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**FOREIGN POLICY AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN
TURKEY:**

**AN APPLICATION OF THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF ATTITUDE
CONSTRAINT**

by

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


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FOREIGN POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY:

AN APPLICATION OF THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF ATTITUDE CONSTRAINT

ABSTRACT

Previous studies on Turkish public attitudes on foreign policy have mostly been of descriptive nature and failed to test a model against the data at hand. Explaining foreign policy attitude formation with a model both sheds light on to the role of public attitudes in international negotiations and renders predictive power for identifying public attitudes in future international incidents. Using information processing theory, this thesis applies the hierarchical model of attitude constraint to see whether character beliefs and values of an individual determine her attitudes in foreign policy domain, a realm which is especially complex and ambiguous to make sense out of with everyday stimuli one is exposed to.

Multiple ordinary least squares and binary logistic regressions were run on a data obtained from a nationwide survey that included both urban and rural areas. The components of the model were derived from previous literature that examined the faults of Turkish society.

Findings suggest that expectation in socioeconomic status change is a major determinant in foreign policy attitude formation. While statistically significant, religiosity plays a relatively minor role in the model. Contrary to the expectations, group identity also plays a trivial role as a constraining factor in attitude formation – by an ideologically polarized, agitated small Kurdish group consistently stand out in foreign policy attitudes. Trust in third party actors (i.e. the European Union) prove to constrain attitudes in specific foreign policies pursued by Turkey.

Keywords: Foreign policy, public attitudes, attitude constraint, survey, European Union

TÜRKİYE’DE DIŞ POLİTİKA İLE İLGİLİ TUTUMLAR: HİYERARŞİK TUTUM KISITLAMASI MODELİNİN UYGULAMASI

ÖZET

Ülkemizdeki dış politikası üzerine oluşan kamuoyu hakkında şu ana kadar yapılan çalışmalar genellikle olanı tasvir etmekle kısıtlı olup eldeki veriyi bir modelle açıklama konusunda yetersiz kalmışlardır. Dış politika üzerine olan tutumların oluşmasını kapsamlı bir modelle açıklamak hem homojen olmayan kamuoyunun uluslararası değişimler üzerindeki etkisini daha iyi anlamamızı sağlayacak, hem de ileride meydana gelecek uluslararası olaylarda oluşacak kamuoyunu tahmin etmek için bize yardımcı olacaktır. Bu tez, bilgi işleme teorisini kullanarak, soyut inanç ve değerlerin günlük bilgi akışının özellikle karmaşık ve belirsiz bir alan haline getirdiği dış politikada bireyin tutumlarını belirleyip belirlemediğini görmek için hiyerarşik tutum kısıtlaması modelini uygulamaktadır.

Tezde, kırsal ve kentsel nüfusu içine alan bir ulusal anketten elde edilen veri, lineer ve logistik regresyon yöntemleriyle test edilmiştir. Kullanılan modelin parçaları ise Türk toplumunu bölen “fay” hatlarını inceleyen literatur baz alınarak inşa edilmiştir.

Çalışmalar, sosyoekonomik statüde beklenen değişikliğin dış politika tutumlarını belirleyen önemli bir etken olduğunu göstermektedir. İstatistiki olarak önemli olduğu gibi, dindarlık aynı modelde görece olarak daha az etkili bir faktördür. Ayrıca, bireyin geleninin aksine grup aidiyeti / kimliği tutum belirleme konusunda önemsiz derecede rol oynamaktadır. Bundan ajite ve ideolojik olarak polarize olmuş ufak bir Kürt topluluğunu ayrı tutabiliriz. Üçüncü taraf oyuncular (Avrupa Birliği) da bireylerin Türkiye’nin izlediği spesifik dış politika tutumları üzerinde sahip olduğu tutumları belirleyen etmenlerden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Sözleşme Kelimeler: Dış politika, kamuoyu, tutum ve algılama, anket, Avrupa Birliği

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The coverage of foreign policy issues in the media has been steadily increasing in both breadth and in depth. A number of items on Turkey's foreign policy agenda have been driving their way into the daily lives of many. A fast moving consumer goods producer, for example, decided to capitalize on the public attitudes towards the Iraqi war by creating an ad that touched the heart strings of many¹. The ad showed American soldiers in action in a desert and as a result of tasting the beverage the question deciding to return back home. Still, to what extent this information flow is effective on the foreign issue positions of the individuals is questionable. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987a, 1103) claim that "among the various policy domains that comprise the political environment of the average citizen, the international sphere is exceptionally complex and ambiguous". These events are distant, the causes of which are very subtle to be clearly recognized and their nature is quite complicated for the average person to fully comprehend. Furthermore, the opinion leaders (i.e. the political elites and the media) usually offer contradicting – if not conflicting – views on the subject that further complicates the task of following the international relations agenda for the individual.

How do individuals position themselves in such a chaos? Does this complex environment necessarily lead to an arbitrary positioning of individuals on different foreign policy issues, or can one still identify a structure in attitude formation of

¹ The ad was produced for Ülker's Cola Turca. It was broadcasted during summer 2004.

individuals who do not extensively think or are not exposed to a lot of information? Using information processing theory, this thesis argues that Turkish public's foreign policy attitudes are structured within a hierarchical model of attitude constraint.

The model maintains that issue positions emanate from abstract beliefs and postures on foreign policy. These general beliefs and postures, in turn, are constrained by core values that act as perceptual lenses through which an individual makes sense of the political world around her. Individuals do not have to be fully informed to form opinions. Instead, being *cognitive misers*, they refer to what they already know and have experienced and try to deduce an issue position out of this (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993, 65). This past knowledge, in turn, is stored with reference to the beliefs and values that person possesses. Therefore, whenever a new issue arises, previously held beliefs and values significantly constrain attitudes formed about it.

This thesis also suggests that there are several different factors that simultaneously affect an attitude of an individual. Therefore, it is a vain effort to seek consistency between specific attitudes themselves since different dimensions affect different issues in varying degrees. Instead, one should look for consistency between specific issue positions of an individual and the factors that constrain and determine these positions. Accordingly, the cues for future behavior of a person do not lie in previous issue positions, but rather in the values and beliefs she holds in general.

Proving that foreign policy attitudes are structured has implications both in the foreign and domestic political realms. First, the way foreign policy attitudes of the public are formed has important repercussions on pluralist approaches in international relations, which assume that the way state is embedded in domestic and transnational politics is directly linked to its foreign policy formulation. The model carries predictive power for mass attitudes towards future incidents and it can identify the preferences of certain groups whose demands are not well expressed. Second, such a structure has to be taken into consideration when a political party positions itself in domestic politics. The model demarcates the permissible foreign policy-set the party can defend and gives a better picture of where the median voter is.

The linkage between domestic and international politics and the role of domestic politics in international relations has been a widely discussed subject among scholars (Putnam 1988; Iida 1993; Fearon 1994; Mo 1995; Smith and Hayes 1997). Among the related research on the subject, Putnam's concept of two-level games is of paramount importance in linking domestic opinion with international negotiations. In his seminal

work, Putnam (1988) focused on the two-way feedback between domestic and international events and did away with the unitary-actor state assumption. He argued that international negotiations could be considered as a “two-level game” where at the national level, “domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring government and national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures” while at the international level governments “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988, 434). Thus, the negotiations could be concluded only if the solution reached at the negotiation table satisfied all the parties’ domestic concerns. In other words, the “win-sets” of each country depended on the domestic pressure it was exposed to.

An important problem with this approach is which loci of domestic pressure to take into consideration. While specific interest groups’ positions are easy to identify, thus to incorporate into the model, many of the related analyses treat public opinion as a coherent whole that is uni-dimensionally distributed on a given foreign policy subject. This thesis, on the contrary, argues that individuals may approach to a specific issue from different angles, have separate sensitivities, and more than one dimension usually determine a specific issue position. In other words, Level II is seldom homogenous and comprise “different pockets, sections or constituencies” (Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004, 119). Hence, Putnam’s uni-dimensional win-set transforms into a multi-dimensional and heterogeneous win-set in which different constituencies reveal different preferences. Consequently, the “appropriate” boundaries, in which the state can act “rationally”, can be drawn more accurately and precisely as domestic constraints are better assessed.

A second shortcoming of Putnam’s model that this thesis addresses is that public attitudes do not remain constant, and accurate determination of current and future attitudes of the public may prove to be extremely important at the negotiation table. Taking a snapshot of public attitudes towards any policy is a relatively easy task as it is mostly a matter of budget, survey design and conducting field-work. However, a snapshot is static and its future value for policy making purposes is questionable at the very least. What policy makers take account of is a retrospective positioning of the public. While this still forms an important point of reference in international negotiations, it is also quite possible that policy makers commit themselves to certain *paths* before getting an input from the public. Alternatively, the negotiation process may be a long one (as in the case between Turkey and Greece), and the information that the

snapshot gives may become obsolete during this process. In the meantime, goals of certain interest groups may predominate over the diffused will of the general public. In short, foreign policy makers in a democratic country may be forced to designate the country's position without getting an effective, up-to-date input from the public. In other words, a paradox of feeding past public opinion to future foreign policy haunts the pluralist perspective of international relations theory.

Asserting that foreign policy attitudes are structured and constrained by abstracter beliefs becomes a key point in solving this paradox. Delineating the determinants of specific issue positions of the mass public endows the policy maker predictive power for future cases. The application of the model of attitude constraint sheds light on the contextual dependency between the domestic politics and foreign policy formulation. Any arising issue can be analyzed in terms of its relevance to the core values and general postures of the groups. Consequently, one can already have an estimate of certain constituencies' positions even before the groups form these.

Proving that foreign policy attitudes in Turkey are hierarchically structured also brings a new perspective to elite-mass interaction in foreign policy formulation. Coalition-building process between the elite and factions of the society has been shown to govern the interaction between these two groups (Risse-Kappen 1991, 464). However, these coalitions are not necessarily stable. Ephemeral coalitions that either change from issue to issue, or even simultaneously form around a single issue is a recurrent phenomenon in foreign policy making (Gaubatz 1995, 542). However, giving a comprehensive list of these groups is a difficult task as one can only identify those who can and do voice their opinion. Consequently, marking out the determinants of foreign policy attitudes of different groups within the mass public is an important step as one can better assess the nature of the "latent" groups whose positions (thus demands) are not well articulated in the polity.

In a similar vein, structure of foreign policy attitudes is of critical relevance to the issue positioning of political parties. In a fast changing environment, parties have to position themselves quickly, and this makes the imperative task of meticulously analyzing public opinion even more difficult. Declaring party position becomes an especially insurmountable challenge when public opinion exhibits elements of considerable indeterminacy. Hierarchical model of attitude constraint thus suggests that a thorough account of determinants of attitudes of a party's constituency gives an effective lever to the party elite. Being able to estimate the positions of different groups

within society, they can better evaluate which votes to go after by repositioning the party.

Besides its theoretical and policy-wise implications, a final motivation of this research lies in the fact that foreign policy attitudes of the Turkish public has not caught much scholarly attention. While there exist a considerable amount of research on public attitudes in Turkey, little of it stand out as potential benchmarks for the study at hand. Earlier works mostly focused on the effect of modernization on the values of various segments of the Turkish society (e.g. Lerner 1958, Hyman et al. 1958, Frey 1968). Other works mostly include Turkish legs of widely administered cross-national studies (e.g. Yılmaz 1999) or institutionally backed ad hoc studies (e.g. Adaman and Çarkoğlu 2000;, Adaman et al. 2001; TÜSES 1999). While many of these surveys included some questions that probed into the beliefs of these individuals regarding foreign policy, none of these were specifically oriented towards identifying the determinants of foreign policy attitudes of the Turkish people.

