

**TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF
IMMIGRATION**

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TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF
IMMIGRATION

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ABSTRACT

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Turkey's success in the membership negotiations is linked to its commitment to the Copenhagen criteria and its capacity to implement the *acquis*. However, the economic and political development in Turkey, improvement in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely full convergence with the European *acquis*, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership. Turkey's membership includes other aspects which make the accession problematic. Immigration is such an area where economic, cultural, and security related concerns of the European public as well as leaders come to the fore; where the rhetoric of both illustrates the opposition sentiments towards accession. Since Turkey is a large, populated and predominantly Muslim country, the prevailing sentiment of a mass flow of Turks after membership and their negative impact on the labour markets, European culture, and internal security leads to hesitancy towards Turkey's accession in the member states. European leaders often use this public concern for an exodus of a large Turkish population to mobilize the public, and they refer to public opposition to immigration when discussing Turkey's membership. The debates on the application of free movement for Turkish labour also reflect other issues of the European societies such as unemployment, the integration of the immigrants, and the need for finding effective solutions to the aging European population. Therefore, European leaders have been restrained by both the demands of the public and the markets while taking steps on Turkey's EU membership.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE KATILIMI: GÖÇÜN OLASI ROLÜ

GURBET DENİZ YAVUZ

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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: göç, kişilerin serbest dolaşımı, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği, kamuoyu, üye devletlerin tercihleri

Türkiye’nin üyelik müzakereleri sürecinde başarısı Kopenhag Kriterleri’ni yerine getirmesine ve Avrupa Birliği müktesebatını uygulamasına bağlıdır. Ancak; Türkiye’deki ekonomik ve siyasi gelişmeler, insan haklarına ve temel özgürlüklere saygının artması, yani Türkiye’nin müktesebata tam uyum sağlaması üyelik için gerekli bir koşuldur ama yeterli değildir. Türkiye’nin üyeliği, katılımı sorunlu hale getiren başka boyutlar da içermektedir. Göç, Avrupa halkının ve liderlerinin ekonomik, kültürel ve güvenlik konularında endişelerinin ortaya çıktığı ve her ikisinin de üyeliğe karşı söylemini gösteren bir alandır. Türkiye’nin, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan büyük bir nüfusa sahip olması, üyelikten sonra Türklerin toplu olarak göç edeceği ve Avrupa piyasalarını, kültürünü ve hatta iç güvenliğini olumsuz yönde etkileyeceği inancına ve dolayısıyla üye devletlerde Türkiye’nin üyeliğine karşı tereddüte yol açmaktadır. Avrupa liderleri halkın bu tereddütünü onları mobilize etmek için sık sık kullanır, ve karşılığında Avrupalı liderler Türkiye’nin üyeliği hakkındaki konuşmalarında halkın göçe karşı olmasına atıfta bulunurlar. Üyelikten sonra Türklere serbest dolaşım hakkının verilmesi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar aynı zamanda Avrupa’nın işsizlik, göçmenlerin entegrasyonu, ve yaşanan Avrupa nüfusunun demografik sorunlarına etkili çözümler bulma ihtiyacı gibi diğer sorunlarının göç üzerinde yansımalarını da gösterir. Bu nedenle, Avrupalı liderler, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için adım atarken, Avrupa halkının ve piyasaların ihtiyacı konularında bağlanmış durumdadır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich)
CDA	The Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CSU	Christian Social Union
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEC	European Economic Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EU	European Union
FPÖ	The Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PvdA	The Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
SEM	Single European Market
SPD	The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
UMP	The Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire)
VVD	The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in its December 2004 summit and membership negotiations were opened on October 3, 2005. However, it took roughly eight months to open the negotiations of the chapters on which screening is completed. This was regarded as a historical moment in Turkey-EU relations in the sense that the promises of Europe for Turkey in the way of its accession seem to be closer to reality than it had ever been. However, although it is certain that Europe gave a very crucial decision by moving beyond the longest standing association agreement in the EU enlargement history, Turkey is on the edge of a long accession process which seems to be tough and problematic.

This thesis deals with one of the issues between Turkey and the EU in this problematic process and argues that possible immigration from Turkey in case of EU membership is a major obstacle to Turkey's accession. The literature on the immigration issue between Turkey and the EU generally focuses on the migration trends in Turkey, migrant Turks in Europe, and the immigration policies of the European member states including the justice and home affairs issues of the EU. The topic of this thesis is a relatively unstudied one since it examines the immigration issue from the European side with member state preferences and the public opinion. Moreover, it tries to understand how both regard the immigration of Turkish people from an economic, social and security point of view. Hence the thesis finds out how the cost and benefit considerations of the EU becomes an obstacle in the Turkey's accession

process. Therefore the thesis will be a contribution to the literature on the immigration issue between Turkey and the EU.

Considering all the costs of Turkey's membership, the ideas that oppose Turkey's accession and the problems of the accession process, it is worth to focus on one of the issues to examine it deeply. As a result, this study will focus on the debates, hesitations and doubts of the public and the leaders of the member states about the free movement issue if and when Turkey becomes an EU member, since the public and the leaders are not mutually exclusive. It is crucial to study the immigration debate because of various reasons. First immigration has economic, social and political implications for both sides which are important for the furtherance of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. Second, it is one of the most debated issues by the European public and European decision makers and is generally referred in the discussions that oppose membership. Third it is an issue that is very much used by the European elite for popular means. Fourth, freedom of movement is still an uncompleted issue between Turkey and Europe since the 1963 Association Agreement that envisaged the extension of the free movement rights to Turkey by the European Community at different stages.

Immigration is a two-sided sensitive issue in the sense that on the one hand there is a great fear in some of the member states because of the idea that Turkey's accession will lead to large-scale immigration which would cause serious disturbances on the European labour markets, social welfare structure, European values and cultural identity, on the other hand restriction of the free movement of people would make Turkey a second-class member as stated by the Turkish leaders. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the immigration issue in terms of the application of free movement of people principle in case of membership. It aims to find an answer for the question that how the

possible immigration of Turkish labour becomes an obstacle for Turkey's membership with respect to the ideas and assumptions of the EU member countries.

According to intergovernmentalist logic, enlargement of the Union for the most part depends on the material benefits of the member states. Therefore perceptions of costs and benefits of the membership of a country shape the decisions of the member states. Thus, Turkey's accession from the migration perspective is a main issue around which member state preferences and the public opinion are formulated. As the accession negotiations began, possible impact of Turkey on the Union has been much more debated and the idea of massive migration from Turkey to the more developed EU member states has become apparent in the statements that oppose the enlargement. The arrival of the Turkish labour to the EU member states is seen as a threat because of the idea that immigrants take jobs of the national workers, replace them and cause further unemployment or they may not get any jobs but become dependent on the government by being an underclass who benefit from the social security structure of the welfare states. Keeping in mind the unemployment problem in Europe, letting Turks to move and work in Europe rise the anxiety of the European residents who seek for economic and social benefits and may not want to share these rights with the new comers.

Immigration of Turkish labour can also be examined from the sociological institutionalist perspective with regard to the impact of the immigration on the European way of life and culture. Sociological institutionalists argue that the collective identity, shared norms, and values affect the preferences of the member states with regard to the enlargement process. It is undeniable that flow of Turkish people to the EU countries is one of the biggest concerns of the EU countries where the public fears that immigration will boost unemployment, decrease wages, lead to social and political upheavals. According to sociological institutionalism identity rather than the material costs and

benefits of the immigration becomes the determining factor for accession. Immigration is an issue where this identity perspective comes to the ground. Therefore different cultural characteristics and Islamic disposition of Turkish people create a fear for the Europeans since Turkish immigrants are thought to affect the European way of life and culture which are seen as different from the Turkish way of life and culture. Moreover, the idea of accepting Muslim immigrants creates tensions in the society with regard to the security issue as a result of the violent attacks by the Muslims in Europe. Turkey's image very much revolves around the image that the minorities present for Europe considering the already existing Turkish or other Muslim minorities in European societies. Therefore, all the economic and social problems that the minorities have with the rest of the society, become a clue for the possibly upcoming problems of the European societies.

Therefore from the cost and benefit analysis, immigration of Turkish people can be considered as a cost because of the idea that immigration may cause loss of jobs and may increase expenditure of the government for the social benefits, may harm the European identity and the cultural values, and may put the internal security in danger. It can be also considered as a potential benefit since Turkish immigration may provide human resources to fill skill shortages, keep economic growth because of the declining population rates of Europe, and mean the enrichment of the European culture by the different values that it would bring. Considering the big and increasing population of Turkey which is predominantly Muslim and keeping in mind the problems of Europe to integrate the immigrants, as well as the perception about the Islam in the European countries, Turkey's accession becomes problematic. Therefore, it is important to find out whether the expected thing will happen, there will be a large-scale of immigration, and whether the claims of many Europeans about the negative consequences are

sensible considering the age structure of Europe. However, since migration is a politically and economically sensitive issue in the member states, it is possible that free movement of people will not be allowed at the time of accession, but there would be a period of transition for Turkey and the EU to get prepared for the negative causes of immigration. In the 2004 enlargement, a flexible transition period up to 7 years was allowed for the Central and Eastern European workers. EU may keep a permanent safeguard that will allow the EU member countries to keep Turkish workers out if there is an estimated negative impact on their labour markets.

This thesis is composed of four main chapters besides the introduction as the first and the conclusion as the last chapters. Second chapter deals with the EU's position on immigration with regard to the general EU policies on immigration, explains how the free movement of people principle, permanent safeguards, and transitional arrangements work in the EU. Subsequently, it explains 2004 enlargement to the Central and Eastern European states as a past experience of the application of the free movement of persons and the transitional arrangements to the new comers by different member states. The 2004 enlargement presents us an example of the application of the transitional measures and the estimated economic impacts of the immigration on the existing members with the already attained results which were stated in the March 2006 Commission report. Moreover, the 2004 enlargement gives a clue about the attitude of the member states towards the free movement of persons issue under the economic pressure of the labour markets and the suggestions of the European Commission.

Third chapter includes the EU member states' preferences towards the free movement of Turkish people after the accession. Firstly, theoretical discussion is given to understand the reasons behind the opposition to Turkey's accession and the free movement of Turks with regard to costs and benefit considerations of the member states

in terms of the impact of the immigrants. The preferences of the member states are explained with five cases: Germany, Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and France where the potential impact of the flow of Turkish people is taken into consideration from the economic, cultural, and security related concerns.

Fourth chapter comprises the European public opinion on the immigration issue and its reflection in the society from xenophobia to racism as well as the debate on the success of the multicultural society. In the beginning of the chapter, it is explained to what extent the public opinion matters in the European decision making process. In the subsequent part of this chapter, the concerns of the public on the immigration of Turks are explained with reference to the domestic situation in the member states from unemployment to the perceptions of the immigrant Turks and Muslims. In order to learn the public opinion, recent Eurobarometer surveys which questioned the support for Turkey's accession and immigration related issues are chosen.

The fifth chapter explains the possible migratory flows from Turkey to the EU member states in case of the membership with the econometric studies of the scholars in order to understand whether the fears of the leaders and the European public are unfounded or in contrast Europe will face a mass flow of Turks. The chapter takes the provision of free movement rights to Turks from the historical perspective; later presents the projections on Turkish immigration with possible migratory flows and questions if the young and growing Turkish population can be a remedy to the problems of the ageing European population.

CHAPTER II

THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON IMMIGRATION: PAST EXPERIENCES FOR FUTURE PROSPECTS

This chapter deals with the stance of the European Union and member states on the immigration issue with regard to granting EU citizens free movement rights within the enlarged Union. In this context, the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is studied with a reference to the application of transitional arrangements and the safeguard clauses in order to restrict free movement. The EU stance with regard to the 2004 enlargement and granting new member workers free movement rights sheds lights on how the EU shapes its position on the Turkish immigration issue in the case of Turkey's membership. The 2004 enlargement therefore presents us a historic example where the free movement rights of the workers can be suspended and member states apply either national measures within the specified period or Community measures under the guidance of the Commission. Two main points arise with the eastern enlargement: firstly, immigration has been less than expected. Secondly, when occurring immigration benefits the host country by filling skill shortages, thus contributing to economic growth and helping the host country to deal with the illegal work. This positive outcome is seen in the example of the UK, Ireland, and Sweden.

Differences exist between member states on the application of free movement rights for the newcomers because the immigration policy is left to the discretion of the individual EU members. No supranational immigration policy exists in the EU, but

there are general guidelines and member states can decide themselves on what to adopt. The EU guarantees the citizens of the member states the same rights by treating them equally. The free movement of persons is thus one of the basic principles of the European Union. However, the free movement of persons may pose some challenges when we talk about the accession of ten new member states with a total population of approximately 75 million, who possesses low income level, and relatively low living standards. Prior to the accession of 10 new members in 2004, concerns about the costs of the enlargement with regard to the free movement of persons have increased. Some of the governmental and societal sectors have discussed the possible worker influx of the accession states to the EU-15 (EU members before 2004 enlargement) and worried that the immigrants could take the jobs and social benefits of the existing workers. Considering the low wages and living standards of the new members, and the economic and social opportunities in the EU-15, the opponents of the immigration have claimed that a disproportionate number of people would move to the EU-15. On the other hand, economists have presented various figures and tables to forecast the migration potential and argued that after the enlargement, new member immigration would be modest.

While Britain and Ireland have shown their intentions to open their borders to the workers of the CEECs from the beginning of the accession, Germany and Austria opposed new comer migration. Under these circumstances, the EU applied transitional arrangements for the freedom to move in order to balance both the new member and EU-15 demands as well as permit member states prepare for the possible negative impacts of the free movement of workers. Transitional arrangements allow the member states to restrict the flow of new member nationals, including only workers but not students, tourists, and the nationals of Malta and Cyprus. Transitional arrangements foresee a gradual opening of borders in seven years at the longest, through three phases.

Member states are free to apply national measures or Community measures during these periods, or wait until the end of the seven years to open the borders for workers if they experience serious difficulties in their labour markets.

2.1.General EU Policies on Immigration

2.1.1. Free movement of Persons:

The Free movement of persons, one of the main pillars of the European Union, is considered in two terms within the EU context: firstly granting the right to settle in a member country, secondly the right to cross the internal borders within the EU for the purpose of travelling without any internal border checks. Free movement for the purposes of work and travel within the European Community has been a main goal of the Union as envisaged in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which established the European Economic Community. The EEC Regulation 1612/68 states that "mobility of labour within the Community must be one of the means by which the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social advancement" ("Free Movement of Persons", 2007). The free movement of persons within the Union is also linked to the basic element of the European Union law: prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, which was laid down in Article 12(TEC) and required member states to equally treat the nationals of other members. Once a national of a member state is allowed to work in the enlarged Union, Community laws apply, such as the right of residence, non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, the recognition of qualifications, or the provision of social security.

However, although right to mobility was drafted in the Treaty of Rome, this goal was not achieved until the formation of the Single European Act in 1980s (Dearden, 1999). There were many barriers to mobility such as passport controls and the preferential treatment of the native workers in the employment procedure. The Single

European Act requires that four freedoms, the free movement of people, capital, goods, and services must be achieved by January 1, 1993 with the “abolishment of any restrictions on internal mobility, including internal border controls” (Zimmermann, 1995:58).

However, the main step towards a common migration policy for the EU had been the Schengen system, which has been developed outside the EU framework. In 1985 Germany, France, and Benelux countries signed an intergovernmental agreement for the elimination of the internal border checks, unified visa policy, and stronger external controls. This agreement that brought the Schengen system came into force in 1995 with the establishment of a Schengen area that comprises the member states of the EU except UK and Ireland and plus the two non-EU countries Norway, and Iceland. With the Schengen regime, member states agreed to abolish internal borders controls, harmonize controls at the external frontiers of the Schengen area, and apply a common visa policy and other supplementary measures such as police and judicial cooperation (Jileva, 2002).

Although the Schengen acquis is binding on the new member states from the date of accession, the EU membership does not automatically incorporate the new members to the Schengen system. Implementation of the Schengen acquis is conducted in two phases. The provisions related to the external border controls, illegal immigration, and, to some aspect, police cooperation apply to the member states from the beginning of accession. However, the provisions related to the freedom to travel, internal border controls, visa policies, and Schengen Information System (SIS) may apply at a later date (Byrska, 2004).

With the inclusion of the internal market objective to the Single European Act, new measures were adopted which are imperative for the free movement since one of

the main pillars that the SEM rests on is the free movement principle which takes account of goods, persons, services and capital between the member states (Nugent, 2003). Article 8A of the EEC Treaty states that “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” (Nugent, 2003:298). The Treaty provides the right to move for both the employed and self-employed people. For the employed, Article 39 of the EC Treaty states that the freedom of movement necessitates the “abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states with respect to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” (Hailbronner, 2005). For the self-employed, this right principally relates to the rights of establishment in the other member states.

