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**THE SELJUKS OF RUM IN TURKISH  
REPUBLICAN NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY**



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**THE SELJUKS OF RUM IN TURKISH REPUBLICAN  
NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY**

by

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
  
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
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ABSTRACT  
THE SELJUKS OF RUM IN TURKISH REPUBLICAN  
NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

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This study investigates how Seljuks of Rum are posited within the Turkish history in the republican era. Although this study had confined itself only to academically oriented studies, rather than being a study of historiography, it tried to display the nationalist baggage that had to be tried to realized upon constructions of Seljuks of Rum. After overviewing the late Ottoman historiography and their encounter with Seljuks of Rum and “western Turks”, the study begins with discussing the Kemalist imagination of Turkish history with a special focus on the Kemalist position towards Seljuks of Rum in this imagination. Fuad Köprülü, who had revolutionary impact on the studies of Seljuks of Rum had been also under scrutiny and had been analyzed how he had posited Seljuks of Rum in the Turkish history. Finally, study approaches to the later works on Seljuks of Rum and Great Seljuks by politically conservative oriented scholars and especially Osman Turan. In the conclusion, all these alternative interpretations of Seljuks of Rum had been analyzed in the light of their differing modes of nationalism and concluded that different interpretations although clashing partially had been reflections of the gradually consolidating of ideology of the modern Turkish nation-state.

Keywords. Turkish Historiography, Seljuks of Rum, Turkish Nationalism

ÖZET  
CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ MİLLİYETÇİ TÜRK  
TARİHYAZIMINDA ANADOLU SELÇUKLULARI

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Bu çalışma, cumhuriyet döneminde Anadolu Selçuklularının Türk tarihi içinde nasıl konumlandırıldığını araştırıyor. Her ne kadar bu çalışma kendini sadece akademik çalışmalarla sınırlasa da, amacı itibarıyla bir tarihyazımı çalışması olmaktan öte milliyetçi arkaplanın Anadolu Selçukluları kurguları üzerinden kendini ifade etmesi üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Geç Osmanlı tarihyazımının ve bu dönemde Anadolu Selçukluları ile ilk temasların genel bir değerlendirilmesi sonra, çalışma Kemalizmin Türk tarihini tahayyülü ve özel olarak Anadolu Selçukluları bu tahayyülde konumlamasını tartışılmaktadır. Anadolu Selçuklu çalışmalarında çığır açan Fuad Köprülü'nün de benzer şekilde Anadolu Selçuklularını Türk tarihinde nasıl konumlandırıldığı incelenmektedir. Son olarak, daha sonraki muhafazakar tarihçilerin, özel olarak da Osman Turan'ın Büyük Selçuklulara ve Anadolu Selçuklulara bakışı değerlendirilmektedir. Sonuç bölümünde Anadolu Selçuklulara farklı bakış açıları, bu bakış açılarının temsil ettiği farklı milliyetçilik biçimlerin ışığında değerlendirilmekte ve tüm bu farklı yorumların kısmen birbirleriyle çatışsa da, tedrici olarak güçlenen modern Türk-ulus devletinin ideolojisinin yansımaları olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk tarihyazımı, Anadolu Selçukluları, Türk Milliyetçiliği

*sen bunu bilmesen de, altı yıl sonra, hala, Günseli'ye.....*



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The writing of this thesis was almost completely a lonely enterprise as any other academical study would be. However, I want to thank the friendships of certain people who had provided me a luxury in this lonely embarking, having in mind Gül Deniz (Kıbrıs) who has a promise to me to write a co-authored book in distant future, Emre (Hatipoğlu) of now eighteen years since first grade of elementary school and also never omitting Harun (Küçük).

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## INTRODUCTION

The Rum Seljuks occupy a unique position within Turkish history. Manzikert is one of the most commemorated events of Turkish history if not the most. It was the so-called “opening of Anatolia as a homeland (*heimat*) to Turks” in the Turkish nationalist discourse which in decades became the cliché incorporated to the popular mainstream discourse beyond narrow nationalist circles as a self-evident truth. The making and rise of the discourse of Manzikert and the emotional significance and dramatization attributed to the war worth a treatment and an analysis.

Manzikert was not a pre-planned strategic victory for Seljukids. Alparslan did not aim to attack Byzantines but had to encounter the marching army of Byzantium. He achieved victory over the ambitious Byzantine army before moving to his real combat ground, to the south to face Fatimids for the supremacy of abode of Islam. He had to meet the Byzantine army which gathered to carry out an ambitious project, to end the continuous Turkoman raids and ventures into Anatolia which they already had began from the 1050s until the frequency of the raids made the Byzantines reluctant to face the raiders but in the end they failed drastically. “Alp Arslan’s object was not to destroy Byzantine Empire; he contended himself with frontier adjustments, promise of a tribute and an alliance-settlement which the downfall of Romanos Diogenes rendered impermanent<sup>1</sup>.” However, what followed the war was the very quick and curious Turkification and Muslimization of Anatolia. “This was due to the internal political unrest and disorder in the Byzantine realm. These domestic conflicts not only induced Turcomans to raid the west of Cappadocia but also enabled them to take hold and settle

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<sup>1</sup> Cahen, Claude, EI, “Alp Arslan”, E.J. Brill, 1986, vol I, p. 420-1

in these lands<sup>2</sup>.” within two centuries mainly in two waves; first in the second half of the eleventh century; second after the flight in front of Mongols although the influx never stopped within these two centuries. Manzikert paved the way to a very dramatic Turkish colonization and within time caused the complete transformation of Anatolia. It is the time when Anatolia became a Turkish heimat. One can also add to that Anatolia became Islamized as well. This colonization is yet to be explained. It is still out of our reach to comprehend the aspects and dimensions of this massive Turkification and Islamization process. How much of the Turkish populace had come to Anatolia ? Was it predominantly a phenomenon of a conversion/assimilation to Turkishness/Muslimness ? How a demographic revolution took place ? We do not have enough evidence to be able to assert a convincing claim. However, to our knowledge, it is more likely that the aggregate of Turkish populace which had rushed into Anatolia looks like far from inducing an overturn of the demographic composition in Anatolia. This figure is lower than it had been assumed.

One theory to explain the “decline of Hellenism” in Asia Minor had been developed by Speros Vryonis who had claimed that the collapse of Christianity was due to the destruction of the churches and church organization in general<sup>3</sup>. The collapse of the church did not only cause the destruction of the hegemonical-spiritual center of Greek Christianity but also brought the destruction of the social support mechanisms of the establishment. This semi-economical theorization balances both economical perspectives and idealistic approaches. This approach is healthier than thinking in terms of confessions (Muslims, Christians, heretical Christians) and ethnicities (Turks, Greeks, Armenians). One’s confession and belief system is an outcome of the circumstances and the socio-political and socio-economical environment in which he lives. Studies concerning later periods provide us evidence in favor of an assimilationist approach. Heath Lowry’s study on the Muslimization/Turkification of Trebizond after

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<sup>2</sup> Cahen, Claude, *Türklerin Anadolu’ya İlk Girişi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992, p. 26 (originally article appeared in *Byzantion* (1948), “La Première Pénétration turque en Asie-Mineure”

<sup>3</sup> Vryonis, Speros, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor*, University of California Press, 1971; see also Vryonis, Speros, *Byzantium, Seljuks and Ottomans*, Undena Publications, Undena Publications, 1981 (collected essays)

the take over of Trebizond shows us that Trebizond had been Muslimized/Turkified in an amazingly short time due to massive local conversions<sup>4</sup>.

We also have little evidence to contemplate on exactly which periods this demographic revolution had taken place. Throughout the two centuries following Manzikert, there was a regular migration to Anatolia once the gate was opened. The push factors, the devastation of the East by ravaging hordes in the east supported this process. However, we can speak of two waves, first in the aftermath of Manzikert, second following the Mongol devastation of Iran and Khorasan in 1230s. The second wave looks as drastic as the first one if not more so.

Not surprisingly, the assimilationist approach had been disregarded and rejected in the Turkish (national) historiography. Osman Turan in his short study of “Türkler Anadolu’da”, he denies such a theory outright<sup>5</sup>. He makes a claim that with the foundation and advance of Ottoman principality in Bithynia, the Greek populace had fled to Roumelia fearing the nomadic Turks. He also recalls that although Albanians and Pomaks had converted to Islam, they did not lose their national identity and language. Basing on these, he claims that there was no Muslimization/Turkification occurred in the 12<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> century Anatolia<sup>6</sup>. The pro-assimilationist approach is also against the racial categorization of the Kemalist perspective and also against the Turco-Islamists and their universalization of the conflict of the Muslim/Turk against the Christian camps. These also serve to imagining Seljuks of Rum as a purely continuation of the Turkish/Islamic heritage. How did nomadic Turks adapt to the plains of Anatolia ? Were Seljuks of Rum an urban polity ? Could the pre-conquest urban populations keep their urban livelihoods ? Could the new masses to a certain extent be integrated in the pre-conquest urban order ? The urban life of Seljuks of Rum had been a non-issue. The most we know about the urban life of Seljuks of Rum are Mawlana Rumi’s stories in his literary works.

It is interesting that the early republican (Kemalist) historians did not pay much attention to Rum Seljuks. Rum Seljuks were posing a good alternative to the dissipated and too Islamic Ottomans. Seljuks of Rum also never stretched beyond Anatolia and

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<sup>4</sup> Löwry, Heath, *Trabzon Şehrinin İslamlaşması ve Türkleşmesi*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1981

<sup>5</sup> Turan, Osman, *Türkler Anadolu’da*, Hareket Yayınları, 1973, p. 51

<sup>6</sup> op. cit., p. 53

had established their territories very close to the contemporary Turkish Republic. This similarity in the eastern and southern borders is so striking that it inspires a feeling that Anatolia is divinely promised to Turks for beginning from 11<sup>th</sup> century to the 20<sup>th</sup> century and Anatolia being a manifest destiny, not to be taken away from Turks as their legitimate and historic right. It also has the tacit implication that “Anatolia” was actually the territories of contemporary Turkish Republic, apart from the “Rum” of the Ottomans, the word which may be taken as the alternative usage of Anatolia which actually omits unruly and the savage “Kurdistan” and the very East of the modern Turkish Republic. Historical Anatolia, Taeschner writes is roughly a line from Trebizond down to Erzindjan, Biredjik to Alexandretta following Upper Euphrates”. He adds that in today’s usage, this term corresponds to all the non-European Turkey “including historical al-Djazira, Kurdistan and Armenia<sup>7</sup>.” The corresponding borders of Seljuks of Rum to that of the Republic of Turkey fits within the Anatolization of Turkish heimat after the drastic loss of Roumelia. Now the loss of Roumelia has to be compensated with a new Anatolian identity as we can trace in narratives such as “Ateşten Gömlek” of Halide Edip or in the discovery (not a *rediscovery* but a *discovery*) of Anatolia by the retired soldier Ahmet Cemil in “Yaban”. Furthermore, it was during the time of Seljuks of Rum Anatolia had been referred as *Turchia* for the very first time.

But against all these affinities, Rum Seljuks were not treated accordingly. I would dare to say they were not given what they deserved in the national aura which I claim had the potential to be celebrated as genuine Turkish and genuine Anatolian Turkish, avoiding any irredentism and holding on an eternal claim on Anatolia. Such an interpretation had developed in the republican decades, especially based on the emergence of the heterodox Islam in Turkish Anatolia. A very significant point is that Seljuks of Rum looks to be less Islamic to fit nicely within the secularism of Republic which had to be supported by the eternal secular characters of Turks as republican feminism in the history always emphasized the “equality of the hatun to his husband kağan and reigning in case of the death of the kağan before his son takes over”.

The rise of the Rum Seljuk historiography comes with the later generation of historians. It did develop as a part of the studies of Islamic Turkish states and had been adopted in the pre-destined Turkish course of history as the inevitable intermediary sequence/stage in which Anatolia became the homeland for Turks and became

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<sup>7</sup> Taeschner, Franz, EI, “Anatolia”, E.J.Brill, 1986, vol I, p. 462

unquestionable as just a later stop in the Islamic Turkish history and fully within the Eurasian, pan-Turkish path. It has never been adopted as purely Anatolian but within the universality of Turkishness, Manzikert serving as the critical connection between the two. As we will see, several Turkish scholars who had penned essays on Seljuks of Rum had also worked on other Islamic-Turkic polities. Interestingly, no scholar of Seljuks of Rum had entered the domains of Ottoman history and these two fields were like completely closed and exclusive to each other. Only Faruk Sümer had expanded his interest to the later Turcoman polities contemporary of Ottomans besides his interest in Turcoman conquests of Anatolia<sup>8</sup>. Again, Sümer's disinterest in the contemporary Ottomans in his works regarding later centuries investigating what is happening in "East Anatolia" is striking and needs some explanation which I can modestly argue for the establishment of two domains of interest; that of Ottomans and that of pre-Ottomans. Pre-Ottoman studies erupted by late 1960s had induced the emergence of a discourse of Turkic greatness which ironically Ottomans failed to provide. This is a quest to find an alternative discourse to that of Ottomans themselves failed to provide. This argument needs some qualification.

First, we will point out a certain paradox. To resolve the "paradox" pointed out above that Kemalists did not show a particular interest towards Seljuks of Rum whereas the conservative nationalism of later decades subscribed to embrace Seljuks of Rum heritage; we can explore more on the problem of "encountering the Ottomans". I would argue that despise of Ottomans was a more salient phenomena than one confined only to Kemalist circles. Disregarding the Kemalist disinformation that conservatives/Islamists had been loyal monarchists and apologists of the despotic Ottoman dynasty, this is a myth basically created by Abdülhamid II who pursued a self-styled "Islamic" policy and could claim an Islamic tone in his imperium. Ottomans had tense relations with Islamic-leaning regroupings throughout history from the early outsider sufi brotherhoods to the rising puritanical movements of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. This background had been taken over by the modern Islamists who were never mere apologists of the Ottoman dynasty. On the contrary, they detested sharp contradictions to reconcile them with Islamic government. This theme had waned later as a reaction to Kemalist anti-Ottomanism but always found its own way to contemporary Turkish Islamist circles,

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<sup>8</sup> his works concerning later centuries; *Safevi Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992; *Karakoyunlular*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1984

generally implicitly. Ottomans had been associated with pompous courtliness and corrupted nepotism. These Ottomans can not only represent a warrior-like race as in the immature Kemalist imagination would like to imagine, but also too degenerated to spread the world of Islam. The loftiness of the court had destroyed the gazi spirit which had been the motive of the early conquest but had collapsed after some point. One can even point out the significance of the corrupted Constantinopolis at this point. The very strong anti-imperial position embraced by many leading Ottoman men of letters positing themselves against the imperial rhetoric developed with the take over of Istanbul as masterfully showed by Yerasimos<sup>9</sup> had prevailed to our contemporaries and many among the conservatives with pro-Islamic rhetoric of the republic had sympathized with this anti-imperial rhetoric. After a point, the Ottoman sultans gave up leading the marching Ottoman armies but even before that, the sultan in luxurious dress and luxurious court hardly satisfies the image of “pious and holy warrior king” image. Some indirect signs of such a negative representation of it can also be found in the very early Islamists’ anti-Abdülhamid stances although a vindication of the uncorrupted earlier sultan image had been more profound and coexisted with the demonization of the incumbent despotic sultan<sup>10</sup>. This contempt is very rarely made explicit by conservative nationalists who are in reaction to the overt anti-Ottomanism of Kemalism and went on their promotion of greatness of Ottomans and their invaluable services to Islam but this contempt and dilemma had been deep in their hearts. Ottomans with their indolence and ineffectualness are hardly to be revered. The interest to Seljuks of Rum enabled them to find a niche to begin Ottomans from a more “active” origin and insert them within a more prestigious tradition. Ottomans had been far from representing an ideal “paradise” to be exalted. Weaknesses in this spiritual ground had brought such an alternative which can be read also as an escape from a harsh condemnation of Kemalism’s anti-Ottomanism but still rely on the “heroic past”. Seljuks of Rum also provided the

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<sup>9</sup> see Yerasimos, Stefanos, *Konstantiniye Efsaneleri ve Ayasofya*, İletişim Yayınları, 1998; for the major anti-imperial text, anonymous, *anonim Osmanlı kroniği*, edited by Necdet Öztürk, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2002

<sup>10</sup> Very interesting but only very slightly studied circles of Nakshibandi-Khalidi order of 19<sup>th</sup> century Istanbul had strong anti-imperial rhetoric which had been on the brink of being activated. Kuleli incident was certainly not a single affair. For preliminary but remarkable discussion of these tendencies, Abu Mannah, Butrus, *Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (1826-1876)*, Isis Press, 2001

“missing link” between Ottomans and the Eurasian Turkishness. This is comfortable for a Kemalist imagination as well.

The historiography of Seljuks of Rum shares the general traits and shortcomings of the general Turkish historiography and could not go further than producing several chronologies, narrating the contemporary Iranian and Arabian sources as well some certain local Turkish chronicles. This approach is completely closed to the non-Turkish scholars of the same subject and also lacking of any substantial debates on aspects and problems of the history in question. The study of Seljuks of Rum had been restricted to an unprivileged minor area under “Iranian studies”. It had been perceived as one of the Islamic polities emerged after the collapse of the Islamic political unity which had been partially or fully influenced by the Iranian political and cultural traditions. Moreover, the field of Seljuks of Rum was certainly never a promising area to the scholars of medieval Persia. The Seljuks of Rum also had been put under the category of “medieval Islam polities” in a larger context. However, its unique *Rumi* character had created certain problems for the conventional Islamic scholars who had mastered the Middle East proper and Arabic/Persian classical ages but were completely alien to the *Rumi* culture of Anatolia. Another major reason for the disinterest toward Seljuks of Rum is the absence of primary sources, archival material. The lack of satisfactory sources renders this field even desperate and gloomy.

In the “Cambridge History of Islam” of 1970, the Seljuks of Rum were covered by a full article, written by Osman Turan<sup>11</sup>. Although Osman Turan with his general enthusiasm of Seljuks begins his article writing that Seljuks had accomplished a revolution in the Islamic world<sup>12</sup>, his article is a lonely one within the volume. Osman Turan’s article is followed by Halil İnalçık’s “The Emergence of the Ottomans<sup>13</sup>” in which he tries to reveal the undeciphered, unknown Anatolia prior to the Ottomans, that of the period of principalities. In Marshall Hodgson’s “The Venture of Islam<sup>14</sup>”, (Mewlana Jalaladdin) Rumi occupies more space than Seljuks of Rum itself. The

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<sup>11</sup> Turan, Osman, “The Seljuks of Rum”, in *Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (originally 1970), p. 231-262

<sup>12</sup> Turan, Osman, op. cit., p. 231

<sup>13</sup> İnalçık, Halil, “The Emergence of Ottomans”, in *Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (originally 1970), p. 263-291

<sup>14</sup> Hodgson, Marshall G. S., *The Venture of Islam*, Chicago University Press, 1977



Seljuks of Rum had been mentioned under the section “successor states to Seljuks” and are covered only in two pages<sup>15</sup>. Their discussion is brief in contrast to the lengthy coverage of Middle eastern polities of their contemporary. In Hodgson, they occupy a marginal role in the Islamic world out from the core of Islam although Indian polities had been studied also quite extensively. All the sections of Seljuks had been covered by Bosworth, a specialist of medieval Iran with a comprehensive study of Ghaznavids<sup>16</sup>. The late Bosworth is a respectable scholar of medieval Turkic polities of Transoxania and Khorasan but his main field of study is hardly “Rum”. In the relatively recent work of Ira Lapidus, “A History of Islamic Societies<sup>17</sup>”, the same disinterest is continued with again only two pages allocated for them<sup>18</sup>. Lapidus does not go further than repeating the overall generalizations in the absence of a substantial analysis of the socio-economical interpretation of Seljuks of Rum. He speaks of the akhi organizations, the mysticism, the heterodoxial orders et cetera before we encounter the sudden rupture of Ottomans. In this regard, Lapidus is not that far from Gibbons with his “a new race is born.” His works are also parallel with Wittek’s history of the principality of Menteşe<sup>19</sup>, originally published in 1934. Here, Wittek trying to explore the unknown world of non-Ottoman fourteenth century Anatolia applies his “gazi thesis” extending his previous argument which he had applied previously to the principality of Osman not only to the certain principality under question in the study but also to a general phenomenon of the pre-Ottoman Turkish world of Anatolia with a comparison with medieval Spain of Moors. He speaks the dangerous and unique world of the frontier in which constant gaza is the main activity against the infidels. This he argues is a general trait of Anatolian Turkish world since Manzikert. As Danişmend and others had colonized Eastern Anatolia, the new begs had been able to conquer Western Anatolia beginning

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<sup>15</sup> Hodgson, Marshall G. S., *op. cit.*, p. 273-5

<sup>16</sup> Bosworth, C.E., “Saldjuks”, *EI*, vol VIII, p. 936-978, the article provides the relevant bibliography for all the various branches of “Saldjuks”.

<sup>17</sup> Lapidus, Ira, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge University Press, 1995 (originally 1988)

<sup>18</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 304-6

<sup>19</sup> Wittek, Paul, *Menteşe Beyliği*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1986 (original German 1934)

from second half of thirteenth century<sup>20</sup>. This history on the horseback plus heterodox and mystical Islam in the countryside and in the towns had been rarely challenged as we can see this in the leading survey books on Islamic history.

One can argue that western historiography of Seljuks of Rum did not progress since it made its debut early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The assertions put forward in this founding era still dominates the scene although presented in indirect manners or within a more sophisticated rhetoric. Another striking point is the congruence of the western historiography with the republican-Köprülü synthesis. The vision of Seljuks of Rum fits perfectly to a nationalist Turkish discourse, idealizing certain aspects of the “mystic” and therefore genuine Turkish religion and a harmonious present in this vision of Seljuks of Rum. Western historiography, which is supposedly “objective” and devoid of any narrow nationalism had borrowed its framework from the early Turkish nationalism produced in 1910s. Of course, one should add, the early Turkish imagination had based their arguments on the authentic sources, chiefly the literary texts developed by heterodox dervishes and their disciples. Supposedly objective western historians had also accepted and internalized similarly an uncritical and unquestioning reading of the “authentic” sources.

Returning back to the Turkish scholars of the field such as Ali Sevim, Faruk Sümer and Osman Turan as being the most prominent one, we do not see a critical reading of the contemporary sources, no original interpretations and problematizations and finally but most importantly lack of any historywriting except for the political history limited to names and names only. The classical format of the study of non-political aspects of any conventional pre-Ottoman Turkish history is also applied here; another chapter on the “civilizational aspects” after the completion of political history, a definitely separated from the political part is written, never intending to mean more than a secondary and non-essential appendix to the political chronology of the polity. That is; the essence of the polity what we firstly deal with is the dynasties but never the socio-economical aspects. Here we face with one of the most if not the most failures of the Rum Seljuks chronology. Although it is definitely true that we lack sources, the richest material in front of us are the religious texts of various dervishes, men of religion, quasi-shamans et

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<sup>20</sup> op. cit., p. 7

cetera<sup>21</sup>. 13<sup>th</sup> century is alive in today's Turkey with its enormous legacy on the religious and quasi-religious traditions<sup>22</sup>. Irene Melikoff is a grand name to mention here. Several other very significant works both from Turkey and from non-Turkish circles had been produced on the heterodoxies of the 13<sup>th</sup> century which tell us an incredible much about their contemporaries. However, it is impossible to say that this dimension had been integrated within the Rum Seljukid historiography. Regretfully, the contrary is the case. One peculiar historian of the conventional Turkish pre-Ottoman Turkish historians who had opened a door to investigate social history is Faruk Sümer who had studied the nomads of Anatolia.<sup>23</sup> Faruk Sümer also never developed or even attempted to develop his studies as he was not in touch with the European approaches, even with the early 20<sup>th</sup> century historiography. Another close field that could be helpful is the philological studies developed within the "Near Eastern Studies" programs or Altaic Languages Studies but adapting linguistic and etymological evidences have been never drafted within the pre-Ottoman Turkic studies with the exception of pre-Islamic Turkic history. The evolution of different forms of Turkish and its interaction with various languages of Middle East and Anatolia could present us with new breakthroughs.

However, here it is not the place to point out and elaborate on these shortcomings. This is because all these shortcomings do not originate from the non-development of this field in Turkey. On the contrary; these shortcomings can only be explained with the "national" stance and discourse of the Turkish historians and their dire anxiety not to invoke economics and sociology as such a comparative and interdisciplinary approach would destroy the idealized perfect harmony and national-consciousness of the Turks

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<sup>21</sup> as claimed above this interest had created a bias in favor of a "nomadic Anatolia" without embarking on further research. This is parallel with the Byzantinists' bias of Seljuks of Rum whom had been portrayed as "barbarians". Especially see Vryonis' article, "Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor", in *Byzantium, Seljuks and Ottomans*, Undena Publications, Undena Publications, 1981, IV. Interpreting Rumi's poetry and commentaries, he speaks of the "destructiveness" of the Turk. (op. cit. , p. 64)

<sup>22</sup> Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar, *Babailer İsyanı*, Dergah Yayınları, 2000 describes the nomadic world of Anatolia of the time and shows how influential and strong the nomadic world was. The state had been easily collapsed with this rebellion in Central Anatolia. Of course, all these had been triggered by the advent of Mongols.

<sup>23</sup> Sümer, Faruk, *Türkmenler*, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972; *Çepniler*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992

from the earliest times of history. The interpretations of social thinkers such as Max Weber, Karl Marx and Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol of recent times could result in dangerous, disturbing and unappreciated conclusions and do not comply with the “cause of Turks” and their self-conscious national aspirations. Similarly, interpretations and utilization of the methodologies and argumentation of historians such as Bloch, Duby and Ginzburg will not be compatible with the desired imagination of Turkish history. The study of history could not be anything but to learn “our” past and study “our” greatness and weaknesses if any. In this sense, the lack of usage of contemporary western historiographical currents and schools can not be explained with a lack of communication with the west and lack of means to do it. It also has the “conscious” disregard of the implications of application of a western-contemporary historical methodology.

The Islamic-Turkic historical imagination summarized above had been developed by a generation of historians who had been trained by early republican Kemalist historians in a Kemalist-oriented curriculum. These historians embraced the Kemalist education. They had been influenced profoundly in the making of their formation. They integrated this stance to a new worldview of their own which later to be associated with the right-wing nationalism. Kemalist history produced a peculiar kind of historians. The path from the 1930s to 1970s should be emphasized and never to be ignored. We can trace the connections and also contradictions as well although all these indicate new problematiques. The place of Rum Seljuks is much more emphasized in the 1970s although this looks like a paradox because 1970s signify the marriage of pre-Manzikert and post-Manzikert whereas the first takes Manzikert as the birth of Turks “as we know today”. The best exemplification of this Anatolian Turkishness is Yahya Kemal Beyatlı; although he is a non-Kemalist and became an inspiration of later times for peculiar strands of nationalists. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı in his youth was very contemptuous of Ziya Gökalp’s speaking of Turan and Central Asian Turks protesting that for him Turks of a far geography and distant past in history does not mean anything and feel no affiliation and regards pre-Manzikert as the pre-history of Turks<sup>24</sup>. It deserves mentioning that Yahya Kemal Beyatlı was also disinterested in ethnic aspects of nationalism. For Yahya Kemal, Manzikert made Turks, not Turks made Manzikert. He

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<sup>24</sup> Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi, *Yahya Kemal*, Dergah Yayınları, 1995, p. 41

had severe criticism of Ziya Gökalp's "crude nationalism" to whom he wrote the famous lines:

Ne harabi, ne harabatiyim  
Kökü mazide olan atiyim

Here, the "harabi" was Ziya Gökalp<sup>25</sup>. Yahya Kemal expressed his "Anatolian Nationalism" in journal "Dergah" during the National Struggle with an aggressive tone towards "utopic" Turanism of 1910s and supported the Kemalist movement in Ankara seeing the movement as the rise of Anatolian nationalism against the discredited and collapsed Turanism of 1910s.

It is no coincidence that Yahya Kemal Beyatlı inspired a peculiar kind of nationalism after his death but an ethnic aspect had been let enter inside although this ethnicity had been subjugated to the Turco-Ottoman state-centrism.

Another very simple and casual explanation could be the "making of the pre-destination of the course of Turkish history from Oğuz Han to Atatürk". Manzikert had both repercussions for an Anatolian version of nationalism as well as for ecumenic Turkist nationalism. Manzikert has two sides opening to the pre-1071 world of Turks and the other opening to the post-1071 world of "Western Turks" in Anatolia. Manzikert is a weird Kemalist project. Beginning from Manzikert, Anatolia is a Turkish land and 1922 is a confirmation of this claim. However, Manzikert had been inserted into the nationalist narration much later than the heyday of Kemalism by the Turco-Islamists. It was a very strange marriage (or coupling) of two diverse historical imaginations. This later adaptation can be interpreted as the establishment, consolidation and diffusion of the Kemalist imagination in various adversary ideologies of the republic. It exemplifies how Kemalism had been anchored and internalized within the modern Turkish epistemology and ontology in different currents regardless of their disagreements with Kemalism on a surface level.

Manzikert's face back to the pre-1071 world of the Turks and its role of being the connection of two eras of Turks is to be seen not only by the Turkish military kind of nationalism which begins with Turkish armed forces from the time of Mete but also

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<sup>25</sup> Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri, *Gençlik ve Edebiyat Hatıraları*, İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 122

quiet common in the conservative strands of Turkish nationalism. Alpaslan here fits in perfectly as the missing link. It is striking that, instead of reconstructing Seljuks of Rum as the indispensable ancestry of Anatolian Turkishness, it had been largely imagined and posited within the larger Euroasian world of Great Seljuks with other non-Anatolian sections of the original Seljuk empire<sup>26</sup>.

Another important point to note is the almost non-existence of Rum Seljuks in the Western academics. Cahen stands almost alone in his studies and since his demise the academia lacks any significant students of Cahen with the exception of the still very interesting and effective French studies on Anatolian heterodoxies from 12<sup>th</sup> century to 15<sup>th</sup> century Anatolia.

The field of Rum Seljukids never became a center of attraction for “Islamic scholars”. The relevant studies in the last few decades could not add significant contributions and novelties to the field and probably more importantly did not introduce new debates and controversies although still what is known to us is extremely limited concerning Seljuks of Rum. A study from a Byzantine perspective, by a Byzantinist or an Islamic historian is also another absent matter. In the Byzantine studies, Seljuks of Rum are always taken as an “external factor” and mentioned as long as these outsiders are directly affecting the affairs of Byzantium. This neglect is mutual. Such a negligence complies with the Turkish/Islamic perspective of otherization Byzantium and draws a picture of two completely distinct worlds. The world of the akritai and Akritas Bigenos, who had a Muslim father and a Christian mother but fought courageously against the “infidel Mohammedians” along the frontiers can not be easily separated. To the embarrassment of nationalist Turkish scholars, we know more than one Seljuk sultan not only took refuge in Byzantium but also converted to Christianity. Similarly, contrary to the Greek nationalist view, the Muslimization of Anatolia was likely to be more to do with voluntary conversion rather than a persecution of the indigenous Christian population.

In short, we can easily conclude that the shortcomings regarding Seljuks of Rum are too many. These do not constitute a singular phenomenon but a reflection of the bigger problems of pre-Ottoman Turkic history and a general evaluation of this problem needs to be addressed in a more global study and in a much broader context. Here, I

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<sup>26</sup> see Sevim, Ali, Merçil, Erdoğan, *Selçuklu Devletleri Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995

want to deal with the problems of the Seljuks of Rum historiography as it has a special place in the constructed Turkish history. Yet, I believe that Ala'addin Kaykubad can not find his proper place in the Turkish Olympus although he deserves it and an answer to this absence should be pursued.



## KEMALISM, TURKISH HISTORICAL THESIS AND THE SELJUKS OF RUM

The Turkish Historical Thesis has been perceived in scholarly literature as a bizarre aberration and an unintelligible phantasm of republican romanticism. However, one should be aware that the republican thesis of Turkish history is not a complete make up. It is not a creation erected on nowhere. It has its traceable roots not only in the pre-republican Turkish/Ottoman modernization/nationalization process but in the Turkish pre-modern self identification/symbolization reminiscent of the authentic national self-images such as Talmudic Jewish mythology as the nation of agony to be promised the salvation at the very end, Russian messianism to be exploited by 19<sup>th</sup> century panslavists such as Danilevskii or Armenian self-identification of as a diaspora nation<sup>27</sup>. What Kemalism did was to officialize a powerful and widely spread out discourse and boost it in an authoritative fashion and provide a state-level sanctioning. Besides these, Kemalism did not produce anything novel and controversial in the “imagination of Turkish history.” Its main novelty was to sideline other disagreeing alternative paradigms and try to monopolize this widely esteemed paradigm over others. Or to say this in another way, the paradigm which had its own long existence for some half a century could find itself a strong protégé.

