COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSATLANTIC INVOLVEMENTS IN THE
EMERGING WORLD ORDER: MULTILATERAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN
THE BOSNIAN WAR (1992-1995) AND THE SECOND GULF WAR (2002-2003)

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Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

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
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ABSTRACT

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSATLANTIC INVOLVEMENTS IN THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER: MULTILATERAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE BOSNIAN WAR (1992-1995) AND THE SECOND GULF WAR (2002-2003)

Giray Sadık

In the aftermath of 11th September, Transatlantic involvements to international crises acquired new momentum. Coupled with the increasing assertiveness of the Bush administration, this era appears more challenging in attaining consensus over the international interventions to emerging crises than does the earlier post Cold War period. To track this trend from cohesion to chaos in Transatlantic relations and demonstrate the challenges to international involvements in the emerging world order, this study aims to comparatively analyze multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003). To this end, the thesis employs Peter Viggo Jakobsen's Conditions Favoring Successful Use of Coercive Diplomacy as thesis pertinent variables. Having the first case in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the second in the aftermath of 9/11 provide fertile ground for comparative analysis in tracing the changes in the Western discourse of international politics. Although these are important issues in shaping the overall strategy of coercive diplomacy, they also convey the misleading impression that the thesis centers merely on Transatlantic relations. In that regard, given the fact the Conditions Favoring Success of Coercive Diplomacy are interdependent, the international support dimension does remain particularly important, but in the end it is only one of the nine aspects that are outlined in the Jakobsen's framework. In order to examine the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in respective cases, while employing the theory of coercive diplomacy, this thesis begins with the introduction of the abstract model of coercive diplomacy, then outlines the adoption of comparative case study methodology, and after that concisely narrates the cases under concern and puts forward the grounds for coercive diplomacy for their consideration. After this elaborate grounding for analysis, the fourth chapter analyzes the cases under concern, and finally the conclusion outlines and explains the comparative findings and repercussions for further contemplation of the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy.

ÖZ

OLUŞAN DÜNYA DÜZENİNDEKİ TRANSATLANTİK MÜDAHALELERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ: BOSNA SAVAŞI (1992-1995) VE İKİNCİ KÖRFEZ SAVAŞ'INDAKİ (2002-2003) ÇOK-TARAFLI KUVVET DİPLOMASİSİ

Giray Sadık

11 Eylül sonrasında Transatlantik müdahaleleri yeni bir ivme kazanmıştır. Günümüz Bush yönetiminin giderek artan tek yanlılığı da eklendiğinde bu süreç, öncesindeki Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme göre, ortaya çıkan krizlere uluslararası müdahalelerde bulunma konusunda fikir birliğine varmanın güçleştiği bir evreyi göstermektedir. Transatlantik ilişkilerindeki uyumdan karmaşıklığa doğru giden bu eğilimi izlemek ve oluşan yeni dünya düzeninde uluslararası müdahalelerin karşılaştığı zorlukları göstermek amacıyla bu çalışma; çok taraflı kuvvet diplomasisinin, Bosna Savaşı (1992 - 1995) ile İkinci Körfez Savaşı'ndaki (2002 - 2003) uygulamalarını karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, tezde Peter Viggo Jakobsen'in Kuvvet Diplomasisi'nin Başarısını Destekleyen Koşulları tez değişkenleri olarak kullanılmıştır. İlk vakanın Soğuk Savaş'ın, ikincisinin ise 11 Eylül sonrasında gerçekleşmesi, Batı'nın uluslararası siyasetteki söylem evriminin karşılaştırmalı irdelenmesi için gereken zemini oluşturmaktadır. Her ne kadar bu konular kuvvet diplomasisinin bütünsel stratejisini şekillendirmekte önemliyse de, aynı zamanda tezin, yalnızca Transatlantik ilişkilerine odaklandığı gibi yanıltıcı bir izlenim de verebilir. Bu bağlamda, Kuvvet Diplomasisi'nin Başarısını Destekleyen Koşulların karşılıklı bağlantılı olduğu esas alındığında, uluslararası desteğin ayrıca önemli olduğu bakidir. Ancak, netice itibariyle uluslararası destek, Jakobsen'in yapısındaki dokuz boyuttan yalnızca biridir.

Kuvvet diplomasisinin ilgili vakalardaki etkinliğini irdelerken teorisini de aktarabilmek için tez, kuvvet diplomasisinin soyut modelinin tanıtılmasıyla (Bölüm 1) başlar. Ardından, karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi metodolojisinin uygulanmasının sıralanmasıyla (Bölüm 2) devam eder; daha sonra da ilgili vakaların özet anlatımlarını ve kuvvet diplomasisi olarak kabul edilmelerinin temellerini (Bölüm 3) ortaya koyar. Analizin detaylı olarak temellendirilmesinden sonra, Bölüm 4, ilgili vakaları irdeler, ve sonuç bölümü (Bölüm 5) ise karşılaştırmalı bulgular ile kuvvet diplomasisinin ilerideki teoriye ve uygulamaya yönelik çıkarımlarını sıralar ve açıklar.

Anneme ve Babama, her şey için...

To my Mom and Dad, for everything...

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ACRONYMS

BSA	Bosnian Serb Army
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IGO	Inter-governmental Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission on Monitoring
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Achieving desired outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, what power is for.

Jessica Mathews

Chapter 1

Introduction

Knowledge of coercive diplomacy remains provisional and incomplete. It will and should continue to be refined with the study of additional historical cases.

Alexander L. George[1]

This statement of George, in the following years after the end of the Cold War, stresses the need to study the utilization of coercive diplomacy in various international settings. Such elaboration would not only serve for theoretical refinement but also can be a promising instrument in analyzing the prospects and challenges for coercive diplomacy in the emerging world order. Particularly in the aftermath of 11th September (hereafter 9/11), after another world-shattering incident in Western policymaking, the study of coercive diplomacy with its emerging repercussions becomes ever more critical. In accordance with the essence of studying the employment of coercive diplomacy in the immediate aftermaths of these noteworthy episodes of modern history, this study aims to comparatively analyze the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy with regard to the selected cases. To this end, the thesis compares the success of multilateral coercive diplomacy between international involvements in the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003). The selected cases are of particular importance in tracing the convergence in Western policymaking. While the former one occurred in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, after the end of the Cold War, the latter one was in the aftermath of 9/11, a direct attack at the heart of the US. Therefore, these cases constitute a fruitful ground for the comparative analysis of coercive diplomacy in essence. The theoretical, methodological, practical, and comparative facets of this essence are addressed in the following parts of this study.

Structure of the Thesis

As stated at the very beginning of introduction, the thesis aims to comparatively analyze the success of multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian and the Second Gulf wars. For this purpose, the First Chapter assesses the theory of coercive diplomacy, its key premises and distinctive characteristics. Following this section, the second chapter introduces the comparative methodology, its variables, and thus sets the

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[1] George, Alexander L. 1991. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

stage for comparative analysis. After this theoretical and methodological presentation, the Third Chapter provides the concise background of the cases respectively, while clarifying the historical grounds for the cases to be analyzed as coercive diplomacy initiatives. Having these indispensable components for analysis, the Fourth Chapter comparatively analyzes the contemplation of coercive diplomacy according to the variables underlined in the second chapter. Finally, the Fifth Chapter draws conclusions with regards to the findings from the study.

State of the Art

A - Literature Review

With the aim of establishing relevance between the existing literature and this study, the introduction of main literature at the very beginning of the study is deemed indispensable. In tracing the state of the literature, the founding studies of the theory of coercive diplomacy are underlined with their respective contributions, and then the presentation of the literature flows to the more contemporary studies addressing the role of coercive diplomacy in dealing with more up-to-date international conflicts and their repercussions for theoretical refinement.

Thomas Schelling has set the foundations of the theory in his 1966 *Arms and Influence*, providing a systematic theoretical analysis of how states use threats of force to change adversaries' behavior. Inspired by game theory, Schelling deductively develops his theoretical propositions from abstract models. While Schelling must be credited with building the skeleton of the theory, George is the one who refines it and puts empirical flesh on its bones. George employs a different research strategy than Schelling, namely 'structured, focused comparative' analysis of case studies. In this way George inductively identifies relevant factors influencing the use of coercive diplomacy, and specifies the conditions under which the strategy is likely to succeed or fail. In his 1991 *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, and 1994 *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* co-authored with William E. Simons, George comparatively analyzed the key American coercive diplomacy initiatives in history such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam 1965, Nicaragua, and the First Gulf War.

Following George, Peter Viggo Jakobsen has improved the George & Simmons framework outlined in the *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (1994). Jakobsen's objective is to develop a better framework for the operationalization of coercive diplomacy in accordance with post-Cold War realities. His research constitutes one of the key

theoretical chapters of *Strategic Coercion* (1998), edited by Lawrence Freedman. The most up-to-date books regarding the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy of critical importance in terms of this study, are two masterpieces of our time: *The Dynamics of Coercion* (2002) by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, and *The United Sates and Coercive Diplomacy* (2003) edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin.

The ever-developing literature on coercive diplomacy is apparently not merely restricted to books. The articles on contemporary coercive diplomacy can be found in prominent journals on international relations and conflict resolution. The ones with particular relevance to thesis topics, while offering fresh outlook for the development of the theory of coercive diplomacy and its utilization in the emerging conflicts, are particularly drawn attention to and categorized below in accordance with their areas of concern. The relevant classification of the available up-to-date literature is as follows:

1) "Bridging the Gap" Articles: These are the articles that aim at theoretical refinement and at tailoring the existing theory of coercive diplomacy in accordance with the challenges of the emerging world order. Their critical analysis puts forward the shortcomings of the theory, while introducing the new challenges and alternatives to deal with them, and thus, providing the basis for linking the abstract model with the emerging realities of the international system. For that reason, the term "Bridging the Gap" is borrowed from George's influential book title. Accordingly, the most recent articles in this category are: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the duration of Economic Sanctions (*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, April 2004) by Fiona McGillivray and Allan C. Stam, The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries (*Comparative Strategy*, Dec. 2003) by Alexander L. George, A Coherent Theory of Coercion? The Writings of Robert Pape (*Comparative Strategy*, Oct. 2003) by Patrick C. Bratton.

2) Policy Oriented Articles: These articles address international conflicts through utilizing the theory of coercive diplomacy as a unit of analysis or at least refer to coercive diplomacy as one of the principal agents in the analysis of their cases under concern. Given their prolificness, they are much more than those of elaborate theoretical studies. Thus, only the ones pertinent with the cases of this thesis fall under this category. These case pertinent articles are as follows: Give Peace a Chance, First Try Coercive Diplomacy (*Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2002) by William S. Langenheim, Preventing Deadly Conflicts:

Failures in Iraq and Yugoslavia (*Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, Jan 2000) by Raimo Varynen, Practicing Coercion (*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Dec. 1999) by Frank P. Harvey, The Changing Balance of Power in the Balkans (*Peacekeeping & International Relations*, Oct. 1995) by Maurice Marnika, Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy (*Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1999) by Barry M. Blechman, The Real Tran-Atlantic Gap (*Foreign Policy*, 2002) by , Marshall Bouton and Craig Kennedy. In addition, foreign policy reviews of well-respected newspapers and magazines can be regarded as examples in this category: Owls are Wiser about Iraq than Hawks (*Financial Times*, 2002) by Joseph Nye, Fear of U.S. Power Shapes Iraq Debate (*Washington Post*, 2002) by Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, Iraq: The Case for Decisive Action (*The Guardian*, 2003), A New Battle over Saddam (*Newsweek*, 2001) by John Barry.

As it can be traced from the literature review covering the overview of the prominent sources in the field from its beginning to the most recent articles and books, studying coercive diplomacy acquired particular momentum in the aftermath of the Cold War. Furthermore, this rising trend has been accelerated after 9/11 due to increasingly global attention on international mechanisms in dealing with aggression of state and non-state actors. In accordance with the flow of the thesis, the next part introduces the theory of coercive diplomacy and, therefore, uses books as the basic sources of information; Chapter 3 and 4, the background and analysis parts lean more to articles so as to keep on track with recent international developments as well.

B - The Theory of Coercive Diplomacy

The abstract model of coercive diplomacy is not a textbook of 'how-to-do-it' prescriptions.

Alexander L. George[2]

As an introductory section of the thesis, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical foundation for the rest of the study. To this end, the chapter primarily responds to the need for identifying the concept of coercive diplomacy as well as to stress its distinctive characteristics from other types of intervention policies. In this

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[2] George, Alexander L. 1991. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

process, the general theory of coercive diplomacy is outlined and detailed to present a basis for the analysis of the selected cases.

In such an analysis, delineating the meaning of coercive diplomacy is of particular importance before proceeding towards the advanced phases of the research. As Alexander L. George introduces the lucid and thorough definition of coercive diplomacy: "The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand" (George 1991, 4). Intimidation of any kind with the aim of getting others to comply with one's demands has been an everyday occurrence in human affairs for ages. Thus, what is referred as coercive diplomacy in this study has been utilized in one form or another during the long history of international conflicts with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, the refinement of such phenomenon, and thus the introduction of the concept of coercive diplomacy by Alexander L. George (*Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, 1991) equip international relations scholars with a comprehensive instrument for analyzing the conflicts of the emerging world order.

What makes coercive diplomacy comprehensive is its context-dependent and flexible strategy, which enables policymakers to tailor the abstract model of coercive diplomacy in accordance with the particular requirements of a conflict. Although, threats and incentives play key roles in coercive diplomacy, communication, signaling and negotiating play significant roles as well. Thus, coercive diplomacy presents an alternative to exclusive reliance on military strategy, while taking into consideration its effective employment.

In that regard, it would be of use to distinguish the strategy of coercive diplomacy from the traditional military strategy based on the crude use of force. The aim of coercive diplomacy, as it can be derived from its very definition, is not to defeat the enemy but rather to persuade an adversary to act in a desired manner. For that reason, the credibility and potency of threat are of utmost importance in determining the success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Thus, the use of force as an instrument of coercive diplomacy facilitates the compliance of an adversary and maintains the credibility of coercer. George points out the role of force in coercive diplomacy:

> If force is used in coercive diplomacy, it consists of an exemplary use of quite limited force to persuade the opponent to back down. By 'exemplary' I mean the use of just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to

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protect one's interests and to establish the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary. (George 1991, 5)

In fact, coercive diplomacy can be interpreted in opposition to brute force in terms of its projection of force and criteria for the utility of such projection. While brute force is designated to be employed, and thus to destroy the opponent's capability to resist, coercive diplomacy aims to channel the adversary's capability towards the coercer's direction without causing sheer destruction. Another prominent international relations scholar, Thomas Schelling, puts forward this distinction, underlining the utility of coercive diplomacy: "Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply" (Schelling 1966, 3). Therefore, in contrast to brute force, the success of coercive diplomacy is of achieving one's demand with using very limited, if possible none of, the projected force.

The reason of the emphasis on the distinction between coercive diplomacy and pure coercion is to particularly underline the constructive dimension of coercive diplomacy that often tends to be overlooked by many. Such distinction is also crucial in the practice of the theory of coercive diplomacy, as this theoretical framework presents the opportunity to achieve one's objectives with relatively lower economic, military, and political costs. Furthermore, such an action is important, carrying less risk of inadvertent escalation of conflict as compared to the traditional military action, since "in employing coercive diplomacy, which may already include non-military sanctions, one gives an adversary an opportunity to stop or back off before one resorts to military operations" (George 1991, 6).

Another key distinction in defining coercive diplomacy points out how it differs from classical deterrence in scope and implementation, as well as how such difference makes coercive diplomacy more appealing as a tool for contemporary policymakers. "Deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that *has not yet been initiated*" (Craig and George 1995, 196), whereas coercive diplomacy aims to *stop* or *undo* the actions that have already been undertaken by an adversary. Thus, coercive diplomacy is more functional in reacting to international crises, while deterrence aims to prevent them. Such a distinction raises the problem of the anticipation of potential threats in order to exercise proper deterrence. Yet as the identity of present-day threats has become increasingly unclear, deterrence becomes

harder while coercion becomes more necessary. Particularly in the emerging world order where potential threats tend to have various motivations, their simultaneous anticipation and deterrence promise little prospect. Even with such a prospect attained, potential adversaries may not be willing to get the message of the deterring power, and thus deterrence may fail to cease aggression. In that regard, coercive diplomacy presents a considerable set of alternatives from mild to severe. Such alternatives may vary from imposing economic sanctions (e.g. embargo, boycott) to the bombing of an adversary's strategic facilities.

This wide range of alternatives makes coercive diplomacy elastic and context-bound strategy. However, operationalizing the theory in accordance to various conflict situations is challenging, since even the most refined versions of the theory of coercive diplomacy may fall short in analyzing dynamic world politics. As George points out, "this task is difficult because it requires the policymaker to understand and deal with a number of additional contextual variables" (George 1991, 14). This study's aim to comparatively analyze multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003) undertakes the challenging task of reformulating the theory of coercive diplomacy in accordance to the specific cases. To this end, the Second Chapter particularly concentrates on the setting up of the pertinent theoretical tools for analysis with the aim of tailoring the abstract model of coercive diplomacy towards refined, case-specific analysis.

The above-mentioned identical characteristics of coercive diplomacy constitute insightful and thought-provoking approach for the analysis of the Euro-Atlantic multilateral involvement in international crises in order to *stop* or *undo* aggressive instigations in international realm. For that reason, several studies have been conducted on the evaluation of coercive strategy by prominent international relations scholars such as Alexander L. George (*Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, 1991), A. L. George and Gordon A. Craig (*Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 1995), and Stephen J. Cimbala (*Force and Diplomacy in the Future*, 1992). Nevertheless, the comparative and multilateral notions have remained modest in these studies. Even if some of them involve certain comparisons with the previous American foreign policy challenges such as the Cuban Missile Crises (1962-1963) and Vietnam (1965), due to the period in which they were conducted they lack a contemporary focus (i.e., the Second Gulf War) and comparative multilateral understanding to a certain extent (i.e., American foreign policy centered studies). In

view of that absence, this research aims to bridge this gap in the analysis of coercive diplomacy via bringing into picture the multilateral negotiation dimension of coercive diplomacy and its impact on the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy.

