THE TRANSITION of HISTORY EDUCATION and HISTORY TEXTBOOKS in EUROPE from a NATIONALIST DISCOURSE to a WIDER EUROPEAN-NESS DISCOURSE

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To my family...

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ABSTRACT

THE TRANSITION of HISTORY EDUCATION and HISTORY TEXTBOOKS in EUROPE from a NATIONALIST DISCOURSE to a WIDER EUROPEAN-NESS DISCOURSE

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European Studies, M.A., Thesis 2006

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History education, Europe, nationalism, historiography, wider European-ness discourse

The objective of this thesis is to explore the problematic nature of European history through the history education in the European Union member states and the impact of history education on the emergence of a wider European-ness discourse in education system of which the teaching methods, materials and teaching mentalities are still mostly nationalistic. It aims to suggest possible ways to the change of nationalist history education and history textbooks in European countries and transition to a wider European-ness perspective/discourse.

The thesis is organized around three different levels of research. The first one is the historical and theoretical studies of concepts such as nationalism, historiography and the concept of "Europe". The second level of research is about the real-life practices and reflections of the theoretical concepts to history education. Here, the relationship between nationalism, education and modernity is looked at; European history education, students' and teachers' perceptions of history, its aims and methodologies are evaluated through the Youth and History survey; history education and school history textbooks are studied nation by nation and lastly history textbooks in Europe are investigated to reach a complete evaluation of history education system. This level also included the Council of Europe's views, activities

and initiatives in history education in Europe. Plus, several other initiatives including transnational and independent ones are studied to reflect the institutional attempts in Europe for the emergence of a wider European-ness perspective.

The last level included what a wider European-ness perspective in history education means or should be, and the necessary content-related and more importantly, methodologyrelated changes in history education in Europe. In short, this thesis argued the way towards a wider European discourse in history education in Europe can be reached through efficient and critical use of available materials and through not the construction of a new discourse of writing history but "reading" history.

ÖZET

AVRUPA'DA AVRUPA TARİH(İ) ÖĞRETİMİ VE TARİH DERS KİTAPLARININ MİLLİYETÇİ SÖYLEVDEN DAHA GENİŞ BİR AVRUPALILIK SÖYLEVİNE GEÇİŞİ

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Avrupa Çalışmaları, M.A., Tez 2006

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Halil Berktay

Tarih eğitimi ,Europe, milliyetçilik, historiyografi,, Avrupalılık söylevi

Bu tezin amacı, eğitim metodları, materyalleri ve eğitim mentalitesi hala çoğunlukla milliyetçi olan Avrupa eğitim sistemindeki tarih öğretiminin daha geniş Avrupalılık perspektifinin/söylevinin oluşmasına etkisinin ve Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkelerdeki tarih eğitiminin çerçevesinden Avrupa tarihinin problemli doğasını araştırmaktır. Avrupa ülkelerindeki tarih eğitiminin ve tarih kitaplarının değişmesi ve eğitimdeki milliyetçi perspektiften daha geniş bir Avrupalılık perspektifine geçilmesi için olası yollar önermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu tez üç farklı araştırma aşaması etrafında organize edildi. İlki milliyetçilik, historiyografi ve "Avrupa" kavramı gibi önemli kavramların tarihsel ve teorik araştırılmasıydı. İkinci araştırma aşaması, tarih eğitiminin teorik kavramlarının gerçek hayat uygulamaları ve yansımaları hakkında yapildi. Bu uğurda, milliyetçilik, eğitim ve modernite arasındaki ilişki incelendi; Gençlik ve Tarih anketi kullanılarak Avrupa tarih eğitimi, öğrencilerin ve öğretmenlerin tarihi algılamaları, hedefleri ve yöntemleri değerlendirildi; tarih boyunca değişen Avrupa algısını araştırmak için tarih eğitimi ve okul tarih kitapları ülke ülke incelendi; ve son olarak Avrupa'daki tarih ders kitapları incelendi. İkinci aşama aynı zamanda Avrupa Konseyi'nin tarih eğitimi hakkındaki görüşlerini, aktivitelerini ve teşebbüslerini içermektedir. Ek olarak, diğer uluslararasi ve bağımsız teşebbüslere de Avrupa'da daha geniş bir Avrupalılık perspektifi oluşmasındaki katkıları açısından yer verilmiştir.

Son aşama, tarih eğitiminde daha geniş Avrupalılık perspektifinin ne anlama geldiğini, ve Avrupa tarih eğitimindeki zaruri içeriğe bağlı ve daha önemli olarak metodolojiye bağlı değişiklikleri içermektedir. Kısaca, bu tez Avrupa tarih eğitimindeki daha geniş Avrupalilik söylemine giden yolun varolan materyallerin etkili ve eleştirel kullanımından geçtiğini ve bunun tarihin yeni bir söylevle yazımıyla değil ama tarihin yeni bir söylevle "okunması"yla gerçekleşeceğini savunmaktadır.

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INTRODUCTION

Until the first half of the twentieth century, history of Europe was the history of wars and the history writing meant writing war histories. In the early modern and modern era Europe witnessed the Italian Wars (1494-1518), German Wars of Religion, French Wars of Religion (1562-1629), Spanish Wars (1502-1659), the Hundred Year War between Britain and France, religious wars that emerged as a result of Protestant Reformation, the British-Spanish war, the Thirty Year War (1618-1648), Northern Wars (1655-1660, 1700-1721), the Seven Year Wars (1756-1763), War of American Independence (1774-1783), Napoleonic Wars (1759-1815), 1848 Revolution, and the wars that built unification of Germany. In the twentieth century, until 1945, it faced the First World War, Second World War, and then in the aftermath of 1945 Europe experienced the Cold War that divide Europe into two different camps and turned it into the battlefield of two different ideologies. Then, these ideological divisions emerged as ethnic violence, extreme nationalist struggles and wars which originated from religion. As a result of all these historical experiences, it can be asserted that the history of Europe, throughout time, had been written by many royalties, dynasties and then, at last, by nation states.

Since the 1950s Europe began to restructure itself as a supranational composition, which is beyond being nation states, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Community and most contemporarily as the European Union. Throughout these developments member states' political and economic structures changed as well as their social and cultural compositions. As Europe began to reconstruct itself as a supranational body, new levels of identity emerged in Europe such as European identity. These newly emerged concepts brought the necessity of a new European history because traditional history of Europe was a history of war; and history filled with hostility and conflict could not let the emergence of European-ness among member states and their citizens. Today the nation states of Europe cannot continue their reciprocal antagonistic, intolerant and aggressive attitudes because the intended supranational future cannot function with these kinds of past habits. In addition to the refusal of hostilities, the emergence of a supranational Europe brought the view that if Europe was considered as a single state, then all the wars it faced could automatically be considered as five-century long civil wars. Thus, the problem that should be solved for the survival of a supranational Europe turned out to be how to re-write and teach the history of these ages-long civil wars to previously hostile states' new generations.

This project is going to look for the problematic nature of European history in Europe by particularly dealing with the history education in European Union member states and the impact of history education on the emergence of a wider European perspective in an education system in which the teaching methods, teaching materials and teaching mentalities are still nationalist. The main question of this thesis is, what kind of changes are needed in history education, people's perceptions of Europe, contents and historical narratives in school textbooks and teaching methods of history, if different human communities, dynasties, royalties and nation states, which spent most of their historical background with wars, conflicts, disagreements and collision, decide to affiliate and unite into a supranational body? In addition to the main question of this project, it is likely to ask, what are the possible ways of creating a wider European perspective through history education in Europe? Can the answer be hidden in the elimination of national histories and in the creation of a comprehensive, single common European history for all European countries? Is it possible to write that kind of history? Or, are there other potential ways to realize it? What is the most probable and most rational way to materialize the aim of having a history education in Europe that would coincide with the demands of the European Union that is a common European identity?

The main question of this thesis defined some areas that must be changed due to the supranational construction of the European Union because these areas are conceived as problematic and not coinciding with the current demands of the EU such as the creation of a common European identity and its internalization. These areas include the history education in Europe; historical narratives in textbooks; teaching methods of history; and people's perceptions of Europe.

Additionally, as the EU is moving towards a supranational unity, the problems must have been originated from national systems. Actually, this is the initial problem given implicitly in the main question. Thus, among the areas those require research there are also national history education systems in general, the reasons that make it problematic, the current state and evaluation of the existing history education system in Europe and the historical perceptions of Europe through nation states' viewpoints.

However, a qualified project cannot be complete without a theoretical basis and historical progress of some concepts that are in question in the project. For this reason, since the main theme is about European history education and the problems are about perceptions of Europe, history textbook writing, then, "history", "historiography", "nationalism" and "Europe" should be studied theoretically and historically as well. What is more, it is important to make it clear that this thesis project is organized and followed a kind of deductive approach in the sense that it begins with the general theories and abstract explanations, and then continues with the particular cases in order to show the outcomes of the discussed theories in real life.

As a result of all these, the thesis project begins its research with the theoretical study of nationalism since the 19th century through Ernest Renan's "What is Nation?" and Etienne Balibar "The Nation Form: History and Ideology"; Ernest Gellner's "Nations and Nationalism", Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities" and Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger's "The Invention of Tradition". The last three books marked an epoch in nationalism studies through providing constructivist approaches possible in nationalism literature. In short, nationalism literature began to be written and thought in constructivistsubjectivist paradigm since the 20th century but in particular with the 1980s. The reason of studying nationalism through these thinkers lies in the fact that nationalism at its origin is an identity construction project and power legitimization system and at the very core of it there are education systems as means of realizing nationalism's aims. Thus, this very first chapter aims to take the first step to the two-hundred year of construction of nationalism that will lead the way towards the dependency between nationalism and education in further chapters of the project. Plus, it aims to explain how nationalism is constructed and through what means; and how the understanding of its construction can help to define the current problems in history education in Europe. It is important to see how strong nationalism is in each sphere of life and how its embedded-ness challenges suggested ideas and solutions for changing history

education in Europe to create a common European identity and wider European perspective in Europe.

The thesis, after a theoretical background on nationalism, continues with the historical development of social sciences from the 18th century to the present by using the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Not only is the development of history as a discipline studied, but also all other social sciences are investigated. The reason for this wide content on social sciences is to provide the reader a broad perspective about the social sciences because it is not only history but also sociology, economics, anthropology, Oriental studies, psychology, geography, area studies, etc had a significant role in the creation of the idea of Europe and Europe's creation of other communities and their mirroring in education in Europe. To be more precise, the rise of social sciences and their institutionalization during the 19th century when nationalism was at its peak; the control and production of knowledge by the nation states in particular by Germany, Britain, France, Italy and the US and according to their political needs and necessities; the use of social sciences through the means of educational institutions such as universities and schools to organize and rationalize the social changes in societies; the divisions of social sciences into several disciplines and the determining of their subject matters; the shaking of the authority of the nation states as being the sole holder and producer of the objective knowledge and the most trustful institution in the world of science during the 1960s; and the emergence of many new disciplines to study non-European people and the "Orient" which study them not through Eurocentric views but more objective ones provide some kind of initial understanding about the significance and power of social sciences in education, particularly history education in Europe considering its vital influence on shaping peoples' ideas and perceptions about Europe and the world in general.

Furthermore, understanding the development of how history had been written over time; or how historiography developed is crucial to identify the problems in history textbooks and to identify and propose what should be done about history education in Europe. For this reason, historiography and its development are studied through four different schools with a special emphasis to their leading figures; the Göttingen School, the Scientific/ Rankean School with Leopold von Ranke; the Annales with Henri Berr, Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel; and the Marxist School of historiography with Marx and Engels.

The chapter begins with the attempts of scientification of history and the shift of the subject matters of history from being only the biography of kings by the Göttingen School during the 18th century. It continues with the Rankean School of the 19th century in which history achieved to be a scientific discipline (that would only focus on and try to define "what really happened") because of the changing research methods of the discipline such as using the state archives instead of the Bible, emphasis on documentary evidence rather than abstract premises and practice of the source critique seminars. What is more, the Rankean School, with Ranke, through recognizing the value and autonomy of every age, nation and people; suppressing the Romantic impulses in history; arguing the existence of a spirit in history and defining it as God in which the general truth of history was embedded; defining European history as a celestial system and defining the nation state as the mere source of historical objectivity became a turning point in the history of historiography.

The model of the 20th century historiography was the Annales School. With the Annales the scope of history widened through the inclusion of non-European world that means the breakdown of the superiority of the Western culture and the demise of Eurocentric view of history; the hermeneutic method replaced with the nomological method; and the event-oriented chronologically organized history of politics of the nation states during the Rankean School replaced with social and cultural history that was approached through the material cultures of societies, their ethical values, art and trade commodities (in other words, history from below) due to the belief of the insufficiency of mere use of written documents. What is more, the Annales used interdisciplinary approaches, comparative methods and quantitative research and analysis approaches in history.

The last school of historiography that is covered in this project is the Marxist School. The main tenets of Marxist historiography are the essential role of social classes and economic constraints in progress and determining of history, the class struggles, the economic basis of social progresses its determined and conflictual nature-dialectical- and its outcomes. Marxists believed and interpreted history as there cannot be the history of ideas; however, only the history of the socially particular individuals who produce such ideas.

The methodological approach of the Marxist School is historical materialism and it looks for the causes of developments and changes in societies in the way in which humans cooperatively make the means to life through economic analysis and to everything that coexists with the economic base of society such as classes, structures and ideologies. Moreover, Marxist history is mostly teleological. It posits a direction of history towards an end state of history as a classless human society, in Marx's terms, Communism. Marxist historiography can be considered as a tool of Marxist history through which history is going to bring the oppressed classes to self-consciousness. In this sense, it can be seen both as a historical project and at the same time a liberation movement and ideology.

The Marxist School of historiography, in a way, corrected the Rankean teachings which were too literal interpretations of history and which were overstressing the accumulation of facts and ignoring facts' critical, fundamental interconnections. In particular, Marxist view of history achieved "...to bring 'the people' back into history; not in the old romantic way, but in a manner which makes exhaustive use of every available source and every new technology" [Marwick, 1970: 206]. It also rang a bell about the necessity of paying attention to local studies due to they include the power of creating huge outcomes, the need to study long-term social changes, inevitability of emphasis on economics, social crises, the eternal contradictory condition of nature-dialect-, significance of history-from-below approach, the historical impact of class struggles and the role that political institutions and forms of social consciousness play although it failed in many aspects.

The last theoretical and historical research of this thesis focuses on what Europe is. About this question I would be very glad to be able to write "this was a difficult question to answer" which implicitly would mean that in one way or another it is answered. However, there is no case of it because Europe, throughout history has meant many different things to many different people. The idea of Europe had always been re-invented and re-constructed in almost every age through the pressures of new collective identities, politics, and even nature itself [Delanty, 1995]. Thus, it is not possible to give a clear-cut definition of Europe; the only option for what Europe is, as Norman Davies argued, is to describe it. For this reason, this chapter aims to describe different perceptions of Europe through two different paths; one is formation of it and the other one is the construction of it.

The formations of Europe are studied through brief explanations on the physical features of Europe, Europe's peopling and its languages. The construction of Europe is studied through different discourses of Europe, as Gerard Delanty asserted, such as the discourse of Christendom, the Enlightenment discourse of civilization, the late 19th and early 20th century discourse of culture, the Cold War discourse and the discourse of post-Cold War. Thus, this chapter describes the long historical journey of "Europe" from being associated with a mere

geography and continuing to be associated with Christendom, the "West", the Occident, civilization, progress, the "Dark Continent"¹, the economic unity, idea and an identity.

As mentioned before, this thesis follows a kind of deduction in its organization in terms of shifting from general and abstract theories of concepts to particular and figurative cases. In other words, this project aims to look at the reflections, outcomes of the grand theories and historical developments of subjects in question to real life practices; in particular the reflections and influences of nationalism, historiography and history in foundation and practice of history education in Europe. Subsequently, it is predictable that the outcome of the explanations of history, historiography and nationalism theories drag the project along to the detailed study of "nationalistic history education" due to there is an undeniable link between history, nationalism and education and what is more, due to the main question of this project alluded the concept of "nationalistic history education" as a problem implicitly.

The nationalist history education is consciously preferred to be studied through the case of Turkey and Turkish history education. There are several reasons in assigning Turkey as a case that would be the model of nationalistic history educations in general. First of all, Turkish history education is a very typical example of nationalistic history educations. To put it differently, Turkish history education involves all features of a typical nationalistic history education-if not more-; thus its coverage automatically is able to mirror the current and dominant forms of history that is taught in European schools, and the dominant form of history textbooks that are read by the pupils in Europe. Secondly, Turkey was the most rational choice as a case among other European countries because it was the one that I am well-informed about; and yet I directly experienced it because of being educated in it. Thirdly, it was not possible to be able to make a qualified research on other European countries' history education systems due to both the lack of sufficient historical knowledge about their histories and the difficulty of reaching their history textbooks. As a result of all these, the first figurative case of this project has been determined as Turkey and its nationalistic history education system.

The study of Turkish case provides information about the features of national histories; the means of creating nationalist histories to be used in history education in schools and the outcomes of this history education systems. Thus, it is possible to assert that national histories do have neo-positivist claims in terms of having a significant emphasis given to the belief that

¹ For further detailed information see [Mazewor, 1998].

the past can be written objectively due to the existence of written documents, the knowledge of the past and the use of material proofs. Also, national histories use national historiography as means to reach their goals that are creating an image of a nation, national identity and their internalization in peoples' minds. What is more, they are arrogant, vindictive in nature; mostly construct its image through creating the "Others"; give special emphasis to golden ages; and made up through Romantic-restorationist, nostalgic and anti-rationalist narratives.

The case study of nationalist history education in Turkey also introduces the reader the means of nationalistic history in textbooks to be taught to and read by the pupils. These means include the constant repetitions of nationality and its vitality in history textbooks; the frequent self-praising of the nation itself; irrational and distorted explanations to strengthen nationalism in students' minds (pseudo-scientific approaches); gathering of all ideas under a national security aspect and mostly reflecting them as threat to national security; implicit meanings in textbooks; the construction of the "Others" as enemies and inferior communities; definition of the nation, its goals and its values as good, ideal, and superior; use of religion as a uniting factor and for the creation of the "Others"; deifying the glorious times and sacrifices; establishing links with glorious pasts of other societies that have lived previously in nation state's borders and even treating the successes as the nation's (anachronism); emphasis on the "exceptionalism" of the nation; hostile word choices in narratives; and origin-centered way of teaching (teaching through asking questions of "how" and "why").

The next step, after understanding the general features and pitfalls of a nationalistic history education is to look at current European history education system and defining its problems to be able to propose possible suggestions to make it compatible with the supranational identity construction demands of the European Union. The study and evaluation of European history education is done through two ways. The first one is through the use of the Youth and History Survey and a general study of history-textbooks and European history books in Europe; and the second one is done in the course of a closer look to several European countries and through their perceptions, practices and use/abuse of history, plus the reflection of their national past experiences in Europe to their shaping of history education in their countries.

The Youth and History² survey was carried out between the years 1994-1995 among 27 different countries including Turkey, Israel, and Palestine with the participation of 31,000 young people whose ages were between 14 and 15 years old. The main question of the project was "What do history and politics mean to young people?". In 1997, in Hungary, the conference, *The Youth and History Project, Challenges and Implications for the Teaching and Learning of History, September 17-21*, was held which aimed to evaluate the results and possible outcomes of the questionnaire in order to suggest solutions and recommendations to national governments of Europe to improve their educational systems, in particular history education.

The survey that was a very comprehensive one consisted of 48 main questions with 240 articles. The issues that the survey aimed to search were students' "...interest in historical topics, ways of teaching and teaching aids, their associations, attitudes and understanding of history, about ways of teaching, their understanding of historical concepts and expectations for the future" [Leeuw-Roord, 1998: 12] and also the attitudes of young people to history related political issues such as identity, democracy and nationalism. In short, its goal was to make overt that how students in Europe are interpreting and understanding historical information, and how these understandings affect their political attitudes and their expectations for the future.

Thus, the chapter on the Youth and History Project aims to give the outcomes of the questionnaire and try to interpret the most recent situation and problems of history education in Europe and this is done through five different parts. The first part focuses on students' general perceptions of history and Europe. It aims to evaluate the general motivation of students towards history, their preference to learn distant history of intimate one, the meaning of history, students' engagement to religion and interest in politics, their perceptions about different regions in Europe, evaluation of living conditions, welfare, internal conflicts through past and present and their interpretation of European countries in terms of modern or tradition.

The second part of this chapter looks at whether history teaching in Europe is up to date or not through defining modern and traditional history teaching models. In order to answer it is looked at the table outcomes about the current activities in history lessons, the ways in which history is being taught to students, the materials and methods used by teachers, and

² See Appendix A and Appendix B

lastly the preferences/trust/fun of students regarding history lessons' content, methods and aims.

In the third part, the similarities and differences between students and their teachers on issues like teaching methods, approaches and aims of history is studied comparatively because the mere study of students' perceptions and definitions of the problems of history education in Europe cannot provide reliable research outcomes. For this reason, the Youth and History project had prepared a teachers' questionnaire through which it aimed to reach information about teachers' approaches to history, their teaching methods, and their perception of the aim of history. In this part the aim is to find the overlapped or deviated ideas between students and teachers because the outcome could make it possible to answer the question whether the students and the teachers in Europe perceive and understand history lessons in the same way or not in terms of aims of history, methods and materials which are fun to use and at the same time efficient. The investigation of teachers' perceptions are very important because a working and beneficial history education can be done when the perceptions of students and teachers do not differ much and when they reach at a common point regarding history.

The next part focuses on the historical thinking, reasoning and awareness among European students. In general, historical thinking and reasoning both necessitate the perception of, firstly, difference or the "otherness" within time; secondly, perceiving changes as a result of existent differences; thirdly, awareness and acceptance that morality, human values and conditions of behaviors differ within time and change in time; fourthly, the internalization of each difference such as moral, cultural, social, etc are rational when considered in their own time period and lastly it necessitates the ability of present values' comparison between present and past [Körber, 1998]. They are important while taking decisions regarding future. The ability of analyzing the past experiences and to come up with lessons learned from those times can provide many benefits for future moves of countries. Also, the understanding of time as a constant change is necessary to eliminate the bias, prejudices and strict intolerance among societies because people, values, traditions and characteristics do change. So, for a better future in Europe in terms of eliminating inferior superior dichotomies, enemy concepts, etc it is very important for people, in our case for students, to understand the concept of change. Thus, this chapter looks at to what extent European history education achieved to promote these abilities to the pupils.

The last part centers its attention on problems of European history education that are beyond historical perceptions, methods, aims and reasoning. Among them there are the main problems of teachers such as financial problems, lack of teaching materials, preparation time for lessons, administration pressures, lack of teacher training services, lack of students' interest and time for history lessons in curriculum; political constraints like teachers' religious and political affiliations; and the impact of quality and quantity of teaching on students' achievements.

If the investigation of European history education system and the defining of its problems are done only through identifying method, aim and perception-related issues it cannot be a complete research. At this point, the study of history textbooks in European countries is a must condition. For this reason, this project continues with country-specific research of history textbooks and research on "complete history of Europe" book attempts. Regarding the former, it is important to mention that this chapter is not a one-by-one case study of each European county's history textbooks; however, among the mentioned countries there are Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Eastern European countries and Nordic countries. It tries to show the general features of the history textbooks in Europe and compare it among European countries to show how Europe is defined in their history textbooks, the promising developments and negative aspects and also to determine the sense of balance or challenge between European and national approaches in history teaching through history textbooks.

On the other hand, the "complete history of Europe" book and book series attempts involve Norman Davies's *Europe. A History*; Michael Salewski's *History of Europe, States, Nations from Antiquity to the Present;* and the Fischer and Beck's publishing series and their evaluations. This short research on complete European history books is important because it leads further thoughts on the possibility of a generalized, comprehensive, common, and single European history. As asked at the beginning, two of the main questions of this thesis are whether the solutions of European history education problems can be hidden in the elimination of national histories and in the creation of a comprehensive, single common European history for all European countries or not; and whether it is possible to write that kind of history or not. So, this part (together with the outcomes of the Youth and History Survey, history textbooks research) is important in the sense that it provided a clear answer to the questions above. After discussing the first way of looking at and studying the current European history education system and its problems in the course of the Youth and History Survey and history textbooks research and analysis, the second way deals with three aspects of history in national countries such as the addressing of Europe, use and abuse of history and national European experiences that shapes the history education differently in each European nation. The first part of this chapter particularly focus on changing perceptions of Europe among several European nations such as Poland, Denmark and Central and Eastern European countries. The general aim of this part is to show how these countries differ in their perceptions of Europe and which different historical factors or choices affected their different perceptions of Europe. To be more precise, it briefly looks at the national identity construction periods of these countries and tries to understand and analyze how these countries perceive Europe and mirror it in their education systems through teaching strategies and materials as the way they are.

The second aspect that is stated is different uses of history by countries like Romania, Sweden and Russia. The goal is to show how countries used/abused history and history education to realize their aims like political achievements, explaining the rise of violence in their territories and constructing their national identity through the elimination of past identity indoctrinations and mentalities.

The last section in this chapter includes a study of European national experiences of history from the perspectives of Finland, Hungary, Romania, France, Latvia and Wales. The aims of this section are to show how national authorities conceive the aim of history; to show the changes in national curriculums of European countries; to give an idea about the most hotly debated issues in their national systems; to reflect their changing perceptions of history education and to evaluate them whether their systems are promising in terms of promoting European consciousness, wider European perspectives or not.

At the end of the research and analysis of specific European nations, their historical experiences, uses of history and their addressing of Europe, a general evaluation part is added to the project. This part constitutes one of the vital parts of this thesis because it summarizes the features and pitfall of European history education and the current problems embedded in it. More important than defining the problems, it states where the possible answer to the main question of this thesis can be hidden.

To be more precise; today nationalism is totally embedded in Europe's history education. History discipline ontologically includes challenge of subjectivity and complete scientificity. Nationalist history education is still the dominant type in Europe. Teachers and students have both common and diverse problems considering the education system. European nations' historical experiences and current transition processes do affect their perception of Europe, perception of history and its use/abuse; what is more, they do influence the curriculums and the way history is being taught to students. Plus, more importantly, "Europe" is a very ambiguous phenomenon. In bold outline, this is the general picture. And the main question is, as aforementioned, what should be done to European history education, if different human communities, dynasties, royalties of the past and nation states of the present, which spent most of their historical background with wars, conflicts, disagreements and collision, decide to affiliate and unite into a supranational body that aims the construction of a common wider European identity? Can it be solved through the widening of school history textbooks' contents with more European related topics? Is it possible to solve it through a single, common European history book for all European students? Since "Europe" is not a mere geography but associated with many concepts but in particular with an invention, an idea, and identity during the European Union era, can the answer be hidden in somewhere else?

1. ON THE SUBJECT OF NATION and NATIONALISM

In contemporary world and politics, the most universally legitimate value and concept is nations and accordingly nation states and nationalism. All of them, however, are notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze. As Benedict Anderson suggested "...no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists" [Anderson, 1991: 3]. Nevertheless, if it is tried to define nationalism, it is possible to say that nationalism is "...the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as 'neurosis' in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia, rootless in the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world and largely incurable" [Nairn, 1977: 359].

In the early years of the 1980s the origin of nationalism literature shifted from the nation that was at the origin of the objectivist category, to nationalism that was being studied under subjectivist approach due to the changes in historiography, in particular the rise of subjectivity approach with E. H. Carr. The idea of "nationalism is posteriori of nations" replaced with "nation is posteriori of nationalism". In other words, the subjectivist approach argues that nations and nationalism are not natural, historic and ancient phenomena but products of modernity; in particular industrialization, capitalism, technology. Thus, they had to be constructed through certain institutions of power such as states, army, and factories; and through use of other means like maps, census, museums and schools, traditions, common symbols, memories, etc.

The aim of this chapter is not to answer the question of what nation and nationalism are (although through Renan and Balibar these are being explained in brief) and not to give a historical analysis of the development of these concepts throughout time in specific regions. The goal is to show how nations and nationalism emerged and the means of their further construction. To be more specific, the very first chapter of this thesis project looks at the constructivist perspective of nationalism and will show several ways of the construction of nations and nationalism which at the end will directly be linked with the power of nationalism in history education.

There are some influential scholars in subjectivist-constructivist approach of nationalism such as Ernest Renan, Etienne Balibar from the 19th century and, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm in the 20th century. This chapter through focusing on each scholar and their famous pieces of work will show how nations and nationalism are constructed through modernity and the means used to make them indoctrinated, internalized and legitimized by people.

1.1. Theories of Nationalism

The definitions of nations and nationalism, their origins and through which processes they evolved have been addressed in a variety of ways and from very different standpoints. However, among these points of view two schools of thought become most influential in nation and nationalism discussions. These are the essentialist and modernist schools. The essentialist school is divided into two different sub-schools as the primordialists and perennialists.

1.1.1. Primordialists

This early explanation of nationalism is greatly influenced by organic varieties of nationalism. According to primordialists, nations are the natural and primordial divisions of humanity and nationalism is ever-present and universal. They argue that nationalism is a part of human being like genetics and it is natural. Thus, this perception of nationalism makes it to be perceived as old as human history.

Additionally, primordialists believe that nationality cannot be chosen but it is something that is born in it. People's nationalities, in this sense, determine all other political affiliations people may have and who they are. It is not the class a person belongs to or the city a person lives in, but people's nations that matters. Anthony Smith asserted that "...the key to the

nature, power and incidence of nations and nationalism lies in the rootedness of the nation in kinship, ethnicity, and the genetic bases of human existence" [Smith, 1999: 4].³

Primordialists have different types of arguments of nations and nationalism in terms of their focal points. The popular nationalists argue that nations are not only elements of history but of nature; and they are the vital basis of power, will, purity and law. Nations are natural organisms and re-born throughout time. Thus, considering nations as natural and pure this view obviously ignores the role of interaction among societies, intermarriages, colonization and migrations. Also, another type of primordialism argues nations are the real extensions of kinship units and are built up from the nepotistic drives of "inclusive fitness" [Smith, 1999]. Furthermore, in another kind of primordialism, the political significance of biological descent groups are released and it is preferred to highlight "...the overwhelming power of the *primordial tie* attributed to the *givens* of human existence, namely, congruities of blood, speech, custom, religion and territory, *givens* that threatened the dissolve *civil ties* of the modern state" [Smith, 1999: 4-5].

1.1.2. Perennialists

For perennialists, as it is for primordialists, the nation is immemorial but they do not argue that nation is a natural matter; it is not genetically coded but it is so fundamental concept that is existent since human history. People are able to choose their nation to which they belong. In contrast to primordialists who believe that nation is natural; perennialists see nations as ancient origin and as concepts that change structures throughout time (recurrent perennialism).⁴ What is unchanging is the idea and identity of the nation itself.

³ For further details see [Smith, 1999]

⁴ For detailed information see [Smith, 1999]

1.1.3. Modernists

According to modernists, the past is irrelevant in terms of nations and nationalism because nation is a modern phenomenon and the outcome of nationalist ideologies that are constructed throughout industrialization and modernization [Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992]. Nation is a recent concept and novel concept; not natural. Modernists

...regard the era of the French Revolution as marking the moment when nationalism was introduced into the movement of world history. It was then that the ideal of the sovereignty of people was fused with the drive to cultural homogeneity; to forge self-determining nations of co-cultural citizens [Smith, 1999: 6].

Thus, nation and nationalism are totally recent origin; they did not exist for most of the human history but what made them be realized as historical is its delusion [Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1983]. What created the nations were the economic, political and social conditions of the modern era. These were industrialization for Gellner and print capitalism for Anderson.

For this paradigm, nation building is a project because nationalism as a political movement had come before the nations were formed. To materialize this project education, more specifically compulsory schooling, printing and invention of new traditions are used. The aim is of schooling and printing is to make people speak and write the same language; read the same books; and understand in the same way; and with the invention of traditions it is to make people have common memories about the past and have common practices because the materialization of these goals would create a common identity that is national.

1.2. Subjective-Constructivist Discourse of Nationalism

1.2.1. Ernest Renan and "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?"

Ernest Renan is famous for his definition of a nation given in a lecture entitles "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" ("What is Nation?") at Sorbonne in 1882. In this piece of work, he defined the nation through the willingness of people to live together in contrast

to German writers who had defined the nation through objective criteria such as race, language and ethnic group. His methodology in this work is to list commonly accepted criteria of being a nation and criticizing each of them through poignant, empirical and normative perspectives.

According to Ernest Renan a nation is a soul and a spiritual concept, which includes solidarity that emerged through sacrifices, and the conscious forgetting of the genuine past and its reconstruction all the way through fundamental values of a society.

Renan argues that the concept of nation is a very new phenomenon in history [Renan, 1996]. He does not count the societies of antiquity as nations by giving its reasons such as lacking of citizens and central institutions, but being just clans.⁵ During the Roman Empire hegemony, the invasion of Germanic people brought the major principles that are necessary for emergence of nationalities. "The effected little change in the racial stock, but they imposed dynasties and a military aristocracy upon the more or less extensive parts of the old empire of the west, which assumed the names of their invaders" [Renan, 1996: 43], thus this constructed the origins of France, Burgundy, Normandy and Lormandy. As a first step, "the Germanic people adopted Christianity as soon as they underwent any prolonged contact with the Greek or Latin people" [Renan, 1996: 44]. By making this, a kind of equality and common senses emerged between the conqueror and the conquered. The second step was the forgetting of their own language by the conquerors [Renan, 1996]. Thus, this fastened the transformation of societies into nations and Renan wrote this as "the crucial result of all this was that, in spite of the extreme violence of the customs of the German invaders, the mould, which they imposed became, with the passing centuries, the actual mould of the nation" [Renan, 1996: 44]. Renan gives the example of French people. Although there were sharp differences between serf and nobles in courage, education, status; ethnically there were no differences. There was no feeling of the conquered ones that they were in fact conquered; they were just feeling hereditary differences; thus at the end all people in France were naturally French. Therefore, these two factors became the crucial factors of being a nation.

Additionally, Renan underlines that "forgetting...is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation" [Renan, 1996: 45]. The reason is that at the origin of all political formations and in most of the creations of unity there are performances of violence and different usages of brutalities. If these brutalities and violence acts were presented as they happened it would

⁵ For more information see [Renan, 1996: 41-55].

make the emergence of the concept of nation and nationality. It can be said that in the spirit of a nation there are as many things in common and remembered as there are many things that should consciously be forgotten or reconstructed and be reminded to people. "The modern nation is therefore a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts. Sometimes unity had been affected by a dynasty...by the direct will of provinces...sometimes it has been the work of a general consciousness..." [Renan, 1996: 45].

Ernest Renan, after explaining the crucial factors of a nation, begins to discuss the role of dynasty, race, language, religion, material interests and geography and asks the questions below: Can a nation exist without a dynastic principle? Do race and common language indispensable element of being a nation among people? Can religion provide an adequate basis for the constitution of a modern nationality? Do interests suffice to make a nation? By answering these questions, in his article, Renan tries to explain the inadequate things for the creation of nations which in fact cannot be constructed through material tools but a spiritual unity.

First of all, according to Renan a nation can exist without a dynastic code. Further, he supports that "nations which have been formed by dynasties can be separated from them without therefore ceasing to exist" [Renan, 1996: 47]. The reason for that is the mankind's return to the spirit of antiquity and the beginning of supporting his own rights; in short the rise of citizen and patrie. The crucial question Renan asks after on is that from what tangible fact can one derive it? The answer given to that question by some thinkers was the race. According to these people race is fixed and remains firm; thus it constitutes legitimacy. Renan strongly opposes this view and denies the mere role of race in the process of emergence of modern nation states. He suggests "the primordial right of races is as narrow and as perilous for genuine process as the national principle is just and legitimate" [Renan, 1996: 47].⁶ The certainty is that there is no pure race and "ethnographic considerations have...played no part in the constitution of modern nations" because it is fact that communities in the world were established through migrations, thus it is actually not possible of any race to be pure and homogenous [Renan, 1996: 48]. From the historians' point of view, Renan stresses that races are things that are made and unmade and has no applications in politics. In other words, they are socio-cultural constructions just like identities.

⁶ For further information see [Renan, 1996: 46-49]

Besides the empirical explanation, Renan asks that even if it were possible to live in nation a hundred-percent purity, is it a good way to organize political identities? He says, race and ethnicity are important but for zoology and it should not make sense for humans because it is a kind of de-basing and insulting. He further asks, as an individual do people really want to be defined through this criterion whereas justice, freedom, and solidarity do also exist?

The second concept Renan highlights is the language and he mentions that "language invites people to unite, but it does not force them to do so" [Renan, 1996: 50]. It is just like the race. According to him, the will of the people is superior to race and common language in constructing nations. The inferiority of language comes from the fact that it is too ridiculous when people, who has will to become a nation, cannot make it just because they do not know that specific language. Renan also attaches that some people consider language as a symbol of race, thus it is believed that languages are one of the mechanisms of proving who comes from where and which blood. Just like the arguments of races, he asserts that there is no such thing as a pure language and languages are products of long centuries influences' and transformations. They do not exist in vacuum but in social setting, adaptation and sharing. If the language was a criterion, why were America and England not a single nation?

Ernest Renan totally rejects the use of language as a distinctive criterion of nation because prior to anything else, human beings are reasonable and moral before being a member of certain race, language or particular culture. Human beings, at the outset, carry human culture and human spirit [Renan, 1996]. The most important thing is to realize the vitality of the education of human spirit which will improve the will among people to create nations.

The third question is can religion be an adequate basis for the constitution of a modern nationality? Renan's answer is no. According to him, in the past the religion was a state religion. However, there were no masses that believe in a completely homogeneous way. "Each person believes practices in his own fashion...There is no longer a state religion: one can be French, English, or German and be either Catholic, Protestant or orthodox Jewish..." [Renan, 1996: 51]. This means the individualization of religion and turning of religion into personal conscious issue.

The next factor Renan discusses the role the geography in nation building. He states that natural boundaries have decisive role in the division of nations but "it is no more soil that...makes a nation" [Renan, 1996: 52]. The empirical argument of geography was done through emphasizing how constantly the borders have changed throughout history. He believes that the mountains, rivers, lands are inferior when compared to men's will to become a nation. "A nation is a spiritual principle, the outcome of the profound complications of history; it is a spiritual family not a group determined by the shape of the earth" [Renan, 1996: 52].

Plus, a nation can not be constructed through material concepts and interests. It would be a very narrow view of being a member of a nation. It is argued that if nationalism was based on material interests, then why people willingly sacrifice themselves and die for their nations. He believes that there are two factors that constitute a nation. "One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form" [Renan, 1996: 52]. There must be a heroic times of yore and glory as the social capital of a nation. Also, there must be moments of suffering which are more powerful than glorious times regarding binding people together. Renan defines nation, with other words, as "...a large-scale solidarity, constituting by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future..." [Renan, 1996: 53].

What Renan argues basically is that nations are not something eternal; they have their beginning and end; and the necessities of the 19th century made them materialized due to they guarantee liberty of people. To sum up, Renan's notion of a nation is totally a moral conscience and spiritual consciousness of human beings who are bound with common heritages and common future faith, not with material possessions. The most important tool of a nation is the will of people and virtues that human culture carries. A nation is an outcome of a convention of rational and moral people who want and are aware of that the only way to reach legitimacy and gain rights depends on a strong nation and national identity.

1.2.2. Etienne Balibar and "The Nation Form: History and Ideology"

According to Etienne Balibar a nation is formed through fulfillment of a project that consists of different stages and moments of self-awareness. The formation of a nation necessitates a retrospective illusion and institutional realities. The continuing power of myths is one of the factors that lead the emergence of national origins. "The myth of origins and national continuity...which emerged with the end of colonialism is...an effective ideological form, in which the imaginary singularity of national formations is constructed daily, by moving back from present into the past" [Balibar, 1996: 133]. Balibar, in his article, specifies the differences of features of pre-history when compared to modern times' nations, institutional character and impact of capitalism as the factors that affected the construction of a nation.⁷

In the formation of a nation, some features of pre-national era have crucial effects. In other words, the configuration of a nation is the creation of an extensive pre-history. However, this time interval differs from nationalist era. First of all, "it consists of a multiplicity of qualitatively distinct events spread out over time, none of which implies any subsequent event. Second, these events do not of their nature belong to the history of *one* determinate nation" [Balibar, 1996: 133]. This situation is verse in nation states.

The second factor is the institutional character "...with the fact that they cause the state to intervene in the form which it assumed at a particular moment" [Balibar, 1996: 134]. Non-national state structures involuntarily produced the building blocks of nation states through mercantilism, rebirth of Roman law and domestication of feudal aristocracy. All these developments caused the emergence of improved market structures and class relations. Thus, nationalization of society began.

One more factor is the impact of capitalism. Balibar summarized this factor as "every modern nation is a product of a colonization: it has always been to some degree colonized or colonizing, and sometimes both at the same time" [Balibar, 1996: 135]. According to the Dependency (world systems) theory the construction of a nation is not just related with the capitalist market economy but a world economy "...which is always hierarchically organized

⁷ For further information see [Balibar, 1996]

into a 'core' and 'periphery,' each of which have different methods of accumulation and exploitation of labor power, and between which relations of unequal exchange and domination are established" [Balibar, 1996: 134]. In this world system nation states form the whole structure through competing each other with the aim of becoming and dominating the core. Also, Balibar mentions that the configurations of classes, which owned different sectors of world economy and their struggles (different bourgeoisies), not just on economic means explain the nation state formation, naturally the nation. "The privileged status of the nation form derives from the fact that, locally, that form made it possible...for struggles between heterogeneous classes to be controlled and for not only a 'capitalist class' but the bourgeoisies proper to emerge from these..." [Balibar, 1996: 135].

Shortly, in his article Balibar focuses on the initial thresholds of nation building such as the role of capitalism, features of pre-historic times and the role of bourgeoisie. However, more important than these, he explains how the people of a nation were produced and subordination of the existence of the individuals of all classes to their status as citizens of the nation state. In order to explain this process Balibar uses the institution of national-social state as the major tool because this institution has the capacity to intervene all aspects of life by reproducing the economy, forming the individuals and family structures, providing the health conditions of the society; in short, this state controls the private life of the society and produced people of the nations.

The most important question asked by Balibar is "what makes the nation a community?" The answer is the imaginary constitution of people.

Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary...it is based on the projection of individual existence into a weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past...But this comes down to accepting that, under certain conditions, *only* imaginary communities are real [Balibar, 1996: 138].

Thus, people and communities are imaginary concepts. People produce their own nations through creating unities among themselves. This constitution of unity is done by constituting a particular ideology which can be called as patriotism and nationalism. These ideologies are necessary because they increase communication among individuals and also they do not suppress but relativize the differences among individuals and creates symbolic differences among "us and them". Moreover, they construct social solidarity and social

morality among people. This means that to construct a nation it is a necessity to form the external frontiers of states and the notion of "home" for the citizens.

In addition to all above, Balibar mentions "fictive ethnicity" as one of the basis of nation and nation state. According to him,

No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them and dominated by them are ethicized-that is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions [Balibar, 1996: 140].

In other words, ethnicity is a constructed concept in order to make it possible for the expression of a pre-existing unity to be seen in the state and in order to idealize politics. Through the construction of ethnicity, national ideology can rationalize and justify the state for controlling the populations. In short, this fictive ethnicity legitimizes the state control, creates sense of natural belonging in the community and sublimes the ideal nation.

Balibar defines the two tools of creating this fictive ethnicity as language and race. According to him, language has the power of connecting people in a common origin "...which may at any moment be actualized and which has as its content the common act of spoken language and the whole, constantly self-renewing mass of written and recorded texts" [Balibar, 1996: 141]. Furthermore, he connects the national formation and development of schools as popular institutions because schools, by using the advantage of common language create socialization of individuals. That is to say, "schooling is the principle institution which produces ethnicity as linguistic community" [Balibar, 1996: 142]. Thus, mother tongue is the model of common origin and usage of it improves love, belonging, commitment among people and at the end it leads the emergence of nation and national identity.

However, as a critique of language, first of all, it is not enough to produce ethnicity by its own. The reason is that "the language community is a community in the present, which produces the feeling that it has always existed, but which lays down no destiny for the successive generations. Ideally it 'assimilates' anyone, but hold no one" [Balibar, 1996: 143].

The second tool is being a part of a common race for the construction of fictive ethnicity. The first feature of race is that it is not related with its applicability and practicability like language, and because of this Balibar defines it as a second-degree fiction. "Whereas the language community can only create equality between individuals by simultaneously 'naturalizing' the social inequality of linguistic practices, the race community dissolves social inequalities in an even more ambivalent 'similarity'; it ethicizes the social difference which is an expression of irreconcilable antagonisms by lending it the form of a division between the 'genuinely' and the 'falsely' national" [Balibar, 1996: 143]. To be exact, race creates a king of bond with the process of transmission of individual filiations among generations.

Balibar, after explaining these two tools-language and race-as the major constructors of fictive ethnicity focuses on the importance of family structuring and schooling regarding fictive ethnicity. With the deepening power of the state in societies the "family" is controlled by the state and became a channel for establishing fictive ethnicity. With the nationalization of the family, sense of belonging in the community shifted from common antecedents to common descendants [Balibar, 1996]. Through this way, one of the biggest problems of creating a nation that is "forgetting" was eliminated and nationality and nationalism were depended on much secured grounds.

Another shift was experienced from "family-church dyad to the family-school dyad" [Balibar, 1996]. Balibar proposes that the importance of family and school "...does not derive solely from the functional place they take in the reproduction of labor power, but from the fact that they subordinate that reproduction of the constitution of a fictive ethnicity- that is, to the articulation of a linguistic community and a community of race implicit in population policies (what Foucault called by a suggestive but ambiguous term the system of 'bio-power')" [Balibar, 1996: 146]. In other words, schooling helps to "verbalization of race" and race helps to "racialization of language"; both of them, in this way, construct fictive ethnicity that creates concept of nationalism.

To sum up, Balibar, while discussing nationalism, proposes that this concept can only be constructed through fictive ethnicity that is based on new definitions of race, language and newly constructed or changed channels like family and school. The material, sociological and biological basis are not sufficient to create national identity. What is needed is the usage of the power of rhetoric, because ideas and created opinions matter more than people imagine and realize. Balibar tries to prove that sometimes the more things look unreal, the more they become powerful. Therefore, as the ethnicity depends more on fiction and depends more on construction by powerful channels like state and public opinion, it becomes successful creating a national identity and nationalism. In conclusion, it can be said that Renan conceptualized the "nation" as a soul and spiritual concept which is constructed through sacrifices, forgetting and rewriting of common past, construction of fundamental values of the society. When compared to Balibar, Renan seems giving less importance to institutions-it can be pronounced as the lack of agencies-, constructive channels and the role of powerful state in nation construction process; because according to Balibar, these mechanisms play more important role in the construction of the concept of nation and nationalism among people. Balibar believes that construction of a nation entails stages of processes and institutions (state, school, family) whereas in Renan the focus point is the people and their common will.

For Renan the common religion, language, geography, and race are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a nation building process, because people from different religions, people who speak different languages and who do not live in the same territories may have the "will" of being and constituting a nation. Thus, if these factors are defined as the concrete conditions of being a nation, they may prevent emergence of nations. Because of this risk Renan depended his theory on the will and consent of the people and defines a nation as a spiritual family whereas, for Balibar, what matters more is the leading role of the state and other mechanism in creating the "illusionary people" and "fictive ethnicity". Additionally, the role of economics, particularly the role of capitalism, is pronounced in Balibar's nationalism when compared to Renan. In short, for both these two thinkers nationalism is a constructed and created concept; however, for Renan the constructive channel is people, their will, possession of common memory, desire to live together and solidarity whereas for Balibar the channels are the state, school and family, which will construct the illusion, the unreal which is more stronger than the reality, that is the fictive ethnicity, the illusion and the imaginary people. To put it differently, Renan has an interpretation of nationalism from the "demand" side whereas Balibar has an interpretation from the "supply" side of nationalism.

1.2.3. Ernest Gellner and "Nations and Nationalism"

"There is an enormous difference between a world of complex, intertwined, but not neatly overlapping patterns of power and culture, and a world consisting of neat political units, systematically and proudly differentiated from each other by 'culture', and all of the striving, with a great measure of success, to impose cultural homogeneity internally. These units, linking sovereignty to culture, are known as nation-states" [Gellner, 1996: 98] and during the 19th and 20th centuries the emergence of nation states and the coming of nationalism were very significant social transformations. Ernest Gellner based his theory of nationalism on three major stages of society as pre-agrarian, agrarian (agro-literate) and industrial societies and the role of structures and culture in the construction of nations and nationalism. Specifically, he argues that nations emerge only in the industrial societies such as homogeneity, standardization, mobility and literacy could provide the emergence of nations and nationalism. What created nations, for Gellner, was the transition from the notion of "being" in agro literate societies to "knowing" of industrial societies and the balance among them [Szporluk, 1998].

1.2.3.1. Agro-Literate Society

Agro-literate society does have several characteristics specific to itself. It is a society based on agriculture that means food production and storage. It has a fairly stable technology in which innovation and progress do happen from time to time.

The society is free of general idea...that nature forms an intelligible system susceptible to exploration, which when successful engenders a powerful new technology...the society was *not* that of an ever-increasing comprehension and mastery over nature (as in ours), justifying the expectation of perpetual improvement in the human condition [Gellner, 1996: 99].

In other words, there was a stable partnership between nature and society in which nature both provided materials and justified the social order and arranged it. Moreover, the values of the members of the society are mostly shaped on coercion and hierarchy. The change in society is not through efficiency of production but linked to status; in short the society is based on ascribed status. Very shortly, "A man is his *rank*" in agro-literate societies [Gellner, 1996: 101].

Due to agro-literate societies' Malthusian condition in the sense that the production capacities were limited and the population is getting increased, there are socially controlled access to the guarded storage-centers and as it is easy to guess, higher ranked people have the privilege. Plus, the order is being maintained through coercion and consent and their work in conjunction.

The pre-literate societies are endowed not only with a stable agricultural base but also with literacy. Gellner states that writing is a technique of the recording and retrieval of data, ideas and information. Pre-literate societies are not devoid of these techniques of preservation of affirmations and meanings; they are maintained by ritual and repetition. Due to scope of preservation is rituals and repetitions in this kind of societies, literacy becomes a tool of status differentiation between high rank people and lower ones [Gellner, 1983].

In agrarian societies culture is dynamic due to its production through daily practices and conversations and due to the lack of preservation. However, this culture is the culture of low ranks because high rank culture is being recorded through writing and as a result it becomes more rigid, standardized and stable. For this reason, another characteristic of this society becomes obvious: a constant "...tension between a high culture, transmitted by formal education, enshrined in texts and setting up socially transcendent norms, and, on the other hand, one and more low cultures, incarnated only in living practice, and not in that disembodied form of speech known as writing, and hence incapable of rising above actual practice" [Gellner, 1996: 102]. Thus, in this kind of society, cultural differences just like literacy, define positions and ranks of people within society and they can control the access and escape from the society and certain ranks.

The culture of agrarian society lies in a system of differentiated ranks and statuses. The discontinuities of speech, dress, consumption and manners are the cultural signals of this kind of a society. In short, culture is not homogenous, but based on heterogeneity and it is not for uniting society, but defining diversities and dividing. There is no attempt to standardize culture and in fact, it is reacted when it is tried to do so. The reason behind this differentiation, for the higher ranks, is based on to protect themselves against emulation from below; for the lower ranks, to acquire cultural uniqueness in comparison with geographic neighbors of parallel status. Diversity also brings benefit for the rulers in terms of ruling the societies. "Cultural specificity helps to allocate people to their social and geographical niche, inhibits the emergence of far-flung and possibly dangerous identities and loyalties. 'Divide and rule' policies are easy to implement if culture in any case already divides the population" [Gellner, 1996: 104].

In short, the most striking feature of pre-modern societies are "...the co-existence within them of multiple, not properly united, but hierarchically related sub-worlds, and the existence of special privileged facts, sacralized and exempt from ordinary treatment" [Gellner, 1983: 21]. The agro-literate societies do not share culture to form political units. The notion of nation is more probable to indicate a loose corporate body, the politically enfranchised gentry of a certain territory, those dedicated to take part in politics, than the sum of participants in a culture. To put it differently, nation is only a political not cultural category in agrarian societies. "Political hierarchies and cultural networks simply are not mediate and unified by something called 'nationality'" [Gellner, 1996: 105].

1.2.3.2. Advanced Industrial Society

This type of society is actually what now exists in the world. It is totally different from the agro-literate society in terms of its characteristics. First of all, its economic foundation is self-consciously based on sustained, constant innovation and on an exponential expansion in productive resources and production. Nature is manipulated by human beings and it is a source of ever-growing affluence. More, nature is not a source of legitimating principles of the social order but economic growth is. It is no more a Malthusian society because production is no more limited with a certain extent. The culture of advanced industrial societies is no more based on birth and ascribed status. Gellner asserts this situation by saying "Human beings are usable only if educated, and education is expensive. Quality not quantity of personnel counts, and quality depends on the machinery of cultural production of men, in other words on 'education'. Offspring are not valued by authority for their military or productive potential, or by parents as a form of insurance. Offspring are expensive and must compete, often unsuccessfully, with other forms of satisfaction and indulgence" [Gellner, 1996: 106]. Plus, physical work in any pure form has disappeared in industrial societies in contrast to agrarian ones. Physical work turned into controlling, running and maintaining a machine through complicated control systems and even it turned out to be the fast operation of meaning through computers, telephones, etc [Gellner, 1983].

All these changes reflect to the composition of culture and re-definition of symbols in advanced industrial societies. Context is erased by the method of communication due to the lessening of face-to-face interactions and universal, standardized and context-free communication system emerged. "...meaning cannot be transmitted by the body posture, identity, tone, location of the speaker, or the timing or context of delivery. Status can neither contribute to meaning, nor be reinforced by it" [Gellner, 1996: 106]. Therefore, the emergence of context-free communication necessitated the elimination of local idiosyncratic context and the replacement of it with a standardized sensitivity to meaning. Gellner states this change makes the high culture become the invasive, operational culture of a whole society and it would be provided through formal mass schooling. In short, because work has become semantic and requires impersonal, context-free communication; this requirement necessitates the sharing of the same rules for decoding messages and it can only be done through sharing the same culture that was of high-culture and can only be acquired through formal schooling for each member of the society.

The advanced industrial society is based on innovation and constant transformation of the occupational structures as aforementioned. The most important roles are bureaucratic positions and positions in the productive systems all of which are unstable. For this reason, members of the society must compete to live and gain status. Gellner, regarding the elimination of ascribed status and replacement of it with achieved status, mentions that this new industrial society includes the base line of egalitarianism due to providing equal chances for its members through promoting education to improve their merits and competency.

In the very essence of the system of advanced industrial societies, the recognized rules of operation of the society both at work and in politics permit and in particular require members of the society have the same culture which must be standardized, homogenized, disciplined and achieved by education that "turns the biological raw material into an acceptable and serviceable cultural product..." and that can only by realized under the responsibility of states, the only agencies competent of carrying out, supervising and shielding this operation [Gellner, 1996: 109]. Thus, states of the industrial societies become the protectors of high cultures, idioms and symbols and nationalism automatically becomes the demand that each state succor and contain one and only one nation.

So, what can be derived out from Gellner's types of societies regarding nations and nationalism is that economic change requires cultural homogeneity and that demand for cultural homogeneity and the state apparatus to provide it, is what derives nationalism. "The stress of the Reformation on literacy and scriptualism, its onslaught on a monopolistic priesthood...its individualism and links with mobile urban populations, all make it a kind of harbinger of social features and attitudes which...produce the nationalist age" [Gellner, 1983, pp. 40-41]. Thus, nationalism appears in the transition from the agro-literate to the industrial stage of human history. The very essence of Gellner's theory is that industrialism demands a homogeneous high culture; a homogenous high culture demands an education system; an educational system demands a state which maintains supervises and protects it; and the demand for such a state is nationalism. Industrialization begets nationalism, and nationalism begets nations [Gellner, 1983].

However, it is important to realize that Gellner's nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, although this is how nationalism does definitely present itself. In reality, nationalism is the outcome of a new type of social organization, based on extremely internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each are protected by its own state. To put it differently, nationalism is

...the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions new prevailing, through admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world...it determines the *norm* for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world: most of them must satisfy the imperatives of nationalism... [Gellner, 1983: 49].

To be more specific, nationalism uses and indeed "selects" the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures and it frequently "transforms" them radically. It revives the dead languages, invents traditions and creates fictitious pristine histories to provide the continuation of industrial societies.

What is more, there is a significant contradiction between what really happens in the construction of nationalism and its affirmation. More precisely, as aforementioned nationalism is basically all about the general imposition of high culture, its symbols and idioms on previously low cultures. So, it is about the generalized dispersion of education or "school-mediated" idioms and codes to provide the progress of bureaucracy and technology in industrial societies. The end product of it is the construction of "…anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by micro-groups themselves" [Gellner, 1983: 57]. Although this is what happens, the affirmation is different. The affirmation is that the culture of nations is an "assumed" folk culture and the origin of symbols is based on the pristine life of peasants. However, the case is not the continuance of original folk culture, but

its reinvention and redefinition through the values of high culture. Thus, the construction of nationalism and the nation is all about the deception of the masses by high culture; and the self-deception of the end product society in terms of affirming cultural continuity [Gellner, 1983].

To recap, although Gellner's seems too functionalist, the processes causing nationalism are too general, the nationalism is limited with industrialization, and the theory cannot explain the resurgence of nationalism in post-industrial societies, it can be considered a very influential piece of work in nationalism literature and discourse. In other words, Gellner, besides the pitfalls of his theory, makes people realize that nationalism is very complex phenomenon and yet protean in its materialization; nations, as well as nationalism are modern phenomena in the sense that they are the necessary conditions of modern industrial world. What is more, nations and nationalism are real and powerful sociological phenomena, even if their reality is quite different from the story told about them by nationalists themselves.

1.2.4. Benedict Anderson and the "Imagined Communities"

Benedict Anderson is one of the most influential figures of modernist school of nationalism with his book "*Imagined Communities*". He mainly argues that nationalism is the result of the fusion between the decline of religion, human diversity; the new perception of time; the development of capitalism and the technology of printing. Nations developed as a necessary component of industrial industry and gives special emphasis on the constructed nature of culture and particularly on the role of print-capitalism concerning the development of nations and nationalism.

Anderson begins his theory by stating that nation is a phenomenon that has to be imagined. The nation

...is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion... The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet. It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the

divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the (direct relationship) between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state. Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings [Anderson, 1983: 6-7].

The main causes of the nationalism that derives from the imagined community can be listed as the reduction of privileged access to particular script languages due to mass literacy, the movement to abolish the ideas of rule by divine right and hereditary monarchs and the emergence of print press capitalism that all began with the Industrial Revolution and modernization.

In Western Europe the 18th century brought both the rise of the age of nationalism and the end of religious modes of thought due to the impact of the Enlightenment. The demise of the religious thought systems necessitated a secular transformation which would bring continuity and meaning and this transformation, for Anderson was the idea of nation [Anderson, 1983]. Specifically, "nation has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which...it came into being", that is religious communities and dynastic realm.

1.2.4.1. Religious Communities and Dynastic Realm

Since the 17th century sacred monarchy began to decline due to the impact of capitalism, the Enlightenment, modernization and the French Revolution. These developments led people to search for new belongings other than dynasties and the nation turned out to be the option.

According to Anderson, religious communities were imaginable through the medium of their sacred language and written scripts. The language was sacred because it was God's words. The existence of sacred language had made them consider themselves unique and central; and at the origin of history. However, with the exploration of non-European world and the demise of Latin which was the language of high culture through printing press decreased the power of religiously imagined communities. The printing press has ended the hegemony of Latin and led the increase and spread of vernacular languages. Thus, the outcome was that "...the fall of Latin exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized" [Anderson, 1983: 19].

1.2.4.2. Change in Conception and Perception of Time

The "reality" of sacred religious communities had been defined through visual and aural figuring like visual arts because the majority of the population was illiterate. The conception of time was not based on rational reasoning in terms of cause and effect relationship and there was no definite separation between the past and the present, because the time and its periods were linked through the will of divine powers. The time was Messianic time and people were not aware of any kind of "simultaneity" like the perception of two different events at the same time. Their notion of simultaneity was between the past and present because religious conception of time had been constructed like this [Anderson, 1983]. However, the dissolution of religious communities brought "homogeneous empty time" in which "…simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross time, market not by prefiguring sand fulfillment but temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar" [Anderson, 1983: 24].

1.2.4.3. Print-Capitalism

The emergence of "homogenous empty time" was a vital point in the birth of imagined community of the nation because it created two forms of imagining with the impact of printing: Newspaper and novel [Anderson, 1983]. These two imaginings became the means of representing the nation. Anderson argued that the development of print-as-commodity is the key of totally novel ideas of simultaneity; print changed the appearance and state of the world for people. The heroes created in novels and the news from different parts of communities and even world created familiar landscapes, people, and events for the readers and they showed the outside world. The heroes became the representatives of communities and lead further homogenization among people. Newspapers, as Anderson stated, turned out

to be "one-day best seller" or a substitute of modern man's daily prayers and created an imagined world that was rooted in everyday life of people [Anderson, 1983]. In short, the consumption of the same language, particularly the vernaculars, events, places and their standardization and increased familiarity of them increased national consciousness among the members of the communities; thus, print capitalism created nations.

The print-languages created national consciousness among the members of communities. "First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars..." People who did not understand one another in face-to-face meetings, over time, began to understand their languages through print-languages. This made people more aware about the world and standardized their perceptions; at the end people became familiar each other. In short, this provided the existence of the notion of common temporality and spatiality. "...Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation...Third, print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars" [Anderson, 1983: 44-45].

The general expansion of literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machineries during the 19th century caused the emergence of new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification within each dynastic realm; thus new impulses for the creation of nations and nationalism such as folklore, popular epic poetry, dictionary publishing, music and mass education. [Anderson, 1983].

Languages were made compulsory as the language of instruction and language courses were added to the curriculums because speaking nation's language in a correct way without any accent considered a significant component of being a nation. Plus, state-controlled primary education became compulsory. The significance of these practices were hidden in the fact that through controlling language and education, it is possible to construct values, opinions and identities and control them. As Anderson stated "It is always a mistake to treat languages in the that certain nationalist ideologues treat them as *emblems* of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk-dances and the rest. Much, the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect *particular solidarities*" [Anderson, 1983: 133].

Plus, three institutions of power; census, mapping and museums were constructed to serve for the same goal. Anderson calls these and additionally the state-organized propaganda,

official re-writing of history and militarism as "official nationalism" [Anderson, 1983].⁸ Through census, the national authorities get knowledge the human beings whom they rule; through mapping they could legitimize expansionist moves and colonies; and through museums the legitimacy of ancestry was provided. Therefore, the idea of nation is situated firmly in all print languages and nation-ness is virtually indivisible from political consciousness.

Consequently, Benedict Anderson explains the construction of nation and nationalism through the demise of religious communities, the lessening human diversity, the new conception of time, the rise of capitalism and specifically through the emergence of print-capitalism. To put it differently, the loosening power of Latin as a script-language (or the rise of new vernaculars and their spread through print-capitalism); the demise of the sacred monarchs (or the rise of more secular authorities) and the end of Messianic time (or the emergence of homogenous empty times) created "...a new way of linking fraternity, power and time" which solely lied in nations [Anderson, 1983: 36].

1.2.5. Eric Hobsbawm and "The Invention of Tradition"

Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger begin their book, "The Invention of Tradition", by saying that

'Traditions' which appear or claim to be old are quite recent in origin and sometimes invented... 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past [Hobsbawm, 1983: 1].

In invented traditions there are references to historic past and these references are about continuity and this continuity not actually fictitious but based on historical facts. "It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant, that makes the 'invention of tradition' so interesting for historians of the past two centuries" [Hobsbawm, 1983: 2].

⁸ For further and detailed information see [Anderson, 1983]

Since the Industrial Revolution, there seems to be three overlapping types of inventions of tradition as Hobsbawm defines. The ones to establish or symbolize social cohesion or the membership of groups, real of artificial communities; secondly, to establish or legitimize institutions, status or relations of authority, and lastly those to provide socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and convention of behavior [Hobsbawm, 1983].

Inventing traditions is about to create formalization and ritualization in present time in reference to the past and the repetition of these references. The relation between nationalism and invented traditions lies in the fact that traditions are being invented more frequently during rapid social transformations or during the destruction of social patterns "...for which 'old' traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated: in short, when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or the supply side" [Hobsbawm, 1983: 4].

The invention of traditions is mostly about the use of ancient materials for new purposes. To put it differently, existing customary traditional practices such as folksongs, official rituals, symbols, etc are being modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the new purposes and this was the trend in the 19th century for new national purposes such as the creation of national identity and legitimizing of the state and its authority. The authorities in nation states were taking the traditional folk songs or religious hymns and changed them through including patriotic, epic and romanticized lyrics. Thus, automatically previously-used traditional materials began to serve for new ideas. Hobsbawm lists means of these powerful ritual formations as "festival pavilions, structures for the display of flags, temples for offerings, processions, bell-ringing, tableaux, gun-salutes, government delegation in honor of the festival, dinners, toasts and oratory" [Hobsbawm, 1983: 6]. In addition to the use of past symbols, traditions and adapting them for present concerns; there were also new symbols, during the construction of nationalism, invented such as the national flag, anthem, and the personification of the nation in symbol or image.

One of the reasons of the 19th century invention of traditions is because the long term inadaptability of pre-industrial ways to a society revolutionized beyond a certain point. Another reason for the invention of traditions is that the old traditions can become obstacles for progress or create militant adversaries. For example, the pre-national societies' linguistic and ethnic diversities could not provide progress in nationalism project due to nations could

only be realized through the achievement of homogenization and standardization of society's members.

The invented traditions compared to the old traditions and customs are quite unspecific in terms of the values, rights and obligations they indoctrinate to the members of the society such as patriotism, duty, loyalty and the school spirit. Hobsbawm argues the vital element in them is the creation of universally sensitive, emotional and symbolic signs of a particular "club membership". "The National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty, and as such they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves they reflect the entire background, thought, culture of a nation" [Hobsbawm, 1983: 11].

The invented traditions do mostly fill the space left from the old traditions and customs. So, they are mostly not created from vacuum but are invented through the new interpretations or re-modifications of old traditions because the past as a model looses it relevance in terms of being a model and creating a common memory; however, the practices of it can be applied with a change. According to Hobsbawm, the means to indoctrination of the invented traditions (such as flags, images, ceremonies, music) mostly done through schools and army because these are the public forms of socialization.

The invented traditions shed light on the human's relations with the past. All invented traditions use history, as much as possible, as a legitimator of acts or cement of group unity.

The element of invention is a significant part of nationalism and history since the history became a part of the fund of knowledge of the ideology of nation, state or movements. The invented traditions are not what actually preserved in popular memory but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so. Yet all historians are engaged in inventing traditions inasmuch as they contribute, consciously or not, to the creation , dismantling and restructuring of images of the past which belong not only to the world of specialist investigation but to the public sphere of man as a political being [Hobsbawm, 1983: 13].

And this is where the relationship of history, nationalism and education becomes interlinked.

Consequently, modern nations and all their impedimenta usually assert that they are rooted in the remotest antiquity, and in opposition to their construction, they argue human communities are natural as to require no definition other than self-assertion. What subjectively composites the modern nation involves such constructs and inventions and they are associated with quite modern recent symbols and subjective discourse such as national history that is indoctrinated to society mostly through education, in particular history education. Then, the concept of nation or nationalism cannot be understood if the invention of traditions and their vitality in the construction of nations and nationalism are not accepted.

1.3. Concluding Remarks

According to the modernist constructivist discourse of nationalism, the nation is not a perennial and natural category but a necessary product of modernization and its impedimenta, because it is the vital reason behind the continuance of capitalist production and industry. In other words, nations and nationalism had to be constructed due to the pre-modern traditions and societal organization were no more compatible with modernity and capitalism; plus they could no more satisfy the demand of the new economic and political system. Religious identifications had to be eliminated and societal harmonization and belonging to territoriallybounded units had to be materialized. Thus, three ties emerged as necessary conditions of nations and nationalism that had to be constructed. These were "...a 'memory of some common past...as a 'destiny' of the group-or at least of its core constituents;...a destiny of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it;...a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society" [Hroch, 1996: 79]. So, according to subjective-modernist discourse of nationalism, the way they would be materialized passed through creating a large social group-that is nation- through combination of several objective relationships, such as economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical and historical, and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness [Hroch, 1985]. This creation was done by the formation, construction and invention of collective myths, traditions; language; historical selections; ethnic territorializations; cultural assimilations; economic unification; legal standardization; and mass public schooling [Smith, 1999].

The significance of these processes concerning the main theme of this thesis, the history education, lies in the fact that nations and nation states controlled history writing and re-write them according to their needs. It was also necessary because the new nation-state system was also a significant project of identity creation that is national identity. All of these will be studied and analyzed in the further chapters with detail. However, for now, concerning the

theories mentioned above, it is important to know that the transition to a wider-European perspective in history education as the main argument of this thesis cannot be provided or even discussed by ignoring nationalism that is constructed and strengthened significantly through education and continues for at least 200 years.

2. SOCIAL SCIENCES THROUGHOUT HISTORY

The basis for today's social sciences in Europe including creating a system of research, training and analysis goes back to the nineteenth century. Although the main themes of this thesis is confined as history, historiography, in particular European history and its education, it is vital to know the historical development of the social sciences, their institutionalization processes, internal and external factors that gave their contemporary forms and the impact Europe in their construction in order to analyze the relationship of history, nationalism and education with politics and supranational movements. For this chapter, I heavily preferred to make use of the book *Open the Social Sciences* written by *the Gulbenkian Commission* about the development of the social sciences from nineteenth century until today due to its objective approach to the topic as much as possible and understandable compendious explanations which will make the reader learn and understand more due to its choice of chronology as an approach of explanation.

The steps of this development have been studied by the Gulbenkian Commission in two different time intervals. One is from 18th century until 1945 and the second one is from 1945 until today. This chapter will follow the same categorization by taking 1945 as a crossroad due to three major changes that happened; firstly in the world political order, secondly in the productive capacity of the human activities and lastly in the number of universities and their expansion, all of which will be covered in detail in the further pages. In the conclusion part, the general evaluation of this historical development will be done by defining the current problems and offerings to solve them in order to comprehend the connection between scientificity, search for objective truth and politics of Europe.

2.1. Historical Development of the Social Sciences from the 18th century to 1945

The classical view of science was built on two bases. The first one was the Newtonian model, in which the relation of past and future was symmetrical. This was a quasi-theological vision: like God, we can reach certitudes, and therefore do not need to distinguish between past and future because according to this basis, everything coexisted in an eternal present. The second premise was Cartesian dualism in which there is a fundamental distinction between nature and humans, between matter and mind, between the physical world and social/spiritual world [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 2].

Before the eighteenth century, theology and a-secular approaches were the main areas in which knowledge was constructed. The compatibility of new knowledge with the religious offerings was indispensable. The new improvements in intellectual world had to coincide with the spiritual world and its doctrines. For this reason, during the beginning of the construction of natural sciences in the 17^{th} and 18^{th} centuries, science and philosophy which was very much related with theology were not distinguished strictly by people who attempted to establish the legitimacy and priority of the scientific search for the laws of nature although they considered themselves as the searchers of secular truth. Nevertheless, with the rise and expansion of empirical work natural sciences started to become distinct from philosophy. However, it was not only natural scientists adored themselves to find the secular truth but also there were social scientists who shared the same goal. As the Gulbenkian Commission mentioned "Social science is an enterprise of the modern world. Its roots lie in the attempt, full-blown science since the sixteenth century, and part and parcel of the construction of our modern world, to develop systematic, secular knowledge about reality that is somehow validated empirically" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 2].

Although the goals were the same, natural sciences and social sciences were not considered in 'separate but equal' spheres. By the beginning of the 19th century in Europe the natural sciences had the higher rank in this hierarchical system. The knowledge produced by social scientists considered as all unreal, in other words products of imagination. "Finally, in the beginning of nineteenth century, the triumph of science was ensconced linguistically. The term

'science' without specifying adjective came to be equated primarily (often exclusively) with natural science' [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 5].

The struggle over the legitimate knowledge was not the only debate. The other major issue was who would control the knowledge and its construction. As it is easy to guess, considering the political environment of the end of the 18th century and throughout the 19th century and rise of nationalism, the state would hold this role. The entrance of the state and its concentrated existence both in natural and social sciences changed many things in the system. The reason of these changes (such as the materialization of new categories of knowledge, replacement of the faculty of theology with department of religious studies etc.) was, to put it with the words of the Gulbenkian Commission Report, "the need of the modern state for more exact knowledge on which to base its decisions... "[Wallerstein et al, 1996: 6]. What is more, the universities as the places where knowledge was being produced by the scientists were the selected institutional settings in which the aim would be realized. In short, nation states used universities as a means to legitimize their policies and in order to do these, they transformed universities into modern structures of knowledge in which knowledge were to be built in diverse autonomous disciplines which "...was premised on the belief that systematic research required skilled concentration on the multiple separate arenas of reality, which was practitioned rationally into distinct groupings of knowledge. Such a rational division promised to be effective, that is, intellectually productive" [Wallerstein et al, 1996: 7]. In other words, the aim of multiple disciplines was to secure and advance the objective knowledge about reality and to learn the truth, not invent it. In this new system the multiplicity of the disciplines and especially the positive sciences became the proof of liberation from theology, and explaining reality.

Of course, the only concern in social sciences was not their development and expansion for the sake of science. There was something more behind their rise. It was the French Revolution in 1789 and its reflection in the society of all Europe. This event necessitated the political and social transformation in order to bring the natural order of social life back. "...the solution lie rather in organizing and rationalizing the social change that now seemed to be inevitable in a world in which the sovereignty of the 'people' was fast becoming the norm, no doubt hoping thereby to limit its extent. But if one were to organize and rationalize social change, one had first of all to study it and understand the rules which governed it" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 8]. Thus, social sciences not only rise as a contribution to science but also it was an urgent social need for the 19th century's Europe. As a result, no matter the reasons behind, the expansion of the institutions of knowledge both in numbers and their impact in the society and the acceptance of new ways of producing knowledge led to professionalization of knowledge and made it a permanent structure of society and this considered as one of the most important developments of the 19th century in the field of science. This process of institutionalization took place in five main locales that had most of the universities in their borders with the highest prestige: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. Plus, the major disciplines were history, economics, sociology, political science and anthropology. It is important to know that "although the underpinnings of the divisions within the social sciences were clearly crystallizing in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was only in the period 1850-1914 that the intellectual diversification reflected in the disciplinary structures of the social sciences was formally recognized in the principal universities in the forms that we know them today" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 12-13].

Among these major disciplines *history* was the first social science discipline to achieve an autonomous institutional existence. The historians placed history between the natural sciences and humanities, as the study of social realities. "...as historians from Leopold von Ranke to J. H. Hexter have maintained, that the subject matter and the methods of history differ fundamentally from those of the natural sciences, that 'history, as it is practiced, is a rule-bound discipline with rules and a rhetoric different from those of scientific explanation, i.e., of explanations in the natural sciences'" [Iggers, 1975: 4-5]; however, what is common both in historians and scientists is that the methods of inquiry and rules of explanations-although their ways can differentiate- are governed by inter-subjectively acceptable rules of inquiry.

History was not a new practice, it can be stated that it is a phenomena, which is more or less 2500 years old. In fact, it was a practice of the past accounts and it can be considered a tool of the ones in power because of the huge encouragement behind hagiography. However, 19th century brought many changes to history. History was a tool of justifying monarchs but with the 19th century it became a "true" story of the past, explaining the present and a path that gives ideas for the future. The new discipline of history was searching for 'what really happened' in Ranke's term, it was no more filled with story telling and it was-actually reflected by nation states as- no more the arena in which powerful people were given legitimization and power. In order to realize this goal, the way data was collected renovated. Now history began to be done through the collection of empirical archival data and methods which would protect the objectivity compared to the previous methods. The Gulbenkian Commission's report puts this

change in words by saying that locus of reading and reflection replaced with the loci of research in the 19^{th} century [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996].

The emphasis of historians on the use of archives to be objective and scientific methods to be able to reach the truth were the best parts of the development. In the nineteenth century, in contrast to past, historians preferred not to engage in justifying the kings, princes and the concepts or people related to empires but they found themselves in justifying nations, nation states, the sovereigns and the peoples. Although this issue will be discussed in the next chapters with detail, it is important to become conscious about the nation state as the sole holder and producer of the "objective" knowledge and as the most trustful institution in the world of science.

Other than history, the rise of *economics* as a discipline was the subject of the 19th century. At first, in the 18th century it was called as political economy but then by the second half of 19th century the adjective 'political' was erased. The reason was that the erasing process of the "political" would make economy a universal discipline which would be out of the borders of a socially constructed institutions and which could strongly argue the spontaneity and universality of laizze-faire system.

In the 19th century Germany had a discipline called *Staatswissenschaften* which meant sciences of the state and which had included economic history, jurisprudence, economics and sociology. The main attempt was to search for the rules governing social systems [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996]. In other words, this field tried to create a space of understanding that is responsible for providing knowledge to the states. In the beginning of the 1920s, this field's name replaced with *Sozialwissenschaften* that meant social sciences.

Other than history and economics, in the second half of the 19th century, one more discipline that was invented by August Comte and was a positivist one, emerged: *Sociology*. Its origin came out of the institutionalization of universities and social reformers who were generally dealing with urban working class population and their problems. However, by time, sociology elucidated its topic areas as ordinary people and the outcomes of modernity on societies [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996]. *Political science* followed sociology in terms of materialization. The Commission pointed out that the reason of the emergence of this faculty is "…not because its subject matter, the contemporary state and its politics, but primarily because of the resistance of faculties of law to yield their monopoly in this arena" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 19]. Political science both allowed, at first to Europe, the emergence of a claim that was

a past belonging up to Greeks and gave a chance to read ancient authors. Moreover, it legitimized economy as a separate discipline which believed that state and market had different rationale in their functioning, says the Commission [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996].

The subject matters of these four major disciplines, at first, were limited to their own histories, economies, societies and peoples which were totally European. However, universities were not merely composed of these disciplines. There were others which studied the non-European societies and their politics, economies, peoples and dynamics. These disciplines can be listed as anthropology, Oriental studies, psychology and geography. The scholars who made research about them were Europeans. In other words, colonizers studied and made research about their colonies. To be more specific, history, economy, culture etc of eastern and southern Africa were studied by British, West Africa by French, Native Indians by Americans, and Lebanon by Italians. According to the Commission's report, "...what took priority initially was the need to justify the study of difference and to defend the moral legitimacy of not being European" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 22].

What was interesting about the study of these non-European societies was the method used by European scholars. European scholars studied these people by dividing them into two groups as "tribes" and "high civilizations". The first group was labeled as the "peoples without history" by Eric Wolf and it included the study of the Third World. The reason of this labeling was due to they were living in small groups, did not have written records and military strength and not seem to share in a geographically far-flung religious system [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996]. To put it differently, according to Europeans, because of these features the people had past but not history. This group has been studied by *anthropology* and as it was mentioned above it was the study of the colonies by their colonizers.