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<sup>27</sup> To see how these authentic mythologies and self-images prevalent in “national” cultures in pre-modern centuries had been treated and used by modern emerging “national intelligentsia” to form “modern nations” out of “pre-modern proto-nations”, see Smith, Anthony, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999, for his discussion of the pre-modern origins of the nations see Smith, Anthony, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Blackwell, 1988 Another interesting theme deserved to be studied is how the Roman values and mythologies had been effective in constructing modern national ethos. The Roman values had been major themes since the Roman times throughout medieval ages. This pre-modern images had been adapted and grafted to a national discourse in the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century. See, Thom, Martin, *Republics, Nations and Tribes*, Verso, 1995



First of all, the discourse of Turkish modernization and nascent nationalism had been initiated and partially but persistently developed by the Tanzimat elite Ottomans before the Young Turks assumed power. This “promotion of a self-identity” was not necessarily consciously national in mind but reflection of an effort to define new self-images other than vague Muslim ummah image. This phase may be named as the proto-national stage of Turkish nationalism. A consciousness of Turkishness had been present in very late Tanzimat intellectuals such as Şemsettin Sami, Ahmet Vefik Paşa, Süleyman Paşa et cetera but their interest in Turkishness had been confined to cultural sphere and devoid of any political program. Leaning on the weak foundations of the Tanzimat intellectuals regarding nationalization of Ottoman/Turkish society, the reign of II Abdülhamid had been a very crucial landmark and built the pillars upon which Kemalist ideology could arise. We can think the Tanzimat era as the development of a national discourse within the Ottoman imperial structure. But its presence had been restricted by the dire necessity of Ottomanism’ priority.

But it was the era of II Abdülhamid when the Ottomanist state ideology has collapsed. The most evident reason was the immense loss of territory in Balkans in the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-77. With the loss of these lands, the Ottoman Empire had been homogenized in favor of a Turkish and Muslim majority. The loyalty of the Christian minorities could not be sustained anymore after the rising consecutive hostilities. Besides all these, there was a general shock within the elite and a collapse of optimism and faith in the destiny of the Empire could be easily observable. There should be another niche to hang on. This niche was not to be Turkish nationalism for another thirty five years but it was not Islamism as it had been claimed to define the reign of Abdülhamid.

First of all, there was the notion of vatan (or watan) of Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal was on the margins of the Ottoman elite and had never been accepted among the grandees for his dangerous ideas but could not be easily rejected by the elite either. He had been tolerated in the margins. His vatan was a concept more than vague. In his play “Vatan yahud Silistre” vatan was the Ottoman possessions and its territorial integrity (may be imagined as dar-ül-Islam) which had to be defended. The castle of Silistra had to be defended because it is within the imperial possessions. However, the concept “vatan” was more than a territorial entity, it belonged to an ideal conceptualization that also can not be only the community of faithfuls (ümmet, ummah). Vatan was the Ottoman Empire with all its possible meanings (Ottoman Empire as a territorial state, as

the ideal of a just Muslim polity, the unity of the “Ottoman people”) but which Ottoman Empire ? Certainly non-Muslims were not admitted in this imagined vatan. This was a continuation of the Islamic legal interpretation of the status of non-muslims according to which non-Muslims can enjoy their legal and commercial right as much as Muslims but are excluded from the political realm. Namık Kemal adhered to this principle and applied it to a half-modern, half-traditional concept. We are still before a constitutionalist and inclusive notion of citizenship<sup>28</sup>. But “Ottomanness” was not simply based on a religious belonging. Religious affiliation had been degraded to a secondary role. Its promotion had been an aspiration but the duty to accomplish this aspiration had emerged as the “new goal” and a mean for itself; the Ottoman imperial state<sup>29</sup>.

The interests of the Ottoman Empire were to be defended. The interests of Islam should have coincided with the high interests of the Empire but this was not certain and always. Moreover, it was not the Ottoman Empire as understood for centuries. It was not an ideal concept never referring to the present grandees (too elitist for the commoner Muslims), not the present administration (oppressive) and neither the sultan (people was the legitimate dynamic from which power can derive for the constitutionalist Namık Kemal). This was the first noticeable effort of an Ottoman intellectual trying to be make a synthesis of modern ideologies and notions with the old traditional worldview-ideology of Ottomans and discourse of Islam<sup>30</sup>. At the time, as expressed above, there were “Turkists” who had been studying Turkish history, language and trying to promote Turkish culture in every sense but although these were prominent figures, their effort could not go further than an academic curiosity. There was no transfer of this Turkist agenda to a political agenda or any political position and no politicization had been present in that sense. Although Ahmed Vefik Pasha was

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<sup>28</sup> The Constitution of 1876 does not use the word “citizen” but speaks of subjects. Midhat Paşa is an early daring statesman who had included all “Ottomans” completely regardless of their religious identities.

<sup>29</sup> For a detailed discussion of Namık Kemal’s vatan, Mardin, Şerif, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, İletişim Yayınları, 1996, p. 361-368. Şerif Mardin concludes saying “his concept of vatan is too complicated” (p. 366)

<sup>30</sup> For a semi-Kemalist reevaluation of Namık Kemal, see Deringil, Selim, “The Ottoman Origins of Kemalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal”, in *The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics*, Isis Press, 2000, p. 185

writing that Turks can not be confided to Ottoman lands<sup>31</sup> but inhabitants of a very vast geography, no political implication manifested in his studies reminding us Hroch's phases of nationalism and his A phase.

A similar modest politicization of Turkishness is very shyly present in Ali Suavi, This interesting and original figure of the anti-establishment Young Ottomanism carries the card of being a precocious Turkist who is declaring Turks as representatives of a very ancient civilization and defends the cause of Turks against insults in London dailies in his London exile years<sup>32</sup>. His presentation of Turks in movement from their ancestral homeland is a harbinger of the later theories. His main source is Ebu'l Gazi Bahadır Han. Another claim he makes to be a very early example of a very popular later genre is his suggestion that the Turkish presence in Anatoliacan be found even back in Heredotus<sup>33</sup>. From Ali Suavi's Turks who are representatives of a very ancient civilization, Gökalp will move forwards and write that Sumerians and Hittites were also Turks<sup>34</sup> after in the late nineteenth century excavations will introduce us Sumerians and Hittites<sup>35</sup>. Ömer Seyfeddin makes fun of this "Turkification craze" of 1910s in his

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<sup>31</sup> Arıkan, Zeki, "Tanzimat'an Cumhuriyete Tarihçilik", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Ansiklopedisi*, cilt 6, İletişim Yayınları, 1985, p.1587,

<sup>32</sup> Arıkan, op. cit., p.1588

<sup>33</sup> Çelik, Hüseyin, *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*, İletişim Yayınları, 1994, p. 621-622

<sup>34</sup> Heyd, Uriel, *Ziya Gökalp'in Hayatı ve Eserleri*, Sebil Yayinevi, 1980, p. 83

<sup>35</sup> Halil Berktaş writes that in the intra-war Hungarian nationalism, Sumerians were also proclaimed as Hungarians, fathers of Hungarian nation (Berktaş, Halil, "Tarih Çalışmaları", *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, cilt 9, p.2460). Note that Hittites and Sumerians had been discovered later. Assyrian-Babylonian cultures were strongly present in the Old Testament. Ninevah, Babylon and Persepolis had been excavated and their languages deciphered more or less by mid-nineteenth century. It was 1880s that Sumerians were recognized as an earlier distinct civilization after excavations in southern Iraq (Jean Botero, *Mezopotamya*, Dost Yayınevi, 2003, p.84) and Hittite language had only been deciphered in 1915 in Hattushash by Hrozný (p.86) It should have been enthusiastically celebrated that Semitic Assyrian-Babylonians had in fact got their alphabet and culture from Arian Sumers and Anatolia had originally been another Arian country from the earliest phases of recordable history. It looks like THT has its similar versions and can be understood as a global phenomena. Hungarians who developed an extreme official nationalist in the authoritarian Horthy regime and faced a European assault to this Asian race would produce same motives which forced Kemalist elite to develop THT. Hungarians, settled in central Europe, between Indo-European nations should have felt that their race should have a certain divine superiority and messianic significance. For the rupture of Hungarian Turanism flourishing due to these

“Efruz Bey” in the voice of a bizarre example of extreme Turkish nationalist as follows; “Although Ahmet Mithat had showed us that except the Ottoman dynasty, no Turk lives in Ottoman Empire, he did prove that negroes were actually Turks. The discoveries of the author of “History of Amasya” are also remarkable<sup>36</sup>. One also should not forget Necip Asım and his contributions. The historian Ahmet Refik had showed us that Sumers, Hittites and Akkadians were all Turks. But none could discover what I had discovered. I had discovered that Americans are Turks<sup>37</sup>.”

It should be emphasized that II Abdülhamid would benefit a lot from Namık Kemal’s ideas which was neither nationalism nor Islamism. Again it was the question of the ideological legitimacy of the reigning Ottoman dynasty for now about six centuries. It was obviously for glorification of Islam. However, it was a reality that things were not going good for the abode of Islam. Ottomans were losing consecutive wars. These may be declared as “tactical retreats” in preparation for future assaults. Short term losses can be bearable for future victories. The message was that everything was under control (obviously, this was only a rationalization; nobody was expected to believe in that) and submission to the wisdom of the imperial order necessary. Here the pure interests of Islam had been hijacked deliberately by the interests of the dynasty. The interests of the empire and Islam are the same and perfectly matching in eternity as in the theorem of limits in mathematics but for practical reasons, the interests of the

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motives, see Tark Demirkan, *Macar Turancıları*, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2000. For a superb article on how racial question sneezed into historywriting of 1930s France, especially for G. Dumezil, Ginzburg, Carlo, “Germanic Mythology and Nazism: Thoughts on an old book by Georges Dumezil”, in *Clues, Myths and the Historical Method*, John Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 126-145

<sup>36</sup> “ according to Diyarbakırlı Said Paşa writing in Mir’atü’l-Iber, in ancient times, in the region of “Pont”, three Turkish tribes named Tibar, Salib and Maznik had been living. Later, Greeks had migrated to Trabzon and Amis (Amasya DG).....(Abdi-zade Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, Amasya Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 1986, p.12)....(speculating on the origin of the word “Amas”, the original name of Amasya; “the word “amas” derived from the verb “ammak” and similar to other words originating from the same verb like amaç, amaret, amak, aman and amad. When one thinks that Hittite Turks had long time settled in “Pont”, it becomes clear that the “Amas” (the founder of the city according to Hüsameddin DG) belongs to one of these (Turkish) tribes (op. cit., p. 13) These incredible lines from a book originally published in 1914 displays not only Turkish Historical Thesis but also a proto-Sun Language theory !

<sup>37</sup> Ömer Seyfeddin, *Efruz Bey*, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999, p. 114

state takes not only precedence but assumes to be the guiding principle as long as we do not speak of a value decided on  $x$  being equal to infinite. Abdülhamid's "imperial pan-Islamism" was always on this premise and for example high interests of the Ottoman Empire avoided this Islamism to a more open manifestation not to harass relations with Britain. An expression pertaining to these two levels given precedence to the state interests is summarized in an imperial medallion from the time of Abdülmecid that reads; *cet etat subsistera, Dieu le veut*<sup>38</sup> (this state will prevail, God orders so)

Abdülhamid knew that only a homage to Islam was not enough to legitimize his reign and pacify restless protests. Another strategy he turned to was a rediscovery of the Ottoman ancestors. This state, its possessions, wealth all had been built with the blood of these heroes. A revitalized interest towards the heydays of Ottoman Empire had been manipulated<sup>39</sup>. Again what matters here is the Ottoman empire, the dynasty, the loyal military and administrative servants; nothing more than that. But the rediscovery of Ottomans also brought a covert recognition of its Turkish heritage.

One of the pillars was the construction of a Turkish national history with a depictable genealogy. As Selim Deringil profoundly showed us, II Abdülhamid's reign was the very significant "invention of tradition" phase. Hobsbawm in his article in the book gives certain time ranges for the national inventions of traditions. This stage goes back to the eighteenth century in Britain whereas in the French case we have wait until Third Republic in its consolidated version in a republican garb and for Germany it coincides with the unification of Germany<sup>40</sup>. Such a phase can be located arguably in the Turkish case in the Abdülhamid era. Of course it may easily be set in the Kemalist 1920s and 1930s and such a position is much less controversial and more conventional but an outright emphasis on the Kemalist era would miss the fact that Kemalist iconography had been shaped chiefly by Abdülhamid's "construction of nation-state"

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<sup>38</sup> Deringil, Selim, *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002, p.37

<sup>39</sup> This dimension well explains the distaste of Young Turks towards the Ottoman past and the complete denial of anything Ottoman of Kemalism. When Turkish nationalism ruptured and created its own lieux de memoires, Ottoman mythologies had been hardly posited in the Pantheon and took a few decades for such a reconciliation. Abdülhamid's use of Ottoman past may have been a strong reason for such a distaste. Uriel Heyd writes, "while listing Turkish heroes throughout history, Gökalp decided to include Ottoman sultans as well after a great hesitation (Heyd, Uriel, op. cit., p.83)

<sup>40</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric, "Mass-producing Traditions: Europe", in *Inventing Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge University Press, 1997

the nation here not necessarily the “Turkish nation” but only “nation” (millet, between *ümme*t and *ulus*). In reality what Turkish nation-state in its consolidated form understands from nation is closer to the understanding of Abdülhamid’s rather than the romantic version and interpretation of the Kemalist Turkish Historical Thesis<sup>41</sup>.

There are a lot of national-historical references in the construction of a such tradition. It was Abdülhamid who rebuilt the tomb of Ertuğrul Gazi in Söğüt with a majestic opening ceremony . He had organized a privy guardsmen recruited from his “fellow” Kayı tribe members belonging to the Karakeçili which Osman also belonged and descended from had been brought from Söğüt to serve in Yıldız Palace<sup>42</sup>. Again the history school books of the time had developed a special notion of “Ottoman historical identity” not only as Islamic conquerors fighting in the name of the prophet but also a unique and respectable dynastic tradition with a not very evident but still persistent Turkish identity. At least it was how the school children of the time who later made the Young Turk and Kemalist cadres knew this from their childhood. The legends and epics of the yore which had been “rediscovered” or dully “invented” in the time of II Abdülhamid and taught to the schoolchildren to be proud of their heroic ancestors (half Islamic, half Turkic in character and Ottoman in its syntheses form ) had a significant impact on the kids who were to be the future Young Turks as Somel argues analyzing the memoirs of Young Turks<sup>43</sup>. A Freudian analysis may be not only interesting to

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<sup>41</sup> A very general and strong mistake in the literature of history and political science is to miss the strong tension between nation as “volk” and the state constructed nation. Hitler’s Night of Long Knives is a method how nationalism retreats to the state-nationalism rather than “genuine” nationalism. Turkish Historical Thesis’ understanding of nation is what Herder (or Rousseau as a pastoral community) understands from it. Nationalism had been taken over by state in the late nineteenth century and nationalism had been installed into the state apparatus. In that regard what is alive in Kemalism is its Abdülhamid’s version whereas romanticism of Turkish Historical Thesis had died out.

<sup>42</sup> Deringil, op. cit, 41-2

<sup>43</sup> Süleyman Paşa’s book to be studied in the military school has to be analyzed differently from the general school books of the reign of II Abdülhamid. Süleyman Paşa was a nascent Turkish nationalist without any strong loyalty to the dynastic-imperial authority. The royalist school books had been prepared chiefly to spread out an imperial ideology which had been strengthened by an ambivalent reference to Turkish identity to gain the new intelligentsia who are more willing to submit their loyalties to a national program rather than a hardly defined imperial loyalty. To see how the experiences of the schools of Abdülhamid on the rising new elite reflected in their memoirs see, Somel, Akşin, *The Islamization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire*, Brill, 2001

apply but can bear some fruit for the imaginative vision of the future Young Turks. Ultra-modernist and supposedly anti-Ottoman Ömer Seyfeddin's heroic Ottoman stories glorifying the Ottoman idea with a very profound reservation implicit in the background can be interpreted with such an approach. In that regard, we can speak of a consciousness of Ottoman origins within a Turkish ethnicity and Turkish element which had been interpreted and illustrated in various contested forms.

Of course the problem here is the "four hundred tents" thesis which disregards the prehistory of the Ottoman principality and settlement of the Ottoman principality within an earlier Turkish history. According to the four hundred tents thesis, ancestors of Ertuğrul had migrated from Horasan to Anatolia and after a few movement from their settled soil, they finally settled in Söğüt-Domaniç. This disregards the very complicated and ambivalent relations in an Anatolia of frontiers and rural-urban dichotomies and marginalizes the significance and presence of Seljuks of Rum. It had been noted that origins of the making of Turkish Historical Thesis is Atatürk's reaction to the simplicity and the very Ottomanness of this theory. "Four Hundred Thesis" associated with Namık Kemal as the reviver of this very old dynastic rhetoric to be deciphered from court historians is certainly a royalist one. But not many Ottoman intellectuals had subscribed to this theory. They were aware that there is something deeper than the rise of a certain dynasty in Bithynia in early 8<sup>th</sup> Hegirah century. What lies "deeper" may not be necessarily a Turkish essence but anything that may shake the unquestionable legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty.

We do not see any attribution of attention to the Seljuks of Rum in the "Four Hundred Thesis". This we can relate to the dynastic reluctance to ignore any other Turkish dynasty to rule over Anatolia and a need to attribute the Ottoman dynasty a privileged role in the course of Turkish history before the advent and rise of Osman which was basically nothing substantial beyond four hundred tents. But this "misrepresentation" had its limits in the dynastic ideology. As the dynastic hegemony had been questioned not in terms of an anti-monarchial movement but the dismantling of the dynastic ideological hegemony in regard to the Ottoman and Turkish nation; it was natural after the Revolution of 1908 to seek the origins before the advent of Osman. This we will see first in Köprülü in the 1910s. Before studying of Seljuks of Rum, study of history does not go further than the shepherds around Söğüt. Of course in the 1910s, especially with the mild sultan Mehmed V Reşad, the Ottoman dynasty was left as a symbol and Mehmed V Reşad hardly enjoyed more influence than a late 20<sup>th</sup> century

European figurehead monarch. Thus we observe the “democratization of history”. Ottoman dynasty’s status as a taboo had been rendered void. The study of pre-Ottoman Turkish history had been supported and encouraged by the democratic and anti-authoritarian currents. This we will see even in the heydays of .Kemalist authoritarianism when the state intelligentsia will relieve itself with their inclination of their interest towards pre-Ottoman Turkish history when the democratic wave had been successfully overturned. Again as will see later, many of the Turkists of 1910s while preserving their Turkist sympathies had taken democratic position in a rising tide of authoritarian ideology and state.

We can discover “authentic roots” to the “course of Turkish history” as presented in the early republican discourse as well. Neşri’s “Cihannüma” presents us some dazzling evidence for such a “consciousness”. The first chapter opens with Oguz Khan and a summary of the pre-Anatolian Turkish history with remarkable and knowledgeable references to the pre-Ottoman Turkish history both pre-Islam and Islamic ages and treat the Turkish past as a living memory and sees the advent of Ottomans in this “Turkish tradition”. In the presentation of this first chapter, the reader senses that all the Turkish history which he summarizes originates from the grandfather Oguz and all of it can be reduced to one big story. Then the second chapter is totally about Seljuks which had been mentioned as the “.....of the Turkish sultanate”. After a detailed summary of the Seljuks history, we meet the Ottomans in the third chapter in which Ottoman dynasty is presented as the “new inheritors of the Turkish sultanate”. Here a direct transition is present from the Seljuks of Rum to the Ottomans neglecting all the complicated and anxious struggles between the Anatolian principalities and especially those between the smaller Ottomans and Karamanlids. It gives the reader same impression as if reading a modern Turkish nationalist work as if one star will be immediately followed by the another as in the emblem of Presidency of the Turkish republic. But of course the more than impressive passage is the Neşri’s almost invoking of the Turkish Historical Thesis some five hundred years earlier in the first chapter of his Cihannüma;

“ve bu cemi-i etraki müvehhiddin ki elan bilad-ı Türkistan’da ve Maveraünnehir’de ve Horasan’da ve Fars’da ve Irak’ta Azerbeycan’da ve Diyarbekir’de ve Ermeniyye’de ve Rum’da ve Şam’da ve Mısır’da ve Mağrib’de sakin olurlar, ebna-i Oğuz’un bu yiğirmi dört evladınun zürriyetindendir. Ve dahi Oğuz’la bilad-ı Türkistan’a kaçan ebna-i a’mamınun neslindendir.....müverrih eydür: vakta ki Oğuz bilad-ı arzı şarkan ve garban



ve Çin ve Hitay ve Gur ve Gazne ve Hind ve Sind ve Türkistan ve Deylem ve Babil ve Rum ve Efrenc ve Rus ve Şam ve Hicaz ve Habeş ve Yemen ve Berber, çün bu kadar illere müstevli oldu, yine vatan-ı asliyyesi ortak ve kürtak'a rücu idüb, evladından Gün Han'ı ve Ay Han'ı ve Yıldız Han'ı meymene üzerinde kılub Gök Han'ı ve Tak Han ve Dingiz Han'ı evladiyle meysere üzerinde kılub ve Oğuz Han kendüsi Medine-i Sayram'da istikrar idüb nasa adl ü dad gösterib tertib-i saltanaten meşgul oldu<sup>44</sup>.....”

This “more than striking” passage presents us an interesting phenomenon of a reconstruction of a national myth which had died centuries ago and had been resurrected<sup>45</sup>. The same Neşri proudly locates the advent of Osman in that tradition. After Osman conquered Bilecük and Söğüd in Hagirah 700, the Iconium sultan recognizes and greets Osman by sending him presents and recognizing his free standing position.

“Ve Osman Gazi bunların zamanında sultan Ala ü d-din Keykubad bin Feramürz'den kılıç kuşanub atı Ertuğrul tariki üzerine gazaya nasb-ı nefis idüb ve niyyet-i hayr olub, “mahza etmeği gazadan çıkarayın ve hiçbir melike ihtiyaç göstermiyeyin; hem dünya ve hem ahiret elüme girsin” dirdi.<sup>46</sup>”

Hence, this is declaration of independence for modern Turkish historians. Throughout his history, Neşri not only gives a long history of Seljuks of Rum but also praises them. Neşri is not unique in his respect towards Seljuks of Rum. Gordlevski writes that early Ottomans had affection and attachment towards Seljukids. One of the daughters of Mehmed I was Selçuk Hatun. A forged document believed to be from 15<sup>th</sup> century was included in Münşaat'üs Selatin Alaaddin Kaykubad III declaring Osman as his

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<sup>44</sup> Neşri, *Cihannüma*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995, vol I, p.13-15

<sup>45</sup> we should remember that Neşri was the primary source of Ottoman chroniclers and then medieval and modern western historians. Aşıkpaşazade, the other rich and authentic source lacks of any such pre-history of Ottomans. For Aşıkpaşazade Ottomans are seen as a reaction to the imperial tradition and therefore we do not see any legitimacy-construction of tradition problematique. On the contrary, there is an effort of disassociation. In that regard, Seljuks of Rum dimension is also lacking. But that is not the case for Neşri.

<sup>46</sup> Neşri, op. cit., p.51-53

legitimate successor<sup>47</sup>. Neşri's position will be reiterated by the later Ottoman chroniclers but as the Ottoman dynasty will consolidate its power, legitimacy and authority; the place for commemorating pre-Ottoman Turkish dynasties will shrink sharply and will come to the point of disappearance. A change in the opposite direction will come as argued above when this legitimacy and authority will decline and diminish in the very late Ottoman history.

In 1392, I Bayezid asked the Mameluk sultan to be recognized as "sultan-ür-Rum", a title previously referring to the sultans of Seljuks of Rum<sup>48</sup>. A similar peaceful transition of the "Turkish sultanate" from Seljuks of Rum to Ottomans is presented in almost all the accounts. Here this legitimate right to rule over the Turks and over the geographical territory "Rum" can be understood as the transfer of the "kut", the ancient Turkish notion signifying the "right to overwhelm". Wittek has pointed out that the legend of mythical Süleymanşah, the father of Ertuğrul being drawn in the river "Habur" had been taken from the death of Kutalmışoğlu Süleymanşah and the ancestor of Seljuks of Rum had been adapted and assimilated by Ottomans taking the "kut" from them<sup>49</sup>.

In Cantemir, based on Neşri and himself echoing first modest footsteps of modern historiography within the domains of medieval historiography, the legend of the legendary ancestor of the Ottoman family and the Seljukid family member commander Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman had been again taken as one. Cantemir narrates the legendary story of the conquests of Süleymanşah, his tragic death in Euphrates and his burial in Djaber near Aleppo. But the reason for his advent to Anatolia had been given as fleeing from the marching Mongul hordes of Genghis Khan. This Süleymanşah is the father of Ertuğrul<sup>50</sup>. Cantemir tells us that due to their prejudices, Christian historians tend to define Osman as a bandit and a shepherd. This is pretty much present in Gibbons and the motivation to develop his theory. Cantemir also confirms the accord between Seljuks of Rum and Ottomans. Cantemir claims that the birth of Ottoman principality

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<sup>47</sup> Gordlevski, Vladimir, *Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti*, Onur Yayınları, 1988, p. 15

<sup>48</sup> Inalcık, Halil, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003, p.62

<sup>49</sup> quoted in Divitçioğlu, Sencer, *Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kuruluşu*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2000, p.20

<sup>50</sup> Cantemir, Dimitri, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Yükseliş ve Çöküşü Tarihi*, Kültür Bakanlığı, 1979, p.3-5

can be traced back to the times when the eleven governors partitioned their territories after the fleeing of Keyhüsrev. The loyal gazi commander Ertuğrul acted and presented western Anatolian lands back to the Seljuks of Rum. Subsequently, he was very beneficial in overthrowing strong Mongol elements in Anatolia. These favorable deeds of him and the unfavorable developments of the invaded Anatolia had forced him to declare his independence<sup>51</sup>. Ottoman and Crimean khanate family had been presented as two branches from the Oghuzs. In all these, we see that the continuities had been carefully expressed and emphasized.

Jumping from Cantemir of the early eighteenth century to Hammer of early nineteenth century, now we are really in the purgatory between medieval historiography and modern historiography. Hammer is a western utilizer of Ottoman chroniclers more or less in a relatively critical fashion. However, his scope does not surpass medieval norms. Again, Hammer follows the traditional pattern to initiate Ottoman history from "ancient Turks". Hammer uses Ottoman sources such as Neşri, other oriental sources such as Ebu'l Gazi, his precursors in the West such as De Guignes and classics such as Herodotus as we trace from his footnotes<sup>52</sup>. This variety of sources he uses displays a remarkable and striking synthesis of how traditional historiography and tools of modern historiography have been used together and mingled. This blend also gives us an interesting hint how modern historiography, here in that matter oriental historiography, disregarding all the rhetoric of modern approach has been influenced and shaped by the traditional versions. This is also true for the Kemalist historiography which is another and strong example of modern historiographical approaches and tendencies shaped by traditional versions. Again we see Neşri on the pitch in Hammer, the crucial pillar of Hammer's conclusions. We should remember Neşri again in its unnoticed but decisive role in the construction of the Kemalist THT.

From here we can jump to another landmark figure. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's brief introduction to the history of Ottomans begins with the summary of the early Islamic history. However, the Turkish presence is not completely absent. In the book, the deeds of the Ottomans have been presented as follows. " In the beginning, Devlet-i Aliyye was a very small political entity. But due to its praiseworthy and eternal character unique to

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<sup>51</sup> op. cit, p. p.LIV-LV

<sup>52</sup> Hammer, Joseph Von Purgstall, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Üçdal Nşeriyat-Emir-Berikan, 1996, p. 30-59

Turkishness and heroism with faith in Islam gave the necessary talent and capacity<sup>53</sup>." The linkage between Ottoman principality and the Iconium sultans of Rum had been given as follows; "although Iconium sultans of Rum had been one of the strongest forces in the abode of Islam, they had been weakened by the Tartars. They even had to pay tribute to Tartars. After years of uncertainty and weaknesses, their polity had waned after their order had been demolished in the year 699 (A.H.). At that time, thanks to God, the dark beginning's happy conclusion and nightmarish dreams' optimistic interpretation, the Ottomans had risen and gave light to all the Islamic lands and the neighboring lands<sup>54</sup>". The drum and the tail had been sent to young Osman by the Iconium sultan after his victory against Greeks. This symbolic act claimed to take place refers to the concept of the continuity of the existence of the single Turkish political leadership and the idea that one Turkish polity will be replaced by the other immediately by a quasi-divine sanctioning and consecration. Here in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Turco-centric interpretation had been tried to be included within a more or less Islamo-centric interpretation but Ahmed Cevdet Pasha is not coy to display a Turkish dimension to his story. After all, he might be a faithful Muslim but his loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty whom he perceives as a present from God's will is even stronger. After all, he is the mastermind of Mecelle, the Ottomanized Shariah, Shariah bounded to the political domains of the Ottoman order. Furthermore, to make the connection how Ahmed Cevdet Pasha has taken in the Turkic element in his study, we can recall that as a sincere believer in the will (inayet in Islamic terminology meeting the "kut" of Turkic terminology) of the dynasty, he can not disregard the glorious past upon which the Ottoman dynasty rises.

Finally, before concluding our remarks regarding the Ottoman era, one should not omit mentioning Mustafa Celaledin Pasha's book and one can not miss how it resembles the THT. Such a comparison will display a perfect example how racial questions and national identity longings are decisive on development of national historiographies. The theme of racial dimension is central in Mustafa Celaledin Pasha's book. This is important because the same question is present in all the books of the time but in other books, this theme is covert and never made explicit. This book renders us see this anxiety easily and explicitly. This angst will be a major underlining

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<sup>53</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Üçdal Neşriyat, 1994, p.37

<sup>54</sup> op. cit., p.37

theme in the nationalist history literature of the later periods. For its unique position vis-a-vis the Turkish Historical Thesis, I will return to this book in more detail in the following few pages.

In the 1910s, following the captivity from the imperial ideology monopolizing the areas of history to study, 1910s brought a multilateral and rich environment to study history. In the “Milli Tetebbüleri Memuarı”, Ottomans lost its taboo aspect and could be also deciphered with other areas of Turkish history worth exploring into. In the liberal and open atmosphere of the Second Constitution, Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni was founded by figures such as the official chronicler of the Ottomans Abdurrahman Şeref, Necib Asım and others but the real giant steps in Turkish historiography had been taken by the nationalist journals such as *Türk Yurdu* and *Halka Doğru* where articles had been published about Turkish history, archeology, literature and sociology<sup>55</sup>. In 1913 Yusuf Akçura criticized Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni severely claiming that they only give attention to great men, sultans, pashas, beys and missing the social-economical backgrounds and lacking any analytical founding<sup>56</sup>.

The status of Seljuks of Rum being a non-interest area was not confined to the early Turkish historians. In the very early twentieth century Seljuks of Rum was a terra incognita for the western historians who had been busy theorizing on the origins of the Ottomans. In these theories, a common characteristic before the advent of Köprülü was 1-) taking Ottomans only in their very geographical setting and ignoring the “Anatolian middle ages” as the origins of Ottomans 2-) accepting the rise of Ottomans as a predestined phenomena and ignore the causality factor. The negative influences of these two axioms had been unquestioned because of the neglect of Seljuks of Rum in Anatolian history.

The role of Seljuks of Rum is strikingly marginal in the Turkish Historical Thesis. This contradicts an armchair interpretation of the Turkish Historical Thesis. A logical conclusion following the paths of the emergence and rise of Turkish historywriting, one could suspect an emerging interest towards Seljuks of Rum for three possible reasons. First of all, to demolish any legitimacy to the now gone Ottoman family-dynasty, secondly to find a more secular Turkish polity to replace the despicable Ottomans who

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<sup>55</sup> Berktaş, op. cit, p.2459

<sup>56</sup> Georgeon, Francois, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, p.72-6

are seen as too Islamic and thirdly to strengthen the Anatolian identity using the Rum of Seljuks whose frontiers are strikingly corresponding to the frontiers of the modern Turkish republic. However, such a restoration did not take place.

There was the emergence of a new generation of historians having interest towards Seljuks of Rum. Köprülü had been accompanied by young historians such as Halil Mükrimin Yinanç, İsmail Hakkı Danişmend (himself a descendant of the Danishmenids of 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> century Anatolia ), İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı. In the early republican era, they were in their youth and about giving their early works. However, all these figures had been left aside in the margins of the Turkish community of historians and could not reach the core of the official “star (quasi)historians of the era.

