

THE IMPACT OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  
ON THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF  
MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES

by  
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*Anneme ve babama...*

## ABSTRACT

### THE IMPACT OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES

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Key Words: Barcelona Process, Eastern Enlargement, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,  
European Neighborhood Policy, Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The Barcelona Process / Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a foreign policy instrument to handle the southern neighborhood of the European Union. The EMP aims at creating an area of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The enlargement waves of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 have brought 12 new member states, ten of which are the ex-Soviet states situated at the Central and Eastern Europe. This massive, eastern-oriented enlargement induced the European Commission to introduce the Wider Europe – European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to establish a secure and coherent neighborhood along its new borders in the east. Although the ENP aims at bringing both the eastern and southern dimensions of European neighborhood, empirical data show that the pro-eastern policy preferences of the newly admitted member states along with Germany cause the ENP to move closer to the east at the expense of the South, therefore negatively affecting the present and the future of the EMP. This is because of the increased bargaining power of the new members, shifting the locus of power from Western Europe to *Mittel Europa*. The recent statements of pro-South EU members such as France might be a new impetus for the EMP, although one should be critical towards such individualistic policy proposals.

## ÖZET

### AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN DOĞU GENİŞLEMESİNİN AVRUPA-AKDENİZ ORTAKLIĞI'NA ETKİSİ: ÜYE DEVLETLERİN TERCİHLERİNİN BİR ANALİZİ

SİBEL OKTAY

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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barselona Süreci, Doğu Genişlemesi, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı,  
Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Liberal Hükümetlerarası Teori

Barselona Süreci / Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı (AAO), Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz'e kıyısı olan kalan komşularıyla ilişkilerini düzenlemek amacıyla hazırlanmış bir dış politika aracıdır. AAO tanımladığı bu bölgede bir barış, istikrar ve refah alanı yaratmayı amaçlamaktadır. Avrupa Birliği'nin 2004 ve 2007 yıllarında içinden geçtiği genişleme dalgaları birliğe on tanesi Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'da konumlanmış eski SSCB devletleri olmak üzere 12 yeni üye katmıştır. Bu devasa ve doğuya bakan genişlemeler Avrupa Komisyonu'nu Daha Geniş Avrupa – Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası (AKP) adı altında, yeniden çizilen doğu sınırını güvenli ve uyumlu bir bölge haline getirecek bir yeni araç hazırlamaya itmiştir. Her ne kadar bu yeni araç Avrupa'nın hem güney hem de doğu boyutlarını bir araya getirmeyi amaçlıyorsa da, ampirik veriler göstermektedir ki yeni üye devletlerin, ve Almanya'nın doğu-sever tercihleri AKP'nin güney pahasına doğuya yönelmesine neden olmaktadır ki bu da AAO'nun bugününü ve geleceğini olumsuz etkilemektedir. Bu durum yeni üye devletlerin eski üyeler karşısında pazarlık gücünün artmasına ve dolayısıyla AB'nin ağırlık merkezinin Batı Avrupa'dan Orta Avrupa'ya kaymasıyla açıklanabilir. Bugün Fransa gibi güneyi ön planda tutan devletlerin açıklamaları AAO için yeni bir umut olarak görülebilir, fakat bu tip tek taraflı tekliflerin de dikkatle incelenmesi gerekir.

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This Master's thesis proposes that the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargement of the European Union has negatively impacted the progress of the Barcelona Process / Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since the policy priorities of the member states situated in the eastern part of the EU dominated those of the member states situated in the west and the south. Such prioritization strengthened the European Union's relations with its eastern neighbors at the expense of those in the south.

The European Union's political endeavors date back to the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. With the ratification of the Treaty, the then European Community has not only become a literally more integrated entity now calling itself the European Union, but having become more integrated, it shifted its gears from being Europe's main –and mere- economic organization to transforming into one that also has political orientations. Moreover, this political orientation it had attained was being reflected both inside and outside its borders. Internally, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union and restructured the Union's task establishing three pillars: the European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Leaving the first pillar aside, as it was already there keeping the Community alive single-handedly for the past 35 years, the latter two pillars signaled the new, politically aware Union.

These pillars envisaged the close cooperation of the European Union member states in terms of identifying common foreign policy goals and utilizing tools to reach those goals as well as committing to cross-border cooperation in areas such as information exchange, organized crime and immigration. This actually meant that, and especially with regards to the CFSP, the Union was signaling a change in its foreign policy making. Member states, at least in principle, would no longer have separate and even divergent foreign policies but a unitary and harmonized one, in accordance with the EU's founding principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and respect to the principle of sovereignty and obedience to international law. With Maastricht, therefore, member states declared their will to converge to the ideal of having a common foreign and security policy towards third parties. This is why the Maastricht

Treaty was a breakthrough in moving the European integration from an economic to a political union.

The European Union had become an important locus of attraction since the 1990s. Before then, it not only had showed a remarkable economic progress following the end of the Second World War, but was a prime example of achieving post-war stability and cooperation via creating a multiplicity of institutions. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, capitalism and liberal democracy were the globally accepted settings upon which the world at large would operate, and indeed regarded as the ultimate destination of human progress as some scholars argued<sup>1</sup>. Whereas the Communist camp, the power center of which was the eastern neighborhood of Europe, was alien to such concepts, the EU was already ahead of its time, moving towards a single market with a common currency and no internal boundaries. In front of such a background, a Union with novel political orientations soon developed awareness towards its immediate neighborhood. It was facing to two distinct regions by 1990s: First, there was the eastern flank, the home to ex-Soviet countries with which the Union had no connection during the Cold War and hence no real policy, let alone a common one. Second, there was the Mediterranean region.

The Mediterranean region was and is of ample importance to the European Union for many reasons, the totality of which has brought the Union to adopt a common neighborhood policy. The two main reasons for the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe are history and geography. Historically, the Mediterranean is the backyard of European powers. The legacies of colonial powers such as England or France still make them the quasi-patrons of these Mediterranean countries and hence responsible towards the region. Not surprisingly, what we call the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership today is fundamentally supported by these ex-colonial powers, which also happen to be two of the most influential member states in the EU's decision making mechanism.

Geographically, the proximity of the Mediterranean countries to the southern tip of the EU makes the Union vulnerable towards legal and illegal migration as well as drug trafficking and other types of organized crime. To alleviate these migratory

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, *The National Interest* (1989).

patterns and their consequences, the Union has to promote a regional development and reform program, which in the medium-term will hopefully result in backward migration. In other words, the region not only has historical but also geographically strategic connotations for European countries. It is also important to note the economic concerns the EU has with respect to its Mediterranean neighbors. In fact, economic dimension of the region was on the EU agenda in the 1970s, due to the international economic crises that swept Europe, the foremost of which is the OPEC crisis. Ignited by the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>2</sup>, the oil crisis proved that the Union countries needed to find a solution to stabilize the region for overall economic development, both in the North and in the South. For this reason, the EU developed a Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) during the early 1970s. This was a short-lived initiative, however, due to the Southern enlargement of the EC.

“By admitting the southern European countries of the GMP, the Southern enlargement highlighted a basic contradiction of the EC Mediterranean policy, namely the fact that the Northern border of the region it intended to create was left unspecified. Was the EC trying to create a region *together* with the Mediterranean, i.e. a Euro-Mediterranean region with increasingly tight relations between the EC member and all Mediterranean non members? Or was it to promote the constitution of a Mediterranean region which was in fact *separated from* the EC? The Southern enlargement showed that the tension between the two approaches persisted.”<sup>3</sup>

Therefore the GMP was dissolved and from an economic point of view, it was soon replaced by a more progressive agenda of establishing a European Single Market to remedy the impact of global economic dependency by fostering integration inside the borders. By 1990s, however, the region was back in the EU agenda. The Mediterranean

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<sup>2</sup> G. Vanhaeverbeke, “A Survey of Europe’s Mediterranean Policy: Where it comes from, where it stands today, where is it likely to go?” Information and Training Seminar for Diplomats, 15 – 17 March 1997. Retrieved from the website <http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt>

<sup>3</sup> Federica Bicchì, (2004), *The European Origins of Mediterranean Practices*, Institute of European Studies: University of California, Berkeley, pp. 8.

is home to some of the major energy routes from which the Union feeds, let alone the fact that it is also an important trading partner. However, the macroeconomic instability the region undergoes hampers the EU's economic stakes. The widening economic gap between the North and the South is revealing itself in cross border crime, terrorism, racism and xenophobia. Economic interests, bringing along security concerns, therefore, become major imperatives for engaging in the Mediterranean.

One can also argue that political instability and the absence of democracy in the region stand behind these plethora of social and economic problems. The Union sees this political weakness that the Mediterranean countries experience and believes that fostering democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights as well as promoting the rule of law will not only transform the Mediterranean politically, but also bring the stable environment necessary for investment and social development.

Finally, as for the security dimension of the region, the EU's interests are threatened by the ongoing disputes in the Middle East, spearheaded by the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, it is not only the social and economic interests that drive the European Union towards engaging with the Mediterranean but also those of security, without which neither a sound economy or democracy can be realized. To achieve these objectives, however, dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean at all possible levels is necessary. The Union acknowledges the necessity of supporting and engaging with civil societal organizations as well as implementing projects which will bring about cultural dialogue both within the region and between the North and the South.

Indeed, these were the primary motivators when the European Union, with the leading initiative of Spain, embarked upon introducing a new policy instrument, called the Barcelona Process / Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) specific for the southern neighbors, which would aim at creating an "area of peace, stability and prosperity." The EMP did move along for the first ten years without significant ruptures. This was to be changed, however, with the European Commission's Wider European Framework, designed specifically to handle the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargements of the European Union, which introduced ten new Central and Eastern European countries including some big ones like Poland.

From a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, this becomes an alarming situation for the future of the EMP: the new members' preferences towards the Mediterranean show a clear divergence from those of the Western and Southern European member states for historical and geographical purposes. As the European integration process is determined by the preferences of member states formulated at the nation-state level, they inevitably impact how future policies will be implemented. By taking member state preferences as the point of reference in line with the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, this thesis proposes that the so-called eastern enlargements slow down the pace of the Mediterranean partnership at the expense of strengthening the relations with the EU's new neighbors situated along the eastern border.

Speculation is just a hollow way of generating conspiracies unless they are supported by empirical evidence. This brings us to the purpose of this thesis: we propose that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU led to a change in the balance of power between member states from Western and Southern Europe and what is traditionally called as the *Mittel Europa*, which induced a change in the EU's approach towards Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This is due to massive divergences of preferences between these two geographical camps, which cause a change in the pace and direction of its progress.

To support this argument, we first begin with a chapter that introduces to the reader the history of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its institutional characteristics, followed by the 2004 arrangements of the European Neighborhood Policy as well as the road leading up to it.

The next chapter will start by introducing to the reader the main theoretical debate that surrounds the study of the European Union. After this brief informatory part, the chapter will lay down the basics of the theory we employ to explain the EMP phenomenon. As one might have noticed, the theory we use is Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory, which assumes that it is the preferences of the member states and therefore the intergovernmentalist institutions in the EU rather than the supranational ones that drive integration forward.

This chapter will be followed by what we prefer to call the core of the thesis, where the liberal intergovernmentalist argument will be employed to display the member state preferences. The chapter will begin by explaining the rationale behind the EU's enlargement process and that of the eastern round in particular. France, Germany, Poland and Spain will be some of the countries whose priorities will be presented to the reader in order to show that the ENP arrangements are fallen vulnerable to the demands directed from the *Mittel Europa*.

After the historic 2004 enlargement was completed, the analysts of European integration began referring to a new term: "enlargement fatigue". Understanding enlargement fatigue is not only central for the future appreciation and integration of newly member countries but more importantly, it has profound implications over the future of European Union policies and its foreign policy, in particular. What is particularly important here is the 2004 enlargement due to its size and thus, its historical importance. Thus, we expect to find the most important impact by the 2004 enlargement rather than 2007 when only Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.

The last chapter of the thesis will tackle the most recent development taking place in the EU, namely the result of the French presidential elections held in May 2007, which brought the ex-Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy. As one might have been following from the news, the new French President's most groundbreaking statement on the EU was about creating a new Mediterranean Union. The chapter, due to lack of empirical data, will generate scenarios about this new proposal and conclude by giving policy recommendations to bring the EU neighborhood's Mediterranean dimension back on track.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **A BRIEF HISTORY OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP**

It is important to understand how the course of relations between the Mediterranean countries and the European Union evolved until today to draw conclusions about the past and generate scenarios for the future. To do this, one should go back to the beginning of 1990s, where the Union's initial enthusiasm for being politically active is clearly observed. This chapter will first concentrate on the formation of EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean by looking at Council and Commission reports between 1999 and 2003, which construct the basis of Euro-Med relations for the years to come.

#### **I. A Politically Aware Union – Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:**

The combination of the peculiarities of the Mediterranean region displayed in the previous chapter, which can be summarized as the “the Mediterranean Reality” became an impetus for the European Union to take collective action. To nobody's surprise, however, the initial EU position following the discovery of “the Mediterranean reality” was far from an ideal picture with detailed policy plans. Nevertheless, specific steps were taken on the road towards a well-structured partnership policy. Following the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon European Council in June 1992 concluded that a regional dialogue and cooperation among the Maghreb countries was necessary. The Council stressed that the Mediterranean is a region where social stabilization and provision of security are of vital importance. Realizing this, it is observed that the Council states the necessity of creating a framework of regional cooperation and integration to foster Maghreb economy and to promote European values, which will help engender political stability.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, DOC/92/3. Lisbon, 26/27 June 1992. Retrieved from the EU Website.  
<http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/92/3&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>



In line with the decisions taken in Lisbon, in 1994, it is seen that the EU expanded its focus in the Mediterranean, this time encompassing both Maghreb and Mashreq countries. Corfu European Council of June 1994 was critical in that respect, when the concluded that it was necessary to have a joint cooperation between Europe and the Mediterranean. The unique contribution of Corfu was that it was the first platform where the Union spoke of a possibility of convening a summit, whose participants would come from both sides of the Sea.<sup>5</sup> Corfu conclusion is remarkable, since it shows that the EU acknowledges the importance of consulting with the countries in the region. Rather than implementing a top-down foreign policy, it paves the way to pool the EU's material and human resources with those of the Mediterranean countries to provide the policy with legitimacy and regional support.

The European Council, the EU's main decision-making body, is composed of the heads of state and government of all member states, and convenes twice a year, in June and December. Because a six-month period is long enough to cool down any enthusiasm shown towards new ideas, coupled with changes of interest in policy agendas or within the composition of the Council due to national elections, sustainable outcomes from the European Council conclusions are often regarded as success stories. For that reason, Essen European Council of December 1994, that is, the very next summit after Corfu, is a successful one in terms of displaying the Union's commitment toward its Mediterranean ideal. Between 1992 and 1994, we observe a sustained and even progressive, uniform and balanced policy agenda in the European Council, which is also the highest decisive body<sup>6</sup> among the various European Union institutions.

As the EU grows larger in territory, population and economy through enlargements, it feels the need to reconsider the wider area where it resides. This is not only necessary for security reasons, but also for economic ones. It has to strengthen its borders, sustain peace and stability; look for new markets around its periphery to improve its internal economy. For these reasons, the Union decides to concentrate upon

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<sup>5</sup> European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, DOC/94/1. Corfu, 24/25 June 1994. Retrieved from the EU Website.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00150.EN4.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00150.EN4.htm)

<sup>6</sup> Except for the European Court of Justice, whose decisions overrule those given by national judiciary organs.

certain areas around its neighborhood. However, the prioritization of certain regions over others is determined by the balance of power among the EU members, as we will argue in the following chapters. Essen Summit was significant in this respect, since it was the last EU summit before the three new prospective members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, joined the Union by January 1, 1995. During the Summit, the members have agreed to “recognizing the need to balance in its relations with all neighbors”. However, it should be noticed that while Essen was held under German presidency, the name of that direction was the Mediterranean. The Summit also revealed that Spain and France were the most important member states in terms of giving that conclusion a definitive direction. This can be observed through the responsibility that was given to Spain to convene the first ministerial Euro-Med conference and to France to embark upon intensive cooperation on the issue during its presidency, starting in January 1995.<sup>7</sup> As one can see, the term Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med) was also uttered in Essen for the first time.

