# AN ANALYSIS OF FOUCAULT'S "INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGY"

## FOUCAULDIAN ARCHAEOLOGY AS A SEARCH FOR A NON-ANTHROPOLOGICAL VERSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL

by

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**Abstract**

Michel Foucault's relationship to several philosophers -whom Foucault himself declared openly his philosophical allegiances, such as Nietzsche, Marx or Heidegger- has been widely and repeatedly analyzed without much discord. His self proclaimed Kantianism on the other hand, starting particularly after his essay entitled "Qu'est-ce que la critique?" published in 1978, -in which Foucault provides his own interpretation of Kant's essay entitled "What is Enlightenment?"-, had been subjected to fierce criticisms. Primarily after Habermas' accusations Foucault's late return to Kant was mainly considered as an apologetic move, an inconsistent proclamation that does not fit well with the rest of his philosophical *oeuvre*; a sort of criticism which insists that this supposedly penitent move is an indication of Foucault finally realizing the dangers of ignoring to provide a normative background to his critical philosophy.

With the new evidence provided by the recent publication of Foucault's complementary doctoral thesis (1961) on Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, this work defends the opposite thesis and puts forward that Foucault's relationship to Kant is much more intricate than previously thought. His *Commentary* on Kant's *Anthropology* provides enough evidence suggesting that his first encounters with (and immanent criticism of) Kantian philosophy more or less defines the path Foucault's own critical thought will follow. This work argues that Foucauldian critical project is a continuation of Kant's critical enterprise, while transforming it, in order to leave as little room possible for the transcendental. Therefore, at least during his archaeological period Foucauldian philosophy can be thought of as a sincere struggle with Kant and the philosophical link between these two philosophers should not be discarded hastily.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology

**Özet**

Michel Foucault'nun felsefi bağlarını açıkça ortaya koyduğu Nietzsche, Marx ya da Heidegger gibi düşünürlerle olan ilişkisi, çok da aksi yönde bir iddia ortaya atılmadan, çokça üzerinde yazılan, düşünülen konular olmuştur. Ama özellikle 1978 yılında yayınladığı "Qu'est-ce que la critique?" yazısı ile kendisini Kantçı felsefenin varisi olarak göstermesi, başta Habermas olmak üzere birçok düşünürün tepkisini çekmiş, bu bildirge içten ve tutarlı bulunmamış ve Foucault'nun normatif temeller sağlayamadığı felsefesini Kantçı geleneğe sonradan neredeyse absürd bir şekilde bağlayarak eleştirilerden kendisini kurtarmaya çalıştığı iddia edilmiştir. Bu Kant'a geri dönüşün Foucault'nun temel felsefi görüşlerine tamamen ters düştüğü savunulmuştur.

Ama yakın zamanda gün ışığına çıkan Foucault'nun Kant'ın *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* adlı eserine bir giriş olarak yazdığı ikinci doktora tezi bize üstte sunulan ve Foucault ve Kant arasında ortaya konulabilecek tutarlı bir ilişkiyi doğrudan reddeden görüşü reddetmeye olanak sağlıyor. 1961 yılında, yani Kant'ı felsefeyi antropolojik bir uykuya mahkum etmekle suçladığı *The Order of Things* adlı eserinden yaklaşık 5 sene önce, Foucault bu ikinci doktora tezinde Kant ile olan felsefi ilişkisinin doğasını çok daha açık bir şekilde ortaya koyuyor. Hatta bu çalışma bize Foucault'nun kendi erken dönem felsefesinin yoğun bir şekilde Kant'tan etkilenerek şekillendirdiğini gösteriyor, ve bu iki düşünür arasındaki herhangi bir felsefi bağı daha en baştan silip atan düşünürlerin aksine, Foucault'nun düşüncesinin Kantçı geleneğin temelde bir devamı olduğunu, ve Foucault'nun Kant'ın düşüncesinde 1961 gibi erken bir zamanda gördüğü problemlerden kaçınmak için en azından kendi erken dönem felsefesini bu şekilde şekillendirdiğini bizlere gösteriyor.

Anahtar sözcükler: Michel Foucault, Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,

Introduction to Kant's Anthropology

Seçtiğim yolda, verdiğim kararlarda sevgisini ve desteğini hiçbir zaman esirgemeyen pek muhterem babam Mehmet Kobaş'a en derin hürmetlerimle…

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Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

### A- 1 "Foucault, a Kantian? Who […] is kidding whom?"[1]

Shortly before his death, in a series of lectures, interviews and essays[2] (most well-known of which poses a reflection on Kant's article entitled "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?") starting from early 1980s, Michel Foucault startlingly situated his critical philosophy under the lineage of Immanuel Kant, and proclaimed that under the split established by Kant in modern Western philosophy (dividing it into two camps[3]: 1-"analytics of truth -"philosophy as formal ontology of truth", or "critical analysis of knowledge"- and 2- "ontology of the present" –or, "historical ontology of ourselves-") his own works should be considered under the pole of the latter camp along with other members of the same line of thought, such as Fichte, Hegel, Comte, Weber, Nietzsche, Husserl and *Frankfurterschule*[4]. Considering Foucault's anti-humanist stand, his blatant criticism of the Enlightenment principles, and equally importantly, the nature of his treatment of Kant and Kantian philosophy, particularly in *The Order of Things* (chapters 7, 8 and 9), although praising him, in this text, for awaking philosophy from a dogmatic slumber only to accuse him, in return, for lulling it back, this time, to an anthropological sleep[5] (a philosophical anthropology

[1] Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, p. 284

[2] Also in an article he wrote for *Dictionnaire des Philosophes* under the entry that bears his own name, using a pseudonym "Maurice Florence", Foucault starts defining his own philosophy with these words: "To the extent that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his project could be called a Critical History of Thought."

[3] Foucault says, in the lecture delivered in Berkeley, in 1983, this split occurs not as a result of the *Critique* itself, but as a result of the way such questions "What are we now? What is our *actualité*?" are asked in Kant's "What is Enlightenment?", that is, the way that the *Critique* is instrumentalized toward the present, while the philosopher takes his distance as much as possible equipped with the knowledge that he is and his own reason are limited (thus finite) by the historical conditions of his present.

[4] Foucault, M. "The Political Technology of Individuals", in Technologies of the Self, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, The University of Massachusetts Pres, 1988, p. 145

[5] It is the belief that all the philosophy's questions, particularly the ones that Kant asked in his *Critique of Pure Reason* – respectively, 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What am I permitted to hope for? - in the end, could and should be wrapped around and referred to

formally "caught in the bind of treating 'man'"[6] –"Man", as the epistemic structure of modernity, and man, as the empirical content of that structure- as both an object of empirical inquiry and the transcendental ground of all knowledge), and since the greater part of his career is spent "showing that every alleged victory of Enlightenment marked the triumph of a new and insidious form of domination"; it should be no surprise that people would most likely wonder: "Foucault, a Kantian? And Kant, a Nietzschean? Who, one might reasonably ask, is kidding whom?"[7]

In one of his last essays, Foucault elucidates in more detail the reasons why he situates his work within the critical tradition of Kant: in Kant's discussion of the Enlightenment, what occupies the centre of the debate, what concerns Kant the most is not "a theory, a doctrine, or a permanent body of knowledge", rather, it a distinctively modern attitude, an *ethos*, "a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them." Similar to Kant, Foucault shows his interest in the analysis of the limits of our reason, of the ways in which we produce our truth, the conditions of possibility of knowledge, only to look for a possibility to transgress them; not, this time unlike Kant, "to seek universal structures of all knowledge or all possible moral action". Therefore, not deviating from the Kantian spirit entirely, Foucault offers his Nietzschean version of the critique (more akin to philosophizing with a hammer), a critique that opens the way to possible transgression[8]:

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a fourth question "Was ist der Mensch?" ("What is the human being?"), which becomes Kant's central question in the *Opus Posthumum*. For Kant, in his introductory lectures on Logic, the first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the third by Religion, and the fourth by Anthropology. "In reality, however, all these might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to the last." In the later parts of this work I shall explain why the centrality of the fourth question, around which the other three are subsumed, becomes important for Foucault, in the *Commentary* (Introduction to Kant's Anthropology) and in *The Order of Things* (henceforth OT in the endnotes and references), chapter 7.

[6] Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, ibid

[7] Ibid. There are several other articles expressing the "absurdity" of Foucault's self-professed late return to Kantianism: Bernstein (1994), Freundlieb in "Rationalism vs. Irrationalism? Habermas' Response to Foucault", Gordon (1986), Habermas (1987 and 1989), Harpham (1994), Hiley (1985), Pryor (1998), Taylor (1984), and White (1986).

[8] For a more detailed account on what Foucault means by "limit attitude" and "transgression" and further links establishing a connection between him and Kant, see M. Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression" in D.F. Bouchard ed., Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 1977)

"Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And . . . genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think."[9]

For most of the early commentators to this debate, this "late return" to Kant indicated major contradictions. Jürgen Habermas claimed that, this "apologetic return to Kant"[10] designated not only a contradiction for the Foucauldian philosophy, but also indicated a manifestation on the part of Foucault that his critical theory needed and lacked, eventually, a normative framework, which Foucauldian corpus almost *en masse* challenges and subverts. After all, Habermas argues, Foucault's critical philosophy can not justify the need for a resistance although Foucault so aptly demonstrates why certain truth regimes (or "games of truth"), discourses, practices and relations of power are problematic, why they should be realized as historically contingent, thus constructed not necessarily as a result of, so called, "scientific, humanist, progressive" processes, "so that the social and political violence that had always been a part and parcel of these regimes could be criticized and attacked."[11] Criticism, on its own, does not justify, nor can it muster a necessary motive for resistance, for the very criticism of Enlightenment principles by Foucault also undermines the normative grounds for such resistance. Thus, Foucault's critical thought "sees itself compelled to a relativist self denial and [thus] can give no account of the normative foundations of its own

[9] Foucault, M. (1984), "What is Enlightenment?", in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 46, quoted from Amy Allen's "Foucault and Enlightenment".
[10] Richard Bernstein (1994), too, describes Foucault's late essay on Enlightenment and Kant as an apology: "It is, in the classical sense, a succinct statement and defense of his own critical project. It is also an apologia in the sense that Foucault seeks to answer (at least obliquely) the objections of many of his critics."
[11] Human Nature: Justice versus Power Noam Chomsky debates with Michel Foucault, 1971

rhetoric."[12] Therefore, this late self-affiliation with Kant demonstrates a symptom of incoherency, a need for normative justification for Habermas.

In his eulogy for Michel Foucault, Habermas reveals his bewilderment following Foucault's "curious declaration of loyalties", and asks:

> "How does such a singularly affirmative understanding of modern philosophizing, always directed to our own actuality and imprinted in the here-and-now, fit with Foucault's unyielding criticism of modernity? How can Foucault's self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable criticism of this very form of knowledge of modernity?"[13]

Failing to find any reasonable explanation other than the assumption that Foucault indeed came to recognize the major contradiction in his philosophy towards the end of his life, Habermas concludes:

> "He contrasts his critique of power with the "analysis of truth" in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity which he thought he could explode."[14]

Among several others, Habermas too, suggests the idea that Foucault seems to have two radically different Kants: one that Foucault rejects (Kant of the *Critique*s) and one that he embraces (Kant of "What is Enlightenment?" and Kant that Foucault refers to in other articles such as "*What is Critique?*", and "*What our Present Is*"):

> "In Foucault's lecture, we do not meet the Kant familiar from *The Order of Things*, the epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological thought and the human sciences with his analysis of finiteness. Instead we encounter a different Kant – the precursor of the Young Hegelians, the Kant who was the first to make a serious

[12] Habermas, J. (1987), p. 294
[13] Habermas, J. "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1986), p.106
[14] Ibid. 108

break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned philosophy away from the Eternal Verities and concentrated on what philosophers had until then considered to be without concept and nonexistent, merely contingent and transitory."[15]

It is important to note, however, that although Foucault himself -particularly, in his essay entitled "The Art of Telling the Truth (*On Parrhesia*)"- makes such a distinction within the Kantian philosophy, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this work, he also adds that there is an intimate connection between Kant's two legacies –the ontology of the present and the analytics of truth-, contrary to Habermas who argues that Foucault cannot have it both ways. It is one of the arguments of this work to reveal the importance of the connection between these two poles in the shaping of Foucault's critical philosophy, and more importantly to put forward that Foucault's genuine struggle with, and ultimately his rejection of Kant's "analytics of truth" via his reading of the *Critique* and the *Anthropology* gives the final shape to his methodology (first, Kantian Archaeology, and later, Nietzschean Genealogy), while Kant's "ontology of our present" provides Foucault the aim of his critical philosophy.

Surely, Jürgen Habermas is not alone in his criticisms; Nancy Fraser joins him with a similar claim: "if one considers the disciplinary, or carceral, society described in *Discipline and Punish* [and asks] what exactly is wrong with that society, Kantian notions leap immediately to mind."[16] Since Foucault cannot account for any normative ground in which his philosophizing would justify any dissenting action for certain "modes of subjectivation and objectivation" that are deemed problematic in our modern society, Fraser argues that Michel Foucault seems to be "presupposing the very liberal norms that he criticizes"[17], therefore, trapping himself within a major contradiction.

Schmidt and Wartenberg, in "Foucault's Enlightenment" -only to propose the opposite idea, that the struggle with Kant spanned Foucault's career from start to end, thus it was most certainly not a strategic last minute move-, continue to fire away, summing up the arguments and reactions of those who think that Foucault was either deliberately provocative just to

[15] Habermas, J. "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present," in Kelly, ed., Critique and Power, 150.
[16] Fraser, N. (1989), p. 30, retrieved from Christina Hendricks, "Foucault's Kantian Critique: Philosophy and the Present" in Philosophy Social Criticism, 2008, 34: 357
[17] Ibid.

"parry the thrusts" of his critics or insincere at best in this last moment of repentance, about his sudden attachment to Kant: "How could a thinker who had spend his life showing how the light of reason forges subtle but powerful bonds choose –at the very end- to cast his lot with the tradition he had mercilessly criticized? Was this one last quick change of masks by a master of ironic gesture? Or had he come at last to question the coherence of his earlier work? He had spoken with contempt of "the blackmail of the Enlightenment" – the "simplistic and authoritarian alternative" that "either you accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism…or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality."[18] But even as he was mocking the blackmailer, was his check, Schmidt and Wartenberg asked, already in the mail?[19]

In the next section, I will introduce the arguments of those scholars whose answer, in essence, is "No" to this question.

[18] Foucault, M. (1984), "What is Enlightenment?", section quoted from Schmidt and Wartenberg, (1994), p. 284
[19] Ibid.

## A-2

## A Sincere Struggle with Kant: An "Immanent Critique"/ "Continuation-Through-Transformation" Thesis

In response to Habermas, Schmidt and Wartenberg warn us not to rush into too hasty repudiations concerning Foucault's self-professed philosophical alliance with Kant and the Enlightenment tradition. They argue that, Foucault's "invocation of Kant should neither be written off as simply an ironic gesture nor turned into a deathbed concession of defeat. It is instead a remarkably productive interrogation of a thinker who never ceased to inspire and provoke Foucault."[20] Although, Schmidt and Wartenberg realize the centrality of Kant within Foucault's thought (as Amy Allen notes, when quoting from their piece, that Foucault's Kantianism was definitely not a "passing fancy"), and despite their detailed focusing on a variety of Foucault's late works revolving around the issues of Kantian philosophy and the Enlightenment spirit, while presenting Foucault's distinctively close reading of Kant's several other works (small essays, prize winning articles, mostly presented to the *Berlinische Monatschrift*, other than his celebrated "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?"), they still submit to the idea that Foucault indeed maintains two separate Kants, therefore, at least at this point, they seem to be in agreement with Jürgen Habermas.

Although Thomas McCarthy had used the phrase when describing Habermas' philosophy, Amy Allen borrows it to describe Foucault's, indicating that he, "like Habermas, offers us a continuation-through-transformation of the Kantian critical project."[21] Amy Allen is one of the first scholars who took Foucault's *Commentary* to Kant's *Anthropology* (entitled *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*) seriously[22] and offered a close reading of this text with another of Foucault's early work, *The Order of Things*. Consequently, after analyzing Foucault's early close encounters with Kant, the epistemologist (as opposed to popularized

[20] Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, p. 287
[21] Allen, A. (2003) p. 183
[22] Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* was commonly considered as a "crackpot or marginal" approach to Kant's central philosophical enterprise. Today, both works (Foucault's Commentary and Kant's Anthropology) are regarded as seminal and scholarly reflections upon these works increased immensely in the last few years. See Olssen (2006) for a long list of recent literature that provides an analysis of the *Commentary*. See Miller, 1993 for an analysis of this long and ambiguous silence concerning both of these works.

Kant of the "What is Enlightenment", that is Kant, the critical philosopher of the present) she is able to put forward that "Foucault's stance toward Kant was never as rejectionist as has been supposed". For Allen, Foucault is engaging in a kind of 'immanent critique', or a "Kantian critique of Kantian critique", attempting to transform the critical philosophy from within, and investigating the limits and the conditions of possibility of the transcendental subject.

For Daniel Touey both Foucault and Kant were concerned with a similar question: "How is it possible that I know the things that I know, and what accounts for the way I know them."[23] Considering Foucault's emphasis on the importance of the analysis of human "practice", and from the *Anthropology*, we also know that Kant was also concerned to test, so to speak, his assumptions in the *Critique*, this time within the empirical realm in human experience[24]; we would not be doing any harm to that fundamental question presented above, the one that Kant and Foucault both share, if we replaced the verb "know", with "do" in the quote above taken from Touey.

A common mistake, shared by most of the commentators to this debate and particularly of those that were mentioned in the first section, displaying an all too rejectionist of a reading of Foucault's Kantian aspirations is that they seem to focus on a limited number of Foucault's texts: even those who make references to *The Order of Things* seem to either misunderstand or simply overlook the sections where Foucault deals with Kant and explains his reasons behind his rejection of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical anthropology. It is one of the arguments of this work to put forward the idea that, charges against Foucault's self-proclaimed Kantianism (charges of contradiction, apologia, etc.) can best be answered by a careful examination and a reconsideration of Foucault's early works on Kant, so that one can demonstrate that Foucault's stance toward Kant had never been entirely rejectionist as has been proposed and supposed. Amy Allen notes, after an analysis of Foucault's *Commentary*, that it is remarkable to see "a striking continuity…, namely, a central and abiding interest in

[23] Touey, D. (1998) p. 98

[24] Kant's analyses on the faculty of desire –third book, in the Anthropology-, or the second part of the Anthropology, entitled *Anthropological Characterization*, where Kant analyzes the character of "person, sexes, nation, races and species" respectively, are segments of the Anthropology where Kant dwells upon the empirical contents of the transcendental conditions.

and critical engagement with philosophical anthropology."[25] After reviewing the *Commentary*, it becomes obvious that Kant's *Anthropology* is not a marginal text only to be discarded when famous Critiques are on the table; for Foucault, as the last published text of Kant, as the book on his most popular class which he had lectured for over thirty years, and accordingly continued to update, labor on and improve with new material, *Anthropology* is as central as it can be for Kant's critical philosophy: it is the text, which, not only, establishes the question "*Was ist der Mensch?*" as the central question of future philosophies, and therefore re-centers Kant's own triple interrogation onto this fourth question (this displacement is highly problematic, as will be seen later, as it causes to make the contents of empirical experience work as their own conditions of possibility, eventually resulting in a confusion between the empirical and the *a priori*), but this text, by establishing 'man' as the central concern of philosophy thus monopolizing the field of possible knowledge around him[26], thereby bestowing post-Kantian philosophers with that insidious circularity - a constant back and forth between 'man' and his doubles- of which our modern philosophy is condemned. Therefore, Foucault's philosophy is not a rejection of humanism for rejection's sake; it is rather the recognition of a major problem within Western modern philosophy.

What Foucault realizes in his reading of the Kant of the *Critique* and Kant of the *Anthropology* is the changing form of the role attributed to the transcendental subject (particularly in the latter); and it is from this moment onwards, Foucault puts forward the idea that the transcendental theme, first introduced by Kant, becomes problematic when analyzed within actual experiences, cultural and social structures, and thus he concludes that, the modern subject (both as subject and object) is grounded in contingent historical conditions, which he never can fully understand and thus can never master. **In the end, therefore, while Kant is interested in what is necessary and universal in what seems to be contingent, Foucault, by reversing the plot, but while still remaining faithful to the critical enterprise by remaining within the same ground in which the subject is analyzed, questions what is contingent in what seems to be necessary and universal.** A close examination of Foucault's *Commentary* in the following sections, will give us the main trajectory in which Foucault conducts his critical project: an attempt "to historicize as much

[25] Allen, A. p. 182

[26] "Man, as anthropology constitutes [...] the fundamental disposition that has governed and controlled the path of philosophical thought since Kant until our own day". "The Order of Things" (henceforth OT in the endnotes and references), p. 342

as possible in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental"[27]and rethink it in a non-subjective way.[28] Although, in the same interview that which the previous quote is taken, Foucault himself admits that he cannot rule out the possibility that one day he will have to "confront an irreducible *residuum* which will be, in fact, the transcendental."

Therefore, Touey is correct in suggesting that Foucault is involved in a Kantian critique without Kantian foundations. For Foucault, the conditions under which our *a priori* grounds are formed are "specific to the historical situations", in which a framework of "relative stabilities" are continually "shifting".[29] Since the gaze of the critical philosopher turns outside the subject, to the place where the "place of the king"[30] - within which knowledge and truth should be formed under already determined (transcendental) conditions- is ignored for a moment, so that what seems to be transcendental conditionings will have a chance to be tested, for there is a probability that they may be momentary, arbitrary occurrences within the field of representations, or they might simply belong to the domain of epistemology rather than ontology, and perhaps the place reserved for this enslaved sovereign is never the conditioning subject of Kant, but that most peculiar but clever animal of Nietzsche who on an obscure planet, one day, invented something called 'knowledge'.[31]

Although in the *Order of Things* we do witness an entirely different approach to Kant, it is also true that the nature of the charges in this book against Kant is not quite clear. It is

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[27] Interview with Michel Foucault, entitled "A Historian of Culture" in Foucault Live, Michel Foucault: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, ed. by Sylvére Lotringer, 1989, Semiotext(e)

[28] The final chapter of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is framed as a dialogue between Foucault and a hypothetical critic. In the dialogue Foucault responds to the questions concerning his methods and project overall with the questions he himself prepared. In one of them he asks: "you have fantasized a discourse that does not depend on speaking subjects; therefore, you do not take account of the full range of richness and irregularity in discourse." He replies as "I did not erase the speaking subject, but rather approached the issue at the level of discourse, describing the diversity of positions from which the subject can speak."