The EC Treaty, in its origin, regards the individual primarily as an economic actor, but the free movement for the asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced people are not reflected in the Treaty but incorporated into the legislation by means of the Amsterdam Treaty (Baltoni, 2003). Although at the beginning, the right to free movement was granted for the European Economic Area (EEA) workers to be employed or self-employed, reside in the host country, provide and receive services in the EEA, this right has been extended in terms of both its scope and the range of the citizens it addressed by secondary legislation and Court rulings. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played a very important role in extending the scope of the free movement from workers to persons since 1968 (ibid). However, the impediments to the labour mobility within the EU remained until the introduction of the Common Market in 1992 (Biffi, 2001). In the years following the establishment of the Common Market, the purpose of the Community in terms of the rights of the immigrants has been redefined;

the Community has been made more than an economic entity by incorporating social as well as economic purposes to its objectives and by treating the nationals as citizens, human beings, not just as economic actors (Melis, 2001). First of all, the barriers to movement are aimed to be abolished with the mutual recognition of educational and other qualifications as well as the provision of training and social facilities such as welfare payments (Nugent, 2003). Subsequently the free movement right is granted to all various groups of citizens: dependants, pensioners, students, providers, and receivers of services and economically non-active persons under certain conditions (Hartley, 2004). The concept of EU citizenship, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, has been developed to include certain rights and duties with the text of the Treaties, secondary legislation and especially case law. By means of this citizenship, with regard to the immigration rights, the right of the citizens “to move and reside freely on the territory of the member states (Art. 18 CE)” is emphasized (Baltoni, 2003:9). As a result of attempts to avoid indirect discrimination, some basic social issues such as the rights to receive medical treatment in other member states, the social benefits for nationals of other member states, and the position of family members of the migrant workers have been promoted.

Furthermore, although Article 12(TEC) states that the rights of the Union citizens are subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty, the Court has attempted to use citizenship as a tool to expand the rights beyond the economically active Union citizens by bringing cases within its reach that would fall outside the scope of European law such as the position of the students and of third country nationals (Hailbronner, 2005). The ECJ gave substance to the issue of citizenship by extending the concept of discrimination and interpreting the previous regulation for a broader definition of equal treatment. The value placed upon citizens included persons who are

partially dependent upon social welfare as long as they exercise an effective economic activity within the scope of the application of the provision.

However although the nationals of the EU are provided with an extensive scope of rights, there are some practical and legal impediments prevent the effective implementation of free movement rights in terms of the recognition of qualifications, tax arrangements, and social security arrangements.

2.1.2. Transitional Arrangements:

The freedom to travel, search and work in another member state is one of the main contributions of the EU for its nationals. Enlargement of the Union does not automatically bring these rights to the nationals of the new members. The time for the application of free movement rights for persons of the new members depends on the decision and national measures of the existing member states.

As seen in the previous enlargements, such as the southern enlargement of the EU and the enlargement to the CEECs, a transitional arrangement can be set out to delay the granting of this right to the new member state nationals for a specific time period to limit their access to the labour markets in a member state (Boeri and Brücker, 2000). The limitations to the mobility of Spanish and Portuguese labours lasted until the completion of the Single Market in 1991. Eastern enlargement exemplifies the implementation of derogations for the labour mobility to the new members. Transitional arrangements for the freedom to mobility aim gradually bring this right in order to prevent the social and economic tensions by giving time to the old member states to arrange their social and economic systems for the new comers (Chammartin, Bazaldua, 2004). Moreover, restriction to labour mobility lets the new members take advantage of the membership and decrease the income gap before the opening of the borders to prevent the influx of workers to the EU-15 member states (ibid). The restrictions on the

free movement apply only to the migrant workers and not other categories of citizens. However, the limitation does not mean exemption from the other rights connected to the employment such as the equal treatment, indiscriminate with regard to remuneration and social and tax advantages, once a migrant had access to the labour market (Commission of the European Communities, 2006).

The eastern enlargement of the EU, namely accession of CEES with 75 new citizens, explains how the Union extends the free movement rights to the new comers and how transitional arrangements function.

2.2. 2004 Enlargement

2.2.1. Application of the Free Movement of Persons for the New Comers

The extension of the free movement rights to the nationals of the new member states was debated before the accession of the 10 new member states. The issue was complicated because of the necessity to balance the demands of both the old and new member states on the one hand and the public on the other hand. During the accession negotiations, some member states raised their voices against the opening of their borders to the new comers since they thought that the immigration would have negative impacts on the labour markets and on the employment conditions (Byrska, 2004). The reason they asserted for the hesitancy to open borders was that if the new members were given the right to free movement, they would migrate en masse. It is this massive migration that many of the nationals of the EU-15 fear. Since an income gap exists between the old and new members and an apparent unemployment problem exists in the new members, the basis of the fear relies on the possibility of these people to migrate to the old members to find a job with a lower remuneration than they could have in their home countries. Keeping in mind the structural unemployment in the EU, migration is thought to have pressure on the markets, lower wages, even cause further

unemployment in the Union (ibid). Not only economic problems but also social problems that may occur in case of the immigration have been discussed, such as the abuse of the welfare system by the immigrants.

The immigration issue is also complicated from the new member states' perspective. They faced with the dilemma of a brain drain as a result of immigration, but on the other hand, the migration of unemployed population would decrease the market pressure of the home country and even contribute to the country's economic development with the remittances that sent to families remaining in the home country.

As a consequence, the Commission proposed a transitional period up to 7 years with the flexible "2 plus 3 plus 2" formula for the workers of the 8 new members. The transitional period contains 3 phases which apply different conditions. The first phase of the transitional arrangements started on the 1 May 2004 and ended after two years, 30 April 2006 (Hubert, 2004).

It is clearly stated in the Act on Accession that the transitional measures only refer to the free movement of workers and freedom to provide services and cannot be used to limit the free movement rights of students, pensioners, self-employed, self-sufficient people, and to the people with the purpose of travel. Moreover the restrictions are not applicable to immigrant workers legally employed in the territory of the EU-15 before the accession. They are automatically recognized as legal workers with the same rights as the nationals of the country and the other citizens: the right to move for family-reunification, education, and establishing a business (Chammartin, Bazaldua, 2004). Free movement also applies to the family members who reside in a member state with the worker at the time of accession if the worker is allowed to work in that member state for at least 12 months (disregarding the period that he stayed in the state concerned) but for the family members admitted after the accession, free movement applies at least

after 18 months of their stay or from the third year of the accession (Adinolfi, 2005:487-488). For the rest, access to labour markets is restricted. Transitional measures that have 3 phases with a 7 years time period at most are set up as follow:

- Period 2004-2006: For two years the member states that reject to open their labour markets apply national measures on access to their labour markets or apply the bilateral agreements that they have with the new members. (Boeri and Brücker, 2005).
- Period 2006-2009: At the end of the two-year period, the Commission releases a report based on the review of the Council on the functioning of the transitional arrangements set out in the Accession Treaty. However, the result of the report is not binding on the member states. At the end of the first phase member states choose whether to apply national measures and the measures of the bilateral arrangements after the notification of the Commission, or choose to implement the Community rules on the free movement of labour. However, within this three-year period, member states at any time can inform the Commission and apply the free movement of labour provisions.
- Period 2009-2011: Although the application of the Community rules are left to the member states, at the end of five years, they should be applied under normal conditions. However, the prolongation of the period for another two years for the third period is only possible in case of a serious disturbance of the labour market.

The majority of the member states agreed on imposing national measures to the workers of the eight members. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Luxembourg decided to apply transitional arrangements to

limit the labour mobility for the initial phase. However, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Ireland were the three states who opened their borders for the new immigrants with the accession. For the first two years, Belgium kept its work permit system which was different for salaried workers and temporary workers. Netherlands and Finland also applied the work permit system, but the system was more flexible in some of the sectors and professions; in all other sectors the post was offered if only nationals of the old member states did not take the job (Byrska, 2004). France had a permit policy excluding some professional sectors; in Denmark it was necessary to get an official residence permit and full-time job; in Italy and Portugal, a work permit scheme was applied with the application of a quota system (*ibid.*). Austria and Germany, who have opposed the free movement, apply certain restrictions in some of the cross-border services. Spain, Luxembourg, and Greece applied the work permit system for the first period. Furthermore, the new member states are allowed to impose reciprocal restrictions on workers of the EU-15 member states.

First phase of the transitional arrangements expired in April 2006; some member states nevertheless still continue to apply restrictive measures. However, although in the first phase only three member states agreed to open their labour market, this number increased to eight with the decision of Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain to remove the restrictions at the beginning of the second period which started in 2006. Five other countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, agreed to gradually lift the restrictions gradually within three years; that is to say, before the end of the second period of the transitional arrangements. Denmark decided to apply a flexible procedure for all the sectors in the labour market whereas Belgium, France, Netherlands and Luxembourg chose to adopt the procedure for some sectors, especially those experiencing labour shortages. Nevertheless, Austria, and Germany, who had

raised their voices against the immigration of the nationals of the eastern members from the beginning of accession, will continue to keep the restrictions at least until the end of the second period in 2009. Germany mentioned its existing unemployment problem in the country as a reason to restrict the free movement; Austria cited the forecasts for high unemployment in the future as the motivation of the restrictions, besides its proximity to the new members (Free Movement of Labour in the EU-25, 2006).

2.2.1.1.Safeguard clauses

Cyprus and Malta are not included in the transitional arrangements; free movement of the citizens of these two states are allowed after accession, in contrast to process of the other new members. The free movement of Cypriot workers is guaranteed in the Accession Treaty and in the case of Malta although free movement applies to citizens of the latter; there is a possibility of invoking a permanent safeguard clause. (A safeguard clause lets the member states that do not apply restrictive measures on the free movement of persons, impose new restrictions after the authorisation of the Commission if its labour market is intimidated by a serious difficulty.) If the member states suffer serious problems on the labour market related to the immigrants or even there is a threat of this kind, the Commission decides on the restrictions that can be imposed at a later date. This safeguard is only figured for Malta because of the limited size of its labour market (Freedom of Movement for Workers after Enlargement, 2006).

Moreover, Austria and Germany, traditionally the Central and Eastern European migrants receiving countries, expressed their anxiety about the negative impacts of immigration. Despite applying national restrictions and provisions of bilateral agreements between themselves and member states, they also preferred to accept a safeguard clause on some of the sectors such as the construction and industrial cleaning

to restrict the movement of workers in these areas if the service sectors are negatively affected.

2.2.1.2. Standstill clause

The standstill clause requires members states not to apply more restrictive policies for the movement of workers than it possessed before the sign of the Accession Treaty, 16 April 2003. Moreover when there is a job opportunity for the foreigners in the EU-15, the citizens of new members should be given priority over the third nationals.

As a result, in the Eastern enlargement, the transitional arrangement scheme was established in order to gradually open the labour markets in seven years. During this period, member states can open the borders to the new comers or maintain restrictions if there is a risk of serious disturbances of the immigration on the country, but the restrictions should not be stricter than that was applied before the accession. With the safeguard clauses, member states that abolished the restrictions on the free movement are allowed to impose new restrictions under the authorization of the Commission.

2.2.2. Commission Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements for the period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006

The first phase of the transitional arrangement expired in 2006 and the Commission released its report on the functioning of the Transitional Arrangements for the first period from 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006. The Commission report is based on the data on residence and work permits, and other figures on the workers that were submitted to Eurostat by the member states (Industrial Relations Services, 2006). The European Council takes the Commission report as a base while reviewing the functioning of the arrangements. The Commission report on the evaluation of the transitional arrangements provided information with regard to the functioning of arrangements and

helped the member states to decide on the future application of national arrangements or Community law on the free movement of people during the second period from 1 May 2006 to 30 April 2009. As stated in the framework at the end of the phase all member states declare their positions on the issue and notify the Commission about their intentions for the second phase.

2.2.2.1. Mobility of workers in the EU-25

Before the eastern enlargement, the Commission (2003:6), in its midterm review of the social policy agenda, stated that:

One element that has featured strongly in the public debate on accession is labour mobility in an enlarged Europe. Despite the fears, the most likely scenario is one in which labour mobility will be moderate to limited and will after a likely short upsurge just after the accession period - with some 250.000 persons per year - start declining again to fall below 100 000 persons per year before the end of the decade. Past experience shows that fears of mobility at previous rounds of enlargement were unfounded. On the contrary, the developments in those countries meant that many previous migrant workers actually returned to the home country, following EU membership.

The Commission repeated the similar statements after the experience of the first phase of the transitional arrangements. The Commission's 2006 report, based on the national data received from the member states, affirmed that the mobility flows between the new and old members are very limited and most countries experienced lower labour flows than expected from the eight new members (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). The employment rate of the EU-10 nationals in several EU-15 member states such as Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Austria and Netherlands has increased. This growth is due to the increased opportunities for the establishment of private business and the changing attitudes of the employers to the nationals of the new members (ibid). Although the employment rates of the EU-10 nationals in each member state are higher than that of the non-EU nationals in general, there is no surge in the number of EU-10 workers in the other EU member states. With the exception of Austria

and Ireland, nationals of the EU-10 represented less than 1% of the working age population in the member states (Industrial Relations Services, 2006) (See Table 2.1).

Moreover, since the data received by the Commission includes the residence permits, and work permits as well as statistics on workers from other administrative data sources such as the social security registers, sometimes presenting the actual migration flow in the EU because of the undeclared work is not possible. However, enlargement contributed to the declaration of the underground economy in the member states where the nationals of the EU-10 legalized their status as a worker after the enlargement. This led to positive consequences for the EU-15, such as the greater compliance of the workers with legal standards, an increase in the revenue of the states with regard to tax and social security contributions, and the improvement of the social cohesion by decreasing the marginalization of those in concern.

Moreover, the residence and work permits may overestimate the number of EU-10 nationals in the EU-15 since this data does not take account of the number of people who returned to their home countries and the length of the work permits. As the Commission states, an important percentage of the residence and work permits issued for the EU-10 nationals are for short-term or for seasonal jobs: 87% of the work permits in Austria were issued for less than six months; 95% of those in Germany are also valid for short term periods (European Parliament, 2006). Therefore, from this point of view, the existing data may show a greater amount of labour mobility after the enlargement than the actual number.

Table 2.1: Resident Working Age Population by Nationality 2005-row percentages

Country of destination	Nationality			
	National	EU-15	EU-10	non-EU
Belgium	91.3	5.8	0.2	2.8
Denmark	96.4	1.1	-	2.4
Germany	89.5	2.8	0.7	7.0
Greece	94.0	0.3	0.4	5.3
Spain	90.5	1.2	0.2	8.1
France	94.4	1.9	0.1	3.6
Ireland	92.3	3.0	2.0	2.8
Luxembourg	57.9	37.6	0.3	4.2
Netherlands	95.7	1.4	0.1	2.8
Austria	89.2	1.9	1.4	7.5
Portugal	97.0	0.4		2.6
Finland	98.3	0.4	0.3	1.0
Sweden	94.8	2.3	0.2	2.7
United Kingdom	93.8	1.7	0.4	4.1
EU-15	92.4	2.1	0.4	5.1
EU-10	98.4	0.2	0.2	1.2
EU-25	93.7	1.7	0.3	4.3

Source: European Commission Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006), 2006

The Commission's report also states that the mobility from the member states has positively impacted the labour market since the nationals of the EU-10 contribute to labour market performance, sustained economic growth and the state of public finances in each member state (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:11). Furthermore, the impact of the immigration relates to the skill composition and sectoral distribution of the workers with regard to their role in the labour market such as the complementary or supplementary role. The workers of the new members can be seen as a threat if they replace the already existing national workers and compete with them for similar jobs. However, if the workers of the new members complement the national workers and fill the gaps for the sectors where new workers are needed, the labour

markets of the member states would receive a positive contribution. In this sense, the report states that the division of the workers according to the sectors do not show a noteworthy change for the 2003-2005 period (ibid, 12). While the EU-15 nationals mostly work in the service sector, nationals of the new members are represented in construction.

2.2.2.2. An example: UK and free movement of persons

The United Kingdom, together with Sweden and Ireland, is one of the states that opened its borders to the new workers in the first period of the transitional arrangements and continued to do so in the second period. Despite the free movement regime that has been applied since the beginning of the accession, the UK government introduced a new “Workers Registration Scheme” which necessitates worker registration with the Home Office for certificate (Byrska, 2004).

The Home Secretary of the UK, David Blunkett, regards the worker registration regime as a success since after the enlargement and the movement of workers of the new members to the UK, workers are regularising their status in the legal economy, taking jobs in the industries where needed and contributing to the productivity of the UK economy (Home Office, 2004a). In the first phase of the transitional arrangements, the Home Office (2004b) stated that the UK government supported legal migration since it believed that new legal migrants could contribute to the development of the economy by increasing the production and the UK would benefit from the skills of the new migrants. Moreover, the Home Office also confirmed that if the contrary occurred, the government was allowed to apply the necessary measures to restrict the free movement (ibid). The Home Office also reported that between May and September, fewer than 91,000 nationals of the eight countries have registered for work and 45% of this population were already there before the 1 May (Home Office, 2004a). They have

been in the UK legally as visitors or non-working students, legal workers who have work permits or are self-employed but registered for a different job after the accession or as illegal workers (Gilpin, et al, 2006).