The second group of non-Europeans, which included China, Persia, India and Arab-Islamic world, named as "high civilizations" because of their writing record systems, structured governing systems in empire set-up, geographically spread religious systems and their militarily strength. They have been named due to their pre-modern, pre-state and monotheistic structures. The discipline that would be the research area of these societies was called as *Oriental Studies*. The aim of this discipline was "...understanding and appreciating the set of values and practices that created civilizations which, although considered as 'high' civilizations, were nonetheless thought to be immobile..." [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 24]. To see this situation from another perspective, it could be said that while Classics, which was the way of enlightening modern Europe since the beginning such as antiquity, barbaric conquests led by the Church, the Renaissance, Greco-Roman heritage, etc, was searching for the roots of civilizations that have history; Oriental studies would be the study of civilizations that had not concluded their modernity. What is more, one of the most important improvements that Oriental studies brought to academia was the comparing and contrasting the Occident and the Orient in order to find answers to the question of why it was the "West" that proceeded modernity and capitalism and what made the "West" unique; moreover, as the Gulbenkian Commission framed, it brought an end to Christocentric worldview.

The emerging social science disciplines of the 19^{th} century were not limited with the mentioned above. In addition, there were the ones that actually did not become code constituents of the social science. These were geography, psychology and legal studies. To begin with, geography reconstructed itself in the late 19^{th} century in German universities and instead of achieving to become a major component of social sciences, it took its place as a minor adjunct to history. The Commission cited that due to this condition "…treatment of space and place was relatively neglected in social sciences. The focus on progress and the politics of organizing social change made the temporal dimension of social existence crucial, but left the spatial dimension in limbo" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 26]. Thus, geography is re-constructed to awaken the study of places and spaces. Following this, psychology constituted itself not only in social science arena but also in medical arena due to expansion of the use of chemicals and psychologists' competency to use them. The last discipline that never quite became a social science was legal studies due to the already existence of a faculty of law [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996].⁹

Besides the details of the newly emerging disciplines and their subject matters, the political dynamics of Europe and its hegemonic condition in the 19th century was vital considering the development of the social sciences. 19th century was the period in which the imperial system began to be shaken and the nation state system was in rise. The world was being lead by several European countries like Great Britain, Germany and France. Thus, Europe as a continent was the most powerful dominance area. It was in the 19th century that the "West" became synonym of Europe.

...social science in practice based itself on a particular view of spatiality..." which was Europe "...the set of spatial structures through which social scientists assumed lives were organized were the sovereign territories that collectively defined the world political map...these

⁹ For further information see [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996]

political boundaries fixed the spatial parameters of other key interactions-the sociologist's society, the macroeconomist's national economy, the political scientist's polity, the historian's nation. Each assumed a fundamental spatial congruence between political, social and economic processes. In this sense, social science was very much a creature, if not a creation, of the states, taking their boundaries as crucial social containers" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 26-27].

To put it differently, social sciences were constructed by the rules of the nation states and the subject matters and research methods were done according to the necessities of the nations. To be more specific, the aim of the social sciences of this century was to study Europe and find the criteria, developments and conditions that made Europe so unique that it became the only place on earth that achieved to rule over the rest of it and became the hegemon. Due to the acceptance and recognition of the superiority of the scientific explanations over theological ones, the self-evident superiority of European society was legitimized and continued to be justified through "…the state-centric trinity of sociology, political science and economics…" and history [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 30].

In conclusion, the social science knowledge, which had began to be accumulated long before the 19th century, defined, structured and institutionalized under different disciplines between 1815 and 1945. This process began with the establishment of universities, departments, chairs, associations and academic journals. This institutionalization process aimed to study the differences in the content of the social realities. In terms of contents and subject matters, historians, in this century, tried to reconstruct the past reality through cultural needs of the present (like Ranke), anthropologists reconstructed non-European social organizations of people, Oriental scholars tried to legitimize the non-Western "high civilizations" values, cultures and religions. In terms of methods, nomothetic sciences that aimed to find general laws in science like economy, sociology and political science, in this century, necessitated the use of studies of general populations, not just elites but common people. Likewise, the recognition of the superiority of scientificity and objectivity was another observable fact of this era. However, the most trustable source of objective knowledge and research defined as the state which delivered the inseparable relationship between science and politics in Europe. It was because of this situation, the nineteenth century sciences, both natural and social, in Europe focused on the reasons behind European cultural, economic, political and social dominance over the rest of the world and dealt with their legitimization.

2.2. Historical Development of the Social Sciences since 1945

The year 1945 is a turning point in the history of social sciences because after this year the structure of the social sciences substantially changed. Among the aforesaid three major developments, the first one was total change in world political structures. To be more specific, it was the rise of new hegemon, the United States due to the Second World War. This automatically meant the end of Western Europe's hegemony (cultural, economic and political) in the world. This reflected to the field of education and social sciences. The US hegemony shifted the prestige of universities from Europe to the US and increased the historical existence claims of non-European people who now would be free to declare their existence not from a Eurocentric point of views but from their own inside. In other words, "...the political reassertion of the non-European peoples meant that many assumptions of social science would be called into question on the grounds that they reflected the political biases of an era which was now over or at least ending" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 34]. In short, the rise of new hegemon changed the issues, subject matters of the social sciences and their addressing.

The second development was that the world, a few decades after 1945, had a huge increase in its productive capacity and population that resulted with a spreading out in the range of all human activities and this development affected the social sciences. After the WWII, the major powers began to invest in technology, consequently in natural sciences. However, these huge investments automatically returned to the social sciences and they caused more increased specialization and scientification in social sciences. The Commission pointed out their consequences as "the result was the emergence of centralized poles of scientific development with a concentration of information and skill, with financial resources that were provided primarily by the U.S. and other major states, by foundations (largely U.S. based), but also, to a lesser extent, by transnational corporations" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 35].

One further change was the spread of universities both in number and territory. This caused "...to encourage reciprocal intrusions by social scientists into neighboring disciplinary domains, ignoring in the process the various legitimations that each of the social sciences had erected to justify their specificities as reserved realms. And the economic expansion fueled this specialization by providing the resources that made it possible" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 34]. As

a result of all these developments, social sciences began to adapt more nomothetic tendencies especially due to the encouragement of American scholars and the huge investments in scientific research by both public and private institutions. The end of Western hegemony in this field made the expansion of the panorama of social sciences. To be brief, after the WWII institutional structures of social sciences such as the universities, chairs, journals, conferences, etc continued to exist more or less like their previous conditions but practices of social scientists widely changed.

2.2.1. Where did the Strict Lines between Social Sciences Go?

Did the strict lines between social sciences that were constructed by Europe at the beginning of nineteenth century really help to find truths? What were their limitations? One of the most significant issues belong to post-1945 period was to what extent these divisions in the social science disciplines were valid and efficient. Has the boundaries between them ever decelerated the way that goes to scientific realities? These questions constituted the major debates until the 1960s and the answers were advocating the inefficiencies of the borders. As a result, area studies through which different geographic zones would be studied according to their cultural, historical and linguistic features were established [Wallerstein et al, 1996]. It was a study area in which people from different disciplines and social sciences would come together to study the specific areas. To put it differently, it was a multidisciplinary study. Thus, in this discipline Orientalist scholars, natural scientists and social scientists searched the truth by cooperating with each other. The Gulbenkian Commission argues that this innovation was not lead by scientific concerns but political ones. They explained the political motives as the US's necessity of knowledge about the different regions of the world because of the change they faced with the demise of Western Europe's hegemonic position. After 1945, many previously passive regions became active and the US needed to know about them in order to control them.

The emergence of area studies changed many things in social sciences progress. It achieved cooperation between historians and nomothetic scientists on research about the non-Western zones. What is more, the heavily concentrated study of non-Western societies expanded the subject matters geographically. These new developments gave rise to fundamental questions like "were the two zones ontologically identical or different?" or did Third World which had defined as tribes and "peoples without history" during European hegemony ever have histories? [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 39] Before 1945, the answer was for the former yes, and latter no; however, aftermath of the WWII it began to be re-questioned.¹⁰

Furthermore, social sciences and history began to have denser cooperation during the 1960s. History reformed its structure and expanded its scope due to the increased criticisms about hermeneutic approaches of history. Since the second half of twentieth century, history became a more quantitative discipline and searched on topics like class, social change and, historians began to use mass data such as tax documents which were provided through other social science disciplines. The Commission explains the situation as the expansion of the nomothetic social sciences (economics, political science and sociology) into history and as a result of the emergence of social science history and historical sociology. In short, in the aftermath of 1945, the most visible development was the overlapping of different nomothetic sciences with history. Not only did it materialize in subject matters but also in methodologies through the use of quantification and more numeric methods. Consequently, the multidisciplinary movement brought an end to the petite list of accepted social sciences of 1850-1945 and added new ones with expanded subject matters and different methodologies.

2.2.2. "Europe": Did its Hegemony End in the Construction of Knowledge and Science, too?

It was certain that in the post-1945 period Europe was no more the hegemon of the world but the United States. Did it also mean that the construction of social sciences would no longer be Eurocentric? Would the rise of the US as a hegemon bring American way of construction of knowledge? The answer was no because the only thing that ended was Europe's (particularly the Western Europe's) political dominance, not its hegemonic position in knowledge industry. The dominant powers of knowledge and science were the North America and Europe. The Gulbenkian Commission explains the European dominance in this area in the course of the education of the non-Western scholars in Europe and with European epistemologies, methodologies and theories. In short, the "West" was still the symbol of civilization and a universal normative power [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996].

¹⁰ For further detail see [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 40-42]

However, the Western dominance was criticized by some who argued that Eurocentric view was masculinist and dealing only with "individuals", but not common people. Europe was constructing knowledge not without biases and prejudices. In other words, it was disregarding women, minorities and non-Western people. The solution should be the elimination of "...*a priori* prejudices or modes or reasoning that have neither theoretical nor empirical justification..."[Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 55]. As a result, the solution came with the expansion of the social sciences and the inclusion of new areas which will be included to research such as race, class, gender and sexuality.

Additionally, *cultural studies* was established in universities and institutionalized through journals and associations. With its institutionalization gender issues, non-European societies, local identities, politics, economics, ecological issues and the impacts of technology over society profoundly began to be heeded. Thus, anthropology and ethnography became very important disciplines unlike the overlooked positions of them during nineteenth century.

Although 1945 is labeled as a turning point in history of social sciences, at some points it was not a crossroad. One of them was the nation state system and the second one was the objectivity question. In the social sciences the role of the state as an analytical building block has never been changed and does not seem to be in the future, too. This state centricity (the unquestionable, totally trustworthy kind) was valid especially for the Western world since 1945 in nomothetic sciences. However, after 1945 these social sciences spread to the non-Western world and they became state-centric, too. In short, both in the Western and non-Western world social sciences had been the tool of states.

Though, this did not last too long. With the 1970s, "the self evident character of the state as constituting the natural boundary of social life began to be questioned..." [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 81]. The major reasons of this questioning were that states began to loose their power because of not providing economic well-beings of people and scholars. Moreover, neither global nor local levels had been studied enough until the late 1960s, early 1970s. The emergence of these studies diminished the state-centrism of traditional social sciences which was "...a theoretical simplification that involved the presumption of homogenous and equivalent spaces, each of which formed autonomous system operating largely through parallel processes" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 84-85]. In short, although the self evident nature of states as conceptual containers became open to serious challenge and debate, towards the end, we

cannot claim the end of the power of the nation states on the construction of social sciences or on any kind of change in them.

The issue of objectivity was the other matter that did not define 1945 as a decisive moment. What is important to remember about objectivity is that scholars can not be thought separate from their social settings and they inevitably construct social reality on the basis of their presuppositions and prejudices. As the Commission said "all data are selections from reality, based on the worldviews or theoretical models of the era, as filtered through the standpoints of particular groups in each era. In this sense, the bases of selection are historically constructed, and will always inevitably change as the world changes" [Wallerstein *et al*, 1996: 91]. However, this does not mean that objectivity is impossible to reach in social sciences. If the scientists can intuitively accept the sense that knowledge is not presumptive, cooperate with other colleagues; what is more, if they become open to inter-subjective evaluation and criticisms of the other scholars it could be reached, maybe not as a total objectivity (due to its existence is ambiguous and open to discussion) but the possible maximum level of it.

However, the significance of 1945 on objectivity discussion cannot be denied. The fragmentation of knowledge in many different disciplines, expansion of the scope of social sciences, increase in multidisciplinary approaches, establishment of area studies, cultural studies and study of local themes in them provided huge chance for objectivity to be realized in real terms.

2.3. Concluding Remarks

To sum up, before 1945 social sciences were totally practiced, taught and constructed through Eurocentric tendencies. The "Other"ing process was the core of it. There was on the one side the "West" which was superior and normative power; on the other side the "Rest" which was considered backward, without history and convicted to be intellectually colonized. However, after 1945 with Europe's loss of hegemony and the rise of the US as the new power, expansion of institutionalization of education and social sciences began to be questioned owing to its Eurocentric institutionalization. Through the expansion of the subject matters, methodologies, multidisciplinary movements and social sciences' convergence with the natural sciences this problem tried to be transcended. Today the strict division among sciences is no

more like natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. To put it with different words, due to the developments since the 1850s until today, the field of science turned into an arena in which knowledge can be produced through multiple domains which are not contradictory with each other.

3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORIOGRAPHY SINCE THE 18TH CENTURY

Historiography refers to the methodology of writing history and its practices. To be more specific, it is not writing *of* history, it is writing *about* history. Conal Furey and Michael J. Salevouris, in their book entitled *The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide,* defined it as "the study of the way history has been and is written—the history of historical writing..." as it is mentioned above and they added that "When you study 'historiography' you do not study the events of the past directly, but the changing interpretations of those events in the works of individual historians" [Furey, 1988: 223].

Historiography is being studied through some basic questions such as who wrote the source, what is the authenticity and intelligibility of the source, what was the view of history when the source was written, who are the intended audiences, by what method was the evidence compiled, in what historical context was the work of history itself written and how does the historian establish their own objectivity or subjectivity.

3.1. Three Different Methodological Principles of Historiography

There are three different conceptions of history as a historical social science that occurred throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These are the hermeneutic, nomological and dialectic materialist approaches. As Georg Iggers mentioned, these three approaches had their forerunners in the 19th century. The most important figures were Leopold Von Ranke in hermeneutic perspective, H.T. Buckle and Hippolyte Taine in nomological approach and Marx and Engels in the dialectical, materialist view [Iggers, 1975].

In this chapter the aim is to explain the chronological development of historiography from the 18^{th} century to 21^{st} century. According to this aim, first, briefly, the basic tenets of

these three approaches will be explained and then the four different schools in historiography will be analyzed through giving specific attention to their most famous historians/leaders who basically established their schools and whose views on historiography were enough to reflect the general trend of the century or specific time period. These schools and historians are the Scientific School/the Rankean School in Germany and its most important figure Leopold Von Ranke; the Annales School in France and as figures Marc Bloch and Lucienne Febvre; the historical materialist/ dialectical approach through Marx and Engels.

3.1.1. Hermeneutics Approach

The word 'hermeneutics' is defined by Merriam-Webster online dictionary as the study of the methodological principles of interpretation. The hermeneutic approach dominated the historical discipline during the 19th century. It is an approach that is against concepts and generalizations. For hermeneutics, the aim of the historian is to discover the unique in every event, as Ranke put in words by saying that there is "...the indefinite in every existence" [Iggers, 1975: 43]. Followers and supporters of hermeneutics methods did not try to lessen the distinction between historical and natural phenomena as structuralists and neo-positivists tried to do. They supported the autonomy of historicism. They argued history as a science deal basically with individuals, not the mass.

"...the very element of meaning ...opened up 'the possibility of precision in the combination of meaning-analysis and sociological diagnosis that in time it may be possible to compare them with the methods of the natural sciences.' This method Mannheim continued, 'will have, in addition, the advantage that it will not have to disregard the realm of meaning as uncontrollable, but will...make the interpretation of meaning a vehicle of precision'" [Iggers, 1975: 37-38].

Iggers says that what matters was the coherence of the events and the coherence can be reached by the conceptualization that historians do while approaching to their subjects. What is more, these conceptualizations as "... 'thought models created for activistic purposes in real life' which took into account the unique elements of meaning and purpose found in concrete historical settings" [Iggers, 1975: 38]. So, these models suggested some kind of calculability to social behaviors because it presumed human beings had both individualistic and social aims in

societies. Furthermore, because of these similar purposes and calculability, it is possible to formulate the probable acts of historical agents' and institutions' acts.

In short, hermeneutic approach gave importance to the role of collective human consciousness because these intentions of people are the structures of change in history. And according to hermeneutics, each historical context has their own unique meanings and they cannot be treated as formalized relationships as neo-positivists and structuralists aimed to do.

3.1.2. Nomological Approach

Nomological model of inquiry assumes that the logic of scientific history is one for all sciences. This approach can be divided into two different attempts: Neo-positivists and structuralists.

According to the neo-positivist attempt the main aim in this approach is to minimize the differences of research methods between historical sciences and natural sciences. So, history considered an empirical science that uses general empirical laws, but it mostly failed (such as social-physics) due to applicability of law-models to history [Iggers, 1975]. The supporters of this approach believed the quantitative history as a science because only quantitative approaches can lead the appearance of measurable results. However, they ignored the complexity, structure and uniqueness of the historical conditions which were put into the center by hermeneutics. In other words, this approach was a kind of quantitative reductionism. Although this was the case, economic history and demographic history branches used this approach.

Another attempt in nomological approach came from the French Annales School as categorized under French structuralism which "…proceed[s] from empirical, often quantitative data, to the structural contexts within which these data receive their significance" [Iggers, 1975: 36]. They, such as Lucien Lebvre and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie gave significance to the social, anthropological and cultural structures and used psycho-analytical concepts. Their focus points were both natural and biological factors but at the same time they deeply investigated the societal facts which were based on concrete empirical data. In addition to all, Iggers pointed out that these historians

...have been joined in the investigation of the 'unconscious structures' which they believe underlie all institutions and customs and give them coherence...such structures exist

and that neither the historian nor the ethnologist may take verbal evidence at its face value but must 'decode' this evidence and proceed from the recurrent phenomena, economic data, social relations, word usage, art forms, symbolism, which permit a degree of quantification, to the deeper structures concealed behind these [Iggers, 1975: 37].

3.1.3. Dialectical-Materialist Approach

The dialectical materialism is the methodological approach to the study of society, economics and history that was first expressed by Marx. According to Marx and Engels, "...all social phenomena and historical events must be viewed within the framework of a system of social relations undergoing constant change" [Iggers, 1975: 39]. The pushing forces of the change are neither humans' will nor laws of nature but the participation of both of them. The dialectic-materialists believed that history is not the product of human beings but people who act and live in social relationships. So, they reject the pure quantification approaches of history and hermeneutic approaches which tend to view history as the history of some unique personalities. "Marxism…view history as a process leading to human emancipation. It carries with it the notion of history as a critical social science seeking not merely to interpret but to change the world and views itself as rooted in the concrete material and political situation making for change" [Iggers, 1975: 40]. The most important and visible factor in this approach is the role of objective economic factors as well as of consciousness.

Maybe the best way of reflecting this approach and the way how it looks, interprets and analyze history can be done through quoting from *the German Ideology* of Marx (1845].

"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness".

3.2. The Development of History and Historiography since the late 18th century: The Göttingen School

"The modern conception of historical science had its origin in the Enlightenment, patterning itself on Enlightenment notions of man and reality and reacting against them" [Iggers, 1975: 13]. In the development of history as an institutionalized discipline the role of the development of the modern natural sciences played an extremely important role due to the institutionalization of historical studies followed of natural sciences which has been studied with detail in the previous chapter of this thesis. In the natural sciences the organization of community of scientists and scholars emerged in the 17th century beginning with being centered around the academies and then beginning in Germany in the 18th century at the universities.

In the eighteenth century, at the German universities, the transition from erudite scholarship to the new scientific orientation in history which combined the critical examination of evidence with the narrative reconstruction of a course of events. One of these German universities was the University of Göttingen that was founded in 1737. It emerged as the center of research which is conceived as a teaching institution and the training center of future officials and professions. The main attention in the university was given to philology and statistics which was a new science of the century. The usage of statistics in history was widely accepted because the aim of history included the necessity of having factual data basis such as data on population, law, political organizations and industrial activity. In other words inclusion of statistics not only brought numbers to history but the way to describe the concrete institutions and characteristics of a society in quantitative and verbal terms [Iggers, 1975]. By including the statistics to history, the aim of the Göttingen historians were to find the way of grasping the interrelatedness of events in history and to organize the chaotic materials of history into an integrated whole. Thus, history was no more merely the biography of kings or chronological listing of the royal events, wars, and battles.

What is more, the Göttingen historians not only were keen on quantification of history, but also "...rejected any attempt to impose a philosophic scheme on history or to introduce an overly simple conception of historical objectivity" [Iggers, 1975: 15]. In other words, these

historians thought that all history involve selectivity. This means that there existed an objective history in which the position and perspective of the historian were the determinants of truth in history. As a result of these two conditions, it is visible that history was facing with a methodological dilemma. This dilemma was

...between the insistence of the historian on elevating history to the rank of a science seeking to introduce conceptualizations into history buttressed empirical evidence and the recognition of the limits of conscious rational thought, particularly of empiricism and induction, in the comprehension of meaningful human relationships which required an element of empathy and sympathetic understanding which resisted strict methodological procedures [Iggers, 1975: 16].

The Göttingen historians aimed to write history from both chronological and synchronical way. They pursued a continuous development of interconnected events through giving attention to the structures of societies at a specific historical time. On one hand, they tried to end an event-oriented political history and began to write a wide-ranging social and cultural history thru social institutions and the state which had a central role in them. On the other hand, the Göttingen historians pointed comparative social and economic history of politics and tried to find out next century's topics in history. However, at the end, they failed in the quantification of history due to not being able to interpret the numbers with their social interpretations and they could not succeed to make critical examination of the sources because they contradicted with other by using both the primary sources in their research and the Bible at the same time [Iggers, 1975].

In short, although the Göttingen historians could not totally achieve the scientification of history and the critical use of evidences, they contributed a lot to the discipline of history due to taking the subject matter of history from being only the biography of kings, and including the statistics to history in order to make history more solid other than story telling.

3.3. The Scientific/ Rankean School

One of the most important developments had seen in the early nineteenth century; it was the establishment of the University of Berlin in Germany in 1810 in the period of the Prussian Reforms. It had been established "...under the guidance of Wilhelm von Humboldt as an institution in which narrow technical training would be replaced by an education firmly based on research", with the academic team of very important and influential historians such as Georg Barthhold Niebuhr, Friedrich Ernst Scheiermacher, Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Karl Frederich Eichhorn, Leopold von Ranke [Iggers, 1975: 19]. These academicians have seen the function of history as a political one, and because of this defended their government policies against its critics. This school regarded history as it was made up of individualities, each possessed unique purpose structure and meaning. However, individuality no more meant people but also states, cultures, and nations. And the Berlin School believed that the only way to interpret them is possible through hermeneutic methods, not through abstract reasoning.

This institution with Leopold Von Ranke started scientific orientation in history through critical use of evidence and utilization of it in the construction of a coherent narrative. However, "...despite its stress on the critical examination of documents, did not effectively contribute to a lessening of the ideological function of historical scholarship but lent itself to the increased political utilization of history in the service of nationalistic and domestic political aims" [Iggers, 1975: 21].

The history of the enlightenment that defined its scope in a broad social and cultural history turned into a history which focused on religious and political events and the actions of powerful people. The historians of this era compared to the Göttingen scholars were much more definite to overcome the subjectivity issue in history. Moreover although Göttingen school believed unique historical expressions in terms of intuitive understanding, this new scientific school rejected this, and believed in the possibility of scientific certainty in history. As a method they choose Hermeneutics which is "…the art of correctly understanding the texts" [Iggers, 1975: 18]. This new school also insisted on using the primary sources such as memoirs, letters, and embassy reports, together with their internal and external criticisms to reconstruct the past as how it was.

3.3.1. Leopold von Ranke

Leopold Von Ranke was a 19th century Prussian historian who arrived to the University of Berlin in 1825. He can be identified as the founder of methodology of modern history and new scientific history which are still being used by modern historians and in their education. Leopold Von Ranke played an enormous role in the foundation of direct discipline of history. Ranke defined the task of the history in the preface of his *The Histories of the Romantic and Germanic Peoples* as it was not to judge the past but only to show 'what *really* happened' (*Wie es eigentlich gewesen*) and the study of effective factors in historical events and understanding their universal relationship were the basis of historical work on which history must be proceeded.

Compared to the other historians of his time, he contributed to history by finding unique methodological developments such as the practice of "source critique seminars"¹¹ in history that are still today the main stones of historians' education. Other than his critical reading and seminar methods, his individualizing method was one of the most important steps in professionalization of history writing. The Rankean School, with this method, recognized the value and autonomy of every age, nation, people, mankind and cultures. To explain it with different words, for them, every age and the listed concepts above represented an end and value in themselves.

In his writings Ranke aimed to show the subjectivity of history through lightening the relationship between history and the memories of people and personal memoirs of historians. This relationship, to him, was the source of historical subjectivity because historians were, without conscious, unable to write without their life experiences and personal memories while trying to write history in an objective way. During his time, "he resolved...to limit himself in the future to the representation of only those facts that were attested by documentary

¹¹ Ranke's seminar method was popular in Germany; however, this was not the case in France until 1868 (the establishment of Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes) and in America until 1870s (Johns Hopkins University history PhD program) and in England due to the continuation of the notion that education was an elite practice. For further details see [Iggers, 1975].

evidence, to suppress the 'Romantic' impulses in his own sentimental nature, and to write history in such a way as to relate only what had actually happened in the past' [White, 1973: 163]. Thus, Ranke worked for making history an objective science due to being one of the people who supported that history as a field must be given a title of science because this is the only way for history to achieve and claim a greater authority, not a bunch of subjective opinions.

About historiography, Ranke asserted that it must be considered an autonomous field of study and a discipline with its particular aim, methods, subjects thus it must be different from Positivistic science, Idealistic philosophy and Romantic art, therefore, he rejected their methods. Hayden White phrased Ranke's ideas on this issue as "...the science in historiography was not to be Positivistic, the philosophy in it was not to be Idealistic, and the art in it was not to be Romantic" [White, 1973: 268].

Besides these, Ranke can be explained through several different notions which will reflect his general ideas about history and its writing and through which the 19th century history and historiography in Europe will be revealed. Georg Iggers defined Rankean view of history as follows: The first one is Ranke's argument against the application of abstract ideas to politics and social issues. According to Ranke, social and political issues or related organizations should be studied and understood in the framework of their own institutions in which they function. Moreover, he believed that "…all products of history and everything that operates within the context of a historical society are concrete, objective values" [Iggers, 1983: 72].

The second notion was, as Iggers defined, "...although all existence can be understood only in terms of its history, behind the ephemeral appearance of every particular phenomenon there is concealed a general truth" [Iggers, 1983: 72]. This means that the ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs lies in the perception of the particular (from particular to general) which Ranke defined as the method of history. What is more, objectivity not only did lie in the exclusion of one's subjective ideas and prejudices from history but also it was in the objective order, the general spirit which was independent and which was behind all historical events: God. And lastly the third concept is that "...the states existing in history are the concrete expressions of underlying ideas" [Iggers, 1983: 72]. In short, the objectivity as an indispensable principle of history, God as a factor and the nation states are the three notions that composes the Rankean thought of history which means the general approach of history and historiography during the 19th century in Europe.

3.3.2. Ranke: God in History and History as a Balanced System

As it was mentioned above, Ranke believed that the ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs lie in the perception of the particular (from particular to general) which he also defined as the method of history and the second one is in the abstraction. Moreover, "...it could not be denied that the world presented evidence of its governance by a spiritual power in which the particulars of history must ultimately find their unity as parts of a whole. The presence of this 'spirit' justified the belief that history was more than a spectacle of 'brutal force.' And the nature of this spirit could be glimpsed only by a religious consciousness, which could not be appealed to for the solution of specific historical problems. But a sublimated form of this religious apprehension of the world was necessary to a proper appreciation of the parts and of the relation of the parts to the whole" [White, 1973: 165]. It means that the world and history is full of spiritual, creative forces and moral energies; and these forces, which capture the world, sometimes interact with other, sometimes decline and rejuvenate, etc. However, in the end, Ranke says, the world is in balance and the understanding of these dynamics will be enough to understand the world. Due to this belief, European history is a celestial system and the realities of European history were being led by God. In short, in all historical events, Ranke considered God as the common denominator and he defended that in each crucial moment God enters and leads the events to provide the continuity of balance.

What is more, the concept of God in history and the balance in the system gained history a closed structure which is no longer considered to change. Although he was aware that history did not come to an end in his time, it was an arena that had borders defined by the interaction of celestial and moral forces. As a result of this, Ranke believed that "...the constitution of the system was at last achieved; in which the system became a self-balancing mechanism, the appropriate general form of which was completed" [White, 1973: 168]. To put it differently, the history had ended for Ranke after the constitution of Europe in the mid-19th century. For him, the constituted system was the basic form for the future systems and it

was fixed. Not only was the system fixed but also the way other nations would follow was fixed. So, the European historical development was a model that had clear-cut borders in terms of development and change, and all other societies, nations would follow the same path because it was what God had wanted and sent as a model for others.

3.3.3. Ranke: The Nation State and Europe

Ranke placed the nation state as the center of history and this was totally connected with the necessity of objectivity in history. The reasoning is as follows: The state for Ranke is a concrete existing thing which has a positive spiritual content [Iggers, 1983: 81]. Each state is real, spiritual and unique and most importantly they are and their tendencies are determined by God. So, for Ranke, states and nations are the thoughts of God which means "...the idea of the nation...not only a datum but also a value..." [White, 1973: 172].

So, if the states are thoughts of God; then documents must have been written more neutral and safer in terms of objectivity and in terms of reflecting the truth. Thus, due to the role of God, Ranke believed that history and historical events can only be written "as they actually were" if and only if they are of state archives. So this situation perfectly explains why Ranke always used state archives as the most trustable sources of history and its writing.

Thus, in Ranke's system of history, the nation state cannot be thought separate from God and correspondingly the church as the material reflection or institutionalization of God in world although each of them must have different policies, aims in societies. In this system, history was basically aiming the internalization of nations and nation states plus the church, and it can be considered as the history of nations in which states and the church was overstressed, honored and legitimized. The church and the state, to him, were the control and ordering mechanisms of people's vigor that will be used for the good of their own nations after being shaped by these two institutions. Hayden White, about the role of these two institutions from Ranke's point of view, says that

The *general* beneficial character of these two institutions he took to be *a fact* of history, a truth established not only by historical reflection but also by quotidian experience. He was privately convinced that these institutions had been founded by God to impose order on a disorderly humanity; and he thought that a dispassionate study of history would confirm the generally beneficent role played by these two institutions in human life, which might suggest to the pious their divine origin...They constitute the sole ordering principles in historical

time; it is through them that a 'people' can direct its spiritual and physical energies toward the constitution of itself as a 'nation' [White, 1973: 169].

To sum up, people, the nation states and the church were the 'as givens elements' of Ranke's system of history and the nations, as you would expect, had both political and ecclesiastical origins and the self-conscious governing principles.

Ranke's writings and ideas supported the continuation of the nation state system and he defined the task of historian as writing history to strengthen the idea of nationality because it was the most important concept that differentiated civilized societies from barbarism. Ranke connects the relationship between history and the nation by saying "history is not simply an academic subject: the knowledge of history of mankind should be a common property of humanity and should above all benefit our nation, without which our work could not have been accomplished" [Marwick, 2001: 65].

However, although Leopold Von Ranke brought many developments to history discipline in terms of objectivity and scientificity, there are many things about Ranke that needs to be criticized. First of all, Ranke's system of studying and writing history was too inductionist. Specifically, taking the nation states as the only social organization system led only the historical study of nation states, not the others such as economics, cultural, etc.

Secondly, the mere usage of the state archives, documents written by the state organs, princes and governments due to the belief of their objectivity and trueness and the Godly perception of the state spiritualized the power. Moreover, it led to extreme subordination of individuals' interests to the states'. Because of these implications, Ranke in his historical analysis or writings always tended to judge events from the standpoint of governments and because of his huge concentration on governments, he, unknowingly, ignored the social forces of the 19th century in his works.

Lastly, "...even with his 'method of investigation' and 'critical conclusions' Ranke underestimated the biases and imperfections inherent in all primary sources" [Marwick, 2001: 64]. In other words, he did not see the historical subjectivity and further realities behind states' sources. Either in explicit or implicit, he could not see or was not aware of the cultural espouses in history and historiography. His inclination to scientificity and strong reaction to personal bias and huge support for objectivity, here at this point, contradicted with his inability or lack of ability to see the cultural espouses of the nations in history education, teaching and historiography. The reason for this blindness, as mentioned more than once in the previous pages, was the belief of 19th century European historians that European nations were all beloved ones by God and they have a Godly mission. In conclusion, Ranke, by not realizing the implicit or explicit cultural espouses in history and historiography, showed how the Scientific School of history could be that much ideological.

3.3.4. Concluding Remarks

Although Ranke had been criticized by other historians due to his excessive focus on religious tones in his studies, conservative prejudices and his desire of philosophy which he used to reach divinities in history; he, at the end, "left a large school of historians who are in fundamental agreement on common standards of objectivity" [White, 1973: 166], and became the "...father of the scientific history...who 'determined to hold strictly to the facts of history, to preach no sermon, to point no moral, to adorn no tale, but to tell the simple historic truth" [Iggers, 1983: 63-64]. He left vital principles such as the pure love of truth, causal relationships, impartiality, respect for what actually happened principle and impacts such as the critical use and study of documents (especially the diplomatic ones), emphasis on the central role of the state and of foreign affairs in history, the view of the state as an ethical good and spiritualization of power upon his contemporaries and today's historians.

In addition to these, Ranke brought Europe to a level in which it became the best and only ultimate model, which was an end in itself, for the rest of all nation states. To express differently, for Ranke the "ideal" for all times was the reality of his own time which was Jude-Christian tradition in European nations and nationalism. Thus, other than Europe's development model based on nationalism, there cannot be any further and better social organization structures.

In conclusion, in the 19th century, Ranke brought an exact break to literary Romanticism that was being used in history although he had some Romantic assumptions such as "...his interest in the individual event in its uniqueness and concreteness, in his conception of historical explanation as narration, and in his concern to enter into the interior of the consciousness of the actors of the historical drama, to see them as they saw themselves and to reconstruct the worlds which they faced in their time and place" [White, 1973: 188].While trying to understand the nature, society and history, Ranke had some kind of religious

sensibility, the belief that nations are thoughts of God. Despite the facts of Ranke's Romantic assumptions and religious sensibility, he succeeded to constitute history as an autonomous discipline in the second quarter of the 19th century. Ranke, during his time wrote the history of all nations in Europe and became the figure of realistic representation of history. What he believed and did was that "...the simple description of the historical process in all its particularity and variety will figure forth a drama of consummation, fulfillment, and ideal order in such a way as to make the telling of the tale an explanation of why it happened as it did" [White, 1973: 190].

3.4. The Annales School

Every tradition of historical scholarship reflects the conditions under which it emerged and developed, that the Rankean 'scientific' model of historical inquiry, with its narrow concentration on a political history separated from its broader social setting, its narrow concern with the foreign affairs of the great European states, its heavy reliance on documents of state to the neglect of other sources, represented not only a step back from the aspiration of German Enlightenment historians to write a cosmopolitan social history of politics but reflected the political, social, and intellectual limitations of the early 19th century Prussian university at which this model of inquiry emerged.

For the very fact that history is so intimately linked to its historical context also introduces a source of historical insight, however perspectivistic. The Rankean model appeared at a point when the claim of the 18th century German Enlightenment historians to scientific status no longer sounded true in the setting of early 19th century Germany. The changing nature of the Western and non-Western world in the 19th and 20th centuries, the emergence of a highly technological society with its political, social, and intellectual concomitants, the appearance of submerged classes and peoples on the political scene have all provided a real basis for the growing dissatisfaction with the paradigms of scholarly method provided by the 19th century scientific school.

By the turn of the century many things have changed with the demise of the dominance of the Rankean School. One was that the scope of historical studies has widened through both the inclusion of the non-European world and by giving serious attention to broader segments of the population which have been neglected for a long time. The other was the occurrence of an extensive agreement among historians on the insufficiency of concentration of history on the conscious action of "men". The necessary action was to understand the human behavior within the framework of the structures within which they occur. In short, the new idea was the replacement of the history which had concentrated on peoples in politics, military and diplomacy with comparative social and cultural history that would focus more on the anonymous masses and their social processes [Iggers, 1975]. Not only did the subject matter of history change but also the method of hermeneutic reading was tried to be replaced with an analytical one in which history would be written and be studied as a result of a cooperation of history discipline with other social science disciplines.

As a result, what happened was the historians of the twentieth century have remained committed to the critical use of evidence upon which the nineteenth-century 'scientific' school insisted; yet at the same time they have recognized that the documents do not tell their own story and that the historians of the nineteenth century in letting the past speak for itself were generally insufficiently aware of the presuppositions which enabled them to establish threats of historical development. The result has been a strengthened recognition of the role which theories, hypotheses, and conceptualizations occupy in historical analysis and narration [Iggers, 1975: 11].

The result has been the rise of the Annales School which would be the model of the 20th century's historiography. The Annales School began the new century with the questions remained from the 19th century as follows: '1) Is the central concern of history the political state and relationships between states...? Or are there other sub-histories which ought to be given primacy? 2) Should history seek to emulate the sciences, or should it retain its affiliations with literature? 3) Could history be objective or was it always subject to the assumptions and prejudices of the historian? Could knowledge of universal validity be established or was it always culturally circumscribed? 4) As new techniques were developed such as statistical be treated with suspicion or embraced and will supercede all older ones or considered as a growing range of methods at the disposal of historians?' [Marwick, 2001: 79-80].

3.4.1. The New Historians: Precursors of the Annales

At the end of the 19th century the necessity of expanding the scope of history began to be discussed. The traditional historical science and its methods were no more sufficient to satisfy the requirements of modern, democratic and industrial societies. In both France and America, history began to be combined with other social sciences. As a result, in the US a group of historians emerged who called themselves as the New Historians. Among them there were Frederick Jackson Turner, James Harvey Robertson and Woodrow Wilson and from Europe Karl Lamprecht and J.H. Bury began to reform historical studies in the direction of interdisciplinarity.

Although they brought new ideas to history, in the institutions that they worked they continued the traditional views of older historians, they kept on using traditional research method such as critical reading and the notion of "Western" civilizations' superiority continued to exist. In short, the New Historians emphasized the breach with the pre-modern European past. They used history to help dealing with the social problems of the present day. This school overall interested in modern society, primarily economics, sociology, geography and psychology. They claimed that economic, intellectual and geographical forces must be given special attention in history due to their relevancy to the social problems [Iggers, 1997; Marwick, 2001].

The significance and relatedness of the New History with the Annales comes from the fact that the Annales School very much affected from them. Basically, they questioned how change happened in the past societies and there was a readiness to combine and incorporate social sciences with history which actually made a peak in the Annales.

3.4.2. The Annales School

The Annales School can be considered as a middle ground between historical approaches which totally accepts all conceptualizations and generalization and the other which totally rejects these. "This middle ground is provided by the attempt to utilize explanations of limited or medium range to explain concrete historical phenomena. This approach recognizes the uniqueness of every historical situation, the factors of will, intentionality, and consciousness which color every historical context, and hence the need of the historian to 'understand' every historical situation" [Iggers, 1975: 44].

The Annales School is a school of historical writing which named after the French academic journal *Annales d'historie économique et sociale* that was formed by Henri Berr in 1929. The Annales tradition can be studied through three different generations. The first generation consisted of historians like Henri Berr (1863-1954), Lucien Febvre (1878-1956), Marc Bloch (1886-1944), Henri Pirenne (1862-1935), Ernest Labrousse (1895-1986) and Georges Lefebvre (1874-1959).

3.4.2.1. The First Generation: Henri Berr (1863-1954)

Henri Berr can be considered the head of the Annales School due to his attempts to make a synthesis of all human activities in the society through other social sciences. In the academic journal *Annales d'historie économique et sociale* Berr declared their aim as to discuss the theoretical aspects of historical science which would depend on empirical observation. This approach believed that history and its study necessitates a group work rather than individual researchers. By this way, they considered history would materialize its main task which was explaining, not describing. What really the precursors of the Annales School did was to replace the event-oriented chronologically organized history of politics of the nation states with social and cultural history-at the center- that was approached topically. In other words, while the previous approaches studied history on the basis of developments in political, legal and constitutional, military and diplomatic structures; in this school of thought,

beginning with Berr, people's lives, their material cultures, ethical values, art, trade commodities and social divisions became the major focal points of history.

3.4.2.2. Marc Bloch (1886-1944)

Marc Bloch was the most influential and dominant member of the Annales' first generation due to his contributions to historiography. Bloch, just like Lucien Febvre, was interested in geography and also collective psychology. Among what made Bloch very significant there were comparative and regressive methods of history through which he compared the similarities and differences between countries and used evidences drawn from a later age of, say customs, place names and traditions in order to lighten the earlier periods in history.

In contrast to the German historicism, Bloch proceeded from the assumption that "...the individual could only be understood within in the context of a society and that this society manifested itself in concrete forms which could be observed from the outside very much like phenomena of nature" [Iggers, 1975: 49-50]. After that Bloch asked "...whether it is really true, as conventional historians have maintained, that 'the observation of the past even of the most distant past is always indirect' and could be mediated only through documents, documents which first had to be 'understood'" [Iggers, 1975: 50]. The outcome he reached as a result of this asking was that the mere usage of written documents prevented the pure nature of the individual event and the consciousness. In other words, the mere usage of written documents created a barrier for direct observation because these documents were automatically indirect explanations. He believed the only objective knowledge that could be learned from the written documents was the society's institutional framework. As a result, Bloch rejected the idea that history was not possible without documents and added that the written documents, which were naturally secondary sources according to Bloch, were insufficient for scientific and scholarly purposes due to the reflection of events in them through the observer's subjectivity. Thus, he was no more putting the focus of historical study to hermeneutic analysis of documents but to the material remains of the past researched and analyzed by archeology. Iggers mentions that with Bloch the society began to be studied through agricultural relationships but not from legal and institutional ones as it was in the Scientific School [Iggers, 1975].

Moreover, Bloch, in order to understand and define the distinctive character of the social structures, was concerned with the serfs and peasants' lives and the problem of historical change of rural and agricultural life¹² in contrast to Febvre's study of rich and powerful people was the way of explaining history. In short, Bloch as one of the founders of the Annales shifted the emphasis in history from the individual to the collectivity.

3.4.2.3. Lucien Febvre (1878-1956)

It is possible to affirm that during the 1920s the Annales' most dominant figure was Bloch but in the 1940s and 1950s Febvre took this position. He was one of the historians who developed Berr's ideas. Febvre was the one who carried the Annales into the post-war period, most especially by training Fernand Braudel who will be mentioned in the further pages. One thing Febvre did was the stress on the relationship between geography and history. He believed that "...the geographical environment indeed constituted an important part of the framework of human possibilities but that man himself participated in the shaping of this environment" and this conception labeled as human geography which was the area in which there was an awareness of cultures' interaction and the physical spaces they are landed on [Iggers, 1975: 52-53].

Moreover, Febvre argued that the primacy of any single factor of economics, religion, politics, geography, etc can not be enough to explain the realities of the past. In other words, there was a dependency relationship among all these different aspects of life in order to reach a full understanding and explanation of history. More important than these actually, he contributed history by the concept of "historical psychology". This was very important because this contribution extended history into the area which was later known as 'mentalities', "…the attitudes and values of a particular people or a group of people"

[Marwick, 2001: 92]. The mentalities approach caused the study of people like intellectuals, bankers, heretics and insane, their role in the society and the changes in

¹² These studies, at the end, made significant contribution to history because Bloch defined feudalism as a form of society. For further details see [Iggers, 1975]

collective mentalities. More specifically, the Annales searched for the role of status, wealth, etc to understand the economic mentalities and folklore, mythology, fashion, etc to understand the social mentalities [Iggers, 1975].

3.4.2.4. The Second Generation: Fernand Braudel (1902-1985)

The first generation came to an end with the end of the Second World War and the second generation came to the scene with the new structure of the Annales in terms of their institutional base, prestige and material assets [Marwick, 2001]. In 1946 the Annales School had a firm institutional basis in the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes which has been formed by Febvre in 1947 and directed by Braudel after 1956. What this institutionalization favored was the spread of interdisciplinary approaches in history. In short, since the end of the first half of the 20th century the Annales became the supporters of the idea that history and the social sciences can no longer be separated.

The dominant figure of the second generation was Fernand Braudel (1902-1983) who has been trained by Lucien Febvre, had studied diplomatic history and who was the head of the Annales from 1957 to 1975. He has been considered one of the greatest of those modern historians who emphasized the role of large scale socio-economic factors in the making and writing of history. During his time, specifically in 1947 the name of the journal changed and became "Annales, économies, Sociétés, Civilizations".

Back to Braudel, what he did was, first of all, to define three different kind of histories regarding time and its speed: a history of constant repetition, stationary geological time in which all change is slow (*the long duration*); social history in which time is slow but has perceptible rhythms (*structure*-economic systems, states, societies, civilizations and changing forms of war); and history of events (*conjoncture*-trade cycles, population trends)in which history is ultra-sensitive on the scale not of man but of individual men and in which time is rapid and has fluctuations [Marwick, 2001].¹³ This division of time provided different levels of change and causations for history. As a result of this classification, he rejected the connection between events and structure while studying history and added that these political events are ephemeral, not lasting and rational. What is more, due to this classification of

¹³ For further information see [Marwick, 2001: 120-122]

different historical times, he only gave his attention to long-range developments in history. According to Braudel, only these events can be decisive in explaining and understanding of history.

In the 1940s, with his contribution, there emerged a transition in history from "...an emphasis on the history of mentalities..." which had brought by Bloch "...to an 'emphasis' on structures as quantities which were relatively independent of human action" [Iggers, 1975: 58-59]. To be more specific, after the 1940s the dominant structure of the Annales turned into quantitative history of *conjonctures*. However, the Annales School had attention to quantitative history since the 1930s. In the 1930s the major interest was on economic cycles and during the 1950s it was research about demography. This notion of attention, by time, became a part of the structure of the school. The aim was the analysis of social and economic processes but the depiction of the exceptional historical condition [Iggers, 1975]. In other words, the quantitative history was not to describe some events rather it regarded as problem oriented approach in which the sources could be investigated more critically and the elimination of biased, subjective views would be possible.

Nevertheless, during the 1950s this new approach, quantitative economic history, has been criticized due to its exclusion of human factor; in particular, concrete humans. As a result, demographic studies, the study of data from families and villages gained popularity in France during the 1950s and then in Britain in the 1960s. To be more specific, demographic studies were made through the inclusion of the everyday life such as harvests, nutrition behaviors, fashions, clothing, epidemics, means of production, climatic changes and wealth and these new research areas enabled historians to write history through material cultures to which Braudel participated after the 1960s. Iggers shortly concluded that "the new demographic studies not only made a direct contribution to the theory of economic development but also offered a clearer picture of the everyday life of the masses of the population"; as a result, it increased the level of awareness and consciousness [Iggers, 1975: 63].

In the 1970s quantitative methods expanded in history discipline due to the invention of computer and as a result historical demography became a discipline. "Geoffrey Barraclough commented that 'the search for quantity is beyond all doubt the most powerful of the new trends in history, the factor above all others which distinguishes historical attitudes of 1970's from historical attitudes in the 1930's" [Iggers, 1997: 45]. So, the general trend in the 1970s

was transforming qualitative evidences into quantitative statements which took its most visible form in the Annales School.

3.4.2.5. The Third Generation

In the third generation of the Annales tradition, actually the historical developments were not specific to the Annales but the developments were common worldwide and they really had an impact on the Annales principles about history. The important figures and developments in this generation are Georges Duby (1919-) who further advanced "mentalities" concept; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1929-) who attempted to write a total history through dividing time chronologically and according to economic movements and who was a supporter of micro-history in which one episode in one place is being used to draw more extensive ends; Maurice Agulhon (1926-) who brought the concept *sociabilite* ("…the networks and circles which produce clusters of shared political ideas") in history discipline. Moreover, in this generation female historians were encouraged to join to the discipline of history such as Michelle Perrot, Mona Ozouf and Arlette Farge [Marwick, 2001].¹⁴

3.4.3. Critiques

Although the Annales tradition was the turning point in 20th century historiography and made significant contributions to history discipline, many criticisms took place. Georg Iggers listed the first one as being defined "...too narrowly with purely quantitative approaches to the study of relatively stable social structures" [Iggers, 1975: 65]. Moreover, Marxist historians made the critique of the Annales historians due to their ignorance of the role of political factors and the role of conscious direction in social processes. Also, the validity of the archives that Annales historians used, such as marriage contracts in order to reach information about economics of the time, also criticized by some historians due to the class differences that is visible in these contracts. "A further charge which has been leveled by Marxists and others against the *Annales* historians is that they have sought to turn history into

¹⁴ For further information see [Marwick, 2001:124-126]

a natural science in which human life would be governed by blind determinism and conscious human intervention eliminated" [Iggers, 1975: 70].

During the 1970s the Annales School began to widen their historical perspective through focusing on comparative studies rather than European concentrations. The Annales investigated the cultural and social expressions of collective consciousness which at the same time meant getting away from the study of modernization. The Annales historians mostly studied "primitive" cultures, non-Western and underdeveloped countries. This too-much concentration on the study of pre-modern societies has been criticized by the Sixth Section for its lack of interest in the recent history and problems of industrial societies and pointed out that most of the Annales historians are early modern Europe or of the Middle Age historians.

One more lack in the Annales tradition can be pointed as the lack of a comprehensive theory of social change which in other approaches of historiography such as Marxist view had been studied at the very origin of historiography. Another problematic part of this tradition was the limitations of methodological perspectives due to both scientific concerns and institutional structures of the Annales and the Sixth Section. Iggers continues to explain, because of the team work rather than individual scholars, the flexibility was limited in the Annales studies. What is more, with the new computer technology history turned to military archives for their data and this at the end led to centralization of history in France.

Iggers also criticized them regarding that they lack a model for the understanding of politics due to their classification of time in different periods. Because of this lack, they had methodological irrationalities in dealing with political and intellectual history. Finally, the emphasis on the dominance of social structures so exclusively caused them to neglect to examine to what extent "men" made history.

3.4.4. Concluding Remarks

The Annales School was the most significant development in history discipline and it occupied a unique place during the 20th century. In almost eighty years they changed the conceptions of what constitutes history and who makes history.

They offered a very different conception of time, which was no more one-dimensional time from past to future but a multilayered and relative one, compared to the 18th and 19th

centuries' approaches. Time was no more a linear and directional but a plural one which coexisted among different civilizations and within each civilization [Iggers, 1997]. One major contribution of this newly defined time concept was the decline of the Eurocentric view of history and the breakdown of the superiority of the "Western" culture.

The major aim of this school was to understand the past. They are not totally different from the Scientific School because they had been affected and shaped by the German Scientific School such as critical reading and seminar methods.

The Annales broadened the perspective of the historian, not only spatially, by breaking through the frame of Western civilization and by exploring non-Western as well as "primitive" cultures and logics, but also topically and methodologically, by widening the scope of the historians' interest to all phases of human social life, including the biological aspects and the realm of fantasy and myth building, and exploring the broadest variety of non-written expressions not only for the pre-historic but also recent periods. They have integrated historical science with the human sciences in the broadest sense, not only in the case of the classical social and behavioral sciences but structural anthropology, psychoanalysis, the arts, literature and linguistics in their most modern forms. They have challenged the parochialism of the classical tradition of historical writing, which has centered on the conscious actions of individuals of power and culture. They found social history as the most relevant one and the decisive factors of history were not individuals' actions but social structures and conjonctures. With them history began to be understood not through the state, administration or jurisprudence but through a history of consciousness, mentalities, material culture, geography, economics, anthropology, in short through interdisciplinary approaches.

They succeeded to transform history from the approach "history from above" to "history from below" which popularized during the 1960s. By doing this, they focused on the perspectives of ordinary people within society and they achieved the inclusion of people and regions which were previously considered as historically insignificant such as women, the working class and regions like Africa and India. Also, in the writings of the Annales during 20th century, the nation and the sense of identity that was constructed based on nation were not as visible as during the Rankean tradition in the 19th century.

The Annales have in practice kept alive a concept of historical objectivity. They assumed that there were objective social processes which operated independently of human will and which could be understood by strict scientific methods that transcended ideological divisions. Thus, they strove towards de-politicization of history although they could not succeed it totally due to the reasons explained in the critiques part.

Outside of France the Annales did not have institutional basis but they have become a model of scientific history to historians throughout the world today to a greater degree than any other one group of historians.

3.5. E. H. CARR: A Milestone in the 20th Century Historiography

Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982) was a British historian, an international relations theorist, and a challenger of empiricism within historiography. During his life, he served as a diplomat in Britain, taught in several universities, studied Soviet history, wrote a series of internationally recognized books on the USSR, and worked in *The Times* as an assistant editor. Among his works, there are many biographies such as Dostoevsky, Karl Marx and Bakunin. However, he is most famous today for his examination of historiography with his work "*What is History?*" and that is the piece which this project will focus on and explain and discuss its significance in the 20th century historiography.

Carr had an enormous impact on historical method in the mid-20th century through defending scientific history and in the idea of progress. His most famous work, "*What is History*?" originated in a series of lectures he gave at Cambridge. The lectures were intended as a broad introduction into the subject of the theory of history, and they included discussions on history, facts, the bias of historians, science, morality, individuals and society, and moral judgments in history. Thus, the most significant concepts that will be the subjects of this project are Carr's views on the description of history, its aim, the objectivity of the history and historian, and at last the contribution of Carr to the field of historiography.

3.5.1. Carr's Approach to History

E. H. Carr believed that the methods and the tools, which were used in history, did not always justify the theories as they are the facts. He explained theories through power relations, and according to him these theories were the tools of hegemonic countries in order to realize their goals in the world through using these theories as the tools of coercion and oppression on less powerful ones.

By way of defining his own approach to history, he criticized both idealists and realists. Carr pointed out that historical theories are related to power politics and as long as people focused on "what ought to be" as idealists do, they would be drawn away from the realities and this would create a situation in which hegemonic powers would be able to use these theories to materialize their aims that actually had been seen in the rise of Nazi Germany and Hitler that brought the biggest devastation to Europe. The same kind of situation was also valid for the realist school. He accused realists to be only the discoverers of the existent problems, in other words "what is" but not the solution providers. Because this school was always interested in "what is" and had no intentions to change the existing situation, they automatically accepted the current conditions as inevitable. Moreover, because they did not bring any solutions, they always changed the conjuncture of their theories due to change of time and loss of their theories' context and validity. At this point, Carr mentioned that questioning of both the conditions of "what is" and "what ought to be" were vital, and asserted the necessity of questioning these two simultaneously; as a result he defined his approach as critical.

3.5.2. Carr's History

E. H. Carr had asked "What is History?" in 1961 and he answered this question as it is a continuous "process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past." In his work Carr tried to make a distinction between history and chronicle. According to him, "history was an attempt to understand and interpret the past, to explain the causes and origins of things in intelligible terms. Chronicle, on the other hand, was the mere cataloguing of events without any attempt to make connections between them" [Evans, 2002: 1]. For Carr, careful research and factual accuracy were necessary but not sufficient conditions for becoming a historian. Historical arguments were more than simple arguments about who did what in the past and why. According to his view, the historian should look at the wider forces such as economic change, industrialization, class formation and class conflict, and to understand these forces the historian needed theories

developed in the present, whether these were Marxist or Weberian arguments or sociological concepts.

In addition to these, it will not be wrong to add that, for Carr, with or without the theory, discerning and interpreting patterns and regularities in the past were the central task of historians in order to assist human society by understanding the present and moulding the future. As Evans pointed out about Carr, for him, history should not be taken as simple as the past in terms of historical accidents and coincidences and the operations of the intentions of great men. "It was not merely that the grand trends and tendencies of history brushed aside accidental events and causes, which could have no more than a short-term, partial and temporary influence on the way history moved; nor merely that men, even the great men, were seldom wholly aware of why they did what they did, and almost never achieved exactly what they wanted, so that historical change often occurred in ways intended by nobody at all" [Evans, 2002: 2]. Moreover, Carr's "What is History?" can make people reach that he had instrumental view of history; thus he was mostly interested in and dealt with "big battalions" of history which would serve the making of policy in societies.

Regarding to the discussions about the literary value of history and its scientific value, Carr believed that history is a science not a literary thing. Thus, history had proof standards and scientific procedures which can lead history to reach scientific laws of that discipline. The main reason behind this belief in scientificity of history was the advent of computer technology during the 1960s and the advantages it brought historians like easiness of collecting and analyzing mass quantitative data. To make a long story short, the concept of history according to Carr in a very professional way can be defined as

History was the study of the past, and its interpretation in terms of large forces and longterm developments, aided by social theory, quantification and other tools of social science and thus contributing to the creation of a firm basis of knowledge on which to take political action and political decisions in the present [Evans, 2002: 4].

3.5.3. The Carr Historian and Historian's Facts

E. H. Carr claimed that the historian "'is a part of history' with a particular 'angle of vision over the past" [Munslow, <u>http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/reapp/carr.htm</u>]. He believed that historians were people who could not be evaluated apart from their own times in which they lived. As Michael Stanford put it, Carr strongly claimed that the historian cannot

dissociate himself from the stance, concerns, interests and welfare of his age and society. [Stanford, 1994]. What this meant was that historians should be aware of what and why they are writing and how their work could be of use and abuse in their own society. So, history was not just interpreting the past for future purposes but also it had political meaning in times when they were written. For this reason, historians' works were politically important and the discoveries and arguments of historians not only were reflecting society's concerns but also had a real intellectual impact on society and their future ideas.

Regarding the issue of how Carr defined the historian and the fact, it is rational to start with Carr's epistemological approach. Rather than using chronological or dialectical approaches he used epistemological approach in his theory of history and accepts this model of historical explanation as the definitive mode for generating historical understanding and meaning. Due to this approach Carr believes that the historian is in a dialogue with the facts. He mentioned that "…historians were not empty vessels through which the truth about the past was conveyed from the documents to the reader, but individuals who brought their own particular views and assumptions to their work, which had to be read in his fact in mind" [Evans, 2002: 15]. He believed sources only become evidence when they are used by the historians. In "*What is History?*" he said that historical facts arise in the course of "…an apriori decision of the historian" [Carr, 1961: 11]. To be more specific, he likens the notion of the "fact" to a sack and unless someone puts something in it there is no way for it to stand upright. And this "something" is about the evidence. Carr asserted that, "the facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context" [Carr, 1961: 11].

Thus, for Carr, facts are meaningful as long as the historians use them and the choice of the facts, their listing, writing, ordering and the content in which they are going to be written are totally depended on the historians. Things happen at a particular time and place in the past and its significance and meaning are provided by the historian as in the way they narrate it. So, historical meaning did not lie in the event itself, but in the moral, social, cultural and ideological choices of the historians. In short, the meaning of history is being defined through the historians' hierarchy of significance [Munslow].

For this reason, the total objectivity of the historian is an illusion because historical facts can never be objective due to what makes them a "fact" is the meaning and significance that the historians gave to them [Carr, 1961]. So, an objective historian can not be the one who consider himself or prefers to see himself totally objective and totally independent from the ideologies or his own times' conditions but he is the one who is really aware of the limits of historical facts and theories and who accepts the impossibility of dissociating of facts and values from each other; plus he is the one who is aware of the impact of external conditions, cultural and social values on him. Carr put this in words as follows: the objective historian is who "has a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own situation in society and history" [Carr, 1961: 123]. Munslow added that he is also who " 'penetrates most deeply' into the reciprocal process of fact and value, who understands that facts and values are not necessarily opposites with differences in values emerging from differences of historical fact, and vice versa" [Munslow]. In short, the historian should/must be able to say and confirm which facts he chose and which values he was affected by during the writing phase of his work instead of claiming his history writing as the perfect, objective and the true reflection of what really happened. To explain it with Carr's own words "the serious historian is the one who recognizes the historically conditioned character of all values, not the one who claims for his won values an objectivity beyond history" [Carr, 1961: 78].

By admitting the facts of history can never be pure due to their constant condition of always being the refractions of the historians' minds and due to being derived within the process of narrative construction, it can be asserted that Carr was a historian who had a crisis in his mind. The reason was, he both believed in the subjectivity of historians and also carried the hope of objectivity in reflecting the past. In other words, although the problem of subjectivity of the historian is visible, he believed this did not decrease the role of empirically derived evidence in history. At this point it is significant and necessary to differentiate Carr's ideas on the objectivity of history and the historian from postmodern theories, in particular from the absolute subjectivity approach. Carr, in his theory, did not mean the necessity of constant suspicion while looking to the historical pieces. He never said that there are only the discourses of the historians; nor did he advocate absolute skepticism just like postmodernists asserted. Also, he never mentioned that there can be no objective historical truth [Carr, 1961].

What he asserted and believed was the achievability of some sort of objectivity in history. Carr pointed out that "the Carr historian" was a person who had an ideological view, interested in and connected to his material, social, cultural and political context. However, the historian had power and rationale to overcome these obstacles against historical objectivity. Munslow says that the historian of Carr "…knows that the significance of the evidence is not

found solely in the evidence" [Munslow]. What Carr believed was that although the facts of history are "...only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian" [Carr, 1961: 120], "...the standard for objectivity in history was the historian's 'sense of the direction in history' [Carr, 1961: 123]. Thus, the selection of the facts were not based on personal bias of the historian but his "...ability to choose 'the right facts, or, in other words, that he applies the right standard of significance" [Munslow; Carr, 1961: 123]. Consequently, we can conclude what Carr was looking for in history in terms of objectivity was not a total, absolute objectivity or the absolute truth but the most accurate and most likely interpretation of evidences through the historians' comparisons of their interpretations about their subject of research.

What is more in terms of objectivity is Carr's idea of history as progress. He believed that the objective interpretation of the past is only possible through the interpretation of history and the evidences in the present time and through the reiteration of interpretation process in the future. To put it differently, if the historian is able to understand the trends of the times on which he is making his research and in which he is living, then he can become an objective historian. Thus, by seeing history as a progress Carr provided the possible objectivity in history through the necessity of making interpretations of history again and again over time due to not underestimating the trends of the times.

3.5.4. Concluding Remarks

With his critical approach Carr changed the way people look to historiography in the 20th century. He challenged the empiricist way of history and brought relativity-the subjective approach- to the discipline. Through his epistemological approach he argued the most accurate past is obvious through the evidence which is interpreted by the historian.

Alan Knight explained the reason of Carr's significance in history by saying that he informed historians to cross-examine and question the documents and to show skepticism to their writer's intentions [Munslow]. Moreover, he was a turning point in history discipline in terms of his definition of history as a dialogue between the historian and his facts-the explicit acceptance of subjective concerns-and the possibility of objectiveness through educating rational historians who would be able to provide rational evidence selection and interpretation

of them. What is more, Carr's method and the way he saw history, historians and the facts provided "...a more sympathetic definition of history than the positivist one it has replaced, simply because it is more conducive to the empirical historical method, and one which appears to be a reasoned and legitimate riposte to the deconstructive turn" [Munslow].

As a result, according to Evans, too, what Carr brought to history was "to persuade historians to reflect on their own biases and preconceptions, to articulate the purposes for which they wrote, and to lay bare to the reader the assumptions on which their work rested" [Evans, 2002: 16]. In other words, Carr bestowed a legacy for future generations of historians which was the danger behind manipulating or distorting the materials of the past on which they are working on and he reminded them that there are always limits of different interpretations of the sources and the necessity of maximum usage of these interpretation opportunities.

Although this book and the ideas of Carr has been criticized a lot, for the 20th century historiography "*What is History*?" was very important for many reasons such as its insistence on the nature of history as a process and the interconnectedness in it (interconnectedness between the historian and his facts, study subjects and the wider context). More important than this, this piece of work made historians accept that there is and will always be a subjective element in historical writing due to historians are human beings who are getting affected from their time, personal, social, cultural, political backgrounds and views. E. H. Carr showed nationalism was an ideology from the standpoint of the historian and it was a very influential phenomenon that not only shaped the progress of history but also its writing, teaching and interpretation. Through making these realities obvious, Carr achieved to show the ways of history discipline's purification from nationalism. This is where the significance of Carr places. Thus, what Carr did through this work was that he made these subjective elements explicit realities and got readers of history from being passive agents and turned them into active subjects who were now aware of the necessity of critical reading.

3.6. Marxist Historiography

Marxist or historical materialist historiography is an influential school of historiography which had been originated by mainly Karl Marx and with contributions of Friedrich Engels. Marx lived periods between 1818 and 1883. He was born in the German Rhineland and he was a son of a lawyer. However, much of his writings were done in England by himself. He never presented a full, rounded account of his theory, known as the Marxist or the materialist interpretation of history. Thus, it will not be wrong to say that the Marxist historiography mostly shaped by the followers of Marxist idea and through these people's interpretations of Marxism concerning the dynamics of their time.

The main tenets of Marxist historiography are the essential role of social classes and economic constraints in progress and determining of history, the class struggles, the economic basis of social progresses its determined and conflictual nature-dialectical- and its outcomes. Primarily, this school contributed historiography through the inclusion of the methodology of history from below and the history of oppressed nationalities and the working class. Also, the members of this school can be listed as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Franz Mehring, Jean Jaures, V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Witold Kula, Jerzy Topolski, Andrzej Wyczanski, Jan Rutkowski, Franciszek Bujak, Jean Bruhat, Pierre Vilar, Ernest Labrousse, Eric Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson who achieved to broaden the scope of history into social history.

Marxist history is mostly teleological. It posits a direction of history towards an end state of history as a classless human society, in Marx's terms, Communism. Marxist historiography can be considered as a tool of Marxist history through which history is going to bring the oppressed classes to self consciousness. In this sense, it can be seen both as a historical project and at the same time a liberation movement and ideology.

This chapter will first define the changing relationship between economics and history. In particular, it will try to explain the inclusion of history, ethics and morals to the interpretation of economic progress. Secondly, it will, shortly, give the basic premises of Marx's grand theory of economic forces. Then the essay will continue with different interpretations of history by Marx and Engels, the methodological approach of Marx to history that is historical materialism and his theory's conflictual nature that is dialectical materialism. Subsequently, Marxist historiography will be studied with its impact and interpretation in Europe particularly in the Soviet Union, Poland, France and Britain. The chapter will be concluded with the contributions of Marxist theory of history to the general historiography discipline and its weaknesses.

3.6.1. Economy and History

It is asserted by Breisach that economic matters in history not only did focus on mere economic activities but also the morals and ethic behind them. However, this was not the situation since the beginning of economics and time. As Breisach mentioned from Hammurabi to Aristotle and to Aquinas morality was a significant part of economy. However,

...after 1300, with the commercial revolution in its initial stages, the analysis of economic matters was gradually detached from moral considerations; calculations of cost and profit grew more precise; greed, avarice, and selfishness became pardonable attitudes...Finally, those who studied economic matters began...to view the diverse economic activities as components of self-contained systems with their own typical interrelationships between wages, prices, production, consumption, and trade that must be explored without constant recourse to moral questions [Breisach, 1994: 291].

That means, for a long time economy and morality were separate. In these periods, particularly until the mid-19th century, scholars studied economics as a natural law and little was left to history. To put it differently, because the artificial order of economics considered as natural law, the past and its study were not necessary to understand the dynamics of economic development.

In the mid-19th century this separation began to change. The Old School in Germany made first systematic reflections on economic matters in historical veins. This school reacted against "...the classical economic model in which isolated individuals acted solely on according to selfish and unchanging economic motives which were divorced from religion, ethics, and politics-a view simplistic enough to permit timeless generalizations, even laws" [Breisach, 1994: 292]. For the Old School economic activities were not just to profit and increase wealth of individuals but national prosperity. For this reason it included morals, ethics and history to study the economic activities of the past and societies and they affected the next schools regarding the relationship of economics and history and their intermingled condition.

3.6.2. Marx's Grand Theory on Economic Forces

What really differentiated Marx from other historians of economics was his concern not only for benefits of industrialization but also his critical awareness of the dark side of industrialization that covered labors' problems, inequalities, bad working conditions and etc. This awareness forced him to create a general theory of economic forces through which not only would the explanation of all of history be done but also the tools of eventual human liberation from all injustice would be defined [Breisach, 1994]. For this reason, as a subject matter he chose how people make a living, the goods they produce and the way they produce these goods. In other words, his origin was the productive forces of the mode of production, and Marx and Engels, in their theory, suggested a three-layered social structure composed of the productive forces, the relations of production and the political/ideological superstructure.

Rigby put in words,

For Marx, all social life is based upon the material production necessary to satisfy humanity's subsistence needs. This process involves the transformation of specific raw materials by means of particular instruments of production, human labor-power, and scientific and technological knowledge within a given specific technical division of labor, i.e. by means of society's 'productive forces'. A particular level of development of these productive forces forms the basis for specific 'relations of production', i.e. relations between people,...or between people and the productive forces...These relations of production, or property relations, determine people's access to the productive forces...and to the products of the labor process [Rigby, 1997: 891-892].

In Marxist terminology, the arrangement of particular relations of production with a definite level of development of the productive forces named as mode of production and each mode of production is defined by its relations of production.

The changing logic of economic development and productive relationships pushed for the emergence of new modes of production. Marx argued that the forces of the mode of production governed all aspects of life and it is the driving force of change. In other words, change comes from internal dynamics of societies not from external forces. Thus, when new productive forces comes, the modes of production change, then automatically productive relationships change and these changes affect all social relations. According to the impact of these changes, Marx and Engels defined five different periods through the connection of relations of production to the level of development reached by its productive forces such as Asiatic mode or "primitive" communism-, ancient slavery, medieval feudal, capitalist and socialism/communism which is defined as yet to come.

In "primitive" communism, there was no private property in means of production; property was communal; society had been organized in large family groups, clans, etc; the order was cooperative and in Breisach's terms it was the higher stage of barbarism and the dawn of civilization [Breisach, 1994]. In the second mode of production, the ancient slavery, the system was slavery; merchant classes were rising and communal attachments were weakening. In the next phase, medieval feudalism, private property was in means of production; farming and small handicraft were modes of production and money economy damaged the order. In capitalist stage, industrialization, urbanization and capital became leading forces of economy and the whole system; labor turned into a commodity and among capitalists and proletariat there occurred huge aggression and hostility. Lastly, in the final state, communism which is yet to come, Marx argued the private property will fade away and all contradictions and antagonisms will end forever due to the consciousness of proletariat and their revolution.

In Marx theory, the class relations were based on private property and they "...are necessarily 'exploitative' since they involve the appropriation of specific forms of 'surplus labor' from the producers by a class of non-producers..." [Rigby, 1997: 892]. And this kind of exploitation causes class conflict because the producers look for restraining the level of exploitation whereas the non-producers, the owners inquire about to maximize it.

These tools of exploitation are not only bounded with the ownership of private property but maximized through some kind of institutional and ideological tools which named as "superstructure". "If society's productive forces form the foundation for its relations of production, then, in turn; these relations of production form the 'economic base' for society's legal, political and ideological 'superstructure'" [Rigby, 1997: 893]. This meant that the state and forms of social consciousness such as religion, art, ideology and philosophy are determined or imagined or constructed by its mode of production. It means that the state and ideologies served for social relations and for the benefit of the exploiters.

To be more specific on the superstructure, Marx viewed religion, arts and philosophy as the reflection of the productive forces not dynamic forces that can create changes. For him, these did not have any value in themselves and they can by no means cause a change in society and they represented a part of a superstructure and they were all based on economics. "...they were defined as mere reflections of existing modes of production and their concomitant productive relationships, were by necessity tied closely to those people who uphold the status quo-those who own the means of production and are called by Marx the exploiters or the ruling class" [Breisach, 1994: 294]. Thus, the whole superstructure was the tool of oppression used by the exploiters against those who try to change the productive relationships to eliminate exploitation of the proletariat. The state is a part of this superstructure and it interpreted as an immoral body, not as the follower of the law but again the tool of the exploiters who through the state checks the exploited. And religion is an illusion constructed in the interest of keeping the exploited servile; religion was the opiate of the masses as Marx stated.

In addition to the explanation of how Marx saw and evaluated private property, state, ideology and other superstructure concepts, his notion of individual or human being is important. "Individual human beings were the agents of change, but they neither originated it nor determined its course nor set its ultimate aim. They had no choice but to implement the changes prescribed by the 'logic of economic development'" [Breisach, 1994: 294]. Therefore, it can be put it differently as humans are social animals who live in a complex society, are a part of a complex division of labor, but in terms of organization they are always dependent to the power structures of their societies and the modes of productive forces just like art, ideology and philosophy in terms of lack of dynamics. The outcome of this dependency and passiveness of the individuals, over time, would cause the rising of class struggles.

The modern class struggle was rooted in the fact that laborers had minimum rewards and could not have an appropriate position in capitalist society although they were the only productive force. In other words, they become alienated to themselves, works, families, workplaces and the system. In the course of time, these laborers would enrich very few people who accumulated most of the money and laborers, the proletariat would become powerless in the society. As Marx suggested in his theory, this situation would lead to the emergence of Socialism through a proletariat revolution and productive relationships would be reorganized in which there would be no inner conflicts. As Breisach wrote, "the common owner ship of all means of production would bar the forming of social classes and establish a perpetual, stable and perfect harmony between the mode of production..., productive relationships and the superstructure" [Breisach, 1994: 295]. And the story continues as follows; at the end, all exploiters, oppression tools and exploited ones would vanish and new society in which all human beings are cooperative would emerge, thus there would be no need for any superstructure mechanisms. In short, the state, religion, art, philosophy would wither away. Thus, the final society that was the ultimate aim of Marx, Communism would emerge in which everyone would everlastingly be cooperative, equal, happy, free and peaceful.

3.6.3. Marx, History and Three Different Interpretations of History

To begin with, Marx and also Engels had many different interpretations of history during their lives. They "...worked within at least three overarching historical outlooks: the anthropogenetic, the paragmatological¹⁵ and the nomological¹⁶, [Rigby, 1997: 889]. In the first view that was the view of Marx and Engels in their early works, "...history is seen as the overarching, dialectical progression through which humanity comes to its full self-realization, passing through a necessary negative phase of self-alienation and a necessary negative phase of self-alienation and social atomization before achieving a fully human, free and rational community" [Rigby, 1997: 889-890]. However, this view replaced with pragmatological one in the mid-1840s. "Here the anthropogenic conception of social development...is replaced by a view in which history is seen as 'the outcome, more blind than the result of any tendency to a specific goal, of the actions of individuals and of groups impelled by their needs in the situations in which they find themselves" [Rigby, 1997: 890]. Lastly, in their works of the years 1860s and 1870s they adopted nomological perspective. In this view "...historical development is seen as analogous to a natural process taking place in accordance with 'inner hidden laws' which it is the task of the historian to uncover. Here the emphasis on human agency of the pragmatological outlook is replaced with a structuralist approach which sees the development of economic formation of society as 'a process of natural history' and in which individuals are presented as 'the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests" which, through time by Marxists, generalized as the

¹⁵ The paragmatological approach, as Rigby mentioned, is obvious in the Holy Family, The Condition of the Working Class in England and the German Ideology.

¹⁶ The nomological approach is evident in Marx's works such as Capital (1867) and Anti-Dühring (1878)

system of dialectical materialism which will actually be explained in the next parts of the chapter [Rigby, 1997: 890-891].

3.6.4. Historical Materialism

Historical materialism is the methodological approach, articulated by Marx, to the study of society, economics and history. It looked for the causes of developments and changes in societies in the way in which humans cooperatively make the means to life through economic analysis and to everything that coexists with the economic base of society such as classes, structures and ideologies. One of the best explanations of historical materialism took place in Marx's "Materialist Conception of History" in 1859 in the preface of his "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy".¹⁷ He explained the key concepts of this notion as follows: "In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness."

In short, historical materialism is the way of studying history through positioning the economics and productive forces at the center. It can be summarized through the assumptions like humans are social animals that live in a complex society; human societies develop a complex division of labor; human beings, over time, improve themselves about controlling the nature through science and technology and humans are capable of interact with nature and affect their society but they are dependent on the condition of development and of the power structures in their society.

¹⁷ For further and detailed information see [Marx, 1992]

3.6.5. Marx and History

The contribution and extent of Marx's influence on history and historiography should not be underestimated. Although it is difficult to specify the exact impact, it is possible identify a distinctive school of Marxist historiography. The reason is, although methodology and epistemology of historical materialism are not totally different from conventional historical practices, Marxist historians can be unique through their common vocabulary, concepts, interests, questions and historical emphasis.

It is important to note that Marxist historiography which will be studied with detail in this project relates to his and Engel's most recent notion of history, nomological one. It is logical to begin with how Marx saw history, motivators of history writing, and his dialectic.

3.6.5.1. Marx's History

Human history, as Marx saw, was made by men not under circumstances that they chose through their will but

...'circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past'. Man's actions create forces which at a point in historical development arrive at operating independently of the will of men and in fact control them. This makes it possible for Marx to view the 'development of economic formations of society,' which for him constitutes history, as a 'process of natural history' governed by laws'' [Iggers, 1975: 126] which are not like the laws of natural sciences but the laws of capitalist development.

Additionally, in his work "*Class Struggles in France*, *1848-50*" Marx defined history as "...a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in the social forces, of formations of ideas; there is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movements-*mors immortalis*" [Marx, 1964; Breisach, 1994: 294].¹⁸ Plus, at one time Marx defined history as "...the theory of conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat" [Breisach, 1994: 297].

What is more, he considered that all sciences of society are historical sciences and they proceed from the material basis of human existence. Thus, "The writing of history...must

¹⁸ For further details [Marx, 1964]

proceed from the 'material conditions' under which men live and 'their modification in the course of history through the action of men'" [Iggers, 1975: 128]. For him, political history was the key to the understanding of economic history and the political arena was the scene in which class conflicts were practiced and the outcome of these conflicts was determined by the overall direction of history. From all these definition what can be sorted out is that Marx saw history and economics as sciences that are inseparable and history was the right place to follow the universal theory of human development and it was the arena in which the laws of these universal developments would be formulated.

3.6.5.2. Motive, Time and Location of History

For Marx, the crucial force of lawful historical development in social conflict rooted in economic inequality. The motivating force behind history was not ideas but productive forces, as Marx stated most concisely in the preface of *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*. Over time, these forces would conflict with the social conditions they took place and against which they had rebelled when these became obstacles to the full unfolding of productive forces. This would emerge in the capitalist mode of production because in capitalist system, as Marx stated, the process of production rules and controls man, instead of ruled by him.

Other than the specificity of mode of production of history which was capitalism, the geographic location of the historical development was explicit. The progress of mankind would be in the "West" because it was economically dynamic whereas Asia and Africa were stagnant. In short, the view of history, for Marx was strongly embedded in the main currents of Western thought in the 19th century [Iggers, 1997].

3.6.5.3. Dialectic Materialism

The conception of reality and knowledge of Marx that was actually significant for history and historiography was different compared to other thinkers' conceptualizations. He clarified his conception with the notion of "dialectic".

Dialectic means an exchange of proposition and counter-proposition and resulting in a synthesis of these opposing claims. Dialectics is the science of the general and abstract laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. Its principal features can be listed as follows: The universe is not a detached mix of things isolated from each other, but an integral and interdependent whole; the nature is in a constant motion; development is continuous and progresses that seem insignificant lead to fundamental changes; and all things contain internal dialectical contradiction that are the major sources of motion, transformation, and development in the world, and for Marx, it is the source of history.