Essen European Council, under the voluntary leadership of Spain and France, stated that a permanent and regular dialogue is necessary with all the Mediterranean countries, regardless of distinctions such as Maghreb or Mashreq, and also with those who decide to participate in the future<sup>8</sup>, such as Egypt. It stressed that this partnership is crucial not only because the region has geostrategic importance for the EU, but also because the potential membership of some Mediterranean countries. Cyprus, for instance, which issued its membership application in 1990 was critical in that its possible membership would make the EU a central player in the region, crosscutting the Mediterranean with its new borders. The possibility of other Mediterranean countries aspiring to become members was therefore another reason why the Council paid particular attention to stressing “partnership”.

The main breakthrough in the EU’s Mediterranean policy came in 1995 with the Cannes European Council, which laid down the basic principles of the Union’s

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<sup>7</sup> European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, DOC/94/4. Essen, 9/10 December 1994. Retrieved from EU Website.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm)

<sup>8</sup> Libya is not fully included in the partnership but has attained an observatory status in 1999, when the UN sanctions were suspended.

Mediterranean policy. Cannes Summit was unique not only because of its conclusions for spelling out the will towards engaging with the Mediterranean. Rather than merely paying lip service to the importance of having a common foreign policy for the region and asking from members to pool their efforts on the issue, it went on to lay down a detailed framework for partnership. The Council agreed to have a broad approach with three main aspects. These are 1). Political and security aspect, 2). Economic and financial aspect, and 3). Social and human aspect.<sup>9</sup> Box 1 below shows the initial template for areas of cooperation and integration, depending on this three dimensional perspective.

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<sup>9</sup> European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, DOC/95/6. Cannes, 14/15 June 1995. Retrieved from EU Website.  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm)

Box 1: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Framework decided in Cannes European Council

*A). Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability*

\* Human rights, democracy and the rule of law:

- Respect for basic texts
- Rule of law
- Fundamental freedoms
- Pluralism and tolerance
- Human rights

\* Stability, security and good-neighborhoodly relations:

- Sovereign equality
- Non-interference
- Respect for territorial integrity
- Non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes
- Fight against terrorism, organized crime and drugs
- Objectives in relation to disarmament and non-proliferation
- Good-neighborhoodly relations, confidence and security building measures.

*B). Economic and Financial Partnership: Building a Zone of Shared Prosperity*

\* Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area

\* Cooperation priorities

- Investments
- Regional cooperation
- Business
- Environment
- Fisheries
- Energy

\* Other cooperation areas

- Agriculture and rural development
- Infrastructure development
- Transport
- Information technology and telecommunications
- Local authorities and regional planning
- Research and development
- Statistics

*C). Partnership in Social and Human Affairs*

\* Cooperation priorities

- Education and training
- Social development
- Migration
- Drug trafficking
- Terrorism
- International crime
- Judicial cooperation
- Racism and xenophobia
- Combatting corruption

\* Other areas of cooperation

- Culture and the media
- Health
- Youth

*Source: Official Website of the European Union, Document No. SN0021195EN*

It was after the Presidency decisions of the Cannes European Council that Spain took the initiative to hold a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, in order to realize the objectives as laid down previously. Participants were the foreign ministers of the EU-15 as well as 12 Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority as Mediterranean partner countries and Malta, Cyprus and Turkey as partner countries with a membership prospect. The country holding the Presidency was Spain, so it was Javier Solana from Spain and the Vice President of the European Commission Manuel Marin, who represented the Council and the Commission respectively. Barcelona Declaration, fed by and large from the Cannes framework, was the end product of this Euro-Med Ministerial Conference, signed in November 1995.

Barcelona Declaration states that poverty, miscommunication between cultures and political instability in the form of non-democratic regimes are the three most important problems the partnership has to solve. The parties to the Declaration are “convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership.”<sup>10</sup> To achieve these objectives, the Declaration proposes a number of cooperation areas, previously outlined in Essen under three distinctive aspects: Political and Security Partnership, Economic and Financial Partnership, and Social, Cultural and Human Affairs.

Political and Security Partnership aspect sets out a number of principles, on the basis of which cooperation will be realized. The Declaration binds the partners to “act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human rights”, as well as the international law. They should have full dedication to the rule of law, respect for human rights, diversity and social pluralism, and the right to self-determination. They should also respect other partners’ sovereign equality, territorial integrity and unity. These are fundamental principles since they not only lay down the

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<sup>10</sup> Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Barcelona: 27-28 November 1995.

rules of the game, meaning the partners should respect these principles before taking part in the Process, but also act as the areas of cooperation. They signal first the intent to have a region with a relaxed and more user-friendly political establishment endowed with basic rights and freedoms, and second a peaceful region that abides by the international law and the principle of sovereignty.

Once these preconditions are achieved, the Declaration aims to create a network of cooperation both within the region and with the European Union on the issues of fighting against terrorism and other types of international crime, non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, controlling arms to prevent both asymmetrical growth of military capabilities across countries and to impede personal armament, and developing good-neighborly relations. By cooperating in these areas, therefore, the Barcelona Process aims at creating a stable and peaceful zone around its southern neighborhood.

Economic and Financial Partnership aspect of Barcelona presents a much detailed and elaborate account of how and in which areas cooperation should occur, not surprisingly, since the EU is first and foremost an economic giant. Signatories to the Declaration observe the need to “accelerate the pace of sustainable socio-economic development, to improve the living conditions of their populations by increasing the level of employment and reducing the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region and to encourage regional cooperation and integration.”<sup>11</sup> To reach these objectives, the partners have agreed to set 2010 as the target date to establish a free-trade area in the Euro-Mediterranean region. To reach this target, the Declaration aims at encouraging partners to adopt an efficient market economy, gradually harmonizing rules and regulations with those in the European Common Market, developing the private sector and promoting transfers of technology, while at the same time taking the social consequences of this thorough transformation into consideration.<sup>12</sup>

Economic aspect of the Barcelona Process also intends to achieve a South-South cooperation, albeit on a voluntary basis. The European Union believes that a sound and strong regional cooperation can only be achieved when the cooperating partners

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<sup>11</sup> Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Barcelona: 27-28 November 1995.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

themselves relate to each other. For that reason, the Process also tries to develop environmental awareness, since environmental protection is a regional interest, cross-cutting national boundaries.<sup>13</sup>

Barcelona Declaration stresses the importance of women in economic growth as well. The signatory countries believe that women's education and their eventual participation in the economy as workforce will bring about growth as well as social justice and a better understanding of equal rights.

Finally, the Declaration proposes a number of issue areas where cooperation will result in mutual benefits, such as partnership in the energy sector, managing water supply as well as integrated rural development, transport and communications systems, information technologies, statistics and exchange of know-how in science and technology via training and research projects.<sup>14</sup>

Social, Cultural and Human Affairs aspect of Barcelona Declaration is built upon highly fundamental principles, most of which are of European origin. First of all, the Declaration expresses the partners' commitment to the dialogue between cultures and religions. This is necessary because only through bringing people closer can the partnership be a fruitful initiative. Undoubtedly, it is impossible to have cooperation when populations grow hostility towards each other. The Declaration also emphasizes the importance of education and training in the form of educational and cultural exchange programs to provide the young population of the Mediterranean with a positive and constructive vision as well as respect towards their European counterparts. This will help people to identify themselves with each other and contribute to the legitimacy of the Partnership. Barcelona also acknowledges the importance of health sector, social rights and the right to self-advancement. Most importantly, however, it puts great emphasis on the critical position civil society is expected to play in the Partnership. Needless to say, a flourishing civil society not only signals the coming of a more democratic polity but also contributes to the intra-regional and cross-cultural dialogue Barcelona Process hopes to engender. The Declaration points out the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Barcelona: 27-28 November 1995.

subregional bodies such as universities and media as important players on the road to achieve the socio-political objectives of this partnership. Finally, the signatory countries agree on intensive cooperation in the areas of migration both legal and illegal, terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption and “underline the importance of waging a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to cooperate to that end.”<sup>15</sup> As one can observe, all these items target mutual understanding and cooperation between partners to solve some of the most intrinsic problems the Mediterranean faces, although the imperative seems to be the European Union’s efforts to solve problems relating to its own social, economic and security concerns. This thesis shall tackle this approach in the next chapters.

The tools to implement the objectives laid out in the Barcelona Declaration are the following:

*Association Agreements:* The novelty of the Barcelona Declaration is that it introduces the Association Agreements. These are official documents that the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) sign with the European Union to put down their frameworks to implement the Barcelona Declaration. They are not designed to replace the agreements bilaterally signed by these countries previously, but to complement them.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is only a complementary solution to remedy the neighborhood’s problems rather than one that makes the past network of relationships void.

*Periodical Meetings:* The organizational schema to implement the Barcelona Process is also outlined during the 1995 Conference. It is suggested that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs shall meet periodically, starting in the first half of 1997, in order to monitor the progress of moving through the list of targets set in the Declaration. These meetings will be coupled with ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts as well as civil society actors. The Declaration also encourages contacts between regional actors and subregional ones such as local authorities. Signatories have agreed to establish a “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process” at

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<sup>15</sup> Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Barcelona: 27-28 November 1995.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.




senior official level, which shall be composed of the EU Troika<sup>17</sup> and one representative from each MPC that will prepare the agenda for the regular Ministerial Conferences, echoing the structure of the EU's COREPER. The EMP also stimulated national institutions, so much so that in 1998 the partners established a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum. The activities undertaken by this forum resulted in its transformation into an institutionalized, official body entitled the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly by April 2002, with the joint efforts of Foreign Ministers and the European Parliament.<sup>18</sup> A more detailed organizational schema is displayed in Figure 1.

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<sup>17</sup> The EU Troika consists of the current term president country, the prospective president country for the next term as well as the European Commission and the High Representative of the CFSP.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, *From Barcelona Process to Neighborhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues*, CEPS Working Document No. 220/March 2005.

Figure 1: The Organizational Scheme of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership



Source: Philippart, E. (2003), *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique features, first results and forthcoming challenges*, CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 10, CEPS, Brussels, April.

*Financial Instrument - MEDA*: Needless to say, the EMP needs financial support to harmonize regulations, conduct exchange and training programs, fund projects and apply aid programs in order to reach the objectives set out in Barcelona. For that purpose, the European Union adopted the Meda Programme as the EMP's primary financial instrument. The Programme applies to "states, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society."<sup>19</sup> The website for Meda Programme states that "The Commission's External Relations DG is responsible for drawing up the strategy papers and the three-year indicative programs. Based on this input, the Commission's EuropeAid Co-operation Office establishes the annual financing plans and manages the projects and programmes from the identification to the evaluation phase."<sup>20</sup>

Meda was first introduced by the 1996 Council Regulation, where it was declared that the EU was committed to allocate 3424.5 million ECU between 1995-1999.<sup>21</sup> As the first Meda programme ended by 1999, in 2000 the Council adopted a second regulation, this time calling the programme Meda II and decided to allocate 5350 million euro, to be used between 2000-2006.<sup>22</sup> Meda's objective is to realize the ultimate aim of creating a free trade area between the Union and the Mediterranean Partner Countries by 2010.

The programme has a two-path approach. Bilaterally, i.e. within the context of EU-MPC relations, Meda puts priorities on supporting economic transition (promoting a competitive market economy with an emphasis on the private sector) and on strengthening the socio-economic balance. In other words, Meda prioritizes the ways to alleviate the social consequences of the aforementioned economic transition. The other approach that Meda employs is regional. Here, it aims to encourage the MPCs to move away from engaging only with the EU towards a sophisticated intra-regional

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<sup>19</sup> Information gathered from the European Commission's External Relations DG Website, 17 April 2007.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996.

<sup>22</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/00 of 27 November 2000.

cooperation occurring among each other.<sup>23</sup> This is done especially in the areas of trade, economy, finances, energy, industry and environment.<sup>24</sup>

*European Investment Bank Loans:* Financing the EMP is also managed through the loan allocation of European Investment Bank, lending 3445 million euro for the period 2000-2003<sup>25</sup>. This has been increased via a Council conclusion in November 2003 by an additional 2180 million.

Although the picture we have laid until now is bright, one should also look for an overall performance the EMP showed in terms of officially bringing together the two shores of the Mediterranean. By the year 2007, although the Union has shifted from the EMP to adopt a wider Europe-European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), it is seen that many MPCs lingered at the initial stage of negotiating the Association Agreements for a long time.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Information gathered from the European Commission's DG External Relations Website, 17 April 2007.

<sup>24</sup> European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper* (COM 2004, 373 final), Brussels, 12.5.2004.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23.

<sup>26</sup> It should be noted that until 2004, Cyprus and Malta were taking part in the EMP via their Association Agreements signed previously for prospective candidate status. Similarly, Turkey contributes to the EMP via its own Association Agreement signed in 1960. This is why they are not included in the table.

Table 1: The Progress of Enacting Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans by 2007

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contractual relations</b>	<b>ENP country report</b>	<b>ENP Action Plan</b>	<b>Adoption by EU</b>	<b>Adoption by partner country</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	AA 2005	<i>Under development</i>	-	-	-
<b>Armenia</b>	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
<b>Belarus</b>	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Egypt</b>	AA 2004	March 2005	<i>Under development</i>	-	-
<b>Georgia</b>	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
<b>Israel</b>	AA 2000	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	11 Apr 2005
<b>Jordan</b>	AA 2002	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	11 Jan 2005
<b>Lebanon</b>	AA 2002	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
<b>Libya</b>	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Moldova</b>	PCA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	22 Feb 2005
<b>Morocco</b>	AA 2000	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	27 Jul 2005
<b>Palestinian Authority</b>	Interim AA 1997	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	4 May 2005
<b>Syria</b>	<i>AA pending ratification</i>	-	-	-	-
<b>Tunisia</b>	AA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	4 Jul 2005
<b>Ukraine</b>	PCA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	21 Feb 2005

Source: "The European Neighborhood Policy", *EurActiv*, 6 July 2007.

Nevertheless, Barcelona Declaration is a groundbreaking step in the EU's political history. It is not only a policy initiative to control, stabilize and integrate its immediate neighborhood, but also a manifestation of its capabilities, both material and ideological, to come up with a common external stance. It is also an attempt to bring the EU closer to the peoples of the neighborhood, to introduce them the founding principles of it as well as the ways it can contribute to the well-being of the region. Furthermore, it is a

tool for socialization.<sup>27</sup> It lays down the tools with which the partner countries had the chance to socialize, and identify with, each other. In this sense, it is a major achievement for the EU's search for legitimization, support and peace outside of its borders.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was also a useful experiment for the European Union to evaluate its efficiency when conducting partnership with third parties. Between 1995 and 2003, the reports from the Commission show that there have only been seven meetings at the Foreign Ministerial level and 16 others at various sectoral ministerial contexts. This means that platforms where the EU member states, Commission and Council representatives and MPCs have gotten together occurred, on average, less than once every year. This is a critical indicator of the EU's ability to sustain commitment for its initial strategy and of the MPCs level of political will.