Table 2.2 Stock of 8 Central and Eastern European Member Migrants in the UK aged 16 and over

	Stock of new member migrants aged 16+	New member migrants as a percentage of the migrant population aged 16+	New member migrants as a percentage of the total population aged 16+
Summer 2005	245,000	5.6	0.53
Summer 2004	165,000	4.0	0.36
Summer 2003	110,000	2.8	0.24

Source: Gilpin, N., et al. UK Department for Work and Pensions, 2006

Therefore, the number of immigrants presented does not reflect the actual number of workers migrating after the accession because the Worker Registration Scheme requires foreign workers to register for each new job. As a result, changing jobs require reregistration; migrants are not obliged to deregister when they leave their jobs and country, and if “a EU8 worker has been legally employed for a period of 12 months” the worker does not have to register with the scheme (Heinen and Pegels, 2006:4)

As the statistics of the Home Office show, many workers registered for August and September period and many of these workers particularly those worked in the agricultural sector, have returned to their home countries. With the abolishment of the restrictions on the free movement of workers, illegal migrants in the UK have legitimized their status and helped the UK government tackle to some extent with the underground economy. Blunkett (2004) says “Our common sense approach to EU enlargement has put us at a clear advantage compared to the rest of Europe. Illegal

workers have legitimised their status and are contributing to the economy, benefiting from protection in the workplace and allowing us to focus resources on other forms of illegal working.” (ibid.). As Blunkett argues, while the UK has much more easier dealt with the abuse and illegal working, some of the old member states that could not apply the free movement, experienced greater problems tackling with illegal work (Home Office, 2004a). He also states:

The success of the worker registration scheme and the information it gives us - on the sectors accession nationals are working in and the jobs they are doing - is an important part of the ongoing review of our managed migration system. Through this we are delivering a tightly controlled migration programme, which is flexible enough to meet the needs of the UK labour market and contribute to our economic growth, while tackling abuse and illegal working. This benefits everyone – legitimate employers, legal migrant employees and taxpaying UK workers (ibid.).


According to the Home Office, for the period of May and September, migrant workers contributed 120 million euro to GDP of the UK with the 20 million euro tax and national insurance payment (ibid). The Home Office Minister Des Browne stressed similar outcomes, arguing that the UK benefited from the workers, considering the skill-shortages in some of the sectors such as the agriculture, catering, and hospitality (Travis, 2004). He also points out that there would not be a flood of immigrants to the UK, but the high numbers assumed were just media exaggeration (ibid).

Moreover, the European Parliament similarly comments on the impacts of the immigrants in the UK on the labour market in its report on the transitional arrangements restricting the free movement of worker on EU labour market. The Parliament (European Parliament, 2006:8) states:

Regarding the United Kingdom, after the labour market was opened up, 60 000 job-seekers arrived from the new Member States in 2004; the two sectors chiefly concerned were agriculture and fisheries. Given the high number of vacancies, the influx certainly did not increase unemployment in those two sectors. On the contrary, the immediate effect it had was of improving the profitability and competitiveness of the businesses concerned, raising their productivity, and strengthening their financial position. In

macroeconomic terms, the policy of opening up the labour market translates into a marked increase in the British growth rate.

Graph 2.1 Vacancies in the UK filled by the Central and Eastern member state nationals



Source: A Manpower Report, EU Enlargement-two years on, 2006

A report carried out by NOP, a research company and Manpower, one of the largest companies in employment services in the UK, examined the impact of the EU enlargement on the UK labour market from the date of the accession of 10 new member states through a research on UK businesses. The report pointed out that although the number of migrant workers from the new member states increased in two years following the enlargement, their numbers are still low (A Manpower Report, 2006:2). Moreover, immigration has helped some sectors of the UK business to meet their needs.

Accession workers generally work in jobs requiring few skills and in bigger companies rather than smaller and medium-sized enterprises (ibid, 5).

Despite opening of the borders for the new comers and providing jobs for them, the Government is strict on access to benefits. Before opening borders, the UK toughened controls on benefit access and informed the accession nationals on the limitations of government assistance.

2.3 Conclusion

The fears of a massive migration of the Central and Eastern European workers to the EU-15 resulted in the application of the transitional arrangements on the free movement of persons. The member states have been hesitant to the numbers of the potential immigrants and the negative impacts that they might cause on the labour markets. For the opponents of free movement, the immigration leads to pressure on the markets, causes further unemployment and replacement of the national workers, decreases wages, leads to attainment of the social benefits in the member states, and creates tensions in the society. The doubts of the member states reflect the material costs both for the member states and the public considering the possible pressure of the immigrants on the labour markets and the unemployment problem that many of the members experience. The proponents of immigration proposed the material benefits that member states could have with the movement of persons such as the filling of skill shortages by the immigrant workers where there is a need because of the aging population of Europe or the unwillingness of the native workers to do the job, and increase in the productivity with a reference to the experience of the member states that opened their borders for the new members.

In the case of Turkey's accession similar statements are put forward by the member states. Free movement of Turkish workers is discussed with respect to the costs

and benefits of immigration for the member states. However, Turkish example includes another perspective which drives the member states to think accession and immigration not only by considering the costs and benefits analysis but also from the identity perspective. If and when Turkey becomes an EU member, it will probably be the second largest country within the Union in terms of the size of its population. One could add that this large population is of a different culture and religion. The doubts and fears of the Europeans that arose in the previous enlargements, the arrangements to balance the immigration are also the main points of the discussion on Turkey's accession. The Commission anticipated a condition to prevent the Turks from moving freely in the other EU countries. In the EU Negotiating Framework for Turkey (2005) it is stated that:

Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market.

As stated in the Negotiating Framework, the Commission is considering transitional arrangements in order to restrict the free movement of Turkish labour for a specific time period in order to prevent serious disturbances in the EU labour markets. Some of the member states are more eager than the others to put transitional restrictions on the free movement of Turkish labour in case of its accession. Since free movement is one of the fundamental principles of the EU and cannot be denied to any of the member states, permanent safeguards to check the free movement of Turkish workers and the transitional periods to gradually let the free movement within the EU help member states to think more positively about Turkey's accession. Gunther Verheugen, EU

Enlargement Commissioner from 1999 to 2004, regarded this provision as necessary in order to alleviate the European fears about the free movement of Turks within the EU (Pope, Biefsky, Champion, 2004). Before the negotiations, France and Germany lobbied for the provision in the negotiating framework.

The European Commission, based on the experience of the states who abolished the restrictions on the free movement of persons and the data about the number of immigrants in an enlarged Union after the accession, states that mobility from new members to the EU-10 has been more limited than it was assumed before the accession and has not greatly disturb the EU-15 labour markets, but the impact has been positive. Migration has led to the creation of new jobs and business especially by highly skilled workers, decreased labour shortages, increased competitiveness and production, formalized the underground economy, and improved social cohesion. Moreover, migration has contributed to the long-term growth of the economy and the increase in the public finances.

In this context, the European Commission encourages member states to abolish restrictions and apply Community measures on the free movement. Moreover, the European Commission declared 2006 as the “European Year of Workers’ Mobility” with an aim to raise the awareness of the benefits of the movement of persons to work in an enlarged Union. Romania and Bulgaria will be EU members in January 2007. Free movement has also been discussed in the case of accession of these states. The same transitional arrangement framework with “2 plus 3 plus 2” scheme will be applied and member states will be allowed to restrict the free movement of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens until 2014. As a result, considering the doubts of the member states about Turkey’s accession and its population, it is highly certain that EU member states will restrict or limit the movement of Turkish immigrants in the EU and apply transitional

arrangements, derogations for Turkey in the case of its accession as seen in the previous enlargements and described in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey.

CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES' PREFERENCES TOWARDS TURKISH IMMIGRATION

This chapter addresses the European Union member states' preferences towards Turkey around one major issue area: immigration. The relative support that member states show towards Turkey revolves around the possibility of migration from Turkey. There are two main issues: firstly, member states' preferences that have a major role in the bargaining and decision making process and that are shaped by immigration related concerns; secondly, the opinion of the public that shapes or formulates the domestic politics within the states. The public opinion and member state preferences are not mutually exclusive. Public get its clue from the European leaders. Therefore, since the aim of the thesis is to look at to what extent immigration issue can be an obstacle to Turkey's accession and to the application of the free movement principle for the Turkish labour, it is important to study on the preferences of the European leaders about the free movement of Turks in case of the accession of Turkey.

In order to present the rationale behind the support and opposition to the movement of persons within the Union it is necessary to draw a theoretical framework. This chapter first tries to prepare a theoretical base for the whole discussion related to the reaction of the Europeans to the free movement of Turkish workers in Europe, and deals with the ideas of the member states with accentuation on the opinions of the member state leaders. The chapter does not aim to explain the real forecasts about the costs and benefits of free movement of Turkish labour, but aims to examine the member

state preferences with regard to the free movement of Turkish labour. The preferences of the member states are examined with cases of some of the member states such as Germany, United Kingdom, France, Austria and Netherlands who have large Turkish populations. These are five case studies illustrating the member state positions. The first three are chosen because they are the largest states in the European decision making process according to the liberal intergovernmentalism and show different attitudes to the free movement issue. The latter two are the states where the immigration is an important concern and a sensitive issue for the many. Moreover, the inclination of these member states towards the free movement of labour is important because states such as Austria and Germany opposed opening of the markets at least until the end of the second phase of the transitional arrangements in the Eastern enlargement. Moreover, the public of Netherlands and France opposed the EU Constitution and one could argue that the rejection of the Constitution Treaty is linked to the opposition to Turkey's accession as well as the fears of immigration.

Member states have different preferences and positions on the immigration issue. Their concerns for the immigration in the previous enlargements are applicable to the immigration issue with Turkey, but they also have some other concerns from cultural and security perspective. In order to understand the basis of these concerns, the theoretical framework will be described before dealing on the positions of the member states.

3.1 Theoretical Discussion

Andrew Moravcsik, the founder of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, argues that European integration is the result of the bargains between the member states who act according to the national interests and it is the product of the rational choices made by the national leaders who pursue economic interests (Moravcsik, 1993). Liberal

intergovernmentalism is built upon three constituents: ‘the assumption of rational state behaviour’, ‘liberal theory of national preference formation’ and an ‘intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation’ (Moravcsik, 1993:480). Deepening and broadening in European integration are initially promoted by the national governments, specifically by the heads of the governments, heads of states and powerful ministers (Puchala, 1999). Therefore, according to Moravcsik integration is possible if only it is in the interest of member states in terms of the material benefits that they preserve and each member state bargains during the decision making process according to the perceived costs and benefits and looks from the utility perspective. Therefore, European integration is the result of the relative power of some of the member states and the converging interests of these members; however these interests are shaped by the domestic factors such as the powerful societal groups which also preserve their benefits and empower or constrain the government in international negotiations.

However, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the collective identity as the determining factor of policy preferences of the member states with regard to the enlargement process rather than the material costs and benefits of the member states (Muftuler-Bac, MacLaren, 2003). According to this theory, liberal values, and norms of the Community make the decision makers decide for the future enlargement and it is the expansion of the liberal Community that motivates the leaders.

Schimmelfennig (2001:49) argues that “enlargement preference of the EU member states and the initial bargaining process largely conform to rationalist expectations, the international outcome... cannot be explained as the result of egoistic cost-benefit calculations and patterns of state preferences and power.”. While the rationalist approach does not take account of the common values and norms in the

absence of the material benefits, namely economic and security benefits, sociological approach regards these as necessary and sufficient for the expansion of an organization (ibid, 61). He believes that rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, can explain the preferences of the member states and the bargaining process in some important decisions, but it is unable to explicate the collective decision for the enlargement (ibid, 76). However, the decision makers generally use a rhetoric which is based on the community, identity, collective norms, and values to justify their self-interests and Schimmelfennig named this strategic use of a norm-based expression as a 'rhetorical action'. Shared norms, values and beliefs with the new members provide the conditions for decision makers to rationalize what they intend to do.

Nonetheless, Helene Sjursen (2002: 508) believes that the enlargement decision is derived by a sense of kinship-based duty which highlights the common cultural identity and it is this duty that mobilizes the member states to treat the Eastern Europe as preferential when compared with the accession of Turkey. Liberal democratic norms of the Community are not sufficient to explain the enlargement decisions. Therefore the accession does not depend on the norm-based justifications such as the norms of the liberal democracy and the criteria related to democracy and human rights or the utility calculations of the Community in terms of economy and security but depends on the sense of a Community (ibid, 491). As a result ethical-political reasons become important in the decision to enlargement. As seen in the Turkey's case, the debates about Turkey's accession have a different rhetoric than that of the Eastern Europe. Emphasize on collective identity was clearly seen in the accession of the CEECs. Integration of these countries was portrayed as a return to Europe, where they actually belong to, with a stress on the European history as a unifying factor of the Community (Kubicek, 2004). While new members claim that they have always been a part of the

European tradition with an adherence to the constitutive values and norms of the European Community, to some extent the old members regarded identity issue as a positive incentive for accession of these new members since they believed that they share common norms and a history. Although unifying Europe has become the main expression of the eastern enlargement, the opponents of Turkey's accession generally link the accession with utility based considerations in terms of both economy and security and admitting Turkey would not unify Europe, but make Turkey a close partner to Europe (ibid, 504).

Turkey's accession does not include the value-based justifications. Kubicek (2005:73) states that "Although Turkey does not fit into the "return to Europe" narrative; its inclusion into Europe is increasingly being viewed as a responsibility and a political necessity if the EU hopes to aspire to be true to its highest ideals." It is a widespread view that Turkey is not a part of Europe in terms of its culture and history considering that Turks were generally defined as the other of Europe during the history. The cultural arguments that are proposed to oppose Turkey's accession generally focus on the identity of Turkey with its different history, religion, traditions, and a different way of life. Former French president Valerie Giscard d'Estaing stated that Turkey was close to Europe, but its capital was not in Europe and 95% of its population live outside the Europe; Turkey has a different culture and way of life and it is not a European country, therefore Turkish entry into the EU would mean the end of Europe (Güney, 2004).

In this context, Turkey's accession will mean the movement of Turks to Europe who do not have a European identity but have different life-styles. Therefore, free movement of Turks is regarded as a cultural challenge to the existing European values and norms and that's why the immigration issue poses a significant obstacle to the

accession of Turkey. Cultural differences between Turkey and the EU make the Europeans fear that after the accession these culturally different people, as called by many Europeans, will reside within them as a different and segregated society or will get involved into the daily life of the European people by devastating the norms of the European culture.

3.2. Member States' Positions on the Immigration of Turkish Labour

One aspect of Turkey's accession which leads to many debates in terms of its costs and benefits for the member states is the issue of the free movement of persons. It is discussed from many perspectives such as the utility considerations which include both the economic and security considerations on the one hand and on the other hand it is a debated issue which leads to hesitancy of the member states from the cultural perspective.

Free movement of Turkish labour becomes a problematic issue with respect to the opposition of the European public, the calculations of the economists, and the preferences of the member states considering both the demands of the labour markets, the public opinion on the issue and opposition of many European leaders. Therefore, the general concerns for the anti-immigrant sentiments have three important causes: first the socioeconomic costs which are the concerns about its negative impact on the job market such as the competition for jobs, structural unemployment, replacement of national workers, decrease in wages, and increase in the welfare burden; second, cultural concerns in terms of the failure of the integration of the immigrants to the society because of the different identities and different way of lives and cultural characteristics such as being non-European or non-Christian; third, the immigration issue, considering the opening of the borders to the Muslim workers, becomes sensational in terms of the security concerns. Therefore, with reference to the rise of Islamic presence in Europe,

the violent actions in the European cities and the threat of terrorism make the Islamic identity of Turkey more apparent in the discussions on its accession. The Security Strategy Document of the European Council of December 2003 states that one of the major threats that Europe faces today is linked with the violent religious extremism which causes crises in the society and alienation of the young generation (European Security Strategy, 2003:7). As a result, Turkish immigrants mean for the some, the rise of insecurity in the society because of the feasible violence that one can link with the non-European and Muslim identity of Turkey.

Therefore, the case studies of five EU member states Germany, Austria, Netherlands, present to what extent the European states think Turkish immigration as a major concern for the European well-being and therefore an obstacle for the membership.

3.2.1. Germany

Immigration has been a hot political topic in Germany where the leaders had diverging views on the policies to be implemented. The new Immigration Act of Germany which was introduced on 1 January 2005 had been debated by the political parties and media from autumn 2001 to spring 2004. The new Act replaced the previous Green Card Scheme which aimed to make the movement of foreign IT specialists to Germany easier, since it failed to bring expected number of workers. With the new Immigration Act, Schroder's government has taken an important step to change the attitude of German government to the immigration issue despite the criticism of the right parties. The migration act focuses on the measures to let the migration of highly-skilled foreigners for economic growth; it extends the scope of the rights of highly-skilled persons, their families, and students. Moreover, the law makes easier to expel the foreigner who is supposed to impose a threat for the security and it tries to recover the

failure of the previous integrationist measures by reforming them. The problems of the immigrants are addressed and in the act integration courses, German lessons for the migrants and improvement of the German of children whose first language is not German are focused for their integration to prevent the creation of 'parallel societies' in Germany. However, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) criticized the Immigration Law and the liberalization of movement of high-skilled migrants. Merkel called for more integration of the existing immigrants in Europe before accepting new immigrants. The CDU and CSU argued that the labour migration should be limited and already existing migrants should be integrated before accepting more immigrants and they emphasized the domestic measures to train the people for skill shortages before filling them with new immigrants. The arguments of the Chancellor and her party make it clear that the new German government aims to develop the integration of the immigrants in Germany and to decrease the mismatch of the German workers which leads to unemployment although there are skill shortages in the labour market. Therefore, acceptance of more people to Germany seems to be problematic.

