contributions to provide the support of humanitarian assistances for Palestinians in all efforts as the implementation of Indonesia's support policy over Palestine issue.

Yet, beyond all diplomatic efforts and unofficial efforts to support Palestine, Indonesia has also constraints and limitations. There the gap between Indonesia's new orientation of Indonesia's Muslim world policy through an activism and engagement

policy in the Middle East. In particular, to be a honest broker of the Palestine-Israel conflict. This gap affected by several factors. *First*, Indonesia is a “periphery” or non-popular new actor in geopolitical context of the Middle East region. *Second*, the lack of political experience in the regional complex politics. *Third*, no diplomatic ties with Israel, *fourth* no strategic position and a prominent trusted figure. Those mean it has no much more leverage or bargaining value and strategic position in the Middle east regional politics. Therefore, it is probably concluded that Indonesian active and independent foreign policy on Palestine issue has no much more effectiveness and significant impacts especially in conflict resolution context.

Meanwhile, during 2004-2016, factors that shape Turkey’s foreign policy on Palestine issue **in domestic level**. *First*, the significance of public opinion and non-state actors influence the foreign policy. Before the AKP party came to power, a determinant actor of Turkey’s foreign policy was the military. However, a significant shift has occurred. Military influences on determining the foreign policy then decline. Instead, non actor states including civil society and non-government organizations have become as the determinant actor. In the context of domestic public opinion has been marked by a re-emergence of common historical and cultural senses under Ottoman heritages. This factor then results in a re-active engagement of Turkey to the Middle East. Besides, Palestine issue actually gets a large sympathy in Turkish society. A holy city of Jerusalem wherein Al-Aqsa mosque is placed represents a sensitive issue across Muslim groups of Turkey. Those factors have shaped Turkish supports on Palestine. For instance, when an Israel invasion of 2008 on Gaza, an Israel sentiment rised in Turkey. While Turkish government responded that situation by a cancelation policy of Turkey over the annual jointly military exercise and defence industry cooperation with Israel. *Second*, an emergence of civilian leader as a new foreign policy actor. When the military controlled foreign decision-making mechanism, Turkish ties with Israel rapidly rised especially reaching its peak in the 1990s. The mechanism of foreign decision-making then shifted following a decline of military influence. An active civilian control emerged. Domestic political structure rebuilt. It resulted in multi-actor of foreign policy such as NGO, think tanks, etc. They contribute as the new tool of Turkish soft power. This shift impacts on Turkish larger roles in the region including a mediator role of Israel-Palestine conflict.

Third, leader factor. Leaders play roles in attracting international public opinion. This situation then motivates other actors to show their capacity to international society

that Turkish capability on the conflict resolution. Leader opinion also is a part of citizen diplomacy. In this case, it promotes Palestine issue as a global cause in order to raising global awareness. Turkish leader's opinion perceives that no permanent peace of region without peace in Palestine. They also put an emphasis to a strategic importance of Muslim world. Therefore Turkey needs to re-engage into the regional issue. **Fourth**, an increase of Islamist factor. Re-involvement of Muslim groups into domestic politics serves a democratic equality for all parties. Turkish NGO with Islamist outlook also rises as a pressure group, thus it increase to the Palestine issue. They also put a large concern to the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for Muslims especially a concern to who will control that holy city. **Fifth**, a proactive foreign policy. An implementation of such foreign policy led it to establish peace and stability in the region. Thus, it plays an active role as a honest broker or facilitator to settle regional conflict. The method of conflict resolution that adopted namely dialogue and negotiation. Turkey stands on an international win-win approach namely two-state solution rely on 1967 line border. **In regional level**, the main source of regional conflict is the Palestine-Israel conflict. Overall, Turkey conducts a balancing policy during the AKP administration regarding Palestine issue.

After the Syrian revolution in 2012 escalated, it has turned into a civil war. The emergence of various non-state actors such the ISIS, the PYD-YPG, and other militant or radical groups, as well as direct intervention of regional and international powers involved that these have become the conflict much more escalated. These have posed direct threat to Turkey and challenges Turkey's Middle East policy, notably in Syria. Thus, **Turkey's Syria policy has changed from soft power to hard power approach. Several domestic factors shapes** this shift as follows. **First**, open border policy and humanitarian dimension. These two factors interplay to affect Turkish policy. Since 2011, the outbreak of Syria's civil war has sparked refugee waves to Turkey. As a direct neighboring countries, it had been demanded by international community and domestic humanitarian nature to open the borders and secure the people. This policy is also a result of soft power approach that adopted. **Second**, securing Turkey-Syria borders. This measure to be taken by Turkish government following Assad regime's military policy against the Syrian oppositions. Such policy has posed increasingly security risks and threats especially at the border areas. Furthermore, due to the development of the crisis with an engagement various non-state armed groups (the YPG-PYD, ISIS, other moderate and radical groups) that began in 2013,

have made the situation more complicated. Their activities strived to claim the sovereignty. Since, they have distinct ideologies, structures, and long-term strategies as well as have begun to set themselves as the state, thus they have posed threats to Turkish national security and territorial integrity. Turkey suffered the terror attacks posed by the ISIS and the PKK affiliated the YPG-PYD group within its territories. Another risk that motivate to improve Turkey's security border policy is the influx of foreign fighters across the border through Turkey. In this context, Turkey's territory is used by the foreign fighters on their way to and from Syria. Even, probably residing in Turkey as a third country before returning to home countries. It also has to dealt with the way to send them back to countries of origin.

Meanwhile, **in the international level**, the factors have affected Turkey's Syria policy as entail. **First**, global and regional powers' engagement. Since 2015, there has increased the international intervention. For instances, beyond the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition war, Russia, Egypt and France also conducted direct military intervention in 2015. Meanwhile, Turkey deployed troops in August 2016 to counter the ISIS and YPG-PYG terror attacks, the U.S. partner with the YPG dominated-the SDF group against the ISIS has started in May 2017. These foreign countries and non state actors involvement have created the strategic pattern of alliance and enmity among global and regional powers as well as non-state actors. **Second**, the rise of ISIS. This terror organization posed territorial integrity and national security threat including multiple suicide bombings in Turkey. In response, it deploys military operation within the framework of war on terror. **Third**, the PKK affiliated the YPG's terror attack threat. This group has taken benefits of Syria conflict from controlling the Syrian Kurds that initially sided with the Syrian opposition, to self-proclaiming several cantons and establishing a sphere of influence or terror corridor in northern Syria. In this case, this region has geopolitical significance including populated heavily by Syrian Kurds and contain the critical oil reserves. The problem for Turkey is Assad regime strives to move the Kurdish issue that demands the rights to Turkey. Moreover, this issue also has been politicized as a counter position opposing Turkish economical and political influences in northern Syria. In addition, self-proclaiming an autonomy region of the YPG is located along Turkey-Syria borders, therefore it will pose risk and threat of terror attacks into Turkish territories.