## **II. 2004 Onwards: Wider Europe – European Neighborhood Policy**

EU membership has always been the most effective foreign policy “carrot” the EU offered to third parties. Indeed, it was through the prospect of membership the ex-authoritarian countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece undertook substantive reforms to be eligible for membership. However, this trend reached its natural limits by 2004. The colossal enlargement wave of May 2004, with the accession of 10 Central and Eastern European countries as well as Malta and Cyprus, in addition to the “virtual” accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Union had come to a point where the carrot of enlargement was no longer a logical or possible option.

In the post-2004 environment, the problems and challenges surrounding Europe are still there, in fact at a much higher level of importance. The EU is larger than ever, with a population of some 500 million people. Since it is impossible for the EU to enlarge *ad infinitum*<sup>28</sup>, a new policy is needed to approach this new environment – a

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<sup>27</sup> Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, *From Barcelona Process to Neighborhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues*, CEPS Working Document No. 220/March 2005.

<sup>28</sup> Eneko Landaburu, *From Neighborhood to Integration Policy: are there concrete alternatives to enlargement?* Speech given at CEPS Conference “Revitalising Europe”. Brussels: 23 January 2006.

policy to embrace the new neighborhood with a much more substantial content as well as with better material and political tools. Furthermore, this policy would contribute to the peace and stability around the European Union's enlarged borders. It is this understanding that led the Commission to propose a European Neighborhood Policy in 2003.

After foreseeing the possible challenges the 2004 enlargement (as well as the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania) will bring on the shoulders of the EU, the European Commission set out to draw a new framework where the name of the new approach would be "a ring of friends". This ring would bring about enhanced interdependence between the EU and the neighboring countries in the East and the Southern Mediterranean, without the prospect of membership in the medium-term.<sup>29</sup>

The European Council acknowledged the Commission's initiative to engage in the Mediterranean under this new, larger umbrella of immediate neighborhood policy and adopted the European Neighborhood policy in the Brussels Summit of June 2004.<sup>30</sup> With this decision, "the European Council reiterates the importance it attaches to strengthening cooperation with these neighbours, on the basis of partnership and joint ownership and building on shared values of democracy and respect for human rights."<sup>31</sup> The 2003 Communication of the European Commission for a "Wider Europe"<sup>32</sup>, quickly followed by the 2004 Communication entitled the European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper<sup>33</sup> were those documents on the basis of which the Council reached its above conclusion.

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<sup>29</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003) 104. Brussels: 11 March 2003.

<sup>30</sup> European Council, *Brussels European Council 17-18 June 2004 Presidency Conclusions*, 19679/2/04.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003) 104. Brussels: 11 March 2003.

<sup>33</sup> European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373. Brussels: 12 May 2004.

### **III. Novelties of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP):**

The ENP, as laid down in the aforementioned Commission reports, is unique in its design and with the tools it utilizes and for these reasons it diverges significantly from the Barcelona Process. First of all, it encompasses a wider area, where the MPCs are now put into a larger basket including those neighbors along the EU's eastern border. This means that the scope of the ENP will necessarily be a much broader one, remedying the challenges that come both from the West and the South. Furthermore, since it will bring the EMP under its larger umbrella, it will aim to solve the problems and inefficiencies the EMP could not envisage back in the 1990s. Secondly, and in relation to the previous point, the ENP departs from the "one-size-fits-all" approach that shaped the Barcelona Process. As the preceding paragraphs showed, Barcelona Declaration was a single document laying down the framework for all MPCs and tried to encourage all partners, regardless of their peculiarities, to converge to it. This is now changed with the introduction of ENP in 2004 with a "tailored" approach, which takes the unique features of each country into consideration and cuts out a road map, called an Action Plan, designed specifically for that partner country. This is why the ENP is a more general and a more specific foreign policy instrument, all at the same time. Moreover, since it is tailored for each country, it also necessitates "joint ownership". In other words, because the Action Plans will include country-specific progress paths, it requires as equal amount of political will and contribution from the partner country as the European Union will put.

Third, the ENP diverges from the EMP in its character. Barcelona Declaration was a much more naïve and user-friendly document, approaching the MPCs in a softer way. The next couple of years following the Barcelona Process showed the Union that this was ineffective, presented by the fact that many countries were still negotiating on Association Agreements and there was only an incremental progress in political and economic development. The ENP saw this problem and adopted a rather hard-liner approach. It now comes up with a "progressive, benchmarked approach"<sup>34</sup>. This means that EU aid will be contingent upon the progress each partner shows on the basis of

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<sup>34</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003) 104. Brussels: 11 March 2003.



their negotiated Action Plan. Rather than channeling aid beforehand, the EU will evaluate the country's position along the road map agreed previously and only then the partner country will be eligible for funding. This is of great importance in terms of the efficiency and enforcement capability of the ENP.

European Neighborhood Policy's most important feature is that it "offers the possibility of a stake in the EU's internal market", i.e. the neighboring countries will enjoy the four freedoms (free mobility of goods, services, labor and capital). In other words, this unprecedented offer is the carrot with which it will encourage the partners to stick to their individual action plans. Needless to say, the EU expects from its neighbors to converge to the EU *acquis* by converging to the European standards and harmonizing economic policies to earn this prize.

The ENP was first outlined by the DG for Enlargement but then it was put under the competency of the DG for External Relations. For this reason, the structure of the Policy resembles that of the accession process to full membership. This is another point where the ENP is different from the Barcelona Process. The principle of benchmarks therefore becomes the watermark of the DG for Enlargement: rather than considering the "commitment to shared values and objectives such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law" as one of the policy priorities to be achieved within the Association Agreements as in the case of Barcelona Process, the ENP now makes this commitment a prerequisite. To sign an Action Plan, the country must first fulfill this very principle, which, rather not surprisingly, resembles the idea behind the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for membership.

Another original contribution of the ENP echoes the idea of "variable geometry" that is already present in the European Union's internal policy patterns. The EU foresees and accepts the fact that not all neighbors stand on equal ground and understands that some countries may be ahead of others and thus want to move faster than others. The ENP acknowledges the desire for such an initiative and indeed encourages cooperation at other levels.<sup>35</sup> Chris Patten, for example, the then External Relations Commissioner, expressed the Union's support when the Arab Mediterranean

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<sup>35</sup> European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373. Brussels: 12 May 2004.

countries (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) signed the Agadir Agreement to establish a free trade zone amongst each other.<sup>36</sup>

The ENP works on the basis of Action Plans, which are designed to lay on top of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Association Agreements signed with Eastern and Southern Mediterranean partners respectively, rather than overthrowing them. These Action Plans (APs), as suggested by the Commission and adopted by the Council, will bring the partners closest to the EU without becoming members. The APs will be tailored to cover a period of three to five years so as not to be outdated.

The ENP, via the APs, will continue to concentrate on political and security partnership, economic partnership and close cooperation on the issues of justice and home affairs, this time in a deepened fashion. Politically, the ENP offers the possibility of being involved in some aspects of the CFSP/ESDP or EU-led crisis management operations. It works for the creation of subcommittees to launch regular discussions on democracy, human rights and good governance. Economically, it necessitates the partners' convergence to the EC acquis and encourages the Mediterranean partners to move from a free trade area of goods towards an area of both goods and services. Needless to say, the EU expects the partners to reform their judicial and legislative systems to reach this target. In the area of justice and home affairs, the EU envisages the possibility of visa facilitation for immigrants from partner countries, a novel approach when compared with the Barcelona acquis. More importantly however, the ENP will have a better regional dimension than that of Barcelona Process. The APs will refresh and update the list of priorities and concerns the MPCs faced with, following 1995. Moreover, the ENP is specifically designed to boost regional and sub-regional cooperation so as to lessen the partners' dependence on the EU. This also supports the variable geometry idea described earlier.<sup>37</sup>

The ENP proposes deeper integration with partners on the issues of transport, environment, information society, research and innovation, as well as energy. It also

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<sup>36</sup> Chris Patten, Speech on the Occasion of the Signature of the Agadir Agreement, Morocco: 25 February 2004. Retrieved from the Commission website, [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/news/patten/speech04\\_101.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech04_101.htm)

<sup>37</sup> European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373. Brussels: 12 May 2004.

seeks the possibility of gradually opening certain Union programmes such as Erasmus to encourage people-to-people cultural dialogue. This is particularly important for the improvement of the EMP, where cultural dialogue is of utmost importance for the security and prosperity of both regions.

Unlike the rather sluggish monitoring process of the EMP, the ENP offers a regular monitoring agenda. This will not only keep a close eye on the partner's progress, but also stand in front of any possibility of losing focus or political will. The Policy suggests the adoption of Midterm Reports, prepared by the Commission and the High Representative of the CFSP two years after the approval of an Action Plan, followed by another report within the next three years.<sup>38</sup> This represents clearly that the EU does move on a learning curve, drawing from the mistakes under the Barcelona Process.

Without a doubt, this new neighborhood policy necessitates a larger and more efficient financial instrument, designed especially for the novelties of the ENP. As described earlier in this chapter, Meda II was launched in 2000 for a period of six years. This means that the ENP, which brought the EMP under its umbrella in 2004, used the Meda II financial programme until the end of 2006. While this is the case for Southern Mediterranean dimension of the ENP, the Commission decided that the Eastern dimension will continue to be funded by Tacis (Community Technical Assistance Programme for the Commonwealth of Independent States) until the same target date. Keeping the previous financial instruments employed for specific regions as they are until 2006, the Commission proposed the establishment of a new financial instrument, a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), in October 2004.<sup>39</sup> This proposal was adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the European Council two years later in Strasbourg, in October 2006.

The ENPI is the ENP's financial instrument, overruling the previous Meda (and Tacis) arrangements, and accepted for the next budgetary period, from 2007 to 2013.

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<sup>38</sup> European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373. Brussels: 12 May 2004.

<sup>39</sup> European Commission, *Commission Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument*, COM(2004) 628 final, Brussels: 11 October 2004.

Main elements of the ENPI are sustainable development; joint work in the areas of environment, public health and fight against organized crime; provision of efficient and secure common borders and local, people-to-people type actions. It contains a total of some 12 billion euro for both Eastern and Southern Mediterranean dimensions. The ENPI is designed to allocate funds on two tracks: “a minimum 95% of the financial envelope shall be allocated to the country and multi-country programmes referred to in Article 6(1)(a)(i)<sup>40</sup>” and “up to 5% of the financial envelope shall be allocated to the cross-border cooperation programmes referred to in Article 6(1)(a)(ii)<sup>41</sup>”. In addition to the ENPI grants laid in this regulation, the European Investment Bank is committed to loan a total of 12.4 billion euro for the same budgetary period.<sup>42</sup>

By the year 2005, that is only a year after the launch of the ENP, seven Action Plans are signed, five of which are done with the former EMP countries Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. A 2006 Commission Working Document points out that the ENP Action Plans adopted by these countries helped them in a number of ways. Israel had developed its relations with the EU in a number of areas including fight against terrorism, environmental protection, justice and security. It is observed that Jordan has shown a real commitment to its political and economic reform agenda, and has reached concrete results in some areas such as corruption or protection of human rights. The country is also converging with the relevant EU regulations such as those on standards for industrial products. Tunisia has shown real progress in economic and social reforms, but not so much in the areas of human rights and democracy. Morocco, the foremost Mediterranean country with a history of rejected EU membership application, has shown significant efforts to deepen its relations with the

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<sup>40</sup> Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, laying down the provisions establishing a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Strasbourg: 26 October 2006. Article No. 29(1)(a).

These programmes include “country or multi-country programmes, which deal with assistance to one partner country or address regional and sub-regional cooperation between two or more partner countries, in which Member States may participate.” This is a clear indication of the ENP prioritizing regional cooperation.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Article No. 29(1)(b).

These programmes include “cross-border cooperation programmes, which deal with cooperation between one or more Member States and one or more partner countries, taking place in regions adjacent to their shared part of the external border of the Community.” Because of the geographical position the Mediterranean countries have, this portion of the ENPI seems to be designed exclusively for the Eastern countries.

<sup>42</sup> ENPI Funding 2007-2013, information retrieved from the EU website.

EU following the adoption of EU-Morocco Action Plan. It has implemented substantial reforms in most of the articles of the AP and considered as a strategic partner by the EU for its fight against terrorism. It still needs a modernized judiciary, however, as well as a programme to reduce poverty.<sup>43</sup>

The ENP has certainly contributed to the external relations baggage of the European Union. The second pillar, that is the Common and Foreign Security arrangements, have been a highly problematic subject area for the European Union because of the reluctance of the member states to conduct their foreign and security policies under the shadow of the European Union when they were able to engage with the other states independently<sup>44</sup>. In that regard, the EU's establishing a common external policy towards the third countries under the title of European Neighborhood Policy is, in and of itself, a major success. Two years after its adoption, it seems to show that it has contributed to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well. The ENP replaced the loosely defined articles and economically uninteresting rewards of the Association Agreements of the EMP with specifically designed agreements that foresee concrete benefits to be reaped from the Union's Internal Market. However, there is an important intervening variable that changes the substance of the ENP: the new member states coming from the Central and Eastern European region. This variable brings with itself a number of questions, such as: what were the positions of the member states towards the Mediterranean partner countries? Did the 2004 enlargement changed the internal dynamics of the EU with respect to the Euro-Mediterranean Partners? If so, how is this change portrayed in the shift from the EMP to ENP? Has the ENP put the Mediterranean Partner Countries at a disadvantage? These are the questions this thesis will tackle in Chapter 4.

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<sup>43</sup> European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Document on Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy*, SEC(2006) 1504/2. Brussels: 4 December 2006.

<sup>44</sup> This reluctance has manifested itself first and foremost at the level of EU institutions, meaning that the EU itself realizes this concern: the Maastricht Treaty enabled the option to opt-out from second pillar arrangements. Countries such as Denmark and Britain use this clause.

### **CHAPTER III**

#### **A LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP**

It goes without saying that the European Union has been, and still is, examined from different perspectives, or to put it more scholarly, from different theories to understand what kind of an international organization it is. These theories range from classical theories of international cooperation such as David Mitrany's functionalism to more intricate and custom-made ones such as Ernst Haas' neofunctionalism. The main purpose of these theories is to give an understanding as to how one conceptualizes the process of European integration since the mid-20th century. In other words, these theories provide the students of international relations and comparative politics as well as those of European studies with the lenses through which we perceive the European Union phenomenon. Therefore, it is of enormous importance to lay down the basics of the theory one prefers to employ to understand the type of framework she uses to trace the mechanisms and dynamics of the EU. By the same token, theories also help us explain how certain policies or "grand projects" within the EU are decided and implemented.

In the light of this understanding, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theory with which the process and progress of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is explained. The present chapter's contribution to the thesis should be underlined here: analytical exercises necessitate the employment of a specific framework with which a phenomenon is observed. For without such a framework, the work can at best be the descriptive account of the subject matter. This chapter, therefore, aims to present the reader the framework on which subsequent analyses will be based. As the main framework, Andrew Moravcsik's *Liberal Intergovernmentalism* is chosen for this thesis. As explanations of a phenomenon can vary across different theories, the reader must keep in mind that the theory employed in this thesis is not the one and only instrument to understand the EMP. However, as the rest of the present chapter and the following chapters will show, it is the only theory that has the highest explanatory power – it successfully explains how the EU decides on external policy issues where state preferences still prevail.