Prior to proceeding with the introduction of the thesis pertinent variables of coercive diplomacy, it would be of use to underline the key characteristic of coercive diplomacy in terms of its analysis perspective. Such a perspective is basically "the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure rationality on the part of the opponent" (George 1991, 4). This premise underlines the assumption of the adversary's ability to receive all relevant messages, weigh them up correctly, make proper judgments as to the credibility and potency of the threat, and the ability to see that it is in its interest to comply with the projected demand. Thus, the abstract model of coercive diplomacy does not reflect on any kind of misperception of the adversary due to the values, traditions, culture, and psychological variables that may not coincide with those of the coercing power. Although these possibilities can have varying degrees of importance in different phases of conflicts, this study stays in line with the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy introduced in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the pertinent theoretical tools are set up in accordance with the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy. They can be classified under three main categories:

1) Variables of Coercive Diplomacy

2) Variants of Coercive Diplomacy

3) Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy

The introduction of each category and their interplay constitute the basis for the analysis and comparison of the cases, as well as for the evaluation of the success or failure of coercive diplomacy in respective cases. Thus, this introductory chapter puts forward the foundation for the operationalizing the abstract model of coercive diplomacy.

1) Variables of Coercive Diplomacy

Although the flexible and context-dependent notions of coercive diplomacy are underlined in the other relevant parts of this study as well, the task remains to introduce the core variables of coercive diplomacy that represent the outlook of the abstract model. Such a task is of particular importance in understanding and interpreting the logic of coercive diplomacy. The principal concept of coercive diplomacy assumes that the decision-makers have four essential "empty boxes" (i.e., variables) to load as they are building any particular strategy of coercive diplomacy to apply in certain

circumstances. In order to present a viable coercive diplomacy policymakers should consider these four fundamental variables, and thus

> Policymakers must decide:
> 1) What to demand of the opponent;
> 2) Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand;
> 3) Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and
> 4) Whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand (George 1991, 7).

In such process of constructing a strategy of coercive diplomacy, the characteristics of each variable are essential in guiding the course, and affecting the degree of success of coercive diplomacy. In addition to the nature of the characteristics of these key variables, how they are communicated to an adversary plays a crucial role in addressing and manipulating an adversary's degree of motivation towards compliance. Such manipulation is also particularly related with the coercer's determination to carry out coercive diplomacy and ability to convey such resolution effectively to an adversary. In order to demonstrate the degree of resoluteness, the coercer may use both words and actions as principal means of communication defined in the abstract model of coercive diplomacy. George points out this essence: "We conclude, therefore, that the relationship between actions and words -the two levels of communication- is likely to be very important in employing the strategy of coercive diplomacy" (George 1991, 10).

2) Variants of Coercive Diplomacy

Though in theory the variables are neatly defined and are rather apparent, in practice their interplay needs to be considered carefully. Since the strategy of coercive diplomacy is not a ready toolkit, and its variables are not the tools to be utilized in a uniform manner, the nature and order of their use present different alternatives for decision-makers. "Depending on how policymakers deal with these four components of the general model, significantly different variants of the strategy are possible" (George 1991, 7). Thus, the four variables introduced in the preceding part do not constitute the adequate basis for the conduct of promising coercive diplomacy strategy alone. Rather, they provide the starting point for the elaboration of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Accordingly, differences in the interplay among these variables yield five basic types of coercive diplomacy. George identifies these basic types as:

a) The Ultimatum,

b) The Tacit Ultimatum,

c) The 'Try-and-See' Approach,

d) The 'Gradual Turning of the Screw',

e) The Carrot and Stick Approach.

In order to illustrate the relationship among the pertinent variables in each variant, the identification of the key characteristics of each variant is indispensable.

a) The Ultimatum, also referred as "classic ultimatum", constitutes the starkest variant of coercive diplomacy. "A classic ultimatum has three components: (1) a demand on the opponent; (2) a time limit or sense of urgency with the compliance of the demand; and (3) a threat of punishment for noncompliance" (George 1991, 7). Although, the ultimatum involves three of the four key variables in a clear-cut manner, it does not mean that the full-fledged ultimatum is the most effective variant of coercive diplomacy. As can be noticed in the subsequent parts of the thesis, the ultimatum may not be an appropriate or a feasible option for successful coercive diplomacy, as at the same time it involves certain risks of further escalating conflicts.

b) The Tacit Ultimatum is basically not conveying in a specific manner either the time limit and/or the punishment for noncompliance are. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted as of the tacit ultimatum is less potent, but rather as a flexible strategy for both a coercer and an adversary.

c) The 'Try-and-See' Approach: In this approach, only a single, main element of the classic ultimatum exists: a clear demand. "It [the coercing power] takes one limited coercive threat or action and waits to see whether it will suffice to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step" (George 1991, 8).

d) The 'Gradual Turning of the Screw': The absence of time limit in the 'try-and-see' approach is restored with the threat to increase pressure gradually, and carry out this threat incrementally. Thus, by definition the variant of the 'gradual turning of the screw' "relies on incremental increase in coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply" (George 1991, 8).

e) The "Carrot and Stick" Approach: This variant is particularly related with the availability of the fourth variable of coercive diplomacy, which is basically to employ positive inducements (i.e., carrots) for compliance alongside with retaliatory threats for

non-compliance. As George puts forward eloquently, "what the threatened *stick* cannot achieve by itself, *unless it is a very formidable one*, may possibly be achieved by combining it with a *carrot*" (italics mine) (George 1991, 9).

The combination of the four key variables and thus the formulation of relevant variants, identify the character of the coercive diplomacy employed. Although such character plays a decisive role in coercive diplomacy, the introduction of key variables that explains success or failure of coercive diplomacy is vital in tracking the credence of transatlantic discourse and the degree of accomplishment of coercive diplomacy in the respective cases.

3) Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy

Since coercive diplomacy is a flexible strategy, the refinement of its evaluation criteria is necessary, as in its core variables and variants. Given that decision-makers are in need of tailoring the strategy in accordance with the situation and international conjuncture, the criteria for the evaluation of success or failure of coercive diplomacy also necessitates modification according to the unique circumstances of each case. To this end, different scholars have underlined a varying (though overlapping to a great extent) set of variables that can be utilized in the evaluation of success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Starting from the more recent elaboration, Seyom Brown outlined the potential impact of numerous variables, such as:

> ➢ The strength and asymmetry of the motivations on both sides
>
> ➢ The cooperation of coalition partners
>
> ➢ The level of domestic and international support for further sacrifices
>
> ➢ How each side perceives these factors to be influencing the coercive situation.

(Brown 2002, 453).

Brown takes the advantage of gathering data and driving conclusions from recent crises where coercive diplomacy has been employed such as the First Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As a result, he points out the specific and increasingly influential variables that help to explain the success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Among the above-mentioned variables, particularly the ones stressing the degree of cooperation among coalition partners and the level of international support are of significant importance for the analysis of this thesis in the subsequent chapters.

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Though more conventional, Craig and George put forward an overlapping point of view by presenting the following six variables to explain the success or failure of coercive diplomacy:

Six Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy

1. Non-zero sum view of the conflict
2. Overwhelmingly negative image of war
3. Carrot as well as stick
4. Asymmetry of motivation favoring state employing coercive diplomacy
5. Opponents' fear of unacceptable "punishment" for noncompliance
6. No significant misperceptions or miscalculations (Craig and George 1995, 210)

Nonetheless, one should note that since "coercive diplomacy is highly *context-dependent*" (George 1991, 69), in addition to these six variables some *contextual variables* may be introduced, when the advanced research on the cases deems necessary. In that regard, the variables and perspectives that are highlighting the crisis bargaining and multilateral negotiation dimensions of coercive diplomacy are of particular attention of the research. For further exploration of the impacts of multilateral Euro-Atlantic involvements, and the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, consideration of the book of Peter Viggo Jakobsen (*Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, 1998) is of use. It contains as considerable recent remarks about the overall Western (i.e., American and European) approach to the post Cold War crises including Bosnia, but needless to say, the comparative aspect with regard to the Second Gulf War had not been present yet when his book was published. As can be observed, the dynamic nature of international relations constantly brings the need for the application and re-examination of existing theories. To this end, the research keeps in tune with recent international developments via effectively utilizing modern means of information technology (i.e. online databases, online books, journals, the Internet), in order to nourish its fresh outlook to methodology with the most recent relevant records.

Conclusion

Since, as Alexander George particularly underlines that "the abstract model of coercive diplomacy is not a textbook of 'how-to-do-it' prescriptions" (George 1991, 14), the theory needs to be tailored in accordance with the unique contexts of the cases.

To this end, the following chapter sets the pertinent theoretical tools with the aim of providing a basis for analysis and comparison of the respective cases. After Chapter 2 introduces the methodology of comparison with thesis pertinent variables, Chapter 3 provides the concise background of the cases; Chapter 4 concentrates on the comparative analysis in accordance with the provided variables and backgrounds of the cases. Finally, Chapter 5 ends the study by underlining the conclusions of this comparison.

Chapter 2

Methodology

Setting up the Pertinent Theoretical Tools for Analysis

The way comparative research raises new questions and stimulates theory building is a major strength.

W. Lawrence Neuman[3]

The introduction of the research design of the thesis is with the aim of depicting how to establish the relevance between the theory and the cases, the application of the theory to the cases, and accordingly the comparative examination of the cases for the assessment of the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy. To this end, the research proceeds in line with the comparative case study design, aiming to compare the application of the theory of coercive diplomacy in the Euro-Atlantic involvement (or lack of) in the Bosnian War and the Second Gulf Crisis. Thus, the design basically consists of:

1. The single unit of analysis: coercive diplomacy,
2. Two cases: the Bosnian War and the Second Gulf War.

"Comparative researchers examine patterns of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to terms with their diversity" (Neuman 2003, 422). Accordingly, the research proceeds with the assessment of the degree of the Euro-Atlantic involvement in each case, and the comparative analysis of the effectiveness of multilateral (i.e. Euro-Atlantic) coercive diplomacy with regard to the respective cases. Nevertheless, the research does not restrict itself with mere comparison, instead as a final remark, it draws conclusions with the aim of contributing to theory building and providing the theory with a contemporary ground for the assessment of the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy with reference to another critical example of the early post-Cold War era.

"The way comparative research raises new questions and stimulates theory building is a major strength" (Neuman 2003, 423), since such approach contributes to the research for considering the similarities and differences between the cases studied. For that reason the cases are chosen not only on the basis of their appropriateness for

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[3] Neuman, Lawrence W. 2003. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

the application of the theory of coercive diplomacy, but also because of the fact that they present fruitful grounds for comparative methodology. Such as the cases mark different timeframes and different regions, which can presumably bring diverse concerns of the parties involved in coercive diplomacy in the tenuous international arena of the post-Cold War era.

Ground for Comparative Analysis

Given the apparent difference in the nature of conflicts, it would be of use to underline the essential reasons for comparison of the two distinct cases. On the one hand, the Bosnian War constitutes an example of international intervention to a prolonged inter-ethnic warfare between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats. On the other hand, the Second Gulf War can be regarded as a political-military intervention to prevent a dictator of acquiring WMDs and provide them to terrorist organizations.

Firstly, since the thesis concentrates on the Transatlantic involvements in the emerging world order after the Cold War, the cases serve as the cornerstones of this period. Beginning in 1992 the Bosnian War occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The Second Gulf War (2002-2003), alongside of being the most recent available case of its kind, started a year after 9/11, another ground-breaking incident that undoubtedly have impact on evolving Euro-Atlantic involvement in the emerging crises. Thus, the occurrence periods of the cases provide fruitful ground for analysis.

Secondly, their regions are different, but very relevant for comparative analysis at the same time. On the one hand, Bosnia is in the immediate proximity to central Europe, thus inter-ethnic warfare in its immediate neighborhood cannot be acceptable for the broadening EU. On the other hand, Iraq, as one of the Gulf countries with richest oil reserves under the authoritarian rule of Saddam allegedly trying to acquire WMDs and supporting terrorism, and the neighbor of Iran that has been under American embargo since 1979 with similar American allegations. Thus, different regions raised divergent concerns on the both sides of the Atlantic in different time frames. In view of that, these cases constitute prolific basis for the comparative analysis of Transatlantic involvements in the emerging world order through enabling to trace the Transatlantic stance in multilateral interventions from cohesion to divergence. Indeed, even more critically how this evolving discourse influenced the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in the cases under concern.

Thesis Pertinent Variables

Having introduced the variables, variants, and conditions for success of coercive diplomacy, the most challenging part of the chapter remains to be presented as criteria for comparative analysis. Since the objective of the study is to comparatively analyze the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy in both cases, the variables to be considered are the conditions favoring successful utilization of coercive diplomacy. To this end, in a preceding part of this chapter, the variables that help to explain the success or failure of coercive diplomacy are introduced. These variables generated by Craig and George, are similar to the ones put forward by George and Simons. Nevertheless, since the concentration of this study is on the refined framework of George and Simons model by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, the previous frameworks are not discussed in detail. Instead the Jakobsen's framework is introduced below, and the reasons for its utility in this study are explained in the aftermath.

Table 2-1: The conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy against adversaries who have resorted to force (Jakobsen 1998, 80).

Success Conditions
1) Clear demand
2) Use of ultimatum
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost
4) Usable military options
5) Strong leadership
6) Domestic support
7) International support
8) Assurance against future demands
9) Use of carrot

Jakobsen presents this refined framework in the third chapter of 1998 *Strategic Coercion*: "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities". This title and in fact the topic it refers to constitute the major reason for the consideration of these conditions as variables for the comparative analysis in this study. Since both of the cases occurred in the post-Cold War era, the framework considering the realities of this period can be presumably more conducive

for comparative analysis. The increasing number of international involvements through coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era is also a common factor of this study with Jakobsen's that necessitates the further refinement of the generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy in accordance with the emerging international conflicts.

Beyond this main, broad reason for employing his variables, two other specific reasons reinforce the appropriateness of his framework for its use as basis for comparison in this study. In his words, "I construct a framework that is applicable when coercive diplomacy is employed by a coalition and the opponent has resorted to some sort of force" (Jakobsen 1998, 63). In view of the fact that both cases involve coalitional efforts on the coercers' side, and the adversaries have resorted to aggression, Jakobsen's conditions constitute a remarkable basis for comparative analysis. Although the cases have these basic characteristics in common, their degree and orientation vary significantly. Thus, in Jakobsen's words such cases are "one class of cases", and "the focus on only one class of cases facilitates comparison across cases as the variance in the independent variables is minimized" (Jakobsen 1998, 70). As a result, the above-mentioned conditions favoring the success of coercive diplomacy will constitute the key variables for the comparative analysis of the effectiveness (i.e. degree of success) of multilateral coercive diplomacy in Chapter 4.

Identifying the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy
1) Clear Demand

The clarity of the demand issued to the opponent by the coercer (or coercing coalition) plays a vital role in the introduction and implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Thus, clear demand is essential in building an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy since the form of claim serves as the opening for the coercer, in the form of declaring its demands. As well as another opening for the adversary in a manner that when it receives these demands the adversary comes to the point of responding to them. In this process, although the clarity of demand represents the clarity of the coercer's objectives, clear demand becomes more essential in the effective communication of these objectives with the adversary. As Jakobsen points out in his refined framework for the success of coercive diplomacy, "the clarity of the demand issued to the opponent rather than the clarity of the objective, as it is conceived by the coercer, influences the chance of success" (Freedman 1998, 77).

2) Use of Ultimatum

As the starkest variant of coercive diplomacy, the 'ultimatum' is introduced in Chapter1. To facilitate its analysis as an effective instrument of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, a reminder definition would be of use: "A classic ultimatum has three components: (1) a demand on the opponent; (2) a time limit or sense of urgency with the compliance of the demand; and (3) a threat of punishment for noncompliance" (George 1991, 7). With its characteristics, the ultimatum qualifies the clear demand of the coercer by introducing a sense of urgency for compliance. As well as by the presentation of the credible threat for non-compliance, the ultimatum substantiates the operationalization of the clear demand, in case the adversary fails to comply.

3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost

Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost is particularly important in making ultimatums credible and therefore assuring the compliance with the demands of the coercer. Such threat potential aims to induce the adversary to prefer the coercer's demand instead of use of force or an escalation of full-fledged warfare. Given that any escalation involves certain risks for both the coercer and the adversary, "Following Pape, Huth, and Maersheimer, this [the adversary most likely to perceive escalation as unacceptable] is most likely to be the case if the opponent believes the coercer can defeat him quickly with little cost" (Freedman 1998, 78).

4) Usable military options

In order to ensure that the projected threat will be carried out, the coercer should have viable military options at its disposal. In that regard, for the coercer, it is not only sufficient to possess various military assets, but to be able to use them resolutely in any particular situation against the adversary. Thus, 'threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost' and 'usable military options' conditions of success are mutually reinforcing. Since "the presence of these conditions implies that the coercer is highly motivated and willing to threaten and, if need be, use force. Sufficient motivation to go this far will, as usually be crucial for success" (Freedman 1998, 78).

5) Strong Leadership

Given that the first four conditions for a successful coercive diplomacy are based on signaling the operational elements of the strategy, starting from the fifth

condition, 'strong leadership', the remaining five conditions are based on building international consensus to attain the viable means to be employed in the promising strategy of coercive diplomacy. Beginning with 'strong leadership' is of particular importance since it pertains the orchestration of both domestic and international support to the ends and the means of the coercer. To facilitate analysis, the realization of the domestic and international support is separately analyzed under the following conditions. Thus, the strong leadership component focuses on the coercer' management of the conflict situation by taking into account its domestic and international dimensions, while leaving the analysis of each to the following sections. When the coercer consists of a coalition or when the coercing state has to build a coalition, "decision-making becomes harder as the number of states that have to agree goes up" (Freedman 1998, 77). Not surprisingly, each state tends to perceive a threat emanating from a given conflict differently; thus each state's will to use force vary accordingly.