Of course one observation is the domination of the Tartars in this privileged elite. Naturally, the Tartar origin historians had an inclination and penchant for Central Asia based history at a time of a very strong anti-irredentist and anti-revisionist Turkish foreign policy. After all, they were quite active in the struggle of Central Asian Turks as they were settled in the Ottoman Empire and what they understood from nationalism was a supra-state level loyalty beyond strictly political allegiances. However, after the terrible defeat brought by the unrealistic ideals of Panturkism, they had to be reconciled to the “changing times”. How can we explain the extensive presence of Tartar origin intellectuals in a regime turning inwards to the disadvantage of its fellow-brothers abroad. Does these agendas create a contradiction ? I would argue that they fit in perfectly. Because Mustafa Kemal himself had a strong antipathy to the Turanism of 1910s and of course all these enthusiasms had been demolished in the shadows of a horrible defeat and occupation; this suppressed dream had to be channeled somewhere else where it may be tamed and where it will not pose any threat to the localism of the regime. This was the mythical past of six-thousand years. What Mustafa Kemal did was actually recapture the Turks back in Ergenekon where they will not be able to intervene in the republican politics.

Tartar elite of 1910s had always shown interest to their original homeland and Turks of Central Asia which was not a legendary story of yore but a living memory for them but they were also very western-oriented and educated people. Their foremost agenda for panturkism went hand to hand with a westernist commitment more so than the home-grown nationalists. In that regard, it can be argued that they internalized this compromise and divided their area of interest into two; that of non-political mythical Turkish history based in Central Asia and that of Anatolian-based current affairs. As

they are reconstructing their political program, in their non-political romanticism they took refuge in the secure and cold cellar of history surrendered to the charm of the yore where their dreams can not be demolished for a second time. This also fit the Tartar intelligentsia's liberal political leanings. They had fled from the autocratic czarist Russia and had been in touch (or at least carrying an awareness) with the radical elements of Russian underground opposition. Thus, they always had an inclination towards liberalism, at least liberalism understood in the czarist Russia meaning being against authoritarianism and being a defender of political liberties<sup>57</sup>. So, adding these two aspects which may at the first glance may seem contradictory, created its unique blend; a panturkist dream and ambition within a democratic vision. The obvious contradictions in this political orientation had been experienced in the course of the World War I as the Unionist junta's chauvinism had aggravated. This dictatorship and chavaunism of the Unionist junta had been applied not only to non-Turkish communities but also on Turkish populaces as well as seen in the invasion of Azerbaijan rejecting to recognize the inclinations and appetites of the Azerbaijani political groupings and institutions. Disillusioned from these political maneuvers and facing the darkness of *raison d'état*<sup>58</sup>, after the proclamation of the Republic, Turkism had turned into a romantic vision of the original and genuine Turkish society in a mythical past inserted into 6000 years ago in a pre-state level. This fit into their anti-autocratic and liberal visions with a volkish nationalism and paved the way to the not so weak liberal wing of the Tartar intelligentsia to embrace the authoritarian regime of Kemalism with the illusion of referring to the mythical past of 6000 years ago. These

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<sup>57</sup> see Venturi, Franco, *Roots of Revolution*, Phoneix Press, 1983, Walicki, Andrzej, *Rus Düşünce Tarihi: 1760-1900*, V Yayınları, 1987

<sup>58</sup> The Tartar intellectuals who had developed a liberal version of nationalism (especially Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu) had conflicted with the more state-centric nationalists of Ottoman breeding. For Azerbaijani intellectuals' reaction when Azerbaijan had been dully invaded by the Ottoman armies in the end of World War I, İmanov, Vügar, *Ali Merdan Topçubaşı*, Boğaziçi University Press, 2003, p. 93-103. Ahmet Ağaoğlu who is working as the "political adviser" of the invading commander Nuri Paşa tries to mediate between two sides but fails to do so. For recalling the "origin" of Ahmed Ağaoğlu in a session of the Turkish Parliament in 1930s, Shishler, Ada Holland, *Between Two Empires: Ahmed Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*, I. B. Tauris, 2003. Tartar intellectuals' liberalism also brought their non-involvement with the radicalization of the Union of Progress after the Bab-ı Ali coup. Although one generation had been discredited after their involvement with the İttihatçı power, they could join the new rising elite given their clean record in troubled years.

two inclinations having no way to come together in the reality of the contemporary age had been fused in the ideal of the mythical past of 6000 years. Moreover, Central Asian steppe world had been so caricaturized and rendered no more earthly than Walhalla in the Kemalist imagination that it had lost its touch with reality and possibility to provide a viable political program and discourse although it was inspiring an “applicable” political agenda in 1910s in the heydays of Panturkism.

This coincided with Atatürk’s and his circle’s defensive and conservative foreign policy which look for a very strong nationalism within the territoriality of the Turkish Republic and avoid any uncontrollable nationalism which had pillaged the last decade. The complex conclusion was to avoid the nightmarish years of 1910s with a new generation fascinated with dreams of a rise of Turkish awakening Euroasian wide<sup>59</sup>. All these had been controlled in the name of high state interests. Evidently, such a process required a very manageable means of conduct. These complicated dynamics brought us the making of the very strange Turkish Historical Thesis.

Although Turkish History Thesis is Central-Asia-centric, a curious insight to the “masterpieces” of THT will display that anything pertaining to Central Asia disappears after the embracing of Islam by Turks. We will no more hear of the medieval Turkish khanates, Uzbeks of 16<sup>th</sup> century or the Russian imperialism of 19<sup>th</sup> century. As the last pieces of ancestors of Turks had migrated from the homeland (Turks whom we are interested, not Turks whom we do not have any interest, especially Turks under Soviet yoke), our relation and interest with Central Asia ends. The Turks who had stayed in the homeland lost being an object of interest. They do lose their historicity.

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<sup>59</sup> As like there is a complete silence of “what the Armenian “affairs” of 1915 really were” apart from the semiological question was it a genocide or not, there is a similar silence regarding the high tide of Panturkism which fascinated a whole generation. Panturkism suddenly disappeared from mainstream political discourse and open publicity with the founding of the Republic. II World War enabled its possible resurgence but as the Allies were marching to the victory, it had been suppressed second time and since it had died out as a political program except some eccentric circles. Panturkism of 1970s and our contemporary era as a political movement could never free itself from the conservatism and Islamic sympathies of right-wing nationalism. Today, we are far from realizing the widespread excitement panturkist atmosphere had bolstered. One can look at Halide Edip’s “The New Turan” novel to see interesting reflections of such a dream-world. This dimension is crucial for us to understand the ambivalence, controversies of the founding of the republic and its successive destruction of such political affiliations (to disremember 1910s) which pose a direct and vehement threat to the survival of itself.



Declaring of all possible world civilizations as Turkish, Turkism had been cleaned from its possible menaces and dangerous connotations. If everybody was Turkish, the exorbitance of nationalism could be contained. The state will decide who is the enemy and who is not; not the wisdom and genie of the Turkish national ethos. Again a very strange and impressive cosmopolitan history will be constructed to be taught in secondary schools. Although a very rich survey of compartments of global history had been provided; the Central Asian Turks after the embracing of Islam had been completely forgotten aside.

Here we can understand the reason why Seljuks of Rum had stayed marginal in the THT. It had been declared that Anatolia was Turkish ever since Hittites. Anatolia was a Turkish homeland for thousands of years. And the need to divert attention from Ottomans was concentrated on this mythical ancient Anatolia.<sup>60</sup> No need for the Seljuks of Rum as necessary. The cosmopolitan nationalism had highlighted pre-Manzikert civilizations who had been Turkified.

Returning half a decade for a while, the peculiar book mentioned slightly above appeared in 1869 dedicated to sultan Abdülaziz. Mustafa Celaledin Pasha, a convert of Polish noble origin Constantin Borzhensky gives the book the title of "Les Turcs anciens et modernes" which is written in French. The book looks like having a purpose of being a guide to the sultan and his entourage. Mustafa Celaledin displays the significance of Turks in their contribution to the world civilization from very early ages of history. He further claims that Turks belong to a race which he calls Touro-Arienne. The aim is obvious. Turks are not an oriental race to be buried into the darkness of Asia but a noble genuine European race. His double success is making Turks acceptable and legitimate Europeans in the eyes of Europeans and at the same time making Europe as the legitimate, natural and original goal (and home) for Turks if Turks and Europeans share the same racial background (he points out to the "resemblance of Turkish and

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<sup>60</sup> one interesting point is that the Turkish-declared Hittites and the subsequent nations (Phrigians, Lydians) were all before the Greek colonization in Anatolia. Thus it can be declared Turks were in Anatolia before Greeks. Of course this is an armchair interpretation and contrary to such an interpretation, no direct encounter with the Greek claims of Anatolia is observable. The Ion and Greek civilizations had been also declared as Turks ! and no dilemma is present in such a controversial claim. A very strong (and admirable ) effort can be deducted from this. The bloody past had to be forgotten and the wounds of yesteryear ..... whatever may be bleeding inside. This can be read with the visit of Venizelos in 1930 who is regarded highly as the peace loving president of the neighboring country and good relations between two countries in the timebeing.

Latin such as *jus* and *yasa*, *curules* and *kurultay*” and explain this with possible Turkish origins of Etruscans and declaring Latin language and civilization as Turkish<sup>61</sup>. The Etruscan thesis will be repeated four years later by Leon Cahun. Mustafa Celalaeddin also argues for the intense connections of ancient Greeks and Turks saying if earlier Turks would not take Arabic as their elite-level language, they were to embrace Greek as their language of conduct from Byzantines. This is because actually Greeks and Turks are from the same descent. He supports his claim with “Jean Commene”, a Byzantinian writer. Atatürk has this book in his library and underlined all these claims reading the book carefully<sup>62</sup>. Mustafa Celalaeddin also carefully distinguishes Ottomans who are down to their decline, decadence and catastrophe but this downfall has nothing to do with the Turkish people as Atatürk also had underlined in his copy; “voila, selon moi, l’unique cause de la decadence de l’empire Ottoman. En verite, pourquoi en chercher d’autres ? Nous ne voyons dans le peuple turc aucun signe de decadence. Ainsi, s’il est vrai que le proselytisme, le zèle des ncophytes et les victoires élevèrent beaucoup l’argueil religieux et rendirent apre le caractère des milices turques, le fanaticisme, de fait, n’a jamais existe.<sup>63</sup>” It was the “demi phanoriote et demi-persane, la caste obséqueuse” which had fallen.

It is a magnificent synthesis of westernism and nationalism as if two are an inseparable couple. To enter the civilization of Europe is nothing more than returning back to their homeland and our national features for Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha. This is strikingly resembling the nationalist-westernist synthesis of Atatürk ambitiously fighting to annihilate any possible contradictions between nationalism and westernism as remnants from anti-imperialism, Islamic nationalism, xenophobia et cetera<sup>64</sup>.

Atatürk will go further and with the Turkish History Thesis he will declare that

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<sup>61</sup> Copeaux, Etienne, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, Türk Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998, p.17

<sup>62</sup> see Tüfekçi, Gürbüz D., *Atatürk’ün Okuduğu Kitaplar*, İş Bankası Yayınları, 1985, p.262-273

<sup>63</sup> quoted in op. cit., p. 268

<sup>64</sup> The mythical inland sea which has been the foremost phantasm of Kemalist THT and the migration paths after the inland-sea dries out had been first claimed by L. Cahun in 1873 in the I Orientalists Congress in Paris. He presented his exposé with a map which looks like the first example of the maps which are still present in Turkish elementary schools ! (Copeaux, Etienne, op. cit., p.18)

turning back to our national origins is regaining our culture which is basically every civilization built in the world and nationalism will be accompanied not only by fully-fledged Europeanism but a cosmopolitanism as well. The dismal past of recent Turkish nationalism had to be restored to a respectable position getting rid of its negative outlook and record and adapted within a European-cosmopolitan cultural make up and a cosmopolitan-European worldview. Plus the eccentric status of the westernist school which although popular within the young educated circles had its certain problems. Abdullah Cevdet went to the extreme to argue for marriages with European women to Europeanize and westernize the country himself following his own advice marrying an Italian. THT's success was to render radical westernism as Şükrü Hanioglu perfectly analyzes and display its level of absurdity acceptable for a wider audience disguising it in a nationalist garb<sup>65</sup>. Nationalism, an uncontrollable dynamic had been successfully tamed and integrated in a submissive position vis-a-vis the Kemalist state and westernism had been established as the indispensable aspect of nationalism. The Sun-Language theory also needed to be taken in this regard to establish Turks as a universal civilization from which all the civilizations (and languages) flourished and with that Turks had been admitted to the universal civilization in a very respectable position<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Hanioglu, Şükrü, "Baticılık", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Ansiklopedisi*, volume 5, 1985, p. 1382-1388

<sup>66</sup> The theory of sun-language had been first claimed by the German philologist Max Müller (1823-1900) who had theorized on the origins of the human language. For him, the language reflects the seek of the human to divinity and give a meaning to his life ("primitive intuition"), thus distinguishing itself from animals (his criticism of Darwinism and distinguishing humanities from social sciences). In this effort to give a meaning to the outer world, it was the sun that fascinated the early humans as the first divine object. It should also be mentioned that Müller saw Christianity as the last and the most perfect stop in this historical journey to understand the outer world. Müller disagrees with Renan that Semites and Arians' difference can be essentialized. Writing in the very racial and religious terminology of 19<sup>th</sup> century German academical language, he claimed that in the beginning the self-questioning of the early races were the same. Whereas the higher level of Arian language resulted in an Arian mythology whereas poor and arid language of Semites forced them to submit to one-God idea. Müller's claim is that the poverty of Semites became their advantage to recognize one-God before Arians (Olender, Maurice, *Cennetin Dilleri*, Dost Yayınları, 1998, p.104-116). Müller's universalism contra Renan's racial essentialism had been internalized by Kemalist recognizing one big civilization and Turks the ancestors of it. Although the main effort of the "scientific" efforts of the Kemalist era is to "prove" that Turks are a white, Arian race, we do not see a noticeable racial bias towards "lower races" such as Semites. Note that the beginning of the sun-language was a letter sent by an Austrian philologist claiming that Turkish may be the ur-language (to reflect the very German

Again, Turkishness had been posited not in a closed autarchic world but within the community of civilized. In short, THT and Sun-Language theory satisfied Afet Inan who was scared when he read “Turks belong to the yellow race (and thus may not be admitted to the world civilization being all the reforms of Kemalism in vain)” in 1928.

To come from all these overall discussions about THT’s nature being not state-centric as repeated as repeated here and there as very recently by Tanıl Bora-Kemal Can in 2004 “the myth of the State created and developed by Turkish Historical Thesis in the founding era of the Republic.....<sup>67</sup>” but instead being ethno-centric, we can see a very good demonstration of this in the approach of the Tarih II course book written by Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti, the earlier name of the Türk Tarih Kurumu and printed in 1933<sup>68</sup>. There exists a certain similarity between Tarih II and the 1970s schoolbooks but the differences are more significant and extensive. We will come to the narrative of the schoolbooks of 1970s later but here we have to bear in mind the later approach in a comparative fashion to analyze and understand the interpretation of Tarih II better.

When one begin to read Tarih II’s narration of Turks’ first raids to Anatolia, the first striking detail is the extensive and easy usage of Georgians and Armenians. We even counter the usage of an ambivalent “Armenia” as a geographical territory which lies west to the “cenubi kaskasya” which reminds us that this “Armenia” (Ermenistan Türkler tarafından çiğnendi, Türkler Bizans ordularını mağlup ederek Erzurum’a kadar ilerlediler<sup>69</sup>) is today’s east of Erzurum. Armenia is yet again referred this time with the “destruction of Malatya” reminding one to locate Armenia even more to the west<sup>70</sup>. In 1970s, the words Georgian and Armenian almost completely disappeared from the

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and German-protestant usage) from which all the languages of the world had flourished. Müller among 19<sup>th</sup> century anthropologist with his linguo-centrism had been associated with the diffusionist school which claims that the human culture had emanated from one single source (Barnard, Alan, *History an Theory in Anthropology*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 47-48 ) Curiously, Barnard finds the origins of the diffusionist theory in Sir William Jones and his discovery of the similarities of Greek, Latin and Sanskrit in India in 1790s.

<sup>67</sup> Bora, Tanıl, Can, Kemal, *Devlet ve Kuzgun:1990’lardan 2000’lere MHP*, İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p.147

<sup>68</sup> T.T.T. Cemiyeti, Tarih II, Devlet Matbaası, 1933

<sup>69</sup> op. cit., p. 226

<sup>70</sup> op. cit., p.227

course books and all the raids had been directed against “Byzantines” as the central Byzantine authority had been prevalent and its organized defense supervised from Constantinople manageable. The inability of Byzantine central state had been caught well in Tarih II. When Turkish raiders plunder, they plunder local cities and fight with local commanders, not with the forces of Byzantine central authority. But of course given the Byzantine military and political presence had been weakened, today’s East Anatolia had been ran by local lords and warlords of Armenian and Georgian origins which may transform their territories under control to independent principalities themselves. The disappearance of the “Armenian” throughout decades had been easily understood but we can speculate some on the disappearance of “Georgians”. The easiest argument of course is to let the Armenian disappear, you had to make Georgian disappear also. Another approach is to notify that the Turkish nation-state had been hostile not only to Armenians, Greeks but it had been hostile to other minor non-Turkish ethnicities such as the Georgians and we have to take note that the Georgian presence in today’s Artvin and Ardahan in levels of personal names, geographical names (village names etc.) the usage of the local language had been persistently and successfully been removed. This homogenotization process is more well-known in the case of Lazs who constitute a bigger population and well-known culture but we should not skip the Georgian case which has been very weakly documented<sup>71</sup> Of course, the fear of the founding Turkish nation-state (or labeled as the Turkish Republic, today republicanism turned into nation-statism in popular political language) of non-homogeneous “elements” had never been confined to Armenians and Georgians. It is better if we write our “milli tarih” as Georgian had never lived in the territories where Turkish Republic is sovereign with not mentioning of the very ethonym of Georgian. Of course this explanation does not resolve any problem. If the later disappearance of

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<sup>71</sup> One of the four “umumi müfettişlik” had been founded in Northeastern Turkey with the center office in Erzurum and responsible for the east Black sea coast. Notice that all the four umumi müfettişlik had been founded ethnically “sensitive” areas. The two are obvious, the first located in Kurdish provinces and the fourth in Tunceli, the most restless and insurgent region with a Alavi-Kurdish population. The second umumi müfettişlik had been founded in Thrace due to security concerns as black clouds gather in 1930s Anatolia and working also to establish a homogeneous Turkified Thrace feared from the danger of Pomak and Jewish presence speaking of non-Turkish or non-Muslim elements (Koçak, Cemil, *Umumi Müfettişlikler (1927-1952)*, İletişim Yayınları, 2003, p.141-46) A similar danger had been countered in the Northeast Anatolia changing hundreds of Laz and Georgian village names and “fighting” to destroy the spoken local languages.

“Georgian” with “Armenian” can be explained with the “rise of the nation-state”, the Kemalist era had been the zenith of such an approach but we had the open mentioning of ethnic groups. How to explain this ? Firstly, it was too early to forget the ethnically mixed demography of Anatolia. Armenian affairs had been just 20 years ago and the memories of ethnic pretences had been alive. Time was needed for the “forgetting process”, the main pillar of “construction of national memory and identity” rather than remembering. Secondly, it was too early to consolidate all the fixations. Founding of the codification of the nation-state discourse was not a holistic process but a gradual expansion and dissemination. However, beyond all, not all aspects of Kemalism had accepted the state-centrism yet. Kemalism always had a double game. On the one hand, it tried to praise Turkish ethno-nationalism based on the racial discourse of its contemporary and simultaneously it tried to establish a state-centric regime. We have to wait until 1936 when the union of the party and state had been succeeded but than abolished again. It was 1930s when one party regime had been consolidated<sup>72</sup> and it was not a straight and easy path.

The discrepancy between cult of the state versus cult of the race can be observable here. Turks are fighting and beating Armenians and Georgians. This fits with the social Darwinistic understanding of racial (or better to say in this regard ethnic) wars and struggles. Turks advancing from Iran and meeting other ethnic groupings and beating them. This is also a legitimate story to tell. With the complete take over of cult of the state over ethnic romanticism, it will clean these elements. The story will be transformed and adapted to a war of Turks against the Byzantine state. This will make the story also less complicated. Once Turks beat Byzantines, it will be very easy for them to Turkify and muslimize Anatolia. One “state” will replace the other and no resemblance and continuities with earlier times will persist. To support this claim, much different from the course books of 1970s, Turks here are not portrayed as part of a general plan of Turkish conquest of Anatolia. It is also far from the rhetoric of “Türk

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<sup>72</sup> We should be aware of the long and hard process of consolidating of the one party regime. When republic had been proclaimed, many thought that we will go back to 1908 with a multi-party regime. Many suspected that this will lead a new era but they tried to give a fight before give up. Mustafa Kemal at first had recognized the full legitimacy of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırka although not willingly (Parla, Taha, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, İletişim Yayınları, 1997, volume II, p.136) We have to wait for early 1930s for the successful edification of the one party regime. With this the authoritarian and state-centric nature of Kemalism had been fully expressed.

Cihan mefkuresi". The raids and plunders of Turks are spontaneous and happen due to their own wills (free choice) of the raider groups. Here again, there is no notion of "one Turkish heart" to command the frontier raiders. Turkish race has been demonstrated not as an organism with one brain and single command but demonstrated by these free men raiding for their own benefit and responsibility. This is closer to an ethno-centrist approach rather than a state-centric one. So the fight against "Armenian and Georgian" is more meaningful than fight against the Byzantines. Two parties are ethnicities in movement, not states representing two ethnicities. It has also been mentioned that "Oğuz kuvvetleri" had been active in Anatolia before Seljuks. The rise of Seljuks in 1040 facilitated their activities in Anatolia<sup>73</sup>. And the legendary battle of Manzikert of 1070s had been presented in exactly half a page. This is due to two reasons, the first is that the war is yet to open the doors of Anatolia to Turks as it has been opened some 3000-4000 years ago and a war between two central armies is yet to take the attention whereas the "noble raider" image is more popular and respectable. The presentation of the emergence of the first principalities is also different than the later versions. Whereas in the course books of 1970s, the emergence of the principalities by the raider commanders of Seljuks (Danişmendoğulları, Artukoğulları etc.) had been overlooked and downplayed, in Tarih II they are not condemned but seen as a natural outcome in itself recognizing the right of these military commanders to seek their fortunes. The raider-commanders are seen as fairly independent authorities. Central authority is yet to be seen in the discourse of "ebed müddet devlet". Again, it has been mentioned that "the unification (vahdet) of Anatolia has been achieved as late as during the reign of Kılıçarslan II (1156-1192)<sup>74</sup>" contrary to the later course books in which the "unity" had been achieved quickly and easily by Kutalmışoğlu Süleymanşah against the insurgent but weak commanders who had managed to control over dominions for some temporary time span. The Seljukid of Rum and Danişmendi competition to rule over Anatolia had been well presented, a point also missing in the later course books. And most importantly, the presentation of the economical order of the time are strikingly different. The 1970s version had insisted on a up-down hierarchical "ikta" order in which the economical order had been "decided" from the down and the lower military commanders just followed suit within the "given directions". However, this is not the

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<sup>73</sup> Tarih II, p.226

<sup>74</sup> op. cit., p. 232

case in Tarih II. Very similar to the Köprülü formulation which we will see later in detail, it had been neatly labeled as feudalism and suggested that the economical structure had been decided on the struggle and bargaining process between the center seeking for more control of itself and “periphery” or centrifugal forces trying to stay as independent as possible<sup>75</sup>. Of course such a socio-economical interpretation had not been expressed in such an evident way. Tarih II still emphasizes a penchant for all Turks to act in the same direction as one single and strong body as such an economical structure in which various parties are in conflict for power and material benefits prevents such an harmony and prepare ground for the enemies to abuse domestic conflicts of Turks<sup>76</sup>. This is an effort to reconcile the free standing commanders and the necessity of the unity of Turks. These all to do with the earliest phase of construction of Turkish nation-state where there is still room for free-lance adventurism of frontier commanders and praised for their courageous advances. The notion of “unity” is of course never missing. This as we saw earlier was also the preoccupation of earliest Ottoman chroniclers who also had a notion of Turkish “kut” and an authoritative super-rule of all Turks. Anatolia’s unity had to be achieved and has been achieved. But these notions yet do not deserve special attention. The general intention of the Tarih II in educating the schoolboy is to make him learn the adventuresome history of the Turkish nation. States are yet to deserve special attention. The unity of Turks has its place but within a different interpretation. For the “unity of Turks” in theory you do not need a state as it was not the case when the Turkish race was living peacefully and happily before the inland lake had dried out in pre-state world. The Turks had developed a special regard and self-pride for their own entity and shared a national destiny. This self-regard and an understanding of being part of the greater Turkish nation had been carried throughout their advance to the west and to Anatolia. Therefore, they do not need a state to express and realize themselves.

The similar indifference towards Seljuks of Rum is also visible in “Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları”, a study written by a small committee to establish the “official Turkish history<sup>77</sup>”. This book is of a peculiar sort and is more a global history rather than a

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<sup>75</sup> op. cit., p.278

<sup>76</sup> op. cit., p.279

<sup>77</sup> Türk Tarihini Tetkik Encümeni, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, third publication Kaynak Yayınları, 1999



Turkish history. In the book, we learn that the most noteworthy civilizations all have their Turkish origin in the beginning and emanated from the Turkish homeland some millennia ago. Sumers' Turkishness has been accepted by hearth by a rich community of intellectuals due to the European historians ambiguities to determine the very origins and even racial roots which has been interpreted easily as "yet another proof of their intellectuals" with the logic of "if its origin not clearly attested, why should not Turks?". In this book besides Sumers, Egyptians, Greeks and other early sources of early civilization has been declared as Turks. It also suggested that Chinese civilization has been developed by the Turks who had migrated eastwards and taught Chinese the foundations of their civilization. Based on these arguments, the claim of Turkishness has been withdraw and a brief interpretation of these civilizations has been proposed. All the civilization suddenly becomes one, that of the Turkish civilization. Because of this vast coverage of the book, "genuine" Turkish history looks to be downgraded to a secondary level, especially in the first half of the book in which the interest is towards the cradles of the early civilization. After their migrations from Central Asia, we meet the Turks again in the Islamic realm and follow their interactions within this Islamic context. Again, there is no very direct singling out of Turks but more of a survey of Islamic history in which Turks are a major actor. This book is more a political history rather than a "national history" and interested in states and dynasties. The Turks before their invasion of Anatolia has been free riders on horseback in the free steppes of the east from the Golden Horde of Russia to Transoxanian Turkish political-military formations. Great Seljuks appear as yet another rising political-military formations which had reunited the Islamic realm and became the supreme force in the abode of Islam. But the passage from Great Seljuks to Seljuks of Rum has not attracted any interest and Seljuks of Rum has been hardly treated any differently than other Seljuk principalities that broke off from the Great Seljuks. No slight significance has been suggested to Manzikert which has been just mentioned in page 436. This is a really curious point and we can suggest that Anatolia is yet to gain its second homeland status in the language of Turkish constructed memory. Seljuks of Rum has not been seen "interesting" probably compared to the other Turkish polities who practice more Turkish characteristics of long distance horse riding, more related with the Central Asian notions and traditions et cetera. As the Ottomans has been allocated only 50 pages of the total of 400 pages, Seljuks of Rum has been treated no differently. Political history of Seljuks of Rum has not been even introduced. The Seljuks of Rum has been

only analyzed within the social-economic interpretation and has been suggested as Islamic feudalism.

Şevket Aziz Kansu's paper presented in the II Turkish History Congress is perfectly explaining why Seljuks of Rum had been neglected and marginalized in the Kemalist THT<sup>78</sup>. Kansu is originally an anthropologist and his article is an exposé of his measurements of skulls in different locations from ancient settlements. Kansu presents us very detailed tables of precise measurements of different bones of the skull, distance between different parts of the skull et cetera in the 1930s racist anthropological fashion. Very simply put, he has two sets. The first set is a collection of skulls measured in ancient Anatolian sites from Hittites and proto-historical human settlements. Second is from an excavation from Selçuk, a collection of skulls of Seljuk Turks. In the conclusion Kansu concludes that in the light of this (pseudo) scientific measurements, calculation and tables; the Seljuk Turks did not bring a new racial character to Anatolia. Kansu writes that "it is not true that Turks had changed the racial make up of Anatolia contrary to what has been claimed. When Seljuks reached Anatolia, from East Anatolia to Aegean coasts there was already a majority of Alpine, that is proto-Turkic human elements since proto-history<sup>79</sup>." The comparison of these two sets match each other. This (pseudo scientific anthropological survey once again confirms that Turks had been in Anatolia for thousands of years, an autochthon race and did not arrive Anatolia in less than one thousand years ago. Seljuks were just another Turkish group finally reached to Anatolia following the same migration path of the earlier Turks<sup>80</sup>. A confirming conclusion had been reached also by Prof. Gabriel (??) who praises the high standards of Seljuk art and concludes that "far from being followers of a foreign school, the Seljukid art displays such creativity and original works that Turks can see the artistic works of XII and XIII centuries as a legacy of their magnificent past<sup>81</sup>"

Before ending the chapter, to contemplate on the Kemalist legacy, the disinterest of Kemalist historiography may be interpreted as the fact that Seljuks of Rum had been

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<sup>78</sup> Kansu, Şevket Aziz, "Selçuk Türkleri hakkında Antropolojik ilk bir tetkik ve neticeleri", *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, p. 440-456

<sup>79</sup>op. cit, p.456

<sup>80</sup> op. cit, p.456

<sup>81</sup> Gabriel (???), op. cit., Anadolu Selçuk.....p.450

“too local” to be paid special attention. This looks paradoxical with the “modest” horizons of Kemalism which had to resolve to establish “Turkishness” within the Anatolian peninsula. However, it should be a very hard and painful experience to admit the limits of the capacities and possibilities of the Turkish nation Cum state especially given the inflow of a huge Turkish populace from out of Anatolia. This may be explained with speaking of a separation between the realm of the political and the realm of cultural. Although far from being convincing, we can claim that independent from the “modest” political ambitions, its cultural greatness had been ambitious. The political ambitions had not faded away but had been reverted from “outside” to “domestic” with a racial purification process in an ideological sense. The racial tone is congruent with the very profound purification process applied not only to the non-Muslims but to the Muslim non-Turkish elements too.

In short, geographical identity had been very weakly performed whereas non-geographical Turkishness had been praised in the Kemalist THT. Anatolia had to be praised as the homeland of Turks, even back from proto-historical ages but there was also the other side of the coin. There had been much more promised in 1910s and even earlier than 1910s. These two contradicting goals had to be balanced. The resolution may be interpreted as the romantization of these claims and dreams to enable them coexist. These were all the unavoidable pains of constructing of a nation-state in a given territory. This will take time and not without anxieties and awes.

## KÖPRÜLÜ AND THE SELJUKS OF RUM

Unlike the Kemalist historiography Köprülü never turned his back to the Ottoman past. For him the Turkish Republic could only be the continuation of the Ottoman Empire and the republic can be meaningful as long as it locates itself within the Turkish historical tradition in which Ottomans are not only the most significant part but also constitutes the pre-history of the republic. The dynastic polity may have been corrupted and outmoded to be left to the garbage of history to be replaced by the proud modern-secular republic but its significance should never been neglected and discredited. For Köprülü, Ottoman Empire is a significant stop in the history of Turks. He found the “question of Ottomans” significant and had dealt exhaustively with the question “who the Ottomans were”. This question he posed as a reaction against the theories of Ottoman origins and identity developed and circulated in the West. Of course it is meaningful that his interest towards Ottomans was mainly oriented to the early stages of Ottomans when they were “ruled by the Turkish aristocracy before their degradation by the devshirme “boys” beginning in the second part of 14<sup>th</sup> century<sup>82</sup>.” This may be attributed to his conceptualization of early Ottomans as pure authentic Turks before corrupted by the imperial grandeur and pompousness although it had to be emphasized once more that his respect for Ottomans in general was genuine.