[29] Touey, D. (1998), p. 96

[30] The place that could not be represented in Las Meninas, as described by Foucault in the first chapter of *The Order of Things*, since the classical épistéme, which "representation" was the epistemic structure, could not represent "representation" itself. The Classical épistéme ended with Kant, by the famous Copernican revolution, when Kant opened that space whereby the knowing subject ended up "defining by its very interrogation the field in which its answer will be given, thus revealing himself to be the "condition of possibility of experience itself" (OT, 244) citation modified, and partially excerpted from Beatrice Han-Pile, (1998), p. 18

[31] Nietzsche, F. "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873

one of the arguments of this work that, particularly with the help of Foucault's reading of Kant's *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View* and his introductory notes that made up his *thèse complémentaire* (*Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*), his philosophical attitude toward Kant had been "a good deal more nuanced and complex than his critics would lead us to believe."[32] I shall come back to this issue in the following chapters. First, however, I wish to present several reasons myself, realizing that these reasons in line to explain why Foucault's supposed "late return" is neither contradictory, nor can it best be characterized as a "return", have been largely missing in the scholarship defending Foucault against Habermas' claims.

First, and foremost, Foucault cannot deny Kantian tradition in its entirety[33], for the reasons that, as Foucault explains in *The Order of Things*, "[T]he Kantian critique marks the threshold of our Modernity"[34], therefore, the épistéme of our time begins with the "Copernican" revolution, when the conditions of the constitution and legitimacy of all possible knowledge were referred to the transcendental subject in its capacity as "the foundation of a possible synthesis of all representations." Therefore, as a "son of his time"[35], Foucault cannot escape from the very épistéme that he is thinking within ("the thought that is contemporaneous with us, and with which, willy-nilly, we think"[36]). One cannot renounce the conditions in which one thinks without risking the possibility to relapse towards the unintelligible. Épistéme, as historical *a priori*, defines the limits of historically determined conditions of possibility for a thinking subject to appear, therefore, the very limits that conditions the way the thinking subject organizes his thoughts, enable him to make (true or false) judgments, thus remain within the "intelligible". This is the reason, why he proclaims in 1966: "We are all Neo-Kantians," while reminding "the ceaselessly repeated injunction to

[32] Ibid. 303

[33] Particularly, the analytic of finitude and 'man' as "a strange empirico-transcendental doublet" (for Foucault, these themes form the epistemic structure of our time), which gained its shape after the three questions of the Critique were ultimately referred to that of "Was ist der Mensch?", thereby Western philosophy found itself enwrapped around the central theme of 'man', which, in this manner, determined the epistemic structure of our time by centralizing the human subject in the modern episteme by making him both, the foundation of all knowledge and its object, where that knowledge becomes meaningful.

[34] Foucault, M., OT, p. 242

[35] Hegel, Lessons on the History of Philosophy

[36] Foucault, M., OT, p. 250

return to the break established by Kant- both to discover its necessity and to understand its consequences more fully."[37]

Secondly, and particularly in light of the recent translation and publication of one of Foucault's oldest works, his second doctoral thesis "*Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*", which remained under dark for a long time in the archives of *Bibliothequé de la Sorbonne*, University of Paris; we are now in a better position to understand his philosophical relationship with Kant, and perhaps, understand, now more fully, the ambivalent character of Kant in Foucault's *The Order of Things*, or grasp what was the reason for Foucault to reject – to some degree- the answers given by, "Kant the epistemologist", while embracing Kant, "the thinker of his own present". Although, I shall again postpone the introduction of Foucault's *Commentary* for now, only to present a more direct line that could connect the philosophy of Kant to that of Foucault. In the next section, I will try to find "the question" that Foucault himself admits that his philosophy had continued to come back and referred itself to, and, in fact, I will try to demonstrate with examples from a variety of his works that it had indeed been the "guiding" question that shaped his philosophy from its core, and I will present the Kantian origins of this fundamental question, namely: "the question of the conditions of possibility of knowledge."

[37] Dits et Ecrits, Vol. 1, p. 546, quote retrieved from B. Han-Pile, "Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical" (henceforth FCP), p. 3

# CHAPTER II

## B-1

## "The Conditions of the Possibility of Knowledge"

Having briefly touched upon the debates concerning Foucault's announcement about him being a follower of the Kantian tradition, it is now imperative, in order to determine the nature of the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault, first, to assess the nature of the impacts of Kantian transcendental philosophy on Foucault, and second, by an analysis of *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, to locate the points of convergence and divergence in the thoughts of both philosophers.

In this section, I will raise the question of whether one can argue that within the Foucauldian project, there is a single coherent focus, that is, if one considers the Foucauldian corpus in its most abstract general form, whether one can find a unity among his works, a concern that had not changed although the methodology used in chasing that concern had changed its form several times. In doing this, my aim is not to put forward the idea that without such a coherency the Foucauldian enterprise would be in vain, nor this question is utilized here so that indeed one can successfully "reduce" his entire philosophy to one (and only one) question; it is rather to demonstrate that one can indeed achieve such a unity of thought in the Foucauldian corpus, and second, it is possible to demonstrate that this central theme is a result of a genuine struggle with Kant. After establishing a secure ground whereby the Foucauldian project is situated on one of its core levels, I will question the affinity between this project and that of Kant's, and ask whether Foucault should be considered as a member of the Kantian lineage, before his late essays on the Enlightenment and on Kant, as the thinker of his own present.

Second, I will assess the focus of Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, for as early as 1961, and before *The Order of Things*, where Foucault accuses Kant for lulling modern thought into an "anthropological sleep". In the *Introduction* (henceforth referred as the *Commentary*), we can trace the earlier manifestations of the problems that Foucault claims inherent in Kant's philosophy. As Hacking points out, *The Order of Things* can be considered

as a continuation of Foucault's *Introduction*[38] and it is the book where Foucault most explicitly and systematically problematizes Kant.[39]

## I.

From *Birth of the Clinic* (1963) to the third volume of *History of Sexuality* (1984) there are two major reformations in Michel Foucault's *oeuvre* in which he either abandoned his former methodology completely or reassessed and reexamined the way he carried out his research: genealogy followed archeology, and following the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (with *The Use of Pleasure*) Foucault started his project of "History of Subjectivity" ('techniques of the self'), his final 5-volume project which he could not finish. In each of these investigative methods, Foucault focuses on different objects, - respectively: *épistémes*, "regimes of truth", or "problematizations".[40] Not only these three periods problematizes different objects, Foucault goes back to Greek and Roman classics of Western philosophy in his final works, whereas his first two inquiries were largely concentrated upon a timeframe beginning with the end of the Renaissance and the end of the 19th century. Considering these vast methodological and temporal variations in his thought, is it possible to claim that there had been an unchanging motive, a project that was able to preserve its singularity in Foucault's works?

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[38] Foucault never published his *thèse complémentaire* on Kant, instead his 128 pages long *Commentary* became a three-pages long historical preface to the early French translation of Kant's *Anthropology*, which ended with this promissory note: "The relationship between critical thought and anthropological reflection will be studied in a later work." That later work is *The Order of Things*. – From an Interview with M. Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Vrin, 1994), Vol. I:26

[39] Hacking, Ian in Couzens-Hoy (eds.) "Foucault: A Critical Reader" p. 32-33

[40] "Archaeological" Period: *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The Order of Things* (1966), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969)- "Genealogical Period: *The Order of Discourse* (1970), *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Volume I of *The History of Sexuality* (1976)- The "History of Subjectivity": *The Use of Pleasure*, vol. 2 of *The History of Sexuality* (1984), *The Care of The Self*, vol. 3 of *The History of Sexuality* (1984).
Not every scholar, who is interested in Foucault's works, share this opinion, that is, one can – or shall- divide the Foucauldian *oeuvre* into three distinctively separated periods. I submit to the view, however, which puts forward that, if a major change in methodology and a refocusing of the subject of analysis take place, the differentials have to be accounted for in their respective domains, which may now present, albeit not always in a clear cut manner, but still bearing visible marks that are indicative of a need for a "periodization".

Several of Foucault's interviews, lectures and the commentary of *The Use of Pleasure* are dedicated to prove that indeed, there is such continuity. Two lectures given at the Collége de France[41] establish an immediate relationship between archaeology and genealogy, while the former is described as the method; the latter determines the aim of that method. According to Davidson this shift is not "a replacement of the archaeology by the genealogy" as some may suggest, but, rather, it is the integration of a "second axis" of analysis which brings the archaeology "in a wider framework"[42]. Similarly, Mahon argues that for Foucault the relationship between archaeology and genealogy is one that is between a method and its goal. Foucault himself describes this shift in the following way: "What I mean by archaeology is a methodological framework for my analysis. What I mean by genealogy is both the reason and the target of analyzing those discourses as events".[43] Garry Gutting describes this "turn to genealogy", which "adumbrated in [Foucault's] inaugural lecture at the Collége de France, *The Order of Discourse*, and fully developed in *Discipline and Punish*", as the one that which "goes beyond archaeology by reformulating the historical *a priori* in terms of non-discursive causal factors, in particular social power relations.[44] According to Hoy, by the time Foucault writes *Discipline and Punish*, he has seen the error of his archaeological method, and his postmodern "*pastiche* emulates Nietzsche more than Kant".[45] Archaeology and genealogy are both attempts to make our modern *unthought* clearer ("to make the cultural unconscious apparent"), understandable, which, according to Hoy, is the task of both modern and postmodern thought. However, while archaeology; "with its pretensions to epistemology (in the traditional sense of the privileged discourse about the conditions for the possibility of any and every form of knowledge)"[46] becomes stuck in the analysis of the *unthought* mainly in the discursive fields, genealogy recognizes analysis of the discursive field as only one form of many frameworks in which the conditions of the possibility of knowledge is enclosed and formed.

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[41] Lecture one, 7 January 1976 - Lecture two, 14 January 1976 in Colin Gordon eds. "Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977", p. 79-108

[42] Davidson, A. I. "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in D. C. Hoy (Ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 227

[43] Cited in Mahon, M. "Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject". Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 105

[44] Gutting, G. "*Introduction: Michel Foucault: A User's Manual"*, Cambridge Companion to Foucault, p. 9

[45] Hoy, D. "Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?" in Jonathan Arac, ed., After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 32

[46] Ibid.

In *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-84*, Foucault himself summarizes the crux of his seemingly disperse explorations in the following way: "One might have changed point of view, one has gone round and round the problem, which is still the same, namely, *the relations between the subject, truth and the constitution of experience*" (p. 48) (citation modified).

It is crucial to ask, after witnessing such an apparent disparity in Foucauldian methodology, subject matter and time horizon that how can Foucault claim that he had always concerned himself "with the same problem"? Particularly after taking into consideration his energetic dedication –starting with as early as the 1960s- to drive all forms of subjectivity (but most certainly not the forms of "subjectivation" and "objectivation", which form the axis in which his critical philosophy is situated) out of the philosophical stage (e.g., *The Death of the Author*), on what grounds Foucault can justify his claim that his project had essentially been the study of *"the relations between the subject, truth and the constitution of experience"*?

If we are to look for, within the Foucauldian project, a coherent set of questions for the purposes of excavating a core, a fundamental philosophical concern, only to test it against a Kantian background and to check for a similitude, we should also be able to systematically categorize the Foucauldian corpus around a central theme to which others could be subordinated. In a recent book, Béatrice Han argues that "this central theme is situated at the convergence of an initial question with an object that appears later, a convergence that occurs only retrospectively to Foucault himself, by means of a reflection on his own course and strategies."[47] This "initial question" is posed in differing manners and under diverse forms, but one of the most visible forms that this concern is vocalized in *The Birth of the Clinic*:

> "The research that I am undertaking here therefore involves a project that is deliberately both historical and critical, in that it is concerned…with determining *the conditions of possibility* of medical experience in Modern times…Here, as well as elsewhere, it is a study that sets out to uncover, from within the density of discourse, the *conditions of its history*."[48]

[47] Han, B. FCP, p.2
[48] Foucault, M. "The Birth of the Clinic", xix

Following *The Birth of the Clinic*, in a similar vein, Foucault describes the "archaeological level" as that which "makes knowledge possible"[49] in *The Order of Things* and depicts his project as the one that which reconstitutes "the general system of thought whose network, in its positivity, renders an interplay of simultaneous and apparently contradictory opinions possible. It is this network that defines the conditions of possibility of a controversy or of a problem, and that bears the historicity of knowledge."[50] In the same spirit, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* puts forward that it is "not a question of rediscovering what can legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the *conditions of emergence* of statements."[51] In *Dits ets écrits*, the focus of the text is put forward as the "general theme of the conditions of possibility of a science", identification of "two heteromorphic systems", one of which concerns "the conditions of science as science", and the second questions "the possibility of a science in its historical existence".[52]

In *The Order of Things*, we witness a clearer expression of the aim of Foucauldian archaeology: "What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the épistéme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of *its conditions of possibility.*" (my italics)[53]

Finally, in an interview, conducted in late 1960s, Foucault describes the domain of research that he ascribes to his archeology in the following way: "In a society, different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and political activities, mores- all refer to a certain implicit knowledge (savoir) special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the bodies of learning that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, and religious justifications, but it is *what makes possible* at a given moment *the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice...* [.and] it is this knowledge that I wanted to investigate, as *the condition of possibility of knowledge* (connaissance), of institutions, of practices." [54]

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[49] Foucault, M., OT, p. 31
[50] Ibid. 75
[51] Foucault, M. "*The Archaeology of Knowledge*", p. 127
[52] Foucault, M. "*Dits ets écrits*", (Paris: Vrin, 1994), vol.1:724
[53] Foucault, M., OT, p. xxii
[54] Foucault Live, p. 13

Therefore, at least during the archaeological period, the central concern of Foucault is "the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge". Taken this way, Foucault seems to be justified in his claims to follow the Kantian tradition, since Kant is considered to be among those philosophers in the Western tradition of philosophy, who questioned "the conditions of possibility of knowledge". Through him, Foucault says, the "modern age" had begun:

> "Kant seems to me to have founded the two great critical traditions between which modern philosophy is divided. Let us say that in his great critical work Kant posed and laid the foundations for that tradition of philosophy that poses the question of the conditions in which true knowledge is possible and, on that basis, it may be said that a whole stretch of Modern philosophy from the nineteenth century has been presented, developed as the analytics of truth."[55]

Thus, Kant established the break in which Foucault's work has to be situated. This break, Foucault says, entails "an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject and object are formed or modified", and a demonstration of how such conditions "are constitutive of a possible knowledge."[56]

However, for Kant, it only became possible to answer to the question, that is, the question of possibility of true knowledge, with *The Critique of Pure Reason*, after he introduced the clear distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. It is at this point, we have to underline the reasons behind Foucault's rejection of Kant's answer: first, in his *Commentary* to Kant's *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View*, Foucault "by tracing …the genesis of the transcendental theme", demonstrates that "there are within Kant's own work two ambivalently related versions of this theme."[57] The clear distinction between the empirical field and the transcendental (*a priori*) conditions, established in the *Critique*, goes through a serious deflection in the *Anthropology*, a deviation of the *a priori* to the "originary", when Kant's famous tripartite questioning

[55] Foucault, M. "Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984", p. 95
[56] Olssen, M. (2006) Citation taken from Miller, (1994), p. 138
[57] Han, B., FCP, p. 3

becomes restored to a new center, around the question "*Was ist der Mensch*?"[58], whereby anthropological investigation is given a preeminent role within modern philosophy: an investigation into the nature of man with the task of uncovering fixed universals behind surface differences. However, this displacement, as Han suggests, is surreptitiously convoluted "as it tends to make the contents of the empirical experience work as their own conditions of possibility; moreover, it seeks within human finitude the elements of a transcendental determination henceforth made impossible in principle by the anthropological confusion between the empirical and the *a priori*."[59] Foucault's second objection to the answer given by Kant is evidenced by his criticisms of post-Kantian theories (analyzed in the last three chapters of *The Order of Things*) "as being imprisoned by the "Analytic of Finitude", itself a result of the monopolization of the field of possible knowledge by "man" and his doubles"[60], that is, the modern mode of thought after Kant being enclosed within a vicious circle (referred above as the Analytic of Finitude) whereby the conditions of possibility of knowledge are assimilated into the same space within which they are meant to be found- an unfortunate move that destroys the very possibility of any foundation.

For Foucault, Kant not only established the limits that which reason cannot transgress, thus initiating the modern épistéme by heralding that "discursive space in which modernity deployed itself", he also signaled its premature and abrupt end "by closing this opening when he ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an anthropological question"[61], therefore, becoming its insuperable boundary: as a result, although Foucault himself embraces "the critical question" of Kant, "in the same movement, he shows the impossibility of answering it on Kantian grounds and with Kantian concepts."[62] Thus, the philosophy of Michel Foucault seems to be inspired by two opposing and contradictory problems arising from the ambivalence posed by Kant: to escape the "anthropologism", which Kant's philosophy either directly or reluctantly gave birth, while still remaining within the critical "opening" initiated by Kant.

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[58] This movement symbolizes the point when anthropology is given predominance amongst intellectual disciplines, by Kant. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault traced back the modern conception of man precisely to the moment when Kant established anthropology as the key area of philosophical enquiry.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Foucault, M. "A Preface to Transgression", 1977, p. 38
[62] Han, B., FCP, p. 3

It is at this moment Foucault takes refuge in a form of "historical transcendentalism" in reference to Hegel, whom he first studied under Jean Hyppolyte and wrote his D.E.A. manuscript (now lost) on: "*La constitution d'un transcendental historique chez Hegel*" ("The Constitution of the Historical Transcendental in Hegel")[63] Hegel, similar to Foucault, was also after the historically contingent. However, although for Foucault, the immediate necessity to be aware of the historically contingent in our *actualité* is prerequisite and imperative for an ontological critique of ourselves; for Hegel, "the sole aim of philosophical inquiry is to eliminate the contingent" (Hegel 5, 28), because in the absence of the "divine goodwill", and since "reason" and "nature" are now separated (after Kant), if we cannot get rid of contingency in nature, we should drive it out of our reason.

Foucault adopts "archaeology" as a method in reference to Kant[64], a widely unknown but important detail about his philosophical and methodological allegiance to Kant and introduces the *historical a priori*[65]after his analysis of the 'historical transcendental' in the philosophy of Hegel. However, Foucauldian archaeology moves away from Kantian framework on two grounds: first is the anti-humanism of this method -reminiscent of Nietzsche and Heidegger-, hence Foucault's repudiation of the transcendental subject as the starting point of his philosophy; and second, although the concept of the *a priori* is preserved, it is now purely *historical* in character. According to Béatrice Han,

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[63] Cited in Han, B. "*Is Early Foucault A Historian? History, history and the Analytic of Finitude*", p. 6, fn.

[64] Foucault while explaining the Kantian origins of his archaeological method refers to this quote from Kant: "while [*a priori*] establishes the facts of reason, it does not lend them to the telling of a historical story, but draws them from the nature of human reason as a *philosophical archaeology*."

[65] In the introduction to *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault defines the "historical *a priori*" as the "originary distribution of the visible and the invisible insofar as it is linked with the division between what can be stated and what remains unsaid." (*The Birth of the Clinic*, p. xi)In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault puts forward another definition of what he means by the "historical *a priori*": "Among the vast collection of possibilities offered by logic and grammar, the historical *a priori* has the function of circumscribing a more restricted domain by defining the conditions of possibility of statements in their character as 'things actually said". (*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 127)

> "The notion of an "historical a priori" was first articulated in *The Origins of Geometry*; however, the underlying debate with Husserl established by *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is concerned precisely with the way in which this historicality should be defined. For Husserl, the historical *a priori* turns out to be "suprahistorical", in the sense that it exists essentially to guarantee the possibility of recovering, beyond the sedimentations of history and tradition, the primary evidences originally thematized by the "protofounder" of geometry."[66]

In light of this definition of Husserl's "suprahistorical" *a priori* and Kantian "ahistorical" *a priori*; Foucauldian "historical a priori", as defined in both *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, seems to occupy a middle ground, yet with a *sui generis* twist: although it is open to transformation with the "flow" of history, changing its form between eras, and although this transformation can be scrutinized because "historical *a priori*" is fully given in history; yet it is at the same time behind the curtains, defining "the conditions of possibility, themselves variable, from which the knowledge of an epoch can and must form itself."[67] The paradoxical impasse of the Kantian transcendental theme, exemplified by the ambivalence between its different versions in the *Critique* and the *Anthropology* (this ambivalence will be analyzed in the third chapter), forces Foucault to venture into a transposition of the transcendental with the historical, while rejecting the validity of a similar attempt by Husserl for its "suprahistorical" character. As a result, although French epistemologists, such as Merleu-Ponty or Blanchot on the one hand, and on the other, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Annales school[68] had been detrimental in giving a final shape to Foucauldian critical philosophy; as evidenced by his sincere struggle to find a solution to the "Kantian problem", while rejecting the grounds in which the critical question is asked, and deeming it irresolvable on Kantian grounds with Kantian concepts, but remaining still within the same critical effort, Foucault organizes his philosophical enterprise fundamentally with respect to Kant, meticulously avoiding his foundational transcendentalism with an attempt "to throw off the last anthropological constraints."[69] Foucauldian project, overall, is not just an attempt to provide an account for the

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[66] Han, B., FCP, p. 4
[67] Ibid.
[68] Foucault, M. "*Dits et Écrits*", vol. 3 p.580
[69] Foucault, M. "*The Archaeology of Knowledge*", p. 15

contingent conditions under which certain human sciences had flourished, or an analysis of certain modes of objectivation and subjectivation in general; "but above all of the possibility of defining a new way of connecting history to philosophy, a middle path between an idealism he judged excessive –that of Kant and the post-Kantians- and the too reductive materialism of the thinkers lumped together by Foucault under the rubric "Marxists".[70]

In sum, Foucault's refusal of the Kantian transcendental theme –the critique of the transcendental theme itself- proves central, in that, it incorporates within itself, the denunciation of the anthropological aporia[71] that according to Foucault forces Western modern philosophy into a *cul-de-sac*, and second, through the introduction of the historical *a priori* a renewed project shows itself, in an effort to replace Kant's famous answer in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, still in search of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. For Foucault, this had also been the philosophical aim of Edmund Husserl and his "phenomenology" (i.e., Cartesian Meditations), which tried to find an alternative to Kantian pure transcendentalism, however, Foucault criticizes Husserl's efforts for similar reasons he criticized Kant's *Anthropology*: the paradoxical movement of the "originary" replaces the attempts to overcome pure transcendentalism. Although, this theme will be analyzed in the next section, the function of the "originary" is "to express within the paradoxical form of retrospection the movement by which the transcendental appear within the empirical as an "already there", always present but perpetually elusive in its foundation."[72]

This paradoxical movement is typical of that vicious circle that ensnared our contemporary thought ("Analytic of Finitude"): we have to look for the *founding* in what is *founded*, the conditions of possibility are incorporated into which they are supposed to

[70] Han, B., FCP, p. 5, see also Beatrice Han-Pile, "Is Early Foucault A Historian? History, history and the Analytic of Finitude", 2005

[71] "Anthropological constraints", or "anthropological illusion", all refer to that modern philosophical chimera, which implies the idea that anthropology is somehow liberated from "the prejudices and inert weights of the *a priori"*. Foucault, M. "*Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*", p. 123. Most obvious illusion of this type can be seen in the complete renunciation of the transcendental theme (bypassing the very idea of transcendental determination) and a supreme trust in the empirical positivities by the "Marxists" and the "positivists".