As it has been in the debates on the new law on immigration, the German leaders also do not share the common ideas about the accession of Turkey and Turkish immigrants. The Chancellor of Germany Angelina Merkel and her centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) fear of an influx of Turkish immigrants to the European Union in case of Turkey's accession (Browne, 2005). The Christian Democrats of Germany along with Merkel argue that Turkey is culturally different from Europe with a predominantly Muslim population and it has a diverging historical perspective. For this reason, especially during the election process in Germany they have argued that Turkey should be given privileged partnership. Moreover, Merkel argued that

multiculturalism failed in Germany and Turkey's accession would make the situation worse and also she stated that "A Europe with Turkey as a full-fledged member won't be a Europe that is fully integrated...The degree of European integration achieved over 50 years must not be thrown away just like that" (Bowley, 2004a). There have been other leaders in Europe who supported this argument of Merkel such as the Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the French Union for Popular Movement (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel (Kart, 2005). Merkel's opposition to the membership and her emphasize on the unemployment problem in Germany take the support of the Germans who fear of the large influx of Turkish immigrants. The CDU focused on the integration problems of the Turks in Germany and failure of multicultural society. Therefore, for many German leaders, the immigration of Turks will not solve Germany's problems but further socio cultural gap within the society.

However, the former Chancellor Schroeder from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) thinks that Turkey's accession will improve the security of Europe and he said that "If we manage to bind Turkey so closely to the West that it can't get away anymore, and through this we manage to combine a non-fundamental Islam with the values of the Western enlightenment in Turkey, then we in Germany and in Europe will gain security," (Baker, 2005). Schroder says that "Negotiations about the accession of this country [Turkey] will last 10 years and 15 years." and he states:

The negotiating concept will allow that we eliminate migration to our job market. It will allow for both sides to interrupt or call off the talks. Thus it is an appropriate instrument for reaching our goal without putting any EU country, including Germany, in too difficult a position (Deutsche Welle, 2005).

Therefore he emphasized the fact that member states can delay the movement of migrants into their countries until a specific time. However considering the immigration

trend from Turkey to Germany, he states that before admitting Turkey, Brussels should develop a common EU immigration and asylum policy regulating the settlement of foreigners since Germany can only take certain number of immigrants (Schmid, 1998).

Besides the stance of the German government that opposes further immigration and its will to decrease the labour shortages by educating as well as training the native people, there is another aspect of immigration which has an impact on the attitudes of the European leaders towards the free movement of Turkish people and that is the existing immigrant population in Germany. Germany has the largest Turkish population in Europe and it has not only traditionally been an accepting state for the Eastern European country workers because of its proximity but also has been a destination country for the Turkish immigrants since 1950s (see Table 3.1). However, during the first years of immigration of Turks, Turkish migrants were given limited rights since they were thought to be guest workers who would return to the home country and Germany was not thought to be an immigration country by the German leaders.

Table 3.1. The Turkish Population in the EU Member States (in thousands)

	Total	Turkish Nationality	Naturalized
Germany	2,642	1,912	730
France	370	196	174
Netherlands	270	96	174
Austria	200	120	80
Belgium	110	67	43
UK	70	37	33
Denmark	53	39	14

Source: Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *Europe More than a Promise?*, 2004

There are 7.3 million foreigners in Germany, more than 3 million of them are Muslims and 2.6 million are Turks or Germans with Turkish origins. The discussion on Turkey's accession is generally tied with the minorities in Germany and with the failure

of integration of the migrants, with emphasize on the Turkish minority. Austin and Parker (2005) argue that most part of the opposition to accession of Turkey relates to the failed integration of the Turkish minority into the German society. The problems of the immigrant societies vary from poverty, unemployment levels above the average, to the ghettoisation and the increase in criminality (ibid.15). Many Turks are economically disadvantaged and have higher unemployment levels especially among the younger generations. Turkish students are worse than the German nationals at school because of the problems in the language. They show lower levels of political participation. However this is regarded as a breakdown of German foreigners' law by the minority associations in Germany. Especially banning the double citizenship, which was tolerated before 2000 and provided the migrants to have the citizenship of both the home and the host country, had negative impacts on the Turkish minority since having only Turkish citizenship make the full political participation difficult considering that Turkey is not an EU member (Ozdemir, 2005). According to the German laws, German nationality is only granted when the applicants renounce their current nationality and if they take the German citizenship by birth, they make a choice at the age of 18 (Davy, 2005). Thus, the result is the non-integration of the Turkish society and creation of segregated societies.

For most of the Germans and the German leaders who emphasize the cultural differences of the Turkish people, Turks represent the culturally 'other' who do not preserve human rights especially of women and who have domestic violence, honour killings and as a result do not show commitment to the German values. This furthers the negative connotation of the Turkish immigrants for the Germans and becomes the basis of the negative rhetoric of the German leaders. Therefore, since Germany has not yet solved its integration problem, Turkey's EU membership that would lead to the

migration of more Turks to Europe creates tensions in the party politics. In Germany the political party debates about Turkey's accession and opposition to immigration generally reflect the concerns about the failure of the policies for the integration of the Turkish immigrants and the negative impact of the Turkish immigrants on the social cohesion of the country. The unemployment figure in Germany forms an important part of the opposition to the Turkish immigrants. With Austria, Germany decided to keep the restrictions on the free movement of Eastern European member states at least until the end of the transitional arrangements till 2009. The main reason of Germany to close its labour market to the Eastern European workers is stated by the government as the high unemployment rates.

Therefore, German opposition to the immigration relates to the concerns about the cultural differences because of the fact that Turkish immigrants may not be able to absorb the values and norms of the German society and the economic problems where there is high unemployment rate and unemployment is more serious among the young immigrants.

3.2.2. Austria

Austrian government has a critical stance against Turkey's membership. Austria blocked the starting of membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 and it was the only member state who has been holding the 'No' card. After two days, Austrian government pulled back and agreed with the 24 EU partners to open the membership talks with Turkey. However, new Austrian government of Social Democratic Party and Conservative People's Party announced that Austria will consult the public in a referendum for the accession of Turkey (Euroactiv, 2007).

The Austrian general election campaigns focused on two main issues: the immigration issue and the decline of the welfare states. During the campaigns, the

statements and the posters of the political parties reflected the attitudes of the leaders towards these issues and their demand to mobilize the public around the most sensitive issues in Austria to get the popular support. The slogans of the right wing parties stating that ‘Oust 300,000 Immigrants’, and ‘Safe-Pensions, not Asylum Rights’ showed the discontent of the parties with regard to the immigration (Euroactive, 2006a). The rhetoric of the far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) also emphasizes the opposition to Turks by the election posters stating ‘Daham statt Islam’ namely ‘Home instead of Islam’ and “Austria and not TurkeU” (Bowley, 2006). The party states that it agrees on the idea that 45% of the Muslims do not want to integrate (European Stability Initiative, 2006a). The party sees the accession of Turkey as risky and it warns of an immigration wave from Turkey which would endanger the Austrian culture (Apfl and Huter, 2006). Moreover, the leading candidate for Alliance for Austria’s Future Party pronounced that he wanted to expel 300,000 foreigners out of the country by car, train or bus (Euroactive, 2006a). It was only the Greens who campaigned for the immigrants’ rights. The right wing parties, FPÖ and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), who increased their voices against Turkey’s membership and immigration, also increased their votes in the general elections.

Hence Turkey’s accession becomes problematic when thinking of the anti-immigrant sentiments both at the public and the elite level. Austria has a roughly 300,000 Muslim population and the majority of them are of Turkish origin. Austria has the third largest Turkish minority in Europe at more than 150,000. Since Muslims are regarded as a society who do not show respect to human rights, discriminate women and do not integrate to the European societies, the immigration of more Muslims, referring to Turks becomes a problematic issue. The history has also a role in defining the Turks for the Austrians by remembering the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and in 1683 as

the Muslim threat. The Turks historically represent the culturally other of Europe and a threat to the European civilization with the oppressive, violent, savage character (Muftuler Bac, 2000:27). Moreover, the debates on the welfare structure of the country and the social security which are visible in the populism of the right, dominated the election discussions. The anti-immigrant and anti-Turkey attitudes in the party politics have to do with the history of the Austrians with the Turks. Since the historical hatred combines with the modern day problems such as the concerns about unemployment, the issue becomes more complicated. The critical stance on the immigrants arises from the contemplation that the immigrants take jobs, benefit from the social security schemes, they cannot integrate to the society and show criminal attitudes.

The former Prime Minister Wolfgang Schüssel takes attention to the Negotiating Framework for Turkey which states that “The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.” (Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 2005:1) and he states that the outcome of the negotiations may be different than the full-membership (Turkish Press, 2006). Moreover, Shussel worries about the costs of Turkey’s membership by saying that “Turkey's EU accession would cost as much as the recent accession of all ten new members. Before saying there is full membership for Turkey, someone has to explain to me how to finance that. We have to keep the absorption capacity of the EU in mind. This is what we owe to the anxieties and worries of our citizens.” (European Stability Initiative, 2005). The new Chancellor of Austria Alfred Gusenbauer argues that “Turkey in the EU would mean the end of the EU, if that does not happen before anyway. What I understand as integration might not even be possible with 25 member states anymore. The speed of enlargement has been too high.” (ibid.). Moreover in the government program of Austria (2007:7) it is stated that the commitment of Turkey and

its population to the European values and standards is in the interests of all member states of the EU.

Austria together with France was opposing Turkey's membership with a fear that Turks may flow to Europe and may further the immigration related problems there (Kirisici, 2004). Prime Minister Schussel declared that "There are protection mechanisms against Turkey. First of all, it is out question for us to open the Austrian labour market to Turkish workers." and he insisted on the need to allay the popular fears against Turkish immigrant workers in case of the membership (Turkish Press, 2006). Schussel asserted that Austria would impose permanent safeguard to limit the flow of Turkish workers to protect its labour market (European Commission News Letter, 2005). President Schussel asserts the doubts about the flood of Turkish immigrants including the cheap labour force to Austria who has already high level of unemployment of 6% and he emphasizes the burden of accession of Turkey on the member states considering that Turkey is a poor country with 70 million population and it will be the second largest country in the EU. Moreover, Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, by referring to Turkey's membership, says that "There is the question if the EU can take this, if we are paying enough attention to our people" and argues that the government listens to its people who generally show low level of support favouring Turkey's membership and even oppose the accession and free movement of Turkish labour to the Austrian job market (Anderson, 2005). Furthermore, by referring to the public opposition to the Turkey's accession in Austria, the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Vienna and the Mayor and Governor of Vienna since 1994, argued that "People are not xenophobic, but they were worried. I take their worries seriously" (European Stability Initiative, 2005).

Austria is one of the two countries who decided to keep the restrictions to the Central and Eastern European workers at least until the end of the second period as well as to the Bulgarian and Romanian workers as well. Moreover, in Austria immigration of foreigners is reduced gradually in the recent years. Former Chancellor Schüssel announced that the immigration and the family unification quotas should be reduced because of the unemployment rate which is more visible among the immigrants and told that it was necessary to impose stricter rules on the naturalisation of the immigrants, namely getting Austrian citizenship (Austrian Federal Chancellery News, 2005). Therefore, considering the strict control on immigration in Austria, the restrictions for the Turkish workers in case of the membership seems to be inevitable considering the high population of Turkey, the anti-immigrant sentiments in the country and specifically the hesitancy towards the Muslim immigrants.

Therefore, although Austrian government agreed to open the accession talks with Turkey, there are still some opposition to Turkey's full-membership because of the market related concerns such as the negative economic impact of the flood of Turkish labour which would mean the flood of cheap labour and cultural concerns. However, the economic costs of the enlargement are more pronounced in the statements of the government. The government generally refers to the public opposition in the country that oppose Turkey's membership because of the probability of huge amount of immigrants since Austria fears of the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments towards the immigrant workers if and when free movement principle applies (Hardy, 2002). Therefore, labour migration is thought to bring economic and social problems. Turkish immigrants may compete for the jobs in the host country and replace the native workers; the increase in the supply of workers from Turkey may lead to unemployment

for the local workers and decrease the salaries by considering the negative long-term unemployment forecasts in Austria.

3.2.3. Netherlands

Immigration is one of the most politically sensitive issues in Netherlands considering that it has the second largest Muslim population in Europe after France. It is an immigration country where there is an experience of multicultural society. However the government has been criticized because of the failure of its integration policy and non-integration of the Muslims. The assassination of the Dutch author Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch Moroccan man illustrated the failure of the immigration policy of Netherlands and the multiculturalism for the some. Reactions to the Muslim immigrants including the violent attacks to the mosques of the Muslim communities in the aftermath of the event triggered the problems in the society and demonstrated the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments, xenophobia, and even racism towards the immigrant societies. As a result while there is hesitancy against the Muslim minority in the country, the debate about the free movement of foreign nationals, and accession of Turkey with a predominantly Muslim population caused some doubts and this has been expressed by the decision makers in Netherlands.

It is a prevalent view that successive governments in Netherlands tend to limit the immigration by increasing legal barriers. The Dutch finance minister Gerrit Zalm argues that “We need long transition periods, and must be able to decide for ourselves when there can be free movement of people” and furthers that each member states are to decide on the time to lift the restrictions (Bowley, 2004b). Although the Dutch government rejected the notion of privileged partnership instead of the full membership in a parliamentary debate on 11 April 2006, the criticisms against Turkey’s accession emerged within the governing party Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA), the party of

Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Foreign Minister Bernard Bot, because of the fact that Turkey is not a Christian country and they take the attention to the religious differences which may create problems (European Stability Initiative Series, 2006b:24). However, as opposed to the Christian Democrats in Germany, France and Austria, the party in Netherlands officially rejected the cultural and religious based oppositions but focused on the need for economic and political development of Turkey (ibid, 12).

With regard to The Dutch Liberal Party (VVD), the Dutch State Secretary for Europe Atzo Nicolai argued that one of the most important concerns of the party was immigration and flood of Turkish workers to Holland (ibid,14). Party members supported the transitional arrangements to limit the free movement of persons and called for application of restrictions for the Turkish workers with the safeguard clause on freedom to move. However the concerns of the party members do not relate to the differences in religion and culture to a large extent but the population of the Turks and the economic impact of immigration. Moreover, the concerns of the VVD members about the immigration do not lead them to oppose Turkey's accession since the party members voted in favour of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. The labour party (PvdA) also supports Turkish membership, but the party set out some strict conditions and stated that "free movement of individuals is not automatic with the accession, but requires a separate and unanimous decision about the free movement and transition periods, including with a safeguard clause" (ibid, 16).

There are opposite voices to the free movement of Turkish people in Netherlands as seen in the statements of the leaders and preferences of the political parties. The government is thinking to apply long-transitional period for the free movement of Turkish workers as the other EU members, however the reason of the opposition varies from economic consideration to the cultural and security related anxieties.

3.2.4. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was one of three member states who opened its borders to the new immigrants with the Eastern Enlargement. The UK allowed free movement of workers to fill skill shortages in its labour market and the result of the immigration of workers has been declared to be positive as discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the opposition voices in the government and criticism of the free movement with an argument that the Eastern European workers made a very limited contribution, but the social benefit costs outweighed the economic benefits and at the end they became burden on the government, the government insisted that immigration created positive results yet the migration had to be managed in order to benefit from it. This is why the UK allowed for free movement but limited the access to social benefits for the Eastern European workers and limited the number of workers of the Romania and Bulgaria. Although the UK has applied an open policy towards immigration from the beginning, the government decided not to do so for the Romanian and Bulgarian workers but apply stricter controls on immigration in order to manage it carefully because of the idea that immigration can bring benefits to a country if it is properly controlled (BBC News, 2006). As a result the labour market of the UK is opened to a small group of skilled people, some seasonal agricultural workers and the self-employed (Wintour, 2006).

In the case of Turkey, the UK has been supporting the accession for a very long time. The UK has always stated that supporting Turkish membership would have positive implications for the Muslim world since the accession means incorporating a modern Muslim country into the Western values and favouring democracy in Turkey. Therefore the government believes that the cultural divergence is a positive thing rather than a threat and integrating Turkey would enhance the social security within Europe. With regard to the free movement of Turkish workers, in the European Standing

Committee debates in 2004, Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe, declared that the British government supported Turkey's accession if it met all the required criteria for membership and applied the *acquis* and the government is "generally in favour of the free movement of labour" (House of Commons, 2004).

The Conservative Party of the UK proposed the limitation of the number of immigrants and the asylum seekers in the UK in the 2005 general election and Tony Blair's government argued that the UK is in need of migrants who would contribute to economic growth of the country and instead he was firm on putting stricter control on the asylum seekers. In contrast to Germany, in the UK there is not a fear of parallel societies; and the cultural differences within the society and the religious identity are less pronounced (Austin, Parker, 2005:25). Therefore, Turkey's accession is not linked to the fears of possible social problems that the Turkish migrants may cause (ibid, 27). As have been in the Eastern enlargement, the UK government decides to allow free movement according to skill shortages in its labour market.