6) Domestic Support

Acquiring and maintaining domestic support is crucial for the ability of any coercer to threaten, and use force, if necessary. Lacking domestic support may risk the sustainability of any coercive effort and thus ultimately lead to an ineffective implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, if not to its failure. Generally, the maintenance of domestic and international support goes hand in hand. For that reason, "the leading state faces the difficult task of having to present a convincing case for threatening the use of force on its own public as well as to the other governments in the coalition" (Freedman 1998, 77). Accordingly, the thesis pays particular attention not only to the domestic support of the leading coercer (i.e. the US), but also to the respective public opinions of the remaining states in the multilateral involvement. To be more specific in that regard, domestic support refers to mainly the opinions of the respected audiences about the handling of crisis situations (i.e., the Bosnian War and the Second Gulf War), and whether they were worth to engage in any coercive effort that can trigger full-fledged warfare. Perhaps for that reason, domestic support tends to be affected by the opinion of wider international community in a manner that sometimes its maintenance proves to be contingent upon the assurance of multilateral consent, if not support (i.e., the Second Gulf War).

7) International Support

Prior to engaging any attempt of coercive diplomacy the search for international support is deemed essential for assuring the isolation of the adversary and therefore to make the coercive strategy more effective with low-cost and a quick period of involvement. Agreement is easier to reach in a situation where a direct threat to international security (i.e., gross human rights violations-Bosnia, WMD, terror-Iraq) leaves little room for maneuver than in a situation of low threat where the room for maneuver and hence the possibility for disagreement is greater. Nevertheless, states even though from the same alliance (i.e., NATO), may sharply diverge over their threat perceptions. Therefore, attaining international support may not be guaranteed although there is a direct threat to international security, as long as the international community lacks consensus over the nature of the threat and the means to counter it. In that regard, the nature and scope of international support is of critical importance in terms the cohesion and credibility of the coercing coalition.

With the aim of operationalizing such a broad concept of international support, it would be of use to state its principal scope in the remainder of the thesis. First of all, it should be underlined that international support refers primarily to the consent of international community through the UN Security Council in general, and under the framework of other international organizations with rather regional focus in particular such as the EU and NATO. Given the fact that this thesis is concerned with the Transatlantic involvements in the emerging world order, the particular attention is paid on tracing the convergence and divergence among the members of Transatlantic community in various settings such as the UN Security Council, the EU and NATO. In addition, at the further level international support refers to an active international engagement such as contributing with troops to the intervention (e.g., Rapid Reaction Force, composed by the European troops in the Bosnian War) and sharing the economic burden of the war (e.g., the First Gulf War). Thus, in some cases it refers to active engagement (i.e., the Bosnian War), while in the others bare multilateral consent can be sufficient (i.e., the Second Gulf War), but even more challenging to attain.

8) Assurance against future demands

Assurance against future demands is critical in bringing adversary to the table, as well as in convincing him that the coercer's demands will not be a prelude to potential further demands. A successful strategy of coercive diplomacy involves a

certain degree of cooperation (i.e., not to escalate) of the adversary, regardless of being persuaded or enforced. As Schelling has pointed out, "an opponent will not comply with the coercer's demand if he fears that it will result in new demands in the future" (Schelling 1966, 74). In such a case, the adversary may choose to fight till the end even though all of the remaining conditions are fulfilled, and are perceived potent enough by the opponent since he would regard the strategy of coercive diplomacy as a mechanism for extracting concessions.

9) Use of carrot

Although the principal strategy of coercive diplomacy aims to induce the adversary to comply with the demands of the coercer based on the credibility of threats and their effective communication and thus the persuasion of adversary, the use of carrot can be of essential complementarity. As Jakobsen puts forward its role, "while use of carrot cannot be regarded as strictly necessary for success, evidence indicates that coupling a threat to use force with some sort of carrot enhances the scope for success considerably" (Freedman 1998, 79).

Conclusion

The preceding chapters (i.e., Chap. 1 and 2) of the thesis present the theoretical basis of the thesis. This basis is employed for the analysis and comparison of the cases. The first chapter introduces the theoretical abstract model of coercive diplomacy, while providing remarks about its distinctive characteristics. Thus, Chapter 1 draws the boundaries of the theoretical concept of coercive diplomacy, and identifies the logic of coercive diplomacy.

In view of the fact that coercive diplomacy is a loaded concept, the second chapter refines the abstract model of coercive diplomacy and sets the ground for analysis. In this process, the refinement of the theory goes hand in hand with the introduction of the logic of the thesis. Hence, the second chapter weaves theory with methodology and approaches this study by highlighting the pertinent parts of both, and adding the particular remarks on their interaction when necessary. For that reason, given that this chapter seals the theoretical introduction and refinement part of this study, the in-depth consideration of the definitions and characteristics of coercive diplomacy are of major importance in terms of the analysis and comparison of the respective cases in the subsequent parts of this study. The variables introduced in this chapter may neither

be present in each case, nor referred to any particular situation of the cases. However, their presentation in the very beginning of this study can provide readers a comprehensive illustration of the abstract model with its variables, variants, and criteria for evaluation. As a result, the reader becomes acquainted with the principal logic of how coercive diplomacy works in theory, and thus ready for the elaboration on its practice. Accordingly, Chapter 3 presents the respective backgrounds of the cases and establishes historical and factual relevance with multilateral coercive diplomacy involvements.

Chapter 3

A Concise Description of the Cases: Bosnian War and the Second Gulf War

Coercive diplomacy is a sharp tool…
Disaster is always a single bad decision away…

Alexander L. George[4]

Introduction

Having introduced the abstract model and the pertinent theoretical tools for analysis, presentation of the cases remains essential in blending the theory of coercive diplomacy with contemporary multilateral involvements. To this end, this chapter aims to provide a consecutive description of each case. The description of each case begins with the establishment of relevance for the application of coercive diplomacy in its contemplation. A brief narrative of each conflict follows this part. In this process, the significant international involvements and their impacts on the process and outcome of the conflicts are underlined. Given that the cases are introduced in chronological order as well, the following part is on the concise description of the Bosnian War (1992-1995).

I. Bosnian War (1992-1995)

Some say we were brought to the brink of war. Of course we were brought to the brink of war. To get the brink without getting into the war is the necessary art.

John Foster Dulles[5]

Ground for Coercive Diplomacy

This part aims to put forward why the multilateral involvements in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) constitute an example of coercive diplomacy. To this end, the reasons for and the means of the employment of coercive diplomacy by the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and finally by the Contact Group are discussed.

It took three long years of continued fighting in Bosnia for the gradual emergence of international response to evolve from wavering to resolute. In this

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[4] Craig, Gordon, and Alexander L. George, eds. 1995. *Force and Statecraft: DiplomaticProblems of Our Time* (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
[5] Quoted in "Bell, Coral, 2003. Iraq, Alliances, and Crisis Management. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No: 2".

process, various mechanisms ranging from vague threats of future action to ultimatums, and positive inducements have been utilized. As the emerging hegemon in the immediate aftermath of Cold War, the United States (US) played a key role in all attempts, employing coercive diplomacy in order to halt the Serbian aggression in Bosnia.

"Over the course of the war, the Unites States had participated five attempts to use the threat of force to persuade or compel the Bosnian Serbs to cease certain actions" (Art and Cronin 2003, 60). Each attempt involves certain threat projection with varying degree of commitment to back up the coercer's demand, if the adversary fails to comply. Thus, as it can be observed in the following attempts, the variants of coercive diplomacy can be tailored according to the local situations and therefore may not be as clear-cut apparent as in the abstract model. Nevertheless, in the contemplation of these attempts the general logic of coercive diplomacy in-depth discussed in Chapter 1, shall be considered as guiding in the outlook of tracing multilateral coercive diplomacy in Bosnian War.

First, in response to the strangulation of Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina) by Serb forces surrounding the city in the summer of 1993, "NATO issued a vague threat of future action against those who attacked UN forces or obstructed humanitarian aid" (Art and Cronin 2003, 60). This ambivalent warning can be characterized as the emerging version of the 'try-and-see' variant of coercive diplomacy, or even more to the point as 'the gradual turning of screw', since it lacks certain threat of punishment for non-compliance while stresses the future action.

Second, as a result of overt violation of the first demand about the safety of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs shelling the marketplace in February 1994, for the US and its NATO allies responded "by issuing an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from around the city or face an air attack by NATO" (Art and Cronin 2003, 60). This threat led the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weapons from around the city and to the establishment of a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. With its means and outcomes this can be considered as a successful (yet partially effective, since war is continuing), act of coercive diplomacy that displayed most of the theoretical characteristics identified by Alexander George.

Third, in April 1994 three limited air strikes were conducted against Serb forces attacking the Muslim-held enclave of Gorazde. These air strikes were followed by "another ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw and by at least some consideration of a

more extensive use of force against them" (Art and Cronin 2003, 60). Such combination of the increasing imminent threat for non-compliance with the actual use of force corresponds to George's notion of "exemplary use of quite limited force to persuade the opponent to back down" (George 5, 1991) that has also been discussed in Chapter 1.

Fourth, "in November 1994 NATO launched air attacks against Serb air base and three Serb SAM missile sites in the Bihac area in response to Serb attacks that threatened to overrun the Muslim-held enclave in western Bosnia" (Art and Cronin 2003, 61). Again, it can be noted that the exemplary use of force with the aim of establishing credibility with regard to the adversary is essential if coercive diplomacy is going to bear fruit.

Fifth, "the use of air power against Bosnian Serb ammunition dump in May 1995, in order to back up an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo" (Art and Cronin 61, 2003). This attempt, though a final one, was not a one-shot game but rather an ongoing strategic air offensive until the Dayton Peace Accords attained in November 1995. This final attempt and its repercussions revealed the apparent counter-productiveness (i.e., as a retaliation to air strikes the Serbs seized UN personnel as hostages to use them as human shields against possible further attack) of the UN mission in Bosnia, and thus paved the way for its collapse, and therefore reinforcing comprehensive US strategy of multilateral coercive diplomacy.

Concise Narrative

"The war in Bosnia started in earnest after the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 1992" (Oudraat. 1999, 45). At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs began to the siege of Sarajevo. With its multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition, the city became the symbol for the struggle of a unitary Bosnian state from the very beginning. By May 1992 the situation in Sarajevo became increasingly dangerous; it prompted the UN to move most of its UNPROFOR personnel to Zagreb.

"During the summer of 1992, the eastern, northern, and northwestern parts of Bosnia underwent systematic ethnic cleansing. Within a few months, Serbs occupied close to 70 percent of Bosnia" (Oudraat. 1999, 46). Rather than this vast and rapid invasion, the means employed by Serbs towards occupation contributed to the growing

public dissent from atrocities conducted at the immediate backyard of the EU. As indiscriminate killings of civilians, concentration camps, and organized rape became known in the West, demands for forceful military action were articulated. "To respond to the public outrage over the war in Bosnia, the UN Security Council declared the establishment of a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992" (Oudraat. 1999, 47). But it took until April 1993 for NATO to begin enforcing it.

During the entire course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) various peace attempts have been carried out at different phases of the conflict. These peace efforts can be categorized in accordance with the nature of the intermediaries involved:

A – International Organizations

  1) The European Community (EC) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Mediators: Jose Cutiliero and Lord Carrington. (February-August 1992)

  2) The United Nations (UN) and EC. Mediators: Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen (September 1992 – June 1993); Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen. (July 1993 - December 1993)

B – States

  1) The US involved mediation (i.e.: the Contact Group, Dayton Process). Mediators: Charles Redman, Richard Holbrooke (February 1994 – November 1995).

A – International Organizations

1) EC & CSCE Mediation: "Aware that it did not have the justification to interfere in Eastern Europe, the EC went before the CSCE to seek approval for its actions. The CSCE was very supportive of the EC diplomatic initiatives" (Raymond, 1993). With the aim of facilitating the Bosnians in finding a way to become independent from Yugoslavia while resolving ethnic tensions, the EC initiated talks with the three ethnic Bosnian leaders in January 1992. The EC under Lord Carrington recommended the creation of a loose federation of three ethnic regions as a way of forestalling a potential bloody conflict:

> The EC/CSCE attempt remained practically ineffective in preventing the Bosnian conflict from escalating and negotiating a peaceful settlement once the crisis broke out. The EC had no credible capability to respond to the Bosnian conflict. Beyond the EC's political and diplomatic capabilities in solving

regional crises remained relatively undeveloped, "the fact that the EC had no military might could partially explain the ease with which the Bosnian leaders ignored the EC's efforts (Raymond, 1993).

2) UN & EC Mediation: As the Bosnian Muslim leaders began calling for UN peacekeeping[6] efforts around March 1992, the UN responded by passing its first resolution that expanded the Croatian UNPROFOR humanitarian mission to Bosnia. "The next series of resolutions, passed during the early summer, focused on expanding UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo and imposing sanctions against the former Yugoslavia." (Raymond, 1993). Nevertheless, as these UN measures proved to be unproductive in stalling Serbian aggression, an introduction of a new peace proposal was perceived as inevitable. As a result, "the UN and EC negotiators presented a plan to the three Bosnian ethnic leaders calling for partitioning Bosnia into a loose federation composed of 7-10 sectors with limited autonomy." (Raymond, 1993). Since, this was a compromise solution that satisfied none of the parties at all, it failed. However, the underlying reason of its failure was primarily because "the three warring parties in Bosnia were aware that the mediators had no political backing and that they had more than one master to please" (Atiyas, 1995).

The second UN/EC attempt, carried out by Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, was based on "the plan for a Union of United Bosnian Republics, a combination of the Serb-Croat initiative for confederation and the platform of the Bosnian presidency advocating a federal state" (Atiyas, 1995). Despite the two sided compromise proposal and manipulative strategies of the mediators, such as the establishment of the International Conference on the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a new platform for the negotiations, the plan failed due to the similar reasons, if not identical with those of the Vance-Owen plan's:

> A fairer criticism of the European policy would be that, having encouraged Bosnia to seek recognition in these circumstances, it gave the Bosnian government no security guarantees, and even encouraged the Serb-led 'federal' army to move men and material out of Croatia onto Bosnian soil. But this was a failure for which the whole of Europe, and the UN, must take responsibility. (Malcolm, 1994)

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[6] The UN defines peacekeeping as a presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. Peacekeeping works to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. (UN Peacekeeping, 1993)

During 1993, calls for outside military intervention became more determined in Western Europe and North America. However, Western governments could not agree on a course of action, and their reaction to the war in Bosnia remained restricted to the passing of resolutions whose implementation proved to be highly contentious and problematic.

B – States

1) The US Involved Mediation: The breakthrough in international involvement came with the US diplomatic efforts to sustain the Croat-Muslim alliance came after the February 1994 Sarajevo market attack. In its aftermath NATO issued its first serious threat to launch air strikes, but fell short of massively intervening on the side of Bosnian government.

> Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed a federation agreement on 18 March 1994, which stipulated that the armed forces of both sides were to be under unified command. Finally, Izetbegovic and Tudjman signed an agreement that linked the new Bosnian federation to Croatia. (Oudraat. 1999, 42)

Corresponding to these developments on the ground, a Contact Group composed of the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia replaced the stalled EU-UN negotiations. It held its first meeting in April 1994 and came forward with a new peace plan in July 1994. The plan called for 51 percent of Bosnian territory to go to the Croat-Muslim federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs.

In the early spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany established a five-nation *Contact Group*, with the objective of brokering a settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group based its efforts on three main principles:

1. Bosnia would remain as a single state within internationally recognized borders,
2. That state would consist of the Bosniak/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity,
3. These two entities would be linked through mutually agreed constitutional principles that would involve relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper as well.

In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 percent territorial compromise between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian,

Croatian, and Serbian Governments all accepted the proposal. The Bosnian Serbs repeatedly rejected it. This rejection was particularly related with the Serbian perception of the ineffectiveness of the credibility of any threat posed by the international community. Presumably, under such conditions, the achievement of the peace efforts on table is not promising unless decisive maneuvers carried out on the ground. As the US mediator Richard Holbrooke emphasized "...as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield" (Holbrooke 73, 1998).

Not surprisingly, "fighting in Bosnia had picked up in March 1995, when Bosnian government forces initiated offensives around Travnik and Tuzla" (Oudraat 1999, 51). Bosnian Serbs countered with increased pressure on Sarajevo in early May 1995. Several UN-heavy-weapon collection points were overrun. In response, NATO initiated air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Particularly, "an attack on the Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August 1995 provided NATO the excuse to show its resolve. A two-week bombing campaign against Serb targets followed" (Oudraat 1999, 51). The NATO air campaign also helped Croat and Bosnian government forces, which came close to overrunning Banja Luka, the Serb stronghold in the north of Bosnia. The battlefield successes of the Muslim-Croat alliance supported by NATO air strikes provided a realistic basis for division in accordance to the US-led *Contact Group* plan. With the aim of negotiating the plan without further exacerbating the prolonged conflict, a comprehensive peace settlement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, from 1-21 November 1995 and signed in Paris in the following month. The agreement stated that:

> Bosnia would remain a single nation within present borders containing two republics: The Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic. The country would remain under a central government with a rotating presidency, a constitution and an elected parliament. The Bosnian-Croat Federation would control 51 percent of territory; The Bosnia Serb republic would control the remaining 49 percent. Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, would remain united under the control of the Bosnian-Croat Federation. (CNN, 1995)

II. The Second Gulf War (2002-2003)[*]

If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long.

George W. Bush[7]

Ground for Coercive Diplomacy

Although, the US involvement in Iraq and its international repercussions significantly differ from that of Bosnia, this does not necessarily preclude its consideration as a case for coercive diplomacy. As this part of the thesis embarks on the reasons for the contemplation of coercive diplomacy in the process of dealing with the Second Gulf Crisis, it begins with the statement of the coercer's (i.e., the US) motives for the employment of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, and substantiates the argument through the depiction of the implementation of the basic variants of coercive diplomacy introduced in Chapter 1.

In view of the fact that the US has been the principal coercer since the First Gulf Crisis of 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, analyzing the emerging motivations of the US towards Iraqi regime in post-9/11 remains essential. Although Saddam is forced to back from Kuwait and was contained to a certain degree with economic sanctions, UN weapon inspectors and no-fly zones that required limited US existence in the region, which was the necessity of further step that emboldens coercive diplomacy and consequently led to the current full-fledged war and Iraqi occupation.