[72] Ibid.

be found, and therefore, any hope, every possibility for a *founding* is lost from the beginning by virtue of this paradoxical move. This is exactly the reason why Foucault chose to (or perhaps had to) cast aside the subject in his studies (at least, until the second volume of the *History of Sexuality*), or any philosophical foundation of 'man', such as the transcendental ego of Husserl: "in order to cast a non-originary version of the historical *a priori*- that is, to look for a transcendental without a subject."[73]

In the next section, I will analyze the Kantian threshold of our modernity as described by Foucault in *The Order of Things* (1966), and immediately afterwards, I will present the ambivalence of the way Kantian philosophy is presented in this book. At the end of the section, I will introduce the hypothesis that, in order for us to understand this ambivalence, and finally to be in a better position to pass a judgment about Foucault's philosophical relationship with Kant; a close reading of Foucault's *thèse complémentaire* (*Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*) (1961) might prove central and this curiously provocative text can shed some light to the ambiguous position of Kant in Foucault's *The Order of Things*.

[73] Ibid.

## B-2 From Classical Representation to Kant

*The Order of Things* hit the French book-shelves in 1966, became an instant best-seller, exactly at the time when mass systematized advertisements were being formed for the first time by an immense synergy of newspapers, magazines, radio and TV networks, trying to reap the benefits of the popularized intellectual fields in the finally recovering post-war France. To the extent that and as much as Sartre and his followers hated and condemned[74] the book, the more popular it became; the more one claimed to be an anarchist, a Marxist, a structuralist, and so on, and the more one felt the obligation to show his immediate entourage that he is reading Foucault's *The Order of Things*. The book became an instant fad, but the feverish discussions had to wait, when most of the readers had read the book till the end, and saw the prophetic announcement of the "death (end) of 'man'": man, being a recent invention of our Modern thought, promised to an imminent death, and threatened with erasure like a "face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea".[75]

This declaration about the end of the modern epistemic structure, (which took its shape around a philosophico-anthropological understanding of man and his being –after Kant- and, of which the 'analytic of finitude' determined the ground in which human sciences, within this particular épistéme, found themselves constantly referred back to an interminable oscillation between the empirical and the transcendental, between the Other and the Same, the thought and the unthought) soon, although by not Foucault himself, but by his immediate followers, connected the book and therefore Foucault, with the wave of French anti-humanism and sctructuralism of his time.

Anti-humanism, as that great, but short-lived intellectual fire that burned Germany (first initiated by Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism*, denouncing the essence of man as presupposed by humanism as metaphysical), spread to France, and Sartre's humanist existentialism (*Existentialism is a Humanism*), which grew stoutly popular by that time, thanks to overwhelming enthusiasm that arose with the end of the Second World War, was now in danger. In France, the debates surrounding anti-humanism were closely associated with a small but powerful group of intellectuals, such as Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser, the

[74] Sartre accused structuralists for constituting a new ideology, which he refers to as "the last barrier the bourgeoisie can still erect against Marx.", quoted in Foucault Live, p. 54
[75] Foucault, M., OT, p. 387

linguists (following Ferdinand de Saussure), and Foucault, himself. At first, the subtitle of his book (*The Order of Things*) was not "An Archeology of Human Sciences"; it was "The Archaeology of Structuralism". This book, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, "is precisely an attempt to further these structuralist disciplines by determining 'the possibilities and rights, the conditions and limitations, of a justified formalization'".[76]

Foucault believed, for some time, and although later on he emphatically denounced having any relation with structuralism whatsoever, at least when he was writing *The Order of Things*, that structuralism is the most suitable system of thought that can cope with the analytic of finitude, which seemed to haunt all the human sciences after Kant, thus structuralism seemed to be a breakthrough for Foucault in the *de-anthropologization/de-anthropomorphization* of philosophy and human sciences. Structuralism, for Foucault, in its refusal to take man as the subject of freedom, while analyzing him as an object of knowledge may have a chance to escape the pitfalls where most post-Kantians, such as Marx, Comte, or Husserl and Sartre had failed to overcome. In the field of anti-humanism, there were others, literary theorists such as Maurice Blanchot, or historians from the Annales School, like Ferdinand Braudel; and although their assumptions and conclusions varied, and although they come from different disciplines, these thinkers fundamentally denied the primacy of man, be it as an epistemological starting point (the subject as the foundation of all possible knowledge, as in Husserlian phenomenology) or as a practical agent (freedom as the main operator and focus of historical development as in Hegelian history).[77] They all underlined the crucial role played by unconscious structures that determine our thoughts and behaviors.

The appeal of this relatively new formation in modern thought attracted Foucault because it too rejected the Subject in capital letters, the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of Language, and History. Referring to this structuralist wave as a "rumbling", Foucault says, in an interview:

> "One can say that all of Western civilization has been subjugated, and philosophers have only certified the fact by referring all thought and all truth to consciousness, to the Self, to the Subject. In the rumbling that shakes us today, perhaps we have to

[76] Dreyfus and Rabinow, "Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics", 2nd ed. p. 17
[77] Han-Pile, B. "The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism", p.2

recognize the birth of a world where the subject is not one but *split*, not sovereign but *dependant*, not an absolute origin but *a function ceaselessly modified*." [78] (My italics)

Returning back to his typical periodization from *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault analyzes, in *The Order of Things*, the épistémes of three historical periods: Renaissance, with its underlying epistemic structure based on 'resemblance', the Classical Age with 'representation', and the Modern era with the "birth of 'man'" as a result of the anthropological turn and the analytic of finitude (a distinction has to be made between "man", as that empirical being, who lives, works, speaks and 'man' as the new historical *a priori* that underlies our comprehension of the former).

In the book, Foucault attempts to analyze the structure of the discourses of varying disciplines of thought, i.e., life, labor and language. Such an analysis, for him, "does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical *a priori* …ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards."[79] For that purpose, Foucault introduces his notion, épistéme, which later in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he defines as follows:

"By épistéme, we mean…the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possibly formalized systems…The épistéme is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality, which crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities."[80]

Foucault devotes much of the book to the analysis of Classical and Modern épistémes, so that he can provide the reader with the contrast material to show how much of a

[78] In "Foucault Live, Michel Foucault: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984", ed. by Sylvére Lotringer, p. 67
[79] Foucault, M., OT, xxi-xxii
[80] Foucault, M., "*The Archaeology of Knowledge*", p. 191

radicalization that the Modernity brought with itself. This is not to say that the change in the epistemic systems between that of Renaissance and Classical age did not matter, but since Foucault's guiding concern is to lay the groundwork for an analysis of the modern situation of the human sciences and show their incurable defect (the analytic of finitude), thus providing an opening for the coming of structuralism, his main areas of interest are the Classical and the Modern eras. According to Gary Gutting, the ultimate purpose of this book is "to understand the archaeological framework (épistéme) underlying the modern social sciences, but, since Foucault thinks this framework is dominated by the philosophical concept of 'man', particularly associated with Kant, his discussion includes a critical history of modern philosophy."[81]

Resemblance as the epistemic system of the Renaissance consists of four modes: convenience, in the simplest of terms it is the spatial proximity, which both relies upon and breeds resemblance; emulation is resemblance without the spatial proximity ("resemblance at a distance"); analogy is resemblance that stems from (any form of) relation; and finally, sympathy, resemblance that provokes, thus promotes spatial and qualitative change. In a world, where resemblance reigns as the supreme form of discursive regularity, signatures (or, signs if the signature is the being of a sign) are the channels in which representation flows, always in a hurry and since signs themselves are resemblances and since resemblance resides in both the mark and its content, they always carried the chance to become connected to something else in every turn of the tide, without an end, thus, for Foucault, 16th century's knowledge "condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing, to knowing that thin only at the unattainable end of an endless journey."[82]

Representation[83] on the other hand, is the épistéme of the Classical Age, arising out of the rationalism of the 17th century, consistent with "the project of constructing a universal method of analysis which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the world, the order of being- for being, in the Classical

[81] Gutting, G. "*Foucault: A very Short Introduction*", p. 65
[82] Foucault, M., OT, p. 34
[83] George Berkeley (1685-1753) is a good example in the epitomization of this epistemic system: In his *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and again in *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713), the leading principle of Berkeley's philosophy was that the world as represented to our senses depends for its existence, as such, on being perceived (*esse est percipi*).

Age, had a universal order."[84]. Thus, for Descartes and Leibniz (also for Hobbes) the nature is now renovated (as opposed to its Renaissance counterpart) into a totality of what can be "represented" and how can representation itself be conveyed by means of conventional signs. Foucault defines the Classical épistéme as the most general arrangement "in terms of the articulated system of a *mathesis*, a *taxonomia* and a genetic analysis. The sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; and at their center they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system." Therefore, according to Foucault, the underlying structure, "the decisive paradigm" (in Kuhn's terminology), for this is neither *mathesis universalis* (mathematization of the world) nor *taxonomia* (mechanistic understanding of the world) and *genesis* (the analysis of empirical orders), instead these are the results of the system understood as "ordered signs"- the order of things, or the order of *being*. It is the way that the universal order is represented that produces *mathesis*, *taxonomia* and *genesis*, not the other way around.

Language, in this system, is fully transparent, in that the signs are fully representative of whatever is given to representation. As Habermas puts it, "the signifier fully retreats behind the indicated thing signified; it functions like a glass instrument for representation without having a life on its own."[85] It is in "the table" that such an ordering is possible, as Foucault himself describes:

"The profound vocation of Classical language has always been to create a table- a 'picture': whether it be in the form of natural discourse, the accumulation of truth, description of things, a body of exact knowledge, or an encyclopedic dictionary. It exists therefore, only to be transparent. … The possibility of knowing things and their order passes, in the Classical experience, through the sovereignty of words: words are, in fact, neither marks to be deciphered (as in the Renaissance period), nor more or less faithful and masterable instruments (as in the positivist period); they form rather a colorless network on the basis of which… representations are ordered."[86]

[84] Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19
[85] Habermas, J. "Critique of Reason, Unmasking the Human Sciences", p. 66
[86] Foucault, M., OT, p. 311

In Foucault's view, the "emblematic figure" of this era is Descartes, who yearned for certainty through an investigation of a method that would provide it. For Descartes, the key structures for such a method were "comparison and order". If, simple structures can be identified in any subject that is under scrutiny, and if these simples can be isolated accurately, then one can move from the simple to the complex with certainty and thus equipped with an intension to universalize through comparison. Therefore, as Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude, all questions of identity and difference can be reduced, in this way, through the use of method, to questions of order.[87] This decidedly analytical move, 'from the simplest to the most complex', rested on the epistemic structure of "representation" with the intention to reach certitude through a method of standardized progression: "It is precisely in this that the method and its 'progress' consist: the reduction of all measurement (all determination by equality and inequality) to a serial arrangement which, beginning from the simplest, will show up all differences as degrees of complexity."[88]

Thus, the Classical Age identified thought with representation, to think was to represent an object in a table of genus and species. In this form of "ordering", the role of man is not one of "meaning creation": the order is already there, all he can hope for is to come up with the most precise –albeit artificial, since the conventional signs are constructed- way with the representations he himself did not create- since man, himself, did not provide those conventional signs with meaning. Therefore, as Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, "man clarified, but did not create; he was not a transcendental source of signification".[89] This is what Foucault implies by saying that there was no theory of signification in the Classical Age. The critical moment of the book arises when Foucault follows with the assertion that "Classical language as the common discourse of representation and things, as the place within which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes anything that could be a 'science of man.' As long as that language was spoken in Western culture it was not possible for human existence to be called in question on its own account, since it contained the nexus of representation and being."[90]

[87] Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19
[88] Foucault, M., OT, p. 54
[89] Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 19
[90] Foucault, M., OT, p. 311

This means that Classical thought cannot think of representation itself, in the Classical table, what we see is the profound invisibility of "representing", itself as an activity. That is, the human activity of ordering things (man as positing subject and posited object), the very act of construction of the table itself cannot be represented[91]. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain the inability of the Classical Age to think of man, or to represent representation itself (as described in detail by Foucault in his surprising reading of Diego Velázquez de Silva's *Las Meninas*[92] as "the representation of, as it were, the Classical representation") in the following way:

"Since it was taken for granted that language by its very nature made possible successful representation, the role of human beings in relating representations and things could not itself be problematized…the activity of human beings in constructing the table could not itself be represented; there was no place for it on the table…Foucault is concerned exclusively with the systematization of the actual statements of an age, and he sees the Classical Age as having no place for man positing subject and posited object. Man cannot enter the classical picture without the whole scheme undergoing a radical transformation."

This transformation comes with the Modern épistéme, when Kant posits man as the representing subject and represented object, or as Foucault puts it, that "strange empirico-transcendental doublet". In the next section I will analyze the ambiguous position that Kant occupies in *The Order of Things*, and propose at the end of the section, the necessity to read Foucault's *Commentary* in order to better understand this ambivalent position of Kant.

[91] "In Classical thought, the personage for whom the representation exists, and who represents himself within it, …he who ties together all the interlacing threads of the 'representation in the form of a Picture or a table' – he is never to be found in that table himself." Ibid.308

[92] *Las Meninas*, for Foucault, demarcates the empty place of the "sovereign", a place which will only be filled after Kant, and his introduction of the transcendental subject. The place of the king is what makes possible the representation, but it is at the same time elided. Hence, the central paradox of the Classical episteme lies in this impossibility of representing the act of representing: the possibility of representation depends on what itself cannot be represented, the transcendental subject. With the end of the Classical Age "man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in advance by *Las Meninas*."

## B-3 Kant, the Shiva

According to Foucault, "the great turn" of modern philosophy takes place when, with Modernity, ideas are no longer taken to be transparent mediums of knowledge, when "representation" becomes obscure (the cogito is no longer transparent, the mind is not a sheet to be filled –a *tabula rasa*-) and thus, it becomes possible to ask the question whether ideas are –and to what degree- representative of their objects, and if they are, in virtue of what do they posses such capacity. It becomes possible to question the grounds in which representation itself is thought, thus, the fundamental question becomes, whether knowledge is rooted in something other than representation. It is still possible that some forms of knowledge, for all intents and purposes, derived from ideas representing objects, however, as Gutting declares, "Foucault insists, the thought that was only now [with Kant] possible was that representation itself [and the ideas that are represented] could have an origin in something else."[93] This is the transcendental subject.

Kant opens the way to the idea that the mind itself is the ground in which representations are composed when he says, "We must, therefore, make trial whether we may not have more success … if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge." In the Renaissance and Classical épistémes 'man' was not a structuring principle for knowledge in the sense of being a condition of its possibility, with the modern épistéme 'man' emerges not only as the subject that knows but also the object of knowledge, an "organizer of the spectacle in which he [himself] appears."[94] This positioning of man, at the center of the spectacle in his dual role as the subject and the object of knowledge opens up several -and distinctively modern- possibilities in Western philosophy: first, already indicated by Kant, is the idea that representations are constituted by the human mind. Thoughts and ideas, first and foremost, are the products of our minds. It is important to realize the difference, however, that for Kant, these "products" of the mind are not that of natural or historical reality, they belong to a new epistemic structure- transcendental subjectivity. Therefore, one may put forward the idea that, there are within Kant's thought, still certain distinctively Classical themes about the way that knowledge is perceived, a sort of Classical conservatism, insisting that knowledge cannot be posited as a physical or a historical reality; for Kant the grounds of knowledge is situated in

[93] Gutting, Gary, 1989, "Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[94] Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 29

the transcendental domain, within the constant, necessary and universal activity of our intuitions and categories, which are "more fundamental than the ideas [they] subtended."[95] Second view is the acknowledgement of ideas themselves as historical realities, an opening that was realized in several of post-Kantian philosophers. This path goes through several transformations in the history of Western thought, for instance, one branch posits knowledge being primarily tied to language (as in Herder's thought): although, this line of thinking has its immediate background in the opening initiated by Kant; eventually, it carries with itself the danger of emptying knowledge of its normative validity. Heidegger says, this is also a point Kant himself had realized, and he asserts that, this possibility that resulted as a consequence of Kant's critical interrogations drove the "possibility of metaphysics before the abyss. He saw the unknown; he had to draw back. Not only the imagination filled him with alarm, but in the meantime … he had also come more and more under the influence of 'pure reason' as such."[96] When knowledge is perceived as being primarily a mold (or a 'fold' as Deleuze would say) within the historical (or Historicized) succession of events, thus pushing slightly the debate upon that of the domain of the practical reason, the transcendental framework will carry the possibility to remain dangerously limited and reduced to a blunt framework for our thought, and pushed dangerously into a corner whereby it may face the possibility of losing entirely its normative validity.

Consequently, with the first and second (paradoxical) openings mentioned in this chapter, both initiated almost single-handedly by Kant himself, Paul Tillich, a twentieth century theologian, has referred to Kant as the "Shiva figure" of the Enlightenment: Kant's celebrated *Critique of Pure Reason* tended to undermine many of the Enlightenment ideals and its foundations, thus similar to Hindu god Shiva, he became the "creator and destroyer" of the very process that he situates himself and aligns his own thought. In the Hindu art and sculpture, Shiva (many armed one) with one legged raised is shown dancing, when one cosmic epic comes to an end and a new cosmic epic is created. And so it was with Kant and the Enlightenment, Tillich says, philosophy expressed some of its highest ideals; and yet by showing the limitations of human reason and science that same philosophy undercut the traditional foundations of Enlightenment faith. This is Kant the destroyer of the intellectual order. Like the Shiva figure he was, Kant also turned around and tried to reconstruct

[95] Gutting, G. "Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989
[96] Heidegger, M. "*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*", p. 173

Enlightenment ideals on a new basis. He said in a famous quote, that he found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.[97] Heinrich Heine, one of the most significant German romantic poets, said: "This little man from Königsberg aroused more terror in Europe than all the other minions of terrorists, like Robespierre or Marat, and all the political villains."

[97] Note the striking similarity between these two quotes both mentioned in this thesis: Foucault says he historicizes in order to leave as little room possible for the transcendental; Kant writes in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."

## B-4 "The Threshold of our Modernity" and the Ambivalence of Kant in *The Order of Things*

In the closing chapters of *The Order of Things* Foucault dwells on Kant and Kantian philosophy, describing it as that caesura that marked the end of the age of representation. In his analysis, Kant's critical thought "marked a shift from the horizontal interrogation of representation to the vertical questioning of its conditions of possibility, which were henceforth situated outside of representation and consequently escaped the epistemic horizon that the latter had previously assigned to thought."[98]

> "The Kantian critique …marks the threshold of our Modernity; it questions representation … on the basis of its rightful limits. Thus it sanctions for the first time that event in European culture which coincides with the end of the 18th century: the withdrawal of knowledge [savoir] and thought outside the space of representation. That space is brought into question in its foundation, its origin, and its limits: and by this very fact, the unlimited field of representation, which Classical thought had established … now appears as metaphysics."[99]

Kant's critical turn, however, presents itself as a paradoxical philosophical move, because the new épistéme of which Kant himself is the initiator, says Foucault in *The Order of Things*) is itself the space that is now supposed to provide all the answers, to the very questions which will be (and can only be) asked within it (from within). Since with Kant, *a priori* proofs are confined to the world of experience, and since Kant denies the Platonic 'essence' (or the concept which testifies for the existence of an 'intellectual intuition')[100] that for Plato everyone had and therefore also had natural access to the knowledge of the concepts such as God, immortality of the soul, etc.; after Kant, one can only ask questions for the sole purpose of seeking 'knowledge' about things one can, in principle, *already* experience.

In Kant's last major work, the so-called *Opus Postumum*, a work Kant himself described as his "chef d'oeuvre" and as the keystone of his entire philosophical system, which

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[98] Han, B. FCP, p.17
[99] Foucault, M., OT, p. 242-243
[100] Similar references to that same Platonic 'essence' can also be seen in the philosophy of Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas.

occupied him for more than the last decade of his life, the central question for philosophy is laid forward as 'Was ist der Mensch?'. Therefore, Kant assigns, for the purposes of his 'transcendental philosophy', the central place to an analysis of man, in his unique (empirico-transcendental) position. But, in the absence of the 'intellectual intuition' and since our reason is confined to the limits of experience, Foucault continues, the efforts that are made and that will be made in this épistéme, can only be an 'Analytic of Finitude'. Because 'man' is limited in his transcendental and empirical conditions (empirical and transcendental finitude), the questions that he will ask (from the only place he can *legitimately* ask) can only be replied with yet another finding about man's finitude.