On the other side, during 2004-2016 periods, **Indonesian government policy towards the Syria crisis** can be explained through the influencing factors behind. **In**

domestic level, first a commitment to non-alignment with any military bloc as one of basic ideas of the principle of Independent and Active Foreign Policy. In regard to Syria case, Indonesia prevent from an engagement into the multilateral military pact to Syria, even not to aligned with a bilateral military pact with any major powers. Instead, it prefers to strengthen ties rely on peaceful coexistence. Given, Indonesia has a critical and substansial role in the origin of the NAM, so it positions itself to commit to keep the basic spirit of non-alignment. Despite, there criticism toward the NAM with its non-alignment spirit such as the movement is unable yet to prevail and to be counted as a global “pressure group” to put significant contribution into global political constellation. Besides, it is basically only a moral force power, neither economic nor military power. It is not capable to launch an official stance as an international organization due to the type of structure. **Second**, leader factor. For Indonesian leaders, the early reason of the Syria conflict erupted is Syrian demand on a change towards democracy to be implemented completely. Yet, in its development, it is unfortunately followed by the involvement of major powers and various non-state actors. They also emphasize negotiation, dialogue with no preference for military measures and political solution that is self-determination of Syrian people for future. Indonesia stance is sided with neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions while it adopts non-interference to Syria’s domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia’s official stance is neutral. This stance is meant it fighting against any colonialism and violation forms caused by the regime or regime under the world peace and security. Indonesia government not react to neutral stance as a neutral politic that means not to care to the crisis but conducts policy in a way of achieving national interest. **Third**, the protection of Indonesian citizens in Syria as a foreign policy’s priority. In order to pursue this goal, Indonesian government is still opening diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. This representatives has main task to protect, defend and secure them until they are repatriated to Indonesia. No matter who rules, it will cooperate in line with its strategic interests still remain there.

In the international level, first the ISIS and FTF Dimension. Indonesia also targeted by the ISIS through multiple ISIS-linked and inspired terror attacks. Beyond, ISIS also is defined as a threat through the possible terror attacks conducted by Indonesia-origined foreign fighters return to home. The potential threats of the presence of the ISIS’ supporters and recruits in Indonesia is revival of local extremist groups’ sleep cells that probably conducting terror attacks, promoting inter and intra religious conflict, fulfilling

the lack of local militant group's capability, recruiting the new cadres targeting youth cadres. ISIS presence in Indonesia is represented by the extremist groups and individuals pledge allegiance or support to ISIS. **Second**, Indonesia's role within the framework of the OIC. Despite Indonesia is the world's majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, in fact, Indonesia has no much leverage in negotiation capability to settle and play significant role on Syria crisis. It has only played the limited role due to several factors including as a minor actor in term of regional geopolitics and the lack of experience upon the regional complex politics.

Hence, in order to compare, in case of Syria crisis, Turkey has adopted and preferred to choose humanitarian and political-oriented approach towards Syria crisis. However, after several international developments rised that put risks to its national security, Turkish foreign policy has then shifted to propose a security-oriented approach. It combines soft and hard powers in formulating process of the foreign policy. **Meanwhile, Indonesian government** tooks somewhat similar approaches with Turkey, it also has put forth primarily humanitarian approach in undergoing a humanitarian crisis in Syria while suggesting such political solution stance in order to solve that crisis with optimizing the way of diplomacy. Indonesian leaders stance is to prevent a military approach in dealing with this crisis. When it is evaluated on the basic principle of Indonesian foreign policy namely independent and active principle, Indonesian policy stance in case of Syria crisis is independent but not active. In this context, those basic principles determine Indonesia not enter a formal alliance, further interferring and involving into other state's domestic problems. Instead, it should actively encourage bilateral cooperations with other countries. In other words, it avoids to make an alliance with major powers and aimed to play constructive and pursue proactive role in international relations.

Since, the Syria crisis has turned into a global proxy war of major powers that involves not only state actors, spreading steadily followed with an increasingly engagement of non-state actors, those affect and constrain it actively takes significant and major roles as Turkey has done in going through the years of Syria crisis. Conversely, Indonesia is still developing its bilateral relations with Syria. But, this policy has been shaped by several factors. So, it is concluded that Indonesia foreign policy has played ineffective and no significant roles regarding the settlement of Syria crisis. In addition, Indonesia demonstrates a status quo of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in a pragmatic way. It can be suggested that Indonesia probably can re-evaluate how the

effective way of conducting its active and independent foreign policy in order to realize the ideal of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that call for an active participation in establishing an abiding peace across the world.

Besides, there primary reason can be argued to explain why in the conflict resolution, Indonesia more prefers a soft-power approach through diplomacy and negotiation as well as non-interference into domestic cause of other state rather than a hard power approach, due to the factor of its national capability especially military capability as a fact. In this situation, Indonesia should recognise that there is a gap between its aspiration and capability to play wider global roles especially in participating of the conflict resolution. In this regard, Indonesian military dependent on the major power of the U.S. Most of Indonesia military equipments are made in the U.S., whereas its military officials mostly get military training from the U.S. In addition, its military budget also considered in low rate compared to other states. In other words, Indonesia is not independent militarily.

Indonesia ever suffered because of the U.S. military embargo to Indonesia in which put in the era of Soeharto, and already lift in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Despite, it tried to diversify its military cooperation with other state, it did not give significant means to its military capability. So, it comes back to align its military capability to the west country especially with the U.S. So, it may be argued that it is not able yet to vis a vis with major powers and has not yet a strong military capability as a bargaining value. Therefore, in one way, both securing its national stability and pursuing other strategic national interests, it proposes a neutral stance and encourages to strengthen bilateral ties in case of the crisis that involves an active engagement of major powers as such in Syria crisis case.

Meanwhile, Indonesia government and Muslim group tend to stand in opposite in case of Syria crisis. Indonesian government tend to position in moderate stance and keep in status quo of non-interference policy upon the domestic problem of Syria. For Indonesian government, there several reasons why Indonesia still continue to open its diplomatic representative and develop bilateral ties in Syria while most countries closed their diplomatic office in Damascus, as follow. **First**, historical relations between Syria and Indonesia. Syria was the first countries which recognized Indonesia independence. **Second**, Indonesia avoid to be perceived by regime get involved into Syria's domestic issue especially Syria's territorial sovereignty. **Third**, and in order to respect to Syria as a member of the NAM. In which the NAM adopts non-interference policy as an agreement

amongst member states and Indonesia considers the NAM was birth and inspired by the Bandung Conference with its “Dasasila Bandung” that has an important principle is to respect other state territorial sovereignty. In other words, Indonesia has been trying to play a normative international role in this Syria case.

Besides, in case of Syria crisis, Indonesia government also tend to ignore the aspiration of Muslim group especially militant groups. Indonesian government response in such way due to the negative spilled over of the conflict namely the radicalization issue on Muslim group even individuals in Indonesia that has reach out a peak when the ISIS rise. This issue poses a threat for Indonesian territorial integrity due to demand a radical change of the establishment of Islamic state of Indonesia. Where in this case, Indonesian government perceives such way against the existent of the Pancasila as Indonesia national ideology which is a middle way to be dealt between the Muslim nationalist and secular nationalist groups in the time of national identity formulation after the declaration of Indonesia’s independence. The radicalized individuals and militant groups then conducted a series of terror attacks that posed threat to the national security stability and impacted to the recruitment of Indonesian foreign fighters leave for Syria with various motivations and appeals. In short, Indonesia has not played significant and influential role practically within the settlement’s efforts on Syrian crisis. In fact, Indonesian political power has not been yet powerful in affecting directly the situation within the crisis compared to other international and regional actors such as Turkey has.