Despite all the previous work on Turkish public attitudes in general, interest in specific attitudes on foreign policy has only begun to draw scholarly attention as accession to EU became a top priority of the Turkish state (e.g. Eurobarometer studies; Çarkoğlu 2003). Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi (2003; 2004) conducted a pioneering study where they moved beyond descriptive analysis of the Turkish electorate attitudes on foreign policy. They analyzed public attitudes towards the Turkish-Greek relations from a two-level games perspective including the role of the civil society as another domestic constituency and third party players in the international arena in their analysis. The elaboration of the two-level games model as such brought in novelties that proved to be very useful in explaining attitude formation towards developments in Turkish-Greek relations.

Nevertheless, to the author's best knowledge, the formation of Turkish foreign policy attitudes have not been systematically examined, thus hierarchical model of attitude constraint has not yet been tested for the Turkish case. Therefore, the findings of this thesis will constitute an orientation point to which later studies can compare themselves with.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Earlier Works on Foreign Policy Attitudes

Whether the laymen are considerably informed about and possess consistent attitudes on foreign policy has been of interest to a number of scholars during the latter half of 20th century. While most of the relevant research has been confined to the study of the American electorate, these studies nevertheless present complementary theoretical approaches that will prove to be quite useful in developing a model for the Turkish case. These scholars have usually gathered in two camps regarding the nature of public opinion on foreign policy: one camp argues that the public in general is uninformed, inconsistent and unstable in its attitudes (e.g. Almond 1950; Converse 1964; Erskine 1963; Achen 1975), the other claims that individuals hold consistent ideas that are subject to some sort of structure (e.g. Verba et al. 1967; Aldrich et al. 1989; Hurwitz and Peffley 1985).

Earlier studies in US have shown that the average voter is slightly informed about foreign policy issues, and that this level of knowledge is not sufficient to make a healthy analysis of the subject at hand. Almond (1950, 69) has argued in his seminal work on attitudes and foreign policy that “foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content. Under normal circumstances the American public has tended to be indifferent to questions of foreign policy because of their remoteness from every day interests and activities.” He concluded that about 30% of the public was ignorant of foreign policy issues, 45% was slightly informed yet

unable to draw any sensible arguments out of it, and 25% had some knowledge of the prevailing foreign issues of the time. Furthermore, he maintained that foreign policies pursued by the government were not significant determinants of voter behavior.

Rosenau (cited in Aldrich et al. 1989, 124) and Erskine (1963) sketched gloomier pictures in search of an attentive public; the former giving the figures as 75%, 15-20% and 5-10% for the abovementioned three groups, respectively.

In a similar vein, Converse (1964) found very slight parallelism among different foreign policy positions held by an individual. Testing for consistency among attitudes towards separate foreign policy issues, he found insignificant relationships between issue positions that were expected to be correlated. Furthermore, he asserted that “the stability of party identifications outstripped the stability of individual positions”. His conclusions thus pointed to the fact that foreign policy attitudes of the mass public were disorganized, inconsistent and without any intellectual basis. The public lacked the “contextual grasp to bond a specific belief with the general principle belonging in the same system” (Converse 1964, 230)². Similar results were obtained by a later study by Converse and Markus (1979, 40) who found out that foreign policy issue positions of individuals were relatively inconsistent compared to party preferences; the continuity correlations for foreign policy attitudes hovered around 0.3 for both the 1956-60 and 1972-76 periods³.

Although the prevailing view has been that the public possesses little information and only few, ill-formed attitudes that are inconsequential in voting behavior, there subsists several works that argue the contrary. The Vietnam War, in this sense, played a pivotal role in urging scholars to inquire into the relationship between foreign policy preferences of the public and executive endeavors (Oldendick and Bardes 1982, 369). Verba et al. (1967, 323) were among the first to argue that despite noticeable inconsistency and confusion, the pattern of an individual’s attitudes towards issues regarding the Vietnam War was not a random one. Everts (1981), in his work on the Dutch electorate and their attitudes towards international nuclear arms talks,

² Yet, it must be noted that Converse backed up his arguments by testing the correlations between two specific issues that would be expected to emanate from the same general belief. Testing of a direct linkage between specific issue positions and their proposed sources (i.e. related general beliefs) were not tested as such.

³ Continuity correlation gives the consistency in a respondent’s annual answers to the same question over the designated time period. The data that the authors used comprised four surveys from the first period, and only the 1972 and 1976 surveys from the second one.

contended that more than half of the electorate were fairly informed about international events and about 15% were ready change their votes should their currently preferred party adopt a radically different position in the debate concerning nuclear arms deployment in the Netherlands.

An alternative approach to measure the saliency of foreign policy for individuals came from the international relations scholars who focused on the role of public opinion as a means of control over foreign policy (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Foyle 1999; Holsti 1992; Powlick 1991; Sobel 2001). These scholars established a link between the salience of foreign policy in public opinion, and the latter's ability to constrain foreign policy executives through the ballot. Campbell et al. (cited in Sobel 2001, 23) listed three prerequisites that must be met for public opinion to act as a constraint on the executive branch during elections: individuals must be aware of foreign policy issues and sufficiently informed to have an opinion, foreign policy issues must be salient enough for voters to give them weight in making their voting decision and voters must be able to discern the differences in the issue positions of their parties and/or presidential candidates. Following these criteria of salience, Aldrich et al. (1989, 128) found out that more than three fourths of the American electorate could identify both their and the presidential candidates' positions in major foreign policy issues, and about 70% saw the difference between the candidates' positions accurately. Also, it was found out that mass public was more aware of the foreign issue positions than the domestic issue positions of the presidential candidates. Although this higher awareness can be explained by the usage of foreign policy in presidential races, it is also important to note the 1984 Gallup poll showed that 37% and 20% of the American people saw foreign policy issues as nationally and personally most important, respectively (Aldrich et al., 131). Carrying out a more challenging test than Aldrich and his colleagues, Brady and Sniderman (1985) found that individuals can also successfully identify others' attitudes towards political issues.

As separate cases of diagnosis that all drew attention to the saliency of foreign policy attitudes of the public accumulated in the literature, scholars came across a persistent problem in the analytical stage. The traditional factors that determined the public attitude in the domestic realm were insufficient in explaining foreign policy attitudes of the individuals. Verba et al.'s (1967) work on Vietnam War pointed to the fact that the observed internal structure of foreign policy attitudes did not follow along the conventional dimensions of social structure such as party preference, socio-

economic status, geographical location or religion. Rather, specific issue positions of individuals were organized around the “cognitive and affective relationship an individual had to the war” that resulted in a dove-hawk continuum instrumental to attitude prediction (Verba et al., 325-9).

Within the next couple of decades, the inadequacy of using the single liberal-conservative dimension to explain specific issue positions in foreign policy became increasingly evident (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1109). As the traditional liberal versus conservative dichotomy became increasingly obsolete, other scales that survey respondents placed themselves on started to emerge as explanatory factors of attitudes on specific foreign issues. The isolationism-internationalism scale (e.g. RePass 1971; Everts 1983; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a; Conover and Feldman 1984) and militarism scale (Patchen 1970, 662; Chittick et al. 1995, 315) have been some of the recurring dimensions upon which public opinion and foreign policy analyses were built upon. As many scholars “invented” numerous types of variables from their factor analyses to explain the determinants of attitudes, the debate on the existence of structured attitudes of the public on foreign policy eventually abated. Instead, scholarly attention began to focus on bringing novel perspectives to better explain the formation of these structures.

2.2. The Model

As previously mentioned, Verba et al. (1967, 323) talked about two components of an attitude, namely the cognitive and the affective. The general tendency has been to test the cognitive part through questions that measure the level of information one had while party preference and other indirect variables were used to assess the affective part (e.g. Converse 1964; Converse and Markus 1979). Information level was seen as a constraint on the spectrum of positions one could hold while affinity was perceived as a link between general beliefs and specific issues. It was expected that the more informed one was about politics, the more structured and consistent her policy attitudes would be (Gamson and Modigliani 1966, 192). Meanwhile, ideological placement (be it self placement, or obtained through utilization of latent variables) was the main variable operationalized for measuring the level of affinity between general beliefs and specific attitudes (Conover and Feldman 1984, 95). Kinder (cited in Conover and Feldman 1984, 95), on the other hand, argued that since most people do not think ideologically, one should leave examining the ideological elements in individuals and adopt a more practical paradigm regarding how people think about politics.

The introduction of information processing theory in political science offered a breakthrough in this aspect. Focusing on how a typical person organizes political information in her mind, information processing theory mostly did away with the antiquated style of imposing single dimensional ideological scalas on each individual to explain attitude formation. Instead, the derivatives of information processing theory collapse the affective and the cognitive components into one. In general, the theory maintains that “people categorize objects and simplify information as a result of general limits to human cognitive capacity” (Lodge et al. 1991, 1371). These categorizations create clusters of meaningful concepts in the mind that act as reference nodes to future stimuli. The theory assumes a cognitive structure of “organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances that guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1114). Processing of new information mainly takes place through inferences made from the existing stock of information. This, in turn, enables an individual to “fill in missing information or to go beyond information that is directly available” (Fiske and Taylor cited in Lodge et al. 1991, 1371).

To give a simple illustration, an average Turkish citizen may have sparse knowledge regarding the particularities of the Democrats and the Republicans in the US political system. At the same time, she may be exposed to the televised positive images of a Democrat president Bill Clinton in the international arena. This experience will constitute a reference point for attitude formation on any subject on which there is a strong Democrat – Republican debate, should her mind be stimulated that way in the future.

Another important assumption of this theory is that specific attitudes may link to more than one of these reference points and vice versa. This assumption is another keystone in overcoming the ideological inconsistency problem that Converse and others drew attention to. Different reference nodes may influence different specific issue positions in varying degrees. Accordingly, this conceptualization does not seek consistency between specific issues as was the case in Converse, but rather requires consistency between abstract principles and concrete issue positions. Thus, a model focusing on a single determinant, and asserting that it is the only determinant of attitude formation will not possess high explanatory power.

Reverting back to the example to illustrate this point, future incidents in our non-US resident person’s life may lead to the formation of other reference points that may

reinforce (e.g. a belligerent Republican president) or contradict (e.g. a Republican-controlled senate approving foreign aid) with the existing frame of reference she adopted from her experiences with Bill Clinton. At the same time, if she believes in the morality of warfare to protect a country's interests, this may constitute a competing frame of reference. Such a belief of the individual will score as a positive point for the Republicans.

2.3. The Model's Application to Foreign Policy

Explaining attitude formation in foreign policy issues has been even a bigger challenge for scholars. Foreign policy has been regarded as *off-limits* for the public by some (e.g. Morgenthau 1993, 5), while others drew attention to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information since "information regarding the international scene is often distorted or deliberately withheld from the public" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1103). Furthermore, ideological dimensions, socioeconomic status and group identifications, which were instrumental in explaining domestic policy attitude formation, came out as poor predictors of foreign policy attitudes in US (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1100; Gamson and Modigliani 1969).