Talking from the intergovernmentalist perspective, the government shapes its policy on free movement according to the material benefits of the immigration. Since the UK tries to respond to the demands of the labour market, despite favouring Turkey's accession and free movement in general, it is rational to suppose that the government will impose restrictions on the movement of Turkish people. Therefore, the government does not think that free movement of Turkish workers will be a problem from the cultural perspective, since it believes that integration of a Muslim population to the European Union will make the relations better with the other Muslim societies both inside and outside the Europe and it will mean an enrichment of the European culture and development of the social order from the security perspective. After the accession, hence, application of free movement principle for the Turkish workers will be

considered within the scope of the economic benefits of the UK which will be defined in terms of the demands of the labour market such as skill shortages for creating a dynamic and competitive market.

3.2.5. France

France has been a key player in the touchy issues of the Europe such as the enlargement and integration. France is an immigrant country by being home to nearly five million foreigners and as a result immigration is a sensitive issue considering the problems with the minorities especially with the Muslim immigrants. With regard to the accession of Turkey, immigration becomes an important concern for the French leaders. Turkey's membership that would allow the free movement of Turkish labour finds its reflection in the other related issues such as the perceptions about the immigrant Turks in France, difficulty with the Muslims and assimilation problems in the society. The violent acts of the young Muslim generation such as the burning of cars and other criminal acts in the suburbs, followed by the riots in 2005, were seen as the alarming bell for the rise of radical Islam in Europe and even as a Muslim-intifada by many Europeans. These events illustrated the immigration problems of France and the failure of its social model. The French began to pay more attention to the problems of the disintegrated young generation which cause chaos in the society and put the internal security in danger. It also showed the results of the unemployment problem because of an underclass rebellion which is becoming structural in Europe considering that unemployment among immigrants is more than that of the native population.

It is accurate that most of the French leaders did not make welcoming speeches for Turkey. Although President Chirac supports Turkey's accession, other French leaders generally refer to the public unease while stating their opposition (Bowley, 2004a). The former French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said that Turkey's

accession will mean 'the end of Europe' since it 'was not a European country' (Güney, 2004). Nicolas Sarkozy and Dominique de Villepin have spoken against Turkey's accession (Grant, 2006:8). The leader of the French Union for Popular Movement (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy is one of the European leaders who have supported Merkel's third way which foresees a privileged partnership for Turkey. As opposed to its opponents, President Chirac has supported Turkey's membership, but he also called for a French referendum on the entrance of Turkey to the European Union (Aybey and Ozturk, 2005).

With regard to the statements of the leaders about Turkey's membership, Austin and Parker (2005:24) argues that "strong opposition by French political leaders to Turkish entry is an easier way of tapping into what is mostly opposition to further enlargement or unease with immigration". Therefore, the immigration issue shapes the views of the leaders in France or at least their rhetoric about Turkey and free movement and the ideas about Turkey revolve around the cultural related concerns because of their experience about the Muslim immigrants. The immigration issue in France is also coming to the front in the coming days of the 2007 presidential elections and the two candidates show different attitudes to the issue. Nicolas Sarkozy talks about the suspension of the membership talks with Turkey if he wins and making Turkey a close ally rather than a member. He also says "We now have to say who is European and who is not" considering that Turkey has imposed problems in the enlargement debate because of its Muslim population (Bennhold, 2006). While Sarkozy speaks out for the restriction of the number of the migrants according to the selective criteria of education, knowledge of French and professional experience, Ségolène Royal criticises Sarkozy for his intention to restrict the family reunification but both agree on the regulating migration according to the needs of the French labour market (Euroactiv, 2006b)

France is one of the countries where the public opposes the accession of Turkey and further immigration and see integration of Turkey as a failure of the European project since the government supports membership. France opened its borders to the 8 Eastern European countries after the first phase of the transitional period and to Romania and Bulgaria from the time of their accession with the support of most of the French trade unions who believe that the countries without restrictions have profited economically.

3.3 Conclusion

As seen in the statements and attitudes of the member state leaders towards the free movement of Turkish people, the ideas of the leaders change according to what they perceive as the cost or benefit at the end of immigration. Therefore from Moravscik's perspective it is true that the decision makers generally seek for the material benefits and it has been so when the member states closed their markets by considering the labour market disturbances and unemployment figures in their countries in the Eastern enlargement. However, in Turkey's case Sjusen's 'kinship based duty' concept and a sense of community become visible in the debates about the security and cultural related concerns.

Ayhan Kaya (2005) claims that the European leaders as Sarkozy, German Chancellor Merkel, Lafontaine and Rasmussen are inclined to use a rhetoric which is against the immigrants, Muslim society in Europe and Turkey's accession because of the other concerns in the domestic politics. Nation states, who cannot respond to the structural problems within their countries, use the 'fear policy' in order to gain the legitimacy (ibid.). As a result, European leaders prefer to talk about the negative implications of the immigration and especially of the Muslim immigrant societies such as terrorism, violence, human and drug trafficking in order to mobilize the public

without dealing with the structural problems such as unemployment, poverty and inequality (ibid.).

The main point of the concerns of the EU member states is the high population of Turkey with a lower GDP level and possible flood of these people to Europe after the accession. The member states that have problems with the immigrant population in their countries, the leaders, at least the far-right parties are more open to talk about the social threat that the immigrants may pose by underlining the cultural and religious based differences. This is what Schimmelfennig called as a rhetorical action, as the use of norm-based expression of the leaders to rationalize what they intend to do. It is also seen that the European governments refer to the opposition of the public when talking about the costs of the immigration. Therefore, as seen in the debates on Turkey's accession, not all but an important part of the European leaders use a rhetoric that underlines the doubts of the influx of Turkish people regarding the high population of Turkey and relatively low GDP level and emphasizes the economic, cultural and security related concerns by mobilizing the public concerns in order to divert the attention from the other domestic issues. Therefore, it is sure that members tend to impose transitional arrangements for the gradual opening of borders for Turkish migrants because of the economic, security and cultural related concerns if Turkey becomes an EU member.

CHAPTER IV

THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC AND ITS POSITION ON TURKISH IMMIGRATION

The second aspect of Turkey's potential impact on labour movements and immigration relates to the public. As the EU member state preferences and the public opinion are not mutually exclusive, having dealt with the preferences of the member states in the previous chapter, this chapter looks at the attitudes of the European public towards Turkey's accession from the immigration perspective. In order to have a clue about the public opinion, the data of the Eurobarometer surveys on different issues such as the support for Turkey's accession, necessary conditions for Turkey's membership, main problems that member states face today, contributions of the immigrants to the society, are examined. The data provides general indications of what the public thinks but do not endow with why they think so. Therefore, the chapter analyses the reasons of the opposition or support of the European public for the immigration of Turkish labours which relate to various factors such as the domestic situation with regard to economic problems such as unemployment, past experiences with the immigrant societies and existing anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim sentiments among the public.

4.1. Does Public Opinion Matter?

The preferences of the European public play a crucial role in the formation of the attitudes of the member states towards the European issues and constitute a driving force for the European policy makers. European politics can be regarded as a two level

game played both at the lower level within each member state and at the EU level between the member states (Putnam, 1988: 434). At the international level, relative power of the member states and the bargaining process among them shape the final decision, but at the domestic level there is a process going on between the domestic groups who pursue their interests and apply pressure on the government in order to make them seek their demands in the international bargaining. At the national level, the actors may be 'bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes' and 'public opinion' (ibid, 436). Moravcsik (1999: 518) states:

Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently. Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.

Therefore, national governments are constrained by the actors at home since they try to gain the support of the domestic actors and build coalitions among them and in return they seek the preferences of these domestic players while shaping their policies and they satisfy the domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988: 434).

Furthermore, public opinion also matters for the national bureaucratic politics where the preferences of the public may be referred as a cause of the choice and the final decision of the national leaders in order to preclude public opposition. Even the views of the public are used as a legitimatizing tool for what the national leaders want to do at the European level with regard to the sensitive issues on the European agenda and also at the diplomatic level some of the decisions are determined by referring to the demands of the public (Carkoglu, 2003:171). As a result, it is difficult to take the public opinion separately from the government decisions since national governments are responsible for the decisions they take in the name of the public both in the domestic

and foreign politics of the government and they need the support of the public to stay in power.

Although the early phase of integration is derived by the European elites, public support has been an important factor in the process. Moreover the development of European democracy within the institutional framework of the EU such as the European Parliament through which the European public has been included in the policy making with the election of the parliamentarians, has illustrated the increasing importance given to the ideas of the public. There have been criticisms about the democratic deficit of the EU and it is always stated by the Europeans that the support of the public is necessary to make the EU as a democratically legitimate entity. As a neo-functionalist, Inglehart points out that European integration cannot go further without the support of the public and both the deepening and widening of the Union requires the support of the mass publics (Anderson, Kalenthaler, 1996:179). National referenda that are carried out in the member states to take the opinion of the public on various key issues such as the European integration and constitutional documents reflect the importance given to the public opinion. Furthermore, there are opinion polls and surveys such as the Eurobarometer surveys which are commissioned to develop a dialogue between the European Union citizens and the decision makers by taking their ideas, learning their expectations and attitudes towards different issues such as the future of Europe, further enlargement, the European constitution, and personal satisfaction of the life in the EU.

4.2. Explaining the Concerns of the Public on Immigration of the Turkish

Labour

The literature on the public opinion for understanding the anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe focuses on three important perspectives which also help to explain the hesitancy of the European public towards Turkish immigrants. These concerns are:

- rational concerns which are socio-economic based, such as the loss of jobs, disturbances in the labour market, decrease of wages, increase in the welfare expenditure and social costs for the government and the public,
- security concerns including the fears of criminality, loss of control over immigration, and resurgence of terrorist acts,
- cultural concerns which focus on the cultural differences, different lifestyles, religious and ethnic difference which may cause integration problems (Boswell, Chou and Smith, 2005:12).

As the attitudes of the European public towards Turkey's membership and immigration vary in the member states, the reasons of the opposition and support also differ to a large extent. Not all the member states have the same attitude towards the immigration and immigrants and also do not have the similar experiences with the Turkish immigrant societies. Therefore, the feelings of the public may change according to the economic situation in their countries, such as the unemployment problem or need for foreign labour because of skill shortages. However their experiences with the immigrant societies, the perception of Turks and Muslims also have role in the formation of the European public opinion. When they perceive costs in terms of culture, economy or security they become more offensive to accept the immigrants, but the perceived potential benefits relieve the opposition to a large extent.

McLaren's work on the public support for the EU helps to draw conclusions on immigration issue from the cultural perspective. She argues that one of the most important points in the hesitancy towards the integration of other members is the perceived threat posed by the other cultures and antipathy towards other cultures besides the rational costs and benefit analysis (McLaren, 2002). She says that when the

public thinks about the policies, they mostly consider the needs of the society as a whole rather than the individual need and they act according to the group categorization and favour their own group but have hostile attitudes towards the people of other groups. The threat can be both a realist threat which leads to hesitancy of the public towards immigration with a concern about the general resources of the nation, and a symbolic threat that causes a concern about the culture and way of life of the society. Therefore the will of the public to protect the nation and the group identity against the threats form their attitudes towards the European integration and immigration in specific (ibid.555). As a result, cultural threat that the public perceive from the immigrant societies, becomes an important part of the opposition. In this context, in many member states, integration of the immigrants is generally linked to Islam. Anti-immigrant sentiments towards the Muslims have been more pronounced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, Madrid and London bombings. In this context, the idea of free movement of Turks is met with hesitancy from the security perspective, and the attitudes of the public are shaped around the debates on the existence of parallel societies in the member states and the hesitancy towards the Islam.

Socio-cultural concerns also form a big part of the opposition since the public thinks that Turkish immigration will lead to the problems of integration because of the different cultural characteristics, social norms and religious identity of the Turks as they also refer to these reasons for the integration problems of the existing Turkish population in the member states. From the cultural perspective, the concerns have two dimensions: the first dimension is the negative influence of the other cultures on the culture of the receiving society such as lower respect to human rights and non-ethical behaviour at work etc. The other concern relates to the failure of the integration and segregation of the migrant population from the society in many occasions of life; for

instance with isolated housing or by using the native language rather than learning the language of the host country.

Moreover, the discussions of the leaders about the inability of the immigrants to integrate to the society and the debates on the problems that they cause promote the negative views of the public towards immigrants and further immigration. As Vreese and Boomgaarden argue (2005:64), in recent years there is an increase in the popularity of the anti-immigrant political parties, pointing out the right-wing parties, and anti-immigration sentiments among the society improve the support for these parties. However, they do not argue that these parties create hatred in the Europeans towards immigrants, they play an important role in the formation of the stance of the Europeans on the issue because of the negative emphasize on the immigration issue in the party politics (ibid.). As Zaller argues cited by McLaren (1999: 8), if all the political parties share the same view on a specific policy and they all support that policy, the politically aware individuals incorporate the views of these elites, however on the other hand if there is a divergence between the parties on the issue, therefore the partisan values of the individual helps him to shape his preferences according to the message he gets from different senders. However as McLaren says this is not possible on the immigration issue since there is a lack of consensus among the leaders (ibid. 9). For instance the party politics in Austria lead the public mobilize on xenophobic attitudes. The FPÖ developed an election campaign in spring 2005 local elections with a saying that “Vienna must not become Istanbul”, “Pummerin [bell of Saint Stephen church] instead of Muezzin” and they give the message that accession of Turkey will result in the mass flow of the Turks and they will jeopardize the security and damage the Austrian culture (Apfl, Huter, 2006). Largely because of this campaign, the party has earned 15% of the votes in the 2005 local elections in Vienna (ibid).

Boswell, Chou and Smith (2005:34) have also indicated another dimension for the hostility towards immigration which does not relate to migration at all but a reflection of the other sentiments that may occur with the social, political and economic change such as the unemployment, failure of the welfare systems and loss of social security. They argue:

Most non-rationalist theories locate the sources of motivation for anti-immigrant sentiment in economic and social change in late modern welfare states: the changing role and functions of the state as guarantor of welfare, job stability and security; socioeconomic insecurity caused by the restructuring of welfare systems and labour markets; and/or changing or declining patterns of collective identification (ibid.).

When the state no longer keeps its role as the guarantor of the economy, welfare and security because of the constraints of globalization, changing international environment and demographic change, it tries to find new strategies to gain the support and loyalty of the public and re-establish its legitimacy since the states experience a legitimization crisis, in which they fail to fulfil the attributed tasks but instead liberalize the markets and cut back welfare state expenditures. Therefore, the public is mobilized around other issues, namely the unemployment problems, welfare state problems are attributed to the immigrant society which shares the finite resources with the indigenous people. Moreover, the state control on security is reasserted with the new perceived threats in order to create a collective identity for the society and one of the ways to do it, is to build this threat around the outsiders including the immigrants and refugees. Namely the immigrants are regarded as a threat to the society in terms of collective norms and shared culture. Therefore, the negative sentiments of the public towards immigration, chauvinist nationalism, hesitancy, hatred and even xenophobia are articulated through these means and the European public tend to regard the immigration issue as one of the most important challenges that their countries face.

As discussed in the previous chapter creation of parallel societies which do not have interaction with each other is one the biggest fears of Germany. Germany has the largest Turkish population in Europe; hence thoughts of many Germans are shaped around their experiences that they have with the existing societies though a process where they shape the image of Turks in their minds whether it is true or prejudiced. The report of European Stability Initiative on the German Turkey Debate (2006c) argues “With the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005 arguments to define the borders of Europe historically to exclude Turkey have largely ended. A debate on the borders of Europe has been replaced by a much larger debate of stake holders in politics and civil society on integration, Islam and European values, and the position of Turkish women.”. Therefore the honour killings, violence towards the women among the Turkish immigrants make the public think that Islam is hostile and aggressive to women and Islamic values are not compatible with the European values. The debates on Turkey’s accession focus on these issues considering the opening of borders to the Turkish people.

UK and Germany have been facing with similar pressures as a result of the liberalization of their labour migration, however the discourse of the Germans and the Britons are different in the sense that they use different rhetoric to display their opposition and justify their demands to restrict the free movement. The rationale behind the opposition of the German elites and the public includes many concerns such as the perceived costs of immigration in terms of economic considerations and cultural considerations. From the economic point of view, the Germans believe that after the immigration there would be an increase in the competition for jobs, in the supply of workers and a pressure on the wages and replacement of the national workers with the

foreign labour force. Moreover immigration brings poor performance of the immigrants but instead the immigrant population creates pressure on the government.

In the UK, the economic concerns of the immigration are more pronounced rather than the cultural ones while expressing the anti-immigrant sentiments. Cultural divergences with the Turkish population are less pronounced in comparison to their counterparts living in Germany or France. The Turkish community in the UK are more skilled; more integrated to the country, and have a less attachment to the religion or traditions. Since the UK public has not faced many challenges arising from the Turkish population and their experiences with the Turkish immigrants are different from the other European states, they are less concerned about the religious and cultural differences but more about the economic costs of the immigration. However, for the public of the UK, the immigration may have some costs in terms of the abuse of the welfare structure. The public fears of transferring their welfare rights to the immigrants and paying more taxes for them. Moreover the concern of the public does not only relate to the workers but also to the asylum seekers who are thought to be burden on the state. In the UK which seems to be more open to the free movement of workers, there is a more acceptance of the employed people than of the asylum seekers who are thought to abuse the welfare system of the country (Boswell et al., 2005:2). The UK government for instance has been criticized because of the failure of calculating the number of potential immigrants from the Eastern member states and underemphasizing the actual numbers. Many people saw this as an unsuccessful immigration policy; however the reaction to the government was not so strong since the figures illustrate the contribution of these immigrants to the economic performance of the UK.