In this period, the reigning theories circulating in the West regarding Ottomans were assessing that because Turks were an Asian nomadic nation, they could not establish a mighty empire and explanations were developed recognizing and taking account of this assumption. The Romanian historian Iorga’s well-known and

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<sup>82</sup> Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Kuruluşu*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959, p.12

acknowledged phrase defining Ottomans was “Byzantine apres Byzantine” or “Muslim Roman Empire” which means that Ottomans simply borrowed and inherited the Byzantinian institutions (in Köprülü’s phrase “adeta taklit değil intihal”) and that was the foundation of the Ottoman empire building process. The genie behind the Ottoman state building was this Roman-Byzantine institutionalism and nothing can be ascribed to the Turco-Islamic tradition. As Köprülü exposed magnificently in his beginning of “Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Etkisi” (BMOME), this position is not limited to Iorga but it is a premise taken for granted by all the contemporary Byzantinists, Ottomanists and Islamic history scholars<sup>83</sup> such as Rambaud, Diehl (Byzantinists), Deny, Gibbons, Kramers (Ottomanists)<sup>84</sup>. Against this, he will develop a very detailed and impressive contra-argument claiming that rather than Byzantines, Ottoman institutions had ruptured from the Turco-Islamic heritage beginning on one side from Sasanids-Abbasids-Samanids (crucial stage in the transferring of Persian-Islamic heritage to the early Islamic Turkish states)- Great Seljuks-Seljuks of Rum and on the other side beginning from the pre-Islamic Turkish heritage which is only mentioned but not elaborated (also saying “the influence of Mongols on Turks and Iranians is much stronger than assumed<sup>85</sup>“ He names Byzantines as influencing the Umeyyid institutionalism<sup>86</sup>. In short, his genealogy of Ottomans avoids not only of the western Byzantine – Ottomans but also the Turkish History Thesis’ direct lineage of modern and Ottoman Turks from Hsiung-Nu’s up to Ottomans from pre-Islamic Turkish khanates to early Turkish states, Great Seljuks and Seljuks of Rum not only in terms of ethnicity but also in terms of state tradition and civilization-institutionalism<sup>87</sup>. Of course we can see that Köprülü was like living in a different planet in the Turkish purity of the Kemalist

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<sup>83</sup> see a very rich and impressive listing of similar pro-Byzantine arguments Köprülü’s *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Etkisi*, Ötüken Neşriyat, 1981, Istanbul, first two chapters (p.3-28)

<sup>84</sup> op.cit, p.17

<sup>85</sup> op cit., p. 35-6

<sup>86</sup> op. cit., p. 32

<sup>87</sup> see the three possible schemes in Halil Berktaş, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü*, Kaynak Yayınları, 1983, Istanbul, p.21

historians. His multilateral approach is early for the time and will be embraced by the Turkish and western scholars in a few decades<sup>88</sup>.

Another Ottoman historian with whom Köprülü had dealt with is H.A.Gibbons. Gibbons suggested that Ottomans had been upgraded and promoted by the Greek converts, thus Ottomans were made up of a Christian-converts elite above the ignorant masses of Muslim Turks. This fits perfectly with a scheme of a possible hierarchy of races which can not intermix and some are to rule and dominate, the others to be dominated and subjugated. He speaks of a specific "Ottoman race" as this was a new race nothing to do with Turks. Against this thesis, Köprülü had organized his lecture notes later to be published as a book in French. His "Les Origines de L'Empire Ottoman" was originally a collection of lectures delivered in Sorbonne in 1934. In the book, behind a very academic language, it is impossible to feel his fury against Gibbons and targeting his thesis. Throughout the book he "exposes" the "misère" of Gibbons' thesis. It is not hard to catch how much Gibbons had taken from the 19<sup>th</sup> century scientific explanations and studies of race. His main problematization which convinces him to deal with the matter is the contradiction of the strength of Ottomans and the low echelon Turks are occupying in the hierarchy of races. This he manages to resolve with pointing out the role assumed by the converts in the rise of Ottomans. He further suggests that Othman himself was not a born-Muslim based on two of the legends narrated in Aşıkpaşazade. If Othman and his men are possibly converts to Islam from paganism, this may be well true for Greeks to convert from Christianity to Islam<sup>89</sup>.

Köprülü has too many criticisms against Gibbons which can not be summarized one by one. But on one occasion, Köprülü criticizes Gibbons for being completely ignorant of the conditions of medieval Anatolia<sup>90</sup> and here he exemplifies his impressive level of knowledge of medieval Islamic and Turkish history and challenges the endorsed and sanctioned western assumptions on medieval Islamic and Turkish history in general and the nature of early Ottomans in particular.

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<sup>88</sup> Of course the Kemalist historians of the time were aware of the Ottoman-Turkish debt to Islamic institutionalism. But in a Wittgenstenian sense, they opted for silence where it was no any better to speak. Şemseddin Günaltay, also a talented -although amateur and with Islamist origins- historian was unique in that regard.

<sup>89</sup> For a general reevaluation of the arguments of Gibbons, Köprülü and Wittek, Kafadar, Cemal, *Between Two Worlds*, University of California Press, 1995

<sup>90</sup> Köprülü, Osmanlı....., p.12

From this introduction onwards, we may now proceed and go back to the making of young Köprülü. The young Köprülü of the 1910s was a promising artist interested in poetry and French literature. His transfer to the field of history was the suspicion and curiosity he developed on the validity of these theses popular and widely accepted in the West. As a Turkish nationalist, he reacted to these theses and tried to prove that Ottomans were a genuine Turkish empire. His BMOME was an answer to Iorga and his “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu” was an answer to Gibbons. In the first, his thesis was simply that Ottoman borrowing from Byzantine institutions was insignificant and Ottoman empire was the last ring in the lineage of Turco-Islamic empires from Seljukids to the Seljuks of Rum. Whereas, Seljuks of Rum was an outcome of the Great Seljuks promoting from the status of “uç” to a central itself, Ottomans have also arisen from being an “uç” of Seljuks of Rum to an independent political entity. This he writes very clearly; “as I repeated in different occasions, only if Ottoman history can be taken as the continuation of the period of Anatolian principalities and Seljuks of Rum, several questions who are still unknown to us can be understood. The fact that our knowledge regarding Seljuks of Rum is extremely limited had avoided us from realizing this obvious truth<sup>91</sup>.” We can here very shortly emphasize the “peaceful transitions” from one to another which also had been a main theme in the early Ottoman chroniclers except the history of Aşıkpaşazade<sup>92</sup>. The peaceful transition is to prove that there is a neatly traceable course of Turkish history in which a central authority prevails to carry the relay. The exception of Aşıkpaşazade owes to his heterodoxes origins who is not conformable with any state authority. This we don’t see in the official or semi-official chroniclers of Ottomans. So, we may arguably say that Köprülü is within the tract of the earlier Ottoman tradition which had to be repressed as the Ottoman dynasty rose to a level above any question of authority and legitimacy. As this legitimacy had declined,

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<sup>91</sup> op. cit., p.23

<sup>92</sup> for example see bab 14 of Tevârih-i Al-i Osman of Aşıkpaşazade. When Osman Gazi grab Karaca Hisar, he decided to appoint a kadı to establish order and practice the Friday prayer, an objection from Dursun Kadı rises; “Dursun Fakı eyüdür “ Hanum ! Sultandan izin gerekdür” dedi. Osman Gazi eyidür “bu şehiri hod kendü kılıcım ile aldum. Bunda sultanın ne dahlü var kim andan izin alam. Ona sultanlık veren Allah bana dahi gazayile hanlık verdi” dedi. “Ve ger şu mindeti şu sancağ ise ben hod dahi sancak götürüb kafirler ile uğraşdum.” Der. “Ve ger ol ben al-i Salçukvan der ise, ben hod Gök Alp oğlının derin. Ve ger bu vilayete ben anlardan öndin geldim der ise, Süleymanşah dedem hod andan evvel geldi” der.

the pre-history of Ottomans were revoked. The pattern he detested in the Turkish history is an evolutionist and a linear one. However, of course Köprülü has a unique vision of social-economical history which we will not see for more than a few decades.

Thus the interest of Köprülü towards Seljuks of Rum originates from his taking the Ottomans seriously. Because the Kemalist historians did not deal with the “Ottoman question”, they did not show interest in Seljuks of Rum. The unproblematization of Ottomans bring a similar disinterest towards Seljuks of Rum. Atatürk and Kemalist historians did object to the Namık Kemal’s formulation of “thesis of four hundred tents” and instead they turned to Central Asia. Köprülü, although being an amateur in the field, never was a romantic to sacrifice academic standards in the name of a nationalist excitement. The Central Asian aspect is only marginal to the Köprülü history and his construction of the Turkish national history begins from the present and goes back as long as he can establish the relevancy to today and can follow with satisfactory evidence. He establishes the track of Turkish history not from backwards (i.e. from mythic Central Asia of 6000 years earlier) but back from the republic to Ottomans, from Ottomans to Seljuks of Rum, Great Seljuks and so on but being aware of the limits and problems of going further back, he better stops at this point. His interest towards Central Asia was as long as it has some explanatory feature for the modern Anatolian Turkishness and did not share the romantic enthusiasm of his time.

Naturally he knew that the first thing he may employ to embark on disproving the “four hundred tents thesis” was the earlier consolidated Turkish presence in Anatolia; which was the Seljuks of Rum rather than seeking mythical ancestors some few thousands of miles to the east. He objected to Gibbons’ argument which is actually the “conventional position” pouring out of the history of Neşri and other early accounts stating that Osman’s tribe had reached Anatolia after the Mongol onslaught in Iran in 1240s and although no satisfactory evidence available to support any of the two contesting thesis, he argued that it is more likely that Osman’s tribe’s arrival to Anatolia was in the first wave of Turkish raids after Manzikert based on an assessment of other members of Kayı had been in Anatolia before the second great wave of 1240s such as Artukoğulları<sup>93</sup>. His criticism of Gibbons is plausible but we can relate his insistence on the falseness of Gibbons’ argument to his effort to present more authenticity in favor of

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<sup>93</sup> Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlıların Etnik Kökenleri*, Kaynak Yayınları, 1999, p.40 (original appearance of the article in Belleten 1943)



Ottomans in Anatolia and strong will to prove not only to prove the very Turkishness of Ottomans (such as against the thesis of Marquart and later its developed version by Brockelmann which argued for a Mongol lineage for Ottoman family) but also a longer residence in Anatolia to symbolize a reasonably subtle background to develop their polity to a respectable level of civilization.

To come back to the main theme, he points out in his BMOME that although western scholars know pretty much of the Byzantine “civilizational history”, with regard to Islamic-Turkish civilizational history nothing is known to them. And for this reason, they take the Ottoman vakanüvis position on the tribal origins of Ottoman Empire. This Köprülü also reminds here and there in his BMOME and *Les Origines de l’Empire Ottoman* never developing further than Hammer of early 19<sup>th</sup> century who had based on the Ottoman vakanüvises. He puts it bluntly; “despite all the efforts of the 19<sup>th</sup> century European orientalism, this important phase of our civilization (founding of Ottomans) did not liberate from medieval chronicle habits.”<sup>94</sup> In BMOE he claims that for a serious history of Ottomans, one has to reject this “vakanüvis telakki tarzı” outright<sup>95</sup>. Ottomans did not originate from the shepherds around Osman as assumed among the Western scholars<sup>96</sup>. This he thinks emerges from the common prejudices towards Turks who are seen only as destroyers and enemies of civilizational as like Nöldeke who committed his life to exhibit that the rise of Seljuks was a great unfortune for world history<sup>97</sup>. This of course reminds us of the coinciding of Gibbons’ (who happens to be a British) book written in 1916 which does not credit Turks of anything pertaining to civilization and the ongoing war in which especially Lloyd George’s cabinet embracing the slogan of Gladstonian time of kicking Turks from Europe. So Köprülü is here to disprove all the western arguments and show that Turks are not an uncivilized nation but throughout the course of Turkish history have developed their culture<sup>98</sup>. So for Köprülü Ottomans can not be understood in vacuum but can be

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<sup>94</sup>Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu.*, p.26

<sup>95</sup> Fuad Köprülü, *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Etkisi*, Ötüken Neşriyat, 1981, Istanbul, p.29

<sup>96</sup> op. cit., p.6, p.25

<sup>97</sup> op. cir., p.23

<sup>98</sup> To avoid any misunderstanding, it is very hard to find any trace of critic of orientalism. His main polemic is on the general prejudices against Turks in history and

understood as a phase of the Turkish history. The problem was that the level of knowledge pertaining to pre-Ottoman Turkish history was very limited, ambivalent and vague. His demolishing of too simplistic Byzantinian argument is noteworthy and remarkable but he has been also trapped by a similar shortcoming. He argues for another essentialism which is not reductionist but simplistic to present such a linear and straightforward evolution of Turco-Islamic institutionalism. The high level of immediately recognizable continuity has been draw throughout his BMOME as he discusses the Ottoman administrative and military institutions and economical practices one by one and relating these institutions to a sharp line completely compatible with his scheme of Turco-Islamic lineage<sup>99</sup>. This of course we can excuse with the very early phase of the creation of Turcology. But his peaceful transitionism can be understood with his efforts to create a new and alternative Turkish history, never childish as the Turkish Historical Thesis. He wanted to establish what Turkish Historical Thesis could not achieve to construct due to badly presented unconvincing arguments from a sophisticated and scholarly approach. His basic romantic dreams were the same. As Kafadar noted after a long appraisal of his modern historiographical craft and his aversion to mono-causal explanations and so forth, “whatever his historiographic sophisticated, however, Köprülü was committed to an essentialist notion of nationhood

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his protests are limited as long as Turks are concerned and he never attributes anything beyond a general lack of knowledge and taking of the old concepts. For him as long as western social sciences will gather further knowledge and set free from the prejudices of religious times, western orientalism will be fine. He is very respectful of western oriental scholars and for him all the shortcomings originate from their being not aware of rich authentic sources as it is the case with the question of origins of Ottomans and Seljuks of Rum. This is very clear in his critic of Gibbons. Although he makes very strong statements against Gibbons, he explains this with his lack of reading Arabic scripture and being unaware of very crucial texts pertaining to origins of Ottomans. For the simplicity of Gibbons’ thesis, this is just a phantastic prejudice (tarihi realiteye hiç uygun olmayan bir fanteziden, bir prejuje’den ibarettir, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu, p.11) He also criticizes the lack of the grasp of the western orientalist of the Turkish general culture. He is optimistic due to the latest works on Turkish history by the Turkish scholars in the last six-seven years. Now he says the role of Turks are in process of rehabilitation with the better study of sources so that the erroneous interpretations of the western orientalist has been destroyed and shown that such a perspective is irrelevant (Fuad Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında ilk Mutasavvıflar*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1976, p.2)

<sup>99</sup> see Fuad Köprülü, Bizans....., p. 39-197

even more strongly than the historians he opposed<sup>100</sup>.” The difference was that he was not naive but a professional and a committed and honest scholar. But he always believed in that Turkish history is peculiar and this honorable fact has to be established in universal arena (not limited in masturbating home !) by challenging the prejudices against Turks and enable Turks to give what they deserve for their deeds throughout the history<sup>101</sup>. In these regards, Köprülü may be compared with Karl Lamprecht, the German historian who had throughout his life criticized the Rankean approach and the dominance of the “political history”. For Lamprecht, “political history” does not explain much except providing chronological table. He embarked on a project of economical-cultural history. He was also not comfortable with the Prussian statist nationalism in the academia. But all his criticism and his being ostracized by the conservative-nationalist historians’ circles does not render him any less nationalism. Like Köprülü, Lamprecht had the vision of “Germany” and “Germanness” throughout ages can not be reduced to a political story. In the volkish tradition, Germany as a geist has its cultural “coming into being” in an economical background. One of the most serious “accusations” against Lamprecht was his “alleged” historical materialism and the similarities of his economism and materialism with Marx’ historical perspective which of course is in direct contrast to the Prussian school<sup>102</sup>. His explicit closeness to a Marxian or quasi-Marxian approach is striking and Köprülü’s approach has the same similarities. However, these do not render Lamprecht any less nationalist than the Prussian historians. His personal tragedy when he was in his military service at the end of his life in the World War I, his encounter with his life-long academical friend Belgian historian Henri Pirenne in the German-occupied Belgium and his helpless defense of Germany’s occupation to the bewilderment of Pirenne explains much of his nationalist sentiments. His apology for German invasion was that “the concept of a Belgian nationality (was) .....a “very empty and vague thought, beyond all political feasibility.”<sup>103</sup>”

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<sup>100</sup> Kafadar, op. cit., p. 40

<sup>101</sup> This reminds us of the very developed racially-inspired anthropological-historical studies of 1930s. Using very “objective” methodologies, one can erect an outright nationalist discourse. One example may be the Kossacka’s pathbreaking studies and developed methodology on pre-modern excavation sites and their interpretation.

<sup>102</sup> Chickering, Roger, *Karl Lamprecht: A German Academic Life*, Humanities Press, 1993, p.121

<sup>103</sup> Chickering, Roger, op. cit., p.439

The phenomenological significance and importance of the Ottomans and Ottoman problem in western academic circles in local popular discourse and rhetoric was creating a false effect and hindering people to get the right questions. He was not an anti-Ottomanist but he was never amazed by the grandeur of Ottomans. He also shared the Kemalist prejudice that Ottomans was a diversion from the authentic Turkish character and nature. Freedom-loving Turks should have been freed from the corrupting image of Ottomans. For him Caesar's right has to be rendered to Caesar here Caesar being the Ottomans but Köprülü was in pursuit of much more important and essential questions pertaining to Turks. Ottomans also could be rightly understood only from such a perspective. So going further back than problematizing "origins of Ottomans" and "origins of Ottoman institutions", he asked the question what the Turks were in a more broader timeframe. As expressed above, this time range should not be opened without any limits. That essence can not be discovered going back a few thousand years ago or few thousand miles to the east. Here he introduces us his "social history" of Turks although here social history is different than what we understand from it. And the timeframe he names is the "middle ages" which is broader than the pursuit of the Ottoman ages and more importantly freed from the dominance of Ottoman administrative identity. As long as history of Turks can be studied in a social dimension, presence and significance of Ottomans will fade away.

Köprülü makes a separation of political history and social history. He notes that political history had been studied over and over although in a long range the effects of these political affairs may be limited. For him the social history has a priority and is essential for history because its influence over future is much more decisive. Of course this separation makes us recall the same assessment made by Braudel some fifteen years later in his Mediterranean in late forties in his differentiation of three levels of history, the least significant being political history<sup>104</sup>. Köprülü's vision is not far from Braudel's. Of course the similarities are on the surface. Braudel is a committed economic historian who would disagree with any social-economical-legal-cultural

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<sup>104</sup> Köprülü writes that "...siyasi ve askeri tarihe ait vak'aların meşuk olanlarına, devamlı bir eser bırakmayan küçük askeri vak'alara ehemmiyet vermeyerek yalnız esasi mes'elelere dikkat etmek.....bu cemiyeti terki eden muhtelif anasırın stratification'unu, müteakıl vaziyetlerini, kuvvet ve zaaf amillerini, aralarındaki zıddiyet ve tesanüd sebeplerini, yani dahili hayatındaki değişiklikleri araştırmak; daha kısa bir tabirle bu cemiyetin siyasi ve askeri hadiselerinden ziyade morfolojisini ve dini, hukuki, iktisadi, bedii müesseselerinin tekamülünü tesbite çalışarak.....(Osmanlı....., p.24)"

synthése. What Köprülü has in his mind is more a “civilizational approach”. He is far from an economical determinism. He can be regarded as a “civilizational essentialist”. What Köprülü in his all articles and books repeats saying is the concept of “medieval ages”, “Anatolian medieval ages”, “Turkish medieval ages” or Islamic medieval ages. This he takes from the European conceptolization of medieval ages as the long silent and motionless centuries in which a snap shot can be taken and studied in which the notion and dimension of time is missing, not necessarily trapped in an essentialism but as a useful tool to understand European medieval ages. Köprülü believes that a similar medieval ages can be found in Turco-Islamic lands. This is what he understand from Braudelian *historie ev.....* Ottomans can only be an outcome of such an medieval heritage. Then Köprülü will strive to explore on this “Anatolian-Turkish-Islamic middle ages”<sup>105</sup>. But still we have to do justice to Köprülü. In his article “Ortazaman Türk-İslam Feodalizmi”<sup>106</sup>, dated from 1938, he discusses the recent European historiographical discussions concerning the nature of feudalism and criticizes the approach tending to essentialize and crystallize one single and strictly European medieval feudalism. He asks the question “can we speak of an Islamic feudalism” and responds to his question “yes and no at the same time !<sup>107</sup>”. He says that this answer needs a better qualifying of the question. If what we understand from feudalism is the European land tenure regime, the answer should be no. But for him the very specific definition of feudalism is non-sense and meaningless. For that, he prefers to speak for a medieval Turco-Islamic feudalism” not specifically fitting in the medieval European feudalism but displaying the same characteristics and emerging from a similar political decentralized order.

His very sincere invitation has been expressed very clearly; “to apply the new methods used in the study of western middle ages to the study of Islamic and Turkish

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<sup>105</sup> Although may not be perfect analogy, he has a very similar ambition with Marc Bloch. As Marc Bloch is curious about French (and later European) middle ages written in capital M freed from temporal political changes and events, Köprülü has the same curiosity and intuition with regard to Anatolian-Turkish “middle ages”.

<sup>106</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Ortazaman Türk-İslam Feodalizmi”, in Fuad Köprülü, *İslam ve Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları ve Vakıf Müessesesi*, Ötüken Yayınları, 1983, p.36-50

<sup>107</sup> Fuad Köprülü, opus cited, p.46

middle ages<sup>108</sup>”. One can argue that this invitation of Köprülü in 1934 is yet to be answered satisfactory today.

And now let’s see how he as applied his own agenda to his vision of Seljuks of Rum which he sees as a unique and significant phase in the course of Turkish history. Although we have discussed his interest towards Seljuks of Rum as emanating from the question of origins of Ottoman, he now need a retrospective turn and go back to Köprülü the younger for another major cause of his interest towards Seljuks of Rum.

The manuscripts pertaining to the period of Seljuks of Rum and providing us indispensable informations about the time had been very slowly collected by both foreign and Turkish dilettantes from libraries, especially concentrated in old Seljuk cities such as Tokat, Kayseri, Sivas in the few decades prior to World War I<sup>109</sup>. This is due to the huge increase of foreigners visiting Turkey for economic projects, mainly of German origin. This led a curious inquiry towards unknown and unexplored past of Anatolia as well as the old manuscripts themselves. Hartmann, an orientalist of the time lacking any reliable knowledge speaks of Seljuks of Rum while passing as “an orderless period. Wittek also notes that not much is known regarding Seljuks of Rum but he mentions this period as an “auxiliary area” to bolster the “main areas of study.”<sup>110</sup> Gibbons in his “Foundation of the Ottoman Empire” (1916), he immediately begins his book with the first chapter “a new race is borning” in which he mentions Seljuks of Rum insignificantly in a few sentences<sup>111</sup>. Pre-Ottoman Anatolia is a blank sheet. Gibbons only suggests that Byzantium was too weak to react to the Turkish invasions and was confined in West Anatolia to the neighborhood of Constantinopolis<sup>112</sup>. When the young Indologist Franz Babinger in the University of München decided to shift his field and embark on Turkish studies after working as a liaison officer in the Ottoman army during the World War I, the German orientalist G. H. Becker “cautioned him

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<sup>108</sup> Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı.....*, p.26

<sup>109</sup> Gordlevski, Vladimir, *Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti*, Onur Yayınları, 1988, p. 24

<sup>110</sup> Gordlevski, op. cit., p.35

<sup>111</sup> Gibbons, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1998, p.10, brief discussion of the “sultanate of Iconium”, p. 13-4

<sup>112</sup> op. cit., p. 14

about his views saying that from the standpoint of academic advancement, they (Turkish studies) were a “sheer catastrophe”. There was no future in Turkish studies<sup>113</sup>.”

Not to create a confusion, interest of Köprülü towards the Seljuks of Rum was extending before the foundation of the Republic and the establishment of the Kemalist orthodoxy. His first studies of history were going back to 1913. He was first involved with the foundation of Türk Bilgi Derneği, a community formed by Turkist intellectuals trying to imitate the western academies and to promote scholarly studies. This community had been a first in Turkish-Ottoman history and there was no precedent of the Türk Bilgi Derneği<sup>114</sup>. Although only substantial activity of the community was the publication of “Bilgi Mecmuası” which had stopped after seven issues, it had promoted a very competent group of intellectuals and prepared the ground for the coming competent journals and studies. After publishing his very early articles and having his apprenticeship in Türk Bilgi Derneği, he was appointed to the post of professorship of history of literature in the Istanbul Literature, in the same time he became the founding director of Milli Tettebbüler Mecmuası”, the journal of Asar-ı İslamiye ve Milliye Tetkik Encümeni. He was one of the founders of the community with Ziya Gökalp and cooperated with German, French and Hungarian historians. The statue of the community published in the second issue of Milli Tettebbular Mecmuası defining the goals of the community as follows;

“encümen Türklere ait müessesatı diğer milletlerin müessesatıyla mukayese ederek Türk milletinin hangi enmuzec-i içtimaiyeye mensup ve tekamülün hangi safhasında olduğunu arayacaktır.....Bu müesseselerinde Türk harsında ve İslam medeniyetinde mevkiini tayin etmek ve yekdiğeri ile revabit ve münesabatını bulmak encümenin saha-i mesaisine dahildir<sup>115</sup>.”

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<sup>113</sup> Leisler, Gary, in his introduction to Fuad Köprülü’s *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion*, Utah University Press, 1993, p. xiv

<sup>114</sup> Toprak, Zafer, “Türk Bilgi Derneği ve Bilgi Mecmuası”, in *Osmanlı İlimi ve Mesleki Cemiyetleri*, edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987, p. 251

<sup>115</sup> Ersanlı, Büşra, *İktidar ve Tarih*, İletişim Yayınları, 2003, p.96

The language employed here is a perfect synthesis of Gökalp's and Köprülü's approaches. It can be argued that it has a Köprülüian comparative approach not to single out Turks from other "civilizations" but also recognize Turks' own and essential civilization a la Gökalp. Of course Gökalp's studies on Turkish civilization are also reflecting a remarkable openness to the new methodologies of western social sciences but he is also easy to construct a perfectly definable, a definitive Turkish civilization as such<sup>116</sup>. One thing to mention is his recurring cliché of (regarding the study of Turcology) "the pathbreaking developments of the last six-seven years", "impressive works in the six-seven years" et cetera. 1910s was of course a revolutionary decade for the study of Turkish history in Ottomans. There is an explosion and eruption of studies concerning Turkish history, most irrelevant and unscientific works of nationalist fervor but some promising and original contributions too. Fuad Köprülü reflects his enthusiasm and excitement about this productive decade and he hopes that the emerging interest of Turks towards their history and culture will refresh and revise the biased studies appearing in Europe and also convinced that this is slowly being the case. Turks will be restored in the scene of history and they needed to be saved from the negative image they are suffering because of their contemporary backwardness vis-a-vis Europe and their proud history will provide this opportunity. His studies are all in this vein. Now we can see how Seljuks of Rum was instrumental in this effort.

His first study on Seljuks of Rum was "Selçukiler Zamanında Anadolu'da Türk Medeniyeti" in 1916. However first we have to draw his path from his earlier literary interests to scholarly history. His shift from being a man of letters to a scholar was through his interest towards the sources of the contemporary Turkish literature. His first relevant article was printed in *Servet-i Fünun* in 1912 on the poetry of Şinasi<sup>117</sup>. This article was followed by a very competent and able article in *Bilgi Mecmuası* with the name "Türk Edebiyatı Tarihinde Usul" in 1913<sup>118</sup>. This article is not significant only in

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<sup>116</sup> It may be useful to read Köprülü with Yusuf Akçura. Akçura is yet to be recognized as a giant figure of both Turkish nationalism and Turkish intellectual environment of the time although more than twenty years since the appearance of Georgeon's Akçura monography in French and almost twenty years since the first translation of the book into Turkish has passed.

<sup>117</sup> Fuad Köprülü, "Şinasi'nin Şiirleri", *Servet-i Fünun*, no.25, 1328/1912

<sup>118</sup> Fuad Köprülü, "Türk Edebiyatı Tarihinde Usul", *Bilgi Mecmuası* I, 1329/1913, p.3-52



the field of literary history was also a landmark in the general methodology of historiography in Turkey. In this article, Köprülü discusses the 19<sup>th</sup> century approaches to history discussing a wide range of historians from Vico to Seignobos. After this breakthrough study, he will turn back to his research on Turkish literature applying the comparative methodology he suggests in this very article. He also publishes an article in *İkdam* in the same year with the name “Yeni Bir İlim: Halkiyat”<sup>119</sup> setting sail in the new horizons of folklore and adapting literature within folklore. That is showing that literature is no more only literature for Köprülü but a key to decipher a certain social culture literature carrying the symbolic element representing a whole social/cultural heritage in it back. This was a great undertaking. He continues his literary explorations on Yunus Emre<sup>120</sup>, Ahmed Yesevi<sup>121</sup>, Şeyh Galip<sup>122</sup> and a long series of articles on folk poets. From this rich documentation and explorations of the Turkish cultural sources, he jumps suddenly to a new field devoting his new article published in *Milli Tettebbüler Mecmuası* in 1916 on the vaguely studied Seljuks of Rum<sup>123</sup>. At the time not only not much is known about Seljuks of Rum but very grave mistakes about Seljuks of Rum had been made by the prominent scholars of the time<sup>124</sup>. He also continued his interest on Turkish literature and published articles pertaining to literary history in *Milli Tettebbular Mecmuası* and *Bilgi Mecmuası* especially on folk poets. His emerging and growing interest on Seljuks of Rum is perfectly compatible with his continuing passion towards Turkish folk literature as will be explored and explained in the coming few pages.

His “Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar” which had been published in 1919 based on his previous articles was his first major breakthrough signifying his entrance to the field of history from the history of literature justly acquiring the prestige of the

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<sup>119</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Yeni Bir İlim:Halkiyat”, *İkdam Gazetesi*, 24 ikinci kanun 1329/1913

<sup>120</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Yunus Emre”, *Türk Yurdu*, V, 1329/1913, p. 922-930

<sup>121</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Hoca Ahmed Yesevi”, “Çağatay ve Osmanlı edebiyatları üzerinde tesiri”, *Bilgi Mecmuası*, I 1330/1914, p.611-645

<sup>122</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Şeyh Galip hakkında”, *Servet-i Fünun*, no.63, 1329/1913

<sup>123</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Selçukiler Devrinde Anadolu’da Türk Medeniyeti”, *Milli Tettebbüler Mecmuası*, II, 1331/1916, p.293-332 (not completed)

<sup>124</sup> Berktaş, Halil, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü*, Kaynak Yayınları, 1983, İstanbul, p.17-19

prominent Turcologist of his time. This book also may be regarded as the first comprehensive and scientific work on the history of Turkish literature as it had been expressed by Turcologists such as Nemeth Gyula, Mordtman and Cl. Huart<sup>125</sup>. Here his main focus was to reconstruct Ahmed Yesevi whom he thought as the forefather of Anatolian Turkish folk literature and establish his direct influence in Anatolia, especially in Yunus Emre whom he sees as a genuine example of the authentic voice of Turkish Islam and folkloric culture. “Hereby, Yunus Emre integrated this foreign philosophical element (Persian high culture) with the original genie of Turkish esthetics within a national system and established a Turkish mystical literature suitable for the tastes of the people and completely different from the Persian mystical works. Yunus Emre could exemplify the national values and esthetics for long centuries because it could synthesize and integrate the accumulation of centuries of national artistic genie and apprehend the culture living in the breasts of the (Turkish) people for centuries and serve the needs of the (Turkish) people<sup>126</sup>.”