Information processing theory has proved to be especially useful in explaining foreign policy attitudes. An important derivative of information processing theory, namely hierarchical model of attitude constraint, has been widely used to explain the formation of foreign policy attitudes. Aldrich et al. (1989, 127) contend that foreign policies pursued are important determinants in presidential races and people hold basic, general views in foreign affairs, but at the same time they are largely unconcerned about the detailed arguments that characterize the elite debate on most of these issues. Given the fact that searching for information on each and every foreign policy issue is extremely costly for an average individual, this argument strongly suggests that people derive their attitudes from beliefs they hold at an abstract level. Parallel to this line of thinking, the hierarchical model of attitude constraint assumes that people are "cognitive misers" and information short-cutting is the key to understanding how an average individual "processes foreign policy information" and "makes decisions on foreign policy issues" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1103). The model rests on "a degree of deductive political reasoning from abstract beliefs to more specific political preferences" (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, 877). While allowing for other exogenous variables that influence foreign policy attitude formation, the strength of the model lies

in the nature of the relationship between the clusters of meaningful concepts that constitute cognitive reference points (i.e. abstract beliefs) and specific attitudes that are claimed to derive from these clusters⁴. When one can successfully predict an individual's specific attitudes from a knowledge of the individual's superordinate or abstract beliefs, it may be said that the individual exhibits a pattern of constraint (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, 872).

The multitude of levels and constraints imposed on the formation of specific attitudes needs further clarification at this point. Calling the set of beliefs at a specified level of abstraction as a belief system, one can identify a number of belief systems that are hierarchically organized in a person's mind. The scholars thus far have confined the number of levels to less than five. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987a) have identified three levels: core values, general postures and specific attitudes. While core values pertain to the very abstract and basic beliefs which shapes an individual's perception on foreign affairs, general postures refer to "broad, abstract beliefs regarding the general direction the government should take in international affairs" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1112). Finally, specific attitudes refer to the particular policy preferences of an individual in a specific issue area. In a later study, the same authors add the perceived image of an enemy country as an intermediary level between core values and general postures (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990). Goren (2001), on the other hand, omits the middle layer in his model and focuses on the relationship between core principles and policy preferences of an individual.

Likewise, one can determine many dimensions (i.e. individual nodes of reference) within a level of belief that may form numerous links upstream and downstream. While the essence of the theory dictates the fact that there usually exists more than one factor explaining different attitude formations, letting a proliferation of dimensions in a model will result in a loss of parsimony thus a loss of effectiveness. This danger is especially imminent as one derives mid-level dimensions in a

⁴ Actually, when Hurwitz and Peffley first introduced their model, it was simply assumed and not proven that specific issue positions were derived from abstract beliefs and not the other way around. The veracity of this assumption was later verified by the same authors who utilized panel data to prove that general orientations are more stable than the current and determinants of future specific issue positions (Peffley & Hurwitz 1993). Nonetheless, due to lack of similar research, the same assumption regarding the direction of causality will be held for the Turkish case, too.

hierarchical model. Besides, the model will increasingly suffer from multicollinearity as many of these dimensions will be significantly related to each other.

Cognizant of the dangers of including too many explanatory variables in a model, most of the scholars that adopted the hierarchical model of attitude constraint thus confined themselves to a small number of dimensions at each level of the hierarchical pyramid of beliefs. Wittkopf (cited in Richman et al. 1997, 940) opted for a bi-dimensional model that encompassed militarism and international involvement. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987a) used three elements (religiosity, ethnocentrism and morality of warfare) as core values which constrained three dimensions in the general postures level, namely militarism, isolationism and anticommunism. Likewise, Chittick et al. (1995) emphasized the necessity to use three or a couple of more dimensions to develop rigorous models. Richman et al. (1997) found four distinct and readily interpretable dimensions (global altruism, national interest, impact on domestic economy and military security) for foreign policy beliefs of the public.

2.4. The Turkish Case

Adopting the hierarchical model of attitude constraint to the Turkish case poses a couple of serious challenges. First of all, there exists little work describing the foreign policy attitudes of the Turkish people and none examining the relationship between these issue positions and their determinants from an information processing perspective⁵. The lack of related research inevitably leads to arbitrariness in the initial selection of belief dimensions. Furthermore, the fact that most of the existing works on the subject focus on the US public exacerbates the arbitrariness problem in constructing a model for the Turkish case. The two societies have different dynamics and fault lines; a direct application of belief dimensions of the society of a superpower to the Turkish case would be a *naiveté* at the very least.

Another serious problem is related to the nature of the data at hand. The field survey that will be utilized has not been conducted with the aim of inquiring into the dynamics of foreign policy attitude formation. Many questions that could potentially probe into the middle levels in the hierarchical model of attitude constraint have not

⁵ To the best of the author's knowledge, there exists two works on Western Europe in general (Ziegler 1987, Everts 1995), one on Sweden (Bjerel and Erengrén 1999) and one on Costa Rica (Hurwitz et al. 1993).

been asked to the respondents. Besides, data does not offer a wide range of questions from which complex variables could be obtained. This lack of suitable data severely limits the operationalization of belief levels between the (most abstract) core values and the specific foreign policy issue positions. This, in turn, makes it very difficult to construct middle level belief systems. Finally, the questions have been asked within the context of Turkey's accession to EU and its effects in domestic politics. Therefore, one may speak of a spill-over of domestic concerns onto the answers regarding foreign policy preferences.

Despite the shortcomings, trying to come up with a Turkish hierarchical model of attitude constraint in foreign policy is still meaningful. Previously conducted research on Turkey provides many cues to possible dimensions to be utilized as core values and/or general postures. Moreover, the narrow scope of the dataset utilized paradoxically helps in constructing a middle level since the questions asked are confined to a single issue: EU membership. Lastly, this work is of an exploratory nature and a partial or a total failure of the construct will still carry scientific value.

Core values were defined as the most abstract beliefs of an individual that constrain her attitudes in every aspect of the political realm including foreign policy preferences. These are major cognitive differentiators, and they provide lenses through which individuals perceive and process political developments. People who look through similar lenses tend to group and make parallel senses of the political events they witness. Consequently, through their constraining effect, core values divide a public to different camps of issue preferences. Previous research on Turkey has identified several dimensions of social cleavages (Frey 1975; Mardin 1975; Ergüder 1980-1). These values exhibit great similarity to the core values of the hierarchical mode as these social cleavages follow along the fault lines of Turkish society and have been proved to be determinants of party preference (Kalaycıoğlu 1994). Thus, one can reasonably assume that these dimensions are instrumental in the information short-cutting process of Turkish public and variables derived from these fault lines of Turkish society stand as reasonable candidates to be tested as core values⁶.

Mardin's (1975) seminal work on "center-periphery" relations has provided students of Turkish politics a key argument in explaining the social cleavages in Turkey. The center has been defined as a homogenous, articulate, nationalist, laicist and

⁶ While the universal applicability of belief dimensions is rejected, the universal applicability of the human mind's utilization of cognitive heuristics is assumed here.

uncompromising bureaucratic center that is in constant struggle with a heterogeneous periphery encompassing groups from diverse ethnic, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds who seek liberalization in many aspects of social and economic life in lieu of centralist tendencies (Mardin 1975; Frey 1975; Heper 1985). Among these many areas of conflict, liberalization of religious practices has been identified as one of the most controversial points between the center and the periphery (Mardin 1975, 29). Concomitantly, many of the following research that employed this theory used level of religiosity as the main variable in distinguishing the center from the periphery (e.g. Akgün 2002, 73-4; Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 62). Furthermore, religiosity, as a source of moral judgment and custom, has also been shown to constitute a major source of attitudes toward political issues in general (Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 50). Alternatively, Hale (2000, 39) contends that “how to integrate Islam into the structures and values of a modern state, with its concomitant foreign policy assumptions, still remains a problem for many Muslim Turks”. Consequently, these arguments form a sound basis upon which one can safely rationalize the taking up of religiosity as a core value in our model for Turkey.

Another important cleavage in Turkish society that may act as a core value is group identification. Two foundation stones of the Turkish revolution have been secularism and civic nationalism (Özbudun 2003, 135). While debates on the former have been taking place within the center-periphery framework, identity and its effects on in Turkish polity is a relatively new subject in literature. Ergüder (1980-1) was among the pioneers in this area and showed that ethnicity played an important role in determining party preferences, especially in the Kurdish population. Concomitantly, post-1980 polity in Turkey witnessed the delineation of four “camps” around which political parties positioned themselves. These were the civic nationalist camp, Turkic nationalist camp, Kurdish nationalist camp, and Islamist camp (Kardam 2003). Also, while there exists other ethnic lobbies such as the Bosnian, Chechen or Abkhazian, to what extent they would be influential during policy making is a question that needs to be further addressed (Hale 2000, 206). Nevertheless, one can reasonably expect self group identification to have a constraining affect on general postures and specific policy preferences.

Socioeconomic status (SES) is another variable that requires close scrutiny. A number of studies on US have shown that SES is not a determinant of foreign policy attitudes. Verba et al. (1967, 319) contended the reason to this was that policies pursued

in the foreign realm constituted no threat to the existing system of domestic distribution of resources, thus no threat to domestic political setting.

Applying this line of thought to the Turkish case brings out a different picture. Hale (2000, 208) argues that bringing out successful economic programs has started to require effective foreign as well as domestic policies. Table 2.1 shows that a significant percentage of the population is concerned about handing over authority over other areas that do affect domestic distribution of resources such as monetary issues, agriculture and unemployment. Therefore, a significant percent of the population may process political information on the EU with reference to its perceived affect on the distribution mechanisms of the country. Accordingly, one has convincing evidence to include *concern on the possible effects on domestic economy and individual welfare* is a strong value constraining related beliefs in foreign policy. To operationalize this variable, which will be called “SES expectation”, I will use the data obtained on how a respondent expects his life to change if Turkey is admitted to EU.

Table 2.1
EU and Domestic Resource Distribution

Name two policy areas for which it is most perilous to transfer legislative authority to the EU		
<i>Policy Area</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Defense	1513	49
Culture	868	28
Monetary	837	27
International Relations with non-EU countries	701	23
Agriculture	538	18
Education	469	15
Unemployment	439	14
Welfare	168	5

Source: Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004

Having identified the top of the hierarchy for the Turkish case, the next task is to construct a middle level system of beliefs (i.e. general postures) on foreign policy that are constrained by core values, and together with these values constrain specific issue positions. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987a, 1105) have identified militarism versus diplomacy, level of anti-communist sentiments and isolationism versus internationalism as three general postures constraining foreign policy attitudes. In an inquiry into the foreign policy dimensions for the Swedish public, propensity to use force in international arena and propensity to co-operate with great powers in the international

system emerged as the two dimensions (Bjereld and Ekengren 1995, 511). For the Turkish case, one can intuitively denote trust in EU and role model adaptation for Turkey (i.e. whether Turkey should adopt the European model or stick to its own traditional values to base its development on) as possible general postures that can be constructed with the available data. While trust in international organizations has been shown to affect attitude formation in Turkish-Greek relations (Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004, 145), the lack of previous research is still most severely felt here as none of the potential postures have been tested for their relevance to either core values or specific issue positions in particular. Nevertheless, both general postures can be related to previously tested postures (albeit for the US public) in the literature. Trust in EU and role model adaptation can be seen as derivatives of international trust (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990, 11; Brewer et al. 2004) and isolationism versus cooperative internationalism (RePass 1971; Modigliani 1972; Wittkopf cited in Richman et al. 1997, 940; Brejer and Ekengren 1995), respectively.


