THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INTERACTION IN TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS: DEBATES ON ANNAN PLAN (2004) AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2007)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the nature of political interactions in the context of two critical policy issues within Turkish domestic politics: the 2004 negotiations over the Annan Plan in Cyprus and process of the 2007 presidential election and analyzes the impact of international environment on this process. This thesis predicts that the presence or absence of international attention impacted the nature of the domestic political interactions. The existence of international actors in the above cases made domestic conflictual political relations more moderate and cooperative. The absence of such audience led to more aggressive maneuvers and sharper polarizations. It was also found that the level of cooperation and competition of the domestic actors changed according to their level of involvement with the international community.

The study is based on a comparative-case study implemented by process tracing methodology. The main objective of this research thus is to analyze the process of the policy and decision making of two politically sensitive cases through coding the domestic actors' political interaction.

TÜRKİYE İÇ SİYASETİNDE POLİTİK ETKİLEŞİMİN DOĞASI: ANNAN PLANI (2004) VE CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SEÇİMİ (2007) TARTIŞMALARI

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ÖZET

Bu tez siyasi etkileşimlerin doğasını Türkiye iç politikasındaki iki kritik politik konu çerçevesinde incelemektedir: 2004 yılında gerçekleşen Kıbrıs Annan Planı müzakereleri ve 2007 yılındaki cumhurbaşkanlığı süreci, ve uluslararası çevrenin bu süreçlere etkisini analiz etmektedir. Bu tez uluslararası ilginin varlığı veya yokluğunun iç politika etkileşimlerin doğasını önemli derecede etkilediğini öngörmektedir. Yukarıda sözü edilen çatışmalı iç politika olaylarında uluslararası aktörlerin varlığı ilişkileri daha dengeli ve işbirlikçi yapmıştır. Ancak, böyle bir varlığın olmaması daha agresif manevralara ve daha keskin kutuplaşmalara neden olmuştur. Ayrıca, iç politika aktörlerinin çatışmacı veya işbirlikçi olma seviyelerinin, yine bu aktörüleri uluslararası aktörler ile olan ilişkilerinin düzeyine göre değiştiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Bu çalışma karşılaştırmalı vaka analizine dayalıdır ve süreç analizi metodolojisi ile yapılmıştır. Bu anlamda, bu araştırmanın ana hedefi iç politikadaki aktörlerin politik etkileşimlerini kodlayarak politik anlamda hassas iki olayın politika yapma ve karar alma süreçlerini analiz etmektir.

Annem Emine Kalan
ve babam Süleyman Kalan'a

To my mother
Emine Kalan and my father
Süleyman Kalan

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1   INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on the nature of political interactions within Turkish domestic politics in relation to two critical policy issues: the 2004 negotiations over the Annan Plan in Cyprus and the political interaction in the 2007 presidential election process. I will also analyze the impact of international actors on these processes. Both cases have been controversially intense topics in recent Turkish domestic politics. Although the domestic actors involved in these two cases are almost the same in terms of their political positioning and identity, there is a major difference in terms of their political patterns. These different patterns were the result of the fact that the conflicts over presidential election were more or less an isolated domestic issue without any obvious stakes for international actors, whereas in the Cyprus issue the interests and concerns of international actors had a significant impact on the interactions between main domestic actors. In this sense, the comparison of these cases gives us a good opportunity to assess the impact of the involvement of international actors in domestic political interactions. Through these comparative assessments and analyses, I will argue that the more international actors can impact on domestic political interactions, the more those domestic political interactions tend to be moderate, cooperative, and constructive; while in the absence of such international impacts domestic political actors tend to be less restrained in pursuing their own interests, decreasing the possibility of a sustainable reconciliation. Thus, isolated domestic conflicts tend to be more sharply polarized in comparison to those conflicts negotiated in the context of a larger international interests and concerns. This analysis is beneficial as it provides insights into the interaction between domestic actors and into the nature of the Turkish domestic policy-making processes. Let me briefly describe the cases analyzed in this study in focus of the study.