REFERENCE

Books

- AGUNG Anak Agung Gde, *Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945-1965*, The Hague: Mouton, 1973.
- ANWAR Dewi Fortuna, *Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia*, Jakarta: CSIS, 1992.
- ANWAR Dewi Fortuna, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994.
- ANWAR Dewi Fortuna, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003.
- ALTUNISIK Meliha Benli, Ozlem TUR, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2005.
- ARI Tayyar, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika*, Vol. 10, Bursa: MKM Publisher, March 2013.
- ARI Tayyar, *Gecmişten Günümüze Orta Dogu: Siyaset, Savas ve Diplomasi*, Vol. I, 6.ed., Bursa: Dora Publishing, 2014.
- AYOOB Mohammed, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- AZRA Azyumardi, *Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen (eds.), Singapore: ISEAS, 2000.
- AZRA Azyumardi, *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy. Dynamics in a Global Context*, Jakarta: Solstice Publishing, 2006.
- BALCI Ali, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, Istanbul: Etkileşim Publisher, 2015.
- BAC Meltem Muftuler, *Türkiye ve ABD: Soguk Savas Sonrasi Iliskiler*, Simten Cosar(translator), Istanbul: Alfa Publisher, 2001.
- BAYIR Ozgun Erler, Faruk SÖNMEZOĞLU, *Dış Politika Karşılaştırmalı Bir Bakış*, Faruk SÖNMEZOĞLU, Ozgun Erler BAYIR (eds.), Istanbul: D&R Publishing, 2014.
- BAYLIS John, Steve SMITH, Patricia OWENS (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 5.ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- BÖLÜKBASI Süha, Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik, Ş. Çalış, İ. DAGI, R. Gözen (eds.), Liberte: Ankara, 2001, pp. 250-253

- BOZDAĞLIOĞLU Yücel, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Postmodern Analizler-1: Kimlik, Kültür, Güvenlik ve Dış Politika*, Tayyar ARI (ed.), Bursa: MKM Publisher, April 2012.
- CARLEY P., *Turkey's Role in the Middle East*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995.
- DOYLE Michael.W., *Ways of War and Peace*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
- DOYLE Michael W., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases, Second Edition*, 2.ed., Steves SMITH, Amelia HADFIELD, Tim DUNNE (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- ELMAN Colin, *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*, M. Griffiths (ed.), Oxon: Routledge, 2007.
- ERDOGAN İbrahim, *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, İbrahim Dağı (ed.), Ankara: Siyasal Publisher.
- ESBER R. M., *The Symposium on Palestine Since the Ottomans 28-29 November 2013*, Vol.2, Ankara: Afsar Press, 2014.
- EVANS Graham, Jeffrey NEWHAM, *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and Institutions*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
- FEALY G., *Religion, Faith, and Global Politics*, S. Harris & L. Elliott (eds.), Canberra: Australian National University, 2006, p. 26.
- GOKAY Bulent, *Emperyalizm ve Bolsevizm Arasında Türkiye*, Sermet Yalcin (translator), Istanbul: Agora Publisher, 2006.
- GÖZEN Ramazan, *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, 17.ed., Ankara: New Turkish Publisher, 2002.
- HAFNER Robert, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- HALLIDAY Fred, *The Middle East in International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- HATTA Mohammad, *Mendajung Dua Karang: Keterangan Pemerintah Diutjapkan oleh Drs. Mohammad Hatta Dimuka Sidang BPKNIP*, Yogyakarta : Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1948.
- HATTA Mohammad, *Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta: Buku 3, Perdamaian Dunia dan Keadilan Sosial*, Endang Basri ANANDA, Sori SIREGAR, Mien JOEBHAAR (eds.), Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001.
- HILL Christopher, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.
- HOLSTI K.J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 3.ed., New Jersey:

- Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977.
- HUNTINGTON Samuel P., *Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga*, Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiti, 1995.
- INAYATI Ratna Shofi (ed.), *Hubungan Indonesia-Amerika serikat 1992-2000: Masa Pemerintahan Clinton*, Jakarta: PPW LIPI, 2000.
- KARACASULU Nilüfer, *Postmodern Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Yaklaşımları*, Tayyar ARI (ed.), Bursa: DORA Basım Yayın Dağıtım, October 2014.
- KEOHANE Robert O., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, D.A. BALDWIN (ed.), New York: Colombia University Press, 1993.
- KHAN Saad S., *Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, December 2001.
- KISSINGER Henry, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, James N. Rosenau (ed.), New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- KUT Şule, *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, G. ÖZCAN, Şule KUT (eds.), İstanbul: Boyut Publisher, 2000.
- KÜRKÇÜOĞLU Ömer, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusuna Karşı Politikası 1945-1970*, 2.ed., Ankara: Barış Kitap, 2010.
- MAN W.K. Che, *Muslim Separatism: The Moro of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- MAY Brian, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Singapore: Graham Brash, 1978.
- ORAN Baskin (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol. 12, 1.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Publishing, 2006.
- ÖZCAN Mesut, *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, The European Union and the Middle East*, Avebury: Ashgate, 2008.
- PANGGABEAN S. R., *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millenium*, V. HOOKER, A. SAIKAL (eds.), Singapore: ISEAS, 2004.
- PERWITA Anak Agung Banyu, *Indonesia and the Muslim World: Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007.
- REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, *Palestine in Ottoman Documents*, İstanbul: General Directorate of State Archives, 2009.
- ROSENAU James N., *World Politics: An Introduction*, Rosenau, J.N., et.al.(eds.), London: Free Press MacMillan Publishers, 1976.
- SABIR Muhammad, *Quo Vadis Nonblok*, Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1990.

- SANCAR G. A., *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*, B. Senem CEVIK and Philip SEIB (eds.), New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.
- SANDER Oral, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Ankara: İmge Publishing, 1998.
- SCHWELLER Randall, *Progress in International Relations Theory*, Colin ELMAN, Miriam F.ELMAN (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
- SEYDI Süleyman, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreaux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2003.
- SMITH Anthony L., *Abdurrahman Wahid and the Indonesian Economy*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2001.
- SOEKARNO, *Pancasila dan Perdamaian Dunia*, Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1989.
- SOESATRO Hadi, *Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, Chris Manning and Peter van Dierman (eds.), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
- STEINBERG David Joel, *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- SUKMA Rizal, *Islam and Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Internal Weakness and the Dilemma of Dual Identity*, Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 1999.
- SUKMA Rizal, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*, London: Routledge, 1999.
- SUKMA Rizal, *Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.
- SUKARNO, *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.
- SURYADINATA Leo, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997.
- SOYSAL Ismail, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları (1945-1990)*, 2.ed, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.
- TALIAFERRO Jeffrey W., Steve E. LOBELL, Norrin M. RIPSAN, *Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy*, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steve E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman (eds.), New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- TAYEB T.M. Hadi, *Sejarah Diplomasi Republik Indonesia Dari Masa ke Masa Periode 1945-1950*, Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 1996.
- TIM BALAI PUSTAKA, *Kumpulan Pidato Presiden Soekarno, Wakil Presiden Drs. Moh. Hatta, Perdana Menteri Sutan Sjahrir*, Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1946.
- TÜR Özlem, *Doğu'dan Batı'ya Dış Politika: AK Partili Yıllar*, Zeynep DAĞI (ed.), Ankara: Orion, 2006.