David Logan (2005), former British ambassador to Turkey, argues that in the countries with poor economic performance and high unemployment figures the public

tends to be more critical on the arrival of Turkish labour, whereas in the countries with low unemployment rates people are more open to the immigrants. The Dutch, French and German public are concerned about the economic problems in their country and the high unemployment figures. As a result, they refer to these economic problems while talking about possible flow of people that might deepen these problems. However economic problems are not sufficient to explain the causes of the opposition, also their experience with regard to the Turkish immigrants or Muslim immigrants in general extended the grounds of opposition. Many Euro Turks reside in Germany, France, Netherlands and Austria. In these countries there is also fear of flow of the Turks and the public thinks that the accession will bring the risk of immigration by 75% in Germany, 65% in France, 61% in Netherlands and 76% in Austria. Austrians are more critical on the immigration from Turkey and also they are more critical on the idea that Turkey's accession would favour the mutual comprehension of the European values. The Austrians stand against accession since they have concerns about immigration as a result the threat to their jobs and the cost of absorbing Turkey (Bowley, 2005). Therefore, immigration of the Turks is not a desire but a fear for the majority of the Austrians and the anxiety about the possible disturbances in the labour market and Turkish culture and Muslim values become the most pronounced reasons behind the opposition. There are more than 150,00 Turks in Austria where there are parallel societies who do not integrate to each other. For many Austrians Turks represent the cultural incompatibility. They have arranged marriages and most of them are underage and have traditional family structures with many children. The women are generally repressed by the dominant male in the family and cannot adapt to the Austrian culture. The children are not good at school, since most of them cannot even express themselves in German. Moreover, many Austrians complain about the high taxes they pay for the

government because of the fact that Turks work in low-paid jobs and benefit more from the social security systems such as the medical treatment and child-support money. Therefore, the ideas of the Austrians about the immigrant Turks further their anxiety for the acceptance of more Turks. There is also another side of the concerns of the Austrians. There are still many people who think within the historical scope and who carry the feeling deep inside that Turks are invaders and they were saved from Turkey by referring to the Ottoman Vienna sieges and accession of Turkey will mean the acceptance of a non-European country to the EU which will destroy the European values.

In Netherlands, the anti-immigrant sentiments among the public has become more visible after the political murders of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 by a Muslim extremist. These events made the Dutch people to think about their problems with the immigrants, their tolerance towards the foreigners and failure of the adaptation of the Muslims to the society. Because of having a huge Muslim population, Turkey's accession is thought around these issues which indicated the failure of the multicultural experience. Netherlands have segregated societies which are mainly Moroccan origin. However, Turkish immigrants also have problems in being integrated to the host country and the result is the formation of 'dish cities', which have the houses with dishes outside which are directed to Turkey to get the Turkish TV channels. The fears of the foreigners and the Muslim extremism reveal in the issue of possible migration of Turks and further the anxiety of the Dutch about the eradication of the European values as a result of the tolerance to the immigrants and revival of a threat to internal security.

The riots in French cities which involved the North African youths, have paved the way for the sharpening of the negative feelings towards the immigrants in Europe

and as a result Turkey's accession has become problematic considering the free movement of Turks within the European cities and the growing hesitancy in Europe to accept more migrants (Dougherty, 2005). Moreover, the unemployment problem in France increases the doubts of the French people on the accession of Turkey. Jacques Floch, socialist member of the European Affairs Committee says "If people didn't worry about unemployment they wouldn't worry about outsourcing, about enlargement, about immigration or indeed about deregulating European markets some more." (Bennhold, 2005). Therefore, the unemployment in France doubles the political debate about the accession of Turkey.

After giving the main points of the opposition to the Turkish immigration with regard to the unemployment problem, experiences with the current immigrants, European perceptions about the Turks and the Muslims and lack of elite consensus on the immigration issue, it is also important to deal on the indicators of public opposition with the statistics provided by the Eurobarometer survey results.

4.3. European Public Opinion on Turkey's Accession and Immigration Related Issues According to the Surveys

4.3.1. Public Support for Turkey' Accession:

Enlargement is one of the most popular issues in the EU that is being discussed in the public sphere and on which the opinion of the public is taken very often. Besides the enlargement in general, enlargement to Turkey takes the attention of the European public and the support for integration varies according to the countries. Public opinion on Turkey's accession matters because of the perceived costs of the enlargement and its identity related implications. In particular, public support to Turkey's EU membership is crucial with regard to the fact that it can determine the outcome of the membership


negotiations by means of the referenda on Turkey's membership that might be held in France, Netherlands and Austria before the accession. In order to assess the position of the European public, recent Eurobarometer surveys are chosen which ask questions about Turkey's membership, main concerns of the European public and the immigration related issues. Therefore, survey results provide a general idea about the public attitude and their preferences on the issue of free movement of Turkish people and Turkey's membership.

Special Eurobarometer survey on "The future of Europe" (2006:55) that was carried out in between February and March 2006 illustrates that more than half of the Europeans (55%) think the enlargement of the EU in positive terms. As seen in the survey results Europeans are not opposed to enlargement in general. Nevertheless, opposition to enlargement is felt harder in Turkey's case. According to the Standard Eurobarometer 64 (2005), 31% of the European population support Turkey's accession whereas 55 % oppose it. The old member states are more reluctant to include Turkey into the EU than the new member states.

Although the support for Turkey's accession seems to increase to 39% in spring 2006 when European public is asked to decide on the country that they would favour as an EU member, Turkey becomes the least favourable state (See Table 4.1.). The membership of Bulgaria, Romania and of other states such as Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Ukraine are supported more than that of Turkey. Moreover, there is a far stronger support for the accession of the current European Free Trade Area (EFTA) member countries Iceland and in particular Norway and Switzerland (See Graph 4.1.). While the greatest support for Turkey's accession is from the Turkish Cypriots by 67%, and even more than Turkey

itself (54%), the opponents of the accession are Austria with 81%, Germany with 69% and they are followed by Luxembourg, Cyprus and Greece.

Graph 4.1: Support for Enlargement-Tested Countries



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 64, 2005

As the Eurobarometer surveys show since the enlargement of the EU is generally regarded as positive by the European public, the support for Turkey's accession is less than the support for general enlargement and majority of the European public oppose Turkey's membership. Moreover, when compared with some of the European states, Turkey has the lowest support and according to the EU citizens, Turkish membership must be subject to certain conditions.

Table 4.1: European Public Support for Turkey's Accession

	Support	Opposition
EU25	39	48
Belgium	43	55
Czech R.	32	61
Denmark	50	44
Germany	27	69
Estonia	35	49
Greece	33	67
Spain	47	23
France	39	54
Ireland	40	32
Italy	36	49
Cyprus	26	68
Latvia	35	47
Lithuania	33	42
Luxembourg	24	69
Hungary	44	46
Malta	35	31
Netherlands	55	42
Austria	13	81
Poland	51	31
Portugal	37	30
Slovenia	53	41
Slovakia	33	55
Finland	42	55
Sweden	60	33
The UK	42	39
Turkey	54	22
Bulgaria	47	26
Croatia	58	28
Romania	66	7

Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, July 2006


4.3.2. Immigration as an Obstacle to the Accession

The European public support for Turkey's accession is low. It is important to consider the reasons of the hesitancy of the European public towards Turkey's membership which make it least favourable even among the non-candidate states although it is an EU candidate and has already begun to the accession negotiations. According to the

European public, there are some obstacles on the part of Turkey which make the accession difficult such as the human rights issue in Turkey, the economical problems, the issue of immigration after the membership and the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU. 84% of the Europeans think that Turkey should respect to human rights and 76% believes that it is necessary for Turkey to improve its economy in order to be an EU member in ten years (Standard Eurobarometer 63, 2005).

As shown in the Graph 4.2, 54% of the respondents agree that the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for this accession and most of the Europeans disagree with the idea that the accession would favour the mutual understanding of the European and Muslim values.

Graph 4.2. European Public Opinion on the Conditions for Turkey's Accession



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 63, 2005

Whereas the public in Sweden, Poland and Hungary has more positive view about the mutual understanding of Muslim and European values, Greeks and the Austrians have the most opposition voices.

The causes of the opposition to Turkey's membership differ, but immigration becomes one of the most vital elements in the growth of the public hesitancy towards the membership. One of the most important concerns of the Europeans after Turkey's human right records and economic development is the immigration issue. Immigration of Turkish people to the more developed EU member countries after the accession is regarded as a risky issue by the Europeans.

According to the survey 63% of the Europeans believe that Turkey's accession brings the risk of immigration to the more developed countries in the EU. While Romania (39%), Lithuania (47%), Luxembourg (44%) and the UK (52%) have the lowest support in the EU-27 to the idea of the risk of immigration, Cyprus (82%), Austria (78%) and Greece (77%) are the three states that show the biggest commitment to the idea that after the membership, the immigration will be a risky issue for the Europeans because of the flow of Turkish people to the other EU member countries. According to the Eurobarometer, surveys 54% of the French oppose Turkey's membership, and the French opponents mostly cited the risk of massive migration from Turkey and the idea that Turkey is not in Europe with a large Muslim population (Pope, Biefsky, Champion, 2004). Therefore, the doubts about the immigrants and the further immigration make the public more hesitant towards enlargement.

Moreover, related to the topic of immigration, a small percentage of the European public, representing just 29% of the EU-25 population replied that 'Turkey's accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population' and %50 of the respondents opposed the statement. Within the EU-25, Slovenia, Denmark, UK and

Spain show the biggest support to the idea but with 34% of the population and it is only Turkey between the EU-27 and the candidate countries who thinks that Turkey's accession will help to the ageing population of Europe.

Therefore, it seems that the accession of Turkey is seen as a problematic issue initially in terms of its human rights records and economy which are understandable problems with regard to the fact that these two credentials are the necessities of the accession for all the members as stated in the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the data presents us that the public does not only concern about the fulfilment of these criteria for the membership, but there are other issues that they see as risky, and immigration is one of the most important causes of the doubts of the Europeans.

Another important reason for the hesitancy to the membership is the cultural differences between the EU and Turkey and this relates to the immigration from the cultural perspective in the sense that the Europeans are not willing to open their borders to the culturally different nationals and Turkey's accession will lead to the flow of culturally different people to the European cities where they may have integration problems (see Table 4.2). However, while the proponents of Turkey's accession and the free movement of Turkish people generally focus on the needs of the ageing population of Europe and claim that the dynamic, young population of Turkey will be a remedy for an ageing Europe, the European public does not share the same idea.

Table 4.2: Public Opinion on the Immigration of Turks

	Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	Turkey's accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population
EU25	63	29
Belgium	70	28
Czech R.	69	25
Denmark	75	33
Germany	71	31
Estonia	76	25
Greece	77	24
Spain	58	33
France	68	26
Ireland	52	25
Italy	57	28
Cyprus	82	23
Latvia	64	23
Lithuania	47	18
Luxembourg	44	27
Hungary	67	24
Malta	58	22
Netherlands	59	27
Austria	78	21
Poland	63	33
Portugal	55	33
Slovenia	67	34
Slovakia	68	24
Finland	79	28
Sweden	57	28
The UK	52	32
Turkey	65	74
Bulgaria	59	27
Croatia	63	32
Romania	39	23

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 63, Special Eurobarometer 255

The perceptions of Europeans and Turks differ to a large extent on the benefits of the growing young population of Turkey as an alternative for the ageing European population. Therefore, the immigration of the Turks is not considered as beneficial in

terms of its contribution to solve the problems of the European states that arise from its demographic structure.

4.3.3. Costs and Benefits of Immigrants to the Society

The immigration of Turkish people is not welcomed by the European public. However learning the perceptions of the European public on immigration is important to understand why immigration is a debatable topic in Europe which attracts the concerns of the public. The Eurobarometer 63 (2005) provides data about the most important issues that the public thinks they face at the national level. The major concerns of the public are unemployment and economic situation and these concerns are followed by other problems: crime, healthcare system, inflation and immigration. Immigration is labelled as an important anxiety of the member states by 14% of the population, but European public does not fear the same threat from the other issues such as terrorism, defence and foreign affairs. Moreover the EU-15 members seem to be more critical on immigration issue than the new members, and the concern is the highest in the UK, and Denmark. It is crucial to underline that the UK is one of the three states who opened their borders to the Eastern European workers from the time of accession and where the government is favouring immigration because of the economic benefits that they might provide.

The views of the European public on the immigration issue are also shaped by their perception about the immigrant societies in their countries. Therefore, if the public believes that immigrants provide benefits for the host society they tend to be more open to the immigration, however if they regard the immigration as costly they become more hesitant towards the migrants and migration. In this context, Standard Eurobarometer 66 (2006) asks for the ideas of the European public on the contribution of the immigrants to their country. 40% of the respondents agree with the proposition that ‘Immigrants

contribute a lot to our country' whereas 52% oppose it. Therefore majority of the European believes that the migrants do not contribute to the host countries.

The surveys on the issues with regard to Turkey's accession and immigration provide us a perspective about how the European public thinks about Turkey's accession from the free movement perspective. Thus it is seen that while more than half of the European public support the enlargement of the EU in general, Turkey is the least favourable state among the previous candidates and other potential members because Europeans think that Turkey should have progress in specific areas, such as the human rights, economic development, as always stated by the European leaders and even by Turkish decision makers. But what is important is that, the public also regards immigration issue as a risky for the accession of Turkey as the other two credentials and this represents the European public's fears of potential Turkish immigrants. Immigration is seen as one of the major concerns of the member states after the economic problems and more than half of the Europeans believe that immigrants do not contribute to their society and Turkish accession will not help to the rejuvenation of an ageing European population. Therefore, according to the European public the costs of the immigration outweigh its benefits.

4.4. Conclusion

In consequence, immigration becomes one of the main areas on which the opposition of the public to Turkey's accession is noticeably seen. As the larger literature on immigration and public sentiments towards the immigrants points up and the survey results illustrate, the accession of Turkey becomes problematic considering the hesitancy of the European public towards foreigners. This hesitancy is based on various factors such as the economic problems in the country, the experiences with the immigrants and as a result perceived costs of the immigration on the economy, culture

and security. The opposition of the European public to the immigrants has also been examined in the debates on the application of free movement rights to the Central and Eastern European workers. The concerns of the Europeans about the cheap competition from the new members were symbolized with the symbol of 'Polish plumber'. However, Turkey's case becomes more complicated and the public opposition is higher for the movement of Turkish labour. Immigration seen as a risky and challenging issue for the Europeans, since the public is not very satisfied with the idea of living with Turks because of many reasons. But why the public is so hesitant to Turkish immigrants? Turkey is large, poor and predominantly Muslim. Besides the economic based considerations such as the flood of Turkish people and their negative impacts on the labour markets, other cost and benefit analysis with regard to the impact on welfare systems, and cultural identity of the European public there rest other explanations as the motivation of hesitancy. First, in comparison with the Central and Eastern European member states, Turkey's membership is a more popular issue which takes the attention of the media with an emphasize on the negative consequences of the immigration. Secondly, generally there is not an elite consensus on Turkey's case and the political party cleavages become more visible in the discussions on Turkey. The right-wing parties are more diffident towards the immigration and the European elites tend to mobilize the public on the opposition of the Turkish immigrants to increase their votes and they use the anti-enlargement and anti-immigration rhetoric in the election campaigns. Thirdly, while talking about immigration of Turks, European public tends to think in relation to the past experiences with the other Turkish immigrant populations in their country who are not well integrated to the host country and who keep their religious and cultural attachments. Therefore the integration problems of the immigrants and the failure of the multicultural societies in Europe, find its reflection on the attitudes

towards the free movement issue. Finally, the rising extremism in Europe, which is exemplified by the rise of criminality, and terrorist acts are generally attributed to the Muslim populations and to their affiliation with terrorism. Moreover considering that Muslim societies have historically been the other of Europe, Muslim identity of Turkey generates an obstacle to the free movement.

CHAPTER V

TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS POSSIBLE MIGRATORY FLOWS

The concerns of the European public and the European elites about the free movement of Turkish people in case of Turkey's membership are studied in the previous chapters from different perspectives such as the economy, security and culture. The basis of the concerns does not always have to reflect the real issues, since they are perceived by the various segments of the public. This chapter therefore moves beyond the perceived assumptions or justifications of the attitudes towards the issue of enlargement and free movement. It tries to present the predictions, from the migration studies of the scholars and economists, about the number of potential immigrants to the EU if and when free movement of persons principle applies to the Turkish workers or contrarily in case of the failure of Turkey's membership prospects. Moreover, by taking account of the future demographic structure of Turkey and the EU, the chapter deals with whether the movement of Turkish workers can contribute to the European labour markets by being a remedy for the ageing and shrinking European population.

5.1. Provision of Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU

In order to fully understand the issue of migration between Turkey and the EU, one needs to go back to the 1963 Ankara Treaty. Ankara Agreement which is known as the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement laid down the basic principles for the strengthening of economic relations and envisages the establishment of customs union

between Turkey and the EC. In addition, the Additional Protocol of 1970 detailed the arrangements and foresaw the time table for the establishment of the customs union in three phases. Ankara Agreement also included a provision for gradual granting of free movement rights to Turkish workers. With regard to the free movement of persons, Article 12 of the agreement states that “The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by 48, 49, and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement of workers between them” (Association Agreement, 1977). Furthermore, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol (1977) states:

Freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement. The Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end.