Naming the specific issue positions to relate to core values is the most straightforward task in constructing the model. Both the relatively clear definition of what a “specific issue position” is and the limitations of the survey design leave one with four specific foreign issue positions on which an individual is expected to have an attitude. Attitudes on Turkish-Greek relations, accession to EU and entering the European Monetary Union stand out as the most obvious ones, whose relationship with the general postures and core values can be tested later on⁷. More specifically, the respondents are asked whether they approve the Turkish-Greek rapprochement through mutual compromise, whether they favor accession to EU and if admitted, whether Turkey should enter the Euro-zone⁸. It must be noted that all of these issue positions are

⁷ Again, it is important to note that one can further derive specific issues in addition to the ones set forth. Yet, this does not add any significance to the aim of this thesis which is to show that hierarchical model of attitude constraint is useful in explaining Turkish public’s foreign policy attitudes.

⁸ Another specific issue position attitude, attitude towards peace in Cyprus, was omitted due to two reasons. First, the two variables were strongly correlated and preliminary analysis showed that the regression results were exceedingly similar. The bivariate correlation between the specific attitudes towards peace through mutual compromise with Greece and in Cyprus was correlated with an astonishing 0.865 significant at 0.01%. Thus, analysis of the second would be a redundant effort considering the purpose of the thesis. Second, Cyprus issue is as much an issue of domestic politics as it is of foreign policy. Therefore, one can reasonably argue that the cognitive process for Cyprus issue and the others in the model would not be comparable.

either related to or a consequence of accession talks with the EU. Likewise, general beliefs and core values will be analyzed from a European Union perspective. Such confinement controls for contextual effects that might otherwise have varying effects on different policy issues. Figure 2.1 illustrates the hierarchical model of attitude constraint constructed above.

Figure 2.1
Hierarchical model of attitude constraint: Turkish case



CHAPTER 3

DATA and METHODOLOGY

3.1. The Data

The data that will be analyzed is obtained from Çarkoğlu, Erzan, Yılmaz and Kirişçi's EU-Turkey Relations survey that was conducted between May 18 and June 4, 2002 (Çarkoğlu et al. 2002). The sample comprised 3060 voting age individuals, representing both urban and rural areas of the country, who were interviewed face to face. Two districts per geographical region were selected alongside with the self representative units of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir totaling to 17 districts. The sample was randomly distributed, taking into account of the population proportions of the geographic regions and the self representative cities⁹.

3.2. Operationalization of Core Values

Core values constitute the most abstract level of our model, the operationalization of which is critical to the validity of this study. Therefore, a meticulous account of how these variables were constructed as well as their descriptives is necessary before moving

⁹ Detailed information can be obtained from TESEV's webpage (see Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004).

onto the subsequent analyses. Corresponding information regarding the general belief and specific issue position variables will be provided for as they are analyzed.

3.2.1. Religion

This variable is a religiosity index that takes into account self-declared religious practice and faith. The weight of the index was purposefully biased in favor of religious practice. While a full score on faith questions amounted to 4, the same for practice questions amounted to 6. The scores resulting from answers to the following questions were added up to reach a 0-10 scale. Non-muslims were automatically given 0 points. Even if one declared himself as a Muslim, he still can get a 0 which represents the lowest religiosity score an individual can have. If there were one or two missing answers to the religious faith questions, remaining answered ones were normalized to the "3" scale to be added to the religious practice scores. If the praying score was missing, the entry was omitted in the analysis. Missing values for fasting were treated as zero.

Q. What is your religion? (Siz bir dine bağlı mısınız?)

Table 3.1

Religiosity index

<i>Q. Considering the last five years, how often do you go to a mosque for prayer disregarding funeral prayers? (Son beş yılı düşünürseniz, cenazeler dışında camiye ne sıklıkta gidiyorsunuz?)</i>	
Answer	Points
More than once a week	6
Once a week (Fridays)	5
Once a month	4
During Ramadan and <i>Kandils</i>	3
For religious holidays / once or twice a year	2
Less than once a year	1
Never / Almost Never	0
<i>Q. Do you fast? (Oruç tutar mısınız?)</i>	
Answer	Points
Yes, I do fast	1
I used to fast, but not anymore	1
No, I never fast	0
<i>Q. Do you believe in the following?</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Life after death</i> • <i>A person has a soul separate from his body</i> • <i>The existence of heaven and hell</i> 	
Answer	Points
Yes	1
No	0

Table 3.2
Religiosity sample distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Lowest	145	4.7	4.7
1	37	1.2	6
2	51	1.7	7.6
3	89	2.9	10.5
4	529	17.3	27.8
5	100	3.3	31.1
6	172	5.7	36.7
7	571	18.7	55.4
8	112	3.7	59.1
9	696	22.8	81.8
Highest	556	18.2	100
Total	3058	99.9	
Missing	2		
Total	3060		
Mean	6.74		

3.2.2. Expectations in Socioeconomic Status Change

This variable aims to construct the socioeconomic change a person anticipates to go through because of an important political event (EU accession in this case). To measure this expectation, the following question was asked to the respondents:

Q. If Turkey is admitted to the European Union, how will your life change? Taking 1 as very bad and 10 as very good, could you rate it between 1 and 10? (Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olursa hayatınızda nasıl bir değişim olacaktır?)

There are a couple of drawbacks in constructing this variable. Using a single survey question to construct a variable leaves the variable more prone to measurement error. Also, the question asks expectations about change in life of a person in general, not specifically for expected change in socioeconomic status as such. People who evaluate “change” from a cultural or ideological perspective may exhibit significant variance all of which are inevitably accounted towards SES expectations. Nevertheless, as the analyses prove, SES proves to be an important determinant of general beliefs and specific issue positions. Table 5 also shows that people in general have positive economic expectations from Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Table 3.3
Expectations on SES change distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Change for the worst	242	7.9	8.1	8.1
2	110	3.6	3.7	11.8
3	130	4.2	4.3	16.1
4	127	4.2	4.2	20.3
5	766	25	25.6	45.9
6	352	11.5	11.8	57.7
7	399	13	13.3	71
8	333	10.9	11.1	82.1
9	115	3.8	3.8	85.9
Change for the best	421	13.8	14.1	100
Total	2995	97.9	100	
Missing	65			
Total	3060			
Mean	6.01			

3.2.3. Group Identity

This variable was constructed to see which sociopolitical identity a person's allegiance was to. As a result, following question was asked to the respondents:

Q. When asked, would you identify yourself primarily as a Turk, a Muslim, a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, a Kurd or an Alevite? Or would you classify yourself with a different identity? (Sorulduğunda kendinizi öncelikle Türk olarak mı, Müslüman olarak mı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olarak mı, Kürt ya da Alevi olarak mı tanımladınız? Yoksa kendinizi daha farklı bir kimlikle mi tanımladınız?)

- *I would identify myself primarily as a Turk (TURK_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Muslim (MUSLIM_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey (TCVAT_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Kurd (KURD_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Zaza (KURD_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Krmanc(KURD_DV)*
- *I would identify myself primarily as an Alevite(ALEVI_DV)*
- *Other (OTHER_DV)*

Six dummy variables were obtained from this question, namely **TURK_DV**, **MUSLM_DV**, **TCVAT_DV**, **KURD_DV**, **ALEVI_DV** and **OTHER_DV**. Kurd, Zaza and Krmanc categories were collapsed into **Kurd_DV**. Table 6 also shows that despite not being mentioned, 48 people identified themselves as both Turk and Muslim and

another 41 as a human being. These two categories are also collapsed into the ‘other’ category.

Table 3.4
Group Identity Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
I would identify myself primarily as a Turk	733	24	24.2	24.2
I would identify myself primarily as a Muslim	1102	36	36.4	60.6
I would identify myself primarily as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey	988	32.3	32.7	93.3
I would identify myself primarily as a Kurd	76	2.5	2.5	95.8
I would identify myself primarily as an Alevite	38	1.2	1.3	97.1
I would identify myself primarily as both Turk and Muslim	48	1.6	1.6	98.6
I would identify myself primarily as a human being	41	1.3	1.4	100
Total	3026	98.9	100	
Missing	34	1.1		
Total	3060			

One must note here that these group identity dummy variables do not represent ethnic origin, but rather what a person identifies herself with. Therefore, inferences upon the upcoming findings should not be generalized into ethnocultural cleavages of the Turkish society. Data shows that while 11% of the respondents claimed that they speak Kurdish, only 2% identified themselves primarily as a Kurd. Furthermore, Table 7 shows that these people’s ideological self-placement is remarkably skewed to the left. Thus, one can conclude that KURD_DV represents a small but politicized and agitated faction of the Kurds¹⁰. Great care is needed for accurate interpretation of what groups sustain which values.

¹⁰ Since the aim of this thesis is to link attitudes with beliefs and values, demographic factors are only relevant if their inclusion in a regression render an abstracter belief or value insignificant.

Table 3.5
KÜRD_DV – ideological placement crosstabulation

KÜRD_DV	Ideological Placement										Total
	Extreme left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Extreme right	
No	159	99	170	94	919	172	193	225	100	333	2464
Yes	17	10	9	6	21	1		1		1	66
Total	176	109	179	100	940	173	193	226	100	334	2530

3.3. Methodology

Due to the varying nature of the variables, it was not feasible to use a single technique to analyze hierarchical relationships between the models. While some of them were of scalar nature (religiosity, SES expectations, trust in EU, Greek – Turkish relations), many were nominal variables (e.g. group identity, role model, EU accession and EURO) with limited dependent variables¹¹. Consequently, ordinary least squares and binary logit analyses were conducted to test the hierarchical relationships proposed between the variables. Since the aim of this thesis is to test whether abstracter beliefs constrain more specific issue positions individually, it need not compare their relative effects on different dependent variables. This justifies using different techniques within a model to inquire into the nature of the relationships between core values, general postures, and specific issue positions.

There is also the possibility that abstracter beliefs act in behalf of latent demographic variables and the model does not rule out such a possibility as such. Among these, sex has been shown to be a determinant in foreign policy attitudes (Togebay 1994). Therefore, basic demographic variables of sex, education and socioeconomic status will be controlled for in all of the regressions conducted in this thesis.

¹¹ See Appendix A for how the variables are constructed. Further discussions will be made as individual variables are discussed in the analysis.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

4.1. Bivariate Correlations

Before carrying on with the regressions, bivariate correlations will be taken to form initial expectations regarding the direction and the magnitude of the relationship between abstracter beliefs and specific issue positions that are operationalized with interval ratio variables. Out of 46 possible bivariate correlations between the variables that are vertically connected (i.e. excluding horizontal linkages), 34 of them were statistically significant¹². SES expectations and religiosity are both significantly correlated to all general postures and specific issue positions at except the latter's correlation with TURKIC_DV (identifying oneself primarily as a Turk). $r_{SES, EU}$ scored a high 0.524, providing another basis for including SES expectation in the model. Significant correlations were seldom encountered between dummy variables constructed for group identity and the general posture variables. The situation differed for KURD_DV, MUSL_DV and TC_DV all of which weakly but significantly correlated with specific issue positions except $r_{KURD_DV, EURO}$.