Indeed, "at the end of the eighteenth century . . . seeing consists in leaving to experience its greatest corporal opacity; the solidity, the obscurity, the density of things closed in upon themselves, have powers of truth that they owe not to light"[101]; thus, in the modern épistéme, 'man's necessary and total involvement in the positivity of knowledge (i.e., empiricity) conceals the very objects that he seeks to know, without an external source of "light", man is left alone in his finitude: "All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature … Man's finitude is heralded –and imperiously so- in the positivity of knowledge."[102]

The most fundamental feature of the anthropological turn, therefore, for Foucault, is that human finitude (both empirical and transcendental finitude) becomes self-foundational; whereas for Descartes human finitude was put forward in an Aristotelian/Thomist view, far from being self-foundational, it was considered as a derivation of the infinite, viz. the only possible explanation for the notion of the infinite in man is the idea that it was placed there by God.

Let us follow our steps backwards a little bit, in order to grasp fully what is meant by Modern épistéme's paradoxical movement. During the Classical period representation was both the ground and the privileged medium of knowledge: to be known was to be represented

[101] Foucault, M., "The Birth of the Clinic", xiii
[102] Foucault, M., OT, p. 313

adequately.[103] On the other hand, beings were fully given to representation, at least in principle and the main objective of knowledge –where knowledge is directed in its essence- was to make perfect by finding the most suitable method that would compare, differentiate, measure and arrange representations (i.e., thoughts and ideas) so that the order of the world will be revealed. Foucault reads Descartes primarily on these grounds, viz. Descartes' efforts in the organization of the system of thought that would systematize most effectively the differences between representations, or more generally, the fascination of the Classical age with the table "as a synoptic form of knowledge."[104] However, it is the modern age that prescribes the birth of 'man' (not in the ontological sense of the term, but epistemological) thanks to the well-known Copernican revolution, whereby the answer to the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, by Kant, is located beyond the space of representation and these conditions themselves, therefore, are referred to the transcendental subject in its capacity as "the foundation of a possible synthesis of all representations"- a masterly show of skill from "the great Chinaman of Königsberg"[105], in which the representing subject "ends up defining by its very interrogation the field in which its answer will be given, thus revealing itself to be the 'condition of possibility of experience itself."[106]

As exemplified in the preceding paragraphs directly by a quote[107] from Kant, the main idea behind the Copernican revolution was that it might be more profitable, in order to securely ground empirical knowledge –thus, provide a sufficient answer once and for all to

[103] At this point, see: "the threshold between Classicism and modernity … had definitely crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid fort the knowledge of things." (*The Order of Things*, p. 304) Language becomes a limiting structure imposed upon man (a founding finitude), "a dense web with its own inscrutable history", as Dreyfus and Rabinow puts it.

[104] Han-Pile, B. "*The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism*", p. 7

[105] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil", tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 210. Whoever uses Nietzsche's now infamous referral to Kant, as that great Chinaman of Königsberg, is inclined to interpret this line as one of ridicule. However, who are those philosophers that Nietzsche most often attacks? He enumerates four principles in which his attacks are based in one his last books, "Why I am so Wise", Ecce Homo (page 7): (1) "I only attack causes that are victorious"; (2) "I stand alone"; (3) "I never attack persons"; and (4) "attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of gratitude." This referral of Nietzsche may not be that antagonistic as presupposed by many after all. For more, see "How Chinese" Was Kant?" by Stephen Palmquist. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/ ~ppp/srp /arts/ HCWK.html #_ednref9

[106] Han, B. FCP, p. 18

[107] The quotation from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* referred above is on page 27: "We must, therefore, make trial whether we may not have more success … if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."

the interrogating gaze of the skeptic-, to look into the activity of representation (or activity of representing) itself, with a view to finding out whether any *a priori* conditions could be identified that would hold for any possible representational content. If such conditions are indeed there, then it would become possible to suggest that the mere existence of such necessary and universal restraints on our representations is enough proof to certify their legitimacy in the empirical realm.[108]

This transition in the formal structure of the conditions of possibility of our knowledge from *post hoc* to *a priori* have two essential consequences: in the first step, the immediate result is that "the very being of what is represented fell outside of representation itself"[109]. Secondly, and this is the central theme of which this work will henceforth commit itself to disentangle via a close reading of Foucault's *Commentary*; the Copernican revolution of Kant giving rise to a new understanding of man as "the empirico-transcendental double". As a transcendental subject, 'man' is the foundation of empirical knowledge: "to be known is still to be represented; but in order to count as candidates for true knowledge, representation must conform to the epistemic conditions laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic [in the *Critique of Pure Reason*]."[110] Still, 'man' is at the same time a possible object of representation within the field opened up by such epistemic conditions. In Foucault's words, "man appeared as an object of possible knowledge (…) and at the same time as the being through which all knowledge is possible."[111] It is important to emphasize however, at least at this point, the fact that these two aspects of man are clearly separated[112] in the *Critique*, one does not cross over to the other's domain, and it is this possibility of crossing over revealed in the *Anthropology* that will put the Kantian critique in jeopardy; when, as mentioned, Kant's triple questioning (respectively followed in his *Critiques*) were re-centered around the fourth, that is, on the question of 'man', thus anticipating the philosophical path of modernity, while swirling it around a fundamentally anthropological understanding of man.

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[108] Han-Pile, B. "*The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism*", p. 8
[109] Foucault, M., OT, p. 240
[110] Han-Pile, B. "*The Death of Man: Foucault and Humanism*", p. 8
[111] Foucault, M. "Dits et Écrits", Vol. I, 607
[112] As Béatrice Han-Pile puts it, ". . . in the *Critique*, there is no overlap between the empirical "I" of our self apprehension in the form of the internal sense on the one hand, and the transcendental "I" of the "I think" of transcendental apperception on the other", ibid.

Analytic of finitude endangers this clear divide that the *Critique* established between the transcendental and the empirical (the two halves of the double), thus, gives the Copernican turn an anthropological twist. This twist, according to Foucault, was already apparent in Kant's transition from T*he Critique of Pure Reason* to *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: "from Kant onwards … there is nothing but finitude, and it is in this sense that the Kantian critique carried with itself the possibility –or the peril- of anthropology."[113] This position of Foucault is not quite clear, what he means by "the peril of anthropology" cannot easily be deduced from the ambiguous chapters when he dwells extensively on Kant in the final chapters of *The Order of Things*. Let us now pass to these ambivalent remarks on Kantian philosophy, so that the strategic importance of Foucault's *Commentary* shall reveal itself as a crucial and strategically important piece of work; and consequently so, we shall find ourselves in a better position to appreciate the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault.

As a result of the Copernican revolution, we saw that the transcendental subject found itself in the midst of a paradoxical environment, while "Man's mode of being" is described by Foucault, "as that historical *a priori* which, since the nineteenth century has served as an almost self-evident ground for our thought"[114]. The paradox is the very characteristic of 'man' as an historical *a priori* (of Modernity): his dual position as "the foundation of all positivities present … in the element of empirical things"[115]. Being the "foundation of all positivities" means that 'man' is himself their conditions of possibility, "that positivities are dependent on the transcendental organization of human faculties to be given and understood as such."[116] Surely, the *existence* of these positivities (life, labor, language, etc.) does not depend on 'man's existence *per se*, only "their uncovering as positivities is governed by the transcendental opening of human experience". On the other hand, 'man' in his corporeal presence occupies also an empirical space, and thus, he is subject also to an empirical finitude (we are limited by a vast array of forces, i.e., organic, economic, linguistic, etc); again, this empirical finitude opens up the conditions (in the form of a positivities) of the possibility of knowledge. Béatrice Han-Pile summarizes this "doubling" in the following way:

[113] Foucault, M. "Dits et Écrits", vol. 1, p. 446
[114] Foucault, M. "The Order of Things", p. 344
[115] Ibid.
[116] Han-Pile, "*The Analytic of Finitude and the History of Subjectivity*" , p. 3

"The anthropological structure specific to modernity is thus defined from the beginning by this doubling of the transcendental subject as an object of empirical knowledge: in later Foucault's terms, the form of subjectivation particular to Man is such that he cannot become a subject of knowledge without being inscribed within the horizon of his own experience, and thus without appearing to himself as an object of knowledge. For the first time in the history of Western knowledge, theoretical subjectivation and objectivation go together."[117]

However, in the final chapters of *The Order of Things*, where Foucault deals with the paradoxical dual nature of man that we were discussing in this chapter up until now, we witness a curious, yet important uncertainty, which is not just an innocent confusion in terms, but one that seems like an ambiguity, in the criticism of Kant. Although in the 7th chapter of *The Order of Things* Foucault puts forward the introduction of the transcendental theme as a "threshold of our modernity", in chapter 9 we see Foucault changing his mind: this time he asserts that it is the introduction of the "Analytic of Finitude" which defines the threshold of our modern times: "Our culture crossed the threshold beyond which we recognize our Modernity when finitude was conceived in an interminable cross-reference with itself."[118] In the final section of the book, we witness that the transcendental theme had long lost its structurally prominent position, as the governing dynamic of *reason* that was once acclaimed to it (page 242), now it appears as one of the "doubles" within the analytic of finitude (Foucault mentions three "doubles" that arise as a result of this specific structure of finitude: the empirical/*transcendental*, the cogito/unthought and the retreat/return of language). Transcendental theme, therefore, is identified towards the end, "with the contents of knowledge, rather than with the space that determines it."[119]

Secondly, and equally importantly, the criticism of Kantian philosophy itself seems to get confused: for Foucault, Kant is responsible for the "dethronement of the sovereignty of 'I think'" (transparent *cogito* of Descartes), "when to his traditional trilogy of questions he added an ultimate one: the three critical questions (What can I know? What must I do? What am I permitted to hope for?) then found themselves referred to a fourth, and scribed as it were, 'to its account': *Was ist der Mensch?* This question, as we have seen, runs through our

[117] Ibid.
[118] Foucault, M. "The Order of Things", p. 318 (citation modified)
[119] Han, B. FCP, p. 18

thought from the early nineteenth century: this is because it produces, surreptitiously and in advance, the confusion between the empirical and the transcendental, even though Kant had demonstrated the divide between them".[120] Here, finally, we may have two Kants!

This situation, of course, raises serious questions: At which point now, are we supposed to consider that we have passed the threshold to our modernity? Chapter 7 puts forward the clear and distinct "divide", which introduced the transcendental subject, as the distinctive moment; whereas in the 9th, we see this division being blurred with the introduction of the fourth question focusing on 'man', and both of them are presented to us as the mark that signified the end of the classical age, and when finally our modernity had begun. Are we to think that there are two opposing versions of the transcendental theme, one deemed 'good' for Foucault, whereas the other as 'bad'; as Béatrice Han puts it, "a 'critical' version that would initially separate the constituting from the constituted, and an "anthropological" version that would then superimpose the two elements?"[121] If that is the case, are we to assume that this introduction of the anthropological fourth question, which places the figure of man at its center, transforms the nature of the transcendental theme, while accordingly, fundamentally altering the critical project itself? And secondly, as mentioned in the first part of this paragraph, how are we to approach the transcendental theme? Should we take the transcendental theme as one of the many forms that the Analytic might take (as exemplified by the quote above, *The Order of Things* page 318) or should we perceive it as "the primary element from which the Analytic itself must be diachronically understood as a deviation resulting from the recentering of Kantian thought on man?"

Foucault, indeed, tries to provide some clarification through a synthesis of the two conflicting preceding statements: "The threshold of our modernity, is situated … by the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet that was called *man*".[122] Where exactly in Kant's thought should we situate this strange empirico-transcendental doublet, in which one of his books we are to look for his emergence? In the 7th chapter of *The Order of Things* it is in *The Critique of Pure Reason* that we should look for the transcendental theme, since it

[120] Foucault, M., OT, 341
[121] Han, B. FCP, p. 19
[122] Foucault, M., OT, p. 343

"questions the conditions of a relation between representations from the point of view of what in general makes them possible: it thus uncovers a transcendental field in which the subject, which is never given to experience (since it is not empirical) but which is finite (since there is no intellectual intuition) determines in its relation to an object = X all the formal conditions of experience in general."[123]

However, if we are looking for the emergence of that "empirico-transcendental double", the first *Critique* seems to be an unlikely place to look for since, according to the quote above, the *Critique* uncovers that transcendental field which is non-empirical. The object of Kant's argument cannot be the 'man' of the second *Critique* also because the subject in *The Critique of Practical Reason* is studied in its capacity (of knowing or acting) as a representing/constituting subject and not as a constituted subject. If the empirico-transcendental double is not a problem of the *Critiques*, and it is certainly not since the fact that they are not presented there, at what point should we locate the connection between the transcendental theme and anthropology?

Foucault primarily lays blame on the Neo-Kantians in *The Order of Things* for slipping into the anthropological perversion; from Comte and Marx to Husserl and Sartre, Foucault contends that analytic of finitude is at once restricting and falsifying these systems of thought. The foundations of his criticism will be dealt with in the final chapters of this work, however it is important here to raise the question that whether this "anthropological usurpation" of the transcendental theme was already present in Kant's own thought, undermining it secretly but effectively, or is it something that the post-Kantians themselves failed (thus, not inherited it from Kant) to consider (or even failed to realize it in the first place), a mistake that proved lethal for their theories at the end. When analyzed in this context, Foucault's archaeology and genealogy proves to be, at least, aware of the dangers posed by anthropological slippage, and of the pitfalls affected by the analytic of finitude. Archaeology and genealogy, in their design, are meant to protect that territory, which designates the boundaries to what belongs to history, thus isolating the transcendental, and rescuing it from becoming perverted by the anthropological tendency. However, it is crucial for Foucault to answer the questions laid down here (rather it is the goal of this work to locate the answers within the Foucauldian *oeuvre*), as Han puts forward "if the possibility remained

[123] Foucault, M. OT, 243 (Quoted in Béatrice Han, FCP, p. 19)

of isolating a non-anthropological form of the transcendental theme, while analyzing in detail the way in which this theme has been perverted, then nothing would prevent Foucault from searching elsewhere, notably in what he called the "historical *a priori*", a revised and non-subjective version of the transcendental."[124]

It is at this point, I should introduce this curious little text, which will prove its fundamental worth at this exact time when the philosophical crossroads had been roughly defined, and the obstacles hindering modern philosophy to achieve a certain clarity, according to Foucault, had been presented. It is by this way, by introducing Foucault's second (complementary) doctoral thesis[125], which consists of a translation of Kant's "*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*" and a 128 pages long introduction to this most neglected of Kant's texts, I will try to answer to the critical questions that were posed in the previous pages, and try to provide an analysis of the "degree zero" of the debate concerning "'man' as that strange empirico-transcendental double".

## B-5

[124] Han, B., FCP, p. 20

[125] His major thesis was published later under the title of "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique" (Madness and Insanity: History of Madness in the Classical Age).

## Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and Foucault's *Commentary*

In the *Commentary*, Foucault mainly problematizes the role played by 'man' in Kant's thought by primarily focusing on the relation between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique*. In this work, Foucault has two purposes; one is an exegetical concern, that is, an archeology of the *Anthropology* tracing its diverse roots, what had been added as the years passed by via a comparison of its earlier drafts, while asking whether

"was there from 1772 onwards, and underlying perhaps the *Critique*, a certain concrete image of man that no philosophical elaboration essentially altered, and which is formulated at last … in the last of Kant's published texts? … But it is also possible that the *Anthropology* was modified in its central elements as the critical endeavor developed… This is to say that the *Critique* would add to its specific character of being a propaedeutic to philosophy a constitutive role in the birth and future of the concrete form of human existence."[126]

This question reveals the second concern of Foucault's *Commentary*, which is philosophical. An exegetical analysis of the text is necessary at first, because it is very difficult to pinpoint accurately the date of its content: although Kant's *Anthropology* is his last published text, it is probably the one that he labored the longest, since it was also a course that he gave for over thirty years, while making the lecture notes and thus the text itself more and more elaborate by constantly changing its content and adding new material. This archaeological excavation of the earlier grounds in which Kant's text stood is important for the reason that its starting points (the date Kant opened a course entitled "Anthropology") lie in the pre-Critical period. This is one of the reasons why Foucault is interested in this work in the first place: he asks whether there was, before the *Critique*, an underlying concrete conception of man "that no philosophical elaboration [i.e., *The Critique of Pure Reason*] essentially altered."

[126] Foucault, M. "Introduction to Kant's Anthropology" (henceforth IA in the endnotes and references) , p. 19

Secondly, Foucault is particularly interested in Kant's least discussed work, because *Anthropology* takes the 'man' (unlike the *Critique*s) in his paradoxical identity, as a constituting and constituted subject. Foucault mentions at the beginning of his *Commentary* the "proper place" sketched out by Kant, for a possible anthropology ("the space in which an anthropology could occupy"[127]: "a place in which self-observation bears neither the subject in itself, nor the pure I of synthesis, but a self which is object and present solely in its phenomenal truth. Yet this object I, which is given to the sense in the form of time, is nevertheless not alien to the determining subject, since in the end it is nothing but the subject as it is affected by itself."[128] **Therefore, Kant's *Anthropology* would not take as its object the "subject in itself", which was the object of *The Critique of Practical Reason*; nor it would be the "pure I of synthesis", which was studied in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. The object of the *Anthropology* is 'man' in his paradoxical position as a constituting and a constituted subject. Therefore, *Anthropology* is of great interest for Foucault because "contrary to the two *Critiques*, which are only concerned with the transcendental, it takes account of man in his ambivalence as an empirico-transcendental double."[129] It is for this reason this marginal text of Foucault becomes significantly important, it presents us the only possible venue in which we can answer to the questions concerning the ambivalent position of Kant in *The Order of Things* put forward in the previous section.** In short, Foucault's *Commentary* enables us to trace the different positions that the transcendental theme took within the Kantian corpus and to establish once and for all, the nature of the relationship between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique* (as put forward by Foucault himself, the main goal of his *Commentary* is "to discover what fixed coefficient the

[127] Foucault, M. IA, p. 39
[128] Ibid.
[129] Han, B., FCP, p. 20

*Anthropology* shares with the *critical* enterprise".)[130] In the next section, I will introduce Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, emphasizing first, its central importance within the Kantian corpus and second, the reason underlying Foucault's interest in this text, that is, anthropology being concerned neither with the study of human nature as *homo natura* (man in his animal nature) nor as pure self-consciousness; but rather its being a study of man as *Menschenwesen*. Thus, the *Anthropology* is the questioning of man's limits in knowledge and concrete existence, 'man' in his dual role as a "strange empirico-transcendental double."

## I

## Kant's *Anthropology*: an analysis of 'Man' as an "Empirico-Transcendental Double"

In the *Groundwork,* Kant divides moral philosophy into two distinctively separate parts: the metaphysics of morals (also known as "morals proper" and which was supposed to provide the "laws according to which everything ought to happen") and practical anthropology.[131] 'Morals proper', according to Kant, was thought to be "entirely unmixed with any information about what does happen." Consequently, our knowledge about the human nature, which we know through experience, has nothing to offer our knowledge of 'metaphysics of morals'.

In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant repeats the same distinction, and contrasts "metaphysics of morals" with "practical anthropology"[132] while, in his *Lectures on Ethics* suggesting that the latter should be called

*Philosophia moralis applicata*, moral anthropology … Moral anthropology is morals that are applied to human beings. *Moralia pura* is built on necessary laws, and hence it cannot base

[130] Foucault, M. IA, p. 19
[131] Kant, I. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 4: 388
[132] Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. by Mary J. Gregor, p. 10

itself on the *particular constitution* of a rational being, of the human being. The particular constitution of the human being, as well as the laws which are based on it, appear in moral anthropology under the name of 'ethics'.[133]

Here, we see that what Kant considers as practical anthropology is part and parcel of "morals, or practical philosophy", not of theoretical philosophy.[134]

Although in the *Groundwork*, Kant clearly separates the domains of 'morals proper' and 'practical anthropology', in the introduction of *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant establishes an inherent connection between the two fields of practical philosophy. Kant says, "A metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object *the particular nature of human beings*, which is known only by experience."[135] Thus, Kant establishes an indispensable link between metaphysics and empirical anthropology, insisting that "the system of duties falling under the title of 'metaphysics' consists of pure moral principles insofar as they are applied to human nature."[136] For Kant, empirical information about human nature, and metaphysical (*a* priori) principles, both, "determine the content of moral ends and thereby of ethical duties."[137] As Wood asserts, for Kant, "such information is to be used not merely in choosing the *means* to moral ends but in determining which *ends* we ought to set as moral beings."[138] This signifies the importance of Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic View*, and its central place within the Kantian corpus, sharing with the *Critiques* practically an equal weight of the search for the means and ends that us, as moral beings, ought to set.

According to Wood, by reallocating the content of a 'metaphysics of morals' toward the empirical, "Kant is not abandoning or even modifying his fundamental thesis that the supreme principle of morality is wholly *a priori* and borrows nothing from the empirical nature of human beings." Kant, by intertwining these two domains together is only taking back his initial claim that a metaphysics of morals can concern only "the idea and the

[133] Kant, I. Lectures on Ethics, 29: 599
[134] Kant, I. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 388-389
[135] Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. by Mary J. Gregor, 6: 217
[136] Wood, Allen W. Kant's Ethical Thought, p. 195
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.

principles of a possible *pure* will and not the actions and conditions of human volition generally."[139] In brief, a metaphysics of morals no longer singly constituted by certain *pure* moral principles, while pure moral law serving as its sole foundation; instead, it is achieved insofar as pure moral principles are applied to the empirical nature of human beings.