As the article states, free movement of persons was aimed to be established between November 1974 and November 1986. However, in 1976 Turkey announced that it could not decrease the tariff barriers within the scheduled time. Although the reciprocal lowering of the EC tariffs is foreseen in the Additional Protocol, in 1982 the Commission suspended the closer relations between EC and Turkey and the rights of the Turkish citizens to free access to the European labour markets were not implemented (Martin, Midgley and Teitelbaum, 2001).

Although the customs union was established on the decided date of 1996, it did not include any provision for the free movement of persons principle. The rights of the immigrant workers and their families are guaranteed under the national legislation of the member states to some extent, but the right to free movement has never been achieved even though it is foreseen in the agreement and its additional protocol (Melis, 2001). There are 3.5 million Turks that reside in the European countries and 70% of this population rest in Germany. The status of the Turkish immigrants in the member states

is guaranteed by the EC-Turkey Association Council established with the Association Agreement, bilateral agreements between the states which cannot grant less rights than those provided in the Association Agreement. Moreover, the case law is developed by the European Court of Justice which interprets the rights and extends its scope through different cases brought by the immigrant Turks in the member states. Therefore Turkish immigrant workers enjoy broader scope of rights than third country nationals in the EU but without the rights to move freely to take up employment within the EU territory.

Having dealt with the documents that define the free movement of rights of Turks in the past, making projections on the potential migratory flows by the time of the application of this right is also important.

5.2. Projections on Turkish Immigration

The studies on Turkey's accession deals with the possibility of massive immigration from Turkey to the more developed EU member states. This is claimed by the opponents of free movement and is emphasized by most of the European public and the leaders since there is a great debate on the free movement of Turkish workers both at the elite level and the public level. Therefore it will be beneficial to present the literature with regard to the estimation of migration from Turkey in order to make feasible assumptions about the migratory flow and its impact on the receiving countries.

5.2.1. Possible Migratory Flows from Turkey to the European Union:

The number of the potential Turkish immigrants after the application of free movement of labour principle cannot be predicted with any certainty. Migration depends on many variables such as the differences in the income levels, employment opportunities in the countries, the institutional arrangements for the movement as the guest-worker agreement or application of free movement. Hence there are pull and push factors that

motivate immigration or decrease the pressure on the potential immigrants. Pull factors, the features that attract immigrants to other countries, are: “better living conditions and wages, other people’s experience with migration, good employment prospects and more individual freedom” and push factors which lead to leave the home country because of the issues related to the domestic problems include the relatively worse economic conditions of the home country and ethnic problems (Krieger, 2004). Moreover the factors that affect immigration do not only involve economic considerations, but there is also the social perspective which comprises the culture, language, geographical distance and social networks and they can be both an incentive or an obstacle to move (Flam, 2003). For instance, although free movement is guaranteed within Europe for many new members, the mobility is not massive since there are other barriers in front of the movement such as the differences in language.

The methodology used for the immigration forecasts varies from econometric methods based on the immigration experiences of the emigrant country before and after the accession considering the pull and push factors for the immigration, projections arise from the past experiences of the other enlargements and opinion polls conducted in order to measure the ideas of the people on the likelihood to leave their country (Commission Staff Working Document, 2004).

In this context, the arguments about the migration potential of Turkish nationals in case of the membership can be based on two basic arguments. First one relates to the assumption that there will be massive flood of Turkish people to the EU after the accession because of the low income levels, wage differentials, poor economic performance of Turkey that will drive the people to move to more developed countries. This idea is very common in the European public and even in many European leaders as described in the previous two chapters. Since Turkey is very populated and the fertility

rates indicate that it will continue to grow in population and there is a significant unemployment problem in the country, the number of immigrants is thought to be doubled. However, the second scenario assumes that the movement of Turks with the application of free movement principles will not be in large scales as feared by the opponents of accession. After the enlargement, the pressures on the movement of the Turkish people will decrease and as a result most of them will not feel the need to migrate because of the progress in Turkey both in economic and social terms. The report of the high level group of the Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs (2004) addresses that the past examples of immigration showed that as the pull and push factors become less differentiated and there are more economic and social development in the new members, although the wage levels are different between the member states, this does not lead to major movements. Therefore, less people tend to move to another country. However, in case of the failure of membership there would be more immigration to the more developed states of the European Union.

Considering the migration trends in Turkey and its past experiences, Turkey has traditionally been a sender country to the Western European states since the early 1960s with the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the European states especially with Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands. Between 1961 and 1975 the number of immigrants reached 805.000 and after bringing to an end the acceptance of immigrant workers, immigration has continued with the family reunifications and family formations (Toksöz, 2006: 217-218). Daniel Gros (2005) argues that even under the strict migration regime of the EU member states, the annual net migration of the Turkish people equals to 35,000 which is the difference between inflows and outflows of the immigrants, generally in the form of family reunification and family formation.

The study of Erzan, Kuzubaş and Yıldız (2004) on the magnitude of potential immigration from Turkey to the EU which is calculated according to Turkey’s past experience with regard to the immigration from Turkey to Germany for the period 1967-2001 presents two scenarios: first is with an assumption that Turkey will enjoy high growth rates and the rights to free movement will be granted in 2015; the second scenario assumes a worse condition and is based on the assumption that Turkey’s EU membership is suspended and Turkey experience lower development figures with higher unemployment rates. The alternative growth scenarios for Turkey are developed by examining the demographic developments as states in the UN population projections, internal migration; unemployment; productivity and urban and rural growth (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. High Growth Scenario for Turkey, 2005-2030 (annual values)

Urban GDP Growth		0.065
Urban Productivity Growth		0.03
Rural GDP Growth		0.02
Unemployment-2015	Urban	0.13
	Average	0.09
Unemployment-2030	Urban	0.05
	Average	0.04

Source: *Erzan, Kuzubas, Yıldız (2004), Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU*

In the first scenario the result is within the range of 1 to 2.1 million immigrants between 2004 and 2030 because of economic and social benefits of the accession for Turkey such as the motivation for economic growth in the country, decreasing unemployment rates, increasing respect to human rights (ibid.) (see Table 5.2).

In the other case, if membership fails, free movement principle does not apply to Turkish labour, and the current visa regulations are kept, but the pressures for the movement increases. Therefore, this scenario results with the immigration of more than 2.7 million people despite the restrictions on the free movement of labour.

Table 5.2. Immigration Scenarios for Turkey in 2004-2030

Net Change in the Turkish Migrant Population	<u>2004-2015</u>	<u>2015-2030</u>	<u>Total</u>
High Growth-Membership-Free Movement of Labour	246.000	1.888.000	2.134.000
Lower Growth-No Membership-No Free Movement of Labour	760.000	1.974.000	2.734.000

Source: Erzan, Kuzubas, Yıldız (2004), Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU

As the authors argue the scenario which is based on the failure of the membership is very risky since it leads to flow of more migrants than it would be in the case of membership with free regulations. The suspension of the accession of Turkey may lead to larger flows than in the case of membership because of the lower growth and relatively higher unemployment rates in Turkey since the EU has a role in the stabilization and consolidation of democracies and it encourages the economic development in the member states. Therefore, if implementation of the reforms for the economic and social development does not keep the same speed, there can be a loss of stability and this will create more pressure on the migration of the nationals. Kirişçi (2003) argues:

A Turkey that is left outside to meet the challenges of democratization and globalization alone, next to an increasingly unstable Middle East, may fall into the grasp of pressures to emigrate legally, illegally, or through the asylum track. At that point, it is unclear how well Turkey would be able to continue its traditional act of balancing between emigration and immigration.

Therefore, not only legal migration may be in larger scales, but there can be an increase in the illegal migration if the free movement is not allowed and this would increase the scale of the underground economy in the member states.

There are some other projections about the immigration of Turks to the EU, prepared in the very beginning of the 2000s and these projections assume that Turkey was to gain the free movement rights in 2005 or in 2010 which seems to be too early when looked from today's perspective. The study assumed that 25% to 35% of the working age men would seek jobs in the EU in the initial wave, but the later waves of the immigration depend on the labour market situation of Europe (Martin, Midgley, Teitelbaum, 2001:602). If after the first wave of immigration, there are still jobs in the European labour markets for the Turkish workers, more people will tend to move, otherwise the immigration figures will tend to fall because of the lack of better employment opportunities in the other EU countries. Therefore, if the immigrants are generally unskilled, migration trend towards the west will be short-lived by eliminating the doubts on the massive flow of the Turks since the number of jobs that require unskilled migrants will tend to decrease in the near future and unskilled people will have difficulty in finding jobs abroad (ibid. 603). Moreover, some of the experts predict lower level of immigration even if there are employment opportunities in the EU members since the posts that are filled by the Turks in Europe are generally "difficult, dirty and dangerous, living outside Turkey was expensive and there was discrimination against Turks" and these are discouraging factors to emigrate (ibid. 602).

Harry Flam made a forecast of the migration potential from Turkey between 2000 and 2030 based on the population and GDP growth rate assumptions for this period. The forecast is only formulated around the immigration figures to Germany since there is a lack of data for the whole of the EU. Germany has been the main receiving country for

the Turkish workers and can verify close assumptions about the Turkish migration trends (Flam, 2003:17). The forecast is founded on the assumption that every year 1, 2 or 3% of the per capita income gap between Turkey and Germany is closed. It is assumed that there is a higher GDP per capita growth rate than it has been in the late 1990s, and this growth will be 9, 12 or 15% in the initial years and 3% at the end of the period of 2000-2030 (ibid.). Considering these possible economic developments in Turkey and the population estimations, GDP growth rate and the decrease in the income gap, immigration is thought to be 2,2 million in 2000 and it ends with 3,5 million new immigrants, if there are no restrictions on the free movement of people (ibid.). Therefore the result is the immigration of 3,5 million of Turks to Germany. However, Flam presupposed that free movement is granted by the year 2000 which is proven to be an early date for the membership and the calculation is made for the following 30 years. However, the forecast does not seem to be a realist one from today's perspective considering the indefinite date of Turkey's membership if there will be, and given that the free movement rights to Turkey will not be applicable right after the accession.

Another important implication of the accession and free movement of persons is the return migration. As experienced with Spain, Greece and Portugal there may be a reverse migration by some Turkish immigrants who have already been living in the member states and who may choose to return to Turkey because of the developments in Turkey. However in the failure of the economic and political developments which can be linked to the failure of membership prospects, it will be difficult to expect a noteworthy return migration. The econometric models of immigration forecasts do not make real predictions about the political problems or slow down of the reform process in the sender country in case of the failure of the membership. However, the political problems and security related problems increase the pressure on the society and lead to

further migration. As a result, economically and politically more stable and developed country will attract more people to Turkey. For instance, the results of a survey, made by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005:66) on the Turks in France and Germany, show that 30% of the Turks think about returning to Turkey when Turkey becomes an EU member.

On the other side some of the major cities such as Kocaeli and Istanbul may benefit more from the investment opportunities of the enlargement and experience larger growth. As a result this may lead to the creation of jobs within country and internal migration from the rural areas to the more developed parts of the country. Moreover, the linguistic and cultural problems and the social affiliation of the people with the society create reluctance to move, since generally people do not tend to leave their relatives if they do not have serious considerations. The Commission report "Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" (2004), states that the number of the Turkish immigrants does not only depend on the development of the income levels in the country and filling of the gaps between Turkey and the EU. From the social perspective linguistic and cultural barriers impose an obstacle for the movement. Therefore, the economic developments and investment opportunities may increase the intraregional mobility rather than the mobility within the EU. As the Eurobarometer surveys indicate (2002), although 6.2% of the Turkish population has a general inclination to move to the EU countries, only 0.3% of the people have the firm intention to move. The intention to move is the highest among the young of 18-24 age group (Krieger, 2004). 41% of the people, who have a general inclination to move to the EU, specified the work reasons while 34.9 mentioned financial reasons as a motivation for emigration. Therefore as seen in the surveys, the trend of migration is generally derived by economic motives.

Hughes (2004) estimated the potential migration for Turkey which is based on the study of DIW institute on the migration potential from the Central and Eastern European members and Bulgaria and Romania to the EU-15 and which assessed the migration of 286,000 for the initial term and 3.7 million as a total stock. Hughes considered that Turkey would be poorer than these states at the time of accession if it became a member in 2015. If Turkey had similar determining factors on migration, considering its population of 82 million when compared with the 104 million people of the CEECs, the migration figures would be 225,000 at the outset with a total stock of 2.9 million which is equal to the 0.5% of the total EU-28 population in 2025 (ibid.)

Lejour, Mooij and Capel (2004) prepared a research for the estimation of the migration potential from Turkey based on its past immigration patterns by applying the data to the income differentials between Turkey and the EU for the assessment of the impact of income disparities on the immigration as also done in the migration projections for the free movement of the Central and Eastern European workers. By taking account of the future demographic developments such as the rise of the Turkish population to 86 million in 2015 and of the economic developments such as the decrease in the income differential between Turkey and the EU, they reached a conclusion that there is a possibility of 2.7 million Turkish immigrants moving to Europe in the longer term, namely 15 years after the accession (ibid.). Moreover they assume that distribution of the immigrant population will not be even, but as a result of the network effect which leads to the movement of people into the countries where their relatives reside, Germany will be the main destination of the immigrants by 76% which is equal to more than 2 million of Turks and Germany will be followed by France by 8% and Netherlands by 4% (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.3: Expected Destination of Turkish Immigrants in Europe

Total	2665 (in 1000)	100 (in %)
Germany	2025	76
France	2013	8
Netherlands	107	4
UK	53	2
Italy	27	1
Rest of Europe	240	9

Source: Lejour, Mooij and Capel, 2004, Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession to the EU

Turkey has higher fertility rates when compared with the European member states and the working age population is too large. However, the employment rate of the working age population is too low and also female population shows the lowest participation to the labour market which decreases the labour productivity in the country. Therefore, although the growing population generally leads to the formation of a dynamic and young generation who can display an immense economic performance and increase productivity, employment opportunities of Turkey do not promote the labour productivity. As the OECD report on Turkey indicates Turkey has an enormous potential to sustain the labour productivity and labour utilisation performance, but it needs some structural reforms to increase the employment performance such as the reform in the education system, agricultural system and overcoming the duality in the formal and informal sector by formalizing informal enterprises (OECD Economic Survey of Turkey, 2006). Since this reform process is also encouraged by the EU and the membership opportunity becomes a motivational force in order to make economic and social reforms, in the future the employment opportunities may increase in Turkey and this may end up with less people seeking jobs in the EU.

As seen in the studies, the experts do not agree on the number of the potential immigrants from Turkey. The immigration estimations range from 0.5 million to 4.4

million and this number is equal to the 0.7% of the EU-28 population which is assumed to be more than 570 million in the 2020s (Barysch, 2005:8). Considering this number of potential migrants, the public fears about the occupation of the European labour markets by the Turkish immigrants seems to be exaggerated (Belke, 2004:291). It is also important to deal with another dimension of the Turkish immigration besides the estimation of number potential migrants and this is the impact of the immigrants on the EU labour markets.

5.2.2. Can Turkish Migration be a Remedy for the Ageing European Population?

The potential migration of Turkish workers to the EU is thought to have different implications in the sense that migrants may be remedy for the aging European population by filling skill shortages of the European population or contrarily cause further unemployment in the host countries and become burden on the society. From one perspective, in the future, Europe will need additional workforce because of its demographic indicators which tend to shrink; the decrease in the population will be serious for the working age population and in this situation, movement of Turkish people will have a complementary impact. However, since the need for unskilled labour force is largely met by the Central and Eastern European workers, European markets will be in need of more qualified labours. Therefore, from the other perspective Turkey's accession may bring many unskilled people into the European Union even though there is not a demand for it and as a result, this will further the European unemployment problem. However, since Turkey has been developing its education system, the number of educated and skilled people will increase and not only disqualified people, but also qualified people will tend to move to Europe because of the better job opportunities in Europe. And the scholars point out that the economic impact

of the free movement of Turkish labours on the EU will depend on skill composition of the immigrant workers.

The assumptions on the impact of immigration on the EU member states bring the question of whether immigration can be a solution for the shrinking and aging European population. The fertility rates in Europe are dropping and life expectancy increases which will lead to the population decline and creation of an older Europe. As stated in the United Nations Replacement Migration Report (2000), Europe is facing with the challenge of a declining and ageing population (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.4: Population Figures for Turkey and the EU for 2003-2050

<i>Population Dynamics (in thousands)</i>				
	2003	2015	2025	2050
<i>Turkey</i>	71 325	82 150	88 995	97 759
<i>Germany</i>	82 467	82 497	81 959	79 145
<i>France</i>	60 144	62 841	64 165	64 230
<i>UK</i>	59 251	61 275	63 287	66 166
<i>Italy</i>	57 423	55 507	52 939	44 875
<i>Spain</i>	41 060	41 167	40 369	37 336
<i>Poland</i>	38 587	38 173	37 337	33 004
<i>Romania</i>	22 330	21 649	20 806	18 063
<i>Netherlands</i>	16 149	16 791	17 123	16 954
<i>EU-25</i>	454 187	456 876	454 422	431 241
<i>EU-28 (inc. Turkey)</i>	555 743	567 842	570 832	552 318
<i>Turkey as % of EU 28</i>	12%	14.4%	15.5%	17.7%

Source : UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and Independent Commission on Turkey

Although Europe will keep its growth in the following decade, the population will start to decline after 2025. As the Green Paper on Migration (2005) states, from the five big countries of the EU, only Britain and France will have population growth between

2005 and 2050. Even in the new member states Bulgaria and Romania the forecasts show negative growth rates.