General postures, on the other hand, are highly correlated with specific issue positions. TRUST_EU, ROLEMODL The relationship between general postures and

¹² For a complete list of bivariate correlations, see Appendix B. The correlations for dummy variables are omitted since it is unnecessary.

positions on EU accession is especially interesting. While these correlations change around +/- 0.1 to 0.2,

Having shown that the variables in the model are generally related to each other, further inquiry into the nature of this relationship is necessary to test the nature of this relationship as well as assess the cumulative effects of higher ranking variables in the hierarchy onto lower status ones. It is important also to note that the aim of this thesis is to see whether the attitudes of the respondents exhibit a structure, and not to delve deeper into the particularities of the theoretical relationships. Consequently, while general remarks on the expected nature of the relations will be made, a thorough treatment of the relations between the model components is beyond the scope of this thesis. Put in simpler terms, the first and foremost concern of this thesis is to see whether the coefficients of abstract beliefs as independent variables are significantly different than zero. The direction and the magnitude of these coefficients are of secondary concern.

4.2. Determinants of General Postures and Specific Issue Positions


4.2.1. Trust in EU

Like many other foreign policy issues, issues regarding Turkey's membership to the EU are very difficult to comprehend. Figure 2 illustrates a general mistrust towards the union as the mean trust level is 3.01 on a 1-10 scale¹³. Still, forming a sound intellectual basis upon which individual positions on issues regarding the EU can be deduced is next to impossible for the layman. The endless debates in the media make things even more difficult. Contending views full of unsubstantiated assertions aggravate the "learning-load" which is already over the cognitive capacity of a typical individual. Moreover, the meticulous task of synchronizing with the EU rules and regulations, and the resulting stream of feedback from the EU authorities further agitate the public that helplessly try to make more sense out of it. This environment makes inquiring into the determinants of trust to EU even more interesting.

¹³ Almost one third of the population does not trust the European Union at all.

Figure 4.1

Trust in EU distribution



Source: Çarkoğlu & Kirişçi 2004

The three core values of the model (i.e. religiosity, expectation on change in socioeconomic status and group identity) pertain to three dimensions of trust in EU. Associating European countries with a conspiring Christian club has been a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of Islamist parties in Turkey (Kardam and Tüzün 2003). Similar thoughts have been expressed by Turkish elites as well (McLaren 2000, 124). As discussions on whether the EU is based on a Christian heritage find more place in the political agenda of Turkey as well as Europe, one would expect the religiously sensitive Muslims in Turkey to become more skeptical of Turkey's membership to the EU. Thus, religiosity and trust in EU are expected to be inversely related and the bivariate correlation between the two variables suggest the same (-0.142, sig. at 0.01 level). On the other hand, the more one expects her socioeconomic status to change for the better with a Turkey as a member of the EU, the more tolerant and less skeptic she will be in assessing the relations between the two parties. This, in turn, may result in an increased trust in EU. The bivariate correlation between SES expectations and trust in the EU is 0.259, again significant at 0.01%.

Lastly, the EU policies on minorities have been another fierce area of debate in Turkey. Some see these policies as a threat to the unity of the country, and others – especially the minorities – see this as an opportunity for further liberalization and

democratization of the country. McLaren and Müftüler-Baç (2003), in their study of the Turkish parliamentarians, have found out that the camps in this debate also stretched along the political party ideologies. While the most ultranationalists and Islamists saw the pertinent provisions of the Copenhagen criteria as the advent of the hidden agenda of Kurdish separatism and Christianization respectively, there were fewer skeptics among other parliamentarians regarding the democratization reforms that EU imposed on Turkey.

These findings shape our expectations accordingly. One can reasonably anticipate Turk_DV to be inversely, Kurd_DV and Alevi_DV to be directly related to Trust_EU. Identifying oneself as primarily a Muslim can act in two ways. First, being a Muslim as opposed to a Christian, one may tend to trust less on EU. However, being a Muslim as opposed to being a Turk implies an opposition to the centralist tendencies of the Turkish state. Therefore, an individual may ascertain parallelisms between the Islamic and the EU perspectives. Whether this common aim of liberalization will result in increased trust in EU is a question that is to be answered.

The index that was built to measure trust in the EU was built up from three scale questions. The below-mentioned questions all having 1-10 scales were asked to measure the level of trust one had in EU. The arithmetic mean of the resulting answers was taken to reach a trust index. If there were one or two missing answers, the missing value(s) were omitted and the index was calculated accordingly.

Q1. How honest do you think the European Union is? (Sizce Avrupa Birliği ne kadar samimi?)

Q2. Even if Turkey satisfies all the conditions that are requested to be satisfied, the EU will still not admit Turkey to membership. (Türkiye kendisinden istenen bütün şartları yerine getirirse bile, Avrupa Birliği yine de Türkiye'yi üyeliğe almayacaktır.)

Q3. The European Union puts forward conditions that are not done so to other candidate countries. (Avrupa Birliği, başka aday ülkelerden istemediği şartları Türkiye'den istiyor.)

Simple multiple OLS technique was sufficient to further analyze the relationship between core values and the general posture of trust in the EU. Table 8 shows the least squares regression with all the core value variables inserted and those who primarily

identify themselves as Turks as the reference category¹⁴. Despite being significant, the religiosity's negative effect is minute, hence providing proof to neither of the aforementioned arguments. SES expectation has a small but significant positive effect that confirms with our assumptions. The constant is significant showing that a person who has average religiosity (6.74) and SES expectations (6.01) figures, and does not identify herself as a Kurd scores 3.87 indicating a moderate mistrust towards the EU¹⁵.

Table 4.1
Determinants of Trust in the EU

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
(Constant)	2.822	0.205		13.786	0.000
Religiosity index	-0.085	0.019	-0.092	-4.489	0.000
KÜRD_DV	1.660	0.303	0.101	5.481	0.000
MÜSL_DV	-1.491	0.123	-0.003	-0.121	0.903
TCVAT_DV	98.110	0.124	0.018	0.790	0.430
ALEVI_DV	0.712	0.431	0.030	1.650	0.099
OTHER_DV	2.217	0.252	0.002	0.088	0.930
SES EXPECT	0.248	0.018	0.244	13.725	0.000
EDUC	-1.007	0.012	-0.001	-0.081	0.936
SEX	-0.163	0.101	-0.031	-1.618	0.106
SES STATUS	-0.563	0.009	-0.001	-0.060	0.952

Dependent Variable: TRUST_EU

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0.305	0.093	0.09	2.49

Those who primarily see themselves as Kurds trust EU more than the others. Such a person with average religiosity and SES scores 5.53. Other models with different groupings of core value variables constantly render the Kurd_DV a coefficient hanging between 1.6 and 2. It is also interesting to note that Musl_DV is insignificant in all of the variants of this model including the ones where religiosity index is left out. Likewise, religiosity's coefficient did not significantly change when Musl_DV was left out in the model.

Lastly, despite all of the significant relationships, the problem of arbitrariness in choosing the components of the model and the problem of using survey data becomes

¹⁴ All of the applicable F-tests in the upcoming regressions were significant at 0.001% level. Further reference to these will not be made hereafter.

¹⁵ All the insignificant coefficients were taken as 0.

evident in this regression. Although demographic factors are controlled for, the model can only explain 9.2% of the variance.

4.2.2. Role Model

This general posture categorizes respondents into two. First group supports the idea that Turkey should take members of the European Union as examples when shaping its progress while the second group argues that the main principles of Turkey's progress should be based on national values and traditions. The variable operationalized for this general belief is a rough estimator of the isolationism/internationalism bifurcation that has been extensively used for the American public (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987b). A major drawback of the question asked to measure this variable is that it presents only the European Union countries and "national" traditional values as main reference points, thus excluding others such as Islamism or socialism. Nevertheless, one can still assume that the question separates the EU perspective from the other orientations to a certain extent, and the variance obtained from its data carries significant knowledge. The following question was asked to probe into this subject:

Q. In your opinion, should Turkey take the European Union countries', or its own national traditions as a foundation in shaping its progress? (Sizce Türkiye gelişimini Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeleri örnek alarak mı, yoksa kendi milli gelenek ve göreneklerini temel alarak mı şekillendirmelidir?)

Table 9 shows that a majority of the respondents favored basing Turkey's progress on traditional values. Nevertheless, the split is close enough to conduct a binary logit analysis¹⁶.

Table 4.2
Rolemodel breakdown

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should stick to traditional values when shaping progress	2205	72.1	75.8
Should take the West as a role model	703	23	24.2
Total	2908	95	100
Missing	152	4.9	
Total	3060	100	

¹⁶ Long (1997:59-60) argue that binary logistic analysis renders healthy results when the split is at least about 20-80 %.

Previous data had shown that among the significant correlations, the variable ROLEMODL was positively linked to SES, KURD_DV and TC_DV and negatively linked to RELIGION and MUSL_DV. Because of the nature of the variable at hand, binary logistic regression was conducted to see whether core values increase the likelihood – thus constrain – Turkish voters’ general beliefs in orienting the country’s development. The results are listed in Table 10.

Table 4.3
Determinants of orientation towards the EU countries

	B	S.E.	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
RELIGION	-0.111	0.018	1	0.000	0.895
SES EXPECT	0.255	0.02	1	0.000	1290
TÜRK_DV(1)	-0.001	0.253	1	0.998	0.999
KURD_DV(1)	-0.874	0.346	1	0.012	0.417
MÜSL_DV(1)	0.115	0.253	1	0.650	1122
TCVAT_DV(1)	-0.334	0.245	1	0.174	0.716
ALEVI_DV(1)	0.299	0.457	1	0.512	1349
EDUC	0.018	0.011	1	0.092	1018
SEX(1)	-0.283	0.1	1	0.005	0.754
SESSTATU	0.015	0.008	1	0.066	1015
Constant	-1.332	1.081	1	0.218	0.264

Dependent Variable: ROLEMODL

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	2,877	0.101	0.15


Similar to the analysis on Trust_EU, both regressions on Role Model single out religiosity, SES expectation and identifying oneself primarily as Kurdish as factors significantly affecting the probability that one will endorse orientating Turkey’s progress to the West. The effect of KURD_DV is notably high; for an individual with mean religiosity and SES values, identifying oneself primarily as Kurdish decreases the odds about 58% (complement of 42%, the exp(b) score for the related variable) that the individual will take the EU countries as role model. This finding is very counter-intuitive and needs further analysis. Albeit of lesser magnitude, religiosity also acts in a similar fashion in shaping an individual’s preferences. SES constrains this general belief in the opposite direction. The omitting of MUSL_DV makes TC_DV significant. The fit of the model is significant and other binary combinations of core values also do not render higher R squared values. In sum, religiosity, Kurdish self-identification and SES expectations can be identified as constrainters of the general posture on the role model for Turkey’s progress.