Addressing this fundamental question will provide the essence of the US motives for employing coercive diplomacy until the end that leads to the full-fledged war and the occupation of Iraq. As much as the impact of the 9/11 on the US foreign policy, the analysis of the threat perception of the respective US government (i.e., the Bush administration) and the chosen means for the response to the perceived threat remains essential in such elaboration.

A year after 9/11, the Bush Administration issued its first National Security Strategy in September 2002. The Chapter V of the document summarizes the Administration's approach to using force, known as the Bush Doctrine. Driving an apparent lesson from the 9/11, the doctrine's definition of threat is based on the combination of "radicalism and technology" (Record 2003, 4). To be more specific, radicalism in terms of rogue states that are willing to support attacks on the American

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[*] Indeed this was the 3rd war in the Gulf, starting with 1981-1988 Iran-Iraq War, 1990-1991 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the most recent US-led War against Iraq. But given the focus on the US-led multilateral involvements, the recent war is referred by many as the Second Gulf War.

[7] Quoted in Record, Jeffrey. *The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq.* 2003. [*]

homeland via either equipping the terrorist networks with WMD, or generating alternative means for delivery (i.e., ballistic missiles as Iraq attained progress to a certain degree). As the US President George W. Bush proclaimed this stance in his West Point speech on June 1, 2002: "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology" (Record 2003, 4). After having declared the nature of the threat that sounds considerably different from the already existing Cold War threat perceptions, the doctrine embarks on the means of dealing with this threat. Not surprisingly, the nature of response involves significant differences from the previous strategies as well. Thus, the fundamental Cold War strategies such as deterrence and containment are losing their relevance according to the doctrine. The US President George W. Bush particularly underlines this perception signaling the necessity for alternative strategies in dealing with this emerging threat: "Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies" (Record 5, 2003). Therefore, the Bush Doctrine identifies a multifaceted, undeterrable and unprecedented threat to the US, by implication that such threat demands an unprecedented response as well.

The above-mentioned key premises of the Bush Administration are essential in illustrating the US threat perceptions that would lead to the formulation of the specific demands, and response strategies that could be employed in case of non-compliance. As introduced in the first chapter, the demand and punishment for non-compliance are the fundamental elements in the implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. In this regard, the US-led coercive diplomacy has "two objectives, interrelated but distinct, Iraqi disarmament and regime change" (Langan 1, 2002). Since the disarmament of Saddam's regime would lead to gradual decline of its control over Iraq, the regime change might occur internally without necessitating American direct military involvement. To realize both of the US objectives one way or another, coercive diplomacy seems the most promising strategy, since "it is the only option that holds out the prospect of reducing the Iraqi threat without war, while actually reinforcing the United States should war actually occur" (Keohane 1, 2002). The underlying reason of Keohane's claim reveals also one of the fundamental objectives of any American attempt to employ coercive diplomacy against Iraq. As Wright points out in his earlier remarks: "this [American attempt] would be to tilt global public relations back in its favor by demonstrating that its immediate objective is the unconditional implementation

of SCR 687, which defined the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire in 1991 but has not yet been fully implemented" (Wright 1, 1998). This tactic would place the burden of shame for noncompliance on Saddam's regime.

Through this maneuver, the US objective emerges as to shift the burden for the Iraqi people's suffering away from the UN sanctions and onto Saddam with the aim of depriving him from its favorite maneuver for international support. To this end, "at the end of March 2002 Russian and American diplomats resolved a year-long standoff over "smart sanctions"- sanctions designed to have more impact upon the regime and less on the general Iraqi population- by permitting the passage of SCR 1409 in May" (Baker, 2002). According to Langenheim, "with this development, it is now possible for the United States to employ coercive diplomacy to once and for all bring about Iraqi compliance with SCR 687" (Langenheim, 2002). For such an effort, the 'gradual turning of the screw' approach is the most appropriate, with smart sanctions serving as a form of 'carrot' (to engender not only allied cooperation, but also possibly the support of opposition within the Iraqi regime). Since in this variant the time pressure is not an overt one as in ultimatum, the clarity of the coercer's demand becomes even more essential. Thus, the US has to clearly convey to the Security Council's permanent members, its European allies, and regional partners that Iraqi compliance with all existing Security Council resolutions must be full and unconditional. To this end, the Bush Administration even threatened Saddam's regime with unilateral action. This threat is not only to Saddam, but even more so to international opposition. Conveying this readiness for unilateralist American action increased the pressure on the UN Security Council with regards to rigorous inspections. The unanimous resolution 1441 passed by the UN Security Council in November 2002 is of particular significance in terms of the success of the US coercive diplomacy towards the effective disarmament of Saddam's regime. Although not authorizing immediate use of force in case of non-compliance, this resolution was claimed to be the source of legitimacy for the US action by the proponents of the Bush administration. Through this achievement the screw turned against Iraq at diplomatic realm, by securing international consensus for tougher measures. Therefore it can be argued that the unilateralist rhetoric of the Bush Administration is convenient with multilateral coercive diplomacy, since as Keohane points out: "without a credible threat unilateral action, it is hard to imagine the Security Council taking such tough measures against Iraq" (Keohane 1, 2002). Although there are a variety of dangers in making an ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq

such as "an adversary may respond with conditional or partial acceptance, prompting calls for negotiations or third-party mediation" (George 73, 1991). Because these reasons led to an ever-increasing degree of disagreement in the UN Security Council, and even among NATO allies, any ultimatum is not to be issued without difficulty. Nevertheless, some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply coercive diplomacy against Iraq, since "Saddam was never likely to yield to anything but convincing threat or actual war (Bell 226, 2003). Consequently, the US and Britain tried to pass a second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but given the staunch opposition from Russia, France, Germany and China they first postponed, then abandoned the proposition for such still birth resolution. Instead, together with the Spanish Prime Minister they decide to give a final 24 hours for the immediate and unconditional disarmament of Saddam Hussein. As the US President Bush points in his final remark before the first day of the war: "Tomorrow is the day that we can determine whether or not diplomacy will work" (Ohio, 2002).

Concise Narrative

Although this part of the study discusses the Second Gulf War and its international repercussions, the history of American coercive diplomacy in the region can be traced back to more than a decade ago since the First Gulf War of 1991. This long period of the wavering US involvement in the Gulf after the decisive First Gulf War is illustrated with all relevant details in the chapter of Jon. Alterman ("Coercive Diplomacy against Iraq, 1990-98") in "The United States and Coercive Diplomacy" (Eds. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin). 1998 marks the year when the UN (i.e., UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors left the country. After their return under the US-led Security Council resolution 1382 in 2002 under the refreshed title, UNMOVIC, Iraq repeatedly stressed that it had completed its disarmament obligations, and obstructing the weapons inspectors. However, as Jessica T. Mathews points out, "as the United States stepped up its threat to change the Iraqi regime by force, the Iraqi leadership resumed dialogue with Secretary-General Annan, hinting at the possibility of accepting inspections" (Mathews 2002). Although, this approach is interpreted by France, Russia and Germany as Saddam's willingness to comply with the UN resolutions, it failed to generate the similar outcome in Washington. As the US President George W. Bush clearly declares the discontent of his administration in October 2002, "The entire world has witnessed

Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith" (Ohio, 2002). Thus, according to the Bush Administration, the Iraqi stance with regards to the new inspections is nothing more than another maneuver to divert international consensus on tightening and enforcing the inspections, and thus ensuring the disarmament of the Iraqi regime. Particularly in that regard the employment of coercive diplomacy is instrumental. Since, the threat is not only necessary push Saddam for full compliance with the UN resolutions, but also to press the international community to take step in their enforcement, or at least avoid their potential opposition in any unilateral American action.

The final report of the latest Chief UN Weapons inspector Hans Blix provides ground for an American action, to back up its demand. Blix notifies the UN Security Council that "I naturally feel sadness that 3 months of work carried out in Iraq have *not* brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq" (italics mine) (Iraq chronology, 2003). Predominantly, the Iraqi recalcitrance during the negotiations on and the process of inspections plays critical role in such report, and thus its interpretation in an according manner by the Bush Administration.

Despite this final report supporting the adamant American stance for regime change in Iraq for (at least reportedly) securing its disarmament in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions, Saddam still plays on the divergence in the UN Security Council, as well as among the US allies. On 19 March 2003, "Iraqi President Saddam Hussein appears on national television and rejects the US ultimatum" (Iraq chronology, 2003). Given the fact that France, Russia and Germany issue a joint declaration, saying there was no justification for a war on Iraq and that UN weapons inspections were working, this could not prevent the US from realizing regime change through the occupation of the entire country. As Keohane underlines "Credibility is necessary to make threats that matter" (Keohane 1, 2002).

Conclusion

As the background chapter of the thesis, this chapter filled the theoretical skeleton with empirical flesh. This process has not only been the one of mere story telling, but rather the one that underlines the fundamental facts that constitute the ground of the consideration of the cases concerned. Such ground is not only essential in tracing the contemplation of coercive diplomacy properly, but also critical in

conducting a competent comparative analysis. This analysis will be the subject of the following chapter (Chapter 4), which comparatively examines coercive diplomacy involvements in accordance with the thesis pertinent variables presented in Chapter 2.

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Analyzing the Success Conditions for Coercive Diplomacy

[Coercive Diplomacy] is like a scalpel, it can cut off a diseased organ in the hands of a skilled surgeon or it could maim and even kill.

P. G. Thakurta[8]

Introduction

After completing the brief narratives of the cases, now the stage becomes ready for analysis. The aim of this chapter is to examine the conditions for success introduced in Chapter 2 with regards to the contemplation of coercive diplomacy in respective cases. To this end, the chapter begins with the analysis of the each of the success conditions for coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War, and continues with contemplation of the same structure for the Second Gulf War. Since this chapter is designated to establish a factual ground for comparative analysis, only the condition-specific (i.e., 9 success conditions) incidents and their pertinent remarks are raised up to substantiate the analysis and facilitate drawing conclusions in the final chapter (Chapter 5). For that reason, neither this chapter nor the thesis intends to provide a detailed observation and narrative of the respected cases. Even Chapter 3 of case descriptions is focused to this end. Therefore, Chapter 4 seeks to underline and analyze the specific incidents during the respective conflicts that constitute one (or more) of conditions for success in coercive diplomacy.

Analyzing the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy in the Bosnian War

1) Clear Demand

Although, clear demand is indispensable for a theoretically sound and practically effective strategy of coercive diplomacy, achieving that clarity in practice may not be politically preferable, particularly in the complex conflict situations such as the Bosnian War. As it can be traced in the following conditions for success, the asymmetric motivations of the coercing parties (i.e., Western governments, NATO, finally the Contact Group) and the Bosnian Serbs made it difficult, if not impossible to issue clear-cut demands until the ending phases of the conflict. James Gow puts forward this split between the success conditions of the theory, and the imperatives on the ground in

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[8] Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, <http://www.rediff.com/money/2002/jun/29paran.htm>[cited on 3/7/2004].

Bosnia and the reluctance of international community towards an active involvement to the conflict:

> Schelling's notion of compellance, in which clear demands are made, a defined period for its fulfillment established and the consequences of non-fulfillment impressed upon the coercee, may be less appropriate in situations such as that in former Yugoslavia where the attempted use of coercive mechanisms was in the first place a reflection of asymmetric interests, motivations, commitments, and resources. (Freedman 1998, 277)

As such asymmetry at varying degrees becomes increasingly apparent, compliance to the demands of international community to stop the Serbian aggression has repeatedly been overlooked by the Bosnian Serbs. Such a disregard brought the principal coercing coalition of Western governments under the UN and NATO framework to specify and to limit their demands, while adding the credible threats for non-compliance. Only after the Bosnian Serbs were convinced that the Western involvement was a rigorous one, did they start to gradually comply with the clear, specific but limited demands of the coercing coalition.

The effectiveness of the clear demands during the course of the Bosnian War can be traced in two crucial instances of international involvement. Given the opening impact of the clear demands, these instances can be marked as the cornerstones of the international involvement to the conflict, marking its degree shift from wavering reluctance to decisive consensus for an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy.

The first instance was in August of 1993, while the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, was under the siege of the Bosnian Serbs for more than a year despite all Western diplomatic initiatives. As it becomes evidently clear that there is a strong need for clear demand coupled with a credible threat to overcome the Serbian intransigence, "on 2 August 1993, NATO threatens to undertake immediate preparations for stronger measures, including air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if the strangulation of Sarajevo continued." (Jakobsen 1998, 91). The clarity of demand in its content and limitation in its scope, while effectively communicating the consensus for the action in case of non-compliance, brought the strangulation of Sarajevo to an end, though not yet the removal of the entire heavy-weapons of the Bosnian Serbs from around Sarajevo.

Since Western governments have not followed keenly the partial success of the first clear demand to generate the lasting solution to the conflict, this hesitation led to

another year of continued Serbian aggression. After this aggression acquired its most vivid form in the world media with the killing of 68 people in a marketplace in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, such cruelty triggered a strong NATO response. "The Bosnian Serbs were given ten days to comply with NATO demands or face air strikes" (NATO Press Release 1994, 15). To further constrain any possible Serbian manipulation of the implementation of the demands on the ground, NATO made its demands even clearer: "On February 9, 1994, NATO demanded that the Bosnian Serbs remove heavy weapons from an exclusion zone or turn them over to UN control" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 66). The alliance coupled its demand with a threat of air strikes. As a result of the coordinated efforts of the UN and NATO during the February confrontation, the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weapons or placed them under UN control. The unprecedented consensus within the alliance concerning the use of air power and its rigorous formulation in terms of the clear demand, coupled with the credible threat and a sense of urgency, brought an unprecedented, timely Serbian compliance. The idea here, in the words of NATO Secretary-General Claes, was "to demonstrate to the Bosnian Serbs the futility of further military actions"(Silber 1995, 8).

Although, this idea remains in the Western rhetoric as an objective of the Western involvement from the beginning of the conflict, such standing has neither been formulated in the 'clear demand' manner nor supported with potent military threat (i.e., air strikes). As a result, the effective issuance of the clear demand proved essential in introducing a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, having a clear demand is not sufficient alone; it needs to be combined with the remaining conditions for the success of coercive diplomacy.

2) Use of Ultimatum

As the starkest variant of coercive diplomacy, the use of ultimatum plays a vital role in attaining Serbian compliance to the UN demands. After more than two years interplay of ineffective economic sanctions and diplomatic initiatives in the European front (as described in Chapter 3) the international community came to the point of realizing the essence of full-fledged ultimatum for the sake of halting the Serbian aggression. Although the Western governments maintained their clear demands in this period, the need for qualifying them with time pressure and substantiating them with credible threats remained essential in making use of the ultimatums in the Bosnian War.

Such ultimatums were employed basically in three essential occasions during the conflict.

Firstly, NATO issued an ultimatum to substantiate its clear demand aiming at stopping the strangulation of Sarajevo. As it has been mentioned in the 'Clear Demand' part, this was the reaction of international community to the killing of 68 people in a marketplace in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994.

> After hectic activity both in the Bosnian theatre and in the international arena, on 10 February 1994, following a request to the Atlantic Alliance from Boutros Ghali on 7 February, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs: they were given a ten-day deadline to withdraw their heavy weaponry from what would become a twenty-kilometer radius heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, or to place it under UNPROFOR control – otherwise it would be destroyed by air strikes. (Freedman 1998, 288)

This ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), threatening extensive action if it did not cease, had brought the Serb assaults to the capital to an end. Although, it was limited in its scope, the NATO ultimatum fulfills all requirements of full-fledged ultimatum in credible and potent manner, so as to pressure the adversary (i.e., BSA) to comply with the demands. As this conviction can be observed from the speech of Clinton's National Security Advisor Lake, who expressed the conventional view held in the West in September of 1994: "The Sarajevo ultimatum succeeded because the threat of NATO air power was judged real"(Lake 1994, 24).

After the Serbian aggression had been seized by the effective but limited utilization of ultimatum, the BSA directed its attacks on the other UN declared safe areas in Bosnia that are even more vulnerable to Serbian assaults, and therefore more difficult to be protected by the international community. The example of such attacks came, when the BSA attacked on the safe-area of Gorazde in late April 1994. Given the success of the one in February, NATO did not hesitate to issue one more ultimatum of the same kind:

> On 22 April 1994, when NATO gave the BSA an ultimatum and threatened to carry out wide-scale air strikes. NATO demanded that the Bosnian Serbs stop their attack on Gorazde immediately, that they pull back three kilometers from the center of Gorazde by 00:01Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) on 24 April and that they withdraw all heavy weapons from a 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Gorazde by 00:01 GMT on 27 April." (NATO Press Release 1994, 31-32)

As a result of UN and NATO cooperation and the selected air strikes, there was effective compliance with the NATO ultimatum. Having realized its potential of coercing Serbs to comply with the UN demands and halting their attacks on safe-areas, "the alliance also threatened to counter BSA attacks on any of the six UN-designated safe areas with wide-scale air strikes" (NATO Press Release 1994, 31-32). However, given the absence of the remaining component of the full-fledged ultimatum (i.e., the sense of urgency), Serbs failed to fully comply with this demand until the end of the conflict in November 1995.

As noted above, Serbs were more submissive to the coercers' demands when they were limited in scope and specific in terms of time for compliance and threat for non-compliance. As the demands of the ultimatums evolve from limited to extensive ones aiming to halt the Serbian aggression in the entire Bosnian territory the Serbian resistance hardens, and therefore necessitated the use of exemplary, limited force to persuade the opponent (i.e., Bosnian Serbs) to comply with the demand. This situation became fact when NATO's Secretary General Willy Claes issued a new ultimatum on 3 September 1995: "He gave General Mladic until 1:00 p.m. on 4 September to halt all attacks on Sarajevo and the other three safe areas, withdraw his heavy weapons Sarajevo and guarantee freedom of movement for the UN in Bosnia" (Atkinson 1995). After, Mladic, the General of the BSA, failed to comply with the ultimatum NATO resumed its bombing campaign on 5 September. Although NATO demonstrated its resoluteness, the BSA resistance to comply with the ultimatum continued for a few more days until Tomahawk cruise missiles were used for the first time on 10 September; 4 days later the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the conditions set out by the UN and NATO.