However, the demographic figures of Turkey differ from EU27 and candidate country Croatia. Turkey has an increasing population despite the decrease in the fertility rates and the annual growth of its population is 1.1%. Between 2005 and 2030 the population of Turkey is predicted to rise by more than 19 million and by the year 2050 Turkey is expected to have more than 97 million people and after 2015 its population will probably exceed the population of Germany (Vatanen, 2006).


Since birth rates decrease, but life expectancy increases for the European people, if the migration is not allowed, many European states will face with the decline in the population size in the future and the decline is faster in the working age population (see Graph 5.1). As the UN report on migration (2000) indicates, in the longer term the problem of the ageing European population should be addressed with economic, social, political policies and programmes. The report proposed three strategies to cope with the decreasing population of the working age: avoiding the early pensions system, incorporating some certain groups such as the women into the working life and integrating the existing migrants while developing strategies to let the international migration for compensating the declines in the size of the population, especially in the size of the working age and supply the demands of the labour markets (ibid). Ferguson (2004) states:

By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards and Greeks will be 65 or over, “even allowing for immigration. Europeans therefore face an agonizing choice between "Americanizing" their economies, i.e., opening their borders to much more immigration, with the cultural changes that would entail, or transforming their union into a fortified retirement community.

The aging population has many negative consequences such as the reduction of the ratio between the working age populations of the age 15-64 and the population

above 65 years old. By 2030 there will be additional 40 million elderly people, but the number of children will fall by 8.8 million (Rösh, Özdemir, 2005). Therefore, the decrease in the working age population will also decrease the economic productivity and the increase in the elderly retired population will mean an additional burden on the society especially on the working age population. Until 2030, the EU will be in need of 20.8 million people of working age population and the dependency ratio will rise from 49% to 66% meaning that three active persons will have to take care of two inactive people, while it was four in 2005 (ibid.).

Graph 5.1. Ageing European Population: Distribution of the EU-25 population according to the age groups (1950-2050)



Source: UN World Population Prospects (2002 Revision) and Eurostat 2004 Demographic Projections

The Green Paper of the Commission on “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations” (2005:5) dealt with the demographic problem of Europe and its implication for the future of Europe by stating that:

Never in history has there been economic growth without population growth. Increasing productivity, in particular through access to lifelong learning, and increasing employment participation, in particular by creating a real European labour market and a higher level of occupational mobility, are two important ways of doing this, as are increasing the birth rate and immigration.

Therefore, immigration is proposed as one of the necessary ways to increase the productivity. Immigration in general have positive economic impacts by its contribution to the employment and economic growth as seen in the US example who experienced an economic boom in 1990s by means of the immigrants who have changed the ageing population figures of the EU to a large extent (European Commission, 2003). The contributions of immigrants to the sustained economic growth are also observed in Ireland.

One of the reasons for the fear of immigration is the thought that immigration may lead to higher unemployment which is already seen as a problem in many European countries. Will the Turkish immigrants increase productivity or lead to further unemployment in the receiving states? It is hard to reply since the immigration studies are based on restrictive assumptions and but not definite calculations. However, as the Commission states (2003:11), by and large the immigration does not lead to unemployment, on the contrary it can have positive effect on the domestic employment since it helps to make the labour markets flexible which adjusts to the increase in the supply of workers. Immigrants do not always take the jobs in the host countries, but they also create jobs by being entrepreneurial regarding that many Turkish immigrants in Europe have established their own business.

However, as the British government claims the positive contributions of the immigrant societies to the economic development depend on effectively management of the immigration flows. Therefore the effects of the Turkish immigrants will be positive when they are complementary rather than supplementary to the native workers and if

they fill the gaps of the labour markets. Explicitly in a country where the population is highly skilled and the market needs to be fulfilled by the lower-skilled or unskilled workers, the movement of Turkish workers carrying those qualifications will increase the productivity and also will increase the wages in the country (Flam, 2003:12). Moreover unemployment depends on the skill composition of the immigrants; when the skill composition of the immigrants are complementary to those of the nationals and immigrants do not displace the national workers, then immigration may not create unemployment and may increase the productivity in the economy. However it is important to avoid the creation of segregated labour markets as a result of fulfilling a specific sector with the migrants which will create a dependency to migration to fill that sector in the future (ibid.).

Nevertheless, since the labour forces will shrink in many member states in the next decades which may lead to slow economic growth in Europe, Turkey would provide human capital with its growing population and therefore, European countries will benefit from letting Turkish workers migrate rather than keeping them out (Barysch, 2005). Labour migration will help the Union to reduce the shortages in the labour market such as the shortages for the skilled people in the area of information and communication technologies, advanced technologies or health services on the one hand, but on the other hand there may be need for the low-skilled people in some sectors such as the construction sector. Skilled immigrants may help the host countries to specialize in some areas and have competitive advantage; alternatively less skilled or unskilled immigrants may also contribute to the society by lowering the costs of goods and services as a result of working for lower wages and doing the jobs that the native workers hesitate to do (Vatanan, 2006).

Although it is difficult to make assumptions about the skill composition of the potential immigrants, it is important to consider that young generation is more willing to move. In this context two scenarios are produced by Lejour, Mooij and Capel (2004). In the first assumption the immigrants are skilled since the education level is increasing in Turkey and more people are getting higher education, the other assumption predicts that all immigrants are unskilled since the workers in agricultural sector have a risk to be unemployed after its restructuring. If all the immigrants are primarily unskilled, the wage inequality rises in the EU with a decline in the wage of unskilled workers, but the effects of migration for the EU-15 are generally small in economic terms. Therefore, an expected inflow of 2.7 million Turkish migrants would reduce the GDP in Turkey by between 1.8% and 2.2%, but the GDP increases in the EU-15 by between 0.5% and 0.7%; however, it is assumed that the income in Turkey will rise while it falls in the EU by increasing the wage inequality in the EU-15 if the migrants are unskilled (ibid.).

Kirsty Hughes (2004:18) argues if Turkey becomes an EU member in 2015, but the free movement of workers is applied after 2025, the migration of the Turkish labour will depend on the relative income levels and the employment conditions 20 years from now. Therefore, in that condition Turkey will have a young and skilled workforce while there is an increasing need in the European labour markets, but Turkey will still be poorer when compared with the EU average and skilled people may also migrate. Migration of skilled people would mean a remedy for the skill constraints of the ageing European population.

The opponents of immigration claim that free movement will depress wages. Brücker (2002:34) argues that the impact of migration on the wages is measured between -0.3 and +0.3% and this impact is generally negative for the unskilled since

replacement of the workers by the new comers is more probable. However the impact of migration on the wages is positive for the high-skilled workers.

People who have a negative stance towards the impact of the accession of Turkey and letting the Turks move in the member states, generally do not consider the decrease in the working age population in Europe but overemphasize the costs of immigration by disregarding the contributions of the immigrant societies to the receiving states for the longer term. Although immigration cannot be regarded as a permanent remedy for the aging population, it provides the states some relief in making adjustments (Erzan, Kirişçi). Therefore, it seems that immigration is one of the ways to respond to the demands of the aging European population by alleviating the labour market shortages in the near future and a driving force to make the labour markets function effectively which may have the risk of slowing growth.

5.3. Conclusion

The flow of Turkish people if and when the free movement rights are granted cannot be predicted with any certainty since the migration potential depends on various factors which are defined as pull and push factors in the immigration studies such as the income differences, wage differentials, unemployment rates. But the social networks, past migration trends of the country, culture, language and geographical proximity are also important in the decision to move. However, since it is difficult to predict the statistics about the developments in the economy or even it is harder to make predictions about the social motivations of the immigration, the projections about Turkey rest on restrictive assumptions and do not present the real figures, but provide a perspective about the immigration potential and the impact of the immigration on the member states by taking account of various factors, developing econometric models or by conducting surveys to measure the willingness of the people to move.

The predictions about the number of immigrants differ in different studies. However, losing the membership prospect may end with more immigrants in the future both in terms of legal and illegal workers and this would have more negative impacts on the society. On the other side, the anticipation of membership provides Turkey the motivation to develop economic and political reforms since the EU contributes to the stability in the accession states. As a result the pressure on the migration of people will decrease to a large extent as many Turks have economic motivations behind their intentions to move. Accession negotiations will have a positive impact on the Turkish economy which will be a driving force for further economic reforms initiated for economic growth, maintaining macroeconomic stability and reduction of unemployment in the longer term. Since at the time accession Turkey will conform to the EU legislation and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, many obstacles on the trade between Turkey and the EU will be resolved and the shortcomings of the customs union will be removed with complying with the rules of the internal market. However the failure of the membership may lead to the collapse of Turkey's reform process and this would lead to instability and political unrest in the country.

The migration generally contributes to the economic prosperity of the host countries if it is managed. Scientific research done both in Turkey and Europe demonstrates that immigration of Turkish people may boost European economy. Therefore not only Turkish, who may have a wishful thinking about the membership, estimate that there will not be a mass flow of immigrants to the EU, but also many European researches agree on the idea that Turks may not flood en masse and Turkish immigrants may contribute to the European economy. Considering the ageing and declining European population and which is more seriously felt in the working age population, Turkey's accession can provide the human resources to fill the needs of the

labour markets of the other member states. It is important to note that immigrants do not have to be unskilled as it has been in the previous Turkish immigration. Since Turkey's population is being more educated and more skilled, immigration of skilled people can also be expected who will contribute to the overall economic performance of the EU. Therefore, although the transitional arrangements help the member states to calm the populist fears in their countries, this transitional period may lead to the suspension of the economic benefits of migration. Considering the situation of the EU labour markets with ageing workforce and skill constraints which will be felt more seriously in the future, the member states may become more open to encourage the migration and the political attitude can change in the member states towards a more flexible migration policy. However, it is important to keep in mind that Europe will have to face with the problems of ageing population on the one hand and unemployment on the other, with or without Turkey, and integration of Turkey will just provide a relief for the short term while creating efficient solutions to its economic problems.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Turkey's possible accession to the European Union has increased the debates about its impact on the Union and the challenges of the enlargement since Turkey is a large, relatively poor country with a predominantly Muslim population. Moreover Turkey is assumed to be culturally different with a different role in the identity formulation of the Union than the already acceded members or the candidate countries. The preferences of the member states have an important role to play during the enlargement and all the debates about the membership of Turkey are very much shaped around the perceived costs and benefits of the accession, preferences of the member states and their expectations from Turkey's membership. However, member states preferences are formulated in the domestic politics where the public opinion has an effective role to play in the decision making process.

The debates about accession of Turkey do not only revolve around the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of the *acquis*. The utility concerns of the member states and the public come together with the identity based concerns on the immigration issue. Immigration is one of the most sensitive areas where the hesitancy of the Europeans around these concerns arise and it is reflected to the opposition to Turkey's accession. Turkey's possible membership becomes problematic considering the concerns of the public and the leaders about the impact of immigration of Turks on labour markets, European culture and security. In this context the immigration issue

poses a pressing challenge for both Turkey and the European Union. Free movement of persons issue is a pressure for the EU since on the one hand, there is a Lisbon strategy by which the EU aimed to be the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world by the year 2010 and this will be possible by making the economy more efficient, filling skill shortages and immigration is a good opportunity to relieve from the pressure on the European labour markets. On the other hand there is a growing hesitancy of the public towards the foreigners within the member states and even an increasing xenophobia especially towards the Muslims. Europe's demographic trend shows an alarming bell with a shrinking and ageing population, which is more serious in the working-age group, but Europe is also facing with an unemployment problem. As the unemployment figures rise and people have more economic considerations, the Euroscepticism, anti-immigrant and anti-enlargement sentiments also rise among the European public.

The European leaders face with the pressure of the public in the domestic politics with regard to the free movement issue and this becomes stronger in Turkey's case. The idea of free movement is sensitive for many member states because of the fears of a large-scale immigration. Free movement of Turkish workers is seen as a benefit for the EU as a whole and a remedy for an ageing Europe by many Turkish and European researches. However, the majority of the European public thinks that free movement would be a burden on the member states. Opening of borders would lead to mass flow of people to European job market and cause structural unemployment which is also a problem for Europe today. Furthermore, migration would lead to replacement of the national workers, decrease wages because of the flow of the unskilled workers who work with lower remuneration, and create additional burden on the governments because of the social benefits they seek. Moreover, besides these economic considerations, identity of Turkey becomes an important issue to affect the opinion of

the public and the leaders on immigration. Considering the existing problems with the immigrant populations in Europe and the failure of the integration policies, migration of a Muslim population causes doubts for the European elites and the public. Social concerns are based on the idea that immigrants would lead to social and cultural problems and cause disturbances in the society since Turks have a different way of life, different culture and religion. The European public and the leaders fear about the furtherance of the integration problems after the movement of Turks. The opposition to Turkey and the free movement of Turks is higher in the countries with the largest immigration population such as Germany, France, and Netherlands. Since the Turkish and even Muslim immigrants in Europe play an important role in the formation of the public attitudes towards the immigrants and further immigration, it seems that the assimilation and integration problems in Europe, creation of 'parallel societies' as in Germany or 'dish cities' as in Netherlands find its reflection on the issue of Turkey by making the accession more difficult. Therefore it becomes inevitable to question to what extent the failure of the multicultural societies can be an obstacle for the free movement of Turks and if the failure of the multicultural societies also gives the signals of a failure of a multicultural EU.

Considering the demands of the European labour market and the future forecasts for the European population on the one side, the public opinion which highly opposes the movement of Turkish workers on the other side, European leaders face with a dilemma. While some of the leaders tend to mobilize public around the opposition to the immigration issue in order to divert the hesitancy of the public towards other structural problems such as the unemployment, they also think about the upcoming elections and the need to get the support of the public by taking account of public considerations. Since the public opinion matters for the democratic legitimacy, the public sentiments

against the free movement, market led demands and the election concerns of the decision makers complicate the issue of Turkey's accession from the migration perspective.

Some European governments such as Austria and France have shown their intention to hold a referendum and consult the issue of Turkey's membership to the public, after the governments decide on the accession. The European public states the immigration of Turks as one of the major obstacles in front of the accession after the human rights and economic issues. If the systematic respect to human rights increases and the economy improves in Turkey, would the cultural differences be less visible? The immigration is a challenge for Turkey's accession since the issue involves other actors besides Turkey. Turkey may develop its human rights records and provide an economic growth with political and economic reforms and may decrease the pressure on the emigration of Turks, but it is beyond the scope of Turkey's efforts to alleviate the fears of the Europeans on the identity based consideration. But it has to do with the European leaders and the public and it is up to the European leaders to ease the negative public sentiment in order to respond to the demands of the aging European population by making the public know about the positive consequences of the immigration and by providing elite consensus on the immigration issue.

The European Commission declared that the immigration has contributed to the economy of the member states such as UK, Sweden, and Ireland who opened their borders to the Central and Eastern European workers from the beginning of accession. Moreover the Commission encourages the mobility within the Union, and declared 2006 as the 'European Year of Worker's Mobility' with an aim of increasing the awareness of the benefits of free movement of persons. Since the EU does not have a supranational policy, but general guidelines and immigration policies fall in the scope of

the authority of the member states, it is highly possible that after the accession Turkey will face with restrictions on the free movement of labour. However, as the econometric analysis suggest the immigration from Turkey to the EU member states would not be in large scales since Turkey's reform process in economy, politics and social life may decrease the pressure on the migration considering the long negotiation period. In case of the failure of membership the number of immigrants in terms of both legal and illegal workers, may be higher than it would be in the case of accession, because of the slow down of the reform process in Turkey. Moreover, since the skill composition of the Turkish people changes in time and more people get higher education, the immigration from Turkey may not only include non-skilled workers.

Free movement of persons is one of the basic principles of the EU and after the accession, member state nationals are granted this right maybe with some derogations and transitional measures. Without doubt it is not possible to deny the free movement rights to the Turkish workers in the case of membership except the provisional restrictive measures. The abolishment of the free movement forever is contrary to the spirit of the Treaties between Turkey and the EU such as the Association Agreement and Additional Protocol which determine the rights of the Turkish immigrants. Also, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000 provides the citizens freedom of movement and of residence within the territory of the member states in the Article 45 and provides equal rights by respecting to cultural, religious and linguistic diversity with its Article 22. Therefore, although it is highly probable that the Turkish workers will not have the free movement rights immediately, if this right is suspended forever, it will be a discrimination and as a result a second class membership which is strictly opposed by the Turkish leaders.

With or without Turkey, Europe will face with its own problems with regard to the integration of the immigrants, finding efficient solutions for the unemployment problem and developing reforms for economic growth despite the pressure of the population trends. Turkey's membership will help the member states to relieve from the problems of the EU labour markets while dealing with long-term solutions. As the pressures on the labour markets increase in the future and are more felt by the Europeans, the member state governments and the public would be more open to the immigration of Turks which partially offers a solution for the efficient functioning of the European markets.

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