4.2.3. Greek – Turkish Relations

The Greek – Turkish relations is an issue that has a long history and been frequently recurring in media and occasionally topping the political agenda in the country. In addition, all levels of formal education expose an individual to the subtleties of this relation to a certain extent, furthering the info-set of this individual. Thus, there is a relatively easily accessible information set that Turkish public can make use of. One can observe this exposition from the bipolarized distribution of attitudes towards peace with Greece from an EU perspective, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 4.2

Attitudes towards Greek – Turkish rapprochement



On the other hand, the Greek issue can be perceived as an aggregate issue that can further be dissected into specific cases (e.g. the Aegean problem, the blocking of EU funds). Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi (2004) have found that attitudes towards different dimensions of the Turkish-Greek problems differ among the population. If data was available, identifying these specific cases' respective attitude constraints would render interesting insights. From a theoretical point of view, it would be a challenge to explain why attitude constraints differ for attitudes towards the Aegean or the minorities problem, if it turned out to be so.

From a policy perspective, it could assist party leaders in deciding which steps to take and in what order that would simultaneously satisfy the other delegation (i.e. the Greeks) and the party constituency during peace talks. In other words, using Putnam's (1988) terminology, breaking an issue down to its constituent parts and compare the associated attitudes would render a multi-dimensional win-set with each specific part as a dimension. A more detailed survey could delve into the particularities of attitude constraints of these more specific issues and eloquently portray the win-set of the incumbent party in Turkey. Still, the data is confined to a single question and the resulting reservations on the measurement error problems hold.

Q There are certain changes that have to be done for Turkey to be admitted to the European Union. Could you, on a scale of one to ten, tell me to what extent do you agree with each change that I will say? (Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne girmesi için yapması şart olan bazı değişiklikler vardır. Size sayacağım değişikliklerin her birini ne derece onayladığınızı söyler misiniz?)

- The solution of the problems with Greece through mutual compromise. (Yunanistan'la olan sorunların karşılıklı tavizler verme yoluyla çözümlenmesini)

Since respondents' attitudes towards relations with Greece was measured on a scale of one to ten, OLS will be the method of analysis. The hierarchical model of attitude constraint asserts that both general beliefs and core values constrain attitudes on specific foreign policy issues. OLS method allows us to analyze the individual effects of general postures in the model controlled for core values. Still, Table 11 will present the results attitudes towards the Greek problem regressed on the general postures only. Table 12, then, will add core value variables to the model. Demographic factors will be controlled for in both of the models.

As expected, Trust_EU and ROLEMODL's (whether Turkey should orient itself towards West or base its progress on national values and traditions) coefficients are positive and significant. Level of trust is an important determinant of attitudes towards peace with Greece through mutual compromise. One standard deviation change in Trust_EU results in a 0.195 point increase towards endorsing peace with Greece.

Table 4.4
Determinants of attitudes towards Greek – Turkish rapprochement
(General beliefs and postures only)

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
(Constant)	4.080	0.156		26.169	0.000
TRUST_EU	0.265	0.025	0.195	10.378	0.000
ROLEMODL	0.908	0.156	0.110	5.823	0.000
EDUC	-0.024	0.017	-0.026	-1.417	0.157
SEX	0.201	0.131	0.028	1.536	0.125
SES STATUS	0.008	0.013	-0.011	-0.616	0.538

Dependent Variable: GREECE

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0.244	0.059	0.058	3.45

Table 4.5
Determinants of attitudes towards Greek – Turkish rapprochement
(Core values, general beliefs and postures)

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	
(Constant)	4.065	0.300		13.553	0.000
RELIGION	-0.114	0.027	-0.091	-4.175	0.000
KÜRD_DV	1.280	0.439	0.056	2.917	0.004
MÜSL_DV	0.215	0.174	0.029	1.234	0.217
TCVAT_DV	0.274	0.176	0.036	1.558	0.119
ALEVI_DV	0.310	0.627	0.009	0.494	0.621
OTHER_DV	-0.082	0.364	-0.004	-0.224	0.823
SES EXPECT	0.129	0.027	0.093	4.753	0.000
EDUC	-0.030	0.017	-0.033	-1.766	0.078
SEX	0.422	0.143	0.059	2.942	0.003
SES STATUS	-0.008	0.013	-0.011	-0.616	0.538
ROLEMODL	0.594	0.161	0.072	3.692	0.000
TRUST_EU	0.214	0.026	0.158	8.107	0.000

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,279	,078	,074	3,42

When core values are added to the equation, the picture does not substantially change. Table 11 shows that core values do significantly constrain specific attitudes besides general beliefs and postures. Similar to the pictures encountered in regressions of the general beliefs and postures, religiosity, expectations in socioeconomic status if Turkey is admitted to the European Union and identifying oneself primarily as a Kurd stand out as the constraining core values in the equation. The former two's effects are relatively smaller and act in opposite directions. The more one is religious or expects "welfare" with Turkey's admission to the EU, the more ardent opponent or proponent of peace she becomes respectively. Like previous analyses, KURD_DV is a strong determinant of attitudes in this case, and its effect is second to none in this equation. There is also support for peace with Greece in general. The "average Turkish woman" who is not oriented towards the West scores over five (5.53). This support especially increases in people who are somehow oriented to Europe. The same person who sees European Union countries as role models for Turkey is expected to moderately favor a solution in Greece (6.13), and strongly support a solution if she identifies herself as a Kurd (7.41).

In sum, attitudes on peace with Greece are constrained by abstracter beliefs and values. The direction these variables are constrained are parallel to what the bivariate correlations suggest in the Appendix B.

4.2.4. EU Accession

EU Accession is another variable the attitudes to which have to be analyzed with binary logit regression since the variable was constructed from a question that had a limited dependent variable. The breakdown of the answers, given in Table 13, show that the difference between the two groups is small enough to run the regression. The following question was asked to see to which group one belonged to:

Q. If there was a referendum held today on Turkey's full membership to the European Union, would you vote in favor or against Turkey's membership?

Table 4.6
Attitudes towards EU membership

EUACCESS

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Turkey should not enter the EU	905	29.6	31.6
Turkey should enter the EU	1958	64	68.4
Total	2863	93.6	100
Missing	197	6.4	
Total	3060	100	

The general beliefs and core values will be introduced at the same time to test for their constraining effects¹⁷. The pertinent bivariate correlations suggested that EU ACCESS had significant positive relations with TRUST_EU and ROLEMODL. Among the core values that are significantly correlated at 0.01%, SES was correlated with a high 0.524. Other positive correlations were with KURD_DV (identifying oneself primarily as a Kurd) and TCVAT_DV (identifying oneself as primarily a citizen of the Turkish Republic). Religiosity and MUSLM_DV (identifying oneself as primarily a Muslim) were negatively correlated with EUACCESS, thus suggesting an inverse relationship in between.

Table 4.7
Determinants of attitudes towards EU membership

	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
RELIGION	0.019	0.023	0.714	1	0.398	1.019
TÜRK_DV(1)	-0.221	0.281	0.620	1	0.431	0.802
KÜRD_DV(1)	-0.467	0.468	0.997	1	0.318	0.627
MÜSL_DV(1)	-0.057	0.278	0.043	1	0.836	0.944
TCVAT_DV(1)	-0.658	0.277	5652.000	1	0.017	0.518
ALEVI_DV(1)	-0.357	0.575	0.385	1	0.535	0.700
EDUC	0.109	0.043	6407.000	1	0.011	1.115
SEX(1)	-0.015	0.116	0.017	1	0.897	0.985
SESSTATU	-0.006	0.010	0.441	1	0.507	0.994
SES EXPECT	0.526	0.025	428.536	1	0.000	1.691
TRUST_EU	0.100	0.022	21346.000	1	0.000	1.106
ROLEMODL(1)	-0.729	0.145	25410.000	1	0.000	0.483
Constant	-0.943	1272.000	0.550	1	0.458	0.389
Model Summary						
Step	-2 Log likelihood		Cox and Snell R Square		Nagelkerke R Square	
1	2400,444		,294		,414	

¹⁷ The results from the regression on general beliefs and demographic variables do not carry any additional explanatory value and the model fit measures are substantially lower.

Table 14 presents the results of the logistic regression. As expected, the higher the level of trust to EU is, the higher the probability of supporting Turkey's membership to the EU. Likewise, increase in SES expectations makes it more likely that an individual will espouse Turkey's membership. On the other hand, seeing oneself primarily as a citizen of the Turkish Republic makes it significantly less likely that a person will support accession to the EU. This finding is quite interesting, suggesting that the 'national (ulusalcı) movement' against the EU is gaining momentum as discussions over Turkey's membership draw to a critical point where the EU will decide whether to grant a date for starting accession talks.

An unexpected result was obtained as ROLEMODL took on a negative coefficient. The data suggest that as one pegs Turkey's progress to those of EU members, the probability that she will also support Turkey's membership to the EU drops by 4.4% at sample mean¹⁸. This does not theoretically make sense and the cross-tabulation in Table 15 tells why the numbers turned out to be so. Amongst the respondents who defend traditional values as a role model for Turkey, 65% favor accession to the European Union. Given that the number of people in this group is three times larger than the ones who take Europe as role model, one can conclude that the negative coefficient of ROLEMODL is a result of the excessive weight traditionalists have concomitant with the high percentage of EU supporters among these traditionalists.

Table 4.8
Role model – EU accession crosstabulation

	EUACCESS		Total
	Turkey should not enter the EU	Turkey should enter the EU	
ROLEMODL			
Should stick to traditional values when shaping progress	778	1305	2083
Should take the West as a role model	86	592	678
Total	864	1897	2761

4.2.5. European Monetary Union

The last specific foreign policy issue the attitudes to which will be examined is whether Turkey should enter the European Monetary Union (EMU). Including this issue is

¹⁸ This number was obtained from $b \cdot f(Z)$ values (see Dougherty 2000).

especially interesting as it is a relatively difficult concept to make sense out of since there is conditionality involved¹⁹. Besides, it is an issue that has been seldom discussed in public. Information on the EMU is not readily available and too costly to obtain. Thus, it would be safe to assume that the majority is not informed of the issue in general. As a matter of fact, it has been shown that the Turkish parliamentarians -let alone general public- have little knowledge on this issue (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç 2003, 210). Consequently, identifying a structure in attitudes towards an issue that people are not cognizant of carries special significance. Delineation of such a structure will constitute strong evidence in favor of the cognitive heuristic approach to attitude formation. In other words, if abstract beliefs constrain an issue where there is little public knowledge available, it further reinforces this thesis' basic claim that public attitudes towards foreign policy issues are hierarchically ordered.

The variable measuring attitudes towards EURO if Turkey is admitted to the EU is constructed from a single question that renders a limited dependent variable of binary response. The question on Euro openly asked whether one would support Turkey entering the EMU or not. Table 16 shows the breakdown of answers to the question posed.

Q. When Turkey is admitted to the EU, it will make the choice on whether stop using the Turkish Lira and employ European Union's currency EURO. When this stage is reached, would you support Turkey's switching to EURO? (Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olunca Türk Lirası'nın kaldırılıp Avrupa Birliği'nin para birimi olan EURO'ya geçme konusunda seçimi Türkiye yapacaktır. Bu aşamaya gelindiğinde, Türkiye'nin EURO'ya geçmesini destekler miydiniz?)

Table 4.9
Attitudes towards European Monetary Union

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Turkey should enter EMU	1356	44.3	47
Turkey should not enter EMU	1530	50	53
Total	2886	94.3	100
Missing	174	5.7	
Total	3060	100	

¹⁹ Interestingly, while the nonresponse rate (5.7%) is relatively higher than the question on Greece (3.2%), it is lower than the question on EU accession (6.4%).