This is of course an important point. With his high level of insight of early Turkish literature, he is sensing that there can not be a talk of one Islam but different and varying versions of Islam of which “Turkish Islam” is one of the most praiseworthy. He connects the pre-Islamic Turkic culture and heritage to the Islamization process of Turks mainly by wandering dervishes and the continuation of this original interpretation of Islam influenced extensively by the pre-Islamic shamanistic rituals. The Transoxian tradition had been transferred to Anatolia thanks to these travelling dervishes and emerging mystical networks available. The book’s significance has to be stressed. It does not only touch the literary interpretations of Turkish folkloric poetry and mysticism but presents us a tour de force of the Turkish civilization. We have to elaborate this. Throughout the book Köprülü gives us a short introduction of the political backgrounds but this are limited. This is not limited due to Köprülü’s point of view that political structures, developments and affairs are of limited importance a la Braudel or Bloch. We meet the Turks first in Khorasan and Transoxania. Political background is given but the focus is on the developing Turkish civilization and the

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<sup>125</sup> Turan, Osman., “Mukaddime”, p. XIV, in *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1953

<sup>126</sup> Fuad Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1976, p.255 (original publication 1919)

livelihood of Muslimizing Turks. Their cultural production and reproduction draws their destiny. After a while see Turks flowing in masses to the west to Anatolia. This goes hand in hand with the rising Great Seljuks whose advance is towards west and providing the pull factor necessary for the Oghuz masses. But the focus is on the Oghuz masses with specific emphasis on their folkloric literary culture. Then we meet with them again when they had been settled firmly in Anatolia. This has been accompanied with the establishment of the polity of Seljuks of Rum. But although Köprülü gives us a brief history of Seljuks of Rum, this is only to enable us to imagine the social and political ambience early Anatolian culture had risen. In short, this early work of Köprülü provides us his worldview of folkish characteristic of Turks in which the political matters only accompany. Of course this relationship is of a troublesome one because of the extensive presence of the Persian-that is alien- culture of the masses. Although Köprülü writes that “although occasionally the Persian admiring court of Konya was showing interest to the genuine Turkish products such as Oghuzname” the court was ready and eager to take whatever they can from the Persian culture to distinguish them from the masses. The domination of Persian language and culture versus the Turkish culture of masses is vividly described in detail<sup>127</sup>. It is too easy to enrich material to support our point of the dichotomy of contrasting court culture and genuine national culture of masses, this is not necessary. The main point is the essentialization of the “Turkish culture” alive in the kopuzs of ozans, in the alperen tradition et cetera. It is like no alien influence has touched on them and Anatolia just became another untouched Ergenekon for them. His discussion of the art of Seljuks of Rum is curious. He can not decide to a what extent we can count the art of Seljuks of Rum as Turkish and what extent Islamo-Persian. He cites different western authors who are inclined to label Seljuks of Rum art within the Islamo-Persian domain because they have no recognition of independent Turkish culture. Köprülü distantly tries to put some Turkish element into that claiming “the Turkish element is in process of recognition<sup>128</sup>”, he also agrees with the western scholars although ambivalently and inconclusively. His discussion of Seljuks of Rum art is limited because he is more enthusiastic to deal more with the folkloric culture of the era. This is as I had suggested above is the living tradition of the Central Asian steppes. In short what he finds is a living tradition of

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<sup>127</sup> op. cit., p.233-4

<sup>128</sup> op. cit., p.195

Turkish culture in a situation of lower political pressure from above. This will be the case with the rise of Ottoman centrality although he will persistently try to construct the living Turkish folkloric culture in the Ottoman centuries in Anatolia in his praises of folk poets in his later works<sup>129</sup>.

The similar theme had been studied by Franz Babinger in the coming few years. His article "Der Islam in Kleinasien: Neue Wege der Islamforschung" appeared in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* in 1922 which was originally the inaugural lecture delivered in Friedrich-Willhelms University in Berlin in 1921. Babinger whose contribution to Ottoman history was revolutionary and unprecedented since Hammer-Purgstall tried to enter the unknown field of pre-Ottoman Turkish Anatolia. He claimed that contrary to the conventional perceptions Seljuks were Alawites and heretics vis-a-vis the Sunnah interpretation of Islam. He connected Seljuks to the Safavids of 15<sup>th</sup> century and pointed out that nowhere in Islamic lands had been adapted to the local traditions as in Anatolia. His second point of emphasis was the immense influence of Persian culture on Turks in Anatolia. He integrated his two claims and argued for a Turkish Islam taught and developed by the Persian influence and finally adapted as a unique interpretation of Islam.

His article has been translated to Turkish in less than one year and had been published in *Darülfunun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* in the same year<sup>130</sup>. And Köprülü had responded the article instantly. His reply was an article published in *Darülfunun Mecmuası* named "Anadolu'a İslamiyet: Türk istilasından sonra Anadolu tarih-i dinisine bir nazar ve bu tarihin menbaları."

Here he continued his perspective in *İlk Mutasavvıflar*. He criticizes the ignorance of Babinger and the western orientalisists in general of the local sources. For him, the problem emerges from this lack of studying the local sources. After that, he presents his interpretation of the Turkish religion in general. Before that we have to note that in "Türk Edebiyatında ilk Mutasavvıflar" he emphasizes the original and shamanistic-influenced nature of Turkish mysticism and folk literature, he also introduced them as sincere Muslims with a loyalty to the Islamic faith and protection of Islam and avoided any ambivalence of their Muslim faith. Turks of the time were at the same time good

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<sup>129</sup> see Edebiyat....

<sup>130</sup> Leiser, Gary, introduction, p. xvii, *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion*, Fuad Köprülü, translated by Gary Leiser, University of Utah Press, 1993

Muslims and in the tradition of their independent chivalrous livelihood as narrated in Dede Korkut. This is different from the heretic representation of them which Köprülü disagrees. He installs a “free adaptation” of Islam version against the Iranian influenced hereticism assumption of Babinger. In his article of 1922 he finds another chance to reconstruct and rehabilitate the nature of Turks of the time a la Dede Korkut parallel to his earlier construction. This article is a marvelous presentation of the “organic Islam” of Turks in movement throughout centuries in its original and authentic tract, independent from the scribal Islam of centre and the book. He also crushes the orientalist vision of “one single Islam” more based on books and universally accepted principles and demonstrates a folk Islam version with which he is in love with.

A similar contribution will come from Friedrich Giese<sup>131</sup>. Giese, responding to Gibbons and his “ex nihilo thesis”, will take side with Köprülü and point out that akhi federation of craftsmen and merchants in the towns of Anatolia in transferring the administrative infrastructure of earlier Anatolian Muslims states to the emerging Ottoman entity<sup>132</sup>. It is worth mentioning that akhi myth will be exploited by the republican ideology to accommodate Anatolian Turkish heritage (before Ottomans) to a like-republican solidaristic social order. The akhi-polity of Ankara myth will provide a halo on the republican Ankara, representing the opposite pole to the degenerate Istanbul. For example, read those lines from Sina Akşin in his ultra-Kemalist “İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele”; “Ankara’nın bu tavrını belki tarihinden gelen açıklamalarla aydınlatmak mümkün olabilir. Mesela, ticaretçi ve sanayici Ahi geleneğinin adeta cumhuriyetçi, bağımsız, özgür havasından, Osmanlı merkez feodalitesine karşı oluşmuş tepkilerden söz edilebilir<sup>133</sup>.” Such a linking of pre-Ottoman Anatolia and the republic is in fact more in Köprülüian fashion congruent with his emphasis on social history. Osman Beg’s imperial destiny had been exposed by Ede Balı who is a Vefaiyye sheyk but also related with the Akhi orders. The famous dream

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<sup>131</sup> Giese, Friedrich, “Das Problem der Entstehung des Osmanischen Reiches”, *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und Verwandte Gebiete*, 2 (1924) p. 246-271 For the Turkish translation of the text, see “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kuruluşu Meselesi”, in *Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a*, edited by Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz, İmge Kitabevi, 2000, p. 149-175

<sup>132</sup> Lowry, Heath, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, SUNY Press, 2003, p. 6

<sup>133</sup> Akşin, Sina, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, Cem Yayınevi, 1992, vol II, p. 188

of Osman and its interpretation by Sheiyk Ede Balı had took place in Ede Balı's nephew Akhi Hasan's zaviyah<sup>134</sup>. Anyway, Giese will give pre-Ottoman Anatolia a more respectable role although still not much is known about it. This approach will be developed further by W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake in their 1932 article<sup>135</sup> and explore on the akhi institutions and their role and influence in shaping the very early Ottoman administrative practices<sup>136</sup>. They also point out to the heterodox nature of Islam in Anatolia.

Köprülü's responsive works studied above can be interpreted as his effort to establish the "real" Turkish history independent from "chroniclers' tradition, politics, wars and dynasties". His social-economic history of Turks with the civilizational aspect in the center has been his main agenda. The time of Seljuks of Rum provides him a perfect opportunity for his ambition. This has been too early and Central Asian heritage can be more easily detectable, before the rise of ottoman power so that political history can not shade the civilizational aspect and finally a virgin field easy to explore and exploit. Seljuks of Rum is a promised land or a safe haven who has been sick of the "chronicler style history of wars and dynasties" to try and test their hypothesis and construct a Turkish history from a non-dynastic, non-centrist and super-political perspective. As argued above his diverging interest towards from literary history to the question of Seljuks of Rum is perfectly compatible. He discovers the genie of Turkishness in the Seljuks of Rum in the uncorrupted cosmos of Turks before the dominance of the center which he was looking for in the field of literary history. He writes in his first landmark article "Türk Edebiyatı Tarihinde Usül" as follows; "Hippolite Taine in his introduction to his famous book on the English literature writes that the literature of a certain nation is her living history and nothing can be compared

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<sup>134</sup> İnalçık, Halil, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003, p. 61

<sup>135</sup> Langer, W. L., Blake, R. P., "The Rise of Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background", *American Historical Review*, 37 (1931) p. 468-505, for the Turkish translation of the text, see "Osmanlı Türklerinin Doğuşu ve Tarihsel Arkapları", in *Söğüt'ten İstanbul'a*, edited by Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz, İmge Kitabevi, 2000, p. 177-224

<sup>136</sup> Lowry, Heath, op. cit., p. 6

to it to enable us to understand the history of this certain nation<sup>137</sup>.” This is a dull example of the role he attributes to literature.

Of course Köprülü’s interest by time shifts to varying aspects of history. He is especially interested in legal history and tries to place legal history within a social-political context which is also embedded in a wider and overarching civilizational construction. For example in his article “İslam Amme Hukukundan Ayrı bir Türk Amme Hukuku Yok mudur ?<sup>138</sup>” he distinguishes an original Turkish legal tradition recognizable from pre-Islamic Turkic history to Ottomans. This article is pretty much parallel to his BMOME; this time the target is not the assumption in favor of a Byzantine institutionalism but a hegemonic and universal Islamic institutionalism. Köprülü recognizes the significance of the Islamic legalism but for him this never did not destroy the existence of an independent Turkish legality and here we follow the same table constructed above as Köprülü is preferring the peaceful and persistent path from pre-Islamic Turkic polities to Ottomans instead of its two possible constructions one to be integrated within a universal Islamic civilization and second a Byzans apres Byzans perspective. Again Köprülü keeps his anti-legalism and notes that legal culture is only a reflection of (one can read it as a superstructure speaking in a Marxian jargon<sup>139</sup>) the social world and of course this social world is also a reflection of the “Turkish way”.

In short, here and there for Köprülü we can speak of a path of Turkish history. He declares the independence of Turkish history not only from Ottomans but also from the

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<sup>137</sup> Fuad Köprülü, “Türk Edebiyatı Tarihinde Usül”, republished in *Edebiyat Araştırmaları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1986, p. 18-19

<sup>138</sup> originally published in *Belleten*, 1938 with the French text “Les Institutions juridiques turques au Moyen age”. Turkish version of the article in *İslam ve Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları ve Vakıf Müessesesi*, collected articles of Fuad Köprülü, Ötüken Yayınevi, 1983, p. 3-35

<sup>139</sup> It would be interesting to read Köprülü in comparison with a Marxian interpretation of history. His tendency to a wholist approach and his effort to see history as a reflection of a one general Idea in a Hegelian sense makes him a Hegelian for sure and his tendency to explain this Idea embedded in the materialistic culture (his national cultures are never national essences but creations of materialist-historical determinism) makes him a left Hegelian, at least a Feuerbachian ! Although his many points divert from a Marxian perspective and he is very distant to any kind of Marxian interpretation (first of all Marxist history denies nations and national paths) he had developed a quasi-Marxian language which will influence the later Turkish historians.

Islamic history. But he had not been trapped to a romantic Turna myth and tries to discover the Turkish culture in Anatolia, in the very geography of the contemporary Turkish Republic. We also need to remember that it was at the time of Seljuks of Rum Anatolia had been referred as “Turchia” by Crusaders. And here his specific interest towards Seljuks of Rum is worth mentioning. But as we will see after the passing of the Kemalist high tide, a restoration of Ottomans and their apprehension in the course of Turkish history will discourage others to proceed on Köprülü’s achievements and develop further with more factual and critical reading of the history of Seljuks of Rum. Ottomans again will assume their privileged role after a short interruption of Kemalist anti-Ottomanist fervor and the dynasticism will reign, this time dynasticism without a dynasty against a social –economical historical alternative as Köprülü and other early Turkish historians tried to establish.

A very similar assessment has been made by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı in his paper presented to the II Turkish History Congress in 1937. Uzunçarşılı names the remarkable work of Köprülü on the Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institutions and after saluting Köprülü for his achievement, he delivers the same approach to the Turkish principalities after the collapse of Seljuks of Rum and reaches a same conclusion that it was the model of Seljuks of Rum and Ilkhanids that shapes the institutions of Turkish principalities<sup>140</sup>. He discusses very briefly the administrative structures of Germiyans, Karamanlis, Karesi and includes hem in the general Islamic legal institution and practices adapted by Great Seljuks and Seljuks of Rum. He concludes again the western claim that Ottoman institutions were taken from Byzantines and refutes it again supported by his evidences provided from the Anatolian principalities and Ottomans being one of them which could beat the others. His modest and relatively short paper is only limited in theory and does not elaborate on details. A very detailed and very important detailed study of this is his "Anadolu Beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu Devletleri" published in the same year, in 1937<sup>141</sup>. Here he uses Arabic general sources as well as local forgotten histories of he time and the next two centuries when the memories of these principalities were alive plus certain vakfiyes. This book has the first

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<sup>140</sup> Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, “On dört ve on beşinci asırlarda Anadolu beyliklerinde toprak ve halk idaresi”, *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Kenan Matbaası, 1943, p.500

<sup>141</sup> Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, *Anadolu Beylikleri ve Akkayunlu, Karakoyunlu Devletleri*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1969 (original publication 1937)



chronological part for a political history as the narration of events and an analytical part where h deals with the social and economic conditions of time of principalities in Anatolia. Influence of Köprülü on this part is obvious and he never goes further than repeating Köprülü in another context. Of course Köprülü's knowledge of western historiography and approaches is far more superior than Uzunçarşılı's modest theorization. However, this book also should be regarded as a major contribution in a time Anatolian principalities were unknown to the academic world. Again book's theoretical part can not escape from simple essentialism and reductionism and also legalism. It looks like Uzunçarşılı's interest towards social-economic history in a Köprülüian fashion can not beat his tendency to give away to the legalism, sui generism of oriental difference theory. His social-economic approach is only lipservice and he assumes that what legal traditions orders has to be carried out<sup>142</sup>.

#### **Appendix: Akdağ, Avcıoğlu and Kemalist-Köprülü Synthesises**

It may be necessary to mention Mustafa Akdağ slightly who also embarked on an ambitious study of “Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi” whom he could only publish the first two volumes before his early death<sup>143</sup>. His first volume had been published in 1959 and covers the period from 1243 to 1453. He reconstructs Seljuks of Rum as a significantly urban polity. He deliberately rejects to focus on the nomadic populations of Anatolia and their significance. His belief is that contrary to the established approach, an economical and social history of Seljuks of Rum can be written in their absence. He believes that “Seljuk cities” had not been recognized as independent economic units by themselves. This can be also traced in his “Akdağ thesis” in which he claimed that the rise of the Ottoman principality was due to the existence of a Bithynia economical unit in which there was a developed trade in Bithynia with the participation of Greeks and Turks<sup>144</sup> which did not leave much impact on historians and ignored<sup>145</sup>. Akdağ's

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<sup>143</sup> Akdağ, Mustafa, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi*, 2 volumes, Cem Yayınevi, 1977 (originally first volume in 1959, the second posthumously 1971)

<sup>144</sup> first developed in Akdağ, Mustafa, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadi Vaziyeti”, *Belleten* 13 (1949) p. 497-571, *Belleten* 14 (1950), 319-418

appraisal of Seljuks of Rum is followed by his relatively sympathetic approach to Ottomans after three decades of Kemalist despising. Akdağ (as Barkan) feels the need to find historical niches upon which Turkish Republic can rise. Akdağ was not only a life-long Kemalist but also had supported the Ecevit left-of-center group in RPP and even flirted with more leftist tendencies and jailed for his leftism in 1971 subscribing to a “socialized Kemalist” bastard ideology<sup>146</sup>. Akdağ, influenced from Köprülü has two questions to resolve. First is the necessity of a historical background for Turks and secondly a harmonious past in which there an harmony was reigning and social contradictions had been avoided<sup>147</sup>. His aversion to the Jalali uprising and rejecting to recognize them as popular revolts is another curious point. His historical exempla will provide a background to a corporatist cum social democratic project. The uniqueness theme of the “Turks” is present in Akdağ like Barkan and in him we see a vague synthesis of Barkan and Köprülü and parallel with his Kemalist anti-imperialist rhetoric<sup>148</sup>. In Mustafa Akdağ, the forgotten Seljuks of Rum were strongly inserted into the Turkish Anatolian history and a straight path between them and Ottomans had been established to evolve to the Turkish republic. As claimed above, Seljuks of Rum had not been posited within the nomadic and Euroasian Turkish world but to the prosperous urban world of Anatolia. Volkish romantic imagination of Seljuks of Rum had been rejected in favor of a “rational state-founding infrastructure”.

Before proceeding further, I would like to mention the unique study of Doğan Avcıoğlu. As Marx had been disappointed seeing the waning of the revolutionary tide in 1850s and gave up writing on radical philosophy and politics and focuses on the “laws of economics”, after Avcıoğlu had disappointed with his revolutionarism, he produced a

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<sup>145</sup> see his immediate critic, İnalçık, Halil, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadi Vaziyeti Üzerinde bir Tetkik Münasebetiyle”, *Belleter* 15 (1951), p. 629-684

<sup>146</sup> Kayalı, Kurtuluş, “Mustafa Akdağ'ın Tarihçiliği Üzerine”, in *Türk Düşünce Dünyasının Bunalımı*, İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 77

<sup>147</sup> Ecevit although rejecting the Kemalist corporatist ideology of 1930s, defended by the majority of RPP of 1960s, he also argues that different from the European social democrat parties, Turkish “social democracy” lies on not a class struggle but as a gradual evolution of benevolent statism of Kemalism. Ecevit and his left-of-center is also shy on speaking of “social clashes”.

<sup>148</sup> Kayalı, Kurtuluş, Mustafa Akdağ'ın....., p.77

unique 5-volume “Türklerin Tarihi” in his last years<sup>149</sup>. He did not live enough to write his sixth volume supposed to be on Ottomans. His fifth volume covers Seljuks of Rum. He tries to develop a Marxian perspective against the “Turanist” approach. He also contrasts the “Turanist-racist” approach with “Atatürkist” approach and he claims that his Marxist history is parallel to an Atatürkist vision. Rejecting “Euro-centrist” AMP discussions, he constructs all his history on Engels’ “Origins of Family, Private Property and the State”. Although Engels claimed to write an “objectivist” history, a romantic dimension is apparent. Of course one can claim that Tacitus is the most important historian who shaped all the 19<sup>th</sup> century anthropology and ancient history with his book *Germania* written without ever going to Germania personally. Momigliano goes further stating that “*Germania* was among the most dangerous books ever written<sup>150</sup>.” Engels, who has the nickname “General” due to his interest on history of warfare leads him an admiration for early Germanic warfare society. His contempt for Russians and Slavs can also be counted for his appraisal of Germans. Avcioğlu applies this Engelsian imagination to the history of Turks. This Engelsian (rather than Marxian) history summarizes Turkish history as the eternal struggle of centrifugal forces and center. Free Turks on horseback are easily be assimilated within the more progressive sedentary civilizations. The course of Turkish history can be summarized as the tendency of Turkish militia to serve for sedentary civilizations, take over the political authority using their arms to their masters and then target their fellow-Turks of the steppes. This dialectic is the basis of Turkish history. Every time free Turks are exorcized with the charms of civilizations. However at the end, nomadic Turks crush the Turkish-ruling elite empires. This fate had been shared by Great Seljuks, Seljuks of Rum and Ottomans could escape from this fate in early 16<sup>th</sup> century (development of a long theoretical framework with “lively case-studies”, see several chapters of vol I) This fatal struggle had been referred as “to be or not to be” by Avcioğlu<sup>151</sup>. This scheme has been applied to Seljuks of Rum in the fifth volume. Whereas in the beginning, the free plains of Anatolia was the promised land of Turkish hordes, a political leadership had consolidated its grip of power and formed an enemy political body to the Turkish

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<sup>149</sup> Avcioğlu, Doğan, *Türklerin Tarihi*, Tekin yayınevi, 1995, 5 volumes

<sup>150</sup> Mellor, Ronald, *The Roman Historians*, Routledge, 1999, p.80

<sup>151</sup> Avcioğlu, Doğan, *op. cit.*, vol I, p.107

hordes hindering livelihoods on the Anatolian plains husbanding animals and plundering nearby villages and towns. The peculiar thing in Avcıoğlu is how his Engelsian framework had produced a Köprülü-like Kemalist point of view. The myth of the “free horse rider” like the “free man (hence, Franks ?) of the Teutonic forests” from whom Jefferson believed the Americans descended from, is combined in an overt claim that Turkish Republic is for the first time “the” state of Turks<sup>152</sup>. Whereas Ottomans are despised for his massacres of Kızılbaş (who are genuine Turks), the Turkish Republic is “people’s republic”. One sense that the last piece of the picture can be claimed as the crashing of Ottomans by the Turks from Ankara abolishing the sultanate ! Köprülü-Engels-Atatürk had been fused into one ! Another Köprülüian impact is the general vision of Seljuks of Rum in Avcıoğlu. He tends to draw a relatively peaceful picture. Seljuks of Rum may be another political body of the center, nevertheless it is not as abhorrent as Ottomans. Similar to Mustafa Akdağ, Seljuks of Rum brought a relative peace and stability in which trade could flourish and towns flourish. Twenty years after Avcıoğlu, we are still not in position to determine how urban Seljuks of Rum was if it ever was due to the primitive level of search regarding the subject. This sympathetic approach is also congruent with a Köprülüian vision.

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<sup>152</sup> op. cit., vol I, p.40-1

## THE RISE OF THE TURCO-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS

With the rise of Osman Turan, we encounter a new and much more comprehensive perspective on Seljuks of Rum. Osman Turan transforms the parameters of the approach to the Seljuks of Rum. Very simply put, Osman Turan relocates the history of Seljuks of Rum within a broader geographical and cultural span. This transformation includes both an enlargement of the scope of their significance and also a major shift of the positioning of the Seljuks of Rum. Osman Turan's genealogy differs from Fuad Köprülü's. Köprülü establishes Seljuks of Rum within the linear history of Turks from their Central Asian homeland. One can easily point out the stepping stones of the course of Turkish history in Köprülü's configuration whereas Osman Turan's genealogy is lacking such a linear direction but embarks on a broader multi-linear tract. For Osman Turan, there is a two-layer structure in the making of Seljuks and can not be relegated to the history of the ethnic Turks in movement. Of course speaking of a multi-layered structure, we also have to decide if there is a hierarchy of two layers or is there an equivalency between these two layers or are these two layers are just complementing each other and does not pose a multi-layered aspect.

Etienne Copeaux has a different point here. He argues that Kemalist vision of history also emphasized the "prominent role of Turks in the Islamic world". Kemalism was also easily declaring medieval Persian-Turkish estates and polities as genuinely Turkish<sup>153</sup>. The Turkish founders and ruling élite of these polities in their military way of life were always virile carrying the sword of Islam while lazy and passive Arabs were confined in their desert world. However, although a strong emphasis on the eminent contributions of Turks to Islam is a recurring theme in Kemalist discourse, it was also

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<sup>153</sup> Copeaux, *op. cit.*, p.149-150

expressed that Turks always kept their independent national track without a strong integration and a meddling into the Islamic realm. Turks embraced Islam as a historical necessity (even a strategy ) to rush to the west. Because Turks were courageous fighters, they acquire the honor of being “sword-bearers of Islam” and Kemalism loves to downplay the “poor and inactive desert Arab” theme establishing Turks as the real promoters of Islam, this will not be the main tenet in the Kemalist vision. The Kemalist tract as like the Köprülü tract is a one-layer one whereas Turco-Islamists will construct their configuration in a two-layered tract.

That vision had been labeled as “Turco-Islamic synthesis”. Although originally the name had been coined proudly by the architects of such a vision, the label had been endorsed enthusiastically by left-leaning circles. The phase begin to carry a very severe negative connotation with the exhaustive usage of left-leaning circles continuously as an insult. The term begin to signify a display of a regressive vision of history and more to that, subjugation of history to the authoritarianism of the right.

Tanıl Bora studies the "three states of Turkish right" as only different expressions of the same "matter" in different forms<sup>154</sup>. For Bora, the three states of matter of Turkish right are nationalism, conservatism and Islamism. These can easily be convertible to each other as water to vapor or water to ice. The form is only a matter of environmental condition but the essence is the same. This is a healthy approach to a conceptualization of Turkish right. To consider “Turkish right” not in compartments but as variations within a unity is more appropriate in understand the Turkish right. He also has a chapter "Nationalism in Islamisms and Islam in Nationalism" where he points out that how these two concept intermix in which Turco-Islamism is the pure expression of such an integration. Although Bora's observations are noteworthy, he reflects a sophisticated but rigid position of "otherization of right (Kemalism also being rightism par excellence with its authoritarianism and nationalism) with its reactionary elements and positing his "own camp" within the educated-liberationist-civilized value system and sees a duality. He takes rightism representing the ills of Turkish schizophrenia (and a tendency to historicize it within the Ottoman-Turkish history and essentialize these tenets) whereas "the other camp" represents the perfect rightfulness and soundness free from unfounded paranoia. This conceals the dynamics of "Turkish right". It is not a "mistake", it is not an "obsession", it is not a mental disorder or a mere paranoia. Again it is not only a

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<sup>154</sup> Bora, Tanıl, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, Birikim Yayınları, 1998

matter of “expression of the authoritarianism (or the authoritarian personality of Adorno) of the Turkish right. Politics can not be analyzed within such an approach. It is a way of expression of a certain existence. This is more than a simple "state-centrism", more than a state cult. It is a mode of existence. The fact that it has been manipulated above does not necessarily render it to an authorization mentality subservient to an authority figure. That is because every historical construction is an imagination and need for an authoritarian figure would not explain much. This would not explain much regarding the Prussian history<sup>155</sup> or Russian history. Hence, it explains Turkish history that much.

Here it is the place to free the Turco-Islamic synthesis from such a necessarily negative connotation and to relocate what is the vision of Osman Turan and others and also the significance of Seljuks of Rum in this imagination. We have to treat Turco-Islamic perspective not as a perversion but an equal legitimate alternative reading of the Turkish history.

All nationalisms are constructions. They do not imagine a community simply in today but they establish the imaginative background of the nation in history and today is meaningful as long as it is provided a with a legitimate history of its own. Furthermore, a national imagination of history can never be a so-called objective history because firstly no history can be objective, secondly a national reconstruction will inevitably pervert it. A selective remembrance and more importantly selective forgetting will be applied to establish the national vision of history. That is true for any nationalist discourse. Furthermore, there can never be a one and outright nationalist discourse for every given nation. Any person will have his own version of nationalism. This is true for European nationalisms as well. The most vivid example may be the French variants of nationalism with its numerous meanings and symbolisms of nationalism. Varying interpretations include the socialist-republican nationalism with the pride of French Revolution (may be in radical vision of Third Republic whether it be a la Jules Ferry or a la Gambetta , it may be a more left-socialist nationalism with National Front and Resistance its main myths) Gaullist synthesis and compromise of clashing French ideologies within the charismatic figure of Gaulle and his populist Gaullism , Le Pen’s integral nationalism, newly rising souveraniste socialist nationalism led by

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<sup>155</sup> for the later reproducing of the “Prussian values”, “Prussian state characteristics” and historicizing/essentializing it in the 19<sup>th</sup> century see Howard, Michael, “Prussia in European History”, *Lessons of History*, Yale University Press, 1991, p. 49-62

Chevenement and alike and finally the now almost dead national visions of Catholic movements, the most significant of all is the anti-Dreyfusard nationalism of Action Français and Barres. Vichy's fascist nationalism is another shortly lived nationalist model which had risen upon the synthesis of right-wing nationalism of different strands and continued to echo in the post-war constructions of nationalism. And no one can claim representing the "right", "true", "uncontaminated" French nationalism. French Revolution and Joan d'arc are equally symbols of French nationalism. Of course all these movements have claims to represent the "true" nationalism, representing "true" French identity and consciousness. This is equally true for republican nationalists and Catholic-right-wing nationalists alike.

The same is true for the Turkish context. Too many versions of Turkish nationalisms can be identified without elevating one of the narratives as the "true" one. A mistake had been done in the mainstream critic of "Turco-Islamism". "Turco-Islamist" imagination of Turkish nationalism had been treated as a diversion from the true Turkish nationalism although these critics did not themselves adhere to a specific nationalism. However, they have a "certain idea" of Turkish nationalism. "Turco-Islamism's" Islamic dimension had been overemphasized whereas its "nationalist" dimension had been underestimated<sup>156</sup>. This severe misleading representation is endorsed both by self-styled universalist left-leaning academics as well as left-wing Kemalist nationalists. The architects of Turco-Islamic model created a new and radically different imagination of Turkish history with its possible applications for today but this imagination is no less legitimate than the earlier Kemalist vision of Turkish history. Moreover, one point is that it is more touching to the existing "Turkish cultural essence" and it smells less artificial although it is obviously as artificial as any other image-construction. This is also another misleading perspective exploited by right-wing scholars of both vulgar-chauvinistic type and more intellectual liberal-conservative sympathizers. The claim is that Turco-Islamic vision grasped the still surviving and

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<sup>156</sup> A more robust analysis of the rising of Turco-Islamism initiating its genealogy from the never-disappearing Turkist tradition rather than interpreting it as a later construct, see Landau, Jacob M., *Pantürkizm*, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1999, especially p. 218-222. The book assesses the phases of marginalization and the reintegration of Turkism to the establishment from 1920s to 1960s. There occurred a visible shift of the identity of Turkism in 1960s being more favorable to Islam. However, this process of transformation can not render the "new Turkists" distinguishable from the general line of Turkism.



living folk historical imagination more than the jacobin Kemalist vision and can claim for an empathy with the populace. In these “pro-periphery” analysis, the center-periphery dichotomy had been referred and exploited based on Şerif Mardin’s highly influential landmark article<sup>157</sup> which had been manipulated beyond the article’s main theme and entailed an easy and a favorable conclusion towards the surviving “periphery” representing the Rousseian general will of the Turkish people against the authoritative and oppressive “center”. Although the “center” part of the argument may be appropriate, the claim of authenticity of the “periphery” representing the legitimate general (national) will of the Anatolian people is another myth endorsed by certain political regroupings which do not hold on a solid ground. The immense state-fetishism and ethnical-religious determinism embedded in this highly politicized interpretation which constitutes the bulk of this narrative is of course a myth and has nothing to do with the so-called “folk culture of Anatolia”. This vision has stronger aspects than the weaker Kemalist construction but this is not in the sphere of “reflecting the true spirit of Turkishnes” but in its more skillfulness to embellish a populist-demagogic style and being more tactful in communicating with people. Moreover, this is not a superiority of the Turco-Islamic model but an inferiority of the Kemalist construction. This can be seen even simply as a public relations problem rather than Kemalist construction being a groundless intellectual fantasy of the westernized urban elite.

Before discussing the role and significance of Seljuks of Rum within this discourse, first we have to deal with Great Seljuks. Great Seljuks have been promoted to a distinguished position within the general tract of Turkish history. This appraisal needs some elaboration.

In this new imagination, Great Seljuks have been inserted full-fledgedly within the Islamic realm. The discourse goes, at the time of the emergence of Great Seljuks, the abode of Islam was in crisis. The stability of the abode of Islam and the uniform legitimate authority had collapsed and polities of different levels of strength had declared their independence. No longer did Islam mean a political and cultural unity but begin to mean only a collection of Muslim believers. However Islam can never be restricted to the sphere of belief. It is more than a system of belief. It is a political

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<sup>157</sup> Mardin, Şerif, “Center and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”, *Deadalus*, Winter 1973, p. 169-190

project in the sense that the word of God has to be glorified and established to a supreme role in this world. This is a religious duty. At this time, no revival looked possible and viable from within the traditional core of Islam. A revitalization has to come from a new source, from outside. This “new power”, this “new dynamic” was the Turks. This also had been heralded by the prophet himself. A study of hadithes and a “critical” reading of Quaran shows that a new nation will come to save and uphold the banner of Islam. This nation is Turks<sup>158</sup>. After a shy and ambivalent early Turco-Islamic polities, with Great Seljuks Turks had established themselves as one of the leading if not the leading “nation” of Islam fighting in the forefronts of Islam.