As the complexities of implementing the ultimatums illustrate, ultimatums prove to be effective as long as they convince the adversary that they will be resolutely carried out. Otherwise, the credibility of the coercer becomes at stake, and therefore its future demands tend to receive partial responses, at best. Nevertheless, the maintenance of such resoluteness in the post-Cold war era becomes increasingly challenging, and thus the conviction of the adversary turns out to be ever more contingent upon the effective combination of the remaining conditions for the success coercive diplomacy.

3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost

In the early phases of conflict, given that the risk of the threat can be called through an overt non-compliance to the coercer's demands, Western governments were unable or unwilling to make threats that were either sufficiently credible or sufficiently potent to affect the Serbs, who appeared more highly motivated to reject any demands than Western governments were to enforce them. Such reluctance towards active international involvement can be attributed to "governments and military experts on the both sides of the Atlantic opposed military intervention since clear political objectives were lacking and because they feared that the Serbs would make the costs unacceptable by resorting to guerilla warfare" (Jakobsen 1998, 85). This apparent Western indecisiveness for generating credible military threats due to the fact that unacceptable costs of escalation for the Western governments implicitly encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to ever more increase their policies of ethnic cleansing and irredentist expansionism. In this early period, Serbs occupied nearly 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and continued to threaten the strategic points (e.g., Sarajevo, Gorazde) in the remaining 30. As "Western unwillingness to make credible threats of force ensured that Serbian compliance would not be forthcoming" (Jakobsen 1998, 86), thus such wavering can be counted as the principal reason for the ineffectiveness of international efforts in the early phases of the conflict.

The second and decisive phase started only after the Western governments realize that "the Serbs only paid serious attention to Western demands when they perceived military action as a real possibility" (Jakobsen 1998, 86). In order to make the threat of military action a reasonable possibility, Western governments limited their demands and generated sufficiently credible and potent threats of force to put teeth in the demands. As this process begins to signal Western resolve, Serbs become more apt to adhere to these demands. During the course of the conflict, the limited demands that the Serbs adhered to included: opening the Sarajevo airport for delivery of humanitarian supplies, permitting air-drops of food and medicine, and establishing 'safe havens' in various parts of Bosnia. As the attainment of these demands was a matter of rigorous coercive diplomacy on the ground and on the table, their maintenance during the course of the conflict was even a greater challenge for coercive diplomacy. "The Bosnian Serbs knew that the West would be unwilling to suffer more than a minimum of casualties in Bosnia and regarded attacks on UN personnel as an effective way of making air strikes too costly for the West" (Jakobsen 1998, 88). Not surprisingly, if not even anticipated

by the Western governments, Serbs resorted to this move of counter-escalation in a more limited manner. They took some 400 UN personnel in late May 1995 as hostages and attacked the remaining two safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. Unlike, the anticipation of the Bosnian Serbs, the former's attempt of making military intervention more costly, although successful, could not prevent decisive action. In contrast, this led the Western powers to adopt a more aggressive policy. "Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium began to deploy a 10 000-strong Rapid Reaction Force equipped with artillery in June, and NATO began threatening to use air power on an 'unprecedented scale' in July." (Dodd 1995, 14) Complementarily, "the Americans offered a credible threat to the Serbs, NATO agreed to launch air strikes and the Croats proved capable of launching a lightening speed military operation against Serbs" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 49). Such combination of various elements of both international community and the conflicting parties made an active involvement less costly, and thus more attainable, for each of them. These developments on the ground undoubtedly contributed to the negotiations of the final settlement to the conflict. As Gow pointed such essence of the credible threats in the Bosnian War: "there was ample evidence that whenever there had been enough of a threat to put doubt in the minds of the parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs, it had produced a positive outcome, facilitating the conduct of diplomacy" (Freedman 1998, 287).

4) Usable military options

As the Western resolve shifts from wavering responses to decisive policies towards active international involvement in the Bosnian War, the military options employed evolved from mild to severe. This advancement of military options basically takes place from traditional peacekeeping to more assertive use of military power in the forms of air strikes, Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on the side of the international community, and later, but extensive ground success of the anti-Serb warring parties (i.e., Bosnian Muslims and Croats).

At the beginning, the only available military option was the UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) in the territories of former Yugoslavia, of which its mandate had been extended to cover Bosnia as well. "UNPROFOR, the UN force on the territories of former Yugoslavia, was given its most assertive role in Bosnia. However, its role was constrained by the tensions within its mandate and by its scope to respond to Serbian taunts" (Freedman 1998, 285). This problematic situation primarily stems from the high

vulnerability of UNPROFOR to counter-coercive measures of the Bosnian Serbs, such as hostage taking. Ironically, the UN protection force - designated to protect the lives of the Bosnian civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid – was unable to protect itself. This brought NATO involvement into picture with the aim of providing air support to UNROFOR. According to Tanter and Psarouthakis, "when economic sanctions alone did not compel the Serbs, peacekeeping provided an opening for the introduction of alliance airpower" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 64). Their point was substantiated when the BSA attack began to overrun the UN-designated 'safe area' Gorazde, "NATO, acting in support of UNPROFOR, carried out the first hostile air-to-surface attacks in its history against individual tanks and command positions" (Freedman 1998, 289). Such an enhanced availability of military options in terms of the threat credibility as well as ground feasibility resulted in ceasefire and agreement to withdraw three kilometers from the center of Gorazde.

Given the apparent effectiveness of NATO air power as a primary coercing instrument, and thus usable military option in Gorazde, "it was decided to use the threat of air strikes to promote a peace settlement" (Jakobsen 1998, 93). This brought the problem of UNPROFOR vulnerability in the case of Serbian counter-coercion in the form of taking its personnel as hostages. To prevent the BSA from counter-escalate, protect UNROPFOR personnel, and therefore preserve NATO air power as reliable military option, the UN existence in Bosnia needs to be reinforced in a comprehensive manner. James Gow illustrates this wide-ranging international commitment:

> As international engagement increased in Bosnia, with the UN force growing to over 24,000 there (backed by air power made available by NATO and supplemented by a comprehensive sanctions package against Serbia and Montenegro), recognition grew among those involved in the international engagement that a more forceful and coercive approach was appropriate, if international approaches were to succeed. (Freedman 1998, 291).

In this process of increasingly active international engagement, the preservation of air power was of critical importance for the success on the ground, and therefore to convert it to a viable peace settlement on the table. On the ground, the "high vulnerability to air strikes will maximize threat credibility because use of air power is a low-risk option in terms of casualties" (Freedman 1998, 78). Thus, it is functional both in terms of its potency on the ground, and in terms of its relatively low military and political costs (i.e., very low-risk of NATO fighters being shot by Serbian air defense, and therefore low

casualties). On 'the table, "prior peace plans were not as successful as Dayton because NATO had not used force as a prelude to diplomacy" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 52). The facts support their claim in manner that any of the pre-Dayton proposals, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg, and the Contact Group Plan, did not benefit from decisive NATO air strikes.

In the final phase of the international involvement, NATO's decisive air strikes became known as Operation Deliberate Force, coupled with "Rapid Reaction Force artillery and NATO jets began to pound BSA positions on 30 August 1995"(Atkinson 1995). NATO's Secretary General Claes pointed to the effectiveness of Operation Deliberate Force as "a textbook demonstration of the use of limited force in the service of diplomacy" (NATO Public Information Office 1995). Nevertheless, the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force and the relocation of UN personnel into more defensible positions paved the way for the use of large-scale air strikes by reducing the risk of BSA retaliation to a tolerable level. Even though the apparent military preparedness of the Western governments to execute their threats in case of Serbian non-compliance, the Bosnian Serbs complied with UN demands only after the NATO air strikes had been carried out for a while. As Tanter and Psarouthakis noted, "Prior to the systematic use of military force, the Serbs could not kept in check. NATO airpower and Croatian military success on the ground were two factors that made for a preponderance of credible power"(Pape 1996).

5) Strong Leadership

Since any consensus on policies involving the threat and use of force requires leadership by one or more actors involved, and Bosnia is no different in terms of the essence of political consensus behind moves on the ground, the contemplation of international leadership during the Bosnian War can be traced under the two main phases of the conflict. In the early phases of the Bosnian war "leadership did not extend beyond diplomatic and economic initiatives" (Jakobsen 1998, 86). In this phase, the European Community (EC), embarked on diplomacy without force, thus depicting its inability to agree and hammer out any policy towards decisive international involvement. The futility of such approach lacking any political and military leadership revealed itself from the very early stages of the war, when the BSA blocked the international airport of Sarajevo in June 1992. After this apparent Serbian obstruction of

international humanitarian aid, the EC become conscious of its ineffectiveness against strongly motivated aggressors. To address the crisis,

> The EC stepped up the pressure on 27 June 1992, declaring that it did 'not exclude support for use of military means' and urging the Security Council to 'take all necessary measures for reopening the airport. These threats of force effectively made the coercive diplomacy strategy conducted by the UN and Western powers two-pronged. One prong was the economic sanctions. They were primarily aimed at Belgrade in order to coerce it to stop its support to the BSA and put pressure on the BSA leadership to comply with UN demands. The other prong was the military threat aimed directly at the Bosnian Serb forces. (FBIS-WEU 1992, 9)

Still this two-pronged approach remained ineffective in the subsequent years of the war, until "the action of those on the ground backed by timely and coherent political commitment" (Freedman 1998, 287). The apparent ineffectiveness of the European involvement in the early phases of the war highlights the importance of leadership in crafting a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. As Jakobsen points out this deficiency in the international involvement to the Bosnian War, the "absence of any leadership explains why the Western powers only used force on symbolic scale until the summer of 1995" (Freedman 1998, 77). Thus, given the interrelatedness of the success conditions, such lack of leadership prevented the employment of the preceding conditions such as 'clear demand etc.' to commence an effective strategy, and persuade the adversary (i.e., the BSA) to better comply with the agreed policy rather than resist to it.

Leadership involves a readiness to press on firmly to attain support for a specific policy and admit most of the costs coupled with it. The emergence of an active US involvement to the conflict after the marketplace massacre in Sarajevo in April 1994 constitutes an example akin to such understanding of leadership, although it has certain drawbacks emanating particularly from the later involvement to prolonged warfare on the ground. Washington became actively involved in the Bosnian crisis "when the inter-European power play endangered the overall relations between the United States and Europe and when it became pointedly obvious that the European approach to ending the war in Bosnia was futile" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 47). In order to avoid the recurrence of any failure of international involvement, which undoubtedly can bring NATO credibility at stake, the Clinton administration recognized the essence of synchronizing threats of force with clear diplomatic objectives that were generated by

political consensus within the Alliance and therefore can be carried out immediately in case of possible Serbian non-compliance. As the Western coalition improved its leadership, and pressed for comprehensive peace settlement, the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs became apparent on the table as well. "The Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska Assembly rejected this [the Contact Group plan] plan on August 3, 1994" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 47). Despite the failure of the Contact group to coerce the Bosnian Serbs, the Serbian rejection served the ends of Americans in terms strengthening their hand for ever-more active ground engagement and thus stronger leadership role within the Alliance. "It was not until Washington spearheaded NATO military operations with diplomatic activity that the parties signed the Dayton Peace Agreement of December 1995" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 51).

6) Domestic Support

As it can be traced from the contemplation of the remaining conditions for success, the effective international involvement to the Bosnian War and thus the orchestrated implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy tends to follow the pattern from early hesitancy towards active engagement to later decisiveness for lasting settlement. The underlying motive of such pattern was the widespread coverage of the Serbian atrocities by Western media, and therefore rising public pressure in the Western public towards 'to do something' to seize the Serb aggression, and assure lasting order through settlement. Otherwise, "Bosnia was not a priority for London or Paris" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 65). Coupled with the common European reluctance to use force, the domestic pressure paved the way for the early ineffective diplomatic maneuvers of the EC to soothe the mounting public pressure for Western involvement. The situation was no better on the American side where the threat to its national security was far from being immediate, if not irrelevant. For that reason, "the administration regarded Bosnia as a quagmire and based its policy on the assumption that the American public would never support the deployment of US ground troops" (Jakobsen 1998, 89). Thus, in the early phases of the conflict, the Western powers almost unanimously agreed to refrain from any potential military engagement and thus sound threats and effective coercive diplomacy. However, this consensus over inaction becomes increasingly unexplainable to rising concerns by the Western public.

The Western powers entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1992 determined to keep their military involvement to a minimum in order to avoid a potential quagmire. This proved impossible due to periodic, but very strong, outbursts of public outrage, which forced the Western governments to escalate their involvement in a series of small steps. (Jakobsen 1998, 79)

The initial step was the deployment of UN peacekeepers as a reaction to public pressure on European governments 'to do something' to stop the Serbian attacks on the Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilians. As an active mean to halt the Serbian aggression, selective air strikes on Serbian positions were regarded as an acceptable involvement in most of the public opinion polls throughout Europe. The example of such an impressive majority was "an opinion poll [which] showed that 70 per cent believed French forces should participate in air strikes on Serbian positions" (Buchan 1994). Although, air strikes were originally an American idea for active involvement that was repeatedly countered by the Europeans, their public opinion tended to support this measure as effective mean to stop the Serbian attacks. Indeed, NATO threats of air strikes, usually resulted from US pressure, were undertaken to settle down a strong domestic pressure for military action in the American public. The day after the massacre, ABC News cited a poll showing that "almost 60 per cent of the American public supported air strikes, and congressional support was strong too" (Jakobsen 1998, 96). Coupled with strong domestic support, if not an upsurge with congressional support, it became an obligatory task for the Clinton administration to convince a reluctant Pentagon bureaucracy to frame the Bosnian situation in terms of potential loss of NATO credibility in light of noncompliance by Belgrade. Therefore, ever increasing domestic pressure for decisive international engagement generated the ground for international support, and coordination of efforts at political and military levels for the eruption of the sound strategy of coercive diplomacy. As pointed out by Jakobsen, "Increased domestic pressure on the governments to do something to break the deadlock in Bosnia provides part of the explanation why policy was changed [in the Western capitals]" (Jakobsen 1998, 103).

7) International Support

Following the pattern from early wavering to later coherent decisiveness, the initial phases of the war illustrated the divergence between the EU and the US on the means of the force to be employed. For the most part, the political differences in the West on the use of air strikes and the political sensitivity to the issue of hostages "came particularly after the use of close air support and a NATO ultimatum backed by the threat of air strikes in April 1994" (Freedman 1998, 292). Although the ultimatum itself was successful in halting the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, disagreements on how to use force within UNPROFOR and among Western governments had been made apparent. Such discrepancy particularly stemmed from the European concern (esp. British and French) for their troops in Bosnia, while the Americans adamantly resisted on attaining support for the utilization of air power, given the fact that they have no troops on the ground. For that reason, "European governments opposed air strikes out of fear that it would endanger the lives of their troops on the ground" (Jakobsen 1998, 88). Consequently, this divergence on the both sides of the Atlantic undermined the effective employment of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. On the operational front, the apparent disagreement on the means of use of force prevented the UN and NATO to issue proper ultimatums backed by credible threats. Thus, even "the 'all measures necessary' resolution (770) contained no deadline for compliance and the threat credibility quickly evaporated due to disagreement between the US and its main European allies concerning how they should employ force" (Jakobsen 1998, 83). On the negotiation front, the influence of international organizations was too limited to enable the Western powers to reach a consensus on the use of force in an immediate while. Particularly, the inadequacy of consensus building mechanisms between the both sides of the Atlantic became ever more apparent. Undoubtedly, "the international failure to calibrate its position with that of the Bosnian Serbs led to a number of unresolved cadences which allowed the war to continue and the Bosnian Serb leadership to defy international opinion" (Freedman 1998, 295).

As the war prolonged, the ineffectiveness of half-hearted measures revealed and became clearer to the public in the West. Thus, the domestic pressure on the both sides of the Atlantic obliged their leaders to attain an international consensus on the effective means to use of force. Two months prior to the beginning of Operation Deliberate Force, "the Western powers reached a consensus on military and political strategy allowing them to back diplomacy with force for the first time since war in Bosnia had

started" (Jakobsen 1998, 104). Ultimately achieving this consensus was essential for the restoration of the alliance credibility (i.e., NATO). To this end, the foreign ministers of France, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Germany formed the Contact Group, crafted the peace plan dividing Bosnia into two sections - 51 percent for the Bosnian Federation (composed of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and 49 per cent for the Bosnian Serbs, and finally agreed on the means to hammer out the already rejected (by the Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska Assembly on August 3, 1994) peace plan. As James Gow illustrated the eventual Western coordination, "harmonized international resolve, in the end, produced a resolved coercive cadence" (Freedman 1998, 296).

8) Assurance against future demands

Facing an adversary like the Bosnian Serbs that were even intransigent in complying with the issued ultimatums and rejecting the declared demands such as the Contact Group peace plan (rejected by the Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska Assembly on August 3, 1994), the strategy of coercive diplomacy could barely attain its predetermined outcomes, let alone bringing into the picture new ones. The international community was in a more desperate need for assurance for the Serbian compliance to the UN demands rather than the Serbs' need to be assured against future demands of international community. Although this was an ever- more apparent case, the "assurances that compliance would not lead to more demands were provided by the efforts undertaken by UN personnel to avoid the strikes and more generally by the manifest Western reluctance to use force" (Jakobsen 1998, 98).

9) Use of carrot

The US negotiators preferred to use carrots to persuade Milosevic to seize his support to the Bosnian Serbs and thus to induce them to sign the Contact Group peace plan. The principal 'carrot' of the US negotiators was the lifting of Sanctions over Serbia proper, since this was the factor that Milosevic valued, and its attainment was solely contingent upon the removal of the Western naval and aerial blockade of the former Yugoslavia. "Milosevic's cooperation with the West stemmed from his strong interest in getting UN sanctions lifted, and they consequently played a positive role in the success as well" (Jakobsen 1998, 102). On the other hand, the US negotiators tried to introduce both sides with 'carrots' in order to facilitate their agreement on the

Contact Group plan through the accommodation of the interests on the both sides of the table.

> The Dayton Peace Agreement addressed the goal of the Bosnian Muslims for a unified state and a functional central government within internationally recognized borders. The agreement addressed the Bosnian Serb goal of having an independent entity with the right to self-determination. Dayton also gave the Serbs a viable corridor, and thus a unified territory. (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 53)

At the end, the use of carrots as well proved essential for the success of the gradual peace settlement.

