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**INTERNATIONAL IMAGE THEORY, EMOTIONS, AND SOCIAL  
IDENTIFICATIONS: TURKS' IMAGES AND ACTION TENDENCIES  
TOWARD THE U.S.**

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
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
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
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*Per prinderit e mi dhe  
ne kujtim te Michele Alexander*

*For my parents and  
in memory of Michele Alexander*



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**ABSTRACT**

This research is an empirical test of the international image theory. It builds on and extends the Alexander, Levin, and Shana's (in press) work on the Lebanese images of the U.S., Lebanese perceptions of the Lebanon - U.S. structural relations, and the Lebanese social and religious identifications, by replicating their work in Turkey and extending it to assessing Turks's action tendencies and emotions toward the U.S. The goal is to examine the structure of theory components – perceived structural relations, images, and action tendencies – and their inter-relationships, as well as to attempt to build one more block in the formal incorporation of emotions into image theory framework, and inclusion of social identifications as independent individual variables having an impact on the formation of images and action tendencies.

A sample of two hundred twenty six undergraduates at a private university in Turkey participated in the survey. All the participants filled out a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of Turkey - U.S. structural relations, images, action tendencies, and emotions they experienced toward the U.S., as well as the degree of their identifications with their religious group, national/ethnic group, with the Arab world, the Western world, and identification with the Americans.

The results indicate that the respondents in this sample endorse an imperialist image and both resistance and cooperation action tendencies toward the U.S. The structure of images and action tendencies is found to be slightly different from the typical ideal images and action tendencies described by the theory; however, supporting image theory's basic assumption that images are a function of the inter-group relationships and serve to justify these relationships and the behavioral tendencies they provoke. Strong evidence is provided on the need for the incorporation of emotions and social identifications into image theory framework.

Keywords: International image theory, social identity, image, action tendency, emotions, Turkey, U.S.

**ULUSLARARASI İMAJ KURAMI, DUYGULAR, VE SOSYAL  
KİMLİKLER: TÜRKLERİN A.B.D.'YE KARŞI İMAJLARI VE DAVRANIŞ  
EĞİLİMLERİ.**

**ÖZET**

Bu çalışmada uluslararası imaj kuramı ampirik olarak test edilmiştir. Türklerin Amerika hakkındaki davranışsal eğilimlerinin ve duygularının belirlendiği bu tez temel olarak Alexander, Levin ve Shana (yayında) tarafından gerçekleştirilen ve Lübnanlıların gözünde Amerika imajı, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilere dair Lübnanlıların algıları ve Lübnan'daki sosyal ve dini kimlikler hakkındaki bir araştırmaya dayanarak geliştirilmiştir. Buradaki amaç teorik bileşenlerin – yani algılanan yapısal ilişkilerin, imajların ve davranış eğilimlerinin, yapısını ve birbiriyle olan ilişkilerini incelemenin yanı sıra, imaj teorisi çerçevesinde hem duyguların hem de imaj ve davranış eğilimlerinin oluşumunda bağımsız birer değişken olan sosyal kimliklerin yer almasını sağlamaktır.

Türkiye'de özel bir üniversitede gerçekleştirilen anket çalışması için toplam iki yüz yirmi altı lisans öğrencisinden oluşan bir örneklem kullanılmıştır. Anket soruları katılımcıların Türkiye – A.B.D. ilişkilerine dair algılarını, zihinlerindeki A.B.D. imajlarını, A.B.D.'ye yönelik tutumsal eğilimlerini ve duygularını tanımlamanın yanı sıra bu kişilerin kendilerini ait hissettikleri dini grup, milli/etnik grup ile Arap dünyası, Batı dünyası ve Amerikalıları ile ne kadar özdeşleştirdiklerini belirlemeye yöneliktir.

Elde edilen sonuçlar katılımcıların gözünde A.B.D.'nin emperyalist bir imajı olduğunu ve katılımcıların A.B.D.'ye karşı hem direnişçi hem de işbirlikçi tutumsal eğilimleri olduğunu göstermektedir. Bulunan imaj ve tutumsal eğilimler teorik olarak beklenenlerden biraz farklı olsa da, bulgular imaj teorisinin, imajların gruplar arasındaki ilişkilerin bir türevi olduğuna ve bu ilişkileri ve bu ilişkilerden doğan davranış eğilimlerini haklı kılar nitelikte olduklarına dair temel savını destekler niteliktedir. Duyguların ve sosyal kimliklerin de imaj teorisi çerçevesine dahil olması gerektiğine dair güçlü kanıtlara rastlanmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: İmaj kuramı, sosyal kimlik, imaj, davranış eğilimi, duygu, Türkiye, A.B.D.

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1. Images in International Relations**

The concept of image in international relations was first introduced by Boulding (1956, 1959) who defined image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioral unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe” (Boulding, 1959: 120-121). According to Boulding, central to images in international environment are ideas about security and insecurity. These images help to simplify a complex environment in international arena as well as to determine actions undertaken by an actor to increase one’s security (Boulding, 1959). A large literature in international relations explores such images of both masses and elites of one nation about another and recognizes the importance of images in decision making and prediction of the behavior of states (eg. Cottam, 1977; Holsti, 1967; Jervis, 1976; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992). They all join Boulding in asserting that a major function of these images is simplification of a complex international environment and guidance of perceptions and responses toward other nations.

Until recently, the literature on images has been dominated by enemy images used especially and extensively to explain the U.S. and the Soviet Union relations during the Cold War (eg. Herrmann, 1985; Hurwitz and Puffley, 1990; Silverstein, 1989). These studies have focused on explaining the dynamics of conflict between the two powers by examining each’s perceptions and security dilemmas for the other. As research on this topic has proliferated, complex analysis and attempts to reduce these images into predictions of policy choice have been made. For example, Herrmann (1986) has examined how the views and perceptions of Soviet Union determine policy choices of American leaders, proposing that images can be useful independent variables in predicting foreign policy choices. Similarly, the content, structure, and function of public images of Soviet Union, their impact on foreign policy behavior (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990), as well as their impact on the changing relations between Soviet Union

and the U.S. in the aftermath of the Cold War (Peffley and Hurwitz,1992) has been analyzed.

The study of enemy images has been extended out of the realm of Soviet - U.S. relations. The images of the enemy have been used as descriptive and explanatory variables in relations among states within the Arab world (Szalay and Mir-Djalali, 1991) and between the Arab world and the West (White, 1991). This image has become a core concept in the study of international conflict. The enemy image is viewed as “a necessary precondition for aggressive competition between nations, and essential for the maintenance of armed hostilities” (Thompson, 1991:155). Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) assert that enemy images are insufficient to explain all different forms of strategic relations between states. By using the same construct - enemy image - to explain every competitive aggressive relation between states, the differences among strategic relations between states have been undermined. Only one image can not account for all the variability of relations in international arena, therefore, other images should be identified (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995).

Except for the enemy image, at least four other images - ally, dependent, imperialist, and barbarian - and their corresponding attributes have been identified (Cottam, 1977; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). A description of each of these images reflects evaluation of the other actor's capability, its motivation, and decision making processes/leadership. The enemy image, for example, characterizes the other nation as evil and harmful in its motives but equal in power. The decision making structure and leadership is viewed as complex and highly capable, especially for carrying out evil intentions. Although similar to one's nation in terms of power capability, an enemy is viewed as overridden by domestic weakness which can be revealed if strongly opposed. The ally image is the symmetrical opposite of the enemy image. An ally nation is assumed to have beneficial intentions, is noble, has a patriotic public, and is run by highly capable institutions and government. In terms of power capability it is viewed as similar to oneself. A barbarian state is characterized as being highly aggressive in its motivation, uncontrollable in power, and having an irrational, monolithic and dangerous leadership. Because of these characteristics, the barbarian is viewed as capable of engaging in all kind of brutality and atrocity. The imperialist image is that of a people superior in capability but whose intentions can be both harmful and benevolent. An imperialist is controlling and dominating as well as inherently exploitative. An imperial power is viewed as capable to orchestrate operations of

extreme complexity; however, the decision making structure is not viewed as monolithic as in the enemy or barbarian image. The opposite of an imperialist image, the dependent image, portrays the other nation as low in capability, having weak and inefficient leadership, and essentially in strong need of guidance and control. Its elite is viewed more often as being divided among different sections, incorporating destructive, extreme as well as moderate elements (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:106-121; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, 1997).

## **1.2. Images as Schemas**

The concept of images as used in international relations has its counterpart in psychology, capturing the notion of schema and stereotype in cognitive and social psychology respectively. Schemas are cognitive structures which are formed to organize knowledge about different concepts and stimuli in our environment (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Schema theory implies that our knowledge is organized into clusters which help us deal with complexity of information by influencing the way we select, interpret, memorize, and retrieve information. In this way schemas guide our perceptions about one person, by discounting information that does not confirm existing knowledge or otherwise interpret new information in accordance with the existing schema. According to schema theory, components of schemas are interrelated and knowledge of one of these components leads to deduction of other components or attributes. In other words, the way we interpret the behavior of another person depends on what we already know or how we already view the other person. Moreover, the interrelation between schema components implies that even an impression or abstract information about a person can be used to derive more specific information about that person, to explain and predict his/her behavior, and to guide responses toward that person (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Similarly, stereotypes used in social psychology are schemas serving the function of explaining, rationalizing and justifying behavior. Hence, one's reaction to another person's behavior, whatever that behavior is, can be easily justified. For example, a bad reaction to a nice gesture would be justified if that gesture is conceived as only a technique used by a cunning person to achieve a certain goal.

Assuming that images are schemas, a better understanding of states' behavior can be realized as well as important information such as prediction of policy choices can be


deduced. Indeed, Herrmann et. al. (1997) have experimentally demonstrated that enemy, ally, barbarian, dependent, and imperialist images are schemas. Participants exposed to one of the descriptive attributes - capability, motivation or leadership- of an image of a fictitious country could rightly infer the other two attributes of the respective image. Moreover, consistent with schema theory, the rate of the correct inferences increased significantly when participants were exposed to two rather than one attribute. In another experiment of the same study, participants in the experimental condition were induced specific images about a fictitious nation while the participants in the control condition did not get any treatment. Afterwards, all the participants read scenarios that included information on the country's military actions, speeches on economic human rights, revolution in that country, and information about prisoners. As predicted by image theory, examination of memory and interpretation of information of the scenarios that were read by open ended questions revealed that the information was memorized and interpreted consistently with the previously induced images in the experimental condition but not in the control condition.

### **1.3. International Image Theory**

While all the literature on international images reflects the influence of these cognitive conceptualizations in international relations, Herrmann et. al. (1997) have gone a step further in developing a more formal theory of international images by integrating psychological-level theories with theories at international level. The basic assumption of this theory is that foreign policy choices are a result of behavioral tendencies and sentiments aroused from perceived strategic relations between states. The way actors perceive the strategic relations between states elicit sentiments/emotions which in turn determine both the images and behavioral inclinations or action tendencies toward the other actor (See Figure 1). Images of another country stem from and are a reflection of these perceived strategic relations. Consistent with the schema-stereotype conceptualization, these images serve to justify the behavioral tendencies toward the other country as well as to maintain a positive and moral image of self. For example, the endorsement of an enemy image would be useful and necessary to justify the inclination to attack another country, a behavior which otherwise may constitute an

Figure 1

Causal relationships between structural perceptions, sentiments/emotions, images, and action tendencies.



immoral act. In such conditions, knowledge about international images is important to understand and predict states' behavior.

The perceived strategic relations from which images are assumed to stem from are a function of three dimensions: perceived goal compatibility between states, assessment of relative power capability, and evaluation of the cultural status of the other actor (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). The first two dimensions are adopted from international relations theory. The first dimension, goal compatibility, refers to the threat or opportunity posed to an actor by another country. In this dimension, given that there is a goal interdependency between the two actors, there are basically three options of relations: another actor maybe threatening, pose an opportunity to exploit, or give a chance for mutual gain. Power has been the central variable in realist theory to describe relations between states in international environment; however, a judgment of power capability by itself is not sufficient to determine policy choice (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). A judgment of relative power determines the direction to policy choice given the motivation of the other country, whether it poses a threat or an opportunity. Judgments about relative cultural sophistication have been important in sociological and psychological studies and studies of racial and ethnic conflict (Herrmann et. al., 1997). It is assumed that judgments of relative cultural status/sophistication affect estimates of relative power and the threat or the opportunity they pose, therefore affecting policy choice. However, there is no definition up to now indicating what aspects of culture these judgments of cultural status include. Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) argue that perceived cultural differences affecting the norms



that subjects assume will be relevant in the relations between two states, such as norms of justice and reciprocity, are the important factors in cultural judgments.

Enemy image emerges when two nations are perceived as highly competitive but similar in capability and cultural status. This pattern of interaction elicits feelings of threat to both actors about each other, thus making enemy image a symmetrical mirror image with both actors viewing each other in similar ways. These feelings of threat and insecurity combined with perceived equal capability arouse inclinations to eliminate the threat by attack. However, a strategy of containment is the most feasible in this situation, given the perceived equal power capability. An image of the other as highly hostile, capable of generating conspiracies, and untrustworthy, serves to justify containment/attack approaches toward the other country and deal with the affective dimension that these relations evoke.

Ally, another symmetrical image, is the polar opposite of enemy image. The ally image condition arises when an actor sees the other as equal in terms of power and cultural status but different from the enemy image the two states are perceived to have mutual goals and interests. They view the relation with each other as an opportunity for mutual gain; hence there is an inclination to cooperate with each other. Viewing the other as benign and similar to oneself, driven by positive forces and led by a moral leadership, serves to facilitate the cooperation between the two countries. Working together in such a case becomes a moral duty.

When another actor is perceived to have incompatible goals with oneself, be superior in terms of capability but culturally inferior, the typical image of the other nation is of a barbarian. In such a scheme, where the other is higher in power and the presence of incompatible goals signals incoming threat alerts the actor to take action to protect oneself. The perceived cultural inferiority elicits insecurity about the way that the other would act, or may even infer that the actor is capable to use its power uncontrollably and unpredictably. Given these conditions, the best strategy to deal with the threat posed would be self-protection. More specifically, the threatened state may consider insulation at least temporarily until a better strategy such as finding a powerful ally to ensure its security becomes feasible. A barbarian image of the other - viewing the other as irrational, cunning, brutal, and aggressive - helps to deal with and justify these self-isolative behavioral tendencies as the correct strategy choice.

The perceived threat from a nation viewed as superior in terms of both capability and cultural status leads to a portrayal of that country in terms of imperialist image. The



difference between an imperialist state and a barbarian one rests on the perception of its cultural status. While low cultural status leads a country to choose insulation type of self-protection strategies, a high cultural status triggers resistance and even rebellion, especially when the other's dominance is viewed as illegitimate. The imperial image includes seeing the other as highly sophisticated in terms of decision making processes and institutions, highly capable of carrying out complex strategies, yet, at the same time desiring to exploit the resources of one's own country. Such an image of the other legitimizes one's choice of action, hence making resistance and rebelling logical actions to deal with the situation.

The dependent image, the asymmetrical opposite of imperialist image, portrays the other nation as inferior in both capability and culture but as posing an opportunity for increasing one's gains. Such an interaction leads the more powerful country to exploit the weaker one. However, for the exploitation to become a legitimate and moral behavior, a dependent image of the other emerges. This image includes viewing the other as incapable of taking care of itself, and in need of guidance and direction. In this way, exploitation becomes a moral behavior or even a duty of the most powerful one to intervene in the other country.

#### **1.4. Emotions and Image Theory**

Emotions, although not elaborated in international image theory, are assumed to be an inherent part of the theory. Herrmann (1985) claims that the combination of the three dimensions of perceived strategic relations gives rise to sentiments, which in turn elicit behavioral inclinations and images toward the other state. Out of the international level, the idea that emotions are the mediators between perceptions and action tendencies is the main argument of the appraisal theories of emotions in psychology.

According to these emotion theories (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984), specific emotions emerge as a result of appraisals of specific situations and events. The way these events are perceived in terms of personal goals and interests, that is, whether they harm or benefit the individual, in combination with the resources and capabilities that the individual perceives to possess in order to deal with that particular event or situation, determine the specific emotional reactions toward that event. While the configuration of appraisals of the situation and the self triggers emotions, emotions in

turn trigger behavioral inclinations. These theories have gone even further in differentiating among different discrete emotions suggesting that discrete emotions or specific combinations of them correspond to specific cognitions and give rise to specific action tendencies.