Contradiction is the key to all other categories and principles of dialectical development. At the heart of Marxist dialectics there is the idea of contradiction, with class struggle playing the central role in social and political life. Dialectical materialism may be defined as the philosophical doctrine and as Marx wrote in the first section of *"The Communist Manifesto"* (1848), it asserts that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 2000: 663).¹⁹ Thus, dialectical materialism is essentially characterized by the belief that history is the product of class struggle.

Moreover, "...the dialectic repudiates the positivistic notion of the primacy of the phenomenal world of science, because it holds that all visible manifestations are problematic and must be understood within the broader context of conflicting forces" [Iggers, 1997: 80]. This view places the requirements of capital ahead of the innermost needs and aspirations of human beings. For this reason, Marx wrote in his Das Kapital that "the political economy of capital belongs to 'a state of society, in which the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him" [Iggers, 1997: 80].

Before concluding the significant notions about dialectical materialism, it is vital to know that historical materialism of Marx is not the application of dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism is the leading mechanism, source of history that is unique to Marx whereas the historical materialism is the methodology which is being shared by many traditional schools of history.

¹⁹ For the full text of the Communist Manifesto see [Marx and Engels: 2000]

3.6.6. Marxist Historiography

Marxist historiography mainly tried to explain the primacy of the productive forces in historical changes. With the aim of explaining their central question Marxist historians studied subjects like dynamics of the productive forces of the society, main relations of production in specific societies, nature and extent of the class struggles, crisis of production and relationship between political power and ideologies, revolutionary consciousness, actions of working classes, absence of the proletariat revolution, etc. [Rigby, 1997]. By studying these subjects and by interpreting them according to Marxist ideas Marxist historians contributed a lot to the discipline of history and historiography.

It is important to differentiate the theory that Marx wrote down was different from the writings, studies and interpretations of Marxist historians due to the failure of the original theory. Because of this, Marxist historians re-interpreted the theory and made some changes in it such as the necessity of abandonment of the extreme functionalism and economic determinism in the theory, desertion of the grand universal theory of human development, inclusion of more democratic sentiments, etc.

Among the most debated issues in Marxist historiography, there are the impact of the army and slavery system in Roman Empire and its collapse, the main reasons of this empire's collapse; internal factors or external ones?, whether the productive forces are inherent tools of capitalism or not, the impact of slavery system on both feudalism and capitalism, whether the productive forces can be explained through universal laws or they and their developments are specific to each country and etc. Additionally, regarding the Asiatic mode of production the main discussion was whether it is a transition from "primitive" communism to class society or a form of feudalism and regarding the feudal social relations the main question was whether the production by rents [Rigby, 1997: 898].²⁰ These topics were the ones that come to mind first but it should not be forgotten that it is a very tiny list compared to the issues studied from Marxist view by historians. However, I believe it would enrich the project if some of them will be mentioned in further paragraphs.

²⁰ For more detailed information see [Rigby, 1997: 895–907]

Marxist historians never forgot that "...it is wrong to apply to *all* modes of production the laws of development specific to capitalist society...In practice, it is the control which society's relations of production exercise over its productive forces and the class struggles which result from particular relations of production, rather than the autonomously developing productive forces, which enjoy pride of place in Marxist account of change and crisis within, and the transitions between, particular modes of production" [Rigby, 1997: 895]. So, through Marxist historiography and through the way they see history, many civilizations and empires did not collapse due to wars, disasters, foreign impacts, barbarian invasions etc, but due to the failure of the productive forces, inefficiency of feudal mode, inner class struggles, etc as seen in the collapse of Roman Empire and feudal system.

Although Marxist historians have different emphasis and ideas about the analysis of some historical events such as slavery in the Ancient World and the French Revolution, what were common for all Marxist historiography were class conflict and its interpretation. Or at least it can be declared that class conflict was the least controversial one among the criticized issues among Marxist historians. "For Marxists, all...modes of production are based on the appropriation of surplus labor by the propertied class, a process which inevitably generates class conflict as the propertied come into conflict with the producers" [Rigby, 1997: 899]. From the perspective of Marxist historians class conflict not only do rise from the actions of slaves, peasants and workers but also by the ruling class in order to protect their self-interests. Rigby explained that "...Marxist historiography has tended to concentrate its attention on popular social movements and forms of unrest" and much of it "...concerned with the emergence of the labor movement under moderns capitalism" [Rigby, 1997: 899-900].

Among the interests of Marxist historians, the social superstructure of politics, the state and ideology were studied with deep emphasis. The significance of the interest in superstructure takes Marxist historiography from being a simple "history from below". For Marx and Engels superstructure is composed of the state, ideology and social consciousness and all corresponds to economic basis. The state is the tool of the propertied. To put it differently, it is the institution which makes the economically powerful also politically powerful. Thus, the state is under the control of ruling class and this is one of the main issues of Marxist historiography. "That the state is 'a class state, the state of the 'ruling class'..."means that the state is not a socially neutral concept for Marxists [Rigby, 1997: 903]. Moreover, it was not only the state but also various forms of social consciousness from religious views to political ideologies, programs and theories were determined according to the interests, desires and practices of particular groups in society. In other words, Marxists believed and interpreted history as there cannot be "...the history of ideas but only the history of the socially specific individuals who produce such ideas" [Rigby, 1997: 904]. So, for example religions and ideologies are not merely about personal choice and taste but class-specific concepts with the aim of providing transitions, changes in societies.

3.6.7. Marxist Historiography and Europe

In this part, the aim is to show how the original theory of Marx changed, re-defined by European Marxist historians and how they applied the renewed theory in their works and to show the most recent form of Marxist history which took this form due to its failures that emerged from the contradiction of its premises with the actual life.²¹ The countries below are the Soviet Union, Poland, France and Britain in which, with the impact of Marx, economic history became an acceptable attempt to understand the developments and a tool to shape future accordingly.

3.6.7.1. The Soviet Union and Poland

In Western countries Marxist historians had been trained in universities and they had different ideological and methodological positions. However, this was not the case in the Soviet Union. Iggers stated that

In the socialist countries...the coordination of research was often assigned to the academies of science with general guidelines for historical interpretation frequently offered by the parties which also maintained separate research institutions of their own. Historiography that was Marxist served for the political interests of the party at the moment and it was practiced as opportunistic and polemical rather than being scientific. Macro-history was done on larger historical processes for decreasing the class conflicts and revolutionary crises. In the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union there was no central research on archival materials. History mostly dealt with present day politics in these geographies in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century [Iggers, 1997: 82].

²¹ For more information see Chapter 25 in [Breisach, 1994]

The reason was Marxist theory constructed on the impossibility of a science of history that is totally free of all presuppositions because they supported that history is conditioned and has certain social functions that need to be fulfilled. In other words, Marxist historians deny the separation of ideology and history. History was an institutionalized party dominated science which was led by both great men and the conflicts of ideologies.

As an example for the case of Russia, regarding ideological view of Marx's theory of history, Breisach wrote a short summary of Marxist Russian historiography. He mentioned that in imperial Russian historiography, in the 19th century, the state was at the origin. Historians directly wrote Marx's theory including wide generalizations, historical periods of modes of production, economic determinism, passive individuals, plus Lenin's revolutionary action. About the materialist conception of history, Lenin claimed that "...it had discovered 'the objective law behind the system of social relations' and had 'made it possible for us to examine, with the precision of a natural science, the social conditions influencing the life of the masses, and the changes taking place in these conditions'" [Marwick, 1970: 42].

However, this kind of interpretation of the Marxist history and writing changed in the 1920s. With Stalin, the historians who approached history objectively replaced with biased proletariat historians who preferred to move toward history ideologically. Many concepts like Bolshevism and superstructure were made unquestionable and they were all fixed after defined by Stalin himself. Through time, history used as a tool of social cohesion and Marx's historical stages of modes of production were abandoned²² and instead patriotism and nationalism became visible in Russian historiography [Breisach, 1994: 352]. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, historians from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union began to question Marxist theory of history due to the failure of it in many aspects.

Moreover, primary concern of Polish Marxist School, according to Iggers, was the analysis of feudal economies which was defined as pre-capitalist economies and in which main production unit was landed property. This school went beyond from studying economic structures and began to study mentalities in which the changing measures of time and the role of subjective factors of social consciousness in historical change were studied. In Poland, "...a Marxist perspective contributed to a broadening of the questions asked by historians, an increasing concern with the material foundations of culture-which in 1951 led to the

²² Instead of Marxist periodizations like asiatic, feudal, etc, three staged historical periods were recognized such as ancient, medieval and modern. For a detailed explanation see [Breisach, 1994: 352]

foundation of the Institute for the Study of Material Culture –of social and economic conditions and of class conflict' [Iggers, 1975: 141-142].

In 1956, Polish Marxist historiography changed. It began to use demographic and econometric studies other than the explicit Marxist assumptions. In other words, Polish historiography freed itself from explicit Marxist assumptions and historiography became aware of the role of theory in history and the need of formulation of history through empirical evidences just like the ideas of the Annales School.

To sum up, in the Soviet Union Marxist historiography was an ideology-dependent practice for a long time, which in other words was a tool of politics and leaders. However, the questioning of the grand theory in Soviets and re-interpretations of it in Poland through inclusion of mentalities, subjective forces, empirical data, etc contributed a lot to the development of discipline of historiography.

3.6.7.2. France

The most visible impact of Marxist theory in French historiography was the interpretation of the French Revolution in the 20th century from a Marxist perspective. The reason was the Marxist stress on the economic determination of politics and the role of class conflicts. Although different views came from Marxist historians such as whether the source of concepts like freedom, liberty and equality were peasants or the bourgeoisie, in short the French Revolution became a popular subject for historians [Rigby, 1997]. However, more important than that, there happened a wide-ranging interaction between the Marxist School and the Annales that led to the re-interpretation, transformation and even change of the Marxist historiography regarding the subject matters, methodology and emphasis.

The similarities between the Marxist School and the Annales School are many. One is: "the subject matter of history is structured and accessible to thought, is scientifically penetrable like any other sort of reality" [Iggers, 1975: 144]. It means that for Marxist historiography and the Annales School history was capable of scientific analysis. A Marxist interpretation of any historical events requires that the relationship, it assumes between structures and events exists not only in theory but is reflected in empirical evidence. Additionally, over time, Marxist historians increasingly turned to social archives and used quantitative methods and non-Marxist historians took into consideration the conflicting interests of groups that have economic reasons in their social setting, a degree of methodological consensus emerged on what constituted social history among the Annales School and Marxist historians. [Iggers, 1975].

The Annales School and the Marxist School were also very like-minded in the interest in popular culture and material culture. Both of these schools worked through symbolic meanings of some materials such as weights and they made research about the impact of urbanization, commercialization of agriculture, food, culture, fashion, festivals, etc on societies. Additionally, both these schools investigated the role of non-economic factors, the role of popular culture and they preferred to study the pre-modern world. As the Annales School did, Marxist historians brought Marxist history and historiography a human face through studying these subjects by reducing their extreme economic determinism.

Besides this common view, what differentiated Marxists from the Annales was that "For Marxists...proceed with a distinctive conception of the structure of historical reality, which views the mode of production as the core of the social structure marked by the 'economic principle of social contradiction which bears within it the necessity of its destruction as a structure'. Marxism thus involves the application of a theoretical framework for understanding dialectically the 'mechanisms of human societies' but simultaneously a practical political commitment to the transformation of these societies arising from insight into the objective exigencies of the historical situation" [Iggers, 1975: 144-145]. Thus, the rejection of the ideological history in the Annales and lack of the superiority, even mere centrality of the economic dynamics over social ones in the Annales historiography made it different from Marxist one.

To be more specific, many historians like Labrousse and Lefebvre made significant contributions to Marxist theory sometimes by rejecting Marx's own ideas and sometimes by adding new interpretations to his.²³ For example, Lefebvre "Without sacrificing narrative, he placed the analysis of class conflict on a firm archival basis which had been lacking in Marx's own class analysis..." [Iggers, 1975: 148]. Lefebvre made population an active agent of historical change and collective mentality rather than considering them mere masses or classes because "passive individual" thesis had failed long ago. Consequently, the Annales

²³ For further details see [Iggers, 1975: 145-148]

School was among the most effective external impacts on Marxism in terms of its reinterpretation, actually its new formation by means of quantification, archival method, material culture and demise of economic determinism.

3.6.7.3. Britain

As it was mentioned before, with the collapse of the Soviet Union historians from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union began to question Marxist theory of history. However, this re-examination of Marxist perspective was more in Western Europe than in the Soviet Union and by people who did not have Marxism as an official ideology. Among these European countries Britain was one of them that seriously focused on Marxist theory due to facing with the fourth mode of production-capitalism-densely, and due to the huge worker population. Some of the historians that worked on Marxist theory were Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton, Christopher Hill, George Rudé, Eric Hobsbawm and Edward P. Thompson.

The reinterpretation of Marxist theory by Europeans, specifically by British historians gave way to labor and working class studies in England and this is heavily studied by Edward P. Thompson. He mostly studied industrial capitalism, industrial revolution, transition of Europe from feudal to capitalist society, class struggles, and class consciousness and interpreted them. With Eric Hobsbawm, as being historians who were aware about the dogmatic, mechanistic and narrowly materialistic interpretation of Marx's theories by early Marxist historians, tried to get aid from other social sciences to seek and find answers in past experiences. They, through the use of evidential verifications, tried to explain past in a more total sense in contrast to specializations of it. Both of them specialized on Britain in the 19th century and industrial capitalism and they saw "…capitalism as both an economic and value, or attitudinal, system, each part dependent upon the other and both operating through a wide range of political and social institutions" [Iggers, 1975: 167]. With his contributions British historiography improved a lot and contributed to the Marxist theory of history.

The development, change and reinterpretation of Marxist historiography in Britain can be seen through the foundation of some journals and their transformations and the changes in their subject matters through time. One of these journals is *Past and Present* and the other is *History Workshop*. The journal *Past and Present* was founded by British Marxist historians in 1952 as a forum for discussion between Marxists and non-Marxist historians and the general interest was in society and culture. Through time their interests shifted from unnamed social processes to "...the forms these changes assumed in the consciousness of those who experienced them" [Iggers, 1997: 85-86]. The members of this journal believed that methods and reasons of science must be applicable to the study of history.

In addition to *Past and Present* journal, in 1976 *History Workshop* journal was founded and it was built on Thompson's labor history approach. The basic issues of the journal were the fundamental changes in Marxist approaches to history, in particular Great Britain and elsewhere. With its modification in 1982 the journal also added feminist historians and began to be the forum of gender politics and feminist history also. "What distinguished *History Workshop* from other historical journals was not its socialist commitment...but it proclaimed intention to break out of the narrow confines of professional history in order 'to reach and serve a wide democratic audience rather than a closed circle of academic peers'" [Iggers, 1997: 90].

The role of women in this journal contributed to a broadening in the scope of the journal as well as to an exploration of new methodological approaches. The inclusion of women, in other words feminism, caused the questioning of Marxist teleology and it shifted the study area from industrial workplace to domestic and private spheres which were concerned with sexuality and the role of violence in defining male identity [Iggers, 1997].²⁴

Beginning with the 1980s, with the spread of postmodernist ideas, the journal started to study the role of language as a major factor in social experiences and relations. The editors of the journal stated that "the language of socialism...antedates the appearance of a socialist movement' and has in fact contributed substantially to the formation of the movement" [Iggers, 1997: 92]. Moreover, it is believed that language is not independent from the social changes such as kin systems, hierarchies, symbols and materials of cultures and most importantly labor processes. Because of this, the journal began to discuss about language, feminism and the system because they believed gender is not natural but socially and culturally constructed and embedded in language. So, since the 1980s Marxist historiography is being affected from postmodernism.

²⁴ For further details see [Iggers, 1997: 91-93]

With the 1990s, the main geography of the subjects expanded from industrial Europe and North America to non-Western world like Africa and Latin America. In addition to that with the collapse of the Soviet Union-actually this was continuing since 1985 says Iggers- the members of the journal questioned the labor movements and at the end they admitted that labor movements cannot be taken for granted. Thus, Marxist theory, once again re-identified, this time by British Marxist historians.

Although *History Workshop* could not totally achieve to close the gap between professionals and popular mass there are some basic concepts which were shaken by the changes of time. "Not only the Marxist teleology but also the conception of class that was fundamental to its understanding of society and of political practice was irredeemably shaken" [Iggers, 1997: 93]. However, as the journal liberated itself from Marxist assumptions, it came closer to common people in contrast to Marxist working people. What was untouched was the loyalty of the journal to all forms of exploitation and domination which are embedded in society and its inner structure.

Iggers stated that "The emergence of a new social history, the product of many influences, including a distinct contribution from the merging of Marxism and social science, has been the most significant historiographical development in Britain..." [Iggers, 1975: 172-173].

As a result, Marxist historiography, once again changed; however this time it was by British historians. With the new examination and re-shapening of Marxist historiography, social issues like gender and race were no more totally ignored, the taken-for-granted situation of labor and working class changed and the inclusion of the masses to academia of Marxist historians to some extent was materialized.

3.6.8. Contributions of Marx to History and Historiography

One of the reasons why Marxist theory of history evolved so much was the contradiction among what the theory suggested but what happened in actual life such as the role of individual, strength of capitalism, the claim of being the grand, universal theory of history and eternal true structure for historical development, etc. For example, the premise that "goods have value to the degree labor has been used to produce them" challenged with

the determinant role of buyers' psychologies on goods value (as Eugen Böhm-Bawerk suggested); and the passive role of individuals challenged with the rise of capitalism instead of its weakening as suggested by Marx. Although these challenges considered as the failure of Marxist theory, simultaneously they made Marxism one of the biggest schools of thought that was studies, thought on it and re-interpreted.

Moreover, Edwin R. A. Seligman stated that "As a philosophical doctrine of universal validity, the theory of 'historical materialism' can no longer be successfully defended. But in the narrower sense of the economic interpretation of history-...that the economic factor has been of the utmost importance in history, and that the historical factor must be reckoned with in economics-the theory has been, and still is, of considerable significance"[Breisach, 1994: 300]. Plus, he added that Marxism taught historians to search below the surface, while the surface was filled with all political and diplomatic history.

In short, Marxist historiography, in a way, corrected the Rankean teachings which were too literal interpretations of history and which were too much stressing the accumulation of facts and ignoring facts' critical, fundamental interconnections. In particular, Marxist view of history achieved "...to bring 'the people' back into history; not in the old romantic way, but in a manner which makes exhaustive use of every available source and every new technology" [Marwick, 1970: 206]. Marx also reminded historians the necessity of paying attention to local studies due to they include the power of creating huge outcomes, the need to study long-term social changes, inevitability of emphasis on economics, social crises, the eternal contradictory condition of nature-dialect-, significance of history-from-below approach, the historical impact of class struggles and the role that political institutions and forms of social consciousness play although this approach failed in many aspects.

3.6.9. Critiques

Besides the contributions of Marxism to historiography, it has many points open to criticism. Among them, the ideology-dependent usage of it, the legitimacy of functionalistic approach of Marx; the narrow and passive nature of the Marxist conception of social being as a permanent member of a specific class, and the individual as always passive and the 'interpenetration' of base and superstructure can be counted.

One of the problems about Marxist historiography is in its objectivity and its ideological reasoning. Some Marxist historians including Marx and Engels, too, did not follow the methodology and conceptualization of the Marxian theory of economics forces. Iggers stated this situation by saying, "Marx's historical writings were more directly related to the needs of an immediate political situation and guided by general philosophical assumptions and political values" [Iggers, 1975: 123]. In other words, historical writing used as a mean of political instrument to materialize statesmen's, politicians' and political leaders' ends just like Lenin and Stalin did.

Moreover, Marxism can be criticized for considering social beings with class positions. In other words, too much emphasis on economic class underestimated the significance of gender, race, and status which are different forms of social exclusion-other than economic form- in Marxist view, thus historiography, although these issues were added to some Marxist journals over time. Plus, the constant passive description of the individual was not realistic as it was seen in the strengthening of the capitalist system and the escalation of the power and impact of the individual.

A relating criticism was the economic determinism not only in class issues but also in all social, economic and cultural developments. It could be argued that Marx made a mistake by putting economics at the origin of every social dynamic and by making it unbendable. May be, it will be a criticism of a criticism but it is important to state that, just like Marc Bloch asserted, "' Marx himself did not fall into the error of thinking that men's ideas were merely a pale of reflection of their economic needs': the worst excesses of economic determinism have been perpetrated by later writers, many avowedly non-Marxist'" [Marwick, 1970: 206].

Another criticism was about the interpenetration of base and superstructure is whether social beings can be defined without superstructure or not. Some Marxist claimed the answer as no, but others argued that superstructure and its elements not only reflect or cooperate with social beings but "...they are actually constitutive part of society's economic 'base'" [Rigby, 1997: 910]. So, although Marx and Engels argued that superstructure and social being are distinctive as political, ideological base and economic base, other historians did believe the interdependence and mutual dependency among them. Plus, another perspective, by Godelier, mentioned that "Base and superstructure are no longer seen as separate institutions but are instead defined by their different *functions*" [Rigby, 1997: 911].

3.7. A General Historical Look to Historiography

3.7.1. The 19th century

Before the 19th century history was all about the chronology and periodization of knowledge without reference to socio-economic processes, around major political events of European importance. From the early 19th century, historiography began to develop in a fundamentally different way. The crucial changes occurred between the German historians, largely in the course of a reaction to the French Revolution and an impermanent subjugation of their country by Napoleon. What was new in the 19th century was the professionalization of historical studies with a belief of scientific status of history behind it and their concentration at universities and research centers and academic journals. In the 19th century, history, instead of being a way for the defense for religion or done by highly intellectuals, became a discipline for professionals trained systematically at academic institutions in which internal criticisms of the sources were began to be done in addition to external ones. [Berktay, 1992]. In other words, analysis and synthesis became the methods of history which gained it strong methodological basis as a science.

History instead of trying to reach universal generalizations and abstract laws like natural sciences dealt more with concrete people in time who made history and "...the values and mores that gave societies cohesion" [Iggers, 1997: 2]. The major intention of history in the wake of science was shared optimism of the professionalized sciences which generally had methodologically controlled research that made them able to reach objective knowledge possible. For the historians this change provided the constitution of the past "as it had actually occurred" under the Scientific School.

History, which, in Berktay's words, had been developed as a science of documents from the 16th to the 19th century questioned the previous content and method of history during this century. There emerged a huge breaking away from myths and hearsays and history was reduced to only written sources, documents.

...in the second half of the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, the general intellectual atmosphere was very positivistic, and this had a strong bearing on how documents

came to be regarded by historians-as the Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth. Hence, the reconstruction of historical reality was directly and simply conceived of as discovering individual documents, putting them side by side and literally taking their arithmetical sum" [Berktay, 1992: 111].

In addition to the scientific discourse, the literary discourse of history continued which meant that the requirement of imaginative steps in history writing in order to create a consistent story to explain validated facts and events in an empirical manner continued to be seen during this century. The scientific history shared three important features with literary discourse. These are as follows: "(1) they accepted a correspondence theory of truth holding that history portrays people who really took place. (2) They presupposed that human actions mirror the intentions of the actors and that it is the task of the historian to comprehend these intentions in order to construct a coherent historical story. (3) They operated with a one-dimensional, diachronical conception of time, in which later events follow earlier ones in a coherent sequence" [Iggers, 1997: 3]. In short, until well into the twentieth century historical writing was shaped by the principles of reality, intentionality and temporal sequence.

More important than this, these imaginative steps in historical writing used to construct nationalism and national identity in Europe. "It was nationalism's quest to invent a national identity supposedly rooted in the past that stimulated all historical research through most of the nineteenth century" [Berktay, 1992: 112]. With the impact of nationalism, history, in the "West", began as the history of the state and history from above which was written about the elites, not the masses.

To cut a long story short, "Modern historical science emerged (1)as a science of documents and (2) as the history of the state and the ruling classes, or history from above (3) emerged in Europe, was professionally defined as an intrinsically Eurocentrist discipline..." [Berktay, 1992: 116].

3.7.2. The 20th century

Throughout time the methods and practices of history discipline began not to satisfy the demands of a modern science both politically and socially. In the twentieth century historiography and historical science faced with many changes and challenges. The first one was the transformation of the narrative kinds from the 19th century's event-oriented structure

of professional historiography to the 20th century's social-science-oriented forms of historical research and writing. The new social science-oriented historiography which was led by the Marxists, Parsonians and Annalists criticized previous attitudes in history. According to this new approach, the previous methods were narrowly focusing on individuals, particularly "great men" as these individuals were the origin of history, and thus they were ignoring the broader context in which history was operating. Thus, with the emergence of social science oriented approach and the inclusion of the masses and social issues other than mere politics into history, history began to follow a more democratic paradigm.

In the older approach history was for to deal with particulars and its aim was to understand them; however the 20th century approaches favored to deal with generalizations and instead of understanding they maintained explanations because they believed that all sciences, including history, have to include causal explanations [Iggers, 1997].

Both the approaches of the 19th and the 20th centuries accepted the unilinear time concept which included an acceptance of continuity and direction in history. Iggers explained this as "...there was such a thing as *history* in contrast to a multiplicity of histories" [Iggers, 1997: 4]. Leopold von Ranke, for example, rejected the notion of universal history and allocated a privileged position of Western history because he believed that history owns an inner consistency and development [Iggers, 1997]. Ranke's history had been depended on Prussian state of his time, the primacy of the politics over economics, social forces and there was an extreme reliance on official state documents. This kind of state-led history writing approach, although it had been spread all around the world, began to be criticized by the turn of the century. A new approach to history which preferred to focus more on social and economic conditions of societies took place instead of focusing on events and "great men" which ended the era of *history* and started the era of *histories*.

What is more, among this century's efforts there was the separation of history from mythology and literature. To put it differently the question of subjective elements in history began to be challenged strictly. "Historians like R.G Collingwood (1946) and E.H Carr (1961) developed some lucid expositions of the ways in which both documents and the historians which work on them are themselves product of socially and historically conditioned selection processes" [Berktay, 1992: 113].²⁵ In other words, the subjectivity lied in historians'

 $^{^{25}}$ For detailed information about R. G. Collingwood and his studies on history see [Collingwood, 1961]

ideological selectivity in their choice of history and in their interpretation of history. So, the 19th century view of linear accumulation of historical knowledge was challenged by the accumulation of historical knowledge through political, social and economic factors' impact on writing and interpretation of history.

One more change that came with the second half of 20th century was the end of the colonial empires and demise of Europe as a hegemon. These developments reflected on history as the acceptance of the existence of non-European, non-Western histories and the inclusion of neglected parts of societies such as women, gender, race, ethnicity and daily life into research areas of history. The inclusion of all these new subject-matters into historical writing gave populations chance of constructing their own identities apart from the traditional norms and national patterns. In other words, the plurality of civilizations had been accepted; the "history from above" era ended; and "history from below" approach expanded.

In the 20th century, due to the plurality of civilizations, the conception of time also changed. Each civilization followed developmental pattern and showed the signs of turning from a narrative history which followed sequence of events to one that examined conditions in a specific time period. Thus, time in history was no more an objective entity or universal category of thought [Iggers, 1997]. In this century, "historical time varied...with the subject of its study, each with a different speed and rhythm, whether the historian dealt with the great overarching structures within which natural or social, economic and cultural history underwent gradual changes or with the rapid pulse of political history" [Iggers, 1997: 7].

Furthermore, history and power relationship, the possibility of totally objective history and its writing emphasized and criticized more than ever. According to Nietzsche and also Marx, knowledge was a means of exerting power [Iggers, 1997]. From this point it can be come to the point that history, knowledge about past and writing history are effective means of asserting power and authority. Thus, objectivity and priority of logic in history might not be the primary aims at all. From all these outcomes, some historians of this century became convinced that history was more close to literature than science which opened the way for postmodernism.

3.7.3. Challenge of Postmodernism

Since the 1960s and the 1970s the idea 'language is one of the conditions that bounds history in terms of objectivity and scientificity' gained significance. To put it differently, the historian began to be seen as a person whose thoughts and perceptions are constructed and trained by the system of his language in which he works. Thus, the language considered a concept which was shaping the reality. According to postmodernism, it was no more; actually it had never been the means of explaining the past. To be brief, language had been seen as a self-contained system and literary and fictional elements in history were accepted as inevitable. It was argued by Jacques Derrida who stated that "there is nothing outside the text" and Paul de Man that language constructs reality rather than referring it [Iggers, 1997].

Other than the vitality of language in postmodern approach, it involved that the notion of a unitary history was not defensible. "...history was marked not only by continuity but also by ruptures" [Iggers, 1997: 13]. Moreover, they challenged the authority of experts in history and its writing and what is more they questioned the concept of historical truth. By doing this postmodernism had many critiques on historical discourse and fiction-in other words literary tradition- and frank scholarship and propaganda.

According to postmodernists, society and culture are always in transformation, so is history writing. The subject of history writing continued to change from social structures to culture of everyday life and common people. In other words, history shifted from being the study of macros to micros which means the study of concrete individuals started. History, therefore, within the postmodern discourse, began to be understood as cultural history in which the center was no more the state, church and market.

3.7.4. Concluding Remarks

To sum up, Halil Berktay, regarding the development of history and historiography from the 16th to the 20th century, concludes that "...what we have arrived at, it seems, is no longer a single layer of 'facts' but some more advanced notion, however inadequately defined it might still be, of *three interconnected tiers of evidence, theory and ideology*, with the second being constantly formed by, and mediating between the others" [Berktay, 1992: 115]. According to that, history could be defined as the sum of evidence and theory whereas historiography is the sum of theory and ideology. Although history and historiography seems different things they are meaningless without each other; history cannot be produced if the previous written things are not considered seriously enough and without evidence the written documents cannot be considered valid. To sum up, "...what is knowable becomes knowable not in itself, but by going back and forth in successive iterations between evidence, theory and ideology, by scrupulously checking History and Historiography against one another" [Berktay, 1992: 115].

3.8. Historiography and Nationalism in Europe

Nationalism, political legitimacy of authorities and cultural identity have been the most pervasive influences upon the writing of history in Europe since the nineteenth century. Since nationalism was the dominant ideology in the "West" for centuries, it automatically affected the writing of history due to aforementioned significance and influence of history on the construction of legitimacy, power, identity and social belonging etc.

National histories mostly depend on the narration of heroic struggles, battles, wars and war heroes. They deal with hostile neighbors; talk about national suffering and see national 'destinies' in charge of bridging different national tradition. In Europe, national historiographies mostly tended to compare the national development of their own country with that of others. Most national histories show a noteworthy zeal in demonstrating the uniqueness, in other words exceptionalism, in terms of constructing superiority over others, of their own nation states. This kind of writing causes the emergence of different historiographies that frequently obscured the common characteristics of the European heritage.

In addition to usage of history as a way of construction national based uniqueness, "the teleological nature of history encourages historians to retroactively imagine or construct past communities in accordance with contemporary cartographies. Today these cartographies are dominated by the nation-state..." [http://www.ottoman-links.co.uk/2004_nationalism_conference.asp]. What this meant was everything that

happened within the borders of a nation state since the beginning of time covered under national histories. To put it with different wording, "Historiography is usually written and analyzed within one spatio-temporal setting, traditionally that of a particular nation state. As a consequence, historiography tends to localize explanations for historiographical developments within national context and to neglect international dimensions" [Lorenz, 1999: 25]. The result was the acceptance of nationalist historiography as the most suitable way of organizing the states.

This kind of historiography was practiced during the nineteenth century in Europe particularly in Germany and it expanded in this continent throughout the century due to organized teaching of history in schools and universities, in other words the institutionalization and specialization of history and other social sciences. In this era, history and historiography were very much depended on state sources, so history was totally nationalistic both in terms of methodology and analysis which can be called as the Rankean School. Hence, the objectivity of the historical analysis can be questioned and by some it can be argued that in this period history was totally constructed and written through political concerns which led biased histories.

However, the situation of the construction of nationalism, legitimate nation states and national identity through biased usage of history and the methods of historiography, research techniques of history, subject matters and their validity challenged by both internal and external dynamics and specific historians. The internal challenges can be listed as the rise of the Annales School in the 1920s (beginning of history from below); the positivistic critiques; E. H. Carr's book entitled *What is History?* in 1961; the 1983 books such as Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, Eric Hobsbawm's and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, who questioned the role of ideology, the traditions as ancient constructions, subjectivity in the writing of history and the constructivist power of education, media and print capitalism; Marxist historiography (historical materialist historiography), and postmodernism. All these challenges created a turning point in nationalistic history approaches and by challenging their methodology.

In addition to these there were some external dynamics such as the impact of the Second World War as an extreme hatred to fascism, rise of the United Nations, rise of the idea of a Unified Europe through the European Union and strong passion for peace in Europe which, together with the internal dynamics, changed the notions of Europe, history writing and history education in Europe.

4. EUROPE: FORMATIONS and CONSTRUCTIONS

Europe, throughout time has meant many different things to many different people. Not only is it defined with its geographical features, physical boundaries but also with its cultural composition, religion, political concepts and its value. In different periods of history and in particular places there had been defined certain uniting themes that were labeled as being European. The idea of Europe had always been re-invented and re-constructed in almost every age through the pressures of new collective identities. The discourse of Europe is a very ambiguous one because it was not "...always about unity and inclusion..." democracy, human rights and freedom "...but is also about exclusion and the construction of difference based on norms of exclusion" [Delanty, 1995: 1]. Thus, Europe is a concept that has been formed and constructed in history through more on conflicts than consensus.

"to speak about Europe as an 'invention" or as a construction "is to stress the ways in which it has been constructed in a historical process; it is to emphasize that Europe is less the subject of history than its product and what we call Europe is, in fact, a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics" [Delanty, 1995: 3]. At this point, it is important to differentiate two notions about Europe. Europe is both formed and constructed. To be more precise, it is formed through undeniable historical processes like migrations, wars, interactions of communities through several ways such as trade, marriages, migration, etc; its physical features such as its geography, climate, landscape; its peopling; diversity of languages and so. Besides these formations, Europe is also a construction, or in Delanty's term an invention. This means that Europe, besides its formation, is also given some values and defined as norms of some ideas such as Christianity, civilization, democracy, freedom and many more. The construction of Europe as a regulative idea for identity building, cultural model for collective identity and being a higher degree of abstraction than the national ideas can be named as the ways through which it is constructed [Delanty, 1995]. Hence, the construction of Europe shifted "Europe" from being a defined geography with its borders and from being a material "reality" to being an idea, a value and an identity. This is today what makes Europe "Europe" and this is the origin of the complexity of what Europe is. And this reality does actually make defining Europe impossible as Norman Davies argues in his book *Europe. A History*. However, what is possible is to describe Europe throughout time, in different contexts and that is what this chapter is all about.

"...The idea of Europe is a historical projection, a universalizing idea under the perpetual threat of fragmentation from forces within European society; it is essentially the unifying theme in a cultural framework of values as opposed to a mere political norm of the name for a geo-political region. It can be seen as the emblem and central organizing metaphor of a complex civilization. But Europe is more than a region and polity; it is also an idea and an identity" that is crucial for students in Europe today to realize [Delanty, 1995: 3].

It is important for students to learn how the Europe is formed and constructed because the emergence of multicultural Europe in which tolerance, understanding and peace are the main values is dependent on it. The emergence of a peaceful, tolerant Europe as the European Union aimed to create is dependent on how people in Europe (and for this project students) perceive and understand what Europe is, what its real factual formations are and what its constructed notions are. What is more, this complexity of Europe that will be explained with detail in further pages led the creation of a European history education model that is more based on the vitality of teaching methods compared to overload of historical knowledge about Europe to students of secondary school.

In this chapter, the way in which Europe is formed and constructed will be explained. The formations of Europe will be done through brief explanations on the physical features of Europe, Europe's peopling and its languages. These are the undeniable facts of European geography, people's movements and the languages they speak. After that, the construction of Europe will be studied through different discourses of Europe such as the discourse of Christendom, the Enlightenment discourse of civilization, the late 19th and early 20th century discourse of culture, the Cold War discourse and the discourse of post-Cold War, Fortress Europe [Delanty, 1995; Davies, 1996]. However, it should not be forgotten that the construction of Europe and the historical events that had been experienced in Europe by different authorities. In other words, formation and construction of Europe are not mutually expressive. Thus, although this chapter will have two different parts as formations and constructions of Europe.

The main aim is to show that the idea of Europe is older and significantly different than European identity (that today the European Union is trying to construct) and it was existent even before people identified themselves with "Europe". Also, this chapter aims to make students realize that Europe is both a formed and constructed subject throughout history, and it is both a part of history and its product. What is more, Europe is a dynamic concept that is being re-constructed in time; thus students should be made aware of this fact because this dynamism of "Europe" can provide, among students, the increase of more tolerant view towards differences in Europe, the development of multiperspectivity and can lead to the new perceptions of Europe by students. It is important for a student to accept what Europe really was. More important than this, it is vital to teach students that Europe is not all about democracy, human rights, peace, solidarity, science, technology, security, unity, freedom, progress, modernity, the "we", rationalism and civilization but fascism, violence, wars, Nazism, diversity, ethnic conflicts, totalitarianism, imperialism, the "Other", and racism are integral parts of it too, not its aberrations.

4.1. Formations of Europe

4.1.1. The Physical Environment

The attempts of understanding the relationships between human populations and the physical environments in which they live have, all the time, been at the center of geographical enquiry in history because it is a fact that there is a "…controlling influence of the physical environment on the character of human populations, and yet the physical environment has historically played a significant part in influencing human activities in different parts of Europe" [Unwin, 1998: 10]. Europe is endowed with a formidable repertoire of physical features. Europe's landforms, climate, geology and fauna have combined to produce a benign environment that is essential to an understanding of its development.

According to Norman Davies, the European Peninsula is constructed from five natural components which is shown in Figure 4.1.: The Great European Plain in which Europe is defined as an area from the Atlantic to the Urals; the Mountains that curve in two elegant arcs from the Maritime Alps in Provence to the Carpathian Alps in Transylvania; the

Mediterranean; the mainland trunk that is amplified by several large sub-peninsulas which physically joined to the Continent but only approached by sea such as Scandinavia adjoins the Baltic, Iberia, Italy and the Balkan massif-adjoin the Mediterranean and Crimea and Caucasus-adjoin the Black Sea; and Europe with ten thousand islands including Iceland, Ireland, Great Britain, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete and many more.²⁶




Figure 4.1. Europe's Regions

²⁶ For further information see [Davies, 1996: 51-65].

It can be asserted that the basic geological structure of Europe has been shaped by mountain-building processes which have occurred over the last 3500 million years. The outcome of these processes such as rocks, mountains, shields, basins and so on provided a permanent divide on the continent's history, trade and climate. What is more, this complex geology of Europe caused the emergence of many different mineral deposits and mines such as coal, oil and gas in France, Germany and Britain; iron, copper, lead, tin and zinc in Scandinavia and Britain; and aluminum, chromium, copper, lead, silver and zinc in the Southern Europe [Unwin, 1998]. The historical and political significance of these minerals lies in that these mines and their locations influenced and determined the industrial structures and developments of Europe. In other words, these natural resources pretty much determined which parts of Europe would be industrially developed and which parts would not.

What is more, the same argumentation can be done through the climate patterns of Europe. According to Unwin, there are three significant factors that largely determine the different conditions of climates in Europe; these are latitude, degree of continentality, and altitude. All these factors affect the fertility of the soil, the temperature, solar radiation, and the differences as a result of these creates patterns of architecture, use of energy, agriculture, vegetation and its fertility. Europe's temperate climate favored the requirements of "primitive" agriculture due to natural zone of it is full of cultivable grasses and the abundant woodlands of the continent provided fuel and shelter to people. What is more, its climate is probably also responsible for the widespread skin-color of its human fauna. Lastly, the scale of height and distances is far less forbidding than elsewhere, thus Europe's localities are linked by a network of natural pathways which ease the development of transportation and trade more compared to other landscapes [Unwin, 1998; Davies, 1996]. At the end, all affected the development of countries' level of industrialization, urbanization and dependency or independency to other countries in terms of being self-sufficient or not.

Also, countries' geological resources and climate-related diversities define the way they influence nature [Steinback, 1996]. With the development of technology, human beings, each day are getting more able to control the nature. Due to each country does not have the same sources, and the capitalism is based on achieving domination of the market, each country try their best to get benefit from nature due to their products will circulate in the market and bring benefit to them. However, these uses of nature bring outcomes such as the exploitation of resources, agricultural exploitation, and the discharge of pollutants into the air, water and land

and many more. All of these are originated from the interaction of people with their environment due to surviving in world's economic system and all of these create political, economic, social and cultural outcomes among people. In short, the conditions of physical environments has a significant role in influencing human activity (political, economic, social and cultural) across Europe and this is one of the factors of what makes Europe "Europe" and this factor can make people discover the reasons behind the current conditions of some European countries in terms of their industrialization, urbanization levels, and their place in capitalist system.

4.1.2. The Peopling of Europe

Since the early centuries of the first millennium the European Peninsula was dominated by migrations of many tribes due to climatic changes, demographic growth, increased local rivalries, distant crises and insufficient food supply in home lands [Davies, 1996]. There were basically two major migrations to Europe; one was done by the Germanic people and the second one was by Slavic people through which most of Europe's later national groupings are originated from.




Figure 4. 2. Migrations

The Germanic group can be divided into three among itself. The first one is the Scandinavian group which established the future Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic communities. The second one is the West Germanic group, centered on the North Sea coast that included Batavians, Frisians, Franks, Alamans, Jutes, Angles and Saxons and which were the ancestors of Dutch, Flemish, English and also in part of the French. The third group is the

East Germanic group that included Swabians, Lombards, Burgundians, Vandals, Gepids, Alans and Goths [Davies, 1996: 222]. These settings for the massive historical process has been called as "the Barbarian Invasion" by the Roman Empire but the Western Europe from parochial point of view named it the Germanic Invasions. The reason of this labeling comes from the Roman perception of world division. The majority of inhabitants in the Empire, although neither Latins nor Helens in origin, were Latinized in the "West" and Hellenized in the East. And, these people were belonged to "civilized" part of the world and all non-Romans considered barbarians.

The effect of these migrations on the ethnic and linguistic make up of the Peninsula was intense. They radically changed the ethnic mix of the populations in countries quickly compared to their impact on communities' languages. Davies asserted that "If in AD 400 the population of the Peninsula had been clearly divided between 'Roman' and 'barbarians' by 600 or 700 it was inhabited by a far more complex mix of semi-barbarized ex-Romans and semi-Romanized ex-barbarians" [Davies, 1996: 237].

By the 8th century, the ethnic settlement of Europe began to achieve a lasting pattern; and with five smaller migrations, compared to Germanic and Slavic ones, of the Vikings, Magyars, Mongols, Moors and Turks the pattern had been completed. What is significant, though, without the two big migration movements, any concept of "Europe" or of "European" would be unrecognizable; the peopling of Europe is one factor of what formed Europe [Davies, 1996].

4.1.3. European Languages

The significance of language in the formation of Europe comes from the fact that language is a cultural construct which mirrors the changing history and geography of the places where it develops [Murphy, 1998]. The languages of Europe show the same pattern of invasions in terms of historical development because linguistic developments and changes are inevitably interlinked with ethnic migrations.

Most of the modern European languages belong to the Indo-European language family. The epoch-making discovery of this belonging was made by Sir William Jones in the 18th century. Jones discovered that the main languages of Europe are strongly related to the principle languages of India and he saw the link between classical Latin, Green and ancient Sanskrit. All these realizations turned out that many modern Indian languages formed part of the same family as their correspondents in Europe such as the Romance, Celtic, Baltic, Germanic and Slavonic groups [Davies, 1996]. Although there are many branches of Indo European language family the most modern European languages can be gathered under three branches as the Romance, the Germanic and the Slavonic.




Figure 4.3. The Indo-European languages

The roots of the Romance branch goes to Italic languages, particularly Latin that includes Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan, French, Italian, Romanian and so; thus it is directly linked with the Romans. Historically speaking, the Roman Empire did not force its inhabitants to use Latin in their daily life but made Latin as the language of administration and trade. This kind of use made this language belonged to upper classes of the society. However, with the collapse of the Empire, the linguistic impact of Latin demised due to the Germanic invasions of the western side of the Empire and the Slavic invasions of the eastern side [Murphy, 1998]. However, it cannot be argued that the influence of Latin totally ended. In medieval and early modern periods it is heavily used by Christian monasteries. Due to the illiteracy of majority of the population Latin became the language of the Church and continued to serve to upper classes of the society.

The second branch is the Germanic one and it includes Dutch, German, Frisian, English, Danish, Swedish, Icelandic, Norwegian, Faeroese and Gothic. It spread from Southern Scandinavia to northern Europe. With Germanic invasions it affected the Roman Empire but not Latin. "Germanic languages did not replace the mixture of Latin and indigenous tongues that dominated throughout much of the southern and western parts of the Roman Empire" because Germanic influence was the greatest in northern frontiers of the Empire [Murphy, 1998: 39].

The third one is the Slavonic branch. This branch is the largest one of Indo-European family in Europe. It spread throughout eastern portion of the Northern European plain and the Balkans. This branch, within itself, has three sub branches such as West Slavonic (Sorbian, Polish, Slovak, Czech), East Slavonic (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian), and South Slavonic (Slovene, Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Old Church Slavonic) which also served for Eastern Orthodox Church.




Figure 4.4. The Uralian and Slavonic languages

One of the most important things about languages is that they did not only emerge, develop and change through migrations and invasions but also intersection of politics, technology, economy, and literary culture [Murphy, 1998]. Thus, the major shift in the linguistic geography of Europe began in the 16th century due to the impact of printing press, increase in literacy rates and their advantages to authorities to control the masses. To be more specific, during the 16th century, with the Reformation the production of religious texts and vernacular bible, German and English languages extremely developed and spread in Europe.

Besides the impact of technology like printing press, the impact of nationalism created tremendous changes in languages of Europe in terms of their political perception. With nationalism language became the tool of political authorities in order to legitimize the authority of the nation state, construct national identity and internalize nationalism on masses' minds. Language had been reconstructed as a concept with a national value and direct link with the survival of the nation. What this brought to Europe, and in general, is the exclusion of minority languages from education systems or in any kind of opportunity to learn them

because linguistic assimilation had been defined as a state policy and because the language and its dominant use reflected as the symbol of power. However, this perception and practice is changing since aftermath of the 1960s.

In short, language is a dynamic process which involves clues about communities' histories. It is a fact that the most present patterns of European languages reflect the latest expressions of their cultural construction which is in a constant change in terms of content, value and spatiality. Plus, the language patterns of regions, nations, continents are capable of provide information about the history of population movements, different groups' interactions and power relations that govern them. This is, very briefly, how "language" forms Europe.

4.2. Constructions of Europe

4.2.1. Origins of Europe in Ancient Times

For the people of Ancient times, it is possible to say that Europe did not have a vital emphasis. Before it turned out to be even a geography, the idea of Europe belonged more to the myths rather than science and politics in which Europe was a princess seduced by Zeus, or it was the daughter of Phoenix.

The Ancient Greeks believed that their society and culture were unique and distinct from both Europe and Asia. Thus, it can be asserted that the idea of Europe began to emerge with the demise of classical Greek civilization. When the idea of Greek superiority compared to other civilizations ended, "...a broader concept of Europe emerged and came increasingly to refer to what is essentially Asia Minor and included Greece, but with Asia still being the focal point of Otherness" [Delanty, 1995: 19]. The idea of Europe was subordinated to the notion of the Occident which had referred to the Eastern Mediterranean and Hellenic world.

Just like Greeks, Romans did not have a strong sense of Europe and European identity due to most of its parts were on non-European territories and its origin of the empire was in the eastern Mediterranean basin. The Roman Empire can be considered as both Hellenic and oriental. Delanty stated that "...Europe in Roman times referred to a geographical region comprising, approximately, most of the present continent of Europe, with the exception of Scandinavia...Europe was not yet a highly politicized concept. Europe had not yet been 'westernized'; nor, for that matter, had the East been 'orientalized'" [Delanty, 1995: 20]. Europe was a region, not a continent in the geo-political sense of the term and not the western continent. It was not a cultural model for Romans. For this reason Romans constructed their culture on different basis. For example, being Christian had been defined what to be a Roman means.

It is possible to mention that the significance of Romans in terms of the construction of Europe began with the Empire's division into two as Eastern (the Byzantine) and Western Empires because this was the origin of East vs. West dichotomy on which Europe would be constructed and that would last until the present. So, the Occident and the Orient emerges as a reference to the two halves of the Roman Empire.

"The term Occident, along with Europe, tended to be used increasingly for the western half of the former Roman Empire, making it possible to speak of the European Occident. Then, the Byzantine empire laying claim to the imperial tradition, the identity of the western half came gradually to rest on Latin Christianity. Europe and Occident became synonymous for Christendom" [Delanty, 1995: 21].

However, from the seventh century, Europe began to be referred against Islam due to the expansionist policies of Arabs to the west. They moved until Spain and conquested it. However, in a battle, with the command of Charles Martel, the leader of Franks, Muslims got defeated and this war became a vital point in terms of the concept of Europe. What had happened was that the threat, for Roman Empire, was no longer from the barbarian tribes but from Islam. "The Orient was thus destined to become the new image of hostility for...the European Christian West..." and "the West was shaped by the Muslim onslaught in the one hundred years from about 650 to 750" [Delanty, 1995: 24-25]. This Western identity based on Christendom was a siege mentality and an identity constructed in defeat not in victory.

What is more, the notion of Europe as a geographical expression became applied to the Christian parts of Europe. For Europe, the division of East and West not only did create a geographical split but also a moral-religious divide. The Occident signified civilization and goodness whereas the Orient turned out to be barbarian and evil. Thus, Europe was constructed as "...a sense of spiritual superiority in the disavowal of its won very origin in the Orient. Without the image of hostility afforded by Islam, the Christian West would have been unable to attain a single and high culture capable of unifying the diverse elements of European society" [Delanty, 1995: 27].

Before summing up this section, it is important to clarify that the reason behind the secular identity of "West" in contrast to Christendom lied in the different political constructions of the Western and Eastern Empires in terms of the separation of the church and the state. In the Byzantium Empire, there was no separation but in the "West" the means and institutions of political and cultural identity were separated. Thus, this separation is the reason behind future construction of Europe as a secular concept with a Christian religious identity.

In short, for the civilizations in Antiquity, Europe was not important as it is for human beings today. It was not assigned to the continent of Europe until the rise of Islam in the seventh century. Actually, the world of Antiquity was itself Oriental, not Western, and Europe was about the wider Greek world of Asia minor, not the western continent. Middle ages linked Europe to the idea of Christendom and the Christian West. In these ages Christendom defined the territorial identity of the Medieval Europe. To put it differently, during Christendom, Europe was not about a stabilized particular identity that people identify themselves with but a territorial unity.

4.2.2. Europe's Westernization

The Westernization of Europe had been realized through several historical developments such as the rise of Crusading mentality, defining of the Eastern and Western frontiers of Europe.

Until the fifteenth century Europe was technologically and militarily backward compared to the East. Europe had experienced the decline of the Roman Empire, the Black Death, Muslim expansions and the "Little Ice Age" during the 13th and 14th centuries; thus Europe could not develop. However, these events, over time, turned out to be the advantage of Europe because they led the emergence of capitalism in the "West" and the transition to feudal mode of production²⁷. "Between 1000 and 1250 a whole new civilization pattern based upon feudalism expanded as far west as Ireland and as far east as Jerusalem, bringing with it a uniform society...This new framework is what we call Europe: the watchword for the expansion of Franco-Latin Christendom" [Delanty, 1995: 33].

²⁷ For more details see [Delanty, 1995: 32-34]

4.2.2.1. Crusading Mentality

The unity of Europe had to be constructed through foreign conquests and a focus of hostility beyond its frontiers and within the notion of Christendom because Church had failed to unite western Europe into a single unity. Thus, Islam and the Muslim Orient defined as the "Other" of Europe through which Europe would construct its identity and reality from the time of the Middle Ages.




Figure 4.5. Europe's Christianization

The Christendom concept and the idea of Christian community for Europe both provided the legitimization of kingship and cultural cohesion for groups which would otherwise separate due to linguistic and ethnic differences. The unity behind Christendom had been built on a common enemy: the Muslim. This common Christianity was strengthened through the Crusades and it shaped the formation of a common ethno-cultural identity in Western Europe. What is more, the Crusades provided collective mobilization and gave a new sense of territorial identity to medieval Europe which caused the origin of colonization [Delanty, 1995]. Today, it will be wrong to exclude this Crusade mentality from European identity and the idea of Europe.

4.2.2.2. The Fall of Constantinople- The Way towards Defining Eastern and Western Frontiers

The fall of Constantinople and the rise of the Ottoman Empire and their expansionist policies played a significant role in the construction of Europe. The strengthening of the Ottoman Empire created the fact that both Europe and Islam had to compete to control the same territories in Europe and besides this military threat Europe could be converted to Islam. To be precise, "towards the end of the Middle Ages we can speak of an epochal break between the Orient and Occident. A sense of European identity existed by the fifteenth century, but it was an identity that was shaped more by defeat than by victory and was buttressed by the image of the Orient as its common enemy" [Delanty, 1995: 36].

In the 16th century, the idea of Europe had been constructed against Turks and with this century, Christendom notion began to be replaced with Europe due to not all of Europe was Christian. Thus, in the early 16th century it is possible to talk about the creation of a discourse of Europe although it did not become a self-conscious identity until the late 17th century [Delanty, 1995].

In addition to defining the Muslim Orient as the enemy of the West after the fall of Constantinople, the Latin west began to look westwards. Although Constantinople's loss was a defeat for the "West", in the following a few decades Europe achieved to gain its power. The discoveries played a significant role in this recovery period.

"Prior to the Age of Discovery, the "West" as the Occident was defined by reference to the eastern frontier, that is, in opposition to Islam. After 1492 the ground had been prepared for the invention of a new myth of the West: Columbus replaced Charlemagne as the harbinger of the new age. The notion of the West became transformed into an outward movement" [Delanty, 1995: 43].

The discovery of America turned Europe into a mental image, a model of civilization to be imitated. However, the desire of crushing Islam down had not been abandoned. The means of it had changed through discarding a frontal attack on the Islamic world and adopting the view of encircling Islamic world by conquering the ocean and creating a new East Asian boundary between Christendom and Islam.

What is more, Christendom transformed into a western crusading mentality and the Christian legend transferred from the eastern frontier to western frontier which meant a transformation from Islamic infidel to the New World's savage [Delanty, 1995]. With the decline of the Turkish supremacy in 1571 with Lepanto, and with the total conversion of Europe into Christianity in the 16th century, Europe lessened its strict religious meaning and acquired a secular character. The idea of "civilization" became associated with Europe.

The eastern frontier of Europe was a frontier of defense but the western frontier was one of expansion. The master of Europe over the Atlantic caused the emergence of a new "Europe" and European identity which was more related with science, secular thought and colonialism that means "European countries began to focus their identity in the conquest of foreign lands rather than in Europe itself" [Delanty, 1995: 46].

The 16th century showed the dominance of the "West" on sea in contrast to the Orient. In particular, Britain, Spain, France and Holland became leading figures in the sea due to their geographical conditions and connection with the oceans whereas the Habsburgs continued to focus on eastwards and agrarian developments which would directly be linked to the origin of the First and Second World Wars in the 20th century. However, at the end, the 16th century created a gap between European countries that mostly focused on maritime and mercantilist economies and feudalist-agrarian and multiethnic empires. This gap emerged as the gap between West and East. To put it differently, "...Western Europe evolved to become a polity of mercantilist nation-states with non-European empires, while central and eastern Europe remained agrarian polyethnic conglomerate empires with their focus on the eastern frontier of Europe" [Delanty, 1995: 47]. The outcome of this picture was the formation of two different concepts of Europe as the "West" with its future in overseas and colonial empires; and Europe as a Christian bastion against Muslims and built on the central European empires. These two different European world views originated the base of future internal division of Europe into two opposite realms [Delanty, 1995].

4.2.2.3. Concluding Remarks

Until the 15th century Europe was a geographical expression and subordinated to Christendom. The idea of Europe as the "West" began with the age of discovery and this period shifted from being identified with Christendom to an autonomous discourse in which Europe would turn into a system of values in the 17th century. To be more specific, Delanty specified that Europe's definition as a particular identity resulted from its encounters with non-European people and its resistance to the Ottoman Empire's expansionist movements.

Since the 15th century Europe was no more a mere geographical territory but a system filled with civilizational values. The Christendom notion did not demise and it continued to serve as a religious identity of Europe. What happened was that Europe became the normative power of being civilized. "The older ambivalence between Christendom and Europe was thus replaced by a new one with Europe and the West as the shifting signifiers of a rapidly expanding world-system with its epicenter in western Europe" [Delanty, 1995: 31].

The age of discovery can be considered as the renewal of the Crusade mentality but this time towards west, not east. With the discovery of the New World in 1492, Europe became superior in terms of civilizing power. What is more, Europe emerged to become a defined unified region and the origin of a "world system" in Wallerstein's terms. Thus, the idea of Europe that had been constructed in the Middle Ages on the dichotomy of Christendom vs. Islam shifted to the victory of civilization over nature in the early modern period [Delanty, 1995; Davies, 1996].

4.2.3. Internal Frontier Construction

The Balkans has always been complex notion in Europe and its construction because it has a very multifaceted composition. Geographically they are definitely a part of Europe; however politically they are closer to Asia Minor and due to this closeness they were excluded from Europe in history. The Balkan region is the border between Europe and Asia. Sunni Islam, Roman Christianity and Christian Orthodoxy all crash in the Balkan region. Even in Antiquity, it was a borderland that separated Greek from Latin during the division of the Roman Empire in the 4th century. It represented the external limits of Europe between the Latin West and Muslim Orient. As a region, it included both Muslim and Christian populations and cultures; Roman Catholicism (Polish, Czech, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes) and Christian Orthodoxy (Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins, Greeks, Russians); in short, the Balkans are amalgam of different religions, values, cultures, sects and mentalities in contrast to more homogenous composition of Western Europe [Delanty, 1995].




Figure 4.6. Cultural classifications of Europe

One of the major differences in the consciousness of eastern and western Europe lied in the political consciousness linked to the formation of states. "The tendency in western Europe was towards the formation of national states whose territory, in fact, had not significantly changed throughout the early modern period" and in which the dominant ethnic groups gained the power [Delanty, 1995: 55]. However, this was not the case in Eastern Europe. The major empires in this region such as Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires were multiethnic and this caused the formation of Slav identity on ethnicity. This was one of the most important reasons behind the instability of the region and the identification of this region as "bogeys of the Western Europe" in addition to Muslims and Jews [Delanty, 1995]. What is more, the development of feudalism did not happen simultaneously with the "West" because this region faced with the pastoral nomadism of invaders whereas the "West" did not live this experience. This belated emergence of feudalism also differentiated the Balkans from the "West" and it made it easy to be classified as the internal Other of Western Europe.

Rather than Balkans, Russia was a particular case in the construction of Europe. It was the other frontier of Europe against the East besides the Balkans. According to European perceptions, Russia was not a total Occident but a semi-oriental and a product of Asia. Or, it can be stated that, it was an amalgam of Europe and Asia and it was in "Eurasia". Delanty defines several reasons why Russia became the Eastern frontier and not a definite part of Europe. The first one is the long association of Russia with Mongols during the 13th century. The second one is its turning to eastwards and colonizing north-eastern Asia after its emancipation from Tartar Yoke. Further one is the rejection of Russia the processes of westernization in order to protect the uniqueness of Slavic civilization. Also, during the 17th century when the "West" had turned its face towards overseas Russia preferred to expand to the east. In terms of economics, the non-emergence of feudalism in Russia and the state led political domination and economic exploitation in contrast to Western European patterns differentiated Russia from the "West". As a result, all these reasons led to the emergence of Eurasia notion which was associated with the anti-Western Russia in the early 20th century [Delanty, 1995].

So, what did all-the Balkans and Russia show in the sense of the construction of Europe? First of all, these two eastern frontiers established conditions that led to the formation of borderlands between West and East in global sense. However, the external uncertainties and attempts to create foreign borders created the rise of internal divisions. What Delanty asserted is that "the fact that Europe was deeply politically divided as a result of divergent transitions to modernity led to an association of the idea of Europe with western Europe whose homogeneity was only apparent by contrast to the eastern borderlands" [Delanty, 1995: 64].

In short, the internal structure of Europe was defined through eastward conquests and colonization. The idea of Europe was still defined as the cultural model of the western core states. This situation caused that "...the eastern frontier of Europe was above all a frontier of exclusion rather than of inclusion; it accelerated and intensified a process in which Europe became the mystique of the West" [Delanty, 1995: 48]. The emergence of the eastern frontier in Europe shifted the tension between Europe and Islamic East to a conflict within Europe between western and eastern. To be more precise, the enemy of Europe as the Ottoman Empire shifted towards the eastern European Orthodox lands, specifically Russia. Delanty put this situation into words as follows: "Just as Europe in the Middle Ages had failed to create a geographical framework capable of integrating Greek Christianity and Latin Christendom, secular European modernity likewise failed to integrate the Slavs and other Eastern lands into a unitary framework" [Delanty, 1995: 49]. Consequently, Europe as an idea divided, both, the external world into two halves as civilized vs. savage; Christian vs. Muslim; and the West and East; and Europe itself internally as Eastern and Western halves.

4.2.4. Construction of Europe throughout Modernity

The formation and construction of Europe had been affected by universalist revolutions of modernity; the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. It is possible to assert that the idea of Europe that is compatible in the present time is mostly constructed in the 15th and 16th centuries through these revolutions. So, shortly what did these provide for Europe? The Renaissance and the Enlightenment provided a basis for a new secular identity. The Reformation and the 17th century religious wars caused the shattering of Christendom's unity. Thus, Europe became to be the cultural model of the "West" and served as a uniting theme of modernity. The idea of Europe began to be associated with the idea of progress that was the success of the Enlightenment. The new main division became civilization vs. nature and Europe's "other" turned out to be barbarity of uncivilized nature including the New World and overseas communities. What is more, during the 18th century, the French Revolution also gained a new dimension to European identity. The rise of the nation state system was labeled as the polity of the civilized, thus the Western Europe became a normative power in terms of its political system. All these developments, however, should not make us to think that the

impact of Christianity became weak in Europe. Christendom continued to influence Europe but it transformed into a Christian humanism based on "occidental rationalism" [Delanty, 1995].

"The idea of Europe as an international norm of civilization was more significant as a means of regulating conflicts between the nation-states than of institutionalizing of a federation of states...the principal reason why the idea of Europe never surpassed the national idea was because in Europe, unlike the United States, the state tradition, an in many cases the national ideal, preceded the rise of international norms and their institutional frameworks" [Delanty, 1995: 66].

4.2.4.1. Secularization of Europe

From the 15th century, the cultural and geographical names of the continent began not to coincide with each other. The idea of Christendom began to loose its strict structure and the idea of Europe started to be secularized. The first step towards this secularization was taken by the Renaissance with its humanistic ideas in the 15th century. The Renaissance did not gain Europe a total secular identity; it was the Reformation in the 16th century that strengthened the secularism in Europe and challenged Christendom. What happened was that the dichotomy of Europe between Muslim vs. Christian replaced with the civilized West vs. uncivilized barbarians including Asia Minor, Americas, Africa and the newly won Asia [Delanty, 1995].

With the division of the unified Christendom into different forms of Christianity such as Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Calvinism and Lutheranism, the notion of Christendom as a uniting element of Europe ended in the 17th century. The Reformation divided Europe as a Protestant north and Catholic south. What happened was not, as mentioned above, the demise of the impact of Christianity in Europe. What happened was that Christianity came to an end to be the territorial character of European system of states and transformed into a purely religious value-system surviving in a rationalized form. Thus, there is no break between Christianity and Europe, but a transformation of Christianity in the newly defined Europe that is based on civilization, progress, rationalization and humanism. Delanty argued that " the Christian humanist myth of man, the vision of redemptive philosophy of history, and the civilizing nature of the new bourgeois value system provided the foundation for a European identity that had reconciled itself to its Christian heritage" [Delanty, 1995: 68].

4.2.4.2. The Enlightenment

The critique of the past of Europe, itself, came in the 18th century with the Enlightenment. The age that began to be considered as secular and dynamic was also associated with science, formal law and art. The Church and the state were seen as separate spheres, instead of a symbiotic unity. As a result of this separation, the Church began to be dominant in micro levels of society such as family and school. To put it differently, at the end of the 18th century and early 19th century "...Christianity...was not a residue of the medieval age but was itself a product of modernity and a process of re-Christianization: religion was internalized" [Delanty, 1995: 70]. After religion began to be practiced in micro spheres, Europe began to be associated with the idea of progress in terms of scientific and technological developments that can be seen in the next two figures with detail.

P. A. Paracelsus M. Kopernik W. Harvey **R. Descartes** G. Leibniz I. Newton A. von Haller H. Cavendish K. Scheele S. Hahnemann E. Jenner E.-L. Malus **B.** Courtois A.-J. Fresnell J. J. Berzelius H.-C. Oersted G. Ohm M. Faraday J. von Liebig R. Brown F. Runge R. A. Kolliker C. J. Doppler R. Remak W. Perkin C. Darwin G. R. Kirchhoff I. Semmelweis G. Mendel J. Lister D. I. Mendeleev E. Fischer L. Pasteur R. Koch H. Hertz E. von Behring H. Lorentz W. Röntgen H. Becquerel J. J. Thompson P. and M. Curie M. Planck T. Boveri A. Einstein H. K. Onnes E. Rutherford K. Funk W. Heisenberg A. Fleming O. Hahn **Crick and Watson**

Basle, 1526 Frombork, 1543 London, 1628 Amsterdam, 1644 Leipzig, 1666 Cambridge 1666 Bern, 1757 London, 1766 Uppsala, 1771 Leipzig, 1796 London, 1796 Strasburg, 1808 Paris, 1811 France, 1815 Stockholm, 1818 Copenhagen, 1819 Cologne, 1827 London, 1831 Giessen, 1831 London, 1831 Berlin, 1833 Zurich, 1841 Prague, 1842 Berlin, 1852 London, 1856 London, 1859 Heidelberg, 1859 Budapest, 1861 Brno, 1865 Glasgow, 1867 St Petersburg, 1869 Munich, 1875 Paris, 1881 Berlin, 1882 Karlsruhe, 1888 Berlin, 1892 Leiden, 1895 Wurzburg, 1895 Paris, 1896 Cambridge, 1897 Paris, 1898 Berlin, 1900 Wurzburg, 1904 Zurich, 1905 Leiden, 1911 Manchester, 1911 Cracow, 1911 Copenhagen, 1925 London, 1928 Berlin, 1938 London, 1951

theory of disease heliocentrism blood circulation analytical geometry differential calculus laws of gravity neurology hydrogen oxygen homeopathy vaccination polarization of light iodine frequency of light atomic weight electromagnetism electrical resistance electrical induction analysis of elements cell nucleus phenol anilin spermatozoon acoustics segmentation of cells aniline dye theory of evolution spectral analysis asepsis genetics antisepsis periodic table hydrazine: biochemistry bacteriology tuberculosis bacillus electromagnetic waves diphtheria serum electron theory X-rays uranium radiation elektron radioactivity quantum theory chromosomes theory of relativity superconductivity atomic structure vitamins quantum mechanics penicillin: antibiotics nuclear fission structure of DNA

Table 4.1. Scientific discoveries in Europe from the 16th century to the mid-20th century

J.Lippershey Z. Janssen E. Torricelli T. Savery G. Fahrenheit **Jethro Tull** J. Watt S. Crompton J. and J. Montgolfier C. Chappe A. Volta J.-M. Jacquard R. Laennec C. Macintosh G. Stephenson T. Telford N. Niepce **B.** Fourneyron C. Babbage S. Bauer L. Foucault H. Giffard H. Bessemer J. Reis A. Nobel W. von Siemens N. Otto E. Berliner C. von Linde W. von Siemens H. S. Maxim G. Daimler **Daimler and Benz** R. Mannesmann H. Goodwin C. Ader W. Maybach A. L. Lumière R. K. Diesel V. Poulsen F. Zeppelin G. Marconi K. E. Tsiolkovsky **Bréquet-Richet British Army** J. Logie Baird H. Geiger F. Whittle Air Ministry Wilkes and Renwick **Power Ministry**

Middleburg, 1608 Amsterdam, 1609 Rome,1643 England, 1698 Amsterdam, 1718 Hungerford, 1731 Birmingham, 1769 Bolton, 1779 Annonay, 1783 Paris, 1791 Bologna, 1800 Lyons, 1804 Paris, 1816 Glasgow, 1823 Stockton, 1825 Menai Straits, 1825 Chalon-sur-Saône, 1826 Paris, 1827 Cambridge, 1834 Kiel, 1850 Paris, 1852 Paris, 1852 St Pancras, 1857 Friedrichsdorf, 1861 Stockholm, 1867 Berlin, 1867 Cologne, 1876 Germany, 1877 Munich, 1877 Berlin, 1879 London, 1883 Connstatt, 1884 Mannheim, 1885 Düsseldorf, 1885 London, 1887 France, 1890 Connstatt, 1892 Lyons, 1895 Berlin, 1895 Copenhagen, 1898 Berlin, 1900 London, 1901 Moscow, 1903 France, 1907 Cambrai, 1915 London, 1924 Kiel, 1928 Cranwell, 1930 Dover, 1940 Manchester, 1946 Calder Hall, 1956

telescope microscope mercury barometer steam pump mercury thermometer agricultural machinery steam engine condenser spinning mule hot-air balloon aerial telegraph electric battery automated machinery stethoscope waterproof fabric passenger railway suspension bridge photography turbine mechanical calculator submarine gyroscope steam-powered airship blast furnace: steel telephone dynamite dynamo internal combustion engine microphone refrigerator electric locomotive machine-gun petrol engine motor car seamless pipes photographic film aeroplane carburettor cinematograph diesel engine magnetic sound-recording dirigible airship radio transmitter rocketry helicopter military tank television Geiger counter jet engine radar EDSAC, computer nuclear power station

Table 4.2. Technological inventions in Europe from the 16th century to the mid-20th century

Additionally, in the 18th century Europe had been constructed as a cultural model and within Europe France was the model of the ideal. "The universalism of the Enlightenment never expressed itself in a strong sense of Europeanism even though the Renaissance idea of Europe as the centre of culture gained currency and became the basis of a new utopian vision of a European political order" [Delanty, 1995: 71]. Thus, the supremacy of French language instead of Latin, white race and Christianity turned into the defining features of what Europe is or how it should be.

4.2.4.3. The French Revolution

The French Revolution brought the breaking of Europe from the Old Order. In this sense, it was a revolution that was one of the big steps of the construction of Europe. However, it was also a French revolution because "The universalist ideas and ideals it gave prominence to were ultimately to become subordinated to the narrower nationalism of the bourgeoisie classes and the imperialist ambitions of the Directory government" [Delanty, 1995: 72]. To put it differently, it transformed the doctrine of the nation, particularly French nation, into an imperialist discourse. The French nation, as Delanty claimed, took the form of the resurrection of the Roman Empire. The French Revolution was not experienced in the eastern parts of Europe as much as in the Western parts; thus it led to the expansion of the gap between these two regions of the continent during the late 18th century. As the big nation states began to emerge in Europe, the idea of Europe took a normative role as a regulative idea [Delanty, 1995; Davies, 1996].

Thus, in the 19th century Europe was both the origin of science, progress, Christian humanism and reason that were the outcomes of the Renaissance, Enlightenment and Reformation and at the same time the origin of political regulative norms, national citizenship that were derived from the French Revolution.

4.2.4.4. Romanticism

The 19th century continued with the age of romanticism after the rise of nationalism with the French Revolution. Delanty stated that "nationalism was above all a political idea that frequently looked to the future while romanticism was essentially a non-political movement that looked to the past...the rediscovery of the past...notions of heroic self-assertion" [Delanty, 1995: 79]. In this period, Europe was constructed or imagined through its past, not through "what happened" kind-of-past but "what had invented" kind-of-it. Thus, in this period the medieval Christianity was romanticized as being a regenerative force in the world and the unity of tradition in Europe. What is more, Germany was romanticized as the cradle, essence of Europe and the heir of Latin civilization through shifting France from the origin of the concept of Europe. Thus, the race and language began to take place in the definition of Europe. The rise of Aryan myth through the exclusion of Slavs and all other people except the Germanic race began in this period of romanticism. What is more, Europe was romanticized with its material culture of the past such as castles, monasteries, royal houses, cathedrals, music, literature and many more.

Consequently, since the 15th century Europe was constructed through the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution which gave birth to Christian humanism, progress, science, secularization and the nation states and their new racial, ethnocultural tendencies. The concepts like diversity in terms of ethnic, linguistic and religious became only tolerable in the context of the particularism of national cultures which automatically brought strictly defined Europe as a civilization [Delanty, 1995].

4.2.5. The Orient and Europe

As mentioned before, Europe needed an "Other" in order to define itself. The "West" always struggled for economic control of the East and attempted to impose its intellectual superiority upon them. The "West" did not only define itself through the Orient but also made the Orient define itself through Western norms and values. Thus, the East was enforced to

define itself from the mirror of the West which at the end gave rise to the notion Orientalism internalized [Delanty, 1995].²⁸ "The identity of the East as the Orient was imposed upon it by the colonial powers in order to conquer and exploit it, and, indeed, also for the purposes which were ultimately tied to regressive identity-building in the West: the tensions and divisions within Europe induced it to find its identity as a civilization in the mastery and subjection of a contrasting Other" [Delanty, 1995: 86].

At first, beginning from the 7th century, the Other was Islam and the barbarian Muslims against which Christendom achieved to be a unity in Europe. The Renaissance defined the Orient, in the sense of Islam, as despotic, evil, and cruel, and ruled with single despotic authorities whereas the "West" represented the free spirit and many republics. In short, the Christian Europe identified itself against Muslim world that had been associated with hostile political, ideological composition, different civilization and a different economic system. Thus, "…European identity became constructed around an antithesis of East-West" [Delanty, 1995: 87].

However, after the power of Islamic world demised politically, economically and militarily, the new Other of Europe was originated on being civilized and barbarian. This widened contrast area expanded the discourse of the Other by transforming it from East vs. West dichotomy to European vs. non-European contradiction. One of the most significant and influential tools of this construction was the Western control of communication means. Delanty argued that the definition of otherness on non-Europeans and making them internalize these inferior positions were done mostly through written language. This perception and internalization of non-Europeanness by non-Europeans had been constructed in such a way that the Orient existed to be conquered by the "West" [Delanty, 1995]. According to Europe, the Orient was a domain waiting for the "West" to intervene; the loveobject of the "West": despotic but exotic; the image of an attractive woman waiting to be conquested; and beautiful but cruel, static and effeminate concept. Whereas the nature of the "West" was patriarchic, male, civilized, dynamic, rational, secular and virile. The Orient represented stagnation, decay and intellectual inferiority; however, the "West" was the opposite. As Delanty summed up with different wording that "European ideas were judged to be universally valid for all people while non-European ideas were seen as deviations from the norms established by western rationalism" [Delanty, 1995: 89].

²⁸ For further information see [Berktay, 1999: 353-367]

With the Enlightenment in the 18th century, the idea of progress joined one of the norms of being belonged to the "West" and the initial idea behind western civilization. This norm led the definition progress in opposition to exoticism of the Orient. "The Orient…represented what the West had overcome. The Orient was immature and childlike and inherently incapable of progress; it was stagnant, lacking in innovation and rationality" [Delanty, 1995: 90]. In short, the medieval identifications of the Orient were based on its despotic and cruel nature, whereas in and aftermath of the Enlightenment, when its military threat notion ceased, it was constructed through romantic appeals like its innocence, feminity and immature conditions.

4.2.5.1. The White Man's Burden

During the 19th century the Orient was in need of being rejuvenated by the West because it was a dying culture and to gain its sense of being civilization the Western help was a must. This was the white man's burden because "West" was the norm of being civilized, superior moral authority and the Orient was what once the West had been [Delanty, 1995]. This view of Europe and the Orient was a way of justifying the superiority of Western Europe in contrast to the Orient and legitimizing the imperial mission that is colonization. What is more, this view of the "West" strengthened the racial arguments as the superiority of the white race over the others. Among the means of this mission there was Christianity and the conversion of people into this religion because the civilization was the Christian civilization. Hence, what was born was the renewal of the crusade mentality, this time not through the armies of God but by missionary evangelists who contributed to the new imperial identity of Europe. This crusade mentality did not only spread Christianity but also racial tendencies to overseas.

The most significant mean for racial arguments-the racial supremacy of European- came through the Darwin's evolution theory and its application to social sciences as Social Darwinism.²⁹ Shortly, this theory had aimed to legitimize the social and racial superiority of European white race over the others, imperialism, class rule and aristocratic privilege through using the natural selection and the survival of the fittest arguments of Darwin. "The

²⁹ For further details see [Tierney, 1976: 307-365]

expression of the 'subject races' entered the language and the idea of racial differences based on color became fixed. 'Colonial' and 'primitive' peoples were associated with the category of biological inferiority" from the late 19th century onwards [Delanty, 1995: 97]. To put it differently, in the 19th century Europe had been unified in race, not religion. Although in the past, the Church was against the notion of evolutionism, it changed its perception of evolutionary ideas due to its influence on colonial expansionism and the indoctrination of European superiority. Thus, missionary forces of the Church played a significant role in the development of superiority of European white races.

What is more, as mentioned in the first chapters of this project, the development of the social sciences contributed to the spread of European racial superiority. The division of social sciences as anthropology, sociology, Orientalism as the studies of, in order, "primitive" people, the advanced societies and the East was a means towards the exercise of Western intellectual and cultural hegemony over non-Europeans.

Briefly, the Europe that is constructed between the 15th and the 18th centuries through progress, humanism, science and rationalism transformed into a widely defined non-European or the Other concept in the 19th century. The Orient was defined through the "primitive" ness, despotism, backwardness, noble savages and distorted forms of the "West". Europe through its colonizing and imperial tendencies defined a mission to itself as civilizing of the Orient, the Other. This is done through the Christianization of non-Europeans and transfer of European values to them. However, this mission, in its deep inside, did not want the Other or the Orient to make progress and reach to the "West" in terms of economy, technology and progress. The deeper meaning lied in this mission was the justification of the supremacy of the "West" over the Others. The definition of this supremacy extended the religious one and turned into the racial supremacy of the white race. Thus, what is important at this moment is that Europe was constructed through racism and it is not something "...incidental to Europeanism but lay at the very core of European identity" [Delanty, 1995: 98]. The Europe was formed through violence and colonialism in which "the role of the Outsider, or the perpetual Other whose existence always had to be maintained in order for it to be denied" [Delanty, 1995: 99].

In short, in the age of imperialism Europe constructed itself in the confrontation with the Orient. Europe had formed its identity and value not derived from itself but from the formation of contrasts in terms of differences, inferior-superior dichotomies and the "Others"

as enemies. The reason behind this identity-search through contrasts lied in the fact that Europe had failed to provide unity in its homogenous structure because this had never been seen. The diversities in languages, religions, geographical definitions of Europe, consciousness of a shared history, its internal division as East and West and lastly the internal problems within countries never let this happen. So, the only option for Europe to be able to define itself and its identity was to create common enemies. As an enemy, the Orient had been chosen since the beginning. The Orient was defined as the distorted version of the "West" which was defined with positive aspects like progress, secularism, civilization and the core of universal norms. The idea of Europe in the mirror of the Orient was constructed both as a cultural model and the regulative idea of worldwide ethical culture.