Analyzing the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy in the IInd Gulf War

1) Clear Demand

As it can be traced in the assessment of the remaining conditions as well, international involvement and the contemplation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy during the Second Gulf War were significantly different (than those of the Bosnian war), complex, and controversial. Such complexity began to emerge as the US strategy of counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and influencing regime change in the Middle East acquired particular momentum in the aftermath of the 9/11. These notions have remained prominent in the American political and military discourse in the post-9/11 history of international interventions.

Apparently, the above-mentioned American concerns contributed to the demands on the target adversary (i.e., Saddam Hussein and his regime). In order to make these demands address the American concerns in a comprehensive manner, the Bush administration build its demands on Iraq in two-fold manner. The underlying notion of the administration to put up its demands in the manner that can be attributed to its assumption, which can be summarized as "the most effective form of nonproliferation ... [is] an effort to bring about the demise of the regimes themselves" (Kagan and Kristol 2000). Thus, the Bush administration based its demands on two distinct, but inter-related objectives of the US policy towards rogue states (e.g., Iraq, N. Korea, Iran). In that regard the ultimate aim of the US policy was not merely to disarm and topple down Saddam but rather to demonstrate the world that similar tendencies (akin to Saddam) will not be left without rigorous American counter-measures, including the use of force. Such a premise of major demands also highlights the

prospects and the limits of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq, and therefore defines a policy range of which, "at optimum, for the primary policy-makers, it was regime change without war (i.e. via coup), and at minimum deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons by minor powers (North Korea, Iran as well as Iraq)" (Bell 2003, 225). Given the essence of formulating clear demands at the very beginning of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, the aspiration of the Bush administration to realize the above-mentioned objectives simultaneously and immediately led the administration pursue a kind of 'all in one' approach. This approach was the one that led to the confusion in international community with regards to support American intervention, and not surprisingly encouraged deception by the adversary. On the one hand, President Bush stressed the American demand in a clear-cut manner on 12 Sept. 2002: "If the Iraq regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally foreswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and all related material" (Bell 2003, 225). On the other hand, in his speech on 26 Feb. 2003 the President "gave a clear, firm, public indication that he had decided that nothing less than regime change would do" (Bell 2003, 227). Thus, although within the framework of the greater American strategy these objectives are complementary, in the formulation of a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq, they tend to produce contradictory outcomes towards American ends. To be more specific, shifting the demands from comprehensive disarmament of Saddam to his consensual or forceful removal, promises only a little (if any) cooperation from either Saddam or the international community. Therefore, from the very beginning the formulation of the American demands tended to produce controversial international outcomes and needless to say lack of Iraqi full-compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions on its disarmament.

Nevertheless, "as events continue to unfold, the Bush strategy is becoming clearer and it appears to be based on what political scientists call "coercive diplomacy" (Reed 2002, 1). As Schelling underlines the path of coercive diplomacy: "It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make somebody yield or comply" (Reed 2002, 1). In the case of Iraq, Bush wants Saddam to comply unconditionally and immediately with the UN resolutions. Given the months lacking full-compliance (12 Sept. 2002-26 Feb.2003), the formulation of Bush strategy evolved from disarmament to regime change with the aim of assuring full-compliance. Thus, although the perceived controversy towards these demands by the adversary and international

community is underlined, these demands are by all means essential, founding elements of the strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq. This motive has also been underlined in terms of the realization of these demands "the coercive diplomacy that could yet lead to Saddam's disarmament or his disposal by his own side must be pursued" (The Guardian, 2003). To this end, the Bush administration has clear demands not only from the adversary but also from the international community in a manner to maintain support for the full-compliance by Iraq to the UN resolutions. Even the administration steps forward by demanding another UN resolution to authorize the use of force, in case of prolonged incomplete Iraqi compliance. As Jim Reed stresses this tendency of the Bush administration, "The Bush strategy strongly implies the need for a second Security Council resolution that would require Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to define explicitly all Iraqi acts of non-compliance. Iraq would then have to choose whether or not to co-operate fully" (Reed 2002, 3). The underlying motive of this demand from the international community was to equip the principal coercer (i.e., the US) with adequate means to exercise its projected threat in case of non-compliance. The essential mean in that regard was international legitimacy for decisive American action (i.e., American occupation of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power).

> "The Bush Doctrine rightly focuses on the principle of regime change as the most effective means of defeating threats posed by rogue and terrorist-hosting weak states, but actual regime change can entail considerable, even unacceptable, military and political risk, depending upon local, regional, and international circumstances." (Hamill 2003, 14)

Undoubtedly, these circumstances have impact on the success of the coercive diplomacy. This impact will become ever more apparent as coercive diplomacy unfolds, and the remaining repercussions continue to be analyzed under the following conditions for success.

2) Use of Ultimatum

Given the range of clear demands (though they are interrelated) with regards to Iraq varies from assuring full compliance of Saddam to UN resolutions to remove him from power to ensure his proper disarmament, it is of no doubt that the use of ultimatums can involve certain complexities. According to Langenheim, "there are a variety of dangers in making an ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq" (Langenheim 2002, 6). For instance, a poorly timed ultimatum can cause significant

political backlash, provoke preemptive military action, or "an adversary may respond with conditional or partial acceptance, prompting calls for negotiations or third-party mediation" (George 1991, 73). The US fell in these traps in a combined manner. Initially, the Bush administration repeatedly threatened Saddam with unilateral military action to topple down his regime, if he failed to fully comply with the UN resolutions, but the US refrained to issue a time limit till the very end, 24 hours before the beginning of the US-led war against Iraq. Secondly, this ambiguity due to a lack of time pressure coupled with the incomplete compliance of Saddam to UN resolutions. Thus, neither the time limit nor the conditions to trigger military action were clearly set forth. From the first chapter, we know that a state may choose to make the ultimatum "tacit," by omitting either the time limit or the threat of punishment (but not both). Although the threat of punishment (i.e., regime change through military action) was made abundantly clear by the Bush administration, the conditions for its trigger are lacking clarity, particularly for the situation like in Iraq where Saddam had a history of more than a decade of limited compliance. For all these reasons, ultimatums are not to be issued lightly, "but some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply coercive diplomacy against Iraq" (Langenheim 2002, 6). Until the very the day before the war, the full-fledged ultimatum remained the inadequacy of American strategy. However, as outlined above, this does not mean that the Bush administration has not take steps in terms of ultimatum, and advocate their approval by international community. To this end, Robert Keohane put forward that "Resolution 1441 afforded Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (Keohane 2002, 1). Given the uncertainties with regards to domestic and international reactions, and ever-apparent determination of the Bush administration, this declaration can be interpreted as an ultimatum of its multilateral coercive diplomacy, although lacking the elements of full-fledged ultimatum. The remaining conditions that tend to complicate rather than ease the declaration of the ultimatums will be analyzed in the following conditions for the success of coercive diplomacy.

3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost

Given the habit of Saddam's deficient attitude towards the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding his disarmament, the essence of credible threat remains critical to enforce the resolutions. Particularly, if the assertive policy of the Bush administration is considered as the apparent part of the iceberg of the

prolonged US Gulf involvement since 1990 First Gulf War, it is evident that the threat level needs to be increased, if the outcome is to be successful at this time. "The ultimate penalty for Saddam Hussein this time [2nd Gulf War] is not just a military attack against his country [like in the 1st Gulf War], but rather the loss of what he treasures above all else: his position as head of state" (Reed 2002, 2). Thus, this time the level of threat was dramatically increased and made obvious for Saddam to realize that this time the US is serious in carrying out such a threat. The Guardian points out this essential ingredient of coercive diplomacy in the Gulf, "Indeed, the military build-up remains the best strategy for seeking to disarm him, short of war" (The Guardian, 2003). Therefore, the threat was substantiated by the concrete military build-up in the Gulf to enable the US to launch an ample air and ground campaign not only for limited use of force, but also to be able to occupy the entire country to topple down Saddam's regime. On the one hand, this was a clear signal on the operational front for Saddam. On the other, coupled with the American claim for unilateral action, this was even more important signal for the international community in general, and the UN Security Council members in particular, that the US-led coercive diplomacy has to be supported internationally to make the threats potent enough. In the early phases of the crisis, in late 2002, this approach was successful at least in building international support. Keohane put forward the value of such credible threat for triggering international mechanisms to work,

"Without a credible threat of unilateral American action, it is hard to imagine the Security Council talking such tough measures against Iraq" (Keohane 2002, 1). The Result was the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, demanding tougher measures for the disarmament of Iraq and its monitoring, though not yet the authorization for 'all necessary measures' (i.e., the use of force).

Although there is no question on the utility of credible threats in coercive diplomacy, as long as the coercer can enforce and legitimize them domestically and internationally, the condition for successful coercive diplomacy to 'threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost' is not necessarily present in the Second Gulf War, as in the first one. According to Coral Bell, "The costs of invasion and occupation were estimated at about 132 billion US Dollars, and Germany and Japan were not willing or able to help fund those costs as they had been in 1991" (Bell 2003, 229). Thus, issuing a formidable threat does neither mean that it will generate greater support from international community nor greater compliance from the adversary. On the contrary, as it was the case in the Second Gulf War, it may trigger international reluctance (if not

reaction) and therefore implicitly encourage the adversary to prolong its non-compliance.

Since "Saddam was never likely to yield to anything but convincing threat or actual war" (Bell 2003, 226) it was vital to maintain threat credibility. To this end, the US is for sure on the advantageous side, because of in terms of its preponderance in military realm provides effective means to execute its threats. Nevertheless, such upper hand does not mean that the US can be immune from the risks and costs of unilateral military intervention. As Langan points out to potential drawbacks, "If the Iraq project graduates from coercive diplomacy to war, as it gives every indication of doing so, it is likely to achieve the objectives of disarmament and Saddam's removal without great difficulty, but not without some significant negative results" (Langan 2003, 1).

4) Usable military options

As underlined in the previous condition, for coercive diplomacy to work it must be backed by credible threats of war. "Hence in its attempts at coercive diplomacy, the US has committed itself to war, if Iraq refuses to comply with resolution 1441" (Keohane 2002, 2). Such commitment involves certain advantages and drawbacks towards the success of the strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq.

On one hand, the US demonstrates its preponderance in terms of military preparedness and thus "continues to emphasize unilateral and military and coercive measures" (Zarif 2003, 75). Among the assertions of the Bush administration to this end, the most striking one comes from the US Vice-President Dick Cheney: "If we have reason to believe someone is preparing an attack against the U.S., has developed that capability, harbors those aspirations, then I think the U.S. is justified in dealing with that, if necessary, by military force". In late 2002, he declared that the US would need no further justification to employ its military options, other than its perceived threat emanating from Iraqi regime. The assertiveness of the Bush administration was not merely restricted by stressing the potency of military options. Indeed, the diplomatic events were accompanied by a continuing military buildup in the Gulf region in obvious preparation for a military strike against Saddam Hussein's regime, thus, coupling declaratory signals with operational signals on the ground. "Operational signals are moves like deployment of armed forces, raising states of missile alert, readying of bases, overt stockpiling of weapons" (Bell 2003, 224). The simultaneous introduction of declaratory and operational signals is of particular essence in making coercive

diplomacy persuasive on the table through asserting the usable military options, as well as in assuring preparedness if the adversary fails to comply. As Reed underlines this critical aspect of the theory, "Coercive diplomacy presumes that the power to defeat the enemy by brute force does, indeed, exists and *will be used* as the ultimate punishment for non-compliance"

(Reed 2002, 1). For that reason, during the entire course of the Second Gulf Crisis the Bush administration has vigorously threatened military action, unilaterally if necessary, in hopes of motivating the elements within Saddam's regime to revolt and bring an end to Iraq's isolation and suffering. Given that "short of a coup by the Iraqi generals, regime change could be accomplished only by war" (Bell 2003, 229), the administration had aimed to trigger internal dissent against Saddam and therefore enhance its military options beyond the apparent unilateral American military intervention. Nevertheless, such ongoing enhancement attempts promised little prospect, as Saddam remained the sole ruler of the country with no conceivable alternative that its dissidents could agree to follow. As the Pentagon came to realize this ever apparent fact about the regime in Iraq, it embarks on "advocating a punishing air campaign followed by a vigorous ground offensive designed to overthrow swiftly the Ba'thist regime while simultaneously denying Saddam the opportunity to put into play a "doomsday" scenario" (Baram 2001).

Undoubtedly, to attain this strategy would be a daunting task, not so in terms of the potency of military options, but particularly in terms of gathering international and domestic support to legitimize their effective usage. This is the other hand, the hand of drawbacks of military options even though they are abundantly available for the US. These concerns over the drawbacks of the unilateral military operation against Iraq are underlined by Langenheim in late 2002: "given the extent to which the worldwide struggle against al-Qa'ida depends upon the cooperation of allied governments, now is not the time to undertake a campaign in Iraq, if doing so would likely jeopardize relations with key allies and strategic partners" (Langenheim 2002, 4). For that reason, once again, the consensual characteristics of coercive diplomacy come into the picture in terms of the critical essence of building domestic and international support through exercising strong leadership, if the strategy of coercive diplomacy is going to be successful in attaining not only particular goals (i.e., overthrow Saddam) but also, indeed more crucial, to realize long-term macro security objectives (i.e., counter-terrorism, non-proliferation).

5) Strong Leadership

Strong leadership is of particular significance in situations akin to Iraq where there is lack of international consensus over the course of action, and domestic support is contingent upon carrying out a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy, through international legitimacy and adversary compliance. Although this is the ideal picture for the overall strategy (not only domestic dimension), the exercise of strong leadership and therefore an effective coercive diplomacy is complicated by the indecisiveness of the very similar factors as well. According to Reed, "the implementation of coercive diplomacy has been complicated by three factors, each mostly beyond the control of the Bush administration: domestic opinion, international opinion, and the unpredictable behavior of Saddam Hussein" (Reed 2002, 6).

Given the need to address these factors in a manner that at least not to hamper the implementation of the strategy, if not to support it, opting for the strategy of coercive diplomacy alone is a prospective starting point. The underlying reason of such assumption is that it foresees both ways, and therefore can be regarded as a feasible strategy not only if successful, but also, indeed essential, even if it fails to coerce. In his article, Give *Peace a Chance, First Try Coercive Diplomacy*, Langenheim underlines such utility of the strategy:

> Coercive diplomacy against Iraq in late 2002 represents an opportunity to change the rules of the game. There are reasons to hope that the approach would succeed; yet even if it is doomed to failure, by making the attempt the United States would demonstrate that the Iraqi regime's belligerent and intransigent attitude, not American warmongering, is the root of the conflict. (Langenheim 2002, 1)

For that reason, the Bush administration, even though assertively unilateral, by introducing coercive diplomacy as the principal way of involvement, stepped forward towards decisive leadership. In his analysis of the First Gulf War, Alexander George has also come up with similar supporting argument that "ironically, the failure of coercive diplomacy was necessary to gain support for war when war became the last resort" (George 1993, 88).

Although the strategy of coercive diplomacy pertains to the above-mentioned strengths in facilitating decisive leadership, it would not be a realistic contemplation to consider the strategy immune from shortcomings of its executors. In this regard, the Bush administration's overemphasis on unilateralism tends to be counterproductive in gathering international support for any US-led military intervention. Such drawback

particularly stems from "an increasingly predominant voice within the US administration to go it alone, thereby confusing unilateralism with leadership" (Zarif 2003, 72). Undoubtedly, such deliberate confusion has contributed to the widening rift between the US and the rest of the world, particularly Europe. Although, its unilateral leadership attempt produces reaction rather than support in international realm, the hardening rhetoric of the Bush Administration, coupled with continued US troop build up in the Gulf, produced some prospective outcomes towards reluctant compliance by Saddam. According to Reed, as a result of this hardening stance, Saddam "agreed to U-2 surveillance flights, issued a presidential decree banning the importing and manufacturing of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons" (Reed 2002, 5). Not surprisingly, and indeed not unreasonably, this partial success of the strategy of coercing compliance were regarded as another wavering Saddam make-up to divert, the already at stake, international support for the actions of the Bush administration. Nevertheless, whatever Saddam considers about the role of international community, the strong leadership requires to maintain its commitments and since "the disagreement within the Security Council is one of degree only, the time remaining for diplomatic efforts is finite" (Reed 2002, 7). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Bush administration exercised strong leadership in handling the conflict. The apparent disagreement in the UN Security Council for the second resolution was the clear-cut demonstration of the diplomatic failure. Instead, "the US [should] adopts a less aggressively unilateral approach, trying to persuade or compromise with its allies rather than simply issuing pre-emptory commands" (Moravscsik 2003, 4). Although such consensual American attitude may not guarantee unanimous support for the UN resolution authorizing the use of force in case of continuing Iraqi non-compliance, such an action promises the softening of international opposition to the US-led military intervention. Therefore, following such path would be the one in accordance with the original aim and advantage of utilizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy for upcoming success or possible failure.

6) Domestic Support

Facilitated by improved communication technologies and consequently greater circulation of information, the world public opinion appreciates the interdependence of domestic and international policies. Such interdependence "greatly constraints national governments" (Zarif 2003, 74). Given the essence of domestic support in maintaining

the successful strategy of coercive diplomacy, having a domestic public opinion increasingly contingent upon the developments in international arena complicate the implementation and domestic justification of the American coercive diplomacy towards Iraq.

Although in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the American public opinion was strongly behind the Bush administration, this support gradually declined, due to the administration's unilateral rhetoric that could attract neither domestic nor international support. Influenced from the anti-war protests all over the world, the "war-resistance protests had been generated even in the US" (Bell 2003, 224). These protests, which could be regarded as the voices in the margins by many, were further confirmed by the opinion polls in the US. In late 2002, "polls show that 56 per cent of the US public support an American-led war that has UN approval" (Reed 2002, 7). Even if the influence of the international discontent from the American unilateral interventionist attitude was considered, the mere 56 per cent support for *UN authorized* American-led war was a clear indication of the domestic dissent from the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Even this degree of public support is conditioned upon the UN authorization. Thus, as it is illustrated in Figure 4-1, the American public tends to provide its support for international involvements contingent upon multilateralism. Having these figures on the eve of the second American Iraq involvement signals that the strategy of coercive diplomacy unilaterally initiated by the Bush administration attained declining degrees of public support from the very beginning. Jim Reed points out such difficulty that undoubtedly hampers the implementation of successful coercive diplomacy as well, "the Bush administration has been at pains to try to persuade the US public to support the use of force and in the process has hurt its case" (Reed 2002, 7). Further counter-moves in international realm, particularly from the European allies (i.e., NATO) against the US-led war, exacerbated the decline of the domestic public support for the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration. The influence of international support (or its absence) is elaborated in the following section.