## **I. The grand debate: Neofunctionalism vs. Intergovernmentalism:**

A brief look at the literature on European integration reveals that the debate over theorizing the integration project is concentrated on a dichotomous axis of neofunctionalism versus intergovernmentalism. The central question that these two approaches try to answer is “Who pushes integration forward?” The objective of these approaches, therefore, is to find out the engine of European integration. This is a fundamentally important question for two reasons: first, the answer to it determines the main actors in the European integration process and acknowledges their degree of influence in relation to one another and second, it explains the reasons behind the nature and the pace of integration. In other words, these approaches tell us how, why and by whom integration comes about.

The first of these approaches is neofunctionalism, introduced by Ernst Haas in his *The Uniting of Europe*, published in 1958. What Haas did in *The Uniting of Europe* was to tailor a theory specifically to explain the process of European integration, by borrowing substantially from David Mitrany<sup>45</sup> but remodeling it to fit it to the European case. In what he terms “neofunctionalism”, Haas argues that “integration” has to have a political driving force behind it, and that first national audiences and second a supranational authority coordinating the efficient working of previously established functional agencies will be the embodiment of the political will to push integration forward. In the light of this main argument, he underlines two aspects of neofunctionalism: the idea of “spill-over” and the leading role of supranational bodies which drive integration forward.

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<sup>45</sup> David Mitrany’s *A Working Peace System* (1943) introduces “functionalism” to the literature on international cooperation. Here, Mitrany argued for the establishment of a plethora of functional agencies at the international level, responsible for the supranational governance of specific tasks. These agencies, he claimed, would not only integrate nation-states, but also would blur the differences between the nation-states for the common benefit to be reaped by all who join. He particularly refrained from combining these agencies at an internationally federal level, for it would counteract his initial point – that governments inflate nationalism and sharpen divisions across the peoples of the world. In his opinion, what the world needs is rather a web of agencies which works for the common good. Although Haas borrows from Mitrany by emphasizing the merits of supranational agencies to integrate nation-states, he diverges from him on the issue of federalism. Haas, unlike Mitrany, believes that these agencies would ultimately be coordinated by a higher authority, to which nation-states will be subjected – hence the term “neofunctionalism”.

First, Haas explains the European integration process in terms of a series of functional and political spill-overs. He argues that functional spill-over occurs because of the need to further harmonize policies to reap the most benefits from those other areas where policies have already been harmonized. The experience of establishing the Customs Union and then moving towards the Single Market and ultimately arriving at the Internal Market, for instance, can be used as an example to explain how functional integration in different policy areas unintentionally initiates integration in further areas to make the former more efficient, much like a domino effect. Removing tariffs first necessitated the harmonization of macroeconomic policies of the member states and such a harmonization then necessitated the introduction of new instruments such as a single common currency and a single central bank to reduce transaction costs as well as to normalize national economies in relation to one another. Functional spill-over, therefore, occurs because stakeholders see that present policies will not reach their highest level of efficiency unless they are coupled with further integrative policies. Here, cross-nationally operating groups act as the main actors pushing for more integration for the simple reason that integration contributes to their self-interests.

Political spill-over, on the other hand, is used to explain how these ever-integrated policy areas stimulate institution-building at supranational level. Here, Haas underlines the necessity of building overarching institutions furnished with bureaucrats with substantial technical skills to regulate and implement the rules surrounding policy areas around which member states have integrated. This brings us to the second aspect of neofunctionalism, which accounts for a supranational approach towards European integration. That is, the integration process is spearheaded by those supranational bodies within the European Union which not only look after but also stimulate the harmonization and implementation of policies across member states. In short, the European Union project is attributed to the supranational bodies, the foremost of which is the Commission.<sup>46</sup>

The European Commission is the supreme institution according to the neofunctionalist theory. Evolved out of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Commission is a body of bureaucrats appointed by the member

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<sup>46</sup> Ernst B. Haas, (1958) *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford: Stanford University Press and Moravcsik (1993).



states' national administrations and collectively approved by the European Parliament. It is made up of two interlinked institutions: the College of Commissioners and the Directorate-Generals (DGs). Today, the College is composed of the Commission President and 26 Commissioners, who are responsible of specific portfolios institutionalized under specific DGs, encompassing a diverse set of issues, ranging from transport and multilingualism to enlargement or trade.<sup>47</sup>

The Commission has extensive powers, which contribute to the neofunctionalist premises. First of all, they have the “monopoly right to initiate legislation within the first pillar: with few exceptions, nothing can become Community legislation unless the college chooses to propose it.”<sup>48</sup> This means that the Commission is the motor of integration – given the fact that European integration is first and foremost an economic project, the Commission’s competency to propose the substance and direction along which integration will occur is of utmost importance. Secondly, “the Commission also has significant independent powers within the CAP and on external trade and (especially) competition policy.”<sup>49</sup> As far as competition policy is concerned, the Commission acts as a “judge and prosecuting attorney”<sup>50</sup> monitoring the working mechanisms of the Internal Market. This also gives a particular competency to the Commission as its decisions can override national law on anti-trust regulations, competition and so on. Finally, the Commission is also furnished with the freedom to publish annual reports on the EU and opinion papers about EU matters such as enlargement.<sup>51</sup> With these reports and opinions, the Commission becomes an influential actor within the institutional dynamics of the EU. In other words, these publications have the ability to alter opinions formed in other EU institutions, including the European Council and the European Parliament, which may result in a change in how the EU stands towards a certain policy matter. When we look at the case of the ENP, for instance, we see that the initiator was the Commission and its 2003 opinion paper *Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and*

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<sup>47</sup> Information from the European Commission Website, [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_barroso/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/index_en.htm), retrieved on July 4, 2007.

<sup>48</sup> John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, (2002) *The Institutions of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88-9.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

*Southern Neighbors* that gave rise to the establishment of a European Neighborhood Policy in 2004. To sum up, the competencies of the Commission outlined above lead one to the conclusion that the Commission is a significantly powerful and influential body – and for the neofunctionalists, it is the most powerful and influential of all.

Although neofunctionalism has a certain degree of meaning and power, the main critique directed towards it is its apolitical nature – that it does not mention the political background where harmonization among members or convergence around common ideals takes place. While it puts particular strength on the Commission, it strips it away from the political setting where the college is appointed or approved at national and supranational level, respectively. Neither does it talk about the political strategies which give rise to the formation and performance of supranational bodies in the first place. For these bodies obviously do not fall from the skies, there should be a preceding explanation on how they come to life. Neofunctionalism, however, disregards this question on the political background where national preferences are converged to delegate competencies to an authority higher and above the nation-state. This main problem of being apolitical dampens neofunctionalism's utility to be employed as a framework through which integration can be understood. As the next chapter will show, neofunctionalism hardly explains the process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well.

The reason why we have given an account of the European Commission earlier is that the debate between neofunctionalists (or put differently, supranationalists) and intergovernmentalists almost always takes place on the basis of specific EU institutions. While the supranationalists emphasize the role of the Commission, i.e. the supranational authority of the EU to which a number of nation-state competencies are delegated, intergovernmentalists suggest a diverging opinion, arguing that it is the intergovernmental bodies in the EU such as the European Council that drives integration forward. As this thesis argues at large, the Council does play the leading role in European integration.

The Council is composed of two rather interlinked bodies: the European Council and the Council of Ministers. While the former is composed of the heads of state and government, the latter can be differentiated in terms of the policy area that the ministers

are responsible for, such as the General Affairs Council (GAC – Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs), Council of Ministers for Agriculture or that of Environment, Fisheries and so on. Simply put, the Council of Ministers is responsible for decision making. The decisions are reached in a way that proposals received from the Commission are enhanced by the contributions of the European Parliament, a combination of which is then coupled with the discussions in the Council of Ministers that result in a final decision. As far as the decision-making mechanism is concerned, the Council can decide by enacting qualified majority voting<sup>52</sup> or unanimity voting, depending on the guidelines included in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The European Council, on the other hand, acts as the ultimate level of ratification for the decisions reached at other levels. It is also the very last resort of decision making when the process is deadlocked at lower levels, as well as perceived as “the face” of the European Union.<sup>53</sup>

In the eye of the second camp that theorizes the essence of the European Union, intergovernmentalists argue that these aspects of the Council make it the real engine of integration. Spearheaded by Stanley Hoffman during the 1960s, intergovernmentalists believe that the idea of the nation-state had not and will not wither away in the future.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> QMV is increasingly used for the decisions taken at the Council of Ministers, especially after the ratification of the Nice Treaty in 2004. The rationale behind the QMV is that each member state is assigned a particular number of votes proportional to its size. Today, Germany, France, Italy and Britain each have 29 votes, while Spain and Poland have 27, Romania has 14, Netherlands has 13, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal each have 12, Austria, Bulgaria and Sweden each have 10, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland each have 7, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia each have 4 and Malta has 3 votes. Unanimity voting, on the other hand, gives every member state the power to veto a decision if it runs counter to its national interests. Unanimity voting became a bargaining tool of the EU to bring France back in the Union when De Gaulle erupted the infamous Empty Chair Crisis of 1965. Although the operational realm of the unanimity voting has been gradually narrowed down as the Union became dysfunctional at the end of a series of veto decisions and members decided to shift to an increased use of the QMV method, for policies concerning external relations and other second pillar arrangements, unanimity method is still in use.

<sup>53</sup> Peterson and Shackleton (2002), p. 35.

<sup>54</sup> See Stanley Hoffmann, (1966) “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No.3. It should be brought to the attention of the readers that this article was written following the Empty Chair Crisis, which granted the member states the veto power, thanks to the then French President Charles De Gaulle.

This is because of two aspects of the intergovernmentalist rationale: the distinction between high and low politics<sup>55</sup> and the protection of sovereignty.

The intergovernmentalist school argues that there is a sharp distinction between high and low politics, which contributes to the uniqueness of the European integration project. In other words, despite the fact that the Union operates under the proposals generated from the Commission, the distinction between high and low politics acts as a glass ceiling for the Commission to release proposals. This is because the Commission is granted the competency to make policy proposals that only fall under the first pillar (European Communities), therefore making the European Union deeply integrated in some areas (i.e. areas that fall into the spectrum of low politics such as the establishment of the Internal Market) but not in others.

This has important projections on the voting systems that are applied in the Council as well – we see that most of the arrangements that fall under the first pillar are ratified by QMV, with which countries can form allied blocks to push the ratification, or the rejection, of the policy in question. This means that with the help of qualified majority voting, the EU can be pushed to integrate under a “tyranny of majority” – but this only applies to those policy areas where stakes are relatively lower for member states, that is, QMV applies to the policy areas which do not deprive the member states of their national security, defense or identity. Unanimity voting, on the other hand, is used for other areas that fall under the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Indeed, the explanatory strength of the intergovernmentalist theory comes from the Union’s acknowledgment of this distinction between high and low politics and its correspondence to specific voting methods so as not to alienate or antagonize the member states from the European Union. In other words, the fact that the Union has been institutionalized according to such a distinction validates the intergovernmentalist assumptions, therefore giving it a substantial argumentative leverage vis-à-vis its neofunctionalist counterpart.

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<sup>55</sup> High politics is a term that is used to refer to issues of national security, defense and identity. Low politics encompasses the policy areas that fall out of the high politics realm such as economy, environment or education.

This divide between high and low politics, however, is tied to a larger and a more important concept – the concept of sovereignty. Indeed, the original reason behind the creation of such a virtual divide is because the nation-states have an urge to protect their sovereignty, that is, the rejection of any authority higher than the state of the nation that shall interfere with the mechanisms of decision-making, implementation and adjudication. This is the foremost character of the modern nation-state to be protected at all costs. The fact that sovereignty is continuing to be such a highly respected and acknowledged notion carves the European Union from within. The struggle of the nation-states with the institutions of the EU to agree on the extent to which state competencies will be shared or completely delegated to the supranational bodies of the Union not only gives rise to crises but also forces EU officials to resort to custom-made mechanisms to by-pass deadlocks – a trend to which the arrangement of voting systems can be given as an example.<sup>56</sup>

The debates over sovereignty and the willingness of the member states to keep as many competencies as possible so as not to lose their sovereignty and become highly sensitive to outside developments are most effectively captured by the intergovernmentalist theory. When one takes a look at the policies adopted under the second pillar arrangements, for instance, it is seen that the CFSP is truly an intergovernmental pillar where states have the option to veto a decision or completely opt out from it.<sup>57</sup> This is because of the common perception that pooling the security and defense structures of the member states under the larger umbrella of the EU deprives members from unilaterally deciding on their national security interests and therefore limits them from acting autonomously. Indeed, it is this struggle of the member states for the protection of sovereignty that causes intergovernmentalism to claim that nation-states will not wither away even though the Union continues to

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<sup>56</sup> The literature on European integration includes a plethora of works that concentrate on the debates over sovereignty and whether it is undermined or transformed.

<sup>57</sup> With respect to the European Security and Defense Policy, for example, Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Finland opt out from the ESDP arrangements. In the European Union literature, this trend is termed as Variable Geometry – states have the ability to integrate in some areas but not in others. Multi-speed Europe and Concentric Circles are other synonyms to this approach. See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001), *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

integrate. As Hoffmann's famous metaphor says: "One, even an artichoke has a heart, which remains intact after the leaves have been eaten."<sup>58</sup>

To sum up, therefore, intergovernmentalist theory argues that nation-states do matter. They matter because with respect to the institutional structure of the European Union, they are the ultimate units which decide whether to push the Union forward or not. The elected representatives of the nation-states are the ones who choose to converge around a certain policy or diverge from it, according to their baggage of national preferences. The Union, therefore, is perceived as an international organization which will survive and move forward as long as its building blocks (i.e. member states) let it.

Not surprisingly, this view resembles the assumptions of the realist school of International Relations. Indeed, intergovernmentalism can be defined as a theory of integration whose main assumptions are rooted in the realist paradigm, which defines states as entities whose interests are unitary, unchangeable and uncontestable ones, converging around the protection of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and identity. This realist assumption is elevated to the level of international bargaining with the intergovernmentalist school, which stresses that nation-states bring their own national preferences (preferences which are not only limited by national security or defense but now extended to the areas of low politics as well) to the bargaining table and compete to fulfill the most of them, rather than arguing for a more "utopian" view of a bargaining environment where supranational institutions or a formation of a common supranational identity alters state behavior.

Despite its comparative success in explaining how European integration proceeds, intergovernmentalist theory falls short of tracing the paths along which national preferences are formulated. In other words, it takes for granted that preferences are brought to the bargaining table, but does not deal with the process leading up to it. While intergovernmentalists did not see this as a disadvantage of their theory, those coming from the liberal school of International Relations contested this view and altered the theory. The new approach was coined as Liberal Intergovernmentalism, theorized by

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<sup>58</sup> Hoffmann (1966).

Andrew Moravcsik. The rest of this chapter will lay down the fundamental pillars upon which this approach is built.

## II. Liberal Intergovernmentalism:

In his 1993 article,<sup>59</sup> Andrew Moravcsik brings a new impetus to the discussion of theorizing the then European Community (EC). With his ground breaking article, which was later integrated into his 1998 book *The Choice for Europe*, Moravcsik sent a wake-up call to those who saw the European Community as a *sui generis* organization. Indeed, Moravcsik acknowledges the peculiarities of the EC. However, this does not prevent him from arguing that the EC can be explained by employing general theories of international relations and bargaining rather than *sui generis* ones, the foremost of which is Ernst Haas' *neofunctionalism*.<sup>60</sup>

Simply put, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) integrates “a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation.”<sup>61</sup> As established theories of International Relations also point out, national preference formation can be explained differently within different theories. At the one extreme, classical realism disregards how national preferences are formulated into interests. According to theorists of classical realism such as Hans Morgenthau, national interests are counted as given. As mentioned earlier, survival of the state and its territorial integrity, as well as economic well-being and protection of national identity are the monolithic, unchangeable and unitary pillars on the basis of which states engage with each other, almost acknowledged as primary interests that date back to time immemorial. At the other extreme there is the pluralist

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<sup>59</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, (1993) “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31 No. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Moravcsik (1993, p. 474) argues that “Although the EC is a unique institution, it does not require a *sui generis* theory.” In a later writing, Moravcsik acknowledges the N=1 problem of the EU, but continues to argue that this is not a problem specific to the EU but an inherent problem of doing social science, and therefore can be alleviated by consulting to general theories rather than grand ones such as neofunctionalism. Caporoso J., Marks G., Moravcsik A. and Pollack M., (Fall 1997) “Does the European Union represent an *n* of 1?” *ECSA Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 1-5.