The universal validity claims of European modernity tended to cohere around the idea of a European civilization and its racial myth, which functioned to provide a normative model of evaluation against which other societies could be judged. By creating a one-dimensional vision of the Orient, the identity of Europe as a universalizing and unifying world-view was secured... Europe solved the old-age problem of the universal versus the particular by consigning the sphere of the particular to the relativism of national cultures while the idea of Europe was designated to be the realm of the universal. Culture was seen to be relative and embodied in national histories, while civilization was universal and transfixed in the crucible of Europe [Delanty, 1995: 85].

4.2.6. The 20th Century until the Cold War

The twentieth century was, amongst the other historical periods of time, the most important century in the formation and construction of Europe in the sense that it is very much influential about the present notion of it. In this century, the adversary of the "West" shifted from Islam to communism. The rise of the Soviet Union and the conflicts that led to the emergence of the First World War created a new formation of Europe. The idea of Europe during the post-WWI era was about attempting to create nation-states in the territories of the former central European empires and because peaceful creation of Europe failed. In other words, the principle of nationality, the system of nation-states and the idea of Europe did not coincide and the "Europe" began to be constructed through identity projects in which the leadership and the superiority of a specific nation was at the origin such as Mitteleuropa with the leading figure of Germany. Thus, in the 20th century the idea of Europe "…from being a normative

component...in the nineteenth century balance of power system, became, in the wake of the Great War and the October Revolution, a bastion of capitalist opposition to communism and the regulative idea of the Versailles Order, which gave birth to the system of nation-states" [Delanty, 1995: 101].

4.2.6.1. Mitteleuropa: A German Project of Europe

The notion of Mitteleuropa can be defined as "...a political idea in the programmatic designs for a united Central European order under the leadership of Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century and was closely connected to the ambitions of the pan-German movement" [Delanty, 1995: 101]. It was not only about geographical re-building of Europe but also an identity-building project.

The reasons behind the rise of Mitteleuropa or a shift to Germany in Europe were the Prussian Wars and the unification of Germany in the 19th century. From then on, Europe became associated with German expansion and German values. The two main runners of this project were at first Germany and the Habsburg Empire, and then the demise of the Habsburg Empire in 1918; and as a result, Germany became the main runner of the idea. Delanty mentioned that "Mitteleuropa was a counter-revolutionary bulwark between the nascent pan-Slavism in the east and the liberal democracies in the West" which made the concept of Western Europe problematic in terms of its normative and regulatory roles [Delanty, 1995: 103]. According to this idea, the stability and identity of Europe was embedded in German expansion in the continent.

4.2.6.2. The Disintegration of Europe: The First World War

Thus, the strengthening of the idea of Mitteleuropa caused rising of conflicts in Europe and at the end, it turned out to be the First World War. The World War I transformed Europe and European identity radically in such a way that it cannot be changed retrospectively. The concept of Europe, its formation, self-perception and the Others' perception of Europe would never be the same as before. As Delanty put into words, Unlike all previous wars, the First World War was a 'total war' and marked the beginning of the permanent war economy of industrial society. From 1914 onwards the western states would be in a permanent state of preparation for war. The eight million deaths that the war had cost, the collapse of empires, the 1919 settlements leading to the formation of new nation-states and the process of decolonization signaled, in effect, the political collapse of Europe as a system of alliances based upon the balance of power [Delanty, 1995: 107].

This war shifted the center of the world from the "West" to the Atlantic. With the Bolshevik Revolution it turned out that the dichotomization was among capitalism and communism. In other words, the new Europe was constructed in opposition to the Soviet communism. Thus, the "Other" of the "West" shifted to an ideology.

With the First World War, the idea of Europe had changed. The new basis for Europe defined as the nation-state that would be the best alternative for the defeated empires of Central Europe. This new system had been supported through the construction of the League of Nations. Moreover, the 20th century Europe was constructed through wars, not peace processes. The twentieth century Europe witnessed the formation of many new states with more ethnic emphasis. "While the old nationalism had been more directed against the cores of empires, the new nationalism…was more an expression of ethnic tensions within the new state" [Delanty, 1995: 108]. The problem of this new nationalism was that the borders of the state, unfortunately did not coincide with ethnic borders; thus these conflicts began to be more visible in the present Eastern Europe.

In the 20th century Europe was no more associated with the idea of civilization because all the promises of the Reformation, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment failed to provide unity in Europe. What is worse, Europe became a continent and a mentality that devastated itself through devastating the "Others" both in overseas and in their internal borders.

4.2.6.3. Fascism and Nazism

The twentieth century Europe can also not be thought without fascism and anti-Semitism because this century's attempts to provide European unity passed through these two concepts. Delanty stated that "most people today would probably prefer to associate the idea of Europe with the polis than with the concentration camp, democracy than with totalitarianism, but the truth is that the European idea cannot be separated from fascist ideas and practice" [Delanty, 1995: 112]. To put it differently, just like racism, totalitarianism, fascism and Nazism are integral parts of Europe, not aberrations.



Figure 4.7. The Nazi power, 1933-1943

Both fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany were supranational ideologies that aimed to create a homogenous and united Europe based on its superiority compared to the Others. These two did not promote democracy or the rights of individuals but explicitly mentioned the supremacy of Europe as civilization and the white race and in the case of Nazism, its spirit in the Middle Ages and crusade mentality against Bolshevism. Particularly, regarding Nazism, Hitler used collective memory of Europe and the mission of Churches in the Middle Ages in order to legitimate his violence and expansionism towards east. What is more, they portrayed their Russian attack as a struggle for the existence of Europe, not only of Germany. They overtly declared the racial superiority of Western European nationalities. However, at the end, the Holocaust brought the end of Europe as a civilization. In short, these two ideologies and their violent and inhuman practices ended the normative power of Europe in the 20th century.

4.2.7. Europe: A Cold War Construction

During the Cold War, the construction of Europe was very much related with the United States and its perception of Europe because in the 20th century the "West" was no more only Europe but also the Atlantic. The world had three power centres that of Europe, America and the Soviet Union among which the first two created the one bloc by being allies. In the second half of this century, specifically in the 1950s, Europe, for the first time in its history was institutionalized in a political framework through the European Economic Community. Thus, Europe was no more a mere cultural model but a political framework. What is more, Delanty argued that "in the second half of the twentieth century the idea of Europe articulated a particular way of life which can be said distinctively European" [Delanty, 1995: 115-116]. In other words, the culture of Europe was no more associated with only high culture's practices but also the culture of everyday life of ordinary people turned out to be one of the criteria of European-ness.

4.2.7.1. The Atlantic and Europe

For America, Europe was their past due to the fact that America had been constructed by European migrants in the 17th century. For this reason, Europe was where the roots of America took place. For this reason, America did not identify Europe through an emphasis on its racist, fascist and Nazi past but it was a romanticized, nostalgic and aesthetic category although they had to fight against Europe while constructing their settling in the New World [Delanty, 1995]. However, this does not mean that Americans always consider themselves European and Europe as the motherland. Besides these romanticized images, in the 19th century America abandoned to identify itself with Europe. "The self-perception of Americans was no longer that of Europeans. Europe became associated with oppression, inequality while America was the land of freedom, a freedom personified in the mystique of the limitless frontier of Old West" [Delanty, 1995: 117].

However, from the 1920s, America embraced Europe again due to the Great Depression of 1929. Europe, once more, had been the origin of modernity and Americas' past and the close relationship between Europe and the Atlantic strengthened over time due to common enemies such as communism and Islam.

4.2.7.2. Europe during the Cold War

It is difficult to name any event other than the Cold War in the second half of the 20th century that drastically changed the formation and construction of Europe. It had been originated from the expansionary aspirations of Germany and their onslaught on Russia that made Russia's entrance possible and a reality to the Central Europe. "With the defeat of Germany the fate of Europe was once again in the balance, for instead of a Nazi Europe the beleaguered West was now faced with the spectre of a communist Europe" [Delanty, 1995: 120]. For the first time, Russia became a direct frontier to Western Europe with the erection of Berlin Wall in 1961. Europe had been divided into two camps as the liberal democratic West and communist Eastern Europe. While German national identity became very problematic due to its guilt of the war, "...Europe was purified of its past and transformed into a programme for the future. The idea of Europe" with the Cold War "became a utopia rather than a romantization of the past" in which one of the most important subjects was the prevention of the rise of Germany again [Delanty, 1995: 121].

What is more, Europe was also Atlantic's eastern frontier and a power against communism. Europe, as already been lost its cultural normative power and the origin of civilization, turned out to be a mere economic community during Cold War years. What is more, the Cold War provided basis for the US-led internationalism and its hegemony.

The ideological competition between the "West" and the Soviet Union gained a new direction in the aftermath of the Cold War. These two different blocs, this time, began to compete for the control of the Third World. Delanty asserted that "...the conflict between West and East became not one merely about the Cold War but about the neo-colonial race for the Third World" [Delanty, 1995: 124]. In short, the Cold War, for both the West and East, provided psychology of an instant possibility of a constant war. The new identity of the "West" constructed on this threat of total destruction in a war which could emerge in any minute.

The ideological influence of the Cold War on Europe was not the only one. There was economic dimension of it. The new notion of Europe was based on bureaucracy led by Brussels. With the emergence of several institutions and agreements such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, Euratom in 1957 and the European Economic Community (EEC) bureaucratic centralism in Europe emerged. With the EEC, Europe turned out to be an economic community rather than a political one. "The war had discredited European culture as the life of the mind; the new Europe was a materialist one that sought no other legitimation than that which could not be supplied by capitalist modernity" [Delanty, 1995: 126].

To sum up, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the reference point of Europe shifted from nation-states to the idea of the "West". Europe was constructed as the eastern frontier of the US which was one of the super-powers of the world and it defined its Other as the Soviet Union and communism. The identification of Europe was associated with the Western Europe which would collapse in 1989.

4.2.8. Post-Cold War Europe

The post-Cold War issues in Europe can be listed as the German unification, the rediscovery of Mitteleuropa, the transition from communism to capitalism and liberal democracy in post-socialist countries, the construction of unity in Western Europe and the rise of nationalism and racism in Europe [Delanty, 1995].

The 1989 was a turning point for Europe. It brought an end to the division of Europe into two camps as East vs. West and shifted this division to North vs. South dichotomy. The

conception of East, as Delanty states, did not disappear but moved to the south and re-defined as Islam and the Third World. There was no unanimity about what Europe constitutes due to very deep divisions of Europe after the Cold War. "...in global terms the idea of Europe is linked to 'Fortress Europe' while within the European context it is the very diversity of national cultures that sustains the idea of Europe" [Delanty, 1995: 131].

The Cold War had fixed the territorial limits of Western Europe. "Confident in its identity as the West, the word 'western' was dropped and Western Europe became simply 'Europe', or the 'European Community'" [Delanty, 1995: 132]. During the Cold War period that lasted for forty years Western Europe was secure in terms of the stability regarding its identity. However, whatever happened started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the fall of Western Europe's Other, the stability in the region ended. Not even a single state had collapsed in the West in 1989 but the Eastern frontier had vanished. Delanty says that the disappearance of the West Germany from the map of Europe was practically the same as the loss of 'Western' Europe itself. The new Germanization of Europe became one of the most hotly debated issues in Europe.

Not only for the "West" but also for the Eastern Europe it was, of course, a turning point. The existing states had been overthrown and a two-level progress had been begun; the attempt to negate the heritage of 1917 and a belated attempt to catch up on the "West" [Delanty, 1995]. One of the most important developments regarding the construction of European identity and perception of Europe in post-socialist countries was the transition of the concept of Europe from being a term of bourgeois corruption to a major political agenda that must be caught. However, although Europe mostly identified with the metropolitan centers of Western Europe for Eastern Europeans, there emerged many "Europes" for different countries of the East. Europe turned out to be as a matter of choice.³⁰ To put it differently, "in the turnoil that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 new definitions of Europe surfaced with alarming speed. It soon became apparent Europe did not mean the same for everyone. For many, the Central Europe project is potentially a means of 're-Europeanization' and reintroducing some of the values and aspirations eliminated by the Soviet system" such as religion, ethnicity, free market and capitalist economy [Delanty, 1995:

³⁰ For specific examples of different perceptions of Europe by Czechs and Yugoslavs see [Delanty, 1996: 136]

136-137]. Europe, mostly had been defined as a concept, geography, culture, identity, value and mentality which Eastern Europeans would return to, not go to.

The limits of the Eastern Europe were among the discussed topics because the previously called Eastern Europe had now turned into Central Europe. The question that was asked most was whether Russia was in Eastern Europe or not. The reason of this fragile position of Russia originated from its different constructions within different European discourses in different times. Historically speaking, first of all, Russians themselves, throughout history have never been sure whether they wanted to be in or out. Secondly, in the 16th century it was considered as out whereas Poland was in. In the 19th century its frontiers have shifted to westwards dramatically; Poland began to be excluded from Europe whereas Russia was insisting on its European belonging. The role of Russia in the defeat of Napoleon made it European. However, in 1917 it was regarded as barbarian and Russia considered itself not-European. Lenin defined it closely with Russia whereas Stalin distanced it spiritually from European affairs. Then, the concept of Eurasia had given rise which was skeptical towards Western Europe, and at last with the collapse of the Soviet Union they identified themselves with the process of retuning to Europe [Davies, 1996]. Thus, the formation and construction of Europe, in the aftermath of 1989 included the search for the answer of the question of whether Russia is European or not.

The transition from communism to capitalism in Eastern Europe had been backed up by Western European countries mostly through the policies of the European Union. However, this transition did not provide equal changes for all post-socialist countries. The outcome was unequal modernizations and the rise of ethnic and religious conflicts and xenophobic nationalisms [Delanty, 1995]. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s the Eastern Europe was the land of uncertainties. It had no definite frontier, no certain national or ethnic identity, no equality of modernity, no regional unity, no convergence of values and no specific European identity. What is worse, all these conflicts and ambiguities made Eastern Europe the new implicit Other of Western Europe. Just like Delanty worded, "...Eastern Europe has been reduced to being a disadvantaged periphery of the West" and the result was "...the formation of a kind of 'anti-Europe" [Delanty, 1995: 140].

Additionally, the problems regarding the post-1989 period became more visible with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The rise of regional nationalisms and rejections from nations against this treaty; the countries' increasing fear of loosing political leadership in their own

territories and the widespread immigration from Eastern Europe to the "West" and accordingly the rise of public hysteria showed how huge the problem was in Europe.

The Maastricht debate what constitutes Europe collapsed and the nation-state reasserted itself amidst the surfacing of the extreme right. European unity became less popular the more imminent it became: unity may have been attractive as an abstract goal, and as a means of pursuing other projects, but as a reality it was apparently undesirable [Delanty, 1995: 142].

Thus, with the 1990s Europe was constructed through (unequal) integration in the sense of economics and free market, not through unification on equal conditions for all countries. In the European Union, besides the illusion of unification at all levels by the Maastricht treaty, during the 1990s, the idea of Europe became "...an expression of the homogenization of society, the tendency to capitalism to impose economic uniformity and social cohesion by means of the market and the dynamics of capital accumulation" although the success is open to discussion [Delanty, 1995: 143].

Just like the Eastern European countries had their diverse conceptions of Europe; Western countries also had their own perceptions of Europe and the European Union in the last quarter of the 20th century. For Spain, Greece and Portugal its was a way to end to dictatorships and recovery of its impacts; for Greece the means of opposition to Turkey; for France and Britain to contain Germany; for Scotland and Wales it was a means of hostility towards England; for Ireland an opposition to traditional Catholicism and so on. This shows that Europe turned out to be a discursive and dynamic concept in the late 20th ever than before. To be more specific, in this century Europe was defined as the "West"; as peace movements; as the European Union; as European Russia; as anti-Third World, anti-Islam and anti-immigrant; as a new mega power in a multi-polar world, not as the Eastern frontier of the Atlantic; as the center of soft racism based on wealth, and as a security area and many more [Delanty, 1995].

In short, what people are facing today is the re-construction and re-formation of Europe through the process of political identity building in which the means are Western life styles based on consumption and welfare. The "Othering" process still at the origin due to highly diverse religious, linguistic, ethnic, national and mentality discourses in Europe; however, this time the enemy is not communism but the Third World and Islam. Although Europe could have respond to the political, economic, social and cultural outcomes of the collapse of communism in the way towards the creation of collective identity construction, it did not happen. Western Europe chose to define Eastern Europe as the disadvantaged one and it tried to create an integration more based on economics and politics, not through culture and common mentality. Consequently,

Europe is being 'imagined' or 'invented' as a memoryless bureaucratic macrocosm to protect life-worlds organized around patterns of consumption and welfare, and with nationalism providing the necessary emotional substitution for deficits in legitimation...Today, then, the European idea has engendered a contradiction: the antimony of political, economic and military integration on the one side, and on the other social and cultural fragmentation [Delanty, 1995: 132].

4.3. Concluding Remarks

"In the beginning, there was no Europe. All there was, for five million years, was a long, sinuous peninsula with no name, set like the figurehead of a ship on the prow of the world's largest land mass. To the west lay the ocean which no one had crossed. To the south lay two enclosed and interlinked seas, sprinkled with islands, inlets, and peninsulas of their own. To the north lay the great polar icecap, expanding and contracting across the ages like some monstrous, freezing jellyfish. To the east lay the land-bridge to the rest of the world, whence all peoples and all civilizations were to come" [Davies, 1996: xv].

Until the first century AD, there was no sense of a dominant European culture or political entity. The idea of "Europe" was born with the expansion of the Roman Empire. With the military expansion of Roman forces this situation began to change; Romans included the landmass of Europe into their aimed geography in addition to the Mediterranean, west of the Rhine and the Danube. These lands had included many people from different origins who were not sharing a real common European consciousness of a specific European identity; however, the expansion of the Roman Empire to these lands provided "…one of the key leitmotifs of Europe's subsequent identity…the idea of an urban-based civilization and citizenship" [Unwin, 1998: 2]. In other words, this identity included all Romans, urbanization, shared rights-not extended to outsiders-, virtue, liberty of conscience and action, glory, loyalty and public position.

With the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire these leitmotifs shifted to a new uniting element of European identity: Christianity. In 330 AD, Constantine had made Constantinople the Christian capital of the Roman Empire and in 391 Christianity became the

official religion of the Empire. Although the Roman Empire first divided into two halves and then fell, Christianity continued to exist through Franks in the 6^{th} century.

During the 9th century, there had been attempts to create a Christian Europe alliance by the Pope and Charlemagne but it did not last too long. This idea of Christian Europe got stronger with the Crusades and the meeting of Christianity with Islam. However, it is stated that "it was only in the course of the fifteenth century that the word Europe came to be used frequently by all large number of authors...from then on, the identification of Europe with Christendom also became usual" [Unwin, 1998: 3]. In short, in the medieval period, Christianity came to distinction as a formative element of a European consciousness.

Over time, with the Reformation in the 16th century, the Enlightenment in the 17th and the 18th centuries the idea of Christian unity began to loose its emphasis and the focus in the meaning of Europe shifted towards economic, scientific, technological progress, rationalism, humanism, rule of law, civilization, and nationalism. However, although Christianity's power has been shaken by the Reformation in the 16th century, it is still an important part of European identity due to its long-lasting impact on shaping Europe's population movements, politics, culture, art, traditions and identity.

The rise of capitalism in Europe led its redefinition as the heart of world economy. As Unwin mentioned "In Wallerstein's …formulation, the European world economy was created from the re-organization of the earlier distinct medieval economies of northern Italy and Flanders, and was enabled by the expansion of the geographical size of the world, the development of variegated systems of labor control, and the creation of strong state machineries in the core states…the crucial point to emphasize was that each state was increasingly being drawn into an integrated economic system" [Unwin, 1998: 4].

By the end of the 19th century, the competition among European states on expansion, cheaper raw materials, labor and larger markets increased economic, political and social conflicts among them. This gave rise to the emergence of extreme nationalism which caused the First and Second World Wars, the rise of communism, fascism, Nazism and at the end the destruction of Europe. All these events changed and redefined the idea of Europe. Europe was no more the heartland of civilization but the origin of chaos.

Europe's Estimated Death Toll, 1914–45

1	Military losses during the First World War (by states, killed in action or dead of wounds) (not including USA)		3 Civilians killed during the Second World War (by states)			
		ncluding USA)		Allied Powers	minimum	maximum
	Allied Powers			Soviet Union	** 10 000 000	40.000.000
	Russian Empire	1 700 000		Poland	** 16 000 000	
	France	1 357 800		Yugoslavia	*** 5 675 000	7 000 000
	Britain & Empire	908 371		France	1 200 000	
	Italy	650 000		Greece	350 000	
	Romania	325 706		Czechoslovakia	325 000	
	Serbia	70 000		Netherlands	215 000	
	Belgium	13716		Britain	200 000	
	Portugal	7 222		Belgium	92 673	
	Greece	5 000		Norway	76 000	
	Montenegro	3 000			7 000	
	sub-total	5 040 815		Denmark	2 000	
				Axis Powers		
	Central Powers			Germany	780 000	
	Germany	1 773 700		Hungary	290 000	
	Austria-Hungary	1 200 000		Romania	200 000	
	Turkey	325 000		Italy	152 941	
	Bulgaria	87 500		Bulgaria	10 000	
	sub-total	3 386 200		Finland	2 000	
	Total (estimate)	8 427 015		Total (estimate)		
	Military losse the Second M (by states, killed in of wounds) (not incl Allied Powers	forld War action or dead luding USA)	ii I B	his huge number, which is alls, not on recorded death n Table 5. It is only partly a t also ignores the breakdoy losed, where the heaviest l yelorussians, Russians, Pol	s, conceals sever attributable to the vn by nationality, losses were susta les, Balts, and Jew	al categories lis e German Occupa never officially ined by Ukrainia
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Table 4.3. Europe: devastating and devastated

(after R. Medvedev, R. Conquest)		
	minimum	maximum
Civil War & Volga Famine, 1918–22	3 000 000	5 000 000
Political repressions in the 1920s	tens of thousands	
Forced collectivization and 'dekulakization' after 1929	10 000 000	14 000 000
Ukrainian Terror-Famine, 1932–3	6 000 000	7 000 000
Great Terror (1934–9) and Purges	1 000 000	
Deportations to the Gulag, to 1937	10 000 000	
Shootings and random executions, 1937–9	1 000 000	
Deportations from Eastern Poland, Baltic States,		
and Romania, 1939–1940	2 000 000	
Foreign POWs: Poles, Finns, Germans, Romanians, Japan	ese 1 000 000	
Deportations to the Gulag, 1939–45	7 000 000	
Deportations of nationalities: Volga Germans, Chechens,		
Innush Crimean Tatars, etc.	1 000 000	
Post-war screening of repatriates and inhabitants of		
ex-occupied territory	5 000 000	6 000 000
	c.54 m	illion
Gross total (median estimate)		
NB. Several of these categories overlap.		
Principal categories with Europe's deat = 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2	********	*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed 	*******	
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 	*******	*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag Military losses WW2 Military losses WW2 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag Military losses WW2 Collectivization and dekulakization losses Military losses WW1 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag Military losses WW2 Collectivization and dekulakization losses Military losses WW1 Losses during Russian Civil War 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag Military losses WW2 Collectivization and dekulakization losses Military losses WW1 Losses during Russian 		*****
 1 million deaths Total civilian losses in Europe in WW2 Soviet citizens killed during WW2 Victims of the Soviet Gulag Military losses WW2 Collectivization and dekulakization losses Military losses WW1 Losses during Russian Civil War Ukrainian Terror- Famine Jewish Holocaust 		*****
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Table 4.3(continued). Europe: devastating and devastated

After the huge devastations of 1939-1945 period, the period in which nation states were in competition for global domination had ended. The rise of the USA, establishment of several international institutions such as the United Nations, the need to rebuild Europe, the division of world into two blocs as the West vs. the East (the Soviet Union) pawed the way for defining Europe again and gave a new meaning to Western Europe. As Unwin asserted " the establishment of the Soviet hegemony in the east gave a new meaning the idea of western Europe, which for the first time became a distinctly bounded unit, with the Atlantic to the west and the Iron Curtain to the east" [Unwin, 1998: 4]. This strict boundary caused many problems for several nation states which naturally defined themselves as European because the authorities that draw this boundary rejected their European identity and European-ness, and erased the impact of social and cultural factors of belonging to Europe.

The remnants of the Second World War in Europe and the alert views of European countries towards Germany caused the signing of numerous treaties beginning with 1951 the Treaty of Paris, 1957 the Treaty of Rome, 1967 the Merger Treaty, 1986 the Single European Act, 1991 the Maastricht Treaty, 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam, 2001 the Treaty of Nice and many accession treaties. These treaties aimed to create a project of Europe through which a powerful economic, political and cultural union would be established.

So, as a result of all these mentioned historical developments, it is obvious that it is impossible to define Europe in complete; no definitions of it will be sufficient and all attempts to define it will lack some sort of knowledge or dimension of it. However, there are some realities that can be pointed out. First of all, there has never been only one Europe but many "Europes" and among them the most dominant one was always very much focused on exclusion rather than inclusion which is still valid for the present time.

Europe is no longer based dominantly, globally speaking, on East vs. West dichotomy but more on North vs. South. What is more, since the Renaissance, it was not formed and constructed as an alternative to the existing system, in particular nation states but a conformation of the hegemony of them [Delanty, 1995].

There had been many attempts to unify Europe such as Christendom, Christian humanist tradition, liberal democracy, Europe as civilization, but all of them failed to achieve the goal. At the end, Europe turned to, unfortunately aggressive ethnic nationalisms and these constructed the new borderlines within Europe.

Europe is not a subject of history but a product of history. Throughout history it is formed and constructed as a geographical notion, the cultural idea, Christendom, opposition to Christendom, the "West", the civilization over nature, the modernity, the nation states, opposition to the Orient, the superior white race, the Mitteleuropa, the state-seeking nationalism, the Fortress Europe, and the European Union. Thus, it is not a mere geography but an amalgam of reality, myth, identity building, idea, culture, unity, multiculturalism, imperialism, ethnicity, fascism, nationalism, Nazism, communism, diversity and "we" and the "Other" and many more. As Delanty asserted, "Just as Europe took over the world-view of Christendom in the early modern period, it has also taken over the culture of the nineteenth century imperialism, and European fascism has been rehabilitated today in various strategies of 'cleansing', be it ethnic or ideological. The lesson is clear: Europe must be judged by its failures as much as by its lofty ideals" [Delanty, 1995: 158]. So, the way of understanding and learning Europe passes through both its glorious times and dark sides of its history and, moreover, through the changing perceptions, formations and constructions of it.

Today, the idea of Europe is a universal normative standard. This normative position means that it is a kind of cultural violence that is enclosed in a cultural world-view which claims to be in possession of a distinct universal truth and validity. Europe carries the illusion of a privileged and superior "we the Europeans". In other words, Europe mirrors itself as the interpretation of the world; puts itself at the zenith of history, and as the apotheosis of civilization [Delanty, 1995]. However, "the idea of Europe, ostensibly a geo-political concept, is a cultural model, a cultural construct, and as such cannot claim universal validity" [Delanty, 1995: 12]. This claim of Europe makes the idea of Europe inevitable base for a division, a strategy for the construction of difference, us vs. them, and the "Others" and an inferioritysuperiority dichotomy. Within this claim, Europe is being constructed through not what its people have in common but through what separated them from non-European communities. Thus, it is this view of Europe and definition of it that must be avoided in general and that must not be transferred to the new generations of Europe through history education because Europe also means different religions, languages, ethnicities, minorities, non-Europeans. Europe must be based on plurality, tolerance, respect and multiperspectivity, not uniformity, hostility and intolerance; and this must be the main theme and goal in history education.

Consequently, European history should not be "...a 'biological-racial' history of the superior white race or...a 'cultural-racial' history of notable and outstanding Western achievements which give Europe a 'lead' over 'indigenous cultures' or 'cultures without history'" [Von Borries, 2000: 153]. Secondly, European history should not be a pure history of the West; it includes Balkans, Russia, Byzantium and European Islam. Moreover, it is not a history of mere successes, victories and achievement with a total morality, righteousness and no-mistakes. European history is not a straight, homogeneous and consistent progress from antiquity to European integration until today.

So, what should be done is the elimination of

the positive and normative evaluation of one's own history and the negative evaluation of the history others...an unbroken continuity of one's own development from origins to relevant projections of the future...and...a clear location of one's own positive development in the centre of history and the corresponding discriminating marginalization of others... [Rüsen, 2000: 81].

In short, European history includes many pitfalls and these pitfalls of European history were actually making this concept very popular, urgent and necessity-to-overcome in the present time. What should be done is a responsible representation of European history with normative, empirical and narrative validity which will have the capacity of future pluralistic representation of history of Europe.

5. MODERNITY, NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION

This chapter aims to explain the relationship between modernity, nationalism and education. It will discuss how nationalism became a product of modernity through unique aspects of it. Then, it will focus on the contradictions of the modernity project with nation state; and due to nation states use history education as means to their ideals, the chapter will try to show the link between these three concepts and their reflection on historians' tasks, education and historiography.

The idea of modernity developed and spread with the Enlightenment. As İlhan Tekeli pointed out, it has some unique aspects such as its approach to economics (capitalist economy), philosophy and knowledge (universality of knowledge and science), individualism and the nation state, which are the steps towards the link between modernity and nationalism [Tekeli, 1998].

First of all, modernity challenges the feudal system with capitalism. In the project of modernity, society is being defined through capitalist relations and industrialized structure in which production is made for the international and national markets. In this system, products become commodities and labor becomes wage labor; as Marx stated labor becomes commodity. Production processes turn into mass production with the emergence factories and assembly lines. The security of society is provided through the guarantee of property rights.

The second dimension of modernity is its approach to philosophy and knowledge. With modernity knowledge becomes universal, not limited with time and space and the possibility of objective and scientific knowledge grow to be accepted. Regarding individualism as the third dimension, modernity brings the end of the subject and the rise of the individual who carries the responsibilities and rights of being a citizen. The rise of individual comes from the demise of feudal, agricultural societies. Rural populations due to the new production system of capitalism move to urban landscapes and this brings the end of rural social attachments such as kinship and tribe. As a result of all these changes, the concept of "individual" rises in societies which are composed of high mobility, cultural homogeneity, private sphere, anonymous relationships and rationality of the human mind. However, these new individuals feel insecure due to lessened social attachments, complexity and the huge levels of ambiguities of their society. Thus, they begin to search for new attachments. Because of rationality principle of modernity, they do not choose religion or faith but science and nation state as the sources of trust, security and belonging. The nation state provides new common symbols, belongings to individuals who are identified as equals in nation state system. The maintaining of equal rights automatically brings responsibilities to individuals and this situation makes them citizens. What is more, "As the national identity is defined with an ethnic and/or cultural content and the singularity and even the superiority of this identity is emphasized, national identity has become the inseparable attribute and the essential reference of 'human' identity. In other words, 'humanity' has become dependent upon 'nationhood'" [Bora, 2004: 50].

The fourth dimension of modernity is the democratic nation state, the determination of its intervention areas and the declaration of the ways of its legitimization as the will and sovereignty of the people. It is, at this point, important to know that "The rise of nationalism and the transformation of states into nation-states were seen as an inevitable stage of becoming a mature and *civilized* human beings, for human beings acquired the status of citizenship, a status which was the basis of their autonomous existence and of their basic rights that guaranteed this autonomy, within the context of and by virtue of their membership in a nation state" [Bora, 2004: 49].

However, besides these four dimensions, modernity includes three significant contradictions. The first one is the contradiction between nation state, capitalist economy and universal science. When modernity is applied in nation state borders, it automatically leads to expansionist view as Tekeli argues, and the expansion of universality, by each nation state, defined through their own values, systems, etc. In other words, each nation aims to define their values, concepts and points of views as the universal. The second one is the contradiction of equality. Although the nation state defines each citizen as equal, the capitalist economy as one dimension of modernity project becomes the source of inequalities. The third contradiction lies in the construction of the nation states which is directly related with the link between nationalism and history education. Within the modernity project, the concept of the nation state is a universal phenomenon. However, each nation state, during their

foundation, defines themselves through their unique and peculiar characteristics which the other nation states do not have and will never able to have actually. The contradiction is explicit: Within the modernity project nation states are universal, thus they are explained, defined and seen as nomothetic. However, nation states that use modernity project to construct their existence, they do it idiographically. As a result, this contradiction becomes one of the biggest challenges that national historiography faces with, and in fact, this is one of the most important aspects of modernity which provided the complex interaction between nation, history and education [Tekeli, 1998: 105-109].³¹

The question is how does history, its education and historiography become so involved to modernity and nationalism? The answer can be reached in Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, in the three different phases of imaginings of the nation as a community, as a territorially bounded unit and as a sovereign unit [Tekeli, 1998]. Here is the short version of the story:³² Within the modernity project, the first thing that must be imagined is a new community. The transitions from an agrarian society to an industrialized one, the demise of agrarian society's social belongings, and the rise of anonymous relations among individuals necessitated the imagining of nation as a community in order to satisfy the demands of trust, belonging and security. To realize these demands this community must be imagined with borders and certain territories due to providing stability and better, powerful attachments. Additionally, this new community must be imagined as sovereign because modernity defines itself with democracy and the rule of law. In short, the new phenomenon of modernity which is defined as nation should be imagined as a community, as a territorially bounded structure and as a sovereign unit [Anderson, 1983].

As Tekeli referred to Anderson, the individuals of this community will naturally not have the chance of meeting with or knowing each other face to face and this is not a necessity for a modern nation state. However, what should be provided is the offering of the feeling of equality among themselves and the feeling of being a member of the same nation. No sub identities can supercede the national one in this system. The sub identities can be flexible, open and temporary but what is required is the persistent and lasting condition of national identity.

³¹ For further details see [Tekeli, 1998: 105–109]

³² For detailed information see Chapter 1

In addition to these, to strengthen the nation concept, some social relationship structures such as kinship, blood and family should be forgotten or at least be abraded. In other words, relationships must be reorganized or redefined through national ideas. In order to achieve this, there must be social cohesion among the members of the nation. The creation of the notion of "us" is one way of accomplishing this cohesion³³ and it is realized through the construction of common memories, history, traditions and values, and also through forgetting some historical memories as mentioned with detail in Chapter 1. The second way of providing solidarity, besides the creation of "us", is the construction of the "other". The "other" concept is built through the common prejudices of one community to the ones which are at the outside of their territories. Mostly, this process is negative such as the creation of racism, genocide, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, etc. Additionally, the construction of the other is controversial. The contradiction of "othering" lies in the simultaneous construction of stereotypes of the community which is defining its own others [Tekeli, 1998]. Although it is impossible to imagine identities without the "others", the most important thing must be finding ways of creating others, says Tekeli, by not pushing or strengthening the exclusionist or conflictual othering processes which, actually failed in nationalist history, historiography and history education until now.

There emerge some expectations from historians during nation construction period and from a nationalist perspective. The historian must be aware of the fact that historiography and history discipline is used as a means in this period. Nationalism is a project that is related to future; it provides a future perspective. Thus, the historian should be able to or s/he is expected to find an origin, a spirit to the nation in the past which will legitimize the immemorial existence and continuity of the nation. However, the mere eternal historical existence of the nation is not enough, there must be a certain territorial attachment. To put it differently, not only do the construction of nations on certain values play important role in the rise of nationalism but also the construction of geographical attachments are significant.

³³ Durkheim theorized the emergence of "we" with transition from mechanic solidarity to organic solidarity. According to Durkheim, the origin of solidarity comes from different types of division of labor. In traditional societies, for example, solidarity originated from the similarity and sameness of individuals. Because people had no complex division of labor, they defined the origin of their solidarity through their common language, morality and beliefs. However, this is very different in modern societies. In modern societies we see organic solidarity that derived from the differentiation of individuals in contrast to the traditional communities. The reason of this is the complex division of labor and a system in which each individual is dependent to the other.

Nation states, although they are the late 18th and 19th century phenomenon, try to construct some belongings with the past in order to legitimize their perennial existence. Simultaneously, the condition of being defined within certain territories paves the way for establishing artificial belongings and attachments with the societies or people who had lived on those territories before nation states.

Another task that historians should do, regarding nationalist discourse, is to transform spaces into places through the usage of history. Nationalism and nation state demand sacrifices from its citizens and it is important for any nation state to make its territory sacred. The national construction process, accordingly, continues in the construction of places. Spaces that are passive and abstract areas, inside the national movements, must be turned into places. Places, compared to spaces, include action, meaning, value and identity. So, during the construction of nations, geography and territory of the state, automatically, alters from being an abstract space into a meaningful place which has existential value [Tekeli, 1998].³⁴

These legitimizations and internalizations of the eternal existence of the nation, both historically and territorially, can be spread through literacy and mass education. Nationalism within modernity project necessitates catching up the standards and necessities of capitalist economy and at the same time it must construct values and attachments to be stronger and be legitimized by its members. Here, the role of history becomes vital in nationalism both as a tool of constructing these legitimizations and as a tool of transferring these ideas from one generation to the other. So, what happened was that the way how to construct these imaginings through the creation of "we", solidarity, belonging, common memory, their rationalization, internalization and transfers, within modernity, fell in the origin of national historiography, and history education.

³⁴ For more details [Tekeli, 1998: 114–116]

5.1. National History

History and geography are very important social sciences because they comprise all other knowledge spheres. In other words, every social, political, cultural and economic concepts, developments, progress, etc are/can be subjects of the discipline of history. Thus, nationalism with its all dynamics, naturally, is one of the subjects that are studied by history. What is more, history did not only study nationalism but also is used as a means to the construction of nationalism and this usage created the phenomena of national(ist) history and national(ist) historiography.

There are some significant features of national history according to Tekeli. The first one is the neo-positivistic approach to history. In this approach, as mentioned in the first chapters of the thesis, it is believed that the past can be written objectively due to the existence of written documents, the knowledge of the past and the material proofs. The success might not be realized but at least this view suggests the scientificity in history is explicit and all the efforts serve to reach the objective knowledge of the past. When this approach is taken into consideration by national historiography, it is less like a try for the most objective and scientific knowledge of the past but more an endeavor for the creation of national myths to construct and strengthen national identity [Tekeli, 1998: 104].

The second one is the use of national historiography as means to reach national goals through creating an image of a nation and its identity in minds of people. Thus, this usage automatically brings the dichotomy of "us vs. them" which in the further pages will be studied with detail. Nationalism as an ideology and nationalistic historiography always create others, in fact, they necessitate "others" to construct their own concepts and belonging. Even they are constructed with the purpose of protection; they are, as Halil Berktay put it in words, always exclusionist [Berktay, 1993]. Moreover, this dichotomy leads to the continuity of hatred and conflict among nations, plus it delays the materialization of a peaceful world.

The next point about national historiography is the concept of globalization, its contradiction with nation state and anachronism as an outcome of this inconsistency. The contradiction between nation states hegemony and globalization can be explained as follows like it is discussed in 1994 Buca Symposium: The questioned asked in the symposium was,

although countries make some changes in their history education systems and textbooks due to globalization, why did national histories and national historiographies not end and not replaced with different writing approaches which could lead more tolerance, peace, human rights, equality, harmony and unity? The answer given was, although the core of globalization depends on the demise and even the end of the nation state, what is happening today is an attempt to provide the continuity of the nation states and their protection through founding less powerful international organizations. In other words, there is not so much change in the dynamics and power status of nation states. What is new is the emergence of weaker international institutions, supranational organizations which are based on the continuation of national powers. Thus, globalization today although explicitly defined as the demise of nation states, it is implicitly being led by nation states and serves for their continuation. According to Tekeli, this is the reason of anachronisms in history education [Tekeli, 1998].

Berktay sums up the fundamental features of nationalism, which can be considered the reasons of the strength of nationalism, as follows: Almost all nationalisms are said to be historical because of the aim of eternalizing the national identity of societies. Nationalism narrates history through "us vs. them" dichotomization. To put it differently, nationalistic discourse of history is arrogant. It is also vindictive; all guilt belongs to the "other". Plus, it has "golden age" emphasis which is done through, in Berktay's terms and listing, romantic-restorationist, nostalgic and anti-rationalist narratives [Berktay, 1993: 241].

Lastly, it is important to state nationalism and its perception in postmodernism. Different than above, postmodernism affirms the impossibility of an objective historical writing due to every written thing is the product of subjective minds. Thus, the question regarding to history and historiography should not be based on the inferiority and superiority of different national historiographies but the point of views. To put it differently, postmodernism sees national historiographies as a different type of historiography and the different perspectives in their construction should be the origin of the discussion [Tekeli, 1998]; however, this suggestion continued and actually continues to remain, unfortunately, as a utopia concerning the current national history textbooks and history education.

5.2. Turkey: Nationalism and the Things that are Sacrificed for

Turkish history and historiography include gradually rising nationalism and contradictions related to it. According to Berktay, in every sphere of Turkish life including identity construction and history education, there are significant levels of nationalism and actually the extreme nationalism creates barriers for development of the country [Berktay, 1993], because the ideal of nationalist ideology is the establishment of continuation of the existence of nation states and this ideal paves "...the way to the instrumentalization and even the suppression of all other values in the name of this ideal" [Bora, 2004: 50]. In this vein, the problematic parts of Turkish education and social science textbooks regarding nationalism can be listed as indoctrination of nationalism, pseudo-historical explanations, anachronisms, fusion of every topic under national security, rigid construction of the "others", both external and internal, internalization of "golden ages", implicit meaning in word choice and tone and so.

According to Tanil Bora, the content of the doctrine of national education in Turkey is composed of a combination of Ataturkism and nationalism [Bora, 2004]. Most of the high school history, Turkish language, geography and citizenship textbooks explain repeatedly being Turk and Ataturkist and their vitality. Thus, the aim of national education can be defined to raise individuals as loyal followers of Ataturkist nationalism. A quote from a citizenship textbook defined the contemporary national education as "the education capable of turning contemporary science, technology, art and values into a data base for the process of thinking by Turkish identity" [Bilgen, 2001: 102]. The goal of indoctrination of nationalism lies in the supremacy of an instrumentalist approach in every field of education such as literature, arts, history, citizenship, religion, geography and even in music. "In a music textbook", says Bora, "the primary liability of students is 'to sing the national anthem enthusiastically" [Bora, 2004: 52; Yener, 2002: 5]. Plus, some Turkish literature books define the aim of their texts as to make students love Turkish language that is defined as one of the most significant sources of the national identity, national unity and integrity. It is apparent that the study of Turkish language is not based on its aesthetic and literal value but it is based on a self-praising and pseudo scientific way. These can be seen in Bora's article, in

quotations like "...Turkish is the best language for the expression of human sentiments" and "Turkish language is the most beautiful, richest and easiest language of the world" [Kanberoğlu, 2002: 20].

Regarding language, the only problematic part is not the glorification of Turkish language. The way it is used in textbooks also serves for the strengthening and internalization of nationalism in pupils' minds through irrational, distorted explanations such as because Turkish nation was so honest, we would win the war [Özkan, 2002; Bora, 2004: 71]. Bora asserts that

The reductionist and tautological expressions which are full of inconsistencies and anachronisms...may impede the development of students' capacity to reason and interpret what they read. This may be a more important problem than the content of indoctrination itself; or, perhaps, better to say, it is the real-at least the accomplished- objective of indoctrination! [Bora, 2004: 70].³⁵

Furthermore, the impact of the nationalism in education strengthens with the reflection of all ideas under a national security aspect. To put it differently, "the essential texts of national indoctrination are those of national security courses" [Bora, 2004: 65]. The textbooks and education in class reflect language, religion, history and geography as the issues of national security. Thus, they try to instill the idea that they have to be protected. To provide the protection of national security, superficial and ambiguous enemies are constructed who demanded geographical position of Turkey, its rich natural sources, human force and etc. Each aspect of Turkey, let it be cultural, social, political, economic, are turned into the demand of enemies. These are provided through irrational statements like "some countries do not want the strengthening of Turkey" [Kara and Kaman, 2002: 51]. The enemies, both internal and external, just like the nation state itself, are considered as eternal. This situation created a youth whose members are always chronically alert against an attack, war, and threat.

In Turkish education, nationalism is being used as an essential system of thought; it is at the origin of all social science education and actually it is the goal of the education system. To prove this, a sentence from a National Security course's book can be a good vein to continue: "No thought or opinion against the Turkish national interests can be protected..." [Milli Güvenlik, 2002: 34]. Another example is, taken from Bora's article, a quote from a high school Turkish revolution book which shows the constructed idea that Ataturkism is an

³⁵ For specific examples of reductionalist, tautological, inconsistent and distorted expressions in textbooks see [Bora, 2004: 71]

internal and indispensable part of Turkish survival; "To abandon Ataturkism is to be deprived from the libertarian democracy based on national sovereignty and the power of progress" [Mumcu and Su, 2002: 251]. Worse than this, in the same book it is written that "if nationalism is denied, the Turkish existence will be terminated" [Mumcu and Su, 2002 p.260]. These two statements justify the ideologically and politically constructed nature of nationalism. This justification can also be found in secondary school Social Studies books as "The principle of nationalism serves to keep the unity of our nation vis-à-vis the external threats" [Şenünver, 2001: 69].

However, besides the explicit reception of constructed nationalism, in many other Turkish textbooks, nationalism is represented implicitly as a natural phenomenon which is lasting since human existence. For example, Bora gives the example of a primary school citizenship textbook which stated that "humans are sentimentally affiliated to their nation" and "patriotism is an essential characteristic of every conscious human" [Bilgen, 2001: 35]. To put it differently, in Turkish education, each pupil, since they are seven, if not before by their families, is intellectually filled with the idea that nationalism is a symbol of normality. Too much interest in nationalism, national values and identity ignored-or consciously made?-other elements of identity such as class, gender and culture. As a result, "the nation is accepted as the only authentic form of and base for both socialization and political subjectivity (and state)" [Bora, 2004: 54].

One of the characteristic elements of national ideology is to differentiate itself from the "others" in a radical way and to give itself primacy over all the rest of values and human existences. This "other"ing process is in an extreme level in Turkish education. To be different from everybody and the total view of exceptionalism became also the goal of education other than the ideology of nationalism; and the design of distinctiveness of being Turk in education tools come to the point of solipsism and as a result the world began to be seen and interpreted from a self-center [Bora, 2004]. The reflection of this propensity can be seen in a high school religion and morality textbook with a saying "the moral system and comprehension of our nation is very unique" [Dilaver, 2001: 66]. In addition to these, Bora pointed out that the notions of autarkist point of views are visible in Turkish textbooks such as "if we buy goods from foreign countries our money goes to them" [Bora, 2004: 55; Eren and Goren, 2000: 83].

Moreover, there is a huge space set aside in textbooks to the concept of "foreign" and the suspicion and anxiety attached to it which means foreign as a potential enemy. Some textbooks explicitly mention the danger of interacting with the "foreign" defined in economics, social and culture. So, in short, xenophobia is used as means in Turkish education to build national consciousness. Relating to this, the world exterior to the national borders was reflected as the outside and the source of threat, danger, insecurity and enemy. This situation was not only seen in history textbooks but also in geography, literature and morality textbooks. Statistically speaking, Bora found out only 22 pages of a 268 paged literature textbook focused on modern world literature whereas 30% of the same book covered Turkish literature, the literature of Turkic states, outside of the borders of Turkey [Bora, 2004]. Although the example is from a literature book, Turkish pupils, in addition not reading foreign literature, do not also recognize foreign languages, do not learn foreign geographies and do not understand foreign religions which mean that Turkish youth is being raised in a very small world in which understanding the others is consciously made impossible.

The naturalization of nationalism in textbooks continues to be strengthened on the basis of defining Turks and being Turkish as the ideal image of good and beauty, says Bora. The way these textbooks define Turks such as with high degree of morality compared to others, the superiority of Turkish language, traditions and values. For example, in a social studies textbook sincerity, diligence, human love and tolerance, open-mindedness, benevolence, independence, hospitality, generosity, respecting the elders and loving the young ones listed as the characteristics of Turks [Bora, 2004: 58].³⁶ This characterization resulted as the non-emergence of critical approach to moral values of Turkish nation in education. Because all pupils "have" the best moral values by being born as a Turk, they never feel the need of questioning.

Moreover, it is possible to state that nationalism in Turkish school books oscillates between racist and etho-culturalist tones and patriotic citizenship. Quotations like "our nationalism that embraces all people who sincerely see themselves as a Turk" [Mumcu and Su, 2002: 275] and "in this beautiful territory lives our nation which shares common sentiments, the same worries and joys, speaks the same language. Turkish nation has politically organized itself and founded the Republic of Turkey" proves the oscillation [Şenünver, 2001: 20]. Furthermore, in these books, patriotism mostly used in lieu of

³⁶ For more and detailed examples see [Senünver, 2001: 19–23]

nationalism whose meaning was reduced to dying for the nation. The patriotism became a part of epic, romantic nationalism on contrast to "...a consciousness and the will to create, to strengthen and to develop a free, virtuous and just common life" [Bora, 2004: 57].

Pan-Turkism is a further coverage for nationalism in textbooks. Bora pointed out that almost one third of high school literature book devoted to Turkish literature outside of Turkey such as Cyprus and Central Asia [Bora, 2004], and when it is looked at the percentage of the coverage of foreign geographies, Turkic territories and the info about them is more than the other parts of the world including America and Europe.

Being Turk and features of Turkish identity are also constructed through religion and being Muslim in Turkish textbooks. In Kazım Yaşar Kopraman's high school history textbook it is totally obvious: "[It] has caused the loss of self in Turkish tribes (The Huns, Avars, Hungarians etc.) as they were Christianized" [Kopraman, 2002: 69]. Also, the content of the religion and morality textbooks by being focused merely on Islam and its Sunni sect prove this identification of Turkish nationalism with religion.

What is significant is in all these textbooks from history to music, it is found out that the state is at the centre of Turkish education. Statistically, among the most used words in textbooks, the state is the first in social studies and history textbooks and second in philosophy books [Bora, 2004: 67]. State takes a kind of transcendental form in Turkish education textbooks. Likewise, with the overt repetition of each nation has its own state, nationalism; in Turkish education is build as the fusion of nation and state.

To sum up, the methods, contents and linguistic tones in school textbooks of Turkey serves for the propaganda of Turkish nationalism. What is dominant in Turkish curriculum is ethno-cultural identity, absolute loyalty to the state rather than citizenship, repetition of stereotypes of the "others", patriotic sentiments, an authoritarian language and superiority of the Turk in all aspects. At this point, the speech of the Vice President of the Curriculum Board, Altan Ates in the opening ceremony of the 12th Council of National Education will be enough to explain the position of Turkish education, particularly the social sciences and history:

For every society, nation and state, education has a common objective. This objective is to transform those who are born within it or to join it into a part of itself, and transform them into persons proper to its way of life, sharing the same opinions. To realize this objective is a necessity...it has to be known that a society which does not or cannot transform those...is bound to be dispersed and lose its essence and existence...the only instrument to realize this objective is education [Bora, 2004: 71].

Can there be a better proof than this to show that Turkish education is all about indoctrination of nationalism and it is all about sacrifice of scientificity, tolerance, critical thinking and multiperspectivity?

5.3. Turkey: A Case Study of Nationalist History Education

Although the aim of history education in a global world should be raising people as conscious and aware citizens of democratic societies, in Turkey, like in most other nation states, the history education serves to make people obey the state authority and it serves as a tool to realize the ideals of the nation state. In other words, in nationalist view of education, obligatory history curriculum becomes one of the most workable solutions to intensify young generation's identification themselves with their nation.

All problems and sacrifices that had been explained in the previous part are valid for Turkish history education and textbooks, too. The aim of this part is to give certain examples regarding identified problems within history education and history textbooks and to define additional Turkish history-education-specific dilemmas. These dilemmas can be listed within two groups as problems rely on content, methods, language; and dilemmas originated from structural problems. Among the first group there are contradictions of defining Europe; identification of Turkish history with the Ottoman Empire; ignorance of the position of Turkish history in world history due to national concerns; nomothetic-idiographic challenge; chronological approach's consequences; enemy concept; ambiguous explanations; lack of self criticism, comparative approach, multiperspectivity, critical approach, historical empathy and ignorance of subjects like gender, culture, minorities; and the tone of textbooks. Regarding the structural or more mechanic challenges, problems in National Education Law, overloaded history curriculum and problems concerning the re-writing periods of the textbooks can be listed.

To begin with, Turkish history education, according to Sina Akşin, has two problems of paradigm. The first one is that the Turkish Republic, state and its people identify themselves with the Ottoman Empire and the second one is they overlook the place of Turkish history in world history [Akşin, 1994].³⁷ A good example for the first one would be, from Turkish high school history textbook written by Uğurlu and Balcı, the usage of a phrase about the Ottoman Empire (and it is possible to find more) like "*our* loss of Cyprus, Tunisia and Egypt". The defeated part was not Turkey but the Ottomans; however, the book as being a textbook of Turkish history uses the phase "our" [Akşin, 1994: 64].

The second problem of paradigm lies in the late emergence of Turkish societies in world history scene compared to other civilizations and communities. Aksin argues that because Turkish people, due to national history tradition, try to construct their origin in immemorial times, the scientific reality of late occurrence makes them uncomfortable. So, the historical subjects like Huns and Gokturks are being taught to students not in world history but under different parts. For this reason, Turkish pupils cannot totally understand the chronology of the development of Turkish society.

Moreover, to get rid of the complex and pessimistic views and strengthen the nationalism in Turkey, pseudo scientific explanations or anachronisms are being created; not only about Turkish language as mentioned in the last part, but also durations of the existence of nations. In a Turkish literature textbook it is written that "Turkish history going back to thousand years BC", "Turkish nation which lived free and independent all through history" [Ercan, 2002: 80]. The aim of these repeated statements is to make pupils imagine Turkish nation as existent since the beginning of history although the concept of "nation" is a modern one and at most 300 years old.

Anachronistic construction of Turkish nation is very popular in history textbooks. Bora pointed out, one type of anachronism as

Turks in every epoch of history and in any geography are imagined as being the one and the same political and social subject with present day Turks of Turkey...An important aspect of this imagination is to evaluate the old Turkish communities of Anatolia and their entire cultural heritage within the framework of their teleological historical mission of 'preparing' modern Turkey [Bora, 2004: 59].

Regarding another version of it, what is done in textbooks is "to look at historical periods in which the horizon of imagination of the communities considered ethnically Turkish". For example, in one of the high school history textbook it is written that "The Ottoman state had reached a peak point in its power in every field of life by the 16th century and also enveloped in itself many diverse cultures. Within this cultural diversity, the Turkish

³⁷ For further details see [Akşin, 1994: 62–68]

culture has not attempted to assimilate the other cultures, and has been tolerant towards them" [Kara, 2002: 284].

These two problems plus the emergence of anachronism as a way of dealing with them do have serious impact in Turkish education and students. The first one creates a contradiction with the current Turkish Republic, its codes and principles; and the second one creates illusionary and mythical golden ages, a very typical feature of the nationalist history. Moreover, the internalization of Turkish history with golden ages of the Ottoman Empire makes people desperate about the current situation because it created the sense of being loser in history. For this reason, because of a very wrong mystification Turkish youth is being raised with a pessimistic world view [Akşin, 1994].

Another vital problem of Turkish history education is asserted by Halil Berktay. He stated that the construction of Turkish history based on *origins* rather than *formations* creates, may be, more vital problem of Turkish history textbooks. It means that what students learn as important regarding history discipline is who did it, who builds what, who fought against whom, and when etc; and there is almost no emphasis on how s/he did it, how did events develop, why did wars happen, etc [Berktay, 1994: 78]. This situation defines the general character of Turkish history education that is a system built on memorizing, not learning through thinking.

Furthermore, simultaneous emergences and usages of the Enlightenment tradition, universalization, modernization on the one hand and exceptionalism and nationalism on the other caused contradictions in Turkish education and in history textbooks, more importantly in the minds of students [Bilgin, 1994]. As mentioned in the previous part, the explanation of nation and nationalism through differentiating itself from "others" which means to explain itself idiographically challenges with the aim of Turkish state, modernization which explains the dynamics of the system nomothetically.

Necdet Sakaoğlu asserted that Turkish history textbooks, from primary to high school, contain many topics within a huge time interval; however what must be done is that the past should be taught in a need-to-know basis.³⁸ In addition with the chronological methodology of history, students are being forced to memorize pseudo scientific explanations and constructions of history [Sakaoğlu, 1994]. Also, there are ambiguous and unclear explanations regarding world history, History of Islam, Turkish history and history of Turkish Republic.

³⁸ For further information see [Sakaoğlu, 1994: 135-144]

Children cannot even differentiate these different histories conceptually, methodologically and chronologically because all of them are given students in geographically, conceptually, chronologically and even worse ideologically biased and fused format [Behar, 1994]. That is why; the conception of time and clear historical knowledge are very weak among Turkish pupils.

Moreover, Berktay argued that Turkish history contained three notions of "we" that are problematic: A transcendental "we", a "we" that had been studied merely within its own tradition, and a "we" as a constant and unchangeable core [Berktay, 1993: 245]. To put it differently, it can be said that sometimes "we" were the Ottomans, sometimes the Europeans, sometimes historical Anatolian civilization and sometimes "we" were civilization and even the humanity.

These "we's", of course, are created with the simultaneous construction of "others"³⁹ such as Arabs, Armenians and Greeks. What is more, due to these "we", in Turkish history and historiography, artificially and untruthfully constructed racism gets together with ignorance and as a result it created a hatred mythology which spreads from one generation of the other [Berktay, 1993]. To put it differently, the "others" in Turkish history textbooks are constructed not through peaceful differences but within an inferiority-superiority relationship in which Turks were always the latter. Plus, in these history books, enemies are always present and the narratives focus on the description of them; however, they do not need to explain how and why those societies became the enemy of Turkish society. What is more, the way of demising the hatred among nations or communities is thought-if so- to lie in not explaining, but actually is hiding the historical political events that could the origins of the hatred [Behar, 1994].

The list of problems continues with the lack of self criticism. There are some important and fragile events in Turkish history related to Armenians, the Byzantium Empire and Kurdish people. However, none of them is being explained in textbooks. Either books totally exclude them or some of them implicitly are mentioned through different word choices like instead of using Kurdish, books prefer to dictate the situation with general statements and mostly under terrorism [Bora, 2004].

³⁹ For a comprehensive study of the construction of the "Other" in Turkish history education, see Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte Öteki Sorunu, 1995

Comparative approach, multiperspectivity and critical approach do not take place in Turkish history textbooks. The reason is, authorities of Turkish nationalism use other nations mostly (if not only) to define their enemies, threats, and inferior positions; by putting the state and Turkish values at the origin they do not let students know other cultures and their values. Due to the reflection of all Turkish values as the best among others, they give no chance of criticizing to students. What is more, the nationalist discourse of Turkish history always asks and studies the impact of Turkish societies, cultures, economy and wars on other societies but mostly not ask (if not never) how Turkish people be affected by others. In short, students are not let have the chance of discussion, improvement of their ideas and building empathy that are independent from the authors of the textbooks and the authorities of the national ideal, because these approaches challenge with the ideals and goals of Turkish nationalism [Tunçay, 1994; Özbaran, 1994].

The writing style of Turkish history textbooks is narrative and this is another problematic situation in Turkish history education. Narrative can be seen as structuring a story which transforms the chronological order of the historical materials into causality. Because of this, history comes closer to epic and romantic style which is full of emotions and has the power of touching people's senses. Tekeli says that narrative reflects the written text as the life itself, thus this style, instantly, turns historian into an authority figure. As a result, this authority position of the historian makes the construction of others and national goals easier. What is more, narrative style, by creating an image of continuity in history that facilitates the establishment of genealogies, belongings, historical and geographical origins brings nationalist, pseudo historicist explanations about the roots of nations [Tekeli, 1998]. In short, the narrative style of Turkish history books, by turning historians into "sole authorities", makes students passive⁴⁰ listeners and it paves the way for pseudo explanations which lessens the scientificity of history.

Regarding the tone of textbooks, Peter Schrag, in his essay explained the general trend in history textbook narratives which is still valid today. Schrag perfectly pointed out the implicit aim of nationalism on history by saying

⁴⁰ This active-passive discussion is also valid for the creation of heroes in Turkish history textbooks. Since there are heroes and leaders in almost each epoch of Turkish history, society, individuals and anonymous mass always are being reflected as passive people. For further information see [Koullapis, 1994]

History textbooks are bad, not because they are too biased, but because their biases are concealed by the tone. History texts are written if their authors did not exist at all, as if they were simply the instruments of a heavenly intelligence transcribing official truths. The tone of the textbook is the tone of a disembodied voice speaking in passive sentences, it fosters the widespread confusion that the text is history, not simply a human construct composed of selected data, interpretations and opinions [Porat, 2001: 50].

The consequences of this tone are very serious. Students, unintentionally, began to see history as a subject that is only about the accumulation of concrete and true information; a way of only reporting the facts, a kind of chronology, not a discipline of research, argumentation and critical thinking.⁴¹

Lastly, regarding the first group problems of Turkish history education, word choice and the usage of the language besides tone are among other crisis in Turkish history textbooks. In these books, Turkish military's activities are described with conquest, incursion, etc whereas the other nations' actions are defined by negative wording such as pillage, war, and invasion. And may it be the limit, in a high school linguistic textbook this quotation that can be classified as racist took place: "...the consecutive y's or forceful r's of Italian, or the consecutively used 'sin's, resembling the hissing of a snake, and the lisping s's and z's of Greek..."[Özdamarlar, 2002: 101; Bora, 2004: 62]. What is more, within this blindfolded zeal of nationalism and its selective approach in language, as Berktay showed, the names of past societies replaced with Turkish bureaucratic names; Turkish history books had never named Istanbul as Constantinople although the Ottoman sultans used the word Constantinople and about the Byzantium Empire they did not prefer to entitle concerning periods as Byzantium ages but pre-Ottoman times [Berktay, 1993].

The second group of challenges includes problems regarding law, curriculum loads and re-writing of the books as stated beforehand. To begin with, in Turkish National Education law, scientificity of education is not listed among the aims of the Ministry of Education. Plus, in one of the articles, it is written that if the curriculums are going to be changed according to scientific concerns, these changes have to be done according to the current political needs of the country [Neumann, 1994]. In other words, Turkish state, here, overtly states the aim of Turkish history education as an indoctrination of nationalism and Turkish ideologies; simultaneously the abuse of science and history.

⁴¹ For further details see [Wineburg, 1991; Holt 1995]

Additionally, one of the biggest problems of Turkish history education is time constraints. Due to the definite duration of primary and secondary school education it is impossible to include all Ottoman history or the history of the Turkish Republic with their all details. So, the vital question is which eras, periods or subjects should be taught, which should be cited, referred and more importantly which should be forgotten. This suggestion might be good and workable one but the current situation in Turkey is an overloaded history curriculum in which, maybe, 50000 years of history is taught to students in twelve years; what is worse including distortions, pseudo historical attempts and mystifications.

Lastly, the re-writing periods of the books must be arranged and must be done routinely in order to understand and analyze the historical developments in the world. To realize this, the American history and social sciences education model of California can be a very good example for Turkey.⁴² In this model, in each and every four years history textbooks are being re-written concerning the current political, economic and social changes. What this provides to students is the advantage of following the changes in history and characterizing history as a bridge between their past and future [Erpulat, 1994]. If this kind of practice can be improved in Turkey, it is significant that re-writing codes should include scientificity, cultural synthesis, comparative analysis, multiperspectivity, tolerance and the inclusion of subjects like women, minorities and historical mistakes that has to be faced.

Consequently, from this case study of Turkish history education textbook, it can be reached that the general problems regarding Turkish social sciences are also valid for history education; all the sacrifices that had been done for national ideology are also, regrettably, observable. Although the possible solutions to these problems will be suggested in the further chapters this thesis project; to avoid repetition, I prefer to end this chapter by making a reference to Berktay and William Haddad; if nothing would be done to end this extreme indoctrination of nationalism in history education at schools both in Turkey and Europe, national history, historiography and nation state will continue to be the "prisons of the minds" and the 21st century will face more brutal nationalist conceptions and national challenges than the 19th century had experienced [Berktay, 1993: 255].

⁴² For the explanations and discussions on education model of California see [Erpulat, 1994]

6. EUROPEAN HISTORY EDUCATION THROUGH the YOUTH and HISTORY PROJECT

6.1. Youth and History: The Comparative European Project on Historical Consciousness among Teenagers

The Youth and History survey was carried out between the years 1994-1995 among 27 different countries including Turkey, Israel, and Palestine with the participation of 31,000 young people whose ages were between 14 and 15 years old. The main question of the project was "What do history and politics mean to young people?"

The survey was a very comprehensive one that consisted of 48 main questions with 240 articles.⁴³ The issues that the survey aimed to search were students' "...interest in historical topics, ways of teaching and teaching aids, their associations, attitudes and understanding of history, about ways of teaching, their understanding of historical concepts and expectations for the future" [Leeuw-Roord, 1998: 12] and also the attitudes of young people to history-related political issues such as identity, democracy and nationalism. In short, its goal was to make overt that how students in Europe are interpreting and understanding historical information, and how these understandings affect their political attitudes and their expectations for the future.

Bodo von Borries defines four different fundamental motivations of the Youth and History survey. These are demographic interest, theoretical interest, comparative interest and lastly educational interest [Von Borries, 1998]. Regarding these categories of interests, he stated that the huge demand within Europe regarding the questions below made the project come true:

What do we have to expect politically from young people in our neighboring countries, the young Europeans of tomorrow?...Do people in the Balkan really follow more aggressive

⁴³ Both the students' and teachers' survey can be seen in Appendix A

and exclusive national concepts than Western Europeans?...What is cognitive, developmental and cultural logic of historical and political socialization, of historical consciousness and of the ability to make sense out of the past? Is there any confirmation or falsification of theoretical concepts like narrativity, constructivism, multi-perspectivity, retrospectivity, and selectivity of history in the minds of students?...What conclusions may we draw from the different ideas, experiences, successes and failings of our neighbors and the neighbors of our neighbors? Is there in the long run any need or possibility...of European history among adolescents?...What is in fact done in the every-day practice of history lessons...Are there different teaching strategies? Is learning history popular...is it successful or not, is it easy of difficult? [Von Borries, 1998: 17].

In 1997, in Hungary, the conference, *The Youth and History Project, Challenges and Implications for the Teaching and Learning of History, September 17-21*, was held. It aimed to evaluate the results and possible outcomes of the questionnaire in order to suggest solutions and recommendations to national governments of Europe to improve their educational systems, in particular history education which actually is the main theme of next chapter.

The Youth and History survey had been planned as an exploratory project in which historians hoped to find new results regarding Europe and its history education. However, before the project, scholars constructed some hypotheses like; there will be significant differences between the students of post-socialist countries and Western Europe due to the experience of socialism; innovations and modern teaching techniques will be more dominant in Western Europe compared to the Eastern part; and the teachers and students perceptions of history will lead to national differences become more visible among generations [Von Borries, 1998]. However, did the historians who did these hypotheses really face what they expected? This is the aim of this chapter actually; to find the convergences or divergences between the hypothesis and reality.

To be more specific, this chapter will give the outcomes of the questionnaire and try to interpret the most recent situation and problems of history education in Europe. The interpretation of the survey will be done through some tables and figures that were taken with their exact format from the book entitled *The State of History Education in Europe*.⁴⁴ In this section history education in Europe will be analyzed both regionally and nationally. In particular, it will be, firstly, looked at whether history teaching in Europe is up to date or not. In order to find an answer to this question the table outcomes about the current activities in history lessons will be used; and the ways in which history is being taught to students, the

⁴⁴ It is possible to find many more graphs in this book. For further questions asked in the survey, their outcomes and their interpretations see [Von Borries, 1998]

materials and methods used by teachers, the preferences of students regarding history lessons' content, method and aims, etc will be both explained and discussed.

Secondly, the similarities and differences between students and their teachers on issues like teaching methods, approaches and aims of history will be studied comparatively through the results of the Youth and History survey. In this part, the aim is to find the overlapped or diversified ideas between students and teachers because the outcome will make us able to answer the question whether the students and the teachers in Europe perceive and understand history lessons in the same way or not in terms of aims of history, methods and materials which are fun to use and at the same time efficient.

The next section will focus more on the historical consciousness and awareness of students. Do students have historical empathy in Europe? Do the methods, aims and contents of history lessons let students develop European awareness, tolerance, empathy and historical reasoning and thinking? Do students have a sense of the time in big scale? These are the questions that will be studied in this section.

In the last section, perception of teachers rather than the perception of students will be the main focus point. The teachers' ideas regarding educational reforms, problems of history lessons and teachers, religion and politics and moreover the impact of quantity and quality of instruction on students will be researched and results will be interpreted.

6.2. The Students' Perception of History in Europe

The first part of this chapter will cover the students' general interest in history and politics, their religious engagements, the way they conceive historical epochs, their perception of Hitler and post-1985 Eastern European developments, international and internal conflicts and their mentalities.

The first figure that is below is about whether students have general motivation to history or not and whether they prefer to learn distant history or intimate one.




Figure 6.1. General motivation to history and preference of intimate history to distant one

According to this figure, Scandinavian and Western European adolescents' interest in history is significantly low compared to other parts of Europe. In contrast to this, the interest in history is pretty high in the South Eastern and Eastern parts of Europe. This might be connected to Eastern Europe's transition progress and their simultaneous establishment of national and European identities since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, within Eastern Central Europe, Croatia was not motivated in history. From this outcome, Von Borries came up with an argument that this situation was not a regional difference of Europe as dividing it as a post-socialist countries and old free-market mentality countries. "It looks more like the juxtaposition of radically modernized countries (secularized, democratic, universalistic, individualized and materialistic) and more traditionalist countries (religious, authoritarian ethnocentric, corporative and solidary)" [Von Borries, 1998: 25].

Regarding evaluating the preference of students whether they want to learn intimate past or distant history, Scandinavian countries, as they were low in average in their general motivation towards history, it is the same with the intimate history. The post socialist countries seemed like neutral. To generalize, the highest levels of intimate past were seen in Greece, Lithuania, Turkey, Poland and Bulgaria whereas the lowest ones were in Slovenia, Hungary, France, Finland, Israel and Italy. In Europe, in general, Greece prefers the intimate history most and the Czech Republic has the lowest mean that means it is the strongest rejecter of intimate past education. Moreover, regarding general motivation Portugal and Lithuania have the highest mean and the lowest motivation belonged to the Netherlands and the Great Britain.

When it is looked at Western Europe, there is no visible common regional pattern. However, among them, Spain, Scotland and Italy are the ones that prefer intimate history more compared to others. Among the countries that have below-average mean in general motivation, there are Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands and France.

At this point several questions to think on can come to people's minds that do not have complete answers. Why are most of secularized, modern countries' students not interested in history? Do they get bored more in their lessons compared to more traditionalist countries' students? Can it be connected to the ongoing national identity construction in traditionalist, mostly post-socialist countries?

Secondly, the Youth and History project asked students what history, as a concept, means to them and the way they perceive history. Was it a chance for them to learn something from failures and successes of others or was it something dead and gone and that has nothing to do with their present lives?




Figure 6.2. The meaning of history for students in Europe

The outcome, as it is in Figure 6.2, seems pretty conclusive in the sense that all European countries' students, without exception, significantly reject that history was a dead and useless thing.

History as a chance to learn is also accepted by most of the countries. There are only two which rejected; Slovenia and Belgium. The rest of the countries, although they agreed on the subject, their average means are not very high.

Regarding regional patterns, it could be stated that the acceptance of history as a chance to learn from past experiences was accepted with the lowest mean in the Scandinavian countries. The means in Central and Eastern, and Western European countries are moderately higher. Could it be originated from the fact that Western European and Central and Eastern European countries are deeply affected by the First and Second World Wars, communism and other totalitarian regimes most, and paid a big price because of these events? Could it be because of experiencing the dark side of European history?

The next figure, Figure 6.3 is about students' attitudes towards identification concepts such as conventional affirmation and rejective detachments. Von Borries mentioned that the construct of higher order *conventional affirmation of identity concepts* contains *conventional concepts of nation, affirmative concepts of Europe* and *affirmative concepts of democracy*" whereas "the construct of higher order *rejective detachment from identity concepts* contains *erratic distanced concepts of nation, critical concepts of Europe* and *critical concepts of democracy* [Von Borries, 1998: 35].




Figure 6.3. Students' attitudes towards identification concepts

Concerning this, it is visible that there is no common pattern within regions of Europe. However, it can be said that Western European countries' students mostly are below average regarding conventional affirmation. The highest values of this notion are in Italy, Bulgaria and Greece. On the other hand, the highest mean levels of rejective detachment are in Bulgaria, Palestine and Portugal.

How can this figure be interpreted? Von Borries answers this as,

Obviously, *nation, Europe* and *democracy* are not principally historical concepts for the adolescents questioned. As a result we did not succeed completely in measuring historical consciousness, but instead measured political attitudes. But maybe the reason for this is not a lack of historically structured items in our questionnaire. It is much more likely that concepts depending upon fundamental identification, although they are apparently worded and determined in a historical way, are not really understood and explained in a historical dimension by the students, and maybe neither by their teachers [Von Borries, 1998: 36].

Another subject researched in the Youth and History survey was to what extent the students were engaged in religion and interested in politics. This is shown in Figure 6.4 below.




Figure 6.4. Students' religious engagements and interest in politics

According to this, the lowest rank of religious engagement was among Northern European pupils, except Iceland and Western European ones; however, Near Eastern European students were very much dependent to their religious identities. The highest averages were seen in Greece, Turkey, Palestine, Poland and Croatia. However, the post-socialist countries showed various diversities which means there is no regional unity regarding religion. Besides the above mentioned countries, Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Republic showed more Western mentality towards religion. All Western European countries except Italy and Portugal had rejected religious engagement. So, it can be sorted out that there are common regional patterns between Western Europe and Scandinavia. To be more specific, the strongest rejection to religion came from Norway and the strongest agreement was seen in Turkey and Greece.

"While the religious engagement of 15 year-old students shows some positive mean, the political interest...has a negative one" [Von Borries, 1998: 29]. The highest rank to political interest was seen in Palestine and the lowest one was in Slovenia and continued with Croatia, Spain, Great Britain and Iceland. This picture did match with what was thought or hypothesized beforehand. Von Borries and other historians had assumed that the political interest in the Western Europe would be less due to their long experiences of democracy, politics and non-existence of unexpected dangers in their systems. So, it was normal and

expected that adolescents of politically volatile countries would show more interest politics compared to young people who live in very stable systems.

Moreover, another question asked to students in the survey, as the outcomes of it shown in the figure below, was about how they interpret Adolf Hitler; to what extent as a mad criminal and to what extent as a great leader.




Figure 6.5. Students' interpretations of Adolf Hitler

The answers of the young people to the question of whether Hitler was a mad criminal or a great leader significantly differentiated according to European countries' experiences with him and his regime. For example, Scandinavia, Greece, Spain, Flemish Belgium, France and Israel, with a high above-average represented him as a mad criminal; however, Palestine, among all other countries, and with Israel Arabs, did have a very low average regarding Hitler as a criminal. Also, almost the same results were seen in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia.

Besides the rates about Hitler's being a mad criminal, he was also identified with being a great leader. Among these countries, Scandinavian pupils, except Iceland viewed him as a leader with a significantly high mean. In short, Scandinavia without Iceland and Israel depicted him as both criminal and leader. Greece, Spain, Scotland and Iceland answered as criminal and no leader; Bulgarian, Arab and Palestinian adolescents answered as a leader but no criminal and Estonia with Hungary supported the view that he was neither criminal nor a leader. The strongest support for Hitler's criminal view was seen in Denmark, and the strongest rejection against his criminality came from Palestine. This may be occurred due to the understanding of the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The next figure looked for the interpretations of changes in Eastern Europe since 1985; whether the changes were understood as a process of liberation or the defeat of socialism.




Figure 6.6. Eastern Europe since 1985: 'process of liberation' and 'defeat of socialism'

This question led to one of the most complex interpretation areas in this project, says Von Borries [Von Borries, 1998]. He pointed out that, Spanish and Lithuanian students evaluated the condition with very close ranks, both as a process of liberation and defeat of Socialism. Von Borries stated that there is no rationale behind this outcome. One of them did directly have the socialist experience and the other one did not. Then, how could their results be so similar? Countries whose youth interpreted the changes as a process of liberation, significantly different from defeat option, were Norway, Finland, Czech Republic, Belgium and France. On the other hand, pupils in Greece, Turkey, Israel, Palestine and Italy thought that it was more defeat of socialism than the process of liberation. What makes the answers complex is why did Czechs answer in that way? Why did Slovenia see it as significantly less liberation movement although it gained it independence recently? What did Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Estonia have so small differences between the given two options although their lives have changed radically after 1985? Could it be the impact of textbooks? Or, of teachers? Could it be related to multiperspectivity method in education?

What is more, the Youth and History survey also aimed to evaluate the general state of living conditions in past and future concerning the internal conflicts and state of well being in European countries of which outcomes are below in Figure 6.7.




Figure 6.7. General state of living conditions in past and future: 'internal conflicts' and 'state of wellbeing'

The students were asked to evaluate the internal conflicts such as gap between rich and poor, ethnic groups, etc and state of well being such as getting wealthier, more democratic and more peaceful life in past and future. Regarding internal conflicts and state of well being, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Greece and Netherlands supported that increase of wellbeing is significantly higher than internal conflicts. However, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Spain supported the demise of wellbeing over time. In terms of regional patterns, the increase of wellbeing is visible in the Scandinavian countries. Plus, except the Czech Republic, in Central and Eastern Europe the general trend towards wellbeing is below average.

Concerning the internal conflicts, Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Scotland and Great Britain showed an increase of it through time. Additionally, in the Czech Republic, Israel Arabs and Netherlands, although there is the tendency in the increase of internal conflicts, it is not that strong compared to the stated ones above. In terms of regional explanations, most of the Western European countries, except Italy, believed in an increase in internal conflicts more than any participant countries, and Central and Eastern European countries, except a few, believe in reduction of conflicts. Western European pupils had unconsciously been stated that they had more internal conflicts compared to Eastern European ones. This is strange because if the stability of economics and politics of Western European countries are compared to Eastern European the expectation of an increase in internal conflicts Western students' perceptions does not make sense.

The next figure, on the other hand, aimed to show the level of increase or decrease of internal conflicts and state of well-being from past to future in accordance to students' interpretations




Figure 6.8. Change of living conditions from past to future

Regarding internal conflicts, Scandinavian students perceived the increase of internal conflicts more than Western European students. Bulgaria, Russia and the Czech Republic students, compared to other countries, expected an increase in these conflicts. However, there were, of course, the believers of wellbeing; among them Baltic States, Bulgaria, England, Germany, Finland, Greece and Scotland can be listed.

This figure also provides apparent regional patterns. All Scandinavian countries with the exception of Finland saw an increase in internal conflicts over time; and with no exception, all of them evaluated wellbeing with a significant decrease. Similar kind of patterns about

wellbeing is visible in Western Europe. Although their means are not as low as the Scandinavian countries', they all have below-average means. However, in relation to internal conflicts, they show an opposite pattern compared to Scandinavians. Western European students, apart from Spain and Belgium, were more optimistic because they perceived a decrease in internal conflicts.