TÜR Özlem, *XXI. Yuzyilda Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi*”, Faruk SÖNMEZOĞLU (ed.), Istanbul: Der Publishing, September 2012.

WALLACE William, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, London: The Macmillan Press, 1971.

WEINSTEIN Franklin B., *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence from Soekarno to Soeharto*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.

WEINSTEIN Franklin B., *Indonesia Foreign Policy and the Dillema of Dependence from Soekarno to Soeharto*, Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007.

YAZBAK M., *The Symposium on Palestine Since the Ottomans 28-29 November 2013*, Vol. 2, Ankara: Afsar Press, 2014.

YESILTAS Murat, *SETA Analysis: Neighboring A Civil War Turkey’s Border Security With Syria*, No.17, Istanbul: Turkuvaz Matbaacilik Yayincilik, October 2015.

YUDHOYONO Susilo Bambang, *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches*, Jakarta: Buana Ilmu Populer, 2005.

ZAKARIA Fareed, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, London: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Articles

ABDULGANI Roeslan, “Sekitar Konferensi Asia-Afrika dan Maknanya Bagi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia”, *Analisa*, No.4, April 1985, pp. 311-328.

ACUN Can, Huseyin ONER, “ISID-PYD Catismasinin Sicak Cephesi: Kobani”, *SETA Perspektif*, Oktober 2014, p.76.

ACUN Can, Bunyamin KESKIN, “The PKK’s Branch in Northern Syria: PYD-YPG”, *SETA Report*, Istanbul: Turkuvaz Publishing, 2017, p.15, p.55.

ANDIKA Muhammad Tri, “Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum”, *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol.15, Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, 2017, p.49.

AKSOY Ersin, “DAIS ve Suriye Ic Savasinda DAIS’in Rolu”, *Uluslararası Politik Arastirmalar Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No.2, 2016, p.31, p.36.

AKA H. Burc, “Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy after Post-Cold War”, *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, No.3, 2014, p.59.

ALAMI Athiqah Nur, “Indonesian Foreign Policy and Non-Traditional Security Issues”, *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 12, No. 2, December 2015, p.89.

ALSAFTAWI Mohammed, “Who Needs Whom? Turkey and Israel Agree on Normalization Deal”, *Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Working Papers 16*, November 30 2016, p. 5.

ALTUNISIK Meliha B., “Turkish-Israeli Rapproachment in the Post-Cold War Era”,

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.36, No.2, April 2000, pp.186-187.

- ANWAR Dewi Fortuna, "Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesian Social Science and Humanities*, Vol. 3, 2010, pp.41-42, <http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index>
- APLIANTA Derry, "Indonesia's Response in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of the Soeharto and the post-Soeharto Era", *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015, p.14, <http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/jas.v3i1.749>
- ARAS Bulent, "Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *SETA Policy Brief*, No.32, 2009, p.5.
- ARAS Bulent, "Turkey and Palestinian Questions since Al-Aqsa Intifada", *Alternatives*, Vol. 1, No.3, 2003, p.49.
- ARI Tayyar, "Cenevre II Neyi Degistirdi?", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, p.54.
- ARORA B. D., "Nature and Content of Indonesian Nonalignment", *International Studies*, Vol. 20, No.1-2, 1981, pp. 273-292.
- AZRA Azyumardi, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism", *CSCI Islamic Issues Briefing Paper Series 1*, Melbourne: Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam, 2005, p.5.
- BALCI Ali, Kardaş, "The Changing Dynamic of Turkish Relations with Israel: An Analysis of Securitization", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.14, No.2, 2012, p.115.
- BARKER H.J., "The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *TESEV*, 2012, p.4.
- BASTAKI Jinan, "Who Represents Palestinian Refugees? The Sidelineing of the Core of the Palestine Question", *Perceptions*, Vol. XX, No.1, 2015, pp.77-78.
- BAUDNER Joerg, "The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.16, No.3, 2014, p.86.
- BENJAMIN D., "Turkey's Support for Hamas: A Bridge Too Far?", *Journal of the Oxford Center for the Study of Law and Public Policy*, Vol. 1, No.2, p.196.
- BETTS Richard K., "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe", *International Security*, Vol.17, 1992, p.203.
- BROWN Kevin, "The Syrian Crisis of 1957: A Lesson for the 21st Century", *CPD Perspective on Public Diplomacy*, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2013, p.28.
- CARNEGIE P. J., "The political of Indonesia's Islamic identification", *Dialogue*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2006, pp.1-24.
- CEM İsmail, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a Millenium," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, pp. 1-6.

- COOK Thomas I., Malcolm MOOS, "Foreign Policy: The Realism of Idealism", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.46, No.2, June 1952, p.347.
- CORNELL Svante E., "Changes in Turkey: What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?", *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2012, p. 17.
- DALAY Galip, "Report Turkish Foreign Policy after Davutoglu: Continuity vs. Rupture", *Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 14 July 2016, p.4.
- DALAY Galip, "Report: Drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy: Part II Imperative of Regional Politics, not Personality or Ideology, Drives Turkish Policy", *Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 9 April 2017, p.3.
- DANFORTH N., "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Policy Quarter*, Vol. 7, No.3, p.87.
- DAVUTOĞLU Ahmet, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring", *Turkey Policy Brief Series*, 3.ed., International Policy and Leadership Institute TEPAV, 2012, pp. 3-5.
- DONELLI Federico, Ariel Gonzalez LEVAGGI, "Becoming Global Actor: The Turkish Agenda for the Global South", *Rising Power Quarterly*, Vol.1, Issue 2, 2016, p.109.
- D'ALEMA Francesco, "The Evolution of Turkey's Syria Policy", *IAI Working Papers*, Vol. 17, No. 28, October 2017, p.8.
- DEMİR Ömer, Mustafa ACAR, Metin TOPRAK, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2004, p. 168.
- GLASER Charles L., "Structural Realism in A More Complex World", *Review of International Studies*, 2003, Vol. 29, Issue 03, pp.409-411.
- GUZZINI Steffano, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2000, p. 148.
- HAMILTON Natasha, Dave MCRAE, "Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence", New South Wales: The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, November 2015, p.10.
- HARYANTO Agus, Arry BAINUS, "National Role Conception of Indonesia in ASEAN: Natural Leader, Mediator, and Collaborator", *International Journal of Public and Private Management*, Vol, 3, No. 2, 2016, p. 95.
- HATTA Mohammad, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs", *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1953, p.446.
- HEPER Metin, "Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Ozal and Recep Tayyip Erdogan", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.2, 2013, p.155.
- HUNTINGTON Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilization?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp.22-50.