<sup>61</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 482.

paradigm and Moravcsik's Liberal Theory of International Relations<sup>62</sup> in particular, where national interests are indeed formulated according to the domestic preferences, rather than treated as given. This perspective argues that preference formation at the domestic level does matter in order to explain how states act at the international level. LI adopts this latter idea driven from pluralism, where states come to the international level with a basket of preferred outcomes decided at the domestic level, where a variety of social groups with varying degrees of influential power compete with one another to transfer their own preferences to the state level. As far as the European Union is concerned, therefore, the possible set of outcomes the member states push for at the international table necessarily signals the relative power of the domestic preferences voiced at home.

While this is the "liberal" side to Moravcsik's approach to explain European integration, the intergovernmental side continues to echo some of the main premises of the realist school. At the international level, he argues, states act as unitary actors with a solid basket of interests at hand. In his own words, "governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena, but on the basis of goals that are defined domestically."<sup>63</sup> Moreover, and with respect to the European Union, the fact that policies are decided in the form of interstate bargaining taking place between the members rather than imposed by or bargained between supranational bodies such as the Commission represents the realist consciousness in his theory.

Within the larger framework of international relations theories, the LI can be categorized under the rationalist camp. The theory is established upon the rationality assumption, which assumes the states' ability both at the national and international level in calculating the costs and benefits of agreeing to a certain set of decisions (or domestic preferences, for that matter), changing the bits and pieces of a largely uncontested decision or vetoing it altogether.

And yet there is a catch here. As Moravcsik displays by giving specific examples about the negotiation of the Single European Act or the Common Agricultural Policy

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<sup>62</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking preferences seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, pp. 513-553.

<sup>63</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 481.



(CAP) in *The Choice for Europe*, the LI has the highest explanatory power in issue areas where domestic social groups have significant stakes. In other words, the “liberal” aspect of the LI is most visible where decisions taken at the EU level impact domestic audiences the most. The CAP, for instance, is of enormous importance to the agricultural sectors of individual member states, and especially for those whose economies rely relatively more on agriculture, for it issues substantial benefits to the agricultural workers in the form of subsidies. Therefore, any decision taken at the EU level to modify the CAP will be bounded by the domestic social forces (and especially by producers, such as farmers unions) who preemptively voice their particular interests to the national governments, which in turn calculate the relative power of these interests and come to the negotiation table with a specific basket of preferences, now termed as “national”. This implies that by the same token, those policies or proposals which do not ignite some type of a social positioning or preference leave governments alone and independent from domestically formulated preferences. In other words, “where the effects of policy changes are uncertain, organized opposition to government initiatives is diluted”<sup>64</sup>. Similarly, “where the net costs and benefits of alternative policies are diffuse, ambiguous or insignificant, and the risk is low, the societal constraints on governments are looser.”<sup>65</sup>

This means that the LI explains the decisions taken under the “first pillar”, which deals with the establishment and regulation of the Internal Market the best, precisely because any decision taken at this pillar directly affects the economic dynamics of individual member states and hence the citizens. The beauty of LI lies at this very juncture: although the theory accepts the fact that domestic audiences do not necessarily concern themselves with issues falling outside the umbrella of the first pillar; it is substantial and competent enough to acknowledge this and to create explanatory room for those policies for which preferences are predominantly determined at the governmental level.

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<sup>64</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 490.

<sup>65</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 488.

In the light of the above argument, according to Moravcsik's typology, the third category<sup>66</sup> of policies stays the farthest from domestic calculations of costs and benefits. In this category, policies such as common foreign and security policy "exist either for their own sake or to facilitate other policies."<sup>67</sup> Policies which are concentrated on political cooperation among the member states towards third parties, for instance, hardly evoke social forces at the domestic level for two interconnected reasons. First, issues of political cooperation stay higher at the agenda for governments, which can either be listed as classified information (a common security policy towards international terrorism will be necessarily kept away from domestic audiences) or too technical (or mundane, although this is a matter of perception) to be explained to domestic audiences.

While economic harmonization is central for the "everyday" dynamics between the state and the society for obvious reasons, political cooperation and issues concerning the working mechanisms of EU institutions can be regarded as too important, too delicate or too technical to be opened to domestic discussion. Similarly, domestic audiences might not show interest towards such policy areas for the very same reasons. Secondly, and related to the previous point, policies falling into this category do not result in concrete outcomes unlike those under the first pillar. These "second-pillar" issues, so to speak, remain abstract for domestic audiences, precisely because decision-making on them do not create a specific cost-benefit equation at the national level, on the basis of which domestic audiences voice their opinions. Therefore, "the difficulty of mobilizing interest groups under conditions of general uncertainty about specific winners and losers permits the positions of governments, particularly larger ones, on questions of European institutions and common foreign policy, to reflect the ideologies

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<sup>66</sup> Moravcsik divides policy areas into three categories. The first is "commercial policy, market access and producer interests", which, as the name suggests, deals with the issues of Internal Market. Second category is about the provision of "socio-economic public goods", which includes "the coordination of domestic policies designed to redress market failures or provide public goods, such as those assure macroeconomic stability, social security, environmental protection, public health and safety standards..." Policies falling into this category further initiate domestic concerns, since these are some of the most visible areas where citizens are directly impacted. The last category is "political cooperation, EC institutions and general income transfers". This category stands the farthest from domestic forces. For a more elaborate explanation of these categories across which the impacts of domestic preference formations vary, see Moravcsik (1993), pp. 488-496.

<sup>67</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 494.

and personal commitments of leading executive and parliamentary politicians, as well as interest-based conceptions of the national interest.”<sup>68</sup>

This is where we attach the Barcelona Process and the Wider Europe initiative to the Liberal Intergovernmentalist framework and jointly move away from its liberal core towards its intergovernmental crust. What these two overlapping policies have in common is that they develop an ideational project of creating a neighborhood where they can achieve stability and peace, rather than a material one where objectives are laid out in economic terms. This is the central reason why liberal intergovernmentalism is useful to explain the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: LI accepts the theoretical “weakness” in explaining this type of a political phenomenon and yet still provides a substantial framework (i.e. intergovernmentalism) in order to understand how states come to common decisions.

Moravcsik’s principal argument in explaining European integration is that “the major agenda-setting decisions in the history of the EC, in which common policies are created or reformed, are negotiated intergovernmentally.”<sup>69</sup> This suggests that the main institution within the European Union that drives integration forward is the European Council which is composed of the heads of state and government from all member countries, rather than the Commission of appointed technocrats. Although opponents of this view will argue that choosing which particular institution drives integration forward is a matter of where you start the process of integration and thus a matter of perception<sup>70</sup>, we nonetheless see that all amendments to the Treaty of Rome and various other ground breaking policies are finally negotiated at the level of the European Council, rather than the European Parliament or the Commission. This is an important fact which increases the explanatory power of liberal intergovernmentalism, and at the same time shows that some issues are too important to be left to supranational institutions with utopian ideals, one of which is creating a federalist Europe.

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<sup>68</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 494.

<sup>69</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 496.

<sup>70</sup> Indeed, it is only the European Commission that is competent to introduce policy recommendations for elaboration and adoption. In this sense, integration is seen to be driven by the Commission. However, it should also be noted that it is the European Council that takes the “history-making” decisions such as moving towards an Internal Market or accepting candidate countries to full membership, etc.

What LI concentrates more, however, is the nature of bargaining taking place at the intergovernmental level. Although “the EC negotiations can be viewed as a cooperative game in which the level of cooperation reflects patterns in the preferences of national governments”, how states exert their preferences at the bargaining table depends on the relative power they have vis-à-vis each other<sup>71</sup>. This understanding ties back to the classical realist school, which also assumes state power as the intervening variable between dyadic or larger international relations.

When we take a look at the member state profiles, we see cross-cutting cleavages which in return tie to the relative power calculations. First, there are those states which represent the core of the European Community / European Union: the so-called EU-6. These states are assumed to be the most powerful due to their historical legacy and position within the European integration process, since they are the 50-year-old founding fathers of this project. Secondly, there are others which joined the Union at a later stage and hence secondary to the core but still act as a key players because of their size of geography, economy or population. These members, the foremost of which is Britain, run contrary to those core countries such as Luxembourg or Belgium, which remain as minor players due to their relative economic and geographical size. Thirdly, there are those Southern Mediterranean, ex-authoritarian countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece, which joined the Union with a very poor economic and democratic record but then became powerful in pushing for further economic assistance by the EU. Furthermore, there is a fourth group of countries, notably those Central and Eastern European countries who became member states with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. This group belongs to a historical bloc and therefore has brought with itself a legacy of belonging and support. Although they vary in geographical or economic size, they are able to form coalitions within the EU’s decision-making mechanisms.

What these four groups bring us to is that they can overlap or align with, or even oppose within each other depending on the nature of policy to be negotiated. Since the European Council works both by unanimity and qualified majority voting (QMV) depending on the policy at hand, both individual vetoes and coalitions of member states matter during negotiations. This suggests that member states can individually assume

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<sup>71</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 499.

power by, or as a result of, using their veto option during unanimity voting or similarly form ad hoc blocs to block a policy or facilitate its acceptance during QMV.

Power therefore, a solid and uncontested concept which is central to the assumptions of realist paradigm<sup>72</sup>, becomes a tangible one in the case of the European Union for liberal intergovernmentalism, since it can change hands depending on the relative importance of the bargaining chips a country has for a particular policy at a given point in time. In other words, a country might have a stronger bargaining position for policy X at time  $t$ <sup>73</sup> and therefore can be regarded as a powerful actor at the negotiating table, but might be a weak party to the bargaining process at time  $t+1$  for policy Y.<sup>74</sup>

For liberal intergovernmentalists, these fluctuations in power and preferences imply that any negotiation finalized at the international level has to be one whose outcome reflects the median preference, or what Moravcsik terms as the “lowest common denominator”<sup>75</sup>. Since it is simply impossible to have 27 member states with identical preferences on a given issue area, the intersection of 27 different sets of preferences become the final decision, which is reached at the end of rounds of compromises. LI further claims that the lowest common denominators can be expanded

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<sup>72</sup> According to the realist school, power, that is the ability to force others to act in a way that they would not otherwise do, is the biggest “prize” after which all nation-states go. Power stands as a central concept for all realists, regardless of their classical or structural orientations. While classical realists argue that states act in order to keep, increase and demonstrate their power in order not to be engulfed by other states, structural realists see it as a leverage that is used to position oneself with respect to other states in the system. In the anarchical international system, state power acts as a deterrent and therefore a generator of information for third parties who would otherwise act aggressively. See Hans Morgenthau (1962), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf and Kenneth N. Waltz (1954), *Man, the State and War*, New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>73</sup> This strength can derive from the country’s ability to form a more powerful opposing coalition or simply its threat to veto the whole draft (Moravcsik, 1993), fear of ratification process at home or having a narrower win-set (i.e. the size of their basket of preferred outcomes) than other parties at the table. See Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics, the logic of two-level games”, *International Organization*, Vol.42, No.3, 1988, pp. 427-460.

<sup>74</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition, December 1993.

<sup>75</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 501.

by linking different policies at the table. “Package deals”, Moravcsik argues, “tend to create winners and losers in *all* countries that are party to them.”<sup>76</sup> This is different from bargains on single issue areas, where the final decision almost always creates net winners and net losers. By linking multiple issues together, bargaining process becomes more complicated and therefore more intense, but at the same time it becomes more beneficial to every member state to continue bargaining until some portion of the basket of preferred outcomes is earned, rather than simply vetoing the whole deal at once or quickly forming coalitions to block the process. Chapter 4 will try to see whether such linkages worked at the initiation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004.

As one can see until now, intergovernmentalist part of the LI does not mention supranational bodies, since it attributes no decisive power on them. However, this does not mean that the theory simply ignores the presence of these institutions. Rather, it redefines their functions differently from neofunctionalists.

“In the intergovernmentalist view, the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable.”<sup>77</sup> Moravcsik argues that this is done through a). “Increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining” and b). “Strengthening the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis the particularistic social groups within their domestic polity”. Supranational bodies can increase the efficiency of bargaining by generating information and technical assistance to the system, and “by monitoring and enforcing compliance”. By pooling and/or delegating their powers to supranational levels, member states share the burden collectively and create neutral bodies such as the Commission or the European Court of Justice, which stand at an equal distance from all member states. Through these supranational mechanisms they find a way to by-pass domestic forces and bargain without the weight of domestic preferences on their shoulders, thus making the negotiation process more efficient. National governments can also point at these mechanisms as scapegoats for enforcing policies which they “nationally” did not prefer. Moreover, the fact that the boundaries of supranational

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<sup>76</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 505.

<sup>77</sup> Moravcsik (1993), p. 507.

bodies are limited by national governments further reinforces their position at the EU level.<sup>78</sup>

To sum up, Liberal Intergovernmentalism puts particular emphasis on the functions of supranational bodies in such a way that these bodies are meaningful only in relation to their fathers, who happen to be individual member states. Supranational bodies do play a role in the European Union, by reinforcing the importance of national governments on these two axes pointed above. This is a unique approach in the sense that an approach as contrary to the idea of supranational institutions as liberal intergovernmentalism is realistic enough to acknowledge the presence of those institutions, and yet this acknowledgement is made through the same intergovernmental lenses.

This chapter set out to give the reader a brief idea about the ongoing debate on the literature on European integration and the particular theory used in this chapter, as well as its merits. Liberal Intergovernmentalism is the best theory to be employed to explain the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, since it was driven forward by the initiatives of specific member states such as Spain and France. Moreover, when we look at the post-2004 trend in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, we see that it was incorporated under a larger framework of European Neighborhood Policy, which puts relatively more emphasis on the eastern neighborhood than its southern counterpart. This is because of the shift in the power relations between member states. Prior to 2004, power was relatively accumulated in the hands of the Western states which put special emphasis on the southern neighborhood because of the region's geographical proximity. Following the 2004 enlargement, however, the accession of eight Central and Eastern European states (which was rounded to 10 by the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007) altered the power distribution in the EU by shifting it to the eastern part of Europe, spearheaded by Germany, Austria and Poland. With this shift in power, any policy regarding regional cooperation or neighborhood was to be contested by this new "Eastern bloc" of states, which favor more focus on their immediate neighborhood at the expense of the 10-year-old Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Unfortunately, the Commission can hardly reverse this growing tide.

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<sup>78</sup> Moravcsik (1993), pp. 507-517.

Keeping the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions in mind, the next chapter will give an analysis of the peculiarities of member-state preferences, and those of the foremost states located at the west, east and south of the EU in particular. The objective will be to understand the progress of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and to see whether the 2004 enlargement of the EU changed the pace of the EMP due to changes in the relative distribution of power across member-states and their respective policy preferences.