Great Seljuks’s sudden rise and conquest of the central parts of Islamic lands has indicated the return of the establishment of the one and single authority. The symbolic act of reinserting the caliphate’s authority and saving of the caliph from the suppression of Buveyhids is also given special attention. Great Seljuks had finally restored the supremacy of Caliphate and saved the institution from the terror of the earthly forces that had taken over within the abode of Islam<sup>159</sup>. Of course one can not avoid noticing that although caliph has been saved from Buveyhids and Tughrul Beg had taken the title of sultan from the caliph himself, the caliph never rose to a political power

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<sup>158</sup> A unique scholar of Turco-Islamist leanings although quiet independent in his studies is Zekeriya Kitapçı. He has devoted himself to display that Turks had occupied a significant role in Muhammed’s hadithes and the advent of Turks had been pointed out since than. He also had studies “Turks in Arabian Peninsula in the time of Mohammed”. See, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Hazreti Peygamberin Hadislerinde Türkler*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1986, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Saadet Asrında Türkler*, Konya Postası Bölge Gazetesi, 1993. In his other books Kitapçı has concentrated on the conversion of Turks to Islam. According to Kitapçı, Turks had overwhelmed the first Arab military assault. After this early violent phase associated with the Umayyad oppression. After the end of this oppressive phase, Turks had converted voluntarily to Islam. This conversion of the privileged nation had been heralded already by Mohammed. See, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Orta Asya’da İslamiyetin Yayılışı ve Türkler*, Konya Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1989, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Türkistan’ın Araplar tarafında Fethi*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 2000, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Türklerin İslam Medeniyetindeki Rolü*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1976, Kitapçı, Zekeriya, *Orta Doğu’da Türk Askeri Varlığının İlk Zuhuru*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1987 It should be noted that Kitapçı’s interpretation is not unique but he carried one popular discourse to the center and his special focus on the connection between the prophet and Turks almost as a transcendental relation is a matter of varying priorities..

<sup>159</sup> This is almost central to the any narration of Seljukid history in this fashion. For example see Köymen, Mehmet Altan, *Tuğrul Bey ve Zamanı*, Kültür Bakanlığı-Kültür Serisi, 1976, p. 34-46

anymore. But this is because the new times necessities “military forces” to take over the fronts to fight in the name of religion in a respectful attitude towards the caliph. Caliph from his court in Baghdad can not be expected to lead the Islamic fight. This has to be done by proxies. Turks are these willing proxies. They are the trustable men of the caliph.

In the introduction of Osman Turan to his book “Selçukiler Zamanında Türkiye”, he speaks of a “Seljukid Revolution”. The emergence of Seljuks and their taking control of the Islamic world and their reach to Mediterranean coasts and Anatolia is one of the greatest turning points of Turkish, Islamic and world history. Manzikert is the main stage of this Revolution<sup>160</sup>.” An almost same analyses has been suggested by İbrahim Kafesoğlu in the introduction to his book about Seljuks<sup>161</sup>. Apart from the euphorically celebrated “liberation of the Caliph”, Seljuks’ other contribution to Sunnah Islam includes the Nizamiyyah madrasas teaching the “right faith” in the time of rupturing heretic faiths, the firm struggle against the terrorism of Hashasiyun and Hasan Sabbah. These are the decisive contributions of the strong political authority established in a needy time.

Mehmet Altan Köymen also tries to contextualize Seljukids within the realm of Islam. His chapter called "Seljuks within the World of Islam" is 130 pages long. This chapter is more of an "international relations" history and investigates how Seljuks could establish themselves among other Islamic states such as Gaznevids, Samanids Karahanids and could overwhelm others<sup>162</sup>. Köymen summarizes the direction of Seljukid history as "leaving the pre-Islam world of Turkishness and entering the ecumenical world of Islam and acquiring the leadership position. Köymen’s emphasis is more on Turkish national aspiration from east to west and less deal wit their missionary zeal serving the Islamic cause. Köymen celebrates Seljuks for opening a “middle road” between the northern and southern paths where Turkish mass would flow into the west<sup>163</sup>. The peculiar notion in all these accounts is the importance given to the

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<sup>160</sup> Turan, Osman, *Selçukiler Zamanında Türkiye*, Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1971, p.XIII

<sup>161</sup> Kafesoğlu, İbrahim, *Selçuklu Tarihi*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1972, p.V-VI

<sup>162</sup> Köymen, Mehmet Altan, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989

<sup>163</sup> Köymen, op. cit., p. 21

westward march of Turks as if this was an instinctive aspiration of Turks from time immemorial and secondly as if this westward movement had contributed to the national advancement of Turks by only itself.

Great Seljuks had been taken from its tract of linear Turkish history and had been put within the tract of Islamic history. Of course this never denies the Turkish sphere of the story. Turks had been a strong race before their conversion to Islam. Of course there is a problem here. The pagan lifestyle of Turks has to be reconciled with their future Islamic fighter images. This has been managed with treating the shamanist Turkish religion as a monotheistic religion before Islam. Reminding the reader the case of Abraham being a Muslim before Islam with his instinctual self-discovery of the One, Turks were by nature are inclined to believe in the omnipotence of Almighty. This has been consolidated with the claim of the peaceful conversion of Turks to Islam. The commonalities of the pre-Islamic Turkish shamanism with Islam facilitated the easy conversion of Turks to Islam. Differing from Persia and Middle East, Turkish lands could not be invaded militarily. It was Turks own conversion of Islam that enabled these lands to accede to the realm of Islam. Turks were not one of those passive nations who subdued in front of the sword of Islam but audacious fighters who could confront successfully to the Islamic military, especially that of the despicable, oppressive and cruel Umayyad military.

A successful synthesis is made by Osman Turan himself integrating the "Turkish world-conquering ethos" with the Islamic duty of spreading the religion, the *ilay-i kerimatullah*. This marvelous integration again negated the possible arising contradictions between the pre-Islamic and Islamic cultures of Turks. The existing world-conquering ethos of Turks was just converted into a jihad ideal. The pre-Islamic ethos of Turks again made Turks privileged among other Muslim nations.

These two suggestions abandons a possible contradiction in terms and helps the two-track course of history to be harmonized and integrated in one-tract. Although Turks are latecomers to Islam, this also has something with timing. Their fresh energy enters the game just in time. We should not always think in terms of chronology but in a superior dimension. Turks contribution to Islam may not begin from day one but their entrance is in a very crucial time frame.

The role of Great Seljuks is very central in this vision. It was Great Seljuks that give a new impetus and dynamic to Islam which was in pains of losing its dynamism and its missionary zeal. Islam is an activist religion and unless it does not go on fighting

the infields to spread the name of Allah, it may fall. This fall is both a spiritual and a material one and at the advent of Great Seljuks, Islam was struggling of this dual falls.

The intersecting point of these dual collapses is the split of Islamic lands into two. The Shiite Fatimids were reigning in Egypt with their heretical ideas. However before the advent of Seljuks, there was no power to challenge their supremacy in Islamic lands. This is a sort of “medieval Cold War” fought both in political and ideological spheres and more than some battles. This internal feud is more embarrassing than a probable collapse from outside. This appalls the ideal of Islamic unity and furthermore one has to concede that this fragmentation can only be due to the collapse of the spiritual ideal of Islam. And the enormous contribution and assistance of Seljuks is to combat this internal collapse (both political and spiritual, actually spiritual one feeds the political collapse) and achieve to restore the order and stability within the Islamic lands. Seljuks symbolize the restoration of order and hierarchy in Islam. But we have to remember that this restoration of order and peace is thanks to the advent of Turks. The role of Turks as “swords of Islam” is not only against the infidel outsiders, both more against the internal heretics. This role is even more important because it requires also a spiritual ascension.

One source we can turn to is the switch of the paradigm in the school history textbooks. Very simply, we can see three phases in the Turkish republican history school textbooks. First phase is the Kemalist paradigm and the famous 4-volume “Liseler İçin Tarih” published between 1931 and 1934. An analysis of the serie has been developed in the previous chapters. This phase has been followed by a so-called “humanist phase”. The emphasis of the Kemalist schoolbooks has been universalized. The claim that all world history is actually a Turkic history (a la Marx ) has been left aside without a formal or informal or even a partial denial. The claim has been repeated albeit in a shy and lip-service mode. The scope of the history school books reflect a universal approach. This does not render these schoolbooks less nationalist. But here the amateurish aspects had been given up in favor of a more sophisticated and cold-blooded perspective. This may be interpreted as the rising confidence of the second elite of the republic in their Europeanness and their contemporariness. The enthusiastic claim of the early republican elite to make themselves recognized as Europeans against the western racial arguments claiming Turks as an Asiatic yellow race. This hot discussion had been ended and more or less Europeans of the Turks had been accepted in the domestic area and the reformist/revolutionary zeal had ended. This brought a new dialectic with the

“western culture”. The second phase is the learning and assimilating the western culture. This had been symbolized with the 1940s translations of western classics of both antique and modern stock. This also had been reflected in the history school books of the time where European/western culture means something per se without any effort to use it as a further claim of the Europeanness of the Turks. Turks now belong to the European culture as well as the Islamic culture and the Central Asian culture as one can understand from the context of the history schoolbooks of the time. One theme recurring in these schoolbooks is the culture of the Eastern Mediterranean and its unique culture.

Ibrahim Kafesoğlu’s textbook of 1976 is a direct challenge to this “humanistic” approach. The striking point is that the Turco-Islamist scholars’ main reaction is to the “humanistic” approach rather than the Kemalist approach. The word humanistic is meaningful by itself and the recurring usage of this word as an insult and in a derogatory sense by the Turco-Islamists is even more meaningful. Although “Turkish humanistic history textbooks” are far from being humanistic and a different expression and codification of Turkish nationalism, the labeling is reflecting a contesting alternative variants of Turkish nationalism. The word humanism by definition claims for a universalistic civilization and accepts a whole one culture for all humanity. It declares that the main aspect of a “human” is its humanness and it is being a human. These are possible associations one can make with the word “humanism”. This of course is in dispute with an alternative claim of one “human” can be superior in culture or in “civilizational” levels by being belonging to a certain particular group. This particularism may be in religious terms, in ethnic terms, in racial terms or in cultural terms. The Turco-Islamists are believing in any of the above four particularism. Of course Kemalism was making the claim of a superiority of the racial particularism. This is taken positively by Turco-Islamists by strengthening this superiority with other possible spheres of source of supremacy. We have to note the strong emphasis on the “racial aspect” which makes this approach unique given that this is mainly a religious perspective in which the racial aspect has to be completely ignored within the universal and inclusive brotherhood community of Muslim believers. This racial aspect has too much to do with the Kemalist background. We have to note that the architects and masterminds of “Turco-Islamic synthesis” are mainly from the Anatolian periphery (mainly with rural origins) who had the chance and privilege to get a higher education in Istanbul/Ankara of a Kemalist establishment and syntheses their non-scholar

worldviews integrated with the establishment's official scholarship's worldview and establish a new vision which will culminate at its peak 1970s and 1980s.

As discussed above, all three phases have their historical visions. It is popular since Stone to see history as a narrative. History is a fiction. For Hayden White, history is not only a fiction but it is also theatrical performance.

Adapting this fictionalizing approach to history, we have three contesting fictions regarding the "history of Turks". They have also their different climaxes. Kemalist narrative is a racial-based fiction. History is basically a life struggle of "races". The nuance of race within the Kemalist lexicon had been discussed previously. It is different from Hitler's but it is also something different than an ethnicity. The "humanistic" vision had kept the Kemalist notion of race but let it turned into a relativized-ambiguous racial vision. It has added a notion of culture to the race. History is the reflection of the cultural essences of races.

The so-called "humanistic" textbooks can be seen in many ways an intermediary stop between the Kemalist and Turco-Islamic approaches. The anarchic-racial nature of the Kemalist corpus had been tamed to a state-centric vision. Seljuks of Rum in Emin Oktay's textbook is mainly a history of the Seljuks of Rum rather than the advent of Turks. It has common points with the Kemalist corpus but one also can notice major novelties. In Emin Oktay, İbrahim Yinal and Kutalmış Süleyman are in between independent warlords and dependent commanders. Their quest for raids in Anatolia has been mentioned as follows; "Tuğrul Bey, Rey şehrine yerleştikten sonra Anadolu'nun fethine önem vermiş ve buranın fethi işini Selçuklu prenslerinden İbrahim Yinal ve Kutalmış Beylere havale etmişti<sup>164</sup>." This ambiguous sentence does not explain the relation between the center and the periphery and the nature of the hordes of İbrahim Yinal and Kutalmış Bey. Actually "Kutulmuş" and İbrahim İnal" had been referred as "commanders" in TTK 1933 but here these commanders had been ordered to raid Shirvan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Western Caucassia; not Anatolia.<sup>165</sup> There is mentioning of Armenia two times but no single reference to Anatolia had been made except writing "out of necessity Byzantiniens transferred its Roumelian army to Anatolia" which has nothing to do with the route of the Seljuks raids. For TTK 1933 the move to Anatolia was an unintended outcome (in fact there is no effort to make a special effort for such a

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<sup>164</sup> Oktay, Emin, *Tarih Lise II*, Atlas Kitabevi, no publication year, p. 176

<sup>165</sup> T.T.T. Cemiyeti, *Tarih II*, Devlet Matbaası, 1933, p.226

claim) due to the pressure of adjoining Oghuz tribes<sup>166</sup>. In Emin Oktay, we counter a Hegelian slyness of history. It may not be officially sanctioned but course of history leads to Anatolia. Manzikert has risen to new heights in Emin Oktay. Alpaslan with his ceremonious courage before the war and his respectful hosting of the captive emperor Diogenes has made his leap to one of the outstanding Turkish leaders of all times which is absent in TK 1933. We also have been informed of the significance of Manzikert. This has opened a new era for Turkish history. From Manzikert onwards, the “history of Turkey” begins. This we can catch from Emin Oktay’s naming his “sixth unit” in the textbook as “History of Turkey”. In TTK, there is no word of “History of Turkey.” For the racial definition of a possible Kemalist (or quasi-Kemalist, pseudo-Kemalist given TTK writers are not in complete agreement with the Kemalist leading elite) Turkey, Turkey is where Turks live and it should not refer to a particular territory. Anatolia may be where Turks had lived since Manzikert but today Anatolia may be equal to Turkey as a chance of history but this still does not create an equivalency of Anatolia and Turkey. But as we will see it does for Emin Oktay and the later Turco-Islamists.

Danishmenids had been relegated to a more modest place and their earlier rise is seen as a temporary de facto development and doomed to fail as the tendency of Anatolia to unify will manifest itself. Such a determinism is absent in the TTK 1933. The naturalness of Anatolia to unify is a strong point in Emin Oktay.

Of course we have to make it clear that it is questionable if TTK 1933 or Emin Oktay is more Kemalist. TTK 1933 in certain aspect carries a package of earlier decades. Emin Oktay is a much more Kemalist corpus than TTK 1933. TTK 1933 is a work of early Kemalism where there is the heritage of the past not clearly cleaned. The work of Emin Oktay reflects a self-confidence. West is not anymore a destiny to be caught but something that had been achieved at least within the elite circles of Ankara and Istanbul. Nationalism had been mastered within the reasonable and safe limits. It is the nationalism of the center and a confident nationalism, a nationalism of the proud center. That is why Emin Oktay’s nationalism is nomore a disturbing one. It is kind of Third Republic Renan kind of nationalism. Emin Oktay reflects Kemalism in its most developed form. It is a work written after the consolidation of the nation-state, after the democratic turn had been managed and before the fragmentation had shook Turkey. The old differentiation of “inherently dangerous nationalism” versus “civic nationalism” is

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<sup>166</sup> op. cit., p.226



out of fashion, it is nevertheless true that Vormarz nationalism yet not divorced from liberalism and the ideals of French Revolution and not taken over by the founding nation-states reflects an individualistic-anarchist idealization very different from the communalist and collectivist vision of the 20<sup>th</sup> century nationalism. As TTK 1933 takes a lot from this romantic and pre-nation state nationalism, “so-called “humanistic” variant also several takeovers from the early liberal nationalism. One aspect is a la Mazzini belief that every nation has its positive essence and a respect for different civilizations and their contributions to the common heritage of the world. Mazzini’s common Europe of nations is here the common world of different nations and civilizations. In this regard, it is against particularism. Of course TTK 1933 was also respectful of different civilizations but the effort was to base the positive aspects of these civilizations to their Turkic root. The inherent recipe was their Turkishness. This crazy idea at a time of both establish and introduce Turks as a civil race and at the same time (re)integrate Turks from their backwards to the present modern world brought this schizophrenic theory. The healthy version of this thesis after the development of a relative self-confidence paved the way to the new perspective developed in 1940s and reigned till 1970s. In this regard, it reflects the zenith of Kemalist historical interpretation welcoming the two pillars of Kemalism together; westernism and nationalism. The magnificence of this synthesis is that these pillars do not clash with each other. They are perfectly compatible with each other. But the coexistence of these two “Kemalist principles” is always a hard one and easily collapse. This we will see as the center-right Kemalist hegemony will collapse after 1960<sup>167</sup>.

Altan Deliorman’s textbook will be taken as an example of the Turco-Islamic perspective<sup>168</sup>. In Deliorman, pages allocated to Seljuks of Rum has increased very significantly. Manzikert has been celebrated as one of the most crucial dates of Turkishness. Keeping on the comparison how the first raids have been reflected, here we learn that the hordes of 1040s and 1050s were actually an army sent by Tuğrul Bey. The Pasinler War has been mentioned as another war of two regular armies and no

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<sup>167</sup> We should miss that the successful hegemony of Kemalism in contemporary Turkey owes more to the center-right Kemalism than the RPP strand of Kemalism. Kemalism could easily be crashed if its ideological resource would be only RPP. But by 1960s, the center-right loyalty to Kemalism had been shaken and this trend had progressed much more with the “National Front” coalitions in the second half of 1970s.

<sup>168</sup> Deliorman, Altan, *Tarih I*, Bayrak Basım/Yayım/Tanıtım, 1998

different than Manzikert or Dandanakan. Byzantine has dominated the scene as the only enemy which Turks face. Georgians and Armenians had disappeared. The coordination between Alpaslan and the Turcoman tribe chiefs is very positive and hierarchical. "Alpaslan ordered the Turcoman begs to conquer all Anatolia<sup>169</sup>."

1960 was in many ways a landmark for the future Turkey. The coup d'état of May 27 caused the left/right divide to deepen and an enmity had appeared. The executions of Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu had been the very crucial decision which will shape the mood of the rightist and helped a revanchism to flourish which will take "three for three" in 1971. This mood had caused the right Kemalism to loose its grip on the right-wing groupings and AP was in many ways forced by rightist circles to shift to right. Democrat Party of 1950s was a result of a break away from RPP and was a lining within the conventions of Kemalism. Justice Party was more a reflection of the non-Kemalist countryside<sup>170</sup>. Non-Kemalist rhetoric could make their respective debuts in the political arena as well as their non-Kemalist visions of history. As it will be argued, this are not completely immune to the Kemalist rhetoric. On the contrary, they will rise on the Kemalist foundations. But they will also introduce their alternative reading of history, mixing the contemporary nation-state interpretation with the living or supposedly living narrative of the countryside. This will bring us to the Turco-Islamism. The short biographies of the architects of such an approach will show us this aspect clearly. İbrahim Kafesoğlu had been born in Tefenni of Burdur<sup>171</sup> and Osman Turan had been born in Soğanlı, a village nearby Trabzon<sup>172</sup>. They both come from rural lower class families and had succeeded to rise due to their training in the Kemalist academia. They both earned their bachelor degrees in Ankara in Dil Tarih

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<sup>169</sup> op. cit., p.222

<sup>170</sup> for a discussion of Justice Party's flirtations with right-wing nationalist regroupings, Demirel, Tanel, *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika*, İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p. 196-217. For a general discussion of Justice Party's ideology and its identity, p. 145-177, p. 338-345. Demirel also argues that Justice Party was an accomodation of the "countryside" and the modernist-secular project of the republic. However, Demirel's interpretation does not surpass beyond repeating the conventional interpretations of "Turkish right" from a left-liberal perspective which had been criticized above.

<sup>171</sup> Leiser, Gary, *A History of Seljuks, İbrahim Kafesoğlu's Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy*, Southern Illinois University Press, 1988, p. 13

<sup>172</sup> op. cit., p. 137

Coğrafya Fakültesi and took over the work of the preceding generation of historians, that of the first generation of Kemalism. This can be interpreted as a success story of Kemalism, recruiting countryside boys and utilize them to convey its message, widen its accessibility and acceptance. Although this message will be modified in certain aspects, the essential continuities will be exposed in the subsequent pages. In that regard, their rural background and their acquiring of academic formations in the prestigious universities of the “center” of the establishment is meaningful. They made a synthesis and accommodation of two different worlds and two different modes of upbringing.

Osman Turan’s main argumentative work is his 2-volume “Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi”. This book is a wonderful synthesis of Turkish-nationalist and Islamic-universalist rhetoric. In the book, Osman Turan put forwards a combined ideological unity of the Turkish national-racial aspirations and Islamic ideal of expansionist zeal (both an expansion outwards, a geographical expansion and an expansion inwards, a further Islamization or reIslamization of the Muslim population in practice and in heart). Osman Turan’s *Türk Cihan Mefkuresi Tarihi* is the grand opus of the ideological manifestation of the Turco-Islamic opinion. It had been published originally in 1969, three years later than İbrahim Kafesoğlu’s similar “*Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Meseleleri* (The Problems of Turkish Nationalism). Kafesoğlu resembles French philosophical current of Catholic personalism of 1930s and finds a similar escapism from the ills of the modern capitalism. He simply mentions of two possible approach in philosophy, that of mechanism and that of vitalism of Henri Bergson<sup>173</sup>. Turkish nationalism is on the camp of vitalism whereas “others” such as Marxism, socialism. For example for Kafesoğlu, the accusation of Turanism is nonsense because it never refers to a territorial conception. It is a spiritual entity<sup>174</sup>. Turkish victories and might can never be delegated to a mere military-political successes. It is more than that. Different than Romans, who had conquered with their swords and exercised bloodbaths, Turks brought peace and order to wherever they had conquered<sup>175</sup>. Kafesoğlu declares that the meaning of Turkish nationalism can be explained with these premises in mind. It is simply a metaphysical concept. Although

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<sup>173</sup> Kafesoğlu, İbrahim, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Meseleleri*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1969, p.31

<sup>174</sup> op. cit, p.47

<sup>175</sup> op. cit., p.65

Kafesoğlu's this manifesto book had a strong impact on the newly emerging nationalist youth and young "intellectuals" of the nationalist tide, he doesn't prove and strengthen his arguments within the historical context and it is by any means a weak book in its argumentation and in its level of persuasion. Osman Turan in his magnum opus will excel in that regard.

Osman Turan's imagination of Turkish history in many respects constitutes an alternative vision vis-a-vis the Köprülü or Kemalist versions. However, one should also point out the similarities and the fact that Osman Turan borrowed and developed many paradigms. First of all, in the book Islam is almost completely a secular object. It is an object of history open for historians to analyze it (of course praise it and display its supremacy over any other world religion). Islam has nothing to do with the celestial concepts and even Islam here is not a belief system. Muslims may be believers but when Islam is taken as a religion, it ceases to be a belief system but a social-political phenomena. Osman Turan in his book constantly keeps saying the "spiritual (manevi) superiority" of Islam especially to contrast it with the spiritual bankruptcy of Christian West and the post-Tanzimat Turkish history but Osman Turan's Islam has nothing to do with the "spiritual" side of Islam. This is the most striking paradox of the argument. As Turan renders Islam an earthly concept, it destroys its religious-spiritual side although this claim as been repeated throughout the book. So, now we are encountering an Islam which is an expansionist zeal both outwards and inwards. However, if Islam in Osman Turan is no more a religious-spiritual concept, what is it then ?

For Turan, Islam is the prevalence of justice in this world. Islam brings justice where it conquers. Islam's arrival also brings harmony, peace and a spiritual promotion but the main outcome of Islam's expansion is his justness. The local oppressions, suppressions and all the cruelties have been wiped out as Islam's just rule has been established. Osman Turan has no suspicion if this may not be so. This is especially because the "real Islam" (different from real existing Islam ) is Hulefat-ül Raşidun (Rightly Guided Caliphs) With Umayyads, earthly ambitions and corruption had infiltrated the political body of Islam but this somehow does not destroy the real core of Islam which is differentiable from the political injustices and oppressions. This is actually the vital contribution of Islam. With Turks, Islam has not only stagnated but also lost its innocence. The essential Islam had been destroyed by the political unIslamic struggles before the advent of Turks. The second caliph Omar's "justness" is the theme that had been used by all variants of Islamic rhetoric. Omar's legal pragmatic

practices which can not be reached by using Quaran and Islamic sources had been argued as the openness of “real Islam” for secularism. For others, Omar symbolized the ideal Islamic ruler. This is an important point because for many, devotion and piety are not easy to be reconciled with political rule and any kind of political involvement. Omar provides a good example for those who claim that piety can be kept and even strengthened with ruling practice. Rulers may be tyrants but they may be also best Muslims who can give justice to all his subjects. Osman Turan’s vision of Islam is this kind of secular-just rulership. Of course Turan never openly admits the secular characteristics of his vision of Islam. His explicit position is on the contrary, the hegemony of the spiritual in Islamic administration. But his “spirituality” has turned to be a tool to blame the others, that is unspiritual political entities of secular and modern world. And of course all his spirituality requires the political iron hand otherwise a spiritual perfection can not be sustained, not against unislamic infields but especially against Islamic foes.

Osman Turan’s secularizing of Islam helps him to express his nationalism overtly without feeling any kind of shyness. Critics have always overemphasized his Islamic side of his historical interpretation and deemphasized the strong nationalist-racial aspect. If we ask the question if Turan is actually promoting one of the two parts of his “synthése” and abusing the other, a conventional (left-leaning) critic of “Turco-Islamic synthesis” would claim that nationalist rhetoric is only on the surface and Turks had been degraded to mere mercenaries of soldiers. But I would argue the other way around. For Turan, there could be no Islam if Turks did not only save but also revitalize Islam. His approach to Arabs is reminiscent of the approach of high Kemalism to Arabs. He takes over the classical Persian theme of Arabs as the master and the non-Arabs as the subjects (mevali). “Arabs were using Islam for their own benefit (kendi hesaplarına göre)<sup>176</sup>” For Osman Turan, Arabs could no longer be the force that will glorify and promote Islam. That may be due to their “desert climate<sup>177</sup>”. We see that he completely embraces the Köprülü theme of Turkish Islam versus Arab (or non-Turkish) Islam. Whereas Turkish Islam is a culture of liveliness and activism full of ecstasy (vecd) in tariqahs, Arab Islam of the “desert conditions” is dull and dogmatic. He repeats one of

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<sup>176</sup> Turan, Osman, *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi*, Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1969, vol I, p.12

<sup>177</sup> op. cit., p.7

the most-exploited themes of Kemalism, Wahhabism of Arab Islam. He is not hesitant to contempt for this dogmatic and wrong interpretation of Islam<sup>178</sup>. His approach to Persians is not any better. Turan claims that using Firdevsi's well-known contempt for anything Arab and Arabic-Islamic, their İslamism was only on the surface. They were not to serve Islam full-heartily<sup>179</sup>. Unsurprisingly, Iranians had established a lot of heretic *sectes* in Islam<sup>180</sup>. It is noteworthy that Turan simply ignores the Turkish heretic *sectes* of centuries. Furthermore, Osman Turan establishes Ottomans in the course of Turkish history and declares Ottomans as the greatest opus of Turks in the history. First he claims that Ottoman political entity is equal to the Roman Empire and Caliphate and goes on declaring Ottomans "actually surpassing these political bodies" with its success to establish a harmonious political, social and economical atmosphere and never looting like Romans but bringing prosperity to wherever they take over<sup>181</sup>.

Another legacy Turan took from Kemalist-Köprülü heritage is his "positivism". Actually the usage in Turan is a marriage of Islamic scientificism and western positivist faith in science. In 1930s, Turkish scholars and quasi-scholars are committed to "refute scientifically" what is anathema to them and "prove scientifically" what should be right for them. There is the complete faith in scientific exposés. Osman Turan uses the word "ilim" instead of "bilim". Whereas bilim is a neologism of the Kemalist lexicon, ilim is an Arab word for "science" which traditionally imply more "religious sciences" rather than "natural sciences". This is natural because in medieval times, religious sciences were of more interest than natural sciences. Although in medieval usage ilim implies both of religious and non-religious sciences, with the introduction of modern sciences, ilim is getting more and exclusively associated with "religious sciences". And as 19<sup>th</sup> century positivism has a very strong commitment to natural sciences, medieval world has the same faith in "ilim" as Islamic scholars have the complete capacity and knowledge to explain everything. This is no different than the positivist creed of 19<sup>th</sup> century French thought and the Kemalist takeover. Osman Turan applies the Islamic authoritative "ilim" and adapts it to the "earthly" questions as Kemalist quasi-historical

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<sup>178</sup> op. cit., p.7

<sup>179</sup> op. cit., p.9

<sup>180</sup> op. cit., p.7

<sup>181</sup> op. cit., p.6

methodology expresses its with complete confidence to reach conclusions<sup>182</sup>. Osman Turan refutes Marxism on the grounds that Marxism is not sufficiently scientific and does not rely on scientific criticism (ilmi tenkidlere)<sup>183</sup>. Turan also says that the western word for history (history, historia, storia) originates from the Greek word historia originally meaning “story” whereas the Arabic-Islamic word “tarih” originates from “record” and reflects the objectivist methodology embedded in Islamic “tarih”<sup>184</sup>. Using this etymological method, Osman Turan concludes that Western historiography is not scientific enough. Whereas “other” expansionisms lie on groundless fantasies and dreams like the Orthodox zeal of Byzantine or the western resistance in Central Europe against Ottomans, Islamic expansion is not a product of adventurism and dreaming but based on objective reasoning. It is as if historical determinism lies on the side of Islam and Islam and Turks on the horseback of history to use the Hegelian metaphor. This is again displayed explicitly by Osman Turan by using his scientific methodology and scientific interpretation. In short, Osman Turan has a strikingly positivistic language, sort of combination of authentic Islamic “faith in authoritative ilim” and Kemalist positivism. Osman Turan continuing the Kemalist tradition likes to cite western historians to support his views here and there as like citing a westerner is an indisputable source. This appeal to authority using western sources when it works on behalf of the suggested claim is a very typical trait of Turkish historiography ever since accompanied by complete silence for other alternative suggestions raised by “western” historians. This looks more understandable in the Kemalist works who aspire to the western science and methodology but looks less so in the Turco-Islamist works where they try to establish their study completely apart from the western works but feel to cite western sources to strengthen their positions reluctantly confessing their recognition of the supremacy of the western academic standards.

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<sup>182</sup> One should note the fetishism of “natural sciences” and “engineering” by the Islamists of Turkey who will embark on the “ağır sanayii hamlesi” in 1970s with a cadre of “ITU engineers”. The religious and spiritual “ilim” supposed to be “strengthened” with earthly “ilim” as well. Although very marginally discusses the “engineering Islamists” see, Göle, Nilüfer, *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji*, Metis Yayınları, 1998

<sup>183</sup> op. cit., p.10

<sup>184</sup> op. cit., p.1

Osman Turan and his comrades' "imagination" or "reconstruction" had three dimensions, the national dimension (Turkishness), religiosity and the state element as the historical representation of Islamo-Turkishness. Kemalism had also employs these three categories but it had an alternative set of priority. One crucial aspect of "mature" Kemalism is the state aspect and here we can establish the link between Kemalism in progress and Kemalism in transformation. As Kemalism had utilized predominantly other auxiliaries to erect its edifice, Turco-Islamists benefited chiefly from Islam. This aspect should not be overestimated. Islam had turned into an exploitative object to utilize for the cause of national aspiration.