Some researchers have attempted to identify the appraisal dimensions that would correspond to discrete emotions. While evaluations and interpretations of events determine the emotion experienced, not all appraisals elicit emotions (Roseman, Spindel, and Jose, 1990). Roseman, et. al. (1990) demonstrate that appraisals of relative power or strength, motivational state - whether the event increases one's punishment or reward -, and whether the event is caused by the other person or the situation, are important factors in determining whether and which emotions will be experienced. Different combinations of these appraisals would lead to different emotional reactions. However, there is still a lot of controversies on which appraisal configurations differentiate among different emotions (see Roseman et. al., 1990).

Attempts to build the relation between emotions and action tendencies are made as well. Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) claim that emotions have distinctive goals, thoughts and action tendencies. It is argued that each emotion has different response profiles. For example, the emotion of frustration is related to a awareness of being blocked by obstacles and wanting to overcome the obstacle by taking action. Frijda, Kuipers, and Schure (1989) have examined the relations among the three variables: emotions, appraisals of events, and action readiness. Results suggest that it is possible to predict discrete emotions from appraisals and action readiness, action readiness from appraisal variables, and to differentiate emotions by appraisal and action modes.

Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) carry appraisal theory of emotions to the inter-group relations. In threatening inter-group situations, different appraisals of the situation produce different emotional experiences which in turn produce different action tendencies toward the other group (Mackie et. al., 2000). While positive and negative emotions can be easily differentiated, the challenging question is how to differentiate emotions from appraisals and how emotions lead to response choice. Researchers have differentiated between different appraisal configurations that differentiate anger from other negative emotions such as fear, contempt, or anxiety. For example, when self is perceived as stronger than the other, capable and in possession of sufficient resources, anger is experienced. On the other hand, when the self is perceived as weak, anxiety and fear are experienced. These emotions in turn promote different behavioral inclinations;

anger elicits offensive behavior such as attacking, while fear and anxiety elicit non-offensive reactions (Frijda, 1986, Roseman, 1984).

These emotion theories and their component parts -- appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies --, parallel concepts of perceived structural relations, sentiments, and action tendencies in image theory and their pattern of interdependence. Although cognitions are included in appraisal theories of emotion, these cognitions do not have the form of schemas or stereotypes as in image theory. In this regard, by incorporating images within this framework, image theory goes one step further from psychological theories by adding a functional and predictive value to the model. Brewer and Alexander (2002) attempt to incorporate these two different theories by formally meshing emotions into image theory and using this theory as a generalized model of inter-group relations. The concepts of relative power, goal compatibility, and relative status are the counterparts of coping, goal congruence and legitimacy appraisals in psychology. Drawing on these models of appraisals and emotion, it is assumed that specific emotional experiences mediate the relation between action tendencies and structural relationships.

Table 1 shows Brewer and Alexander's (2002) summary of the emotion appraisal model according to the five configurations of inter-group perceptions and the corresponding images and action tendencies as specified in image theory<sup>1</sup>. In the enemy condition, the dominant emotional experience would be characterized primarily by anger toward the other. However, perceived equal power and cultural status would also trigger respect, envy, and jealousy. Combination of these characteristics with a perception of threat triggers frustration, fear, and distrust. In the ally condition, where goals are viewed as compatible and there is place for opportunity rather than threat, only positive emotions of trust, respect, and admiration which lead to cooperation strategies are experienced. Fear and intimidation mediate the relation between structural perceptions and self-protection responses in the barbarian image condition. A perception of threat associated with evaluation of the other as more powerful characterize both barbarian and imperialist image conditions. What differentiates the two is the cultural status. When the cultural status of the other is perceived as inferior, the predominating emotions are fear and intimidation. However these feelings are

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<sup>1</sup> Only the primary emotions identifying each condition are included in the table.

Table 1  
Image theory of intergroup emotions

<u>Relationship Pattern</u>	<u>Intergroup Emotion</u>	<u>Action Tendencies</u>	<u>Outgroup Images</u>
Goal Compatibility Status Equal Power Equal	Admiration Trust	Cooperation	Ally
Goal Incompatibility Status Equal Power Equal	Anger	Containment or Attack	Enemy
Goal Independent Status Lower Power Lower	Disgust Contempt	Exploitation or Paternalism	Dependent
Goal incompatibility Status Lower Power Higher	Fear Intimidation	Defensive Protection	Barbarian
Goal Independent Status Higher Power Higher	Jealousy Resentment	Resistance or Rebellion	Imperialist

Note: Adopted from Brewer and Alexander (2002).

associated with feelings of disgust because of the inferior culture which probably would lead to perceive the other as an immoral actor. On the other hand, when the cultural status of the other is perceived as superior, feelings of jealousy, envy, and resentment are elicited. Still, such a relationship pattern (feeling inferior in terms of both culture and power) will produce anger and shame, especially when the other actor is perceived as threatening which in combination with jealousy leads to hostile actions such as resistance and rebelling. The exploitation tendency in the dependent image scenario is mediated mainly by feelings of disgust, contempt, and also pity for the other (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 119). These feelings arise from viewing the other as lower in cultural status and power.

In their research, Brewer and Alexander (2002) apply image theory to the inter-group relations between whites and blacks in the U.S. Given that much research conducted on the nature of the relations of the blacks and whites in the U.S. and a large literature on stereotypes that the members of these two groups hold of each other, makes a study of images very relevant. The perceptions of the structural relationship between the two groups, the way each feels toward the other, and images of each other were measured by a questionnaire instrument distributed to blacks and whites in a high school in the U.S. The results indicated that structural relations between the two groups were viewed in similar light in goal and status dimensions, but not on power dimension. While both groups agreed that whites had more power in terms of wealth and political power, blacks viewed the power differential between the two groups as more extreme than whites did. In line with the assumptions of the image theory and appraisal theories of emotions which assume that inter-group emotions can be differentiated, four emotion factors were extracted, with trust and respect as the first factor, anger and disgust as the second, fear and intimidation as the third, and envy as the fourth factor. Emotions of blacks toward whites were characterized by anger/resentment, and for whites toward blacks by fear and intimidation. Moreover, consistent with the image theory, feelings of anger and resentment of blacks and fear and intimidation of whites corresponded with endorsement of imperialist and barbarian images respectively. In turn, these images and emotions were associated with the appraisals of the inter-group relations as predicted by the theory.

## **1.5. Social Identifications and Image Theory**

According to image theory as described above, the perceived strategic relations between states is the primary element from which emotions, behavioral inclinations, and images of an actor for another stem. However, while these structural relations as perceived by the actor are very important, factors related to the perceiver himself, such as individual attributes that may be influential in how this context of relations is interpreted and reacted to are not taken into account by the theory. Although not explicitly stated, inherent in image theory is the assumption that for images to be formed, individuals should be part of a national or ethnic group and to a certain degree feel attached to that group. The question to be posed in such a condition relates to how individuals committed at different degrees to a certain national group differ in their reactions to the threat or opportunity another state actor poses.

Social identity theory, the dominant explanatory approach in the study of inter-group relations in social psychology, is highly relevant to this question. Tajfel (1982: 255) defines an individual's social identity as "his or her knowledge that he belongs to a certain social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership". In other words, according to social identity theory, part of an individual's self concept derives from the membership group. Because social group defines part of a person's self image, people are motivated to view their groups positively. In this line, the theory assumes that people strive to maintain or enhance positive self esteem by evaluating their groups favorably in comparison with out-groups, thus contributing to a positive social identity. Threats to identity can evoke divergent perceptions and reactions depending on the degree of group identification. Therefore those who feel highly committed to their group are more inclined to protect their group's image than the less committed group members (Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1999). For Tajfel and Turner (1979), inter-group attitudes are always a product of an interaction between the need for positive social identity and perception of the structure of inter-group relations (cf. Turner, 1996). An implication of the theory is that the more people identify with a group the more their self-image depends on that of the group, hence the more motivated are the individuals to maintain a positive social identity. In distinguishing between high and low identifiers, it can be argued that high



identifiers will try more strongly to sustain a positive group image by seeking an especially favorable image of their group in comparison to other groups (Alexander, Levin, and Henry, in press).

Mackie et. al. (2000) relate inter-group emotions to social identity. They claim that when social identity is salient, inter-group emotions emerge based on appraisals of inter-group relations and lead to action tendencies toward the out-group. Therefore, threatening inter-group situations are more likely to elicit strong emotions and behavioral tendencies toward the out-group, because in-group identity is threatened. Individuals relate to their nations in similar ways as they relate to other groups they are a member of (Druckman, 1994). Returning to an international level, it follows from these arguments that the degree to which a person feels attached to one's nation is important in defining his sentiments and reactions toward the threat or opportunity posed by another state. For someone who highly identifies with his country, such as nationalists for whom nation as an identity is highly salient, the intensity of emotional response to threats or opportunities will be strong. Thus, the specific patterns of interaction with other countries will be affected by strong attachment to the perceiver's nation. A central point is that the manifestation of the images varies depending upon whether or not people are nationalistic (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 97). For the non-nationalist, the primary attachment is to groups other than the nation. For example if a nation state were threatened by an imperialist, it is likely that the response would be angry rejection based upon perceived illegitimacy and injustice of the threat. However, such a response is unlikely from a person whose primary attachments are not to the nation but to other groups, and who does not identify with the nation.

These arguments on social identities are highly relevant to image theory because they suggest that social identifications influence the whole framework presented by image theory. The degree of identification with one's nation determines whether the perceived structural relations will elicit strong emotions toward the out-group hence influencing the formation of images and action tendencies.

## **1.6. Empirical Research on Image Theory: Some Initial Studies**

Most of research on images have been retrospective research conducted by qualitative methods and content analysis (Alexander, Levin and Henry, in press). A similar retrospective research on image theory is conducted by Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) which have used image theory to explain policy choices and relationships among Iran, Iraq, Soviet Union, and the U.S in Persian Gulf. Despite the importance of these retrospective studies, empirical validation of the theory is of utmost importance. Given the recentness of the formulation of the theory in its formal form by Herrmann, there are only few studies that try to test the internal validity of the theory.

Herrmann et. al. (1997) have conducted a series of experiments in order to examine the internal validity of the international image theory by testing some of its inductions. After demonstrating that images are schemas by testing the relations between its components, Herrmann et. al. went on testing the theory deductions, specifically the relation between different components of the theory as predicted by a schema conceptualization of images. An experiment was designed to examine the relation between image and policy choice and the role of emotion and affect as a mediator between the two in the enemy condition. The theory predicts that increased threat and endorsement of more negative emotions would lead to more stereotypical enemy images which in turn would lead to more aggressive action tendencies toward the other actor as revealed in the choice of more coercive policies (Herrmann, et. al., 1997). In the control condition, participants received neutral information about another country. In the first treatment condition, information meant to induce enemy images was given. The same treatment as in the first condition plus information meant to generate negative affect was given in a second treatment condition. All analyses demonstrated that negative affect induced was the critical factor both in interpretation of the target country in stereotypical enemy terms as well as in choosing of more coercive policy options toward that country.

Alexander, Brewer, and Herrmann (1999) have carried image theory beyond the international relations domain so as to apply it to all inter-group relations. Such an application would imply that different structural relations between groups would generate specific images and behavioral inclinations as proposed by image theory. In



order to test this assertion, in laboratory conditions, participants read several scenarios where inter-group situations were manipulated and described according to different combinations of the three strategic relations: assessment of relative power capability, evaluation of goal interdependence, and perceptions of relative cultural status of the two groups according to the four image conditions: enemy, ally, dependent, and barbarian. Except for the barbarian condition, these scenarios, as predicted by image theory, gave rise to the respective images and response strategies toward the other group. Moreover, all of the induced images matched with the induced behavioral tendencies elicited by scenario information. In another similar experiment, incidental arousal was induced independently of the content of the scenarios. Under this condition, the barbarian image and the respective response strategy was activated as well indicating that some arousal is critical to elicit the emotional and cognitive make-up associated with this particular image. While in the two experiments explained above, the induced images and behavioral tendencies were measured by multiple choice questions, in a third experiment, the authors used open-ended questions in order to reduce a possible effect of forced-choice measure on endorsement of these two variables. The answers provided by the participants were stereotypical and matched better with the ideal typical images as predicted by the theory showing an even stronger effect than when the answers were provided by the experimenters.

While these experimental studies are very important in testing the internal validity of the theory, research in real world settings is crucial as well. Alexander, Levin, and Henry (in press) have conducted a direct test of the image theory with a Lebanese sample by conducting a survey which included questions about structural relations between Lebanon and the U.S., images of the U.S., as well as questions on religious and social identities and social dominance orientations of Lebanese people. The U.S. Iraqi intervention in the Middle East makes such a study of images very important both theoretically and practically. First, in such relationship conditions, a general prediction of Lebanese perceptions of the strategic relations with the U.S. could be made, hence making this research a test of external as well as internal validity of the theory. Moreover, at policy level, it is important to get to know how an Arab population views the U.S. after such actions and therefore predicts the possible responses toward the U.S. The results of the study indicate that the predominating combination of structural relationship according to the three dimensions was perceived higher power but lower cultural status of the U.S. and high goal incompatibility; thereby leading to the

endorsement of a barbarian image of the U.S. Moreover, those participants who endorsed this particular structural relationship were significantly more likely to endorse a U.S. barbarian image than all other participants in other combinations of structural dimensions. Controlling for goal compatibility and perceived power, the more the participants viewed the U.S. as culturally inferior, the more strongly the barbarian image was endorsed. The examination of the social identifications and social dominance orientations in this study add an important and different perspective to image theory by including in the theory the individual factors that maybe influential in image formation and behavioral inclinations. While religious identification revealed no effect, high identification with Arabs and Palestinians but low identification with Americans and the West predicted higher endorsement of barbarian image when controlling for structural relationships characteristics, implying thus for an independent effect of social identity on image formation.

### **1.7. The Current Study**

The present research replicates and builds on Alexander, Levin and Henry's (in press) study on Lebanese images of the U.S., Lebanese social identity, and their social dominance orientations in the aftermath of Iraqi war. This research replicates Alexander et. al. (in press) in exploring Turks' national and religious identifications, perceived strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S., and Turkish citizens' images of the U.S. The study is extended in exploring action tendencies and emotions toward the U.S.; however, social dominance orientations are not assessed in this study.

A replication of the study in a Turkish context is justified in the light of Turkey's special identity as a bridge between the East and West, both politically and culturally, associated with the U.S. Iraqi intervention and the recent ambiguous relations between the two countries. Turkey has been the U.S. strategic ally in Middle East during the Cold War and after the 90's, and has stood beside the U.S. during the first Gulf War. However, there have been disparities between the Middle East policies of the two countries concerning the Kurdish issue in Northern Iraq (Sever, 2002). The U.S. intervention in Iraq was associated with a crisis of relations between the two countries concerning the rejection of the U.S. by Turkey to use its military bases for an attack against Iraq. After the intervention in Iraq, Turkey has been concerned with the

maintenance of the integrity of Iraqi territory and has clearly stated its position against the formation of a federal state in Iraq. A recent survey conducted by Pew Research for the People and the Press<sup>2</sup> revealed perceptions of the U.S. and of the recent events in the Middle East in seven countries including Turkey. According to this survey, the majority in Turkey believe that the war in Iraq did not help the war on terrorism; 55% of the Turkish respondents believed that the U.S. is overreacting to terrorism and exaggerating terrorist threat; and the U.S. is viewed as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. From the end of the Iraqi war, a rise in support to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign has increased in Turkey (from 22% to 37%). People in Muslim nations including Turkey doubt the sincerity of the U.S. in its war, by suggesting that the real goals of the U.S. are to help Israel and even to target Muslim countries. 52% of the Turks surveyed view Christians unfavorably and about 31% find the attacks against Americans in Iraq as justifiable.

This context of Turkey-U.S. relations and the diverse perceptions of the public toward the U.S. make a study of images in this context interesting as it gives the possibility for further exploration of images and their attributes. For the same reasons, this diversity becomes a challenge for image theory.

The ultimate aim of this study is to empirically test the theory in a Turkish context by examining the structure of theory components – perceived strategic relations, images, action tendencies, and emotions- and their inter-relationships, as well as to see how social identities relate with the components of image theory.

### **1.8. Goals and Hypotheses**

The model proposed by image theory implies causal relations: structural perceptions as independent variables elicit sentiments/emotions which in turn elicit images and action tendencies (See Figure 1, pp. 6). However, sentiments/emotions are not yet formally incorporated into the theory. Although structural perceptions are the independent variables, the examination of the model in this study will start with images and action tendencies as the crucial variables in the model followed by the examination of structural perceptions and their interrelations with images and action tendencies.

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<sup>2</sup> “A Year After Iraq War. Mistrust of America in Europe even higher, Muslim anger persists.” March, 16, 2004. <http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=79>.

Assessment of emotions toward the U.S. and their fit into the theory will be next, with social identifications being the last variables to be examined.