## CHAPTER IV

### POST-ENLARGEMENT TRAUMA OF THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP: MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES

The year 2004 has been monumental for the future of the European Union as it realized its largest enlargement wave, with the extension of acceptance to 10 new members, eight from the Central and Eastern European region and two from the Mediterranean (only to be followed by the accession of two more eastern European countries, Romania and Bulgaria in 2007). The enlargement had not only broadened the geographical limits of the EU up to the Russian border, but also altered its demographic and economic profile<sup>79</sup>. To nobody's surprise, these important changes brought with itself new challenges, foremost of which was to restructure the institutional setting. The Treaty of Nice, for instance, signed in 2001 and ratified in 2003 introduced changes in the EU so that the institutions would be ready for the new members.<sup>80</sup>

The more conventionally called "eastern" enlargement, however, also changed the foreign policy priorities of the European Union. Now that the borders of the EU stood next to the easternmost ex-Soviet countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus), it was necessary to build a stable region not only to protect the Union from external threats but also by doing this, to prepare the newly admitted members for economic growth that would proceed mostly in terms of foreign direct investment. Of course, the realization of this goal was contingent upon the willingness of the EU15 to channel its political and economic resources towards this part of its periphery. For a coherent foreign policy

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<sup>79</sup> With the accession of 10 new members, the population of the EU increased by 19,57% to ca. 460 million. Per capita GDP fell by 8,94% to \$18,394. By 2007, population increased by another 6,48% to ca. 495 million and per capita GDP decreased by 4,03% to \$25,160. (Overall GDP had increased between 2004 and 2007 but the GDP of new countries decreased the average.) Information gathered from CIA Worldbook. This meant that the EU got poorer with enlargement; although in the medium run it was able to grow back again.

<sup>80</sup> The Nice Treaty a). Increased the areas where qualified majority voting would be used, b). Rearranged the number of seats in the Commission so that each member state would have a seat in the College, adding up to 27 seats, which meant that the big members such as Germany, France or UK had to give up one of their seats and c). Increased the number of seats in the European Parliament from 700 to 732. European Commission (2001), "Treaty of Nice", *Official Journal of the European Communities*, [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C\\_EN.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf)

stance was only possible if member states were able and willing to push for concentrating on the east.

However, just like the levers of a scale, concentrating on one part of the region carried with itself the possibility of decreased interest at the other parts. More precisely, more attention to the east for the obvious reasons of enlargement risked the attention directed at the Mediterranean. This brings us to the purpose of the present chapter, which is to explain and defend the central argument of this thesis – that the 2004 (and the 2007<sup>81</sup>) enlargement of the European Union has negatively affected the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With the accession of the CEEC, foreign policy priorities of the EU have changed and this resulted in the dilution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at the expense of building up a secure, democratic and prosperous eastern front. In line with the previous chapter where the theoretical assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism were explained, this chapter aims to support this argument by displaying the preferences of member states, and particularly of those big states which are perceived as the main engines of the EU integration and neighborhood processes – France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.

## **I. Basic Principles of the EU Enlargement:**

As mentioned in the previous sections, enlargement has always been the most influential and effective foreign policy instrument the European Union has utilized. This is because of the generous benefits the applicants are promised to receive once they fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria and complete negotiations on each of the 35 chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. Being able to enjoy the “four freedoms”, that is, the free movement of goods, services, people and capital, as well as the structural and regional funds and investment opportunities contribute to the ever-growing desire of countries scattered in and around the European continent to become full members.

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<sup>81</sup> Because the 2007 enlargement happened only six months ago, there is not enough data yet to explain its impact on the EMP. However, given the fact that Romania and Bulgaria added to the weight of the eastern wing of the EU, one can lump the preferences of these countries to the eight who joined the EU in 2004.

Prospect of European Union membership; therefore, is alluring to the extent that becoming a member state increases the country's economic capabilities significantly. Moreover, membership is also a carrot to undertake significant political reforms, which contribute to the democratic character of the country. Especially with respect to those countries of the Southern Mediterranean rim, namely Spain, Portugal and Greece, European membership was not only a window to receive substantial aid but also the most rewarding chance to move from transitory to consolidated democracies.<sup>82</sup> In other words, the EU for these countries was a project of democratization, the result of which would have significant outcomes for good governance and economic growth. Of course, the importance of democracy for the EU should be seen as a two-lane road. The European Union is just as enthusiastic to create a wider democratic region as the candidate countries that want to democratize their systems to get in to "the Club". In fact, this was the rationale behind the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, which dictated that one of the foremost prerequisites for becoming a member was to have a consolidated democracy that protects human and minority rights. Therefore, European Union membership was also a matter of political development, which was perceived as an asset by both sides.

Membership in the European Union also brings with itself an ideational package of becoming a part of the largest continental project of the post-Second World War. For becoming a member meant being acknowledged by the rest of the EU that the member country is a Western democracy with a free and competitive market, the EU project was also perceived to be the anti-thesis of the Soviet type of state system during the Cold War setting of 1945-90.

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<sup>82</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave" in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 3-26.

## II. Eastern Enlargement of the European Union:

This brings us to the understanding behind the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union, which was almost specific to the central and eastern European countries (CEEC). In line with the above argument, these enlargements can be described in terms of rhetorical action – “the strategic use of norm-based arguments”<sup>83</sup>. That is, the fact that the European Union was a project to increase and bring together the liberal democratic states of the Continent necessitated the accession of CEEC as well, for they were fulfilling the accession criteria by 2004. This was parallel to the Cold War mindset, which made it imperative to include the ex-Soviet CEEC to the democratic Union of the West<sup>84</sup>. In that regard, the eastern enlargement was the declaration of the end of Soviet legacy over the CEEC and was also the manifestation of the European Union that it was open to all countries around the region that were able to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria and adopt the *acquis*.

However, this was not a consistent signal given the aftermath of the enlargement. It created what came to be known as the “enlargement fatigue”, meaning that the EU was no longer able to move forward with 27 members. The accession of 10+2 new members in such a short period resulted in an overloaded bureaucracy, in increased demands without the necessary infrastructure, and diverse preferences about EU policies, an example to which is the preference divergences over the neighborhood surrounding the enlarged Union. The result showed that enlargement was no longer a plausible method to increase the power and influence of the Union, or for that matter, to increase the number of liberal democracies and free markets around the region.

The reality of the enlargement fatigue, therefore, necessitated the introduction of a new foreign policy tool, which would have the “carrots” that the prospect of full membership used to offer but would exclude that prospect in the long run. It was such a setting that ignited the Wider Europe – European Neighborhood Policy framework, proposed by the Commission in 2004. The rationale behind it was to control, monitor

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<sup>83</sup> See Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 47-80.

<sup>84</sup> Indeed, some perceive the eastern enlargement as “bringing Europe back together”.

and stabilize the new neighborhood created by the 2004 enlargement in order to prevent the EU from “importing instability” and cross-border crime. Bringing peace and stability to the region, however, would only be possible by increasing the number of democracies. Acknowledging that this is a burdensome task, the European Union offered juicy carrots such as offering a stake in the Internal Market to stimulate the neighboring countries to undertake political (as well as economic) reforms. In other words, liberal democracy, just like in the membership process, would become a prerequisite for a beneficial partnership with the EU.

### **III. From Western Europe to Mittel Europa:**

Regardless of the debates over the merits or perils of eastern enlargement, there was one reality to be acknowledged: that the locus of power had moved from Western Europe, spearheaded by France and (to a lesser extent) United Kingdom to what came to be called Mittel Europa, led by Germany and its eastern counterparts. As the geographical distribution of member states significantly shifted to the east, foreign policy priorities also changed direction. Of course, here one should mention the bargaining power of member states in the EU and particularly of those new member states, which ties back to the theoretical framework explained in the previous chapter.

Moravcsik’s contribution to the literature includes bargaining patterns in the EU. In a number of writings, Moravcsik argues that the balance of bargaining power between members and candidate countries changes once candidates become members. During the negotiation process, “applicant countries have consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-à-vis their EU partners, and accordingly have conceded much in exchange for membership.”<sup>85</sup> This is because of the simple fact that applicant countries have much to lose if they choose to leave the table, which in return gives substantial leverage to the EU members which try to reap the most concessions out of the applicants. Moravcsik states that this “simple logic of asymmetrical interdependence – those who benefit the most from a policy must sacrifice the most on

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<sup>85</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, (2003), “National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement”, *Perspectives*, Vol. 19, pp. 22.

the margin – is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations.”<sup>86</sup> However, he continues to argue that “membership effectively reverses the power relationship between core and peripheral members of the EU.”<sup>87</sup> In other words, once candidates become full members, they are elevated to an equal status with the rest of their counterparts and reap the institutional benefits of membership, i.e. the right to use their veto power and the ability to form opposing blocks in the Council. As we will show in the following pages, this approach can be best observed in the execution of the European Neighborhood Policy.

Undoubtedly, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has evolved over the years with the contributions of both Mediterranean partners and European members. However, what it has evolved into was, to a great extent, determined by the 2004 initiative of the European Commission. This literally meant a change in the European Union’s perception of its periphery, now including the region beyond the eastern border as well as that of the south and therefore looking at the region with a wider spectrum. We have given the technical similarities and differences of this new perspective from the then 10-year-old Barcelona Process in Chapter 2.

In the post-2007 period, of the current 27 members of the EU, almost 50%<sup>88</sup> of them belong to the central and eastern European region. When we look at the subject from intergovernmentalist lenses, this is a significant number in terms of being able to influence decisions on regional policies, foremost of which was the European Neighborhood Policy. Indeed, what we observe is that although the Commission proposal was aimed at coupling the Barcelona Process with a new policy tool to engage with the eastern neighbors, the preferences of member states resulted in a virtual clash between the so-called “southerners” versus “easterners”, both of which continue to try to shift the focus of the ENP in line with their own priorities. In other words, although the ENP is a larger umbrella to embrace the entire neighborhood –both east and south-, member state preferences are able to blur this vision and distort the objectives of the

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<sup>86</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Bargaining Among Unequals: The Future of European Integration”, *The New Presence*, Summer 2003, pp. 6.

<sup>87</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, (2003), “National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement”, *Perspectives*, Vol. 19, pp. 27.

<sup>88</sup> Germany, Austria and Poland being the largest three, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

ENP according to their positions. Moreover, the ENP becomes the battle ground for the everlasting Franco-German rivalry in the Union, two core countries which try to exert the most influence over the European integration process. The rest of the chapter will lay down these positions and analyze its impact over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

#### **IV. The EU member states of the East: Apathy towards the South:**

The Mediterranean has always been an important sea for Europe – especially after the southern enlargements of the EU in 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Spain and Portugal). With the accession of these countries, the EU became neighbors with North African countries, which were home to anti-democratic regimes, high crime rates and low economic profiles. Engaging with this part of the world was therefore a must for the EU to protect its own territory both economically and demographically. Moreover, as a country with a colonial history, France also had a stake in the region. Because of its legacy, it was almost a historical duty for France to embrace North Africa, an understanding that unintentionally coupled the country with its southern Mediterranean counterpart Spain to embark upon a policy instrument to tackle the region. This was, however, an objective to be realized only after 1991, when the Union decided to adopt a political character with Maastricht Treaty. As we have explained in Chapter 2, France and Spain were the two countries that gave shape and direction to this neighborhood project, starting in the early 1990s and institutionalized in 1995.

This was not an easy task, however, for there were already diverging opinions within the Union. Germany was the foremost member state that objected to such a foreign policy initiative. Indeed, as early as 1996, the Nordic governments of the EU, including Germany, addressed the Barcelona Process, saying that “The Baltic Sea is just as European as the Mediterranean Sea.”<sup>89</sup> This is an important juncture for the then nascent political Union, for it had revealed that it was impossible for it to have a united stance on foreign policy matters. Indeed, this was manifested when the Baltic States Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland,

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<sup>89</sup> “Towards a New Ostpolitik? Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia”, speech by Minister of State Erler at Georgetown University in Washington, Washington DC, 7 February 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

Russia and Sweden summoned in May 1996 “to strengthen regional cooperation and stimulate regional trade,”<sup>90</sup> around a common document entitled as the Visby Charter. Here, one should note that it was this historical cooperation between the then eastern “candidates” and Germany that survived until and beyond 2004. In fact, the ratification of the Barcelona Process was contingent upon satisfying German preference by promising the prospect of membership for its eastern clients.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, our intergovernmentalist assumptions on package deals in the EU hold with respect to the Barcelona Process – to pass the Barcelona Declaration, the proponent countries had to negotiate with Germany. To gain Germany’s consent, they assured the country that the eastern enlargement process would move swiftly.

By 2004, when the EU embarked upon the Wider Europe initiative, it was almost self-evident that such a foreign policy tool was designed specifically to handle the eastern dimension of European neighborhood, since the Barcelona Process was already in working condition. For this reason it was a golden opportunity for Germany to exert its influence over the region. As a country that has the highest population and GDP, the second largest foreign affairs service and the third largest military structure, Germany was certainly one of the largest countries of the EU, which gave it a very high level of action capacity.<sup>92</sup> This characteristic of Germany, coupled with its historical role as the patron of ex-Soviet states would make the country the perfect locomotive to tailor the ENP in such a way that this foreign policy tool would have a preferential position towards the east.

This understanding soon became an apparent policy direction, as in 2006 German Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that there was a “need for a new approach towards the EU’s eastern neighbors.”<sup>93</sup> However, given the progress of the countries that are included in the ENP, this proposal is highly biased. As displayed in Table 1 in Chapter 2 (page 21), many of Germany’s immediate neighbors Moldova

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Michael Dauderstaedt (2003), “The impact of EU Enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership”, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Paper*, pp. 6.

<sup>92</sup> Baldur Thorhallsson, “The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives”, *European Integration*, March 2006, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 7-31.

<sup>93</sup> “German foreign minister calls for a new EU approach towards the East”, *EurActiv*, 4 September 2006.



and Ukraine have already adopted their Action Plans as early as 2005<sup>94</sup>, whereas many of the EMP countries such as Lebanon still wait for the European Union to adopt the Action Plans agreed in 2004. As of July 2007, Algeria is still waiting for the ENP country report that would be transformed into its Action Plan; Egypt is still framing its own Action Plan with the EU and Syria is way behind, trying to ratify the Association Agreement inherited from the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.

This is an important picture to analyze, since whereas the Mediterranean countries have been engaging with the European Union for the past 12 years, many of them fall behind the new neighbors introduced by the ENP just three years ago. The new neighbors of the European Union were able to draft and sign their APs by 2005, that is, only one year after their acknowledgment as “new members”, whereas the Mediterranean neighbors are still at the stage of framing their APs, such as Egypt. In other words, the time span devoted to bringing the eastern neighbors into the EU neighborhood framework is much shorter than that of the Mediterranean neighbors. What this illuminates is that the EU devotes significant attention and political will to the east at the expense of the south. To flourish and legitimize the ENP, therefore, it has to pay even more attention, both politically and economically, to bring the Mediterranean partners back on track. The Union has to provide the EMP with the necessary willingness to encourage its MPCs to continue with political and economic reforms. Germany, on the other hand, begs to differ.

Traditionally, the member state who holds the presidency frames the policy priorities of the entire Union, and these priorities often overlap with the individual priorities of that president member state. To nobody’s surprise, therefore, Germany’s EU Presidency signaled an increased willingness and power to push for the eastern dimension of the ENP at the expense of the south. Indeed, in one of her interviews the Commissioner for External Relations, Benito Ferrero-Waldner stated that “Brussels will thrust to boost the eastern wing of the ENP in line with the upcoming German EU presidency’s policy priorities.”<sup>95</sup> Similarly, in a CER Briefing Note, Barysch underlines that “Berlin will try to direct EU foreign policy towards the EU’s eastern

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<sup>94</sup> Except for Belarus, which severely suffers from anti-democratic governance.