- ICG, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints", *International Crisis Group, Europe Report*, No.203, 7 April 2010, p.2.
- ICG, "The PKK's Fateful Choice in Northern Syria", *Middle East Report*, No.176, 4 May 2017, p. 23.
- IHLAMUR Suna Gulfer, Oner, "Turkiyenin Süriyeli Mültecilere Yonelik Politikası", *Ortadogu Analizi* Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, p.45.
- IPEK Pinar, "Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No.11, 2015, pp.173-174.
- IREWATI Awani, "Reviewing the Mechanism of Border Disputes Settlement in ASEAN", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 2014, pp.44-45.
- JONES Lee, "ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order", *Nuffied College Politics Group Working Paper*, March 2009, pp.12-13.
- KANAT Kiliç. B., "Theorizing the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No.1, 2014, p.74.
- KARACASULU Nilufer, "Interpreting Turkey's Middle East Policy in the Last Decade", *All Azimuth*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2015, pp.33-34.
- KEYMAN E.F., "A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Toward Proactive Moral Realism", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.1, 2017, p. 60.
- KIRIŞÇI Kemal, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1996, p.
- KIRIŞÇI Kemal, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspective on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, p.31.
- KITCHEN Nicholas, "Systemic Pressure and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of A Grand Strategy Formation", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2010, p.120.
- KOÇER Gökhan, "Türk Dış Politikasında Din Unsuru," *Akademik Orta Doğu*, Vol.1, No. 1, 2006, p.
- KOSEBALABAN Hasan, "The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is Its Strategic Significance?", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No.3, 2010, pp. 36-50.
- LEV Daniel, "Political Parties in Indonesia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1967, pp. 52-67.
- LEE Terence, "The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No.4, 2000, pp.692-706.
- MCRAE Dave, "Analysis: More Talk than Walk: Indonesia as A Foreign Policy Actor", Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2014, p.6.

- MEARSHEIMER John J., 2009, "Reckless States and Realism", *International Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2, p.245.
- MIS Nebi, Omer Behram OZDEMIR, "Suriye 2013", *Ortadogu Yilligi*, Kemal Inat, Muhittin Ataman (eds.), Istanbul: Acilim Kitap, 2013, pp.205-208.
- MOWLE Thomas S., "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2003, p.569.
- MUJANI W. K., Ahmed Y.M, "Speciality of Relationship between Turkey and Palestine", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 6, No.4, 2015, p.556.
- MUTTAQIEN Muhammad, "Domestic Politics and Indonesia;s Foreign Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Global & Strategis*, Vol.7, No. 1, January-June 2013, p.57.
- NUGROHO Arifin Suryo, "Soekarno dan Diplomasi Indonesia", *Sejarah dan Budaya*, Year X, No.2, December 2016, p. 130.
- NURHASIM Mochammad, "The Future of Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 13, No. 2, December 2016, p.242.
- OMAR Abdallah Marouf, "Al-Aqsa Mosque's Incident in July 2017: Affirming the Policy of Deterrence", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 19, No.3, 2017, p. 69.
- ONIS Ziya, "Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and A Critique", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13, No.1, p.52.
- ONIS Ziya, "Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.2, 2013, p.107.
- ORHAN Oytun, "Suriye İç Savaşının İnsan Maliyeti: Mülteci Krizi", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol. 6, No. 61, March-April 2014, pp.36-37.
- ORHAN Oytun, "Struggle against ISIS, Border Crossings and Turkey", *ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs*, No.11, September 2014, p.5.
- ORHAN Oytun, "Firat Kalkani: Hedefler, Firsatlar, ve Riskler", *Ortadogu Analizi*, Vol.8, No.77, November-December 2016, p.12.
- ORHAN Oytun, "Turkiyenin YPG ile Mucadelede Secenekleri", *Ortadogu Analiz*, Vol. 9, No. 80, May-June 2017, pp.48-49.
- ORSAM, "Khaled Khoja: Political Solution In Syria Should Begin Where Geneva-II Ended", *Interviews on Regional Affairs*, No. 18, August 2015, p.3.
- ORSAM, "Panel Middle East Peace Process in the New International Setting: Palestinian and Turkish Perspectives", *Meeting Evaluation*, No.15, 2017, p 4.
- ORSAM, "Turkey's National Interest Entails Peace and Stability in Its Region", *Interviews On Regional Affairs with Ahmet Yildiz*, No.40, January 2017, p.5, p.7.

- ORSAM, "Astana Sonrası Suriye", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 9, No.79, March-April 2017, p.14.
- ORTADOĞU YILLIĞI, Sakarya: Ortadoğu Enstitüsü, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2013, pp.209-213.
- PARK Bill, "US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?", *Defence and Security Analysis*, Vol. 23, No.1, March 2007, p.44.
- PERTHES Volker, "Turkey's Roles in the Middle East: An Outsider Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No.4, p.2.
- PUJAYANTI Adirini, "Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Krisis Suriah," *Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi*, Vol. IV, No.11, 2013, p.
- PUTRA Bama Andika, "Indonesia's Leadership Role in ASEAN: History and Future Prospects", *International E-Journal of Advances in Social Science*, Vol. I, Issue 2, August 2015, pp.190-191.
- RAJAN M.S., "The Conflict in the Gulf and the Non-Aligned Movement", *Review of International Affairs*, 1990.
- ROSE Gideon, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No.1, October 1998, p. 153, p. 159
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068>, (19.11.2017)
- SARI Deasy Silvy, "Maritime Nexus and The Challenge of South China Sea", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2017, pp.183-184.
- SEYDI Süleyman, "On İki Adaların Yunanistan'a Devrinde İngilizlerin Rolü", *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol. 140, 2005, pp.50-57.
- SEYDI Süleyman, "Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.17, No.1, 2006, pp.126-127.
- SMITH Anthony L., "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 3, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2000, p.507.
- ŞAHİN Mehmet, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası: Süreklilik ve Değişim", *Akademik Orta Doğu*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, pp.15-19.
- ŞAHİN Mehmet, Bugra Sari KANAT, "Turkey in the Syrian Crisis: The limits of A Middle Power Foreign Policy", *Ortadoğu Etutleri*, Vol.8, No.1, July 2016, p.18.
- SEESOX, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Old Alignments and New Neighbourhoods", *International Conference St Antony's College, University of Oxford, on 30 April-2 May 2010*, Oxford: South East European Studies , 2011, p.11.
- SIHBUDI Riza, "Timur Tengah Mencari Orientasi?: Timur Tengah dan Gerakan Non-

