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ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**RUSSIA'S ARCTIC REGION POLICY THROUGH
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE**

(MASTER DEGREE THESIS)

Elvira KHAFIZULLINA

BURSA-2019



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Supervisor:

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
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
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ABSTRACT

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RUSSIA'S ARCTIC REGION POLICY THROUGH GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

21st century introduced the world a new region that for a last decade became an object of heated political discussion – the Arctic. The Arctic region has been changing from the potential conflict area between bipolar powers during the Cold War into the arena for international cooperation and economical rivalry. Since the events in 2007 the attention was absorbed to the benefits which shortly it may bring: natural resources and mineral, advantageous transportation ways. Even though the gain out of the region is in unknown distant future, the interest to the Arctic remains high. All the actors agree that due to the extreme conditions of the Arctic area, which requires high financial input, the most successful way to develop the region is cooperation and investment promotion.

In sequence, geopolitical importance of the region has been increasing as well. In spite of this work comprise both: regional and non-regional actors of the Arctic, more specifically it focuses on Russia as the biggest regional country and its geopolitical Arctic approach. As a model for Russian Arctic geopolitics was chosen

the concept of Vadim Leonidovich Tsimbusky “The Russian Island” – the main work of unrecognized genius of Russian geopolitics of post-Cold War time. Analyses of the concept’s pillars revealed the concept being flexible and livable which makes it appropriate fully or partially use as the Arctic geopolitical concept of the Russian Federation.

Key Words: Arctic region, Russian foreign policy, geopolitics, natural resources, Northeast Passage, Vadim Tsimbursky



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JEOPOLİTİK PERSPEKTİFTEN RUSYA’NIN ARKTİK BÖLGE POLİTİKASI

21. asır dünyaya son 10 yılda sıcak tartışmalara konu olan yeni bir coğrafi bölge olan Arktik’i getirmiştir. Arktik bölgesi çift kutuplu Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki muhtemel çatışma sahası durumundan, uluslararası işbirliği ve ekonomik rekabet alanına dönüşmektedir. 2007 yılından bu yana cereyan etmekte olan gelişmeler, özetle doğal kaynak ve mineraller ile avantajlı taşıma yolu olarak tanımlanabilecek faydalara büyük ilgi uyandırmaktadır. Bölgeden elde edilebilecek faydalar uzun vadede çok bilinmez olsa da, Arktik’e olan ilgi yüksek düzeyde devam etmektedir. Etkin olan tüm aktörlerin kabul ettiği üzere, Arktik bölgesinin aşırı zor koşulları nedeniyle gerek duyulan yüksek maliyet, bölgenin gelişimini sağlamada en başarılı yöntemin işbirliği yapmak ve yatırımları teşvik etmek olacağını ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu duruma paralel olarak bölgenin jeopolitik önemi de artmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Arktik’teki tüm bölgesel oyuncular ile bölge dışında yer alan oyuncular değerlendirilse de, çalışma özellikle bölgenin en büyük ülkesi olan Rusya Federasyonu ve onun Arktik bölgesi jeopolitiği üzerine odaklanmaktadır.

Çalışmada model olarak, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Rus jeopolitiğinin tanınmayan dahisi Vadim Leonidovich Tsimbursky'nin temel çalışması olan “ Rus Adası” alınmıştır. Bu modelin temel sütunları analiz edildiğinde, kavramsal olarak esnek ve uygulanabilir olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır ki, bu özelliği nedeniyle Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik jeopolitiği için bütünüyle veya kısmen uygulanabilir bir model olacağı görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arktik bölge, Rus dış politikası, jeopolitik, doğal kaynaklar, Kuzeydoğu Güsergahı, Vadim Tsimbursky



PREFACE

The Arctic Region is distant and unknown land with severe climate. Most of the population of this World will not be able to say about it more than couple of images: ice and snow.

We live in conditions of constantly changing world. Pace of its development is increasing day by day. In these conditions, even such frigid place as the Arctic may be possible to be discovered. It has many things to offer; things, that are precious for well-being of states: natural resources, transportation benefits and power, at last.

In order to make this World safer and more peaceful for human beings it should be regulated by certain order; its destiny and future should be transparent and predictable. Geopolitics is the instrument aimed to provide that transparency and feasibility.

Geopolitics has seen many bright minds, many theories and concepts. Russian geopolitics theorists are separate group trying to solve destiny and position of their country in this World. Vadim Tsimbursky was one of them. He loved and cherished his motherland. He believed in its uniqueness and special place in this World. He wanted better future for Russia. Out of those intentions was born his concept “The Russian Island”. The Concept is the one of its kind. Unfortunately, it has not attracted as much attention as it deserved. We hope that this work will help to promote Vadim Tsimbursky’s name to people who want to learn different perspective, vision for such a big and multifaced country as Russia.

I would like to thank Vadim Leonidovich for his works. He is unappreciated genius of Russian geopolitics. I hope the World will learn you name. May God rest your Soul in peace.

I also would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sezgin Kaya. In any initiative, it is important to have a mentor who can show you the right direction and find the right words to inspire your mind. I am very lucky to have you at the head of our project.

At last, I would like to thank my family, my friends and two special men of my life: my husband who is always a great support and always by my side no matter what; and my beloved granddad.

I dedicate this work to you, granddad. I owe your lessons everything what I have. I love you and miss you very much. I am very sorry that we lost you so early.

Elvira KHAFIZULLINA

25.06.2019, Bursa

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Acronyms
ASEAN	Assosiation of South-East Asian Nations
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation
BRC	Barents Regional Council
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
DSME	Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	Northeast Passage
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defense Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation In Europe
PSA	State Singapore Authority
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea
USA	United States of Amerika
USSR	Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics

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INTRODUCTION

The Arctic has always had an image of frozen inaccessible land, being under thick ice cap with severe cold climate all year long. Despite of all, at the time of Cold War the circumpolar Arctic was highly militarized and politically sensitive area. The Arctic basically was a point of strategic interest of two great powers and their allies.

After the end of the Cold War geostrategic confrontation steadily was replaced by more civilian agenda based on research cooperation, and, primarily, economic interests. During transition period, which lasted from collapse the USSR and installation of the Russian flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in 2007, the region was relatively abandoned: the US left its military bases, the core of USSR Arctic military power was lost. Certainly, the event during Russian expedition in 2007 became a critical junction for next stage of the Arctic region development. The geopolitics of the Arctic has changed from strategic confrontation to exploitation of natural resources and prospects for new shipping routes at first. Still there is a potential for disagreement and rivalry not only between regional states such as Norway, Denmark, Canada, USA and Russia but also non-regional rising economies as China and South Korea which are also willing actively using the benefits of the Arctic.

Since the times of Cold War the region was front for surveillance and military activity, therefore, most political studies of the Arctic were mostly empirical based on tension between superpowers and strategic importance of the region.

At present geopolitics became a strong analytical tradition; besides, geopolitics is a field of study which relates political power to geographical space. It is able to give a clue how to keep the balance point between conflict and cooperation suitable for political climate of the Arctic.

Whereas, the resources, transport routes and strategic importance of the Arctic are the geopolitical priorities of analysis in general, this work aims to focus specifically on Arctic geopolitics of the Russian Federation as a state, which has the biggest Arctic territory and the strongest claims for Arctic benefits. As base of the Russian Arctic geopolitics we will take the concept of Russian geopolitics representative Vadim

Tsimbursky and his concept written at the last decade of 20th century “The Russian Island”.

Following hypotheses will be evaluated in our study and at the end conclusion will be given accordingly:

- The Arctic has transformed from the area of strategic confrontation to the region with economic benefits which requires cooperation between the actors rather than conflict and disagreement.
- The Arctic region due to dramatic increase of the actors and political and economic activity needs to have specific and more developed regulation, including geopolitical regulation specific to each actor of the region.
- Geopolitics is primer instrument of Russian international relations and it can be successfully applied on governing the Arctic region as well.
- The concept of Vadim Tsimbursky “The Russian Island” flexible enough in order to be considered as geopolitical concept representing geopolitics of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region.

We start with review of geopolitics, its story line and evaluation during the 20th century, which will lead us to the Russian geopolitics, most specifically, to scholars working over destiny of newborn Russian Federation. Among all, the name of Vadim Tsimbursky and his concept takes a specific place in geopolitics of Russia. Hence, we take a look of steadily developing concept “The Russian Island” and its unique notions invented by its author. The second chapter represents the overall situation in the Arctic region and the points of view of its actors (regional and non-regional). Most of those states have the Arctic strategies, which will be quickly overviewed as well as an official position of each country. The last chapter will be an assessment of the main pillars of the concept “The Russian Island” concerning applicability of the Russian Arctic geopolitical concept in the frames of international relations’ current trends.

CHAPTER I

GEOPOLITICS AND INTRODUCTION THE CONCEPT OF VADIM TSIMBURSKY "THE RUSSIAN ISLAND"

1. GEOPOLITICS AND ITS CORE

The period between the end of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War might be defined as the golden era of classical geopolitics, both in terms of theory and practice. From the nineteenth century onwards, as the age of geographical discovery drew to a close and global political rivalry was on the rise, all of the major rival powers—Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the USA—had prominent geopolitical theorists who constructed theories to enhance or at least to preserve the power of their countries.

1.1. Founders and the Main Schools of Geopolitics

Geographer from Germany Friedrich Ratzel is known as a founder of geopolitics. His theory was based on popular in 19th century evolutionistic doctrine, which helped him to create fundamental spatial approach in studying politics. Principally important in that approach is the connection between territory (soil) and people which gives life to state. Geopolitics as a term was founded by a Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellen. The author was emphasising dependence political processes from geographical processes. Based on idea of Ratzel "state as a living organism", Kjellen offered a dynamic approach of states, its ability to grow and change its size. That was the way how geopolitics got its base as a scientific discipline, administrative technology and control over spaces as its subject¹. Kjellen was the first who gave a definition by using the word "geopolitics" - "the theory of the state as a geographical

¹ Friedrich Ratzel, "Chelovechestvo kak zhiznennoe yavleniye na zemle", **LIBROKOM**, 2011; R. Kjellen "O politicheskoy nauke, eyo sootnoshenii s drugimi otraslyami znaniya i ob izuchenii politicheskogo prostranstva ", **Polis**, 2005, vol.2, pp.115-126

organism or phenomenon in space”². This definition contains two elements that are crucial within the concept of geopolitics: power (influence, politics) and space (territory, soil). The central role for the state as only powerful entity is very typical for the definition of Kjellen.

There are some different schools at the modern flow of geopolitics: Atlanticism, Continentalism and Critical geopolitics. Atlanticism is represented by the works of H. Mackinder, A. Mahan, N. Spykman and their later followers H. Kissinger, S. Huntington and K. Brzezinski. Due to Anglo-Saxon tradition, they do divide the sides on Sea Power and Land Power, including peoples living in there. The theorists claim domination of Sea Power over Land Power. By general point of view, inshore civilizations have the leading role in producing cultural impulses which spreading over continents. Such idea justifies World's leadership of the Sea Power, first of all, representative of Anglo-Saxon culture. Moreover, rapid development of scientific and technical revolution helped to achieve strategic priority due to evolution of technologies. Value-based content of Atlanticism is based on the study of contention in between the West and the East, necessity of the West domination in order to spread ideals of progress universally such as constitutional democracy and human rights.

Continentalism ideas are mostly opposing Atlanticism. It represents geopolitical tradition to lend credibility to economic and political hegemony of one single or a group of states controlling an entire continent. Schools of continentalism emerged and were developing in Russia (N.Y. Danilevskiy, A.E. Vandam), Germany (F. Ratzel, K. Haushofer, C. Schmitt).

In 1970s geopolitical theorists start to turn from geopolitical dualism in favour of de-globalisation of geopolitical thinking. Diversity of regions, states, continents makes it difficult to form single and correct geographical image of world's development³. Meantime, it became a necessity theoretically explore not only inhabited but also uninhabited space. Such factors as mass migration, tourism development and tendency of people to travel the World made it possible. The wish to visualize

² George Steinmetz, "Geopolitics", **Encyclopedia of Globalization by G. Ritzer**, Routledge, 2012, <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~geostein/docs/Steinmetz%202012%20Geopolitics%20for%20Ritzer.pdf>

³ Zamyatin Dmitry Nikolayevich, "Vlast' prostranstva i prostranstvo vlasti: geograficheskiye obrazi v politike i mejdunarodnih otnosheniyah", **M: ROSSPEN**, 2004, pp.67

perceptions about countries and regions contradicts with the idea of distancing from political, economic and cultural details in order to create a compact and easily manipulated image. In such intellectual context, European geopolitical theorists gave a rise to critical geopolitics. One of the most famous groups of critical geopolitics is the circle formed by Yves Lacoste, which united groups of geographers, historians, sociologists and political analysts around journal *Hérodote* that he had founded. Overall, critical geopolitics representation is opposing classical geopolitics, since not the state but a person is the main actor. In other way it is called as a "domestic geopolitics".

Ideological justification of "domestic geopolitics" is shown by a French geopolitics Vidal de la Blache, who named a person as the main subject of geopolitical actions. At the center of "domestic geopolitics" analyse is a phenomena of domestic geopolitical space as an important chain of international relation's strategy of a state. By using geopolitical analyses for explanation of regional phenomena, French authors see the space as an element of person's development which may become actual as a political factor or may not.⁴ Thus, the theorists of critical geopolitics alienate from geographical determinism by paying more attention to analyses of historical facts, communications of people, money, goods and symbols⁵. Geopolitical space of the region in this context becomes geographical and symbolic unity, the result of history of people living at the territory. Geopolitical space is studied as phenomena generated by creative activity of people. Important to say that definition of geopolitics has been changed dramatically in comparison of its original version. Yves Lacoste described geopolitics as not simply a reference to territorial disputes; frequent usage of the term of geopolitics means that new factors urge escalation of rivalry between powers to take a control over territory. Since increased role of public, now rivalry has a different form than used to be. Such changes are specific and relate not simply to all rivalry between powers in territorial questions but only those forms that widely broadcasted in mass media and cause lively discussions in mass media. Thus, it is principally a new phenomenon, which influences

⁴ Babkov A. "Ikonograficheskiy podhod v rabotah francuskih geopolitikov", *Vlast'*, vol. 7, 2010, pp. 70

⁵ Idea of "circulation" given by French geographer Jean Gottmann after The Second World War. "Circulation" is a movement of people, money, goods and ideas.

on international relations and implementation of functions of power in various countries⁶.

In Russia critical theories do not have separate theoretical schools, but its methodology actively used by philosophers, historians, culture experts and geographers. The brightest of them are represented at the works of M. Il'yin, D. Zamyatin, G. Nurishev, A. Remnev, V. Tsimbursky.⁷

1.2. Russian Geopolitical Minds after the USSR Collapse

First of all, it is essential to mention that after collapse of the USSR the Russian Federation faced severe problems regarding of unity of Russia as a country, including its geopolitical status obscurity and criteria of its self-determination as a state. In fact, such issues could not be left ignored by the Russian scientific community. Social consciousness of Russians has been traditionally divided into two relative groups, based on dilemma of West - East, Asia - Europe, "Westernizers" / Atlanticism - "Slavophilers"⁸/ Eurasianism. For "Westernizers" Europe has been apotheosis and its achievements - a symbol of future prosperity of Russia. "Slavophilers" has been considering the Slavic - Orthodox world as separate identity, completely independent from European culture. The future of Russia has been inside of it, coming as heritage from the Byzantine Empire.

According to beliefs of each group there were different ways of future geopolitical development for the newborn Russian Federation: first one foresaw that after the collapse of the USSR, Russia and Europe would start to move toward each

⁶ Yves Lacoste "Geopoliticheskiy slovar'", 1993, taken from P. Defarges, "Vvedenie v geopolitiku", Moscow: **Konkord**, 1996, pp. 138

⁷ M. Il'yin, "Etapi stanovleniya vnutrenney geopolitiki Rossii i Ukraini, **Polis**, vol: 3, 1998, pp.82-94; G. Nurishev, "Vnutrennyaya geopolitika Rossii: istoricheskiye osnovaniya i sovremennye vizovi", **Izvestiya of Herzen University: Social and humanitarian sciences**, vol: 5, Saint-Petersburg, 2005, pp.233-240; Remnev A.V. "Vnutrennyaya geopolitika Aziatskoy Rossii konca XIX – nachala XX v.", **Paralell'**, 2011, pp.184-203; Tsimburkiy V.L. "Ostrov Rossiya: Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye raboti", **ROSSPEN**, Moscow, 2007.

⁸ "westernizers" (zapadniki - rus.)
"slavophilers" (slavyanofili - rus.)

other for the further union. Contrary, the other wing was calling for the complete isolation from the Western civilization.

Overall, for last 300 years, as many other states experiencing course of modernisation, Russia was becoming the object of geopolitical projection, which was formed under influence of dominant philosophic tradition at the time. For instance, starting from the time of the Enlightenment Russia had: image of European state; image of East European, Slavic country; image of Russia as Eurasia. From other side, such a critical junction as collapse of the USSR became a starting point for the project of reinforcement positions of the newborn Russia in Eurasia. For the group of scholars who were more supporting Slavophiler's side geopolitics meant, first of all, broadening borders of Russia until the scale of the USSR. Such line of thinking was represented at the works of Alexander Dugin - the most well-known modern Russian geopolitician. He reformulated Eurasianism - a theory of geopolitical expansionism of land states, against Atlantic oriented states. As an outcome of it, Atlantic oriented states would be led by England and the USA, there as Russia would become a leader of Eurasian countries. Ideas of Dugin were confronted by the theorists of a new wave of moderate Eurasianism. Most of them are the experts working for government and members of the Russian academic society.

Vadim Tsimbursky was one of the most intellectually influential among them and his "The Russian Island" theory, which will take the central theoretical role in this work, was the most radically revising former geopolitical notions. At that time he was openly supporting isolationistic strategy of the country. The position of geopolitical "island" for Russia would provide favourable conditions necessary to survive in post-Soviet period. In comparison with Dugin, Tsimbursky was dedicated to the idea that after collapse of the USSR major threats of Russia do not originate from the Western or other civilizations but come from unstable surrounding periphery of Russian civilization. For Tsimbursky the most important point was not the size of the country but paradigm of development of new Russia in optimized conditions of moderate isolationism from the main centers of the World.⁹ By some modern representatives of Russian scientific society such as Boris Mejuyev, Tsibursky's vision of the situation

⁹ Tsigankov Andrey Pavlovich, "Ostrovnyaya" geopolitika Vadima Tsimburskogo", **Tetrady po konservatizmu**, vol.1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 12-13

carries neo-isolationistic features. Tsimbursky realized that along with crash of the USSR the time of globalism and cultural universalism, the time of Russian imperial triumph and representing itself as a natural part of European World has passed. Current isolationistic position of Russia brings it some historical meaning. The most reasonable path for Russia is to keep its isolation¹⁰.

It is crucial to mention that isolationism as a separate notion means status of ignoring co-operation with the World without ignoring the fact of existence of that World. Classical isolationistic state has a strong army. Even though such state does not have any external interest but army is kept informed about its potential rivals. Hence, an army carries mainly defensive functions in country. In terms of foreign affairs isolationistic state clearly illustrates its indifference towards major events happening in the World, it does not support any sides of conflicts, does not fight international terrorism or boost human rights: neither diplomatically nor financially. It stays away from any multilateral relations including participation into any international organizations including its membership. Even though such status of state looks quixotic in conditions of high-speed development of communications and general globalization of the World, such conceptual projects are represented in the Russian scientific community. For instance, the extreme modern isolationistic concept "Fortress of Russia" (*Krepost' Rossiya*) developed by Mikhail Yur'yev.¹¹

The concept is based on isolationistic principles, such as closed economy, which aims to slash the backlog in Russian economy as consequences of failed policy of 90s. By the author closed economy would provide continuous high rate of growth. In case if a radical economic lag would not be shortening in comparison with the economies of the great powers, in the future Russia as a country and civilization might be destroyed. Moreover, besides changing economic policy in order to withstand unavoidable confrontation with Western civilizations, the state ideology should be changed as well. The most effective way for it is to create civilizational barrier of differences keeping singularities of the civilization in different spheres of people's life. Such barriers are

¹⁰ Mejuyev Boris Vadimovich, "Rossiyskaya geopolitika Vadima Tsimburskogo", **Intelros** - online non-commercial project, 27.08.2007, http://www.intelros.ru/2007/08/27/boris_mezhuev_rossijskaja_geopolitika_vadima_cymburskogo.html

¹¹ Mikhail Yur'yev Russian businessman and person of politics

capable to change mentality of the nation. By the concept foreign affairs should be based on fractional isolation, except some friendly countries. Dual relations should have pragmatic bases with complete abandonment of human values besides interests of the state. All these changes are mutually strengthening each other and, in conjunction, shaping "Fortress of Russia".

This work will be based on the ideas of particular group of Russian theorists. Representatives of the group aim to seek a mid-range positions avoiding touching an extreme points where the idea of Russian civilization is taking central role. For instance, Alexander Panarin¹² is one the most progressive researcher of modern Russian geopolitical school, whose concept based of the uniqueness of Russian civilization. According to it, the Russian civilization has a complicated way of seeking the model of civilizational development. Such model was given to it due to its intermediate position (in between West and East) in civilizational process. The author claims that Russia has always been out of the big traditions of the West and the East that is why the conflicts in between small traditions (the author refers to one's which belong to small nationalities inside of Russia) and the main civilizational tradition are taking place inside of the Russian civilization. Hence, it characterizes Russian civilization being marginal in civilizational process. Due to such circumstances Russia periodically ends up reconsidering its civilizational status by changing socio-cultural orientation, thus, seeking a balance between western and eastern impulses. In comparison with other countries which are distinguished by relatively stable and integral cultural archetype, Russia from the very beginning has been developing as heterogenic western-eastern formation. Instability of Russia as a socio-cultural type relies not only on intermediate geopolitical position but on problematic synthesis of Russian society in different moments of history. Panarin divides cultures into two groups: donors and recipients. Recipients are ready to neglect own norms in favour of prestigious civilizational notions. In this dichotomy, the author relegates Russia to the second group. Orientation of mass aspirations toward globalization and consumer society plays critical role. Due to such correlation, Russia has two opposing projects: Westernizers and Eurasians, which are based on its own cultural traditions. Panarin has his own vision on Eurasian way of development for Russia, which includes strengthening authoritarian tendencies,

¹² Panarin Aleksandr Sergeevich (1940 - 2003) - Soviet and Russian philosopher and political scientist

distancing from Western civilization, increasing the role of the state in the economy, growing the importance of ideological factor.¹³

1.3. The Arctic as Innovation of Modern Geopolitics

Before introduction to the central concept of this work it is essential to present a physical image of the modern Russia, since geography is part of the core of the concept “The Russian Island”. Russia is conventionally divided into several parts. Central Part of Russia, also called as the Great Russia, is known as the historical core of the country, the capital of Russia is situated at this part, which makes it the biggest financial, informational and science center of the state. It is divided into Central Federal District - the biggest administrative and transportation center of Russia and Volga Federal District - industrial and agricultural macro-region. Both Districts are located at the European part of Russia.

The second geopolitical core of the country is Ural and Siberia. Ural situates at the border of European and Asian parts of Russia, Siberia - completely at the Asian. The regions are in charge of being a passage to the Central Asia that is why they can be called as flank macro-regions. As flank macro - regions are territories providing passages to another people and civilizations and, in case of Russia, unfrozen seas. Cross-border position of these territories can make a contribution to either unification or separation of the country. Flank macro-regions accomplish cooperation function of Russia and neighbouring countries, each one leans toward its own civilization. For instance, North West has gravity of European civilization, Southern part and Northern Caucasus to civilization of Eastern Europe (Orthodox line) and the Middle East, the Far East - China and ASEAN countries.

The regions that were described above traditionally are considered as the main regions of the Russian development. But 21st century forces countries, and especially Russia, to pay attention to the Arctic, which was never recognized as a separate region. But nowadays Arctic is seen as a region which would play a great role in the future not

¹³ Panarin Alexander Sergeevich, "Rossiya v civilizacionnom processe...", **Moscow: IF RAN**, 1995

only of some countries but the whole world. Even though the Arctic region covers a big area of the territory of Russia, it has been always left unnoticed by theorists of geopolitics, since the area was mostly inaccessible land and seas covered by ice and snow. But within the time by changing climatic conditions this tendency has started to change.