Overall, regarding the internal conflicts and wellbeing, Northern and Western European students trust less than average that there will be progress in wellbeing within time. "Adolescents in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary Croatia are apparently more optimistic...It is similar in Greece and Israel. But...students from post-socialist countries like Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Slovenia do not expect the same degree of increase in *wellbeing*. They stay below the average" [Von Borries, 1998: 43].

Additionally, the lead of national living conditions over European ones in the future in terms of internal conflicts and state of wellbeing are researched and the outcome is seen in the next figure, Figure 6.9. To put it differently, the third category concerning the internal conflicts and state of wellbeing was the evaluation of future national conditions compared to the rest of Europe. In other words, where will their country be in terms of internal conflicts and well being compared to the rest of Europe?




Figure 6.9. Lead of national living conditions over European ones in the future

The pupils of all Scandinavian countries were the most optimistic ones who thought that wellbeing would increase in their countries and be quite better than other European countries. The less optimistic ones are the Eastern European countries' students, particularly Russians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians because they did not see their country in wellbeing but in increased internal conflicts. In addition to them, Britain was among the pessimistic countries. The surprising thing was that, Von Borries argued, students of Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia and the Czech Republic put themselves in the same future wellbeing level with Germany, Belgium and Great Britain [Von Borries, 1998: 44].

If it is looked at the extremes of the figure, the highest level of well being was belonged to Norway, the highest expectation of internal conflict was in Russia; whereas the lowest below-average mean of well being was, again, in Russia which made it the most pessimist country and the lowest internal conflict average was in Iceland.

Regarding regional patterns, the Scandinavians reached an optimistic identical pattern. Also, Western European countries did not differ among themselves, apart from Mediterranean ones, by showing, not a very huge level but a common above-average means of internal conflicts and well being.

The last researched category in this section is the scaling of countries' similarities from students' perspectives. The students' interpretations of belonging to modernity or traditionalism; and being an old market economy or post-socialist one were evaluated by the survey and the outcome is obvious in the figure below.




Figure 6.10. Scaling of European countries

Regarding this figure, all post socialist countries are below the average in terms of similarities among European countries. In contrast to this, except Italy and Iceland, Western European countries are above the average. Greece and South Tyrol seems like border cases as staying at the average points. However, the case is different in the horizontal dimension. In this point of view, the Southern Eastern Europe and the Scandinavian countries show a huge difference. The former is considered a total traditional community structures whereas the Scandinavian countries are very modern. In short, what this figure verifies is that there is an obvious mentality in Europe, in particular among European pupils, which classifies Europe as, on the one hand, traditional and religious societies and on the other hand modern and secular [Von Borries, 1998].

6.2.1. Concluding Remarks

As a result of these evaluated charts that were placed in *the State of History Education in Europe*, it is possible to talk about a gap, regarding political and historical attitudes of students, between post-socialist countries' pupils and old free-market worlds'. Relations between historical concepts and political convictions on the level of students and countries do exist. Plus, the methods of teaching in Eastern and Western European countries, as hypothesized, do exist; however, they were not only based on their modernity or traditionalism but also on historical experiences that they faced. This is apparent from their answers to the questions that are evaluated.

Moreover, there are regional patterns and mental clusters among countries. The Scandinavian countries were most of the time had the same perceptions, expectations and views about subject matters. They mostly include a commonality among themselves. Although in many of the cases Western Europe displayed similar answers and attitudes, within themselves it is not always the case. In other words, Western Europe does not have too many common ideas and perceptions like Northern Europe. However, among Western Europe, Germany, Belgium and Netherlands show similar patterns with Northern Europe. Von Borries links this to their common features like Protestantism, being at the seashore and high level of industrialization [Von Borries, 1998]. Also, the general attitudes of Italy, Portugal and Spain are significantly visible. The common patterns are also visible for Eastern Europe and Central Eastern Europe. This may again be combined to the notions above as having apparent likeness among each other since past like economic similarities, level of industrialization, common religion, common cultural values, sharing a similar geography, and common historical experiences etc.

6.3. The Condition of History Education: Modern or Traditional?

There are two different concepts of history teaching. The first one is the traditional one. It is knowledge-concentrated and teacher-oriented way of teaching. To put it differently, teachers are considered the authority of "true" knowledge in this method, and the education is being done through listening teacher and learning his/her interpretations about history. Students are mostly passive listeners and they do not, or not let by teachers, have the chance of developing their own interpretations and ideas about history. The second history teaching model is a modern one. It is student-oriented and method-concentrated way of education. This concept of history teaching encourages students to think, solve problems, and enlighten the contradictions in history as much as possible. Thus, rather than the significance of teachers' knowledge about the subject, the methods of teaching are primary and this makes the teachers as a part of education, not the authority of education [Barschdorff, 1998].

Concerning history education, many Western European countries have been making some changes in their history education through the application of new methods for some decades. Whereas, the post-socialist countries mostly use traditional methods; however, it is important not to make broad generalization because survey results brought many different and unexpected outcomes.

In order to see which history teaching concept is dominant in Europe, what the general conditions of the presentation of history in Europe are and what both the common European tendencies and national differences are, the Youth and History survey asked students four different questions concerning the usual events in their history lessons, their concentration, the sources that they trust in their history courses and whether they enjoy during the classes or not.

About the condition of history education in Europe, Figure 6.11 shows the outcomes of the Youth and History survey's question that is about what usually happens in history lessons. Were students listening to mostly teachers' stories about the past or were they using a range of activities such as role plays and local projects or out-school learning opportunities such as museums and site visits?




Figure 6.11. What does usually happen in your history lessons? I.

Regarding to this figure, the common teaching method in Europe is teachers' narratives. The highest agreement with this approach came from the students of the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Lithuania. The lowest levels of agreement results belonged to Slovenia, Italy and Netherlands. However, in some countries like Iceland, Norway, Finland and Turkey, Great Britain and Scotland, teachers' narratives were not recognized, and actually rejected. In terms of regional perceptions of teachers' stories, it can be stated that the highest level of it is in Central and Eastern European countries, and within Western Europe it is valid in France and Portugal. Among all these 27 countries, unfortunately, there is not even one country agreed on the students' activities in history lessons.

In short, according to students' perceptions of what usually is happening in their history classes, the dominance of teachers' narratives as the most visible feature of traditional model of history teaching is the outcome.

In the second figure, Figure 6.12, the same question of the previous figure was asked but this time the options were the use of textbooks and worksheets or retelling and reinterpreting history by themselves.




Figure 6.12. What does usually happen in your history lessons? II.

This figure is supporting the dominance of traditional approaches of teaching in Europe, however with more diversity compared to previous question and its outcomes. What can be interpreted from this figure is that the regular usage of textbooks in Europe is pretty much widespread apart from the Central and Eastern European region. However, there are exceptions like Israel, France, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Hungary that reject the use of textbooks and worksheets. The highest ranked textbook users are Iceland, Scotland, Great Britain, and Italy. With the exception of Portugal and Israel Arabs, the rest of European countries prefer the regular use of history textbooks and worksheets with a high average according to students' perceptions.

Also, when it is evaluated from a regional perspective, the highest levels are in the Scandinavian and Western Europe countries. However, Central and Eastern Europe is a little bit complex regarding this issue. In half of the countries the use of textbooks is rejected whereas in Estonia, Lithuania and Russia it is strongly agreed upon. The reason of this diversification can be explained through these countries' experiences with communist regime. The rationale behind it can be explained as follows: The textbooks of communist periods were

not objective. They were changing the realities or at least hiding them in order to keep the unity among youth in communist system. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-socialist countries began to construct their national identities together with European identity. Due to their economic disadvantageous conditions, education might become a minor market that needs to be reconstructed. It is not an easy thing to write history textbooks, publish them and distribute them all over the country because it necessitates a significant amount of money. Thus, if the aim of the country is to construct its national and European identities and at the same time has economic problems, in order to teach students ex-socialist ideas, they might have been preferred not to use textbooks.

In addition to this, there are important questions that should be asked to make things clear about traditional and modern teaching methods. For example, why do countries like the Scandinavian ones, not prefer students' reinterpretations as a method? If this is the case, can it be stated that traditional teaching methods are not dependent to countries' being traditional, religious, less-industrialized; and modern teaching concepts are not reliant to countries' secular and democratic attitudes? Can the Scandinavian and Western European countries' stronger rejections of reinterpretations of history compared to Central and Eastern European countries' rejections be a proof for this?

Moreover, about retelling and reinterpretation of history by students themselves, there is no unity in Europe. However, besides Israel Arabs and Lithuania which actually do have a very tiny agreement mean, all countries' averages are below the mean. From this observation, it can be concluded that the students in Europe do not have that much autonomy in the class; they are not let to develop their own interpretations about the past. Thus, Europe in general is still applying traditional teaching methods.

The next two figures are about the comparisons of fun that students have from school textbooks (Figure 6.13) and fictional films (Figure 6.14), and the use of textbooks and the use of radio programs, tapes, historical videos and films in their history lessons. These two figures aim to evaluate the teaching methods and aids that students like or not (fun with media and books) and their use during instruction in history education.




Figure 6.13. Presentations of history that students enjoy I




Figure 6.14. Presentations of history that students enjoy II

These figures reflect that students in Europe, in general, do not find school textbooks enjoyable, but fictional films. The problem with school textbooks reaches its top level in Israel, the Czech Republic, Russia, Finland and Belgium. The countries in which these textbooks are most used are Iceland, Norway, Estonia, Italy, Scotland, Great Britain and Germany. On the contrary although students find fictional films enjoyable, what usually happens in the classroom is they are seldom used.

However, as it is clear in Figure 6.14, students in Denmark, Palestine, Great Britain, Finland and France do not have high breaks with fictional movies and teacher's use of other media sources. In other terms, although the use of media and audio-visual sources are not widespread in Europe, the above mentioned countries use them almost very frequently in contrast to Greece, Turkey, Estonia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine in which these sources' use is very exceptional.

Regionally speaking, "the Eastern European students have more fun in using historical media than their British peers and even greater fun with documentation on historical topics and school media. The British students, on the other hand, prefer audio-visual media above classical school-media" [Shevyrev, 1998, 97-98]. Also, the use of textbooks is least loved in Western Europe and some parts of Eastern Europe. Regarding fictional films, almost all regions' students enjoys using them but there is nearly no usage.

To interpret the use of media and textbooks in Europe Table 6.1 can also be used.⁴⁵

 negative values = weak validity of the factor

 MEDINSTR
 VRBINSTR

 Scotland
 1,20
 Scotland
 - 0,44

 EnglWales
 1,07
 EnglWales
 - 0,38

Poland

Russia

positive values = strong validity of the factor;

MEDINSTR: Teaching history through a variety of media and activities. VRBINSTR: Teaching history through telling stories and using textbooks.

0,57

0,09

Table 6.1. Comparison of teaching practice factors

- 0,23

-0,27

Poland

Russia

When this table is interpreted, it is seen that teaching history with the use of media and activities is popular in Scotland and Wales in contrast to its low levels in Poland and Russia. In other words, this means that in Russia and Poland the dominant teaching materials, as mentioned before, are textbooks and teachers' narratives. However, we should not let this mislead us through making us accept that this is only about countries' inclination towards traditional or modern approaches and it is all about their democratization and secularization levels. More important than these, it also has a direct correlation with countries' economic strength and transition to the era of TV dominance, or media dominance [Barschdorff, 1998]. In other words, a country with weak economic strength, although it is democratic or at least in transition to democracy, cannot afford to renew its education system with full audio and visual equipments. So, how will a democratic and secularized country with weak economy be

⁴⁵ In the book, the State of History Education in Europe, Alexander Shevyrev uses comparison tables that I prefer using them in several chapters of my thesis. Mostly he compares Scotland and Wales as being an example of typical modern approach holders, with Poland and Russia as traditional approach users. Thus, he mentions that, although there are no specific consistent regional patterns in Europe in which all members in the region perceive history and history related issues in the same way, these four countries are able to reflect the general preferences of modern and traditional approach holder countries. Thus, although I will interpret their data, it will not be wrong to make general conclusions regarding the general attitudes and patterns seen in "modern" and "traditional" countries.

evaluated when it uses textbooks very frequently? Modern or traditional? This can be considered an ambiguity that this survey is not enough to give an answer.

Besides the fun in history education and its aids, the next figure that is Figure 6.15 looks at the students' opinions about trustable sources of history.




Figure 6.15. Presentations of history that students trust most I

In a comparison about the trustability of school textbooks and historical novels, although there is not a huge trust to school textbooks, the level of trust to novels seems pretty low except countries like Israel Arabs and Palestine. The highest level of trust to textbooks comes from Norway, Portugal, Spain, Finland and Iceland whereas the lowest is from Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of European regions, the Scandinavian countries and Western European countries reject the trustability of historical novels strongly. These regions also have the highest trust level to school textbooks. The low above-average level of trust to textbooks in Central and Eastern Europe, with an exception of some countries like Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic can be a proof of the rejection of the trustability of socialist period textbooks due to their continuing existence in these countries.

Additionally, Figure 6.16 through asking the same question of the previous figure but this time comparing the historical novels with fictional films draws a different picture concerning trustable sources of history among European students.




Figure 6.16. Presentations of history that students trust most II

Regarding the comparison of historical novels with fictional films in terms of their historical trustability, the latter one came superior. The countries most trusted to fictional movies were Sweden and Lithuania. In none of European countries students rejected the trustability of fictional films. Plus, very interestingly, significant number of Western European countries rejected historical novels as trustable sources. This rejection level is almost none, except Slovenia, in Central and Eastern Europe. There are only two countries which found the trustability of historical novels more compared to fictional films are Palestine and Estonia; that means there is only one European country in this category and which is, at the same time, accepted the trustability of fictional films almost as much as historical novels. If we compare fictional movies with textbooks, it is seen that students trust textbooks more with a significant difference. However, this outcome does not cover the problem of defining fictional movies more trustable compared to historical novels, and even textbooks sometimes.

Table 6.2 also shows trust and fun-related tendencies of students particularly in Scotland, England which are mostly classified as countries with modern teaching methods, Russia and Poland which seem more traditional method users.

positive values = strong validity of the factor; negative values = weak validity of the factor

GFUNMEDU		SFUNAMDU	FUNPRIR	FUNAVMDR 0,13	
Scotland	- 0,06	0,19	- 0,15	- 0,08	
EnglWales	- 0,27	0,07	- 0,27	- 0,22	
Poland	0,33	- 0,46	0,52	0,06	
Russia	0,13	low factor	0,12		
GTRSMED	U	STRSFICU	TRSPRINR	TRSAVMDR	
Scotland	0,29	-0,29	0,40	-0,09	
Eng	0,02	-0,10	0,07	-0,08	
	0,37	0,36	0,13	√0,50	
	-0,05	0,20	√-0,15	_)0,14	

GFUNMEDU: General fun with historical media.

SFUNAMDU: Preference of audio-visual to school media (fun).

FUNPRIR: Fun with historical audio-visual media.

GTRSMEDU: General interest in historical media.

STRSFICU: Preference of fictional to documentary media (trust).

TRSPRINR: Trust in historical documentary and school-media.

TRSAVMDR: Trust historical fictional and audio-visual media.

Table 6.2. Comparison of factors about trust in and fun with media

This table compares the fun with historical media, preference of audio-visual to school media in terms of fun, fun with historical audio-visual media, general interest in historical media, preference of fictional to documentary media in the sense of trust, trust in historical documentary and school media and trust historical fictional and audio-visual media [Shevyrev, 1998].

To select a few among these categories, the general fun with historical media is higher in Russia and Poland, whereas England and Scotland have weak validity of it. Moreover, Russia and Poland enjoy more with historical audio-visual media than England and Scotland. Moreover, the changing trust notions regarding historical documentaries and historical fictional documentaries provide us very interesting arguments. In "traditional" countries trust in historical documentaries and school media is less than trust to historical fictional and audio- visual media. To put it differently, students in Russia and Poland trust more to fictional historical stories than historical documentaries. However, it is not the case in England or Scotland. They do trust more historical documentaries and school media. Shevyrev, concerning this situation, pointed out that the reason behind this differentiation is different teaching methods in these countries. Or in general, traditional approaches to history, which are knowledge-concentrated and teacher-oriented, are not enough to make students develop critical thinking and adds "the trust in fictional media 'indicates a high amount of naiveté and a lack of basic methodological reflection" [Shevyrev, 1998: 98].

One of the most important outcomes regarding fun and trust questions of the Youth and History survey is the divergences among the sources that students trust and have fun as it is clear and detailed in Table 6.3 below.

Type of Media	Students' Trust	Students' Fun	
Textbook	3.18	2.43	
Documents/Sources	3.93	3.14	
Novels	2.72	3.08	
Fictional Films	2.81	3.73	
TV-Documentaries	3.64	3.39	
Teacher's Telling	3.48	3.34	
Adults' Telling	3.36	3.48	
Museums/Sites	4.15	3.62	

1= very little, 3 = some, 5 = very much

Table 6.3. European level of comparison of students' trust in media with their preference of media in education

Regarding to this table, European students trust museums and sites at most, following documents, teachers' telling, adults' telling, textbooks, fictional movies and novels. However, the listing of students' fun does not correspond with the list mentioned. Fictional films are at the top and museums, adults' telling, TV-documentaries, teachers' telling, documents, novels and school textbooks follow them [Barschdorff, 1998]. So, the dilemma is in the question: which must be prioritized in the education of New Europe? Arranging education on the basis of fun, which has the power and advantage of providing general motivation among students to history? Or trust that leads history education to more traditional methods of teaching?

The next subject that is looked at in the Youth and History survey concerning the evaluation of the condition of history education in Europe was where students concentrate on in their history lessons. For this subject, the Youth and History survey gave ten different options to students. These were seeking knowledge about the main facts in history, morally judging historical events according to human and civil rights, understanding the behaviors of past people through reconstructing the special situations and thoughts of the periods that they lived in, using history to explain contemporary developments today, having fun while dealing with history, concentrating on national values and traditions, giving value to the preservation of historical relics and old buildings, concentrating of teaching history with reasoning and teaching on fun with historical traditions [Shevyrev, 1998]. In this project, in terms of sharing national and regional differences with detail, I will focus on the first two. The Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18 serve to enlighten the perception of students on the aim of history education.




Figure 6.17. Where do you concentrate on in history lessons? I




Figure 6.18. Where do you concentrate on in history lessons? II

It is obvious due to low levels of moral judgments of historical events according to the standards of civil and human rights and understanding the behavior of past people through reconstructing situations and contemporary thoughts of the period when they lived that, students see the aim of history education as historical traditions [Barschdorff, 1998]. Regarding the former, Figure 6.17, in most of the countries, excluding Sweden, Slovenia, Israel, Denmark and Palestine, the dominant concentrations are on seeking knowledge about historical facts. Also, the concentration is on the history of students' own nations, society and their values except in Northern European countries, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Israel, Great Britain and Scotland. Understanding the past through reconstructing those period's thoughts is only visible in Portugal, Arabs, Greece, France, Ukraine, and Russia and very slightly in Estonia. There is a huge lack of this phenomenon in Scandinavian countries plus the Czech Republic. Thus, rather than reflecting the aim of history according to young adolescents as historical traditions, these figures also mirror lack of method-oriented approach of history with the lack of empathy either.

To interpret the figures from a regional perspective, it can be concluded that the knowledge about the main facts as an aim of history is mostly seen in Eastern Europe and then Western Europe and at last in the Scandinavian region. Also, identification with national traditions is not visible in the Northern European countries except Iceland and Finland. So,

the general tendency towards national values is low in this region. Besides national identification issue, Scandinavian students reject understanding history through the use of historical awareness and empathy. It can be concluded that deep and strong concentration on main facts in history teaching, almost no-use of interpretation of history from civil and human rights perspectives and lack of historical empathy prove the ongoing traditional teaching methods and their dominance over modern approaches, but also these proofs do not accept a strong fixation to traditional methods. Thus, in Europe there is no serious and complete transition to modern teaching methods but also no zealotry to traditional methods.

What is more, within the Youth and History Survey students' historical knowledge has been evaluated through their abilities like chronological knowledge, correct order of economic stages and contemporary events and visual chronological knowledge which is below in the Table 6.4.

KNOWL		ECON		EVENT	
Scotland	0,70	Scotland	0,83	Scotland	0,55
EnglWales	0,68	EnglWales	0,78	EnglWales	0,51
Poland	0,71	Poland	0,85	Poland	0,49
Russia	0,80	Russia	0,93	Russia	0,63
SHIPS	0,84	COUPLES			
Scotland	0,81	Scotland	0,84		
EnglWales	0,86	EnglWales	0,84		
Poland	0,88	Poland	0,91		•
Russia		Russia	0,95		

KNOWL: Combines chronological knowledge.

ECON: Correct order of economic stages.

EVENT: Correct order of contemporary events.

SHIPS: Put the following ships into the correct chronological order from the oldest (1) to the newest (5).

COUPLES: Put the following couples into the correct chronological order from the oldest (1) to the newest (5).

Table 6.4. Students' historical knowledge

Regarding the table, the level of chronological knowledge is higher in Russian and Poland because it is a fact that traditional approach provides more chronological knowledge compared to modern approach. However, although England's and Scotland's levels are lower, there is not a huge difference. Again, regarding the correct order of economic stages, countries using traditional approach had higher ranks.

However, the correct order of contemporary events is a little bit problematic. Compared to other categories asked, this is the one which all students had the lowest ranks. To put it differently, students' chronological knowledge on contemporary events is, in general, significantly low in Europe. Among these four countries and in Europe in general Russia had the top rank being only after the Czech Republic [Shevyrev, 1998].

Furthermore, in the evaluation of the condition of history education in Europe, in the survey, students were asked the question about the Middle Ages and forced marriages in Europe during those ages. The question is as follows: "Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century. Your father orders you to marry John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in the neighboring village. You don't love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might you do, if you were living then?"⁴⁶ Then, students were given some arguments like,

a. Refuse, because it is inhuman...to force someone to marry without real love, b. Obey, because good economy is more important for a family than passionate love...c. Run away to a nunnery/monastery, because religious like is worth more than worldly life, d. Consent, because nearly all young people have married in accordance with their father's decisions, e. Resist, because it is natural right of any individual to marry for love, f. Obey, because rebellion against the parents' will is a rebellion against the law of God [Appendix A: 392].

 $^{^{\}rm 46}$ To see the full version of what is asked see question 40 in the Youth and History Survey students' questionnaire in Appendix A

The outcome was very surprising as it is shown in Table 6.5.

1 = very unlikely, 3 = possible, 5 = very likely

Inhumanity	/	Economy		Father		Love	
Scotland	3,52	Scotland	2,31	Scotland	2,63	Scotland	3,64
EnglWales	3,44	EnglWales	2,51	EnglWales	2,75	EnglWales	3,45
Poland	4,06	Poland	2,09	Poland	2,16	Poland	4,00
Russia	3,76	Russia	2,12	· Russia	2,31	Russia	3,93
God		MAROBED	s	MARRELIR	1		
Scotland	2,17	Scotland	2,37	Scotland ·	- 0,16		
EnglWales	2,40	EnglWales	2,55	EnglWales	0,03		
Poland	2,33	Poland	2,11	Poland	0,28		
Russia	2,17	Russia	2,18	Russia	- 0,17		

Inhumanity: Refuse, because it is inhuman, immoral and illegitimate to force someone to marry without real love.

Economy: Obey, because good economy is more important to a family than passionate love between husband and wife.

Father: Consent, because nearly all young people have married in accordance with their father's wishes.

Love: Resist, because it is the natural right of any individual to marry for love. God: Run away to a nunnery/monastery, because religious life is worth more than worldly life.

MAROBEDS: Obedience to enforced marriage. (factor)

MARRELIR: Religious reaction to enforced marriage. (factor)

Table 6.5. Historical awareness: Can students understand and evaluate historical periods with the periods' own conditions?

Regarding (a) as an answer, Russian and Polish students found enforced marriage as an inhuman activity, thus they rejected the marriage. Scotland and England were also in the preference of refusal but with a weaker inclination compared to the Eastern European countries. Regarding economy and father issues, modern approach holders found it more important compared to traditional ones, although the differentiation was not that significant. Compared to inhumanity criteria, economy and father items seemed less significant in all of these countries.

The love as a natural right of all human beings was among the most preferred answers just like inhumanity case. Especially in Poland and Russia this was a strong reason of rejection. Also, the level of obedience to enforced marriage as a factor was almost significantly high in Scotland and England compared to others. As a result, all these findings show that the ability of historical empathy and awareness of historical conditions within different time periods were strong and improved in Scotland and England compared to Eastern European countries. Students in Scotland and England were more rational and successful in conceiving the time differences that made them conscious about value and attitude differences between different time periods. The sense of time in a big scale and the perception of its change with its contents like traditions, morals, ethics, and the rationale were stronger in countries with modern teaching methods. Thus, this provides the advantage of modern approach in history education in terms of the sense of time.

However, the more successful condition of Scotland and England in contrast to Russia and Poland did not make them and their education methods efficient and desired. The reason is that the moderate high ranks in their answers towards inhumanity side of enforced marriage, the consideration of getting married with someone you love as a right, plus the low ranks in God, obedience to father and economy, truly contradict with the circumstances of the 15th century Europe. Regarding to this situation Körber stated that

The most interesting and striking result of this study is that the students did not distinguish between the four levels of decision at all...There was no difference between spontaneous affiliation and the reconstruction of contemporary possibilities. All answers proved to be guided by present moral standards...The students are not able or not willing to perform the task of abstracting from the logic of their own time and society...This...shows a severe lack of ability in historical reasoning [Körber, 1998: 135].

6.3.1. Concluding Remarks

So, what can it be told on whether the history teaching in Europe is up-to-date or not? Can this question be answered only through students' perceptions and evaluations? Of course, not. The views of teachers are also needed and in fact will be discussed in the next chapter. However, until now, the students' evaluations can be summed up.

As a result of all these student data, history education in schools, teaching methods in classrooms like condensed usage of teacher narratives and textbooks, authority and activeness of students during lectures, goals of history and use of technology do reflect, and the sources that are trusted most reflect a traditional concept of history teaching in Europe in general. In other words, in European history education the main problems seem like a gap between demands of students and what provided to them. These gaps and differences in perceptions and expectations regarding history will be researched in the next chapter, but right now, it may be beneficial to see Table 6.6 below. Although this is just one example about use of materials in schools, it is obvious that what students prefer dramatically different from what they frequently use their history classes.

Type of Media	Frequency at School	Students' Preference
Textbook	3.65	2.43
Sources	2.69	3.14
Teacher's Telling	3,43	3.34
(Fictional) Films	1.87	3.73
Museums/Sites	1.59	3.62

1 = very little / very seldom, 3 = some, 5 = very much / very often

Table 6.6. European level of the comparison of the frequency of the use of media with students' preferences

Another conclusion is that students are lack of historical empathy and historical reasoning. European students in general do not have the ability of understanding the logic of historical behaviors and decisions in the past. What they do, with no exception of being from Western or Eastern Europe is to perceive, interpret and analyze history only from their modern stance of individualism, secularism and autonomy.

However, it is not right to argue only the powerful dominance of traditional methods over the modern. It is obvious that there is a tendency towards both traditional and modern approach in history teaching and Western Europe is trying to apply modern approaches more while Central and Eastern Europe is more linked to traditional approach. Again, this does not mean that Western Europe does not have any traditional method usages or Central and Eastern Europe do not have any modern teaching techniques. All of these regions to some extent do have both of these methods.

Both of these approaches have their own advantages like modern approach's impact on the development on critical thinking and traditional approach's superiority in teaching historical knowledge, chronology and the main facts. However, the dominance of one of these approaches seems not enough to develop a wider European perspective for a more tolerant and peaceful Europe. There must be amalgam of these two, but the question is how? One more thing that must be known is regarding the origin of these differences in the perception and teaching of history in Europe. Were the different perceptions and interpretations of history in Europe the outcomes of different teaching methods or were they originated from cultural divisions within Europe and mentality differences of it?

6.4. A Comparative View on History: To What Extent Do Teachers and Students Overlap or Deviate in their Perceptions of History and History Education?

As it was mentioned in the last chapter, it is not possible to reach reliable conclusions on history education on Europe through just students' perspectives. Besides students, the other vital element of history education is teachers. Thus, the teachers' perceptions of history, its aims and its methods preferred and used in their classes play a significant role determining the condition of history education in Europe. For this reason, the Youth and History project prepared a teachers' questionnaire through which it aimed to reach the info about teachers' approaches to history, their teaching methods, and their perception of the aim of history.⁴⁷

In the survey students had been asked what usually happens in their history lessons and the same question was asked to teachers, too. Also, the question from a student's questionnaire, which was "what do you concentrate on in your history lessons?" was asked to teachers as on which aims of learning history they concentrate in history lessons. Through these questions, the survey aimed to see what kind of differences do exist (if there is any), in terms of perception, application of teaching methods etc between students and teachers in Europe. This is important because a working and beneficial history education can be done when the perceptions of students and teachers do not differ much and when they reach at a common point regarding history.

Regarding the organization of this part, there will be two different research categories. The first one is about the commonalities and differences between teachers and students on the teaching methods and approaches. The second one will look at the condition of the aim of history and how this is perceived differently or similarly among students and teachers.

In addition to this, there will be two different kinds of graphic representations. On the one hand, there will be tables and on the other hand there will be figures. The tables, without

⁴⁷ To see the teachers' questionnaire see Appendix B

giving any concrete knowledge on similarities and differences about particular European countries, will only reflect the general trend in all Europe. Thus, through these tables we will be able to see the general similarities and differences between teachers and students of Europe. Alternatively, the figures will provide detailed information regarding national and regional differences in Europe. In short, this part will research the different perceptions of teachers and students on diverse issues from European, regional and national viewpoints.

6.4.1. On the Teaching Methods and Approaches

The first subject that will be looked at in this part is about the comparative study on the frequent use of teaching aids from both students' and teachers' perceptions.

1 = very seld	lom , $3 = und$	lecided, 5 =	very often
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S	tudents' Mean	Rank	Teachers' Mean	Rank	Difference of Means
Listen to teacher's narratives	3.43	2.	3.49	2.	+0.06
Being informed of good and bad, right and wrong	3.00	4.	3.06	5.	+0.06
Discuss different explanations of histo	3.10 vry	3.	3.39	3.	+0.29
Study historical sources, e.g. docume	2.69 ents	5.	3.36	4.	+0.67
Retell and reinterpre history our-/themsel		6.	2.61	6.	+0.29
Listen to radio/tapes or look at videos/film	-	7.	2.46	7.	+0.59
Use of textbook and/or worksheets	3.65	1.	3.91	1.	+0.26
Use student activitie like role-plays, proje or museums/sites		8.	2.23	8.	+0.64

Table 6.7. European level of the frequent use of teaching aids in students' and teachers' perceptions

Regarding Table 6.7, except for two cases which are "being informed of right and wrong in history" [this is in the fourth rank for students and fifth for teachers) and "studying historical sources and documents" (this is in the fifth rank for students and in fourth for teachers), students' and teacher's listing items are the same. Thus, there are no considerable differences between them. Both of these groups accept that usage of textbooks are the dominant technique in history teaching, followed by listening to teachers' narratives, discussing different explanations of history. The method that is used rarely is student activities like role-playing and usage of media sources.

However, although ranking is almost the same, when differences of means are taken into consideration the outcome is that teachers do give more emphasis to studying historical sources, using media tools, and using student activities. This situation can be interpreted as, compared to students, teachers consider their history lessons to be more modern. To sum up, in the European standpoint of evaluation, on the subject of what happens in history lessons, there are no major perceived differentiations between students and teachers.

Besides European level outcomes on the frequency of use of teaching aids, the Figure 6.19 shows the national standpoints in Europe. The figure in particular looks at the evaluation of students' and teachers' perceptions of the use of range of activities such as role-plays, local projects and museum visits during instruction and compares them.




Figure 6.19. Comparative study on the frequent use of range of activities in students' and teachers' perceptions

The comparison on a national level showed that teachers and students perceive the national traditions of teaching and learning history in school in a very parallel way. The most parallel views came within the usage of student activities and seeking knowledge about the main facts in history. Regarding to the Figure 6.19 above, almost all participants of the survey affirmed mean values below the average except Portugal and Spanish teachers whereas their students strongly argued the nonuse of student activities like role-playing. Plus, what is significant is that in all 27 countries except Greece, students rejected the usage of activities like role playing or going to museum more than their teachers' perceptions. As an exception, Greek teachers rejected the use of activities more than their students did.

The most identical results of teachers and students came from Iceland, Poland, Hungary, Italy, South Tyrol, and Netherlands. In contrast to this, the biggest gaps were seen in Norway, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Britain and Scotland. In short, the figure made it concrete that the inclination of all Europe to means of modern teaching methods is not among the applied techniques.

Additionally, the Youth and History survey compares the use of textbooks in history lessons through students' and teachers' questionnaires on a national basis of which outcomes are available in Figure 6.20.




Figure 6.20. The use of textbooks and worksheets in students' and teachers' perceptions

On the use of textbooks or worksheets, it can be said that both teachers and students value the subject almost equally. There are exceptions and contradictions, of course. For example, in Israel and France, students' results show rejection to the use of textbooks whereas teachers of the countries showed the significantly over-average use of them. Also, in cases in which students and teachers accepted the use of textbooks above the mean; among 27 countries, in nine of them students had higher ranks and in twelve of them teachers had higher ones. Plus, when it is looked at the rejections, it is overt that teachers rejected only in Poland and the Czech Republic and students rejected in the Czech Republic, Israel and France.

Regionally speaking, the attitudes of both teachers and students of the Scandinavian and Western European countries looked similar. In both of these regions, students and teachers agreed that the frequent use of textbooks. However, Western European countries' teachers had significantly above-average mean.

In short, what could be analyzed is that although Western Europe and Scandinavia are perceived as modern in terms of their approaches to history, the most visible tool of traditional education method, the intense use of textbooks, is dominant.

Lastly, this part looks at frequent use of teachers' narratives during instruction. The case of teachers' stories about the past showed many differentiations, as it is visible in Figure 6.21 below. The only regional harmony can be seen in Eastern Europe due to the students and teachers of these countries both agreed on the frequent use of teachers' stories in the history lessons.




Figure 6.21. The use of teachers' stories about the past in students' and teachers' perceptions

To investigate more in particular, the highest agreement among teachers came from Poland, Israel Arabs and the Czech Republic. Moreover, the highest level of overlap between students and teachers are seen in Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and from Western Europe, Poland. On the other hand, the strongest dilemma is seen in France in which students moderately agreed on the story issue but teachers' rejected.

6.4.2. On the Aims of History

Students and teachers in Europe had not been differentiated significantly concerning the teaching aids and approaches although there were some poles apart. However, when it comes to the perception of aims of history, the differentiation becomes more clear and significant.

The Youth and History project surveyed the aim of history through topics like knowledge about the main facts, moral judgment according to human and civil rights, imagination of the past considering all different viewpoints, understanding the past by reconstruction, explanation of today's world and future tendencies, fascination and fun dealing with history, acknowledgement of traditions and values of their nation, preservation of historic relics and old buildings and internalization of basic democratic values that are shown in Table 6.8 through European standpoint which represents the general perception of the subject in Europe.

	Students' Mean	Rank	Teachers' Mean	Rank	Difference of Means
Knowledge about the main facts	, 3.61	1.	3.99	3.	+0.38
Moral judgement according to huma	2.92 an and civil r	6. ights	3.86	5.	+0.94
Imagination of the past, regarding all		3.	3.83	6.	+0.71
Understanding the past by recons	2.91 truction	7.	3.75	8.	+0.84
Explanation of today's world and	2.93 future tende	5. encies	4.20	1.	+1.27
Fascination and fu dealing with histor		8.	4.00	2.	+1.22
Acknowledgemen of traditions and v		2.	3.96	4.	+0.75
Preservation of historic relics and o	3.04 old buildings	4.	3.77	7.	+0.73
Internalisation of basic democratic v	- values	-	4.18	, * . 	_

1 = very little, 3 = undecided, 5 = very much

As it is seen in the rankings, too, there is not even one common intersection area among students and teachers. The teachers' means are significantly higher than students' in each category. This huge disparity in means and differentiation in the rankings show that in European perspective, the aim of history for students and teachers of Europe do not correspond. For example, if we begin to mention from the top ranks of each group, according to teachers the aim of history is explaining today's world and future tendencies through history; however, for students the initial aim is to get knowledge about the main facts of history. The second highest rank for teachers is fascination and fun dealing with history whereas it is acknowledgement of traditions for students. The main question comes to mind concerning this situation is, if these were the "real" ideas of teachers regarding the aim of

Table 6.8. European level of the aims of history education in students' and teachers' perceptions

history, why, then, their methods do not reflect these aims? Why do they still choose to use textbooks that really bore students? If the fun is their secondary concern, why is there almost no activity that will enjoy students?

If the table is looked from the lowest ranks, for students it is fascination and fun dealing with history and understanding the past by reconstruction. For teachers, the last rank is to understand the past by reconstruction and the one before the last is preservation of historic relics and old buildings. Thus, for both of these groups understanding the past by reconstruction is at the last positions. Von Borries argues that this is very important, because this item is the major vehicle of historical thinking which is necessary for the emergence of a better history education in Europe and more importantly for a tolerant, peaceful, democratic common European future [Von Borries, 1998].

Furthermore, Von Borries puts emphasis on another important interpretation. He says that

For the students, most aims of history education are given some value. For example, in table 15, the average mean values of the students are around 3, which means 'some'. Indeed, there is only one goal that is valued considerably above this neutral position: *knowledge about the main facts*. One may conclude from the not very explicit answers of the students that they do not understand the aims of their teachers. On the other hand, this indicates that teachers did not communicate the aims of their teaching to their students sufficiently [Von Borries, 1998: 111].

The next figure, Figure 6.22 is about the comparison of seeking knowledge about the main facts in history as the aim of history education.




Figure 6.22. Comparative study on the main facts in history as one of the aims of history education

On the subject of seeking knowledge about the main facts in history, all teachers who took part in the survey showed above-average answer to this view and almost all countries' students showed similarity with their teachers apart from Denmark. Denmark is the only exception in which the students reject knowledge seeking in history on the main facts. What does this show? Did Danish students have no idea what historical fact is? Or what do they think on what they are doing in history lessons?

Moreover, students in Lithuania, Russia, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain had higher ranks, but not significant compared to their teachers' perceptions considering teaching facts in history. However, there are countries that have huge differences between these two groups such as in Sweden, Slovenia, Israel, Arabs, Palestine and Italy. In these countries students' answers are almost at the mean but teachers' are radically higher.

The national differences between students are also higher compared to teachers' differences. Why? Can there be a specific reason for this? Von Borries interpreted this situation by stating "some teachers, frankly, cannot possibly confess they place little emphasis

on factual knowledge. Perhaps, they tend to offer politically and socially correct answers to this question" [Von Borries, 1998: 112].

What is more, concerning the acknowledgement of national traditions, values and characteristics as one of the main aims of history education, including both teachers and students as shown in Figure 6.23, the lowest means belong to Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands, Britain, Belgium and France. The highest ranks, in the contrary, belong to Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Israel and Palestine.




Figure 6. 23. Comparative study on the acknowledgment of the national traditions, values, etc.

Besides this harmony, concerning either the harmony of rejection or acceptance of the national value teaching, there are cases of contradiction in which students' and teachers' answers differ extensively. For example, in Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Israel, the Czech Republic and Spain teachers' tendency and claim of focus are very high compared to their students'. Von Borries construes this as "no doubt, these societies display a certain contrast between the modernism of the adolescents and the traditionalist character of their teachers' aims" [Von Borries, 1998: 115].

Moreover, regional patterns are also obvious in this graph. The highest level of teaching national values, traditions and etc are in Central and Eastern Europe. This is not unexpected because these countries are, since the beginning of the 1990s, are constructing their national

identities on the one hand and European identity on the other. Thus, it is normal to see tendencies among teachers towards teaching national values, morals, traditions and characteristics to the young generation. The relative low levels of agreement among youth in these regions can be combined to different historical experiences. Can the same perceptions be expected from a 15 year-old student who had a limited experience with communist regime and who could consciously remember almost no more than its collapse as his/her teacher who experienced communism with all its burdens, enforcements, failures and pain?

The next figure asks the question "what do you concentrate on in your history lessons" and the answer that is compared among teachers and students is to understand the behavior of past people by reconstructing the special situations and contemporary thoughts of the period when they lived.




Figure 6.24. Comparative study of understanding the past through reconstructing

Concerning the aim of understanding the past through reconstructing it is rejected by the Scandinavian countries' students. Although this region's student rejection is the strongest, there are many countries' students who are not fond of with this idea such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Israel, Spain, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Britain and Scotland. This shows that the reconstruction of past with its own conditions, values and rationale is not seen or realized in Europe because with the exception of Norwegian teachers, all teachers stated that this is one of the things that they concentrate on in their history lessons.

To be more specific, teachers both in Iceland and Sweden showed their acceptance of the subject. Teachers in Denmark stayed at the average mean. The highest teacher means were seen in Western Europe and the other regions Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe followed the West with a close difference.

In Europe, the general view is that, students' evaluations, except the ones who rejected the aim, about reconstructing the past do not show a very strong acceptance. The strong emphasis comes from teachers' side without the Scandinavian teachers. Also, the harmony between students and teacher in terms of support can be seen in Greece, Arabs and Portugal. The condition in the Western Europe can be explained through almost-no-support of students and extreme emphasis of teachers. As a result of this representation, it seems impossible to reach or even speak about the emergence of tolerance, understanding "others" and historical consciousness in the Western Europe due to the huge difference in the arguments of both teachers and students. However, more important than this analysis, what is the reason of this total opposite arguments? How can, for example, Western European countries' teachers be agreed strongly on the use of reconstruction of the past as among their aims but their students reject this?

Lastly, in terms of being traditional and modern in education, the highest teachers' ranks and the highest students' ranks are obvious in countries which are imagined as traditional. Among them Palestine, Israel Arabs, Russia and Ukraine can be listed. Regarding this situation, Von Borries makes a very impressive analysis by stating that "Did the classical purpose of history, or better, historiography in the 19th century, the aim of historicism to *'understand the past by the past's own conditions'*, meanwhile become a characteristic of traditionalist societies only?" [Von Borries, 1998: 115]. So, did it?

Another subject evaluated in the Youth and History Project was students' interest in their family stories. The figure below shows the outcomes of this interest both through the eyes of teachers (teachers' ideas whether their students are interested in their families' stories) and students.




Figure 6.25. Interest in family stories

The interest of students toward the history of their families in Europe is considerably high. More specifically, the highest student interests are in Lithuania, Greece and Spain; and the lowest ranks belong to the Czech Republic and Netherlands. Moreover, regarding the regional distribution of this interest it can be stated that the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries' interests are visibly higher than the Scandinavian and Western European students' interest in the history of their own families.

In addition to students' ideas, teachers' interests show different distribution. The highest teacher interest is seen in Israel whereas the lowest is in France. Moreover, in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Arab Israel, and France there is a huge gap between teachers and students. To be more specific, Von Borries, about this graph, mentioned that

the item *the story of your family* is valued by teachers 3.06, and by the students 4.02. Apparently, the teachers are not aware of this basic biographical interest of their students" and adds that "...teachers slightly overestimate their students' interest in *kings and queens and other famous people* (teacher's $M_{overall} = 3.40$, students' $M_{overall} = 3.14$), *the everyday life of ordinary people* (teachers' $M_{overall} = 3.26$, students' $M_{overall} = 2.90$), and *the development of democracy* (teachers' $M_{overall} = 3.10$, students' $M_{overall} = 2.80$) [Von Borries, 1998: 116].

The Figure 6.26 looked at the interest in the development of democracy in European countries from both teachers' and students' perspectives.




Figure 6.26. Interest in the development of democracy

Regarding the interests of students and teachers to the development of democracy it is possible to see regional patterns in Europe. For example, in Scandinavian countries neither students nor teachers, not including Denmark, accept this interest. Among these two groups the rank of rejection among students is higher than teachers'. Moreover, the case of Eastern European countries shows similarity with the region aforementioned. However, in this region, the interests of teachers are higher than the Scandinavian teachers' interests and the rejection of students are relatively less than the Scandinavian students' rejections. In short, among both the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries' students the general tendency is the rejection of the interest towards development of democracy. Teachers' tendencies show difference but not too much.

The means of Western European students' interests are lower than the average. It means that they lack of interest in the development of democracy. What differentiates this region from others regions referred to above is the teachers' lack of interest to the democracy. In countries like Belgium, Netherlands, Britain and Scotland teachers are not very much focused on democracy in their history lessons. A different pattern is seen in Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Palestine and Israel. These countries teachers and students are all interested in democracy and its development. Thus, it is possible to sum this section up with an evaluation that the interest of students in the history of democracy is extremely low in the old democracies whereas the interest is high in the newly developing countries. To put it differently, the countries, in which there is no democratic instability, threat to democracy and inefficient structure of democracy are less interested in this subject compared to the ones that are in the period of constructing or strengthening of their democracy from both students and teachers.

6.4.3. Concluding Remarks

Do teachers and students have a common perception of history in terms of its methods and aims in Europe? This was the main question of this part. However, it is impossible to answer both aspects of the question same way.

Concerning the perception of the methods of history, the answer of the question is yes. While defining the most used methods in history lessons teachers and students mostly came up with the same answer and the overlaps were more visible in European viewpoints. It can be stated that the biggest overlaps were in the lack of activities like local projects, visiting museums and role playing, and use of textbooks. However, when it comes to national point of views, not only did the divergences among students and teachers become more obvious, but also regional and national divergences turned out to be more explicit.

About the aim of the history education, it is difficult to answer same way. There are many differentiations of perceptions between students and teachers. As Von Borries mentioned students do not know the aim of teachers in history lessons and accordingly teachers do not know how their students understand the aim of history lessons. In addition to the lack of communication between students and teachers regarding the aim of history, there are evident differentiations in regions of Europe and nations of Europe.

Lastly, in addition to the outcomes of "the recent conditions of history in Europe" and "the students' perceptions of history" chapters, this part again confronted us with the general inclination towards traditional teaching models in Europe.

6.5. Historical Thinking, Empathy and Reasoning among European Students

"...modern history teaching not only aim to transmit information about the past into the minds of the students, but also aims to assist them in the acquisition of historical and general skills" such as historical thinking which is directly related to asking and answering questions about the past and link them to present conditions as their origin or catalyzer through historical proofs, says Andreas Körber [Körber, 1998: 123].

Historical thinking or historical reasoning is in fact a very complex notion and have a very important place in European history, actually within European aims of history. It necessitates the perception of, firstly, difference or the "otherness" within time; secondly, perceiving changes as a result of existent differences; thirdly, awareness and acceptance that morality, human values and conditions of behaviors differ within and change in time; fourthly, the internalization of that each difference such as moral, cultural, social, etc are rational when considered in their own time period and lastly it necessitates the ability of present values' comparison between present and past [Körber, 1998]. Historical thinking necessitates the development of tolerance and relativity towards difference and "otherness", comparability of events belonging different time periods and comprehension of the circumstances of the past. Due to Europe and the European Union in particular are composed of many nations, ethnicities and religions the concept of difference is unavoidable. To put it differently, in Europe there are many "others". What is significant for this project is that, the method used to define the "others" may create either the other as an enemy or a tolerable "other" which is different and whose value lies within its difference. At this point history education turns out to be crucial tool to define the differences in Europe.

Also, historical reasoning is important in taking decisions regarding future aims. The ability of analyzing the past experiences and to come up with lessons learned from those times can provide many benefits for future moves of countries. Also, the understanding of time as a constant change is necessary to eliminate the bias, prejudices and strict intolerance among societies because people, values, traditions, characteristics do change. So, for a better future in Europe in terms of eliminating inferior-superior dichotomies, enemy concepts, etc it

is very important for people to understand the concept of change. Again, history education is a tool, maybe the only tool that can provide it.

This chapter will focus on these vital issues. It will research the answers of following questions: Do European students have historical reasoning? Can they imagine past societies with their own values or are they more inclined to create enemies and others within history? Do they have the ability of historical empathy? Can they imagine themselves in the past or future? Are they aware of change and its consequences? Can they imagine past as well as future? Do they see the connection between past, present and future? How is time embedded in their minds? Can they compare present values with different time periods'? Through these questions, at the end, we will see the possibility of the elimination of hostile others, long-lasting enemies in Europe and the rise of more tolerant, historically conscious, and more peaceful individuals.

To begin with, the first subject matter is how time is embedded in European students' minds. To research the answer of this question the Youth and history survey asked students to choose the most appropriate figure, which, according to them, defines historical development.⁴⁸ As a result, the survey found out that;




Figure 6.27. Concept of change in time

⁴⁸ See Appendix A for the question 34

The significant majority of European students perceive time as a progress. Thus, it means that they are aware of movement and change of time.

Moreover, to evaluate historical thinking in Europe Table 6.9 looked for the "change" as a phenomenon from past to the future through students' perspective.

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40	Years ago (mean)	40 Years ahead (mean)	Increase during 80 Years (diff.)
Pollution	2.57	4.02	+1.45
Overpopulation	2.37	3.37	+1.00
Democracy	2.73	3.50	+0.77
Prosperity and Wealth	2.48	3.06	+0.58
Economic Conflicts	2.97	3.18	+0.21
Ethnic Conflicts	2.90	3.08	+0.18
Peace	2.90	2.94	+0.04
Political Exploitation	2.91	2.63	-0.28
Average of Change (at	osolute)	2 F	.56

1 = very unlikely, 3 = undecided, 5 = very likely

Table 6.9. "Change" from past to future from students' perspectives

This graph shows that students in Europe have the idea of progress in their minds because all the given criteria changes in the given time periods. To be more specific, students believe that pollution, overpopulation, democracy, prosperity, economic, ethnic conflicts and peace will increase through time. Among them, the highest increase is seen in pollution, overpopulation and democracy. This is something promising because it proves that students are aware of the problems regarding pollution, overpopulation, economic and ethnic conflicts. Among the given subjects, students do not expect a progress in peace. Moreover, they do believe that political exploitation will demise.

However, students' answers involve contradictions which can be seen in the following table.

1 = very little, 3	= undecided, 5	= very much	
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	nfluence up to today (mean)	Influence in next 40₄years (mean)	Increase from Past to Future (diff.)
Ecological Crises	3.49	3.76	+0.27
Natural Disasters	3.48	3.64	+0.16
Economic Interests, Competition	3.43	3.51	+0.08
Population Explosion	3.43	3.49	+0.06
Everybody	3.26	3.23	-0.03
Wars and Armed Conflicts	3.66	3.57	-0.03
Science and Knowledge	4.29	4.22	-0.07
Inventions and Machines	4.39	4.23	-0.16
Mass Migration	3.37	3.21	-0.16
Social Movements, Conflicts	3.61	3.45	-0.16
Political Revolutions	3.44	3.20	-0.24
Political Reforms	3.55	3.30	-0.25
Philosophers, Learned People	3.40	3.12	-0.28
Founders of Religions	3.20	2.70	-0.50
Kings, Queens	3.25	2.66	-0.59
Average of Change (absolute)		•	.20

Table 6.10. Influence on the course of history of certain factors: stable determinants

If the Table 6.10 and 6.11 are looked at carefully; it will be seen that the stable determinants of these changes do not alter as much. According to students, the influence of ecological crises, natural disasters, competition and population explosion will increase but not significantly. On the other hand, the influence of wars and armed conflict, science and technology, inventions, mass migration, social movements, political revolutions, philosophers, kings and queens, and founders of religions up to now will decrease in the next forty years, but again not significantly. And it is looked at the perception of teachers regarding the same subject as in the following table;

1 = very little, 3 = undecided, 5 = very much

Questioned Groups	5	Students		Teachers		
	Past Impact (mean)	Future Impact (mean)	Increase Impact (diff.)	Past Impact (mean)	Future Impact (mean)	Increase Impact (diff.)
Science and Technology	4.34	4.22	12	4.44	4.16	28
Events and Persons	3.45	3.20	25	3.80	3.28	52
Ecology and Demography	3.44	3.52	+.08	3.30	3.54	+.24
Thinkers And Scholars	3.40	3.12	28	3.25	2.74	50
Everybody	3.26	3.23	03	2.84	2.81	03

Table 6.11. Comparative study of stable determinants from past to future

It is obvious that, compared to students, teachers also show the same inclinations but with higher means and a greater intensity.

The next figure evaluates students' perceptions of life in their own countries in the past and future; in particular the condition of being democratic.




Figure 6.28. Students' perception of being democratic in their own country throughout time

This question and the answers of it make us able to draw regional patterns regarding democracy. The students of Scandinavian countries believed that their countries were democratic (more than in any part of Europe) and this will increase in the next 40 years. Among these countries, the lowest level of democracy in the past is in Finland.

The students of Central and Eastern Europe rejected the existence of democratic structure in their countries 40 years ago and all argues this will positively change in the future. Among them, the Czech Republic is an interesting case because they responded like they had the lowest level of democracy in their region in the past and will have one of the highest in general Europe within 40 years of time. Moreover, compared to the rest of Europe this region has the lowest estimation level of democratic life in the future.

Greece, Turkey and Israel are very optimistic about the future with democratic values and life. Also, in the Western European countries, although the level of democratic life will increase, the expectation is not higher than Scandinavian countries, plus Turkey, the Czech Republic, Israel and Israel Arabs.

If the validity of the students' perceptions are evaluated, it is obvious that they have rationale due to long periods of experience of democracy in the Scandinavian countries, the dominance of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the totalitarian experiences and the damaged democracy after the Second World War in Western Europe makes students' aware of these events.

Plus, expectations towards democracy are mostly positive. Only one country that is Estonia expects lower levels of democracy in their countries; in the rest of Europe all students are optimistic, however not in similar ways. The Western European and Scandinavian students do expect an increase but not miracle. This is most obvious in Central and Eastern European students' expectations. Can the reason of this low expectation be originated from the understanding among students that transition is a long process and needs time? If this is so, it means a lot in terms of having rational individuals with strong reasoning in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Figure 6.29 looked at students' perceptions of ecological crises throughout time regarding the question "how much do you think ecological crises have done to change life for people in history up to today?"




Figure 6.29. Students' perceptions of ecological crises throughout time

In this figure, there is almost full unity because all countries' students, except France and Italy, accepted the impact of ecology on humans' lives both in the past and future. In Italy and France the impact of ecology in the past considered below the average. Even France rejected the effect of ecological crises in history. Furthermore, they do not see an averageabove impact of it in the future, either.

The highest future impacts are seen in Iceland, Finland, Lithuania, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece and Germany. Also, the highest past impacts are in Greece, Germany and Russia. Moreover, in Denmark, Greece and Spain there is no feeling of growing impact of ecological crises and the high increase can be seen in Finland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. So, this graphs shows that at least students are aware of ecology's impact in their lives.

The next figure that is Figure 6.30 researched whether European students succeeded to behave as if they were in the fifteenth century Europe or not. Regarding the arguments the options were as follows: a) Refuse, because it is inhuman, immoral and illegitimate to force someone to marry without really love and b) Run away to a nunnery/monastery because religious life is worth more than worldly life.




Figure 6.30. Evaluation of students' historical empathy

This question had been mentioned previously in this chapter and its results had been analyzed with detail. For this reason in order to eliminate repetition, I will only confine myself to put this graph in this section to add one more survey question through which the Youth and History project aimed to evaluate historical empathy, reasoning and understanding the logic of events, behaviors and decisions in the past.

6.5.1. Concluding Remarks

It is visible that students observe "change" in history; however they do not view changes in determinants of change. In other words, students perceive change but only on the surface of history not in its underlying principles. What is more, they do trust in change as in the case of democracy. Also, their comparisons between the past and future are not that rational, so they have weak comparison abilities and historical reasoning as in the case of ecological crises (due to their ignorance of new technology, huge industrialization, the changing balance in nature as a result of the development) and their perception of the 15th century Europe.

Moreover, Körber points out that "...Students in Europe are unable and unwilling to make historical comparisons and judge historical developments, especially in the field of attitude and morality" [Körber, 1998: 137]. Also, he argues that in students' perception of time, change, progress, empathy and historical reasoning, the comprehension of texts play vital roles; and adds that most texts are really difficult for the students and this delays and even prevents the integration of new information into their concept of history [Körber, 1998]. In short, the complex language of textbooks prevent young students comprehend historical reasoning and understand the logic systems of the past.

And the last but most worrying result came from students' inability or not willing to place themselves in the situation of someone else. In other words, European students, unfortunately, are lack of historical empathy. Körber stands out two very important points, one is regarding morality⁴⁹ and the other one is about universal moral standards. However, this thesis project is more interested in the latter one due to the fact that it can lead further and beneficial discussions regarding European history education. He says that

...should we...proclaim that the development of strict universal moral standards damages the acquisition of the skills of empathy and that therefore history education should emphasize empathy, so that these two contradictory tasks counter-balance each other? [Körber, 1998: 138].

To be more specific, the construction of some values such as democracy, human rights, freedom and equality as universal values blurs students' minds. They begin to think that these concepts were in existence since time immemorial. To put it differently, students believe that

⁴⁹ To see the argument with detail see [Körber, 1998: 138]

there are and had always been universal moral principles that are right for all persons at all times. Thus, they begin to have problems of constructing historical empathy. They mostly evaluate events based on their present time values. At this point, Europe is at the origin of a huge crisis. However, it is not impossible to get over it. The solution lies in teaching times of Europe in which democracy, human rights, freedom and equality had not existed at all. So, through this way students can be made aware of the fact that these concepts were constructed within time as a result of the necessities of the time; they are the products of time. In other words, the progress and change in political, economical, technical, and even ecological events, plus, changes in population and societal dynamics bring the necessity of their existence. It means that before some significant changes, these concepts were not being discussed because they were not in the minds of people. In short, if students are made aware that these concepts are constructed within time, they may succeed to imagine themselves in past periods without their present morals, judgment criteria, and traditions and so on.

After summing up the outcomes of the survey, it will be better to conclude this part with Körber's identification on how to construct historical reasoning:

Historical reasoning and learning firstly requires the ability to recognize differences in the moral basis and the logic of human actions between the past and the present and to accept this as a fact. Secondly, it is necessary to keep up the personal and moral identity in the process of learning about and accepting these differences. Students have to learn to abstract from the 'obvious' fundamentals of their own time and at the same moment not to lose their own moral standards when being confronted with the relativity of human behavior. Only by performing the first part of this double operation, can they try to do justice to people of the past and to come to a reasonable opinion about their behavior. Only by performing the second part can they judge the present meaning and relevance of history. Only by combining both parts can they draw a conclusion for the future [Körber, 1998: 135]

6.6. Beyond Historical Perceptions, Methods, Aims, Empathy and Reasoning...

The history education in Europe is not limited with the perceptions, methods and aims of history; plus historical reasoning, tolerance and empathy. The Youth and History survey also focused on the main problems of teachers in history teaching in terms of more technical and political constraints; the influence of teachers' political and religious affiliations and the impact of quality and quantity of teaching on students' achievements. Thus, this section will focus on each of them and continue to evaluate the European history education system.

6.6.1. The Main Problems of Teachers in History Teaching

According to the outcomes of the survey, the main problem categories are sudden and deep political changes, lack of clear interpretation of history, administration pressure on teachers, financial problems, lack of teaching materials, preparation time for lessons, lack of self improvement options, lack of students' interests and lack of time for history lessons in curriculums.

To begin with, Figure 6.31 looked for the evaluation of deep political changes and the lack of clear interpretations of history in Europe.




Figure 6.31. Deep political changes in interpretation and lack of clear interpretation

Regarding the opinion of teachers' perceptions of the requirement for reform, teachers were asked to describe the main problems of a history teacher in their own country. As a result of their answers, clear regional patterns became visible.

Both in the Scandinavian and Western European countries, the impact of deep political changes in the interpretation of history and lack of clear interpretations regarded below the average mean. This means that these two concepts were rejected as the main problems of history teachers. However, in post socialist countries the case is the opposite. Although the

deep political changes in the interpretation of history is significantly higher than lack of clear interpretation of history, both of them are above the average mean; thus they accept these two conditions as problems of history teachers. Among these countries, Estonia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Poland had the highest means in deep political changes items, plus, Poland had the highest rank regarding lack of clear interpretation.

There are only two countries whose deep political changes' means are negative and the other is positive; these are Turkey and Israel Arabs. The countries in Europe, in general, which think that lack of clear interpretation of history is the main problem of a history teacher are Greece, Turkey and Israel Arabs.

In fact, this graph does not include a contradiction. It is obvious why Eastern European countries significantly have higher positive means in political changes concept due to the impact of Soviet Union's collapse and their transition which normally affected their history perceptions, re-interpretations and education.

In short, regarding the main problems of history teachers, deep political changes in interpretations of history and the lack of understandable interpretation of history the Scandinavian and Western European countries' means are all negative in contrast to positive means of post socialist countries. It seems pretty logical due to these regions' historical experiences with sudden political changes.

Before concluding the explanation of the first figure, there are some questions which may force us to think on these subjects more. Can the reason of agreement in the lack of clear interpretation in post socialist countries be related to small market of textbooks, the remnants of socialist indoctrination in history and the non-correspondence of textbook contents and information given with present day developments? Does the general denial of the impact of sudden political changes in the interpretation of history in Western and Northern Europe mean that the changes came with the collapse of the Soviet Union are only the problem of Central and Eastern Europe and their history education? Does not it look like Western Europe underestimated the post-socialist transition era?




Figure 6.32. Evaluation of administrative pressures

Concerning the main problems of a history teacher as pressure from the administration, it does not seem possible to have a clear regional pattern for each region in Europe. To put it differently, the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries are consistent within their region but Western European countries. To compare the Scandinavian countries with Eastern European ones, it is visible that Eastern European countries reject the pressure more than Scandinavians.

The situation in Western Europe is a little bit more complex. Italy, South Tyrol, Germany, France and Belgium reject pressure whereas Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal and to a lesser extent Scotland considered it as one of the main problems of history teachers.

History and politics are not separable; they are embedded with each other because history is, as always and still, a means to political legitimization. Thus, this graph reflects the idea that in countries which rejected the administrative pressure as a problem of history implicitly declared history is freed from political authorities. Can it be the case? Or to put it differently, is it possible to talk about this separation in the European Union in which education is still in the hands of national governments? In my opinion, the answer is no but there can be listed some rational explanations about what the figure mirrors.

First of all, the Youth and History survey has been done almost just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, this also meant the collapse of socialist regime's high bureaucracy in regions that experienced the collapse within and this situation could have been interpreted as the disappearance of administration pressures on education. Moreover, there is no definition of administration pressures. Is it the influence of governments on history curriculums in terms of defining the subject matters, teaching method and so on? Or is it the daily controls of teachers by school managers? Thus, the narrow definitions of the subject in question might have been caused the emergence of this outcome in Europe.

The next figure is about the research on financial problems of teachers and shortage of teaching materials in Europe.




Figure 6.33. Low wages and shortage of teaching materials as problems of history education

Financial problems in terms of low wages of teachers seem like the main problem of history teachers in Europe more than all other mentioned criteria. The strongest acceptance of low wages as the origin of problems in history education came from Eastern European and Near East European countries. Within these regions the highest rank belonged to Lithuania and Hungary. These regions do also have the highest rank for shortage of materials.

The Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, show a very different picture. In Norway and Denmark, and from Western Europe Germany, Belgium and Scotland, low wages were not considered a problem and in Finland; shortage of materials was seen in the same way. Except Finland, all other Scandinavian countries accepted shortage of materials as problems of history teachers.

In Western Europe, low wages were accepted as a problem by Italy, Netherlands, Great Britain and France and also Portugal. Although Spain and Italy accepted low wages as a problem in the same way, the shortage of materials seemed more problematic in these countries.

The second problem subject, shortage of teaching aids and materials were accepted as more problematic compared to low wages by the teachers of Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Ukraine, Poland, Turkey, Israel, Israel Arabs, Spain, Italy-as mentioned above-, Germany and Great Britain. Besides, in all Europe countries which saw low wages more important than lack of teaching aids are Iceland, Finland, Lithuania, Russia (although both of these problems considered almost equal and identical in rank), Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands and France.

These problems actually are not exclusive. There is a high correlation between low wages and shortages of materials due to these two are directly related with countries' economic strength. If the country is not powerful economically, it is impossible for teachers to have high wages as a source of positive motivation and dedication themselves to their works. Also, using teaching aids like having access to media tools, visiting museums and using technology in class necessitates huge investments in schools.

However, it is known that teachers in the Scandinavian countries and Western Europe, especially Germany, France and Netherlands have higher wages. Then, why, for example, Great Britain is complaining about the lack of materials? Cannot its government provide these teaching aids to the country? Moreover, why countries like Denmark and Norway which do not see wages as problems raise lack of materials as a problem?

The next figure mirrors the scarce of personal qualification possibilities and lack of time for preparation of lessons in Europe through teachers' perspectives.




Figure 6.34. Lack of qualification possibilities and time for preparation

According to the figure, the stated problems are not as problematic as the previous themes. It cannot be argued that there are regional patterns regarding short of possibilities and time. Von Borries and Baeck argued that there is no systematic difference between Nordic and Eastern European states or Eastern Central and Western or Western Central countries [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 149].

If it is needed to explain the figure with more detail, it can be stated that countries like Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, Ukraine, Hungary, Turkey, Portugal, Spain and Italy asserted that not enough possibilities to qualify oneself further is more problematic in contrast to lack of time. However, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Greece, Netherlands, Scotland and with an extreme high rank Great Britain argues the opposite. Also, there are some countries which rejected both of these conditions as problems like the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Israel, Israel Arabs, Palestine, Italy, Belgium and France.

So, what can be sorted out from this situation? Maybe, Britain's complain about not having enough time for preparation is related to their new National Curriculum.⁵⁰ Moreover,

⁵⁰ To see the in-action activities of the National Curriculum see <u>http:</u> //www.ncaction.org.uk/index.htm and <u>http: //www.atschool.co.uk/</u> Also to see its content,

as Baeck and Von Borries argued, maybe in the Czech Republic the further education for teachers is more organized compared to others and maybe the reason of Israel's less complaints lies in their desire for further qualifications [Baeck and Von Borries, 1998].

Moreover, lack of students' interest and lack of time for history lessons in curriculums were researched by the Youth and History survey as further problems of history education in Europe as of outcomes are below in Figure 6.35.




Figure 6.35. Evaluation of lack of students' interest and low number of history lessons

It seems like lack of students' interest does not count as a problem in Europe except in Denmark, Turkey, Israel Arabs, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany. Among them, Spain has the highest mean. However, compared to the low number of history lessons the overall mean of lack of students' interests seems almost insignificant. To be more specific, among the Scandinavian countries, only Denmark considered the interest issue as a problem. In Eastern Europe none of the countries saw it in the same was as Denmark did; all of them rejected it as a problem. Moreover, in Western Europe, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, Scotland and France had negative means towards the subject. Thus, in general this pattern shows that "...the teachers attribute the responsibility of deficits in the effects of history education not to their students, but to the system and timetables" [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 149].

aims and methods see <u>http://www.qca.org.uk/</u>, to see how they perceive history and its education see <u>http://www.qca.org.uk/7892.html</u>

Regarding the low number of history lessons, apart from Russia, Turkey and Spain, all participant countries of the survey viewed low number of history lessons as an important problem. Among the strongest supporters of this view there are Iceland, Sweden, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands. More to the point, there is only one country that rejected both of the matters, Russia. Also, another interpretation is that the highest positive rank of lack of students' interest is seen in Spain and the strongest rejection of this view is in France. Plus, the highest positive rank of low number of history lessons is seen in Netherlands whereas the biggest rejection of it is in Turkey.

Although this seems to be the pattern in Europe, Von Borries and Baeck make emphasis on a very important point about these outcomes by saying that "…we have to remember the small number samples of teachers in single countries with an average of about 40 respondents and fewer, and bear in mind the effect this will have upon the reliability of the results" [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 149].

6.6.1.1. Concluding Remarks

On the subject of the estimation of teachers' perceptions on the need for reform the possible problems of the teachers were defined. For some of them, it was possible to reach regional patterns but for the others it was not likely. With the figures used, we did the interpretation of national views. If we look at the issue from a European perspective with European view data it will be easy to reach general conclusions but without underestimating that European level data hinders national and even regional peculiarities.

Here are the exact overall means for the subjects that are defined as the main problems of history teachers. For sudden and deep political changes in the interpretation of history, the overall mean is 3.13; for the lack of clear interpretation of history it is negative 2.76; for the pressure from administration is negative 2.02; for low wages it is 3.80; for the shortage of teaching aids and materials 3.81; for the lack of possibilities to qualify oneself further it is 2.98; for the lack of preparation time it is 3.02; for lack of students' interest it is negative 2.78 and lastly for having too little time for history courses in the curriculum it is 3.46. In the lead of these outcomes and by being aware of the few numbers of teachers as participants of the survey, the main problem of teachers is the shortage of materials, low wages and small

number of history lessons in curriculums. Plus, the pressure from administration, with its lowest rank among others, seems almost insignificant in terms of being a problem of history teachers in Europe however, it is always open to discussion due to the lack of a clear explanation of what administration pressure is.

6.6.2. The Influence of Teachers' Political and Religious Affiliations

Due to students are inclined to imitate their teachers' behaviors and ideas, and more importantly due to the most dominant teaching method in Europe is teachers' narratives, it is important to be informed about teachers' religious and political beliefs and their strength because both religious and political engagements mirror the European map of mentalities [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998].




Figure 6.36. Teachers' interest in politics and religion

According to Figure 6.36, the religious engagement among teachers seems low both in the Scandinavian and Western European countries, not including Belgium and Italy. Although there is positive tendency in Iceland, Finland and Germany, they have very low levels. All the rest of the other countries in these regions, excluding Portugal, have negative means towards

religion. The strongest rejection toward religious conviction is seen in Slovenia. However, teachers in countries like Poland, Lithuania, Turkey, Palestine and Belgium have high levels of religious conviction.

Regarding the political interests of teachers, the highest levels are seen in Western Europe and then, in terms of regions, in Scandinavia. Within Western Europe the lowest political interest is in Portugal, whereas the highest one is in Germany. Also, in Italy, the interest in politics and religious conviction are almost equal with positive means.

Eastern Europe, on the other hand, does not have much interest in politics like Scandinavian and Western European regions. In this region, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have the highest level of political interest. Amongst all European countries, there is only one country that does not have either religious or political interest and that is Hungary.

If the students' and teachers' political interests are compared, it is visible that teachers' are noticeably higher. This is rational due to the intellectual level of a 15 year-old pupil and his/her teacher. However, a significant difference occurs in religious interests. If figure which shows students' interest and religious attachments is compared to the figure above, in Eastern Europe students are more attached to their religion compared to their teachers. To be more specific, except Poland, teachers in this region have no religious engagements whereas their students have the opposite tendency.

The next subject questioned in the survey is whether teachers do see themselves very conservative or progressive.




Figure 6.37. Teachers definitions of their own political positions

Regarding the figure, almost all countries' teachers, with the exception of the Czech Republic which stated themselves as conservative and Palestine which have a neutral mean, claimed to be very progressive. The highest means belonged to Spain, Hungary, Greece, Scotland and France, where the lowest ones were in Belgium, Norway, Russia and Iceland. In terms of regional patterns, the statement of being progressive in the Scandinavian countries is less than Western Europe.

However, the important question is what is it like to be a progressive or conservative? What does a conservative teacher do? These are important questions to be able to analyze the figure above. In field of education to be a conservative teacher is defined by Von Borries and Baeck as follows:

Conservative teachers are politically less interested...but religiously more engaged...During their lessons, they use more listening to teachers' stories...and less studying historical sources... Consequently they are less concentrated on explanation of the world today...and internalization of basic democratic values...but unexpectedly do not stress national traditions and preservation of historical remains...additionally, conservative teachers are less convinced of the future impact of scientific progress...and of the ecological/demographic processes...on human life [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 153].

If the above figure is interpreted according to the definition above, it shows that except the Czech Republic teachers, all European teachers are extremely progressive; at least this is what they say. However, considering the previous figures in this part and others, does it seem convincing? Do not their inclination towards frequent use of textbooks and narratives, lack of activities even in economically powerful countries, extreme focus on historical facts, lack of teaching students the ways of historical thinking and empathy and lack of providing chances to students be active in class show that they are conservative?

To conclude, how teachers imagine themselves (as progressive and users of modern education approaches which was obvious in their listing of the aims of history) contradicts with what they do in history lessons.

6.6.3. The Impact of Quality and Quantity of Teaching on Students' Achievements

In this part, there will be shown three different tables through which influences of teachers' activities on students' achievements will be evaluated. The evaluation will be done through correlation results and an international standpoint. Regarding the first and second tables, Von Borries and Baeck wrote that and values more than +.06 and less than -.06 are significant and for the third one it is more than +.02 and less than -.02. The correlation coefficient on class level for the first one is N>1250; for the second one which is on the students' level is N>1250 and for the third one on students' level is N>31000. It means that the correlations, below this number of participants will lose their validity [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998].

Firstly, Table 6.12 aims to evaluate the impact of the quantity of lessons on changing students' perceptions and judgments regarding respective topics. In other words, if there were several lessons about a specific historical subject, would a student who took several different lessons regarding that subject differ in terms of his/her interpretation of that event compared to another student who took that subject's lesson only for once?

(Correlation coefficients on class level, N > 1.250) level of significance = $\frac{1}{2}0.6\frac{1}{2}$

Teachers' Answers Cov of Middle	Ages	Coverage	Coverage	Coverage of	Coverage of Eastern
Students' Answers		Colonisation		Adolf Hitler	Europe
		Period	Revolution		since 1985
Middle Ages as an Era of Suppression	00	03	05	04	04
Middle Ages as an Era of Glory	.11	· .12	.07	.11	.13
Middle Ages as an Era of Darkness	.02	.02	.08	.11	.01
Middle Ages as Romantic Knighthood	.07	.10	.02	03	.10
Colonialism as Expropriation	.01	.04	01	13	08
Colonialism as Adventure	.12	.09	.01	.05	.05
Colonialism as European Help	.07	.16	.09	03	02
Industrialisation as Improvement	.06	.05	.03	09	04
Industrialisation as Deterioration	05	.07	.05	.05	.02
Hitler as a Mad Criminal	14	14	12	.04	03
Hitler as a Great Leader	10	.09	.13	.25	.19
Hitler as an Opponent of Communism	11	02	.05	.16	.03
Hitler as a Puppet of Imperialists	.12	02	04	06	14
1985 ff. as Process of Liberation	06	03	04	.11	.09
1985 ff. as Defeat of Socialism	.02	.05	.03	.02	01
1985 ff. as National/Civil Wars	01	.01	04	.01	.02
1985 ff. as Market Economy	.12	.08	.01	04	.01

Table 6.12. The impacts of quantities of instruction: Teachers' coverage and students' associations

The table shows very important correlations. Regarding the correlation of contents⁵¹, the table shows that the Middle Ages in European schools are taught by teachers as an era of glory; colonialism, as a European help; industrialization, as deterioration; Hitler, as a great leader; and post-1985 developments, as process of liberation.

⁵¹ The correlation coefficients which are in bold show the correlation about content [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 154]

Here, let's put more emphasis on the perception of the Middle Ages among students. As it is said, regarding content correlations it is more perceived as an era of glory. However, the quantity correlation shows that, when the number of lessons about colonization period and lessons on Eastern Europe since 1985 increases the students' perception of Middle Ages as an era of glory increases. Moreover, there is a strong correlation between the coverage of Hitler and students' perceptions of the Middle Ages as era of darkness. In other words, if the number of lessons on Hitler increases, more students will perceive the Middle Ages as darkness. Moreover, if there will be more lessons on Middle Ages, this will significantly increase the perception of colonialism as an adventure. Also, another example is, the more coverage of Industrial Revolution, Middle Ages and colonization period, the less the perception of Hitler as a mad criminal among students. Lastly, as the number of courses about Middle Ages and colonization period, the revolution period increase, students will perceive the post-1985 Eastern Europe as market economy, rather than process of liberation.

In short, although these proposals do not have causal relationships but just correlations, there is an impact of the number of the courses on students' perception of history, and also in their critical thinking. It is logical to argue that, if specific historical topics are covered in several courses this can improve students' ability of looking an event from different perspectives and having more tolerance towards differences among societies and cultures. So, the increase in history lessons may pave the way for historical reasoning, tolerance, critical analysis and overall an awareness of history, in other words, historical consciousness.

The second table is about the impact of the quality of lessons such as the use of teaching materials and aims of history education. It is be done through evaluating the correlations between teachers' methods and aims of education and students' successes. For this reason, among the aims; the use of textbooks, teachers' judgments in terms of teaching what is good and bad in history, and use of audio visual media are chosen.

(Correlation coefficients on class level, N > 1.250) level of significance $= \frac{1}{2}0.6\frac{1}{2}$

Teachers' Answers To Students' Answers	Use: extbooks	Use: Teachers' Judgements	Use: Manifold AV-Media	Aims: Knowledge of Facts	Aims: Fun with Traditions o	Aims: Operations of Reasoning
Chronological Knowledge	04	04	07	.01	04	.04
General Motivation	.01	.24	26	.04	.23	.14
Positive Associations to Epochs	04	.12	14	.01	.16	.03
Conventional Affirmation of Identitie	02	.13	23	.08	.16	.08
Conventional Pragmatism	05	.06	10	.09	.11	.03
Fundamental Altruism	.07	.08	.06	.03	.03	.03
Materialist Privatism	.03	08	.06	.01	04	00
Authoritarian Traditionalism	09	.32	15	.09	.29	.05
Hitler as a Mad Criminal	01	18	.19	.05	18	07
Hitler as a Great Leader	01	08	.11	07	07	12
1985 as Process of Liberation	.01	07	04	.00	.01	02
1985 as Defeat of Socialism	.11	.10	07	.01	.13	.01
Religious Engagement	07	.35	29	.14	.30	.14
Political Interest	05	.13	11	.00	.07	.08

Table 6.13. The impact of the quality of instruction: Teachers' activities and students' competencies

Regarding these, the impact of the use of textbooks is almost none on chronological knowledge, general motivation of students, positive associations to epochs, conventional affirmation of identities and political interest. However, for example, the perception of 1985 as a defeat of socialism by students is pretty much related with textbooks.

Also, the correlation between teachers' judgments on history and chronological knowledge is very weak. On the contrary, teachers' judgments shape students' both general motivation and more than this, religious engagements extremely. This can be combined students' tendency towards imitating their teachers and their ideas. Compared to the impact of textbooks on students among all listed criteria, teachers' judgments are very moderately stronger with the exception of chronological knowledge which is identical in both of them. Plus, teachers' judgments have a positive impact improving fundamental altruism, which can be considered as a source of tolerance and understanding and accepting "otherness", among students.

The manifold use of media in classes shows an opposite trend with teachers' judgments. Whereas teachers' judgments are increasing students' general motivation towards history, the usage of media decreases this and the reason of it may probably be hidden in documentaries shown in the classes that students find boring. This is also valid for the case of positive associations to epochs and conventional affirmation of identities. Moreover, the use of audio visual materials leads students think about Hitler as a mad criminal, while teachers' judgments was decreasing this perception. Also, media lessens students' religious engagements and political interest, and the use of media does not make any impact on fundamental altruism and observation of post-1985 as a process of liberation. However, a significant notion regarding media is its negative impact on chronological knowledge. This may be linked to the usage of fictional movies and students' great interest in them as the source of historical knowledge.

Von Borries and Baeck, when evaluating the outcomes of the correlations, mentioned that students are getting more motivated through traditional teaching methods and regarding the lack of criticism of media among students, they stated that "perhaps the criticism learnt by students is also directed against history, school and teacher" [Von Borries and Baeck, 1998: 158].