### **1.8.1. Images and action tendencies**

The first goal of this research is to explore the structure of perceptions that Turks have of the U.S. and whether these perceptions match the images as described by image theory. Theory advocates remind that these five images as described are prototypical; therefore, it is not expected for any sample to endorse the exact prototypical images. In the same line, the study aims to explore action/behavioral tendencies toward the U.S. and their relation with the relevant images.

**Hypothesis 1.** The endorsement of one or more images of the U.S. is associated with endorsement of the relevant action tendency: enemy image is associated with attacking; imperialist image with resistance/rebellion; barbarian image with self-protection; ally image with cooperation; and dependent image with exploitation/paternalism.

### **1.8.2. Structural perceptions**

By assessing the perceived structural relations between Turkey and the U.S. in terms of the three dimensions of relative power, cultural status, and goal compatibility, the study aims to test whether the respondents endorsing one of the five particular combinations of these three dimensions would also endorse the relevant images and action tendencies as predicted by image theory. In terms of perceived structural relations between the two countries, it can be predicted that most Turks would perceive the U.S. to have more power than Turkey; however, more diverse responses are expected relating to culture and goal compatibility.

**Hypothesis 2.** If a sample of Turks view the U.S. as relatively superior in power, inferior in cultural status, and as having incompatible goals, than a barbarian

image associated with the tendency to protect oneself by isolation would be endorsed.

**Hypothesis 3.** When controlling for power and goal compatibility, those respondents that view the U.S. culture as inferior, are likely to endorse the barbarian image and self-protection action tendency more than the respondents who view the U.S. culture in more positive terms.

**Hypothesis 4.** Those respondents that view the U.S. as superior in both power and cultural status compared to Turkey, and perceive the goals of the two countries as incompatible are expected to endorse an imperialist image associated with resistance or rebellion tendencies toward the U.S.

**Hypothesis 5.** The respondents that view the U.S. as similar in cultural status and as having compatible goals are more likely to view the U.S. as an ally, much more so than all other respondents in other combinations.

**Hypothesis 6.** It is unlikely that a configuration of goal incompatibility associated with inferior power and culture would be endorsed by a Turkish sample; therefore, a dependent image and exploitation/paternalism tendency toward the U.S. will not be endorsed.

### **1.8.3. Emotions**

Another goal of the study is to contribute to the limited literature on emotions in inter-group relations by assessing emotions that Turks have of the U.S. and thus build one more block in the incorporation of emotions into image theory. The aim is to assess the structure of the emotional patterns of Turks toward the U.S. and examine the relation of these emotions to other components in the image theory. It is expected that discrete emotions correspond to specific cognitive appraisals of the relations of the two countries and action tendencies toward the U.S.

**Hypothesis 7.** Each of the particular combinations of the three dimensions of strategic relations endorsed by this sample would be associated with the relevant emotions as shown in Table 1 (pp.13);

**Hypothesis 8.** Each of the emotions would be associated with the relevant action tendencies and images (Table 1, pp13).

Both image and emotion theories make claims about the direction of causality among these variables. While this study is not designed to test and establish the causality among these variables, examination of the possible directions of relations among variables is attempted with the available methodology within this research's design limitations. Appraisal theories of emotions predict causality flow from cognitive appraisals of structural relations to sentiments to action tendencies; image theory adds the "image" variable next to the action tendencies, thus predicting that sentiments are the mediating variables eliciting both action tendencies and images.

**Hypothesis 9.** The appraisal of structural relations affect images and action tendencies via emotions.

#### **1.8.4. Social identifications**

By assessing social identifications, the current study aims to build on Alexander et. al.'s (in press) work on establishing social and religious identities as independent variables having an impact on the formation of images and action tendencies. Religious (Muslim) and Turkish identification, identification with the Arab world and with the West, as well as identification with Americans may be important determinants of the images of Turks toward the U.S. In terms of ingroup/outgroup distinction, the first three – religious identification, Turkish identification, and identification with Arab world – would posit the U.S. as an outgroup; on the other hand, identification with the West and with Americans implies an ingroup positing. Social identity theory predicts that independent of the effect of structural perceptions, each of these identifications will be related to the endorsed images and action tendencies. Because social identity theory functions at the level of ingroup/outgroup distinction, direct predictions cannot be made on the relation between these identification variables and the specific images and action tendencies. While Turkish identification and identification with the Americans are the most relevant identification variables in this study because they apply directly to the ingroup and the outgroup being studied, the other three variables are more vague in this respect. Religious identification and identification with the Arab world posit the U.S. as an outgroup; however, the two maybe overlapping identities. Different from the Lebanese sample in Alexander et. al.'s (in press) study for which Arabness is an



ingroup identity, this is not the case for the Turkish sample. High identification of participants with the Arab world in this context, may be important given that they perceive an intense conflict between Arab world and the U.S. Religious (Muslim) identity would posit the U.S. as an outgroup in a religious dimension, however religious identification is not salient in the context of Turkey - U.S. relations. This identity overlapping with Arab identity may become salient in the context of the U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Identification with the West, on the other hand, would posit the U.S. as an ingroup; however, it should be taken into account that the U.S. and the West are not necessarily perceived in the same way. The West may be perceived in more heterogeneous terms, still implying an outgroup positing for the U.S.

**Hypothesis 10.** In the context of relations between Turkey and the U.S., supposing that there is no direct threat from U.S. to Turkey, identification with Turks would be related to stronger endorsement of imperialist image and resistance/rebellion action tendencies

**Hypothesis 11.** Identification with the West and Americans, would be related to stronger endorsement of ally image and cooperative tendency.

**Hypothesis 12.** Drawing from Alexander et. al. (in press) findings, it is hypothesized that the identification with the Arab world would be related to stronger endorsement of the barbarian image of the U.S.

Making predictions about religious identification in this context is difficult. Therefore the approach to this variable will be exploratory.

Mackie, et. al. (2000) argue that social identifications' impact on inter-group perceptions is related to inter-group emotions. When group identity is salient, the degree of experienced emotions toward the other group is higher. In this line, a goal of this study is to explore the relation between social identities and emotions as related to images and action tendencies. Given that the above hypotheses on the relation of social identifications with images and action tendencies are supported, it is expected that each identification variable is related to the emotion corresponding the endorsed image.

**Hypothesis 13.** It is expected that the identification with the U.S. and Americans will be positively related to experience of trust.

**Hypothesis 14.** Identification with Turks would be related primarily to anger and envy.

**Hypothesis 15.** Identification with Arab world would be related to fear and intimidation.

While it is important and interesting to get to know about the views, images, and action tendencies of Turks about the U.S., especially after the U.S. intervention in the Middle East, it is not the aim of this study to make general claims about Turkish perceptions toward the U.S. The focus of this research, rather than the endorsement of these variables per se, is to make an empirical test of the image theory in an international context by examining the structure of these variables and their inter-relations as predicted by image theory. The findings will indicate the degree of the endorsement of specific images and action tendencies toward the U.S. by a particular Turkish sample; how these images are related to perceptions of structural relations; whether experienced emotions toward the U.S. match relevant images, action tendencies, and structural relations; and whether the assessed social identifications are associated with images as predicted by social identity theory.



## 2. METHODS

### 2.1. Participants

In order to measure perceptions about Turkey –U.S. strategic relations, images, action tendencies, and emotions of a Turkish sample toward the U.S., as well as their social and religious identities were assessed. For this purpose, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to a sample of 226 undergraduate students (131 males and 93 females, aged 17-34 with median age of 21) at Sabanci University in Istanbul, Turkey. Sabanci University is a five year old private university with a current population of 1548 undergraduates.

The questionnaires were distributed and filled in 13 different undergraduate classes randomly chosen from the course pool during the spring semester 2004. Stratified sampling was applied to make sure that each year, from the freshman to the senior year, was equally represented in the data. The data include the two faculties at Sabanci University, the Faculty of Arts and Social Science and Engineering. When two courses from the same department were randomly selected, the second one was eliminated and another class selected in order to avoid including classes from the same department and with the same students in the sample. The instructors of each of the randomly selected courses were contacted in advance and asked for permission to use the last 10 minutes of their lectures for the students to fill in the questionnaires.

Despite being born and raised in Turkey, twelve respondents do not identify themselves with Turks or any other national or ethnic group; ten of the respondents identify themselves as both Turks and Kurds; twenty four of them identify with another ethnic group in addition to Turkish identification. 73% of the sample feel part of a religious group. Among these, 32% identify themselves as Muslims but not with any of the sects, 48% as Sunni Muslims, while 2 persons identify themselves as Shiite (Alevi). Two respondents are Christians and 3 are Jews. More than half of the respondents (134 respondents) are born and raised in one of the three biggest cities in Turkey: Istanbul,

Ankara, and Izmir. Respondents were asked about their parents education level. 78% of the fathers and 58% of the mothers of the respondents have a least a university degree or higher. Economically, 62 % perceive themselves as from middle-class families, 30% from high income, and 5% from low<sup>3</sup>.

## **2.2. The Instrument**

The questionnaire instrument was adopted by Alexander, Levin and Shana (in press). A shorter version of this questionnaire was previously conducted in Lebanon at the American University of Beirut. The questionnaire that Alexander et. al. have used in Lebanon was first extended and adapted to the Turkish context by the authors of the survey. The original English instrument was translated to Turkish by three different translators (See the questionnaire in Turkish at Appendix). After initial translation, each item in the questionnaire was further investigated and scrutinized by three faculty members, experts in international relations, cultural issues, and survey methodology, in order to ensure the appropriate adaptation of each item to the Turkish context. It was taken care that the message that the original English version of each item aimed to convey at the first place was not compromised, ie., conserved. A pilot study was conducted with 14 students in the Conflict Analysis and Resolution master's program at Sabanci University. Minor changes in the overall structure of the questionnaire were made and one question on cultural perceptions was altogether eliminated because of its ambiguity in meaning<sup>4</sup>.

In the last version of the questionnaire, the items were organized into 5 major parts, each part corresponding to each theoretical component to be measured. The questionnaire began with demographic questions. The first part included religious and social identification items, followed by the second part with questions aiming to assess

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<sup>3</sup> The question on economic status asked respondents to categorize themselves in one of the three categories: high income, middle-class, and low income.

<sup>4</sup> The omitted culture item was: "What are your perceptions about the different ways Americans and Turks live?" The multiple choices were: 1) The Turkish way of life is better than that of the U.S. 2) The Turkish way of life is just as good as that of the U.S. 3) The Turkish way of life is worse than that of the U.S. Respondents at the pilot stage were not clear to what "the way of life" refers.

perceived structural relations between the two countries, the third on action tendencies toward the U.S., and the last, the fourth measured Turks' images of the U.S. This last part was a scale to assess emotions toward the U.S.

### **2.2.1. Image and action tendency items**

In order to measure Turks' images of the U.S., twenty five items, five items for each of the five images - enemy, ally, imperialist, barbarian, and dependent images- were deducted from theory. Each item was constructed so as to measure different attributes of each image as described in the image theory. These components differentiate between different images and include assessment of the other country's intentions, motivations, and leadership characteristics (see Table 2 for the full list of image items). Respondents were asked to determine to what degree they agreed with each of the statements. Responses were measured in 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Reliability analyses among items were conducted for each of the five images and a composite scale for each of the images calculated by the mean of the items for each image. One of the dependent and ally image items were dropped because of the low correlations with other items in each scale. The five-item scale of the enemy ( $\alpha = .72$ ), imperialist ( $\alpha = .63$ ), and barbarian image ( $\alpha = .60$ ) as well as the four-item scale of the ally ( $\alpha = .60$ ) and dependent image ( $\alpha = .58$ ) showed good reliability. All the items were presented in random order.

Similarly, a total of twenty statements, four statements reflecting each of the five different action tendencies related to the five different images, were constructed (see Table 3 for the full list of the action tendency items). Cooperation, attack/containment, resistance/rebellion, self-protection, and exploitation tendencies were measured for the corresponding ally, enemy, imperialist, barbarian, and dependent images, respectively. One resistance/rebellion action tendency item was dropped because of the low correlations with other items in each corresponding scale. Reliability analyses demonstrated adequate reliability for each scale of four items assessing attack/containment ( $\alpha = .54$ ), cooperation ( $\alpha = .77$ ), self-protection ( $\alpha = .38$ ) and exploitation action tendency ( $\alpha = .40$ ), and for three-item resistance/rebellion action tendency scale ( $\alpha = .71$ ). Composite image and action tendency scores were calculated by getting the means of the items in each of the five image and action tendency

Table 2  
Image items used in the questionnaire.

<u>Image name</u>	<u>Items</u>
Enemy	<p>The U.S. has no hostile intentions toward Turkey (reverse coding)</p> <p>The U.S. cannot be trusted</p> <p>The U.S. is motivated by evil forces</p> <p>The U.S. carefully develops plans to harm other nations</p> <p>The U.S. lies to get what it wants</p>
Ally	<p>The U.S. will fulfill the agreement it has made with us</p> <p>The U.S. will work together with us to achieve mutual goals</p> <p>U.S. leaders have good intentions</p> <p>The U.S. values cooperative solutions</p> <p>We cannot count on help from the U.S. when we need it (reverse coding)*</p>
Imperialist	<p>Some Turks have allowed themselves to be used for furthering the U.S. agenda</p> <p>Americans are arrogant and conceive themselves as better than others</p> <p>The U.S. tries to exploit Turkey for its resources</p> <p>The U.S. uses its power to prevent others from getting ahead</p> <p>The U.S. would not take advantage of us to promote its own goals (reverse coding)</p>
Barbarian	<p>The U.S. uses its power uncontrollably</p> <p>The U.S. enjoys intimidating others</p> <p>The U.S. only uses violence as the last resort</p> <p>The U.S. behaves irrationally</p> <p>The U.S. is out of control.</p>
Dependent	<p>The U.S. needs guidance from us</p> <p>The U.S. wants to do better, but it does not know how to do better</p> <p>U.S. leaders are too simple minded to be very effective</p> <p>The U.S. can do quite well without help from Turkey (reverse coding).</p> <p>Americans could do better for themselves if they had more discipline*</p>

\* = Dropped Items

Table 3.  
Action tendency items used in the questionnaire

<u>Action Tendency</u>	<u>Items</u>
Attack/ Containment	<p>We should fight them.</p> <p>We should heighten the presence of our military to contain the U.S.</p> <p>We should show them that we can retaliate with similar force if they provoke us.</p> <p>We should attack them to get what we want.</p> <p>We should defend our own resources while trying to take some of theirs.</p>
Cooperation	<p>We should develop joint policies so that we both benefit.</p> <p>We should combine our strengths by sharing our resources with them.</p> <p>We should work with them so we both can achieve our goals.</p> <p>We should strengthen our partnership with them</p>
Resistance/ Rebellion	<p>We should discourage their intervention in our affairs.</p> <p>We should reduce their influence in Turkey.</p> <p>We should rebel against them.*</p> <p>We should resist them to keep them from taking advantage of us.</p>
Self-Protection	<p>We should insulate ourselves from the U.S. so they cannot hurt us.</p> <p>We should protect ourselves from them as best we can.</p> <p>We should just get out of their way and hope for the best.</p> <p>We should try not to provoke them.</p>
Exploitation	<p>We should take advantage of the U.S. for our own benefit.</p> <p>We should show them how to use their own resources more efficiently.</p> <p>We should help them because they cannot help themselves.</p> <p>We should use their resources to help achieve our goals.</p>

\* Dropped Item

conditions. All of the image and action tendency items were presented in random order within their respective parts in the questionnaire.

### **2.2.2 Perceived structural relations**

Strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S. were assessed by items addressing perceptions of relative power, cultural status, and goal compatibility of the two countries. Relative power was assessed by three items asking respondents whether they viewed Turkey as superior, equal, or inferior in comparison to the U.S. in terms of military power, economic power and world power that each country possesses. Each of these three items had five multiple choice answers. For example, the multiple choices assessing the relative economic power included the following five responses: 1) Turkey is much wealthier than the U.S. 2) Turkey is somewhat wealthier than the U.S. 3) Turkey and the U.S. are equal in terms of economic power. 4) The U.S. is somewhat wealthier than Turkey. 5) The U.S. is much more wealthier than Turkey.

One item addressed the perceptions of the relative cultural status of Turkey and the U.S. by directly asking the respondents how they perceive the two cultures. The available responses to this question were: 1) The Turkish culture is far superior to the U.S. culture. 2) The Turkish culture is somewhat better than the U.S. culture. 3) None of the cultures is superior to the other. 4) The U.S. culture is somewhat better than Turkish culture. 5) The U.S. culture is far superior than Turkish culture.