The significant bivariate correlations suggest that attitudes towards the acceptance of EURO are positively correlated only to MUSLIM_DV (identifying oneself primarily as a Muslim). In contrast, TC_VAT (identifying oneself primarily as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey), expectations on socioeconomic status change, trust in the EU and orientation towards Europe are all negatively correlated variables to EURO. Table 17 lists the binary logit results that include core values, general beliefs and postures as well as the demographic variables that are controlled for.

Table 4.10
Determinants of attitudes towards European Monetary Union

	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)	mean	mean*b	b*f(Z)
TRUST_EU	-0.074	0.017	19.444	1	0.000	0.928	3.71	-0.275	-0.013
ROLEMODL(1)	0.701	0.102	47.379	1	0.000	2.016	0.24	0.168	0.120
RELIGION	0.043	0.018	5.670	1	0.017	1.044	6.79	0.292	0.007
SES EXPECT	-0.136	0.017	61.333	1	0.000	0.873	6.01	-0.817	-0.023
TÜRK_DV(1)	0.010	0.238	0.002	1	0.968	1.010	0.240	1.000	0.002
KÜRD_DV(1)	-0.280	0.348	0.648	1	0.421	0.756	0.020	0.000	-0.048
MÜSL_DV(1)	-0.288	0.237	1.473	1	0.225	0.750	0.36	0.000	-0.049
TCVAT_DV(1)	0.065	0.234	0.078	1	0.779	1.067	0.32	0.000	0.011
ALEVI_DV(1)	-0.456	0.456	1.000	1	0.317	0.634	0.0124	0.000	-0.078
EDUC	-0.066	0.034	3.819	1	0.051	0.936	2.92	-0.193	-0.011
SEX(1)	0.861	0.095	82.680	1	0.000	2.366	0.5	0.000	0.147
SESSTATU	-0.010	0.009	1.229	1	0.268	0.990	4.07	-0.041	-0.002
Constant	1.138	1.046	1.183	1	0.277	3.121	1	1.138	0.194

Z= 1.273
f(Z)= 0.171

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox and Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	3,348	0.127	0.169

The figures show that both general beliefs significantly constrain attitudes towards EURO. At the sample mean, a female Turk who wants to see Turkey's progress based on the model of EU countries is 12% more likely to support entering the EMU. The effect of trust in EU is interestingly negative in direction, but negligibly small. A possible (yet unconvincing) explanation for this inverse relationship could be that the more one has trust in EU, the more information she possesses about it, hence the more aware of the shortcomings of the new monetary system. There is also a trivial positive constraining effect of religiosity on attitudes towards the EURO. While the latter two (along with the significant weight of SEX in determining the likelihood of supporting EURO) raise some doubts on the meaningfulness of the constraining effect

for this specific issue position, SES expectation's role portrays a picture on the contrary. Many of the news on EURO in Turkey mentioned about the price jump the people experienced due to menu adjustments. This may explain the inverse relationship between expectations on change in SES and attitudes towards the adaptation of the currency. The more people are concerned about their welfare and the higher their expectations from the EU are the more negative stance they take regarding the adaptation of EURO.

In sum, demographic variables controlled, general beliefs and core values constrain attitudes on entering the EMU statistically. The theoretical linkage for determinants that substantially weighed more than others can be provided for, same cannot be said for determinants that are statistically significant but have trivial effects on the outcome. Lastly, it is worth noting that group identity was not among the constraining factors for EURO. Conditionality of the question asked can provide a partial explanation to this situation. One can argue that once Turkey's membership is given, group identity becomes insignificant as an explanatory factor.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The findings of this thesis suggest that the hierarchical model of attitude constraint deserves the attention of scholars who are interested in foreign policy attitudes in Turkey. Most basically, the findings show that the attitudes are hierarchically ordered and abstracter values and beliefs significantly constrain specific attitudes. Three core values, two general beliefs and postures and three specific issue positions resulted in 21 hierarchical relations that were tested in the preceding sections. All except two of these relations were statistically significant, thus pointing to a hierarchical relationship. These hierarchical relationships mostly turned out to be in line with the theoretical expectations that the literature suggested.

Like its prominent role in shaping domestic policy attitudes, religiosity also proved to be a major determinant of foreign policy attitudes. It significantly constrained all general beliefs and specific issue positions except the position on Turkey's membership to the European Union. However, the magnitude of these constraints imposed turned out to be minute in most of the cases. Posture on role model orientation and issue position on peace with Greece were the only two model components that were moderately constrained by religiosity. Still, these results show that the religious, anti-Western discourse is not yet antiquated, and many can be politically mobilized against the Western values when positioning a party in foreign policy.

One can also conclude that, contrary to Conover and Feldman's (1984) argument, core beliefs values do not only help the mind of an individual to fill in the missing pieces of information and/or act as reference nodes for evaluation of what has

been received from the external world. They can also be decisive in what specific events to be taken into account and what specific events to be ignored in the international arena when forming attitudes on foreign policy. The recent events in Sudan clearly exemplify this point. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands have been killed within a very short period of time, these atrocities – committed by Muslim forces– occupied much smaller space in the popular Turkish agenda than Israeli invasions that resulted in a very small fraction of the casualties experienced in the former case. Should religious values (such as respect for human life, especially for fellow Muslims) have been the main determinants of attitudes in all foreign issues, strong negative reaction towards the events in Sudan would be expected. Therefore, realizing that religiosity (and probably other core values as well) does not constrain one’s view uniformly towards everything happening around her is critical in understanding attitude formation. This point should especially be kept in mind when comparing the constraining effects of core values and general postures in other specific issue positions.

“Expectations on SES change” also was a determinant for all general beliefs and attitudes on the specific issues in the model. Keeping that the model in this thesis was constructed from an EU perspective, one would expect economic concerns to play a major role in attitude formation. A typical individual is exposed to a substantial amount of information regarding the economic merits and perils of joining the EU. Parallel to the expectations, expectation on SES change turned out to be a central determinant in attitude formation. It proved to be particularly important in determining the level of trust felt towards EU and orienting Turkey’s progress to the West. SES Expectations also came out as one of the most significant determinant of attitudes towards Turkey’s orientation to the West (ROLEMODL) and accession to the EU, thus hinting at the economic considerations’ effect on foreign policy attitudes.

Group identification acted somewhat different than the other two core values. As previously noted, the ones who identified themselves as Kurds formed a group that was politically agitated and represented less than 20% of all who claim they speak Kurdish. This group manifested its ideological orientation in the regressions run on general beliefs and the Greek issue, yet carried no explanatory power for attitudes on EU accession and EMU. The positive orientations of this group towards West and their increased trust in EU can be explained by the established political links with these entities. There exist several Kurdish institutes in EU countries that are backed by their

respective governments. Similar proclivity towards Turkish-Greek peace is also observed within this group.

The three major groups, namely those who identify themselves primarily as Turks, Muslims and citizens of the Turkish Republic rendered insignificant relationships with components down the hierarchy except one. Identifying oneself primarily as a citizen of the Turkish Republic made it very unlikely that this person would also endorse Turkey's accession to the European Union. At face value, this seems counter-intuitive and further speculations on its causes can be put forward. Primary identification of neither being a Muslim nor being a Turk acted as attitude constraints from an EU perspective. This is a very interesting finding since the Welfare – Virtue – Felicity Party line of Erbakan and the Nationalist Action Party have been the most vociferous against Turkey's quest in joining the EU. The findings of this thesis suggest that both parties may have to reevaluate their stance in Turkey's accession to EU as the majority of the electorate seems to be indifferent at best to anti-EU campaigns. The findings also partially rationalize Tayyip Erdoğan and his Ak Parti's pro-EU stance despite his Islamic – conservative discourse. One can argue that AKP realized concerns on restoring welfare presided over other concerns in domestic politics. This, combined with the fact that group identification is not a principal determinant of public attitudes towards the EU, led Prime Minister Erdoğan to adopt a more pro-EU stance.

Together with KURD_DV, trust in EU is the strongest determinant of attitudes towards peace in Greece through mutual compromise. The increased role of the European Union in mediating between the two countries as well the conditionality of peace for Turkey's accession to the EU seem to be accurately perceived by the Turkish public. The less euro-skeptic one is, the more she believes that peace can be achieved and sustained between Turkey and Greece. The others, who think that the EU will not admit Turkey anyhow, see peace with Greece as one way compromise and tend to position against it. In a similar vein, orientation towards West positions individuals towards the pro-peace camp.

One of the most interesting points in the model was that level of religiosity and identifying oneself primarily as a Kurd did not constrain attitudes on Turkey's accession to the EU. Those who claim they are primarily citizens of the Turkish Republic are significantly and strongly against the EU. This finding invites further inquiry into whether the "*ulusalci*" current is finding its way into the foreign policy attitudes of the

public in general. On the other hand, SES expectations manifested itself very strongly in the related regression. Consequently, economic considerations seem to take over religious concerns when it comes to the first and foremost issue of whether Turkey should enter the EU. Alternatively, one can also say that proposing alternate courses of overcoming economic hardships is an essential policy for EU opponents to gain more supporters. This finding is not surprising at all; a simulation had been run during Northern Cyprus elections with the Turkish Cypriots. During the election campaign, the two conflicting ideas were sustained freedom versus economic relief where the latter won by a slight margin. A similar contest is to be expected, should Turkey be given a date for accession talks and eventually a date for accession.

An interesting finding of the thesis is that neither religiosity nor identifying oneself primarily as a Muslim turned out to be a determinant of attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU. This initially seems very peculiar, considering the fact that Islamist parties have constantly used anti-EU rhetoric to collect votes during elections. Furthermore, while foreign policy has not been a frequent area of electoral debate in Turkish politics, anti-Western campaigns of Necmettin Erbakan stood out as important exceptions (Hale 2000, 226). The explanation may very well lie in the irony that while Islamists may oppose the Western values, the democratization norms that the EU mandates creates and sustains the habitat in which they can survive and flourish without serious impoundments from the forces of the center. This irony becomes more visible as the results also show a significant inverse relationship between religiosity and trust in the EU. Nonetheless, proving that laymen are cognizant of this fact is a task that is yet to be accomplished. Also, if this indeed is the case, than the Turkish public attitudes would constitute a counterfactual to Verba et al.'s (1967) arguments since accession to EU seriously threatens the existing system of domestic distribution of resources, thus the domestic political setting. It would also constitute a proof towards the spillover of domestic issues into foreign policy attitudes.

The logistic regression of attitudes towards EURO also gave interesting results. Being an issue difficult to be informed on, asked with a question that was relatively complicated, the regressions of EURO still gave significant relationships. SES expectations and trust in EU turned out to be negatively constraining the attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EMU while posture on role model and religion acted

in the opposite direction²⁰. At the sample mean, the effect of religion was negligible, and the effect of Trust_EU was relatively small. Nevertheless, the negative relationship between level of trust and attitudes towards EMU was an unexpected outcome. This outcome becomes even more interesting as orientation towards EU member countries as role models is an important determinant of attitudes towards EURO. The fact that orientation towards West significantly increases and increased trust in EU significantly decreases attitudes towards EURO is a problem that needs to be further addressed. SES expectations, on the other hand, confirmed the expectations. Most of the discussions about the EURO have either been on price increases experienced due to menu adjustments or the poor performance of the EURO-zone during the last couple of years. The more people are concerned about their welfare and the higher their expectations from the EU are the more negative stance they take regarding the adaptation of EURO.