<sup>95</sup> “EU swings focus onto ex-Soviet neighbors”, *EUObserver*, 4 December 2006.

neighborhood.”<sup>96</sup> In fact, the Merkel administration was eager enough to propose an ENP-plus<sup>97</sup> that would be framed by the Commission, particularly designed for Germany’s priority neighbors, Georgia, Moldova, “and lately even Belarus” as well as Ukraine with the latter having an apparent membership prospect that is supported by Germany. ENP-plus argues that the states which are more willing than others should enjoy greater benefits as well as juicier carrots.<sup>98</sup> Of course, the argument of willingness here is a subjective one, depending on whose eyes one looks at the neighboring countries. Moreover, such a policy proposal clearly ranks ENP states among each other, causing discontent and competition. Because of its inherent and clear subjectivity, Mediterranean countries of the Union and most notably Spain disagreed with the proposal, which removed the proposal from Berlin’s agenda.<sup>99</sup>

Nevertheless, these disagreements did not stop Germany from clearly pronouncing its own perception of the ENP. Soon after the country took the presidency in January 1, 2007, during a speech the Minister of State Gernot Erler gave at Georgetown University states that “the regional priority of the German EU Presidency is to expand the European area of security and stability. To this end, we intend to devote particular attention to the EU’s relations with its neighbors to the east.”<sup>100</sup> Controlling migration as well as transforming and modernizing the post-Soviet region, Erler says, are the components of their agenda of “strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy.”<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Katinka Barysch, “What To Expect from the German Presidency?”, *CER Briefing Note*, January 2007, pp. 4.

<sup>97</sup> The commission's ENP-plus will suggest a second new fund of €700 million to help neighbourhood states co-fund borrowing from the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with Brussels hoping member states will top up its €700 million to €7 billion.

Brussels is also set to propose a new multilateral diplomatic structure for the six ex-Soviet states covered by the ENP on the model of the Barcelona Process, which has tried to improve relations with Mediterranean rim states as a group since it was put in place in 1995. Source: Andrew Rettman, “Morocco and Jordan lead EU ‘neighborhood’ pack”, *EUObserver*, 21 November 2006.

<sup>98</sup> Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, “European Neighborhood Policy Two Years On: Time indeed for an ‘ENP plus’”, *CEPS Policy Brief*, March 2006, No. 126, pp 1.

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<sup>100</sup> “Towards a New Ostpolitik? Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia”, speech by Minister of State Erler at Georgetown University in Washington, Washington DC, 7 February 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

This is an immensely important example to show the perception of the German administration towards the ENP. As we mentioned earlier, although the ENP was introduced to bring the southern and eastern (and northern, for that matter) dimensions of European neighborhood under a common umbrella, the developments taking place since 2004 created a false illusion that the ENP was specific to the eastern neighborhood. Erler's statement of "strengthening the ENP", therefore, points to that illusion – throughout his speech, he does not mention the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP.

Nevertheless, German Presidency did tackle the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by preparing a ministerial level conference on higher education and scientific research. Convened in June 2007 – just two weeks prior to handing the seat to Portugal – the meeting embarked upon a project towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area. The final document of this meeting, the so-called Cairo Declaration, stated that it was necessary to increase the standards in education and research across the MENA region by approximating the system to that of the EU's as well as modernizing research and development policies in the MPCs.<sup>102</sup> In addition to the Cairo meeting, in May and June 2007 Berlin hosted the first rounds of Euro-Med Youth Parliament, as well as preparing a conference on Employment and Social Dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the civil society aspect of the EMP<sup>103</sup>.

Although Germany should be given credit for such initiatives, the timing and the substance of them generate questions about the political and material willingness of the country toward boosting the relations with the Euro-Med partners. This becomes an even more critical point given the fact that it was a fellow member state, Spain, whose enclaves along the Moroccan coastline Ceuta and Melilla were raided by illegal migrants less than a year ago. News reveals that in 2005 alone "more than 12,000 have attempted to enter Melilla in the hope of getting that foothold in Spain."<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> "Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area" (Cairo Declaration), *First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research*, Cairo, 18 June 2007. Retrieved from the German Presidency website <http://www.bmbf.de>

<sup>103</sup> "Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy: Presidency Progress Report", *General Affairs and External Relations Council*, 18 and 19 June 2007, pp. 5.

<sup>104</sup> "EU Outposts turn into fortresses", *BBC News*, 29 September 2005.

This reality points toward a significant failure of the EMP in terms of securing the borders of the European Union and managing good neighborly relations with imminent countries in the south. Given the fact that Frontex, the EU's Border Control Agency established in 2005, is located in Warsaw contributes to this failure. Analysts rightly argue that there is "concern about whether guards from one part of Europe would really be fit to tell another country's border guards."<sup>105</sup> This is yet another important signal for how the EU conceptualizes its "neighborhood" – evidently for securing borders, priority is given to the east. Unfortunately, German Presidency followed this trend of keeping aloof from the Mediterranean problems as the preceding two other disinterested countries – Austria and Finland did. On the other hand, Germany's Strengthening the European Neighborhood: Presidency Progress Report reveals that the presidency has held many rounds with Ukraine on the negotiations over an Enhanced Agreement, "which should be considered as a flagship project for the enhanced ENP."<sup>106</sup> Moreover, during the German Presidency Action Plans with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were being implemented, and they concluded negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Ukraine and Moldova.<sup>107</sup> As these examples show, given the migratory pressures directed to the EU from its southern borders, the tightened relations with the eastern neighbors can only be explained by the policy priorities of the German Presidency. This is, without a doubt, the by-product of the country being one of the foremost engines of the European integration project.

It should be noted, however, that Germany was certainly not alone in supporting the eastern dimension of the ENP. Many of the new members, notably Poland in particular, supported the ENP, once again falsely perceiving that the ENP was solely an eastern-oriented neighborhood initiative.<sup>108</sup> The reason behind Poland's support to the ENP, however, is more ideational than material. It is the post-Cold War rationale, namely to pull "Christian nations into the EU away from the Russian sphere of

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<sup>105</sup> "Migrant clashes expose EU shortcomings", *EUObserver*, 4 October 2005.

<sup>106</sup> "Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy: Presidency Progress Report", *General Affairs and External Relations Council*, 18 and 19 June 2007, pp. 3.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>108</sup> Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2003), "The New Neighbors – A Framework for Relations, Proposals from Poland", cited in Madalena Meyer-Resende, "The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on the Barcelona Process", *EuroMeSCo Paper*, No. 38, November 2004, pp. 5.

influence”<sup>109</sup>, that formulates the Polish preference. Here, one can point out two ideational factors. First, there is a clear statement that Poland prefers the patronage of the EU over that of Russia. Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, there is a religious preference in it. This is a very critical point in terms of handling the Barcelona Process, simply because the MPCs are predominantly Muslim. Put differently, a Christian approach towards the ENP distorts the objectives behind the policy and paves the way for discrimination against the Muslim-populated countries of the Mediterranean.

This approach is not peculiar to Poland, though. The Lithuanians, the Slovaks and the Hungarians, “the countries with minorities in the Eastern countries, and stronger cultural and historical roots with the Eastern neighbors”<sup>110</sup> display a strong Christian identity, which contribute to the Polish position and tie back to the German policy of prioritization within the Wider Europe Framework. Lithuania in particular, for instance, is yet another example of how the ENP is misperceived. Prior to the visit of the US President to Brussels in 2005, ten EU members were chosen to address ten big policy issues to the President to avoid the meeting become a shouting match. In this arrangement, Lithuania was left out of the club of ten. Resenting the arrangement, a Lithuanian diplomat stated that they were still planning to raise the EU’s neighborhood policy. Ironically, Spain *was* in the chosen ten, which was assigned to address the Barcelona Process!<sup>111</sup> Although we do not have clear information about who assigned these topics to member states (was it the Commission or the free will of member state diplomats themselves? – If the former was the planner, then there is an even larger problem with the communication of the ENP to the EU), it is apparent that the ENP falls short of explaining its *raison d’être* to the constituency of the European Union, therefore weakening the possibility of strengthening the Euro-Med partnership. For the misrepresentation and therefore the misperception of the ENP causes member states, and mostly those situated in the east, to decouple its southern dimension from its eastern counterpart.

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., pp. 5.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., pp. 5.

<sup>111</sup> “EU prepares carefully managed summit with US”, *EUObserver*, 17 February 2005.

The reason why we concentrate on these minor powers of the EU such as Slovakia, Hungary or Lithuania should be traced in Moravcsik's bargaining explanation, which, as mentioned earlier, argues that these smaller countries increase their bargaining power against other members once they become members themselves. In line with this argument, the fact that these countries support the "easternization" of the ENP vis-à-vis its Mediterranean dimension contribute to Polish and ultimately to German positions, albeit for different reasons. In other words, these countries, although minor in themselves, bolster Germany's position and therefore make Germany even more powerful against other member states which support a more even-handed approach towards the EU's neighborhood.

Of course, it should be acknowledged that the geographical and historical distances between the *Mittel Europa* and the Mediterranean cause such a lack of association across the member states and partner countries. As one Polish observer of the EU says: "The Mediterranean, seen from most of the EU's new member states is a distant sea...It is a struggle to get our domestic politicians to take an interest in salient EU related issues let alone something they consider to be esoteric as a policy aimed at creating 'a region of peace, stability and prosperity' in the Mediterranean."<sup>112</sup> This, however, should not distort the definition and principles of the ENP, which tries to reach all the neighbors, regardless of their geographical position. Unfortunately this is not yet achieved, causing the eastern members to push for the ENP, although what they are really doing is to push its eastern dimension at the expense of diluting that of the south. Establishing Frontex in Warsaw, for example, is a clear demonstration of this perception. The proponents of the Mediterranean dimension, that is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, on the other hand, try to counterbalance this misperception that is produced and reproduced by the eastern camp. Spearheaded by France, this brings back the historical Franco-German axis in the process of European integration. Whereas "traditionally, the motor of EU initiatives has been the bilateral relationship

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<sup>112</sup> Krzysztof Bobinski, (2004), "European Enlargement and the Barcelona Process" in Andreas Jacobs (ed.), *Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation: enlarging and widening the perspective*, Zentrum für Europäeische Integrationforschung Discussion Paper No. 131, cited in Kaczynski et. al., "Political Scenarios for the EU and Its Neighborhood – Views from Selected Southern Mediterranean Countries and Eastern European Countries", *EuroMeCSO Paper* No. 60, October 2006, pp.12.

between France and Germany,”<sup>113</sup> it is observed that on the subject of foreign policy the “core” EU countries significantly diverge from each other, therefore weakening the EU at large.

#### **V. The EU member states of the south: Pulling the EMP back in?**

Although the Barcelona Process is a genuine Spanish initiative, it received significant political support from France, which, as mentioned earlier, has historical ties with the MENA countries. Using this foreign policy initiative to bolster its own position in the EU— supporting the EMP would mean attracting the entire Mediterranean rim of the EU to its side – France became a natural opponent of Germany, which was simultaneously lobbying for the ex-Soviet candidate countries of the east. Indeed, soon after the 2005 events in Ceuta and Melilla and only a few weeks before the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, the French and Spanish presidents came together in a meeting, where President Chirac stated that “illegal immigration...it’s not a Spanish problem, nor moreover is it a Moroccan one, it’s a European one.”<sup>114</sup> During the meeting, President Chirac declared: “We are wholeheartedly supporting our Spanish friends’ initiative and effort in this Euro-Mediterranean area, particularly at a time when the new European budget is going to come in with the neighborhood initiative taking over.”<sup>115</sup> This was a most apparent reply to the rather disinterested EU Presidency at the time but also to those countries in the east, first and foremost Germany, which turned a blind eye to the Mediterranean neighborhood that became prey to massive illegal migratory pressures. It was also the re-manifestation of the Franco-Spanish collaboration for the strengthening of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Moreover, the French President underlined the necessity of keeping the budgetary balance by putting a relatively more emphasis on the Mediterranean – that the two thirds of the ENP budget should be devoted to the Mediterranean and the rest to the

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<sup>113</sup> Heather Grabbe and Ulrike Guerot, “Could a Hard Core Run the Enlarged EU?”, *CER Briefing Note*, February 2004, pp. 1.

<sup>114</sup> “Statements made by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, during his joint press conference with Mr Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, President of the Government of Spain”, *18<sup>th</sup> Franco-Spanish Summit*, Paris, 10 November 2005. Retrieved from <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

former Soviet Union countries.<sup>116</sup> This warning, however, did not find enough support in the EU: for the 2007-2013 budgetary period, €3,64 per capita is decided to be spent for the eastern countries of the ENP whereas the amount drops to €3,34 per capita for its Mediterranean counterparts.<sup>117</sup> One should not be confused by such a small gap, though: the difference on the whole becomes ca. €150 million, which is more than three times the financial assistance given to Lebanon between 1995-2003<sup>118</sup>. Numbers do not lie – the economic bias towards the eastern dimension constrains the MENA countries which try to survive in a region that gets messier by the day.

Spain, on the other hand, which stands out as the admiral of the EMP was not reluctant to show how worrisome it was soon after the 2004 enlargement. The fact that the country stands the closest to North Africa and has territory, albeit small, in the region makes it the most sensitive member in the EU with respect to the Union's attitude towards its backyard, especially at a time when the EU massively enlarged to the east. Indeed, it was this rationale in mind when in November 2005, that is only six months after the enlargement, by a joint declaration with France, Portugal and Italy, Spain underlined the necessity of strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its Foreign Minister; Miguel Angel Moratinos stated that “the Mediterranean should not be a forgotten sea.”<sup>119</sup>

This position is supported by Italy, when one of the country's MEP, Pasqualina Napolitano said in 2005 that “the Mediterranean represents for Europe, even more today than before, an absolute priority.”<sup>120</sup>

Napolitano's statement was preemptively complemented in 2003 by those of George Papandreou, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told in the EMP Midterm Conference: “Europe's development cannot be completed only with the deepening and the enlargement towards the East and the North. We need to have a close link with the

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> “EU swings focus onto ex-Soviet neighbors”, *EUObserver*, 4 December 2006.

<sup>118</sup> Retrieved from the European Commission Website on Lebanon, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/lebanon\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/lebanon_en.htm).

<sup>119</sup> “EU-four call for focus on Mediterranean”, *EUObserver*, 4 October 2004.

<sup>120</sup> “Helping Europe's southern neighbors take a leap forward”, *European Voice*, 12 May 2005, Vol. 11, No. 18.



Mediterranean area and safeguard values such as peace, safety, human rights in the wider area.”<sup>121</sup> During the Midterm Conference jointly organized with Italy, Greece underlined the necessity of focusing on the Middle East and reviving the Barcelona Process, which is “a priority for enlarged Europe.”<sup>122</sup>

As one can see until here, therefore, Mediterranean countries show a determined commitment towards the EMP, which brings them next to their core partner, i.e. France and simultaneously puts them against the eastern members of the EU, spearheaded by Germany and to a lesser extent, Poland. In the end, however, such a polarization within the Union on foreign policy preferences is translated into a weakened and forgotten EMP first by the Commission’s proposal for establishing a Wider European area which had a strong eastern essence in it and then by the preferences of subsequent President countries – Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain, Austria, Finland and Germany – most of which did not have stakes in a common Mediterranean policy. We hope to see a change in this trend by the current Presidency to be held by the Portuguese until January 2008.