Therefore, the Arctic region steadily is getting involved into big "geopolitical game". The situation can be considered as unprecedented, since the location of the Arctic region carries a great value as being strategically important for the Great Powers of this century, such as the USA, Canada, China, Russia and some European and Asian states. It is possible to state that 21st century will become an Arctic Era in human's history, during which geopolitical structure of the world will be completely changed. In the frames of international relations at the area of the Arctic region bipolar model starts building again: Russia from one side and the rest of counterparts from another. Geopolitical approach helps to visualize strategic picture in the world and nearby regions, and then, taking relevant mid-range and long-range decisions regarding of complex protection of national interests and strategy of safe development of the states.

Arctic region locates at the North Pole of the planet and includes northern continental edges of Eurasia, North America and the Arctic Ocean with almost all its islands (except near shore islands of Norway), as well as adjacent waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Total area of Arctic region is about 25 million km²: 10 million km² is land and 15 million km² is water. 3,8 million and 6,8 million km² accordingly belongs to Russia. Russian border at the North Pole is defined by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on 15th of April 1926. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) was ratified by Russia in 1997. Due to the Convention 12 mile from the coast is sovereign territorial waters, as well as 200 miles is economic zone with free navigation excluding the right for using mineral and bio resources. Any country is able to claim for economic zone of 200 miles or more, in case if the country proves that shelf from its coast extends out of 200 miles^{14, 15}.

¹⁴ Mid-ocean Ridge is underwater mountain system formed by plate tectonics

¹⁵ Lisichkin A.N. "Arktika – region Rossii. Principi videleniya Arkticheskogo ekonomicheskogo regiona", **Problemi mestnogo samoupravleniya**, <http://www.samoupravlenie.ru/35-11.php>

2. VADIM TSIMBURSKY AND HIS GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPT “THE RUSSIAN ISLAND”

In the beginning of 21st century at his article "Ostrov Rossiya" (perspektivi rossiyskoy geopolitiki) (1993) Tsimburskiy stated that after collapse of the USSR demand for geopolitics increased dramatically. Such change required comprehension of international and domestic background of the state's border compression, acknowledge such changes as a consequence of the changing World and, at last, design for transformed Russia an optimal strategy in mutated oecumene.¹⁶

Tsimbusky was stating that it is crucial to evaluate the new tendencies of interrogation of the Russian Federation towards the space. International geopolitics and geo-economics should be combined with the domestic geopolitics and geo-economics¹⁷ in order to justify the method of future development of the country space. It would allow deriving benefits from a new-build structure of Russia. In case if the modern scholars are willing to substantiate a new geo-strategy of the country, they should, first of all, offer a new image of the country. It could become the basic model for the future, subject to analysis and rational critics output.¹⁸ Tsimbursky claimed himself as a scholar who presented to the scientific community his concept "The Russian Island". It is a unique geopolitical concept of the author, which aims to light the future path for the Russian Federation and its people. He believed that his concept is able to reflect needs of national and statehood development of new Russia. Nowadays it can be seen that relevance of theoretical heritage of Tsimbursky is growing dramatically in course of time. His ideas are getting semantic significance. Such outcome can be explained only if the theorist was able to feel and describe core of social, political and civilizational processes.

¹⁶ populated universe ("Multitrans" - online dictionary)

¹⁷ Geo-economy is a field of geopolitical projection, which deals with different kinds of flows of resources. As well as trying to regulate those flows by violent and non-violent methods in order to strengthen or undermine the power of state or political subject. Definition given by Vadim Tsimbursky, "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", 1999 <http://www.archipelag.ru/geopolitics/osnovi/russia/geopolitics/>

¹⁸ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem" let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

2.1. Establishment of “Russian Island” Concept. Features of Civilization.

In 1993 Vadim Tsimbursky published the article representing a new concept for the newborn Russian Federation. Since then, the author over 15 years continuously kept changing and developing his concept due to the major changes at the international arena. The concept presented a new way of development for the country in a future prospect. It explained a new image of the Russian Federation and it created the space for dialog for different powers for the first time. At the beginning the concept was not taken seriously by the scientific society of Russia: neither Westernizers nor Slavophilers did take the concept as their competitor. The work contains crucial details which should be widely demonstrated in order to have a full picture for evaluation. It is important to mention that the meaning of "island" differs from traditional explanation of the word as a territory surrounded from all sides by water such as lake, sea and others. By Tsimbursky "island" means territory and locals isolated from others.¹⁹

The first question that Tsimbursky states is vision of Russian identity after collapse of the USSR: if the Russian Federation is a new state or just a new phase of life of the country which used to be the Russian Empire and the USSR before. In order to find out the answer the author distinguishes the borders of Russian pattern, which by Tsimbursky, matching with the borders of Russian civilization.

The concept has civilizational specification. It states that civilization is a foundation of "The Russian Island", in fact, it is the island itself. Tsimbursky's civilization is named "pattern". In the article published in 2000, Tsimburky gives his own definition to the notion "civilization": in the center of the civilization is a solid core which made out of people or a group of peoples.²⁰ Precisely, people/peoples are the main representatives of civilization. The area of peoples' inhabitation is surrounded by civilizational periphery. Civilizational periphery is territory of communities who are relatively close to the core by ethno-cultural organization. The author here meant

¹⁹ Tsimbursky Vadim, "Ot velikogo ostrova Russii. (K prasinvolu rossiyskoy civilizacii)", **Polis, Political researches**, 1997, vol: 6, pp.34

²⁰ According to population census in 2010, there are more than 190 different peoples live on the territory of the Russian Federation

peoples of former Soviet republics including the Baltic countries. Then periphery of the civilization smoothly shifts to periphery of other civilization, thus, it is the space which is out of any civilization. Moreover, Tsimbursky thinks that besides of simple clash of civilizations, geopolitics should research:

1. Role of peripheries towards its civilizational cores
2. Ability of peripheries willingly or not protect a core from external influences, in some cases, block that core or strike at it by absorbing core with peripheral space and dissolving it.

The author states that in his works as civilization he considered only that people or a group of peoples which:

1. Federally controlling spacious area of coverage in the world's scale
2. Carrying sacral mainstay - religion or ideology typical for the civilization, which would reflect spiritual and social preferences of people to vision of existence of the world and humanity.²¹

The author states that for civilizations is natural to include numerous numbers of states, but not for the civilization with such size as Russia.

In geopolitics, Tsimbursky has seen a type of political projection, which aims to mobilize peoples and elites via geographical models and contain some political orientation and settings. Therefore, geopolitics carries three main goals:

1. Convince peoples and elites to identify themselves with certain geographical body/model;
2. Contaminate their minds with some "vital problem" which that body/model carries;
3. Captivate peoples and elites will to solve that problem.

²¹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem" let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

Geopolitics is a form of implementation of political will to the World, but not the scientific discipline existing by procedures of verification, self-refutation and methodological self-limitations.²²

States generally are acknowledged as a subject of geopolitical management. At works of Tsimbursky people carry geopolitical projections, and practicing realization of geopolitical acts. Thus, civilization is crucial concept for understanding geopolitics. Civilization is known as a stable and capable to develop macro-social community. Moreover, civilization is a complicated system which includes: unity of population and place of living; common historical background; similarities in economy, social structure, culture, religion and mentality; acknowledgment of people of belonging to that civilization and, at last, same language.

2.2. From Strait-territories to The Great Limitrophe²³


"The Russian Island" concept is the first attempt to build a project of civilizational geopolitics. Afterwards, Tsimbursky was trying to prove that civilizational geopolitics should not only concentrate its attention only on Samuel Huntington's "Clash of civilizations" doctrine, in order to be productive.²⁴ Tsimbursky was questioning if it is appropriate to equate religious communities with civilizations. He suggests several criteria to distinguish civilizations and its borders: ethnical, confessional and linguistic. The author describes Russia from geopolitical point as an integral geopolitical platform of Russian ethnicity, which it shares with Finno-Ugric and Turkic-Mongolian peoples of The Volga region, Ural and Siberia. One of the central theses of the concept is given to the notion of *strait-territories (terrioirii – prolivi)*,

²² Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich "Konyunkturi Zemli i Vremeni. Geopoliticheskiye I khronopoliticheskiye intellektual'niye rassledovaniya", **Evropa**, 2011, pp. 103

²³ The notion of Limitrophe was taken by Tsimbursky from his colleague Stanislav Khatuntsev, which originally means an ancient designation of boundary areas of the Rome Empire which had special regime, status, and, sometimes dual subordination. Through those areas the Rome Empire was in contact with the world

²⁴ Khtuncev Stanislav Vital'yevich, "Vadim Tsimburkiy, russkiy geopolitik", **Tetradi po konservatizmu**, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 158

which is described as one of the features of Russian pattern²⁵. If it comes to direct description, then "strait-territories" is the belt of the states and the peoples verged to the core of European civilization but not the part of it. "Strait-territories" separates the Russian civilization from European Roman-Germanic civilization. By the author, the belt covers the countries of Baltic region, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.²⁶



Map 1.2.1. The strait-territories decribed by the author at his first edition of the concept « The Russian Islnad » in 1993.

A year after his first conceptual article has seen the world Tsimbursky published an annex to his concept. The author prolonged the "straits" area including bordering countries of the Central Asia, as civilizational and geopolitical belt separating "The Russian Island" from the Middle East. The land of "*The Great Limitrophe*" (*Velikiy Limitrophe*) by the author is matching with the borders of "the Island". It serves as protection from the influence of other neighboring civilizations such as Europe, Middle

²⁵ Map 1.2.1. <https://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/europe-map/political-map-europe.htm> (07.06.2019)

²⁶ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya. Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye raboti. 1993 -2006.", Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007, pp.8

East and China. "The Great Limitrophe" is an integral geopolitical mega system from Baltic's to Korea. Distinctive feature of Limitrophe area is a constant "hanging" communities in between of those civilizations, they lived historically on the outskirts of it. In order to set apart "The Great Limitrophe" as an integral system Tsimburky produced some historical arguments. Limitrophe is a belt of lands left and preserved from an old intercontinental Eurasia, which was torn apart by strengthening Russia in 16th – 17th centuries. In addition, Tsimbursky mentions solidarity of the majority of "The Great Limitrophe" states in antagonism against Russia, which effects at the time when Russia starts "pushing on" those countries. But at the same times the belt of Limitrophe plays an important role of being a barrier in preventing clash of Russia with core powers of other civilizations. Tsimbursky took into consideration states that "The Great Limitrophe" might predominantly lay a claim to be a real "Eurasia". Then the majority of international geopolitical problems of Russia can be described as relationships between Russia and the peoples of Limitrophe - Eurasia as well as with those other civilizations, which civilizational platforms are coming out to Limitrophe.²⁷

Furthermore, if in 17th - 19th centuries the area where platforms of Russia and China are coming close was considered as the remote lands, now its role has been transformed. Lands on Russian pattern are specific with its low-development. Sparse population attracts or, how Tsimbursky expresses, it is being "swallowed" by "stronger" population of China and its economy. The landscape and the natural conditions on the south - east of Russia dissemble crawling Chinese platform on Russian pattern. It is considered by the author as an external threat due to a bad industrialization of the lands of Siberia and the Far East.

From other side, in his work (1999) Tsimbursky suggests to collaborate with the powers of the neighbouring civilizations such as China and Iran - the alliance with Russia against possible penetration of European - Atlantic powers to the territory of "The Great Limitrophe". The author claimed that Caucasian and Central Asian sectors of "The Great Limitrophe" are vulnerable against the influence coming from Euro-Atlantic powers. Therefore, Tsimbursky draws a plan of mutual control over

²⁷ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem' let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

"explosive" inter-civilizational buffer zone of the Central Asia region. Regarding the plan, three "eastern centers" should unite into one barrier to prevent direct invasion Euro-Atlantic powers from "The Great Limitrophe" to Heartland.²⁸ Transport streams going from the Indian Ocean to Europe through the northern path, in fact, could consolidate transport oligopoly between of these three countries, which would be provided by their cooperation in the Central Asia and joint opposition against any attempts to destabilize "The Great Limitrophe". The Central Asia can be a good strategic field of Russia, China and Iran, which could help to keep the status-quo in the Central Asia. Such plan is able to guarantee safety of Russia.²⁹ Practically, already in 90's Tsimbursky predicted strengthening a new line of foreign policy of the second presidency of Vladimir Putin: persistent collaboration with China within the framework of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in order to avoid dominance of the USA in the Central Asian region, Ukraine and Transcaucasia.

Critical events of 90s and first decades of 21st century demonstrate that worries of Tsimbursky regarding vulnerability of "The Great Limitrophe" region had the ground. The region became the main confrontation field between Russia and other regional powers of Eurasia against the USA and the Western power overall (Orange revolutions, tension over Caspian oil, issues during the Chechnya War, attempt to spark Uyghur revolt in Xinjiang).³⁰

In fact, a gigantic belt consisting the Eastern Europe, Subcarpathia and Trans-Dniester, Transcaucasia including Caucasus Mountains, Kazakhstan, Xinjiang region of China is a "straits" in between civilizational platforms³¹. Thereby, Tsimbursky claims that since the beginning of 21st century Russian does not situate in between Europe and Asia. Russia is a platform with the gates to the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans with full

²⁸ Mejuyev Boris Vadimovich, "Kartografiya rossiyskogo evropeizma", "**Zapiski konservatizma**" journal, vol.1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 25

²⁹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, interview "Posledniy geokulturniy vibor Rossii - "s krayu stola bogatih I silnih", "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "The Russian World", 2001, <http://www.archipelag.ru/geoculture/concept/interpretation/final-choice/>

³⁰ Mejuyev Boris Vadimovich, "Politicheskaya kritika Vadima Tsimburskogo", **Evropa**, 2012, pp. 34, 46

³¹ Map 1.2.2 <https://majorityrights.com/uploads/Evroazija-mapa-eurasia.jpg> (06.06.2019)

access to "The Great Limitrophe" along of all its extension.³² Such a widespread position of the country in between of two economic powers creates a threat for its survival as a political body. Moreover, Russia will be able to take advantage out of its unique position, just as Pacific economies, mostly China and Japan, make their way to "The Great Limitrophe" is questionable. If in 1991-1993 "The Russian Island" had to strive to protect itself from dictatorship of the states of Limitrophe (European Union, for instance), in the second half of 90's the most important task of the state is to generate a policy towards all space of Limitrophe - Eurasia without any exclusion. Primarily, governmental vision to the Limitrophe space should be changed. If during the Russian Empire "The Great Limitrophe" was considered as a territory of possible hegemony of Russia and its total geopolitical field, then in modern time "The Great Limitrophe" is an "outer" shelf of the "Island" which blends to the "shelf" of other civilizational platforms. It perceived that following decades the main Russian external security challenges will be forming on the fields of outer shelf. Meanwhile, it contains the main possibilities to enhance security of the country and chances to get a new role in the World³³. Latest situations on Balkans', Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Pacific shows that leading powers of the West would try to fulfill some world-systemic and geopolitical projects including "leftover of Soviet heritage" on "The Great Limitrophe". The shelf of "The Great Limitrophe" differs from the classical geographical notion. The shelf of "The Russian Island" is the territories that relate to present fundamental Russian territories in terms of physical geography, geo-strategy and cultural ties. Mikhail Il'yin presented such definition³⁴. Tsimbursky states that present contour of Russia is optimal for Russian geopolitics of space; in particular, such territories as Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia are part of shelf of "The Russian Island" and are clearly considered as a privileged for the interests of Russia.

³² Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem' let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of " The Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

³³ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem' let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of " The Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

³⁴ Il'yin Mikhail Vasil'yevich - Doctor of political Science, professor of Moscow State Institute of International Relations



Map 1.1.2 The Great Limitrophe (blue lines) – described by the author at his concept’s edition in 1994. Map is self-made by the author of this work

Meanwhile, Russia is "staked" with the "Island" status without a claim to hegemony but remaining an opponent of any other hegemony on "the strait - territories" and "The Great Limitrophe". It is crucial to mention that in comparison with the classical type of Eurasianists trying to expand territory of Russia to the size of the USSR, Tsimbursky thought that Russia should not try to include the area of "The Great Limitrophe" into its borders. Since he considered Russia as "civilizational platform" and its people as its core, then the peoples living on the "strait-territories" are not integrated enough into Russian civilization to harmonize with it and become part of it. By his point of view the "strait-territories" are not domesticated in terms of its ethnicity but they are "geopolitically homogeneous" to enhance Russian security. Not having the territory of "The Great Limitrophe" inside of the Russian borders but hold it as a buffer zone would give Russia a chance to involve deeply into internal development of the country.³⁵ Tsimbursky insists that the most important task is to avoid domination of the Western

³⁵ Tsigankov Andrey Pavlovich, "Ostrovnyaya" geopolitika Vadima Tsimburskogo", **“Tetradi po konservatizmu”** journal, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 12 - 13

civilization on "The Great Limitrophe". That belt should be the territory, which connects and separates civilizations, but not the area that is under control of these civilizations and the weapon of its dictatorship.

Contrary, authors who were considering the possibility of such project, think that to realize it there should be certain conditions such as absence of any external threats for Russia. Also for such plot being realistic Western expansion should only exist as an answer to Russian invasion to Europe and geopolitical civilization platforms should be solid, motionless and expand on account of only empty spaces on its geopolitical area. Such scenarios are geopolitically utopian. External threats do and will continue to exist. Moreover, Tsimbursky also emphasized that Russian civilization is one of the smallest in terms of its population, in comparison with euro-Atlantic, Chinese or Indian, which does not favour reinforcement of Russian civilization.³⁶ However, at the same time Russia has several decades to acclimatize to realities of the modern World, since its "island" position protects it from military pressure either from Western or Chinese civilization. But in order to succeed in domestic politics it requires having appropriate foreign political course as well. The author was offering to use balancing approach between the main sub-centers of the World without being a part of it. Tsimbursky was claiming that Russia in 21st century does not claim to be a hegemonic power of the World, but opposes any sub-centers hegemony.³⁷ Parameters of unimultipolar world³⁸, belt of "The Great Limitrophe" and nuclear weapons are three basics of security for "The Island of Russia" until the time the Russian civilization will finish establishing the image of New Russia. Till then it is important to avoid open external threats³⁹. Moreover Russia should learn to coordinate on geo-economical field⁴⁰ some decisions

³⁶ Kholmogorov Egor Stanislavovich, "V poiskah utrachenogo Tsar'grada", "**Tetradi po konservatizmu**" journal, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 136-137

³⁷ Tsigankov Andrey Pavlovich, "Ostrovnyaya" geopolitika Vadima Tsimburskogo", "**Tetradi po konservatizmu**" journal, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 13 - 14

³⁸ The term was invented by Samuel Huntington in 90s of 20th century, the World with one Powerful Center, which is able to influence on processes happening all over the World, but at the same time there are some sub-centers which neither by themselves nor together are able to counterbalance the Powerful Center. Generally sub-centers do not offer any alternatives of existing order, but at the same time they can confront the Powerful Center in case if their interests dramatically do not match

³⁹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Konyunkturi Zemli i Vremeni. Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye intellektual'niye rassledovaniya", **Evropa**, Moscow, 2011, pp.12

⁴⁰ Geo-economy is a field of geopolitical projection, which deals with different kinds of flows of resources. As well as trying to regulate those flows by violent and non-violent methods in order to strengthen or undermine the power of state or political subject. Definition given by Vadim Tsimbursky,

which would help Russia to compensate an absence/weakness of military alliances. Hence, apart of nuclear weapons and strong state's military forces, geo-economy of the country should use its methods to reveal chances to increase security of Russia.

The period after collapse of the USSR to modern days can be distinguished as a critical junction when several events came together to help Russia to demonstrate its civilizational substance. By Tsimbursky for the first time Russian civilization for the last three centuries is neither close to European civilization nor to Asian. Russia is surrounded by the belt of the countries which are weaker by military strength (accept China). Although on "strait-territories" the situation might be changed in case if the countries of Baltic's region, Ukraine or Georgia will be integrated into NATO. The scenario is basically coming true since the beginning of 21st century. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO in 2000. Therefore, it weakened the security level of Russia from the side of "strait-territories".

The author offers three main geopolitical interests, which should become a prior in Russian geopolitics in 21st century:

1. Accepting modern lineaments of the state
2. Priority of domestic geopolitics
3. Priority of Russian east with its ethnical autonomies.

Therefore, Tsimbursky created the frame of the ideological project for Russia: dual ideology, which is from one side, is facing the World and from another side - itself. The system represents mutually supportive ideological complex.⁴¹

To sum up, the author applies three geopolitical priorities for Russia:

1. Russia should accept current borders of the state, therefore, it should not try to expand his territory;
2. Eastern part of the country with its people should become a priority of the country;

"Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", 1999, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", <http://www.archipelag.ru/geopolitics/osnovi/russia/geopolitics/>

⁴¹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Shel'f "Ostrova Rossiya". Geopolitika prostranstv i geopolitika granits", Speech at the Roundtable of the Institute of the Peoples of the North, 18.09.2008 <http://www.archipelag.ru/authors/cimbursky/?library=2783>

3. Russian Federation should concentrate on its domestic geopolitics.

Consequently, Russian geopolitics has a chance to reinforce domestic geopolitics in order to optimize using the state's land. Domestic geopolitics includes not only governing over some territory but also governing over population of that territory by minding ethnical aspects. Domestic geopolitical space consists social and cultural elements, state and regional borders, ethnical, religious and local identities and migration processes⁴². Moreover, after collapse of the USSR the borders between international and domestic geopolitics became conventional because of strengthening status of the regions inside of countries regarding their roles in international affairs. It makes actual to study the problem of domestic regions and its role of influence on the World's geopolitical situation. As it was mentioned above Tsimbursky and his concept are periodically criticized for offering for Russia isolationistic model of development which is not appropriate for modern conditions and does not conduce favourable development of Russia. However, "The Russian Island" concept is not a classical isolationistic model. If regions of Russia especially its eastern part on the rise, it is going to require attraction of foreign funds, establishing certain legal conditions (taxes, information and others) for successful economical interrogation. Therefore, "The Russian Island" allows international investments on its territory, while keeping its isolation towards other global civilizations.⁴³

At his works Tsimbursky paid attention to the peculiarity of geographical structure of Russian landscape as well, he kept stating that the landscape is essential for Russian geopolitics. Nowadays geopolitical formula of the country has the shape of rectangular inscribed into ellipse. Ellipse also includes waters and lands surrounding the country from the outside, and playing an important role for maintaining Russian security. Rectangular, by itself, is in charge of communicational structure of the country. The ellipse of Russian external environment is made of two arcs, meeting at two points: Murmansk and Vladivostok. The waters of Arctic Sea and Pacific Ocean on its east shape the upper arc. Moreover, the lower arc is the territory of "The Great

⁴² Remnev Anatoliy Viktorovich, "Vnutrnnnyaya geopolitika aziatskoy Rossii konca XIX – nachala XX v.", Novosibirsk, **Parallel'**, 2011. pp.184

⁴³ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Osnovaniya rossiyskogo geopoliticheskogo konservatizma", **Tetrad po konservatizmu**, vol.1, Moscow, 2015, pp.44

Limitrophe" itself. Tsimbursky mentions about structural and geographical correlation in between of two arcs of "Russian Island": one of it is an arc of waters between Russian and the New World⁴⁴ completely or partially is prone to glaciations. The other arc is overland interval in the Old World⁴⁵ in between Russia and civilizations of warm waters. Significantly that the arcs meet where Russia comes up to open oceanic waters. In Russia the main communication systems situates along meridians: Volga, Don and rivers of the White Sea flows. Railways and airways pulled along European part of Russia. On the Far East River Lena flows along meridians as well, the ways linking Yakutia and Transbaikal situate parallel to it. Navigation along the shore of the Pacific Ocean goes from south to north and back. Communication systems on Siberia mainly are latitudinal: in the area of Ural-Siberia transportation ways forwarding from West to East, such as Trans-Siberian Railways and The Northeast Passage. The most crucial airways go from west to east as well - parallel to the belts of tundra, forests and steppes. Due to poor habitation of Siberia, the most importance is given to "*angle regions*"⁴⁶ (*stolpi*) of Russia: on north-west - Baltic and White Seas, on south-west is lower Volga region and North Caucasus with exit to the Black and the Caspian Seas; on the north-east corner is south Primorye and Transbaikal. The last angle has the most severe climate conditions since it faces Bering Strait (Chukotka, Kamchatka, Magadan region and northeast of Yakutia).⁴⁷

⁴⁴ The New World is one of the names used for the majority of Earth's Western Hemisphere, specifically the Americas (taken from Wikipedia.com)

⁴⁵ The Old World term is used to refer to Africa, Europe, and Asia, regarded collectively as the part of the world known to its population before contact with the Americas and Oceania (taken from Wikipedia.com)

⁴⁶ Map 1.2.3. <https://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/country-map12/russia-map-quiz-countries-and-capitals.htm> (01.06.2019)

⁴⁷ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", 1999, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", <http://www.archipelag.ru/geopolitics/osnovi/russia/geopolitics/>



Map 1.2.3 Angle regions of Russia

Besides of these four angles Tsimbursky distinguished one more sector of high importance. It situates on the east from the Volga region and North Caucasus angle, south-west of Siberia with heads of the rivers Irtysh and Ob, facing plains of Western Siberia. The routes from the west of Russia coming through Orenburg region and north-west passing through Ural are situated at the sector. The first route involves Islamic republics and the second totally excludes them. The area from Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk until Tomsk and Kemerovo remote from Caucasus the Middle East allows in case of necessity to localize and block spreading possible conflicts on south west and Caucasian region, keep safely conducting the West of Russia with its East bypass of the crises area.⁴⁸

In the "angle regions", more particularly those which are next to the other civilizations of Euro-Asia, local elites are very strong. If the center of the state does not want to lose control over "the angles", maintaining mutual understanding with those elites is important to the center. "The center" can feel strong only when it has an acknowledgment in Ural-Siberia and strong position on the Western flank of Russia.