Figure 4-1: US citizens' opinion about the US involvement in international crises (Worldviews Report 2002)

7) International Support

The impact of international support is not only critical in terms of influencing domestic public opinion, but also and, indeed, more essential for the success of the overall strategy of coercive diplomacy. This was particularly the case for the Second Gulf War in Iraq where the splits within various international organizations (i.e., UN, NATO, EU) became ever more apparent. Such divergence, between the both sides of the Atlantic primarily, without doubt contributed in a counter-productive manner during the course of multilateral attempts to make coercive diplomacy achieve its goals in success, short of war. Given the fact that "several instances since the end of the Cold War have clearly shown that for the US to deal effectively with any major international issue, it needs the cooperation of at least some of the major regional and global powers" (Zarif 2003, 73), such a reality becomes ever more indispensable in the aftermath of 9/11 when the primary issues under American concern (i.e., WMD, terrorism) have required substantial international cooperation. For that reason, the "international support" for the Second Gulf War was the key condition of success for coercive diplomacy, and the one of which its absence has proved to be the most detrimental for the coercer. Given such an essence of international support in the contemplation of coercive diplomacy in Iraq, this part extensively elaborates on the complexity of how

the lack of international support can complicate coercive diplomacy and therefore leads to its failure.

As the Bush administration repeatedly revealed its intention of intervening in Iraq after 9/11, "virtually all NATO allies and every one of America's regional strategic partners have disagreed with the use of military force either to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or to topple Saddam's regime" (Lederer 2002). Such apparent reluctance particularly among the international actors (i.e., the NATO allies) that the US expects tacit support at least, undoubtedly emboldened divisions in the wider international community (i.e., the UN Security Council), and therefore indirectly encouraged Saddam's intransigence. Despite this starting with an early non-cooperative outlook from the international community, the Bush administration demonstrated its appeal to the UN, with the aim of assuring full compliance to its preceding resolutions concerning Iraqi disarmament. Indeed, a year after the 9/11, when the "US President George W. Bush told the UN last September [Sept.2002] that Iraq must comply with all UN resolutions ordering it to disarm. It was a signal that the US had opted for a multilateral approach to its strategy of coercive diplomacy with respect to Iraq" (Reed 2002, 6). He addressed the UN and urged the nations of the world to support his call for Iraq to disarm peacefully or face 'serious consequences'. As an opening phase of US policy, these maneuvers of the Bush administration were perfectly in line with multilateral coercive diplomacy. The administration combined the notions of embedded military threat (i.e., face 'serious consequences') with a public appeal to the UN members to back their decisions in the form of the Security Council resolutions. In the following month this multilateral approach bore fruits, and "Bush was rewarded with a unanimous Security Council resolution (#1441); it called for rigorous program if weapons inspections in Iraq" (Reed 2002, 2). Nevertheless, this early success story was to be no indication for the flourishing future of the US engagement in the Gulf.

Figure 4-2: Cartoon illustrating the divergence in international community over Iraq in the Second Gulf War. (The Daily Telegraph 2003).

Following the achievement in the international ground to get ever more strict weapons inspections, the US proceeded to keep up the pressure by reserving its right to act outside the UN, at the head of what American officials called "a coalition of the willing". This tone was particularly emboldened by the words of Donald Rumsfeld in an early 2003, "the mission determines the coalition, not the coalition the mission" (Bell 2003, 223). Such unwitting declarations have contributed to the rising divergence between the US and its European allies.

Particularly, "the political leaderships in France and Germany appeared alienated" (Bell 2003, 223), needless to mention from Russia and China's (both permanent members of the UN Security Council) breeding concerns about American international involvements for decades. At the end, not surprisingly, this unilateralist and assertive tone brought the US President George W. Bush and his administration to the point of standing virtually alone among the nations of the world with respect to the question of what to do about Iraq. As an additional consequence of the failure to build consensus among any of the permanent members "Washington and London also failed in their bid to enlist the support of eight non-permanent members – Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan and Syria – thus the humiliating withdrawal of the resolution" (Hamill 2003, 8). Consequently, the second step of increased pressure of the Bush strategy did not produce anything like the result advocated by the hardliners in the Bush administration, namely authorization for military action. As this breakdown becomes increasingly obvious, the Bush administration further underlined its right for unilateral

military action. Nevertheless, this assertiveness only raised the tension in international community, and thus brought no benefit for the administration to acquire the international legitimacy trigger to use its overwhelming military might. As the success of coercive diplomacy that underpins the Bush strategy depends on Saddam's belief that the threats will be carried out, and that his leadership is at stake, he might be "calculating that the French and Russian divergence from American and British course will work in his favor" (Reed 2002, 7). Undoubtedly, such divergence contributed to prolong his non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. As a result, legally speaking, the power of the US to coerce Saddam for unconditional and immediate compliance, let alone to go to exile, had tremendously eroded in the absence of the UN authorization for military action. As this fact becomes apparent, the beginning of the end for the ineffective American coercive diplomacy left its place for the coming US-led war against Saddam Hussein. Evidently, this will not be the one without significant political costs for the US. As James Hamill points out, "military operations that take place outside the confines of the United Nations (UN) Charter will always carry a political price and 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' is likely to be no different." (Hamill 2003, 7). Therefore, additionally, the lack of international support detrimentally affects the third condition for success (i.e., threaten to defeat adversary with little cost) through increasing the political costs of unilateral military action for the Bush administration. In that regard, the impact of a single condition of success on the overall course of coercive diplomacy can be observed. Although the success or failure of coercive diplomacy can be regarded as temporary processes, their repercussions may involve long-term drawbacks for future American involvements. Andrew Moravscsik underlined such an element of risk for the long-term US strategy of international involvement as the "failure to cauterize and contain disputes such as that over Iraq threatens all of this [transatlantic] cooperation, as would any deliberate US strategy of trying to weaken or divide international organizations like the UN, the EU, or NATO (Moravscsik 2003, 4). As a final point, as long as the US preserves its unilateral persistence, coercive diplomacy in Iraq may not be the only failure. Regardless of the success of military operation in Iraq, the lack of international legitimacy, let alone consensus would contribute to nothing but anti-Americanism. This fact is particularly emphasized for the Arab world by James Hamill, as "the launching of an illegal war will seriously complicate the war against terrorism and will help to foster a climate in which more young people throughout the Arab world will be receptive to the crude anti-

Western rhetoric of terrorist groups."(Hamill 2003, 9). Therefore, by triggering the absence of international cooperation, the unilateralist tone of the administration tends to generate counter-productive, if not detrimental outcomes to its overall declared strategy of countering terrorism.

8) Assurance against future demands

Although in the original strategy of coercive diplomacy "assurance against future demands" implies to assure the adversary under concern (i.e., Iraq under Saddam's regime), in the Second Gulf War, the Bush administration did not feel the need to do so. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the administration refrained from giving any guarantees at all. Since, the international consensus was indispensable to maintain the legitimacy of American military action, the Bush administration was convinced that if any assurance should be given, it should be to international community as long as it supports its course of coercive diplomacy. In the early phases of his involvement, the US President G.W. Bush underlined the assurance of his administration in his appeal to the UN on the 12 September 2002, "the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable" (Bush addresses U.N. on Iraq, Sept.12, 2002). This assurance appeared to convince the UN Security Council to vote unanimously for the UN Security Council Resolution #1441, until followed by ever increasing unilateral, interventionist tone and its repercussions. Undoubtedly, growing unilateralist tendencies within the administration deliberately overlooked the assurance against international community, let alone to Saddam himself. Consequently, in his speech of 26 Feb. 2003 to the American Enterprise Institute, G.W. Bush gave a clear, firm, public indication that "he had decided that nothing less than regime change would do" (Bell 2003, 222). This statement was the end for all assurances, and indeed the beginning of the end for Saddam Hussein and his regime.

9) Use of carrot

Although, the use of carrot is rather a complementary condition that enhances the prospect of success for coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration did not feel the need to introduce such condition with regards to Saddam Hussein. Indeed, this belief was not surprising, since the Bush administration had declared its commitment to topple

down his regime. Therefore, the preferred post-conflict relationship with the adversary was never the one of co-existence, let alone cooperation. To this end, the absence of any carrots was in line with the overall strategy of the Bush administration, although this strategy produces little comprehensive success, if any, in terms of the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy.

Conclusion

Each of the success conditions for coercive diplomacy has been analyzed in accordance with the cases concerned. During this study, each of the conditions for success is examined in line with its credence to the overall strategy of coercive diplomacy. For that reason, some conditions are more detailed in the analysis of one of the cases, while others can be more brief in nature, and vice versa due to their varying influence in the each case. As a consequence, having analyzed the success conditions for coercive diplomacy with regards to each of the respected cases and highlighted the pertinent factual data and its remarks, now the ground is laid out for drawing together significant findings and conclusions as a result of such comparison. Chapter 5 concludes the study, offering comparative remarks to the cases and indeed more critically to the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in the emerging world order.

Chapter 5

Findings and Conclusions

Coercive diplomacy is not a panacea that will solve all international crises, but it does provide the chance to achieve political objectives with little or no bloodshed.

David W. Angle[9]

Introduction

In the aftermath of this comparative case analysis in reference to the conditions favoring the successful use of coercive diplomacy, the stage becomes ready for assessing the comparative findings and drawing conclusions. Accordingly, this part is organized under two main categories in order to facilitate explanation of the findings, and to come up with the further implications of this study. The grouping is as follows:

A - Comparative Findings

B - Conclusions and Implications

In part A, the direct findings from the comparative analysis in Chapter 4 are outlined and explained. Table 5-1 is designed with the aim of facilitating the comparative analysis and illustrating differences between the cases with regards to the conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy. Thus, this part constitutes the essential core of comparative analysis. Akin to the model followed in Chapter 4, part A explains findings with reference to each condition for the successful use of coercive diplomacy. It should be kept in mind that since this part aims to present with the comparative findings from both of the cases, only the conditions became the reference point in combining the cases. Therefore, findings with regards to both of the cases are blended with theoretical premises to reveal the converging and diverging elements in the cases under concern.

In the conclusions and implications part, the primary objective is to put forward the lessons learned from this study. In line with the first part, the similar flow is put into practice in a manner that first introduces the conclusions point by point, and then elaborates on their substantiation with reference to the cases and their further implications for the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy.

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[9] David W. Angle, <http://www.stormingmedia.us/60/6020/A602073.html> [cited on 7/5/2004].

A - Comparative Findings

Table 5-1: The Summary of Comparative Findings according to the Conditions Favoring Successful Use of Coercive Diplomacy.

Conditions Favoring Successful Use of Coercive Diplomacy (CFSUCD)	Presence (+)/Absence (-) of the CFSUCD	
	Bosnian War (1992-1995)	Second Gulf War (2002-2003)
1) Clear demand	+	—
2) Use of ultimatum	+	—
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost	+	—
4) Usable military options	+	+
5) Strong leadership	+	—
6) Domestic support	+	—
7) International support	+	—
8) Assurance against future demands	+	—
9) Use of carrot	+	—

1) Clear Demand

Given the apparent dissimilarity of the cases, the divergence of fulfillment of success conditions for coercive diplomacy is far from being surprising. Beginning with an explicit difference in the clarity of demands between both cases also signals that such divergence will remain, if not deepen in the comparative analysis of the following conditions. The Clarity of demands is vital for the overall strategy of coercive diplomacy, since the demands concerned are introductory moves for the coercer's engagement that can be hardly compensated in the later phases. In that regard, it can be argued that during the entire course of the Second Gulf War (2002-2003) preceding the war, the evolution of the Bush strategy, from disarmament to regime change with the aim of assuring the full-compliance, lost momentum due to the lack of clarity of its demand. On the other hand, it can be traced that although reluctant at the beginning, the coercing coalition remained as clear as possible in its demands during the overall course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995). To give an example from the most reluctant, thus vaguer period of the Western involvement "on 2 August 1993, NATO threatened to undertake immediate preparations for stronger measures, including air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if the strangulation of Sarajevo continued" (Jakobsen 1998, 91). Unlike in the case of the Bosnian War, the US failed to convince even its allies as to the viability of its demands with regards to Iraq (i.e., regime change to assure full compliance of Saddam with existing UN Security Council resolutions, and thus his complete disarmament). Such discrepancy can be attributed particularly to lack of clarity and specificity of the demands of the Bush Administration to both the adversary (i.e., Saddam Hussein) and the international community of which it needs at least the support for legitimating the US-led war against Iraq. On the contrary, the principal coercing coalition of Western governments under the UN and NATO framework specified their demands, and such specificity added credibility to their threats for non-compliance against the Bosnian Serbs. To compensate this lack of clarity and specificity the Bush Administration stepped forward by starting to demand another UN resolution to authorize the use of force, in the case of prolonged, incomplete Iraqi compliance. The underlying motive of this demand from international community was to equip the principal coercer (i.e., the US) with adequate means to exercise its projected threat in case of non-compliance. Thus, in the end, the US constructed an image that promised little support, if any, from the international community in the manner that its sole demand was the UN authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Undoubtedly, these

critical discrepancies in the opening phases of the strategy for both cases bring about the reasons for great divergence in the remaining conditions for the success of coercive diplomacy.

2) Use of Ultimatum

Given the interrelatedness of the conditions for success, complexities in the very first condition (i.e., clear demand) have complicated the use of ultimatum in the Second Gulf War. Thus, not surprisingly, the absence of clear demand in the Second Gulf War by the principal coercer (i.e. the US) translated to the ambiguous strategy orientation. To be more specific, in the Bosnian War, the ultimatums were issued for the specific limited ends that are agreed by the UN and carried out by NATO. On the other hand, in the case of Iraq, the constant threat of unilateral action by the Bush Administration was neither specific in terms of its time constraint and of the conditions triggering unilateral American action nor indicating any consensus in the international realm. Accordingly, such an absence of clarity in the overall strategy of the Bush Administration might have contributed to worldwide distrust to recent American policies in the Gulf, thus feeding the sentiment for non-compliance within Iraq under Saddam's rule. Therefore, needless to say, the US was unable to attain complete compliance to the UN Security Council resolutions. The ultimatums proved to be effective as long as the adversary has been convinced that they will be carried out. To this end, NATO resorted to exemplary use of force against the Bosnian Serbs, to demonstrate its resolution. On the other hand, the Bush Administration fell short of coupling its strategy with exemplary and effective coercive measures. Although ever-increasing American military built up in the Gulf could be regarded as such a signal, this might well be regarded as an American pressure bluff that tends to be called by Saddam. The inadequacy of full-fledged ultimatum until the very end (i.e., 24 hours before the all-out war) of the crisis remained the primary shortcoming of an American strategy aiming effectiveness through coercive diplomacy. Whereas in the Bosnian War, most ultimatums (if not all) were full fledged although they were limited in their scope. Perhaps, since their implementation required consensus between the EU and the US at least, they were very specific and limited. For sure, this was essential in the Gulf as well but apparently lacking. The elaboration of the presence (and/or absence) of the remaining conditions will further comparative analysis.

3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost

The Western indecisiveness to generate credible threats that can be carried out at reasonable costs led to the continuation of the Serbian aggression in the early phases of the Bosnian War. Although entailing different concerns, similar uncertainty has been experienced during the entire course of the Second Gulf War. Again the Americans were on the side of the decisive military action, while the Europeans were the doves of the day leaning more on a 'wait and see' policy. Nevertheless, the fact is that the Gulf is far from the immediate neighborhood of Europe and the ever-increasing unilateral tone of the Bush administration fueled European reluctance with few exceptions such as the UK, Spain, and Italy. In the Second Gulf War, it is of particular importance that the principal US allies that had contributed to finance the First Gulf War in the early 1990s demonstrated such similar resistance. According to Bell, "The costs of invasion and occupation were estimated at about 132 billion US Dollars, and Germany and Japan were not willing or able to help fund those costs as they had been in 1991" (Bell 2003, 229). Thus, although the US maintained its capacity to deliver and execute credible threats such as occupying the entire country to topple down Saddam's regime, the absence of international consensus tend to reveal itself as mounting burden for the costs of the war. Coming back to Bosnia the inevitability of taking action for the Europeans contributed to their willingness to cooperate with the Americans. Europeans had the peacekeepers on the ground, and later deployed Rapid Reaction Force, while the Americans constituted the backbone of the air campaign, and maintained Bosnian Croats and Muslims front united to fight against the Serbs on the ground. As a result, all of the costs -political, economic, and military- were shared in the Bosnian War, and accordingly the coercer (i.e.: the Contact Group) was able to threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost. Whereas in the Second Gulf War, such opportunity has been missed from the very beginning. Perhaps that's why many have labeled it as 'the US-led war against Iraq', since the burden remains on the US. So far, this burden has not provided any clue that the adversary has been defeated with little cost.

4) Usable military options

Although in both of the cases the United States possessed military capabilities far superior to those of the adversaries (i.e., the Bosnian Serbs, Saddam Hussein's regime), military assets do not translate evenly into usable military options. Apparently this fact seems better comprehended by the Clinton administration than the current Bush

administration. With the aim of translating its superior military capabilities into usable military options to the service of coercive diplomacy the Clinton administration refrained from any active involvement till the later phases of the Bosnian War from mid-1994 to late 1995. During this period, the US embarked on the decisive air strikes in an unprecedented manner, of which only after its use, the Bosnian Serbs could be persuaded to cease their aggression and negotiate for the settlement. Furthermore, the Clinton administration encouraged the formation of complementary military options such as the Rapid Reaction Force with the aim of not only sharing the burden of the war, but also to mobilizing international (i.e.: European) cooperation through usable military options. The result was the translation of political resolution and international consensus to the ground effectiveness, whereas such translation could not be regarded as something more than a mismatch in case of the Second Gulf War. In the Second Gulf War, the Bush administration offered nothing more than a threat of all-out unilateral war. Thus, although the US possessed usable military options, in the hands of the Bush administration, they were more conducive towards a full-fledged war rather than coercive purposes. Even so, this fourth condition still remains the only one that exists in both cases. Although the leading coercer (i.e.: the US) remains the same in terms of its military might and thus availability (if not abundance) of usable military options, its ability to transform them into acceptable effective instruments of coercive diplomacy proves to be much curtailed due to the Bush administration's lacking strong leadership, and thus inability to attain domestic and international support.