What is more, this table includes correlation values between the aims of history and students' achievements. According to this, when the aim of history education is knowledge of facts, the more this aim is tried to be realized the more authoritarian traditionalism among students increase, just like conventional pragmatism and conventional affirmation of identities. Moreover, this specific aim significantly increases the religious engagements of students. However, this aim has nearly no impact on students' chronological knowledge.

When the aim of teachers is fun with traditions, students' general motivation to lessons increases extremely; however, it does not affect their chronological knowledge. Positive associations to epochs, conventional affirmation of identities, conventional pragmatism, and perception of 1985 as defeat of socialism gets stronger and more significantly religious engagements of students increase radically. Also, perception of Adolf Hitler as a mad criminal becomes to a certain extent weaker.

The last aim is stated as operations in historical thinking and the results are as follows: This aim has a positive impact, which means an increase, on students' general motivation towards history and their religious engagement. Moreover, it decreases the perception of Hitler as a great leader. However, this aim which belongs to modern history teaching, do not make any impact on students' chronological knowledge as well as their positive associations to epochs and fundamental altruism. Compared to other aims, historical thinking strengthens students' political interests more. Lastly, the third table evaluates the impact of quality of teaching through teaching methods, aims and students' competencies.

	Method: Oral rmation/ ommuni- cation	Method: Activities like Project Work	Method: Textbook and Worksheet	Aim: Historical Knowledge	Aim: Historical Traditions	Aim: Historical thinking
Chronological Knowledge	.03	08	.06	.16	02	.02
Trust in Documentary/ School- Media	.21	.03	.13	.33	.24	.22
Trust in Fict./Audiovis. Media	.14	.07	.00	.06	.18	.16
Middle Age as Era of Suppression	.05	01	.08	.14	.07	.10
Hitler as Mad Crimina	I .01	05	.05	.09	02	00
Impact of Scientific Progress	.09	07	.09	.24	.12	.11
Negative Associations to Epochs	.05	03	.11	.16	.08	.12
General Historical Motivation	.30	.13	.10	.34	.53	.43
Conventional Affirm. of Identification	.18	.02	.06	.24	.23	.22
Rejective Detachment from Identification	t .03	.05	03	08	.02	.02
Conventional Pragmatism	.15	00	.11	.27	.21	.17
Fundamental Altruism	.04	.09	.02	06	.10	.09
Materialist Privatism	.07	04	.09	.12	.06	.0.
Authoritarian Traditionalism	.19	.11	02	.05	.28	.20

(Correlation coefficients on students' level, N > 31.000) level of significance = $\frac{1}{2}0.2\frac{1}{2}$

Table 6.14. The impact of quality of teaching: Teaching methods, aims and students' competencies

When the method of teaching history is oral information communication, it does not make a huge impact on students' competence of chronological knowledge. However, it makes positive impact on students' trust in documentary, trust in fiction, impact of scientific progress, conventional affirmation of identification and radically in students' general motivation. Compared to other methods such as activities like project work and textbook, this method provides the highest positive correlation in general motivation. Also, oral information as a method does not make any change in the conception of Hitler as a mad criminal. What is more, this method strengthens the conventional affirmation of identification in terms of national identity, democracy and Europe.

The second identified method, project work, has a strong negative correlation with students' competence of chronological knowledge. In other words, this method decreases the students' knowledge regarding chronology. The reason might lie in too much student autonomy in projects, and this too much autonomy may cause students focus on the subject matter which they most like and as a result it might cause the underestimation of chronology in history lessons. However, project work method very moderately raises students' historical motivation and fundamental altruism. On the other hand, it has a negative correlation with the impact of scientific progress which means the more project work, the less belief in historical impact of scientific progress, although there seems no rationale in it.

Regarding textbook and worksheet as methods, the chronological knowledge of students develops and reaches to the top point among all other methods. Textbooks also provide positive correlation with general motivation of students but not as much as oral communication method. However, it does not have any impact on fundamental altruism of students. Thus, textbooks may not be enough to improve tolerance towards differences in European countries. On the other hand, it has a strong positive correlation with trust in documentary, school media.

In this table, students also specified three aims of history lessons such as historical knowledge, historical traditions and historical thinking and the correlation between these methods and students' competencies are being evaluated. To begin with chronological knowledge, the highest student competency is reached in historical knowledge as the aim of history. Although this is not the complete list, trust in documentary, the conception of Middle Ages as era of suppression and Hitler as a criminal, impact of scientific progress, negative association of epochs and national identification show higher correlation ranks. It means that if the aim of history is perceived as historical knowledge, students' competencies are being shaped as above.

The second aim is historical traditions. When the aim of history is constructed as learning historical traditions, students' competencies in trust in fictional media and fundamental altruism significantly increases. Plus, the general motivation of students reaches the top correlation levels if the aim is learning historical traditions.

The last aim is historical thinking that is one of the main tools of modern education system. The acceptance of history education's aim as gaining historical thinking does not have any highest rank within the all table. However, it significantly makes positive correlation with students' competencies in trust in documentary, school media, trust in fictional media, impact of scientific progress, general motivation towards history and fundamental altruism.

To sum up, there is no concentration of highest students' competencies neither in one specific method nor in a single aim. However, there is a low positive correlation between traditional methods and aims and the achievements of the students; and a low negative relation between modern accesses and students' competencies. Due to both positive and negative correlations are low, this leads us to conclude that in Europe the total success and failure of traditional and modern education methods cannot be declared. What is obvious is that students are improving themselves through amalgamation of these two different approaches.

6.7. Conclusion: The General State of History Education in Europe

This chapter was composed of five different parts: Students' perceptions of history; the condition of history education in terms of whether it is modern or traditional; overlaps and deviations between students and teachers regarding their perceptions of history; historical thinking and reasoning among European students and finally the main problems of teachers and more technical issues in European history education.

Through these parts it is aimed to look at the general state of history education in Europe. There were many questions on my mind. Was European history education traditional or modern? Was it successful? How was the relation of teachers with their students? Were students aware of the significance of history? What kind of methods was being used in Europe? Were they effective? And many more...

To find the answers and realize the general aim, the available data from the Youth and History survey which was held in 1995 in 27 countries of Europe including Israel, Israel Arabs and Turkey and whose data was brought together in 1997 is preferred to be used. The reason of its selection, although it was held a decade ago, lies in the fact that the Youth and History project is the most wide-ranged (both by geographically and content wise) project that

has been done in Europe ever⁵². Also, it served as a guideline in defining the major problems and weaknesses of European history education system; thus it has a direct impact on current developments in the European Union regarding history education. To put it differently, it paved the way for defining how to teach history in New Europe. However, while using this survey, I was actually aware of its weaknesses and critiques regarding the validity of the outcomes. For this reason, it is important to list these defects of the survey.

The first thing to question is the validity of students' answers. What kind of a control had been applied by people who were responsible for applying the survey in schools? Were students really aware of the significance of the data they provided? If yes, did they pay attention to be serious and honest enough in their answers? Actually, when a 15-year-old student is thought, the possibility of dishonesty and unconcernedness lead further anxiety about the validity of students' responses.

Second question to ask is: Were teachers' answers trustable? In the survey, there was an implicit search for countries' traditional and modern attitudes in their history education system. And, being traditional and using traditional methods mostly seems inferior to being modern. Thus, this increases the possibility of teachers' answers' invalidity. To put it differently, teachers may be inclined towards showing themselves more modern than they actually are. Edgren, regarding the issue, stated "...teachers overstate their methods, thus implying that they have more 'modern' approach to history teaching than might otherwise be the case" [Edgren, 1998: 120]. Specifically, did not the extreme gap between students and teachers in the case of using media sources prove this?

Besides problems embedded in the participants of the survey, there were ambiguities in the criteria asked in the survey like the "frequent" use of media and history "projects" [Edgren, 1998]. Regarding the problem of "frequent", what did frequent mean? Was it three times a week? Two times a week? On what definition did students and teachers answer this question? Plus, concerning the history projects, the same problem is visible. What does a project mean? One-month detailed research? Or a single page paper written over-night? Thus, the problem is that there is no clear definition of the terms "frequent" and "project". If these

⁵² The previous research initiatives were CIDREE [Consortium of Institutions for Development and Research in Education in Europe] in 1990 and CHATA [Concepts of History and Teaching Approaches at Key Stages 2 and 3]. These two studies focused on understanding of key concepts of historical enquiry, teaching methods, common problems, curricular developments and many more. However, neither of them was wide ranged as the Youth and History survey. For further information see [John Slater, 1995: 68-74]

had been specified, I believe, the results would be more valid, thus right now they do not seem trustable.

Another problem was whether the students were aware of the differences between school media products, fictional movies and documentaries or not. Could they really differentiate which one is more objective and scientific? In my opinion, the answer is no.

Furthermore, answers of both students and teachers regarding visiting museums and sites do not seem reflecting the right outcomes of being traditional and modern. According to these models, as it was defined at the beginning of this chapter, modern teaching approach necessitates and uses these kind of activities as teaching methods. Concerning the graphs of both national and international standpoints, the answers of both groups of participants showed low levels of practicing this activity. Did this make all countries traditional in terms of education? No, because visiting museums is not only about the mentality of the education but also about economic conditions and living in rural or urban areas. In short, the survey did not provide the origin of outcomes in countries regarding visiting museums; was it originated from being mentally traditional or being weak economically or lack of museums in places they lived?

Also, the teachers' answers to the existence of pressure from administration as it does not exist really shocked me and it is still among the ambiguities of the project. While the education is under the control of national governments in the European Union, and while history lessons are still tools of transmitting national values, ideas and maybe the strongest tool of constructing national identities of the youth in each country, how could there not be pressures from administration on teachers about history education?

Moreover, there were no questions regarding the impact of students' extra-curricular activities and their impacts on their history perceptions, because it is a fact that history perceptions are not only being shaped at school. Movies, theatres, family stories, daily conversations with people; in short cultural and daily practices significantly affect students' perceptions about history. The inclusion of this dimension of history could provide better evaluations and interpretations of the current situation of history education in Europe.

These are the ambiguities of the project, and because of the existence of these blur parts and weaknesses, the Youth and History project turned out to be difficult to analyze. Plus, due to my low levels of European history knowledge, I might miss the significant exceptional behaviors, reactions and attitudes of some countries like the Czech Republic because, I can honestly admit that I have no idea why this country is so different when evaluated with its regional neighbors' characteristics or there is not any satisfactory explanation why this country is so different when evaluated.

Besides its difficulty to derive strong and conclusive results due to the before mentioned ambiguities, the project enabled to come up with very important outcomes concerning the general state of history education in Europe. First of all, there is a huge gap between teachers and students on the perceptions of history, specifically about the aim of history. There is no universally accepted and applied modern education approach in Europe, but there is the mixture of two methods since they have different advantages. However, it is open to discussion whether the reason of this amalgam is constructed through conscious attempts of authorities due to different superiorities of approaches in different areas or it is just a coincidence. There is, on the other hand, one obvious thing. In this amalgam there is no equality between these methods, but Orwell's "more equality" of traditional methods.

Moreover, the problems in the way of applying modern methods do not only lie in mental choices but equally in economic conditions of countries. The reason is that providing museum visits and access to media necessitated significant amount of economic power.

Another outcome, which is a little bit pessimistic, unfortunately, is the lack of historical reasoning and empathy in European history education. Students do not have the ability of analyzing past periods with their own dynamics, rationale and values; rather they use their present values like individualism, autonomy, democracy, human rights and freedom. To put it differently, there is no history for them in which human rights, freedom and individualism did not exist at all.

Lastly, the existence of old teachers who are not open to change like in Estonia, the lack of teachers' interest, mostly among traditionally educated, the lack of using new methods in history lessons like in Albania, the society's prevention of teachers and the application of innovative methods like in Spain and Netherlands, and the continuation of knowledge-based systems due to university entrance examinations as in Russia remain important obstacles in Europe towards transition to better education systems which will bring tolerance, historical reasoning, critical analysis and historical knowledge [Watts, 1998, Del Moral, 1998].

7. A LOOK AT HISTORY EDUCATION and EUROPE NATION BY NATION

European history education cannot be understood only through teaching methods, history textbooks and teacher trainings. History education in Europe is very much related to the countries' historical experiences through which they constructed their perceptions of Europe, their national identity and history writing and transfer of these experiences through their own national histories. For this reason, this part of the project will specifically focus on European national experiences through which their present historical perceptions of Europe and their history education systems emerged.

In order to understand the contemporary situation of history education in Europe, particularly the reasons behind the current contents, methodologies, the choice of language and the nationalist tendencies in history textbooks, firstly, how some European countries addressed Europe will be explained. In this first section, *Changing Perceptions of Europe throughout history*, the chosen countries are Poland, Denmark and Central and Eastern European countries and the general aim is to show how these countries differ in their perceptions of Europe and which different historical factors or choices affected their diverse perceptions of Europe. To be more precise, *Changing Perceptions of Europe throughout history* will briefly look at the national identity construction periods of these countries and try to help understand why these countries perceive Europe and mirror it in their teaching strategies and materials as the way they are.

In the second section, *Different Uses of History*, the goal is to show how countries such as Romania, Sweden and Russia used/abused history and history education to realize their aims like political achievements, explaining the rise of violence in their territories and constructing their national identity through the elimination of past identity indoctrinations.

In the third section, *National European Experiences of History Education and European Consciousness in Education*, several countries' educational practices particularly about history education will be researched and discussed. The aims of this section are to show how

national authorities conceive the aim of history; to show the changes in national curriculums of European countries; to give an idea about the most hotly debated issues in their national systems; to reflect their changing perceptions of history education and to evaluate them whether their systems are promising in terms of promoting European consciousness or not. The countries of this section are Finland, Hungary, Romania, France, Latvia and Wales.

In the next section, *History Textbooks and European History Books in Europe*, the subject is the study of school history textbooks in several European countries such as Britain, Nordic countries, Italy, Spain, Baltic States and Eastern European countries. Through this examination, the aim is to look at the general attitudes of European countries regarding their history textbooks and the way they define Europe, their relations with other countries, the parts of Europe that are included and excluded and their reasons. Moreover, this section focuses on complete European history book attempts which became popular after the Maastricht Treaty that expanded the definition of Europe by overtly declaring that it is also a common identity among Europeans in addition to its political, economic definitions.

7.1. Changing Perceptions of Europe Throughout History

7.1.1. Poland

The Polish people suffers from their history since the beginning of the 19th century due to losing their statehood at the end of the 18th century and facing many tragedies during their attempts to gain it back and because of this they are called by themselves as "the suffering Christ of Nations" [Jarosz, 2002: 45]. In their history, since the beginning, Polish people did not identify their nation with the state but heroic history as the origin of social integration. When the communist authorities began to control Polish population they used this heroic history as a tool to control Polish society and legitimize their power on them.

The communist forces began their activities in education. They organized the curriculum according to communist ideology and they brought Stalin's statements at the center of education in 1951-52 curriculum. The teachers are forced to teach the doctrines of communism, and statements like "only in the socialist system could they have conditions for a multi-faceted development" and "the individual's interests coincide with the interests of a

society organized on the basis of social justice'" are indoctrinated in pupils' minds [Jarosz, 2002: 46].

Not only were the textbooks re-written according to Stalinist ideas but also commemorations and celebrations at schools were re-decided and re-arranged. As a result, the authorities decided on the May Day, the October Revolution, Soviet Army Day, etc to celebrate and they even explained "how" these days should be celebrated. Moreover, just like it is experienced in the Turkish case, the names of the Polish schools changed with Russian names, specifically with the names of Russian heroes [Jarosz, 2002].

The Polish communists began to unify Polish population on the basis of ethnicity, pro-Soviet, anti-German sentiments; even explicitly anti-Semitism. However, the indoctrination of communist authorities began to be shaken in Poland during the 1980s due to government's failure to provide development. Statistically speaking, in a survey students had been asked whether socialism will spread to the world or not; and the positive answer fell from 42% to 3.6 % from 1958 to 1983 [Jarosz, 2002].

Over time the domination of Polish national identity by communist authorities shifted to the Church. This shift had been legitimized as "A symbiosis of Christianity, Church and State has existed in Poland from the beginning and was never breached. It led to an almost common way of thinking among Poles that 'Polish' meant 'catholic'" [Jarosz, 2002: 48]. These sources of identity, first as Stalinist and then Catholic, among Polish people, play a very important role in their construction of the idea of Europe and European history.

Polish identity, in addition to internal dynamics of the country, also affected from its relations with others. Jarosz states that during the WWII the development of hatred towards Soviets, Germans and Jews; "...an increased gulf between Poles and Ukrainians and manifestations of anti-Polish attitudes by Lithuanians and Belarusians..." played a huge role in the construction of contemporary Polish identity [Jarosz, 2002: 49].

One more development that is vital for Polish identity is the abolition of communism and the formation of Polish government. In this period, communism, by Poles, was correlated with corruption, chaos, stealing of public money and properties and also it is declared as the basis of destruction of Polish values like religion and God. However, Polish people not only did fail in becoming a part of communist regime but also capitalist system. They constructed their identity in between by naming it a third way [Jarosz, 2002]. These traumatic changes in belonging and identification, of course, reflected to Polish view of Europe. Although they got rid of hard conditions of communism, they do not trust Europe and they approach it "...with the awareness of endangering their traditional national identity" [Jarosz, 2002: 51].

7.1.2. Denmark

Until the 1960s the Danish educational system did not have European history textbooks. They only had Danish, Nordic, Scandinavian, and world history textbooks. The reasons behind the non-existence of specific European history textbooks have two reasons as explained by Bernard Eric Jensen. The first one "...during the first part of the 20th century, Danes tried to hold on to 19th century traditions, in which the Nordic community of memory was considered the second most important community" along with the national Danish community of memory [Jensen, 2002: 55]. Secondly, the Danish national identity during the 19th and 20th centuries was about building clear demarcations between Danes on the one hand and Germans on the other. As it is visible, the need for an identity that is based on Europe and common European values was not at the center and due to this position; Danish people did not have European history textbooks until the 1960s when their European membership became evident.

However, in the 1960s, a new textbook, the Danish *Gymnasium*, was published with a core subject of *History of European Ideas* [Jensen, 2002: 55]. The aim of the book was to create a sense of common cultural heritage of Europe. The major motivation behind this new textbook was the potential membership of Denmark into the European Union that would be realized in 1973. In other words, the political goals of Danish state changed the history education in the country. What is more, the particular devotion to European history in Denmark began in the mid-1980s. Over time, this step spread to primary and secondary schools curriculums. With the 1990s, "Europe" became an unavoidable mentality of Denmark within the field of teaching [Jensen, 2002].

When Danish history books are investigated throughout time, their origin goes back to 1899 with Gustav Bang's *A Cultural History of Europe Told as Stories for the People* and Hartvig Frisch's *A Cultural History of Europe* that was published in 1928.⁵³ These books

⁵³ These two books on European history and the historians who wrote them are labeled by Jensen as the first generation.

mostly used interdisciplinary approaches in their research and they had well-built attachments with the Social Democratic Party as well. That is why; it can be argued that writing history of Europe in Denmark, until the 1990s, had mostly been a leftist project. This characteristic of the books can be understood from their titles and contents which were frequently about cultural history of Europe such as Hartvig Frisch's book *A Cultural History of Europe* and Per Krarup's *Our Cultural Heritage* [Jensen, 2002].

This Marxist historiography in Denmark is not without purpose. They wrote history of Europe as a cultural history, not as history of the nation state because

...focusing attention on the history of Europe...was a way of making the point that one was interested in furthering an international approach to history" and it was "...a way of making the point that one was attempting to write a history in which historical processes were viewed from below, that is to say, a history of the common people and everyday life" [Jensen, 2002: 60].

In short, in Denmark, since the beginning, both the history of Danish nation and the history of Europe were written as cultural histories and in a more comparative and interdisciplinary way compared to other European experiences. What is more, the way they wrote the Danish history was not a national history of Danes which excluded others, but it was constructed as an integral part of a general history of Europe and this approach was followed up to the 1990s due to changing perceptions of Danish people about Europe. So, the main question is how did Danish people define Europe throughout history?

In the first and second generations of European history books which were written by Bang and Frisch, it can be stated that the question of how Europe should be defined was not in their interest and not among their problematic questions because they assumed that Europe was a reality and everybody was familiar to it [Jensen, 2002]. This generation of historians, rather than studying the social and cultural borders of Europe, focused on the origins of Indo-European race. It means that, Europe was conceived through racial terms, not geographical and socio-historical expressions.

Moreover, this generation accepted Europe as a unique, more dynamic, and superior civilization compared to others. Indo-European race by Bang and Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranian people by Frisch were labeled as superior races and communities to others. To legitimize and internalize this notion of superiority, history followed comparative approaches like comparisons of Indo-Europeans with Negros [Jensen, 2002].

Regarding the purpose of writing European history, at the beginning of the 1900s, Bang, in his book, aimed to link the past, present and future. The message in the book was that "...it was Europe who were to be seen as the main carriers and chide promoters of an ongoing process" [Jensen, 2002: 67]. In contrast to Bang, Fischer had a pessimistic view about Europe due to his witness of the World War I. For this reason, the purpose of European history, for him, was to define the lessons that must be learnt from the War and defining the possible cultural and political strategies that would end national divisions in Europe.

Throughout the 1960s, although the familiarity of Europe did remain constant, the emphasis on race demised in European history due to the World War I, the rise of the US and the Soviet Union. Thus, Europe was no more at the center of world affairs. Because of these changes, Europe was defined totally on cultural basis and historical studies were devoted to find common cultural heritages. History books revealed that Greco-Roman, Judaic-Christian traditions were the common European cultural roots [Jensen, 2002].

During the 1970s, the racial arguments lost all their legitimacy because Europe suffered a lot from the World War II, Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy. The superiority of Europe was depended on its cultural supremacy. Additionally, the purpose of writing European history during the 1970s was to define the challenges and prospects of Europe regarding its transformation and to build Europe on a common cultural heritage.

With the 1980s and 1990s the Danish history and the way they conceive Europe faced with a major shift. Europe was no more a taken-for-granted and familiar entity. Historians and other academicians began to focus on the problems of common European heritage or the definition of Europe. Europe was being re-discovered and re-constructed. Europe was no more seen as a continuation of Antiquity as in the 1960s. In this period, Antiquity and medieval Europe, rather than being conceived as a part of continuity turned into breaking points in European history. Jensen, regarding the shift stated, "the question of how to define Europe is indeed a contested issue, and that it therefore also constitutes one of the sites of struggle and conflict in contemporary society. Its corollary was that the writing of European history now entailed involving oneself in a field of political conflict" [Jensen, 2002: 62]. In the late 1980s and 1990s Europe was a complex entity both geographically and culturally.

Since the 1980s, the conception of uniqueness and superiority of Europe was built on the idea that Europe is the "Civilization". "What had made European culture into something special was the development of scientific and secularized ways of thinking which had begun to evolve during the 17th and 18th centuries..." [Jensen, 2002: 65]. To put it differently, ties with the Antiquity and the Middle Ages as the origin of Europe had been ruptured.

At this period, the purpose of writing European history, in Denmark, was to show the ruptures in history. Europe was not a passive cultural heritage but an active political and cultural project in which people can influence its definition and shape it. Jensen argued that "...this new sense of being an active part of this an ongoing political and cultural project" distinguished Danish histories of Europe from earlier Danish experiences and other European countries histories [Jensen, 2002: 68].

Consequently, although the Danish history faced with many shifts in their approach to Europe, the uniqueness and superiority of Europe were never changed. The changing thing was the ground on which this superiority was justified.

7.1.3. Eastern European Countries-Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland

One of the most important questions about the 19th and 20th century Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Croatian historians had to face is "how is it that they are in principle considered to be 'part of the West' and still they are not treated as equals, their regions are economically and socially less developed and frequently fall victim to 'Western' great power aspirations"? [Pók, 2002: 76] According to them the answer lies in the division of Europe into Western and Soviet bloc after the World War II.

Regarding the victimization, these nations think although they fought against threats to Europe such as the Ottomans and the Mongolians, Western authorities sacrificed them for their interests. What is more, Hungarians argue that the Ottoman Turkish wars pushed them into the East and the Habsburg administration did not let them integrate with the Western Europe. Although, industrialization and the French Revolution could shift Hungarians, Czechs and Poles to the "West" by breaking the impasse state of Eastern development, the socialist revolution emerged as a barrier. After a few attempts to reach the level of West, and their failures; at the end of the 1970s, these countries asked that "was it only Soviet expansionism...and the logic of the cold war that doomed these 'Western' aspirations to failure or were more deep-seated structural peculiarities of decisive significance in this respect?" [Pók, 2002: 78]. The answer was the belated and distorted formats of the Western

institutions in these regions. As a result of these, Central and Eastern European countries concluded that they were "...in many respects different from the West but it is much *more different* from the East i.e. from Russia and the Orthodox world in general" [Pók, 2002: 79]. So, these nations did not want to be a part of Eastern Europe because this region did not represent the destiny and heritage of the "West".

The Hungarian history mostly focused on the reasons and roots of the division of Europe during the Cold War. During the second half of the 15th century they had the same level of economic, cultural, social and political development with Western Europe but due to the collapse of the centralized state system, suppression of the peasant revolt and the Ottoman invasion, Habsburg exploitation and internal problems regarding the agriculture caused their failure and their division.

In the aftermath of 1989 new solutions to the division of Europe began to be searched by people living in "Europe-Between" [Pók, 2002: 82]. The collapse of the Soviet Union became the biggest motivation of integration. Questions like "...was it only the 'Soviet yoke' and the cold war that created the line of division in the heart of Europe or were the regional differences so old and substantial that plans of a short-term integration or reintegration...of the region were illusory" were re-asked [Pók, 2002: 82]. This time the answers were different. The Hungarian, Polish and Czech historians did not choose to identify themselves Central Europe as an entity that was different from the West but more different from the East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the answer turned out to be; Central Europe had always been a realm of imagination and this time it would be imagined and be created as a part of the West. Moreover, the self-centered authorities of Europe who had sacrificed them became democratic partners, whereas the Soviet Union defined as the origin of stagnation, root of economic backwardness and as an evil which destroyed the European brotherhood [Pók, 2002]. "European standards and European values", as Pók pointed out, "came to mean a kind of idealized imaginary Western Europe that rather sooner than later could be extended to the territories symbolically situated beyond the Berlin Wall that came crumbling down in November 1989" [Pók, 2002: 83]. The people of Central Europe had imagined that economic prosperity, social security, military power, qualified social services, technological and scientific achievements of the West would transfer to them; however, their dream did not come true. In these countries, ethnic and national conflicts increased; migrations emerged; inflation, unemployment, criminality, and corruption reached extreme levels; as a result the

gab between the East and West deepened. So, the Eastern Europe accepted their inferiority, in particular economic, scientific, technological and institutional inferiority, and also the necessity of transition. What had happened in Europe was the collapse of the ideological division, but the rise of cultural division. Pók stressed this by quoting Samuel Huntington; "'The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe'" [Pók, 2002: 86]. What should be done, as a next step, was to end the cultural divisions between the West and East [such as Western Christianity vs. Orthodox Christianity or Islam, the experience of democracy in the West vs. its lack in East, etc) during whose elimination history and education would play a vital role.

In short, the politics of writing of European history in Central and Eastern Europe depended on these historical developments. At first, Central European countries imagined themselves as a natural part of the West and carriers of the common heritage; however, over time they put their position in between. Neither were they belonged to the East nor to the West. Then, they blamed the West by arguing that they sacrificed this region for their interests. After the collapse of the Soviet Union they blamed the Union for their economic stagnation. At the end, they declared their common European heritage and values with the West by giving up their in-between-position with the hope of becoming a real part of the Western Europe. However, their dream turned into a nightmare with the rise of extreme nationalist movements, corruption, inflation and religious clashes.

So, who was culpable in this picture? Who should be blamed? What should the Central European countries do to construct their identity? What can be suggested is, regarding this region, continuation of remembering fictitious past glories and their reflection in history writing as a method cannot be workable for the emergence of a wider European consciousness. If it is done, it only can create more divisions and disintegration in Europe. So, it would be better for them to construct their national and European identities on the present day achievements and progress, not on imagined glories of the past. Lastly, it is obvious that the materials of history cannot be changed or shaped, so what must be done is that new perceptions of history and new approaches should be used in order to show the peculiarities of Hungarian history in history of Europe.

7.2. Different Uses/Abuses of History

7.2.1. Romania

Modernization and westernization in Romania began during the first half of the 19th century. Until this time, Romanian society was rural in structure, orthodox in religion and influenced by the East. Lucian Boia defines Roman society as

...a rather complicated and contradictory country with a Latin language but an orthodox religion and Slavic culture...It is a country torn between East and West, belonging both to the Balkan countries and Central Europe, to the East and –at least according to how the Romanians see themselves- to the West [Boia, 2002: 133].

In their modernization period, Romanians denied all their past and original values and preferred to imitate Western countries as models like France and Germany. "Romanians have evolved at the margin of the great political entities and civilizations. When compared to Roman and Byzantine Empires, to the Western world, to the Ottoman, Austrian or Austrian-Hungarian, or Russian Empires, or today to the European Union, Romania constituted, and still does, a border zone" [Boia, 2002: 135]. These various historical contacts made the construction of national origin difficult and contradictory for Romanians because these borders created belonging and national identity construction problems.

First of all, until the 19th century the origin of Romanians had been constructed as Romans; however their origin was shifted to Dacians during the 20th century and this shift created problems for Romanian history. Secondly, due to the problems between Romania and Hungary regarding the historical rights on Transylvania, several myths of continuities were established by both countries and the contradictions among them reflected to present Romanian historiography. Moreover, national communism, for political concerns, created myths of continuity. It depicted the entire Romanian nation united behind the Party by rewriting the history of Romania. Until the communist regime which was established after 1944, the true Romania and the stereotype of it was rural. It was a peasant community; however, with communism this peasant identification of a Romanian replaced with urban proletariat [Boia, 2002].

Concerning the independence struggles, Romania imagined itself as the savior of the West. Romania portrayed its resistance against the Ottomans or other empires like it is saving the West from the invasion of Islam or other threats. Thus, Romania, while establishing its relations with Europe, pictured itself like West is indebted to them [Boia, 2002]. Furthermore, Romanians always constructed their images regarding the others as a victim and peace-loving nation. In parallel to this, they were always in the side which defended itself and which have been made backward by its enemies. As Boia asserted, the West sacrificed Romania to Russia and these members of the West made Romania wait at the gates of the NATO and the EU [Boia, 2002: 140-141].

Romanian historiography, due to huge amounts of contacts throughout history and the impact of communism, had problems about the construction of Romanian origin, continuity, unity, independence and the "others" of Romania. The contradictions that emerged during the establishment period of these contexts, unfortunately, embedded in Romanian history and created problems in the European Union period because the way Romanians constructed their national identity and European consciousness did not match with the demands of the 21st century.

As a result, the constructed historical mental images and the myths of Romania as listed above generated the historical consciousness of the community. However, this is a very problematic Romanian consciousness, identity and historiography that are based on victimizing, blaming, and creating fictitious historical origins which has to be changed regarding the present day concerns, especially the European Union integration and the construction of a common European consciousness among Romanian youth.

7.2.2. Russia

In all countries and by all political cultures history is used as means to legitimize power. However, this kind of usage of history in the Soviet Union in the service of communist ideology more than seventy years was unique in itself. Also, this constructed historical consciousness, today, remarkably affects and shapes the transition of Russia and its place in Europe. That is why; Russia is a very sensitive case for the European Unions' future due to many post-socialist countries are becoming its member. In short, the main questions regarding Russia are: How is it constructed? How was the consciousness of the Soviet Union erased-if so- and how did it become Russian consciousness? What kind of memories did remain in Russian people concerning the communist past? How was Russian identity defined through history?

The policies of Glasnost, which came to life with Gorbachev in 1985 and gain speed after 1987, aimed to fuse Western style liberal economy and democracy within socialist system in order to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. It offered many suggestions in the spheres of economy and politics, but regarding the Soviet past it aimed to fill the gaps in history. The goal started to be realized with the explicit rejection of Stalin's system and with a return to the Leninist ideas. The reason to turning back to the Leninist ideas was related to Gorbachev's belief that socialism can be revitalized from where Lenin had left it. However, public was not agree with him and they denied the legitimacy of the Soviet Union. Moreover, due to the impact of media, Stalin's personal writings had been published and both Russian historians and public began to criticize their own past. These developments started a moral revolution in Russia. With these attempts, democracy, civil society, rule of law and liberal economy were introduced and the heritage of the Soviet period overtly rejected [Scherrer, 2002].

Many changes took place in the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First of all, the new authority, the Russian Federation needed state symbols in order to legitimize its power. The first symbol was the replacement of the red flag of communist regime with a tricolor blue red and white flag. The new national holiday was declared as 12th June, in 1990 when the first Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) declared its sovereignty. In addition to this, the October Revolution was no more celebrated, but the day of its past celebration declared as a day of reconciliation. Boris Yeltsin promised that the monuments, which would serve to commemorate the Civil War victims, would be build. Plus, not all Soviet Union memories were abandoned. May Day, Woman's Day, Soviet Army Day continued to be celebrated to remember the Soviet army's power and its glorious past. Traditional Christian holidays have begun to be applied again. Scherrer stated that Yeltsin's period was called as "yearning for history" in which "the epoch before 1917 was being rediscovered as the real, true Russia" [Scherrer, 2002: 95].

In addition to these, the architectural transformation of Moscow had been realized according to nostalgic memories of Russia. The buildings were reconstructed in ByzantineRussian styles and this particular conscious choice represented "...the ideology of the Russian Empire's, symbolizes the rejection of Bolshevism, the reversal of history and the physical deletion of the Soviet period from local memory" [Scherrer, 2002: 96]. Plus, not only were the buildings reconstructed but also the names of the streets and cities were changed. The memories of the Soviet Union was tried to be forgotten with the usage of original pre-Revolutionary names such as Leningrad became St. Petersburg. The visual changes continued with the construction of icons that were removed by Bolsheviks, restoration of the churches and historical museums [Scherrer, 2002]. So, the goal of the Russian authorities was, first of all, to get rid of the memories and any kind of marks of the communist regime.

However, simultaneously Russia had to construct its post-communist identity, in other words its national identity. To realize this, they used the national history. "Values that were taboo during the Soviet period have come again to the forefront, as for instance the cult of the tsars" [Scherrer, 2002: 98]. In this vein, Yeltsin organized burial ceremonies for the last tsar Nicholas II and he canonized him and his family. By doing these, they proposed to indicate the permanence of Russia's history and the legality of the Russian Federation as a regime fixed in Russia's imperial history.

Communism was no history had no history...For the sake of legitimacy of the new Russian statehood, there was no other way to legitimize the new Russian Federation except by appropriating the pre-1917 past, thus transforming the post-1917 Soviet Union into a power system exclusively based on violence and lacking the very term 'history' [Scherrer, 2002: 99].

So, the Russian national identity constructed through historical memory of traditions and pre-revolutionary Russia.

However, the Russian Federation, by idealizing the pre-revolutionary era as its real and ideal past and as its origin of national identity, ignores the social problems of that era which had led the revolutions of 1905 and 1907. In a way it distorted the usage of history.

Besides the Soviet Union and its removal from the memories, Russian state began to construct myths to strengthen itself due to the failure of the Russian society's adaptation democracy, law and civil society. Thus, the strengthening of the state power and Russian Orthodox Church became the two mainstays of Russian history [Scherrer, 2002]. In other words, just like the other nations of Europe, Russian national identity was based on constructing a powerful state; using Orthodox religion; remembering uniqueness of the Russian society and its tradition; constructing dichotomies like Russian sense of community vs. Western individualism and the spirituality of Russian orthodoxy vs. Western capitalism; and most importantly, forgetting totalitarianism, great terror of 1937, five million victims of famines, Stalinism and collectivism [Scherrer, 2002]. Russian national identity, in short, is founded on the remembrance of the glories of pre-1917 period and the forgetting of the dark side of its own history.

7.2.3. Sweden

In Sweden, since the last two decades, history is not anymore only academic or scholarly concern but also a means of understanding society and handling its problems. Klas-Göran Karlsson argues that "...Sweden had reached the end of history two decades after the end of the World War II, at least in the sense that history seemed to have lost its position as a dimension for providing society with varying, meaningful political opinions and ideological sense" [Karlsson, 2002: 145]. The historical concern in Sweden is about to spread their successful economic model to other countries, thus they use history to show the concepts that they have left behind like conservatism and nationalism and to raise young people with democratic values.

Just like in the rest of Europe, the Second World War is among one of the most hotly debated issues in Sweden. Among them, "...the Swedish involvement in Nazi gold affairs and Jewish bank accounts" and the adoption of the "policy of forced sterilization" by Swedish government during the 1930s were the most sensitive subjects. Although historians and scholars had known these issues since the beginning, the public, journalists began to discuss them overtly during the 1990s. What they discussed, regarding the gold and banking issues, was the reality that "...the Swedish postwar welfare society, *Folkhemmet* or the National home, was build on cowardly adaptability to a totalitarian regime and on the misfortunes of others" [Karlsson, 2002: 146-147]. Plus, although Sweden had explained its withdrawal from the War with Swedish ""neutrality of mind" in the past, since the 1990s, it was began to be discussed not as a non-alignment but the abuse of people and political conditions for Swedish self interests. Shortly, since the 1990s Sweden experienced a transition to public and moral use of history and began to face its dark past.

The reasons behind this transition are listed as the restructuring of the Central and Eastern European countries and the increased significance of the questions concerning identity that came up with the processes of mass migration, multiculturalism and Europeanization. Swedish people began to ask themselves, who are we? Who are they? What unites us with them? [Karlsson, 2002]. Additionally, the problems occurred in the Swedish economic system and the weakening of the welfare state forced them to interpret their history from different perspectives.

7.2.3.1. Sweden and the use of Holocaust

One of the activities in Swedish renaissance of history was the large scale campaign about the Holocaust. It was called *Levande historia*, Living History [Karlsson, 2002]. A book was written on the violent acts of the Nazis. During the campaign, this book translated into many Swedish minority languages and sent to all families and students of the country. The campaign was not only restricted with the book but also conferences, courses, documentaries and movies were included. The aim of the campaign was

...to inform about the Holocaust in order to better cope with current Swedish social problems, primarily increasing expressions of racism, anti-Semitism and new-Nazism among Swedish youth...to strengthen tolerance, human values and respect for democracy in Swedish society by letting young people know more about the Holocaust...prevent genocide from repeating itself [Karlsson, 2002: 149].

Living History was initiated in three different contexts to realize its aims. The first one was the national level. It would serve to bring the fact about Sweden, its war experiences and its relation with the Holocaust. In other words, it would change the fake notion of "Swedish neutral mind" and show the reality that human rights were violated and even genocide had been integrated to realize the political and economic interests of modern societies including Sweden.

The second context was European one. The project at this stage aimed to gather and relate all European people around common historical experiences. By this way, in the era of European integration the Holocaust, its atrocities and in general the WWII would be common grounds that would lead people see their mistakes and gather around one purpose: A peaceful, united Europe. In other words, this common traumatic experience would accelerate the unification process and the membership of Sweden into the EU. In the last context which was global level, departed from the fact that genocide was still being practiced in Europe,

maybe in different formats than the Holocaust. Thus, the usage of the Holocaust as a universal symbol can prevent new painful experiences [Karlsson, 2002].

Although the campaign seems very beneficial and the aims are really promising there is a problem with the use of history here, actually the abuse of history by the Swedish authorities politically. The Swedish people tried to link the current problems of racism and neo-Nazism directly to the Holocaust. In other words, they showed the Holocaust or used the experience of the Holocaust as the sole origin of their contemporary social problems. To hide this abuse they supported their campaign with persuasive connections and comparisons with the past although they excluded the other genocide experiences, Sweden's other conducts in the War and Soviet communist terror under Lenin and Stalin [Karlsson, 2002].

How should then the Holocaust be taught or be used for the good purposes? Karlsson argues that the Holocaust has an autonomous, unique, moral and intellectual value in itself. It is almost impossible to suit the Holocaust to realize political objectives; this will be the abuse of this historical experience. Due to the values it consists, teaching of the facts of the Holocaust should serve for more humane, moral and peaceful objectives, not to legitimize countries' current political problems.

7.3. National European Experiences of History Education and European Consciousness in Education

7.3.1. Finland

"Collective identity refers to a socially interactive process, where people identify themselves with events, institutions and values" [Ahonen, 2001: 91]. Finland, particularly the young Finns, constitute a unique case in terms of collective identity and the way they perceive their national history. The explanation of this unique situation will be done through a research project, *The No-History Generation*, done by Sirkka Ahonen which aimed to find out historical events that young Finns identified themselves with and how their identification is connected to their relations with older generations. In this project Ahonen chose three different historical memories which are sensitive issues of the 20th century Finland: 1918

Civil War in Finland, 1939-1944 the Finnish-Soviet Wars and socio-structural changes from the 1950s to 1970s, in particular the creation of the welfare state.

First of all, the 1918 Civil War was a fight between the Whites and Reds and it was based on the cause of socialism versus bourgeoisie society in Finland. The Whites won the war and then terror began in Finland with the killings of 80000 Reds in concentration camps, executions and starvation. The second traumatic event was the 1939-1944 Finnish-Soviet Wars in which Soviets won the war and Finns became the ally of Nazi Germany. The third one was about the great migrations and urbanization movements in Finland. This period was also traumatic because the constructed social security system was not equally applied. The result was epidemic diseases, tuberculosis, unemployment and extreme suicide rates in urban areas of Finland which resulted with the reconstruction of social security system [Ahonen, 2001].

Regarding the 1918 Civil War of Finland what Ahonen found is that the memories of it or the identification of youth itself with this period of Finland's history is absent. The reasons for this outcome are listed as the lack of shame of this event among young Finns and the end of the generation who experienced the Civil War that brought the end of live memories and their transaction [Ahonen, 2001].

The case of the Finnish-Russian war of 1939-1944 shows the opposite in terms of the existence of the generation which experienced the event directly. About the Finnish-Russian war case, the war memories are very much alive and young Finns are more enthusiastic about listening to the memories of their grandparents compared to their enthusiasm toward the Civil War of 1918. However, the problem is that grandparents, especially grandfathers, do not share their memories. The old generation lists several reasons for their silence. One of them is that they really do not like talking about those times because life was so poor for them. The other reason is that the war is not a good thing to talk about because it only awakens the memories of horror, violence and revenge and because of this they must be forgotten. However, one more reason can be listed but not explicitly mentioned by the older generations is that they feel the deep shame of joining the Nazi Germany and do not want to remember of this shame [Ahonen, 2001]. In short what is observable among the older generation is a refusal to memorize the war traumas again and again. So, what does the older generation share with their grandchildren? Rather than sharing their memories of the Second World War, "...today's grandparents are more acquainted with the way of life of the young than to inform

the young about the old ways" [Ahonen, 2001: 95]. Then, the question is: How do the young Finns perceive the Second World War memories of their nation?

The young Finns do not feel shame of the Nazi Germany alliance of their country. They perceive the Finnish-Russian war as a milestone in their nation construction period and mostly interested in the survival stories of their grandparents because they look for the hints of national pride and heroic stories in their history. However, it is important to highlight that the way the older generation defines Russians is not hostile. They mostly define them with their disorganization during the war and with their weakness but they never constructed the image of an evil enemy Russia. So, this reflected to young Finns and they are not interested in creating historical enemies which shows the lack of extreme, aggressive nationalistic tendencies [Ahonen, 2001].

The last sensitive historical event in Finnish history is the creation of welfare state and socio-structural changes from the 1950s to 1970s. The young Finnish students do not have historical understanding of the creation of welfare state in their country and the hazards experienced by their grandparents. They do not know the struggles of people in the past for having modern and universal welfare structures in their country. Students are lack of info in the numerous protests, campaigns and demonstrations their grandparents did to gain equal social security rights. The reason of this lack of knowledge may be originated from students' lack of interest to the topic but also the lack of sharing experiences of older generation with their grandchildren is another explanation. Ahonen stated that "the grandparents, who had themselves experienced an enormous change from the poor agrarian Finland of the early 50's to the rich welfare society of today, seem to feel awkward and embarrassed about having faced poverty, simplicity and hierarchy in the society of the old world" [Ahonen, 2001: 104].

What is more, the difficult and traumatic times of the 1950s for the older generation perceived as progress by young Finns. The rational explanation of this depends on the fact that because older generation do hide the details of difficult times, the stories only include a transition from a poor life to a better conditions of the welfare state.

In Finland the national identity construction, besides history education in schools, is being realized through family memories such as military competencies and civil survivals, civil society construction, and public historical culture. However, the young generations mostly build their national identities on the memories of war and heroic stories, not on the history of the welfare state. The reason for the proclivity towards the war memories lies in "...the incapacity of the old people to convey memories of the struggle for social justice and security. Old people have talked about unity in the war efforts but not about solidarity in the welfare pursuits" [Ahonen, 2001: 105]. Additionally, the explicit shame of the older generation towards the Nazi Germany alliance, the violence in the Civil War and extreme poorness of the unequally practiced welfare state do not visible among young Finns.

What is more, due to lessening of family memories, their hiding because of shame and historical guilt and the lack of transition of them to younger generations make the construction of collective identity in Finland base more on international events rather than national and domestic experiences; and the role of contemporary media should not be underestimated here. Plus, the historical novels and movies, which can help young Finns to construct historical empathy with their pasts, are not consumed by them.

In short, the typical feature of Finland's national and collective identity construction is significantly related to the transition of memories from one generation to the other. However, due to sensitive historical experiences of the past, the guilt felt by people who directly experienced these events, the tendency of old generations towards hiding national memories and the lack of young Finns' interests to their rural past makes them literally the *No-History generation*.

7.3.2. Hungary

In Hungary, the European integration accelerated the country's attempts on promoting political, cultural, economic and educational programs. Among them the educational programs focused on improving students' skills, competencies and abilities about knowledge-based society because education is mostly seen in Hungary as the most important means to join the competitive market of the European Union. As the White Paper on education and training in 1996 stated "Basic knowledge is the foundation on which individual employability is built. This is par excellence the domain of the formal education and training system. A good balance has to be struck in basic education between acquiring knowledge and methodological skills which enable a person to learn alone" [White Paper, 1995: 13]⁵⁴ Thus, it can be stated that Hungary in its education system tries to strengthen this balance.

⁵⁴ To read the full text see <u>http://www.mszs.si/eurydice/pub/eu/lb-en.pdf</u>

Regarding the European dimension in teaching and learning process in Hungary Bero and Vass asserted that the teaching of European dimensions in history, literature and geography is not a new paradigm for Hungary. However, what is new or what is being improved in Hungary regarding education is the level of political culture, knowledge, skills and competencies of students. To be more specific, the emphasis in education in Hungary is on

...the collection of European cultural roots, attitudes and values of civilization such as democracy, human rights, freedom and tolerance...the usefulness and utility of the pupils' textbook data, particularly with regard to their correspondence with the present curricula...teaching based on relevant data, statistics and maps...illustration of integration and differentiation and consideration of the local, regional, national and global aspects of the enhancement of a European dimension...more complex competencies of communication, collecting and selecting information, co-operation and problem solving...self-awareness, self-evaluation, social and environmental awareness...[Bero and Vass, 2001: 142-143].

All these aims were tried to be materialized in 1998 with the Hungarian National Core Curriculum. The changes in the new curriculum were not only done in content of lessons and their materials like textbooks but also in methodology. With this curriculum Hungary shifted its subject-focused education system to competency-based system in which three different levels of teaching were defined: Subject level, cross cultural level and extra-curricular level. To put it differently, what changed in Hungary is the way they provide information about Europe to their young generations.

In the subject level, the aim is to give students information about Europe and improve their perceptions and competencies about European identity and citizenship. In this level, European history has more emphasis compared to the world history and among European history 20 % of it belongs to Western Europe. These emphases are not only visible in teaching methods or just in in-class practices but also in teaching aids like textbooks and syllabuses. In addition to these, the subjects mostly concentrate on common European experiences such as religion, culture, empires, economy, heroes and international cooperation because the general aim is to provide European unity on students' minds [Bero and Vass, 2001].

In this level, the organization of teaching has some steps. According to Hungarian educational authorities, students should first learn the regions of Europe as western, northern, central and eastern and then social and economic characteristics of the continents including their changes over time and at last they should learn the interaction of these continents and the outcomes. In short, the subject level provide students chance of improving their knowledge

about Europe in a traditional way that means through the facts, chronology and Hungarian perspective [Bero and Vass, 2001].

The second level is cross-curricular level in which the main approach is interdisciplinarity. It aims to "...provide time to develop skills and competencies on European identity and consciousness, and created continuity and coherency between the fragmented knowledge about Europe" [Bero and Vass, 2001: 145]. The subjects of the second level are European environment, politics, migration, culture, civilization, unity, diversity, change, conflicts, safety and continuity. Through these themes what is expected is to understand the common European values, the role of Hungary in European development, the lives, traditions and values of neighboring countries and the significance of European unity.

The last one is extra-curricular level in which students were expected to widen their knowledge about Europe through out-school activities such as visiting museums, participating European festivals and commemorations, and joining European projects, clubs and European Days.

Hungarian history education program does not only involve teaching of European history with a European dimension. It also teaches students the European consciousness and civic education. To be more specific, Hungary, since the end of the 1970s also focuses on topics like family, workplace, society and Europe in general and discusses the problems regarding these topics and problematic areas such as civic education, human rights, civil society and global problems. Thus, Europe is not only dealt through its history but also with its present problems and concerns. Hungary also encourages the implementation of multiperspective approaches to these topics; although it is not fulfilled yet; it is promising for the future.

Another way of increasing students' consciousness about Europe is through teaching of the European Union, its institutions and policies, the Council of Europe, NATO and other organizations and the role of Hungary in them. Thus, the history education system in Hungary supports the education of European past and present.

The changes in the new curriculum are not only done in content of lessons and their materials like textbooks but also in methodology [Bero and Vass, 2001]. First of all, although in the subject level the methodology seems more traditional and based on facts and chronology, it must be known that this is not the whole picture. History teaching and learning in Hungary is mostly based on independent learning, creativity and done through personal

activities in which students are not passive listeners of teachers' narratives. The application of this modern method is being done through small group works in classes in which students find chances to apply and improve their critical thinking and problem solving abilities. Moreover, Hungary frequently applies debates on European topics, problem solving research work, long-term projects and role plays to students to make them internalize the dynamics, values, divergences, convergences and traditions of Europe. The inclusion of teaching of different regions of Europe to the curriculums makes students see the differences in Europe and how these differences lead Europe's well-known "unity in diversity" [Bero and Vass, 2001].

To summarize, Hungary is a very promising country in terms of the application of new National Curriculum in history to their pupils. It works hard to apply methodological and content base changes in history education because Hungarian authorities are aware of the necessity of having European consciousness and European dimension in history in the minds of new generations. Although the country has financial problems and constraint regarding time, just like the other Central and Eastern European countries, it is up to now showed numerous progresses to improve its history education.

7.3.3. Romania

The Romanian educational system has three cycles as primary, secondary and high schools. For each of them history is a compulsory subject⁵⁵. Each cycle ends with Romanian history because to enter next educational stage students have to take a national examination in Romania. Thus, this condition of history teaching proves that teaching Romanian history is a priority for authorities of education and teachers in the country [Capita, 2001].

However, there have been initiatives for improving European dimension of history in Romania. For example, in the year 2000, the Ministry of National Education of Romania added a course to the curriculum of high schools: Integration in the European Union [Capita, 2001]. The National Curriculum also asserted that there will be subjects in Romanian history

⁵⁵ To see the details of the national curriculum of history in Romania and to have a detailed info on history education grade-by-grade see [Capita, 2001: 72-74]

syllabuses in which Europe related issues and issues regarding being European are explicitly mentioned both for secondary and high schools. For secondary schools these areas are

The Dacian world and Europe...the appearance of new power centres in Europe... the medieval society in Europe; the state in medieval Europe; the beginnings of absolute monarch in Europe and Europe after the 30 year war...the Napoleonic Code and its influence in Europe; Central and Eastern Europe...; the installation of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, the communist states; the division of Europe, the Cold War and its effects...the year 1989 in Europe, and Europe and the world in the modern era [Capita, 2001: 76].

For high school students the mentioning of Europe is a little bit stronger and detailed. The areas for high school are

...the Indo-European languages and people; the Christianization of the nobility and common people in Europe, Christian Europe and Islam...Renaissance figures in Central and Eastern Europe...daily life in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe...the balance of power policy in Europe; the Ottoman Empire and Europe; the beginning of the Oriental Problem; European nations in the Napoleonic Empire...the French Revolution and Europe...Europe and the Jewish identity...the nazi 'new order' in Europe, the fascist alternative; the necessity and principles of European unity; the formation of a new European consciousness...European unity and the problem of the integration of former communist states...[Capita, 2001: 76-77].⁵⁶

Although the list of areas seem many, the representation of Europe or the European perspective is not clear actually. To put it differently, there is a contradiction between what is mentioned in the National curriculum document and the application in classrooms. Specifically, as Capita mentioned, seventy percent of curriculum is Romanian history and the rest belongs to European one. Also, the links between Romanian and European histories are very weak; students perceive them as almost totally different and exclusive histories.

Rather than the content, the textbooks in Romania also must be scrutinized in order to understand the national experience of Romania in history. First of all, textbooks on the topic of Europe show parallelism with the National Curriculum in terms of content list but the open and clear expressions of Europe are not that much visible. Secondly, the Romanian history textbooks include information about Europe but not on a continental base. In other words, when culture and economics are the subjects Europe or the related countries are being mentioned; however, the general progress of the related issue is not reflected on European scale. Only in issues such as the Second World War and post-1989 Romania it is possible to see direct references to Europe [Capita, 2001].

⁵⁶ For the full list of areas see [Capita, 2001:76-78]

Thirdly, Romanian history textbooks do seem to have the aim of giving students as much information as possible, "...with a side effect of reducing the debate over issues that are more likely to be introduced by focusing on Europe as a special topic" [Capita, 2001: 79]. In other words, too much information on several topics prevents opportunities of students to discuss on European related issues and develop their own ideas about related subject; so in Romania students rather than knowing historical subject in-dept and questioning them have their history lessons based on their teachers' narratives. However, this negative situation changes when the subject of history is contemporary Romanian history, says Capita. The references to Europe increase both in terms of number and their consistency with Romanian history.

Another important category in Romanian history education is in-class practices. This category is actually promising concerning the inclusion of European perspective to Romanian history and the emergence of European consciousness among young Romanians. First of all, regarding in-class practices there is a "hidden curriculum" in the classes [Capita, 2001]. It means that the external sources of information like teachers' in-service training about the current developments in history and in particular the European Union, the use of several channels of media by students help the strengthening of European dimension, perspective and European content in history lessons.

To continue in the same vein, in terms of positive sides in Romanian history, the approach towards ethnic minorities in Romania shows potential regarding promoting multiperspectivity, tolerance and respect for minorities. In National Curriculum, there is a course named "*The history and traditions of minorities*" which enables secondary school students who belong to different ethnicities in Romania to learn their histories and cultural heritage of their ethnic groups. This promising act is not limited in this point, moreover "…instead of focusing on the evolution of the respective minority and its relations to the majority in Romania, there is a distinct emphasis on presenting the history of the state that has this particular minority as a majority" [Capita, 2001: 74]. This makes students learn their ethnic histories from different point of views and makes them learn the topics in-dept.

To sum up, the Romanian National Curriculum is to a certain extent successful in providing convergence between the official documents' goals, contents and in classroom activities. There is a tendency towards the inclusion of European perspectives, and towards the integration of Romanian and European histories. However, this is not a total success because as it is stated by the Council of Europe "' the twin tasks of introducing a truly European-wide dimension into the curriculum and of combating prejudice, stereotypes, xenophobia and cruel nationalistic attitudes throughout the history curriculum will not be efficiently addressed simply by the introduction of additional curriculum content" [Capita, 2001]. To put it differently, the inclusion of many topics related to Europe does not mean that students are gaining European perspectives, common values and European consciousness. This is what happens in Romania. The National Curriculum defines and adds many European related topics but the ways they are practiced in class do not materialize what is aimed. The problem is not only in teaching methods or the way these topics practiced in class but also in the textbooks. As Capita affirmed, "European history tends to be more of an annex to Romanian history" [Capita, 2001: 79]. Only subjects the World War I and II, Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy and the situation in Romania in between two world wars include obvious European perspective.

Plus, in Romanian history education there is a significant contradiction between textbooks and actual in-class practices in terms of the application of European perspectives. With the influence of outside sources of history students and teachers use more European views and discuss on them. However, this cannot be generalized to all Romania.

Also, there are significant differences in the coverage of local, regional, national, European and global histories as mentioned above. European focuses are mostly on Western European countries. Romanian students also do not learn too much about their neighbors. What is more, in the in-school activities and textbooks Europe is mostly explained through rivalry, conflict and war whereas students learn common cultural values, tolerance and unity in Europe from outside sources in Romania [Capita, 2001].

An overall conclusion regarding Romania is that, instead of some significant attempts and successes towards European perspectives, at the end it still has a dominant traditional history teaching based on national history of Romania and in terms of methods and teaching materials it is based on narratives, use of textbooks, lack of historical reasoning, and multiperspectivity.

7.3.4. France

In 1992 French Ministry of Education proposed a history curriculum that could be regarded as significantly progressive one in terms of providing European-ness and historical consciousness among students in France. According to this curriculum, until the first year of lycée history should be taught chronologically and in the last two grades of it history must be taught through themes. The main focus points of this curriculum was "...constitution of the state, birth of the nation, organization of free-trade, and freedom of opinions and religious convictions" [Martin, 2001: 46]. What is more, the sole emphasis would not be on French history but all European countries to promote commonness in Europe and improve European identity among pupils. As Martin mentioned, the perception of Europe in this curriculum proposal was "...a political and social territory, without any strict borders, but identified by its historical involvement in freedom of thought, religion or belief and trade...Europe cannot be synonymous for western civilization" [Martin, 2001: 46]. From these features, this proposal seemed like an influential one in terms of providing the developments the Maastricht Treaty brought regarding common European identity and being European. However, the outcome was not the application of it in France but many challenges by French authorities and teachers. Their arguments based on the insufficient attention to French politics, too complicated structure of it, rejection of the separation of chronology and interpretation of history and lack of enough emphasis to French national history [Martin, 2001]. Thus, the curriculum proposal of 1992 could not be materialized.

Due to rejections raised by French teachers and educational authorities, new curriculum was prepared. In this new curriculum the major emphasis is on national history and "*connoissances patrimoniales*".⁵⁷ French history curriculum is mostly filled with history of the states and governments. The history of communities that are non-nations, ideological

⁵⁷ As Martin stated, there is no exact translation of it in English. However, at best it can be translated as "patrimonial knowledge". The new curriculum defined some particular facts and events in which the origins of French identity lie. Thus, these facts and events such as the 14 July 1789, the prise de la Bastille, industrial revolution made compulsory in history education. For further details see [Martin, 2001: 47]

aspects of history, and the roles of individuals are not touched upon in this curriculum. Moreover,

economic and social dimensions are illustrated from a global point of view, neglecting their inner contradictions, without any reference to religious or cultural dimension. European history is taught as if European unification could not have been a matter of discussion in the past...Non-European people are of little importance before the 19th century, because their opportunity to appear in French history is only given when their examples explain the success story of Europe as a major world colonizer [Martin, 2001: 48].

What is more, Martin wrote that other countries like Germany and Italy are not mentioned through their peculiarities as nations. To put it differently, Germany is being mentioned when the subject matter is Nazism and Italy is only mentioned when the topic is Renaissance and Fascism. Moreover, no emphasis to Jews before the Second World War, no slavery during the Industrial Revolution and no place for women and gender relations in general history course. The ignored topics continue with the historical context of Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the opponents of them, different aspects of liberalism [Martin, 2001].

Thus, all aforementioned explanations make us to come up with the general French practices towards history. Among these practices, the first one is that in France teaching of history and research on it is dependent on the state power. This was not the 20th century phenomenon but was lasting since the 18th century and even before. History in France including its writing, research and teaching, just like in other European countries, since those times, was a tool to legitimize the power of the king. This trend continued until today by shifting from legitimizing the kings to legitimizing the power of the nation states. With the 19th century, history became the strongest mean to construct national identity. Regarding this tradition Martin asks a very important question: "...if history in France was always seen as a slave of the state, how could history be free of the state in a European community, allowing rival memories and rival research?" [Martin, 2001: 50-51].

The second general feature of French history is that since the beginning, French political system originated itself from the idea that French history involved the idea of the nation; France, for them, was the birthplace of the nation [Martin, 2001]. This strong belief, of course, dominated the history education in country. Thus, the question is, how can French history education be freed from this dependence to provide European-ness and common European identity among students?

The third feature is the belief on French authorities that history is a way of creating French citizens and citizenship. Through the compulsory standing of patrimonial knowledge in history lessons, and through creating national heroes France is trying to strengthen French citizenship and identity. Thus, these kinds of uses (or abuses) of history make history automatically dependent on politics in France.

The last feature is that French people due to the experiences of the French Revolution and the Declaration of Human Rights in their territories consider their history and wanted it to be understood by the rest of the world as the "universal history" [Martin, 2001]. This perception, thus, makes French history education not focus on regional, local histories. To put it differently, French history education tries to make students internalize the unity of their state, not differences in their regions.

If this is the case in France, then, what should be done regarding teaching of European history? Martin suggests that if national habits are tried to be completely eliminated it will not work because a transition in education systems necessitates long time and it is impossible to eliminate national tendencies and nationalist views in French history. For this reason, what must be done should be within ongoing national traditions in history. Thus, the first thing that should be done is to formulate new historical orientations that will be able to mix national or regional features with European principles. As an example he stated that "…French people should certainly be confronted the conquest of European neighbors carried out by Louis the XIV or by the French Revolution or Napoléon, in order to explain how the political discourse caused great disillusions and provoked nationalism" [Martin, 2001: 57].

Also, according to Martin, European history should be constructed just like national histories. The history textbook authors must find new heroes, events and values that will be accepted by all students no matter to which nationality, ethnicity and religion they belong. However, one significant difference from national history is, the European history, besides including successes, conflicts, struggles should include failures and different perceptions of the same events among European nations. To eliminate the rise of hatred, prejudices, bias and contradictions among students, the concept of "Europe" must be taught as it is something new and has new principle, values and codes.

In short, besides the suggestions to create a common European history and its peaceful teaching to students, the general condition in France is that they see European history from their own point of view. French curriculum is still full of French perceptions and interpretations and the root of this condition depends on the view that history is for the construction of national identity and for legitimizing and spreading of state unity in France.

So, if this is the general view towards history and its perception by the authorities, to what extent are French students influenced from this situation? How do they see Europe?⁵⁸

French students have various perceptions and ideas regarding Europe and the European Union. First of all, the ones between 14-15 years old do not consider themselves as present or future actors in Europe. Among the 18-19 year-old group perceptions show differentiations. For example, some of them do not have a concept of European future and Europe has no significance. For some others, the future role of the European Union is obvious but they see France weak in the Union. What is promising is that a very small group of French students feel European consciousness and believe that they will actively take place in the construction of a common Europe [Guillon, 2001].

In terms of economic development of Europe, French students share the same opinion of a progress in European economy. However, in terms of identity they do not feel in the same way. They are afraid to loose their cultural and national identity in the integration process of the European Union. Guillon asserted that French students' fear on this issue can be seen from their experience of Europe through travel, exchange programs, culture and family structures [Guillon, 2001].

Moreover, the perceptions of the European Union among French students from different age groups differ to a certain extent. The younger ones relate the European Union to an ideal social structure in which solidarity, equality, peace and harmony will take place. However, the elder French students give emphasis to tolerance instead of harmony and they do not perceive diversity as a negative aspect.

Concerning the "others", French students define two different categories of others. The first one is economic competitors of Europe such as Japan and the US and the other one is countries which have different cultures and mentalities such as Russia and Turkey. Also, from a nationalist perspective, sometimes they define other countries of Europe such as Germany, Britain, Italian, Greeks and especially the post-socialist countries as the "others". However,

⁵⁸ The perspectives of French students towards Europe, being European and history education in Europe will be given through the use of an empirical study conducted by the department for didactics of social and human sciences at the Institut de la Recherche Pédagogique and written by Nicole Tutiaux-Guillon. The outcomes that will be mentioned in this part are the results of a 313 students from 14 to 18 years old from all ber the Rhônes-Alpes region of France. For further details of the research project see [Guillon, 2001: 164-167]

the European "others" mostly are not defined in a negative way; this differentiation generally focuses on the differences which are considered as enriching and attractive [Guillon, 2001].

What is more, French students defined themselves through their "...territory, family, language and culture but there is no mention of a common history or a common political project...The community they refer to is not exactly a nation, and that this sense of identity is not explicitly linked to an historical consciousness" [Guillon, 2001: 174]. French students never use the phrase "we Europeans" and even sometimes they refer to European identity as a future identity project which will emerge through time and never existed or never could be found in the past because the past is full of wars and conflicts. Plus, "Europe is the politicians' affairs, not the citizens'. Europe is too wide, too far. There is no feeling of belonging to a European territory nor to a European emotional power" [Guillon, 2001: 174].

To sum up, French students identify Europe through economic and political terms, thus it is a limited space with specific content due to historical experiences. However, the European Union is the representation of an ideal society in which equality, freedom, solidarity, harmony-for the young students-, and tolerance-for the older ones- will be practiced. Thus, European consciousness seems lack among French students due to narrow perceptions of Europe. In terms of historical consciousness, the past for French students mostly limited with their national history and the future is not taken into account. Thus, just like European consciousness historical consciousness seems problematic.

7.3.5. Latvia

During the Soviet rule in Latvia, European history, multiperspective understanding of history and alternative perceptions of European history were forbidden in schools. However, the history of Europe and some topics such as revolutions, class struggles, capitalism and feudalism had been mentioned in schools only from the Russian Empire perspective in order to legitimize Soviet ideology and to make students internalize the regime without questioning. Plus, the mentioned Europe was western part of it, in particular Britain, Germany and France. However, after the independence of Latvia in 1991 these practices changed. The communist perception of European history had gone and instead a Latvian perspective of history turned out to be dominant in schools. The long-term ignorance of Latvia's neighbor countries' and

other regions' histories ended and histories of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Scandinavia and Eastern Prussia began to be taught to Latvian students [Klisans, 2001]. In Latvia, presently, "...the history of Europe...is nether a national nor an ethnic perspective but a territorial or regional perspective, it focuses from neighboring territories to distant countries" [Klisans, 2001: 111].

In Latvia, one of the biggest problems regarding history is the lack of unified opinion on the European Union and related issues such as European identity and European awareness. Moreover, just like in other post-communist countries, Latvia lacks a completely constructed national identity. Due to this situation, one of the most debated issues in the country was how to organize history education; through a single integrated history or a divided history, on the one hand world history and on the other hand the history of Latvia. The holders of the second approach believed that the unified approach would lead to dissolve of Latvian national history in common history. Thus, this would prevent students understand the continuity of their national histories and additionally this group showed evidence that Latvian students do not have any idea about their national holidays and commemoration days of their country [Klisans, 2001]. In other words, the lack of national and patriotic feelings of youth necessitated the division of history in Latvia into two as a world and Latvian histories.

On the other hand, the supporters of the first view argued that the division of history into separate subjects would make teaching of some topics impossible such as the Nordic Crusades, Swedish and Russian periods in Latvia, etc [Klisans, 2001]. As a result, with the support of Association of History Teachers and the Ministry of Education and Science history continued to be taught as an integrated subject. This application brought a new aspect to European dimension of history in Latvia. European dimension, according to Latvian educational authorities did mean "...the possibility for pluralistic interpretations of the past, tolerant attitudes and approaches to contradictory issues and interactive learning methods" [Klisans, 2001: 112]. Of course, the content, the inclusion of topics about Europe was not underestimated but the emphasis was on the methodology of history and the way history was taught to students; and more importantly the skills and abilities that students gained through history mostly mattered in achievement of European dimension in Latvia.

The new history in Latvia in which local, national, regional, and world histories were integrated backed up by several institutions such as the EUROCLIO, the Soros Foundation, Association of Latvian History Teachers and the Council of Europe. Not only was teaching system renewed in Latvia but also the examination system. After these changes the national examinations included more skill-based questions, and questions ask for historical analysis and reasoning. All these changes are positive for Latvia and its history education. However, one problem continued to lie in history textbooks. Although the system, methods and aims of history changed, the history textbooks remained as they were in the 1990s. Thus, in Latvia there is a significant contradiction in simultaneous use of modern teaching methods and traditional history textbooks, which may result with the emergence of historical confusions on students' minds.

In short, Latvia's approaches towards wider European awareness and historical consciousness seem promising. The problems regarding history do not lie in different mentalities but in economic constraints and constraints regarding time. To reach their aims Latvians need time to renew their textbooks and need financial power to publish and allocate them each corner of the country and again need economic strength to increase the low salaries of teachers to motivate them in their occupation.

7.3.6. Wales

In Europe many countries are multilingual and multicultural. Countries do involve many different groups, which have different backgrounds, divergent structures, beliefs and values. Due to this structure of Europe, many teachers face the challenge of teaching of a balanced history of their society in which different groups have prejudices, biases, contradictions and even hostility regarding other groups. "To present the history of a minority in a way which is fair both to that minority and to the majority, and to do that in a way which sets national experiences in its European and global context is the challenge which faces teachers in all countries in Europe" [Jones, 2001: 36]. This challenge is especially strong in Britain "…where the history, culture and language of England has for centuries dominated the other countries of the British Isles and the prevailing attitude to the European Union would appear to be one of indifference or even suspicion and unease…" [Jones, 2001: 36].

Wales, as Jones states, can be considered Britain's first colony. At the end of the thirteenth century Wales were completely conquered by Anglo-Norman empire. In the fifteenth century some punitive laws made the native Wales' people a powerless underclass.

However, with Wales' integration with England in the first half of the 16th century replaced these damaging laws with English laws. Thus, Wales began to take part in English state and laws and the original customs and languages of Wales came to an end in terms of having legal standing. To put it differently, Wales were legally absorbed by England. This absorption naturally included the education system of Wales by England. The education system in Wales was the same with England's. The history lessons only covered political and constitutional history of England; there was no emphasis towards other British Isles either.

However, with the 19th century, the increase of nationalist tendencies and nationalism in Europe reflected to Wales and also Ireland and Scotland. These countries demanded some changes in education with the influence of nationalism. One of these changes was "...the Welsh Intermediate Education act of 1889, which allowed local councils to finance secondary education from local taxes...the establishment of institutions to administer, examine and inspect schools in Wales-and the writing of school text-books on Welsh history, which became a compulsory element in public examinations in Wales" [Jones, 2001: 38]; however, this emphasis on Welsh history was neglected for a long time and under the title of Welsh history the history of England and the relationships of Welsh with England were studied. What is more, there was no attention given to other countries in United Kingdom or to European aspects.

With the 1970s and 1980s, Europe experienced a significant change in education. The teaching methodologies began to be discussed; sources were criticized; and historical thinking and critical analysis were declared as aims of history. Also, national histories in Europe increased their scopes and the European dimension and European history began to be studied. These changes naturally affected the education of Welsh history, too. In 1989 there established a new Education Reform Act. With this Act, Wales, England and Northern Ireland established their national curriculums. In particular, in Wales, this Act made Welsh language a compulsory course. From four to fourteen years old, history education was done through Welsh perspective. The emphasis between seven and eleven would be the relations among Wales and Britain; also between eleven and fourteen the dept of history on the same topics would increase and the international dimension of history would be present in these years [Jones, 2001]. The important thing regarding history in Wales is that students are free to take history or not after fourteen years old. The ones who want to continue history education can focus on different nations' histories with no emphasis on British history; and these students

mostly choose to focus on the Second World War, Fascism and Nazism in Europe. Jones explains the consequence of this condition in Wales by saying that "...students' interests determine to a very large extent the topics studies in history, and also, to a lesser extent, the approaches and methods followed, which are still at the discretion of the teacher [Jones, 2001: 40-41]. To put it differently, up until the twenty first century, the freedom of choice in Wales among students and the topics they focused on could not promote a sense of European-ness and a common European culture among students.

However, this situation changed with the introduction of new examinations in Wales in 2000. With this change, each syllabus was required to include European dimension; as a result, European studies courses began to be studied. These courses included "...the institutions of the European Union, the major treaties, European security systems...the policies of the European Union, tourism...the enlargement of the union, economic and monetary union, cultural diversity and environment" [Jones, 2001: 42].

These changes also reflected to the methods of history teaching. Since the last thirty years, says Jones, Wales supports active and independent learning in history through interactive teaching methods, role-plays and inquiry approaches. Also, teachers use outside sources like museums, and historical sites. The usage of primary and secondary sources, their comparisons are being provided to students. Moreover, there is a significant emphasis towards multiperspectivity and different interpretations of history in Wales, plus an attempt to balance teaching of local, national, regional, European and world histories is obvious. However, the coverage of Eastern European countries' histories, excluding Russia, and the Scandinavian countries are still absent in Wales.

Since this is the general condition in Wales, it is possible to sum up with the view that the absorption of Wales by Britain and Welsh history by the history of Britain determined the development of history education of Europe. Today, people of Wales are still working on to construct their national identities and the spread of the use of their language. So, just like the Central and Eastern European countries, in Wales there is a simultaneous construction of both national and European identities.

7.4. History Textbooks and Complete "European History" Books in Europe

7.4.1. European History Textbooks

What is a textbook? The first answer comes to mind is that they are standardized teaching materials which are actually the most used ones; concerning our subject they are the most used teaching materials in Europe. They are produced to address a whole generation of students, which means they do not, in particular, focus on specific students and their different learning capacity and abilities. Thus, they consider each student has the same skills, intelligence and abilities. The textbooks offer a bunch of information, questions, exercises and materials for students to improve themselves about regarding subjects. "As a rule, history textbooks offer a variety of methods and offer us a large bulk of names, events and topics, many of which will actually not be taught in the classroom, nor read and memorized by students"; thus these standardized teaching instruments are less efficiently used than their authors and the educational authorities had thought [Pingel, 2001: 207].

The general aim of this chapter is to show how Europe is defined in several European countries' textbooks, the promising developments and negative items and also to determine the sense of balance or challenge between European and national approaches in history teaching.

The first country I will concentrate on is Britain. As a result of the examinations of Pingel on European textbooks in several European countries, in secondary school geography textbooks of England, it is possible to state that there is no coherent image of Europe. Europe is only discussed in national context, not as a separate subject. The "united Europe" image is being linked to ancient times such as the Roman Empire. Also, Napoleon and Hitler are taught as people who dreamed this unity. This confuses students' minds about a united Europe image because Napoleon's and Hitler's united Europe dreams had depended on the rule of one power on the rest of Europe; however today's dream is about the equality of all nations and their cooperation for common goals for Europe and in Europe [Pingel, 2001]. In short, they way England's textbooks teach the image of a united Europe does not, to a certain extent, correspond with today's European unity.

Additionally, English textbooks, when the theme, in European chapter, is the contrasts in Europe, do not mention their country with contrasts but only mention Italy's north-south divide. Plus, the study questions or questions to think in textbooks reflect a significant contradiction between being a nationalist and European. For example,

Nationalism means that people are proud to belong to a country, rather than a larger place called Europe...Are you a European or a nationalist?...Why would belonging to a fully united Europe be a good thing? Why would keeping a country's national identity be a good thing? [Pingel, 2001: 208].

As it is visible, the reflection of being European and having national identity are reflected as mutually exclusive phenomenon. However, the representation of the European Union obviously differs from being European. The European Union is being depicted as a success story and this story is being supported through various teaching materials such as statistics, maps and figures. Compared to the depiction of Britain in European chapters, the more realistic approaches are visible in the European Union parts. Although the general message about the European Union is positive considering it a successful and promising project, in addition to economic, political and social successes, the economic differences among countries in terms of inequality, their different goals expected from the Union and the advantages and disadvantages of European integration are explicitly being mentioned.

However, the existence of this kind of textbooks is not the general situation in Europe. For example, as Pingel stated, in France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands textbooks are more fact-oriented and the emphasis of European unity before the 1930s, in particular times before the Second World War is not existent. Although the focus on past is not as much as in Britain, in these countries' textbooks the civic side of the European Union is evident. Textbooks aim to make students aware of their responsibilities and rights in the European Union due to being European citizens and they try to aim to increase students' interests towards European affairs. To put it differently, in these countries Europe is not only about the EU and the EU is not just an economic union but this does not change the significant level of the attention on organizational, political and administrative development of the European Union.

What is more, Pingel as a result of his research found out that "chapters with a focus on modern Europe are considerable shorter in Greek and English than in German, French, Italian or Spanish books...the longer a country has been a member of the European Union, the more emphasis is put in schoolbooks in the current process of integration and on its historical roots" [Pingel, 2001: 210]. Conversely, Greek school textbooks do not show this pattern. Although

most of European countries try to include Ancient Greece and their connection with this civilization as their root of being European and belonging to Europe, Greece mostly focuses on their national narratives.

In Nordic countries' textbooks both Europe and the European integration can be seen. Also, in their new National Curriculum Europe is defined as a separate issue. The interest and concentration on national issues is less compared to emphasis on international issues.

The Italian history and geography textbooks, compared to the ones mentioned above, seem to involve the most successful depiction of Europe. In Italian textbooks although the debate about Europe is concerted on the current procedure of integration, the European dimension is not mirrored to modern-day history. European commonalities are more frequently emphasized in the history textbook parts which deal with the Middle Ages and Early Modern times, not in the 20th century. The reason of less concentration on the 20th century is related with the rise of nationalism, conflicts among European countries, dictatorships, and totalitarian regimes in Europe. Also, another reason for this concentration on Early Modern periods is the time allocated to modern times in history curriculums. Due to the distribution of time in history curriculums, history textbook authors enrich the illustrations about the Early Modern Europe and write the content with more generalizations and with examples from several regions of Europe. Thus, students are given change to find common values among European countries and construct their European-ness to a certain extent.

The same situation can be seen in Spanish history books, too. The emphasis on the European Union begins in chapters of the Middle Ages. The connection between them is being done as follows, as Pingel wrote:

The Union emerged from the individual states which were formed in the Middle Ages. These were forced from their very beginnings to define their relationships to their neighboring states and to more powerful ones which endangered them. With the nation, international relations were born. The large number of states in Europe and the dense population among them brought them in close contact through peaceful terms or through wars. Thus, with the narrative of the nation state, the text introduces a further dimension by transcending and questioning its exclusiveness and leading, in the end, to the process of European process of integration. The 'construction of Europe' starts in medieval times [Pingel, 2001: 212-213].

As a result, this preference makes students able to understand Europe in the past and improves their European consciousness.

Besides the stances of member states of the European Union regarding textbooks, the condition in non-member states are also important such as Baltic States and Eastern European

countries. As it is easy to guess, the focus on Europe and the European Union is not totally absent but significantly less in these countries compared to aforementioned ones. However, most of these countries state in their textbooks that they are a part of Europe but alienated from them through communist regime. Even some of them argue that the Western European countries did not protect them against the Soviet Union and it is guilty for their alienation.

These countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the one hand are busy with constructing their national identities and legitimizing their newly achieved freedom and independence and this makes the issues of the European Union secondary in their textbooks. The contradiction is they are, on the other hand, actually aware of the significance of becoming a member of the European Union. They are trying to develop a method in which their national identity and concurrently European identity will be created. What is more, as the Youth and History survey showed, these countries are more eager than many Western European and the Scandinavian countries to apply modern teaching methods in their history lessons. Another contradiction is they also apply traditional teaching methods and nationalistic education tricks like going back as far as in ancient times and stretching out to territories which essentially no longer belong to them and trying to attribute their country dignity and permanence in time and space [Pingel, 2001].