⁴⁸ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Zemlya za Velikim Limitropheom": ot "Rossii – Evrazii" k "Rossii v Evrazii", "Rossiya – zemlya za Velikim Limitropheom. Tsivilizaciya i eyo geopolitika", **Editorial URSS**, Moscow, 2000, pp. 125

That is why in case of any national crises these areas should be the most interest for the government.

Tsimbursky stated that four corners of Russia are geopolitically ambivalent. From one side they play paramount role in the country's inner organization, have the function of "sea windows" to the World. Some authors think that the points are the most perspective regions of growth and cluster of innovation along Russian borders. From other hand authors apprehend threats causing by outer positions of “the angles” to Russia, for instance, attempts of nibble of Russian lands.

In case if Russia loses control over any “angle region”, it can be torn apart and destabilized as a whole communication center. Since then Russia may also lose an ability to regulate its relation with the external world and let "that" world geographically cut in Russia, which is going to leave Russia without sovereignty.

2.3. “Kidnapping Europe” and its Repeating Circles

The land of Russian civilization in the past was divided into relatively independent parts, named knyajestvo. The process of uniting the state had been started at the beginning of 16th century. As a result, it ended up with formation of the Russian Empire along with reclaiming Siberia. Therefore, Russia has being shaped into gigantic island inside of the continent, which Tsimbursky named as “Russian Island” with ino-ethnic spots. In 16th – 17th century inaccessible lands on the East more radically separated "Russian Island" from ethno-civilizational platforms on Asia, rather than "strait-territories" from European civilization platform. In the event, Russia faced the question of its governmental identification: the choice to focus either on rural, hard to domesticate the East or on "strait- territories". In fact, most of the Russian territories are the result of Russian expansion. At the same timeframe (16th and 17th) century, Russia spread its authority over its north and eastern territories using the same method as Spain and England used to do over its colonial era: fleet and firearms. Russian colonizers were moving down the rivers without almost facing any rival civilization until crashing

against Manchu Empire at Albazino⁴⁹ in 17th century. The most essential for the state was that Russians started agrarian peasant colonization of Siberia by establishing agrarian basis, which pushed forward economic development of Siberia. It forced locals to lay down arms and accept agriculture of Russian peasants. By uniting scattered peoples of Siberia inside one country Siberia became part of Russia.⁵⁰ Obviously, in establishing Russian civilization Tsimbursky gave a tremendous role to Siberia. After collapse of the USSR, there was a general fear that Siberia might be torn away. Therefore, concept of "The Russian Island" was created as a method to hold Siberian territory and make it solid platform of the Russian civilization, therefore, other external civilizations would not be able to take it away⁵¹. Although, in Russian scientific society has contradictionary points of view regarding the role of Siberia for the state. Debates on this matter have started at the second half of 19th century and continues since then. Tsimbursky argues with some scholars, such as Potanin Grigory Nikolaevich⁵² who was trying to prove that Siberia should be recognized as a colony of Russia. In the period of 19th – 20th centuries such idea was popular among the Russian scholars. The importance of Siberian lands was underestimated generally including the ruling elites. Well-known historical fact is sale of Alaska by the Emperor Alexander II to the USA in 1867 for extremely low price is the brightest example of it. In the modern time sale of Alaska is broadly criticized and considered as one of the biggest political failure of the century.

The image of Siberia was changing gradually: overall, the first time a call to stop dividing Russia into European and Asian parts came from the Russian geographer Pyotr Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky at the beginning of the 20th century. At his articles he offered to get thorough geographical image dividing country into two unfair parts, since it was making the country vulnerable. The author urged to avoid presenting the Siberian part as a suburb. It was advised consider it as fundamental land, which is equal to European part of Russia. Tsimburky had a strong statement that Russia did not take Siberia in but Siberia established Russia as state. In order to prove his affirmation the author draws a

⁴⁹ Albazino is a village in Skovorodinsky District of Amur Oblast, Russia, noted as the site of Albazin, the first Russian settlement on the Amur River. Located close to Russian - Chinese border

⁵⁰ Sherstoboyev Vadim Nikolayevich, "Ilimskaya pashnya. T.1: Pashnya ilimskogo voevodstva XVII i nachala XVIII veka", Irkutsk, 1949, (Second edition, Irkutsk 2001)

⁵¹ Kholmogorov Egor Stanislavovich, "V poiskah utrachennogo Tsar'grada", "**Tetradi po konservatizmu**" journal, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 142-144

⁵² Grigory Nikolayevich Potanin (1835 - 1920) Potanin was an author and a political activist who aligned himself with the Siberian separatist movement.

hypothetical scenario: if Russian territory would break down into two - Moscow Central part and Ural - Siberia Federation, their destinies into "The Russian Island" pattern would be different. The Moscow Central would not be Russia as it is known since 16th century anymore because of existence the Ural - Siberia Federation. In this case, the Moscow Central would fall into sphere of attraction of the European civilization. Since Europe being heterogeneous in many aspects, it would climb down to the area of "strait-territories" with all upcoming consequences: conflicts with Ukraine for territories, exacerbation of relations with Estonia and Latvia and others. Whereas, the Ural-Siberia Federation would have the most strategic potential of "The Russian Island" enough for deterrence of on surge from China. It could be still a country with "strait-territories" on its West and remote area on the East. Thus, it would be a state reflecting original civilizational pattern of Russia, which it is now, just smaller on its size. Such hypothetical project clearly illustrates deterministic role of Russian East, which it plays nowadays.⁵³

At modern time there are also some contradictive geopolitical projects exist. For instance: Igor' Yakovenko⁵⁴ is a bright representative of modern Westernizer's scientific club. At his book "Russian state: national interests, borders, perspectives" published in 1999 he claims that Russia is able to overcome its economical lag by allowing its own disintegration. To support his idea, Yakovenko proclaims Siberia, firstly, being partially populated colony, secondly, its inability to fit into European frames following classical idea of Westernizers that Russia is a part of European culture. At last, the author states that for thousands years the territory of Siberia belonged to Chinese civilization. Therefore, Siberian side with its local peoples could easily follow China and adapt to its culture. Then Russia itself would be free from the extra load to develop rapidly and adopt European style of supervision.⁵⁵

Vadim Mejuyev named Russia at the end of 20th century an "Atlantis", as a sign of the country, which exists under threat of disruption after collapse of the USSR. There

⁵³ **Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" (perspektivi rossiyskoy geopolitiki)", - Polis, Political researches, vol.5, 1993, pp.6**

⁵⁴ Yakovenko Igor' Grigor'yevich, Prof. of philosophy at Moscow State University named after Lomonosov

⁵⁵ Yakovenko Igor' Grigor'yevich, "Russkoe gosudarstvo: nacional'niye interesi, granitsi, perspektivi", Novosibirsk, **Sibirskiy khronograf**, 1999, pp. 61, 136

are also some popular predictions of foreign scholars. Zbigniew Brzezinski represented image of future Russia as confederations taken under European influence on the West and Chinese on the East.⁵⁶

Therefore, if we conclude, 16th – 17th centuries became the period of "insular" self-realization expressed in terms of expanding towards East, thus increasing its size and resources. Further, the focus of Russian geopolitics was dramatically changed.

Starting with regiment of the Peter the Great at the beginning of 18th century Russia was striving to become part of European culture. Such movement Tsimbursky named as "*kidnapping Europe*" (*pokhischeniye Evropi*) - an important notion of the concept. The central meaning of the notion is that Russia as European nation is not consistent with Europe. In his later publication the author developed the idea: each great civilization has its own core of population - the group or one ethnic. For Western (European) civilization it is peoples from Romano-Germanic ethnical family. It situates on both sides of Northern Atlantic originated from Europe. As it was mentioned above, once in 18th century Russian elite, being on the head of the country, which before geopolitically and civilizational had been formed out of the European culture, declared itself as a part of it and wished to be acknowledged by European states. For Russian elites the way of success was not only imitation of Western cultural habits but secure Russian's constant place in European politics to have the ability to influence balance of power in European pattern.

General point of view among Russian historians is Russia was always facing foreign invaders from Europe trying to protect its own land. But the point of view of Tsimburky differs from the traditional vision. To prove his idea, he divided historical time interval of three centuries to three circles.

⁵⁶ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", 1999, "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", <http://www.archipelag.ru/geopolitics/osnovi/russia/geopolitics/>

2.3.1. Circle One⁵⁷

Step A: After victory in the battle in Poltava (1709) during the Great Northern War Russia first time in history reinforced its position in European continent. Then within 90 following years Russia participated in 4 military operations on European platform and on the area of "strait-territories": Seven Year's War (1756 - 1763), military campaign in coalition with Austria against France and Switzerland where the revolutions were taking place - territories which Russia never had common borders and never could. The third one was the Suvorov's military march through Alps (1799), which by Tsimbursky did not have any political sense and as a result weakened union with Austria. As final, Alexander I held two unsuccessful wars in coalition with Austria and Prussia against Napoleon (1805 - 1807), which as a result brought threat of Napoleon army close to Russian borders. For the same period of 100 years the Russian Empire managed to take away from Sweden territory of Baltics, Finland, Crimea, shared Poland territories with Austria and Prussia, as well as holding four wars against Turkey netting an advance to Mediterranean. Thus, in Step A military policy of Russia has two lines: first one is pragmatic, expressed in continuous pushing on inside of Europe by including new areas of "strait-territories" inside of Russian geopolitical body. While spreading deeper into European pattern Russia did not face core of Europe directly until division of Poland did not bring Russia close to Romano - Germanic Empires. The second line is idealistic, when Russia participated into big wars far from its own borders for balance in Europe or crackdown of European revolutions, wars without any territorial benefits or any other financial rewards.

Step B: Combination of two lines described above gives the result of reciprocal aggression. For instance, Napoleon army came close to western borders of the Russian Empire, which, after violation of conditions of Treaties of Tilsit (1807) between Napoleon and Alexander I, gave reason for Napoleon to start military campaign against the Russian Empire in 1812.

⁵⁷ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", 1994, **Russian Archipelago** – online project, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

Step C: After defeating Napoleon Army on the wave of Russian patriotism (1812) Russia again started the war for "liberation of Europe" from Napoleon and following threat of another war against "liberated" European states for Polish territories which Russia claimed fully for itself. In the event, coming up Holy Alliance (1815) made by Alexander I and his successor Nikolas I hegemoned most of the lands of Germany. Overwhelmingly, both of the Emperors kept status-quo by fighting against revolutions appearing on the European platform against royal families, at the same time not paying attention at the opportunities opening aside of European civilization, such as embodying complete Slavic territories of Eastern Europe to the Russian Empire.

Step D: Since 1820 the biggest states of Romano - Germanic world, such as England, Austria and France started deterrence policy of Russia, which as a result caused The Crimean War (1853 - 1856) and its territorial loses for Russia. Following Congress of Berlin (1878) when European countries tried to push away Russia from Slavic Balkan territories. Therefore, 1870s were the conclusion of the first circle of "kidnapping Europe". After then defensive alliance of the Ottoman Empire and England as well as Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (1882) completely closed the way for Russia to the West and South-West.

2.3.2. Circle Two⁵⁸

Step A: By the author, the Triple Entente (1907) started the second circle of "kidnapping Europe" period. Being one of the members of the Triple Entente restored the chances for the Russian Empire to assert itself in European pattern. The two military-political lines: pragmatic and "idealistic", which were described above emerged in getting into the First World War in prejudice of Russian interests.

Step B: An attempt to rank among European societies finished in 1910s similar as one hundred years ago but a way worse due to instability within the Russian Empire at that time. The Russian attempt to get out of war without annexation and contributions failed

⁵⁸ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", 1994, **Russian Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

completely: The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) deprived Russian "strait-territories" including some part of Russian platform on the south. In addition to it, there followed additional negative measures from Russian former Entente allies states: France and England. As at the beginning of 19th century Russia pushed into Europe by taking too many commitments for non-European country. Again, such policy led to invasion of Russian territories and interests by European states.

Step C: Russia, undergoing Bolshevik regime, experienced stir on "strait territories" in the form of unsuccessful local revolutions in Hungary (1919) and Slovakia (1919), including some campaigns in Poland, which led to Peace of Riga (1921) not in favour of the Bolshevik Russia.

Step D: European states stood up for Poland (1920 -1921) and failure of communistic revolutions in Germany (1923) and Bulgaria (1923) meant the end of the second circle of "kidnapping Europe". At the end of this circle Russia lost more of "strait-territories" rather than in the previous circle.

2.3.3. Circle Three⁵⁹

Step One: Although Versailles system fenced off Europe from the USSR, relations with Germany were kept tight until 1933. Even though the USSR was expecting upcoming war Russia operated in Poland with Germany annexed Baltic and signed Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact (1939) which would allow the USSR move toward Europe in case of aggression against Germany. Thereby, the USSR was trying to return to Europe.

Step B: Circle was repeating: same as in 18th - beginning 19th centuries the USSR ended up close to European pattern borders, binding itself with obligations to the biggest European hegemon of a new European order from one side and entering into disputes from another. Failure in the war with Finland (1939 - 1940), contradictions between Russia and Germany in 1940 ended up with The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).

⁵⁹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", 1994, **Russian Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

Step C: Same as in previous circle rollback of European intervention led to the biggest Russian irruption to European platform. Due to Brezhnev Doctrine the USSR prevailed on "strait-territories", including German, Prussian and Saxony lands on the eastern bank of the Elbe River which can be considered as a part of European core. Russia has never been so "European" power as it was during the third period.

Step D: Western policy of the USSR deterrence in the system of Euro-Atlantic security, falling out Albania and Yugoslavia from the USSR protectorship which took away Soviet positions in the Adriatic, weakening positions in Romania, end of the Warsaw Treaty, withdrawal of troops from European platform and as final, collapse of the USSR. These were the major, one by one event, the USSR experienced during this Step.

After analyzing all the three circles it is possible to see that relative Steps of each circle repeating itself. During the Step A Russia breaks spatial barriers which separates her from Romano-Germanic European platform, and at the same time getting involve into alliances forcing her partially sacrifice her own interests. That pushes to Step B, when Russian strategy stumbles (losing in wars of 1805 -1807, abortive military situation in 1917 or weakened positions of the USSR in 1939, which illustrated Russian - Finnish War). The common plot of Step B is counter march of Europe to Russia, which covers "strait-territories" and starts to overflow Russian platform. Such military strike has been two ways: organized by the strong European Empire, which concerned by too pushy interference of Russia into European affairs. Or march organized by opposing each other in Euro-Atlantic World powers, that separately pushing onto Russian platform by dividing Russian elites and bringing domestic destruction. Such scenario happened during the First World War, when elites were divided into White and Red supported by different European groups, which lead to devastating Civil War. Step C is the consequence of Step B. Russian counter stand against European intervention finishes with occupation and abeyance of "strait-territories" and partially interference onto the lands of Romano-Germanic Europe. Step D comes down to European active deterrence by Cold or "Hot" wars, while Russia does not drop back to its own platform for a long duration (from decade to half a century), thus Russia eases the pressure on European platform. After the end of each "kidnapping Europe" circle

some part of "strait-territories" is experiencing non-control by Russian or European permanent ill-being.

2.3.4. "Eurasian Interlude" Periods

Apart of "kidnapping Europe" circles, Tsimbursky distinguished periods which Russia experiencing in between of those circles. The author named them "*Eurasian Interlude*" (*Yevraziyskaya intermedia*).⁶⁰

First "Eurasian Interlude" starts the second half of 1850s and continues until middle of 1900s. During that period Russia managed to bring under control lands in Central Asia, made a first attempt to go forward Afghanistan, had numerous expeditions to Mongolia and Tibet, expansion in Korea, Manchuria and the War with Japan. End of the interlude considered signing the agreements with England and Japan in 1907 -1912, which established Russian borders of Asian interests and marked Russian turn towards Europe in the face of Entente.

The second "Eurasian Interlude" is taking place between 20's and 30's of 20th century: the period of establishment of the USSR, turning Mongolia into Soviet protectorate, political preconception in China, battles with Japan on the Far East. Weakening of the second "Eurasian Interlude" is demonstrated by suspicion of Stalin to Mao Zedong revolution, limited interference of the USSR into Korean War, giving away some territories such as Port Arthur and Dairen to China, readiness to return part of Southern Kuril Islands to Japan.

Tsimbursky concludes that the existence of "Eurasian Interludes" in between "Kidnapping Europe" circles means that growing tension between Russian and Europe for last three centuries never has started with open call of Western civilization. In all cases the circle starts from Russian activity in Europe.

By analysing all the circles and phases, Vadim Tsimbursky concluded that from circle to circle phase power of "Kidnapping Europe" decreases, same happens with

⁶⁰ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", 1994, **Russian Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

"Eurasian interlude" period. Thereby, the author expresses his disbelief in the fourth circle of "Kidnapping Europe" happening again.⁶¹

The times when the Russian Empire conducted activity on the East, the "door" to Europe or the areas linked with Europe were blocked. Besides, the object of Eastern expansion was the regions of European interests as well. Such periods, more particular Russia rushed to Europe, are called by the author, as the most dramatic in Russian history during The Russian Empire. It was causing reverse actions from Europe toward "the island". The brightest example of it is the harsh conditions of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 because of Russian disengagement from the Second World War.

Therefore, nowadays Russia leaves "strait-territories" and retreats to "the island". That way it is distancing from other ethno-civilizational platforms. Tsimbursky thinks that along with crash of the Russian Empire and diplomacy of Bolsheviks came to its end, 280 years of period in Russian history when it was trying to "kidnap Europe" finished. The concept "The Russian Island" leads to the geopolitical priorities, which are completely opposite to one's, which used to be at the time of Russian Empire. Nowadays, by the author, Russia does not have any perspectives at the West of "strait-territories". There as the South part of it plays highly important defensive role, protecting from hegemony of other civilizations. The first priority of "The Russian Island" is domestic geopolitics focusing on regional development of "the island", taking into consideration its natural and economic differentiation, in particular, those remote areas that remain untouched since its accession. "Kidnapping Europe" was always preventing development of the country itself. In particular, the Eastern and Trans-Urals were left without attention mainly because of external European, Balkan, partially the Middle East focuses of the Russian Empire's governmental politics.

Tsimbursky simultaneously distinguished the terms that might bring a negative impact to the development of Russian geopolitics. He named it "idols"⁶² of geopolitics which are not suitable for the Russian Federation. Among one of the most dangerous "idols" the author underlined that geopolitics should not be represented as an ideology

⁶¹ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", 1994, **Russian Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/same

⁶² The term is taken from the work of Francis Bacon "Novum Organum", where he classified the intellectual fallacies of his time under four heading, called "idols"

of spatial expansion. Such representation of geopolitics comes from the time of Haushofer, which is by Tsimbursky gives one-sided vision, determined by circumstances of Germany at the beginning of 20th century. Modern Russian geopolitics should realize that the country has been changed due to the transformation of the World itself. That is why it is crucial to generate a strategy which would help the country to adopt and survive in conditions of constantly changing World. It is essential to highlight new features of Russian relations with the space in comparison with The Russian Empire time⁶³. As it was described above the circulation of "Kidnapping Europe" came to its end and, by Tsimbursky, is highly unlikely to be repeated. Therefore, the author expected that from economical point of view, decline of tension with European pattern may provoke rapid regional development of "The Russian Island". The author claimed that "domestic geopolitics" has already taken a meaningful place in Russian geopolitics; it is just left unnoticed by authorities.

In Russian scientific community along with unsympathetic scientific audience, Tsimbusky has a group of scholars supporting and developing his concepts. By Kholmogorov⁶⁴ Tsimbursky has been trying to comprehend "the largest geopolitical catastrophe of 20th century - collapse of the Soviet Union and sudden compression of Russian borders until the size equal to the 17th century. His vision of the situation drastically differs from the general point of view represented in the scientific society. Russia lost not the fundamental parts of its territory; not the core of Russian civilization but the "strait" of "The Great Limitrophe", which as was already described, separating "The Russian Island" from European and other neighbouring civilizational platforms.

The main idea which can be taken from his works is, first of all, to stop correlating itself with European and any other global order, and, secondary, start to determine itself as a special, self-sufficient people on the special land. Russia should forward its strength to taiga, its East and Siberia, even to consider moving the capital to Novosibirsk or eastern.

⁶³ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Osnovaniya rossiyskogo geopoliticheskogo konservatizma", **Tetrad po konservatizmu**, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp.42

⁶⁴ Kholmogorov Egor Stanislavovich - political writer, chief-editor of online magazines "Russian correspondent" and "New chronics"

The idea of changing the capital of Russia was periodically being mentioned by Tsimbursky. It was considered as an important task since capital is privileged point from where "the center" observes the country and the World in general. That is why, from the location of the capital depends the picture which is visualized by the government. For instance, from such cities as Krasnoyarsk or Vladivostok it is more clearly visible that Russia borders not with the Great Britain or Switzerland but with the USA and Japan. Moreover, in such case frontiers of Russia open up economically perspective paths to Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and states of the South and Central America. In Russia, by Tsimbursky, political and economic focuses can be displaced only together and the first one should lead the way of the second. Russian politicians in terms of their vision to the World should not be attached to European borderland as Moscow or Saint Petersburg/Leningrad used to be. The concept of changing the capital has the goal to change and understand the world's order and Russian position in it. It may help starting differently organize domestic and foreign politics. That is why Russia needs government, which will bend on minimize responsibilities taken in front of Europe. The government should realize that possibilities, which geopolitical structure of Russian pattern contains will not be able to form in Moscow. In the event, Moscow as a capital will become less functional, and its survival as a capital will contradict survival of the whole country.

Changing the capital in history of Russia meant serious revolutionary dramatic mutation of cultural and political core. For instance, Saint-Petersburg became a new capital of Russia in 1712 which lead beginning of orientation to European cultural norms and policy of "kidnapping Europe". That is why Tsimbursky claims that creating a new capital in Trans-Ural would be inaugurating the turn from Europe to facing the East: internal Russian East and external at the Pacific.⁶⁵ Vadim Tsimbursly was the first who started speaking about shifting Russian capital to Trans - Ural region based on geopolitical, geo-economical, and geo-cultural arguments.

Tsimbursky is not typical Eurasianist: by his point of view, nowadays Russia is shifted to frigid cold zone. It is not the part of Eurasian civilization with continental warm and cold heath and semi-deserts, but it is gradually becoming Arctic - Eurasian

⁶⁵ Khatuncev Stanislav Vital'yevich, "Vadim Tsimburkiy, russkiy geopolitik", **Tetrad** po konservatizmu, vol. 1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 163-165

civilization. That is why the latest decisions of Russian administration to consolidate its presence in the Arctic region and taking measures to build cities on the North Pole are predictable.⁶⁶

Tsimbursky's concept represents Russia as something that is able to be self-sufficient, thus, to stay out of control of other powers and, all the more, not become a part of any external project. The concept of "The Russian Island" is offering the path of development for the close future of the Russian patterns and neighbouring territories. It also helps to build an image, "the face" of the Russian Federation. The concept is solid and precisely defined by the author.

The determination given by the author to Russian civilization vividly illustrates that the author puts the northern territories of Russia, including the Arctic region out of his concept. He considers its difficulty for reclamation and emphasising the absence of any big threats and rivals in the area. It is clearly illustrated that the Arctic region is not involved into "the moving and developing area" of Russia. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration the changing conditions and claims happening in the Arctic region by the external powers, there is a presumption that the geopolitical concept of Tsimbursky "The Russian Island" might nowadays expand on the Arctic area as well.