5) Strong Leadership

The essence of strong leadership remains critical in orchestrating the strategy of coercive diplomacy, and gathering domestic and international support to assure its effective maintenance. To this end, having strong leadership becomes the initial condition of consensus building to acquire and sustain domestic and international support for any coercive effort. According to Art, "If the coercer's top-level decision makers do not provide consistently strong leadership, then the coercer's message can become disjointed, clarity in objectives can be lost, and sufficient domestic and international support will not be forthcoming" (Art 2003, 371). Thus, the shortcomings of the leading state or group of states can jeopardize the success of coercive diplomacy through curbing the vital domestic and international support indispensable for its adequate implementation. The series of such shortcomings came when the Bush

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administration handled the Second Gulf Crisis in an unprecedented unilateral fashion. Thus, the Bush administration has confused strong leadership with unilateralism. Undoubtedly, this overemphasis on unilateralism brought reaction rather than support, and therefore exposed the strategy of coercive diplomacy in the Gulf to be regarded as nothing more than an illegitimate US war by many. On the other hand, unlike the Bush administration's top-to-bottom imposing tone, the Clinton administration pioneered the evolution of strong leadership with regards to the Western involvement in the Bosnian War. First, refraining from active engagement till April 1994 allowed the Europeans experience the futility of their bewildering diplomatic interplays. After that, the US took the lead through not only attaining political support for its involvement, but also through admitting most of the costs associated with it. Moreover, remarkably the Clinton administration embarked heavily on multilateralism while orchestrating coercive diplomacy under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and finally the Contact Group. Undoubtedly, the Clinton administration's aptitude to master multilateral support for its involvement contributed to the success of the coercive diplomacy in gaining domestic and international support.

6) Domestic Support

Given the interdependence between domestic and international policies, the essence of domestic support remains critical in maintaining an effective coercive diplomacy. "If the coercer's leadership lacks adequate domestic support for its policies, then it will not be able to sustain them" (Art 2003, 367). Thus, in order to maintain the strategy of coercive diplomacy the coercer needs to sustain (if not to increase) adequate level of domestic support. As a result of widespread coverage of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia by Western media, the Western public opinion constituted a rising pressure on the decision-makers to intervene with the aim of halting Serbian aggression. Furthermore, public opinion on the both sides of the Atlantic was also supporting air strikes as the principal coercive instruments to induce Serbian compliance, due to their effective and low-risk, low-casualty profiles. Therefore, "in Yugoslavia, the will to threaten and use force was primarily domestic driven" (Jakobsen 1998, 136). As opposed to the Bosnian War, domestic support tended to have a declining trend in case of the Second Gulf War. In that regard, it should be particularly underlined that even the already existing American public support for the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 was increasingly contingent upon the UN authorization. Thus, beyond merely

having domestic support or not, the consideration of the nature of domestic support is of critical importance. Therefore, the essence of qualifying the nature and conditions for domestic support emerged as one of the key points towards theoretical refinement as well. For that reason the absence of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force increased war-resisting protests, and considerable anti-war public opinion began to divert the already fragile international consent (let alone support) for the US-led war against Iraq. Therefore, because the unilateralist approach of the Bush administration has proved to be counter-productive in the international realm, such drawback was not going to give any prospective signals towards acquiring domestic support.

7) International Support

International support is not only vital in rising domestic public opinion behind the strategy of coercive diplomacy but also constitutes a critical ingredient for the maintenance of the overall effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. "If it [the coercer] lacks adequate international support then, its actions could be easily frustrated or undermined by other states" (Art 2003, 371). This fact proved to be particularly influential in rendering the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration towards Iraq fruitless. Since the claim of the Bush administration was to pressure Iraq for the sake of preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and countering terrorism, claims which both need ever-more international cooperation to be sustained at global level. International support once again confirmed that it was a condition of which its absence has proved to be the most detrimental. Indeed, the Bush administration underestimated, if not overlooked, the impact of international support on the success of coercive diplomacy and subsequent war should it fail. Instead of seeking consensus, and then pushing hard for international support as did the Clinton administration in the Bosnian War, the Bush administration came up with an idea called 'a coalition of the willing' that tended to alienate the states concerned about the American unilateralism. Unfortunately, such an assertive policy of the Bush administration fueled these concerns and exacerbated divergence in the major international organizations where the US takes the lead, such as NATO and the UN. At the end, neither of them was unanimously on the American side, but they were rather diverted and frustrated about the lack of American consideration for their jurisdiction. To be more specific, the fact that NATO was behind the US as a whole in Bosnia

should be underlined, whereas in the Second Gulf War the Alliance was polarized in case for whether to support the US-led War against Iraq or not. Undoubtedly, this polarization exacerbated the divergence in principal organizations of Western multilateral involvement such as the EU and UN. Thus, in the absence of international legitimacy (i.e.: lacking UN authorization for military action) the American power to coerce Saddam for unconditional and immediate compliance crumbled enormously. Whereas in the Bosnian War the disagreement among the Western governments was more on how to use force rather than whether to use it or not, unlike in the Second Gulf War, domestic public opinions on the both sides of the Atlantic pressured their governments to agree on the common course of action and hammer out the agreed policy to stop the Serbian aggression. As a result, international support proved to be the most critical condition in attaining the effectiveness of the Western coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War, whereas its absence complicated the remaining conditions for success in the Second Gulf War.

8) Assurance against future demands

Since the strategy of coercive diplomacy aims to manipulate the adversary's behavior in a desired manner, the adversary has to be assured by the coercer that its compliance will not lead to more demands. As Robert Art argues, "Credibility considerations make compromise difficult enough for the target because they involve the following sorts of issues: if the target gives way on this matter, will this be the coercer's last demand, or is it only the first in series of demands?" (Art 2003, 366). In the Second Gulf War the Bush administration (principal coercer) had never felt such need to assure Saddam (principal adversary) against future demands. On the contrary, the Bush administration underlined its self-declared option of unilateral military intervention to topple down Saddam's regime. Thus, it is not possible to talk at all about any assurances of the US towards the adversary (i.e. Saddam) in the Second Gulf War. On the other hand, in the Bosnian War, the Clinton administration followed a consensual path in line with the conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy. One of these conditions was, according to Art, "the target may demand assurances from the coercer that it will meet its obligations under the bargained agreement" (Art 371, 2003). This agreement was the Dayton Peace signed in Ohio, USA in November 1995, ending the Bosnian War with assurances not only to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, but also to the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, assurance

against future demands encourages adversary cooperation, and facilitates negotiation for the lasting settlement.

9) Use of carrot

The findings with regards to the final condition for success of coercive diplomacy confirm the maxim of the literature from previous studies, "all other things being equal, the target should be more likely to comply with the coercer's demands if it is offered positive inducements in addition to coercion" (Art 2003, 388). Thus, the use of carrot is of rather a complementary nature, but never negligible. Particularly, in gaining the cooperation of the behind the scenes parties to the conflict. The Bosnian War confirms this argument in a manner that the US offered to lift the embargo to Serbia proper with the aim of attaining Milosevic's (the leader of the Serbia proper and principal supporter of the Bosnian Serbs) support for the peace settlement. As Ivo Daalder puts forward "in the Bosnian case Milosevic wanted sanctions lifted, and amorphous promises to lift them were apparently made as early as September 1995" (quoted in Art 393, 2003). Nevertheless, it should not be disregarded that positive inducements are likely to be most effective in those cases in which the target does not place the value of its goal above all its other interests. For instance, Bosnia was not as crucial for Milosevic as being the sole ruler of Iraq was for Saddam. Thus, the fact that defending his regime is of utmost importance for Saddam made him not receptive towards use of carrots, if any. Since from the First Gulf War onwards, the Anglo-American approach towards Saddam was the one of formidable stick rather than any carrot at all, it was unlikely, if not impossible, for Saddam to get any form of positive inducement. This difficulty in offering carrots in coercive diplomacy is emphasized by Jakobsen: "the scope for offering carrots may sometimes be very limited. This problem was underlined by the British and American governments during the Gulf conflict that Saddam Hussein did not deserve any carrots" (Jakobsen 140, 1998). Therefore, not surprisingly, the increasingly unilateralist Bush administration was in no position to appreciate any value to use carrots to assure compliance of Saddam. However, if history is any guide, even if the unilateralist intervention can attain short-term military victory, the coercer will have to give some sort of positive inducements to maintain its rule over Iraq in the long-term.

B - Conclusions and Implications

Since "the presence of these conditions does not guarantee success" (Freedman 84, 1998), and emerging cases of coercive diplomacy requires further elaboration, the following conclusions are the outcome of this comparative analysis that fall beyond the categories of the comparative findings. These are also the implications that need to be considered in improving the abstract model of coercive diplomacy as well as in adapting the strategy of coercive diplomacy to the emerging conflicts.

1. Combining diplomacy with force is more effective than either diplomacy or force alone
2. The best way of preserving peace is to prepare to use force in an enduring manner
3. Military superiority does not guarantee success
4. Multilateral use of coercive diplomacy complicates its effective accomplishment
5. The impact of international organizations goes beyond legitimation
6. Need for new political and military doctrines to use force in support of diplomacy

1.Combining diplomacy with force is more effective than either diplomacy or force alone

If this study is going to have any grand conclusion, it should be the first one. This first conclusion is not the lesson that solely belongs to this study but rather the underlying logic and founding basis of coercive diplomacy. Indeed, this fundamental conclusion is inspired from the words of Tanter and Psarouthakis when they describe the theory; "coercive diplomacy suggests that the combination of diplomacy with force is more effective than either employing diplomacy or force alone" (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 58).

In view of this premise, the cases under concern confirm this founding argument of coercive diplomacy in a complementary manner. For example, in the early phases of the Bosnian War (1992-1994) diplomacy alone proved ineffective. The Bosnian Serbs continued to defy the early UN and EC mediation attempts since they did not regard the international community as a powerful actor that can have a say so over the Bosnian War.

On the other hand, in the Second Gulf War (2002-2003), flexing military muscle alone (even though overwhelming) led to the failure of the strategy of coercive

diplomacy. Thus, military superiority alone proved to be ineffective in attaining the compliance of the adversary, short of war. Adamantly unilateralist to of the Bush administration failed to acquire international legitimacy, let alone support. Undoubtedly, this virtual isolation of the Bush administration contributed to the adversary's (i.e.: Saddam Hussein) intransigence. Therefore, the cases together support this conclusion in a complementary manner.

2. The best way of preserving peace is to prepare to use force in an enduring manner

Unlike the old dictum that "the best way of preserving peace is to prepare for war" (Freedman 84, 1998), this study stresses on the need to prepare to use force in an enduring manner. The Second Gulf War revealed the fact that if states prepare to go all-out war, they have a tendency to fulfill their preparedness. Nevertheless, such readiness does not mean that the preparedness to use force is trivial. On the contrary, possessing the preparedness to use force in an enduring manner, while denying the counter-escalation by the adversary is critical for the success of coercive diplomacy. This vital notion of the preparedness to use force was demonstrated during NATO's 'Operation Deliberate Force' against the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian Serbs had experienced the might of NATO's air power, they waited for a while to check the endurance of this might, only after a certain while of NATO bombing did they agreed to sign the Dayton Peace Accords. Therefore, the demonstration of such preparedness is critical in attaining the credibility of the coercer, which is indispensable for accomplishing any kind of compliance. As James Gow argues "to make coercion effective, the intent of the coercer must be made credible to the coercee" (Freedman 291, 1998). However, one should keep in mind that the preparedness to use force in an enduring manner means much more than military build up in the region concerned. Endurance here refers to use force in an internationally acceptable manner as well. Otherwise, the adversary may comply partially at best with the aim of exploiting divergence in the international community on the course of action to seize its non-compliance. As a result, the success of coercive diplomacy depends heavily on the ability to establish and sustain an enduring operational and diplomatic preparedness to use force.

3. Military superiority does not guarantee success

Although, the preparedness to use force is of critical importance, it promises little success if it is used in an isolated manner. Military superiority is essential in attaining the adversary compliance in a cost effective, low risk, and low casualty manner. This was particularly exemplified during the effective American involvement in the Bosnian War without any troops on the ground. However, the same muscle tended to be inadequate alone in coercing Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions unconditionally and immediately. Thus, the opposing outcomes of the cases (i.e.: success and failure) confirmed the point that military superiority is no assurance for success, given the principal coercer (i.e.: the US) was the same in both of the cases. This conclusion constitutes particularly a warning signal towards American policymakers, "the United States should never bank on the fact that being militarily stronger automatically brings victory in coercive diplomatic encounters as the way it can in wars" (Art 408, 2003).

4. Multilateral use of coercive diplomacy complicates its effective accomplishment

In the cases where there is a coalition of coercers, even if the coalition may be united in its overall goal, it can be divided over the means to achieve the goal. This was the case for the ineffectiveness of the Western involvement in the Bosnian War. Everybody agreed that Serbian aggression needs to be seized, but there was no common ground regarding the mean till the very end on the war. The Americans advocated decisive air strikes while the Europeans were more in a containing and wavering mood. Given this divergence in the early phases of the Western involvement, the Bosnian Serbs continued to overlook the international community for a while even after the Americans declared their seriousness. Thus, "actions taken to hold the coalition together can degrade the military and diplomatic effectiveness of the coercive attempt" (Art 367, 2003). Furthermore, the coalition itself can be a target of the adversary to divert the limited international support from the principal coercer. This was the case for the Second Gulf War when radical groups declared that the ones cooperating with the Americans will also be punished, and this threat was followed by the assault to Spanish force in the Gulf, for instance. For that reason, "Coalitional use of coercive diplomacy is exceedingly difficult as the various coalition members will often assess the threat posed by an opponent differently and thus find it hard to agree on the necessity of adopting the high-risk ultimatum strategy that as a rule will be required for success" (Freedman 85, 1998)

5. The impact of international organizations goes beyond legitimation

Unlike traditional wisdom, which claims that international organizations exist for the mere sake of legitimizing the actions of great powers, this study underlines further utilities of international organizations in facilitating consensus building and coordinating coercive efforts. To this end, the primary function of international organizations in contributing to the success of coercive diplomacy is that "the impact of international organizations went beyond legitimation as their presence occasionally induced states to do something they would not otherwise have done" (Jakobsen 138, 1998). To be more specific, "British interest in preserving NATO as the principal security organization in Europe was the decisive factor in persuading the British government to support the strong ultimatum issued to the Serbs in February 1994" (Jakobsen 138, 1998). Thus, alongside the prestige of the states themselves, the reputation of international organizations (i.e.: NATO) that they value is crucial in attaining alliance coherence during coercive diplomacy.

6. Need for new political and military doctrines to use force in support of diplomacy

Given the fact the "success hinges on a capability and willingness to use force" (Freedman 84, 1998), the need for new political and military doctrines is apparent. Such inevitability stems particularly from the fact that "effective crisis diplomacy needs to be backed by threats and the use of force, highlights the need to develop new military doctrines allowing Western forces to threaten and use limited force in support of diplomatic efforts" (Jakobsen 144, 1998). This final conclusion, which encompasses also the elements of projection for the future of coercive diplomacy, does merely entail the formulation of new doctrines for the excessive use of force. On the contrary, it also offers a vision of restricting the use of all-out force against an adversary, while underlining the need for international mechanisms of decision making for the effective international involvements to humanitarian emergencies, such as the one in Bosnia. As Jakobsen points out, "the Western powers could have stopped both conflicts [i.e., Bosnia] earlier if they had been willing to back their diplomacy with force" (Jakobsen 141, 1998). Therefore, the study emphasizes to the need to develop more effective doctrinal and institutional frameworks for using the force in a coercive and limited manner rather than in an all-out war manner. The absence of such international mechanisms coupled with the assertive policies pave the way to the failure of coercive

attempts, and thus leads the conflict to all-out warfare. The Second Gulf War constitutes the most recent example of that kind, which has been clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of current doctrines and institutional networks in addressing the contemporary problems of international community such as the increasingly widespread terrorism, and even more horrifying, the conduct of terrorism through weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusion

Emerging challenges of contemporary world require fresh outlooks based on reason, humanity and applicability. Studying coercive diplomacy becomes the quest in these lines. Although, the phenomenon is not a brand new one, it is open for tailoring and improvement from the very beginning. In this light, this study gathers as much as from the emerging literature on coercive diplomacy such as Jakobsen, Freedman, and Art as much as it did from its founding father Alexander L. George.

Bringing a comparative dimension into an usual case study analysis constitutes another characteristic of this study. Analyzing the very recent Second Gulf War, with no precedent of detailed analysis in coercive diplomacy, constitutes a challenge. Nevertheless, the one to be carried out to examine the theory of coercive diplomacy in emerging world order, 'like the old wine in new bottles'. Once more, to reveal the limits of theory when it comes to practice, and our limits when it comes to explain.

Undoubtedly this quest of academic rigor reveals opportunities and prospects for coercive diplomacy as much as it does for the limits. For that reason, the final chapter of the thesis remains of particular importance in outlining the lessons learned from this study through drawing conclusions from the comparative analysis. After comparatively analyzing the cases in accordance with the conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy in Chapter 4, this final chapter draws comparative findings in line with Chapter 4, and further elaborates on the conclusions and implications of this study. Given the ever-dynamic nature of world politics, the new challenges will keep on calling for new strategies to deal with them. In view of the fact that there is no way to envisage all of the challenges on the horizon, studying the effectiveness of employing coercive diplomacy is not only essential, but will be an ongoing, evolving process.

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