Three out of the four items designed to assess goal compatibility addressed recent events and policies related to Iraqi war. The respondents were asked about their opinion on 1) the U.S. current involvement in Iraq 2) allowing U.S. access to Turkish territory to fight Iraq 3) the U.S. war on terrorism. The responses of each of the three questions included 3 point multiple choice answers: 1) This policy benefits both the U.S. and Turkey. 2) This policy benefits the U.S. without hurting Turkey. 3) this policy benefits the U.S. at the expense of Turkey. Higher numbers reflect higher goal incompatibility. The fourth item on goal compatibility assessed a more general goal of the two countries, namely the compatibility of the two countries' democracy visions: 1) Turkey shares the same vision of democracy with the U.S. 2) Turkey's vision of global democracy is slightly different from the vision of the U.S. 3) Turkey's vision of global democracy is completely different from the vision of the U.S.

The above questions capture the recent events in the Middle East by relating to the interests and goals of the U.S. and Turkey. In these terms, goal compatibility is assessed only as related to the Iraqi war. However, the U.S. and Turkey have a wide range of relations and interests other than the recent Middle Eastern concerns. Therefore, to make a general evaluation of goal perceptions between the two countries another measure of general goal compatibility, a scale of six items was constructed. The items are: “The goals of the U.S. are compatible with those of Turkey”, “The goals of the U.S. are incompatible with those of Turkey (reverse coding)”, “The U.S. and Turkey have similar goals”, “The U.S. and Turkey have different goals (reverse coding)” “The U.S. and Turkey cooperate with one another”, “The U.S. and Turkey compete with one another (reverse coding)”. The six items were presented in random order among image items. A composite scale of general goal perceptions was constructed by averaging the scores of these six items.

### **2.2.3. Emotions**

Sentiments toward the U.S. were assessed by asking respondents to indicate how strongly they felt about the U.S. in terms of each of the 24 emotions that were listed in the questionnaire. The listed emotions were: respect, fear, sympathy, anger, trust, contempt, awe, disgust, hostility, gratitude, intimidation, envy, admiration, jealousy, warmth, resentment, irritation, disrespect, fury, pity, worry, liking, anxiety, and affection. A 10-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 10 = very strongly) was provided and respondents were asked to place a number from 1 to 10 in the blank place beside the name of each emotion.

### **2.2.4. Identifications items**

Five items assessed respondents’ religious identifications. However, preliminary to the identification items, respondents were asked whether they felt themselves part of a religious community at all. Those that did not feel close to a religion skipped the questions on religious identification. On the other hand, those respondents that felt close to a religion went on with other questions. Respondents were asked “To what religious



community do you belong?” in order to identify each one’s religious community. The degree of identification with religion and belonging to the religious community was assessed with these questions: “How often do you think in terms of your religious beliefs in your daily life”, “How important is your religion to your identity”, “How strong are your religious beliefs”, “How strongly do you identify with the members of your religious community” and “How close do you feel to the members of your religious community”. Reliability analyses of this five-item scale demonstrated very good reliability ( $\alpha = .90$ ). An aggregate variable of religious identification was calculated by averaging the scores for the five items.

Apart from religious identification, the degree of identification with Turks, Americans, the West, and the Arab world was assessed. Firstly, a question on the ethnic and national origin was asked: “Are you a Turk?”, “Are you a Kurd?” and “What other groups do you feel yourselves related to?”. Participants were asked to respond these questions by circling “Yes” or “No” written beside the first two question, or write the national/ethnic group they belong to in the blank place provided beside the third question. The degree of identification with each of the groups was measured by two items asking how strongly they identified with each of the groups and how close they felt to each of the groups. For example, the two items assessing identification with Arab world were: “How strongly do you identify with the Arab world?” and “How close do you feel to the Arab world”. Two questions on patriotism were also included “How patriotic do you feel towards Turkey?” and “How proud do you feel of being a Turk?”. The two questions on Turkish patriotism were combined with the identification items with Turks making a four item scale of Turkish identification. Two-item scales for identification with the West ( $\alpha = .91$ ), with the Americans ( $\alpha = .91$ ) and the Arab world ( $\alpha = .83$ ) and the four-item identification scale with Turks ( $\alpha = .90$ ) demonstrated very good reliabilities in reliability analyses. The identification items for each group were aggregated by averaging the items in each scale.



### **3. RESULTS**

#### **3.1. The Structure of Images and Action Tendencies**

The first goal of the study was to assess the structure of images and action tendencies endorsed by the Turkish sample. To assess whether image items differentiate the images they belong to from other images, as predicted by image theory, and to determine which of the images are meaningful for this Turkish sample, the 25 image items were entered into a factor analysis. Principle component analysis with varimax rotation extracted a 7-factor solution each with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 61% of the variance in the sample. Only variables loading more than ,40 onto a factor were retained. The first factor incorporated three imperialist and two enemy image items and was the largest factor explaining 24% of the variance. The imperialist image items loaded in the first factor are: “The U.S. uses its power to prevent others from getting ahead”, “Americans are arrogant and are convinced they are better than others”, “The U.S. tries to exploit Turkey for its resources”. The two enemy image items address U.S. leadership motivations: “The U.S. carefully develops plans to harm other nations” and “The U.S. is motivated by evil forces”. Despite the two enemy image items, this factor can be safely interpreted as the factor explaining the imperialist image. In the imperialist image, the imperialist leadership can be viewed in both positive and negative terms (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). In this case the leadership motivations are perceived negatively; therefore, these two enemy image items by themselves do not really differentiate between enemy and imperialist images. This pattern of perceptions becomes even more meaningful in the context of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and suspicions related to the U.S. motivations in the Middle East.

The second factor explains 10% of the sample and corresponds to the ally image, including three ally image items and one enemy image item loaded negatively onto the factor. The ally image items loaded in this factor are: “The U.S. will fulfill the agreements it has made with Turkey”, “The U.S. will work together with us to achieve

mutual goals” and “The U.S. values cooperative solutions”. The enemy image item that loaded negatively in the factor is “The U.S. has no hostile intentions toward Turkey (reverse coding)”. The ally item on the U.S. leader’s intentions “The U.S. leaders have good intentions” did not load on this factor, implying once more about a general view of the U.S. leadership intentions as motivated by bad intentions.

The third factor was composed of imperialist, enemy, and barbarian image item; however, a meaningful interpretation of the underlying dimension in terms of images could not be made. The remaining barbarian and dependent image items have been distributed among the last four factors. Only the first two factors however were retained both because they explained most of the variance in the sample and they reflected a meaningful dimension in terms of accounting for images. Each of the last five factors explained less than 7% of the variance in the sample (see Table 4 for the summary of factor analysis results).

Similarly, action tendency items were entered into a factor analysis. Principle component analysis with varimax rotation extracted 6 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 65% of the variance in the sample. Only items loading more than 0.40 in a factor were retained. The first factor explained 18% of the variance and was composed of the four cooperation tendency items and one exploitation tendency item. The exploitation item loaded in the first factor was: “We should take advantage of the U.S. for our own benefit”.

The second factor explained 13% of the variance and included two attack/containment items, “We should attack them to get what we want” and “We should fight them”; one self-protection tendency item, “We should insulate ourselves from the U.S. so that they cannot hurt us”; and one resistance/rebellion item, “We should rebel against them”. Except for the self-protection item, the other three items underlie offensive behavior toward the U.S.; therefore, this factor was named by the attack tendency category.

Three resistance/rebellion items and one self-protection item loaded in the third factor which explained 11% of the variance. The resistance/rebellion items are: “We should reduce their influence in Turkey”, “We should discourage their intervention in our affairs”, and “We should resist them to keep them from taking advantage from us”. The self-protection item is “We should protect ourselves from them as best as we can”. The resistance/rebellion tendency corresponding to the imperialist image, in this case, stands closer to the resistance rather than rebellion end of this continuum. The inclusion

Table 4.  
Summary of the results of factor analysis conducted with image items.

Factors	%	Loading
<u>Factor 1</u>	24	
The U.S. carefully develops plans to harm other nations		,75
The U.S. uses its power to prevent others from getting ahead		,74
Americans are arrogant and conceive themselves as better than others		,65
The U.S. is motivated by evil forces		,62
The U.S. tries to exploit Turkey for its resources		,52
<u>Factor 2</u>	10	
The U.S. will fulfill the agreement it has made with us		,81
The U.S. has no hostile intentions toward Turkey*		-,77
The U.S. will work together with us to achieve mutual goals		,60
The U.S. values cooperative solutions		,43
<u>Factor 3</u>	7	
We cannot count on help from the U.S. when we need it*		-,67
The U.S. would not take advantage of us to promote its own goals		,60
The U.S. cannot be trusted		,57
The U.S. enjoys intimidating others		,48
Some Turks have allowed themselves to be used for furthering the U.S. agenda		,46
The U.S. lies to get what it wants		,44
<u>Factor 4</u>	6	
U.S. leaders are too simple minded to be very effective		,80
The U.S. behaves irrationally		,64
The U.S. wants to do better, but it does not know how to do better		,57
Americans could do better for themselves if they had more discipline		,48
<u>Factor 5</u>	5	
The U.S. only uses violence as the last resort		,72
U.S. leaders have good intentions		-,63
<u>Factor 6</u>	5	
The U.S. uses its power uncontrollably		,83
The U.S. is out of control.		,62
<u>Factor 7</u>	4	
The U.S. needs guidance from us		,81
The U.S. can do quite well without help from Turkey		,70

% = Percentage of variance explained by each factor.  
\* = Reverse Coding

of the self-protection item “We should protect ourselves from them as best as we can”, moreover, suggests a more extreme form of resistance and incorporates fear as well. All of these items reveal strong resistance tendencies toward the U.S corresponding to the imperialist image, therefore the factor was named as resisting tendency. The remaining attacking, exploitation, and self-protection items loaded in the last four factors; however, each of these factors explained a smaller portion of the variance explained, and did not reflect an underlying dimension in terms of action tendencies as described in the theory, so they were discarded from further analysis. Only the first three factors were retained, cooperation, resistance, and attacking tendencies, respectively (See Table 5 for the summary of the factor analysis with action tendency items). Factor scores for both of the factor analyses were calculated to be used in further analyses.

The results of these two factor analyses indicate that the respondents endorse two images – imperialist and ally- and three action tendencies – cooperation, resistance and attacking. Other images and action tendencies are not meaningful in explaining perceptions of this Turkish sample for the U.S. The retained factors however, are not composed exclusively of items of the retained images or action tendencies. Some of the items describing other dimensions loaded in the retained factors and some of the items theory wise belonging to the retained images/action tendencies did not load on the extracted factors. One explanation is that the structure of Turkish perceptions toward the U.S. is slightly different from the prototypical images as described by the theory. Another explanation may be attributed to measurement error. All images are described in terms of capability, motivation, and decision making processes, and there may be similarities or overlapping in the description of these dimensions among images. Therefore, the mixing of the items from different images and action tendencies in factor analyses, may also suggest that some of the differences in the description of these attributes of images are not captured by the items used in this survey.

### **3.2. Images and Action Tendencies**

For comparison reasons with other studies which have exclusively used composite scales of the prototypical images in their analyses rather than factor loadings, the analyses on the respondents’ endorsement of images and action tendencies will be conducted with both factor scores and the composite scales of each of the five images

Table 5.

Summary of the results of factor analysis conducted with action tendency items.

Factors	%	Loading
<u>Factor 1</u>	18	
We should work with them so we both can achieve our goals		,81
We should strengthen our partnership with them		,80
We should develop joint policies so that we both benefit		,77
We should combine our strengths by sharing our resources with them		,53
We should take advantage of the U.S. for our own benefit		,50
<u>Factor 2</u>	13	
We should attack them to get what we want		,82
We should fight them		,78
We should insulate ourselves from the U.S. so they cannot hurt us		,72
We should rebel against them		,49
<u>Factor 3</u>	11	
We should reduce their influence in Turkey		,82
We should discourage their intervention in our affairs		,79
We should resist them to keep them from taking advantage of us		,68
We should protect ourselves from them as best we can		,63
<u>Factor 4</u>	7	
We should defend our own resources while trying to take some of theirs		,86
We should use their resources to help achieve our goals		,85
<u>Factor 5</u>	7	
We should help them because they cannot help themselves		,80
We should show them how to use their own resources more efficiently		,70
<u>Factor 6</u>	5	
We should heighten the presence of our military to contain the U.S.		,66
We should show them that we can retaliate with similar force if they provoke us		,66
<u>Factor 7</u>	5	
We should just get out of their way and hope for the best		,75
We should try not to provoke them		,62

Note: Total variance explained 65% . Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

% = Percentage of variance explained

and action tendencies derived from the theory. Such analysis is also important to compare data driven versus theory driven results, that is results from images and action tendencies as extracted from factor analyses and results from images and action tendencies as derived from theory.

Two different analyses are conducted to determine which images and action tendencies are endorsed most by the sample. First, the means of each image and action tendency variables are compared in order to assess which of the images is most endorsed by the sample

in general. Second, by transforming the image and action tendency variables into categorical variables the number of respondents endorsing each image was assessed.

**First:** Composite scales for means of the items loading in each of the retained factors were computed and then compared in a paired sample t-test and repeated measures ANOVA for the two images and three action tendencies respectively. Results revealed that the imperialist image ( $M = 5,17$ ,  $SD = 1,11$ ) was endorsed more ( $t = 13,481$ ,  $p < .000$ ) than the ally image ( $M = 3,48$ ,  $SD = 1,24$ ). Similarly, resistance action tendency was the most endorsed tendency ( $M = 5,31$ ,  $SD = 1,27$ ), followed by cooperation action tendency ( $M = 4,67$ ,  $SD = 1,34$ ). The attacking tendency is not endorsed by the sample ( $M = 1,67$ ,  $SD = ,99$ ). Repeated measures ANOVA indicated significant differences between the three action tendencies  $F(2, 224) = 526,37$ ,  $p < .001$  (paired sample t-tests among pairs of the three action tendencies were all highly significant at probability lower than .001).

Analyses with the composite scales derived from theory, in line with the analyses with the retained factors, indicated that the most endorsed image was the imperialist image ( $M = 5,34$ ,  $SD = .97$ ). Imperialist image was followed by barbarian ( $M = 5,22$ ,  $SD = 1,03$ ), enemy ( $M = 4,66$ ,  $SD = 1,23$ ), dependent ( $M = 3,43$ ,  $SD = 1,26$ ) and lastly ally image ( $M = 3,17$ ,  $SD = 1,07$ ). Repeated measures ANOVA indicated significant differences among the five images  $F(4, 219) = 200,6$ ,  $p < .001$ . Except for the barbarian and the imperialist image, all other differences between pairs of images were significant at probability level lower than .01. Therefore, from these analyses, it seems that the barbarian image is endorsed as highly as imperialist image. However, as indicated by the factor analyses results, such an image is not meaningful for this Turkish sample in this context. Such a result supports the assertion that the items used do not differentiate among barbarian and imperialist image.



The most endorsed action tendency was resistance/rebellion tendency ( $M = 5,64$ ,  $SD = 1,31$ ), followed by cooperation ( $M = 3,95$ ,  $SD = 1,31$ ), exploitation ( $M = 3,58$ ,  $SD = 1,21$ ), self-protection ( $M = 3,16$ ,  $SD = 1,01$ ), and attacking behavioral tendencies ( $M = 2,71$ ,  $SD = 1,03$ ). Repeated measures ANOVA with the five level action tendencies revealed significant differences among groups,  $F(4, 224) = 403,65$ ,  $p < .001$  (all paired samples t-tests between the groups were significant at level lower than .001).

**Second:** In order to assess the number of respondents endorsing each of the images and action tendencies, each of the image and action tendency mean scores derived from the items loaded in each of the retained factors as well as from the aggregate scales of the five images were transformed from interval 7-point Likert scale variables to categorical variables with three levels: does not endorse the image/action tendency (range: 1-3), undecided (range: 3,1-4,9), endorses the image/action tendency (5-7). Frequency results are reported in Table 6 and 7. As shown in Table 6, frequency results also indicate that imperialist image and resistance tendency are endorsed by most respondents in the sample. While cooperation tendency is also highly endorsed, ally image is not. Results in the Table 7 with composite scales of five images and action tendencies, while showing that imperialist and resistance/rebellion tendencies were the most endorsed, also indicate barbarian image is as well highly endorsed, supporting the previous ANOVA results revealing no difference between endorsement of imperialist and barbarian image.

To assess the relation between images and action tendencies in order to test Hypothesis 1, Pearsons correlations were conducted between each image factor score and action tendency factor score as well as between composite scales of the five images and action tendencies.