Although Kant's own illustrations in the *Groundwork* concerning the moral principle are taken heavily from actual assumptions about human nature ("about the natural purposiveness of self-love and of natural talents, about our dependency on the charitable aid of other people", and so on), he does not provide any information about how these substantive assumptions relate to any systematic study of 'morals proper'. As he mentions in "*Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*" (1755), Kant is not yet sure whether anthropology is ready to meet the requirements to be considered as a 'science proper', and equally importantly, he is solemnly troubled whether human self-knowledge is possible at all:

> "It is not even known at all to us what the human being now is, although consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us in this; how much less will we be able to guess what one day he ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul's desire for knowledge snaps very desirously at this object, which lies so far from it, and strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some light."[140]

In part, Kant is doubtful over the success of 'practical anthropology' because of its relatively immature and inadequate state not only when compared to other 'sciences', but also compared to what in one day it may become. Allen Wood provides us with a crucial information about when and why Kant decided to lecture and compile a book from his notes on anthropology in the first place (although, particularly in the *Groundwork* he appears to cast himself as someone better suited for a work on the metaphysical side of moral philosophy rather than the empirical, or anthropological side):

"Kant's desire to lecture on anthropology and even to reconceptualize the study of human nature was apparently stimulated in 1772 by his dissatisfaction with the 'physiological' approach to the subject taken by Ernst Platner. According to a 1773 letter to Marcus Herz, Platner's popular treatise on anthropology provoked Kant to institute an

[139] Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 391, quote taken from Wood, p. 196
[140] Kant, I. "Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens", I: 366

empirical study of human nature aimed at avoiding Platner's 'futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought."[141]

To an extent some of Kant's doubts over anthropology result from epistemological concerns, in that, for him, anthropology may not meet the standards for scientific knowledge. On the other hand, Kant also thought that "what we do know about human nature gives us every reason for distrusting our abilities to know ourselves."[142] Empirical psychology, at this point, is of crucial importance for Kant. We see him, at the beginning of his lectures on anthropology, almost equating the study of empirical psychology with anthropology entirely[143], although later on, as the lectures and the book itself progress, he starts to refer to empirical psychology as that "part of anthropology that deals only with the appearance of inner sense (*Gemüt*)".[144] This distinction that Kant makes between the subject matter of empirical psychology, that is the *Gemüt*, and *Geist*, which Kant describes as that 'enigmatic nature of reason' is extremely important in the analysis of the relationship between the *Critique* and *Anthropology* and will be examined in more detail in the fifth subsection of the second chapter (under the section entitled "the Originary"). However, precisely at this point, a curious similarity between Kant and Foucault arises: both in his early lectures on *Anthropology* and in the *Critique of Pure Reason* we see Kant complaining about how people tend to confuse questions concerning empirical psychology with those of transcendental philosophy, or metaphysics.[145] In this section, we have already witnessed his growing sensitivity with respect to that patient but frail line separating the empirical and the transcendental both in his reactions to Platner, and also in his treatment of empirical psychology. In *The Order of Things* we see Foucault raising similar concerns about the post-Kantian philosophies, complaining about that dangerous tendency in certain philosophies, such as positivism or Marxism, an attempt to subordinate the transcendental completely to the empirical: "nature" or "History" as the sole determinants of the conditions of possibility of knowledge.

Returning to the topic at hand, and in brief, Kant, although he himself placed the question "Was ist der Mensch?" at the very center of any philosophical inquiry, while never

[141] Immanuel Kants Schriften, 10: 146, from Wood, p. 197
[142] Kant, I. Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, 2: 13
[143] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 8
[144] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 243
[145] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 8, Critique of Pure Reason, A 848- 849, B 876- 877

offering anywhere what the proper systematic study of this 'man' would look like, we see Kant struggling with two major problems concerning the productiveness of anthropology: first, the question of the proper methodology of anthropology and consequently, whether it will ever attain a scientific merit, and second, the obscurity of its subject matter, that is, the difficulty of self-knowledge of 'man'. In the *Anthropology*, Kant says, "[For] this species is only one possible variant of rational nature, yet we are acquainted with no other variants with which to compare it and arrive at specific differentia."[146] There is a good chance that what certain positivities, e.g., "predispositions and propensities" of human nature, anthropology will ever discover, they might only have (and remain to have) a provisional character.

Rationality, for Kant, is a capability of a human being; it is not its primary character. A human being is capable of acting rationally; however, this is not what it does constantly and unconditionally. Rational behavior is neither a necessary nor a typical exercise of the human being.[147] Additionally, as Wood puts forward, rational capacities themselves open our nature to modification by being the source of perfectibility. In stark contrast to animals, whose lives are fixated between certain mediums for they cannot go beyond the barrier set down by their instincts; our rationality is precisely the reason for our "indeterminate mode of life".[148] This traditional definition of human nature itself is an acknowledgment of its indefinable disposition.

For Kant, one of the most important obstacles that hinder anthropology from being considered an adequate field of science is the hardships that one faces when trying to catch a glimpse of human self-knowledge. While we cannot even be sure about the nature or quantity of the laws that govern human nature, human beings themselves block the way to their discovery, because of their "essential psychic habits to conceal and disguise their real motives and principles, not only from others, but also from themselves." According to Kant, human beings have that strong tendency to obscure with an intention to disguise the truth behind their thoughts and actions: "The human being has from nature a propensity to dissemble."[149] Via a comparison between "crude and cultivated, educated people", Kant makes a similar observation about the difficulty of human self-knowledge resulting from self-deception and

[146] Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 322
[147] Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 321
[148] Kant, I. Conjectural Beginning of Human History, 1786, 8: 111-115
[149] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 1197

self-opacity: “In crude people their entire humanity is not yet developed,” however, when we observe more cultivated people, “then [we] run into the difficulty that the more educated the human being is, the more he dissembles and the less he wants to be found out by others.”[150]

For the purposes of anthropology, and therefore for a better understanding of ‘morals proper’ or ‘practical philosophy’ in general, ‘self-observation’ is substantially crucial; however, Kant says it is also “inherently untrustworthy”: “without noticing what we are doing, we suppose we are discovering within us what we ourselves have put there.”[151] Observing others is equally deceptive because the person who is being observed “wants to represent himself and makes his own person into an artificial illusion.”[152]

The main reason underlying the difficulty of both self-observation and observation of others, for Kant, is that “when our incentives are active, we are not observing ourselves; and when we are observing ourselves our incentives are at rest.”[153] Although this last quote from Kant seems to imply that “active incentives” only destroy the purpose of the process of *self*-observation; in fact, the problem is exactly the same when we observe others: their ‘*psychic propensity to dissemble*’ and their ‘*incentives*’ to show themselves different from what they are disable the observer to get a glimpse of what human nature looks like.

A careful reader would be quick to discern, however, that the “*propensities*” and “*incentives*” that Kant lays down his argument about the difficulty of attaining “objective” knowledge about the human nature (the difficulty of self-knowledge, and knowledge about other people) are already important assumptions that he gathers from his own observations of human nature. However, this is not at all contradictory: In Kant’s view, anthropology is a developing science (which, empirical psychology is only a part), and he is merely trying to find certain rules or laws (hopefully without contradicting what he laid forward in his *Critiques*) about the human nature that he can prove as necessary and universal. He says,

“We must concede that psychological explanations are in very bad shape compared to physical ones, that they are forever hypothetical, and that for any three different grounds of

[150] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 857
[151] Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 133
[152] Ibid.
[153] Kant, I. Anthropology, 25: 857

explanation, we can easily think up a fourth that is equally plausible … Empirical psychology will hardly ever be able to claim the rank of a philosophical science, and probably its only true obligation is to make psychological observations (as Burke does in his work on the beautiful and sublime) and hence to gather material for future empirical rules that are to be connected systematically, yet to do so *without trying to grasp these rules*."[154]

The standards to be qualified as a *science*, for Kant, are very high thanks to immense improvements in our knowledge about *physics*; therefore, since certain aspects of anthropology, for instance empirical psychology, are in a process of development, anthropology "should content itself for the moment with making unsystematic observations, which are only later (as science matures) to be taken up into empirical rules."[155]

This is exactly the reason why Kant uses examples from Shakespeare's tragedies, Moliére's comedies, Fielding's novels, or Hume's *History of England* in his lectures and notes on the *Anthropology* as *auxiliary* sources for a possible anthropology, since they do (eventually) provide crucial insights from customs and folkways of different peoples. However, for Kant, "local knowledge of the world" must rest on a "general knowledge of the world". Hence, anthropology studies *human nature* (empirical nature of man) in his cultural, social, geographical, etc. surroundings ("man as a denizen of the World"), and does not scrutinize *human beings* in themselves. At this level, Kant is following the formal structure of the *Critique* in setting the quest of the *Anthropology* as the search for what is necessary and universal.

Kant's definition of this aspect of human nature, that is, his observation that human beings are *psychologically opaque* is reminiscent of Nietzsche and Freud. According to Kant, an overwhelming part of our mental life is comprised of "obscure representations": representations that are not accompanied by consciousness, that are only available to us through inference.[156] The underlying reason for this is that "many of our representations are physiological in origin and never need to reach consciousness."[157] However, Kant says,

[154] Immanuel Kants Schriften, 4: 471, from Wood, p. 198
[155] Ibid.
[156] Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 135-137
[157] Wood, Allen, p. 202

human-beings are already inclined to make their own representations obscure by pushing them into unconsciousness. He says

"We play with obscure representations and have an interest, when loved or unloved objects are before our imagination, in putting them into the shadows."[158]

In sum, this section guides us in understanding the unique place of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* within the Kantian *oeuvre*: it is concerned neither with the *Homo* natura (the human animal) nor with self-consciousness, but instead, with "*Menschenwesen*, the questioning of man's limits both in knowledge and concrete existence"[159]. Therefore the *Anthropology* studies 'man' in his strange empirico-transcendental position and its subject matter is "not the pure I" of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, nor the "subject in itself" of *The Critique of Practical Reason* but rather "man, affected by himself." Consequently, this is the work of Kant that Foucault wants to analyze, in order to find out whether the philosophical problems that he sees (and warns us in his *The Order of Things*) in post-Kantian philosophies is visible within Kant's own works (between the *Critiques* and the *Anthropology*), or is the Kantian project is safe from these accusations. The study of Kant's *Anthropology* therefore, is crucial for Foucault.

As mentioned before, whether Kant had a concrete image of 'man' starting with the *Anthropology*, thus secretly underlying and guiding the *Critique*; or whether there were serious reconsiderations on the part of how 'man' is conceived when *Anthropology* was being constantly updated over a course of thirty years is important for Foucault, and there are two reasons for that: "if the Critique turned out to be constitutive for the *Anthropology* in such a way that the distinction between the *a priori* conditions and empirical facts was preserved, then the Kantian project on the whole would be free of any empirico-transcendental slippage, and Kant's *Anthropology* could function as a model and point of reference for subsequent anthropologies. If, on the other hand, the relationship between these two works is one of reversal, that is, *Anthropology* not being subordinated to the *Critique*, instead if it served as its substratum (hence, in Foucault's aforementioned quote "underlying… the *Critique*), then the

[158] Kant, I. Anthropology, 7: 136
[159] Foucault, M. IA, quote taken from Arianna Bove's translation of the *Commentary* which is a part of her unpublished PhD thesis. (available at: http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm)

confusions that were mentioned in the *Order of Things* as clear and immanent threats within the Kantian anthropological/philosophical tradition[160] would throw the entire Kantian critical project into jeopardy, while putting a question mark over that entire Western tradition of thought that stayed loyal to that portrait of 'man'. This "reversal" argument, therefore, would show that this Kantian portrayal of 'man' was originally skewed, thus the anthropologico-critical project is irredeemable within Kant's own thought. Ambiguously enough, in his *Commentary* Foucault seems to defend both these, clearly incompatible, theses: repetition and decentering of the *Critique* by the *Anthropology*, respectively with the introduction of two opposing themes, namely "the originary" and "the fundamental", which will be analyzed in detail in the next section.

The next section, in order to introduce these symmetrically opposite themes (the originary and the fundamental), examines Foucault's ambiguous reading of the *Anthropology*. As mentioned above, Foucault defends two versions at the same time: *Anthropology* being a "repetition" of the *Critique,* in which case the uniformity of the transcendental theme is preserved; and the other, opposite scenario, that of "reversal" of the *Critique*, in which case the univocacy and inviolacy of the transcendental theme is tarnished. Both of these arguments are entertained by Foucault in his *Commentary*.

[160] e.g., confusions between the empirical and the transcendental, such as declaring one's primacy over the other (as exemplified by *The Order of Things* pitfalls of positivism and Marxism in taking the empirical as the primary, preceding determinant of human action, while subordinating the transcendental to the modality of the transcendental or to it mode of being, in the most general sense)

# II

## The "Degree zero" of Confusions

In the case of *Anthropology* being a "repetition" of the *Critique*, Béatrice Han asserts that, it would be possible through an "archaeology of the text"[161], "to reveal the constitutive role of the *Critique* in "the birth and the evolution of human forms"[162]: the explicit foundation of the *Anthropology* would then be the transcendental conditions of possibility defined by the *Critique* some twenty-five years earlier."[163] Hence, Foucault says, the *Anthropology* bears "a certain critical truth of man, a truth born from the critique of the conditions of truth."[164] An analysis of "the layers that give [the *Anthropology*] its geological depth" might reveal "the genesis of a 'homo criticus,' the structure of which would be essentially different from the image of man that went before."[165] In the next chapter, this first interpretation, that is "the subordination of the *Anthropology* to the *Critique*" will be presented with an elucidation of the concept of the "fundamental", "which allows us to think the relation of the empirical and the *a priori* from the perspective that, although symmetrical to that of the *Critique*, nonetheless remains in conformity with it."[166]

As mentioned before, this is not the only interpretation of Kant's text that Foucault entertains in his *Commentary*. Another possibility is laid down with the quote partially given previously at this work in page 42:

> "In 1772, was there already, perhaps even subsisting in the very depths of the *Critique,* a certain concrete image of man which no subsequent philosophical elaboration would substantially alter and which emerges at last, more or less unchanged, in Kant's last published text? Moreover, if that image of man managed to reap the rewards of the critical experience, and yet, for all that, still not be subject to any distortion, is this not

[161] Foucault, M. IA, p. 19
[162] Ibid. 14
[163] Han, B., FCP, p. 21
[164] Foucault, M. IA, p. 20
[165] Ibid.
[166] Han, B. FCP, p. 21

because it had –if not quite organized and determined that experience- then at least *indicated the direction it might take*, *acting as its secret guide*?"[167]

Considering that Kant started working on the *Anthropology* before he engaged in the critical project, and since *Anthropology* remained unpublished until Kant's last years, Foucault asks whether there is a 'concrete image of man' that would have shaped the critical enterprise from the beginning, in harmony with the logic that made him to sway away from the question of the limits of knowledge (as in the three questions corresponding to three *Critique*s) towards the question of the nature of man (the question that summarizes the goal of the *Anthropology*, and which other questions should be subsumed: "*Was ist der Mensch*?"). Therefore, in opposition to the claim above, that *Anthropology* being founded by the *Critique*, it may well be that the *Anthropology* "would be its mute presupposition". This interpretation suggests that there would be an inherently faulty version of the transcendental theme, generated by the anthropological questioning (recentering), an "inner fault [faille] affecting the transcendental revolution of criticism".[168]

These two interpretations (repetition or reversal in the form of decentralization of the *Critique*s), hardly complement to one other, thus they pose a fundamental irreconcilable duality in Foucault's interpretation of Kant's *Anthropology*. However, it is not Foucault's aim to provide a coherent reading of Kant, although towards the end of his *Commentary* he does seem to give credit to the *Anthropology* having a coherent philosophical framework, via his analysis of "the fundamental"; however, as mentioned before, the primary aim of the *Commentary* is to understand the relation between the *Critique* and the *Anthropology*, so that the development of the transcendental theme within the Kantian corpus will be clarified, its entanglement with the "birth of man" will be revealed, and therefore first steps of Foucault's

[167] Foucault, M. IA, p. 19 (My italics)
[168] Foucault, M., IA, p. 67 (originally cited in Béatrice Han's FCP). The parts that she makes references to the *Commentary* are her own translations. I have to admit that, every once in a while; I will take recourse in her translations for several reasons: First English translation of Foucault's *Commentary* is published in 2008 by Semiotext(e), however there had been several Foucault scholars who had made personal notes and references in their works to the text originally held in the library in Paris. Among them, and including the English translation itself, Béatrice Han-Pile offers a much clearer and erudite translation of parts of Foucault's *Commentary* in her works. Instead of losing all the important nuances by referring to the translation of Semiotext(e), I prefer to quote certain portions of the text from B. Han-Pile's FCP.

"Analytic of Finitude" will be witnessed as early as 1961, long before *The Order of Things*. As Han summarizes aptly:

"Should the *Commentary* establish that the internal evolution of the Kantian corpus prefigures in miniature that of modernity, it would be possible to isolate even within the Kantian oeuvre itself the paradigm of the first empirico-transcendental "divide", as well as what Roland Barthes might have called the "degree zero" of the "confusions" that enmeshed the post-Kantians."[169] Therefore, the *Commentary* is strategically important to understand the initial phases of the "confusions"[170] that serve as the foundation for those three events, which Foucault identifies with the birth of modernity in *The Order of Things*: namely, the transcendental theme, the birth of 'man' and the Analytic of Finitude. This little text prognosticates many of the debates (on the nature and influence of the anthropological thought) that will be central to the *Order of Things*, particularly in its final chapter where Foucault extends his criticism to post-Kantian anthropologies, via a criticism of Kantian anthropology itself.

In the next section, I will try to describe the oppositional interpretations in which Foucault analyzes Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, particularly focusing on the twin but symmetrically divergent themes, namely the "originary" and the "fundamental". [171] However, first I should at least introduce the contents of Foucault's *Commentary*:

In the first four chapters of the *Commentary*, Foucault, through an 'archaeology' of Kant's text, analyzes certain connections between *Anthropology* and a variety of other texts, some belong to Kant himself, such as the C*ritiques,* some other works, which Kant deemed essential for the study of anthropology as a science, published while he was working on his lecture notes and the book itself. The exegetical part, therefore, deals with layers of changes that were made to the text, while Kant was constantly renewing and improving his notes. However, one should bear in mind that the primary text that Foucault compares and contrasts

[169] Han, B., FCP, p. 22
[170] Foucault, M., OT, 341
[171] My analysis and interpretation of the originary and the fundamental have been substantially influenced by that of Béatrice Han (1998, Eng. Trans. 2002) Therefore, I will refer to her "Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical", along with her other articles on the same topic, frequently.

the *Anthropology* with is Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Certain parts of both are, in later stages, are taken into consideration in light of the *Opus Posthumum*. Next two chapters of Foucault's *Commentary*, on the other hand, investigate "the displacement of the *Critique* by the *Anthropology* thesis" through an examination of the theme of the '*originary*'. The opposite thesis, which is the reading of the *Anthropology* as a repetition of the *Critique* is introduced in the 7th and 8th chapters with the theme of the '*fundamental*', which puts forward the idea that the *Anthropology* "would convey the *Critique* towards 'transcendental philosophy'.[172] Kant defines 'transcendental philosophy", in the *Opus Posthumum*[173], "as a bridge between the system of the a. (*a priori*) metaphysical principles of 'science of nature', and b. physics as an (empirical) *scientia naturalis*."[174] Final sections of the *Commentary* confirm that Kant's critical philosophy is not incoherent (in itself), by favorably settling on the "repetition" thesis, -that is, the *Anthropology* does not drive the transcendental theme (or Kantian critical transcendental philosophy overall) towards an empirical field-, thanks to the theme of the 'fundamental'. In these chapters, Foucault also warns us against the dangers of the consequences of anthropological thought "trying to pass itself off as an empirical form of criticism."[175]

[172] Han, B. Review of *Michel Foucault's Introduction a l'Anthropologie*, p. 2

[173] The Opus Postumum is what remains of a work-in-progress that occupied Kant for the last decade of his life. It survives as a collection of fascicles or bundles of manuscripts that begin in the early 1790s and continue until 1803, shortly before its author's death. Although not able to bring this last work to publication, Kant nevertheless regarded it as completing ''the task of the critical philosophy'' and thought sufficiently highly of his achievement to refer to it as ''his chief work, a chef d'oeuvre. The Opus Postumum can be seen to mark a number of important departures for the critical philosophy, especially with respect to the philosophy of science.'' The central question of the Opus Postumum was ''what is the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics?'' Howard Caygill, "The Force Of Kant's Opus Postumum" p. 1

[174] Han, B. Review of *Michel Foucault's Introduction a l'Anthropologie*, end note n. 5
[175] Ibid.

| Metaphysics | | | | Physics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Metaphysical Principles | --------- | **Transcendental** | --------- | (Empirical Principles |
| of the science of nature) | --------- | **Philosophy** | --------- | of *Scientia Naturalis*) |

***Critiques*** ***Anthropology*** ***Opus Postumum***

**-Originary**, condemns man to a most originary passivity, where the conditions laid forward by the *Critique* are referred to an empirical region

**-Fundamental**, empirical limitations only make sense when they are referred back to their transcendental foundations

# III

# "The Anthropological decentering of the Transcendental Theme: The Originary"

This theme, "the originary", which supports "the displacement of the *Critique* by the *Anthropology*" thesis, first shows itself in the fifth section of the *Commentary* through an analysis of the relation between Kant's two concepts: *Gemüt* and *Geist*. Although, both *Geist* and *Gemüt* refers to different dispositions of the word "mind" in German; unlike, for instance, *Verstand*, which strongly emphasize the intellect; *Geist* has a nuance of "spirit" (*espirit*), while *Gemüt* has connections with "personality", "mental state", "disposition", or "frame of mind". First, therefore, one should begin with a definition of *Gemüt* in the sense Kant himself used the term, so that an emphasis can be made on what Caygill[176] describes as a key term in Kant's philosophy "although it has never been the object of sustained scholarly scrutiny".[177] Caygill, in his "A Kant Dictionary" describes *Gemüt* as being

"variously translated as 'mind', 'mental state' and 'soul', even though these translations fail to do justice to the term's significance. It does not mean 'mind' or 'soul' in the Cartesian sense of a thinking substance, but denotes instead a *corporeal* awareness of sensation and self-affection. ... in [*Critique of Pure Reason*] he explicitly distinguishes *Gemüt* and *Seele*, a distinction expounded ... in terms of [*Gemüt*'s] 'capacity to effect the unity of empirical apperception (*animus*) but not its substance (*anima*)' (The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 256) Gemüt does not designate a substance (whether material or ideal) but is the position or place of the *Gemütskrafte* (the *Gemüt*'s powers) of sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason."[178] For Kant, "the Gemüt' is all life (the life-principle itself), and *its hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in connexion with his body*".[179]

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[176] Howard Caygill "A Kant dictionary", Wiley-Blackwell 1995 p. 210

[177] Not at least for over a hundred years, since both Heidegger in his *Being and Time* (1927), and Derrida in his *Of Soul* (1987) make references to this important term. (See pages 27 and 127, where Derrida describes *Gemüt* as "the topos of spirit".)