Another subject about European textbooks is what is written and how much historical subjects are written in textbooks. In most of the countries of Europe, separate European chapters do only constitute 10% of the whole volumes. The countries that are exceptions are Italy, Germany and Spain because these countries textbooks explain whole periods of industrialization, the Enlightenment, the World War I and II, the Great Depression and the Cold War from a European perspective. Also, in the old members of the European Union the history of the 20th century consists of about 30% to 40% of chapters on Europe, whereas this number falls to 10% in Baltic and Easter European countries. Regarding how Europe is included in textbooks, it can be stated that Europe is mostly the Western Europe. Some countries and their contributions are neglected. However, even in the textbooks that left a minimum state to Europe it is obvious to read about Britain as the origin place of industrialization, France during the age of absolutism and revolution, Italy due to Renaissance and Germany and Russia as the places in which the dark side of European history has born with wars, dictatorship and mass ideologies that devastated and divided Europe [Pingel, 2001].

Plus, most of the European textbooks including geography and history made the dichotomization of center and periphery among European countries basing this differentiation on economic strength. To be more specific, Pingel stated that being at the periphery mean being "...partly dependent on assistance from the centre and...more of a burden than a contribution" [Pingel, 2001: 215]. According to this definition, the center has been defined as Britain, France, Germany, Northern Italy and Benelux countries and the periphery as Southern Italy, Nordic countries, Scotland, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and all post-socialist countries. Additionally, Bulgaria and Portugal most of the time are never being mentioned in the textbooks. What is stranger, Sweden and Switzerland are also neglected although they are economically powerful and countries in which centuries of peaceful live has been experienced, multiculturalism has been practiced. Pingel explains its reason as "...because they are not known for a 'special' contribution to Europe" [Pingel, 2001: 215].

The neglected parts of Europe in textbooks are not limited with Sweden, Switzerland, Bulgaria and Portugal; there is also Balkans and to be more precise there is the case of Yugoslavia. It represents "...the conflict of transition from the end of the communist system to a new, pluralistic and democratic Europe, which is dealt with most extensively in the textbooks of western European countries" [Pingel, 2001: 215]. For example, in German history textbooks the students are asked about the necessary steps of helping strategies to this region in order to promote more democracy. Thus, in German textbooks this region is reflected as mobile and it can be changed if necessary steps are taken; but the steps must be taken by the West, not from the inside. Another reflection of this region comes from Spanish textbooks. Spanish textbooks pay attention to the multi ethnic and religious structure of the region; and explains the origin of the problems in Yugoslavia as "...because of this multicultural mixture, the region has been constantly shattered by armed conflicts...Thus, the authors create new, or foster the already existing stereotypes that a multicultural society leads to ethnic conflict and that Balkans are a typical example of such a process" [Pingel, 2001: 216]. Although the opposite view, the peaceful relations between people of different cultures, can be spread by using Balkans, Spanish books only reflect one side of the coin. The thing that should be thought about is that to what extent is this reflection rational concerning the integration of Europe and the EU's attempts to become a multicultural society?

Though, Western Europe and their textbooks are not alone reflecting Balkans as a conflict zone but the Balkans presents their region through extended conflicts, unsolvable

religious and ethnic problems and also they portray their neighbor countries as enemies. These negative representations are all visible in their textbooks. Also, global divisions rather than national issues, plus the distinctive characteristics of one's own ethnicity rather than European cooperation are explicit in their textbooks. Moreover, the minorities living in these countries are not being mentioned in textbooks. Pingel interprets this practice not only as ignorance of some parts of the population but also as a reflection of a distorted image of society.

7.4.2. Complete "History of Europe" Books

The necessity of common European history became clearer in the twilight of "spring tide of nationalities' wars" since 1991 and with the impact of the Maastricht Treaty [Von Borries, 2002: 22]. In the past Europe was not conceived as a central theme to be seen from different perspectives. Since the Maastricht Treaty this conceptualization changed and Europe began to be seem as a separate wide topic because after Maastricht Treaty Europe had been defined as an identity and as something people would become its' citizens besides their national citizenships. Thus, the member states and potential future members began to consider rewriting of the textbooks in their countries. Since then many complete European history book attempts had been practiced from comprehensive 'Histories of Europe' written by individual authors or smaller groups of academics from different countries to the publishing houses Fischer and Beck to develop a 'set of special histories in respect to Europe' as projects of recent years with the aim of showing how to write history of Europe.

In the first group of addressing Europe, Norman Davies's book, entitled with "*Europe*. A History", takes place as an example of a comprehensive history of Europe⁵⁹. The general characteristic of the book can be explained shortly as follows: Davies's book deals only with the history of Europe with an elitist and humanitarian character and it makes this in one volume, almost in 1400 pages. The lines between important historical events such as industrialization, the Iron Curtain and the Roman Empire are made very successfully. Additionally, he uses many visual sources like maps, charts and tables to make the book more

⁵⁹ In Norman Davies's book it is possible to find many more complete European history books and their evaluations. For further details see [Davies, 1996:1-46]

pleasing and to make history digestible. He does not only deal with political and diplomatic history but also cultural, intellectual and artistic history; he achieves this through using sources from literature, economics, science and daily life. Through explicitly giving his own judgments, he makes the reader remember that history is about interpretations, re-identifications and a discipline open to discussion. Besides these advantages of the book, it ignores some regions of Europe such as Balkans and Southern Russia; some of its maps are erroneous and lastly he mostly identifies Europe mostly with Western and Northern Europe [Von Borries, 2002: 23-25]. The book is mostly interested in center and periphery of Europe and by doing this Davies is actually tries to break the prejudice of "…the more the marginal areas are, the less important of less value they have for historiography" [Pingel, 2001: 223]. Thus, although Davies ignores some parts of Europe and actually considers Europe mostly as Western Europe, he tries to make people realize that "Western civilization is essentially an amalgam of intellectual constructs" [Davies, 1996: 25]; thus, even the most unknown part of it has a role in its construction in every epoch of it as the present.

The second grand narrative of European history was Michael Salewski's book, "*History* of Europe, States and Nations from Antiquity to the Present". It was at most a 1100 page book which mostly focuses on states, not nations. What consists its content is "...political history of rulers, diplomacy, wars, peace treaties, administration, uprisings, revolutions and sometimes constitutions", says Von Borries and lists economy, gender, minorities, culture and ecology as ignored subjects [Von Borries, 2002: 25]. The difference of the book from Davies's piece is its inclusion of Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Europe and the exclusion of the Byzantium Empire and the Ottomans. This book can be a good guide to learn short and long term international problems in Europe but at the very end it cannot compete with Davies's book as Pingel mentions.

Besides these two comprehensive history attempts, there are short history books of long series like Fischer and Beck publishing. In Fischer, European history is divided into 65 volumes of 200 or less paged books. Although topics are various, subjects like the First World War and women are not involved. One author, coming from different European countries, writes each volume of this series. What is more each volume is not prepared according to national or regional aspects; instead "…they handle developments which have left their mark on a whole period of history such as Enlightenment, Industrialization or Communism" [Pingel, 2001: 222]. The balance between macro and micro history approaches are tried to be

achieved. The authors of this series believes that "since Europe can only be understood as 'unity in diversity', a European history has to be a comparative history in all its elements, comparing different epochs...different parts of the continent...different social groups of human beings...different types of development..." [Von Borries, 2002: 29]. In contrast to this view, the balance between Western and Eastern European history is not achieved and the series turned out to be more like the history of Western Europe. Plus, the concept of the nation-state as political history like power politics, diplomacy and wars are among the ignored issues. However, history and related developments in gender, environment and mentalities are very successfully taken into account. In short, Fischer series has uneven quality differentiations in its volumes.

The second example for special histories is Beck publishing series. This series' books have more pages but fewer volumes. As in the other series and great narratives, the Eastern Europe's history is among the ignored subjects. Also, some volumes are too long and detailed for public usage and the comparative style is less used compared to Fischer. However, Von Borries sums up by stating both of these series offer multiple and creative approaches to history besides their weaknesses [Von Borries, 2002].

Consequently, all these attempts of creating a complete European History should remind us that a generalized and comprehensive "European History" is a very controversial and difficult goal to realize. The reason lies in the controversial structure and history of Europe. Also, history is all about selection; thus in each attempt there will be not-selected parts of European history. However, the "not-selecting" should not be practiced as a total ignorance of a European region or very influential historical events like the World War I. As a result, what is needed is a pluralistic version of 'European history' in which many different versions and interpretations of events should be done not through biases, prejudices and exclusions but tolerance, peace and scientificity.

7.5. General Evaluation of European History and History Education

In this chapter the general aim was to show the current state of European-ness in history education, the influence of historical experiences of European countries on their perceptions and constructions of Europe and the European dimension in history textbooks. Since the last two decades the most debated question in Europe, particularly in the European Union, is related to what Europe is and how it should be taught to the youth. Today, "...what 'Europe' means to those who live in it-as well as to those outside- is inevitably shaped by perceptions of its history" and others' histories [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 10]. Thus, at this point, history and history education become of significance and even of vitality for Europe. If this is the case (actually it seems so), it is important to evaluate the general features of history education in Europe in order to find ways of moving towards wider-European approaches in history which is a necessity for common European future.

Regarding the aforementioned experiences of several countries of Europe, it is obvious that history, its perception, teaching and learning of it in Europe are national and they possess strong nationalistic flavor. "In its origins...history-teaching was recruited to the service of patriotism. In its most "primitive" form, it consisted of little more than a rota of the names, dates, and titles of the ruling dynasty. From that it progressed to a recital of the nation's heroes, victories, and achievements" [Davies, 1996: 33].

What is more, both the majority of the content and the interpretation of other types of histories like world history are national in which national sufferings and glories are the most focused subjects. Although there are present attempts to lessen the national content and interpretations, the strong continuation of "national" is still existent and challenge for countries. In the case of Britain, for example, England's the domination of other countries of the British Isles historically, culturally and linguistically and also their indifferent or even suspicious views towards the European Union provide the continuation of national narrative in country's history education. Another example was shown as France in which history education is totally understood as French political history and which defined a concept "connaissances patrimoniales"; thus it seems almost impossible to lessen the "national" from their curriculum.

Secondly, history, its education, writing, and perception in Europe are all about politics and utility of the related country. To be more precise, the changes in curriculums happen because of political necessities and expectations of countries. For example, with the Maastricht Treaty that expanded the definition of the European Community to a union of common citizenship, identity and culture, history education changed through the inclusion of European dimension in history textbooks as shown in the case of Hungary. Thirdly in Europe, the history of Europe is mostly about ignoring Eastern European and Nordic countries' histories but Western emphasis. Sometimes these regions were ignored due to their lack of contribution to the general history of Europe and sometimes they were ignored because they were mirroring hostility, war, and conflict to students. And from time to time the reason of their neglect was because they did not experience the important events that made Europe 'Europe' such as the Renaissance, Industrial Revolution, Reformation and the French Revolution.

Fourthly, the history education in Europe is two folded. On the one hand, countries are trying to strengthen or construct their national identities and teach it through history. On the other hand, there is a simultaneous construction of European-ness and European identity. Although this pattern can be seen in almost all countries of Europe, it is (the simultaneous construction of both national and European identities] most visible in Central and Eastern European countries that are experiencing transition from the Soviet regime to democracy; from communism to market economy; from suppressed identities to free constructions of them. The general view in these countries is that when they are on the track of constructing their national identity through history textbooks, as one of the means, "Europe" is being defined as the "other" to show their peculiar national characteristics and values. However, they are also aware of the necessity of having a European dimension and European consciousness in their education; thus they also define Europe as "we". It can be stated that what is evident in post-socialist countries is the pragmatic and utilitarian use of history. In short, in Europe, both in Western European countries-not as much as Eastern countries though- and post-socialist countries of Europe, there is the narrative of both being a part of European civilization in terms of roots, heritage and mentality and at the same time the historical narrative of national uniqueness and even sometimes superiority [Leeuw-Roord, 2001].

The next feature in Europe regarding history education is the emergence of special emphasis on "Europe" in curriculums. This inclusion of European dimension happened in two ways. One is through the emergence of it within nations' own histories. To be more precise, "in many countries local and national history only develop a European dimension when a particular period, event or person has influenced Europe, or was influenced by Europe" [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 18]. Romania can be shown as an example as it is stated in related text in the previous pages that European history mostly tended to be an annex to Romanian

national history. In short, the first way of the emergence or use of European dimension is through using European history when necessary and when one's own nation is taking place in the related subject. Plus, it is important to mention that the treatment of European dimension in this way is from a totally national perspective; whereas the second way is using the European dimension through focusing on specific events, periods and people with no reference to national past but to European common heritage and common values.

Moreover, the European history education features also involve some themes that are under discussion. One of them is the representation of Europe as a unity or diversity. The first representation that makes its arguments through unity of Europe gives reference to Greco-Roman tradition, Judaeo-Christian beliefs, common artistic and architectural heritage, the emergence of nation-state in Europe, feudalism, the Crusades, the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution and so on. The second approach that defines Europe with its diversity focuses on the different ethnic, national, linguistic, dialectical, local and regional differences in Europe. This perspective compared to the first one gives more emphasis to dark side of the continent such as genocide, conflicts and xenophobia. Some countries like Romania represent Europe by focusing on mostly negative diversities such as labeling it through conflicts, nationalism, intolerance, ethnic problems, religious diversity and etc. The other perspective is approaching Europe as if it is a unity and a common heritage. Hungary can be listed among these countries because in their history textbooks, they prefer to focus more on uniting elements like commonality of cultures, religion, economy, historical experiences and values and etc. These two ways of representing Europe automatically raises the "theme selection" question in Europe, the question of which topics should be included to the curriculums and which should not be.

Continuously, the 1990s is a turning point in Europe so is in history education. The collapse of the Soviet Union and transition of ex-communist countries from socialist regime to capitalist economy and democracy reflected on the European history education as widening of the focus on current history in textbooks and more focus on democracy, human rights, peace and respect for difference, not fully in practice but at least totally on curriculums. New courses like "Integration in the European Union" were introduced in several countries like Romania and the special interest to Europe began to be explicitly declared in national curriculums like Hungary, Britain and even France.

The mere change of the 1990s was not only in contents of the textbooks but also in methodology of teaching. The grand narratives of teachers on national histories were tried to be replaced with multiperspectivity, use of media, critical thinking, historical empathy and consciousness. Leeuw-Roord stated that these defined approaches "...are closely connected with the general process of educational reform which started in 1970's and 80's mostly in Western Europe and became pan-European after the changes of the early 90's" [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 24]. These shifts in methodology caused the emergence of a new question in Europe on whether the aim of history teaching is all about teaching main facts and events or improving historical skills, critical thinking abilities and historical consciousness of students. Just like the preference of countries diversified between these two aims the application of new methodologies fluctuated from one country to another. To give examples, the application of multiperspectivity in France is very limited and the major focus in their history education is the facts, not problems due to their understanding of history as national French political history. However, comparatively, the application of this method is more in Romania and Latvia due to the existence of special minority lessons and the allowance of minorities to learn their history and languages in these countries.

The last feature of the European history education is the fact that it is not governed only by national governments but at the same time backed up through the European Union, the Council of Europe, international and transnational initiatives like the EUROCLIO and the EUSTORY and many more that will be mentioned with detail in further chapters.

As it is evident, Europe does not have a commonly accepted European history education both in terms of theoretically and practically. Countries differ much in their perception of history, its aims and methodology. There are suggested evident changes though, such as the inclination towards wider European dimension in history education and the lessening of the "strict tone" of national narrative whose success is open to discussion. The ways of realizing them are defined as the inclusion of more European related issues and common European historical experiences into the contents of textbooks and the change in methodology. However, what I think is, due to the complex nature of history of Europe and the answer of the question what Europe is, the increase of common European historical experiences in textbooks. In other words, the widening of history syllabuses' contents does not realize the improvement of the sense of Europe and European historical consciousness among students.

History education in Europe still needs substantial political will to question the dominant position of political and military history, to extend the content of history education

to local minority, to shift from a national to a wider perspective and to introduce and respect various viewpoints and interpretations in history education, says Leeuw-Roord [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 33-34].

All these suggestions seem both necessary and utopic considering the European historical past that is full of wars, hatred, conflicts besides democracy, human rights, etc; the existence of no clear answer of what Europe is; and at the same time the present situation in Europe such as the countries still in transition from socialism to democracy and focused on construction their national identities; the on-going inner conflicts; the continuity of national priorities and the national memories of the past embedded in millions of peoples' minds.

What I think, the solution for a wider European perspective in history education lies in necessary changes in content related issues, not in the sense of increasing European history subject in history curriculums; but mostly method and approach related issues. These notions are important because a perfect curriculum can be destroyed with a poor textbook; and a perfect curriculum and a perfect textbook can become inefficient by insufficient teaching methods. What is more, an insufficient curriculum and textbook can turn into a miracle through right teaching methods and new thinking models and this is what I am arguing as a solution to the problems of European history education and as the way towards the emergence of a wider European perspective in history.

8. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE and HISTORY EDUCATION

This chapter will focus on two issues relating to the Council of Europe and history. The first part of it will show how the Council of Europe developed and changed over time concerning history education in Europe. This will be explained through four different periods. The second part will be based the Council's perceptions of specific issues such as the status of history, aim and function of it, content, teaching history, teaching materials, training of teachers, outside-school practices of history like exhibitions and museums, relation between history and human rights and lastly the perception of "other" countries'/continents' histories by European students. All these topics will be explained briefly, mostly without concerning chronology; thus, the second part will serve to explain the general subjects that the Council of Europe had been interested in, is working on presently and will continue to do so.

8.1. The Council of Europe and History

The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 with ten members; Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Among its general aim there exists fostering of mutual understanding in Europe. In particular, almost since the last 50 years, the Council of Europe is providing a discussion forum in Europe about the history textbooks and history education in schools in Europe through organizing conferences, workshops and meetings. As a result of these conferences, the Council of Europe prepares detailed reports concerning the outcomes of the conferences and makes recommendations to the governments of the countries and delegates regarding the discussed issues.

8.1.1. 1950s and 1960s

The first Council of Europe history conference was held in 1953 at Calw and its theme was "the European Idea in History Teaching". This conference clearly stated the Council's purpose on the subject of history as "…'not to use history as propaganda for European unity, but to try to eliminate traditional mistakes and prejudices and to establish the facts'" [Slater, 1995: 27] and "history must 'avoid any interpretation of historical developments which might be used in the particular interest of any one state or might disturb the friendly relations between two peoples'" [Slater, 1995: 29].

During the 1950s, the Council of Europe mostly had focused on secondary school history courses and textbook contents. As a result of their research the findings can be listed as follows: Europe's school courses in history were dominated by national history. The specific courses on "European History" involved many national prejudices and bias. Within these courses, countries were choosing specific periods in which their own histories were dominant in Europe. What is worse, Europe was not reflected with its all countries and perspectives. There was no mentioning to Marxist view of history which means that Europe, in those years, had been defined as Western Europe. Some regions and concepts of Europe were not mentioned. To be more specific, as Low-Beer stated, Greece, Byzantium, Turkey and Orthodox Christianity were among the ignored histories [Low-Beer, 2000]. In short, history courses were filled with national bias and subjective approaches to history. Ann Low-Beer writes that "…there seemed to be a very limited and blurred view of European history" [Low-Beer, 2000: 126].

The Council of Europe conference at Cawl, in addition to its contribution to the acceptance of heavy nationalist views in history, declared two things for the first time. One was that contemporary history is more interesting for young people, thus school history textbooks and history teaching should include more up-to-date subjects because through this way they can be more active in the lessons. The second one is that young people are aware of the contemporary world. They are informed through media and outside sources but the knowledge at the end was full of chaotic mix of myths, prejudice, and partiality. Thus, what the Council recommended was that "the task of the history teacher is not just to add to young people's knowledge, but to help them organize, categorize, reflect on and critically evaluate, the knowledge they already have" [Slater, 1995: 32].

In the year 1965, the Council of Europe arranged a conference at Elsinore whose theme was "History Teaching in Secondary Education". In this meeting the possible common European topics were discussed. What was vital regarding to this conference was the Council's perception of history and projects regarding to this. Low-Beer clearly explained that in this conference,

...there was no intention to create a single or a uniform view of European history. However, the European importance of events which might occur within the national history should be presented whenever possible...The national experience should at least be set in European context to indicate something of a wider movement" [Low-Beer, 2000: 127]. Thus, at Elsinore, as Slater pointed out, history was seen "...as a necessary basis for all humanities... [Slater, 1995: 27].

One of the most significant themes of this conference was the history's impact and contribution to civic notions and as regards the aim of history in 1965 was perceived as enabling students to develop their own opinions.

8.1.2. 1970s

Between 1972 and 1983 the Council of Europe had three conferences which discussed "'Religion in School History Textbooks in Europe' (Leuven, 1972), 'Cooperation in Europe as Presented in the Resources for Teaching History, Geography and Civics in Secondary Schools' (Braunschweig, 1979), and 'The Portugese Discoveries and Renaissance Europe' (Lisbon, 1983)" [Slater, 1995: 26]. However, during the 1970s and 1980s the Council of Europe mostly focused more on pedagogical methods in history teaching and less on contents. The Council of Europe supported the use of visual materials, radio and television programmes, and interdisciplinary courses. The reason of a significant shift to interdisciplinary approaches in Europe was an agreement on "…subjects should be decompartmentalized so as to make the pupils aware of the interpretation of knowledge in everyday life" [Slater, 1995: 26]. Regarding the historical topics in schools, in 1978 the Council of Europe started the Human Rights education in schools [Low-Beer, 2000]. Although history books' contents were not too much focused during this decade, in general the 1970s included a movement away from nationalism.

8.1.3. 1990s

Beginning with 1989 and a few years that followed it Europe faced with a significant transition in all its spheres including education. Low-Beer revealed that "what was now required was to recover a conception of the whole of Europe" [Low-Beer, 2000: 129]. To put it differently, it was time to make Europe a whole again after forty years of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain which had divided the continent into two parts as politically, economically, socially, culturally and worse mentally.

For this reason, the Council of Europe met in Bruges in 1991 in a conference named "History Teaching in the New Europe". Until 1991, the Council of Europe only represented and interested in Western Europe, but with Bruges Conference it began a pan-European approach and extended its debate and activities to the whole of Europe [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 249]. The participants discussed the ways of teaching history in the New Europe and reformulating history courses. This conference elucidated the reality of how ignorant western Europeans were regarding the histories of other parts of Europe. In others words, Europe was no more- at least should not be- Western Europe but a whole. As a result, the decision was to reformulate history textbooks both in the West and East by changing the priorities of them and these priorities were mentioned as the need to "teach recent and contemporary history; establish the idea of Europe; embrace not just political but social, economic, cultural, scientific, technological and spiritual history; recognize the importance of local and regional history; maintain a balance between local, national, European and world history" [Slater, 1995: 31].

However, this decade was challenged with a swing back to nationalism because all post-Socialist countries were trying to construct their national identities. Among these national tendencies, of course, there were countries which really achieved to minimize their national histories like Holland and which succeeded to apply new methods for European historical consciousness like the application of comparative approach in Luxembourg [Low-Beer, 2000].

8.1.4. 2000s

The Council of Europe increased their emphasis and activities on European history courses and teaching strategies in the last decade. In particular, the major areas became the teaching of sensitive issues like the Holocaust, the Second World War, etc. Additionally, systematic constraints of European history education were realized more than ever. For example, time limits of history courses, loaded curriculums and lack of visual, outside sources for history were strictly included to the agenda of the Council of Europe. The role of the teacher and their consciousness about the New Europe listed among the vital necessities that should be come true.

Many exchange programs brought to life such as the European Studies Project in which schools were linked to other schools and they change their history materials three or four times a year. This provided the opportunity of learning about the "other" and improvement of comparative understanding and tolerance among the youth. Also, the Council of Europe made several visits [for festivals, field studies, sports activities, etc) available in Europe among pupils, thus they had the chance of knowing their peers living other parts of Europe. It can be summarized that, with the 2000s, the Council of Europe saw history as a part of civic and intercultural education [Low-Beer, 2000].

8.2. How did the Council of Europe Perceive...?

8.2.1. The Status of History

According to the Council of Europe, history is the necessary basis for all humanities as defined in 1965 Elsinore and as it is decided in 1991 Tuusula conference, it is a right of each pupil to understand the developments in the world, in particular their near-geography such as the developments in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Baltic Sea [Slater, 1995].

8.2.2. Aims and Functions of History

History, according to the Council of Europe, should not serve for the interest of a particular group. It is a means to promote tolerance, cooperation and peace among countries. It is important because it shapes and defines personal identities through making people realize and internalize their communities, ethnic backgrounds, nations, cultural roots and universal values.

8.2.3. Elimination of Chauvinism and Partiality

The eradication of bias, exaggerated expressions, implicit or explicit hostility messages and prejudice, particularly from textbooks is one of the most significant aims of the Council of Europe. The reason of this struggle lies in the fact that history is not a propaganda tool but a way for people; in the education case, for students to form their own opinions [Slater, 1995].

8.2.4. Content of Textbooks

The Council of Europe works on to make content of textbooks include most recent and contemporary history. The Council believes that textbooks should be a means to establish the idea of Europe through not ignoring local, regional, national and world history. There must be a balance among these levels of history. Moreover, textbooks while involving these different levels, each level should embrace political, cultural, social, economic, scientific, technological and spiritual forma of history [Slater, 1995].

8.2.5. History Teaching and Learning

In the early years of the Council of Europe conferences the main question was how students were learning history and whether the textbooks were helping students relate history to their personal experiences with their society, nations, and regions. This was important because the Council of Europe believed that as long as students deal with abstract subjects in history, over time, they would loose to be interested in history. Moreover, not only was the content of textbooks questioned, but also their usage as a method was also under inquiry. In 1979, at Braunschweig conference one of the major themes was "…whether a dependence on textbooks, no matter what their quality, could ever adequately support autonomous learning" [Slater, 1995: 35]. Moreover, at the beginning of 1990 in conference held in Braunschweig again, the Conference Report made the following statement:

Textbooks have long been and are likely to remain a necessary support or crutch which all teachers have at some time needed. But the object of using a crutch is to abandon it as soon as possible. If the medical metaphor can be extended, let us accept textbooks as crutches to be thrown away as soon as possible rather than as drugs which may create permanent dependence [Slater, 1995: 35].

However, in the following years this emphasis point shifted from content to teaching methods used in history lessons and the Council of Europe conferences began to focus on cooperative teaching, method that improve historical reasoning and empathy in students.

8.2.6. Teaching Materials and Aids

The most discussed issues regarding teaching materials and resources in the Council of Europe were the adequacy of resources to motivate students towards autonomous learning, critical thinking and developing their own ideas and the diversity of these sources in terms on their numbers. Besides textbooks as problems, the Council accepted that they have more serious problems regarding teaching materials. These problems were mostly about in Central and Eastern European countries. They can be listed as lack of adequate materials, shortage of history book authors, to be more specific shortage of authors who do know writing history textbooks in an objective way, and the dominance of the market by ideologically tainted materials [Slater, 1995].

8.2.7. Training of Teachers

Among the conferences of the Council of Europe, until 1995, only the Elsinore (1965] and Braunschweig [1969] conferences touched on this important issue. Since then, the general ideas of the Council regarding this issue are as follows: History education and textbook writing must be done through specialists; history teachers should be trained about historiography and critical approaches to history; the interdependence between history and art, literature, archeology, technology, science, politics and economy should be taught to teachers due to it is expected that they will teach history in the same way as they are educated; and teachers' training should be updated through in-service training programs to make teachers aware of the latest researches about history [Slater, 1995].

8.2.8. Exhibitions

The Council of Europe does not only focus on history, its education, and problems in school but also outside the school. It is organizing public exhibitions to spread European culture among the people of Europe. The exhibitions' themes included several European specific subjects such as great periods of European art from Byzantine to Gothic, from Baroque to modern art; important people like Charlemagne, the Medici; important events like the French Revolution; and emblems of liberty, historicism, architecture and history and many more. The aim of these exhibitions are to help Europeans understand and appreciate their European cultural and historical heritage and to prove that despite all long-lasting wars and divergences of all kinds like cultural, religious, ethnic, etc Europe has commonness and unity in itself [Slater, 1995].

However, how did the Council of Europe achieve to link these exhibitions to history education? Although these exhibitions were not directly linked to school history teaching, for some of these activities pamphlets were published and distributed to schools. These pamphlets were written with a clear and easy language so to make students understand, and also within the pages there were questions about the exhibitions' historical content for both students and teachers. In short, these pamphlets were kind of history study books which can both teach students European history and provide them to discuss the issues through the questions put into them [Slater, 1995].

8.2.9. Museums

The Council of Europe supported the view that European history was not only in the history books or in schools but also in Europe's landscape and museums. As Slater put it, the sense of history and the consciousness of European history could be reached through reading, writing and also looking [Slater, 1995]. Thus, for the Council of Europe, museums were means to European identity, collective memory and European awareness. For this reason, European history education system should no more ignore the use of museums. Although, it had been mentioned in this thesis, visiting museums is not a cost-free activity and necessitates economic power and the existence of museums in related geography; at least school authorities should support visiting cost-free museums if they are available. Also, besides the need towards museums in education field, in the time Slater wrote his book, *Teaching History in the New Europe*, according to the national reports of European countries in the early 1990s.

...in Romania everything has to be built from new foundations and there is a desperate need for contacts with the west; in Norway the immediate task was to introduce Norwegians to the world outside their own borders, while in Iceland it was to bring art into their national life; in Spain museums were seen as rejuvenate forces for whole districts and areas...[Slater, 1995: 39].

Concerning these situations, museums are also needed to lessen prejudices against countries and cultures, to be recognized by other countries and to strengthen national identities through art. In short, museums are very significant means to the construction of identity, recognition, tolerance and mutual understanding of differences.

8.2.10. History and Human Rights

The collapse of the Soviet Union had been seen as a chance for Europe to be united again and to live in the rest of time in peace, democracy, stability and tolerance. However, things did not develop as expected. Europe challenged with extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, ethnic struggles, racism and hostility towards immigrant populations. The Council of Europe added the elimination or at least demise of these negative events among its tasks. The Council tried to promote human rights like equality, freedom, live in peace, etc through education, for example, by adding human rights courses on Europe-wide curriculums and establishing campaigns like European Youth Campaign.

Additionally, as mentioned in previous chapters, students of Europe do not have much historical reasoning and one of the reasons behind it is construction of some values like democracy, peace, freedom, etc as universal. This labeling makes them confused and lead them think these values as being existed since time immemorial. The Council of Europe must have taken this situation into consideration because it aimed to teach students that human rights have had to be won and defended all through history and that human rights are not static, and new rights appear as society develops [Slater, 1995]. Thus, the Council of Europe aims to make students aware the fact that human rights and some other concepts like democracy, freedom and equality are the products of time and emerges through the necessities of communities and time.

8.2.11. Religions and Europe

The Council of Europe had several conferences on the subject of Judaism, Islam and imagining Europe and European culture without the impact of these two religions. The conclusion was Judaism and Islam were European cultures had been ignored since long time and unfortunately had been labeled with negative stereotypes [Slater, 1995]. Thus, the Council of Europe, in order to make students recognize these religions, their values and their impact in Europe necessitated their coverage in history textbooks wider and detailed than before.

8.2.12. The "Other's" Histories

The Council of Europe is not only interested in the history of Europe but also it necessitates the teaching of other continents', nations' and countries' histories like Africa, Asia, Latin America, China, Japan, Canada and the United States in Europe; in other words it necessitates international understanding. The first issue on teaching other histories in Europe involved how to teach the other parts of the world in an objective, scientific and right way and how to eradicate the misunderstandings, biases and prejudices about these histories [Slater, 1995].

The second issue is a little bit more complex. It can be seen in the following quote:

'...history books tell" the members of other parts of the world that "...nothing happens until a white man comes along. If you ask any white person who discovered America, they'll tell you 'Christopher Columbus.' And if you ask them who discovered China, they'll tell you 'Marco Polo.'...as I used to be told in the West Indies, I was not discovered until Sir Walter Raleigh needed pitch lake for his ship, and he came along and said 'Whup-I have discovered you.' And my history began' [Slater, 1995: 46].

To put it differently, a serious problem in Europe, which is originated from history textbooks, is the perception of students that other cultures were being discovered by Europeans and their histories began with the arrival of Europeans into their continents. Thus, the Council of Europe added the elimination of this perception to its other aims. The Council of Europe believed that the awareness of the cultural, political, economic, social, technological and spiritual characteristics and achievements of other societies before Europeans' arrival is very important to promote tolerance, mutual understanding, historical reasoning among European students and more importantly the emergence of multicultural society in Europe; thus it concentrated working on this through seminars and conferences [Slater, 1995].

8.3. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1283 (1996)⁶⁰

The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly published this document in 1996 as the Recommendation 1283. It listed important issues about history and its education such as the aim of history, its function, techniques of teaching history, dimensions of history and country specific interpretations of history and their acceptance by the other European Union members.

In its first article, it states that every individual has right to learn and reject his/her past and history is a mean to learn this past and to construct cultural identity. In the second one, it identifies history in Europe with its political function. It affirms that the history has a political role in today's Europe and that role is its task to provide or at least pave the way for tolerance, reciprocal understanding, indulgence and trust among European individuals and societies. For the Council historical knowledge is one of necessities of civilized life because this knowledge makes the individual stronger and eliminates the possibility of believing in political or other kinds of deceit, chicanery and behaving accordingly.

Furthermore, according to this declaration, history, for most people begins at school. For this reason, schools (teachers and history textbook writers can also be added) should not follow memorizing strategies while teaching history. Instead, history should be based on (and should improve) students' critical thinking, democratic values and respect for law.

However, the education system and its parts are not the only source of historical education. The media, cinema, literature and tourism can be listed as other sources. Plus, the values of families, local, national, religious and political groups can be added to other means of historical knowledge. The Council also believes the impact of technology on history. The idea mentioned refers that the concepts of history can be widened and at the same time subject matters of history can expand through the usage of new technologies such as CDs, internet, etc. One important thing about these extracurricular sources of history is that the owners or people who are working with these means should be transparent with each other for the development of history both as a discipline and as a means of identity construction. In short,

⁶⁰ The full text of the Recommendation is available at <u>http:</u> //assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EREC1283.htm

these outside sources of history and its education should be supported and improved in order to make European youth more aware of the significance and worth of history.

In addition to this, in the eighth article, the Council explicitly states the abuse of history by politicians and also by all political systems. This overt acceptance is actually very important for the future of European history education policies because this declaration can be the proof of the necessity of a critical approach in history education and in its textbooks. Furthermore, the Council declares that historians are people who are very well aware of the openness of history to different interpretations of all historical events and who accept the possibility of the reconstruction of history. So, this clarifies the view that history is the usage of the past for present purposes.

According to this declaration, all individuals have right to learn de-falsified history and for this reason validity of the history must be guaranteed by the states through the elimination of religious and political biases and the encouragement of scientificity. For this reason, besides ensuring of the scientific historical knowledge, scholars and historians should also revise, rearrange and rebuild means of history education. The reason is that it is important for history, according to the Council of Europe, to make progress with the present. To realize this aim, Georg Eckert Institute has an international research institution on school history textbooks.

What is really important for the future of history in Europe is the Council clearly mentioned that the Central and Eastern European countries' histories should be studied and searched with extra care due to huge and recent political, social and economic transitions.

In this report, there are also some suggestions of the Council of Europe to the Council of Ministers concerning the development of history education in the Union. One of them is about how to teach history to pupils. According to the statement, history education should be done through criticisms instead of direct acceptances and internalization of what is told. Students should realize the complexity of issues and recognize the cultural diversities. Additionally, history curriculums should be open and wide. Not only did history base on events but also political, social, cultural histories, the role of women in societies should be included. Also, history should not limited with national issues but also local. History of minorities and some sensitive issues should be taught in history.

European history that should be in history curriculums in Europe, as said by the report, must be composed of fundamental political and economic events of Europe; plus cultural and philosophic movements that constructed the European identity. However, due to different historical events had been faced in different formats and times in different countries of Europe, the Council asserted that different interpretations of the same events in different countries should be respected and recognized by education authorities.

Besides all these, the Council suggests that some institutional encouragements by the Cultural Cooperation Council and EUROCLIO should be supported.

One further proposal is the preparation of "history education codes" among history teachers to catch a Europe wide standard and "Europe condition" in order to save the codes from political manipulations.

The suggestions of the Council continue with the demands to the governments. According to them, governments should support contemporary history research and also establish commissions which should be financially supported by them and be guaranteed. Also, historians' freedom of expression and freedom of research should be protected.

Specifically, regarding to the European Union, the Council suggests the inclusion of the fundamental and universally accepted histories of all people of Europe and their collection in Europe's history textbooks; the establishment of electronic history library among member states; the construction of national history museums among member states just like "History House" in Bonn, in Germany; and the creation of bilateral and multilateral projects, both among members and among neighbors to develop regional projects, about history and its teaching.

9. INITIATIVES FOR EUROPEAN HISTORY EDUCATION

9.1. The Council of Europe Initiatives

9.1.1. European Dimensional Pedagogical Materials Programme

In 1991, the Council for Cultural Cooperation (CDCC) of the Council of Europe initiated a project called "A Secondary Education for Europe". This project aimed to create a permanent forum that will discuss the problems, aims, methods, etc of secondary education in Europe; a guide to European Education Systems which would explain the great diversity of education systems in Europe; pedagogical guides and case studies that would present the results of projects regarding education in Europe; school exchanges; and a special focus on Central and Eastern Europe which would deal with the shortages concerning education in the countries of these regions [Slater, 1995]. In other words, this project aims "...to support the development of education *for* Europe by promoting education *on* Europe and developing strategies to deal with secondary education *in* Europe" [Slater, 1995: 52].

Along with this, the European Dimensional Pedagogical Materials Programme is a part of this project. It aims to improve a sense of European dimension among students through publishing maps, pictures, tables, graphs and texts to use in their classes on issues like ethnicity, migration, frontiers, cultural identities, political power, economic developments, nationalism, Industrial revolution, human rights, the European institutions, the World War I and II.

To sum up, this Council of Europe initiative aims to provide European dimension and even historical awareness among young people by providing source materials about historical issues which are covered in their schools.

9.1.2. In-Service Training Programme for Teachers

This Council of Europe initiative is about training of teachers on history teaching and current changes in teaching contents, methodologies and aims. It provides short term inservice training courses in another member State. By doing this, it aims to make teachers share their methods, ideas regarding history teaching, its education and its content. In other words, it provides professional experience exchanges [Slater, 1995].

9.1.3. School Twinning and Local History

The School Twinning and Local History was a pilot programme established in 1991 in the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). It suggested the creation of school twinning in Europe because due to the developments in the 1990s in Europe, some issues which had been ignored before should be taken into consideration. The history of minorities, women, local communities and their relations with each other should be, very moderately, included in history education of the young generation. Moreover, the meeting of Western, Central and Eastern European countries' youth with each other would become possible, increase and cost significantly less compared to other methods. Also, school twining could increase the diversity of teaching materials and methods. More important than these, it carried the possibility of increasing and spreading of European identity and expectations for common European future through making students aware of the differences among themselves and by encouraging them to be more tolerant against different lives, perceptions and cultures [Slater, 1995].

To be more specific, by pairing different schools, for example one from an Eastern/Southern European country and one from the West/North, the improvement of future East-West and North-South relations could be build up and differences may reduce.

What is important about this initiative is that it was a pilot project and ways of providing it on a larger scale, which is the coverage of all Europe, must be found to realize the listed aims and benefits.

9.1.4. The Trans-European Cooperation Schemes for Higher Education (TEMPUS)

The Trans-European Cooperation Scheme for Higher Education (TEMPUS) is established by the European Union in 1990 with the aim of developing and restructuring the higher education in Central and Eastern Europe and in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. It is managed by the European Commission's DG Education and Culture with assistance given by the European Training Foundation. Within the project, in the first years of it, history and humanities education were priorities.

In 1990, the members were Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In the year 1991, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia entered TEMPUS only for one year term. Then, in 1992, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Albania were added to the partner countries TEMPUS worked with. In 1993, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine became members of the project. Until 1994, the first phase of the program had been practiced. As of 1994 July, the European Council is started the second phase with new members like Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and this enlargement continued with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia in 1995; then in 1996 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

The Council adopted the third phase of the project for a six year period, from 2000 to 2006. With the Bologna Declaration the establishment of a European Area of higher education by 2000 was accepted.

In 2000, the participation of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as member was realized. The enlargement continued with Mediterranean region countries in 2002.

Besides the historical development of the project, in the first years of its establishment it aimed to "promote the quality and support the development and renewal of higher education in the eligible Phare and Tacis countries; encourage their growing interaction and as balanced a cooperation as possible with partners in the European Union, through joint activities and relevant mobility" [Slater, 1995: 55]. It is designed to support the transition and modernization processes in higher education in these countries. Plus, it aimed to create local learning centers; to promote new basic skills to students particularly the information technologies; and to increase transparency of qualifications. Through time, its scope is enlarged with TEMPUS Plus, which extended the scope of TEMPUS III to vocational education and training.

In short, the TEMPUS program aims to reinforce cooperation in higher education between the European Union and its partner countries from the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Mediterranean region. It aims to improve cultural understanding and tolerance among cultures. Through creating and improving networks among different education fields and scholars, it tries to unite cultures in Europe, at least to create mutual understanding.

9.1.5. SOCRATES

SOCRATES is the European Community action programme in the field of education. It was adopted in 1995 thorough the Council Decision 95/819/EC of 14 March 1995 and its second phase is adopted with decision 253/2000/EC of 24 January 2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The programme is open to the Member States of the European Union (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the three countries of the European Economic Area (EEA - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), the two candidate countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and Turkey. Within these member states, the beneficiaries of the programme are all pupils, students, all categories of education personnel, all types of education establishments, persons and bodies responsible for education systems and policies at local, regional and national level. Also, local and regional organizations, education associations, professional organizations, chambers of commerce, and research centers can benefit from the program [http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c11043.htm].

It aims

to contribute to the development of quality education and training and of an open European area for education" and "...to enhance quality and develop the European dimension in studies at all levels and to promote knowledge of the languages of the Community so that its citizens may take advantage of opportunities arising from the completion of the European Union, while at the same time reinforcing solidarity between the peoples of the Community [http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c11023.htm].

Also, the increase in mobility of students in higher education, promotion of intensive cooperation between educational institutions of each member of the European Union can be listed among the aim of the program. Furthermore, it aimed to provide the recognition of diplomas within the borders of the EU. Thus, this would intensify the mobility of people and accordingly it would increase the interaction among people. Furthermore, it also aimed the improvement and use of technology in education and also supported the "intellectual mobility of know-how" through open education and education in distance. In short, SOCRATES phase I identified itself with being a step towards the emergence of common European values or European-ness and European consciousness through education.

SOCRATES Phase II included all the aims above. Its objective was defined as

to promote a Europe of knowledge and encourage lifelong education through learning foreign languages, encouraging mobility, promoting cooperation at European level, opening up to methods of access to education and increasing the use of new technologies in the field of education [http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c11043.htm].

In addition to the first phase, the second phase explicitly declared promotion of equal opportunities in all sectors of education.

The SOCRATES program is practiced through five measures. These are *Comenius*, nursery, primary and secondary schools education with aim of improving the quality of education, strengthening European dimension and spreading language learning; *Erasmus*, higher, university and post-university education with aim of strengthening mobility and language learning; *Grundtvig*, adult education aiming to supplement Comenius and Erasmus through the integration of adults excluded from school systems; *Lingua* aiming the spread of language education in Europe; and *Minerva*, education of information and technological communication systems with an aim of improving the usage of these technologies and multimedia and open and distance learning.

In short, SOCRATES can be considered as a response to "...the challenge of addressing the constantly evolving educational needs resulting from technological change, quickening obsolescence of knowledge, and the role of education in enabling people to fulfill their individual potential" [Slater, 1995: 55].

9.1.6. European Cultural Routes

The Council of Europe established the Cultural Routes programme in 1987. The generally defined aim was to show how the heritage of the different countries of Europe represented a shared cultural heritage.

To be more specific, this initiative aimed to increase awareness of a European cultural identity, European citizenship and European-ness through shared values and by means of cultural routes retracing the history of the influences, exchanges and developments that have shaped European cultures. It also aimed to intercultural dialogues for more tolerant European individuals. What is more, "...to safeguard and enhance the cultural and natural heritage as a means of improving the quality of life and as a source of social, economic and cultural development; to give pride of place to cultural tourism, with a view to sustainable development" were among their goals [http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_co%2Doperation/heritage/european_cultural_routes/].

The way these aims were realized passed through defining European cultural routes. It is argued that cultural roots are thematic networks in which European identity, European thoughts, experiences and values and their continuities are embedded [Slater, 1995]. Slater stated that these routes may be transnational or regional. The significance in them is that cultural, social, historical and artistic interests of them should go beyond the borders of defined borders. "The themes selected as examples..." should not only seen as "a series of monuments, but also as recognizing events and periods European history shared by a number of countries" [Slater, 1995: 56]. These routes can be listed as, The Santiago De Compostela Pilgrim Routes ; Pilgrim Routes; The Mozart Route; Historical and Legendary Figures of Europe; The Legacy of Al-Andalus; The Route of the Castilian Language and its Expansion in the Mediterranean: The Sephardic Routes; The Viking Routes; Vikings and Normans; The Via Francigena; Pilgrim Routes; Saint Martin de Tours, a great European figure, a Symbol of sharing; The Jewish Heritage Routes; Architecture without Frontiers: Rural Habitat; The Schickhardt Route; Historical and Legendary Figures of Europe; The Wenzel and Vauban Routes; Military Architecture in Europe and The Iron Route in The Pyrenees; Industrial Heritage in Europe [Slater: 1995].

The significance of this initiative is that it provides opportunities to learn history out of school. While it goes beyond textbooks, classrooms, and narratives; it also goes beyond visiting museums, castles, and ancient buildings. It gives people, in particular students, chance of experiencing history lively through providing visits to still active ancient buildings, for example [Slater, 1995]. Also, when students join to the celebrations of festivals in different countries or regions, when they taste different cuisines, when they meet people in countries, unconsciously they improve their perceptions about differences (of people, cultures, histories, etc) and they begin to understand what European-ness is and what common European values are.

9.1.7. The European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity

The European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity was established in 1989 on the basis of a Partial Agreement of the Council of Europe. Besides this official name, it is called as North-South Centre. Currently, it has twenty members Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Holy See.

The aim of the Centre is to provide European co-operation to increase public awareness of global interdependence issues and to encourage solidarity through not underestimating the aims and principles of the Council of Europe. "The North-South Centre promotes the idea that only globalization based on solidarity will enhance universal respect for the Council of Europe's core values of human rights and democracy, and enhance peace and stability in the world". In particular, among the Centre's tasks there are "promoting a European dimension to multilateral co-operation initiatives for sustainable development; strengthening ties between NGOs in the North and South; developing working relations with international organizations concerned with global interdependence; acting as an interface between Europe and the South" [http://www.coe.int/t/e/north%2Dsouth_centre/programmes/1_three%2Dyear_programmes/N SC_programme_of_activities2005.pdf].

The Centre is trying to realize their aims through three programmes. These are global education and youth, dialogue and communication, with a geographical focus on the Mediterranean basin and Africa. The Centre, as a body of the Council of Europe works very closely with the European Union and international organizations such as the OECD, the UN, the African Union and the League of Arab States. As it is obvious, none of these mentioned methods and activities is about history education. The connection of this initiative with history education, according to Slater, becomes visible when "…history teachers need to understand the historical context of an interdependent world and the nature of north-south relations" [Slater, 1995: 59].

9.2. Transnational Initiatives

9.2.1. European Association of Young Historians

This initiative is an association of national young historians who are under 40 years old. The main target group of it is the historians who work at universities throughout Europe. There are two general problems on which these historians are focusing on; the first one is the isolation of historical research and the second one is the lack of interest and awareness given to cultural issues in history, particularly during the European unification period both within the Union and throughout Europe [Slater, 1995].

The Association tries to realize its aims and bring solutions to the problems mentioned above through publishing a review journal whose editorial board is composed of 11 members all from different countries of Europe. This journal is mostly concentrating on comparative studies of national histories and historiographies. Through this journal what is aimed is to provide a multiperspectival understanding of European history and strengthen historical reasoning among young historians.

Also, the Association arranges workshops, seminars and conferences through which face-to-face contact of historians are being provided. The relation of benefit of European Association of Young Historians with general history education is that it may, with contributions of young historians, provide new perspectives to European History and also new directions to the interpretation of New Europe. So, rather than students, it may serve to increase historical consciousness, awareness, reasoning among teachers.

9.2.2. The International Students of History Association (ISHA)

The International Students of History Association (ISHA) was founded in 1989 in Budapest as an international, academic, non-profit-making and independent network of students and recent graduates interested in history and interrelated sciences.

The ISHA has social and academic motivations. It aims to encourage international cooperation and understanding through a more objective, scientific and tolerant study of history and to decrease or at least understand the gap between east and west. Moreover, they seek

Advancement of the contact between students from different countries, thereby breaking the borders of national-oriented history teaching in favor of a more international approach; Promotion of the co-operation of history students interested in the same fields of history; Offering international publication channels for history students; Increasing the interest in lesser known areas of history [http://www.isha-international.org/].

Besides its academic goals like improving more tolerant and objective history, it has also a social aim due to their strong belief in the role of history in the creation of reciprocal understanding among nations and different groups. By organizing conferences it is hoped that individual links between history students of today or, to put it differently, historians, history teachers, and intellectuals of tomorrow will be created and this will lead their aims to become real.

Regarding history education in school, these activities in which different perspectives meet and historians exchange their knowledge can increase the quality of history teaching in schools.

9.2.3. The International Society for History Didactics

The International Society for History Didactics was founded in 1980 in Tutzing, Germany. The Society believes in a new historical awareness that should provide understanding of "...understand how the world arrived at its present state, how to build bridges across past and present divisions, how to articulate an understanding and appreciation for cultural differences, and how to make the world a better and safer place in which to live" [http://www.int-soc-hist-didact.org/].

The Society is specifically interested in "...textbooks; the training of history teachers; curriculum at the primary, secondary and post-secondary levels; popular historiography; history in the mass media and in the public sphere; and the general question of historical consciousness" [Slater, 1995: 74]. Thus, it is obvious that the members of this initiative believe that history is not only taught in educational institutions but also through the mass media and they try history to be taught in its all forms at all levels.

9.2.4. The European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Association (EUROCLIO)

The Council of Europe's conference on "Teaching History in New Europe" in Bruges in 1991 had suggested an initiative which would satisfy the condition of history education in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1992 representatives of 15 national and regional associations of history teachers met in Strasbourg and decided to establish EUROCLIO. In 1993, it was officially founded. Through time, it grew rapidly and in 2001 it had 76 full and associated member organizations from 43 (mostly) European countries and in 2005 the number of countries increased up to 46.⁶¹

The overall aim of EUROCLIO is to promote and support the development of history education so that it strengthens peace, stability, democracy and critical thinking among students. To be more specific, its aims are

...to introduce skill-based education in order to create independent learners with flexible competencies to enter the labor market and international cooperation"; to strengthen intellectual freedom of teachers and the position of history in curriculums in Europe; to promote the European dimension and also regional, national and local dimensions in history education; to encourage European awareness through teaching history; to study Europe and its relations with the world; to promote the setting up of European Information and Documentation Centers for history teaching in Europe; to form joint projects about how to teach history in Europe; to promote publication exchanges, seminars and conferences among member associations; to encourage countries in which there is no history teachers' associations to have one; and lastly to provide a forum for the discussion of matters of common interest to history teachers in Europe [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 252; Slater, 1995].

⁶¹ For detailed information on the establishment of EUROCLIO see [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 249-251]

However, it began its activities, at first, from increasing the time allocated to history lessons and strengthening the position of it in national curriculums in Europe. Then, it continued to research the list of topics related to history education in Europe, the role of technology in history classes, balance between knowledge and understanding, conflicting demands of societies regarding history education, methods of history teaching and the ways of making history learning fun for students.

The EUROCLIO, as Leeuw-Roord stated, in the first eight years of their existence focused in particular on methodology of history teaching because due to different and several national experiences of countries it was difficult to meet on a common ground regarding content of the books. Thus, working on methodology of history teaching and learning could bring more efficiency to the field. Concerning the Central and Eastern Europe, EUROCLIO did not only focus on methodology of history teaching but also rewriting the history textbooks due to significant level of communist ideology in textbooks. Also, EUROCLIO helped to clarify the extent of national and European histories in the Central and Eastern Europe's history textbooks [Leeuw-Roord, 2001].

What is more, at the end of the 20th century, in Europe it was obvious that the general trend in history education was teaching of national histories and it would continue to be so. Thus, EUROCLIO began to work to make national histories cover European perspectives rather than to promote a full European history in Europe.

The aforementioned aims and activities of EUROCLIO were done through seminars, workshops, project and conferences given in different European countries. To give an example, EUROCLIO had conferences that were focused on problems of learning. These can be listed as "Problems in the Learning and Teaching of History" (1994); "History Teaching: a Key to Democracy?" (1996); "History Teaching and Information Technology" (1998); "Stereotyping and History Teaching" (1999); and "Teaching History, Commemoration and Memories" (2000). Moreover, the conferences on textbook contents were "Teaching of history since 1815 with special reference of changing borders" (1993); "Teaching about Potsdam Conference and its Consequences" (1995); "Preparing for the 21st century-Principles for the Design of History Syllabuses" (1997); and "A Changing World-The significance of everyday life in the learning and teaching of history with focus on the 20th century" (2001) [Leeuw-Roord, 2001].

Through all these activities EUROCLIO achieved many things in Europe. First of all, EUROCLIO was efficient in increase of European history in national curriculums in Europe. Although the included European history was mostly Western countries' histories, this can be considered as a success and what is better is there is an ongoing attempt to promote the inclusion of small nations of Europe in textbooks. Secondly, through its multilateral projects EUROCLIO contributed to the development of European awareness in Europe and in particular the development of European historical consciousness among history teachers. Also, countries' narrow and strict definition of what Europe is, traditional teaching methods and narrow nationalist perspectives of countries changed, at least improved with EUROCLIO initiatives. Lastly, it became an influential partner of national governments, educational institutions and other organizations thus, each day it is becoming more influential history education in Europe [Leeuw-Roord, 2001].

However, these achievements did not mean that EUROCLIO initiative did not face challenges and still facing. First of all, members of EUROCLIO show differentiations regarding defining Europe. As Leeuw-Roord mentioned, Russia, the Scandinavian countries and Britain see Europe as something alien or as a different continent [Leeuw-Roord, 2001: 260]. Moreover, the impact of politicians on deciding the national curriculums, together with the above mentioned effect decreases the efficiency of EUROCLIO activities.

The constraints continue with the cultural differences among countries. The reason is that each participant or educator sees the necessity of objective truths in history textbooks which seem a very positive view; however, each of these members' objective truths is mostly the truths of their national histories. Also, there are still disagreements about whether the main area, in which EUROCLIO specialize, should be contents of the books or methodology of teaching and learning history [Leeuw-Roord, 2001].

Additionally, EUROCLIO has some technical or mechanic problems like providing knowledge about itself in Europe; many educators and people in general are not aware of their activities. Thus, the capability of the organization to promote its aims, functions and activities-although it has a *Bulletin-* is a constraint on EUROCLIO. What is worse, the media is not much interested in it, as Leeuw-Roord stated. Plus, to arrange more activities, to use media in order to make themselves known more by the people and to spread their activities to Europe-wide significant level of financial power is needed which is unfortunately lack in EUROCLIO initiative. Also, among EUROCLIO members there are problems regarding

voting procedures and many small countries argue that the initiative is being directed by only small number of big countries. Lastly, although it is not considered as a big problem by Leeuw-Roord, there is a lack of solidarity among the members due to Cold War experiences. To be more specific, Russians are sometimes being failed by Western members lobby activities in EUROCLIO because they do not trust Russians. Plus, because Central and Eastern European countries get more sponsorship for activities (it might be because of these countries' extreme interest in history education to construct both their national identities and European one or to eliminate the embedded communist ideology in textbooks), Western countries do envy them.

However, besides all these activities, achievements and constraints it can be concluded that EUROCLIO is a very successful association which is working for and actually to much extent achieving the development of history education in Europe on the basis of improving the quality of history education through training teachers; increasing international dimension of history in learning and teaching of it; creating a large network of specialists within Europe and raising a young generation with historical consciousness, tolerance and European awareness.

9.2.5. EUSTORY

Looking at developments of the early 1990s, there is no doubt that it might be wrong or even dangerous to underestimate the particular meaning of history and mentality for the successful integration of Europe. Due to transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe, the debates about both national and supranational identity and a European-wide discussion about a common awareness of history are increasing.

One of the initiatives regarding these two issues is the EUSTORY programme. The EUSTORY program was launched as a result of complex outcomes of the Youth and History survey in Europe that is done during 1994-1995; and it was established with a close cooperation of the European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations (EUROCLIO). It is established by the Körber Foundation in 1998.

The EUSTORY program focuses on the development and encouragement of independent history competitions among young people in different European countries including both Western and Eastern Europe. It aims to provide learning of history through research. The competition gives students chance of exploring the suppressed and neglected parts of history, perceiving the contemporary problems of the world, mostly Europe, searching their local and regional histories and creating alternatives to the problems or traditional historical interpretations. It is important to know that the founders, members and supporters of EUSTORY perceive European history as "...much more than the history of the European Union, but includes the study of a much wider range of historical aspects across the European continent...Europe should become not only a matter of historical content but also one of perspective" [EUSTORY Charta, 2001: 298].

This competition, particularly, encourages students to improve a critical view of the past. It aimed to make students able to see different perspectives and perceptions of history through encouraging them with interdisciplinary studies. To put it differently, the aim is to make students gain tolerance and multi-perspective understandings. Moreover, through promoting the European perspective it aims "...to bridge not only the gaps between nations and regions, but also between men and women, social, political, ethnic or religious groups" [EUSTORY Charta, 2001: 298]. By bringing students from different parts of Europe, it tries to strengthen the cross-border dialogue in Europe. However, the EUSTORY program does not only serve for students but also history teachers, specialists and the public because the only activity they provide is not competitions but conferences, workshops and meetings. Most of the society can benefit from this program [Bucher-Dinc, 2000].

In short, the EUSTORY program is a very important initiative especially to understand the New Europe of the 21st century through the creation of a European perspective in history. The EUSTORY initiative tries to materialize learning through research, sharing the past and shaping a common future and strengthening of the cross-border interaction, multiperspectivity, transparent and consistent methods in history all of which are vital for the emergence of historical consciousness, tolerance, peace in Europe and a common European future.

9.3. Independent Initiatives

9.3.1. The European Studies Project

In 1986, the Ministry of Education in Ireland, the Department of Education in Northern Ireland and the Department of Education and Science in London established the European Studies Project. It aimed to promote young people chance of working together and using new technology to understand views and ideas of each other. In other words, it attempted to provide perception of differences in views, ideas, beliefs and histories from peaceful, democratic and tolerant standpoints. At the time of Slater's writing, in 1995, there were more than three hundred school involved in this project from Ireland, Northern Ireland, England, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Scotland and Spain [Slater, 1995].

The project used three different non-cost-free programmes to materialize their aims. The first program was "The 11-14/12-15 Programme". It was focused on the regions of founders of the project. This program aimed to eradicate the stereotypes between Ireland and England. To do this, some sensitive subjects, which were challenging the biases, were given to students. These students were provided huge technological equipments like internet, audio visual sources and also residential courses were arranged. Through using them, they established relations with different regions' students; thus they found the chance of discussing their ideas.

The second program was "The 16-18 Programme". This program was not based on a specific subject but a general research on social, cultural, economic, and political issues in Europe. The methods used in the first programme were used in this one also. Again, the aim was to provide reciprocal understanding and exchange of ideas among European students. And the last one was "Language, Industry and Trade" which, in contrast to other programmes, focused on economic awareness in Europe [Slater, 1995].

In short, with these programmes, the European Studies Project achieved, to a great extent, the elimination of violence, prejudice and political divisions between the youth of founder countries; and in general it succeeded pretty much to able students gain the abilities of critical thinking, mutual understanding, tolerance and democracy.

9.3.2. The Young Historian Scheme

The Historical Association in the United Kingdom started this initiative. Its purpose is to improve the history studies in schools.

It seeks to help history pupils and their teachers throughout the school system to become more confident of the value of studying history as a school subject; to extend the opportunities available for involvement in activities which makes history more enjoyable and stimulating; to develop new ways of making contact between history students and the world of work; to generate among the public a better appreciation of the importance of history in the education of children; and to disseminate good practice in the teaching of history [Slater, 1995: 62-63].

To materialize these aims, the Scheme established local and regional centers in which history teachers can create contacts with each other, and share their works, opinions and ideas. Also, the initiative arranges several history competitions among students from different age groups in Europe. In short, this project, just like the others, tries to improve history networks in Europe, encourage European-ness, common values in Europe, historical reasoning and the value of history for both teachers and students.

10. TOWARDS A WIDER EUROPEAN-NESS PERSPECTIVE IN HISTORY EDUCATION IN EUROPE

10.1. The Wider European-ness Perspective

From the first pages of this project, its aim is being reflected as the emergence of or a transition to a wider European perspective in history education in Europe. To find possible methods to realize this goal, the history of historiography, theories of nationalism, relationship between modernism, nationalism and education, the European history education through students', teachers' and, nations' perspectives and national historical experiences were studied with detail. So, what is this wider European perspective? Although it is the aim of this project, what does wider European perspective aim? How does it differ from dominant national perspectives in history education?

In my opinion, wider European perspective is a very complex phenomenon for history education and it is difficult to define it through what it is and how it should be. So, let me first try to define what it is not, what it does not involve and actually what it aims not to involve. As opposed to nationalistic perspectives of history, wider European perspective in Europe should not include "us vs. them" dichotomy in a hostile way. It also should abstain from pseudoscientific explanations and definitions and also anachronism in history and its teaching. What is more, it should avoid particular kind of tones of narration through which students would think that the history textbook is "the history", not a composition of selected data and interpretations of an author. The wider European perspective of history should also not raise passive students who always listen to the narratives of their teachers and takes all given information as historical truths.

Besides what wider European perspective in history education is not, it can also be defined through four concepts: Questioning, inclusion, shift, and multiperspectivity. To be more specific regarding questioning, the European perspective means nurturing generations whose members can question the teaching materials and sources of history education such as textbooks, audio-visual materials, museums, internet, teachers' narratives, documentaries, maps, and many more. In other words, it aims to gain students the skills of critical thinking, analyzing, interpreting and conceptualizing. Thus, the initial aim of wider European perspective is to create evidence and enquiry-based history education.

As seen above, wider European perspective in history is a dynamic concept rather than a static concept. In other words it is not a given status but it involves this constant endeavor, struggle and action to create itself. Therefore, all the concepts that define wider European perspective are also the tools and the methods to realize this wider European perspective. As a result, once the wider European perspective is realized, it will continue to evolve and recreate itself with each generation. The real challenge is to generate this perspective for the first time by introducing the above-mentioned four concepts to the European community.

Concerning inclusion, it aims to include the understanding and learning of so far ignored, marginalized and disadvantaged groups, communities, regions and nations of Europe. In relating to this, the European perspective intends to make students have, practice and develop historical empathy, historical consciousness and tolerance.

What is more, the European perspective in history education is about shifting emphasis of history from nations to more micro emphasis points like regions, locales, and even individuals. Through doing this, it aims to teach students that history is not just about big nations' wars and experiences of diplomacy but also small units' pasts, experiences and their contributions to Europe. Another transfer can be defined as shift of subjects from nations' citizens to individuals with no emphasis of national identity and this will enable students to see that there are other alternative histories not involving nations and nationalistic tendencies such as the history of minorities, women, and progress in terms of technology, urbanization and many more.

Regarding multiperspectivity, wider European perspective of history aims students to gain the skills of interpreting historical events throughout time periods, defining the similarities and differences between nations, regions and people, creating patterns of historical experiences and being open-minded to different interpretations of the same events in different regions by different people in different times. This also includes the facing with the dark sides of European or their own nations' histories, the learning and discussing controversial issues through facts and evidence.

Lastly, the wider European perspective is about teaching students the values embedded in scientificity, objectivity and also in differences among people, religions, ethnicities, languages and nationalities and also in commonalities such as experiencing the same historical events and having common cultural heritage.

To make long story short, the wider European perspective in history education is an attempt to integrate skill-based learning into a predominantly knowledge-based curriculum in European history education system. This makes our new question as how can it be realized with the embedded practices of traditional and nationalistic history education system in Europe?

There are two options defined by the European educational authorities, in particular the European Union and the Council of Europe regarding solutions. The first one is the change of textbooks' contents through inclusion of many new European history subjects and the effort to eliminate the strong emphasis on national history. The second one is changing the teaching methods and the perception of history among students with little emphasis of change in contents of textbooks. And that is personally what I believe where the solution definitely lies.

In my opinion, the change of textbook contents through the inclusion of new European history subjects cannot provide permanent solutions to the problems of European history education and it cannot directly create wider European perspective of history. It is possible to list some reasons for this. First of all, the time that is allocated for history lessons in school curriculums is not enough to teach students many more topics concerning Europe and this had been proved with the results of the Youth and History survey. It is at most two hours a week in European countries and history lessons are not compulsory in each country. So, some students learn history only until they are fourteen or so; on the other hand others learn until they are eighteen. "The more limited the number of hours of history education which a students receives and the more-content rich the existing curriculum is, the fewer the opportunities there will be for extending...the curriculum" and for increasing students' understanding of history [Stradling, 2001: 29]. That is why, the inclusion of many European history topics cannot bring benefit to students due to lack of time, and the difficulty of providing equal basis for students in Europe taken as a whole.

Secondly, the nature of European history may serve as a barrier for the emergence of a wider European perspective in terms of positive values. As the history of Europe, particularly the 20th century, is the history wars, conflicts, reciprocal antagonisms, intolerance,

disagreements, collisions and aggressive attitudes of nations, the increase of history subject in textbook contents may cause the increase of negative values of differences, rise of ethnic, religious and linguistic conflict. Also, it is a fact that the selection of themes in curriculums are being done by national education authorities due to education is under governments' authorities in the European Union, if not, their teaching is done through nationalistic perspectives, it is really difficult to promote uniting wider European perspective that is open for tolerance, acceptance of the dark sides of history and respectful towards differences. The widening of history education curriculums through new European history themes can, most probably, pave the way for the new nationalistic interpretations of European history (in my opinion related to the impossibility of elimination of subjective and biased interpretation of history] and that is what the current history education system needs to be got rid of.

Thirdly, making changes in the contents of the textbooks, their designs, publishing and distribution processes necessitates a huge textbook market, money, time and eligible personnel, particularly history writers who are experienced in textbook writing. These necessities make the content related solutions more difficult to bring success because especially the Central and Eastern European countries do not have those qualifications. They do lack of history textbook authors who are able to write textbooks that are free of ideology and lack of money to do these necessary processes. Although these can be done in the Western European countries, the gap between Western and Eastern Europe will demise the possibility of success.

What is more, according to the results of the Youth and History survey, students do not enjoy using textbook and considering the impact of textbooks on the development of students' chronological historical knowledge, historical empathy, awareness and the rise of students' own interpretations, it does not seem a very effective plan to change the structure of history textbooks or widen their contents because textbooks do not improve the mentioned skills or abilities of students.

The widening of European history textbooks' contents with more European history related subjects also will bring the necessity of teacher in-service training because teachers also have to be trained about what to teach and how to teach. However, in-service training mechanisms are not widened in Europe, mostly the Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the capacity of countries to promote necessary teaching materials regarding the addition of new European history subjects may not be sufficient and this may increase the gap

among countries and among students that will serve as a barrier for wider European perspectives in history.

Lastly, it is a fact that students mostly forget what they learn in history lessons after a few years of their graduation. History is such a subject that people do not prefer to read or be interested in after school. These features of it make its teaching more important. However, due to the factor of forgetting and lack of further interest makes focusing more on the teaching of facts inefficient in the long run. So, rather than teaching students the historical facts of European history, teaching them skills of learning, criticizing, analyzing and interpreting seems more reasonable for solving the problems of European history education.

However, it is important to overtly state that while I am supporting the vitality of skillbased learning I do not argue the total elimination of knowledge-based curriculum structures; this was already mentioned in my definition of wider European perspective. The reason behind it is that the aims of wider European perspective of history such as the development of critical thinking, historical consciousness, empathy and multiperspectivity, etc necessitate preliminary knowledge about historical events and the rationale behind them.

What is more, personally, I do support the continuation of national history and I am aware and argue the impossibility, at least extreme difficulty of the elimination of nationalistic interpretations of history. Regarding the former, national histories do have values in themselves in terms of providing diversity, proofs for interactions, common heritages, continuity and changes in Europe. It is a fact that all national histories do search for the "uniqueness" and "exceptionalism" of their nations and this approach creates dangerous outcomes such as xenophobia, racism, intolerance, the hostile definition of the "others", and the indoctrination of the inferiority of all other nations; and in education, the rise of extreme subjectivity, anachronism, pseudo scientific tendencies and implicit hatred messages that are stuck between textlines. However, the total elimination of national history and of the attempts to create common and identical histories, in other words equalization of history, do involve worse and more dangerous outcomes [Berktay, 1994: 85]. In an environment in which all members of it are the same, there is no way for the emergence of tolerance, respect, multiperspectivity and also way for improvement because differences and their understanding bring progress to human societies. Thus, the optimum way in history should be to achieve to catch the fragile balance between the general and private and their interaction through developing a neutral language of history and constructing a neutral multiperspectivity rather than overloading curriculums with new history subjects [Berktay, 1994].

Regarding my second argument that is the impossibility, or at least the extreme difficulty of the elimination of nationalistic interpretations of history, the reason lies in the global system as argued in previous chapters. It is argued that globalization necessitates rewriting and rearrangement of history textbooks due to it is changing the power and hegemony of the nation states. Thus, history textbooks which had been written from nationalistic perspectives became insufficient to satisfy the demand of globalization which is a peaceful and more tolerant world. However, although countries make some changes, national histories and national historiographies and the nationalistic interpretations of European and world histories did not end and not replaced with different writing approaches which could lead more tolerance, peace, human rights, equality, harmony and unity. The reason is, although the core of globalization depends on the demise and even the end of nation states, what is happening today is an attempt to provide the continuity of the nation states and their protection through establishing less powerful international organizations. In other words, there is not so much change in the dynamics and power status of nation states. What is new is the emergence of weaker international institutions, supranational organizations which are based on the continuation of national powers [Tekeli, 1994]. As this is the system of the world, it seems impossible to eliminate nationalistic history interpretations due to its present ongoing impact on the construction of national identities and values. Personally, the attempts towards the abolition of it are no more than losing time in promoting solutions to European history education in the short run.

Besides all these arguments (values embedded in national differences and the unfeasibility of the removal of nationalistic tendencies in history) and the reasons that aimed to show the possible inefficiency of widening history curriculums with more European history subjects in the case of its application as the sole solution to European history education problems, there are some changes that needs to be done in textbook contents and writing styles such as theme selection, inclusion of European dimension, promoting three fundamental principles of history textbooks, inclusion of local and regional histories and necessary changes in language and tone of textbooks. Although these changes cannot be realized entirely in terms of success, each European country, at least, should try their bests according to their economic strength and mentality of European-ness.

10.2. Necessary Changes in History Textbook Contents for a Wider European-ness Perspective

10.2.1. Theme Selection

In the history of Europe, especially in the 20th century, "there is too much history per square" and this overloaded situation of it makes the main question what to include and what to exclude from history curriculums. In teaching of European history theme selection is an inevitable process. As a suggestion regarding the teaching of history of Europe to students, the selection criteria should not only focus on "…*what* should be taught but also *why* it should be taught and *how* it should be taught" [Stradling, 2001: 21].

Some of the common themes of secondary education throughout Europe regarding history are

...the first world war and its origins; the Russian Revolution; the restructuring of Europe in 1918; the rise of totalitarianism: communism, national socialism and fascism; economic depression; the collapse of international peace; the second World War: the 'people's war'; restructuring Europe in 1945; the cold war era: Nato and the Warsaw Pact; decolonization; post-1945 political and economic co-operation; the European Community; glasnost and perestroika; the break-up of the Soviet Union; the emerging independent democracies of central and eastern Europe...technological and scientific developments in the 20th century; social change...the changing roles of women in society...the distinctive cultural and artistic movements of the 20th century; industrialization...urbanization...population movements...the changing situation of national and other minorities in Europe...human rights [Stradling, 2001: 22].

As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, most of these issues are being taught from nationalistic perspectives and through economic and political point of views rather than European views and cultural and social emphasis. Also, some of them are being ignored in history lessons such as women and minorities. Thus, the first assertion is that theme selection can change the dominant nationalistic interpretations of history and the ignorance of particular groups and subject in history.

Secondly, the theme-based history education can provide the demise of chronological history education. As the wider European perspective is dominantly defined through teaching students the skills and thinking abilities, it is much rational to apply thematic framework in

history education. Thematic framework means learning history through case studies of themes as listed many of them above.⁶² It includes only one subject matter at a time and its development over time (or in particular time period defined) in different countries simultaneously rather than focusing on its development in one nation and its interpretation from a specific nation's point of view. For this reason, selection of themes in history lessons contributes students to recognize trends and patterns over time and across Europe at a given point in time and to go beyond the description of events; and gives students the chance of analyzing, comparing and contrasting them across time and space; and to use variety of sources, to examine alternative historical interpretations, to collect historical evidence thus the chance for better use of historical methods and to trace back over centuries to understand the roots of current events. However, if the whole content of history textbooks are filled with themes as the main source of history teaching; to put it differently if the chronologically designed contents are totally eliminated, then themes may cause students to develop a more atomized view of history which means jumping from one theme to another without links of continuity and students may not develop the sense of time [Stradling, 2001].

Regarding theme selection, the difficulty comes from the impossibility of teaching each topic with careful and detailed pan-European perspectives, balanced chronological and diachronical approaches and through multiperspectivity because there is no time to realize this due to two-hour history lessons per week. What is more, the impossibility of teaching each topic with same emphasis comes from the inequality in history. As Berktay stated, there is no possibility of giving room to each society and community in history textbooks because the course of history is not equal for each community [Berktay, 1994: 77]. Also, because history is pretty much about politics, the theme selection process lies in what authorities think the students ought to learn and what is reasonable to expect students to learn due to political necessities of the present concerns. However, by being aware of this reality, textbook writers should try to do their best to include as many countries, nations, minorities as possible to make history more equal although it is indispensable that some countries will continue to be mentioned more.

Rather than filling students' minds with historical facts, names of people, places and times of wars, treaties and etc, the main aim of theme selection must be related with the question: "what residual of their history lessons would we like them to retain five or ten years

⁶² To see how these themes can be used in history textbooks see [Stradling, 2001: 68-78]

after they have left school?" [Stradling, 2001: 23]. Do we want them to remember the dates and the names of important people without the content in which they took place? Or do we want them remember the rationale in historical period and significance, contributions and reflection of the past on present developments?

Briefly, I will not give the list of the themes that must be chosen for the emergence of a wider European perspective in Europe, because I can sincerely confess that I do not know the appropriate list and I doubt that if there is a possibility of defining a certain list. However, what I can suggest is that the theme selection is not independent from the success of methodological changes due to it includes what to teach, why to teach and how to teach. It is directly linked to the realization of aims of wider European perspective such as critical thinking, historical empathy, conceptualization, analysis, tolerance and so on. What should be done concerning the content of textbooks, the chosen themes should be able to give students the chance of the application of new teaching methods through which they can both improve their historical knowledge and thinking skills.

10.2.2. European Dimension

As mentioned in previous chapters, in Europe, some curriculums define Europe and European identity as a unity and some others define it as diversity. However, the single usage of these approaches; to be more specific, defining Europe only through commonalities or through only diversities, have several limitations. When Europe is defined as a unity, European history becomes a continuous narrative from beginning to the present. This view of Europe, however,

...tend to omit those parts of Europe which, for significant periods of their history, were untouched by those influences which are thought to be central to the European tradition... tend to gloss over those periods of European history when the mainstream cultural tradition was virtually lost to large parts of Europe and only recovered through rather circuitous means...tends to downplay the external influences on European cultural, philosophical and scientific history...tends to put a lot of emphasis on cultural and political history and the history of ideas. Social and economic history tends to be missing, perhaps because a focus on these dimensions would tend to highlight diversity rather than commonality [Stradling, 2001: 25-26].

The second approach which defines Europe through its particularity has both pros and cons. In terms of advantages, it may make students able to see different dynamic forces that influenced and shaped their country and Europe. They can understand the commonality between their own country and Europe in general. However, students may also acquire an atomized and fragmented picture of European history rather than an overview.

So, how textbook contents can deal with these two dimensions of Europe lies in the balance among them. European history is neither the history of mere commonalities and unity nor the history of differences and diversities, because the contemporary Europe is the outcome of mutual interactions between different communities, nations, regions, languages, cultures, traditions, values, morals and so on. Shortly, textbook contents should be arranged according to the inclusion of this balance between Europe as unity, commonality and as diversity and particularity.

10.2.3. Three Fundamental Balances of Textbook Contents

History textbooks should give attention to three fundamental balances in order to promote better education to students. The first one is the balance between what is historically important and what is suitable for inclusion regarding the goals of history education. To be specific, the events that have a major impact in Europe or the events that happened elsewhere and their outcomes that mirrored to Europe must be taught to students if they are available in terms of sources and time allocated in curriculums [Stradling, 2001]. What this means, textbooks should choose what to teach concerning the availability of scientific evidence about them; countries' capability to provide the teaching materials of that subject in question and the availability of time in curriculums. Otherwise, trying to teach a historical subject through insufficient sources, within a very limited time in which the subject becomes too narrow can create misunderstanding of the subject, and the time and energy of both teachers and students can be wasted.

The second balance is between "the particular" and "the general" histories. History textbook contents should be arranged to make students able to both learn the general history of the related subjects and the particularities of them in different regions, nations or localities of Europe [Stradling, 2001]. So, what happened in general, what happened in particular and what

the significance of particularity or the uniqueness or distinctiveness in that particular situation is must be known. Thus, after the general info in grand events in Europe, their emergences, reflections and influences in particular places, regions etc must be compared and contrasted by students to better understand Europe; and textbooks should provide opportunities to do these.

The last fundamental balance is between the vertical historical perspectives and the horizontal historical perspectives. The vertical historical perspectives (can also be seen as a pedagogical approach) include studying of change and continuity over time; developing an extensive impression of specific topics and periods as a whole; knowing the main forces shaping events and the historical turning points; understanding some major lines of development over an extended period of time; understanding different phases of the same event and the noteworthy developmental patterns; the causes of events and developments; and being able to identify the end results. Alternatively, what horizontal historical perspective (can also be seen as spatial approach) includes can be listed as the locating of particular events and developments into a wider European context; comparing and contrasting them and developments in their own country's history with the equivalent in other European countries; how events and developments in ones' own country have influenced and have been influenced by what has happened elsewhere in Europe, the impact of neighboring cultures, countries outside the region and Europe on each other; how national and local developments in specific time were experienced and perceived elsewhere in Europe, how European conflicts and divisions have affected recent national histories and how international dynamics like events, institutions and developments affected Europe [Stradling, 2001; Bourne, 2003].