Correlations of factor scores: Consistent with Hypothesis 1 the imperialist image was highly correlated with the resistance action tendency ( $r = ,33$ ,  $p < ,001$ ) but not with attacking action tendency. Ally image, on the other hand, was highly correlated with the cooperation tendency ( $r = ,50$ ,  $p < ,001$ ) and negatively correlated with resistance ( $r = - ,167$ ,  $p < ,05$ ) and attacking action tendency ( $r = - ,186$ ,  $p < ,05$ ) (See Table 8 for the summary of correlation results).

Correlations among five composite scales: Bivariate correlations among five aggregate scores of images and action tendencies showed that barbarian image was correlated with self-protection action tendency ( $r = ,150$ ,  $p < ,05$ ), resistance/rebellion tendency ( $r = ,410$ ,  $p < ,01$ ) and negatively correlated with the cooperation tendency ( $r =$



Table 6.

Frequency results of respondents endorsing each of the images and action tendencies as retained from factor analyses results.

	<u>Imperialist</u>		<u>Ally</u>		<u>Resist</u>		<u>Cooperate</u>		<u>Attack</u>	
	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>
Endorses	142	63	30	13	150	66	112	50	2	2
Undecided	69	31	104	46	62	27	84	37	10	4
Does not endorse	9	4	92	41	13	6	29	13	211	93
Total	226	100	226	100	225	100	225	100	225	100

Note: The mean scores of the items in each image and action tendency retained from factor analysis were transformed into categorical variables: 1-3 endorses; 3,1-4,9 undecided; 5-7 does not endorse.

Freq. = Frequency; Percen. = Percentage.

Table 7.

Frequency results of respondents endorsing each of the five images and action tendencies as derived from the theory.

Images	<u>Imperialist</u>		<u>Ally</u>		<u>Enemy</u>		<u>Barbarian</u>		<u>Dependent</u>	
	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>
Endorses	157	70	10	4	96	43	135	60	35	41
Undecided	58	26	106	47	104	46	82	36	99	44
Does not endorse	5	2	110	49	26	12	7	3	92	16
Total	226	100	226	100	226	100	226	100	226	100

Action Tendencies	<u>Resist/Rebel</u>		<u>Cooperation</u>		<u>Attack/Contain</u>		<u>Self-Protection</u>		<u>Exploit/Paternalism</u>	
	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Percen.</u>
Endorses	173	77	57	25	4	2	11	5	35	16
Undecided	40	18	116	51	68	30	97	43	106	47
Does not endorse	12	5	52	23	153	68	117	52	84	37
Total	226	100	226	100	226	100	226	100	226	100

Note: Each of the 7-point Likert scale of the mean of image items was transformed into categorical variables: 1-3 endorses; 3,1-4,9 undecided; 5-7 does not endorse.

Freq. = Frequency, Percen. = Percentage.

-,192,  $p < ,01$ ). The imperialist image was correlated with all action tendencies except for exploitation ( $r = ,482, p < ,001, r = ,231, p < ,01, r = ,225, p < ,01, r = -2,76, p < ,01$  for resistance, self-protection, attack/containment, and cooperation, respectively). The enemy image was correlated with attack/containment tendency ( $r = ,295, p < ,01$ ), resistance/rebellion ( $r = ,460, p < ,01$ ) and negatively correlated with cooperation ( $r = -,412, p < ,01$ ). The ally image was correlated with cooperation ( $r = ,542, p < ,01$ ) and exploiting ( $r = ,236, p < ,01$ ) and negatively correlated with resistance/rebellion tendency ( $r = -,322, p < ,01$ ). The significant correlations between imperialist, barbarian, and enemy images and the corresponding action tendencies reject the first hypothesis by demonstrating once more that the measures of these variables do not differentiate them from each other properly (See Table 9 for a summary of correlation results).

**Table 8**  
Summary of bivariate correlations between each image and action tendency factor scores as extracted from factor analyses.

<u>Images</u>	<u>Action Tendencies</u>		
	<u>Resistance</u>	<u>Cooperation</u>	<u>Attacking</u>
Imperialist	,33***	,02	,15
Ally	-,17*	,49***	-,19**

Note: \* = ,05, \*\* = ,01, \*\*\* = ,001

**Table 9**  
Summary of bivariate correlations between each of the five images and action tendencies with composite scales as derived from theory.

<u>Images</u>	<u>Action Tendencies</u>				
	<u>Resist.</u>	<u>Coop.</u>	<u>Attack.</u>	<u>Self-Prot.</u>	<u>Exploit.</u>
Imperialist	,48***	-,28***	,23***	,23***	-,034
Ally	-,32***	,54***	-,12	-,03	,24***
Enemy	,46***	-,41***	,30***	,30***	-,07
Barbarian	,41***	-,19**	,06	,15*	-,03
Dependent	,11	,01	,16*	,11	,14*

Note: Resist. = Resist/Rebel tendency, Coop. = Cooperation tendency, Attack. = Attack/Containment tendency, Self-Prot. = Self-Protection tendency, Exploit. = Exploitation/Paternalism tendency.

\* = ,05, \*\* = ,01, \*\*\* = ,001

### 3.3. Perceived Structural Relations

The items measuring structural perceptions were entered into factor analysis to see whether these items measure the three different dimensions –goals, power, culture - as predicted by image theory, as well as to examine the weight of each of the dimensions on the structural perceptions. Principle component analysis with varimax rotation extracted a three factor solution with eigenvalues more than 1, explaining a total of 53% of the variance. The three factors corresponded to the three structural dimensions as predicted by the theory. The four goal items loaded in the first factor which explained 23% of the variance. The three power items loaded together on the second factor, explaining 17% of the variance in the sample. The third factor was composed of only the culture variable and explained 12% of the variance. Factor scores were retained to be used in further analyses (See Table 10 for the summary of the factor analysis results).

Table 10.

Summary of the Results of Factor Analysis Conducted with Perceptions of Structural Relations

Factors	%	Loading
<u>Factor 1</u> - Goal Compatibility	23	
Which of the following is your opinion toward the U.S. war on terror?		,71
Which of the following is your opinion about allowing the U.S. access to Turkish territory to fight Iraq?		,70
Which of the following are your opinions about the U.S. current involvement in Iraq?		,69
Which of the following is your opinion toward the U.S. vision for democracy in all nations?		,45
<u>Factor 2</u> – Relative Power	17	
Compared with the U.S. how much world power does Turkey have?		,79
What is the difference between Turkey and the U.S. in terms of economic strength?		,60
What is the difference between Turkey and the U.S. in terms of military strength?		,44
<u>Factor 3</u> – Relative Cultural Status	12	
Compared with the U.S. how much world power does Turkey have?		,93

Note: Total variance explained 53% . Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

To determine how people view the U.S. in terms of these structural perceptions, the number of respondents endorsing each combination of the three structural dimensions was calculated. In order to obtain a categorical scale of the goal compatibility measure from the four items on goal compatibility, respondents are categorized in three categories according to their perceptions of – compatible, independent and incompatible goals- according to the proportion of “compatible”, “independent” and “incompatible” responses given in the four items. Three out of the four responses should belong to one of these categories in order for a respondent to be categorized in those categories. A separate category was constructed for those respondents whose responses varied more among items. This category was named as “contradictory goal perception” because such replies suggest contradicting perceptions of goals of the two countries in terms of the items asked in the questionnaire. For example, when a respondent had two “compatible”, one “independent” and one “incompatible” answers, then s/he was categorized in the “contradictory goal perception” category. The responses of power and culture items were first reduced into three categories by combining the “much more superior” with “somewhat more superior” categories. Then, the three power items were aggregated into one scale similarly to the procedure conducted with the goal items, except in this case at least two of the three responses should be the same in order for the individual to be categorized in one of the three groups: “Turkey is more powerful than the U.S.”, “Turkey and the U.S. have equal power”, and “The U.S. is more powerful than Turkey”. Those respondents that gave different responses for each of the items were not categorized in any of the three categories, rather a new category of “contradictory power perceptions” was constructed for these respondents.

To assess how this Turkish sample views the U.S.- Turkish relations in terms of these three dimensions of the image theory, a crosstabulation analysis was run with the new aggregate items of relative power, culture, and goal compatibility. Only 179 cases were valid and included in the crosstabulation because of the high rate in the missing values in goal question<sup>5</sup>. While nobody reported Turkey and the U.S. equal in power, only two of the respondents stated Turkey to be more powerful than the U.S., and three

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<sup>5</sup> The high number of missing values in the goal compatibility scale may reflect the lack of the following choice: “This policy is against both countries”, among the available multiple choices in the question. However, this choice was not included on purpose, because it does not reflect a goal compatibility dimension.

respondents have given varied answers among the three power questions so they could not be classified in any of the three conditions. Among 174 people that perceived the U.S. as more powerful than Turkey, 121 persons (70%) perceived Turkish culture as superior. Among those respondents that perceived Turkish culture as superior, 49% (59 persons) perceived the goals of the U.S. and Turkey to be incompatible, while 42% (51 persons) were categorized in the “contradictory” category because of the varied responses among the three choices. Forty-five persons perceived the two cultures to be relatively equal in terms of cultural status. Among those that perceived equal cultural status, 22 respondents perceived the two countries’ goals as incompatible, while 19 gave contradictory responses (See Table 11 for the summary of crosstabulation results).

Because the four goal questions address specific goals related to the recent events, the goal compatibility measure may be biased to these specific events they address. In order to assess whether perceptions change relatively to general assessment of goal compatibility perception, another crosstabulation with the general goal measure is conducted. The 7-point Likert scale of general goal perception measure was reduced into a three category variable: incompatible goals (range: 1 - 3,50), undecided (range: 3,51 – 4,50), and compatible goals (range: 4,51 - 7). A crosstabulation analysis was conducted with relative power, culture, and the new categorical goal compatibility variable. Results are not very different from the previous crosstabulation analysis, showing that the majority of the respondents (216 out of 222) perceived the U.S. as superior in terms of power as compared to Turkey. Among those that viewed the U.S. power as higher, 63% perceived Turkish culture as superior, 32% perceived equal cultural status, and 4% perceived the U.S. culture as superior to Turkish culture. In terms of goal compatibility, 57% (124 persons) were undecided about whether the goals of the two countries were compatible or not, 33% (72 people) reported that the U.S. and Turkey have compatible goals, while 9% (20 people) perceived incompatible goals (See Table 12 for the summary of crosstabulation results).



Table 11.  
Number of Respondents for each Configuration of the Three Dimensions of Structural Perceptions.

Power	Goals				
	<u>Contra.</u>	<u>Comp.</u>	<u>Indep.</u>	<u>Incomp.</u>	<u>Tot.</u>
<u>Contradictory Power</u>					
TK. Culture Sup.	-	1	-	1	2
Equal Status	-	-	-	1	1
<b>Total</b>	-	1	-	2	3
<u>Turkey more power</u>					
TK. Culture Sup.	1	-	-	1	2
<b>Total</b>	1	-	-	1	2
<u>U.S. more power</u>					
TK. Culture Sup.	51	5	6	59	121
Equal Status	19	4	-	22	45
U.S. culture sup.	5	-	-	3	8
<b>Total</b>	75	9	6	84	174

Note: Contra.= Contradictory goal perceptions; Comp. = Compatible goals; Incomp. = Incompatible goals; Tot. = Total; Contradictory power = Contradictory power perceptions; TK. = Turkey; Sup. = Superior.

Table 12.  
Number of respondents for each configuration of the three dimensions of structural perceptions with general goal compatibility used as an assessment of goal compatibility.

Power	Goals			
	Comp.	Undecided	Incomp.	Total
<u>Contradictory Power</u>				
TK. Culture Sup.	1	1	-	<b>2</b>
Equal Status	1	-	-	<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3</b>
<u>Turkey more power</u>				
TK. Culture Sup.	1	2	-	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3</b>
<u>U.S. more power</u>				
TK. Culture Sup.	46	80	11	137
Equal Status	23	38	9	70
U.S. culture sup.	3	6	-	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>216</b>

Note: Comp. = Compatible goals; Incomp. = Incompatible goals; Contradictory power = Contradictory power perceptions; TK. = Turkey; Sup. = Superior.

### 3.4. Perceived Structural Perceptions, Images, and Action Tendencies

The second hypothesis predicts that participants with a certain combination of the three structural dimensions – power, goals, and culture - would endorse the corresponding image and action tendency as predicted by image theory. The only available combination of the three dimensions from crosstabulation analysis is perceived high power, low culture, and incompatible goal cell. The theory in this case predicts the endorsement of barbarian image for these respondents. However, as revealed by the results of factor analysis, the barbarian image is not meaningful for this sample. In order to assess whether respondents in this particular combination of structural perceptions endorse one of the images and action tendencies more strongly than the other respondents in the other combinations,

independent sample t-tests between the respondents in this cell and all other respondents were conducted for each of the image and action tendency factor scores. Results of the independent t-tests between these two groups revealed that respondents in the high power, low culture and incompatible goal combination endorsed imperialist image significantly more ( $t = 2,25, p < ,05$ ) and ally image significantly less ( $t = -3,17, p < ,01$ ) than all other respondents. Among action tendencies only cooperation action tendency scores were significantly different ( $t = -2,48, p < ,05$ ) between the two groups, showing that respondents in this combination endorse less cooperation tendencies toward the U.S.

The same analyses were conducted with aggregate images and action tendencies to see whether this group would endorse the barbarian image and the corresponding action tendency more than did the other groups, as predicted by the theory. Independent t-tests with aggregate images and action tendencies showed that this group viewed the U.S. in more enemy ( $t = ,469, p < ,01$ ) and imperialist image terms ( $t = ,252, p = ,001$ ) but in less ally image terms ( $t = -3,369, p = ,001$ ). Among five different action tendencies, only the cooperation tendency was significantly different, with the selected group endorsing less cooperative tendencies than the rest of the respondents ( $t = -2,981, p = ,003$ ). These analyses reject hypothesis 2 stating that respondents in this combination will endorse a barbarian image and its corresponding action tendency toward the U.S. Given these results, Hypothesis 3 (controlling for power and goal compatibility, those that perceive U.S. culture in more inferior terms endorse the barbarian image more than those respondents that perceive U.S. culture more positively) becomes invalid. As the respondents in this combination have an imperialist image and endorse a resistance action tendency toward the U.S., then the fourth Hypothesis - controlling for power and culture, those that perceived the U.S.- Turkey goals as more incompatible would endorse more the imperialist image and resisting action tendency toward the U.S. than those that perceive goals as less incompatible - applies to this combination. Among respondents that viewed the U.S. as higher in power and lower in culture, an independent t-test was conducted between those that viewed the goals between the two countries as incompatible and those who had more contradictory answers among goal items. Results from independent t-tests between the two groups indicated that persons with higher goal incompatibility endorsed less an ally image of the U.S. and cooperative action tendencies toward the U.S. than the ones with more contradictory perceived goals ( $t = -2,89, p < ,01$  and  $t = -2,1, p < ,05$  for ally image and

cooperative action tendency respectively). There were no other differences between the two groups. These results reject the hypothesis that implies that differences in goal compatibility perceptions are crucial for the endorsement of imperialist image; in turn they suggest that goal compatibility is crucial in endorsement of ally image and cooperative tendencies.

### **3.5. Emotions and Image Theory**

In order to assess the underlying structure of the emotional reactions toward the U.S., the 24 emotions were entered into a principal component analysis. Five factors with eigenvalues more than 1 were extracted from varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization and explained 66% of the variance. The first factor explained 28% of the variance with the highest loadings on fury, disrespect, irritation, and hostility. Other emotions that loaded in this factor were disgust, anger, and resentment. A composite scale of anger was computed with the means of the highest loading emotions. The second factor explained 20 % of the variance with highest loadings on admiration, envy, like, and jealousy. The other emotions that loaded more than ,40 in this factor were respect, sympathy, and warmth. A composite scale of envy was computed by averaging the highest loading emotions. The third factor explained 7% of the variance and included emotions of affection, trust, and gratitude. A scale of anxiety was retained by the fourth factor which included worry and anxiety emotions and explained 6% of the variance. The last factor explained 4,5 % of the variance and included emotions of awe, contempt, and intimidation. Scales of trust, anxiety, and fear were retained by taking the means of items in the last three factors respectively (See Table 13 for the summary of the factor analysis results). Consistent with the psychology literature on emotions, not only positive and negative emotions are differentiated, but differentiation within positive and negative emotions takes place as well. The second and third factor differentiate between trust and envy, while the first, fourth and fifth factor differentiate among anger, anxiety, and fear. The factors extracted, except anxiety, match those extracted by Brewer and Alexander (2002) in their study of blacks and whites in the U.S. It is argued that all these emotions are important in differentiating among images. Therefore, the last three factors are retained although they explain only small portion of variance in the sample.

Table 13.  
Summary of the results of factor analysis conducted with emotions.