Therefore, the central thesis of this work is to test how successful the concept is able to adapt to realities of modern world and the Arctic region, which is taking one of the central roles in international affairs.

⁶⁶ Gromiko Yuriy Vyacheslavovich, "Ideologiya kak distsiplinarnoye zanyatie. Tsimbursky – gumanitarniy ucheniy-prorok", **"Tetradi po konservatizmu"** journal, vol.1, Moscow, 2015, pp. 180, 183 - 184

CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC REGION. ITS REGIONAL AND NON-REGIONAL ACTORS

1. THE ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL ACTORS

Constant changes are happening almost at all main spheres of the global society: geopolitical, geo-economical, geo-cultural, social demographical, ethnical. Moreover, acceleration of the social development growth continues. In 21st century containment and methods of state, business, society and human resources management are undergoing some transformations. Taking control of those changes is a necessity of global system; it also includes such unimpaired regions as the Arctic and the North Pole in all.

Climate change was the first reason, which attracted international attention to the Arctic region. According to some popular scientific belief the ice on the Arctic is melting, which makes the area more accessible for some certain economic activities, presenting not only regional but also global significance, such as oil and gas extraction and intercontinental navigation. In such situation, the main actors in the Arctic region are five littoral states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States and Russia. In this chapter, we are going to represent geopolitical situation in the region through the prism of regional and non-regional players and international organizations interested in the Arctic. More specifically the attention will be paid to Russian domestic and international Arctic policy. It will be used at the next chapter to generate geopolitical theory for Russian geopolitics in the Arctic based on the theory shown in the first chapter.

There are three main and the most known reasons of interest for the states in the Arctic region: 1. Gas, oil and other natural resources mining possibility; 2. The Northeast Passage access; 3. Strategic position of the Arctic which provides military and strategic safety and governmental sovereignty.

1.1. The Main Pillars of the Arctic Geopolitics

The relations between the main geopolitical players in the region are distinguished by geopolitical interests of two interrelated problems solution:

1. Prospecting and reclamation of mineral resources of the Arctic;
2. Development of the Arctic communication lines and transport infrastructure.

1.1.1. Natural Resources

At the end of the 20th century and beginning 21st century globalization has brought a great influence on many spheres of human activity. Global world's economy is characterized by open national economies, regional integration processes, national economics competence, competence for geo-economical territories, global population growth, international migration intensity and unfair resources allocation. In such conditions, the Arctic region is becoming the arena of international competition for possibility of using the Arctic Ocean for maritime and mining resources.⁶⁷

By the database of the United States Geological Survey published in 2008, the Arctic region consists 22% of non-discovered reserves of hydrocarbon, including 30% of natural gas resources, 20% of natural gas liquids and 13% of raw petrol. By the specialists, 88-95% of the Arctic resources are in Exclusive Economic Zones of littoral countries, which leads to the necessity of international dialog development. Upon on most of the amount of the resources (approximately 70%) is concentrated on the Russian sector of the Arctic.⁶⁸

Hence, one of the main reasons to share the Arctic region is the natural resources which are hidden in the subsoil beneath the bed of the open sea. However, due to the climate condition in the region extraction of oil and gas from the shelf of polar seas is very expensive and technologically difficult process. Development of natural resources at the place is economically feasible if the price for barrel of oil is over 100 dollars.

⁶⁷ Hooman Peimani, "Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st century", **World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.**, Singapore, 2013, pp.251

⁶⁸ Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal Assessment Team, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle, The US Geological Survey (USGS), 2008 <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>

Thus, deposit of natural resources on the shelves of the northern seas can be considered as backup for distant future.⁶⁹

1.1.2. The Northeast Passage

Appearance of the new sea passages on the north is one of the most significant consequences of climate change. The specification of the Arctic Ocean is connecting the North Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Reduction of thickness of the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean opened up possibility of maritime through two passages: the Northeast Passage (NEP) which spreads along the coast of Siberia from Murmansk to Barings Strait, and the Northwest Passage spanning the coast of North America. It starts from Alaska towards the Canadian Island Archipelago and continues until the Greenland. Even though easier climate conditions ships still are not able to travel independently without using the services of ice-breakers, which which may be provided only by some states.

NEP is about 3500 nautical miles long itself and able to reduce the length of the travel from Northern Europe to Northern Asia. As a result, the route contributes to the savings of transportation of goods. Moreover, currently more than 80% world's transportation system's cargo traffic comes via sea transportation due to its price efficiency. Thus, NEP is attractive for foreign companies as a natural resources transportation path from the Arctic regions.⁷⁰

The route from the Northwest Route is also able to shorten the distance from East Asia to Northern Europe to approximately 7000 nautical miles in comparison with present used routes such as the Panama Canal. Both routes provide safety to ships travel in terms of absence pirates due to difficult access of the terrain.

Although potential of the Northeast Passage as an alternative route of the Suez Canal is generally overrated. NEP has not been yet commercially viable. According the calculations the path from Europe to Asia through NEP is shorter and cheaper than through the Suez Canal. By using NEP is possible to decrease the consumption of fuel

⁶⁹ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.56

⁷⁰ Jacob Borresen, "The Arctic Highway, The polar Game, The Actors and Issues at stake", **Eurasian review of geopolitics**, 2008, pp.37-38

and the fee of freight. But at the same time NEP is considered as unpredicted and unsafe route in terms of climate conditions. Difficult climate conditions, ice drift and shallow waters require high coast ship construction and more investments to its adaptation in the Arctic. Moreover, the abilities of current existing infrastructure of NEP are limited. The shore does not contain sufficient number of ports to provide ships possibility to dock in case of need to be repaired or other unforeseen circumstances. The fee for a pass through the Suez Canal is a way lower than icebreaker ships escort on NEP. Some maritime specialists think that the transit through NEP will be just seasonally alternative to the Suez Canal and will have mainly orientation on raw materials. Nevertheless, shipping along the Northeast Passage has been increasing continuously, thus, turnover in 2016 was 6, 9 million tones. The number is mainly includes the transportation of equipment and materials for the construction. In the future, traffic may be filled by export of resources.⁷¹

To sum up, it is possible to say that the Arctic region is the crucial field for international actors, which would like to proceed with its geopolitical interests. It will conduct to reinforce positions in the international political domain by taking over regional routes and guarantee deposit of energy sources. Therefore, it may provide a better economic future.

1.2. International Legal Regulations in the Arctic Region

Since the beginning of 20th century the Central Arctic Area has been taken under the process of building special regime primarily by littoral states which have a direct access to the Arctic Ocean. The term "Central Arctic Area" defined as water space surrounding the North Pole and limited from all sides by 200 nautical miles borders of the Arctic states. This term is used in official papers of the Arctic states and it is equal to 2, 8 million km². The main geographical, climate, politico-legal specification of the Arctic Ocean region does not allow non-arctic states safely conduct navigation, fishing or other economic activity without assistance any of the Arctic states. It is also impossible to cross the Arctic Ocean from Asia to Europe without interfering into the areas under sovereignty or jurisdiction of littoral Arctic states. Such favourable location

⁷¹Janko Petrovich, "The Arctic in Contemporary International Relations – the Geopolitica", *Geostrategic and Overall Importance of the North Pole, Geopolitics of the Arctic region*, Belgrade 2013, pp.35-36

provides those countries a leading role in verification of legal economic activity order in the Central Arctic Area.⁷²

Legislation system of the Arctic region is based on the acts of domestic legislation of littoral countries, reciprocal bilateral and multilateral agreements reflecting special conditions for activity in the Arctic Ocean. Apart of mentioned above the Arctic Ocean is regulated by norms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by 1982⁷³, agreements generated by the Arctic Council⁷⁴ and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation⁷⁵. In fact, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gives a legislative opportunity for internationalization of the region which non-arctic states are striving for: to get an equal access to the natural resources and transportation advantages of the Arctic region, full participation in conducting decisions of Arctic region governance.

1.2.1. International Organizations

The leading body of the Arctic cooperative structure is the Arctic Council. It was established in 1996 as a high forum in order to address environmental and indigenous issues. The Council remains the only one regional forum that includes all the Arctic states. The members of the organization are eight Arctic region countries: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, USA, Iceland and Russia. The Council works by consensus and has no regulatory power. Later Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, France and Spain (1998 – 2006), China South Korea, India, Japan,

⁷² Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijnyy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.32-33

⁷³ The United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea is international agreement which defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment and the management of marine natural resources. Taken from https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

⁷⁴ The Arctic Council is founded in 1996 by Canada, Norway, Russia, USA, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Considered as the key mechanism of regional cooperation, international coordination of mutual actions of environment protection, constant development of the region, saving culture, traditions, and languages of local peoples in Arctic.

⁷⁵ The Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation is established in 1993 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden and Eurocomission . The main goal is maintain stability and development of the region, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, environment and socio-cultural questions.

Singapore, Italy (2013) and Switzerland (2017) joined the Council as permanent observers⁷⁶.

At the begging the Arctic Council was not active due to the region was low on the international political agenda. However, the growing interest to the Arctic, particularly from non-regional states and need to establish regional international treaty for the region clued the Arctic littoral states to endorse the basic rules in the region. Thus, the Ilulissat Declaration was signed in 2008 by five littoral states: Denmark, Norway, the USA, Canada and Russia. The document will be presented at the next paragraph of the Arctic Documentation⁷⁷.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation is the second main regional body. It includes two platforms: the Barents Euro-Arctic (BEAC) and Barents Regional Council (BRC). In case of BEAC, six states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia) along with the Commission of the European Communities established in 1993 a platform in order to promote sustainable economic and social development in the Barents Region. The forum is open to join for all interested states as well as active participation of indigenous people are widely promoted. Whereas, BRC is the platform for cooperation of the regional governments including participation of indigenous peoples of the Arctic region. Such two-fold cooperation provides a special international state which is able to fulfill the needs of inhabitants of the Barents region. The Cooperation does not generate any legally binding obligations under international law, as well as it is not obliged itself to follow any formalities applied for international organizations by international law⁷⁸. It based on keeping on level the wellbeing of the region via scientific research organization between universities, research institutes, administrative and other relevant bodies in the region⁷⁹.

To sum up, regional intergovernmental bodies such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council are not only forums aimed to generate mutually beneficial

⁷⁶ "The Arctic Council: A backgrounder", last updated 13 September 2018, an official web site of the organization <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>

⁷⁷Klaus Dodds, Royal Holloway, "Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, precaution and preparedness", **University of London**, 2012, pp.3-6

⁷⁸Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations of between International Organizations (1986)

⁷⁹ Md. Waliul Hasanat, "Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region in the Light of International Law", **The Yearbook of Polar Law**, vol.2, Boston, 2010, pp.280-283

decisions but it is platforms for declaring unique national interests and for limiting the opportunities of non-Arctic countries.

1.2.2. Documentation

In fact, there is no agreement clearly regulating and defining right for the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. Currently continental shelf is regulated by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 (UNCLOS). The body codifies a legal situation on seabed resources exploitation in the Arctic waters. Five littoral states: Russia, Canada, United States, Norway and Denmark have extensive rights to owe a continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean of minimum 200 nautical miles in case of ratification of UNCLOS. As well as those states are rightful to extend the distance to a maximum 350 nautical miles from the baseline in case if the state provides the geological connection to the mainland. UNCLOS has the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) aiming to review the documentation from the states⁸⁰. The Littoral states declare their commitment to the Law of the Sea with evident reference to legal issues related to the region such as delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, protection of the marine environment, freedom of navigation and marine scientific research.⁸¹

The document, which should be mentioned is Ilulissat Declaration signed in 2008 by five Arctic littoral states, the document named after the town in Greenland.⁸² The Ilulissat Declaration is merely a political document since it does not have a power to bind the actors. The declaration is demonstration a wish to establish common principles of treating the Arctic resources in the future and gives the message for the rest of the world interested in the region how littoral states perceive forthcoming developments. According the common comments of five Arctic countries in the Declaration, now there is no an inevitable necessity to maintain a new comprehensive legal regime for the Arctic region. Although with the matter of time the states will be forced by outer

⁸⁰ Arild Moe, "The Dynamic of Arctic Development, Asia and the Arctic: Narratives, Perspectives and Policies", **Springer Gwology**, 2016, pp. 8-10

⁸¹ Mit'ko Valeriy Bronislavovch, "Sovremenniye geopoliticheskiye problem osvoyeniya Arktiki", The articles of international scientific conference, 2016, pp.43

⁸² The Ilulissat Declaration https://www.arctictoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf

conditions of the changing world to return to the question of the legal regulations of the region, in particular regarding the resources of the Arctic Ocean. The states recognize growing risk of accident through tourism, shipping, research and research development due to popularization of Northern Sea Routes. Within this framework they support bilateral and multilateral arrangements among related states in order to reinforce rescue measures in case of emergency. In addition, the littoral states agree to exchange scientific research information by request. In general, the Ilulissat Declaration shows the desire of littoral countries to keep the leading role in resolving issues related to future of the Arctic resources: use of mineral resources, shipping routes and control over environment and ecosystem⁸³. Five littoral states agreed that questions of jurisdiction and territorial claims should be solved by negotiations within existing international legal framework. The document also assigned that the Law of the Sea provides necessary rights and obligations regarding the delineations of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of maritime environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research. Declaration also emphasises that littoral states have the unique position to address possibilities and challenges of the Arctic due to virtue of their sovereignty.⁸⁴

2. GEOPOLITICAL POSITIONS AND THE STANDPOINTS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN LITTORAL STATES

Five littoral countries of the Arctic Ocean: Denmark, Norway, Canada, the USA and Russia are playing a leading role in the Arctic region. The countries non-officially called the main Arctic five (A5) due to its beneficial positions in the region which allow the states have extra rights in comparison with the other states. It includes at least 200 nautical miles from the coast by UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, owing prospect natural resources and navigation control. In order to effectively manage Arctic policy

⁸³ Ingo Winkelmann, "Fixed rules of play for dividing up the Arctic Ocean", SWP Comments, **German Institute for International and Security Affairs**, 2008, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2008C18_wkn_ks.pdf

⁸⁴ Oyvind Osterud, Geir Honneland, "Geopolitics and International Governance in the Arctic", **Arctic Review on Law and Politics**, vol.5, 2/2014, pp. 165

countries have generated official Arctic strategies which includes full net of regional development. Therefore, the positions and standpoints of A5 will be represented below.

2.1. Position and Standpoints of Denmark

Denmark does not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean but the country has right to act through the Greenland which is selector territory of Denmark since 2009. Even though Greenland has right fully govern its natural resources, negotiate international treaties and agreements, Denmark keeps control over foreign and defense policies of the island. However, in the future Greenland has a high chance to get right fully control its own territory.⁸⁵

In 2008 and 2011, Denmark has released two official documents, which can be considered as official papers reflecting state's Arctic policy. There are numbers of factors which had influence on development of the Arctic strategy. First, it is changing of juridical status of Greenland and its growing independency. Membership of Denmark in EU, the Arctic Council and ratification of UN Convention of 1982 also had an impact in modeling the state's Arctic strategy. Moreover, Denmark has profound experience in the field of oil extraction and overall hydrocarbon sector. The main goal of Denmark is to keep the status of being an Arctic nation by providing mutually beneficial cooperation and coordination of actions with neighboring powers. In general, Denmark Arctic policy is based on cooperation in the frames of the Arctic Council and other international organizations and agreements signed by the state⁸⁶.

Reclamation of Denmark to extend shelf area in the Arctic over 200 nautical miles crosses Russian claims to Lomonosov ridge. Denmark lodged its application to UN treaty on the Law and the Sea in 2014. Denmark ratified the UN Convention on the Law and the Sea from 1982 in 2004. The kingdom makes a claim for territorial expansion

⁸⁵ Medvedev Dmitry Andreevich, "Mejdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v Arktike. Arkticheskiy ekonomicheskiy sovet", "**Problems of security in the Arctic**" series, Moscow, 2015, pp.11-12

⁸⁶ "Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 – 2020", available at <http://library.arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf>

from the coast to the north, south and east from Greenland, and north and south from Faroe Islands. The decision of UN Commission is expected at the beginning of 2019.

Since economic and military potential of the state is limited, Denmark mainly relies on multilateral co-operation with NATO, EU and the Nordic Council in order to provide security to its own interests. Denmark advocates for reinforcement military cooperation in between North European countries in the Arctic area, admission of EU to the Arctic Council. Whereas Greenland keeps its membership in NATO as well as having USA military troops on the island. Presence of the USA on Greenland is regulated by agreement from 1951. Moreover, since 2004 the USA has Thule Air Base located on the north of Greenland, which in 2009 was included to USA Ballistic Missile Defense System.⁸⁷

2.2. Position and Standpoint of Canada

The government of Canada consistently pursues a policy of complex economic reclamation of its Arctic zone as a highest national priority of the state. Thus, Canada has the program of social and economic enhancement of Canadian North territories. Consistent with these targets the country keeps reinforcement of military presence and Coast Guard in the region. The focal point of a policy plays a crucial role in political life of Canada; idea of promoting the Arctic spirit is actively used in pre-election campaigns.

Inbeing of Canadian Arctic policy is reflected in official document “The Northern strategy of Canada: our North, our heritage, our future” published in 2009⁸⁸, in following years Canadian government published two more Arctic documents^{89 90}.

⁸⁷ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol.307, Moscow, 2014, pp.13-16

⁸⁸ “Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Published under authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians”, Ottawa, 2009, <https://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp>

⁸⁹ “Statement on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy. Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad”, Ottawa, 2010 http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy_booklet-la_politique_etrangere_du_canada_pour_arctique_livret.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

⁹⁰ “The Northern dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy”, Prepared by the Communications Bureau Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 2011 http://library.arcticportal.org/1255/1/The_Northern_Dimension_Canada.pdf

Canadian strategy is based on four priorities: firstly, necessity to ensure Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic territories. In order to succeed the country aims to solve existing boundary disputes, constantly keeps expanding Arctic navy, conducts scientific and other researches. Since 2008, Canada regularly conducts military exercises “Nanook” and develops naval harbor in Nanisivik. Secondly, Canada aims to develop social segment of the territory. Thus, Canadian government evolves tourism to the north, increases investments into transportation and communication infrastructure, and supports construction social housing, developing educational, health care program in order to attract more citizens populate the territory. In terms of economy and mining natural resources currently Canada prefers to postpone exploitation of the Arctic hydrocarbon resources while using more accessible mine fields instead. Third, environmental issue plays one of the most important roles in Canadian Arctic policy. Financing environmental projects takes a vast range of expenses in Canadian budget. Forth priority relates to first nations of the North. Canada provides wide range of right to govern natural and other resources of the territory.

Canada intends on clarify its northern borders in coherence with seeking of Convention of UN Declaration on the Law of the Sea. Canada has territorial disputes with Denmark over Hans Island, with USA over sea borders in Buford Sea. Simultaneously Canada, Denmark and Russia put a claim on Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev elevation.⁹¹

Canada takes a favorable view of role the Arctic Council as a crucial forum for the Arctic states’ cooperation. Moreover, Canada has initiated foundation of the Arctic Council and became its first chair⁹².

2.3. Position and Standpoints of Norway

Norway was the first littoral country, which announced its complex Arctic strategy; it was published in 2007 as “The Norwegian government’s High North

⁹¹ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol:307, Moscow, 2014, pp.20-23

⁹² Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol:307, Moscow, 2014, pp.25

Strategy”⁹³. Later it was updated by additional official documents^{94 95}. The strategy lays stress on the Arctic Research and Advanced Development in order to proceed with economic reclamation and labor-training program. The Arctic is one of the main political priorities of the country due to its needs of oil resources. Moreover, Norway has technological, financial and management potential to develop deep-water hydrocarbon endowments in severe northern conditions. Future secured profit from natural resources ensures position of the country in the international arena and enable to keep an independent political course by balancing in between USA and Europe at the same time being out of EU frames.

Norway has initiated reinforcement of military cooperation of five north European states in the Arctic and establishing NORDEFECO (Nordic Defense Cooperation). Some experts name NORDEFECO as Nordic NATO in which, comparing with NATO, take part the neutral states such as Sweden and Finland. In NATO Norway speaks for creating military forces in order to provide security in the Arctic region and conducting peacekeeping operations, joint patrol of sea borders and air space over Iceland. Currently northern European countries carry out some of the measures themselves, also the states closely coordinating the actions with NATO, EU and OSCE. If to be precise, one of the main goals of the organization which is not stated openly on the Charter of NORDEFECO, is mutual military mission in the Arctic. Military maneuvers in collaboration with forces of the USA and the Great Britain have been already conducted in the region.⁹⁶

The country was the first littoral state, which succeeded to affirm the borders of its shelf through UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. Norway has applied to UNCLOS in 2006. Due to the decision of the Commission in 2009, it was filled an

⁹³ The Norwegian government’s High North Strategy, Norwegian ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategien.pdf>

⁹⁴ New Building Blocks in the North. The next step in the Government’s High Northern Strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009,
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategien.pdf>

⁹⁵ Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Store, The High North. Visions and strategies, 2011,
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/nordomradene/ud_nordomrodene_en_web.pdf

⁹⁶ Khranchiknin Alexandr Anatol’yich, “Vliyaniye Ukrainskogo krizisa na voenno-politicheskuyu i ekonomicheskuyu obstanovku v Arktike”, The institute of political and military analyses, **Materials of conference “The Arctic”, The Northeast Passage: development of the Arctic communication lines in global economy**, Moscow, 2015, pp.96-98

indent. As a result, Norway got the right to expand its sovereignty on meaningful scale of the territory almost equal to its land domain.

The only moot case which Norway left by these days is the question of economic zone of Svalbard archipelago. Norway claim to exclusive possessions contradicts with Russian, the USA and other state's claims.

2.4. Position and Standpoints of the USA

The Directive of the President George W. Bush from 2009 laid the foundation for the basis of the Arctic policy of the USA⁹⁷. National security strategy from 2010 claims Arctic ambitions of the country. Fundamental interests of which is protection of national security, environment, responsible management of natural resources, conducting scientific researches and reinforcement of international cooperation⁹⁸. In 2013 administration of Barak Obama introduced plan of precise actions in the frame of the Arctic strategy of the USA⁹⁹. According to it, the central point in the region is providing domestic and international security of the USA. Priorities also include organization of international management, extension of continental shelf and resolving frontier problems. The USA adheres to the principle of freedom of navigation and economic activities in the seven seas (the Northwest and the Northeast Passages) not only for commercial but military fleets. However, the USA has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982. Therefore, in fact, positions of the USA and other countries come into collision, since the USA officially is not ready acknowledging restriction of freedom of navigation, which the UN Convention reflects. As well as the country does not accept the restriction of resources access on bottom of sea and necessity of issuing permission for it.

As it was mentioned above, the USA has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; therefore, the country does not have juridical right to legalize claims on economic zone extension behind 200 nautical miles based on specifics of sea bottom structure. According some senators of the USA some clauses of the Convention may

⁹⁷ President George W. Bush, the White House, National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 2009 <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm>

⁹⁸ National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington, 2010 <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>

⁹⁹ National Strategy for The Arctic Region, The White House, Washington, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf

restrict the US sovereignty. However, US presenters affirm that the USA acknowledges the UN Convention as juridical basis to develop international cooperation in general, but excluding clauses mentioned above. In order to the USA ratify the Convention, the country have to modify some US laws.

From strategic point of view, the Arctic plays an important role for Air Force and US Navy. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) located in Alaska, US nuclear submarine force regularly runs in the Arctic waters. The shortest ways for ballistic missiles between western and eastern hemispheres go through the region.

In order to conduct its Arctic policy US have reinforced military presence in the region. They constantly are taking measures to develop infrastructure including navigation. US are planning to develop ice-breaking fleet since it is one of the most crucial points in the region. Nowadays the USA has only one ice-breaker able to serve the Arctic waters.

Defining feature of US Arctic strategy is statement of terrorism threat existence in the region. Thus, in order to be able to respond to a threat military questions should take pride of place. The USA intends to protect its national interests in the Arctic independently as well as in cooperation with other states, first of all by cooperation with members of NATO. It includes missile defense, distant early warning, deployment of maritime and air systems and others. The USA regularly conduct military exercises in the Arctic zone as well as nuclear-powered submarines regularly keep up a patrol in the Arctic waters.

The USA closely cooperates with Canada on the base of studying sea floor structure and Arctic Research and Advanced Development. However, the countries have dispute over border on the Buford Sea.