A criticism of state-centrism in Kemalist historiography can be found in numerous works of Halil Berktaş. Ömer Lütfi Barkan (1902-1979) had been saluted as the founding of scientific documentary historiographical craft in Turkey and noted for his loyalty to documentary evidence instead of studying with given axioms and use documents to "prove" pre-determined axioms. Berktaş challenges this established claim. Instead, Berktaş finds not only an obsession of written documents in Barkan but also a deliberate (and sinister) manipulation of "what really happened". Firstly, official documents reflect only how the political authority sees things. Secondly, the documents tells us how things should have happened but does not tell us how things really were running. The idealized picture of the classical Ottoman social-economical order is the successful control of the "state" (a misnomer for the pre-modern polities) of the economy. The deal between the subjects and the "state" is that the subjects will loyally pay their taxes and in return Ottoman central state will provide them justice and security. These two assumptions (especially of course the second one) is strongly present in the official documents (firmans, correspondences as reflected in *mühimme defterleri*, *vakıfnames*, *kanuns*) and the historian will easily come to the conclusion unless he decides to read the documents critically with an ideological deconstruction. Then he will declare that the strong central state ( a weak, feudal, fragmented "polity" "similar to medieval Europe" is anathema to Barkan and Barkan's vision of Turkish uniqueness in history) organize a harmonious society where there is the very distinct two estates, that of askeri and reaya, but without a class struggle, class enmity or a social unrest unlike the modern European societies. The Kemalist corporatism had to lean to the past. The conventional sharp separation of askeri and reaya classes have been under attack in Ottoman historiography in recent years. Although this separation was a solid one, the mobility was more fluent that it had been assumed earlier. This sharp



interpretation was due to a la Barkan legalistic and uncritical reading of primary sources with his state-centrism in mind. This legalistic reading also enabled Barkan and his alike to establish the "myth of the state" omnipotent and benevolent. "...Barkan posited the state as a datum in itself, as the prime mover of history and society, as the creator of "particular historical circumstances"<sup>185</sup> Whereas the Turkish Historical Thesis reflect an ambiguous early stage of Kemalist historiography, Barkan who had been a loyal "one-party RPP sympathizer all his life"<sup>186</sup> constitutes the consolidated Kemalist perspective. He was the exampla of high tide of Kemalism when Kemalism could stand alone. Berktaý speaks of the Thermidorian phase of Kemalism, the inevitable reactionary phase of the Turkish bourgeois revolution in a schematized Marxist fashion which implies that it had (or had to have) a "progressive" earlier stage, although he also speaks of the "consolidation of the state add post-1929 dirigism in a mixed economy open the way to a "reconciliation with the despised Ottoman past"<sup>187</sup>. I would argue that although the winds blowing to the right are a factor, the concentration of the state power was a secular orientation from late 19<sup>th</sup> century in the Turkish-Ottoman political development. The only problem was to subjugate the vormarz elements which had been achieved by early 1930s.

Berktaý's criticism touches also Halil Inalcık, the doyen of Ottoman history. Berktaý's striking remark is that in Inalcık's book of "The Ottoman Empire: Classical Age 1300-1600"<sup>188</sup>, the chapter on "reaya" is under the part on "State", not on "Society and Economy"<sup>189</sup>. It is interesting to see how Inalcık conceptualizes the "reaya" in his mind. Reaya has no existence of its own except being an economical factor serving the state. Reaya is not a social phenomenon but an economical one and can not be imagined out of the "realm of the state". Ottoman history can not be imagined in social and economical realms (Inalcık's chapter on "society and economy" includes city life and

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<sup>185</sup> Berktaý, Halil, "The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography", in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, edited by Halil Berktaý and Suraiya Faroqhi, Frank Cass, 1992, p.153

<sup>186</sup> Berktaý, Halil, "Batı ve Türk Ortaçağ tarihçiliğinin Köylülüğe Bakışının Temel Deformasyonu", in *Toplum ve Bilim*, winter-spring 1990, p.75

<sup>187</sup> Berktaý, Halil, *The Search For.....*, p.146

<sup>188</sup> Inalcık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire: Classical Age 1300-1600*, Phoneix Press, 1994

<sup>189</sup> Berktaý, Halil, *Batı ve Türk.....*, p.77

international trade) independent from the existence of the state. Peasants are legal entities that one can see in Ottoman official documents. They live only in the documents as facts and figures. The state-centrism and state-fetishism makes its way in Turkish historiography to Inalcık via Barkan<sup>190</sup>.

Barkan who is a Kemalist and a state-nationalist constitutes a perfect connection between Kemalism and so-called Turco-Islamism of 1970s and beyond. Kemalism may be defined as the "effort to establish a modern nation-state to compete in the imperial world" ("age of empire" between 1870-1914 in Hobsbawm as Kemalism is the ultimate stage of the Young Turk thought developed and rose in this "age of empire") and a cult of the state is urgent to survive in such an imperial world. Those who could not establish modern-states compatible in the imperial-capitalist world had disappeared. India had been swallowed by English. Persia and China had been permitted a formal independence but humiliated and wrecked economically. More backward polities had been all annihilated. Ottomans felt that a similar tragic fate is approaching for themselves. The idea and cult of "strong state" emerged not only in terms of armpower and high capacity of employing force internally or externally but an ability to infiltrate to the minds of its manpower. This process is called nationalism and in this particular atmosphere, any nationalism unless it is subservient to the state is perceived equally harmful as alien ideologies such as socialism and liberalism. This Kemalist project had kept its grip and 1970s demonstrated another variant of "Kemalism". The state this time had been "guarded and protected" by an accommodating ideology addressing the more conservative consciousness of the new masses. But the essence had been kept; the cult of the state. Barkan's strong central state had been again suggested by İbrahim

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<sup>190</sup> Berktaş extends his criticism of Turkish historiography to pre-Ottoman Turkish historiography in another work of his. He shows how the state had not been defined operatively in the Turkish historiography. This avoids any further development because we have to be aware of the limits and meanings of the "state" in a pre-modern world. Without a proper definition of state in its political and economical aspects, one can hardly comprehend the pre-modern world of Turks and others. Berktaş tries to adapt a Marxian-Engelsian framework to early Turkish history and he sees Seljuks of Rum as the mature feudalism equivalent of Carolingian and Merovingian (and maybe Capet) kingdoms in the West. ("Osmanlı Devleti'nin Yükselişine Kadar Türkler'in İktisadi ve Toplumsal Tarihi", in *Türkiye Tarihi*, Cem Yayınevi, 1995, vol I, edited by Akşin, Sina, p. 132) This work although laudable in its effort to speak a universal language and apply contemporary western economical historical theory (although in a too Marxian fashion) to Turkish history does not consider and treat the local factual and historical background of Islamic lands. However, it proposes an inspiring framework.

Kafesoğlu, Osman Turan, Altan Deliorman and others. No history can be understood unless one conceives the "ideal of the state" thus the "state" in Turkish nationalist historiography whether it be Kemalist or not had been very important and significant.

In short, Osman Turan does not overturn the republican historiography but applies a different variant within the republican paradigm. He is trying to found another linear course of Turkish history. He also sees a pre-determinism of Turkish advent to Anatolia as if the ethnic Turks were pouring into Anatolia within an east-west axis. This "determinism" of course denies or belittles the presence of non-western Turks (or more specifically non-Oghuzs) who had never intended to migrate to the "destined west" and stayed in the ancestral lands. A part of the "Turks" had been loaded with a historical mission whereas the "others" had lacked such a grace and sidelined to the margins of history. This is to do with the Anatolianness character of the contemporary Turks of Turkey which had to be admitted willingly or reluctantly. The question what about the others is in limbo especially given that Turks of Central Asia are in captivity in Soviet Union in a world of Cold War. Vague references to them is a general trend in this period. Kafesoğlu argues that Turan is an ideal concept rather than a territorial phenomena. (see above)

Osman Turan's novelty is his effort to put Islamic element into Turkish history. But the Islam Turks professed is a very Turkish Islam, a view not so different than the view Köprülü had held. The difference is that for Köprülü, Islamic element could be assimilated into a much wider Turkish secular culture and could be interpreted as a folkloric element. Osman Turan wanted to enlarge the legitimate space reserved to Islam. However, Islam is still subservient to Turkishness. Very obviously, this contradicts with the universalistic message of Islam. Osman Turan is well aware of that and feel reluctant to write that "Islam is not against nationalisms". It is a question if Osman Turan would praise other Islamic nations for their contributions to Islam or for their "national characteristics". This is hardly possible given that he has no respect to Arabs although the prophet was himself an Arab and Arabs were the spreaders of Islam for the earliest centuries. Islam's first appearance in Arabia is for Osman Turan due to their immense immorality. There is nothing for Arabs to be proud of in that. And it is never important where something was initiated. The relay has been taken by Turks and from then on Arabs were doomed to the periphery of Islam. This also can be explained by the will of God. God had entrusted Islam to the Turks in the most critical phase. Given all, Osman Turan's nationalism is superior to his religious convictions. His denial

of the universalism of Islam is overt. He only brings back the Islamic element to Turkish nationalism which was never completely absent but relegated to a secondary role by the radical wing of Turkish modernization. In several ways, the republican legacy had been preserved<sup>191</sup>.

Nationalism is not a black box and it does not mean anything by itself. Nationalism is an empty text to be written on. It doesn't signify anything by itself employing a Saussurian language. As French nationalism does not mean anything by itself but can be interpreted by left and right alike, the same is true for "Turkish nationalism". It does not say anything by itself. Nationalism since early Tanzimat with different emphasis had dominated the political discourse in Turkey. Some strands of Turkish nationalism had been interested in a "imagined future civilization", some find the utopia in the past, some had a more ethnic concept, some had a more inclusive understanding and some reserved some presence of religion within the nationalist discourse. After all, transition from religionist discourse to a national discourse was never easy and straightforward. The Islamic dimension was always present even in the most radical secular variants. But doesn't matter to what extent Islamic dimension had been preserved, a certain modernist tract had been developed since 19<sup>th</sup> century and in this regard Turkish nationalism had also a general history and Turco-Islamism was not out of this "general history". The struggle is not about the nationalist discourse but nationalism is a manipulative tool which is employed to hegemonize the particular minority discourse to the general audience. A very important mechanism which nationalism is extremely helpful is presenting a general historical imagination of course of Turkish history. Imagination of a certain Turkish history paraphrasing De Gaulle is a key item in this regard. Now we will see how Seljuks of Rum was vital in this exploitative venture.

I will deal extensively on Osman Turan's presentation of Seljuks of Rum. But before I begin exploring on Osman Turan, I will discuss briefly relevant articles of Ali Sevim and Faruk Sümer. The studies are from 1960s to early 1970s, parallel with Osman Turan's two books on Seljuks of Rum. The approaches of these two authors imply a certain "imagination" but before Osman Turan revolutionized approaching to Seljuks of Rum, this approach is lacking a general perspective and position. Osman Turan's revolutionizing Seljuks of Rum historiography goes parallel with his

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<sup>191</sup> Copeaux speaks of the gradual emerging synthesis of Kemalism and Turco-Islamism beginning by late 1980s. "From then on" writes Copeaux "we can speak of a Kemalist-Islamist synthesis" (Türk Tarih Tezinden.....p.150)

revolutionizing the “general Turkish history”. So does Ibrahim Kafesoğlu’s “perspective”.

Osman Turan’s argumentative and comprehensive studies of Seljuks of Rum are major contribution to the field, especially within the Turkish historical community. Earlier studies were interested in collecting events and details as much as possible. Almost an encyclopedist motivation with extreme carefulness not to miss any detail regardless of how small and irrelevant it is can be observable. This carefulness derives from a deep respect to the ancestors and render them as accessible as possible by the new generations of Turks. Two industrious historians worth mentioning are Ali Sevim and Faruk Sümer. Ali Sevim’s interests covers the Seljuk begs and their deeds in the very early "conquest" of Anatolia and also Syria. Faruk Sümer is the most authoritative name in the study of Turcomans. He also had published on the Seljuk begs. Both authors are first of all interested in "activities and events" of the time. They do not present us a comprehensive narrative of the time. Osman Turan will rise on this encyclopedic efforts. Although both authors share the tendency to conceptualize in terms of Turkishness and Islam and imagine an all-inclusive unity of Turks, they do not prioritize this. Such universalization can be deduced from their "remarks" summarizing the foundations.

Faruk Sümer’s study, "Malazgirt Savaşına Katılan Türk Beyleri"<sup>192</sup> aims to discuss the commanders of Alpaslan in the Battle of Manzikert. He first reevaluates Mükrimin Halil Yinanç’ 1944 study and corrects some mistakes Yinanç had committed in the light of new and undeciphered sources. After a laborious activity, he concludes that due to the lack of authoritative and contemporary sources, we are in no position to determine the participating begs precisely. However, Sümer relying on the sources tries his best and enunciates the begs whom we can know for sure that had participated in the war and enunciates certain other begs whom may have participated in the war or not<sup>193</sup>. However, the curious question remains unanswered. What exactly he means by "beg" ? He never gives us an operative definition or even tries to define partially what these begs are exactly. We suspect that they had their own nomadic followers and serving the "central army" of Alpaslan but there is no effort to define what he understands from a

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<sup>192</sup> Sümer, Faruk, “Malazgird Savaşı’na Katılan Türk Beyleri”, *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 4, Türk Tarih Kurumu Matbaası, 1975, p.197-207

<sup>193</sup> op. cit. , p.207

"beg" is absent.

The same absence of operative definitions, especially who are these begs are missing in his two other similar studies. He discusses Saltuk and other begs conquering Erzurum and neighborhood. In another study, "Anadolu'da Moğollar" the same attitude had been repeated<sup>194</sup>.

Ali Sevim published three consecutive articles in *Belleten* back in 1962 on Artuk Bey and two sons of Artuk Bey, Artukoğlu Sökmen and Artukoğlu İlğazi<sup>195</sup>. This time we learn that Artukoğlu Sökmen had founded Principality of Artuk (or Tabaka-i Sökmeniyye) after he conquers Hisn-ı Keyfa in 1102.<sup>196</sup> In the article on Sökmen's brother İlğazi, we learn that he had founded the Mardin branch of Principality of Artuk (tabaka-i İlğaziyye) in 1106. Curiously, İlğazi "conquers" Mardin from Şems, the castle commander in the service of Ibrahim, the son of Sökmen. However, in both case no definition of "what founding a principality" does men is given. What are the relations of "begs" ? We do not know.

Ali Sevim will expand his studies on these alleged "commanders" of Alparslan. In his book "Ünlü Selçuklu Komutanları" investigating Afşin, Atsız, Artuk and Aksungur, there is the lack of any comprehensive definition of the "commanders". We only meet them with their virulent qualities; "courageous and militarily capable<sup>197</sup>". The book is a narrative of the brave raids and conquests of these "commanders" through Anatolia. However, in this book dated from 1990 displays a remarkable difference from his earlier studies from 1960s. There is a process of Osman Turanization of Ali Sevim as he speaks of a manifest destiny of Turks. We learn in the book that a kurultay had been gathered after the victory of Dandanakan in the year 1040 and the kurultay had decided upon realizing to achieve the world domination of Turks. Manzikert and all others had been an outcome of this "master plan". Most significantly, the independent commanders

<sup>194</sup> Sümer, Faruk, "Anadolu'da Moğollar", *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 1, Türk Tarih Kurumu Matbaası, 1970, p. 1-147, Sümer, Faruk, "Saltuklular", *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 2, Türk Tarih Kurumu Matbaası, 1971, p.391-433

<sup>195</sup> Sevim, Ali, "Artukluların soyu ve Artuk Bey'in siyasi faaliyetleri", *Belleten*, vol. XXVI, January 1962, no. 101, p. 121-146, Sevim, Ali, "Artukoğlu Sökmen'in siyasi faaliyetleri", *Belleten*, XXVI, July 1962, no.103, p. 521-528, Sevim, Ali, "Artukoğlu İlğazi", *Belleten*, XXVI, October 1962, no. 104, p. 649-692

<sup>196</sup> Sevim, Ali, Artukoğlu Sökmen'in.....p. 511-2

<sup>197</sup> Sevim, Ali, *Ünlü Selçuklu Komutanları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990, p. VIII

had been much more incorporated into the “state apparatus”. For example, after Alpaslan conquers Ani in 1064, he carries out several appointments<sup>198</sup>. The commanders had also been appointed. The Seljuks had been reconstructed as a central state. The central state had superseded the independent warrior-gazis.

Osman Turan will partially answer these questions. He will draw a general picture and loads these random warfare a special meaning, that of the instinctive mission of Turks to spread the word of Islam and pride of Turks. It should also worth mentioning that before Osman Turan, the role of Islam is very slight and insignificant. This is even true when Sümer and Sevim discusses the warfare waged against Crusaders by the Seljuk begs. Waging war against Crusaders was a necessity rather than the expression of a missionary zeal.

Now, we can turn to Osman Turan and his “Seljuks of Rum”. The early period of Seljuks of Rum is a time of constant fighting. From Manzikert on, Turkish hordes are aspiring to move forward in Anatolia. Early successful victories are followed by some setbacks as Byzantine respond with counterattacks with immense cruelty as “(they) were so violent against Turks that they drop babies in their cradles in hot crucibles<sup>199</sup>”. Finally, the situation has been stabilized in favorable conditions for Turkish hordes. All this process regarding the earliest fifty years from Manzikert on can be summarized in one sentence that “the presence of Turkishness in Anatolia had been consolidated” in Osman Turan’s account. This early phase has been followed by a time of construction, building of the Turkish civilization after the military period. The early military activities were not only against the Byzantines but also it involved “domestic warfare” among Turkish warlords. The death of Süleymanşah in 1086 had caused an instability in the political leadership. The Rum of Seljuks lacked a leader for a time. This not only shook the political unity but give way to the rise of Danishmenids<sup>200</sup>. Afterwards, the post had been taken by Kılıçarslan, the young son of Süleymanşah who had turned to east to fight with Crusaders after clearing the Byzantine danger in the west. However after the departure of Kılıçarslan from west, Byzantines retook İznik. The “capital” had to be transferred to Konya. Although the wars of Kılıçarslan were

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<sup>198</sup> op. cit., p. 8

<sup>199</sup> Turan, Osman, *Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk İslam Medeniyeti*, Dergah Yayınları, 1980, p.292

<sup>200</sup> op. cit., p.289

partially successful, the period after his death brought a further decline to the Seljuks of Rum. This is again due to the lack of a stable leadership problem. This time is named as “time of crisis” by Osman Turan. This unpleasant stage has been ended by Sultan Mesud. With Sultan Mesud we can speak of a peaceful and stable era.

The account of Osman Turan had been summarized as brief as possible. The problem here is that although Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman is a member of the imperial family, his independent military activities do not deserve special attention unless one pursue a retrospective approach and write history from forwards to backwards. Süleyman is one of the many military entrepreneurs who want to maximize his strength. In the year 1086, the dominion of Süleyman theoretically inherited by his captive son Kılıçarslan is confided to the neighborhood of İznik and this territory will also be lost to Byzantines, not by Kılıçarslan but his independently moving commander Eb’ul Kasım who commanded his hordes for six years between 1086 and 1092 when Kılıçarslan was set free in Isfahan . At this time, we can not speak of any Seljuks of Rum. In this year, other Turkish commanders are in action conquering lands for themselves. One of the most notorious commanders was Çaka Bey who is performing sea-gazas in the neighborhood of Smyrna. Anatolia was partitioned among several Turcoman warlords of which Danishmenids looks the strongest.

However, we have to go back a little. We know that the consecrated founder of Seljuks of Rum, Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman is the son of Kutalmış, grandson of Arslan Yabgu who is one of four recorded sons of Selçuk, the ancestor of the imperial Selçuk family. However, not dissimilar to the Turkish tradition before, he is an outcast in the family and not in good terms with the effective ruling branch of the family. His father was probably killed by Alpaslan and again it is assumed that four sons of Kutalmış were in scrutiny in Middle Euphrates Basin<sup>201</sup>. At the hearing of Alpaslan’s death they attempted to flee. Although this attempt was averted by Melikşah, they were dispensed a certain territory in Central Anatolian plateau to render them harmless and distant from

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<sup>201</sup> Interestingly, the myth of Seljuks of Rum founded by a branch of the Seljuk family as an extension of the monolithic Seljukid power is not a make-up of modern Turkish historians as it is the same case with most of the Ottoman “myths”. It had its “authentic” origins. Bosworth writes that “pace the view of some modern Turkish nationalist historians, these activities (post-Manzikert advances-DG-) seem to be purely acts of individual enterprises although later official historiography of 7<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> century promoted by Saldjukids of Rum asserted that the Great Saldjuk sultan Malik Shah had, on his accession, personally bestowed the land of Rum on his cousins, the sons of Kutalmish. (Bosworth, C.E., IE, “Saldjuks”, E.J.Brill, 1986, vol VIII, p. 948)



the core areas of the imperial dynasty<sup>202</sup>. These brothers managed to gather Turcoman hordes and clashed with another Turcoman beg, Atsız. Atsız defeated sons of Kutalmış and sent two of the brothers to Melikşah as gift. By 1075, the remaining two brothers, Süleyman and Mansur see Great Seljuks as enemies and Great Seljuks perceive them as a threat<sup>203</sup>. Here the domestic contention among Byzantines commanders let them to emerge as a strong force. They took sides in these clashes. When commander Nikeforos Botaniates rebelled against the emperor Mihail VII in 1078, Mihail urged for the military support of the sons of Kutalmış. Although they defeated rebel Botaniates in the name of the emperor, they had settled an agreement with the rebel commander and supported him to assume the throne. Then they took an oath to Botaniates and they continued to serve to him as mercenaries as like against another rebel commander Bryennios in Europe. Melikşah decided to take firm action and exterminate brothers forever. The accounts tell us that Mansur had been killed but Süleyman managed to survive. From then on, Süleyman decided to take action in eastern parts of Anatolia for two reasons; not to lose keeping in touch with Turcomans who are his stock to recruit soldiers and to ease his Byzantine ally while remarching to the east. Süleyman waged war in Cilicia against Armenians, took Antioch and fought with the Turcoman begs of Syria. He died while he was struggling in Syrian politics of the Turcoman begs. This is more or less the account of Claude Cahen elaborating Byzantine, Arabic and Syriac sources. The clash between Byzantium and “Seljuks of Rum” broke out due to Ebu’l Kasım’s breaking of the truce among two parties. Eb’ul Kasım has to pay for his decision severely. Eb’ul Kasım also had to face the commanders of Great Seljuks (Porsuk in 1090, Bozan in 1092) and killed by Bozan when he was desperate to ask for a pardon from the great sultan Melikşah. When young Kılıçarslan make his way to Anatolia in 1092, he renews the truce with Byzantium and turns to the east. His battles against the other contesting Turcoman warlords will continue until his tragic death in river Habur in 1107. His “eastern policy” was followed by his successors before slow but persistent victories enabled the polity to take the political control of Muslim Anatolia to the disadvantage of other Turcoman warlords.

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<sup>202</sup> Cahen, Claude, *Osmanlılardan Önce Anadolu*, Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p.8

<sup>203</sup> Cahen, op. cit., p. 9

It is strange that Byzantines could manage to avoid further defeats on the hands of marching Turcomans. Why the polity of Süleyman and his breeds did not pursue a western drive is worth analyzing. One explanation could be due to their supremacy vis-a-vis the Turcoman hordes. However, it is likely that it is the other way around. Byzantine could avert further attacks not due to its strength but its evident weakness. The Turcoman warlords saw each other as evident and ambitious enemies. Byzantine, now only in defense was masterfully able in manipulating alliances did not pose any urgent military threat. The question who will dominate the Anatolian plateau could be concluded with was between these warlords. Furthermore, there had the ideological part of the matter. Byzantium was out of a steppe world where the question of authority can be resolved with machtpolitik, who will bow to whom and who will establish his complete authority over others. All the warlords were posing such an ideological threat. The existence of any other Turcoman beg means an assured potential threat for the future. Byzantium could be negotiated but no such negotiation or compromise could be possible in the steppe world. Besides these, the spiritual superiority of the Byzantine emperor should be added. The military humiliation of Byzantium was at stake but the imperial glamour was also there.

Of course the reality that the deadliest enemies of Turks were themselves, not the infidels does not support a nationalist axiom of "national solidarity and will". This can not be simply analyzed with regard to center-periphery analysis but the core of the struggle is in the frontiers that supposed to be the spiritual flagship of a national-religious struggle. Reduction of this clash to simply a center-periphery struggle will not bother a Kemalist argument where as we saw in the relevant chapter the historian was on the side of the fierce peripheral force carrying the authentic virtues against the corrupted and absolutist center. As we will see, interestingly Osman Turan will also feel to side with the "peripheral force" contrasting with his earlier enthusiasm for an ecumenical central guidance from one center. But the violent and constant wars among "virtuous, uncorrupted frontier lords" is harder to reconcile.

Osman Turan also presents the timeline of these moving military activities. However he has a different interpretation. First of all, he has a tendency to see the relations of Byzantines and Turcomans as equals and the support of Süleyman is an ally, not as mercenaries. It is interesting to note that in the Aşıkpaşazade account being the most authentic source on the origins of Ottomans has a similar record writing

“Kara Hisarun vilayetinde Germiyan babası Alişar var idi. Ve hem çavdar derler idi bir Tatar dahi var idi. Bu Kara Hisar vilayetiyle Bilecük vilayetini gah gah gelürler, ururlar, üşendirürler idi. Bu Er Dunrıl Gazi gelmesiyle ol kafirlerün vilayeti emin olmuş idi ol Tatarlardan.....hemin ki Osman Gazi atasunun yerine durdı, yakın konşı kafirleriyle gayet müdaraya başladı. Germiyanogluyilen adavate başladı<sup>204</sup>.”

This again implies that the tribe of “Er Dunrıl” moved from “Engürü” to serve the Byzantine local warlords as mercenaries against the Turcoman raids. It is interesting to catch a similar pattern in these two incidents and it is even much more curious to observe a silence on behalf of historians (especially for the case of Ottomans) to disregard such dangerous “possibilities” destroying certain “mythologies”. It is not necessarily true that early Ottomans had served as mercenaries of a local Byzantine lord. However, this kind of presenting your military service for a satisfactory payroll is an indispensable surviving strategy in the militarized world of the warrior nomads. Such surviving strategies of a certain mode of livelihood had been hindered for the sake of national loyalties and belongings. Second strategy Osman Turan employs is that the alliance of Süleyman is to be seen as a strategy to expand benefiting and exploiting the internal strifes of Byzantines. He writes that “Turks could expand their outreach to Marmara, to Black Sea, to Mediterranean exploiting the internal struggles of Byzantines<sup>205</sup>.”

Although Osman Turan is avoiding any indication that Süleyman could have any other intention than that of expanding Turkishness (the dimension of Islam is missing here, probably Osman Turan is conceding to the superficial Islam of these Turcoman hordes), he is not that firm in ambitions of Melikşah. Melikşah’s correspondences with Constantinople to form an alliance against Süleyman is analyzed in pure cold-blooded strategical terms. As Thucydides would say for the “growth of Athenian power and fear which this caused in Sparta<sup>206</sup>” the rise of a rival Turcoman powerhouse had forced Melikşah to negotiate an alliance with Byzantine. Here we observe a sympathy of Osman Turan towards Seljuks of Rum. Why is this so ? Probably because the

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<sup>204</sup> Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, edited by Nihal Atsız, Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947, p.93-4

<sup>205</sup> Turan, *Osman, Selçukiler Zamanında.....*, p.55-6

<sup>206</sup> Thucydides, *Peloponnesian Wars*, Penguin Books, 1972, p.49

Anatolian Turks can claim a direct lineage from Seljuks of Rum. However this contradicts with his glorifying of Great Seljuks as their deed of reenergizing Islam. This should not be taken as an open contradiction because such reelpolitik plays are a part of history and no historian, even a zealot historian can not completely reject it. Osman Turan is of course very well-read in the Islamic primary sources of the time and would not simply ignore them. However, this is more or less his attitude towards Seljuks of Rum in his denial that they served loyally for the Byzantine militia, for pure reelpolitik reasons, simply to survive. Here we have to assume his sympathy and bias towards "Anatolian Turkishness". A not so different interpretation may be improvised parallel to the argument developed early in the chapter; that is the construction of course of Turkish history in constant move in a deterministic fashion. As the Great Seljuks were the rising power enlightening the Islamic world and functioning to enable Turks to move peacefully and in huge numbers from Transoxania to Anatolia, as this mission had been accomplished successfully, their mission had ended and doomed to fail. This resembles the idea of Marx that while a certain class assumes a progressive role, after it had contributed to the progress of history, it becomes an obstacle in front of "progress" as like the course of bourgeois from being progressive in 1789 to being "reactionary" by 1848. This may be attributed to Great Seljuks in the vision of Osman Turan. At least we can say that on the stage the lights are no longer reflected to Great Seljuks as we meet the new and fresh actor in his debut and new center of interest. Somehow they deserve this "fall".

The heroic narrations regarding Manzikert are by no means mere fabrications of the modern mind. Whereas an approach sees nationalism and national constructivism a make-up of the modern intellectuals ex nihilo, others disagreed claiming that the modern discourses had to lean on age-old myths. Two canonical studies of nationalism within the modernist approach are Hobsbawm's<sup>207</sup> and Benedict Anderson's<sup>208</sup> studies. They treat nationalism as modern constructs. Anderson comes closer to the emphatic approach more than Hobsbawm and much more than Gellner<sup>209</sup> who simply reduce nationalism to an ideology of modernization. But for him, nation is a creation, albeit a

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<sup>207</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, 1992

<sup>208</sup> Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, 1991

<sup>209</sup> Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalisms*, Blackwell, 1984

very sophisticated one. And in Anderson, there is the activist rising intellectuals who have the luxury to use the Habermasian public space and print capitalism to construct a unifying solidaristic theme which turns to be a nation. However, this is a one-sided process. The past is simply a tool for these rising intellectuals to be manipulated. But the past can manipulate intellectuals as well as for example in the case of Zionism. The fin-de-siecle Jewish nationalist could not freely turn Jewish traditionalism to a civil nationalism like French nationalism although Zionist intellectuals had in mind had such a program. The Jewish past with the myths of exodus, exile could not be manipulated to form a civic nationalism. It had its own agenda. Myths had their autonomy. This does not crudely mean that national myths have their own reality. This means is that myths has their pre-modern constructions before the encounter of modernity. This is a never ending process although it gained an immense pace with modernity and its providing of communication and transportation facilities as well as rise of nation states with their mechanism of control and manipulation. But these may not suffice. The nation-states need good and reliable allies. These are the “persuasive” myths against complete made-up myths. This was the superiority of the conservative nationalists against the Kemalist nationalism<sup>210</sup>. Kemalist myths were less persuasive than the Turco-Islamists ones although they were equally fake. Unless it does not lean on something convincing and subtle, this could not convert enough people to render this national mythic construction universalized. The Turco-Islamists did simply turn back to the primary source's heroism which had been averted by the early republican intelligentsia fearing of its too Islamic dimension. Faruk Sümer and Ali Sevim gathered relevant Islamic sources on Manzikert. It contains thirteen accounts including the relevant chapter of Rash-üd-din's Jami-üt-tevarih. Any observer would notice that the narrations in these thirteen accounts are very similar and repeating each other. Cahen notes that Muslim/Arabic sources concerning Manzikert are reliable and congruent with accounts of the Byzantine

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<sup>210</sup> One should not miss that we can not make simple dichotomization of Kemalist radical nationalism versus a conservative variant of Turkish nationalism. One peculiar variant of Turkish nationalism the “official nationalism” of Turkish armed forces. Although the Turkish military has the (firm) claim to represent the purest form of Kemalist nationalism with its secularism and modernism, it has much to do with conservative aspects of nationalism due to the patriarchal and solidaristic rhetoric of the army. Kemalist nationalism is in many ways conservative and different from radical nationalism of French Third Republic or German liberal nationalism of late 19<sup>th</sup> century Reich.

commanders who had participated the battle<sup>211</sup>. None of these sources is contemporary of Manzikert, by and large one or two centuries after Manzikert. We do not know which earlier source the authors had utilized (utilizing means at that time taking whatever written in the basic source to the work) some we do not. Given none of the authors had experienced the times themselves, none contains original data but reiterating earlier comments. And although some contesting arguments had been put forward such as the actual itinerary of Alpaslan and some put forward unreliable claims and of course exaggeration of numbers of the soldiers of the both side et cetera. However, the theme is strikingly parallel. This make us think that they reflect a certain mood that had furnished and accepted to the disfavor of any contesting discourse. This discourse in very simple terms is a "making of a gaza epic". The Christians had been defeated by Muslims severely and this had been celebrated with euphoria within the Muslim lands. Ibn'ul Esir writes in his *el-Kamil fi't-tarih* that "poets had praised Alp Arslan and frequently commemorated this victory<sup>212</sup>". This makes us think that these epic narrations had emerged from this epic tradition. Similarly, Ibn'ül Cevzi writes that "when the news reached Baghdad, drums and horns had been played. People gahered in beyt'ul nuba. The letter of victory had been read aloud<sup>213</sup>." It is curious if the victory had made such an impact. This is beyond our knowledge and we no longer have the privilege to learn. But this we see a perfect case of a minority opinion expanding to the disfavor of alternative and various other opinions and becomes the only known form of narration. One of the many alternatives had defeated others and exposed its interpretation as the exposition of the sole truth. And upon such a hegemonic acquirance, the myth of Manzikert had been constructed. One of the alternatives, or the position of a minority (this does not mean that there was another "majority opinion" but that means the mood of a certain section of the people at the time) became the only legitimate narration. One point of view becomes universalized and all the rest has been excluded.