Factors	%	Loading
<u>Factor 1 - Anger</u>		
Fury	28	,84
Disrespect		,82
Irritation		,79
Hostility		,73
Anger		,68
Resentment		,60
<u>Factor 2 - Envy</u>		
Admiration	20	,86
Envy		,82
Like		,81
Jealousy		,75
Respect		,61
Sympathy		,60
Warmth		,57
<u>Factor 3 - Trust</u>		
Affection	7	,73
Trust		,67
Gratitude		,65
<u>Factor 4 - Anxiety</u>		
Worry	6	,86
Anxiety		,85
Pity		,50
<u>Factor 5 - Fear</u>		
Awe	4,5	,60
Contempt		,57
Intimidation		,51

Note: Total variance explained 66% . Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

% = Percentage of total variance explained

Image theory suggests that emotions arise from particular combinations of structural perceptions. Hypothesis 7 states that particular configurations of the structural perceptions are associated with the relevant emotions as predicted by image theory (For a review see Table 1, pp. 11). The only combination of the three dimensions of strategic relations with sufficient number of respondents for statistical testing is the high power, low culture and incompatible goal cell from the cross-tabulation analysis. In order to assess emotions that are associated with this configuration of structural perceptions in the Turkish sample, independent samples t-tests between the respondents in this group and all other respondents were conducted for the five emotion factors. According to theory predictions this combination is related to barbarian image, so in this case fear, intimidation and disgust would be the emotions endorsed by these respondents. However, because in this sample this combination is related to the endorsement of imperialist image and resistance action tendency, then the emotions predicted by the theory would be anger and envy. In line with this argument, independent-samples t-tests indicated that the respondents in the high power, low culture and incompatible goals cell reported more anger ( $t = 3,77, p < ,001$ ) but less trust ( $t = -3,5, p < ,01$ ) and envy ( $t = -2,26, p < ,05$ ) toward the U.S. than all other respondents. There were no differences between the two groups on anxiety and fear sentiments.

In order to test the relation between emotions and images and action tendencies as predicted by image theory (Hypothesis 8), factor scores for each image and action tendency were regressed into emotions. The results of regression analysis conducted with enter method show that imperialist image is associated with anger (Beta = ,303) and fear (Beta = ,197) ( $R^2 = ,165, p < ,001$ ); ally image on the other hand was negatively associated with anger (Beta = -,213) and positively associated with trust (Beta = ,213) ( $R^2 = ,17, p < ,001$ ). From the three available action tendencies only cooperation and resistance tendency were significantly associated with emotions. Cooperation tendency was negatively associated with anger (Beta = -,18) and anxiety (Beta = -,136) and positively associated with envy (Beta = ,322) and trust (Beta = ,157) ( $R^2 = ,26, p < ,001$ ). Resistance action tendency was associated with anger (Beta = ,314) and negatively associated with trust (Beta = -,276) ( $R^2 = ,219, p < ,001$ ).

These analyses demonstrate that images and action tendencies are associated with emotions, however they do not show that emotions are the mediating variables leading structural perceptions to images and action tendencies as predicted by image theory. Image theory makes claims about the direction of causality from structural perceptions

to emotions and lastly to images and action tendencies. The principles of path analysis can be used to demonstrate whether emotions are the mediator variables through which the effects of the three dimensions of structural perceptions passes to images and action tendencies. If the effects of structural perceptions passes through emotions, then there would be no direct effect of structural perceptions on images and action tendencies. A path analytical approach is used, in which the direct and indirect effects of each of the emotion and structural perception variables on images and action tendencies are measured. To measure the direct effects of each of the variables on images and action tendencies, multivariate regressions with images and action tendencies as dependent variables, and emotions and structural perceptions as independent variables are conducted. As emotion and image theory literature argues for a direct effect of emotions on action tendencies and images, hierarchical regressions with emotion variables as the first block and structural perceptions as the second block were conducted. Regressions in both of the blocks were conducted with Enter method. Results of the regression analyses are summarized in Table 14. As shown in Table 14, imperialist image was associated with anger (Beta = ,28,  $p = ,001$ ), and negatively associated with power (Beta = -,18,  $p < ,05$ ) and culture (Beta = -22,  $p < ,01$ ) ( $R^2 = ,251$ ,  $p < ,001$ ); ally image was associated with goals (Beta = ,29,  $p < ,001$ ), power (Beta = ,15,  $p < ,05$ ) and negatively associated with anger (Beta = -,17,  $p = ,055$ ) ( $R^2 = ,250$ ,  $p < ,001$ ); resistance action tendency was associated with anger (Beta = ,31,  $p < ,001$ ), and negatively associated with trust (Beta = -,32,  $p < ,001$ ) and power (Beta = -,20,  $p < ,01$ ) ( $R^2 = ,31$ ,  $p < ,001$ ); cooperation tendency was associated with envy (Beta = ,24,  $p = ,004$ ) and negatively associated with goals (Beta = -,26,  $p = ,001$ ) ( $R^2 = ,27$ ,  $p < ,001$ ); attack tendency was associated with anger (Beta = ,17,  $p = ,056$ ) and negatively associated with power (Beta = -,34,  $p < ,001$ ) ( $R^2 = ,17$ ,  $p < ,001$ ). These results demonstrate that the three dimensions of structural perceptions have direct effects on images and action tendencies.

In order to examine the effects of structural perceptions on images and action tendencies via/ through emotions, each of the emotions were regressed onto images and action tendencies. The results of multivariate regression analyses with enter method with emotions as dependent variables and structural perceptions as predictors are summarized in Table 15. As shown in Table 15, power is not associated with any of the emotions; goal compatibility is positively associated with anger (Beta = ,24,  $p < ,001$ )



**Table 14.**

Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting imperialist image, ally image, resistance, cooperation, attacking tendency.

Variable	Imper.	Ally	Coop.	Resist.	Attack
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
<u>Step 1</u>					
Anger	,35***	-,21*	-,13	,32***	,20
Envy	,04	,12	,29***	-,00	,04
Trust	-,10	,11	,29***	-,33***	,03
Anxiety	-,11	-,10	-,36	,09	-,20
Fear	,16	,01	,04	-,00	-,00
<u>Step 2</u>					
Anger	,28***	-,17*	-,09	,39***	,18
Envy	,02	,07	,24**	-,00	,01
Trust	-,07	,15	,13	-,32***	,01
Anxiety	-,04	-,07	-,11	,11	-,12
Fear	,12	-,01	,03	,03	-,05
Goals	-,03	-,29***	-,26***	,06	-,01
Power	-,18*	,15*	,07	-,20**	,34***
Culture	-,22**	-,04	-,01	,09	-,04

Note: Imperialist image:  $R^2 = ,17$  for step 1:  $\Delta R^2 = ,082$  ( $p < ,01$ ). Ally image:  $R^2 = ,16$  for Step 1:  $\Delta R^2 = ,09$  ( $p = ,001$ ). Cooperation:  $R^2 = ,22$  for Step 1:  $\Delta R^2 = ,05$  ( $p = ,01$ ). Resisting:  $R^2 = ,27$  for Step 1:  $\Delta R^2 = ,04$  ( $p < ,05$ ). Attack:  $R^2 = ,05$  for Step 1 ( $p > 1$ ):  $\Delta R^2 = ,114$  ( $p < ,001$ ).

Higher scores for goals shows goal incompatibility; higher scores for power shows the U.S. to be stronger; higher scores for culture shows the U.S. culture to be superior.

Imper. = imperialist image; Coop = cooperation tendency; Resist. = resisting tendency.  
 +  $p = ,05 - ,06$  \*  $p < ,05$  \*\*  $p < ,01$  \*\*\*  $p < ,001$

Table 15.

Summary of regression analysis for structural perceptions predicting emotions.

Variable	Anger $\beta$	Envy $\beta$	Trust $\beta$	Anxiety $\beta$	Fear $\beta$
Goals	,24***	-,31***	-,31***	,16*	-,11
Power	-,00	,01	,03	,14	-,03
Culture	-,23**	,03	,14+	,01	-,09


Note: Anger:  $R^2 = ,11$  ( $p < ,001$ ). Envy:  $R^2 = ,1$  ( $p = ,001$ ). Trust:  $R^2 = ,11$  ( $p < ,001$ ). Anxiety:  $R^2 = ,05$  ( $p < ,05$ ). Fear:  $R^2 = ,02$  ( $p > ,1$ ).

+  $p = ,062$  \*  $p < ,05$  \*\*  $p < ,01$  \*\*\*  $p < ,001$

and anxiety (Beta = ,16,  $p < ,05$ ), and negatively associated with trust (Beta = -,31,  $p < ,001$ ) and envy (Beta = -,31,  $p < ,001$ ) ( $R^2 = ,11$ ,  $p < ,001$ ); and culture is associated with anger (Beta = -,23,  $p < ,01$ ) and slightly associated with trust (Beta = ,14,  $p = ,062$ ) ( $R^2 = ,11$ ,  $p < ,001$ ). The results in the two tables contradict theory predictions, indicating that while some of the effects of the perceptions of structural dimensions passes through emotions to images and action tendencies, the structural dimensions directly affect the formation of images and action tendencies. See Figure 2-6 for the demonstration of paths of the impact of structural perceptions to emotions and images and action tendencies.

Figure 2.


The illustration of the effects of emotions and structural relations on imperialist image.



Note: The numbers above the arrows show the Beta values from regression analyses.


Figure 3.

The illustration of the effects of emotions and structural relations on ally image.




Note: The numbers above the arrows show the Beta values from regression analyses.

**Figure 4.**  
The illustration of the effects of emotions and structural relations on cooperation tendency.



Note: The numbers above the arrows show the Beta values from regression analyses.


**Figure 5.**  
The illustration of the effects of emotions and structural relations on resistance tendency.



Note: The numbers above the arrows show the Beta values from regression analyses.

Figure 6.

The illustration of the effects of emotions and structural relations on attacking tendency.



Note: The numbers above the arrows show the Beta values from regression analyses.

### **3.6. Social identifications, Images, Action Tendencies, and Emotions**

Are social identities related to images and action tendencies toward the out-group as would be predicted by social identity theory? In order to answer this question, partial correlations controlling for the three dimensions of structural relations were conducted between identification items and image and action tendency items. The analyses with religious identification item was conducted only with respondents that identified themselves as Muslims. Results indicate that while imperialist image is correlated with religious identification ( $r = ,20, p < ,05$ ) and Turkish identity ( $r = ,33, p < ,001$ ), ally image is correlated with identification with the West ( $r = ,20, p < ,05$ ). Among action tendencies, only resistance action tendency was significantly correlated with identification with Turks ( $r = ,32, p < ,001$ ) and negatively correlated with identification with Americans ( $r = -,37, p < ,001$ ).

However, social identities may be related to emotions which in turn may have an impact on images and action tendencies. If this is the case then part of the correlations between social identifications and images and action tendencies are a result of the mediation effect of emotions. Therefore, in order to control for emotions, partial correlations were once more conducted including emotions as controlling variables. After these analyses were conducted, the association of ally image with identification with the West became non-significant. Imperialist image was no more correlated with religious identification, while the association of this image with Turkish identification did not change ( $r = ,37, p < ,001$ ). Resistance action tendency was still significantly associated with identification with Turks ( $r = ,30, p < ,01$ ) and negatively associated

with identification with Americans ( $r = -.22, p < .05$ ) although at a lower degree (See Table 16 for the summary of the results from the two partial correlations).

To assess the association between social identifications and emotions, partial correlations controlling for structural perceptions were conducted between five emotion scales and identification items. Anger was positively correlated with religious identification ( $r = .22, p < .05$ ) but negatively correlated with identification with the West ( $r = -.24, p < .01$ ) and identification with the Americans ( $r = -.34, p < .001$ ). Identification with Americans was also positively correlated with envy ( $r = .34, p < .001$ ) and trust ( $r = .36, p < .001$ ). Trust in addition to its correlation with identification with Americans was also correlated with identification with the West ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ). While fear was only slightly correlated with identification with Arabs ( $r = .17, p = .055$ ), anxiety was not related to any of the identification items.



Table 16.  
Summary of correlation analyses between social identifications, images, and action tendencies.

	Imperialist Image		Ally Image	
	r	Pr*	r	Pr*
Turkish	,30***	,37***	-,06	,09
Arab	,11	,04	-,02	,01
West	,05	,12	,22*	,11
Americans	-,00	,12	,14	-,03
Religious	,27*	,22*	,05	,10

	Resist Tendency		Cooperate Tendency		Attack Tendency	
	r	Pr*	r	Pr*	r	Pr*
Turkish	,31***	,32***	,12	,13	,17*	-,01
Arab	,03	,11	-,03	-,22	,05	,00
West	-,08	-,16	,19**	-,03	-,07	-,16
Americans	-,27***	-,37***	,30**	-,06	-,11	-,05
Religious	,08	,11	-,05	,06	,20*	,11

Note: r = coefficient of bivariate correlations. Pr = coefficient of partial correlation controlling for structural perceptions. Pr\* = coefficient of partial correlations controlling for structural perceptions and emotions. \* p < ,05, \*\* p < ,01, \*\*\* p < ,001.



## 4. CONCLUSION

### 4.1. Images and Action Tendencies

The respondents in this sample endorsed two different schemas about the U.S. corresponding to the ally and the imperialist image, as well as three action tendencies – cooperation, resistance, and attacking. The structure of these images and action tendencies endorsed by this Turkish sample do not match exactly the images and action tendencies as deduced by the image theory (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995, Herrmann et. al., 1997). The items from different images and action tendencies mixed up in different factors. The imperialist image incorporated two enemy image items; the cooperation tendency included an exploitation item; the resistance and attacking tendencies included one self-protection item each. These findings, however, do not necessarily contradict image theory, rather they support Herrmann et. al.'s argument that the images as described in the image theory are prototypes, and that perceptions in international settings may deviate from these prototypes. As the U.S. is perceived to be superior in power, and in the wide variance of impressions about cultural status and goal compatibility, the perception of the ally image and its corresponding action tendency are expected to vary as well. Examining closely the items that are loaded in the two retained image factors gives a better understanding of the structure of perceptions of this Turkish sample about the U.S. The two enemy items loading in the first factor, the imperialist image, address the U.S. motivations specifically, by stating that the U.S. is led by evil forces and that the U.S. develops plans to harm other nations. Similarly, the only ally image item that did not load in the second factor, the ally image, states that the U.S. leaders have good motivations. This pattern implies that suspicion about the U.S. intentions is part of the schema of those participants who view the U.S. in either imperialist or ally terms.

The retained action tendencies, on the other hand, especially the first two – cooperation and resistance - are much closer to the corresponding prototypical

tendencies as described in the theory. This difference may be taken into account by the different nature of images and behavioral inclinations; images as cognitive constructs are complex and therefore may vary more, as well as are also more difficult to measure.

The incorporation of an exploiting item –“We should take advantage of the U.S. for our own benefit”- among cooperation tendency items, suggests a slightly different pattern of relations than that are predicted by the ally image. As no respondent perceived the two countries equal in power, and only a portion of them perceived equal cultural status, the endorsement of the prototypical ally image would contradict image theory. Similarly, the resistance tendency includes a self-protection item - “We should protect ourselves from them as best as we can”- suggesting endorsement of a more extreme form of resistance; it implies experience of fear and therefore may signal the first step to a transition from imperialist to barbarian image endorsement. While the resistance action tendency as described here, stands for mild defensive-resistance behavior, the third factor named as attacking tendency incorporates offensive tendencies, attacking. However, the loading of the self-protection item supporting isolation as a form of protection is contradictory, because the item describes the opposite extreme in behavioral tendencies, switching from attacking as an offensive tendency to isolation as an extreme defensive tendency. This factor includes more extreme forms of reactions to the U.S., in both offensive and defensive directions, weighting more at the offensive side.

Two explanations may pertain to the finding that the other images and action tendencies are not meaningful for the sample studied. First, these results may imply that other images were not schemas for these respondents<sup>6</sup>; second, maybe a measurement

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<sup>6</sup> At this point the difference between endorsing an image-schema and that image-schema not existing should be emphasized. This difference is captured by factor analysis. For example, while attacking tendency was not endorsed by the respondents, still that tendency has a meaning for the sample. Similarly, ally tendency is mostly not endorsed by the sample (mean lower than 4), however respondents endorse such an image or schema.

problem exists. The explanation for a measurement error is supported by the analyses conducted with composite scales of images and action tendencies derived from the theory as compared with the analyses from the retained factors.