1.1 Focus of the Study

This part provides an introductory description of the cases: the negotiations over the Annan Plan in 2004 and the political interaction in the Presidential Election in 2007.

1.1.1 The Annan Plan Case

Initially the focus will be on the Annan Plan with a historical overview of the issue. Although the Cyprus issue has been part of the Turkish political scene for over 50 years, the space it occupies on the domestic political agenda and the political interests it has been associated with have never been fixed and hence the issue is subject to constant changes in the larger political context. For example it was used as an excuse to expel the non-Muslim minority elements through 50's and 60's by the state authorities[1] and the military establishment, but the same issue was also utilized by Bülent Ecevit, a social democratic figure in Turkish politics, to gain support for his third-world 'leftist' political programme in the 70's.[2] Therefore it is outside the scope of this study to give a fully fledged account of the historical background of the issue.[3]

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[1] Ayhan Aktar, *Valık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları [Property Tax and "Turkification" Policies]*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004); Dilek Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları[6-7 September Incidents in line with Minority Policies and Strategies of Republican Period]* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005).

[2] Gökçen Kesgin, "Bülent Ecevit" in Ali Faik Demir (ed) *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler [Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy]*(Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007) pp.241-342

[3] For detailed resources, see: Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği /Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme[Ataturk Nationalism, An Evoluation out of Legal Ideology]* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997); Celement H. Dodd (ed.), *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, (Hemingfors Grey: Eothen Press, 1999), pp. 128-147; Celement H. Dodd, "Turkey and the Cyprus Question," in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); Dr. İrfan KALAYCI, *Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik Bir Tartışma [Cyprus and its Future: An Economic-Political Discussion]*(Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2004); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000,*

Instead I will briefly describe what the Cyprus issue means for the major political actors in 2004 and explain the positions of the actors towards on the Annan Plan. There are two camps in this conflict and the meaning of the Cyprus problem differs greatly for each of them. On the one hand, there is the civilian government of the ruling the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), claiming to have accepted the basic values of modern liberal political system[4]; on the other hand, in opposition, there is the secular establishment, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), and the military of the republic convinced that the government's Islamic identity and agenda are still intact and its new liberal face is just a screen for their hidden Islamic agenda.[5] In this context, AKP is attempting to gain legitimacy by solving the Cyprus problem which is the visible barrier between Turkey and the full membership to the European Union.[6] However, the secular establishment, which has used unresolved conflicts and crises as political taboos in their ongoing political struggle to fortify their allegedly unquestionable political power and status, considers the possibility of a final solution to Cyprus problem as a challenge to the very existence of their privileged positions in Turkish domestic politics. Both camps are aware of the fact that a final solution to the Cyprus problem will eventually lift an important barrier in Turkey's accession to EU. For the government, it is vital to maintain relations with the EU for these negotiations seem to be a critical democratic force and hence a source of legitimization for AKP.[7] For the

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(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); Vemund Aarbakke...[et all.], *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish minorities law, religion and politics* edited by Samim Akgönül (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2008). Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry (eds), *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Détente*, (London: Routledge, 2005).

[4] You can read main policies and principles of AKP via following web page: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/akparty_MainPolicies.html

[5] For a detailed analysis of the AKP's Cyprus Policy in 2003 and 2004, see: Müge Kınacıoğlu and Emel Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union"*, Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7 No.2, (June, 2006), pp. 261-273. See also: Philip Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: "Between a "post-Islamist" government and a Kemalist state", *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1, (2007) pp. 289-304. Hakan Yavuz*, The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, (Salt Lake City: Universityof Utah Press, 2006).

[6] Dodd (ed.), *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 128-147.