In short, textbooks through their contents must be able to make students understand and apply the main premises of history like change, continuity, causality, reason and conceptualization to historical cases through using of vertical perspectives and also make them able to compare and contrast historical events in different places, in different times, analyze their interaction, understand the existence of different dimensions of history and different interpretations of the same events in different spatialities, temporalities, and individualities.

10.2.4. Inclusion of Local and Regional Histories

As was pointed out earlier with detail, with the rise of nation states history became a tool for construction of national identities and legitimization of national powers. For this reason, history was taught through the glories of nations and their superiority compared to other communities. This situation created a generation who look history from one perspective that is national and they believed that national history was the mere source of historical truth. However, this trend should be changed or at least widened. History textbook contents should be arranged according to the inclusion of local and regional histories because their understanding is a big step towards wider European perspective in history.

To begin with the local history, the most essential contribution of studying local history lies in its impact on the shift of historical emphasis from macro levels such as nation states and powerful countries to micro levels like family, school, city, town, village, and etc. The real goal of this is to shift the subject of history from nation states to individuals and localities. It serves to abstract the history of individuals from national histories and to remind students that there are other historical dimensions like history of everyday life which do not contradict and intersect with the fate of nation. Thus, local histories provide the possibility of writing new histories independent from the destiny of nation states.

Secondly, regional histories provide links between history and geography but not national geography. It is vital to know that studying regional histories do not mean the study of regions in national territories. It is the construction of "new" geographies which are not identical with nation state boundaries and which do not involve national perspectives. To be more precise, regional histories is about studying and making research about regions in-question in time when there was no nation state construction and even the idea of it. It tries to understand regions' economies, demographic dynamics, cultures and heritages left to present time. The main contribution of regional histories to wider European perspectives of history is it makes students able to understand that there was a different "human geography" before nation states.

In short, history textbooks, by means of including texts on local and regional histories and by providing research exercises to students, can contribute to the development of wider European perspectives in history.

10.2.5. Inclusion of Historically Sensitive Issues

Controversial issues are sensitive in history education. They include the possibility of dividing nations and increasing hostility among countries because they rise due to different perceptions of the same events through different countries; they question people's loyalties and arouse people's prejudices to each other. Controversial issues, besides being sensitive, can be more related to countries' painful, tragic and divisive pasts. This time what makes them controversial does not come from fear of hostility among nations but fear of re-emergence of old painful memories.

The important thing about teaching of sensitive issues is that the discussion regarding sensitive issues should not be based on the elimination of them from curriculums but should be based on the possible ways of teaching them because qualified understanding of history and its education necessitates facing with dark sides of history in which people, nations made mistakes and guilt and declares regrets overtly. The teaching of sensitive issues in Europe is a very important issue because the history Europe is full of them and each European country has their sensitive issues. More precisely, these controversial and sensitive events can be considered as

...the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, war crimes, collaboration with occupying forces, treaty violations, civil wars, deportations, the treatment of Roma/Gypsies, migrant workers and refugees, military occupations, violations of human rights, religious persecution and sectarian conflict, colonialism, and so on [Stradling, 2001: 99].

Thus, this list proves that it is impossible to teach the 20^{th} century European history without focusing on the sensitive topics because each European nation is somehow linked to these sensitive issues.

Teaching controversial and sensitive issues are vital for the development of wider European perspective in history because they teach students the ability to understand the real world in which they live in and its dynamics. It makes students understand the fundamental nature of history as a discipline that is almost all historical events and developments are open to different interpretations. What is more, their inclusion to the content of the textbooks helps to develop some skills and ways of looking at history such as critical analysis of the evidence, language and asking analytical questions. Through these skills, at the end students can become able to critically evaluate different source materials that offer different perspectives about the relevant subjects; compare and contract the situation with parallel situations in other countries; to put themselves in the shoes of other people and try to interpret the subject matter from different perspectives through historical empathy.

10.2.6. Changes in Language and Tone of Textbooks

As already mentioned in Turkish case as a model for nationalistic history education with detail and at the beginning of this chapter, students assume that the texts they are reading in their textbooks are the "history" and the tone of textbooks make student not realize that there is an author who is writing those lines. Students do not realize that the author of the book is an individual, a historian who found the sources, analyzed, then interpreted and at last wrote them to the textbook. What students perceive is that there is an "authority" whose reliability cannot be questioned. What is more, concerning use of the language and word choice, there are many implicit messages, false analogies, stereotypes and emphasis on national epics and emotions that develop intolerance, hostility and inferior-superior dichotomy on students' minds due to nationalistic tendencies of the textbooks.

The change that must be done is to be careful about these distorted meanings which develop hostilities and negative attitudes towards other societies and nations among students. Also, regarding the tone of textbooks, students must be taught that authors are not the authority and the sole sources of historical truths. Students can realize this through the inclusion of authors 'personal ideas between texts' lines and the inclusion of a well-written bibliography at the end of the books and active use of footnotes and references throughout the book [Stradling, 2001]. If these can be done, students can easily internalize that writing history is a selection process and a subjective study that makes it open to questioning and which can encourage students to develop their own interpretations of historical events.

10.3. Teaching Methods and Approaches: Where the Solution Lies

Today in most of European countries the emphasis in history education is shifting from what to teach to how to teach students. The main debate shifted from a straightforward division between teaching content or teaching skills to one where the main issue is how to amalgamate skill-based learning with knowledge-based curriculums. Also, another important question regarding history education emerged as what to retain students in the future, especially after school education concerning history. These can be listed as a continuing interest in history, not only to the national or ethnic history but also European and world history; an interpretative overview of the history which is both chronological and thematic; a sense of recurring patterns and the dynamics of change which have shaped centuries; a sense of some of the main trends and developments which were common to most of Europe and those which reflect national or regional differences; a way of looking at the contemporary world which takes into account the temporal and spatial dimension; recognizing that today's events and developments generally have their roots in the past and are not just the results of things that have happened recently; transferable analytical and interpretative skills which will be able to use in the future to understand the world and the changes [Stradling, 2001: 88].

Students rather than memorizing historical facts must be raised as capable of organizing historical knowledge and ideas about history, making generalizations, recognizing similarities and differences, establishing connections and finding patterns in history. However, these aims cannot be realized through grand national historical narratives that mostly teach history through chronological developments and through the authority of the textbook writer. So, the means of promoting these goals that are actually all about historical understanding include in creating sense of continuity, change and causation on students' minds and also teaching them chronology, comparison and use of evidence.

Due to the main intention of the wider European perspective in history is to make students gain the basic skills of learning and thinking abilities rather than filling their minds and memories with historical facts and dates, application of new teaching methods or the increase in their usage in education system seems to be able to provide permanent solutions to the problems of European history education. In short, the way that goes to the successful practice of skill-based learning in Europe necessitates the use of modern teaching methods. It is aimed that students will be able to understand continuity and change in history; significance and sense of chronology; causation in history; values and problems embedded in evidences and historical sources; the peaceful and tolerant perception of the dark sites of European history; the understanding of differences and their reasons; the improvement of historical empathy and awareness; and the development of key skills of learning such as critical thinking, comparing and contrasting, critical reading of sources, analyzing, interpreting, conceptualization and finding historical patterns through the application of these methods. These teaching methods can be listed as the use of audio and visual sources, role plays and simulations, practice of multiperspectivity, use of out-school learning channels such as museums, historical site visits and the use of technology.

10.3.1. Use of Audio-Visual Sources

It is a fact that students like audiovisual teaching materials more than reading textbooks and while they are working with these aids they enjoy more. What is more, visual materials such as photographs are considered historical evidences just like primary sources. Stradling stated that "at one level photographs are simply visual traces of events in the recent past. At another level they often evoke an emotional response from us to those events and they impose meaning on the events without analyzing them. That means that, like most other historical sources, they have to be interpreted or 'read'" [Stradling, 2001: 110]. Besides the historical value of photographs, they can improve students' skills and opportunities to learn. For example, through using photographs; social trends, fashion, family life, the work places, urban landscapes, etc can be learned by students. Stradling asserts that using advertising photographs, for example, from different periods of centuries can make students understand society's choices, fashion, products they used, their values, preferences and social life. Also, photographs can be used to chart developments over the centuries such as technology, transport, architecture and art. What is more, showing the same images such as buildings, streets, etc in different periods can provide students identify the similarities and differences over time; thus this makes them able to better understand continuity and change [Stradling, 2001]. Additionally, students can find contradictions between textbooks'

narratives and photographs regarding some historical topics. These kinds of ambiguities may push students think more critically and lead them do research.

However, although looking at photographs can make students able to have conclusions about history and gain them information about the related topics, this does not mean that the outcomes are true and reliable. There are some important facts that students need to know before interpreting history through photographs. First of all, "photographs which are preserved for historical record have been subjected to an intensive process of selection at several levels" [Stradling, 2001: 113]; such as the selection of camera angle, background, the subject, the composition and so on which significantly affects the ideas of viewers and their perceptions. Secondly, photographs are being edited and it is a very easy process. That is why, students must be aware of the political, social and cultural motivations behind visual sources. Lastly, students should be taught that "...the photographer can have a direct effect on the events that are being photographed" by themselves [Stradling, 2001: 115]. This means that while students are interpreting the photographs as historical sources and try to understand history through their usage, they must be able to ask, why was the photographer there? What was the motive tat forced him to take that shot? Has the presence of him/her increased the actions of people in the photograph such as violence, showing tragedy and so on? Very shortly, what must be done is to encourage students to ask questions about the reliability of historical sources on which they are studying.

10.3.2. Role-Plays and Simulations

One of the teaching materials of modern education model is the use of simulations and role plays because this model aims to make students more active in thinking and participating.

To begin with simulation, it is "...a model which seeks to emulate or recreate the conditions which exist (or once existed) in a particular situation, event or process" [Stradling, 2001: 125]. They can be considered as simplified models of real historical experiences. They focus on historical crises, main turning points in history such as alliance formations, military interventions, revolutions, etc; the decision making processes and the factors that affected their outcomes; enquiries and investigations such as war crime tribunals, poverty, racism, religious tolerance, refugees and so on; and lastly "the news desk simulation, a means of exploring how a

crisis or an event of major significance might be interpreted and presented in different parts of Europe using, where possible, materials form the news media at the time" [Stradling, 2001: 126].

The second method is use of role-plays. In role-plays students are expected to recreate a historical situation and act out the roles of people who had involved those events in history. This teaching activity tries to teach students think in other time periods and understand those times' values and thinking patterns and their reasons. In other words, this method provides opportunities for students to perform historical empathy and understand how an individual in another place and time would have responded and to comprehend the everyday lives of ordinary people of the past.

These two approaches have two different kinds of positive consequences for students. The first one is about their contribution to students' general education lives. These teaching methods encourage students to do cooperative work with other students for a common objective and encourage them to show tolerance for differences in ideas. Also, they improve their communication and research skills due to the necessity of background information before simulations and role plays in order to be successful.

Besides these general educational contributions, if simulations and role plays are wellstructured and realistic, the factual information is accurate and the aims and tasks are appropriate to the age ranges and abilities of students they can provide many contributions that will be helpful for the emergence of a wider European perspective in history education in Europe. Firstly, they give students chance of improving historical empathy through which students gain the ability of seeing particular events, changes and developments of the past from the eyes of someone else. Secondly, students can understand that the same developments, events or circumstances of history can have different interpretations and different outcomes in different time periods. Moreover, they can make students "... experience some of the dynamics which influenced decisions which were critical for Europe in the last century: the different perspectives and priorities of the participating decision makers, the timescale within which decisions had to be taken, the domestic and international pressures on them, the resources they could mobilize, the power they could wield and the constraint on that power, the maneuverings and machinations which shaped the decision-making process at the time" [Stradling, 2001: 128]. Continuously, in contrast to the textbooks, simulations and role-plays put emphasis on the processes of historical events not outcomes. Students, through role plays and simulations can learn to look at historical events as if they have not yet happened [Stradling, 2001] and by this way they can understand

the impact of internal and external factors in the development of processes and they can really rationalize why the people of the past or authorities, nations etc acted as the way they did.

The role-plays and simulations are the effective tools of creating active and thinking individuals. However, there are some constraints about them, too. The first constraint is the lack of the number of produced historical simulations on the market and the lack of simulations that are focused on social and cultural historical developments; most of them are concentrated on political, diplomatic crises and battles. Also, the range of different languages in simulations is not enough, plus the cost of simulations is too high. Besides these technical and economic problems, in order to benefit from these approaches, teachers must be very careful about the differences among students in terms of their abilities to read, understand and information about the historical topics [Stradling, 2001].

Another aspect to note is that, simulations and role-plays involve the high risk of anachronism which is modernizing the past. Thus, teachers must check students' words, behaviors and ideas during these activities to prevent anachronisms. Another constraint is the inclination of students towards national values, ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs while role playing or while they are in a simulation which can lead erroneous perceptions about historical events. Lastly, the aim of improving historical empathy in students through role plays and simulations is not an easy task and this must be understood. It is difficult for students to totally get rid of their values, beliefs, inclinations and experiences during these teaching activities and this situation seems more obvious when their ages are taken into consideration.

So, if these are the problems, where do their solutions lie? Robert Stradling defines these as follows: To eliminate the constraints of role playing and simulations, it is better to apply these towards the end of a topic or theme rather than at the beginning or to give students time to do some first round research. The reason is that if students begin these activities with information relating to the period and event that will be role played or simulated, the reliability of these practices will automatically increase. The second suggestion is follow-up work which means things that should be done after role playing or simulations. To be more detailed, after the application of these methods in classrooms, students must make an evaluation session on what happened. Through these sessions, with the leading of their teachers, they will be able to discuss the problems emerged during activities such as ethnocentric interpretations, anachronisms, and rational mistakes regarding the use of correct info. Also, students can compare and contrast their outcomes and the reasons behind them with the suggestions of their textbooks or other teaching materials; thus they can learn to be more critical towards sources and can improve critical thinking and analysis. What is more, due to the result of simulations and role plays do not have to be the same as it happened in history, students can discuss their results with actual outcomes and work on the reasons behind differences. In short, what is needed in the application of these methods is some kind of checking and discussion mechanisms in the aftermath of their practice and if these can be applied, the efficiency of role plays and simulations will increase because the constraints are not unsolvable.

10.3.3. Practice of Multiperspectivity

The teaching and learning of history of Europe changed a lot over the last four decades. There has been a shift from over-emphasis on political and diplomatic history to an increasing interest towards social and cultural history; European, global and regional histories; the history of disadvantaged, ignored and marginalized people. To put it differently, the focus points of history is shifting from overloaded national history to several micro histories including the history of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. The reasons of these shifts are stated by Stradling as the increasing accessibility of historical records and achieves; the impact of media in terms of its ability to reflect the ordinary people's lives [Stradling, 2001]. However, there is also the impact of political improvements like the European Union and countries' will to realize the requirements of Union membership. All these developments, at the end, provided the potentiality and necessity of examining the recent past from different perspectives and this gave rise to multiperspectivity approach.

To be precise, multiperspectivity "...is a way of thinking, a way of selecting, examining and using evidence from different sources in order to unravel the complexities of a situation and work out what happened and why" [Stradling, 2001: 142]. The application of this method in European history education is important because it can make students understand that there is not only one correct version of historical events and the historical truths can be many due to the possibility of several interpretations of the same event by several people, countries, nations, institutions and so on. In other words, the same historical events can be explained in different ways and through different standpoints; as a result there emerges many incomplete but valid explanations of the same historical event. Moreover, multiperspectivity makes "time" a significant focus of analysis because the same events can be interpreted very differently in different times. This situation, the relationship between time and multiperspectivity gives rise to the sense of historical empathy and awareness among students.

In addition to these, through the use of multiperspectivity student can become able to see different perceptions of "the other" and (re) define the relationship between the self and others. What is more, the application of multiperspectivity necessitates use of different historical evidence. When students use diverse evidence, they begin to realize the origins of particular viewpoints in history and the factors affect them such as the related time period's social, political and economic conditions, authorities' objectives, priorities and obligations [Stradling, 2001]. This understanding enables students to answer why specific historical events happened as the way they did besides what happened.

In short, multiperspectivity aims to gain students a more wide-ranging understanding of historical events and progress through the inclusion of differences and similarities of all parties involved. It intends to provide the dynamics of what happened and why happened through investigating the interactions between people, groups and nations and their interdependence. Lastly, multiperspectivity with historical empathy aim to improve tolerance in historical understanding among students through promoting the understanding of differences with their rational explanations and through teaching students the value of difference in Europe.

However, just like in other suggested approaches, multiperspectivity has its own constraints. First of all, the scale of multiperspectivity is evidently constrained by the availability of teaching materials. Due to the teaching materials such as textbooks are written from a national perspective and their contents are mostly about national histories of countries, the application of multiperspectivity becomes harder. Most of the European students are being educated through national values either explicitly or implicitly and although they are aware of different interpretations of historical events, they do believe that the truth lies in their nation's interpretation.

The second problem of the scope of multiperspectivity is about the number of languages that students and teachers know. As it is obvious, application of multiperspectivity necessitates use of different sources from different countries which means use of several different languages. And concerning the non-availability of translations of these sources to other languages emerges as a problem for this approach.

Furthermore, bringing several sources with different standpoints of the same historical event and making students read them does not mean that students achieved multiperspectivity in history. To put it differently, this approach is not separable from analytical thinking, historical empathy and the elimination of ethnocentric and nationalistic attitudes. Thus, the success of multiperspectivity necessitates significant systematic study of teachers and students.

Is it impossible to develop multiperspectivity in countries in which all other teaching materials are full of national interpretations and indoctrinations? If students and teachers do not have fluency and enough knowledge about other languages, cannot they practice multiperspectivity? The answer is no. There are several ways to develop multiperspectivity among European students even they have aforementioned constraints. For example, critical evaluation of history textbooks can promote multiperspectivity. To be more specific, if students are encouraged to critically analyze their textbooks by searching for author's personal perspectives on particular topics, the missing information about historical events, their outcomes or reasons and deliberate or unintended bias and prejudices, they can improve multiperspectivity; at least one of its objectives that history is about selecting and there are many truths because of this [Stradling, 2001].

In addition, in Europe many important historical events like wars, regime changes, internal revolutions, conflicts and alike are being covered in textbooks, documentaries and public media and they include direct quotes from different political authorities, eye-witnesses, historians and key actors of those events. What Stradling suggest is that "it is often possible to identify their point of view, their perspectives and their personal biases by analyzing the language they use: the emphasis they give to some points rather than others, the points which are positive and the ones which are negative, the people they praise and the ones they condemn, and the loaded words which they choose to use (for example betrayal, misguided, evil, "primitive", etc.)" [Stradling, 2001: 147]. At this point what must be done is to teach students the embeddedness of political and ideological use of language and intentional word choices in textbooks through several examples and giving them some texts on which they can work. Also considering the use of media as a means towards multiperspectivity, students can be encouraged to learn to differentiate factual information from opinions, whether the person in media gives objective and balanced reflection of information or not.

Another way of realizing this approach can be done through studying events from the perspectives of "the others" before interpreting them from your own perspective. Stradling

pointed out that "this approach represents a shift of emphasis which can help to prevent the perspectives of other nations or national and ethnic minorities from being marginalized. It can also help to prevent 'the others' being presented as the problem which needed to be solved" [Stradling, 2001: 148].

In short, even if the range of teaching materials in schools are not enough to provide multiperspectivity, the critical use of media and the materials in hand can give students chance to apply and improve multiperspectivity. This approach is vital for moving toward wider European perspective in history education because it will make students learn and internalize the nature of Europe which is multicultural in its origin.

10.3.4. Use of Out-School Learning

Among the out-school learning approaches there are visits to museums, projects that necessitates the collection of evidence from people who experienced the related historical experience, case studies of local people and communities that have significant contributions and effects in the history of that region, community or nation, visits to cities, towns, rural and urban areas to look for the evidences of the past and change, visits to specific places like battlefields, cemeteries, buildings and etc to understand historical events and the role of ordinary people in history and lastly school twinning and common projects with other schools in different countries with the aim of sharing different evidences, perceptions and experiences about the same event [Stradling, 2001]. It is possible to state that out-school learning activities can make students understand that there are other sources for history different than textbooks, maps, charts, and teachers' narratives and also other dimensions of history. The towns, villages, cities, rural landscapes, historical buildings, examples of different architectures, shops, housing patterns, products sold in markets, daily lives of people and museums, to name but a few can be "read" as historical documents.

The usage of these historical documents can be applied to schools with the inclusion of research projects about their localities, visiting historically significant sites and museums. Students through reading the aforementioned historical documents in their localities can understand the changes and identify the aspects of continuity in history. They can make research through using local museums, local newspapers, official statistics and photographs and by using

them they can learn the development patterns of their locality such as political, economic and cultural, and its contribution to the history of Europe or even world.

One important contribution of local history research is that it increases tolerance among students when the subjects of it are minorities, disadvantaged groups or marginalized communities. If the locality involves diverse population in terms of ethnicity, religion and language, studying the history of these people through mentioned documents can provide students to understand that these people contributed to the history of the community as a whole and these people are integral part of that communities' and nations' history [Stradling, 2001]. What is more, students not only learn the contributions of the minorities in their community but also can find a change of learning countries in which these minorities are the majority of the population. Thus, studying local history helps students learn both local and wider histories.

Another point is that, the process of researching historical evidences through local newspapers, interviews, archives and photographs can improve students' research abilities and scientific thinking. As students are told in textbooks and by their teachers that the information originated from primary sources like people who experienced the historical subjects in question have more reliability compared to secondary sources. However, if students are given the chance of making research projects focused on local histories in which they will find the opportunity of making interviews with people, they will also understand and see how communal memories and misremembering can be differentiated from what was written in textbooks and shown in photographs [Stradling, 2001].

Also, the use of local history as a teaching method can improve students' comparative abilities. Through the given projects they can research the differences and similarities of their locality or region with other regions and they can compare and contrast buildings, art pieces and their themes, architectural monuments, city plans, commemorations of the same events, fashion, and many more that will able them to see history from a different point of view.

In addition to these out-school research projects based on local historical experiences, visiting museums can play a significant role to create a wider European perspective in history. As the outcomes of the Youth and History Survey showed museums are the students' most reliable historical sources, and they are one of the most enjoyable activities for them during learning history. So, the use of museums in history education can increase students' motivations towards history and also it can provide them to understand, learn history and interpret its nature.

The possible contributions of museums to history education are that first of all students understand that not only textbooks, books and teachers are means of learning history but also museums can serve for this act. Secondly, visits can provide clear evidence of change and continuity in peoples', regions', countries' and nations' lives. Thirdly, through establishing links with museums in other countries of Europe it can help to emergence of wider European dimensions. Moreover, they provide chances for students to construct historical empathy with people lived at particular times and places in history. Also, students can see the contradictions between what textbooks offer and what they see in museums and these kinds of differences may encourage them for further research on the subject in question [Stradling, 2001].

Besides these contributions of museums on students, there are some other notions that students must be aware of. First of all, museums are all about what to include and exclude. They "…have acquired the symbolic agency to proclaim the existence of 'a culture,' 'a history' and 'an identity'; through their displays they do this in a very material-and thus seemingly 'objective' and 'inevitable' form" [Macdonald, 2002: 238-239]. However, these material proofs should not make students totally accept the reliability of museums. They should learn that selections are made, decisions are taken on how to present exhibits and through which perspectives they will be presented. In other words, in museums everything is planned and each material, its place in the museum, the explanations about it, the curator's approach and many more have implicit or explicit messages to the visitors. Thus, students should be realized that museums are not totally objective sources of historical knowledge and they do include politics.

10.3.4.1. The Practices Available in Europe Regarding Museums

In some of European countries there are connections between museums and schools because museums serve for educational means. For this reason, some museums have their educational departments which are working for "liaising with schools about up-coming visits; consulting with teachers before putting on a new exhibition; consulting with local teachers' associations on how the museum can effectively relate its exhibitions to the school curriculum; organizing specialist guided tours and events for schools; developing pre-visit and follow-up teaching materials for schools; running in-service training courses for history teachers" [Stradling, 2001: 164]. Through these activities museums' exhibitions and other activities

become compatible with history curriculums and the use of museums automatically become more effective. These links and activities make museums more than a nice outing from school but a way of understanding history with more details, gaining visual memory about the past, and memories of societies.

But what about schools that do not have museums in their regions and due to economic constraints do not have access to museums in other areas such as Central and Eastern European schools? Is there any chance for the students of these regions to experience museums as means to learn history? Actually, yes there is. The students of these schools do develop their own museums⁶³ which are called "school museums".

"The 'school museum' refers to a collection of objects, documents, photographs, etc. collected by students, their parents and teachers, gathered at school, described and catalogued, and, if possible, exhibited in a dedicated space" [Stradling, 2001: 167, Box 5 quote]. The process of developing these school museums begins with the collecting the relics of the past from school's near neighborhood because these museums are mostly focused on regional or local histories. All collection, catalogue and description processes are being done by students and these experiences improve students' historical knowledge on national, European, regional and local histories due to these processes necessitate significant level of information on subject in question. In addition, these experiences improve their ability to analyze and interpret written, visual and material historical sources. By gaining the skill of differentiating national, European, regional and local histories students can understand that history is not about politics, diplomacy, culture of nations but the daily life of ordinary people and their socio-cultural past are also parts, actually significant parts of history. To be more precise, the school museum establishment directly by students themselves provides them the chance of shifting the emphasis of history on nations to micro levels.

Moreover, the processes during the collection of materials that will be exhibited in the museum include student interviews with people who had participated the historical subject in question; collection of local stories, myths and searching archives, newspapers, etc. All these research period provide students not only learning about the topics but also practicing the fundamental methods of scientific research.

⁶³ See Box 5: School Museums and teaching history in [Stradling, 2001: 167-171]

10.3.5. Internet and History Education

Since the 1990s the Internet entered to all spheres of human life and education is one of them. It did not take long for the Internet to become a new source of teaching and learning because it is almost cost-free and mostly included information in wide range of context and time. In particular, compared to textbooks and other teaching materials it provided plenty primary source documents, multiple resources such as documents, magazines, journals, memoirs, photographs, maps, chronicles, films, documentaries, letters and many more. Also, it provided all these from a multiplicity of perspectives from different historians, academicians, also from different countries, and times. The Internet, more specifically, can provide access to history departments of universities, museums, academic journals, public forums, online encyclopedias, online history books, official European history websites, and websites of international organizations, television channels, official documents and many more reliable historical source pages [Stradling, 2001]. Students can improve knowledge about themes that they are like to work on and can access many sources which cannot be reached due to distance constraints and economic inadequacies.

However, effective use of internet requires effective skills of systematic research and enquiry. Students who use the Internet for their research must be aware of the constraints of it and should apply the same methods when examining other teaching materials like archives, memoirs, textbooks and etc. It should not be forgotten that the Internet is open to everyone for both reading and entering data and information, and many people are using it as a tool of propaganda and it includes politically, ideologically and religiously distorted information. Thus, student must be able to differentiate scientificity and objectivity in websites; otherwise the Internet can turn into a disaster for history education.

Moreover, the history sites and history related sites in internet do not match with the content of the curriculums. Thus, this may cause overload of students' mind with many irrelevant information concerning their age and intellectual development. Also, students may easily get lost while using links in the pages during their research. If they get lost or learn more details than they can handle through their skills about the subject that they question, they may loose their motivation and interest towards history. For this reason, although reaching information through

web is easy and promotes advantages as mentioned at the beginning, the selection of the scientificity, objectivity and reliability of sources is really challenging.

However, if students use the Internet and the sources from it critically and try to analyze them through a careful enquiry, it can serve better for history education. To be more specific, Stradling gives a question list that students should use to question the nature of the sources in the Internet. These are: "Is it a primary or secondary source? Who wrote the document? What does the document tell us about the position and thinking of the writer? Who was it written for? Why was it written? What sort of document is it? What are the main messages which the writer is trying to convey? Can the information in this document be verified from other sources? Is the information accurate? What does the document not tell us about?Were any other documents produced in response to it? Why has the document survived?...." [Stradling, 2001: 180]. In short, if the historical sources in the Internet are examined through these questions and alike, students can benefit more from both the Internet and history.

CONCLUSION

This thesis project aimed to suggest possible ways to the change of history education and history books in European countries; in particular the member states of the European Union, and transition to a wider European-ness perspective from the nationalist one in education. The main question was what kind of changes are needed in history education; peoples' perceptions of Europe, particularly of students; contents and historical narratives in school textbooks and teaching methods of history, if different European human communities, dynasties, royalties and nation states, which spent most of their historical background with wars, conflicts, disagreements and collision, decide to affiliate and unite into a supranational body and to create a common European identity?

To realize the goal, the general evaluation and analysis of European history education is done from the standpoints of the system, students and teachers. It is shown that history; its perception, teaching and learning of it in Europe was national and it possessed strong national flavor and this was directly linked to the aim of the current history education that is to raise loyal citizens to their states and nations and to create a strong national identity. For this reason, the chosen teaching materials, aid and approaches did include national tendencies.

Initially, it is shown that history textbooks in Europe show the typical features of a nationalistic history education although countries show differences in their levels of national inclinations. They include strict "us vs. them" dichotomy for both externally and internally. The construction of the "Other" is obvious in them and the way the "Other" is defined is an enemy and inferior. The deification of being a citizen of a certain nation, speaking a certain language and having some values are embedded in history textbook lines either implicitly or explicitly. The explanation of historical events and their interpretation are frequently done from a "national security" discourse. Mostly, history textbooks glorify the historical experiences of the nation and lacked self-criticisms. What is more, history in textbooks is mostly lack of multiperspectivity and do ignore minorities, women, and the history of daily

life. To put it differently, history textbooks are focused on macro histories like the histories of states, politics, and wars, but not on micro- histories such as regional and local histories, minorities and culture and traditions.

What is more, textbooks narratives are too much authoritarian in the sense that students do not realize that there is an author, a human who had chosen some sources, and interpreted them to write the textbook but there is an authority that tells "the history". The word choices are also serving to strengthen the nationalist feeling through increasing the "us vs. them" dichotomy and hostility towards the Other. Additionally, countries, for political reasons, do have tendencies to prove that they belong to Europe and these tendencies reflect to history textbooks as the use of pseudo-scientific explanations and anachronistic arguments. The history textbooks are written as origin-based with an emphasis on "who did it" but there is no obvious emphasis on formation-based history that asks "how and why" questions about history.

In European history textbooks, it is difficult to find a coherent image of Europe and sufficient emphasis towards Europe and European history. The general trend is the interpretation of European history and "Europe" through national standpoints. Besides the dichotomy of us vs. them, textbooks also mirror center periphery dichotomies in Europe. Thus, history textbooks play a significant role in the construction of the "Others" both in foreign continents such as the Third Worlds, The Orient, Communism and Islam; and in Europe as the Balkans, Russia and the Eastern Europe. They also neglect certain regions from European history such as Balkans, Yugoslavia, Baltic region and Eastern European countries. In short, both quantitatively and qualitatively the coverage of European history in history textbooks includes problems.

Besides history textbooks, the teaching methods and materials also did include problems in the sense of transition to a wider European perspective. To name a few, the most used teaching material was textbooks; not research projects, out-school learning opportunities, role plays, simulations and audio-visual sources; and the most preferred teaching method was teachers' narratives not discussion-based practices. Due to these preferences, it is shown in this project that history education in Europe is knowledge-based and fact-oriented; thus it still applies the traditional teaching models.

Regarding the evaluation of students in this system, it is shown that the general motivation among students towards history is not that low; they reject the view that history is

something dead and gone. They define the aims of history as knowledge about the main facts, acknowledgement of national traditions and values and imagination of the past. The research showed that they do lack of historical reasoning and historical empathy which makes the emergence of multiperspectivity, sense of the past and tolerance difficult. Plus, they do not enjoy weighted use of history textbooks. On the other hand, concerning the outcomes of the research about teachers, it is shown that students and teachers did not coincide about the aims of history because according to teachers, the aims of history teaching were the explanation of today's world, fascination and fun dealing with history and knowledge about the main facts. Thus, this project showed that reciprocally neither students nor teachers were aware of their expectations from history lessons and this unawareness automatically became one of the factors that demised the quality and efficiency of history education in Europe. Additionally, in European history education system, teachers also face financial problems, problems relating to the lack of teaching materials and time given to history lessons, and overloaded curriculums.

The general evaluation of European history education continued with identifying the problems of covering Europe (its addressing mostly as a part of national histories), defining Europe [the problem of defining it as a unity or diversity) and the authority of national governments in curriculum processes, theme selections and teaching materials, particularly textbooks. As a result, it is argued that Europe does not have a commonly accepted European history education both in terms of content and practice.

However, in order to suggest solutions for the current system to make it transfer from nationalistic discourse of history education to a wider European discourse, research on European nations regarding their national historical experiences and perceptions and uses of history were necessary. Thus, this project investigated the several European nations' perceptions of Europe, their defining of Europe, uses and abuses of history and the current progresses in their history education.

Regarding the addressing of Europe, Denmark, Poland and Eastern European countries are used as examples. As a result of these investigations, it is found countries' imperial pasts, the position of being colonized or governed by other powers and national struggles affected their perceptions of history, and accordingly Europe. In Poland, Stalin's reconstruction of history education based on communism; enforced change of daily life practices; construction of enemies and their indoctrinations through history education composed Polish people's current views of Europe in the sense of not trusting Europe and not feeling belonging to neither communism nor capitalism. Whereas Poland was the example of addressing Europe through the problematic of belonging, Denmark was the example of defining Europe on political interests and necessities due to the increased notion of Europe in the country as the possibility of Denmark's European Union membership turned into a reality. The Eastern European countries represented the complexity of addressing Europe and belonging to it. Throughout history, the Eastern European countries had defined themselves a part of Europe but with socialism they began to accuse the West of sacrificing them for capitalist interests and then after the collapse of the Soviet Union they turned back and argued their belonging to Europe. This showed the dynamic process of defining Europe and construction of national identities throughout time.

The research on the uses and abuses of history showed a fact that history is being mostly abused by nations to realize political, social, cultural and economic interests. Romania turned out to be a proof of how history can be misused to construct national identity by making it a tool of victimization, blaming and creating fictitious origins. Russia showed how history can be used to make people forget their historical experiences, backgrounds and how it can be used create new symbols, environments, contents, identities and new interpretations of the past. Plus, Sweden gave an idea about how one nation's dark past, in this case Sweden's gold affairs and banking activities with Nazi Germany, can turn out to be a self-criticism through historical projects and at the same time how history can be misused to explain current racist tendencies in the country by depending them on Nazi influence and by whitening country's impact on the emergence of these tendencies.

The study of current progresses in Europe in the sense of their impact on the creation of European consciousness looked at several countries' practices in their history education. The case of Finland, from this point of view, showed the significance of out-school channels of history learning and the importance of coverage of historically sensitive issues. To be more specific, this case became evidence for the emergence of no-history generations due to previous generations' insistence on hiding the memories of traumatic times and times for which they felt guilty and regret. On the other hand, Hungary suited for a good example of how history education can be renewed towards the necessity of wider European discourse tendencies. Within this project, it served as an example of how education systems should be improved and transferred from subject based education to competency based one.

The case of Romania was notably important because it showed the insufficiency of recreating history curriculums if European perspectives do not back them up. In other words, in Romania a very promising curriculum failed due to the continuance of nationalistic interpretations of history. However; the existence of specific minority courses turned out to be an efficient attempt for transition to a wider European perspective in Romania.

Among these countries, France was the one that pictured many barriers towards European perspective in history education. With its emphasis on chronological method in its history education; conception of history as the history of states and politics, in particular the French state; its total exclusion of non-nations, individuals, cultural perspectives, religion and non-European with the exception of its colonies; the construction of "connoissances patrimoniales" concept in history; and the definition of the aim of history as raising French citizens, France showed how nationalism is embedded in history and its education; plus, how much the fear of losing national identity in the European Union is still alive.

All issues mentioned above and all problems defined were actually not unforeseen and tried to be shown in related chapters. The impact of nationalism on history education was obvious and its strength was understandable because the power of nationalism and its existence as the dominant discourse in history lies in its and nations' construction within the modernity project. To be more precise, what happened was that modernity brought the rise of the individual that resulted from the demise of feudal, agricultural societies. Rural populations due to the new production system of capitalism moved to urban landscapes and this necessitated the end of rural social attachments such as kinship and tribe. As a result of all, the concepts of "individual", high mobility, cultural homogeneity, private sphere and anonymous relationships began to be familiar. However, these new individuals felt insecure due to lessened social attachments, complexity and the huge levels of un-ambiguities of their society. Thus, they begin to search for new attachments. Because of rationality principle of modernity, they did not prefer religion or faith but science, rationality and at the end they chose a newly emerging phenomenon, nation state as the sources of trust, security, belonging and identity. Thus, nationalism constructed through the necessities of the system and it, in order to make itself internalized by people and to legitimize the power of the nation state, used some means such as history. Since the 19th century, history served for the legitimization of the state; glorification of the nation; construction of an immemorial past for the nation and the creation of a national heritage, national origin and national identity. This strength of the

concentration and its explicit nature of course, did change but history's serving for nationalism did not end, even today. History had been controlled by nation states and its discourse mostly developed within this autonomy of the state.

However, this legitimization of the state power and the identity construction project through nationalism must be indoctrinated to the citizens; the mean was history education and its teaching through the spread of mass education. And this was done. National histories that were written under the control of nation states turned out to be compulsory lessons in education systems. To put it differently, history education, since the beginning did not serve to make people more informed about what happened in the past; it was more a tool, a vital one, of the construction of national identities and it was never a-political. History education is all about politics; it is an indispensable and unavoidable part of an identity construction project. Thus, the theoretical discussion of nationalism and its relation with education was included in this project because it would, otherwise, not be possible to come up with a convincing suggestion about the transition of history education from nationalist perspective in history education in Europe to a wider European-ness perspective. This theoretical research made it obvious that the attempts towards the total elimination of nationalistic approaches from history education would be no more than messing with the impossible.

Besides nationalism, it was vital to understand what Europe is because its definition by the European countries was at the origin of the constructions of the "Others" in a hostile way in history textbooks or extreme inferiority-superiority relationships. Although Europe meant many different things to many different people in different times, it is shown that today, Europe is a universal normative power. This perception of Europe means that it is a kind of cultural violence that is enclosed in a cultural world-view which claims to be in possession of a distinct universal truth and validity. Europe carries the illusion of a privileged and superior "we". In other words, Europe defines itself as the interpretation of the world; puts itself at the zenith of history, and as the apotheosis of civilization [Delanty, 1995]. However, "the idea of Europe, ostensibly a geo-political concept, is a cultural model, a cultural construct, and as such cannot claim universal validity" [Delanty, 1995: 12]. This claim of Europe makes the idea of Europe inevitable base for a division, a strategy for the construction of difference, us vs. them, and the "Others" and an inferiority-superiority dichotomy.

However, as it is explained in related chapters, Europe is a dynamic concept and in each age it was re-invented. At the beginning it was only geography but then it turned out to be

associated with many different notions. Europe was Christendom, anti-Muslim in Middle Ages, the "West", civilization, the heart of the world system and progress during modernity. It turned out to be the "Dark Continent" and chaos with the First World War. It was labeled with Nazism, Fascism, Holocaust due to the Second World War. Then, during the Cold War it was anti-communist and Europe rise as the economic community, Europe as an idea, an invention and Europe as an identity with the European Union after the 1990s. Regarding the civilizations and nations, Europe was the Greek; it was the Roman, then German, France and at last it is the European Union. Concerning its constructed frontiers once Europe had ended in the borderlines of the Soviet Union, once at the other side of the Atlantic. Concerning the internal frontiers, Europe was the Western Europe and it was ended in the Balkans, Russia and in Central and Eastern countries' borders.

In short, the chapter on formations and constructions on Europe provided the thesis project the impossibility of defining what Europe is. It is a dynamic phenomenon; it is both a subject of history and the product of history. It is an amalgam of religion, myth, identity, culture, unity, diversity, ethnicity, imperialism, non-Europeans and many more. In addition, it provided the idea that Europe, since the beginning, was not an alternative to nation states but a conformation of the hegemony of them. Consequently, the research on what Europe is, made it clear that the transition of history education from nationalist perspective to European one could not be done through the writing of a complete history of Europe due to it was impossible to define Europe.

As a result of all these findings and interpretations, it is found that the wider European discourse in history education can be reached through the necessary changes that must be done in history textbook contents; and the construction of wider European perspective and through its mean, the application of modern teaching methods.

Regarding the necessary changes in history textbook contents, it is argued that they should be based on *theme selection* in terms of what to include and exclude from history textbooks due to European history is an overloaded one; *European dimension* in terms of Europe's appearance in textbooks both as unity, commonality and diversity and particularity; *inclusion of local and regional histories* to make students realize that there are histories, geographies, values and perspectives other than national ones; *providing three fundamental balances of history* between "what is historically important and what is suitable", "the particular and the general" and "the vertical historical perspective and horizontal historical

perspective "; *the coverage of sensitive issues* to teach students what the real Europe is and to develop their self-criticism and historical reasoning and empathy; and *the changes in tone and language of textbooks* in terms of the elimination of implicit or explicit hostile meaning and to end the sole authority of the writer on history.

The changes in textbook contents are not argued through the writing of new European history books in each country in which the number of European historical subjects are increased or through the widening of history curriculums with new subjects. It is not suggested because the increase in subjects could lead to the emergence of further diversities, problems concerning ethnic, religious and linguistic issues and the construction of many new "Others" because the interpretations of history are still nationalistic and it is, for now, not possible to eliminate them.

It is also argued that writing new history textbooks, their publishing and distribution within countries necessitate economic power and the professional teams of history textbook writers. Due to the economic problems of Central and Eastern European countries and the lack of authors who are able to write history textbooks without ideological standpoints, plus the lack of time given to history lessons, content related changes, including the list above, lost their reality to be able to promote shift towards wider European discourse in history in Europe. Of course, the attempts to provide them, which were shown in related chapters of this project, should continue; however, all these problems shifted the main argument of this project towards construction of a wider European perspective, teaching methods and approaches where the solutions lied for a European discourse in history education in Europe.

In other words, this thesis project argued that the solution of creating wider European discourse do not lie solely in students' historical knowledge of the main facts and chronology but in the improvement of their capability to understand continuity and change in history; significance and sense of chronology; causation in history; values and problems embedded in evidences and historical sources; the peaceful and tolerant perception of the dark sites of European history; the understanding of differences and their reasons; the improvement of historical empathy and awareness; and the development of key skills of learning such as critical thinking, comparing and contrasting, critical reading of sources, analyzing, interpreting, conceptualization and finding historical patterns through the application of teaching methods. These teaching methods are listed as the use of audio and visual sources, role plays and simulations, practice of multiperspectivity, use of out-school learning channels

such as museums, historical site visits and the use of technology rather than extreme focusing in textbooks and teacher narratives.

Consequently, throughout of this thesis, it became obvious national histories and nationalistic interpretations of history cannot be eliminated to reach wider European-ness discourse in history. The reason of this impossibility was that nationalistic discourse is the discourse of politics. The current political and economic systems are based on nation states and the protection of their interests, thus it would be utopia to suggest the elimination of this notion from history education because history is still serving for the continuation and strengthening of nation states. Due to this unbreakable dependency between nationalism, history and education, the most rational attempt in the construction of a broader Europeanness perspective in history education suggested as to teach students how to "read" all sources of history (textbooks, documentaries, photographs, museums, etc.) in a critical way; to teach them that national history is not the only kind of history ever existed but there are micro histories through which tolerance, multiperspectivity and respect for differences can be gained; and to make them realize that there were times in which there was no concept like nation state, nationalism and national geography.

Also, the attempt towards the elimination of the "Other" from history textbooks and interpretations to answer the main question of the project would not work due to the "Other" is a necessary component of identity construction and the protection of cultural diversities and authenticities are vital because becoming identical is as much dangerous as identifying individual's itself and his/her nation as unique and exceptional. "It is cultural differences that are the most valuable (and most endangered) capital of mankind" [Von Borries, 2000: 159]. In short, it is argued that history, for this project European history education needs the inclusion of diversities such as political, social and economic including cultural diversity. However, what should be done to provide wider European discourse in history is to teach students that the origin of the cultural diversity should not come from "Europeanization" in the sense of globalization and becoming identical but it should come from European cultural differences, not their adaptation by all but their understanding by all [Von Borries, 2000].

Waiting for the perfect textbook and complete European history book was also no more than losing time in the way towards moving from nationalistic discourse of history. The project tried to show that the reason is hidden in the ontological nature of history discipline and historiography. History and writing history are subjective; they are all about source selection of the historians. History, particularly European history can be written at any degree of magnitude and at any level of content [Davies, 1996]. Thus, neither perfect textbooks nor a perfect complete European history book can satisfy everyone and each nation because all historical topics would not be equally included in them. In this sense, it is argued that wider European discourse is hidden in the understanding of these degrees of magnitude, the selection process and embedded subjectivity of history by students. And the solution is shown as lied in the application of teaching methods, not content changes.

The last issue to discuss, defined in this project, concerning shifting to a wider European discourse in history was the problem of the concept of "Europe". The problem of Europe is about what it is and where it ends. "Politically, there are the borderlines of the European Union; economically its boundaries have disappeared into the international trade market; and culturally they are even more submerged" [Rüsen, 2000: 81]. Plus, concerning what Europe is, it is shown that it is a part of history; a product of history and more importantly Europe is a continuing re-invention. Thus, this thesis argued that students must be able to comprehend the dynamism of Europe as a concept, idea and identity; and the most rational and probable way towards it passes through gaining critical thinking, historical consciousness, knowledge and historical reasoning that necessitate "active" and thinking students which can only be raised through the application of modern teaching methods and the critique of historical sources and teaching materials.

At the end, the aim is to make students to be able to formulate relevant questions; to examine an historical issue and suggest possible enquiry; to be able to differentiate primary and secondary sources and their potentiality of information; to be able to evaluate sources in terms of perspective, bias, accuracy and reliability; to recognize their own perspectives and its pitfalls; to use sources to identify relevant information to help answer their questions; to structure information, event, situation into a sequence; to contextualize the information by relating it to the information they already have about the period, parallel events; to scrutinize the sources in causality relation and define the rank of their significance; and to reach conclusions why events in-question happened and how.

Consequently, this project did not argue that attempts to write better history textbooks, complete European history books; to improve conditions at schools in terms of providing teaching materials; to make history more fun for students; to renew the history curriculums and to increase the time given to history lessons do not have impact on the emergence of a

wider European-ness discourse. Of course, all these practices should continue to make European history education system better because they do include the potential.

However, what this project argued and tried to show is that there is no need to wait for someone who would write better history textbooks or almost perfect complete European histories; someone who would bring an almost complete definition of Europe; and some developments that will end the nation state discourse in world politics and its dominance in all other spheres or some events that will unite whole Europe around a common worldview including politics, economics and culture, because the way towards wider European discourse in history in Europe can be reached through efficient and critical use of current materials available such as textbooks, films, photographs, personal memories, biographies, architectures, landscapes, museums etc.

Nationalist discourse of history constructed and became dominant as a result of the controlling of the past by nations, nation states and nationalism. This project in its very essence argued that wider-European-ness discourse in history cannot be realized through the creation of a new mechanism for controlling the past and its writing but through understanding, analyzing, interpreting and criticizing the nationalist discourse's aims, means and ends. Therefore, the wider European-ness discourse in history that is argued in this thesis project is not a new discourse of writing but "reading" history.

APPENDIX A: The Youth and History Survey: Students' Questionnaire

APPENDIX

Students' Questionnaire

To the pupils

1. You and your class have been chosen to participate in a European survey. Right now about 20.000 teenagers in Austria, The Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine are receiving the same questionnaire.

2. Through this questionnaire we would like to know how youth in Europe today view history, and we would like to know some of your thoughts about the present and the future.

3. Please answer anonymously. Do not write your name anywhere. The answers will be treated confidentially. Your teacher will not know your answers. Do not ask your neighbour or look at his/her answers. It is very important that you write YOUR opinion. Do not write what you think others may want you to write.

4. All the students from the different countries in Europe will answer the questions in their own language. Some questions will be easy for you, but difficult for others. You will see many questions to which there are no right or wrong answers. Do as well as you can and answer as many questions as sincerely as possible. If you cannot answer, do not hesitate too long, but continue to the next question.

5. If any question is not quite clear to you, please ask the test leader. But please do so without disturbing the others.

1

Thank you for participating in this project!

For the Project Management

NN National Coordinator

	Do not mark this area!				
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	Stratum STRA School SCHO Class CLAS	Date of test	Î	OP	
Note: To mos Answer	st of the questions by placing only one	there are 5 po X into one bo	ossible a x for eac	nswers. h line.	
			totally	un-de	totall
1. What does history	mean to you? RELE	V_	disagree	disagree un-de cided	agree agree
a. A school subject and	d no more		<u>L</u>		
b. A source of adventure :	and excitement, fascinating and stir	nulating my imagination			
c. A chance for myself to	b learn from failures and successes	of others			
d. Something dead and go	one, which has nothing to do with	my present life			
e. A number of instructiv	ve examples of what is right or wro	ing, good or bad			
f. Shows the background	of the present way of life and expla	ains today's problems			
g. An accumulation of	cruelties and disasters				
h. A means of mastering	g my life as part of historic chang	;es	L		
			ver	·	very
2. In your opinion: of history?	What importance have the for			e little some	much much
a. Knowledge of the p	past				
	present				
	future				
c. Orientation for the					
c. Orientation for the					
c. Orientation for the					
c. Orientation for the					
c. Orientation for the					

4. What presentations of history do you TRUST? TRUST_ a. School text-books b. Historical documents and sources c. Historical novels d. Fictional films e. TV-documentaries f. Teachers telling g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling Y. Museums and historic places						
b. Historical documents and sources c. Historical novels c. TV-documentaries c. TV-documentaries c. Tv-documentaries c. Tv-documentaries c. Teachers telling c. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling h. Museums and historic places c. Historical documents and sources c. Historical documents and sources c. Historical documents and sources c. Historical documents and sources c. Historical novels d. Fictional films c. TV-documentaries c. TV-documentaries c. TV-documentaries c. TV-documentaries c. TV-documentaries c. Historical documents, grandparents) telling c. TV-documentaries c. TV-document	3. What presentations of history do you ENJOY? FUN_	very little	liule	some	much	wery much
c. Historical novels	a. School text-books	<u> </u>				Щ
d. Fictional films	b. Historical documents and sources	<u> </u>				\square
e. TV-documentaries [. Teachers telling g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling h. Museums and historic places 4. What presentations of history do you TRUST? 5. What does usually happen in your history lessons? 6. We use a informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history 7. We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps. 7. We use a tange of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museumy/sites. A. TV-documentaries 7. We use a tange of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museumy/sites. A. TV-documents A. TV-documents A. School text-books A. Historical documents and sources A. Historical advectory A. We use a tange of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museumy/sites. A. TV-documents A. School text-book and/or worksheets A. We use a tange of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museumy/sites. A. TV-documentaries A. TV-documents A. TV-documentaries A.	c. Historical novels	<u>L</u>	\bot			
[. Teachers telling	d. Fictional films	<u>L</u>				
g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling h. Museums and historic places very title little some much much much much much much much much much	e. TV-documentaries	L		<u> </u>		
h. Museums and historic places	f. Teachers telling					
h. Museums and historic places	g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling	<u> </u> _				
4. What presentations of history do you TRUST? TRUST_ very little little some much mick mick a. School text-books					Ŀ	
 4. What presentations of history do you TKOST. TAUST. a. School text-books			ry littl	e some	e much	very
b. Historical documents and sources c. Historical novels d. Fictional films c. TV-documentaries f. Teachers telling g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling Nuseums and historic places S. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past b. We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history C. We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past d. We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps f. We tetell and reinterpret history ourselves. f. We listen to radioprograms or tapes or look at historical videos and films f. We use the textbook and/or worksheets h. We use a range of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museums/sites. ACT		Г			T	
c. Historical novels						
d. Fictional films						
 c. TV-documentaries f. Teachers telling g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling S. Museums and historic places S. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past b. We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history c. We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past d. We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps f. We tisten to radioprograms or tapes or look at historical videos and films f. We use the textbook and/or worksheets g. We use the textbook and/or worksheets h. We use a range of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museums/sites. ACT 	c. Historical novels	L			$\frac{1}{1}$	
f. Teachers telling g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling S. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past b. We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history c. We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past d. We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps f. We listen to radioprograms or tapes or look at historical videos and films f. We use the textbook and/or worksheets g. We use a range of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museums/sites. ACT	d. Fictional films	L				
g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling	e. TV-documentaries	L				
 Museums and historic places What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU We listen to teacher's stories about the past We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps. KET We listen to radioprograms or tapes or look at historical videos and films. BOK We use the textbook and/or worksheets. h. We use a range of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museums/sites. 	f. Teachers telling	L	-			
5. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past	g. Other adults (e.g. parents, grandparents) telling	L				
5. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past	5. Museums and historic places	L				ver
a. We listen to teacher's stories about the past	5. What does usually happen in your history lessons? USU		ldom sel	dom some	times	oft
b. We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history		LIS				
c. We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past	b We are informed of what was good or bad, right or wrong in history	RW				
d. We study historical sources, e.g. documents, pictures or maps	c. We discuss different explanations of what happened in the past	DIS				
c. We retell and reinterpret history ourselves	. We discuss different courses e.g. documents pictures or maps	SRC				
f. We listen to radioprograms or tapes or look at historical videos and films		RET				
g. We use the textbook and/or worksheets	c. We retell and reinterpret history outserves and these and films	MED				
g. We use the textbook and/or worksheets	21.00.1					
		IT				
3	h. We use a range of activities, e.g. role plays, local projects or visiting museums si					
	3					
						78
N2					10	-1 1 d

6. What do you concentrate on in	your history lessons? 7	00		
	1		very	very
			little little some r	nuch much
a. We seek knowledge about the main	facts in history			
b. We morally judge historical events acco	ording to the standards of huma	n and civil rights		
c. We try to imagine what it felt like in the	he past, taking account of all	viewpoints	14	
 We try to understand the behaviour of p and contemporary thoughts of the period 	ast persons by reconstructing t d when they lived.	ne special situationsk.	NO	
e. We use history to explain the situation i		out the tendencies of Z	ad I	
change		_		
f. We are fascinated by and have fun de				
g. We learn to acknowledge the traditions, society	characteristics, values and tasl	s of our nation and		
h. We learn to value the preservation of I	historical relics and old buildi	ngs		
7. Assessment:	M	ARK	bad bad so-so	good good
a. What mark do you usually get in the his If you don't get a mark, guess what your	tory (or social science) test of			
b. What mark would you give your teache				
8. Are you a girl or a boy?	sirl	boy	HHH	
	SEX [-
9. What is your age?	AGE years]		
10. Where do you live ?				
	CITY	lis (more than 1 mill.	inhabitants)	
	Large to	wn (more than 200 00	0 inhabitants)	ļ, ļ,
		or middle size town (Г	\dashv
	Rural	area or village (up to	5000 inhabitants)	
11. What is your nationality?	Norwegian	other (if so, which nationality	()
	NATI	NATI 2		
4	4			

	201			
2. To which religious community do you do not know Roman-Catholic Prote		ish Islamic	other none	will not an
3. What does religion mean to you?	REL	ME	little little	some much mu
14. How strongly are you interested in po	litics? POLI	N	very little little	e some much n
15. At a rough guess: How many books ar (school-books and periodicals excluded) up to 10 11	to 50 51 to 20	a stand stand		
16. Your parents' education :			EDL	IMA EDU
What kind of education do your parents	have?			Mother Fa
a. Not more than compulsory school				
b. Vocational training				
c. High-school				
d. Higher education or university education				
 17. If you compare your family's income do you think you are below, about or a. High above the average 	above the average ?	INCOL	М	
b. Above the average				
c. About the average			•••••	
d. Below the average				
c. Far below the average				
 Further education. We know it is difficult to look into about what kind of education you wo 	the future, but you uld like to get ?	might have FUTE	done some thin DU	king
a. I think I will leave school when I have finis	hed my compulsary ed	ucation		
b. Vocational education				
c. High school			••••••	
d. Higher education or university education				
	5			

In the two next questions we want you to place th	e events in the order in which they happened	d in the history of the world
from the earliest (1) to the most recent (5). Put	one number in each bracket.	an are money of the world,
19.	RNKECO	
() a. Waged work in factories		
() b. Trade between towns		
() c. The cultivation of land		
() d. Hunting and gathering		
() e. Automatic mass production		
20.	RNKEVE_	
() a. The Russian Revolution	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
() b. The Second World War		
() c. The decolonization of Black Africa		
() d. The foundation of UN		
() e. The great world depression (the Wall St	reet Crash)	
		very little little some much
21. How much interest do you have in	the following PERIODS of history? $\mathcal{P} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{P} / \Lambda$	little little some little
a. The Ancient World	12110-	
b. The Middle Ages (from about 500 AD to	1500)	
c. The period from about 1500 to about 180		
d. The period from about 1800 to 1945		
c. The period from 1945 until today		
c. The period from 1949 with today		
22. How much interest do you have in	the following KINDS of history?	little little some much
	KIND_	
The everyday life of ordinary people		
b. Kings and Queens and other famous peop	ple	
c. Adventurers and great discoveries		
d. Wars and dictatorship		
e. Distant foreign cultures		
f. The making of nations		
g. The development of democracy		
g. The development of democracyh. The effects of humans on their environm	nent	


ka

	very little	little	some	much	very
KIND_					
The story of specific topics (e.g. the history of cars, of churches, of music, of sports)					
. The story of your family					
3. How much interest do you have in the history of these GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS? AREA	very little	little	some	much	very muc
. The history of your immediate locality					
. The history of your region			<u> </u>		
. The history of (here: the name of your country)					
I. The history of Europe					
. The history of the world outside Europe					
24. How much do you think these factors have done to change life for people in history <u>up to today</u> ? NOW_{-}	very little	little	some	much	very muc
a. Technical inventions and machines		1			
b. Social movements and social conflicts		1		<u> </u>	
c. Kings, Queens and outstanding political persons		Ļ			
d. Political reforms			$\frac{1}{1}$	-	
e. Founders of religions and religious leaders		╞			
f. Development of science and knowledge					
g. Wars and armed conflicts			1		
h. Economic interests and competition					1
i. Philosophers, thinkers and learned people					
j. Political revolutions	L				
k. Population explosion			\perp		
1. Ecological crises	上		1	-	-
m. Natural disasters	L	\perp		-	
n. Mass migration	L	-		-	
o. Everybody	L				
		···· <			

NEXT_	very	e little	some m	uch m	ary
a. Technical inventions and machines	L				
b. Social movements and social conflicts					
c. Kings, Queens and outstanding political persons					
d. Political reforms					
e. Founders of religions and religious leaders					
f. Development of science and knowledge					
g. Wars and armed conflicts					
 Economic interests and competition 					
i. Philosophers, thinkers and learned people					
j. Political revolutions		T			-
k. Population explosion			\square		-
I. Ecological crises		T	\square		-
m. Natural disasters					
n. Mass migration					-
o. Everybody					
Now some questions about ideas, people and events. If you have never heard of the one. 26. What do you associate with The Middle Ages? ASMA_ a. A dark and superstitious era.	total disag	on, just g ly gree disag			
			1		Γ
b. A glorious period for my country			1		Γ
c. The time when the great cathedrals were built	Γ	Ť	1		Γ
d. The period when Nobility, Church and King dominated peasants	- F				Γ
e. A romantic, adventurous period of knights and ladies					Γ
f. A time of struggles between Church and King in many European countries	L	!		J	

	totally disagree	disagree	un-de ag	ree total	ly
7. What do you associate with The Colonization Period? (Up to the First World War) ASCO_	_				1
. A period of great adventurers (Columbus, Vasco da Gama etc)					1
o. Christian mission outside Europe					Ļ
					Ļ
d. Starting period of European exploitation of overseas foreign peoples and countries					ł
e. European work for progress in other continents					
f. Contempts for and prejudice against other cultures and coloured people		_![]	·L	!	_
28. What do you associate with The Industrial Revolution? AS/N_	totally disagn	e disagre	e un-de a	gree lota	
a. The beginning of environmental pollution					_
b. The source of improving living standard					-
c. The invention of better machinery					-
d. The accumulation of big capital stocks	<u> </u>				-
e. Overcrowded and ugly towns	······ –				-
c. Overcrowded and ugly towns f. Struggle between workers and factory owners					
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners	totall	y disag	ree un-de	agree to	La
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners	totall disag	y nee disag	ree un-de cided	agree lo	ta
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners 29. What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? ADOLF_ a. A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide	totall disag	y disag	ree un-de cided	agree lo'	ta
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners 29. What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A. A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide b. The leading opponent of Communism	totall disag	y ree disag		agree to ag	tare
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners 29. What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide b. The leading opponent of Communism c. A puppet of German industrialists and imperialists	totall disag	y disag			
 Struggle between workers and factory owners	totall disag	y disage			
 Struggle between workers and factory owners What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide The leading opponent of Communism A puppet of German industrialists and imperialists A gifted orator, organiser and leader A mentally ill, antisocial criminal 		y disag			
 Struggle between workers and factory owners What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide The leading opponent of Communism A puppet of German industrialists and imperialists A gifted orator, organiser and leader A mentally ill, antisocial criminal A creator of order, safety and national integration 		y disag			
f. Struggle between workers and factory owners 29. What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide b. The leading opponent of Communism c. A puppet of German industrialists and imperialists d. A gifted orator, organiser and leader c. A mentally ill, antisocial criminal f. A creator of order, safety and national integration g. A fighter against cultural mixture and foreign infiltration		y disage			
 Struggle between workers and factory owners What do you associate with Adolf Hitler? A cynical dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide The leading opponent of Communism A puppet of German industrialists and imperialists A gifted orator, organiser and leader A mentally ill, antisocial criminal A creator of order, safety and national integration 					
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30. What do you associate with the changes in Eastern Europe since 1985 ? $ASEE_{-}$	totally disagree	e disagre	ee un-de cided	agree	tota
a. Downfall of the USSR	[
b. Democratization of the Soviet society					
c. Freedom of the member states of the Warsaw treaty					
d. Victory of the USA in the Cold War					
e. Treason against socialist ideas					
f. National conflicts and civil wars					
g. Establishing of market economy in Eastern Europe					
31. How important are the following to you? /MPO_		e little	some	much	ver mi
b. friends					
c. hobbies/my personal interest					
d. my country					
e. my ethnic group/nationality	L				
f. money and wealth for myself					
g. my religious faith	L				
b. European cooperation	L				
i. democracy	L_				
j. freedom of opinion for all					
k. peace at any cost					
1. solidarity with poor people in my own country					L
m. solidarity with poor people in the third World	L				L
n. wellare and social security	L				
					1



34. People often see history as a line best describes historical developm	e in time. Which of the follow ent? <u>Mark only one box !</u>	ing lines would you think	
a. Things generally get better	LINE		
b. Things generally do not really	change	\longrightarrow	
c. Things generally get worse			
d. Things generally repeat thems	elves	22,0	
e. Things generally go from one ext	treme to another		
35. What do you think life WAS I	ike in(your country) 40 YEARS AGO?	
	PAST	very unlikely li unlikely possible	ikely ver like
a. peaceful			
b. overpopulated			
c. exploited by a foreign state			<u> </u>
d. prosperous and wealthy			
a democratic			
e. democratic			
f. polluted			1
f. polluted g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups			
f. polluted g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups			
f. polluted g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups			
f. polluted g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups			
f. polluted g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups			

6. What do you expect life WILL BE like in(your country) $FUTUR_{-}$		
FUTUR_	very unlikely likely v unlikely possible li	ery
. peaceful		-
). overpopulated		-
e. exploited by a foreign state		-
d. prosperous and wealthy		
e. democratic		_
f. polluted		_
g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor		
h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups		
	very unlikely likely unlikely possible	ve
37. What do you expect life WILL BE like in Europe IN 40 YEARS?	uninkery possible	1115
a. peaceful		_
b. overpopulated		_
c. some states exploit other states		
d. prosperous and wealthy		
e. democratic		Г
f. polluted		Г
g. torn by conflicts between rich and poor		
h. torn by conflicts between ethnic groups		
38. What do you expect your personal life will be like in 40 years? $FSELF_{-}$	very unlikely lik unlikely possible	ely
/ ~~~~.	unlikely possible	Т
a. I have a meaningful job		T
b. I have a happy and harmonious family life		JL T
c. I have good friends		Ţ
d. I have a high income		T
c. I have personal political freedom		
13		

	very unlikely likely very unlikely possible likely
FSELF_	unlikely possible likely
. I participate in political work	
g. I have sufficent leasure time to practise interesting hobbies	
39. Some people in your country are rich, others are poor. Why are s people richer than others ?	
	very unlikely likely very unlikely possible like
RICH_	
a. Because they have been lucky	
b. Because they have been working hard	
c. Because they have inherited wealth and money	
d. Because they have been selfish and immoral	
e. Because they have profited by the unjust economic system	
 Because they developed innovation and/or ran risks	7. Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't
40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century	Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then?
40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might Consider the arguments.	Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then?
40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might Consider the arguments.	7. Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then? very unlikely likely very unlikely possible likel
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 40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century. John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might Consider the arguments. MARRY_ a. Refuse, because it is inhuman, immoral and illegitimate to force someone to mawithout real love b. Obcy, because good economy is more important for a family than passionate love between wife and husband c. Run away to a nunnery/monastery, because religious life is worth more than work 	Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then? Very unlikely possible arry
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 40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might Consider the arguments. MARRY_ a. Refuse, because it is inhuman, immoral and illegitimate to force someone to mawithout real love b. Obcy, because good economy is more important for a family than passionate love between wife and husband c. Run away to a nunnery/monastery, because religious life is worth more than word. Consent, because nearly all young people have married in accordance with their decisions c. Resist, because it is the natural right of any individual to marry for love 	Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then? Very unlikely possible arry
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 40. Suppose you are a young woman/man in the fifteenth century John/Catherine, the son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might Consider the arguments. MARRY_ a. Refuse, because it is inhuman, immoral and illegitimate to force someone to mawithout real love b. Obcy, because good economy is more important for a family than passionate love between wife and husband c. Run away to a nunnery/monastery, because religious life is worth more than word. Consent, because nearly all young people have married in accordance with their decisions c. Resist, because it is the natural right of any individual to marry for love 	Your father orders you to marry the neighbouring village. You don't you do, if you were living then? Very unlikely possible arry
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41. Suppose that the imaginal	ry territory Newland was occupied by ewland has been occupied by country	your homecountry A from 1500 to B. Your country A wants to have
Newland back, and puts forwar arguments?	d several arguments for its case. How	much weight would you give these
arguments.	ABN_	
		A B
		NEWLAND
		(,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
		very little little some much much
a. "The people of Newland speak of	our language and share our culture"	
h. "Newland was under our control	for a longer period (1500-1900)	
than it has been under the control	of B (1900-1994)."	
c. "Settlers from our country came whereas people from B did not s	e to Newland in the year 1500"	
d. "When asked, the majority of t that they would prefer to be contra- that they	he people of Newland say rolled by us to be controlled by B"	
c. "B took Newland from us by w	ar in 1900, which was an unjust act	
	ference has examined the case, and recom	
that we shall have Newland	back"	
g. We have the military power our control"	r and we will use it to get Newland back t	under
	n the future the African nations former	ly colonised by Furonean
42. Suppose that one day is countries go to a World	I Court for damages. Who should pay?	
	PAY_	totally disagree un-de agree to age
b. Those European states that ha	ad colonies	
c. No state at all		
d. Every state in the world in pro	oportion to its present wealth	
1		

3. Suppose a motorway is being planned features are threatened. How much we		ation of these?
	SRV_	very very
		little little some much much
. A stone-age religious site		
A medieval church		
e. A three hundred-year-old farmhouse in good co	ndition	
1. An old factory still in use		
e. A War memorial remembering World War II .		
f. The residence of a famous poet who died 100 y	ears ago	
1 rare geological formation		
h. A nesting site for a threatened bird		
44. People in many countries discuss w		
citizenship including the right to vote. Wh in parlamentary elections in your country?		opinion - have the voting r
	1M/_	totally disagree un-de agree tot agree agree
		disagree cided agr
a. No immigrants to my country should have the	right to vote	
 b. Those immigrants, who have accepted the langua should have the right to vote 	ge, habits and culture of my country,	
c. hose immigrants, who have entered my country for more than five years, should have the right to		
 Those immigrants, who have been victims of op countries, should have the right to vote 	pression and prosecution in their nome	
	pression and prosecution in their nome	
	pression and prosecution in their rome	[
countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy		
countries, should have the right to vote		
countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	
 countries, should have the right to vote e. Those immigrants, who are loyal to democracy should have the right to vote 	and to the constitution of my country,	

5. What are your views on nations and the national state?			
NATIO_	totally disagree disa	gree un-de	agree tot
	UISAGICE	cidea	agr
. Nations are born, grow and perish in history, just like everything else.			
b. Nations are natural entities, unified by common origin, language, history and culture		Ц	
. Nations represent a will to create a common future, despite cultural differences in the past			
t. The claims of national groups for a state of their own was one main cause of wars in recent centuries			
e. National groups have the right to go to war to make their own state			
f. National states should give an essential part of their sovereignity to a supernational organization			II
	totally disagree dis	agree un-de	agree ag
46. What do Europe and European integration mean to you? EURO_			
a. Europe is a geographical expression, no more			
b. Europe is the birthplace of democracy, enlightenment and progress			
c. Europe is a group of white, rich countries guilty of economic			
and ecological exploitation of the rest of the world.			
d. European integration is the only way to peace between nations			
that previously attempted to destroy each other.			
e. European integration is a danger to sovereign nations, to their identity and culture			
 European integration will solve the economic and social crises of the countries in Europe. 			
그 옷을 넣는 것이 같아. 이 것이 같아. 이 것이 같아.			
			70
17			

7. What are your views on democracy? DEMOC_	totally disagree	disagre	e un-de cided	agree	total agree
It is government of the people, for the people and by the people					
	uotally disagree uotall disagree disagree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree and protection of minorities agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree agree				
It is the finest legacy of classical Greece		\square			
. It is the result of a long process of trial and error through times	·	\square		-	
. It is no more than acclaim for some party leaders in elections	-				
. It is rule by law and justice and protection of minorities					
. It should include the welfare state					
y, It is a system of weak government which is not appropriate in times of crisis	-	1			
h. It is a pretence, hiding the fact that the rich and powerful have always won in history					
. It is not real until women and men have equal rights in all situations.					
vote for and what would you vote against? $VOTE_{-}$					voic]
	for				voic]]
VOTE_	for				voic
a. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe	for				voic
a. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe b. Limitation of speed and private traffic in order to prevent air pollution and dying forests c. Reduction of wages and standard of living in Western Europe in order to finance investments	for				voic
a. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe b. Limitation of speed and private traffic in order to prevent air pollution and dying forests c. Reduction of wages and standard of living in Western Europe in order to finance investments in Eastern Europe	for				voic
A. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe b. Limitation of speed and private traffic in order to prevent air pollution and dying forests c. Reduction of wages and standard of living in Western Europe in order to finance investments in Eastern Europe d. Full equality for women in profession, house-keeping and public life	for				
A. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe	for				
A. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe					
 VOTE a. Immediate close-down of nuclear power stations in Europe b. Limitation of speed and private traffic in order to prevent air pollution and dying forests c. Reduction of wages and standard of living in Western Europe in order to finance investments in Eastern Europe d. Full equality for women in profession, house-keeping and public life					

APPENDIX B: The Youth and History Survey: Teachers' Questionnaire

	The European Enquiry into the Historical Consciousness of Students in Secondary Education
	Teachers' accompanying questionnaire
Do not mark this Country	CTRYOLD, COUNTRY Testadministr.
Stratum	STRA Date of test
School	SCHO PC-operator PCOP
Class	CLA
Teacher	TEACH
a public one a private one II. Where is p	e questions about your class, as well as about you yourself as a teacher.
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the large town (more the	xol a public one or a private one?
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the large town (more the small or middle size	vol a public one or a private one?
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the large town (more the small or middle size rural area or villag	xol a public one or a private one? T STYPE your school located? TSLOCA nan 1 mill. inhabitants) TSLOCA e town (up to 200.000 inhabitants) Image: Constraint of the second sec
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the large town (more the small or middle size rural area or villag III. Are there your scho serious ethnic control	xol a public one or a private one? your school located? nan 1 mill. inhabitants) nan 200.000 inhabitants) e town (up to 200.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) special problems in the region of rol? Yes No TPETHN TPECOL
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the small or middle size rural area or villag III. Are there your schoor serious ethnic contained severe ecological of	xol a public one or a private one? your school located? nan 1 mill. inhabitants) nan 200.000 inhabitants) e town (up to 200.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) special problems in the region of rol? Yes No TPETHN TPECOL
a public one a private one II. Where is y Metropolis (more the large town (more the small or middle size rural area or villag III. Are there your scho serious ethnic control	xol a public one or a private one? your school located? nan 1 mill. inhabitants) nan 200.000 inhabitants) e town (up to 200.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) e (up to 5.000 inhabitants) respecial problems in the region of wol? Yes No TPETHN TPECOL

V. Which kind of teacher	education did you receive?		
university			
eacher training college		TTEDU	
university and teacher training co	ollege		
a special high school			
V. Did you undertace spe	cial studies in the field of history?		
intensive education in history .		THESPE	
no special education in history		THENON	
		THEOSS	
education in some other social s		THEOHU	
education in some other humanit	lies		
VI. How many years of te	aching experience (including the		
present year) do you l	lave?	TTEXP	
up to 3 years	······ []		
4 to 8 years	······		
9 to 15 years	L		
16 to 25 years			
more than 25 years	······ L		
VII. How do you teach his	tory in this class?	TSUBORG	
as a separate subject all the year	a		
history, geography and social s	hing of social studies		
periods through the year	····· L_		
E			
			- Sec

VIII. For how many years have this class (including the pr	you been teaching history in esent year)?		
1 year		TINCLA	
2 or 3 years			
more than 3 years	······ L		
IX. For how many years (incl	uding the present year) have essons?		
these pupils had history R	55005?	CHILNG	
1-2 years		C	
3-5 years			
years and more			
X. How many history lesson: this year?	s a week do these pupils have		
1 lessons		CHIWEK	
2 lessons			
more then 2 lesson	······ L		
In your opinion, is this	class in comparison with other		
	you have had experience with, rd working in history, or less?		
		TCLINT	
less then average			
average			
more then average			
XII. Comparing this school	with other schools of		
the same type in your intellectual standards		TCLSTAN	
lower then average	<u> </u>	16031014	
lower then average			
average			
average			
average			
average			

xm.	What is your gender	?	Г	7		
Female			L Г	TSE	×	
Male .			L			
XIV.	What does religion n	nean to you?			very little	some much ver
		•	TRELM			
	I will not answer					
					very test	some wer
Xv.	How much interested	1 are you in poli	tical matters? TPOLI	~/	little little	some much wer
	I will not answer		11021			
XVI.	How would you desc			-	POLPOS'	
progre	ssive progressive	progressive c nor	moderate onservative cons	ervative		
1 -		conservative				
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					
	I will not answer					

	2월 2일 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전 전
Note	: To most of the questions there are 5 possible answers. Answer by placing only one X into one box for each line.
1.	How intensively have you (or another history teacher) taught this not at all little some much very much
a. The	
b. The	
d. Ad	
e. The	e changes in Eastern Europe since 1985
b. Eu	years about following concepts? much utions and national states TCHVNAT urope and European integration TCHVEUR emocracy TCHVDEM
3. a. Tì	What usually happens in your history lessons? $-\frac{1}{1}USU$ he students listen to my stories about the past
b. T	hey are told what was good or bad, right or wrong in history
	hey discuss different explanations of what happened in the past
	hey study historical sources, e.g. documents and study pictures or maps . SRC.
e. T	hey listen to radioprograms or look at historical videos and films
	hey use the textbook and/or worksheets
g. T	They use a range of activities, e.g. role play, local projekts or visiting museums/sites
h. T	They retell and reinterpret history themselves
-	

On which aims of learning history do you concentrate in your history lessons?	very little	little	some	much very
I want my students to acquire knowledge about the main facts in history				
. I want them to judge historical events according to the standards of human and civil rights		\square	\square	
. I want them to imagine what it felt like in the past, taking account of all viewpoints 1MA			П	
I. I want them to understand the behaviour of past persons by reconstructing the special UNI ituations and contemporary thoughts of the period when they lived				
. I want them to use history to explain the situation in the world today and to find out the endencies of change TOD				
. I want them to acknowledge the traditions, characteristics, values and tasks of our nation an pociety TRA	d 🗌			
g. I want them to value the preservation of historical remains and old buildings $\dots \longrightarrow L$				
n. I want them to be fascinated and have fun dealing with history				
. I want them to internalize basic democratic values $\bigcirc \mathcal{D} E M$				
a. The everyday life of ordinary people \cdots				much
b. Kings and Oueens and others famous people				
c. Adventurers and great discoveries				
d. Wars and dictatorships				
•. Distant foreign cultures				
f. The making of nations				
g. The development of democracy				
h. The effects of humans on their environment				
i. The development of agriculture, industry and trade		Π		
j. The story of specific topics (e.g. the history of cars, of music, of sports)				
k. The story of their own families				
				186

	정말 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같이 많은 것 같이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이 많이
6.	Which statements best describe the main problems of a history totally un-total
	teacher in your country? TPROB_
a. There	are not enough possibilities to qualify oneself further
b. There	are sudden and deep political changes in the interpretation of history
c Thew	is too little time for history lessons given in the curriculum
d. Then	e is a shortage of teaching aids and materials
e. Then	e is a lack of students' interest
f. There	is pressure from the administration
é. Ther	e is a lack of clear interpretation of history
	e is not enough time for preparation of lessons
n. i nei	
i. Ther	e are financial problems (low wages)
	영양 집에 가슴에서 가슴 다른 것이 없는 것이다.

the second second second second second second second second second second second second second second second s		
 How much do you think these factors have done to change life people in history up to today? 	for .	
TNOW_	little little some much	very much
a. Technical inventions and machines		
b. Social movements and social conflicts		
c. Kings, Queens and outstanding political persons		
d. Political reforms		\square
e. Founders of religions and religious leaders		
f. Development of science and knowledge		
g. Wars and armed conflicts		
h. Economic interests and competition		
i. Philosophers, thinkers and learned people		
j. Political revolutions		
k. Population explosion		-
1. Ecological crises		
m. Natural disasters		
n. Mass migration		
o. Everybody		
		2

8. How much do you think to in the next 40 years?	these factors will change lit	e for people					
	TNEXT_	•	very little	little	some	much	muc
a. Technical inventions and machine	es						
b. Social movements and social con	flicts			·			
			\square		\square	\square	
c. Kings, Queens and outstanding p	ionical persons						
d. Political reforms	••••••				H		-
e. Founders of religions and religio	us leaders						
f. Development of science and know	wledge						
g. Wars and armed conflicts							L
h. Economic interests and competit	ion						
•			\square	\square	\square	\Box	
i. Philosophers, thinkers and learne	d people						
j. Political revolutions			H	H		H	
k. Population explosion						H	
I. Ecological crises							L
m. Natural disasters							L
n. Mass migration							L
			\square	\square			Г
o. Everybody	••••••						
					М	ANY TH	ANKS
							-

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