Analyses conducted with the retained factors, both comparisons of means of the scales and frequency table results, indicate that respondents in this sample endorse imperialist image and resistance, but also cooperation tendency. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, each of the two images correlated with the relevant action tendency. On the other hand, analyses conducted with aggregate measures of all five images indicate that imperialist, barbarian, and enemy images are all endorsed by the respondents in the sample with barbarian and imperialist images endorsed to the same degree (according to frequency table results however, enemy image is not endorsed). Although all these three images are endorsed, only resistance/ rebellion action tendency was endorsed. Moreover, high correlations between images and non-relevant action tendencies, such as high correlations of imperialist image with all five action tendencies, demonstrate that items used to measure images do not differentiate well among images. The mixing of items in different factors may this way be explained by a measurement error, indicating that these items are not well tuned to make the slight distinctions that may exist between perceptions of different images.

Following the same line of argument, the dependent image is endorsed more than the ally image (despite the means of both of them being below 4, in 7-point Likert scale) and the exploiting tendency corresponding to this image ranks third among five action tendencies. While the analyses with scales derived from the retained factors support Hypothesis 6, stating the unlikeliness of the endorsement of a dependent image of the U.S. by the Turkish sample, these results with aggregate scales reject this hypothesis. The reasons for this discrepancy are better understood by scrutinizing more closely the dependent image items and exploitation items. The dependent image items portray the U.S. as irrational, in need for guidance and help, and as led by ineffective leaders. These characteristics, however, while attributes of the dependent image, are not exclusively so and therefore are misleading. In the context of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, it is conceivable for some respondents to indicate the U.S. actions as irrational and U.S. leaders as ineffective; but at the same time, state that the U.S. needs Turkey because of Turkey's strategic position in Middle East. However, this pattern, although matching dependent image characteristics, is far from a dependent image conceptualization. This argument rather than demonstrating that respondents in this sample do not endorse a

dependent image-schemata, it demonstrates that the items used do not measure the dependent image in this context. Similarly, exploitation tendency items are not relevant to the dependent image. In this case, exploiting the U.S. for one's benefits is far from the concept of paternalism as related to the concept of dependent image. Exploitation tendencies may occur in contexts other than those related to dependent image conditions.

The bottom line of all these arguments is that there are deficiencies concerning the accurate descriptions of each of these images. However, not all of the discrepancy should be attributed to measurement error; rather, this discrepancy may reflect the real structure of perceptions of the U.S. For example, an exploitation tendency item is included in the cooperation tendency extracted from factor analysis; and such, has implications for the pattern of perceived relation of the two countries. The endorsement of two action tendencies, resistance and cooperation, but of only one image, the imperialist, is important in understanding the structure of perceptions of the U.S. While an ally image of the U.S. is not endorsed by the sample, a cooperation tendency is. As previously stated, the implication is that in this case, cooperation does not match to the prototype of ally image action tendency. The tendency to cooperate may lie in the superiority of the U.S. power and perceived need of Turkey's alliance with the U.S., making this kind of cooperation a strategic one. This strategic cooperation slightly differs from the cooperation described in the image theory. It would be useful to establish the difference between the two types of cooperation tendencies. This will be the first step in distinguishing between different types of cooperative behavior, which in turn may lead to the formulation of a new "positive" image.

#### **4.2. Structural Perceptions, Images, and Action Tendencies**

In the two crosstabulations identifying the structure of the perceptions of the three dimensions of strategic relations between the two countries, there was a high degree of uncertainty concerning perceptions about goal compatibility as represented by the large number of respondents in the "contradictory goal perception" cell and "undecided" cell in each of the crosstabulations respectively. While the large number of respondents in the "undecided" cell (more than the half of the sample) in the general goal measure can be interpreted as the individual's uncertainty and indecisiveness about U.S – Turkey

goal compatibility, the “contradictory goal perceptions” responses on the other hand, do not necessarily translate to uncertainty. The “contradictory goal perceptions” cell, rather implies that respondents’ perceptions of the two countries’ goal compatibility are issue specific rather than general. When respondents are forced to provide general statements about goal compatibility, than these varied answers may translate to “undecided” responses but not necessarily so. These two patterns of goal compatibility revealed in crosstabulations are important in better understanding perceptions about the Turkey – U.S. relationship. At this point, it is not possible to find the reason underlying this indecisiveness: whether it reflects uncertainty after the recent events in the Middle East with the U.S. intervention in Iraq, or merely the inability of a large number of respondents to make a general assessment about the compatibility of the two countries’ goals, because simply they lack an idea about goals of the two countries. Whatever the underlying reason, the important finding for this research’s purpose, is that the perceptions of U.S. – Turkey relations are moderate and finely tuned (issue specific) in terms of goal compatibility perceptions, therefore making this sample even more interesting and challenging in terms of investigating image theory.

The high power, low culture, and incompatible goals combination in the first crosstabulation, are the only cell among the five particular combinations defined by image theory that had a sufficient number of respondents to make statistical analyses possible. As the barbarian image is not meaningful for this sample, the existence of this cell by itself contradicts predictions of image theory. More interestingly, barbarian image, is not endorsed more by this group than the rest of respondents. Parallel analyses with both factors and composite scales reveal that it is the imperialist image and cooperative action tendency that differ between this cell and those of all other respondents. The distinction between imperialist and barbarian image with regards to structural perceptions is determined by the cultural dimension, with high and low perceived cultural status of the other corresponding to imperialist and barbarian images, respectively. Consequently, an anomaly in the assessment of culture dimension may help explain the above results. Relative cultural status in the questionnaire is assessed by only one item which does not refer to any specific component of culture. However, the problem with the culture dimension does not pertain to the measure itself, rather to the theory’s deficiency as related to the plausible explanation of this dimension. None of the works on image theory define what it is really meant by cultural status. Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) in their description of images refer to cultural status as related

to values and norms that influence the belief of an actor as to whether the other actor will act morally -- whether the other actor will behave according to values such as justice principles, or whether the other actor does not have any moral value that prevents it from engaging in immoral acts such as atrocities. In Herrmann et. al. (1997), a reference to culture as relating to cultural sophistication is made, however there is no explanation of what cultural sophistication includes. The point emerges that culture is not well defined in image theory, therefore, needs to be clarified and better defined in the image theory framework in order to become a useful concept.

Controlling for power and culture, respondents that perceive goals as more incompatible endorse ally image and cooperation tendency at a lesser degree than respondents that perceive less goal incompatibility. Endorsement of the imperialist image in turn did not change, implying that there maybe a special relation between goal compatibility perception and ally image, similar to the particular relation of perceived cultural status and barbarian image.

### **4.3. Emotions and Image Theory**

The structure of emotions retained by factor analysis supports the psychology literature regarding emotions on differentiation among negative and positive emotions. These results also parallel Brewer and Alexander's (2002) finding of four emotion structure -- anger, trust, envy, and fear -- in the relations between whites and blacks in the U.S., and add one more factor, anxiety, on the emotion structure. This parallelism between the two studies in two different inter-group contexts is important because it suggests the generalizability of this emotional structure in the context of inter-group relations.

Respondents in the high power, incompatible goals, and low culture cell report more anger, but less trust and envy toward the U.S. than all other respondents, thus rejecting Hypothesis 7. According to image theory, this combination is related to barbarian image; so, fear, intimidation, and disgust are the predicted emotions to be endorsed by the respondents in this group. However, these results become meaningful when taking into account that this group of respondents endorse more an imperialist rather than a barbarian image of the U.S. The endorsement of more anger, but less trust and envy by this group, suggests that the "anomalous" relation between this



configuration of structural perceptions and imperialist image is not merely a matter of measurement error of the cultural status variable. The endorsement of these emotions match with the endorsement of an imperialist image. While the prototype of imperialist image is supposed to be associated with envy because of the perceived high culture of the imperialist, in this condition, the endorsement of less envy is consistent with the perceived lower cultural status of the U.S. in this sample. The results support Cottam and Cottam's (2001:91) argument that envy is related to viewing the other actor as superior in both power and cultural status.

Two different analyses accounted for the relations between emotions and images and action tendencies: multivariate regression of images and action tendencies onto emotions, as well as hierarchical regression of images and action tendencies onto emotions as the first block, and structural relation variables as the second. In the first analysis, anger is systematically associated with two images and action tendencies -- positively associated with the imperialist and resistance tendency, and negatively associated with the ally and cooperation tendency. While the ally and cooperation tendency are both related to trust, the cooperation tendency is also related to envy. This result however, does not contradict image theory predictions and Hypothesis 8. Because the U.S. is perceived as superior in power, the U.S. does not fulfill the criteria for being the prototypical ally as described by image theory, thus, taking account of the endorsement of envy. On the other hand, the association of fear with the imperialist image is another reason to argue that imperialist image endorsed by this sample incorporates some elements of barbarian image. The second analysis conducted to examine the mediating effect of emotions between structural perceptions and images and action tendencies, has several implications. First, it demonstrates that while emotions have some mediating effects, structural dimensions directly effect images and action tendencies, thus rejecting Hypothesis 9. Power dimension has only direct effects on images and action tendencies; goals have both direct and indirect effects; and culture dimension influence the dependent variables only indirectly: through anger to ally image; and anger and trust to resistance tendency. Second, the inclusion of the structural dimensions in the regression analyses eliminate the association of several emotions with images and action tendencies -- the association of fear with imperialist image; trust with ally image and cooperation tendency; and the negative association of anger and anxiety with cooperation tendency -- indicating the possible biases occurring in the interpretation of regression analyses because of the inclusion or exclusion of several

variables, leading to implications for the careful use of these results in theory building. Third, emotions and structural perceptions explained only small proportions of variance of the dependent variables, suggesting that other variables important in predicting images and action tendencies are probably excluded. Moreover, the pattern of relationships among structural perceptions, emotions, as well as images and action tendencies may be much more complex than that proposed by image theory (See Figure 2 – 6, pp. 55 -57). However, caution should be made before drawing any conclusions on the above findings on emotions. Both Herrmann et. al. (1997) and Alexander et. al. (1999) have experimentally demonstrated that emotions are critical in inducing images and the corresponding action tendencies (for enemy and barbarian images respectively), as well as interpreting information consistently with the induced images. In this study, participants are given emotion names and asked to report in a 10-point Likert scale the degree to which they experience each of the presented emotions toward the U.S. Because this measure is not context dependent, it may not reflect with accuracy the level of experienced emotions. A more accurate measurement would be a case specific one; for example, asking respondents to remind the emotions they felt in certain context of the two countries' relations, or else, about a special action or policy undertaken by the U.S. as relevant to Turkey.

#### **4.4. Social Identifications and Images**

Consistent with Hypothesis 10, the higher the Turkish identification, the more is the endorsement of the imperialist image and resistance action tendency; this relation is independent of the effects of structural perceptions and emotions, implying a direct effect of national identity on images and action tendencies. Beyond the effect of structural perceptions, the endorsement of ally image increases as the participants identify more with the West and with Americans, supporting Hypothesis 11. The relation of ally image to identification with Americans, but not to identification with the West, lost significance after controlling for the effects of emotions. This suggests that the relation of the endorsement of an ally image of the U.S. with the identification with Americans is more emotionally based than the relation of this image with identification with the West. However, such a pattern does not seem to be the case for the relation between American identification and resistance tendency because the negative



correlation between these two variables remains significant even after controlling for emotion effect.

Table 16 (pp. 59) indicates that bivariate correlation between identification with Americans and ally image is significant, but it loses significance when controlling for structural perceptions, implying that this identification variable has its effect through structural perceptions. It is important to note that only the identification with the West but not with Americans is related to resistance tendency, suggesting that respondents view the Western world in heterogeneous terms. Arab identification is not related to any of the images and action tendencies and this may be because respondents in the sample don't identify with Arab world ( $M = 1,54$ ,  $SD = 1$ ). Higher religious identification is related to higher endorsement of the imperialist image, but this relation became non-significant when controlling for emotions. Some of the bivariate correlations between images/action tendencies and identification variables (identification with the West and ally image, identification with the West and the Americans with cooperation tendency, identification of Turkish identity and religious identity with attack tendency) lost significance when controlling for structural perceptions, suggesting that some of the effect of social identities on emotions is mediated by perceived structural perceptions.

The associations between social identifications and emotions support Hypotheses 12 and 14: trust is positively associated with identification with Americans and the West; and fear was associated with identification with Arabs. Turkish identification is not associated with envy, rejecting Hypothesis 13; however, this finding supports the previous results indicating that Turkish identification is related to the imperialist image, but this image was not related to the experience of envy. Religious identification is negatively associated with anger.

#### **4.5. General Discussion**

This research aimed to contribute to the limited literature on image theory formally formulated by Herrmann (1985, Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). The research built on Alexander et. al.'s (in press) work in Lebanon making an empirical test of the theory with an Arab sample in the aftermath of the U.S. Iraqi intervention. The study aimed to replicate and extend Alexander et. al.'s work in a Turkish context. While Alexander et. al. (in press) assessed only Lebanon-U.S. structural perceptions and

Lebanese images toward the U.S. within the image theory model, the present study assessed action tendencies and emotions as well. Independent from image theory model, Alexander et. al. investigated social identifications and social dominance orientations of Lebanese people; however, in the current study only social identifications are examined. Lebanese people viewed the U.S. as a barbarian and this image corresponded to the particular configuration of structural perceptions as predicted by image theory; however, Turks viewed the U.S. in imperialist terms, but the imperialist image did not match with its corresponding configuration of structural perceptions as predicted by the theory. The more Lebanese participants identified with the Arabs, and the less they identified with the Western world, the more they endorsed the barbarian image. In the Turkish sample, the more the participants identified with Turks and with their religion, the more they endorsed an imperialist image, and the more they identified with the West the more they endorsed an ally image of the U.S. Moreover, higher Turkish identification and lower identification with Americans were related to higher resistance tendencies.

The most important difference and contribution of this study is that this research adopted a different approach to the study of images. Alexander et. al.'s (in press) study was confirmatory in its methodological approach, meaning that the instrument – the images and action tendency items – were imposed on the gathered data. The current research adopted a semi-exploratory approach in its methodology; while the instrument was adopted from Alexander et. al., images and action tendencies as derived from the theory were not imposed on the data; rather, the images and action tendencies endorsed by this sample were extracted from the gathered data by the help of factor analyses. This way, in addition to examining the relation between theory components – structural perceptions, images, and action tendencies – this study also explored the content of images and action tendencies endorsed by this Turkish sample; and compared them to theory-driven typical images and action tendencies. As the results indicate, using such an approach gives explanatory power and goes beyond the current limits of the theory – having identified five different typical images.

Alexander, Brewer, and Herrmann (1999), in their experiment conducted to test the relation between images and structural perceptions, found out that open-ended questions were more stereotypical and matched better with the typical images than the responses taken from forced-choice measures. This result has implications for survey research in this topic. It would be useful to conduct an exploratory approach using open-

ended questions; this would help to reveal more accurately the images endorsed by the targeted sample, as well as to eliminate the measurement error posed by closed-ended questions. The items used to measure images and action tendencies may as well bias the respondents' answers and may fail to capture their endorsed schemas. Such an approach seriously limits the scope of the study and the ability to fully understand the structure of cognitive perceptions as well as behavioral tendencies that the targeted sample endorses. They also may be misleading, such as the case of the dependent image and exploitation tendencies in the current study.

Overall, the results suggest that images endorsed by this sample do not correspond exactly the theory driven images, however, they are meaningful in the context of U.S. – Turkey relations and helpful in explaining the inter-relations among structural perceptions, emotions, and social identities. The comparisons between parallel analyses with data driven and theory driven images, highlight the deficiencies and interpretation biases that may arise in using prototypical images to analyze and explain perceptions of different people.

While most of the predictions of the theory were supported by the findings, some of the results rejected some of the hypotheses. For example, the configuration of the three structural dimensions, theory wise corresponding to the barbarian image, was related to the higher endorsement of the imperialist image in this sample; envy was not the emotion associated with imperialist image as predicted by the theory. However, these results become meaningful when taking into account the presence of a barbarian image component in the endorsed imperialist image. In this line, the results of this study strongly support image theory's basic assertion that images are a function of the relation between two states and serve to justify the intergroup relations and behavioral tendencies toward the other actor.

Image theory makes claims about the causal directions among its components: from structural perceptions to sentiments to images and action tendencies. Limited by the correlational nature of the study, it is not possible to establish causal relations between the examined variables. However, by conducting a path analysis it is possible to test the plausibility of the model presented by image theory. While this was outside the scope of the current study, by adopting the tools of a path analytical approach, it was demonstrated that the effect of perception of structural dimensions on images and action tendencies, as illustrated in Figures 2-6 (pp. 55-57), was direct more than indirect (via emotions). Moreover, the proportion of variance in images and action tendencies

predicted by emotions and perceptions of structural relations was low, suggesting that other important predictor variables are not included in the model. Such may be the case for social identification variables which both in the current study, as well as in Alexander et. al.'s (in press) research in Lebanon were found to be systematically related with images and other components of image theory.