- Blok”, *Analisis CSIS*, Year XXIV, No.3, May-June 1995, pp.193-199.
- SIHBUDI Riza, “Indonesia dan Dinamika Politik Timur Tengah, Januari-November 2011”, 2011, p.243.
- SUKMA Rizal, “Islam, Democracy and Foreign Policy in Indonesia”, *CSIS*, 19 June 2007, p.3.
- TALIAFERRO Jeffrey W., “Security Seeking under Anarchy, Defensive Realism Revisited”, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000/01, pp.128-130, p.132 – 134.
- TAŞPINAR Ömer, “Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 2012, p. 137.
- TÜR Özlem, “From Cooperation to Conflict-Turkey and Israel in the 2000s”, *Israel Studies* Vol.17, No.3, 2012, p.47, p.56.
- TZIARRAS Zenonas, “Turkey’s Syria Problem: A Talking Timeline of Events”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.11, No.3, 2012, p.133.
- ULUTAS Ufuk, “Turkey and Israel in the Aftermath of the Flotilla Crisis”, *SETA Policy Briefs Book*, Vol. 43, 2010, p.15.
- UYSAL Ahmet, “Raport: Ortadogu’da Turkiye Algisi: Misir Ornegi”, *Stratejik Dusunce Enstitusu*, March 2011, p.148.
- VATIKIOTIS Michael R.T., “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.14, No.4, March 1993, p.359, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798170>
- WANGKE Humprey, “Kunjungan Luar Negeri Presiden wahid dan Pemulihan Ekonomi Indonesia”, *Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri Pemerintah Abdurrahman Wahid:1999-2000*, Jakarta: DPR RI, 2001, pp. 97-163.
- WANANDI Jusuf, “Indonesia: A Failed State?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.3, Summer 2002, p.135.
- WALTZ Kenneth, “Neorealism: Confusion and Criticism”, *Journal of Politics and Society*, Vol. XV, 2004, pp.2-5.
- YANI Yanyan M., Ian MONTRATAMA, “Strategic Value of Alliance Between Indonesia and the United States of America in Defending Ambalat Sea Block”, *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, Vol. 12, No. 2, December 2015, pp.73-74.
- YETIM H. T., “The Role of Identity in Turkey’s New Middle East Foreign Policy: The Case of JDP’s Palestine Policy”, Sakarya: Sakarya University, 2014, p.23.
- ZHOU Taomo, “Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965”, *Cold War International History Project*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2013, p.8.

Other Sources

- AFAD, *Turkey Response to Syria Crisis*, August 2017, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis> (17.01.2018).
- AL ANSHORI Mohammad Zakaria, *The Role of Islam in Indonesia's Contemporary Foreign Policy*, (Doctoral Thesis), Victoria University of Wellington, 2016.
- AL JAZEERA and Agencies, "Israel Battles Deadly Forest Fire", *Al Jazeera*, 3 December 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/12/20101238363661534.html>, (18.01.2018).
- AL JAZEERA, "Syrian Diplomatic Talks: A Timeline", *Al Jazeera*, 15 September 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/syria-diplomatic-talks-timeline-170915083153934.html>, (20.01.2018).
- ANADOLU AJANSI, "Başbakan Yıldırım Çukurca'da Askeri Birlikleri Ziyaretetti", *Anadolu Ajansı*, 5 September 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/basbakan-yildirim-cukurcada-askeri-birlikleri-ziyaret-etti-> (20.01.2018).
- Annual Presidential Speech on the Ceremony of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia LXVIII, Jakarta, 16 August 2013.
- Annual Press Statement Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Jakarta 7 January 2014, p.7, p.11.
- ANTONOPOLUS Paul, "Timeline of Syria Peace Talks held in Astana", 23 January 2017, *AMN News*, <https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/timeline-syria-peace-talks-held-astana/>, (20.01.2018).
- ANWAR Dewi Fortuna, "Hatta dan Politik Luar Negeri", *Kompas*, 1998, www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0208/09/nasional/hatt39.html, (21.11.2017).
- ARDYAN Mohammad, "Indonesia Tolak Akui Pemberontak Suriah", 9 April 2012, <http://www.merdeka.com/dunia/indonesia-tolak-akui-pemberontak-suriah.html>, (20.01.2018).
- ARKIN William M., Robert WINDREM, "Why ISIS Attacks Turkey", *NBC News*, 29 June 2016, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis>, (21.01.2018).
- BORA Birce, "Analysis: Is Turkey's 'open door policy' an illusion?", *Al Jazeera*, 24 November 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/analysis-turkey-open-door-policy-illusion-151124084706365.html>, (20.01.2018).
- CNN, "Syrian Civil War Fast Facts", *CNN*, 17 October 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html>, (20.01.2018).
- DAILY SABAH, "Turkey to Continue Open-Door Refugee Policy, Despite Lack of International Support, Erdogan says", *Daily Sabah*, 18 Desember 2017, <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/12/18/turkey-to-continue-open-door-refugee-policy-despite-lack-of-international-support-erdogan-says>,

(20.01.2018).

DAILY SABAH, “Middle East Peace Impossible Without Free Palestine Presiden Erdogan Says”, *Daily Sabah*, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/11/29/middle-east-peace-impossible-without-free-palestine-president-erdogan-says>, (19.01.2018).

DAMARJATI Danu, “Ramai Dibahas, Ini Penjelasan Menlu Tentang Abstainnya RI soal HAM di Suriah”, *Detik News*, 19 December 2016, <https://news.detik.com/berita/3374686/ramai-dibahas-ini-penjelasan-menlu-tentang-abstainnya-ri-soal-ham-di-suriah>, (20.01.2018).

DAVUTOGLU Ahmet, “Zero Problems in a New Era”, *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 21 March 2013, <https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/21/zero-problems-in-a-new-era/>, (17.01. 2018).

Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, “Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menlu: Kilas Balik 2008 dan Proyeksi 2009”, 6 January 2009, http://www.deplu.go.id/?hotnews_id=4044 , (20.01.2018).

Departemen Luar Negeri Indonesia, “Indonesia Desak Penghentian Kekerasan Suriah”, <http://www.deplu.go.id/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=5447>, (20.01.2018).

Departemen Luar Negeri Indonesia, <http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/NewsKemlu.aspx?IDP=198&l=id>, (31.10.2017).

Deutsche Welle, “Syrian Civil War Timeline: A Summary of Critical Events”, *Deutsche Welle (D.W.)*, <http://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-timeline-a-summary-of-critical-events/a-40001379>, (20.01.2018).

DIWAN, “The Kurdish Democratic Union Party”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 1 March 2012, <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48526?lang=en>, (17.01.2018).

Document 6-3: UN Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967.

DOSCH Jorn, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines”, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol.25, No.5, 2006, p.52, <https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-336978>, (30.10.2017).

DPR RI, “Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri”, 25 June 2007, Jakarta: Indonesian House of Representative Republic of Indonesia, p.2.

DPR RI, “Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menteri Luar Negeri”, 16 September 2009, Jakarta: Indonesian House of Representative Republic of Indonesia, pp. 1-2.

ELIRAZ Giora, “Activism and Engagement: Envisioning a Possible New Doctrine for Indonesia’s Middle East Policy”, 9 July 2015, *Middle East Institute*, www.mei.edu/content/map/activism-and-engagement-envisioning-possible-new-doctrine-indonesia’s-middle-east-policy, (18.01.2018).