The USA is interested in deep engagement and coordination relations with international actors in the field of scientific researches and science information exchange. Particularly, evaluation of relations with the Arctic and Nordic Councils, European Polar Board and the Arctic states on the base of bilateral relations is taken

into special consideration. Active international cooperation may provide more complete information due to its high cost in case of independent scientific research.¹⁰⁰

In sum, four Arctic countries represented above have official Arctic policies boosted with consequent legal frameworks. In fact, policies consists numerous similarities and have a lot in common. First of all, the states emphasize importance of the Arctic region as nationwide identity. Thus, it underlines the necessity of development of the region in terms of infrastructure and keeping the region secure by military means. From the other side countries talk about significance of scientific research and environmental protection of the region. However, countries stress readiness for cooperation with each other, at least, for the beginning, on the base of scientific research in particular geological search of natural resources. It explained by high cost of any wide operation in region with severe climate conditions. Cooperation may decrease expenses drastically and give results.

2.5. Russia in the Arctic

In this chapter will be shown the way Russia developed its Arctic identity. Importance of the region for national identity, economic well-being, safety of sovereignty of the country is difficult to underestimate. Russia has a wide range of Arctic policy along with regional development projects. Detailed explanation of Russian Arctic policy is crucial for our research in order to have notion of the Arctic scale which Russia owes and going to develop.

2.5.1. Brief History of Reclamation

In 11th century Russian hunters and merchants reached the Arctic Ocean by following northern rivers. They quickly learned seamanship which allowed them to travel over the Arctic Circle. Thus, the Arctic Ocean became Russian circle of influence. Reclamation of the northern coast was from inland along the northern river banks. Such continental expansion allowed Russians monopolized the marine passage along Eurasia. The Arctic due to its under-population was a convenient path for Russian

¹⁰⁰ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol.307, Moscow, pp.51-54

expansion to the East which ended up with reclamation of Alaska and part of the northern coast of California. Therefore, 11th century Russian became the biggest Arctic power in the world.¹⁰¹

Understanding of geo-economical and geo-cultural uniqueness of the Arctic appeared among Russian political thinkers later at the end of 15th century. Russian diplomat and interpreter Dmitriy Gerasimov (1465 - 1536) worked on the first known project of the Northeast Passage. However, an intensive economic development of the Arctic has started only at the end of 19th century; mainly the development of railway transportation became a crucial point of the development process. The First World War showed strategic importance of the northern seas, which before was taking into consideration only from theoretical point of view. At the moments of blockade on the Black and Baltic Seas, the Arctic Ocean allowed Russia to remain connected with its Entente allies.¹⁰²

During the Soviet period of Russia the Northern part of country was under intense development in terms of science and technical innovations. The most importance was paid to the Northeast Passage as the main transport corridor connecting European part of the USSR with its most distant northern - eastern parts. In order to conduct regular navigation in NEP the government invented polar aviation and the net of hydro-meteo stations, built cities-ports along NEP such as Igarka, Dixon, Pevek and others, organized regular expeditions to draw navigation maps and study hydrographical situation in the Arctic Ocean. In fact, before beginning of spaceship era (1957) the Arctic was playing a role of new horizons for Soviet nation, the USSR was ready to invest into development of the North. Such powerful technological leap which did not have any analogs in the World provided the next step in development of Soviet Arctic: discovering and mining the biggest oil and gas fields. Artificial environment was created in severe climate conditions. They were suitable for people to live and that provided fast population growth in the Arctic zone. Within period from 1925 to 1990 the population of the North and the Far east of Russia increased from 4, 7 million to 27,

¹⁰¹ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knizhnyy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.13-14

¹⁰² Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knizhnyy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.20-22

9 millions people. Infrastructure progressed rapidly; the USSR had the system of academic and scientific processes for reclamation of the North as well as special institutes to prepare specialists to work in severe conditions. Particularly for the Arctic conditions were elaborated new transportation, cultivated a new kinds of vegetation.¹⁰³

During the Cold War the region was militarized by two polar powers as well. The waters of the Arctic contained nuclear submarines of the USA and the USSR in order to provide a connecting route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Since the USSR has been collapsed, most of the Soviet achievements and breakthrough in reclamation of the Arctic were lost. The region experienced a draft demographic crisis, therefore qualified population dropped down to 50%. Workers settlements, towns with its infrastructure were liquidated. The military significance of the Arctic declined as well. Northern Navy and the Arctic aviation numbers were cut. As an attempt to gain support from Atlantic partners as a course of national policy at the time, Russia inflicted damage to its national interests in the Arctic.¹⁰⁴ At the period of Russian complete let-down Denmark and Norway made a move to claim part of polar sector. In fact, the country has become under a risk to lose its sovereignty over territories which over centuries were under Russian influence. In fact, a period of the USSR collapse and beginning of the Russian Federation existence demonstrated a clear pattern of *critical junction* for Russian policy in the Arctic region. In this context of growing international competence in the north Russia was forced by appeared circumstances to start revision of its Arctic policy.¹⁰⁵ Some analysts claim that since the mid of 90s of 20th century the geopolitics in the Arctic have changed from strategic confrontation to exploitation of natural resources, questions of jurisdiction, and the prospects of new shipping routes.

¹⁰³ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.20-21

¹⁰⁴ Hooman Peimani, Energy security and geopolitics in the Arctic, Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st century, **World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.**, Singapore, 2013, pp.11

¹⁰⁵ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.20-28

2.5.2. The Russian Federation in the Arctic Since the Moment of Its Critical Junction

Primarily the Russian Federation has crucial national strategic interests on its own Arctic territory. It relates to the mineral resources, transport and defence potential of the state. Land area of the Russian Arctic is 9 million km² with population of 2, 5 million people which is 2% of Russian population. It accounts 12-15% of the gross domestic product of the state and 1/4 of Russian export. Thus, the economic activity of the country in the Arctic region is far bigger than other Arctic countries. Approximately 2/3 of the Arctic wealth belongs to Russia. 30 trillion dollars is estimated value of the Arctic mineral resources which mostly based on energy resources.¹⁰⁶

In 21st century the first practical move of demonstration of Russian presence in the Arctic was made in 2007 by reaching the bottom of the Ocean under the North Pole, installing Russian flag and taking the sample of soil to prove that submerged ridge Lomonosov is the continuation of Eurasian continent and big land of Russia.

In fact, the Arctic Ocean does not belong to any regional or non-regional country. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the only littoral states have 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone around their Arctic Ocean coasts which also gives the right to exploit the minerals from the seabed. But upon ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, states are able to make claims to extend their zone.¹⁰⁷ Other non-littoral states have full rights to conduct shipping and scientific activities. Russia ratified UN Convention on the Law of the Sea¹⁰⁸ in 1997. The state also relies on it in process of legal justification of the outer border of the Arctic shelves. Due to the norms of the convention it can be proved geologically. The Commission on the limits of the continental shelf has been set up by the UN to review

¹⁰⁶ Makeev Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Possible changes to the Russian Arctic environment under the influence of natural and anthropogenic factors, Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st century, **World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.**, Singapore, 2013, pp.59

¹⁰⁷ Hooman Peimani, Energy security and geopolitics in the Arctic, Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st century, **World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.**, Singapore, 2013, pp.13

¹⁰⁸ UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is the international agreement of 1982 which defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's ocean, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources

submissions. Russia makes an effort to line off zones of functional jurisdiction of the Arctic Ocean in between of other nations. Registering Russian title over areas of Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges following the orders of the Convention of UN will allow establishing outer border of continental shelf beyond 200 miles of economic zone. Thus, this can increase economical territory of Russia to 1, 2 - 1, 5 million km² with predictable 15-20 milliard tons of fuel contents¹⁰⁹. Russia applied to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf based on scientific claims in 2011, but got rejected due to lack of evidence. Russia submitted a revised application after beefing up its scientific and geological claims in 2015¹¹⁰.

2.5.3. Three Russian Pillars in the Arctic

Russia has several leading reasons to be interested in the Arctic region. The region contains military and *security importance* since it situates on the strategic part of the North Atlantic region and provides a free exit for the Russian fleet to the Atlantic waters. Russia deploys in the Arctic its Northern Fleet in order to maintain national security. Secondly, the region is important for potential role in international trade by developing and using *The Northeast Route*. The third main reason is the vast *energy resources* which the region preserved untouched.

In comparison with other Russian territories the Arctic area is densest territory in terms of international attention from geopolitical, military, geo-economical points of view. Strategic role of the region relates to its Arctic borders of 20 000 km long which lies along the Arctic Ocean. It is the most open border of the state. Despite the border has the role of frontline of the countries' defence system. Northern Fleet forces and its operational area are based here. Moreover, crucial defence enterprises are situated in the region¹¹¹. It describes strategic significance of the Arctic for the state.

¹⁰⁹ Kondratov Nikolay Alexandrovich, "Analiz podkhodov k opredeleniyu sostava i granits possiyskogo sektora Arktiki v XX - nachale XXI vv", *The Northeast Passage: development of the Arctic communications in global economy*, Conference materials, **Technical Governmental University of Murmansk**, 2015, pp.113

¹¹⁰ Omer Dostri, Back to the Czarist Era: Russia's aspirations, Buildup, and Military Activity in the Arctic Region, **Strategic Assessment**, vol. 20, No.2, 2017, pp.116-118

¹¹¹ Medvedev Dmitriy Andreevich, "Mejdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v Arktike. Arkticheskij ekonomicheskij sovet", "**Problems of security in the Arctic**" series, Moscow, 2015, pp.19

Due to economic problems in 1990's Russia development of the Arctic region slowed down dramatically. It may be stated that the northern country was continuously ignoring its north identity; instead Russia was oriented to the problems of Caucasus, former Soviet Republics and domestic problems. Today, it is obvious that Russia is inseparably associated with north and the Arctic. Therefore, Russian return to the Arctic is absolutely natural strategic move. Simultaneously with growing attention to natural resources and access to transportation passage potential threats to the state's security is increasing. In general, even if the Arctic region does not have ground for open military conflict, Russian Arctic is the most vulnerable area of the state towards different types of offensive means: either by air or by sea, including anonymous war¹¹². The Arctic is a convenient territory for anonymous war due to its solitudes. If we take into consideration that the main part of Russian gas production is concentrated in the area of Yamal Peninsula, which, in its turn, is the base of energy system of the whole country, a crack-down on gas infrastructure can put on danger the economy of the state. Thus, the special strategic command "North" was created in order to coordinate military forces in the Arctic and liquidate effectively any possible threats.

Among the main signs of military-political interests' growth in the Arctic are:

- Strive of the Arctic states and other NATO members to increase military presence on the region by installing forward operating locations to protect maritime communications and deploying alarm systems for above water and air security situation;
- Growth of combat capabilities of coalitional and national military forces of USA and NATO and deployment and presence in the Arctic NATO Naval Forces;
- Development of sea-launched Ballistic Missile Defence Systems;
- Increase intelligence agencies activity;
- Conducting multi-national combat trainings;
- Strive of some states to assign a status of international traffic artery for NEP in order to decrease an influence of Russia in the region.

¹¹² *Anonymous war* is the state when military action is made by armed groups without any identification marks

To sum up, Russia considers taking preventive measures in order to protect its interest and sovereignty in the region such as having sea-based military presence in the Arctic and, specifically, provide full protection of oil-gas production provinces because of its strategic importance for economy of the country¹¹³.

At the moment Russia is the leader of *oil and gas* production in the Arctic. The first gas pipe line in the Russian Arctic was built by USSR in 1969. For 40 years Russia has produced in the region 3, 5 times more oil and gas than other states did all together. Certainly, oil and gas extraction is the main occupation in the Russian Arctic. That is why the question of natural resources prospection on the Arctic shelf remains crucial. It requires significant expenses from the budget of the country. By the evaluation of specialists for the purposes Russia should invest up to trillion US dollars. Currently there are enough hydrocarbon stocks in the country which does not stimulate companies to carry out a new prospect works. Moreover, legislation rules are limiting access to the Arctic shelf for private companies¹¹⁴.

The Northeast Passage is the main Russian route of the Arctic region¹¹⁵. It lies along all northern shore of the country. The passage contains the importance at domestic and international level. High development of NEP infrastructure is possible to bring numerous benefits and increase the role of Russia in the region dramatically. If to take into consideration high level of international competition, the priority of NEP development should be interests of national economy and security of the country. According to the specialists' research Russia is able to have profit not only from port's exploitation but from renting out the icebreakers. The way of profiting from unique technologies but not from only resources is a chance for economic modernization of the

¹¹³ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.193-199

¹¹⁴ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.100-101

¹¹⁵ According to the Federal law of Russian Federation №132 from 28th of July 2012 (<https://duma.consultant.ru/page.aspx?1621547>) the waters of the Northeast passage is the aqueous space adjacent to the northern coast of Russia, including inland seas, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone of Russia and limited from the east by line of demarcation of maritime space with the USA and parallel of the Cape Dezhnev in Bering Strait; by meridian of Cape Zhelaniya until archipelago Novaya Zemlya and its western coast and western borders of Matochkin, Karskiye Vorota, Yugorskiy Shar Straits from the east of the Northern Passage.

country. Currently the main users of the Northeast Passage in Russia are Russian holdings such as "Norilsk Nickel", "Gazprom", "Lukoil", "Rosneft", "Rosshelf", as well as Krasnoyarskiy Krai, Sakha-Yakutiya, Chukotsky krai. High probability that those companies will become the main partners of the government in reviving harbour system of the Arctic, since in present conditions such huge economic development projects can be successfully realized only via state - private partnership¹¹⁶. Since Russian government is fully aware of upcoming benefits out of the NEP exploitation, in 2013 Russia presented the list of regulations in the area of NEP. The most significant one is the requirement of icebreaker escort that only under the Russian flag.¹¹⁷

There are various profound problems need to be resolved to make NEP run effectively. Since the positions of Russia in the Arctic Ocean weakened dramatically due to political situations in the state during 90's of 20th century, modern geopolitical situation strained numerous problems of domestic social and economic development of Russia. The implementation of economic development plans, modernization of productive capacity, and restitution of degraded objects of infrastructure faced difficulties of its realization. The Arctic maritime ports are undergoing the same problems. Russian ports are downgraded down to level that they are unable to take a modern oceanic liner. NEP needs a new powerful and modern infrastructure in order to run the route successfully. Russian ports of NEP are designed for ships with capacity of 2 000 containers. If we consider modern situation we will see that generally floating cargos are transported by ships with capacity of 12 000 containers. Moreover, China, which can be the most prospect user of NEP, has more than 10 ships with capacity of 18 000 -19 000 of containers.

Domestication of the Northeast Passage ashore directly depends on the system of ports along a cost of the Ocean. Currently there are only four ports which can carry the function of logistic centers: Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Arkhangelsk and Dudinka. Among them port of Murmansk is becoming the main logistic backbone of the Arctic Ocean shelf reclamation. In order to innovate NEP ports Russia may need international

¹¹⁶Andreeva Elena Nikolayevna, "Arkticheskoye poberej'e kak strategicheskiy geoekonomicheskiy rezerv social'no – ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossii", **Federal Research Center of Russian Academy of Sciences, Conference materials "Arctic 2015"**, Murmansk, 2015, pp.99-102

¹¹⁷ Camilla T.N. Sorensen, Ekaterina Klimenko, "Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic. Possibilities and constraints", **SIPRI Policy Paper**, vol.46, June 2017, Stockholm, pp.17

investments. Russian experts actively discuss the methods of attracting foreign investments in to the development project of the Northeast project. It is suggested that all interested states can create a syndicate of companies aiming developing of coastal infrastructure along NEP. Such type of cooperation would offer use tenders and auctions in order to build specialized terminals. Whereby, an investor would have a guaranteed right as shareholder of those Public Cooperation and would govern those terminals or port in the future. Such type of cooperation would dramatically decrease expenses for development of NEP¹¹⁸. The Arctic Ports are the weakest point in the process of international cargo traffic stimulation along NEP. Moreover, in current severe conditions at the region majority of countries do not consider the Arctic routes economically profitable. Whereas circumspect and consistent plan of development of the Arctic Routes along with cooperation in the field of building infrastructure and decreasing tariff rates may transform NEP into major efficient coastal route in the World.

However, at the moment the national importance of NEP is higher in comparison with the international benefits which are only in the future prospect. For national means the route is the essential corridor which links the Arctic region of Russia with the rest of the country, maintains integrality of the state and provides the unity of economic space. The system of the Arctic lines which based on lateral lines of communications including transportation potential of the Great Siberian Rivers, distinguishes strategic tendencies geo-strategic presence of Russia in the Arctic.¹¹⁹ Overall transit system of the Arctic Zone which connects the region with the rest of the country is weak and not offering many options. River transportation by the rivers of north is an alternative route of NEP. Railways is another possible way of transportation available but railways connect with the northern coast only on the north east by Murmansk, Kandalaksha and Arkhangelsk.

¹¹⁸Veretennikov Nikolay Pavlovich, "Osvoyeniye i razvitiye Severnogo Morskogo Puti v istoricheskoy retrospective XX-XXI vv.", **Murmansk governmental technical university, Conference materials the Arctic 2015**, Murmansk, 2015, pp. 30-34

¹¹⁹Lukin V.N, Musienko T.V., Chizhikov E.N., "Geo-economic and political features of the integrated security system of the Russian Arctic", **Vestnik MGTU**, vol.2, 2016, pp.445

Obviously, the available railways do not provide enough capacity to meet all needs of the region.¹²⁰

Therefore, international transit plays an additional role which may bring some profit to cover investments for NEP. That is why the route development should not be closely related only with international transit. Currently the most achievable status for NEP is to become a domestic through-passage due to the increase of volume of transportation of goods and drop of transit.

2.5.4. Russian Legal Framework and Legislation System of the Arctic Region

Russian aspirations in the Arctic are focused on national political sovereignty, economics, and military. It mostly based on strategic documents generated by the Russian government since the beginning of 21st century. The Russian Federation was one of the first Arctic states to bring up strategic documents of the region.

At the beginning of 21st century Russia has begun an attempts to recover its positions in the Arctic region, first of all by generating official strategies of actions in the area. It includes the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 (1998) and extended version of the document from 2008 - the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and further perspectives¹²¹. The document signed in 2009 as a symbol of the fact that the Arctic region is an object of special policy of the government due to its specifications. Development of the region as strategic base of resources, keeping the Arctic as the zone of peace and cooperation, securitization of unique ecological systems, exploitation of the Northeast Passage as united national transport communication in the Arctic are national interests of the Russian Federation by law. Simultaneously the document confirms development tasks of the region, as well as invents details related to informative and technological innovations and international cooperation.

¹²⁰ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.200-202

¹²¹ "The Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and further perspectives", Moscow, 2008 <http://government.ru/info/18359/>

Apart these two national documents in 2013 Russian government approved document “About Strategy of the Arctic zone development and national security protection of the Russian Federation until 2020”¹²². The strategy based on following principles:

1. Scientific and international juridical verification of state borders and shelf zone of Russia in the Arctic;
2. Development of necessary defence and other types of infrastructures, workforce and means for national interests protection;
3. Fore-run research of natural conditions and resources aimed for future use by the national economy with possible cooperation with international partners;
4. Infrastructure and conditions development for proper functioning of the Northeast Passage.
5. Support of local tribes of the Arctic;
6. Boost of balance of the Arctic nature by using eco-friendly technologies, creating the system of wildlife preservation, invention of necessary ecological standards and systems for its realization.

The state program of socio-economic development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation until 2025 (2017)¹²³ is considered as the main instrument of realization of strategies mentioned above.

Socio-economic part of strategies still has many gaps. For instance, governmental program "Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of Russia until 2025" does not contain part of human resources development. Governmental projects do not cover all spectrums of tasks, thus, it is able to resolve the problematic issues only fragmentally. Such approach still keeps the regional low populated. Extremely low density of the population is one of the specifications of the Arctic Zone.

¹²² About Strategy of the Arctic Zone development and national security protection of the Russian Federation until 2020, Moscow, 2013, <http://government.ru/info/18360/>

¹²³ “The state program of socio-economic development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation until 2025”, Moscow, 2017, <http://government.ru/docs/29164/>

The Arctic area takes 21, 7% of the territory of Russia, whereas the region inhabits only 2% of Russian population¹²⁴. Furthermore, the Arctic population is decreasing from its western part to the eastern¹²⁵. Therefore, the measures such as development of transportation and connection in northern regions, electric power infrastructure development, and creation of qualified work places should be aimed to attract migration to the region. Some Russian experts offer that creation of the Arctic Federal district is able to fill in all the gaps in the regulation. Perhaps the way of cooperation in between of regions and municipalities, development of the cities can possibly improve the population issues. Developed infrastructure, social benefits and high income may help to attract people to towns situated in the Arctic region. Currently 40 out of 85 federal subjects of Russia relate to the Arctic zone. Therefore, the scale of social programs should be wide¹²⁶.

Russia should establish complex of strategies to protect its national interests. It should be reflected in geopolitical doctrine of Russia. It should consider many years' experience, which Russia gained throughout its history. There are several aspects of regulation: *political and diplomatic* - coalition of states which are ready to take part in developing and protecting the Arctic resources and NEP. It is, first of all, China, India and international organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. *Domestic political* measures includes: 1. division and legislative recognition of the northern territories as a constituent territory of the Russian Federation including shelves; 2. involvement economics of other regions in the process of development of Arctic resources; 3. establishment of the single center of regulation of the northern territories. *Military technical* aspects are development and realization of militarization programs effective in the severe conditions of Arctic, successfully withstanding against weaponry of potential adversary. *Military strategic* includes: 1. formation of sole command including all forces of the Arctic zone and being responsible for protection of national interests and security of the region; 2. alignment of forces as a part of the Northern Fleet; 3.

¹²⁴ The database valid for 2014

¹²⁵ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knizhnyy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.98-100

¹²⁶ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knizhnyy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.31-39

involvement of the allied forces of the states invited by Russia for mutual development of the Arctic resources to plan defensive warfare¹²⁷.

Moreover, broaden strategy should *target key goals* and try to *resolve* the most essential *problems* of the region. The key targets are: 1. to provide defence capability; 2. to use natural resources rationally; 3. to increase communication connectivity of the region with rest of the country. The strategy of the Arctic development in order to be efficient should base on conservative financial forecast. It results temporary giving up on some interests which are not on the list of first priority. Thus, the priorities are valid for any economic and political conditions and relate with durable national targets of the Russian Federation, such as military, industrial-technological and ecological security, development of transportation and communication infrastructure, development of technological base for current and future projects. Overall, economic activity of the country in the Arctic region should be supported by military. It will provide efficiency of Russia in the region, since many tasks are able to be resolved on the base of civil and military technologies synergy.

The strategy should also take into consideration important external factors which are not controlled by the state. Currently there are three of them: 1. international sanctions of Atlantic countries on import of some equipment and technologies; 2. sharp fluctuations of oil prices; 3. climate change and its influence on conditions of the Arctic region economic development.¹²⁸

3. NON-REGIONAL STATE ROLES AND AMBITIONS IN THE ARCTIC REGION

May 2013 became a new stage of development for the relations between the states at the Arctic region due to admittance six non-regional countries as permanent observers in the Arctic Council: China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore and

¹²⁷ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.88-91

¹²⁸ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.105-110

Italy.¹²⁹ Thus, most of those states belong to the Asian region. This movement at the international arena reflects such developments as growing interests of mentioned states, first of all, to commercial opportunities appearing by transformation of the region, as well as the strive of the Arctic Council to reinforce its positions as the preeminent body for discussion regional issues. Therefore, the regional affairs are becoming more complex due to being influenced by non-regional actors as well as regional ones. Moreover, close contact within the Council between the members and observers may strengthen and intensify bilateral cooperation outside the Council as well.

Among the newcomers of the Arctic Council can be distinguished two groups of countries among which significant difference appears. It is group of Atlantic and Asian states. All Atlantic states – official observers of the Council are at the same time members of EU and NATO. Therefore, the group highly likely will conduct concerted policy based on common points and interests. Meantime, Asian states usually do not coordinate their policies and actions. Moreover, some of them have serious long-standing contradictions. Non-regional Arctic states do not have complex regional strategies but in any case have Arctic policies. Absence of official documents provides flexibility of actions in the region and makes its assessment by the experts complicated; therefore, intentions of such states become unclear and less foreseeable. However, the analyses of current behavior of non-regional states shows that their interests do not differentiate from the Arctic states, only due to geographic position possibilities of the groups of states are not equal.

As it was mentioned above, non-littoral or non-arctic states are willing to support exploration of oil and gas by investing into the regional countries development projects at first. Second main interest is use of the Arctic sea routes, since the countries are highly involved into international trade and willing to conduct a part of their trade through the north when it will be possible.