[178] Ibid.

[179] Kant, I. *Critique of Judgment* p. 29 (My italics)

This interpretation of the *Gemüt* is Kant's strategy to "bypass many of the problems of mind-body relations bequeathed by Cartesian dualism"[180] and it also provides a linkage across the three theoretical, practical and aesthetic/teleological sections of the critical philosophy (hence, sequentially the *Critique*s) as explicitly stated by Kant, this time in his *Anthropology* where it is described as the "essence [*Inbegriff*] of *all* representations which in the same place occupy a sphere which includes the three basic faculties of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire..."[181]

This nuance displays perfectly why *Geist* functions, in Foucault's *Commentary*, as the hinge of the analysis of the *Anthropology*: while *Gemüt* refers to the empirical and passive nature of 'man', which is the subject matter of *empirical psychology*, for Kant, *Geist* "permits the legitimization –not merely the acknowledgement- of the non identity of the subject with its empiricity." [182]

A reminder is necessary here: as mentioned before, the object of the *Anthropology* is the "object/subject I". It is neither the "pure I" of the first *Critique*, nor the "subject in itself" of the Second; "**but a self which is object and present only in its phenomenal truth. Yet this object I, which is given to the sense in the form of time, is nevertheless not alien to the determining subject, since in the end, it is nothing but *the subject as it is affected by itself.***"[183] It is only after –although perhaps somewhat needlessly- repeating this quote, we can understand why Foucault describes *Geist* as effectively providing "**a ground for the possibility of spontaneous action through which *Gemüt* is 'not only what it is, but also *what it does with itself*'**."[184] *Geist* therefore provides the *Anthropology* with its specifically 'pragmatic' character, with its allusions to **noumenal causality**. Hence the reason why Foucault particularly dwells on the definition of *Geist* in the *Commentary*: "its function … was to secure the binding of the *Anthropology* to the *Critique*."[185]

[180] Howard Caygill "A Kant dictionary", Wiley-Blackwell 1995 p. 210
[181] Kant, I. "Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View", p. 7
[182] Han, B., FCP, p. 28
[183] Foucault, M. IA, p. 23
[184] Foucault, M. IA, p. 52
[185] Han, B., FCP, p. 28

*Geist*, similar to the role played by "freedom" in the second *Critique*, serves as the bedrock of 'pragmatic'[186] anthropology with its 'animating' (as opposed to "regulative") character, while, on the other hand, *Gemüt* characterizes that aspect of 'mind' which is of "empirical and passive nature". Therefore, contrary to *Gemüt*, which is the subject-matter of psychology, *Geist* "permits the legitimization –not merely the acknowledgement- of the nonidentity of the subject with its empiricity." In that, *Geist* is responsible for "spontaneity"[187], as opposed to an 'originary passivity' of mind, characterized by *Gemüt*.

With a translation from the *Anthropology*, Foucault defines *Geist* as "the principle that animates the spirit by means of ideas, this is called the *Geist*".[188] Foucault, in order to provide more depth to this 'animating' function of the *Geist* summarizes a section from the 'Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectics': "[The idea] that is not constituting but that opens up the possibility of objects. It does not reveal the nature of things through an ostensive move, but indicates how this nature can be sought."[189] Thus, far from being a constituting principle, *Geist* is identified with its animating function, and for Foucault *Geist* does not have a "regulative" function as well, Foucault

"[stresses] instead the dynamic character of ideas, which allow reason to satisfy its natural desire for the absolute by outlining for it the horizon of a totality, and therefore by giving its sense, as orientation and meaning, to the movement of spirit. The *Commentary* thus establishes a functional parallelism between the dynamic that pushes reason to exceed the limits of experience at the theoretical level, and the concrete movement through which *Geist* 'causes the empirical and concrete life of *Gemüt* to continue on' (*Commentary*, p. 52)."[190]

For the reasons that *Geist* is responsible for the constitutive disjointing of the subject from all nature (as well as from its own *nature* in the form of *Gemüt*), this dynamic of ideas

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[186] "Foucault understands the 'pragmatic' as a kind of intermediary between the *a priori* moral imperative and a purely empirical means/ends calculus that would only be governed by the principles of efficiency and maximalization. The specificity of the pragmatic is that it 'connects *homo natura* to the definition of man as a subject of freedom." (Commentary, p. 50) Han, B. endnote: 51, p. 204,

[187] Foucault, M. IA, p.50

[188] "Man nennt das durch Ideen behbende Prinzip des Gemüts Geist", Anthropology, I: 113; "Le principe qui anime l'esprit par les idées, c'est le principe spirituel", *Commentary*, p. 50

[189] Kant, I. Anthropology, Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectics, Of the Aim of Natural Dialectic, located at p. 550

[190] Han, B., FCP, p. 29

could heretofore serve as that basis for the argument that *Anthropology*, in a sense, repeats the *Critique*, not displaces it. However, as soon as this possibility is revealed in Foucault's *Commentary* and right after this argument is affirmed by a definition of this function of *Geist* "[tearing] the *Gemüt* away from its determinations"; Foucault immediately adds that there is an inherent mystifying connection between this definition of *Geist* and what Kant refers to as the "enigmatic *nature* of our reason" in the 'Methodology': "Reason is impelled by a *natural drive* to go out beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure enjoyment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through the completion of its course [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent systematic whole." It is with this reference to Kant; Foucault identifies *Geist* with the "enigmatic nature of our reason", and thus, defines it as "something that would be the kernel of pure reason, the un-uprootable origin of its transcendental illusions …, the principle of its movement within the empirical field where the faces of truth ceaselessly appear"[191] As Béatrice Han asserts brilliantly,

"*Geist* does not, therefore, 'animate' only *Gemüt*, but reason itself, which finds itself suddenly deposed from its sovereign position and returned to that of which, from the shadows, would have already determined its speculative movement, and which, as its 'nature', would be constitutively destined to escape it."

It is at this point Foucault introduces the theme of the '*originary*': at the root of our empirical and transcendental existence lies an utterly empirical (constitutive, unregulated, and animating function of the *nature* upon our pure/practical reason) movement whereby "transcendental conditions, which according to the *Critique* are timeless (being the condition of possibility of chronological time), are temporalised within experience by the *Anthropology* and consequently appear within the empirical field as pre-existing themselves (and thus *originary*, or 'primitive', as Derrida puts it in reference to Husserl).[192] This theme of the '*originary*' "seems to refer the *Critique* from its apex, to an *empirical* region, to a *domain of facts* where man would be condemned to a most originary passivity".[193] Hence, Foucault understands *Geist* as an 'originary fact' via its connections to (empirical) *nature* and this empirical form is the source in which reason will "find both its truth and the source of its

[191] Foucault, M. IA, p. 55
[192] Han, B. Review of Michel Foucault's Introduction a l'Anthropologie, p. 3
[193] Foucault, M. IA, p. 54

empirical determinations that bear upon it."[194] Therefore, neither reason can master nor can it escape its (transcendental) essence, while at the same time, being subject to empirical limitations, nor can it master or escape the empiricities that engulf and overwhelm it.

This definition of *Geist* refers the *Critique* to an empirical reason, because, as it is revealed in the *Anthropology*, it opens up the way to a previously rejected possibility (rejected in the *Critique*): the possibility that the transcendental foundations of our reason should be referred to their empirical conditions of possibility (or, to their empirical origins or essence, to their empirical limits, possibilities, etc.). This means that, man and his being as 'a denizen of this world', is marked with a 'most originary positivity', which comes before any other constituting activity, a form of originary passivity that Foucault would refer 'man' to the empiricities of life, labor and language in *The Order of Things*, the primary form of which, as demonstrated, originates from his definition of *Geist* in the *Commentary*.

Foucault explains this deviation of the transcendental theme in the following way:

"Therefore, the relationship between the given and the *a priori* takes in the *Anthropology* a structure that is the reverse of that which was uncovered by the *Critique*. What was *a priori* in the order of knowledge becomes in the order of concrete existence an *originary* that is not chronologically first, but which, as soon as it has appeared … reveals itself as already there."[195]

The notion of the originary therefore establishes the impossibility of confirming to the foundation established by the *Critique*, once the empirical determinants (i.e., the order of 'concrete existence') of the transcendental foundations of reason are explicated. The retrospective movement of the originary (as if it pre-exists itself) marks this impossibility: "What is from the point of view of the *Critique*, an *a priori* of knowledge, does not transpose itself immediately, through an anthropological reflection, as an *a priori* of existence, but appears within the density of becoming where a sudden apparition necessarily takes in retrospection the meaning of an *already there* (déja la)."[196] In order for the transcendental conditions of knowledge reveal themselves as 'already there', they have to –paradoxically-

[194] Han, B. FCP, p 30
[195] Foucault, M. IA, p. 60
[196] Ibid. 57

pre-exist their own empirical 'emergence'; however, in consequence of this retrospection, these transcendental conditions can no longer claim their original and unique independence as Kant has allotted to them in the *Critique*. Hence Foucault defines the *originary*, first and foremost, as a

"…a worrying notion, which seems to suddenly refer the *Critique* at its apex towards an empirical region, a domain of fact where man would be destined to a most originary passivity. All of a sudden the transcendental would be repudiated, and the conditions of experience would refer to *the primary inertia of nature*".[197]

Thus, the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental has to be defined anew after *Anthropology*, as Béatrice Han puts it aptly, in the form of a relationship of a 'retrospective presupposition'. The dual nature of man as empirical and transcendental, requires the *a priori* to reveal itself within concrete experience; "but it can only do so insofar as it is presupposed by experience as that of which it is the condition of constitution, the fact that it can never be simultaneous with itself and must remain inscribed within a logic of recurrence signaling its heterogeneity from the empirical."[198]

However, this movement has the obvious risk of throwing the Kantian (critical) enterprise in jeopardy, because the clear division between the empirical and the transcendental that was established with the *Critique* undergoes an inflection with the introduction of the 'originary', which devotes "the anthropological search for a foundation that is by definition denied to it by its theoretical presuppositions and the ambivalence of its object."[199] Accordingly, Foucault defines *Anthropology* as a "knowledge of man, by a movement that objectifies the latter at the level and in the content of its animal determinations; but it is also the knowledge of the 'knowledge of man', in a movement that questions the subject itself about its own limits and what it makes possible in the knowledge that it takes of itself."[200]

Foucault develops the concept of the *originary* (also a display of the blur between the transcendental and the empirical) with "the emergence of the spoken-I", an intermediary term

[197] Foucault, M. IA, p. 40, quote taken from Béatrice Han's review of *Introduction l'Anthropologie* p. 2
[198] Han, B. FCP, p. 31
[199] Ibid.
[200] Foucault, M. IA, p. 118

between the pure-I of the synthesis and the empirical ego. Kant, in the "Transcendental Analytic" (first division of the Transcendental Logic, in his *Critique*), subordinates the empirical-I to the transcendental-I, thus making the pure-I of the transcendental apperception the condition of possibility of the empirical ego. However, the *Anthropology*, introduces (and makes its object) this third term, the spoken-I, as the

"empirical and manifest form, in which the synthesizing activity of the [transcendental] I appears as an *already synthesized* figure, an indissociably primary and secondary structure: … when it appears, inserting itself in the multiplicity of a sensory chronicle, it presents itself as *already there*."[201]

The emergence of the spoken-I by itself disturbs the neat balance and the clear division established in the *Critique* between the pure-I of metaphysics and empirical-I of physics, also distorts the distinction between activity and passivity: 'intellectual syntheses' and 'sensory dispersion'. For Foucault, Han says, "the spoken I is neither the pure I of transcendental apperception nor the empirical ego offered to the inner sense through the form of time, but a hybrid form, both active and passive, a condition of possibility of experience which is nevertheless inscribed within experience itself on the paradoxical mode of preexistence."

In consequence of this retrospective movement of the originary, the empirical nature of man ('the content of its animal determinations'), in the *Anthropology*, becomes the "*a priori* limit of his knowledge", so that, according to Han, "the empirical understanding of that the subject forms of itself now supposedly generates a knowledge of what the subject is in its constitutive power."[202] Consequently, the constituting power of the transcendental, evidenced by the *Critique*, is now reversed: "the [empirical] knowledge of man" becomes "a [pseudo-transcendental] knowledge of man."[203] Foucault, in one of his interviews, refers to this situation as a "total parallogism": "As soon as one tries to define an essence of man which could articulate itself from itself, and which at the same time would be the foundation of all

[201] Ibid. 41-42
[202] Han, B. p. 31
[203] Foucault, IA, p. 118

possible knowledge [knowledge of oneself, others, and the world], one swims in total parallogism."[204]

The *originary* reveals the anthropological necessity to refer the transcendental (*a priori*) conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience back to the positivities that constitute man "in his empirical state", thus creating an insidious logic, which aims to "make the man of nature, exchange and discourse [man in his empirical finitude] serve as the [transcendental] foundation of his own [empirical] finitude."[205] It is with this inflexion of the transcendental theme that Kantian anthropology establishes man as "an empirico-transcendental double." In a similar vein Foucault announces in *The Birth of the Clinic:* "the possibility for the individual being both subject and object of his own thought implies an inversion in the structure of the finitude … The anthropological structure that then appeared played both the critical role of limit and the founding role of the origin."[206] About the same *inversion* Foucault adds, this time in the *Commentary*:

"The insidious values of the question of 'Was ist der Mensch?' are responsible for this homogeneous, destructured, and indefinitely reversible field in which man presents *his* truth as the *soul* of truth."[207] In a similar vein elsewhere in the *Commentary*, Foucault says that self-consciousness appears in the *Anthropology* "as the always re-emerging temptation of a polymorphous egoism" and not as "a form of experience and condition of limited but founded knowledge" as it is defined in the *Critique*: consequently, "the possibility of saying 'I' gives rise, in consciousness, to the prestige of a 'me good-soul' (moi bien-aime) that fascinates it, to the extent that, in a paradoxical return, consciousness will renounce the language of this first person –as decisive as to what has been – to decline itself in the fiction of a We."[208]

The final chapters of *The Order of Things* repeats the same criticism, which as we have seen Foucault already introduced with the *Commentary*, that is the definition of (philosophical) anthropology as "the fundamental disposition, which has governed and

[204] Quote taken from B. Han's Foucault's Critical Project …, p. 32, referring originally to Dits et Écrits, p. 452, vol. 1
[205] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 341
[206] Foucault, M. The Birth of the Clinic, p. 197
[207] Foucault, IA, p. 126
[208] Ibid. Quote taken from Arianna Bove's translation of Foucault's Commentary

controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day"[209] as long as, in this thought, man is presented and understood as "such a being that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible."[210] It is in the process of *anthropologization* of the transcendental theme, the "Analytic of Finitude" anchors its truth in this "Analytic of Man".[211] Hence, Foucault says in the *Commentary*,

"One has tried to turn the *Anthropology* (which is nothing but another way of forgetting the *Critique*) into the field of a positivity from which all human sciences would derive their foundation and their possibility, whereas in fact it can only speak the language of limit and negativity."[212]

Finally, for Foucault, this 'transposition' has two grim consequences: first, we may lose the philosophical foundation established by the *Critique*, that is, the ability to ground the possibility of empirical knowledge -thus provide it with a place and a meaning-, since the clear divide between the empirical and the transcendental is now lost. For Foucault this opens the way for *skepticism*. Second, anthropology will have to rise up to the challenge and play the part that was previously attributed to the *Critique*, by providing empirical contents with transcendental value. This consequence is what Foucault refers to as the 'anthropological slumber', which had haunted Western philosophy ever since Kant. The final chapters of *The Order of Things* are dedicated to the analysis of the anthropological slumber, or to the problem of 'Man' and his immediate 'doubles', that is, The Analytic of Finitude, which defines modern 'man's mode of being, whereby positivity of his knowledge about himself is inherently and immediately connected to his 'finitude'. Thus, Western philosophy after Kant, since it was Kant himself that established such a 'mode of being' in the modern épistéme, is now in a deadlock, imprisoned to think of the infinite back and forth between (or the reduplication of) the empirical and the transcendental, the perpetual relation of the cogito to the unthought, and the retreat and return of the 'origin'.

[209] Foucault, M. OT, p. 342
[210] Ibid. 318
[211] Han, B. p. 31, The Order of Things, p. 341
[212] Foucault, M. IA, p. 123

# IV

## "The Fundamental": *Anthropology* as the *repetition* of the *Critique*

The '*originary'* is not the only form of relationship between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique* that Foucault investigates in his *Commentary*. Ambiguously enough, Foucault introduces another theme, which is incompatible with the first (the *originary*) and in fact, its symmetrical opposite: the theme of the *fundamental* upholds the idea that the *Anthropology* can also be read as a *repetition* of the *Critique*, -that is, without paving the way to an inflection of the transcendental theme, as it is put forward by the *originary* - by conserving and confirming the clear division between the empirical and the transcendental. Béatrice Han describes the function of the *fundamental* in Foucault's *Commentary* as "to ensure, through a dynamics which both inverts and complements that of transcendental foundation, the return from post-hoc to *a priori*."[213] Not only, with the theme of the *fundamental*, Foucault reads Kant's *Anthropology* as a form of repetition of the *Critique*, but we will see in the later parts of this section; with the theme of the *fundamental* and in light of the *Opus Postumum*, the *Anthropology* completes the project of transcendental philosophy, with a move exactly opposite to that of the *Critique*, that is, an analysis of the empirical limitations to (or, "the positivity of") our knowledge, while insisting on the necessity to refer them back to our transcendental foundations/limitations (the synthesizing activity of the subject itself); thus, the *Anthropology* reaffirms the *Critique*.

In the *Critique* Kant expresses clearly the universal (transcendental) structures which our experience would necessarily have to agree, before any empirical exploration or foundation; the *Anthropology* by repeatedly reminding us (through the concept of the *fundamental*) the necessity, or rather, the "obligation" to refer the empirical contents of knowledge back to their *a priori* (transcendental) foundations. *Anthropology* thus confirming the *Critique* and henceforth preventing us from relapsing into "a naïve empiricism" or a "naturalistic perspective in which a science of man would involve knowledge of nature."[214] In the *Commentary* the notion of the *fundamental* is developed through the theme of

[213] Han, B. Review, p. 4
[214] Foucault, M. IA, p. 49

'anthropological repetition': an analysis of the relationship between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique* as a form of 'repetition'.

Anthropology not only asks similar questions like that of the *Critique*, but also, the answers within which it conveys its research is located in the same transcendental ground described by the *Critique*. This level, that is *Critique* providing the *Anthropology* both the questions that it could ask and the ground in which these questions would ultimately have to be referred to, Foucault describes as "the structural fact of the anthropologico-critical repetition": the *Anthropology* takes up the questions that pertain to the *Critique*s and in fact "the Anthropology does not say anything else than the *Critique*."[215]

First form of repetition is therefore an act of 'mirroring', that is, the *Anthropology* repeating the arguments put forward by the *Critique*. Second, the *Anthropology* could also repeat the *Critique* by already and implicitly assuming its structural-philosophical grounds. While in its structure and constitution bound to the *Critique*, thus by presupposing its foundational arguments, the *Anthropology* necessarily repeats the *Critique* at the formal level. Third, the *Anthropology* could repeat the *Critique* by providing it with new material from the 'positivities' of i.e. life, labor and language, which would not only fit but also complement to its methodological underpinnings; thus, bringing Kant's critical project to a completion, while of course, carefully avoiding not to transform the project itself all too greatly. Fourth, and final form of 'repetition' provides a new role for the *Critique* and perhaps for the Kantian critical enterprise overall by carrying the *Critique* "toward a more finished form, of which anthropology was itself its hidden presupposition …"[216] At this level, repetition receives its greatest range and the *Anthropology* takes central place among the works of Kant being a mediation between all the different periods of Kant's thought: Pre-critical, Critical, and Post-critical period, which was brought in to publication only after Kant's death with the title of *Opus Posthumum*.

Béatrice Han provides four fitting titles for these "four forms of repetition" that correspond to "four possible relations between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique: mirroring*,

[215] Foucault, M. IA, p. 76
[216] Ibid.