- FARDAH, “Indonesia’s Parliament Sends Delegation to Gaza to Support Palestine”, 29 November 2012, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/85865/indonesians-parliament-sends-delegation-to-gaza-to-support-palestine>, (18.01.2018).
- GMF, “Turkish Perceptions Survey”, *The German Marshall Fund*, 2015, pp. 12-13, www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/TurkeySurvey_2015_web1.pdf, (21.01.2018).
- GMF, “Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data”, *The German Marshall Fund of the U.S.*, 2013, <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends-2013/>, (17.01.2018).
- HATTA Mohammad, “Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs”, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1953, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/indonesia/1953-04-01/indonesias-foreign-policy>, (30.10.2017).
- HUONG Nhina Le Thi Minh, “The Gaza Crisis: Impact on Southeast Asia”, *RSIS Nanyang Technological University*, 10 February 2009, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1173-the-gaza-crisis-impact-on-sou/#.WuYMSDaEa2e>, (18.01.2018).
- HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, “Turkey Highlights Open-Door Policy On World Refugee Day”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 19 June 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-highlights-open-door-policy-on-world-refugee-day-100667>, (20.01.2018).
- HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, “Ankara Rebukes Israel as A Threat to International Peace”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 18 July 2014, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-rebukes-israel-as-a-threat-to-international-peace--69328 (27.04.2018).
- INDEPENDENT TURKEY, “Decrypting Erdogans Palestine Policy”, *Independent Turkey*, <http://independentturkey.org/decrypting-erdogans-palestine-policy/>, (21.05.2017).
- JEBREAL Rula, “How to Treat Refugees With Dignity: A Lesson From Turkey”, *The New York Times*, 27 September 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/turkey-syrian-refugees.html>, (20.01.2018).
- JONES Sidney, “ISIS in Indonesia: Understanding the real threat”, *Strategic Review*, July-September 2015, <http://www.sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/isis-in-indonesia-understanding-the-real-threat>, (21.01.2018).
- KAZANCI Handan, “Infographics- The Syrian Diplomatic Crisis: A Timeline”, *Anadolu Agency*, 14 October 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/infographics-the-syrian-diplomatic-crisis-a-timeline/665109>, (20.01.2018).
- Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, “KBRI Tunis: Delegasi RI Tegaskan Posisi Indonesia Soal Konflik Suriah”, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Embassies.aspx?ID?=7678&l=id>, (18.01.2018).
- Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/IIssueDisplay.aspx?IDP=15&l=id>

(30.10.2017).

Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, “Wawancara Drs. Djoko Ahrjanto MA, Dubes RI Untuk Suriah, dengan TV SATELIT Suriah”, 1 April 2015, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/damascus/en/berita-agenda/berita-perwakilan/PagesWawancara-Drs-Djoko-Harjanto-MA-Dubes-RI-Untuk-Suriah-dengan-TV-SATELIT-Suriah.aspx>, (20.01.2018).

LANGLEY Jason, “Politics and Religion in Iraq and Syria: What is the Baath Party?”, *Center for Research on Globalization*, 16 January 2013, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-baath-party-as-the-west-doesnt-want-you-to-know-it/5319120>, (20.01.2018).

LARKIN Brian, “Syria-Timeline of Peace Process”, *Peace and Justice*, 1 June 2013, <http://peaceandjustice.org.uk/newsletter/peace-and-justice-news-syria-issue/syria-timeline-of-peace-process/>, (19.01.2018).

LEWIS Jeffrey, “What a Real Liberal Foreign Policy Would Look Like”, *Foreign Policy*, 26 June 2015, <https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/26/what-a-real-liberal-foreign-policy-would-look-like-obama-democrats/>, (17.01.2018).

LIAUW Hindra, “Empat rekomendasi SBY untuk konflik Suriah”, *Kompas*, 19 July 2012, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/19/2304197/Empat.Rekomendasi.SBY.untuk.Konflik.Suriah>, (20.01.2018).

LLOW Joseph Chinyong, “ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism in Southeast Asia and The Threat To The Homeland”, *Brookings*, 27 April 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/isis-in-the-pacific-assessing-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland/>, (30.10.2017).

MATHEWS Jessica Tuchman, “The Heart of the Conflict in the Middle East”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 4 November 2010, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/04/heart-of-conflict-in-middle-east-event-3086>, (27.04.2018).

MCKIRDY Euan, “8 times Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria”, *CNN*, 13 April 2017, <https://edition-m.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-uns-c-syria-resolutions/index.html?rm=1>, (20.01.2018).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, “Interview by Mr Ahmet Davutoglu”, 12 March 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-egypt-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa>, (30.10.2017).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa Tahun 2014”, 7 January 2014, Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, p. 3.

NASRULLAH Nasih, “Dubes RI untuk Suriah Angkat Bicara Soal Assad dan Suriah”, *Republika*, 21 March 2016, <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/timur-tengah/16/12/17/o4cg87320-dubes-ri-untuk-suriah-angkat-bicara-soal-assad->

dan-suriah-part2, (18.01.2018).

NUGRAHA Fajar, “Suriah dan Peran Indonesia dalam Atasi Konflik”, *Metrotvnews*, 3 October 2015, <http://m.metrotvnews.com/read/2015/10/03/176539>, (20.01.2018).

NUGROHO Bantan, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and ASEAN*, (Master Thesis), Canada: Dalhousie University, 1996, p.50.

NURSALIKAH Ani, “Kongres Suriah di Sochi Hasilkan 12 Poin Pernyataan”, *Republika*, 31 January 2018, <http://republika.co.id/berita/internasional/timur-tengah/18/01/31/p3er9h366-kongres-suriah-di-sochi-hasilkan-12-poin-pernyataan>, (18.01.2018).

OHCHR, “Session meeting of OHCHR on 32ed”, retrieved on December 26, 2016 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx>, (20.01.2018).

OIC/EX-SUM-4/2012/RES/FINAL, Resolutions Adopted by The Fourth Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 14-15 August 2012, pp.7-8.

PERTHES Volker, “Turkey's Role in the Middle East: An Outsider's Perspective”, The Transatlantic Academy Conference, Ankara, 10 June 2010, p.1, <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/turkey's-role-middle-east-outsider's-perspective>, (17.01.2018).

PERWITA Anak Agung Banyu, “State-Society Relationship: Assessing Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy toward the Muslim World Under Soeharto”, Department of Asian Studies and Languages.

PEW GLOBAL Attitudes Project, “America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, HAMAS, No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China”, 13 June 2006, <https://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>, (17.01.2018).

PRIMUS Josephus, “Kofi Annan Bahas “Rencana Annan”, *Kompas*, 30 May 2012, http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2012/05/30/17043357/Kofi_Annan_Bahas_Rencana_Annan, (18.01.2018).

RAVID Barak, “Israel Offers Aid to Turkey in Wake of Massive Earthquake”, *Haaretz*, 23 October 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.391552>, (19.01.2018).

REUTERS, “Indonesia group says to recruit fighters for Gaza”, *Reuters*, 29 December 2008, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-indonesia-sb/indonesia-group-says-to-recruit-fighters-for-gaza-idUKTRE4BS20S20081229>, (18.01.2018).