¹²⁹ Page Wilson, “Asia Eyes the Arctic”, **Diplomacy Economy Environment**, 26.08.2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/26/asia-eyes-the-arctic/?all=true>

3.1. The Arctic Policy of China

Chinese focus on and engagement in the Arctic is gradually experiencing an upward trend over last 10 years. Four points drive the state's Arctic policy. Firstly, it is to maintain a solid Chinese polar research capacity. Second is to gain an access to the energy and mineral resources of the region. Third is to evolve the Arctic sea route which would be a beneficial alternative path for the country; the last is to reinforce position of China in the region which in the future may provide global and regional governance.¹³⁰

In 2018, China officially published the first paper on its Arctic Policy. The state strongly underlines promises follow international law and participation in the Arctic political affairs in the frames of law and rational manner, but at the same time the main goal of Chinese Arctic policy is to pursue its own interests. Apart of a great interest into northern maritime routes along with project of building "Polar Silk Road" and exploration natural resources, the country includes developing legal fishing business and develop Arctic tourism as an industry of future.¹³¹

China actively promotes a complex of scientific, economic and political initiatives in order to strengthen its strategic interests. China regularly carries polar researches. The program has been invented in 1981; the first expedition by land to the North Pole took place in 1995, the first expedition by sea in 1999. Since 1994, China has conducted researches on the board of the only one icebreaker, which China owes at the moment. The icebreaker was bought by the country in 1993 from Ukraine. In August 1993, Chinese icebreaker went through the Northeast Passage. Annually China spends about \$ 63 million for polar research, which is almost equal to expenses of the South Korea for the same purposes and bigger than expenses of the USA¹³². China, as other non-regional states, using a method of active participation in general science diplomacy in the Arctic by using research activity in order legitimize and strengthen its overall presence and influence. Chinese future projects and current scientific

¹³⁰ Camilla T.N. Sorensen, Ekaterina Klimenko, "Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic. Possibilities and constraints", **SIPRI Policy Paper**, vol.46, June 2017, Stockholm, pp.9-11

¹³¹ "China's Arctic Policy", **The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China**, First Edition, 2018,

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

¹³² Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", **The Arctic and the North**, vol.24, 2016, pp.116-117

cooperation facilities help the country conduct its Arctic diplomacy and strengthen the image of China in the region and its relations with the Arctic states, thereby progressively building trust and integrating China into the Arctic governance structure.

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The second point, which was underlined above is economic interest, particularly in diverse energy supplies. China is aimed to build strong economic partnership in the region. Lately, Iceland has become a close partner of China in the field. In 2013, the countries signed free trade agreement. Iceland is beneficial for China in terms of fishing industry, aquaculture development and renewable energy technologies. Therefore, Iceland has taken proactive role in institutional development in the Arctic politics and economics. Iceland positively approaches to non-regional states, which try to act in the region. Thus, Iceland favors facilitate China's access to the Arctic development. In addition, Iceland strives to become a logistic hub on the Northern Sea Route between Asia and Europe, which also promotes development of relations between the states. China also maintains relations in the given matter with Norway. China has a research station in Norwegian Svalbard. The states have tied up the relations in the region in 2016 after six years of political crises¹³⁴. China closely works with Canada on base of energy resources development by, primarily, spreading Chinese economic expansion to an energy sector of Canada. Lately the amount of investment coming from China to Canadian energy sector visibly increased. Chinese companies are spending significant shares in Canadian oil and gas projects. Whereas, Canada attempts to diversify distribution area of its energy sources, which currently mainly oriented on the USA.¹³⁵

The third point stands on sea routes. Chinese commercial vessels have already made several trail journeys through the Northeast Passage in 2013. For the state the route is about 30% shorter rather the transportation path through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Chanel. Access to the Northeast Route for China may play crucial role in case of growing animosity with the USA. Since US has the naval base in Sembawang (Singapore), the country potentially is able to block the Strait of Malacca which is the

¹³³ Olga Alexeeva, Frederic Lasserre, "China and the Arctic", *Arctic Yearbook*, 2012, pp. 81

¹³⁴ Camilla T.N. Sorensen, Ekaterina Klimenko, "Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic. Possibilities and constraints", SIPRI Policy Paper, vol.46, June 2017, Stockholm, pp.5-7

¹³⁵ Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", *The Arctic and the North*, vol.24, 2016, pp.118

way for China to get energy resources from the Middle East. Availability of NEP is decreasing the risks.¹³⁶ The Northeast Passage may become guaranteed path to deliver energy resources. The path unofficially has already been named “Sea Silky Way”. It is a net of routes connecting the ports of China with, firstly, ports of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia and, secondly, with the Silky Way on land. Moreover, the path will decrease logistics expenses and delivery time from the ports of China to Europe. A new transportation corridor is more economically advantageous than traditional routes. For instance, the route from Asia-Pacific Region to Europe through the Indian Ocean is 24 000 km, but through NEP is two times less (12 000 km). It also includes absence of such danger as pirates which appears in the Gulf of Aden and causes appreciation of insurance premium. According Chinese experts one travel of container carrier may save up to \$3, 5 million. For Chinese economy question of maritime is crucial since economy of the country is highly dependable from international export.¹³⁷

China has always emphasised its respect to the right of the littoral Arctic states in the region, acknowledging importance of UN Convention of the Law on the Sea as an important legal framework for the Arctic governance, including further presented Ilullisat Declaration. But from the other hand, China calls for respect non-Arctic states’ rights considering the Arctic as the overall interest of international community, which means that the countries out of the Arctic region have rights to hold scientific researches, explore and transit under international law. Currently China does not have an official Arctic strategy. Although it non-officially proclaimed being under development.

The path to get a closest access to the Arctic matters for China is focusing on investing into the Arctic projects of different kinds. It can increase the role of the state at the region dramatically and bring constructive power.

¹³⁶ Medvedev Dmitriy Andreevich, "Mejdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v Arktike. Arkticheskiy ekonomicheskiy sovet", "**Problems of security in the Arctic**" series, Moscow, 2015, pp.17

¹³⁷ Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", **The Arctic and the North**, vol.24, 2016, pp.115

3.2. The Arctic Policy of South Korea

The main interest of South Korea is scientific researches, possibilities of transportation, condensed natural gas, stable and safe fishery, reclamation of new northern sea paths. Since the country is one of the most significant ship-building countries in the world, the state is attracted in perspective orders to build special ships and icebreakers by Korean shipyards.

In 2013, South Korea generated “The plan of realization of complex policy in the Arctic”. It consists following main pillars: 1. calling for widening of international cooperation in the region, active participation in the Arctic Council and intensification of bilateral cooperation with Arctic states; 2. supporting development of scientific and research activity and its infrastructure; 3. creating juridical institutions including new regulations supporting Arctic type of activities and establishment of Arctic information center. In 2013, government of South Korea proclaimed an intention to generate national Arctic policy for next 15 years. Apart of that the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries released Measures for the Advancement of Polar Region Policy¹³⁸. It includes three major pillars: the formation of the Arctic partnership, strengthening of scientific research and the creation of new Arctic industries¹³⁹.

In 2002 the state joined the International Arctic scientific committee and has started Arctic researches on Dasan station (Svalbard archipelago). In 2009 Korea built icebreaker “Araon”. It conducts scientific researches in the Arctic Ocean. Overall, the expenses of the state are equal to the amount the USA government spends. The reason of such high expenditure is, first of all, dependence on imports of energy resources. In 2013 Korea has imported 50% of hydrocarbon from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates and other. The prospect of energy resources on the bed of the Arctic Ocean attracts Seoul. Moreover, it is expected that South Korean specialists and companies will actively participate in development and extraction of gas and oil in the

¹³⁸ The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Korea Maritime Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea Polar Research Institute, Implementing Programs Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea, http://library.arcticportal.org/1902/1/Arctic_Policy_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf

¹³⁹ Dongmin Jin, Won-sang Seo, Seokwoo Lee, “Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea”, **Ocean and Coastal Law Journal**, Vol.22, №1, Article 7, 2017 : <http://digitalcommons.maine.gov/oclj/vol22/iss1/7>

Arctic region, as well as will just invest in projects of deposits search. The second is obviously, access to the Northeast Passage in order to save on cargo expenses. Korea numerous times has conducted a trial trip through NEP in order to test economic efficiency of transportation by the route. Moreover, the biggest ports of the state can be involved in case of active exploitation of NEP, such as ports in Pusan and Ulsan, which would increase commodity circulation of those ports.¹⁴⁰

The third reason meets specification of South Korea: as it was mentioned above, Korea is one of biggest ship building country in the world. Export of ships is significant part of overall Korean export, which makes 8-12%. Korean economy is monopolized by big business concerns under the state support. It helps the country maintain development of national shipbuilding, update its technologies and regularly upgrade the quality of ships following modern international tendencies. Therefore, the state is expecting to get numerous big foreign orders for icebreakers and even oil platform building. Korean logistic companies are studying possibilities transferring high-density cargos through NEP. Government of the state boosts the companies, which are interested in using the Route.

3.3. The Arctic Policy of Japan

Japan is aimed to reach free navigation through the Arctic Ocean as well as access to natural resources of the Arctic. Meantime, Japan is able to contribute to the region by assisting realization of sustainable development. Transit benefits, which NEP offers, may open up new opportunities for optimization of Japanese export to Europe. In comparison with the route through Suez Channel, the path decreases the distance from Hamburg to Yokohama about 40%, fuel consumption down to 20%. Japan has three icebreakers, the number is planned to increase within the time.

Prospect hydrocarbon resources are also meaningful for government and big businesses of Japan. Thus, 84% of the state's energy needs covered by natural resources. It forces the country to consider some extra traditional and non-traditional sources.

¹⁴⁰ Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", **The Arctic and the North**, vol:24, 2016, pp.129-132

The Japan Institute of International Affairs is a private Japanese policy think-tank focused on foreign affairs and security problems. In 2013 it published a report on Arctic Governance and Japan's Foreign Strategy. Even though the institute is not a governmental body, it closely related with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and acts as an external advisor. Thus, it is significant that the organization focused on the Arctic matter¹⁴¹. The official policy toward the Arctic changes according the situation of businesses of the state, first of all, shipbuilding and shipping companies as well as fluctuating demands on energy sources. For instance, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster has increased interest of Japan to energy supplies coming abroad and diversification of energy sources.

Japan seeks the states among the members of the Arctic Council, which experience a need in additional finances for the Arctic reclamation, as well as allies, which would be able to balance with more powerful Arctic countries. Primarily Japan counts on Norway and Canada. In security questions the USA remains the main partner of the state. US are known military and political ally of Japan, the country relies on its support in the Arctic Council in order to get empowerment and support in exploitation of resources. The Arctic ambitions of Japan are maintained by related financial, economic, science and technology bases, and significant political weight. The Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan calls for establishing a new international body in the Arctic, which would be formed not by geographical meanings but by economic interests in the region.¹⁴²

3.4. The Arctic Policy of India and Singapore

The Arctic policy of India includes following directions:

1. Conducting scientific polar researches and generating official Arctic strategy;
2. Consolidation relations with the Arctic Council;

¹⁴¹ Asari Hideki, "Recommendations for Japan's Diplomacy "Arctic Governance and Japan's Diplomatic Strategy" Project, **The Japan Institute of International Affairs**, 2013, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/research/2012_arctic_governance.php

¹⁴²Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", **The Arctic and the North**, vol.24, 2016, pp. 139-141

3. Cooperation development with the Nordic states and maintaining a strong bilateral dialog;
4. Evaluation of the Arctic resources and studying its possible exploitation;
5. Regularly conducting the Arctic expeditions;
6. Technological preparation to extract biological and mineral resources of the Arctic;
7. Promoting an idea of nuclear free status of the Arctic¹⁴³.

Indian companies are interested in cooperation with Russian companies in order to mutually develop field deposits at Russian north. At the same time the cut of sea cargo density through the Indian Ocean in case of prospect increase of traffic volume through the Northeast Passage. India is building its own icebreaker fleet. Moreover, the country already has own atomic submarines, which are able to make long-term travels.¹⁴⁴

Singapore is the state, which depends from import of energy sources, including hydrocarbons. The country is at the 9th place in the world in the matter of oil import. “PSA” company of the state has the terminals, which are able to accommodate vessels from the Arctic routes. Overall Singapore is one of the biggest container ports in the world¹⁴⁵. The country has an ability to influence on the position of International Maritime Organization. Particularly, the country stands for freedom of navigation, considering Arctic waters as human heritage. Meanwhile, in case of regular use of the Northeast Passage Singapore may experience decrease of amount of cargo vessels from China, which nowadays are following through Strait of Malacca.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol.307, Moscow, 2014, pp.91-92

¹⁴⁴ “India and the Arctic”, Public Diplomacy, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2013, <https://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/India&>

¹⁴⁵ Stewart Watters, Aki Tonami, “Singapore: An emerging Arctic Actor”, *Arctic Yearbook*, 2012 pp.104-110

¹⁴⁶ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, “Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva”, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol.307, Moscow, 2014, pp.100-101

3.5. The Arctic Policy of EU

The EU claim for the Arctic stake is based on several points. First of all, the EU rests on geographical fact that Sweden and Finland (members of the organization) are located at least partially inside of the Arctic Circle. It is the strongest argument for the EU to get involved into the Arctic geopolitics. The interest of the EU based on the opening up the Northeast Passage¹⁴⁷. In the prospect future the passage will be essential to the EU from economic point of view since 90% of external trade of the EU is done by sea. At the second, energy resources are crucial as well, since the EU members is mostly importing energy. In 2010, more than 50 % of the total energy consumption was supplied by non-members countries. New possible fields and recently discovered in the Arctic region are the prospect energy resources for the EU which energy demand will only increase in the near future¹⁴⁸.

To sum up, non-arctic States including observer states of the Arctic Council have nominal legal ground to act in the Arctic region, since the UN Convention from 1982 proclaimed all ocean space out of exclusive economic zones as global commons of humanity. Actually, in case of any activity in the region non-littoral states would need a support from littoral country in order to use their waterfront and communication infrastructures, as well as help in case of emergency¹⁴⁹. Nevertheless, non-regional states vision is the Arctic as a heritage of whole humanity. Therefore, the Arctic reclamations should be done by efforts of all states, which have needs, related financial, economic and technological abilities. Non-regional countries, by acting strive to maintain presence in the region, taking part in scientific expeditions, transferring cargos, fishing and other activities of soft power.

To sum up, the Arctic became a territory where political economical and geopolitical interests of regional and non-regional countries come together. Due to

¹⁴⁷ Joint Communication of the European Parliament and the Council, An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic, High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, Brussels, 2016 http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/160427_joint-communication-an-integrated-european-union-policy-for-the-arctic_en.pdf

¹⁴⁸ Andreas Osthagen, "The European Union – An Arctic Actor?", **Journal of Military and Strategic Studies**, vol. 15, issue 2, 2013, pp.74-75

¹⁴⁹ Antyushina Nataliya Mikhaylovna, "Arktika: noviy format mejdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva", Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe RAS, Reports of the Institute of Europe, vol.307, Moscow, 2014, pp.110

increase of geopolitical importance of the Arctic region the need of systemic approach for target setting and resolving problems in the area are becoming actual. It includes partnership in environmental protection, transportation, logistic, military questions and scientific researches. It also relates to the increase of military strategic importance of the Arctic region in international relations because of concentration of natural resources and international transportation paths.

The main obstacle for more intense development of the Arctic is high capital intensity and low investment prospects, since almost all Arctic projects have extended pay-off period. Apart of it there are some more factors such as undeveloped infrastructure of the region, difficulties of legislative regulation of any types of activity, vulnerability of the Arctic eco-system which leads to high ecological standards and complicated political environment¹⁵⁰. Important to mention that by virtue of capital and research intensity of the Arctic projects, none of players in the region is not able to carry out a project completely by its own. That returns us back to the idea that the most effective way to develop the Arctic in the current conditions is cooperation, especially cooperation of governments and commercial organizations.

Hence, there is high intensive cooperation processes in the Arctic region which also may cause vast range of conflictogenity. However, current political situation in the Arctic region or, how it is frequently named by the authors and mass media resources, "struggle for Arctic", is for now at the level of political rhetoric rather than any practical deeds. Military forces of the Arctic countries almost never get in contact and do not have any practical possibilities to react upon each other.

¹⁵⁰ Medvedev Dmitriy Andreevich, "Mejdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v Arktike. Arkticheskiy ekonomicheskiy sovet", "**Problems of security in the Arctic**" series, Moscow, 2015, pp.57

CHAPTER III

NEW TRENDS FOR THE CONCEPT "RUSSIAN ISLAND". THE LEVEL OF ITS ADJUSTMENT TO THE REALITIES OF RUSSIAN ARCTIC REGION

1. THE CONCEPT “RUSSIAN ISLAND” AND THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC CORRELATION

The core of any concept, which distinguishes main idea and nature of that concept, is specific notions and terms implemented by author. Therefore, in order to adjust the concept of Vadim Tsimbursky to the Arctic area of Russia the main thesis and notions of the concept “The Russian Island” such as “strait-territories”, “The Great Limitrophe” and “Kidnapping Europe” reflected at his main works¹⁵¹ will be used as the key elements. These notions should reflect the progressive point of the concept for the current situation in the Arctic region.

Concept "The Russian Island" was created as a method to hold Siberian territory and make it solid platform of the Russian civilization. Therefore, it will not be able being separated by external civilizations. Tsimburky had a strong statement that Russia did not take Siberia in but was established as a state by Siberia. Siberia is a massive geographical and historical region of Russia. The borders of Siberia start from Ural Mountains spreading toward the east of the country and continue until the shores of the Pacific Ocean. On the south borders of Siberia finish by the border line of China, Mongolia and Kazakhstan. On the north the shore of the Arctic Ocean is considered end line of Siberia. Siberia takes more than 73% from size of Russia.

¹⁵¹ "Ostrov Rossiya" (perspektivi rossiyskoy geopolitiki) (1993), "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi" (1994), "Ot velikogo ostrova Russii. (K prasinvolu rossiyskoy civilizacii)" (1997), "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi" (1999), "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem' let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii" (2000), "Posledniy geokulturniy vibor Rossii - "s krayu stola bogatih I silnih" (2001), "Ostrov Rossiya: Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye raboti" 1993-2006 (2007), "Shel'f "Ostrova Rossiya". Geopolitika prostranstv i geopolitika granits", (2008), "Konyunkturi Zemli i Vremeni. Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye intellektual'niye rassledovaniya", (2011), "Osnovaniye rossiuskogo geopoliticheskogo konservatizma" (2015)

Siberia as a major of Russian pattern is a core field of concept “The Russian Island”. In terms of the statements of the concept following can be emphasised: the Arctic and Siberia is two inseparable notions not only in minds of Russian people but also geographically. More than 50% of the Russian Arctic area, which locates all along the North Pole border of Russia matches with the land of Siberia. Therefore, the North Pole area starting from the Ural Mountains towards the Pacific is the Arctic and Siberia at the same time. Consequently, in the face of two contradicted flows of Russian geopolitical minds, Atlanticism and Eurasianism, a policy of the country is required to be more flexible, open but distinctive. Distinctiveness of “The Russian Island” concept lays on its main idea of giving over correlating Russian pattern with European or any other global order. In place, Russia overall should determine itself as a special land with self-sufficient people.

Thus, the concept was created as a strategy to help the Russian Federation to adopt and survive in the modern changing World. Even if the author has excluded the Arctic, he emphasized possible prompt shift to frigid cold zone of the country, naming it as Arctic – Eurasian civilization. It may define Russian identity after collapse of the USSR.

1.1. “The Great Limitrophe” and “The Russian Island” Leading to the Arctic

One of the first and essential notions of the concept of Vadim Tsimbursky is “strait-territories”. It is the head feature of “Russian Island”. “Strait-territories” is the belt of territories consisting the states of Baltic region, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The belt separates Russian Civilization from European Roman-Germanic Civilization, but people inhabiting the belt do not belong to any of these civilizations but “squeezed” in between of them.¹⁵² Later Tsimbursky continuously kept developing his concept and prolonged the scale of “strait-territories” until Central Asia in order to demonstrate that belt also separates Russian pattern from the Middle East. After this modification in the concept the notion of “The Great Limitrophe” is taking the central position of the concept. “The Great Limitrophe” carries several crucial functions for

¹⁵² Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya. Geopoliticheskiye i khronopoliticheskiye raboti." 1993 -2006.", Moscow: **ROSSPEN**, 2007, pp.8

“The Russian Island”. First of all it serves as protection from the influence of neighbouring civilizations such as Europe, Middle East and China and serves as a barrier of preventing clash of Russian pattern with core powers of other civilizations.¹⁵³ In fact, the concept has couple of references where Tsimbursky addresses to the northern territories of Russia. For instance, the author claims that since the beginning of 21st century the country’s location has been changed visionary from Russia being between Europe and Asia to Russia being a platform with the gates to the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans which brings full access to “The Great Limitrophe” area. “The Great Limitrophe” is presented as shelf of “The Russian Island” which finishes at the point where the shelf of another civilizational platform starts. “The Great Limitrophe” was also named as a flashpoint of challenges for external security of Russia. The latest events such as situation on Balkans, Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Georgia and others serve as verifier of Tsimbursky’s hypothesis.

By the author, the most optimal geopolitical plan for the Russian Federation is to preserve “Island” status without a claim to hegemony, but at the same time to avoid appearance of any super power on the belt of “The Great Limitrophe”. Moreover, the author claims that Russia should not aim to include the area of Limitrophe into its territory. In view of events happening on the east part of “The Great Limitrophe” such as situation in Crimea and conflicts on the east of Ukraine one has an impression that Russia attempts to expand on “The Great Limitrophe”. Although Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia are on the Limitrophe territory, which definitely should be a privilege for Russian international interests and serve as a buffer zone but not become the part of “The Russian Island”.

Hence, the political course of Russian current government over mentioned part of Limitrophe contradicts with geopolitical course of Tsimbursky. Focus on the shelf of “The Great Limitrophe” prevents the state’s profound involvement into internal development of the country and strong maintenance of domestic geopolitics. According to the author, it would be more advantageous to leave “The Great Limitrophe” as a

¹⁵³ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Ostrov Rossiya" za sem' let ili Priklucheniya odnoy geopoliticheskoy koncepcii", 2000, **“Russian Archipelago”** - online project of "Russian World", http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/67/

territory, which connects and separates civilizations and avoid control of any major power over “The Great Limitrophe”. Nevertheless, subsequent to annexation of Crimea in 2014 Russian government finances the peninsula generously by spending approximately fifth part of the amount of funds devoted to all regions of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the government has programs for the rapid development of Crimea, which are financed additionally.

Whereas the Arctic Region of Russia with major cities and ports of the Northeast Passage remain poorly financed and low developed, the population of the area continues immigration to more livable regions of the state. Low population and low industrial development create a threat for the sovereignty of the country and again crosses with the thesis of “The Russian Island” concept regarding domestic geopolitics. Moreover, sanctions, which are applied by the Atlantic states and their allies on Russia, due to the events on Crimea and indirect involvement of Russia into conflict in the East of Ukraine, thwarts progress of existing and planned projects in the Russian Arctic. For instance, essential for the Arctic process of building icebreakers is slowed down because of numerous obstacles regarding its import from Europe. Therefore, current foreign course and critical events taking place on the part of “The Great Limitrophe” miss three main geopolitical priorities of Vadim Tsimbursky:

1. Accept current borders of the state;
2. Make eastern part of the country a priority of the state;
3. Concentrate on domestic geopolitics.

These three criteria for geopolitics of Russia by the author would push development of the Arctic region ahead and would help to secure interest of the nation in the future.

At work of “Geopolitics for Eurasian Atlantis” Tsimbursky paid attention to specification of geographical structure of the state’s landscape due to its importance for geopolitics of Russia.¹⁵⁴ Tsimbursky represented the shape of the country as rectangular inscribed into ellipse. Ellipse maintains security of Russia, whereas rectangular is in charge of national communication system. Ellipse consists of two arcs that meet at two

¹⁵⁴Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", 1999

points: Murmansk and Vladivostok. The waters of the Arctic Sea shape the upper arc and Pacific Ocean, another arc passes through the land of “The Great Limitrophe”. Tsimbursky pays profound attention to the lower arch as an overland interval in the Old World between Russia and warm waters. In contrast, the upper arc does not present importance due to its prone of glaciation. Since past 15 years, current international situation in the Arctic region shows that despite of severe climate situation the role of the upper arc is increased dramatically and will continue its upward trend in the future. Aforementioned example of political situation regarding Crimea demonstrates how closely connected the two arcs of Russian ellipse and how events on it may influence each other’s evolution. Crises appearing on the low arc are able to slow down or stop development processes on the upper arc.