*foundation*, *complementarity*, or *mediation*, all of which are entertained by the *Commentary*."[217]

a. First form of repetition is a formal repetition, different ways in which the *Anthropology* simply mirrors the *Critique*. Not only Kant organizes the formal content, along with the chapter divisions, and headings of his *Anthropology* in harmony with the formal structure of the *Critique*[218], also the line of questioning (or the line of interrogation) itself follows in the wake of the *Critique*. As Foucault says, "The internal structure of the *Anthropology* and the question that animates it has the same form as the critical interrogation itself." Thus, there is, in the *Anthropology* "a claim to know the possibilities and limits of knowledge: it mimics, from the outside and with the gestures of empiricity, the movement of *Critique*."[219]

b. However, the relation between the *Anthropology* and the *Critique* is not only one of mimicry, but more importantly they share a *foundational* link: beyond the simple parallelism between the texts, there is in the *Anthropology* an inherent acceptance of the foundations of the *Critique*. In the *Commentary* Foucault says that, "the empiricity of the Anthropology cannot ground itself in itself. It cannot encompass the Critique, but must refer to it: and the reason it looks like its empirical and external *analogon* is because it rests upon some already named and uncovered structures of the *a priori*." Therefore, the *Anthropology* has to refer to the *Critique* (or as Foucault puts it, 'it cannot fail but refer to it') because the field of experience that anthropology conducts its analyses rests already upon the conditions of experience laid down by the *Critique*. This second form of repetition is a result of the Copernican turn itself, which results in subordination of the 'applied' philosophy to 'pure' philosophy.[220] In sum, in this second possible form of 'repetition', the *Anthropology* is itself a result of the opening made possible by the *Critique*, that is, not only its methodology and the nature of its field of analysis are naturally constituted by the *Critique*, but its empirical findings, by constitution, has to conform with their transcendental conditions of possibility. Thus, from this point of view, the *Anthropology* only has significance insofar as the

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[217] Han, B. , FCP, p. 22
[218] "Transcendental Theory of Elements" of the *Critique* corresponds to the "Anthropological Didactic", and the "Anthropological Methodology" would match up the "Transcendental Theory of Method". B. Han, p. 22
[219] Foucault, M. IA, p.
[220] Han, B. p.24 quoted from IA, p, 45

transcendental field established by the *Critique* founds the same place within which such an anthropology could exist in the first place. Hence, in the second possible 'repetition', the relation between the texts is 'foundational'.

c. The third form of 'repetition' reads both *Anthropology* and *Critique* as two reverse form of analysis in the investigation of man, reverse in the sense that, one deals with his transcendental nature, while the other provides empirical information from the 'outside': if the latter is an "investigation of the conditioning in its foundational activity", the former is an "inventory of what is *unfounded* in the conditioned."[221] The *Critique* is described as an 'investigation', that is, a form of analysis that justifies its conclusions as it methodologically progresses, while the *Anthropology* is regarded as an 'inventory', a collection of empiricities whose foundation we cannot locate in the 'faculties' themselves, therefore those that risk illusion and error. Thus, Foucault says: "The *Anthropology* follows the division of faculties of the *Critique*: but its privileged domain is not that of their positive power, but where they risk losing themselves."[222] The *Critique*, being the foundation of the critical era of Kant, undoubtedly intended to rid the Kantian oeuvre of the transcendental use of reason by 'denouncing' and 'dismantling' it, with a constant referral of the faculties to their (empirical) domain of positivity. The faculties in the *Anthropology* however, follow a path that is open to 'abuses' or 'deviations'.

Therefore, this last published text of Kant gives details about certain 'eventual abuses' that become apparent in the empirical manifestations of the faculties, which according to Foucault, the *Anthropology* does indeed continue to scrutinize. Thus, the eventual ambivalence of our experience is one of the reasons, Foucault adds, why certain concepts that were already defined by the *Critique* carry the necessity to go through certain redefinitions in the *Anthropology*: considering possible confusions in the empirical use of our faculties, "self-consciousness" can no longer be defined as the "form of experience and condition of knowledge, that is, limited but founded," but instead, it is defined as the "temptation of a polymorphic egoism"[223]. Experience cannot be trusted because "possible experience defines, in its limited circle, the field of truth just as well the field of the loss of truth."[224]

[221] Foucault, M. IA, p. 61, quote taken from B. Han, p. 24
[222] Ibid.
[223] Foucault, M. IA, p. 61, quote taken from B. Han, p. 24
[224] Ibid. (IA: 61, FCP: 25)

Anthropology, therefore defines a domain of a possible disorientation in the empirical use of our faculties, rather than transcendental; and thus completing in a way, the *Critique* by bringing into light, the simultaneous presence of opposing impulses (from experience) towards the same faculty causing the ambivalence of our experiences.

As Béatrice Han puts forward, the *Anthropology* underlines the opposition between *Schein* (appearance in essence, semblance) and *Erscheinung* (appearance in phenomena as opposed to the thing-in-itself)[225] "by insisting on the seduction of appearances, rather than on the founded character of phenomena; where the *Critique* only gave the 'possibilities in the order of conditions', the *Anthropology* examines the risks inherent in the empirical engagement of the human faculties."[226] In different terms, in its relation to the *Critique* (which is an 'investigation' of what is conditioning in foundational activity), the *Anthropology* "represents the investigation [or an inventory] of the unconditioned within the conditioned. In the anthropological region [however], there is no synthesis that is not threatened: the domain of experience is almost emptied of content by dangers that are not of the order of arbitrary supersession, but of the collapsing on itself. Possible experience defines equally well, in its limited circle, the field of truth and the field of the loss of truth."[227]

d. The final form of repetition regards *Anthropology* as a mediator among all of Kant's works (including and particularly in light of the *Opus Posthumum*), with a function of bringing the project of "transcendental philosophy" into completion, whose theoretical foundation (its first secure step) was laid forward by the first *Critique* but remained an incomplete project even after Kant finalized his three *Critique*s. It is in the *Opus Postumum* that Kant defends the unity of theoretical and practical reason.[228] Hence, he regards both the *Critique* and the *Anthropology* as two sides of the same coin (transcendental philosophy).

[225] Hegel defines Kant's formulation of *Schein* and *Erscheinung* in the following way: "The *Ding-an-sich* is what does not *appear*. This is a logically determined truth, not an empirical limit. The Beyond may be pure light or darkness, and *Verstand* may be blind or sighted; it makes no difference, since there is no mediating link [there is no intellectual intuition]. We must either call *Erscheinung* truth, or fill the void with subjective imaginings." Foucault spent much of his time in the analysis of the ways (practices) in which we *call* certain *Erscheinung* the truth *by* filling certain *voids* with subjective imaginings.
[226] Han, B. P. 25
[227] Foucault, M. IA, quote taken from Bove's translation.
[228] Eckart Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the "Opus Postumum", Harvard University Press (3 Jul 2000)

Thus, from this perspective, the *Anthropology* completes the Kantian enterprise, first by presupposing the critical perspective in its totality (this aspect of the *Anthropology* had already been emphasized above), and more importantly, the *Anthropology* adds to its achievement, to its realization. As Foucault says, the *Anthropology* is, ironically "*marginal* for the *Critique*, and *decisive* for the forms of reflection that would claim as their task its achievement."[229]

The primary reason behind Foucault's attribution to *Anthropology* the role of a mediator stems from Foucault's reading of the *Opus Posthumum*. The mediating role of the *Anthropology* results from the 'character of its object': man, in the sections of the *Opus Posthumum* that deals with the transcendental philosophy, is described as the 'medium terminus': mediating both the world and God, which were both described as 'ideas of pure reason' in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' (of *The Critique of Pure Reason*). Man is the medium where these two ideas are united, the "concrete and active unity in which and for which God and the world find their unity."[230] Man's synthesizing function between these two pure ideas, of the world and God, becomes only possible in his dual role as an empirically determined object and transcendentally constituting subject, as Béatrice Han puts it aptly, man can achieve this synthesis "in his properly *anthropological* dimension."[231] Foucault, without transition, asks the proper way in which one should understand such a unity: "What is the correct meaning of this unification of God and the world in man and for man? What synthesis or what operation confronts it? Can it be situated at the level of the empirical or of the transcendental, of the originary or of the fundamental?"

Primarily, Foucault says, and deriving his conclusions in light of the *Opus Posthumum*, what attests to man's role as the 'medium terminus' is his synthetic ability as a thinking subject[232], which were already laid forward in the *Critique*. Hence, man "affects himself in the movement by which he becomes an object for himself. … The world is uncovered … as the figure of the movement by means of which the ego, becoming an object,

[229] Foucault, M. IA, p. 83, quote taken from B. Han, FCP, p. 25
[230] Foucault, M. IA, p. 69
[231] B. Han 25
[232] "If man gives unity to the world and God, it is in so far as he exercises his sovereignty as a thinking subject- thinking the world and thinking God: 'Der medius terminus…ist hier das urteilende Subjekt (das denkende Welt-Wesen, der Mensch…)" IA, Bove's online translation

inscribes itself within the field of experience and finds a concrete system of belonging."[233] Hence, Foucault says,

"This unifying act is then the synthesis itself of thought. But it can be defined exactly in this sense starting from the power where it takes its origin: 'Gott und die Welt, und der *Geist* des Menschen der beide denkt' [God and the World, and the spirit of man thinks the two of them]; where everything is thus well considered in its sole form, as if with God, the world and man, in their coexistence and their fundamental relations, the structure itself of judgment is brought back onto the regime of traditional logic; the trilogy Subjekt, Praedikat, Copula define the figure of the relation between God, the world and man. [Man is then] that which is then the copula, the link- like the verb 'to be' of the judgment of the universe."[234]

However, man on the other hand should also be understood as a "citizen of the world" from the very beginning. Thus, secondly, man owes his intermediate position to his 'proper anthropological position', that is, being a resident of the world. Foucault defines what he means by 'man as a citizen of the world' with references to the pragmatic aspect of Kant's *Anthropology* in the following way:

"The Anthropology is pragmatic in the sense that it does not envisage man as belonging to the moral city of spirits (that would be named practical), nor to the civil society of the subjects of law (that would be named juridical); he is considered as a 'citizen of the world', which means as a member of the concrete universal within which the subject of law, determined by judicial rules and subjected to them, and is at the same time a human being who in his freedom carries his universal moral law. To be a citizen of the world is to belong to a certain region that is as concrete as an ensemble of precise judicial rules that are as universal as the moral law. To say that an anthropology is pragmatic and to say that it envisages man as a citizen of the world amounts to saying the same thing."[235]

[233] Foucault, M. IA, p. 72, quote taken from B. Han, FCP, p. 25
[234] Foucault, M. IA, quote taken from A. Bove's online translation of the *Commentary*.
[235] Ibid.

Therefore, although man is the synthesis of both the world and God, that it is in him both are actually unified, and yet with respect to God man is a limited being, and in regard to the world he is merely one of its inhabitants.[236]

It is precisely at this point, Foucault says, the anthropological repetition comes to aid in an effort to rescue the transcendental philosophy from two alarming dangers. First, a definition of 'man' as a 'denizen of the world' underlying the human ambivalence would generate a circular tendency to refer "any reflection on man to a reflection of the world"[237], and, the other way around. Second, and following from the first, this circular reasoning would reduce and even annul man's position as a constituting agent, thus his transcendental capabilities would be forgotten for the sake of a return to a 'pre-critical empiricism', which would only allow "empirical and circular relationships of immanence, at the level of a necessary natural knowledge" between man and the world.[238] Anthropological repetition, at this point, reminds us the necessity of a transcendental foundation for empirical contents, that is, the need to refer the positivities back to their transcendental foundations, "thus distinguishing carefully between transcendental determinations and positive limitations."[239] As a result, the *Anthropology* helps to bring the project of transcendental philosophy into completion ("They [the *Anthropology* and the *Opus Posthumum* taken together] are possible paths and tests for a thought that advances on the ground of a finally attained transcendental philosophy. And at each instant, every time the geography of these new territories needs to be located, the interrogation on man emerges as the question to which the entire problematic of the world and God cannot avoid to be related to."[240])

The theme of man as a "denizen of the world" is laid forward in the *Opus Posthumum* in its tripartite structure: world; as the *source* of knowledge, the *domain* of action, and the *limit* of all possible experience. World is our only source of knowledge (thus, there is no asseverations for the absolute) insofar as the "transcendental correlation between passivity and spontaneity", that is, insofar as the transcendental subject *a priori* unites sensibility and understanding.[241] As Han explains in her review of Foucault's *Commentary*, "the world

[236] Ibid.
[237] Foucault, M. IA, p. 72, quote taken from B. Han, FCP, p. 26
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Foucault, M. IA, quote taken from A. Bove's online translation of the *Commentary*.
[241] Han, B. P. 26

provides sensory impressions which, received through the forms of space and time (passivity), are synthesized by the activity of the understanding (spontaneity)."[242] Therefore, the world as source of knowledge presents itself on the manifold of the possible sensations which indicates the originary passivity of our sensibility; however, the source of this knowledge is "inexhaustible precisely because this originary passivity is indissociable from the forms of *Vereinigung* [merging] of spontaneity and of the spirit [*Geist*]." Thus, Foucault says

"Differently from the universe, the world is given within a system of actuality that envelops all real existence. It envelops existence because as well as being the concept of its totality, starting from the world, existence develops its concrete reality: a double meaning enclosed in the very world *Inbegriff* [essence]. 'Der Begriff der Welt ist der Inbegriff des Dasein' [the concept of the world is the essence of existence]. The world is the root of existence, the source that, by containing it, simultaneously retains and frees it."[243]

On the same ground, the world can only be our *domain* of action (that not only originates our actions but also imposes limits on them from the very beginning) "against the background of a transcendental correlation between necessity and freedom"[244]; explained by Kant in the Transcendental Dialectics as the ground in which human beings can both be empirically constituted and noumenally free. Therefore, although the knowledge of the world is available to us "in the gripped solidarity of determinism", this is only to send us back to "*a priori* syntheses of a judging subject (eines urteilenden Subjekt)." Foucault explains this second point in the following way:

"One can only have – by definition – one universe. The world, on the other hand, could be given in numerous examples ('es mag viele Welte sein'). The universe is the unity of the possible, whilst the world is a system of real relations. This system is given once, and it is not possible for the relations to be other [than what they are]; but absolutely nothing impedes to conceive another system or other relations to be defined differently. This is to say that the world is not the open space of the *necessary*, but a domain where a system of necessity is

[242] B. Han, Review, p. 4
[243] Foucault, M. IA, Bove translation
[244] Foucault, M. IA, p. 79

possible [in the form of man and his synthetic ability stemming from his status as a thinking subject]."[245]

Third, and last, the *limit* of our all possible experiences is the world itself. Thus, ideas themselves alone cannot have any constitutive use or effect, because "reason has anticipated the totality and has prethought it precisely as a limit."[246] Put it differently, the external limitations that surround 'man' can and will only appear as such because they are already translated into the transcendental level, "by a reason that has nonetheless shown its finite character by its lack of intellectual intuition."[247] Synthesizing with the first two levels, Foucault introduces the third form, that is, world as a *limit* of all possible experience, in the following way:

"…one cannot avoid recognizing that there cannot be but one world: 'Es mag nur Eine Welt sein'. Because the possible is only thought starting from a system given by actualité; and the plurality of worlds is only delineated starting from an existing world and from what can be offered to experience: the world is 'das Ganza aller moglichen Sinnen Gegenstander'. The correlative of the possibility of conceiving of other worlds, -whereby the world is nothing but, de facto, a domain- consists in the impossibility of surpassing it and the imperious necessity of accepting its frontiers as limits. Thus the world, taken back in its signification as 'Inbegriff des Daseins' appears according to a triple structure, conforming to 'Begriff der Inbegriff' [complex, or essence of existence], of source, of domain, and limit."[248]

Thus, this final form of 'anthropological repetition' serves the purpose of bringing the critical thought to "the level of the fundamental, and to substitute for systematic divisions the organization of transcendental correlates."[249] Hence revealed is the central importance of the *Anthropology*: "it carries the *a priori* towards the fundamental". The 'fundamental' had never been defined in an open way, neither in the *Commentary* nor in *The Order of Things*, however, after reviewing the *Commentary* in light of the *Opus Posthumum* there is now sufficient information that enable us to reach a satisfying definition: According to Gary Gutting "finitude as founding is the 'fundamental', and finitude as founded is the

[245] Foucault, M. IA, A. Bove's translation
[246] Ibid. quote taken from B. Han, p. 26
[247] B. Han, FCP, p. 27
[248] Foucault, M. IA, A. Bove's translation
[249] Foucault, M. IA, p. 80

'positive'"[250], and Dreyfus & Rabinow identify the term with the 'conditions that allow knowledge': finitude as limitation is the positive and finitude as source of all facts is the fundamental.[251] My own interpretation is similar to that of Gutting's.

The origin of the word 'fundamental' clearly submits to 'transcendental foundation' but it is essentially different from the necessity to ground the empirical to the transcendental "according to the top-down logic of foundation described in the *Critique*; the 'fundamental' allows us to think the opposite direction (hence the 'reverse repetition' detailed above) "by showing that empirical limitations can only make sense in reference to the transcendental determination that they unknowingly presuppose."[252] The *Critique* informs us about the *a priori* foundations, thus forms that experience must take; the fundamental, from the opposite direction, starts from the empirical contents of experience and reveals how they are marked by "irreducible transcendences"[253], which reminds us constantly that empirical cannot ground itself in itself, that is, it cannot be its own foundation. Thus, Han says, "the theme of the fundamental is structurally tied to the retrospection through which empirical finitude always appears as already transcendentally founded."[254]

By opening up that space in which it becomes possible to analyze the empirical in the concrete forms that it takes ('concrete form of existence' as it is referred to in the *Commentary*) and still to be able to refer them to their (transcendental) foundations, that is with the theme of the 'fundamental', therefore, the *Anthropology* constructs the "passage from the *a priori* to the fundamental, from critical thought to transcendental philosophy."[255] According to Han, the mediating character of the *Anthropology*

"does not only come from its object, but from the terrain that it defines: insofar as it opens onto the thinking of the 'fundamental', the *Anthropology* offers the only version of the transcendental theme that, far from perverting criticism, completes it by reversing its first perspective, while insisting on the necessity of referring the limitations brought by empirical

[250] Gutting, Gary "Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason", Cambridge University Pres, 1989, p. 200
[251] Dreyfus, H. L. & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p. 31
[252] B. Han, FCP, p. 27
[253] Foucault, M. IA, p. 72, quote taken from B. Han, FCP, p. 27
[254] B. Han, FCP, p. 27
[255] Foucault, M. IA, p. 123

contents (the general model of which is the "world", as understood in the *Opus Postumum*) to their transcendental conditions of possibility."[256] In stark contrast to this important theme that is highlighted by Kant in the *Anthropology*, the primary error of "philosophical anthropologies" after Kant, Foucault says, is to assume that there could be a "natural access"[257] to the fundamental, that is, an extrapolation that the empirical could "free itself from a preliminary critique of knowledge and from a primary question about the relationship to the object."[258] The direct result of this would be those anthropologies, which take the empirical as its own foundation by ascribing it a 'scientific' position, "which all the human sciences would derive their foundation and their possibility."[259] Kant's *Anthropology*, from the 'anthropological repetition's apex, thus "within the wake of the *Critique* refers the anthropology (as a field) to the established primacy of the *a priori* over the empirical, and therefore, Han says, " produces, by means of the concept of the 'fundamental', the model of the only relation that can be established legitimately from the empirical toward the transcendental –and the paradigm from which Foucault will find it easier to think through the post-Kantian deviations."[260]

It seems that Foucault, saves the *Anthropology*, or in general, the Kantian philosophy from the pitfalls of *the anthropologic slumber* and thus from the grips of *the analytic of finitude* with the theme of the 'fundamental' in his *Commentary*; however, post-Kantians, for him, are in bad shape. Therefore, it would be my guess to suggest that Foucault is trying to

[256] B. Han, FCP, p. 27
[257] Foucault, M. IA, p. 123
[258] Ibid It is my opinion that this quote, taken from the *Commentary* displays perfectly the aim of Foucault's own studies: Foucault engages into the historical (empirical, thus contingent but pretending to be transcendental) to dig up particular consequences of various events and their impacts on our knowledge and practices (e.g., language, etc., which comprise of the empirical aspect of our knowledge and experience) and subjects them to a "preliminary critique" and "primarily" asks the "question about [their] relationship to the object. That thin line between the Same and the Other (which Foucault displays stunningly with our 'laughs' to the degree of 'absurdity' of a Chinese taxonomy –a passage from Borges quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia in which it is written that animals are divided into a. belonging to the Emperor, b. embalmed, c. tame, d. sucking pigs, e. sirens, f. fabulous, g. stray dogs, h. included in the present classification, i. frenzied, j. innumerable, k. drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, l. et cetera, m. having just broken the water pitcher, n. that from a long way off look like flies) provokes us to ask what is the difference between, for instance, madness and mad man, or to what degree the definition of madness owes its contents to *a priori* foundations, and to what extent they are empirical? What remains, finally, if we deduct the transcendental, as much as we can, from the empirical?
[259] Foucault, M. IA, p. 123
[260] B. Han, FCP, p. 27

play Kant off against neo-Kantians, and warning them, with the aid of the theme of the 'originary', against the dangers of formalizing those philosophical ('scientific') activities, which in fact belong to epistemology, while at the same time "philosophically grounding the impossibility of a rational psychology, that is, one that accounts for the workings of the soul as unaffected by empirical modifications arising out of sensation."[261]

With the theme of the 'fundamental', therefore, Foucault insists that Kant's *Anthropology* represents a successful attempt in the field of empirical investigation, which, without contradicting the foundations laid by the *Critique*, the *Anthropology* not only extends its scope, but also carries the Kantian transcendental philosophy to completion. In contrast to Kant's achievements in *Anthropology* (or in the field of anthropology as a 'science'), one must, Foucault says

"in the name of what anthropology must be in its essence in the whole of the philosophical field, reject all these 'philosophical anthropologies' which present themselves as a natural access to the fundamental. … Here and there one finds at play an illusion which is typical of Western philosophy since Kant."[262]

With this cautionary note, Foucault, in the final chapters of the *Commentary*, and as a transition to *The Order of Things*, criticizes various post-Kantian attempts that fail to observe this 'Kantian lesson'[263] in their attempts to 'exert critical thought at the level of positive knowledge."[264] For Foucault, the underlying error of such attempts is that "the originary takes over the fundamental and 'deploys itself without any difference from the problematic of the necessary to that of existence; it confuses the analysis of conditions and the interrogation of finitude. One day one will have to envisage the whole development of post Kantian philosophy from the perspective of this maintained confusion, of this denounced confusion."[265]

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[261] Bove, Arianna. "A Critical Ontology of the Present", unpublished PhD thesis, taken from her notes on 'Foucault, Kant and Anthropology' available at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault2.htm
[262] Foucault, M. IA, p. 77
[263] Foucault, M. IA, p. 75, quote taken from B. Han, Review of "Introduction a l'Anthropologie", p. 5
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid. IA, p. 67

In the *Commentary*, Foucault mentions Husserlian phenomenology as an example of such an attempt, that is, as that philosophical development which tries to "liberate the regions of the *a priori* from the forms in which reflections on the originary had confiscated it, [however] the effort to escape from the originary as *immediate subjectivity* ultimately referred to the originary conceived in the density of *passive syntheses* and of *the already there*."[266] Here, Foucault refers to Husserl as the philosopher, who carries out the Kantian project of positing man both as subject and object (ultimately, a radicalization of the Cartesian project), by grounding the contents of our empirical knowledge "in the reality of the transcendental subject."[267] The primary problem however is that any modern conception of man, after Kant, cannot think of man in the way Descartes represented him, that is, man having an "immediate and transparent cogito". As Gary Gutting explains,

"…the modern notion of man excludes Descartes' idea of the cogito as a "sovereign transparency" of pure consciousness. Thought is no longer pure representation and therefore cannot be separated from an "unthought" (i.e., the given empirical and historical truths about who we are). I can no longer go from "I think" to "I am" because the content of my reality (what I am) is always more than the content of any merely thinking self (I am, e.g., living, working, and speaking—and all these take me beyond the realm of mere thought). Or, putting the point in the reverse way, if we use "I" to denote my reality simply as a conscious being, then I "am not" much of what I (as a self in the world) am."[268]

Consequently, Husserl's transcendental subject is not the subject (pure, transparent cogito) of Descartes but it is the one that which includes the (empirical/historical) unthought as a part and parcel of man's concrete existence. For Foucault, this problem remains unresolved in the works of Husserl's 'existentialist' followers (such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty). Unlike Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty rejected taking refuge in a transcendental ego (or an outright return to a sort of Platonism as Husserl ultimately did) but instead, they "focused on the concrete reality of man-in-the world. But this, Foucault claims, is just a more subtle way of reducing the transcendental to the empirical."[269]

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[266] Ibid.
[267] Gutting, Gary. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Michel Foucault.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid.