A significant implication of these findings relate to the increasing role of foreign policy issues in domestic politics. Foreign policy in Turkey has usually been regarded as an area where policy formulation by consensus in the polity has been the norm (Hale 2000)²¹. However, as foreign policy becomes increasingly entangled with domestic concerns, the structure of the mass public emerges as an important constraining factor for foreign policy devisers²². The findings suggest that mass public can be added as another group that shapes foreign policy outcomes. However, “mass public” as such is a group that is not homogenous in terms of interest. It is linked to the political elites only through the ballot and does not enjoy alternative mechanisms of communication and pressure. Accordingly, incorporating such a group into the liberal theory throws another challenge for the IR scholars.

The fact that foreign policy structures of the Turkish public are structured also confirms the argument that public opinion regarding foreign affairs is sensible thus “prudent” (Oneal and Joyner 1996, 261). Turkish people’s attitudes are constrained by some values that are free of political influence. Thus, one could reasonably expect the average Turkish citizen to discern between self-defense and rent-seeking behavior of the

²⁰ RELIGION and SES EXPECT mostly acted in opposite directions. Therefore, one can say that a typical Turkish person is stuck between the “heart” and the “wallet”.

²¹ A notable exception to this was the Erbakan period of 1996-7. Despite the pressures from his coalition partner Çiller, as well as the bureaucrats in the ministry, the prime minister had unsuccessfully tried to sever the ties with the EU and form a Muslim alliance instead.

²² Terrorism and economic interdependence may be given as two examples of this increasing linkage

government, should Turkey adopt a belligerent stance towards another country. In other words, despite the problems Turkey has been experiencing with its modernization process, Turkish people do not seem to be fully manipulable by war-mongering rhetoric. The recent rejection of the bill that asked for the Turkish troops to be sent to Iraq due of intense public opposition stand as an important example to (and probably the most obvious case of) how public attitudes affect foreign policy outcomes.

In sum, this thesis showed that core values and general beliefs constrain specific issue positions, thus carry predictive power in determining future attitudes of the public. It has also showed that different issues are affected by different constraints in varying degrees. Defining the structure of foreign policy attitudes, in turn, brings in novel perspectives to theory and policy making.

Although not included in this case, the model of attitude constraint does not necessarily leave out other exogenous factors that may carry further explanatory power. Thus, a line of research can focus on what particular exogenous variables that constrain attitudes (e.g. party preferences, ideology) can be added to the model. Nevertheless, substantial work is needed to identify the value and belief dimensions of the Turkish public upon which the model can be improved. Many of the studies conducted for the US public assumed that the foreign policy and the domestic realm are separated in people's minds. As shown above, same cannot be asserted for the Turkish public. Many foreign policy issues that top the agenda have direct domestic consequences. Among those that do not, only the ones that are related to an ethnic group in Turkey, such as the Chechen conflict or the problems in Balkans draw considerable attention. While Turkey's being a middle-strength country rather than a superpower may explain the apathy towards distant but significant events around the globe, the domestic spillover's importance is beyond doubt. Therefore, another possible avenue of research can be examining the common values that both constrain domestic as well as foreign policy issues.

The fact that the fault lines of the society in domestic politics such as religiosity and group identification do not reflect as strongly on the foreign policy beliefs of individuals remind one that foreign policy is still perceived as high politics by many, the conduct of which is left to the state officials; this part of the public also see no role for public opinion in its formulation. For that reason, as foreign policy formulation becomes increasingly intertwined with everyday politics, one can expect to see the center-periphery divide become increasingly apparent in this realm. The internal debates

that Turkey witnessed during Cyprus negotiations and legal reforms to match Copenhagen criteria have provided strong proofs in this regard. As the interests of the two camps have started to manifest themselves in foreign policy, the next question that emerges is through which political weapons these camps will try to win over public support. This research suggests that economic welfare is a vital component in securing public support in foreign policy, and conventional fault lines of the society are not as useful to exploit along for both camps in foreign policy as they proved to be in domestic policy. Therefore, this exploratory thesis' main conclusion is that having shown attitudes are indeed structured, a more thorough and meticulous identification and analysis of foreign policy attitude constraints for the Turkish public will provide invaluable insights for the future of Turkish politics.

Finally, it must be noted that the aim of this thesis to see whether the Turkish public attitudes towards foreign policy are hierarchically ordered, rather than to set up specific hypotheses and statistically test them later on. Although the author is aware of some counter-intuitive results, an attempt to fit a scenario to these findings was deliberately avoided. Consequently, the findings should mostly be interpreted from the hierarchical model perspective that has been utilized in this paper.

APPENDIX A CONSTRUCTION OF THE VARIABLES

RELIGION

Q. Do you profess any religion? (Siz bir dine bağılı mısınız?)

<i>Q. Considering the last five years, how often do you go to a mosque for prayer disregarding funeral prayers? (Son beş yılı düşünürseniz, cenazeler dışında camiye ne sıklıkta gidiyorsunuz?)</i>	Points
Answer	
More than once a week	6
Once a week (Fridays)	5
Once a month	4
During Ramadan and <i>Kandils</i>	3
For religious holidays / once or twice a year	2
Less than once a year	1
Never / Almost Never	0
<i>Q. Do you fast? (Oruç tutar mısınız?)</i>	
Answer	Points
Yes, I do fast	1
I used to fast, but not anymore	1
No, I never fast	0
<i>Q. Do you believe in the following?</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Life after death</i> • <i>A person has a soul separate from his body</i> • <i>The existence of heaven and hell</i> 	
Answer	Points
Yes	1
No	0

EXPECTATIONS IN SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS CHANGE (SES_EXPECT)

Q. If Turkey is admitted to the European Union, how will your life change? Taking 1 as very bad and 10 as very good, could you rate it between 1 and 10? (Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olursa hayatınızda nasıl bir değişim olacaktır?)

GROUP IDENTITY

Q. When asked, would you identify yourself primarily as a Turk, a Muslim, a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, a Kurd or an Alevite? Or would you classify yourself with a different identity? (Sorulduğunda kendinizi öncelikle Türk olarak mı, Müslüman olarak mı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olarak mı, Kürt ya da Alevi olarak mı tanımlardınız? Yoksa kendinizi daha farklı bir kimlikle mi tanımlardınız?)

- *I would identify myself primarily as a Turk*

- *I would identify myself primarily as a Muslim*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Kurd*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Zaza*
- *I would identify myself primarily as a Krmanç*
- *I would identify myself primarily as an Alevite*
- *Other*

TRUST_EU

The below-mentioned questions all having 1-10 scales were asked to measure the level of trust one had in EU. The arithmetic mean of the resulting answers was taken to reach a trust index. If there was one or two missing answers, the missing value(s) were omitted and the index was calculated accordingly.

Q.

- *How honest do you think the European Union is? (Sizce Avrupa Birliđi ne kadar samimi?)*
- *Even if Turkey satisfies all the conditions that are requested to be satisfied, the EU will still not admit Turkey to membership. (Türkiye kendisinden istenen bütün şartları yerine getirirse bile, Avrupa Birliđi yine de Türkiye'yi üyeliđe almayacaktır.)*
- *The European Union puts forward conditions that are not done so to other candidate countries. (Avrupa Birliđi, başka aday ülkelerden istemediđi şartları Türkiye'den istiyor.)*

ROLE MODEL

This variable tries to measure the general beliefs of an individual in terms of where the country should orient itself in the future. It is a rough estimator of the isolationism/internationalism dichotomy that has been extensively used for the American public. A major drawback of the question asked to measure this variable is it presents only the European Union countries and “national” traditional values as main reference points, thus excluding others such as Islamism or socialism. Nevertheless, one can still assume that the question separates the EU perspective from the other orientations to a certain extent, and the variance obtained from its data carries significant knowledge. The following question was asked to probe into this subject:

Q. In your opinion, should Turkey take the European Union countries', or its own national traditions as a foundation in shaping its progress? (Sizce Türkiye gelişimini Avrupa Birliđi üyesi ülkeleri örnek alarak mı, yoksa kendi milli gelenek ve göreneklerini temel alarak mı şekillendirmelidir?)

EU_ACCESION

Respondents' attitudes towards Turkey's membership to the EU were measured with the following question:

Q If there was a referendum held today on Turkey's full membership to the European Union, would you vote in favor or against Turkey's membership?

Greek – Turkish Relations

This specific issue attitude was measured on a 1-10 scale. Again, the survey structure allowed only one question to be used to measure the attitudes of the respondents.

Q. There are certain changes that have to done for Turkey to be admitted to the European Union. Could you, on a scale of one to ten, tell me to what extent do you agree with each change that I will say? (Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne girmesi için yapması şart olan bazı değişiklikler vardır. Size sayacağım değişikliklerin her birini ne derece onayladığınızı söyler misiniz?)

- The solution of the problems with Greece through mutual compromise. (Yunanistan'la olan mevcut sorunların karşılıklı tavizler verme yoluyla çözümlenmesini)

EURO

The question on Euro openly asked whether one would support Turkey entering the European Monetary Union or not.

Q. When Turkey is admitted to the EU, it will make the choice on whether stop using the Turkish Lira and employ European Union's currency EURO. When this stage is reached, would you support Turkey's switching to EURO? (Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olunca Türk Lirası'nın kaldırılıp Avrupa Birliği'nin para birimi olan EURO'ya geçme konusunda seçimi Türkiye yapacaktır. Bu açamaya gelindiğinde, Türkiye'nin EURO'ya geçmesini destekler miydiniz?)

SEX

The sex of the respondent was recorded by the interviewer without asking.

EDUCATION

The following question was asked to learn the education level of the respondent. The ordinal nature of the variable caused a loss of precision in the question with respect to asking years of schooling. This problem is especially important in Turkey as more 8-year primary school graduates enter the voting population every year.

Q. What was the last school you finished? (En son bitirdiğiniz okul nedir?)

- Cannot read or write
- Can read and write
- Primary School (İlkokul)
- Middle School (Ortaokul)
- High School (Lise)
- University and above

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES STATU)

An index of 0-6 was constructed to measure socioeconomic status, the details of which are provided below.

<i>Q. Which of the following do you or anyone living in the same household with you possess? (Aşağıda sayacaklarımdan hangileri evinizde veya sizinle aynı hanede yaşayan birinde var?)</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Wired telephone (ev telefonu)• Dishwasher• Laundry automat	
Answer	Points
Yes	1
No	0

<p><i>Q. Which of the following do you own for your personal use? (Aşağıdaki sayacaklarımdan hangilerine kendi kullanımınız için sahipsiniz?)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Cellular phone</i>• <i>Credit Card</i>• <i>Computer - PC</i>	
Answer	Points
Yes	1
No	0



**APPENDIX B
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS**

		Religiosity index	TRUST_EU	GREECE	SES
Religiosity index	Pearson Correlation	1,000	-,142	-,120	-,088
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000
	N	3058	3005	2961	2994
TRUST_EU	Pearson Correlation		1,000	,218	,259
	Sig. (2-tailed)			,000	,000
	N		3006	2923	2951
GREECE	Pearson Correlation			1,000	,152
	Sig. (2-tailed)				,000
	N			2963	2919
SES	Pearson Correlation				1,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				

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