Additionally, the author distinguished four corners of the rectangular. All corners are corners of “The Russian Island” lead the way to the open sea. In the frames of this work, two northern corners on the east and the west play the most essential role: Baltic – White Seas on the north east and area of Bering Strait on the north east. According to the concept, the corners have two sides that make them geopolitically ambivalent. Since the areas open up to seas of the Northeast Passage, they play a big role in the state’s inner organization, perspective regional growth and cluster regional innovation. The North West angle of Russian rectangular is the center of the Arctic region development: three ports out of four, such as Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Arkhangelsk, situate within range of angle. They carry the function of logistic centers for the Northeast Passage. Moreover, Murmansk, which is inside of the angle and major point of the arcs, is steadily becoming the main logistic backbone of reclamation of the Arctic Ocean’s shelf. Murmansk is an essential hub not only by sea but also by land. It connects northern region with the rest of the country by the railways.

Disadvantage of the angles is its vulnerability in terms of being nibble from the sides of the country. Side positioning and being away from the center of the country creates weakness of the angles. From the other hand, the North East Angle is having a great strategic meaning for Russian sovereignty. The Arctic region was actively used since the Second World War and the Cold War, currently on the North West angle government deploys several military towns and dock nuclear submarines.

To sum up, within the frames of the concept of Vadim Tsimursky “The Russian Island” the Arctic was not mentioned independently since the region was still considered geopolitically inaccessible due to its severe climate conditions. However, at the beginning of 21st century the region importance has started broadly experiencing an upward trend on the international arena attracting attention not only the regional but also non-regional states. High attention to the region and some development on the national and international scale allow fitting the region inside of the concept of Tsimbursky. Therefore, “The Russian Island” which is, in fact, representation of Russian civilization may include the Arctic region mainly as part of Siberia. It is considered as the core of the Russian civilization. The other part of the Arctic area, which is not the part of Siberia, also plays an essential role as the North West angle of the Russian rectangular visualized by Tsimbursky. Overall, the upper part of the arc begins at Murmansk - the center of the Russian Arctic development, and projects over all length of the Northeast Passage. Therefore, the Northeast Passage is not part of “The Russian Island” but the upper arc carrying all the functions of the arc distinguishing by Tsimbursky. Whereas, the Arctic region is not part of “The Great Limitrophe” belt. However, it can be assumed that the arcs are not completely independent from each other and are able to influence on one another, therefore, it is two part of one “rectangular – elipse” system.

1.2. Cooperation of Russia with Asian States. References to the Concept

In the article “Geopolitics for Eurasian Atlantis” published in 1999¹⁵⁵ Tsimbursky focuses on close cooperation with the powers of neighboring civilizations on the east such as China and Iran. China is one of the main non-regional players in the Arctic region, therefore, the idea of China – Russia cooperation takes a central role in the Arctic geopolitics. In the concept, the author suggests using the alliance with China in order to prevent penetration of Atlantic Powers to the territory of “The Great Limitrophe” and destabilize the area.

¹⁵⁵ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Geopolitika dlya "evraziyskoy Atlantidi", "**Russian Archipelago**" - online project of "Russian World", 1999

In practice, sanctions applied on Russia by the Atlantic states have restricted involvement of Western companies in energy and other development projects in the Russian Arctic. For instance, the US sanctions ban the supply of equipment for deep drilling, the development of the Arctic shelf and oil and gas reserves. Whereas EU sanctions forbid the transfer of technologies for deep oil production, exploration and development of the Arctic shelf oil reserves.¹⁵⁶ The largest Russian banks and corporations involved into the Arctic projects became subject of sanctions as well. As result it negatively affected cooperation of those companies and their international companies on the West.¹⁵⁷ As one can see, the sanctions affected the main spheres of Russian national economy: oil gas sector, military industry and financial sphere. The oil and gas sector was chosen deliberately since the industry is crucial for economic stability of the country, since the profit coming from fossil fuel import is approximately 40% of consolidated budget of Russia. Crucial to mention that for the last decade sanctions role has been change from limitation measures applied for a whole country to some economical sector, legal body or private individual. The main purpose of it is localized strike on the most vital spheres which government is interested in the most.¹⁵⁸ Due to such interational trend, Russia addressed to Asia in order to find a potential investors and partners such as China, South Korea and Japan. Engaging Asian countries into the development of the Russian Arctic region is a crucial point within the frames of Tsimbursky's concept.

1.2.1. Russia and China in the Frames of the Arctic Cooperation

As it was mentioned before, China is one of the biggest non-regional players in the Arctic, which seeks the ways to be engaged into the region profoundly. Amid with luck infrastructure, capital and technology but rich in energy resources and profitable sea route China and Russia have a strong base to cooperate on. In fact, Russia was always focusing on the Asian countries as future potential users of The Northeast Route.

¹⁵⁶ EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis, **European Union Newsroom**, https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en

¹⁵⁷ "Rosneft" requests to extend the deadline of the Arctic shelf development", **dr.ru**, 28.10.14 https://www.dp.ru/a/2014/10/28/Rosneft_poprosila_prod/

¹⁵⁸ Nikullina Anni Yul'yevna, "Innostranniye investicii v neftegazovuyu otrasl' Rossii v usloviyah sanktcii so storoni Evropeyskogo soyuza", **The Arctic: History and Present, The articles of international scientific conference**, 2016, pp.494

Recently Russian officials aim to attract those states not only as users but also as co-developers. Moreover, government officials directly addressed to the countries, for instance, in 2016 Vice Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Rogozin invited China to develop The Northeast Route together.¹⁵⁹ The potential for oil and gas cooperation in the Arctic has gradually become part of the negotiations between the states. Although Russia and China have been already cooperating in gas and oil fields, the territories of the subjects were on the Russian Far East and East Siberia. The biggest project of the cooperation between Gazprom and CNPC remains construction and further exploitation of “The Power of Siberia” pipeline. The first gas delivery to China via the pipeline is planned for 2019.¹⁶⁰ Thus, Russia leaves open the possibility to involve companies of China into developing gas and oil resources on the Arctic shelf.

Developing transportation system along territory of Russia, especially on the east and the north of the country, is the question of national and strategic interests. Development of The Northeast Passage is the priority task in order to protect northern borders of Russia and provide communication availability of northern regions with the rest of the country. It should allow full usage of the path for domestic transportation of goods for defensive capacity of the country from the North Pole side and export oil and gas produces in the region. In the future The Northeast Passage has capacity to become an important element of Trans-Eurasian transportation system providing transit sea route from Europe to the Southeast Asia, as well as transportation and logistics operations of the Arctic Ocean natural resources development processes.¹⁶¹

Apart of The Northeast Passage Russia has a big project to evolve railway system of the region. Project "Belkomur" is a new line that allows the shortest access from north and mid Ural with the port in Arkhangelsk to strategic bodies of Northwestern Federal District of Russia (overall 1155 km). The line might help to improve transport and economic relations between Western Siberia and Ural. Moreover, "Belkomur" line carries military and strategic meanings. Firstly, it will allow settling

¹⁵⁹ Rogozin invited China to develop The Northeast Route together, **RIA Novosti**, 26.02.16 <https://ria.ru/20160226/1380762355.html#ixzz42Q5ywZ1y>

¹⁶⁰ Gas pipeline “Power of Siberia”. The largest gas transmission system in Russia’s East, <http://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/>

¹⁶¹ Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knijniy Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.82

transportation corridor "east-west" in case some vulnerable parts of Trans-Siberian Railway will be blocked. Secondly, the line bypasses the busiest parts of traditional transport hubs that is why it may be used for fast redeployment of armed forces, military equipment, strategically important goods to the shore of the White Sea from rearward area.¹⁶² Subsequently, the project demands high financial expenses. Thus, the main foreign partner of "Belkomur" after agreement in 2015 has become China when Chinese Poly Technologies Inc. decided to invest in development of the railways and take part of responsibility for its operation in the future.¹⁶³ Hence, the line will be connected with China. Investing in construction railways linking the Arctic ports, Trans-Siberian Railway and its feeder lines until China will not only boost export from north-east of China to Russian north and Northern Europe but will maintain maritime trough the Northeast Passage and the region in general.

Moreover, China has been developing its own project of the routes. In 2015 governmental bodies of China published a document "Vision and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road".¹⁶⁴ Two out of three main routes of "Silk Road Economic Belt" lay from China to Europe through Eurasia; one out of two routes of "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" starts from ports of China, passes South China Sea until Indian Ocean and continues until Europe. In the aggregate all the routes is "One Belt, One Route" concept. The key goal of the concept is establishing transportation infrastructure in order to deliver goods to Europe. The concept is proclaimed as beginning of a new land based and sea based Eurasian geopolitics of a new Superpower of China. The projects, which the concept includes, will reinforce direct investments of China. The main goal of those investments is increase volume of export of innovation products in transportation and advanced technologies, monopolize Eurasian market of transportation network construction. In 2015 Russia and China have signed letter of agreement about interlinking Silk Road Economic belt and Eurasian Economic Union. Thus, the document distinguishes

¹⁶² Remizov Mikhail Vitalyevich, "Rossiya v Arktike. Vizovi i perspektivi osvoyeniya", **Knizhny Mir**, Moscow, 2015, pp.73

¹⁶³ Alexandr Pilyasov, Belkomur is investment precedent for Russia, 11.09.2015
http://www.belkomur.com/press/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=2809

¹⁶⁴ Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, the National Development and Reform Commission, **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization**, 25.03.2015,
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html

Russian Eurasian space from Ural to Central Asian borders of Russia as the main transit zone, investment and industrial cooperation.¹⁶⁵

It is unofficially assumed that the Northeast Passage may be included into the concept as well. Since the route is the shortest way between China and Europe, it matches the principles of “One Belt, One Route” concept. Moreover, Chinese scholars and the Russian governmental official numerous times were mentioning idea of concept “Silk Belt Northern Sea Route”. Obviously, there are many obstacles on the way to include project of developing the Northeast Route into strategic plan “One Belt, One Route”. Predominantly, The Northeast Passage is low commercialized and low developed transportation route. It is not able to compete with the other Eurasian transportation routes despite its advantageous. Remarkable cost savings depend on future infrastructure development along the Northeast Passage and lowering tariffs on icebreakers provisions. Secondly, China has not yet got experienced and proficient in order successfully operate in Arctic conditions.

At last, Russia anticipates risks related to possibilities of challenges to jurisdiction of Russia over the Northeast Passage, which China may cause by taking a leading position in developing the Arctic. Anyway Russia perceives that in the great political game in order to cooperate with China on the platform “One Belt, One Route”, it will be forced to make concessions of its rights on activity in the Arctic region.

Contrary to cooperation and image of partnership on the international arena, China and Russia have the reasons to hesitate about fully relying on each other. Based on analytic materials there are some problematic trends, which Russia threads about. Among the most obvious ones are competition for communication lines in the Arctic, sharp competition on hydrocarbon market to Asian countries, latent assimilation of the Russian Far East and Siberian population by population of China and, at last, the danger of the Russian economy being transformed into a mere supplier of raw materials for industrially developed China.¹⁶⁶ Additionally, in case of further empowering of China and possible attenuation of Russia due to sanction of Atlantic states, Beijing may

¹⁶⁵ Luzyanin S.G., Afonasyeva A.V., *Odin poyas, odin put' – politicheskiye i ekonomicheskiye izmereniya*, **Herald of Tomsk governmental University. Economics.**, vol.40, 2017, pp.11

¹⁶⁶ Lukin Yury Fedorovich, “Sovremennaya situatsiya v Arktike v kontekste global'nih trendov”, **“The Arctic and the North” journal**, vol. 16, 2014, pp.67

request to assign the Northeast Passage a status of international waters. That may cause tension between two countries, which would meet the interests of Atlantic countries aiming raw containment of China. Moreover, at the international arena proponents of globalization are calling for internationalization of the Northeast Passage. For instance, the idea of establishing transnational company, which would be in charge of the Arctic sea transportation corridor and its development considering interests of different countries, is being popularized.¹⁶⁷

To sum up, relations of Russia and China can be called a flexible strategic partnership where both sides aim to identify mutual strategic interests and work on them issue-by-issue basis rather than strong alliance. Thus, they are not committed to assisting and defending each other on long-term basis.

1.2.2. Russia and South Korea in the Frames of the Arctic Cooperation

The second state on the east with broad prospect of cooperation in the Arctic region with Russia is South Korea. South Korea despite being non-arctic state shows willingness of being involved into the Arctic development and have an access to the region and its prospect benefits. By Tsimbursky South Korea as well as China is the part of “The Great Limitrophe”. In comparison with China, the relations between Russia and South Korea have less common ground but there are prospect and current projects where the states are cooperating or going to in the future.

In 2013 Administration of former President of South Korea Park Geun-Hye offered a project “The Eurasian Initiative”. The project implied cooperation of economic, energetic and transport complexes of Eurasian countries with further formation of integrated space from Western Europe to North-East Asia. Obviously, such broad plans seem utopic. Even though the project is unrealistic, it leads the way of South Korea’s foreign policy. Within time in the frames of “The Eurasian initiative” couple of main functional directions was formed. Predominantly, it is development of economic cooperation of Eurasian states via joint transport and logistics projects.

¹⁶⁷ Didenko Nikolay Ivanovich, “Strategiya razvitiya Arkticheskogo prostranstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, *The Arctic: History and Present*, **The articles of international scientific conference**, 2016, pp.383

Second is diversification of South Korea's foreign policy. For instance, the ninth President of South Korea Roh Moo-hyun has already tried to take forward such policy in order to resolve the problem of excessive dependence from alliance with USA and form a new image South Korea as developed state being able to play independent and active role on regional and global arena.¹⁶⁸

Despite in 2017 new government of South Korea came into the power the direction of foreign policy in the region has not been changed dramatically. Moscow plans development of transport and logistics infrastructure on the Far East, carrying on with investment projects and attracting finances and technologies of South Korea. South Korea remains among of the most crucial partners on the East.

As it was mentioned above sanctions applied by the Atlantic states slowed down projects of development of the Arctic region. For instance, building of new icebreakers stopped since some of the parts were exported from Europe. Russia resolved the problem by addressing to the East. Currently the parts are delivered by South Korea. Moreover, in 2014 "Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering" (DSME) secured the order from Russian navigation company "Sovkomflot" to build 9 tankers for transportation of liquefied natural gas. DSME also builds tankers for Russian project on the north "Yamal LNG". Shipping company "TPI Megaline" takes part in cargo transportation to Yamal. South Korean dockyard Samsung Heavy Industries Co. LTD supplies Russian project 42K "Arctic Shuttle Tanker".¹⁶⁹

At the same time, South Korea considers Russia as a state providing transit possibilities and potential benefits in energy sphere. In the Arctic region, South Korea demonstrates its readiness to invest into Arctic in exchange of guarantee of free access to use the Northeast Passage and Russian Arctic for research and geological exploration purposes. Thus, South Korea aims to gain access to develop energy, mineral and other resources of the Arctic region, use logistic potential of the Northeast Passage, occupy Russian market of special large-capacity vessels building. The possible fields of

¹⁶⁸ Lukin Artem Leonidovich, Korotich Semen Alexandrovich, "Evraziyskaya initsiativa posle Pak Kin Khe: razvitiye, sovremennoye sostoyanie i perspektivi yujnokoreyskih integratsionnih proektov", **The news of Eastern Institute**, 2016/4 (32), pp.102-110

¹⁶⁹ Zhuravlev Valeriy Petrovich, "Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost", **The Arctic and the North**, vol.24, 2016, pp.127

bilateral cooperation of South Korea and Russia are modernization of Russian ports on the north, prospect investments, communication technologies, scientific cooperation and joint Research and Advanced Development.

1.3. Possibility of the Forth Circle of “Kidnapping Europe” Process

“Kidnapping Europe” is another central notion invented by Tsimbursky in “The Russian Island” concept. It represents the process that Russian civilization has gone through its history within frame of its international policy. The author claims that “Kidnapping Europe” consists three circles and each circle has its steps. The first circle starts at the beginning of 18th century when first Russian Emperor the Peter the Great takes Europe as a model of state development. Thus, the Ruler charts a course toward European culture; furthermore, his successors strived to be acknowledged by European states as part of Europe. Whereas, Tsimbursky claims that Russian civilization is not consistent with Europe, hence, Russia will never be Europe. As prove of his statement the author declares that each great civilization has its core ethnical group. For Western Civilization or the core of the Atlantic state is Romano-Germanic ethnical family. Thus, European civilization would never accept Russian pattern and Slavic Ethnicity. As a general opinion, which widely represented Russian history, are European invaders, where Russia is protecting its own land. Nevertheless, Tsimbursky claimed and tried to demonstrate via his circles that Russia was first to provoke foreign invasions. Therefore, “Kidnapping Europe” process was always preventing development of the country, since instead of domestic geopolitics and focusing on regional development of “The Russian Island” government of Russian pattern was trying to reach its “European dream”. At his articles published in 90s of 20th century Tsimbursky claimed that with the USSR collapse 280 years period of Russian “Kidnapping Europe” history came to the end and a new circle would expected to start again. Thus, the author was foreseeing further rapid development of “The Russian Island”.¹⁷⁰

After more than two decades since the article “Circles of “Kidnapping Europe” has been published there are some features in foreign policy of the Russian Federation

¹⁷⁰ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", Russian **Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

that may show that there is a possibility of forth circle of “Kidnapping Europe”. Due to the changes of trend in international arena underwent some modifications.

Summarize of circle’s steps Step A shows that Russia is breaking up its special barriers towards European platform and, at the same time, getting involved into unbeneficial alliances. Obviously, that Tsimbursky described conventional type of war, which Russia was taking part since 18th century. Firstly, since the end of Cold War the meaning of war has been changed. Thus, Superpowers prefer to avoid conventional wars due to its high cost (political, financial or material) and bloody casualties. Such form of conflict has been diminished also due to the changing nature of statehood’s system and generally international order in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Instead, Superpowers push forward alternative indirect engagement in order to maintain their strategic interests such as proxy war. The classical definition of “proxy war” was given by political scientist Karl Deutsch in 1964 as “an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some of that country’s manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.”¹⁷¹ Later, Andrew Mumford at his article defined proxy war “as conflicts in which third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favor of its preferred faction – remain a missing link in contemporary war and security studies.” Same as in conventional war proxy war can be multilateral as coalition proxy warfare. Hence, trends show that developing dynamics of proxy warfare will make it an important feature of the conflicts in the future.¹⁷² The brightest examples of latest proxy war are Syrian Civil War and Ukrainian Crises where two polar powers: Atlantic States and Russian pattern indirectly confronts each other. Even though proxy warfare requires less financial expenses in comparison with conventional war, it demands losses from budget of country, which is not welcomed by society and some elites of state. For instance, amid of economic problems of Russia that cause slow and unsatisfied development of social sphere and domestic politics in general spending budget on proxy war do not seem feasible. In conditions of sanctions applied on the most strategic

¹⁷¹ Karl W Deutsch, “External Involvement in Internal War”, in Harry Eckstein (ed), *Internal War, Problems and Approaches*, NY: **Free Press of Glencoe**, New York, 1964

¹⁷² Andrew Warfare, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict”, **The RUSI Journal**, 158:2, 40-46, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2013.787733, 2013, pp. 40-45

spheres of Russian economy development domestic geopolitics is experiencing downward trends. In particular, Far East, Siberia and the Arctic region receive fewer finances that it is required. Hence, it weakens sovereignty of the country. For instance, Vadim Tsimbursky was mentioning the threats for well-being of Russian pattern bordering with Chinese Civilization that due to its low development and poorly populated features that space of “The Russian Island” can be “swallowed” by stronger population of China and its economy.

Recent crisis in Venezuela creates a new venue for proxy warfare as well. Obviously, Venezuela is an important country for Russia by numerous reasons. From geopolitical point of view Venezuela is the state, which is close to the biggest rival of Russia, thus the state is geopolitically and strategically attractive. Close economic relations bound Venezuela as well as Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador with Russia; beside Russian weaponries are 90% of military imports of those states. Since 2010 Russian Oil Company “Rosneft” invested in the state’s energy sector about 9 milliard dollars and still has not met the expenses. In particular, due to political crises and economic sanctions applied by the USA, Russia supplies Venezuela with high-gravity oil which before was imported from US. Moreover, Russia has a potential project of military base deployment in Venezuela. According some experts Russian economy cannot afford military base even though the state tries to protect its investments in Venezuela. The analysts state that Russia will not be able to hold current President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro in power without support of other World’s Power. For instance, China position regarding the situation in Venezuela is restrained. Although China does not acknowledge opposition as legitimate power in Venezuela and calls for peaceful resolution of the conflict but maintains non-official contacts with opposition anyway. Moreover, Russia risks muddling relations with BRICs partner Brazil that considers Venezuela as zone of its geopolitical interests and opposes militarization of the region. Hence, Russia does not have enough resources to hold current power of the state, and, follow, for instance, Syrian scenario of proxy war.¹⁷³

Aforementioned examples demonstate that Russia passes through the key features of Step A of “Kidnapping Europe” process. Hence, proxy war brings up the

¹⁷³ Alexander Gabuev, “Pochemu Rossiya vkladivayet den’gi v Venesuelly, a ne v Sibir’ ”, **lenta.ru**, 25.02.19, https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/02/25/russia_china_venezuela/

same consequences as conventional wars in the Russian history. Instead of investments that Russian government would forward into development of oil resources in the Arctic and Eastern Siberia and benefit from reinforcement of local infrastructure and employment of citizens. Russia becomes victim of its geopolitical ambitions as it was in previous circles of Step A of “Kidnapping Europe” process.

Step B in the Circle of “Kidnapping Europe” is characterized as counter march of Europe towards Russian Platform due to concern of Europe regarding pushy interference of Russia into European affairs. By “counter march” Tsimbursky applied military operations or wars, which were started by Atlantic countries and came over to “strait-territories” or broke in “the Russian Island”. As aforementioned, after Cold War means of war are changing progressively as well as military conflicts finds its alternatives in the image of international sanctions. States or international organizations more often prefer apply international sanctions of different types in order project power or influence one’s government behavior avoiding military conflict. Hence, sanctions have become a tool of states, in particular World’s Powers such as the US, to make pressure on other states. In general, by international law “sanction” is defined as coercive measures taken by one, several states or international organization, which are intended to convince another state to stop engaging in acts violating international law. Despite of growing frequency of use international sanctions, military conflicts are still widely used as well. Sanctions have different varieties such as military, political, diplomatic, cultural and variations of economic such as embargoes, boycotts, travel, transport or financial restrictions. Sanctions are able to be effective in terms of breaking commercial relations, laying economic costs. By number of sanctions imposed the USA remains at the first place. The US apply unilateral and multilateral (with EU and closest allies) sanctions in order to disrupt of military adventures, impair of military strength or/and destabilize foreign governments.¹⁷⁴

Thus, if to project current international relations in between Russia and Atlantic States on Step B of “Kidnapping Europe” Circle, it can be assumed that Step B has reached its turn within forth Circle of the process. Atlantic States, in particular, the USA and EU are using an alternative means of coercion as sanction as a response to

¹⁷⁴ William H. Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions”, **Handbook of Defense Economics**, Vol.2, 2007, pp. 868-869

annexation of Crimea in 2014 and indirect involvement into Ukrainian crises. Hence, by following the concept of Vadim Tsimbursky, Atlantic countries are trying to push away “The Russian Island” from “strait-territories”, which Crimea and Ukraine are situating on. Moreover, Russia is threatened with more sanctions by the USA in case Russian involvement into crisis in Venezuela. Sanctions applied on Russia include asset freezes for specific Russian individuals and entities, restrictions on financial transactions with Russian firms operating in key sectors, restrictions on export, services and technology for specific oil exploration or productions projects as well as exports of dual-use and military items to Russia. Even though the sanctions contributed to economic losses and damages all involved countries and their economies, as aforementioned Russian economy, in particular, a key sector of the state’s economy energy resources development is experiencing difficulties. Especially it relates to the Arctic region and East Siberia that demands special attention and big financial investments.¹⁷⁵ The oil and gas sector was chosen deliberately since the industry is crucial for economic stability of the country, since the profit coming from fossil fuel import is approximately 40% of consolidated budget of Russia. It shows that for the last decade sanctions role has been change from limitation measures applied for a whole country to some economical sector, legal body or private individual. The main purpose of it is localized strike on the most vital spheres which government is interested the most.¹⁷⁶ Hence, Step B of 4th Circle of “Kidnapping Europe” is arbitrarily distinguished by applying sanctions on Russia in order to bring, first of all, economic damages to the country.