These findings highlight the need for more research designed to establish the interrelations between all the components of the theory, as well as inclusion of other variables, such as social identifications and social dominance orientation (Alexander et. al., in press), within this model. The structure of emotions and the pattern of their relations with other variables in the theory framework support Brewer and Alexander (2002) findings and give one more evidence for the formal integration of emotions within image theory.



## 7. APPENDIX

### Araştırma Katılımcılarının Tasviri

Bu araştırmanın sonuçlarını açıkladığımızda, okuyucular, katılımcıların yaşları, milliyetleri ve benzeri konularda bilgi sahibi olmak isteyecekler. Bu amaç göze alınarak lütfen hakkınızda sorulan soruları cevaplayınız. Bu bilgi, katılımcıların çeşitliliğini açıklamak için kullanılacaktır (örneğin katılımcıların yaşlarının 18 ile 82 arasında olması gibi genel bilgiler derlenecektir). Verilen bilgiler kişilerin tespiti için kullanılmayacaktır. Tüm cevaplar gizli tutulacak.

1. Cinsiyetiniz: (birini yuvarlak içine alınız) kadın erkek
2. Doğum Yılıınız? \_\_\_\_\_
3. İl olarak doğum yerinizi belirtin?: \_\_\_\_\_
4. İstanbul'da kaç yıldır yaşıyorsunuz? \_\_\_\_\_
5. Annenizin ve babanızın eğitim düzeyi nedir (birini işaretleyin):

	<u>Anne</u>	<u>Baba</u>
İlk okul	_____	_____
Ortaokul	_____	_____
Lise	_____	_____
Üniversite	_____	_____
Lisans üstü	_____	_____
Diğer	_____	_____

6. Hangi gelir grubuna ait-siniz? (birini yuvarlak içine alın)
  - a.) dar gelir
  - b.) orta gelir
  - c.) yüksek gelir

### 1. BÖLÜM

1. Siz kendinizi bir dine ait hissediyor musunuz (yuvarlak içine alınız)? evet hayır

Cevabınız **hayır** ise 7 numaralı soruya geçiniz.

Cevabınız **evet** ise, kendinizi hangi dine ait hissediyorsunuz? \_\_\_\_\_ / mezhep belirtiniz \_\_\_\_\_

Aşağıdaki soruları yanıtlamak için birden yediye kadar verilen ölçeği kullanarak bir numarayı yuvarlak içine alın.

2. Kendinizi ait olduğunuz dini grubun diğer bireyleriyle ne kadar özdeşleştiriyorsunuz?  
Hiç özdeşleştirmiyorum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok özdeşleştiriyorum
3. Kim olduğunuzu tanımlarken din sizin için ne kadar önemlidir?  
Hiç önemli değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok önemli
4. Günlük hayatınızda kendinizi ne sıklıkta dini inançlarınız çerçevesinde düşünüyorsunuz?  
Hiç düşünmüyorum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok sık düşünüyorum

5. Kendinizi ait olduğunuz dini grubun diğer bireyleriyle ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

6. Kendinizi ne kadar dindar hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiç dindar değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok dindar

7. İnsanlar kendilerini belli gruplara ait hissediyorlar. Mesela kimileri kendilerini Türk hisseder, kimileri Kürt, Rum, Çerkez, Laz, vesaire. Siz kendinizi aşağıdaki grupların hangisine ait hissediyorsunuz? Lütfen her grup için 'evet' ya da 'hayır'ı yuvarlak içine alınız.

14a. Türk müsünüz? evet / hayır

14b. Kürt müsünüz? evet / hayır

14c. Kendinizi başka hangi grupların bir parçası olarak görüyorsunuz (mesela Yahudi, Çerkez, Gürcü, Laz, Süryani, vs.)? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Kendinizi ne derecede Türklerle özdeşleştiriyorsunuz?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok özdeşleştiriyorum

9. Kendinizi Türklere ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

10. Türkiye için beslediğiniz duygularınız ne kadar vatansever?  
Hiç vatansever değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok vatansever

11. Türk olmanız sizi ne derecede gururlandırıyor?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok gururlandırıyor

12. Kendinizi ne derecede Kürtlerle özdeşleştiriyorsunuz?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok özdeşleştiriyorum

13. Kendinizi Kürtlere ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

14. Kendinizi Musevilerle ne derecede özdeşleştiriyorsunuz?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok özdeşleştiriyorum

15. Kendinizi Musevilere ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

16. Kendinizi ne derecede Arap dünyasının (mesela Suudi Arabistan, Suriye, İran, vs.) bir parçası olarak hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Tamamen

17. Kendinizi Arap dünyasına ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

18. Kendinizi ne derecede batı dünyasının bir parçası olarak hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Tamamen

19. Kendinizi batı dünyasına ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?  
Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

20. Kendinizi ne derecede Amerikalılarla özdeşleştiriyorsunuz?

Hiç değil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok özdeşleştiriyorum

21. Kendinizi Amerikalılara ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?

Hiçbir yakınlıkta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok yakın

22. Aşağıdaki gruplara karşı ne derecede olumlu veya ne derecede olumsuz duygular beslediğinizi birden yediye kadar bir sayı yazarak belirtiniz.

Çok olumsuz 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Çok olumlu

\_\_\_ 1. Türkler

\_\_\_ 2. Amerikalılar

\_\_\_ 3. Araplar

\_\_\_ 4. Kürtler

\_\_\_ 5. Sünni Müslümanlar

\_\_\_ 6. Aleviler

\_\_\_ 7. Museviler

23. Genel olarak siyasi düşünceleriniz ne derece solda ya da sağda? Aşağıdaki derecelendirmeyi kullanarak birden ona kadar bir numarayı yuvarlak içine alınız.

sol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sağ

24. Kendinizi (fikirlerinizi) hangi siyasi partiye veya gruba daha yakın hissediyorsunuz?

\_\_\_\_\_

## 2. BÖLÜM

**Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri** ilişkisi hakkında bildiklerinizi düşünerek, aşağıdaki soruları cevaplayın. Aşağıdaki soruların her birini okuduktan sonra sadece sizin fikrinize en yakın olduğuna inandığınız **tek bir** cevabın yanına çarpı işareti koyun.

1. Her ikisinin de **ekonomik güçlerine** bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Amerika arasındaki fark nedir?

\_\_\_ Türkiye, Amerika'dan çok daha zengindir.

\_\_\_ Türkiye, Amerika'dan biraz daha zengindir.

\_\_\_ Ekonomik açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Amerika birbirine eşittir.

\_\_\_ Amerika, Türkiye'den biraz daha zengindir.

\_\_\_ Amerika, Türkiye'den çok daha zengindir.

2. Her ikisinin de **askeri güçlerine** bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Amerika arasındaki fark nedir?

\_\_\_ Türk askeri gücü Amerika'ninkinden oranla çok daha fazladır.

\_\_\_ Türk askeri gücü Amerika'ninkinden biraz daha fazladır.

\_\_\_ Askeri güçlerine bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Amerika birbirine eşittir.

\_\_\_ Amerikan askeri gücü Türkiye'ninkinden biraz daha fazladır.

\_\_\_ Amerikan askeri gücü Türkiye'ninkinden çok daha fazladır.



3. Amerika ile karşılaştırıldığında Türkiye'nin **dünya üzerindeki gücü** ne kadardır?

- Türkiye'nin dünya üzerindeki gücü Amerika'ninkinden çok daha fazladır.
- Türkiye'nin dünya üzerindeki gücü Amerika'ninkinden biraz daha fazladır.
- Dünya üzerindeki güçlerine bakıldığında, Türkiye ve Amerika birbirine eşittir.
- Amerika'nın dünya üzerindeki gücü Türkiye'ninkinden biraz daha fazladır.
- Amerika'nın dünya üzerindeki gücü Türkiye'ninkinden çok daha fazladır.

4. Türk ve Amerikan **kültürleri** hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz ?

- Türk kültürü Amerikan kültüründen çok daha üstündür.
- Türk kültürü Amerikan kültürüne kıyasla biraz daha iyidir.
- Amerikan kültürü Türk kültürüne kıyasla biraz daha iyidir.
- Amerikan kültürü, Türk kültüründen çok daha üstündür.
- Herhangi birinin diğerinden üstün olmadığını düşünüyorum.

5. Şu sırada Amerika'nın Irak'taki mevcudiyeti hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

- Amerika'nın Irak'ta oluşu hem Amerika'nın, hem de Türkiye'nin lehinedir.
- Amerika'nın Irak'ta oluşu Amerika lehinedir, Türkiye'ye ise bir zararı yoktur.
- Amerika'nın Irak'ta oluşu Amerika lehine, Türkiye'nin ise aleyhinedir.

6. A.B.D.'nin Irak'la savaşabilmek için Türk topraklarını kullanmasına izin verilmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

- Bu politika hem A.B.D.'nin hem de Türkiye'nin lehinedir.
- Bu politika A.B.D.'nin lehinedir, Türkiye'ye ise bir zararı yoktur.
- Bu politika A.B.D.'nin lehinedir, Türkiye'nin ise aleyhinedir.

7. A.B.D.'nin terörle (mücadele) savaşı hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

- Bu politika hem A.B.D.'nin hem de Türkiye'nin lehinedir.
- Bu politika A.B.D.'nin lehinedir, Türkiye'ye ise bir zararı yoktur.
- Bu politika A.B.D.'nin lehinedir, Türkiye'nin ise aleyhinedir.

8. A.B.D.'nin tüm devletlerde demokratik sistemi öngören vizyonu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

- Türkiye de A.B.D ile aynı küresel demokrasi vizyonunu paylaşmaktadır.
- Türkiye'nin küresel demokrasi vizyonu, A.B.D.'ninkinden biraz daha farklıdır.
- Türkiye'nin küresel demokrasi vizyonu A.B.D'ninkinden tamamen farklıdır.



### 3. BÖLÜM

Türkiye ABD'ye nasıl davranmalıdır? Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katılıp katılmadığınızı sunulan ölçeğe göre değerlendiriniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>Kısmen Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>(Bir)az da olsa Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>Kararsızım</b>	<b>Biraz Katılıyorum</b>	<b>Oldukça Katılıyorum</b>	<b>Kesinlikle Katılıyorum</b>

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. ABD'den kendi çıkarlarımıza göre faydalanmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Tedbiren, ABD'ye karşı askeriyemizin varlığını arttırmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. İki ülkenin de çıkarına olan ortak politikalar geliştirmeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. ABD'nin bize zarar vermesini engellemek için kendimizi izole etmeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Onların, Türkiye'nin meselelerine karışmalarının önüne geçmeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Elimizden geldiğince kendimizi onlardan korumalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Türkiye içerisindeki etkilerini azaltmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Onlara karşı ayaklanmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. Kaynaklarımızı onlarla paylaşarak güçlerimizi birleştirmeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. İkimizin de hedeflerimize varmasını sağlamak için onlarla beraber çalışmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 11. Onlara yardım etmeliyiz çünkü onlar kendilerine yardım edemiyorlar.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 12. Onlarla savaşmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 13. Kendi kaynaklarımızı korurken aynı zamanda onların kaynaklarından da almaya çalışmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 14. Onlara ilişmeyip her şeyin yolunda gitmesini ummalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 15. Onlara, kendi kaynaklarını nasıl daha verimli bir şekilde kullanabileceklerini göstermeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 16. Hedeflerimize ulaşmamız için onların kaynaklarını kullanmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 17. Onların bizden faydalanmalarına engel olmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 18. Onlarla ortaklığımızı güçlendirmeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 19. Onları kışkırtmamaya çalışmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 20. Bizi kışkırttıkları takdirde benzer bir güçle misilleme yapacağımızı onlara göstermeliyiz.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 21. Onlardan uzak durmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 22. İstedığımızı almak için onlara saldırmalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 23. Onlarla hiçbir ilişkimiz olmamalı.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 25. Onlarla aramıza mesafe koymalıyız.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 26. Onlara karşı gelmeliyiz.

#### 4. BÖLÜM

Aşağıda ABD'ye dair farklı görüşler ifadelere yer verilmiştir. Lütfen bu ifadelere ne derece katılıp katılmadığınızı sayfanın başında verilen ölçeğe göre belirtiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Kısmen Katılmıyorum	(Bir)az da olsa Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Biraz Katılıyorum	Oldukça Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

- \_\_\_ 1. ABD'nin Türkiye'ye karşı düşmanca niyetleri yok.
- \_\_\_ 2. ABD bizimle yaptığı anlaşmalara uyacaktır.
- \_\_\_ 3. ABD, Türkiye'nin desteğine ihtiyacı yoktur.
- \_\_\_ 4. ABD Türkiye'yi tehdit etmiyor.
- \_\_\_ 5. ABD gücünü kontrol edilemeyecek şekilde kullanıyor.
- \_\_\_ 6. ABD'nin hedefleri Türkiye'nin hedeflerine uyuyor.
- \_\_\_ 7. Bazı Türkler kendilerinin ABD gündemini desteklemek için kullanılmasına izin verdiler.
- \_\_\_ 8. ABD, ortak hedeflerimize ulaşmak için bizimle beraber çalışacak.
- \_\_\_ 9. ABD başkalarının gözünü korkutmayı seviyor.
- \_\_\_ 10. ABD'ye güven olmaz.
- \_\_\_ 11. ABD'nin hedefleri Türkiye'nin hedeflerine uymuyor.
- \_\_\_ 12. Amerikalılar kibirlidir ve başkalarından daha iyi olduklarını düşünürler.
- \_\_\_ 13. ABD, şiddeti ancak son tercih olarak kullanır.
- \_\_\_ 14. ABD, Türkiye için bir tehdit unsurudur.
- \_\_\_ 15. Amerikalılar daha disiplinli olsalardı kendilerine daha çok faydaları dokunurdu.
- \_\_\_ 16. ABD, Türkiye'nin kaynaklarını sömürmeye çalışmaktadır.
- \_\_\_ 17. ABD ve Türkiye'nin benzer hedefleri var.
- \_\_\_ 18. ABD şeytani güçlerden tarafından yönlendirilmektedir.
- \_\_\_ 19. ABD dikkatle başka uluslara zarar verecek planlar geliştirmektedir.
- \_\_\_ 20. ABD mantıksızca davranıyor.
- \_\_\_ 21. ABD gücünü diğerlerinin ilerlemesine engel olmak için kullanıyor.
- \_\_\_ 22. ABD ve Türkiye'nin hedefleri farklı.
- \_\_\_ 23. ABD liderleri iyi niyetlidir.
- \_\_\_ 24. ABD, kendi hedeflerine ulaşmak için bizi çıkarlarına göre kullanmaz.
- \_\_\_ 25. ABD işbirliğine dayalı çözümlere değer verir.
- \_\_\_ 26. İhtiyaç duyduğumuzda ABD'nin yardım edeceğine güvenemeyiz.
- \_\_\_ 27. ABD ve Türkiye işbirliği yapmaktalar.
- \_\_\_ 28. ABD'nin bizim rehberliğimize ihtiyacı var.
- \_\_\_ 29. ABD daha iyisini yapmak istiyor ama bunu nasıl yapacağını bilmiyor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>Kısmen Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>(Bir)az da olsa Katılmıyorum</b>	<b>Kararsızım</b>	<b>Biraz Katılıyorum</b>	<b>Oldukça Katılıyorum</b>	<b>Kesinlikle Katılıyorum</b>

- \_\_\_\_\_ 30. ABD liderleri etkili olamayacak kadar basit düşünceliler.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 31. ABD istediğini elde etmek için yalan söylüyor.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 32. ABD için zafer demek Türkiye'nin yenilmesi demektir.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 33. ABD kontrolden çıktı.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 34. ABD ve Türkiye birbirleriyle rekabet etmektedir.

### 5. BÖLÜM

Aşağıdaki sorular Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine karşı beslediğiniz duygularla ilgilidir.

Aşağıdaki ölçeği kullanarak ABD'ye ilişkin her duyguyu ne derecede hissettiğinizi belirtin.

Hiç değil	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	çok güçlü
1. saygı	_____										
2. korku	_____										
3. sempati	_____										
4. kızgınlık	_____										
5. güven	_____										
6. aşağılama	_____										
7. haşmetli	_____										
8. İğrenme	_____										
9. düşmanlık	_____										
10. minnettarlık	_____										
11. korkutma	_____										
12. gıpta	_____										
13. hayranlık	_____										
14. kıskançlık	_____										
15. yakınlık	_____										
16. içerleme	_____										
17. rahatsızlık	_____										
18. saygı göstermemek	_____										
19. öfke	_____										
20 acıma	_____										
21. endişe	_____										

22. beğenme \_\_\_\_\_

23. kaygı \_\_\_\_\_

24. şefkat \_\_\_\_\_

**Katılımınız için çok teşekkür ederiz!**



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