In these nearly-contemporary accounts contain the popular mythologies of modern Turco-Islamic rhetoric. The spectacular narrative of the captivity of Roman Diogenes

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<sup>211</sup> Cahen, C., "La campagne de Manzikert d'après les sources musulmanes", *Byzantion* IX, 2, 1934, p.613-642, quoted in Copeaux, Etienne, *Türk Tarih Tezinden....*, p.158

<sup>212</sup>in Sümer, Faruk and Sevim, Ali, *İslam Kaynaklarına Göre Malazgirt Savaşı*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988, p.27

<sup>213</sup> op. cit., p.17

had been told in detail. This narrative tradition reaches its zenith in Rash-ud-din where the story resembles a fascinating thriller. This of course points out to the superior moral standards of Muslims. Copeaux makes the point that this gaza epic conveys Kemalist elements introduced by 1970s and tacit or explicit allusions to Atatürk and Alpaslan throughout the epic<sup>214</sup>. They also all give us the dialogs between Alp Arslan and his commanders reflecting their enthusiasm to die for the cause of Islam<sup>215</sup>. The problematique is taking these accounts as expositions of "what really had happened". The striking point here is not that there is a misinterpretation or distortion of any sort. On the contrary, the striking point is the one hundred percent accordance between the Islamic almost-contemporary accounts and the modern version.

The valid questions of how convincing these accounts are, what can be interpreted from these accounts are missing and lead an academic historian to follow the heroic aspect of the accounts. As claimed above, the authors more or less reflect the epic traditions of the time. This looks for evident if we also study unIslamic sources where the epic element on the side of Muslims is naturally absent. One simply can contrast the account of Anna Kommena in her *Alexiad* although that account begins just after Manzikert dealing with the "barbarian" plunders of "Roman" lands<sup>216</sup>. Matheos of Edessa from a local Armenian point of view tells us the extreme cruelty of the Muslim hordes devastating all the Armenian cities and kill all the residents. The craft of historian is not to esteem any of the accounts but to reach conclusions basing on the accounts after a critical reading of them.

This backwards phase of historical methodology is also instrumental in the development of the state-centric historical perspective, apart from a supposed "authoritarian tendency" and ideological conditioning. This could in no way create a "sociological history" or "social history". Not distinct from Barkan, Seljukid scholars are loyal to their sources verbatim. Disregarding all the ideological preconditioning or ideological rhetoric, such a methodology could not give way to a different outcome. This is not very different from Rankean *quellenkritik* with the difference that Rankean Prussian scholars had a more sophisticated classical knowledge and secondly they had a

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<sup>214</sup> Copeaux, op. cit., p. 159

<sup>215</sup> One can not miss the connection here, Atatürk and Trikopis !

<sup>216</sup> Kommena, Anna, *Alexiad*, İnkılap Yayınevi, 1996

wider and richer documents to investigate and study. This is the another variant of "positivism" as I argued above about Osman Turan's "positivism". This suits well to the state-centric weltanschauung of the scholars (naturally all the primary sources studied are chiefly political accounts with vindication of the relevant polities, we do not have "oppositional" accounts like we have for the early periods of Ottoman Empire from within) but methodological approach has also its own independent course. In short, it would not be wrong to suggest that a backwardness in methodology of historiography feeds a misinterpretation (consciously or unconsciously) of history. This is also an independent variable.

Anthony D. Smith writes "I refer to their (modernist school) systematic failure to accord any weight to pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nation that emerged in the modern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of nationalism.....for ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths., memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias.....(cultural and historical elements) are not simply pretexts, by which the atavistic emotions of the masses, in Kedourie's words, are manipulated, nor are they simply invented traditions designed as Eric Hobsbawm claims.<sup>217</sup>,"

I agree with Smith to the point that myths and ethno-historical traditions have their independent and free trajectory. However, these are previously claimed are one of the many alternative approaches and by the modern age they have acquired a monopoly as the monotheist hagiographical view in its Christian or Islamic variant had such a distinctive position. The free competition had elapsed by the "intervention of nation-state" with its massive mechanism of persuasion and its too many arms of an octopus. Here we can speak of an "invention of tradition" because if "certain invention" had been sacrificed or even exterminated in favor of another one, can we call his a tradition, or as a pretext. However, we can no longer assume that modern nation-states and their fifth column in the civil society (so-called national intellectuals) do not have a complete free-hand. Paradoxically, the myths they had mastered may turn against themselves after a point. The Germanic nationalism had this aspect. The aristocratic Prussianism had

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<sup>217</sup> Smith, Anthony D., *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.8-9



initiated and praised German nationalism in the idealizations of free Germans in the woods of Teutonia et cetera but this mythologies after a point shook the conservative-aristocratic elite by the rising right-wing nationalism who had rebelled against the Prussian establishment. Long before Hitler, that aspect was prevalent in the last decade of the Reich.

Although I have serious doubts of this, I have the claim that Turkish example poses different case study than Western (or Eastern) European examples. The impact and trauma of modernity was much more acute in the Turco-Ottoman case. It was rather a catastrophic experience. And it did cause a catastrophe destroying what had been produced in the mental mind for the last thousand years.

First of all, Turkish modernization included two different tracts; that of "modernization" and that of "westernization". It was not only of accepting a new form of livelihood (modernization) but also accepting a "different" form of life-style. The later had to accompany to the former. And the sneezing of western influences had destroyed the earlier cultural mode. As like the entrance of a multi-national firm outright and without any measures and cautions taken to avoid a catastrophe kills all the local small and medium scale entrepreneurship, the entrance of western cultural mores had rendered the so-called authentic culture morbid and doomed. It is true that this traumatic shock was limited to the upper-class atmosphere but it is a reality that the modern "national cultures" had been determined from above and folk tradition also had limited chance to "compete" in a "free market". So, no "social-cultural" section in Turkish society could escaped from this merciless assault. And the "cultural pretexts" of Smith can make their own living. They had died at a point or almost died because the belied that they can be derived at some point lived on.

Kemalism was not a break, but at most a mutation in the path of Turkish modernization, a radical break diverging from "reformism and accommodation". Its radical and sudden taking action may be novel but the desire for implementing such a project had busied the minds of earlier generations. Kemalism only realized what others imagined in a period where applications of such a project was viable and feasible. This is true not only for Ziya Gökalp and his artificially imagined secular and western civilized nation and Islamized only in name. This is again not true only for the Young Turks in power in 1910s, the very predecessors of Kemalists. This is not true only for the flourishing materialism of Young Turks in exile as shown perfectly by Şükrü

Hanioğlu<sup>218</sup>. The Tanzimat elite had the same cruelty and same insensitivity, same apathy towards so-called "authentic culture". This is apparent only with the still unexplained radical transformation of the Ottoman rical to the Tanzimat rical that took place within a very short time interval in 1830s.

This insensitivity to a "claim of authenticity" can also be observed even in Namık Kemal and his transformation of everything Islamic into the modern glossary of western politics and ideology. This is quiet different from what Jamaladdin Afghani had in mind. In Namık Kemal who did have a proper education of Islamic knowledge, whatever authentic and pious had been sacrificed to "adapt" to the "contemporary" and had been emptied in original content. This is why Mümtaz'er Türköne's study claiming Namık Kemal and Young Ottomans as predecessors as "founders of Islamism" is invalid<sup>219</sup>. Murtaza Korlaelçi, approaching from a conservative point of view has to concede that although Namık Kemal was no positivist, his vision had influenced the positivist generation of next generation<sup>220</sup>. Şerif Mardin also points out that Namık Kemal's "Islamic system" in mind and the political system he developed is sometimes very evident<sup>221</sup> although Namık Kemal is vigorously attempting to adapt these two paradigms to each other and render them compatible.

Namık Kemal and others did not try to defend Islam or try to reconcile Islam and modernism. They try to find way out to be modern and don't feel guilt for that. They tried to use Islam to legitimize their conquest which will evolve to Kemalism half a century later. What Namık Kemal did, taking authentic concepts and notions and repackaging them compatible with modern political language had been repeated by Osman Turan and other comrades one century later as claimed previously. This argument is congruent with Pierre Nora's gloomy claim that "we live in a time where we lost our touch with the past and so we had to remake it". Nora makes this claim for the

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<sup>218</sup> Hanioglu, Şükrü, "Batıcılık", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İletişim Yayınları, 1995, vol V, p. 1382-1388

<sup>219</sup> Türköne, Mümtaz'er, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, İletişim Yayınları, 1994 İttihad-ı İslam of Namık Kemal is an overtly political concept whereas for Afghani the unity of Islam is beyond a political program. Moreover and more importantly, ittihad-ı İslam of Namık Kemal is in reality covers only the Ottoman Muslim subjects.

<sup>220</sup> Korlaelçi, Murtaza, *Türkiye'ye Pozitivizmin Girişi*, İnsan Yayınları, 1986, p. 202

<sup>221</sup> Mardin, Şerif, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, İletişim Yayınları, 1996, p. 321

shock after the economic and social crisis of late 1960s and 1970s. The peasantry in France fell below 10 percent by 1975. With the decline of peasantry and retreat from rural France, the cradle of Catholicism and traditionalism, "it was the end of collective memory"<sup>222</sup>. If that is accurate for France, we have to look for the end of "collective memory" much earlier in Turkey. The very striking figure that will display how the level of touch with the past is the number of books printed in 19<sup>th</sup> century and to see how a small percentage of these books are printed editions of Ottoman manuscripts. The very small Ottoman market for books had been occupied by western translations. The striking death of traditional Ottoman arts in so short time interval is another point exhibiting this disinterest. What remains is an artificial reconstruction of the past heroism. One can also notice a perplexing disinterest towards the Islamic past in the field of archeology. This disinterest to display Islamic works in late 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman Empire is in contrast to the enthusiasm to display the Greek heritage within the Ottoman domains<sup>223</sup>. Despite Abdülhamid's political emphasis on the Islamic identity of the Ottoman state, the Islamic collections of the Imperial Museum did not flourish fully until the end of his reign<sup>224</sup>. This is to do with the general contempt of the Islamic heritage and the vision directed towards the West.

Although a contra argument which is not only legitimate but as convincing is the popularity enjoyed by commercial and noncommercial epic traditions such as books given by the right-wing newspapers, publications of books about heroic incidents taking its plot from Turkish and/or Islamic history et cetera. These had taken quiet much from the "authentic" narratives and had popularity. However, the artificiality of these epics and heroic tradition can be seen by how state-centric they are. We do not have La Chanson De Roland, being an epic story and also echoing the ordinary living at the same time. At least we do not enjoy the privilege of interpreting the folk literature works in the same fashion.

The epic traditions that had been exhausted were the stories of firm and ambitious sultans, khans, ghazis who had been given divine blessing and charisma or at least they

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<sup>222</sup> Nora, Pierre, *Rethinking France (Les Lieux de Memoires)*, The University of Chicago Press, 2001, in general introduction, p.XI

<sup>223</sup> Shaw, Wendy, *Possessors and Possessed*, University of California Press, 2003, p. 172-184

<sup>224</sup> op. cit., p.183

had been interpreted in this way which had been claimed as the “historical-cultural legacy” which had been claimed as “artificial”, at least as long as it is interpreted as a reflection of the “supremacy of the political” which is a very modern phenomenon . This is similar to how war of Independence had been relegated to the deed of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the commanders in Ankara rather than an Anatolian-wide traumatic thriller and victory in the end. The state-centrism which could never be imagined before the monstrous expansion of nation-states is strongly present in this epic tradition perfected by Osman Turan and others. One of the best-selling glorifications of such a approach is exalting Abdülhamid II as the ideal-ruler. The irony is that Abdülhamidism not only symbolizes the peak of such state-centrism and state-fetishism but also Abdülhamid can only be second to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his contribution building the modern Turkish state. The alternative suggestion is also within the sphere of modernism. This dimension and terrifying modernism of this "authenticism" is different from its western counterparts. Disregarding extreme level of creativity of 20<sup>th</sup> century ultranationalism to establish descents and genealogies, moderate (?) nationalists had a reliable "living pretext" so that they did not need Willhelm II or III Napoleon to exalt in the name of “conservatism”. The Turco-Islamist perspective only had a more convincing Kemalist narrative knowing to speak the language of countryside and incorporate them to the rhetoric of modern nation-state. One can also seek a middle ground in the unique mode nationalism produced by military which carries in itself features from both the Kemalist and Turco-Islamic nationalisms and itself resembles a good example of the commonalities of these two variants of Turkish nationalism. Although the military is in theory advocating a hard-line Kemalist nationalism, it has its own ambivalence, chiefly due to the “military values” strongly present in the armed forces. This "traditionalist" aspect of the Turkish armed forces had been out of attention. This is not only the reflected in its claim to begin its history from Mete, from the time immemorial of the mythical Turkish history or in its internal language (ironically ) resisting the “purification” effort of the Turkish Language Reform (Revolution) or its strong efforts to display Ottoman legacy in the Military Museum in a country where such considerations are very poor but also can be seen in the late Ottoman (pre-Enver generals) own war accounts in the track of gazavatname literature and their leisure time activity of writing military heroes of the heyday of the Ottoman Empire. A perfect example of this peculiar literature can be pursued in the accounts of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa both in the genre of autobiography and in the genre of historical narration. Gazi

Ahmet Muhtar Paşa was the eastern front counterpart of Gazi Osman Paşa of Plevne in the 1877-78 Russian War<sup>225</sup>. The echoes of pre-Enver generals such as Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa are still heard in the military circles reflecting the “traditionalism” of the military variant of Turkish nationalism.

As a villager's first day in a huge city is a devastating experience against which he can not feel the right to respond in his own right, the same was true for the Ottoman-Turkish elite of 19<sup>th</sup> century. The "western culture" had been so gigantic that it could not be challenged even partially. This brought the collapse of the “authenticity” of the local culture. A necessity to revive and reconcile the past with the contemporary existence was a traumatic effort which had to rely on “authenticity” but in most part, failed to do so. This was not peculiar to the Turco-Islamism but also tried by Kemalism proper and Kemalism in its different variants.

The argument made above has to be elaborated but my aim is not to discuss the relevance of Kemalism to Tanzimat. Where I want to claim is that the so-called "return of Turkish-Islamic authentic heritage" was also "reinvented tradition", no less reinvented as its Kemalist predecessors. Maybe to compliment it a bit, this may be described as conjuring rather than an avert make-up.

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<sup>225</sup> Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Anadolu'da Rus Muharebesi (1876-77)*, Petek Yayınları, 1985; *Feth-i Celil-i Konstantiniyye*, Bedir Yayınevi, 1994

## GENERAL INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSION

The study aimed to study the significance of Seljuks of Rum within the historical imagination of Turkish nationalism. Before discussing how the Seljuks of Rum had been perceived in various forms of Turkish nationalism, we need to clarify some observations about Turkish nationalisms which had been expressed throughout the study at different points.

As put forward above, we can not speak of one definite nationalism as it is not a monolithic body. Furthermore, it does not speak for itself. Nationalism is in fact a way of expressing one's self and identity in a relatively rough and unrefined fashion. Nationalism is a veil for such a reflection enabling one for a self-expression. This is why (left-leaning and liberal) reductionist analyses of nationalism as outburst of primordial instincts or worshipping of a state-cult had been criticized and rejected in the study in favor of a more emphatic and complex explanation of nationalism. Nationalism deserves more careful attention than such a denigration. John Breuilly in early 1980s rejected an essentialist definition of nationalism and suggested that nationalisms are politics by other means. They are strategies and discourses to overwhelm alternative political orientations<sup>226</sup>. However long gone since Breuilly and the privilege of the "political" and "social" vis-a-vis the "personal" in social sciences. In an age when self-politics had been an area of widening interest, nationalism studies had been integrated with personal experiences. For example, George Mosse in a pioneering work almost two decades ago had interpreted nationalism in terms of homoeroticism and one's angst of his encounter with his sexuality and masculinity<sup>227</sup>. Although these developments

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<sup>226</sup> Breuilly, John, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester University Press, 1985 (originally 1982)

<sup>227</sup> Mosse, George, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985

had been although very weakly been adapted in the Turkish context and especially that of Billigs' banal nationalism, these studies also had the same contempt for the "nationalists". They also have the implicit claim of themselves "being free from the national/nationalist unrefinedness"<sup>228</sup>.

On the matter of the state-cult, a voluntarily subjugation to a certain "state-cult" is a volunteer action. No Orwellian state forces such attitudes but these attitudes create such "state-cults"<sup>229</sup>. A perfect example of this is Hitler's anarchist interpretation of the state. The path to the most terrifying state ever built in this world has originally anarchist intentions or at least inspirations imagining rendering the state in the service of a race. The rising and roaring Leviathan-scale of almost terroristic mechanisms of the nation-states is a fact, but we have to concede that there is a volunteer aspect of the phenomenon which rises from below. The modern nation-state had no hard time to find its "true believers", its voluntary worshippers and loyal servants. This we had seen in the case of Turkey throughout our study.

The same is true for the discussions of "abusing history". Here I disregard playing with numbers which certainly is an abuse of history. I also disregard the attitude of exposing certain "facts" but disposing of "others". Certainly some abuse history consciously as in the case of Holocaust denialists or Stalin apologists. However, we have to concede that many alleged abusers of history are sincere in their claims. To claim that some "abuse" history, we have to assume that there are certain enthrustable, hard-working objective historians who have direct access to the "truth". Although I do not want to sound like a postmodern, the point I want to draw is to refute to suggest a strict separation of objective historians on one hand and abusers of history on the other hand whether it be for the sake of nationalism, confessionism or to serve a political ideology or a political commitment. This I assert to reject the outright and total denial of nationalist-inspiring histories as fake and mere expression of chauvinism. Such an

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<sup>228</sup> for example see works of Necmi Erdoğan and Arus Yumul

<sup>229</sup> Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" may be a better analogy to suggest the willingness of the "subjects" to subdue to the totalitarian state. In that sense, Huxley had grasped the meaning of the "totalitarian" state than Orwell whose inspiration reflects the world of World War II. However, this is also weak to explain the nature of the fetishism of the state. What "might" does in Orwell had been achieved by "medicine" in Huxley. The "rise of the state" is a more complex phenomena. George Mosse may be inspirational in that regard. The quest for "perfection" may be the key to understand fascism and totalitarianism.

attitude will not be much explaining to us. Without a critical study of these works, we can not simply ignore them.

As asserted by postmodern and post-structuralist historians, history is mere a construction. That had been labeled as the “linguistic turn” in the discipline of history<sup>230</sup>. In the eyes of postmodernists, history had been delegated to a mere “narrative” and historian has the privilege of selecting the most suitable one among other alternative narratives. As E. H. Carr said a few decades ago, “one first should examine the historian.”

This postmodern assault had not been embraced by historians as it had been embraced by students of other social disciplines. This has its reasons. First of all, if postmodernism is an assault against “grand theories”, history is the least theoretical discipline of all social sciences. Secondly, historians are hard-workers in archives. Historians work with utmost hardships to gather knowledge. When the theoretical pillar of sociology or economics collapses, not much stays undisturbed. But history is not dependent on theories. So, the discipline of history has better resistance against the “postmodern assault”. Although all the data gathered do not mean anything by itself unless a historian utilizes them to make a point. But here, any theoretization should rely on sound and substantive records.

However, nothing can stay untouched in front of a raging storm. Although, postmodern criticism do not apply perfectly to the discipline of history, post-structuralist critics have more relevancy. Although postmodernism and post-structuralism had been reckoned as complementing each other, post-structuralism needs special attention. Whereas postmodernism has the bold argument of rejecting any reality, post-structuralism is more interested in crushing established myths. That is not to say that nothing can be reliable anymore. On the contrary, crushing established myths gives us the moderate hope of discovering the “objective truth” ourselves. It is hard to say post-structuralists are hopeful of such an investigation. They are uninterested of such longings. But historians has this hope. Or at least historian should have this optimism. But to be able to reach a point, he first of all has to be aware of the hollowness of the established myths.

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<sup>230</sup> Stone, Lawrence, “The Revival of the Narrative”, *Past and Present*, no: 85, 1979, p. 3-24



Once George Iggers had observed that it is a misfortune that the discipline of history had risen in a period when nation-states had consolidated themselves. History throughout 19<sup>th</sup> century was an agent of nationalism and cult of the nation-state. This is not true only for Rankean Prussian school but equally true for the liberal and positivist historians of the French Republic and the Victorian whiggish historians of Britain. In France, the earliest efforts to establish a harmonious vision of France with inserting the terrifying French Revolution in was never an easy job<sup>231</sup>. French Revolution was attempted to be tamed and rendered less disturbing with treating the Terror as an aberration. Danton was the hero against the bloodthirsty Robespierre until this established myth had been destroyed by the rise of Robesspierrist historians and the rise of Leninist left establishing the link from Robespierre (and Babeuf) –Buonomonti-Blanque and Lenin in the “jacobin tradition”<sup>232</sup>. By the Third Republic, the liberal historians had given their way to the positivist historians of the with the fall of the liberal credo and inspiration of the French Revolution and the state had taken over the “progressive mission”. The new positivist historians also made their peace with the medieval France and interpreted medieval France to establish a continuity. Their effort was to establish the “civilized world of French” rising upon the liberal message of French Revolution silencing the radical and violent implications of the “foundationalist myth” and also subduing its liberalism a service to the republican state. Dealing with the Revolution and rendering the conservative Third Republic as the inevitable outcome of the Revolution was no easy job. The “French” mediocrity had been called for duty to excuse the defeat at Sedan in the hands of Germans to supply logistic for the Frenchmen their grandeur from time immeorial vis-s-vis the parvenus of Prussian Germany<sup>233</sup>. This had been strengthened by a claim of civility and progressivity against the eastern Germanic hordes making a synthesis of the Revolutionary republicanism and French medieval heritage which also refers to days earlier than the establishment of the

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<sup>231</sup> Furet, Francois, *The Revolutionary France*, Blackwell, 1995, p. 367-75

<sup>232</sup> Crouzet, François, “French Historians and Robespierre”, in *Robespierre*, edited by Hayden, Colin and Doyle, William, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 255-283

<sup>233</sup> see how medieval history had been “imagined” and “constructed” in the aftermath of Sedan, Emory, Elizabeth, “The “Truth” About Middle Ages: La Revue Des Deux Mondes and Late Nineteenth Century French Medievalism”, in *Medievalism and the Quest for the “Real” Middle Ages*, edited by Simmons, Clare A., Frank Cass, 2001, p. 99-114; see also Cantor, Norman, *Inventing Middle Ages*, James Clarke & Co Ltd, 1992

absolutist state and the reign of roi-soléil. The latter's presence also displayed the conservative republicanism of the Third Republic which is not as disturbing as the earlier Republics which had been reacted by the Catholics.

Post-structuralist criticism can be read as a harsh challenge to the “construction of history in a time of nation-states”. This cement in the foundations of the discipline of history is so strong that still many historians had to think in terms of 19<sup>th</sup> century. The problem is much deeper than we realize. The concept of nation is much more embedded in ourselves than we assume<sup>234</sup>.

Poststructuralism can be useful here to depict its Nietzschean genealogy. With a genealogical approach, used especially by Foucault in his flamboyant fashion enabled us to reach destructive and breathtaking results. History is a construction. This does not necessarily mean that there is nothing substantial in history. It means that history had been poisoned by simplistic clichés to explain in terms of nations, states, classes et cetera. But the belief that there can be a history in its pure form as an ideal is kept by historians. This “pure history” is an ideal but one can close as much as he can as he can reach to new sources although depressing fact is that bulk of the sources are beyond our reach.

Then in the lack of completely convincing sources, we have to concede that at least part of history is a construction. After all, there is no history as such as there can be a science of “physics”, or “chemistry” and “mathematics”. We need humans to have “history”. However, this is not enough. One also needs historians to have history. In the absence of historians, there is no history. What we have is memory. And as studied extensively by Dominick La Capra and others, memory and history are completely different realms<sup>235</sup>. Their commonalities are coincidental.

So we have our historians. Here I do not make a separation of amateur historians on one side and professional historians on the other. In our study, late Ottoman intellectuals, Kemalist “historians”, Fuad Köprülü, Osman Turan and others had been under scrutiny. They all had their “constructions”. They each did not aim to “reconstruct history” on purpose but their mental conceptualization had led to different imaginations.

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<sup>234</sup> see a sharp critic of this embeddedness, Geary, Patrick, *The Myth of the Nations*, Princeton University Press, 2001

<sup>235</sup> La Capra, Dominique, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma*, Cornell University Press, 1994

Our effort was to present a genealogy of the “history of Seljuks of Rum from late 19<sup>th</sup> century to late 20<sup>th</sup> century”. The Seljuks of Rum we had studied was not like an electron in physic having its own independence. On academic level, we are far from knowing much of Seljuks of Rum proper. What we have is certain imaginations of Seljuks of Rum.

Although this study has no purpose of using Hayden White and his “tropology”, his categorization is extremely useful to understand different imaginations of Seljuks of Rum in particular and course of Turkish history in general. Using White, we also see that application of a certain methodology with methodology’s value-neutral aspect will also influence the conclusions drawn from it. White speaks of four alternative “modes of emplotment”; that of romantic, tragic, comic and satirical<sup>236</sup>. In a rough fashion, one can cover Köprülü in the “romantic mode of emplotment” and Osman Turan in the “tragic mode of emplotment”. There is certainly a dramatic element in both historians. As seen, the school textbooks reflect “purely dramatic” aspects of these varying “emplotments”. For White, as an outcome, he speaks of four “modes of ideological implication”, that of anarchist, radical, liberal and conservative. These are not open ideological exposures but undertexts hidden throughout the “plot” and make themselves reveal only at the end of the “plot”. This we can catch easily in all our studied texts and it would be useful not to see them as mere ideological texts, but outcomes of certain drama. As another book of White’s name implies, one also has to study the “form” as well as the content<sup>237</sup>.

All these constructions of course have their own agenda. Seljuks of Rum is not examined for purely academic reasons and curiosities but for positing Seljuks of Rum within a greater course of Turkish history.

There existed certain contestations. As covered extensively throughout the study, the role of Islam is of the most conflictual. Islam had been degraded by Kemalism and upgraded by Turco-Islamists. We do not had any claim or suggestion of the authenticity of both perspectives. From an academic perspective, they had been both rejected outright. However our interest does not lie with academic rigor and studiousness.

Note that we are speaking of “myths”. Myth does not mean a lie. Actually, myth is not a lie by its very dictionary definition, at least not in its original definition deriving

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<sup>236</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, John Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 29

<sup>237</sup> White, Hayden, *The Content of the Form*, John Hopkins University Press, 1987

from Greek. It does not mean trash to be thrown to the garbage can. Myth has its truth, to the listener and to the narrator. Myths are to be believed and a myth can be a myth if somebody believes in them. Again I want to be distant from a leftist or a liberal position seeing the national myths as mere tools of the nation-state to indoctrinate his mastery. Myths do need to have certain willing audience.

Lévi-Struss defines myth as “a machine for the suppression of time” and that it had the effect of concealing the contradictions raised by the very existence of social life<sup>238</sup>. This conceptualization of myth is more explanatory than for example Malinowski’s definition of myth as a charter for a society. Malinowski and others following the Durkheimian tradition miss the liminality and complexity of the society and the embedded inherent tensions within the society. Myths do not arise as a natural social phenomena but arise upon a conflict of contesting hegemonical narratives. They also speak for themselves and establish a relative autonomy/truth for themselves.<sup>239</sup> A Marxian/Weberian approach seeing myths as an expression/manifestation of structural conflicts within the society are not convincing in the sense that myths have their own independence embedded in their very essential persuasive nature and their interaction with the society upon which their respectability and prevalence depends.

The very unique position of Seljuks of Rum is their being the “connection” between two worlds of “Turkishness” in the study. Manzikert was particularly investigated. Manzikert is one of the most crucial “foundationalist myths” of Turkish history, if not the most<sup>240</sup>. This is really striking because this war had took place now more than one thousand years ago. The myth of Manzikert as attempted to be analyzed in the light of the above quoted anthropological approaches assessing that Manzikert and other Turkish/Turkic mythologies had their own reality although not necessarily corresponding to an objective reality.

It also had been noted that Seljuks of Rum had been studied and dealt within the Eurasian geographically wide Turkic history rather than an Anatolian territorial polity. This interpretation bases on the realistic premise that although we do not know enough about the nature of Seljuks of Rum, it can be assessed that they belong more to the

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<sup>238</sup> Herzfeld, Micheal, *Anthropology*, Blackwell, 2001, p. 7

<sup>239</sup> see/compare Turner, Victor, *The Ritual Process*, Aldine de Gruyter, 1995

<sup>240</sup> Copeaux, Etienne, *Türk Tarih.....*, p. 158

Eurasian non-territorial world on horseback rather than the settled and territorial world of the Ottoman polity. This positioning also has to do with the commonness of the relevant primary sources with the nomadic Turkic history. Last but not the least, Seljuks of Rum is more or less a part of this nomadic world although they go further in the name of establishing a strong centralized political power. It is a social-political world in which one has to not only beat but overwhelm the contesting political warlords to forcefully oblige them to yield and keep their military build up and strength to keep what they are holding on. Due to this nomadic mode of warfare and mode of political structure built on this nomadic understanding of warfare, Seljuks of Rum never could have established a centralized and strong polity. It had a relatively strong control over west-central Anatolia but in other regions they had to share power with local warlords. As expressed in the study, the nomadic and centrifugal aspects of Seljuks of Rum were more visible in the Lise Tarih textbook of Kemalism as well as in the imagination of Fuad Köprülü. This imagination had disappeared in time as Seljuks of Rum began to be “reconstructed” as a central state especially with Osman Turan. They had been transformed into “Ottomans before Ottomans” although the characteristics and peculiarities of the Seljuks of Rum and “mature Ottoman polity” were of different stock. The interesting point was the interest of the Turco-Islamic scholars towards the Turcoman commanders and their deeds on the one hand and the effort to organize them within a central understanding on the other hand, if not in material terms, in “spiritual” (manevi) terms. However, although nomadic mode of warfare looks to be practiced in Anatolia, one can not miss the interaction with the local population taken over from Byzantines. We can also speak of the rise and gradual consolidation of the new polity based in Konya which in certain features represent a central state. This aspect has been scarcely researched on and awaits new problemizations. In this regard, the world of Seljuks of Rum reflects the romantic connotations and visions on one side and its aspect of being precursor to the future Ottomans. In short, the historical imagination of Seljuks of Rum opens to a two different worlds itself connecting the two.

This “connection” could be interpreted as “towards past” or “towards future”. This may also explain the “magic of Manzikert”. What is impressive in Manzikert is that it refers both to the past of time immemorial and to the very present at the same time. This is exactly what Lévi-Strauss meant when he defines myth as the “suppression of time”. It at the same time symbolizes the eternity of Turkishness in chronology and wideness in terms of geography. It then also confines “western Turks” to Anatolia, a beautiful and

fertile land, almost the promised land of the Turkish hordes trespassing Transoxania, Khorasan, Iranian Plateau as if only to arrive such a beautiful piece of land. Both implications had been strongly present in the myth of Manzikert. I would argue that it provided a satisfactory compromise between the chivalrous ecumeny of the Turks in history and submission to the reelpolitik of the contemporary. This can also be interpreted as a strategy of the rising conservative periphery to embrace Kemalism but exhausting the Kemalist themes and credo to unify it with their conservative agenda. As claimed in the study, it should not be forgotten that the Turco-Islamists had taken their training in Kemalist academia and they internalized the Kemalist epistemology and ontology. Seeing no contradictions, they could adapt the Kemalist epistemology to their own agenda. Manzikert, with overt references both to the themes of Kemalism and to the Islamic suppressed narrative implies it had its strategic undertexts to combine two alternative readings of Turkish history into one as it refers at the same both to the very Kemalist interpretation and to the traditional-Islamic interpretation so that Kemalism became accessible and plausible. In this regard, Kemalism and Turco-Islamism both supports and consolidates the rising and raging discourse of the consolidating Turkish nation-state.

To conclude, Seljuks of Rum was in the beginning a terra incognita. Not much attention had been drawn to it due to lack of information. It gradually gained importance. This interest had been restricted to the republican Turkey. Seljuks of Rum never became a popular area of research under "Islamic studies". It never could gain the prestige of Ottomans. It could not have a "belonging". It was neither Arab, neither Persian and even not Turkish enough in the eyes of Islamic scholars of the West. However, Seljuks of Rum continued to occupy an ambivalent position in the Turkish historical imagination. It never became a spacious empire. It was landlocked in the geographical constraints of Anatolia. It proudly rendered Anatolia as the Turkish homeland but its military successes were still not that legendary. However, it is still an indispensable part of the historical imagination of Turkish nationalism.

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