Step C is characterized by counter stand of Russia against European intervention. By Tsimbursky, it means responsive military operation to Europe after Step B. Within frames of modern reality and partial replacement of conventional means of war with economic measures such as sanctions, the borders of Circles of traditional “Kidnapping Europe” process are flatten. Therefore, there are two options of Step C: either it will not happen and Russia will start “Eurasian Interlude” process or Step C has not reached its timeframe yet. Even though both versions are possible to happen, if to

¹⁷⁵ Jana Ilieva, Aleksandar Dashtevski, Filip Kokotovic, “Economic Sanctions in International Law”, **UTMS Journal of Economics** 9 (2), 2018, pp.201-206

¹⁷⁶ Nikullina Anni Yul’yevna, “Inostranniye investitsii v neftegazovuyu otrasl’ Rossii v usloviyah sanktsii so storoni Evropeyskogo soyuza”, **The Arctic: History and Present, The articles of international scientific conference**, 2016, pp.494

take into considerations some details given by the author, we can say that Step C does not mean to happen. Tsimbursky states that from on Circle to another Circles' power as well as its duration decreases. Presumably, 4th Circle of "Kidnapping Europe" consists only two Steps, since there are clear sign of "Eurasian Interlude" appear already. The author describes "Eurasian Interlude" as the process appearing in between of "Kidnapping Europe" Circles, when foreign politics of Russia is redirected towards Eurasian countries.¹⁷⁷ Aforementioned case when European partners of Russia after sanctions applied on export of energy sector related equipment were replaced by Asian countries such as South Korea and China is brightest example of changing process. In general, the cooperation with Asian countries has been increasing steadily and. Present days Russia has numerous vast projects with Asian countries.

1.4. Militarization of the Arctic Region as a Conventional Measure of State's Interests Protection

The conflicts that are developing on the territory of "The Great Limitrophe" have negative impact on the situation in the Arctic region as not only economical damage but also partially as disrupted cooperation of the regional states. It escalates military presence in the region. It can be observed that the events and changes related to the main notions of the concept closely related to each other. Currently it gives some negative outcome for the Arctic region of Russia and the Arctic overall.

In particular, political crises between Russia and Ukraine had negative reflection on the relations between the members of the Arctic Council. The littoral countries put the mutual projects on hold, including military trainings. In terms of the system of geopolitical relations currently, the Arctic region represents bipolar model of relations: confrontation of Russia and Atlantic States.

In the Arctic region Russia confronts not the separate sovereignties but united front of NATO members. Obviously, the Arctic Council as the body regulating relationships in the region is not convenient for Russia. The Arctic Council is "a private

¹⁷⁷ Tsimbursky Vadim Leonidovich, "Tsikli "pokhitscheniya Evropi", Russian **Archipelago** – online project, 1994, http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/comment/

club” of eight Arctic countries, five of which are the members of NATO and actively participating into sanctions applications against Russia. Thus, Russian orientation to create multipolar “the Arctic G20”, for instance, is logical. Among the Arctic Council members the Russian Federation does not have allies and acts in the conditions of hegemony of the USA and its NATO allies.¹⁷⁸

Nowadays political and military environment in the Arctic is stable and predictable but potential conflict remains. Thereby the head of NATO plans to support economic programs of European states by building up military presence in polar region. Moreover, NATO has the projects such as organization of control and keeping track of situation, search and rescue operations, emergency response and recovery in the North Pole and prevention any possible local conflicts. In order to maintain national interests of NATO states in Greenlandic - Norwegian and western Arctic sea zones of the Arctic Ocean region NATO deploy group of naval forces such as ships, submarines and aviation of NATO members Naval Forces: Belgium, the Great Britain, Denmark, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, the USA, France and Germany. In case of critical situation on the northern part of Europe, united armed forces of NATO are able to react quickly to deploy NATO striking fleet and create a strategic reserve. In order to control the situation in the Arctic the head states of NATO have space intelligence systems as well as commercial satellite systems for surveying the earth's surface with high resolution.

Evolution of military-political situation in the Arctic will be characterized by strengthening regional integration processes with further converging of Scandinavian and Baltic states with the USA, leading Atlantic states and organizations, first of all, within the frames of NATO and EU. Following states supposedly will try to create favorable conditions to develop natural resources of the Arctic in the prejudice of economic interests of Russia. Therefore, Russia will end up dealing not only with the main "Arctic five" states, but with united front of NATO states.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Lukin Yury Fedorovich, “Sovremennaya situatsiya v Arktike v kontekste global’nih trendov”, “**The Arctic and the North**” journal, vol: 16, 2014, pp.60

¹⁷⁹ Kramarenko V.G., “Politika SShA v Arktike. Puti narahchivaniya pristutstviya NATO v regione”, Material of Conference “The Arctic -2015”, Murmansk, 2015 pp.78-80

Alleged "Mini NATO" is another project of the NATO members. The idea was discussed for first time in 2012 among leaders of the Great Britain, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Such coalition is based on mutual military and border forces, general intelligence, center of protection from cyber-attacks and mutual response coordination in the Arctic. It will also allow integrating the neutral Sweden and Finland into NATO. The main idea of "mini NATO" is a response to reinforcement of Russian positions in the Arctic region.¹⁸⁰

Despite of high tempo of militarization of the Arctic region and verbal escalation of situation in mass media the situation in the Arctic remains peaceful and stable. There has not been registered any military collisions between states or coalitions. The main reason of that is a high expense of any actions in the region; in addition, it may stop or slow down development of natural resources in the Arctic and put on risk flow of any international investments.

To conclude with, Russia as any state should protect its national interests and sovereignty. It is expected that Russia will increase its military power and concentrate it at the most vulnerable parts of the country as responded measure to its opponents. However, by Tsimbursky ideology of spatial expansion brings a negative impact to the development of Russian geopolitics. That is clearly demonstrated at the example of Crimea annexation in 2014, which negatively reflected economic and political development of the country and the Arctic region in particular.

The concept of "The Russian Island" leads to geopolitical priorities, which, presumably, call for domestic development and concentration on national identity of Russian pattern. It preserved in Siberia and the Arctic, as unseparable part of it. Thus, Tsimbursky offers duel ideology for Russia: from one side the country is facing the World and from another side Russia faces itself.

As it was shown in this chapter, the concept of Vadim Tsimbursky is flexible and is able to adapt to new realities of rapidly changing world and international system. Hence, the concept "Russian Island" has assumptions to be fit into realities of the Arctic geopolitics.

¹⁸⁰ Maksimov Nikolay Mikhailovich, "Voenno-morskaya deyale'nost' Rossii v Arktike", Material of Conference "The Arctic -2015", Murmansk, 2015, pp. 17-21

CONCLUSION

After the Cold War geopolitics along with globalization have become contrasting images of global development. The time of underestimation of geopolitics has gradually come to the end. It is the field of study, which since the beginning of 20th century proved its efficiency and effectiveness in the matter of overseeing international events of global importance. Within timeframe, geopolitics simultaneously together with the changing world, steadily has been experiencing modifications.

Russian geopolitics faced its critical junction after collapse of the USSR. Among numerous representatives of geopolitical groups was Vadim Tsimbursky, which got known with his non-extreme ideas and concept “The Russian Island”. After detailed examination of all chapters of the concept, which were developed by the author during the last decade of 20th century, we concluded that ideas of Tsimbursky reflect the reality of Russian civilization, named “Russian Island”, which is explained through the prism of Russian history and its future destiny. The concept of Vadim Tsimbursky is unique in terms of its livability and flexibility. At the end of the study we proved how the core of the concept is able to adapt to the conditions of the modern international system. The main idea of the concept is the call for Russia to concentrate, primarily on the domestic geopolitics by developing Siberia, which is the heart of “The Russian Island”. If to specify geographical position of Siberia, it includes inside not only Far East but the Arctic as well. This was a crucial point, which linked the concept and the central region of this study, its geographical location – the Arctic.

In classical geopolitics, the Arctic was always a remote area, which separated Europe from Asia in the north. It is now becoming a contested field with cooperative institutions and joint initiatives with national rivalries over issues of contradiction. Since the beginning of 21st century, the geopolitical status of the High North is being transformed into a strategic zone with new modes of cooperation. Jointly with it, there is international disagreement over crucial subjects: maintaining economic wealth of state under conditions of modern reality such as land on strategic position with natural resources on. In addition, the Arctic provides a control access to one of the most profitable routes in the future. Thus, the Arctic region became a field of tension between contradictory forces. In fact, there can be observed classical bipolar sides of players:

four littoral states such as Denmark, Norway, Canada and The United States of America on one side and The Russian Federation on another, which is representation of clashing Atlantic states with its allies and Russia.

Moreover, for last decades the role of non-regional countries has been increasing steadily. It reached its critical junction in 2013 when non-regional states were accepted as official observers of the main forum of the region - the Arctic Council. Thus, the number of the Arctic actors has been increased as well as it caused intensification of political and economic activity. Although those non-regional actors do not have legal rights to lay a claim to the main gains of the Arctic region, the countries are ready to invest in the Arctic. In exchange, they hope to have an access to benefits, which the Arctic will bring in the future.

Despite of intensification of relations of any kind in the Arctic region, detailed analyses of political situation in the region showed that the actors aim to keep peaceful atmosphere based on cooperation, which official Arctic concepts of the actors and their commitments to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the main legal framework of the Arctic regulation demonstrate. Moreover, the states keep steadily reinforcing significance of the Arctic Council as the main regional platform of negotiation, whereas any military activity of the states serves as conventional symbol of power rather than main agenda. It confirms one of the hypotheses of this study regarding transformation of the Arctic from the region of strategic confrontation to cooperation combined with rivalry of states based on economic benefits of the region.

Among five littoral countries, Russia has the longest shore of the Arctic Ocean, the biggest and the most populated Arctic territory. It created needs to protect and develop the region in order to secure sovereignty of the state. As a regulative measures Russia fortifies its actions by official concept and strategies in order to make its Arctic politics more transparent. In general, geopolitics is a leading instrument of Russian government and there are signs that it will be also applied on the Arctic region, which matches one of the hypotheses of this study.

Due to the high cost of development of the region and vulnerable nature of the Arctic the most feasible way of any positive progress is cooperation not only with

littoral states but also with non-regional actors. As aforementioned, all regional states including the Russian Federation are aware of it. Relations between Russia and the rest of littoral countries after the events in Crimea and Ukrainian crises since 2014 and following international sanctions are experiencing downgrade trend. Moscow is searching alternative partners in Asia. Thus, currently the main partners of development the Russian Arctic and the Far East overall are China and South Korea. Russia already has got involved into various economic projects that directly or indirectly intervene the Arctic region. Simultaneous with working on contracts on the bases of the Arctic natural resources development, which Russia signs with biggest companies of South Korea. However, developing partnership only with Asian countries can create some risks. For instance, relations with China overall is flexible strategic partnership where both sides seek its own strategic interests, it is not a strong alliance. Reinforcement of Chinese positions in the Arctic region can create certain danger for interests of Russia in the Arctic. For examples, Beijing as any other economically powerful states such as South Korea, Japan or Singapore may request to assign the Northeast Passage a status of international waters. It is crosses with interests not only Russia but neighboring littoral states as well. That is why it is essential for Russia to diversify its Arctic partners by addressing to littoral states on one-on-one basis as an alternative.

In order to maximize efficiency of Russian Arctic strategy, it should be based on the certain model, for example following dual ideology offered by Tsimbursky: Russian Island should protect and evolve its internal well-being as primer goal, but at the same time externally should be ready to cherish its own interest on the base of balancing between cooperation and demonstration of its power.

As aforementioned, the regional actors represent two groups of sides: Atlantic states and Russia, increasing influence of non-regional states may assist Russia bring to its side new partners by balancing the power. Complexity of Russian partners in the Arctic may play into the hands of power balance in the region for the country. In this case, the main challenge for Russian Arctic Policy will be control weight of actors involved and play them on each other by making the Arctic political arena more beneficial for interests of Russia.

In order to make Russian geopolitics in the Arctic region more precise, it can be presented by specific concept. As one of the patterns we emphasized the concept of Vadim Tsimbursky “The Russian Island”. By using analytical method, it was revealed how suitable the concept can be. Firstly, we distinguished the main pillars of the concept, later we tested how pillars may be livable in present-day developments. Therefore, above mentioned events such as Crises in Ukraine, annexation of Crimea as proxy war and expansion of “The Russian Island” on the “Great Limitrophe” and international sanctions as preventive measure towards the forth circle of “Kidnapping Europe” with following “Eurasian Interlude” which shifted focus of Russian international politics from the West to the East were indirectly predicted by Vadim Tsimbursky in his concept “The Russian Island”. At the end we revealed potential of the concept to evolve and being flexible to adjust to the conditions of modern realities of international relations. Therefore, the concept “The Russian Island” can represent the Russian Arctic as its geopolitical concept.

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

21. yüzyıl dünyaya, son on yılda ateşli bir politik tartışmanın öznesi haline gelmiş yeni bir bölge olan Arktik bölgesini sunmuştur. Arktik bölgesi Soğuk Savaş dönemi sırasında çift kutuplu dünya düzeninde muhtemel bir çatışma bölgesi olma konumundayken, günümüzde uluslararası işbirliği ve ekonomik rekabet için mücadele edilen bir bölgeye dönüşmektedir.

Arktik bölgesi hakkındaki yaygın kanı ulaşılamaz donmuş topraklar, kalın buz tabakası altına sıkışıp kalmış aşırı sert iklim koşullarının tüm yıl boyunca hakim olduğu biçiminde olagelmıştır. Tüm bu zorluklarına rağmen Soğuk Savaş zamanında Arktik çevresi yüksek düzeyde askeri varlıklarla donatılmış ve siyasi olarak hassas bir alan olmuştur. Bu dönemde Arktik bölgesi temel olarak iki büyük güç ve müttefikleri için stratejik önem arz eden bir konumda olmuştur.

Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle beraber bu jeostratejik konumlandırma araştırma işbirliğinin ama daha da önemlisi ekonomik çıkarların ön plana çıktığı daha sivil bir gündemin konusu olmaya doğru düzenli olarak evrilmektedir. SSCB'nin çöküşünden 2007 yılında Arktik Deniz dibine Rusya bayrağının dikilmesine kadar geçen zaman içinde gerçekleşen geçiş döneminde bölge göreceli olarak terkedilmiş olup ABD askeri üslerini terk etmiş, SSCB Arktik bölgesi askeri gücünün çekirdeği ise kaybedilmiştir. 2007 yılında gerçekleşen Rus keşif süreci, şüphesiz bir biçimde Arktik bölgesinin gelişiminde çok önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Arktik bölgesi jeopolitik önemi stratejik çatışma bölgesi olma özelliğinden ilk olarak doğal kaynakların keşfedilebileceği ve yeni taşımacılık yolları vaat eden bir bölgeye dönüşmüştür. Daha ayrıntılı belirtmek gerekirse, bölgede rol oynayan jeopolitik güçler arasındaki ilişkiler, birbiriyle iç içe geçmiş 2 temel konudaki duruşlarıyla bağlantılı olup, bu temel konulardan birincisi Arktik bölgesinin mineral kaynaklarının keşfedilmesi ve sahipliği, ikincisi ise Arktik bölgesi iletişim hatlarının ve taşımacılık altyapısının geliştirilmesidir. Hali hazırda sadece Norveç, Danimarka, Kanada, ABD ve Rusya gibi bölge devletleri arasındaki muhtemel anlaşmazlıkları ve rekabet değil, aynı zamanda Çin ve Güney Kore gibi bölgede bulunmaya yükselen ekonomik güçlerin Arktik nimetlerinden faydalanmak için yoğun çabalarının olduğu bir gerçektir.

Günümüzde jeopolitik güçlü analitik bir gelenek haline gelmekle birlikte, aynı zamanda siyasi gücü coğrafi konumla ilişkilendiren bir çalışma alanıdır. Arktik bölgesinin siyasi ikliminde yer alan çatışma riski ile işbirliği olasılığı arasında nasıl bir denge kurulabileceğine dair ipuçları elde etmek mümkündür. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında jeopolitik stratejiler ile küreselleşme süreçleri, küresel gelişimin karşıt görünümüleri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Jeopolitiğin görmezden geldiği zaman yavaşça sonlanmaktadır. Jeopolitik 20. Yüzyılın başından itibaren küresel düzeyde öneme sahip uluslararası olayların incelenmesi ve değerlendirilmesi konusunda etkinliği ve verimliliği kanıtlanmış bir çalışma alanıdır. Zaman içerisinde, jeopolitik de değişen dünya ile eş zamanlı olarak düzenli bir biçimde değişime uğramaktadır.

Geleneksel jeopolitikte, Arktik her zaman Avrupa ve Asya'yı birbirinden ayıran uzak bir bölge olmuşken, şu sıralarda, işbirlikçi kurumların ve birleşik insiyatiflerin yarış halinde olduğu ve aynı zamanda da birbirine karşıt meseleler hakkında ulusal rekabetin hüküm sürdüğü bir saha haline gelmektedir. 21.yüzyıl başından itibaren, Uzak Kuzey'in jeopolitik konumu yeni işbirliği biçimlerinin ortaya çıktığı stratejik bir alana dönüşmektedir. Bu süreçle beraber, altında barındırdığı doğal kaynakların bulunduğu toprakların günümüz gerçeğine uygun biçimde ekonomik refahını temin etmek gibi hayati konularda uluslararası anlaşmazlıklar mevcuttur. Buna ilaveten, bölgenin jeopolitiği gelecekte en karlı ticari güzergahlardan olması muhtemel alana erişim kontrolü de sağlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Arktik Bölgesi karşıt güçler arasında gerilim alanına da dönüşmüştür. Aslında, geleneksel çift kutuplu oyunun sahnelendiği, bir tarafta Arktik'e kıyısı olan Danimarka, Norveç, Kanada ve ABD ile diğer tarafta ise Rusya Federasyonu'nun yer aldığı, Atlantik Devletleri ile müttefiklerine karşı Rusya'nın çarpışmasının gerçekleştiği gözlemlenebilir.

Devletlerin eylemlerinin öngörülebilir olması, uluslararası ilişkilerde denge ve güvenliği mihenk taşıdır. İnternet ve kitlesel medyada yaygınlaşan, Arktik bölgesinde artan siyasi ve askeri gerilimlerin öne çıkarılması bölge hakkındaki algı üzerine olumsuz etki ederken, jeopolitiğin amacı uluslararası durumu şeffaf ve öngörülebilir hale getirmektir. Dolayısıyla, jeopolitik konseptin Arktik bölgesini ihtilaftan ziyade işbirliğine açık bir bölge olacak şekilde değerlendirmesi gereklidir. Uzak gelecekte bölgeden elde edilebilecek kazançlar pek belirgin olmasa da, Arktik'e olan ilgi yüksek

kalmaya devam etmektedir. Arktik bölgesinin aşırı zorlu koşulları nedeniyle gerekli olan yüksek maliyetler, tüm oyuncuların en başarılı yöntemin bölgede karşılıklı işbirliği ve yatırım teşvikleri olması hususunda ortak kaniya getirmektedir.

Siyasi durumun ayrıntılı analizleri Arktik bölgesindeki oyuncuların işbirliğine dayalı barışçıl atmosferi korumak istediğini ortaya koymakta olup, bölgesel oyuncuların resmi Arktik konseptleri ve Arktik bölgesindeki temel yasal altyapı olarak Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Yasası Bildirgesi'ne (UNCLOS) olan bağlılıkları bu durumu göstermektedir. Dahası, bu devletler bölgede münazaralar için Arktik Konseyi'nin önemini düzenli olarak güçlendirmeye çalışmakta iken, devletlerin askeri faaliyetleri ise ana hedeften ziyade geleneksel güç gösterisi amacına hizmet etmektedir.

Bölgedeki son önemli dönüm noktası olarak, bölgesel olmayan ülkelerin de Arktik Konseyi'ne gözlemci olarak dahil oldukları 2013 yılı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Böylelikle, Arktik bölgesinde faal olan oyuncu sayısı arttığı gibi aynı zamanda da siyasi ve ekonomik faaliyetler de yoğunlaşmıştır. Temel yasal çerçeve olarak UNCLOS dikkat alınsa dahi, bunun bölgede ortaya çıkan tüm hususları kapsamaması mümkün olmamaktadır. Arktik Konseyi de statüsü uluslararası organizasyon düzeyine ulaşmadığı için kesin belirleyici olmamaktadır.

Kıyıya sınırı olan beş ülke arasında Rusya en uzun Arktik alana sahiptir. Gözlemediğimiz kadarıyla bu durum, sağladığı faydaların yanı sıra Rusya'nın bölgeyi silahlandırarak korumayı amaçladığı ülke egemenliği ile ilgili bazı tehditleri de beraberinde getirmektedir. Buna paralel olarak bölgede işbirliği özellikleri de bulunmaktadır. Mevcut eğilim Rusya tarafından temsil edilen, bölge ülkelerinin üyeleri ve harici gözlemcilerin de dahil olduğu uluslar arası örgütler bağlamında temsil edilen bir işbirliği yönündedir. Bu harici gözlemcilerin Arktik bölgesinden edinilecek ana kazanç üzerinde hiç bir hak iddia edememelerine rağmen, bu ülkeler Arktik bölgesine yatırım yapma konusunda hazır görünmektedir. Karşılığında, bölgeden gelecekte elde edilecek kazançlara ulaşmayı ummaktadırlar. Bölgenin kalkındırılmasının maliyetlerinin yüksek olmasından dolayı, Rusya'nın da dahil olduğu kıyı ülkeleri bölgeye yatırım yapmaya istekli olan diğer ülkelerle işbirliği yapmak konusunda isteklidirler.

Diğer kıyı ülkeleri ve Rusya arasındaki ilişkiler 2014 yılında meydana gelen Kırım ve Ukrayna krizi ve akabinde uygulanan uluslararası yaptırımlardan beri gerileme eğilimindedir. Moskova Asya’da alternatif ortaklar arayışını sürdürmektedir. Bu nedenle, Arktik Rusyası ve Uzak Doğu’nun kalkındırılması konusunda mevcut ana ortaklar Çin ve Güney Kore’dir. Ayrıca, Rusya Arktik politikalarını daha şeffaf hale getirmek için eylemlerini resmi konseptler ve stratejiler kullanarak güçlendirmektedir. Genel olarak, jeopolitik Rus hükümetinin ileri gelen enstrümanıdır ve Arktik bölgesinde de uygulanacağına dair işaretler bulunmaktadır.

Genel anlamda analiz edildiğinde; kaynaklar, nakliye rotaları ve Arktik bölgesinin stratejik önemi jeopolitik öncelikler olmasına rağmen, bu çalışma özellikle en geniş Arktik bölgesine ve bu bölgenin çıkarlarında en büyük hakka sahip bir devlet olan Rusya Federasyonunun jeopolitik politikalarına odaklanmayı amaçlamaktadır. Rusya Arktik bölgesi politikalarına temel olarak Rusya coğrafi politikaları temsilcisi Vadim Tsimbursky’nin genel fikir ve görüşleri ile 20. yüzyılın son on yılında kaleme aldığı “Rus Adası” kavramı ele alınacaktır.

Rusya coğrafi politikaları SSCB’nin çöküşüyle eş güdümlü olarak kritik bir dönemece gelmiştir. Bir çok jeopolitik akımın temsilcileri arasından aşırılık barındırmayan fikirleri ile bilinen ve “Rus Adası” Konseptini ortaya koyan Vadim Tsimbursky öne çıkmıştır. Bu on yılda yazar tarafından geliştirilen bu görüşün tüm uyarlamalarının detaylı bir tetkikinin ardından, Tsimbursky’nin fikirlerinin Rus uygarlığının gerçeğini Rus tarihi ve onun gelecekteki kaderinin bir prizma içinden açıklandığı “Rus Adası” adıyla yansıttığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Vadim Tsimbursky’nin görüşleri gerçeğe dönüşme olasılığı ve esnekliği yönünden eşsizdir. Son bölümde, bu görüşün öz dayanak noktasının modern uluslar arası sistemlerin koşullarına uygulanabilirliği gösterilmiştir.

“Rus Adası” görüşünün ana fikri Rusya’ya, “Rus Adası”nın kalbi olan Sibirya’nın kalkındırılması için öncelikli olarak yerli jeopolitiğe yoğunlaşması için bir çağrıdır. Sibirya’nın jeopolitik konumunu belirtmek gerekirse, o sadece Uzak Doğuyu değil, aynı anda Arktik bölgesini de kapsamaktadır. Bu husus, Arktik bölgesinin coğrafi konumu ve bu görüşle birlikte bu çalışmanın orta noktasına dosdoğru bir köprü oluşturan hayati bir noktadır.

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