# Conclusion

Foucault's *Commentary* on Kant's *Anthropology* is translated into English and published by Semiotext(e) in 2008. Such a long time had passed (the thesis itself was submitted in 1961) until its translation and publication, one wonders why such an alluring work remained in dark for all that time. Nobody, it seems, deemed it necessary to start the publication process earlier. There are several reasons for this.

First, the *Commentary* hardly adds a new perspective to Kantian studies in general, although the *Commentary* is highly critical and energetically reflective in certain instances, the real target of the *Commentary* is not Kant himself or those who study Kant's philosophy, but it is the post-Kantians who, as mentioned above, find great promise in the formalization of the field of epistemology, those that are obsessed with the search of man's 'origins' with the faint belief that once that ideal point is recovered, we shall know the pristine moment when 'man' is in his essential, purest status, and finally it is those anthropologies that focus on the essentialisation of 'man', whom Foucault wishes to address the criticisms in his *Commentary*. Although the *Commentary*'s importance is not about how much and in what ways it contributes to Kantian studies; its in depth analysis of Kantian philosophy (not only the *Critique*s, but also the *Anthropology* and the *Opus Postumum* as well) may erode ready-made opinions about the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault, i.e. a whole-hearted belief that Foucault rejects Kant entirely, and more importantly it gives us an insight into the first organized and productive contemplation by Foucault over Kantian critical enterprise, and thus, get a glimpse of Foucault's Kantian foundations. Taking only *The Order of Things* into consideration, when a relationship is sought between Foucault and Kant, now seems as a grave mistake, and the ambivalence of Kant's position in the book will be lost forever.

Second, the way Foucault engages in Kantian philosophy itself seems Husserlian rather than Kantian. That is, if we are to concern ourselves about the 'anthropological slippage' that Foucault warns us about; it is not because there is an inherent instability within the *Critique* itself, for ideas like "*a priori* of existence" although they might be familiar to Husserl, one cannot put forward the idea that these notions would make sense for Kant. The first step in the foundation of the *Critique* already excluded the possibility of an "inscription of the transcendental within the empirical". This premise does not concern the critical

enterprise at all, which is primarily after the question of the possibility of "an agreement between experience and the conditions defined *a priori* by the transcendental subject."[270] Notions such as 'innate *a priori*' or 'concrete *a priori*' are themes that belong to phenomenology rather than Kant's *Critique*, notions that for Husserl, "makes possible the analysis of the creation of the ego."[271]

Foucault himself admits that the concept of 'time' in the *Anthropology* operates in a radically different way than that of the *Critique*: time operates as if it "undermines synthetic activity itself."[272] Thus, it is almost expected that a notion such as 'density of becoming' will find it difficult to find itself a meaningful place within the formations described in the *Critique*. As Han says,

"The idea of an 'emergence' of the transcendental within *becoming* requires a different conception of temporality. This is indirectly confirmed by the rest of the *Commentary*, which indicates that in the *Anthropology* time is revealed as … that to which the subject is linked by 'already effected syntheses' which in a certain sense, always precede the active transcendental syntheses."[273]

However, the idea that Foucault's *Commentary* does not contribute much to Kantian studies, primarily because it embeds itself in ,first, a critique of Husserlian phenomenology over Kant's *Anthropology* and second, a critique of post-Kantians should not mean that the *Commentary* is without effect. The position of Kant within the Foucauldian *oeuvre* significantly changes in view of the *Commentary*, and close philosophical proximity between these two great philosophers is finally revealed. In light of the *Commentary*, the ambivalence of Kant in the final chapters of *The Order of Things* can finally be resolved, alongside with the nature of the dangers highlighted by Foucault in post-Kantian philosophies, namely The Analytic of Finitude, and the 'anthropological slippage'. To better understand the concept of the 'finitude' and its central place in *The Order of Things* but this time in view of the *Commentary* let's turn to the following passage:

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[270] Han, B. FCP, p. 33
[271] Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations, p. 81, paragraph 39. For Husserl, this 'passive genesis' is the operation that gives us "the 'ready-made' object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing." Quoted in B. Han, FCP, fn. 74, p. 32
[272] Foucault, M. IA, p. 85
[273] Han, B. FCP, p. 33

"In one sense, man is governed by labor, life and language: his concrete existence finds its determinations in them. (...) [Yet] all those contents (...) have positivity within the space of knowledge (...) only because they are thoroughly imbued with finitude. For they would not be there (...) if man (...) was trapped in the mute (...) opening of animal life; but nor would they posit themselves in the acute angle that hides them from their own direction if man could traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite understanding. That is to say that each of these forms in which man can learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of his own finitude. Moreover, the latter is not the most completely purified essence of positivity, but that upon the basis of which it is possible for positivity to arise. At the foundation of all the empirical positivities (...), we discover a finitude — which is in a sense the same (...) and yet is radically other."[274]

In order to make sense of this difficult excerpt one has to distinguish between two different forms of finitude (empirical and transcendental) and of determination (causal and epistemic[275]). Man's governance by life, labor, and language in his concrete existence refers to empirical finitude, that is, to those causal determinations which reside in the fact that man is determined by various processes in which he finds himself enmeshed and in which he has little or no control. Labor, language and life are the forms in which man can learn that he is empirically finite. However, such forms are also objects of knowledge (their empiricity can be turned into positivities so that man can learn about them under such disciplines as biology, economics or linguistics). No different than any other epistemological contents, "they are dependent on the transcendental aspect of 'man' which defines the conditions under which all empirical objects are epistemically determined."[276] Life, language and labor are part of those limitations, as Han says "that bear causally on empirical finitude, only 'have positivity within the space of knowledge' because they are 'thoroughly imbued with finitude': yet crucially, such finitude must now be conceived of at the transcendental level."[277] The reason for this, Foucault says, 'man' cannot 'traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite understanding': a reference to Kant's 'intellectual intuition' (*intuitus originarius*), that is, a Godly intellect which would not be dependent on the reception of sensory material and

[274] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 313-4
[275] Epistemic determination is not about existence of objects but about their intelligibility.
[276] Han, B. The 'Death of Man': Foucault and Humanism, p. 10
[277] Ibid.

could by itself produce a fully spontaneous knowledge of its object.[278] Thus, since human beings lack this intellectual intuition, transcendental finitude is not an empirical matter (it is not the 'completely purified essence of positivity'); it is a result of the transcendental condition that man cannot form any empirical knowledge unless one receives, through the faculty of sensibility, some external input: it is exactly because man is not only empirically, but equally and in connection with the first, also transcendentally finite, our transcendental finitude provides the epistemic conditions ('that upon which it is possible for positivity to arise') which allow the contents that causally determine us as empirical beings to enter the space of knowledge. Therefore, man can have knowledge insofar as he is limited, that is, it is because there are limits to our transcendental, and as much as to our empirical being, that we can "know" things.[279]

It is here that the anthropology and the analytic of finitude "will deploy themselves within the interface between the empirical and transcendental finitude on the one hand, causal and epistemic determination on the other: 'at the very heart of empiricity, there is indicated the obligation to work backwards to an analytic of finitude, in which man's being will be able to provide a [transcendental] foundation … for all these forms that indicate to him that he is not [empirically] infinite."[280] The problem here, however, arises out of the fact that, this ambiguous position of man, which both separates and unites the empirical and the transcendental, ultimately leads to an overlapping "by means of an implicit shift which makes epistemic determination ultimately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart: the relation between the empirical and the transcendental becomes a vicious circle.[281] This shift, explained in detail under the theme of the 'originary' reveals itself in the rest of the passage from *The Order of Things* quoted at large above:

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[278] Ibid.

[279] As Foucault says in *The Order of Things*, "man's finitude is heralded -and imperiously so- in the positivity of knowledge", or "the limits of knowledge provide a positive foundation for the possibility of knowing". Hence, instead of an 'analysis', in the modern age after Kant -when factual and transcendental limitations are treated as finitude and especially when this finitude is made the condition of possibility of all facts-, we have an 'analytic' of (finite) representations. This analytic of finitude, Foucault recognizes as the most definitive feature of our modern age resulting from the dubious position of man (who can legitimately claim total knowledge only insofar as he is limited), which is defined also as the modern épistéme.

[280] Ibid.

[281] Ibid.

"And he, as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself in the form of a being who is already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living being, and instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him. All these contents (...) traverse him as if he were merely an object of nature."[282]

Beware of the multiple temporal locutions in the description of the epistemic positioning of man here! ('as soon as he thinks', 'already', 'in an irreducible anteriority', and 'which exist before him') Here, we witness the originary at work! ('already there') Since man is, for Foucault, is definitely not 'merely an object of nature' the irreducible anteriority that he is describing cannot only be the empirical limitations to our knowledge: but where should we, then, direct the existence of these temporal locutions, or the originary for that matter? They mark (albeit metaphorically) the (retrospective) opening of the epistemic field. However, according to the clear distinction established by Kant in the *Critique* the opening of the epistemic field should not itself be temporal. Since the foundation of any possible representation lies in the *a priori* that renders it possible –thus lies beyond all possible experience- and since, for Kant, time is an *a priori* form of sensibility on which the possibility of conceiving chronological time depends: as a condition of possibility of experience, it cannot feature in the field that it determines.[283] Yet, the theme of the originary in the *Anthropology* –as symbolized with the use of retrospective temporal locutions in the passage quoted above from *The Order of Things*- annuls this neat distinction by inscribing the opening of the epistemic field itself within the chronology of empirical time: thus the analytic of finitude is characterized by a paradox of retrospection whereby transcendental finitude is disclosed as pre-existing itself in the form of empirical finitude. This retrospective pre-existence nullifies the ability of man to provide a universal and necessary foundation for knowledge.

The empirical contents of knowledge which previously were recognized as causally determinant but epistemically determined attain a 'quasi-transcendental'[284] function in that "they are not viewed as chronologically primary and causally determinant for epistemic conditions themselves."[285] This means that the transcendental finitude of man finds itself

[282] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 313
[283] Han, B. The 'Death of Man': Foucault and Humanism, p. 12
[284] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 244
[285] Han, B. The 'Death of Man': Foucault and Humanism, p. 12

causally determined by the same empirical limitations (life, language, labor) that bear on its empirical counterpart. As Foucault says,

"If man's knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without possibility of liberation, within the positive contents of language, labor and life [which thus indirectly become epistemically determinant by virtue of causally determining epistemic conditions]; and inversely, if life, labor and language may be posited in their positivity, it is because knowledge has finite forms [epistemic determination]".[286]

Therefore, anthropology, as the philosophical attempt that produces only an 'analytic of man' by assigning the task for future philosophies to seek an answer chiefly to the question of 'Was ist der Mensch?', comes to dominate the (transcendental) field which was originally reserved for the *Critique*. In another passage from *The Order of Things* Foucault refers to this 'empirico-transcendental redoubling' (or 'doubling over of finitude over itself') as the 'Fold':

"By means of this question [Was ist der Mensch?] a form of reflection was constituted which is mixed in its levels and characteristic of modern philosophy. … It concerns an empirico-transcendental duplication by means of which an attempt is made to make the man of nature, of exchange, or of discourse, serve as the [transcendental] foundation of his own finitude. In this Fold, the transcendental is doubled over so that it covers with its dominating network the inert, grey space of empiricity; inversely, empirical contents are given life … and are immediately subsumed in a discourse which carries their transcendental presumption into the distance."[287]

In the final chapters of *The Order of Things* Foucault analyses the "network of radical misunderstandings and illusions"[288] that results from 'the Fold', which is itself triggered by the inherent duality of man, as an empirico-transcendental double. Presented in this way, the analysis of the relationship of the *Critique* to the *Anthropology* (that is, the primary concern of the *Commentary*) gives us beforehand (or rather in a premature but insightful manner) the

[286] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 316
[287] Ibid. p. 341
[288] Foucault, M. IA, p. 123. Namely, the analytic of finitude, or 'man and his doubles': The Empirical and the Transcendental, The Cogito and the Unthought, and The Return of the Origin, respectively.

model of the circular fractures that Foucault puts forward clearly in the final chapters of *The Order of Things*, under the chapter entitled "The Analytic Of Finitude", as mentioned before. The *Commentary* therefore, allows us to locate clearly the "prefiguration of the three doubles" within Kant's own work (the *Anthropology*), and thus clears the ambivalence of Kant's position in *The Order of Things*.

Particularly with the description of *Geist* as the 'nature' of reason, Kant himself establishes the fundamental 'empirical' limit of reason in the *Anthropology*. From this empirical determination reason cannot rid itself through thought. Therefore, it faces its first "empirical determinations, which teaches it that it is neither unconditioned nor divine, reason painfully comes for the first time to understand its own finitude."[289] As Foucault says in the *Commentary*: "*Geist* would be this originary fact, which, in its transcendental version, implies that the infinite is never there." This 'originary passivity' already precedes any transcendental constitutive activity and in *The Order of Things* this passivity is identified with the empirical and transcendental, and consequently *epistemological* limitations established by man's life, labor and language. Therefore, 'man'[290] is trapped in an endless circularity whereby any attempt on his side to seize *Geist*, in order to get a hold of this most originary passivity, to understand it so that this paradoxical endless redoubling (since it is 'conditioned' in the order of things, and since reason cannot release itself from it in the order of knowledge, because in there it appears as 'conditioning'- *the originary*) could come to an end, provokes only its disappearance over and again, thus its withering away from thought. This constant redoubling of the transcendental over the empirical is identified by Foucault in *The Order of Things* as one of the 'doubles', namely 'the empirico-transcendental redoubling' analyzed in Chapter 9 under The Analytic of Finitude.

Gary Gutting defines, first the analytic of finitude itself, and second, within it, the first double (that is, the empirical and the transcendental doubling) in the following way:

"At the very heart of man is his finitude: the fact that, as described by the modern empirical sciences, he is limited by the various historical forces (organic, economic, linguistic) operating on him. This finitude is a philosophical problem because, this same historically limited empirical being must also somehow be the source of the representations

[289] Han, B. FCP, p. 33
[290] Both in his biological and epistemological *order of being*.

whereby we know the empirical world, including ourselves as empirical beings. I (my consciousness) must, as Kant put it, be both an empirical object of representation and the transcendental source of representations. How is this possible? Foucault's view is that, in the end, it isn't — and that the impossibility (historically realized) means the collapse of the modern episteme. What Foucault calls the "analytic of finitude" sketches the historical case for this conclusion, examining the major efforts (together making up the heart of modern philosophy) to answer the question."[291]

*Geist*, as Han defines it, "is that part of [reason] which reason attempts to recover by the movement of reflection, but which, as it is presupposed in the attempt itself, is destined to escape from reason."[292] Therefore, for Foucault, "*Geist* is the root of the possibility of knowledge. And because of this, it is indissociably present to and absent from the figures of knowledge." It is always 'present' because it is responsible for reason's first "originary rational impulse" but cannot be located (thus invisible) in the order of *knowledge* due to its "constitutive indeterminacy" as its nature. This aspect of *Geist* is defined in *The Order of Things* in the relation between "the cogito and the unthought". Foucault says:

"Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the épistéme without thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely, yet in which it is also caught."[293]

What Foucault means in this quote is briefly the following: man finds himself already involved in a language which he cannot fully master, in a biological entity which he cannot fully penetrate with thought, etc., therefore, unthought –just as thought itself- has to be also taken as that basis in which he thinks and acts. Thus, if man wants to be fully intelligible to himself, this unthought that covers his existence entirely should be made accessible to thought, so that it can be mastered in action, "yet insofar as this unthought it its obscurity is precisely the condition of possibility of thought and action it can never be fully absorbed into

[291] Gutting, Gary, 1989, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[292] Ibid p. 34
[293] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 326

the *cogito*."[294] Therefore, as Foucault says, "the modern *cogito* … is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be taken afresh."[295]

Finally, the *Commentary* defines *Geist* as being at once visible and invisible in thought, and it can only appear in its empirical manifestation 'as if it is already there' (again, the theme of the originary). Its existence (and its determinacy) precedes the critical foundation, yet however, it becomes only visible through it (or, it can only be represented through it.) This 'nature' of *Geist* is responsible for "the efforts to conceive of an ever-elusive origin, to advance towards that place where man's being is always maintained, in relation to man himself, in a remoteness and a distance that constitute him."[296] Here, Foucault comes close to Heidegger's[297] appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology, and particularly to the distinction he maintains throughout *Being and Time* between *das Man* (man as historically, socially, etc. constructed, or rather man both as historicized and historicizing) and *Dasein* (ahistorical 'man'). Although Heidegger will seek the primordial and originary of *Dasein*'s *being* in the world, Foucault will seek the historical *a priori*. The origin of things (e.g., the origin of language that one speaks) always retreats from man, although it can be attained (or, regained) momentarily in the practices of, for instance, historicization, as Dreyfus and Rabinow puts forward, it

"retreats again since these practices turn out to be inaccessible to the practitioners. Although man is defined by the cultural practices which establish the temporal clearing in which objects can be encountered, and this temporality is 'preontologically close' to man since it is his very being, he cannot reflect on what these practices are precisely because they are too near to him and thus too encompassing."[298]

Although, therefore, *Geist* animates reason primarily by means of ideas alone, and thus, it occupies the very root of its *being*, ontologically speaking, it lies in the farthest corner, receding back at every possible attempt to its capture. Hence, Heidegger says, in "The Letter

[294] Dreyfus, H & Paul Rabinow, p. 35
[295] Foucault, M. The Order of Things, p. 324
[296] Ibid. 336
[297] Foucault, in an interview with Alain Badiou asserts that Heidegger had always been "the essential philosopher" in his thought. The interview itself is accessible in the Internet under the title (also the title of the interview) "Philosophie et Psychologie".
[298] Dreyfus, H & Paul Rabinow, p. 35

on Humanism": "Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being."[299] This aspect of *Geist* hints us the final 'double' of The Analytic of Finitude analyzed in *The Order of Things*, entitled "the retreat and the return of the origin."

In light of this detailed but necessary analysis of the *Geist* and its relation with the 'doubles', which occupies the center of the discussion concerning Kant in *The Order of Things* reveals the *Commentary* as a central piece of work in the Foucauldian *oeuvre* if one wants to analyze the nature of the philosophical relationship between Kant and Foucault. It is obvious by now that the *Commentary* is nowhere near being an utterly marginal text to be discarded as far as the Foucauldian corpus is concerned in its entirety, "the *Commentary* functions as a matrix from which to interpret the Foucauldian critique of anthropology, in a way constituting the philosophical 'prehistory' of the archaeological texts."[300] Therefore, the ambiguity of Kant's position mentioned in the earlier chapters is finally resolved: in light of the *Commentary* one sees that it is not the *Critiques* that mark "the threshold of our modernity", it is the division within the Kantian corpus itself that this division is established: namely, between the *Critiques* and the *Anthropology*, which is demonstrated by the inflection of the transcendental theme. 'Man, as that strange empirico-transcendental double' is not a concern for the *Critique* when it is taken only by itself, thus, the break that is established by Kant that separates the modern épistéme from its Classical counterpart is not the result of the *Critique* itself but only when it is taken together with the *Anthropology* that the paradoxical dual nature of man is revealed within the Kantian critical enterprise. It is only then, what Foucault refers to as "the anthropological sleep" gains meaning and takes its place as the primary character of modernity. The inflection of the transcendental theme is responsible for the three deadlocks ('man and his three doubles', explained with their relation to *Geist* above) that threaten our contemporary thought. The *Anthropology* therefore opens the way for that self-contradictory philosophico-anthropological tradition, by seeking "within the empirical for a knowledge that could have transcendental value, as the 'turn towards the empirical' attempted is sufficient in itself to empty of all meaning the concept of a transcendental foundation."[301]

[299] Heidegger, M. A Letter on Humanism, p. 210
[300] Han, B. FCP, p. 35
[301] B. Han, FCP, p. 36

As a result, Foucault's own philosophical attempts will be about whether it is possible to free the philosophical field from this confused anthropologization, and whether it is possible to provide a secure ground for the conditions of possibility of knowledge whereby the *a priori* is not tarnished by the 'anthropological slippage': hence the reasons Foucault's 'historical *a priori*'. Similar to Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault first turns to history, and from there to the épistéme and finally to the 'archive' in search for a foundation for his philosophy. However, as the *Commentary* shows by revealing the strong Kantian overtone in the philosophy of Foucault at least during the archeological period, we witness that Kant never ceases to occupy a central place within the Foucauldian *oeuvre* and in fact, his own philosophical journey starts with taking up the critical question asked by Kant (the conditions of possibility of knowledge), only to find answers by other means and methods. Foucault's own 'archaeology' itself perhaps has Nietzsche as its surrogate father, but Kant remains as its initiator, who according to Foucault defined 'archeology' as "the history of what makes a certain form of thought necessary."[302]

[302] Dits et Écrits, volume II, p. 221

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