Indeed, the Portuguese road map does concentrate on the southern dimension of the ENP. In his program presentation address in the European Parliament, Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates underlines how Portugal will prioritize the relations with the Mediterranean in order to “overcome some of the blockages in fundamental areas such as the management of migratory flows.”<sup>123</sup> Nevertheless, it should still be realized that presidencies come and go, but policies stay intact – to revive the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU has to have a political agenda that exists beyond the short-term preferences of president countries. The Commission, in that regard, plays a key role: it should be able to set an agenda that will not only be acceptable by the member states but also propose policies in such a way that they will have their own dynamics in the

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<sup>121</sup> “Greek FM Papandreu speaks on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, Midterm Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Crete, 26 May 2003. Retrieved from European Union Website.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Speech by Prime Minister Jose Socrates, *Presentation of the Programme of the Portuguese Presidency*, Strasbourg, 11 July 2007.

future once they are implemented and will be able to work rather independently from the rotating presidencies.

## **VI. Britain: the Outsider:**

In this dichotomous setting that divides the EU along the Franco-German axis; Britain stands out as a critical case, not least because it is historically a rather low-profile player in the Union. Although it is one of the strongest member states, it is noticeable that Britain mostly preferred to stay in the margins of the EU integration process. This trend did not change with the EU foreign policy either. With respect to the EMP, Britain did support the Spanish initiative in 1995 and it also took part in the organization of the Euro-Med Partnership's tenth anniversary, but nothing concrete went beyond these acts of good will. In fact, the reason why the country pays particular attention to the MENA might be traced in its "dangerous liaisons" with its Atlantic ally, the United States. As the flagship of the Atlantic alliance in the Continent, Britain prioritizes its regional preferences to the south, since building up good relations contributes to the democratization and stability in the region, which is in and of itself an important policy priority for the United States administration. In other words, British support seems to be contingent upon its own bilateral relations with the US administration, which blurs the country's unbiased, impartial commitment to the Union's own policy agenda for the region.

Evidence seems to concur: in a 2005 speech, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Jack Straw states that the region needs special attention to spread democracy and reduce poverty as well as threat. However, the route he chooses brings in the country's transatlantic links: "I am determined that the United Kingdom play our full part in uniting Europe and the United States in a single common purpose, supporting modernization and reform in the Middle East,"<sup>124</sup> putting Britain farther away from its Continental counterparts, who have already expressed their disappointment in Britain for aligning with the US unilaterally in the 2003 Iraqi operation. Therefore, Britain's commitment to its transatlantic partner dilutes the political will it directs to the Spanish initiative, which dampens the presently weakened Euro-Med partnership. From a

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<sup>124</sup> "Straw democracy speech in full", *BBC News*, 10 March 2005.

European perspective, this might be translated into Britain's historical preference to sustain a calm relationship with the French as well.

Nevertheless, the individual initiative of Britain should be alarming for the entire European Union community, for it concentrates a specific effort on the Middle East. When we look at the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, we observe that its Middle Eastern dimension is missing, in spite of the fact that the EMP is the only platform where Israel and the Palestinian Authority are brought together. In fact, this might well be the most important weakness of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – losing a historical chance to bring the crisis to an end by building economic, political and cultural ties with these partner countries. Despite the Barcelona Declaration's ambitions principles agreed in 1995, the EU member states act reluctantly when it comes to working for the Middle East – except for Britain, which has its own reasons in line with its bilateral relations with the third countries. Following the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, the *sine die* deferral of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability in 2000<sup>125</sup>, which might have been a monumental document to drive the EMP forward by generating confidence and trust across the region, shows how the lack of political will dampens the long term objectives of the EMP. Rather than utilizing the EMP to promote peace in the Middle East, putting it aside until peace is brought by a *deus ex machina* undoubtedly decreases the relative reputation the EU enjoys in the region.

Moreover, how the Israelis and the Palestinians perceive the EU efforts add up to its weakness as an impartial policy instrument. “According to 60% of the Israelis, Europe rarely or never condemns Palestinian violence. Israel also has repeatedly accused the EU of funding Palestinian terrorism.”<sup>126</sup> Similarly, Palestinians also resent the EU for it turned a blind eye to Israel's manipulation of custom accounts and fell short of deterring them.<sup>127</sup> Such accusations from both sides tell that the EU is unable to

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<sup>125</sup> “Presidency's formal conclusions”, *Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers*, Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000. Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/conf/marseilles/conclusions\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/marseilles/conclusions_en.pdf).

<sup>126</sup> Nathalie Tocci, “The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, *CEPS Working Documents*, January 2005, No. 217, pp.13.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.14.

build up an impartial reputation in the eye of its Middle Eastern partners, which might indirectly alter its perception by its Arab partners in the Mediterranean, ultimately causing a lack of confidence in the EMP.

Today, the main EU contribution to the recovery of the Middle East is done through the Quartet<sup>128</sup>, where it takes part with the US, the UN and Russia. This also reveals that the EMP cannot become an in-depth foreign policy tool for the European Union and at best stand as an individualistic, minor and naïve attempt to embrace the region as a whole. To nobody's surprise, given the 2004 enlargement and the positions of the new member states towards it, there is even a tinier possibility for the EMP to play a significant role in the region.

Is this the end of the road for the EMP, then? This chapter has explained so far the black clouds the new member states brought over the Barcelona Process; the meager efforts of Western / Southern European members of the EU which did not go beyond rhetoric; the outlier cases in the EU such as Britain that undermines the Franco-Spanish efforts to boost the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP by unilaterally focusing on the Middle East; and that the EMP is already at a disadvantage for it have been unable to have a well-established Middle Eastern policy agenda in the first place. The final chapter of this thesis will tackle the recent developments taking place in the EU and try to reach some conclusions about the future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

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<sup>128</sup> Also known as the Diplomatic Quartet (on the Middle East), the four parties released a common statement in July 2002 to reach a two-state solution in the Middle East by 2005. The Quartet's 2003 road map aims to reach a viable, lasting solution to end the Arab-Israeli crisis and thus bring stability to the region, although this road map has not been realized yet. The Quartet, whose Special Envoy is the recently resigned British PM Tony Blair, meets regularly at senior levels to discuss the situation in the region. It can be argued that the four adds visibility and credibility to the efforts to resolve the crisis in the Middle East. See the United Nations website [www.un.org](http://www.un.org) and [www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/c9963.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/c9963.htm) to read the statements made by the Quartet between 2002-2007.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

What we have observed so far is that the European Union's Mediterranean policy has greatly suffered from the 2004 enlargement and consequently, from the domination of the east. Complementing that ongoing trend in the Union, the year 2007 witnessed the completion of the foreseeable eastern enlargement of the European Union by extending accession to Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, this latest wave of enlargement brought the EU to the shores of the Black Sea, which is yet another region that needs special attention because of its natural resources and critical countries surrounding it such as Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In other words, there emerged another dimension for the ENP to tackle, which in return carries the possibility of devoting lesser to that of the south. On the other hand, however, 2007 also saw the emergence of a much stronger and determined France with the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy to the presidential post in May. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to understand his idea of a "Union of the Mediterranean" he proposed recently. Our aim will be to evaluate whether France can really bring the Mediterranean dimension back on the agenda or not.

President Sarkozy first uttered his idea of creating a Mediterranean Union during a campaign speech in February 2007. Although it was just one of the proposals he made during his candidacy, this project of a "Club-Med" immediately became a top item in his European agenda. Of course, there are many obvious reasons for such a ground breaking proposal. First, it is the tacit manifestation of the country's discontent with the European Neighborhood Policy that virtually forgot its Mediterranean commitments since 2004. As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, France has a clear policy priority with respect to the southern neighbors. However, the fact that the current policy arrangements ignore that part of the neighborhood forced the French to come up with their own policy.

This brings us to the second reason, which is the explicit distrust of the French towards the EU's present foreign policy instruments. Although the country was the backbone of European integration for many decades, Sarkozy believed and convinced his constituency that the European foreign policy was unresponsive to its preferences,

which signals a deep crack in the EU's deepening process among its very own members. Rather than improving the present structure, trying to establish its own policy instrument signals that distrust between members. Furthermore, the fact that this proposal was made at a time when Germany was framing its ENP-plus<sup>129</sup> signaled that France was ready to confront Germany.

Thirdly, the Club-Med initiative was a way of bringing France back in the *Kerneuropa*. Indeed, Sarkozy revealed the new French position quite clearly, when he stated during his victory speech that “tonight, France is back in Europe.”<sup>130</sup> In other words by establishing its own foreign policy tool the French would not only have the opportunity to leave the ENP scheme, but it would also show that the EU was “unable” and that it would be the French which could make it stand up again. In short, the French proposal hit many birds with one stone.

Simply put, what the Club-Med project aims at is to create an enhanced Barcelona Process – just like the German ENP-plus – that would bolster the EU commitments in the south, notably in the area of illegal migration. “The ‘Club-Med’ countries would form a council and hold regular summits under a rotating presidency. Sarkozy’s aides talked of setting up a Mediterranean investment bank modeled on the European one.”<sup>131</sup> As one can see, the proposal is still a loose project, but it introduces concrete novelties such as the investment bank, which would release the southern neighborhood from its ENP chains if it was implemented.

The Club-Med proposal soon received attention by other pro-south members as well as the partners of the EMP, such as Spain, Italy and Israel.<sup>132</sup> Although it is quite a positive development for the future of EU-Mediterranean relations, it still arises questions as to whether this can really be the initiative the Euro-Med partnership so desperately needs.

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<sup>129</sup> Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, “A little clarification, please, on the ‘Union of the Mediterranean’”, *CEPS Commentary*, 8 June 2007.

<sup>130</sup> “Sarkozy: ‘France is back in Europe’”, *EurActiv*, 7 May 2007.

<sup>131</sup> “Sarko’s ‘Club Med’ makes regional waves”, *Times Online*, 20 May 2007.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.* See also the statements made by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, during his joint press briefing with Mr Romano Prodi, Italian Prime Minister following their meeting, 28 May 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>.

First of all, as mentioned earlier, Sarkozy's Union of the Mediterranean is still a vaguely defined proposal. It gives the feeling as if it was uttered in a matter of moments, without thinking about the background conditions upon which such an initiative will be contingent. For instance, if Sarkozy wants to establish the Union within the EU framework, then he will need to search for a rather large consensus base. Is this possible? Germany, for instance, recently stated that "We must be careful not to inject competition between the one and the other with our policies of neighborliness."<sup>133</sup> Given the eastern position and the British reluctance toward the possibility of an all-powerful France, it seems unlikely that such a heroic proposal will receive enough support.

Secondly, as some analysts also point out, Sarkozy's plan does not mention its good old predecessor, the Barcelona Process.<sup>134</sup> Even though his idea is to do exactly what the Barcelona Summit in 1995 set out to do (but could not) only with more attractive carrots this time, him turning a blind eye to the previous efforts signal that Sarkozy might not be all-benevolent in his endeavors. In other words, the real intention behind the French plan might be to make France a more central and dominant player in the EU even by kicking Spain to the side, rather than a selfless one that tries to channel resources to create an area of "peace, stability and prosperity." Given Sarkozy's previous statements on France, it is highly likely that the country stands on the former line.<sup>135</sup>

Third, there is the everlasting dilemma of the Middle East – should the Mediterranean Union include the countries of the Middle East or simply turn its back to them? This is, without a doubt, contingent upon the amount of political and economic effort that France is willing to spend in the foreseeable future. Given the state of the

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<sup>133</sup> "Germany cautious on Sarkozy's Mediterranean bloc plan", *EUbusiness*, 5 July 2007.

<sup>134</sup> Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, "A little clarification, please, on the 'Union of the Mediterranean'", *CEPS Commentary*, 8 June 2007.

<sup>135</sup> In a speech given in July 2007, Sarkozy says: "From time immemorial, France has been herself, France has been great, and France has been strong only when she stood at Europe's centre of gravity..." Nicolas Sarkozy, *Future of Europe*, Strasbourg, 2 July 2007.

Retrieved from [http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2007/sarkozy\\_eu\\_070207.asp](http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2007/sarkozy_eu_070207.asp)

French economy today, it seems likely that France will choose to divert its resources to its own population who suffers from high levels of unemployment than a distant region with which Britain and the United States have been engaged actively. Consequently, however, this reduces the Club Med's probability of success: as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is the inability and unwillingness of the Europeans to include the Middle East to their Mediterranean efforts that contribute to their failure. In other words, any initiative on the Mediterranean that excludes the Middle East is bound to failure. In that sense, the Sarkozy plan will need to be revised or simply erased off the agenda for it will not add a marginal benefit towards the EU-Mediterranean relations. In short, although Sarkozy's ambitious proposal stole the ENP's thunder and brought it back on Southern and Western Europe again, it seems to be that it will not be the golden instrument that will make France the flagship of Europe – nor will it be that instrument to miraculously change the course of the EU's relations with its southern neighbors.

“There are fears amongst the Mediterranean countries that our expansion will create new dividing lines to the detriment of relations between us. On the contrary, we believe that enlargement will translate into a renewed European contribution to peace, stability, and prosperity along our common borders”<sup>136</sup>, stated Chris Patten, the then Commissioner for External Relations in his 2003 speech during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. In a nutshell, this thesis have defended that Mr Patten was wrong. The eastern enlargement have eroded the Barcelona Process first by putting substantial emphasis on the New Neighborhood Policy, thereby leaving the EMP alone and second, by shifting the focus of power in the EU to the east, where the members are simply not interested in a distant sea. However, we have stated above that a possible French attempt to establish a brand new Mediterranean Union does not help the EMP to grow from its ashes either.

What does the EMP need, then? As several experts argue<sup>137</sup>, the EMP needs the differentiation of the ENP. In other words, an EMP that is almost forcefully integrated

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<sup>136</sup> “The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A longstanding partnership”, *EUFocus*, May 2004, No. 1, Vol. 1.

<sup>137</sup> For some examples, see Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, “European Neighborhood Policy Two Years On: Time indeed for an ‘ENP plus’”, *CEPS Policy Brief*, March 2006, No. 126. Richard Youngs, “Europe's flawed approach



to the pro-eastern ENP does not, and cannot, work in the context of neighborliness; for the EU is not only home to diverse policy priorities but also different regions have different problems to tackle. In exchange for insisting on such an “all inclusive” umbrella, therefore, the EU can have different baskets of instruments to be used for different geographical areas under the ENP setting. This kind of a “diversified umbrella” would contribute greatly to the European Neighborhood Policy, for it would pave the way for a “multi-speed Europe” that the enlarged Union desperately needs in terms of dealing with external relations with third parties. While all neighboring countries would be classified as the building blocks of a Wider Europe, they would still get special treatment from the EU – from those according to their capabilities to those according to their needs.

In line with this, the EU has to allocate time, political will and economic benefits even-handedly between the east and the south. As we have mentioned earlier, the amount of funds allocated to the eastern neighbors is significantly higher than that of the southern neighbors. If the EU wants to increase the legitimacy of the ENP in the eyes of its Mediterranean partners, first it has to show that it is economically able and willing to cooperate with them. Furthermore, the fact that the eastern neighbors’ institutional integration to the ENP, (i.e. the adoption of their APs) was much faster than that of the Mediterranean partners also undermines the sustainability and credibility of the ENP. Therefore, what the EU should do is to boost the Mediterranean dimension by engaging intensely with the MPCs to speed up the process for their adoption of the Action Plans. We expect the Portuguese Presidency in the second half of 2007 to initiate such a project. It should be noted, however, that the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP can only be sustainable if the EU takes a united position to bring in the region as a top item in its foreign policy agenda.

Whatever the course of action it chooses to remedy discontent, only time will show whether the EU will be able to become an impartial neighbor to these non-members in question.

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to Arab democracy”, *CER Essays*, October 2006. Heather Grabbe, “How the EU should help its neighbours”, *CER Policy Brief*, June 2004.

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