SADRIN P., *Turkish Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: From Securitising to Desecuritising Actor*, (Doctoral Thesis), University of Westminster, London, 2010, p.10.

- SAMOSIR Hanna Azarya, “KBRI Damaskus Repatriasi 27 WNI dari Suriah”, *CNN*, 2016, <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20160915140345-106-158511/kbri-damaskus-repatriasi-27-wni-dari-suriah/>, (20.01.2018).
- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, “Press Stakeout Following Bilateral Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Shihab”, Bangkok, Thailand, 29 July 2000, released by the U.S. State Department.
- SECURITY COUNCIL, “The Crisis in Syria”, *International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect*, 2005, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria>, (20.01.2018).
- SECURITY COUNCIL Report, *Chronology of Events on Syria*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php>, (20.01.2018).
- SECURITY COUNCIL Report, *UN Documents for Syria: General Assembly Documents*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22General%20Assembly%20Documents%22+AND+22Syria%22&ctype=Syria&rtype=General%20Assembly%20Documents&cbtype=syria>, (20.01.2018).
- SECURITY COUNCIL Report, *UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15tag=%22Security%20Council%20Resolutions%22+AND+%22Syria%22&ctype=Syria&rtype=Security%20Council%20Resolutions&cbtype=syria>, (20.01.2018).
- SPENCER Richard, “Turkey Accused of Allowing Islamic State Fighters to Cross Its Border in Kobane Attack”, *The Telegraph*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11699969/Turkey-accused-of-allowing-Islamic-State-fighters-to-cross-its-border-in-Kobaneattack.html>, (21.01.2018).
- SHAMBAZY Budiarto, “Politik Luar Negeri Abdurrahman Wahid”, *Kompas*, 2 January 2010.
- SHIHAB Alwi, “Briefing by the Foreign Minister H.E. Alwi Shihab to Foreign Ambassadors in Jakarta on Aceh, Maluku and Irian Jaya”, Jakarta, 7 July 2000.
- SINDONEWS, “Pemerintah Tak Tahu Pasti Jumlah WNI di Suriah”, *Sindonews*, 22 December 2016, <http://video.sindonews.com/play/28996/pemerintah-tak-tahu-pasti-jumlah-wni-di-suriah>, (21.01.2018).
- ŞENOL Aylin, *Understanding The New Activism Of Turkey In The Middle East: Turkey As An Emerging Soft Power*, (Master Thesis), Middle East Technical University, December 2010, p.52.
- TEMPO.CO, “TKI Pahlawan Devisa dan Problematikanya”, *TEMPO*, 27 January 2017, <https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/840572/tki-pahlawan-devisa-dan-problematikanya>, (19.01.2018).

- TEMPO, “Djoko Harjanto: Indonesians are Still Coming to Syria”, *Tempo*, 3 January 2017, <https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/01/03/241832222/Djoko-Harjanto-Indonesians-are-still-coming-to-Syria>, (20.01.2018).
- THE GUARDIAN, “Turkey Downs Russian Jet: What Do We Know?”, *The Guardian*, 24 November 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/nov/24/turkey-downs-russian-jet-what-do-we-know>, (17.01.2018).
- THE STRAITS TIMES, “Jemaah Islamiah Active Again in Indonesia, Recruiting and Collecting Funds,” *The Straits Times*, 15 February 2016, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jemaah-islamiah-active-again-recruiting-and-collecting-funds>, (21.01.2018).
- The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), “Intra-Syrian talks- Key dates of the Peace Process”, [https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/\(httpPages\)/E409A03F0D7CfB4AC1257F480045876E?OpenDocument](https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpPages)/E409A03F0D7CfB4AC1257F480045876E?OpenDocument), (20.01.2018).
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Release Regarding the Ceasefire Agreement between Israel and Palestine*, 21 November 2012, http://mfa.gov.tr/no_-264_-21-november-2012_-press-release-regarding-the-ceasefire-agreement-reached-tonight-between-israel-and-palestine.en.mfa, (18.01.2018).
- United to End Genocide, “Syria Backgrounder”, *United to End Genocide*, 2014 <http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/syria-backgrounder>, (20.01.2018).
- WIBISONO Aria Teguh Mahendra, *Political Elite and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia*, (Doctoral Thesis), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University, 2009.
- WIKANTO Arungbudoyo, “Banyak Dipulangkan Jumlah WNI di Suriah Malah Bertambah”, *Okezone*, 2016, <http://news.okezone.com/read/2016/04/11/18/1360126/banyak-dipulangkan-jumlah-wni-di-suriah-malah-bertambah>, (19.01.2018).
- WORLD BULLETIN, “Palestinian Issue and Turkish Viewpoint”, *World Bulletin*, <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news-analysis/67997/palestinian-issue-and-turkish-viewpoint>, (20.01.2018).
- YAAKUB Ahmad Nizar, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, (Doctoral Thesis), Australia: University of Western Australia School of Social and Cultural Studies Discipline of Political Science and International Relations, October 2009.
- YETKIN Murat, “Turkey Changes Syria policy with Al-Assad Move”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22 August 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/turkey-changes-syria-policy-with-al-assad-move-103087>, (18.01.2018).
- YENI SAFAK, “Avrupa'nın Teröristi”, *Yeni Şafak*, 1 September 2016, <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/avrupanin-teroristi-2520592>, (19.01.2018).
- “Final Document”, 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement. Island of Margarita, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 17-18

September 2016, p.122.

“FMHT: Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Open Door Policy”, *Boston University Pardee School*, 15 April 2016, <https://www.bu.edu/pardeschool/2016/04/15/fmht-syrian-refugees-and-turkeys-open-door-policy/>, (20.01.2018).

“Syria Kurdish Parties Trade Blames”, *KurdPress*, 23 May 2013, <http://www.mesop.de/syria-kurdish-parties-trade-blames-pyd-cooperates-with-assad-regime/>, (19.01.2018).



ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

TEZ ÇOĞALTMA VE ELEKTRONİK YAYIMLAMA İZİN FORMU

Yazar Adı Soyadı	Noor Fahmi Pramuji
Tez Adı	A Comparative Analysis of Indonesia And Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East: The Case Study of Palestine Issue And Syria Crisis
Enstitü	Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Anabilim Dalı	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Türü	Yüksek Lisans
Tez Danışman(lar)ı	Prof. Cafer Tayyar Arı
Çoğaltma (Fotokopi Çekim) izni	<input type="checkbox"/> Tezimden fotokopi çekilmesine izin veriyorum <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tezimin sadece içindekiler, özet, kaynakça ve içeriğinin % 10 bölümünün fotokopi çekilmesine izin veriyorum <input type="checkbox"/> Tezimden fotokopi çekilmesine izin vermiyorum
Yayımlama izni	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tezimin elektronik ortamda yayımlanmasına izin Veriyorum

Hazırlamış olduğum tezimin belirttiğim hususlar dikkate alınarak, fikri mülkiyet haklarım saklı kalmak üzere Uludağ Üniversitesi Kütüphane ve Dokümantasyon Daire Başkanlığı tarafından hizmete sunulmasına izin verdiğimi beyan ederim.

Tarih : 08/06/2018

İmza :