[7] Emin Fuat Keyman,. "Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations"/ E. Fuat Keyman, Ziya Öniş, edited by Can Cemgil, Evren Tok. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007).

same reasons, the traditional Turkish elite understand possible Turkish membership of the EU would lead to a serious deterioration in their political establishment and power. Therefore, it is obvious why the Cyprus problem along with Annan plan negotiations has become such a nodal point in Turkey. Let me give some details of this conflict defining the actors' positions. .

In 2002, AKP which has been defined as a party of conservative democrats[8], came to power winning a large number of the seats in parliament.[9]. One of the first actions of the newly formed government was to develop and implement new policies on the protracted conflict over Cyprus. Until then, policies on Cyprus had been shaped towards preserving the *status-quo* the strategic interests of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, KKTC). The bureaucratic and the military elites of Turkey and their voice in politics, CHP, were already disturbed by AKP's recent political victory. They were wary of the new government's intentions to change the traditional Cyprus policy, which was fundamentally based on maintaining the *status-quo*, and to negotiate a final solution once and for all the Cyprus problem. When the new government decided to follow a proactive, pragmatic policy enabling long term resolutions to deeply seated conflicts, the forces of the *status-quo* mentioned above started a frontal attack on the

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[8] Tayyip Erdoğan, "Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom" in The Emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti" edited by M. Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). See also a definition made by Tayyip Erdoğan: "AK Parti, Yeni Muhafazakar Demokrat çizgiyi muhafazakarlığın genlerine ve tarihi kodlarına uygun şekilde, ama siyaset yaptığı coğrafyanın toplumsal ve kültürel geleneklerine yaslanarak ortaya koymaktadır. AK Parti kendi düşünce geleneğinden hareketle, yerli ve köklü değerler sistemimizi evrensel standarttaki muhafazakar siyaset çizgisiyle yeniden üretmek amacındadır". See whole document on: www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/.../KonusmaBasbakan%20UMDS.doc. Another explanation: Metin Heper argues that the AKP defines itself as such. Metin Heper, "Conservative-Democratic Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party in Turkey", in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Contemporary IslamicThought* (New York: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 345-361.

[9] In the general election, AKP had 34.34 %; CHP had 19.41 % of the votes. In the parliament, AKP had 365 seats and CHP had 177 seats over 550. Although AKP had the simple majority of the seats, it was not enough to make constitutional amendments. Therefore AKP did not hold the absolute majority power in the national parliament to elect the president on its own. Please see following link for further information: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/specials/1419_turk_elections/page2.shtml

government's new Cyprus policy. These forces are defined as the defenders of the status-quo, while the AKP government is the challenger[10]

The discussions which continued would lead to the negotiations of the Annan Plan proposed by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the subsequent 24th April 2004 referenda which were held in both parts of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in the referendum,[11] and after that the Cyprus issue seemed to come to another gridlock. The leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots are still holding negotiations in Cyprus.

The analysis of this conflictual interaction is one of the subjects of this thesis. In this interaction process, we see the political actors interacting fiercely on the domestic front and the limits of the Turkish domestic paradigm are tested. In other words, since the Cyprus issue is not an ordinary foreign policy issue but a constitutive element of the political *status-quo* defenders which have been represented chiefly by the CHP and the military, the analysis of conflicts around the Cyprus issue is also the analysis of the major political powers (the defenders and the challengers of the *status-quo*) in Turkish domestic politics and the historical transformation Turkey has been going through for more than a decade.. As a second case I will analyze the presidential election process in 2007 as explained in next section.

1.1.2   Presidential Election Case

In this section I will briefly introduce the presidential election process in 2007. In this process, the crisis was the very existence of Turkish Republic. The political

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[10] Regarding the AKP's approach towards the secular or Kemalist elite, Çoşar and Özman states that "Insel also notes that owing both to the distance between this new middle class and statist elites and to the AKP's announced commitment to pluralist democracy and consensual politics, the party has the potential to provide democratic extensions that can thwart the hard-line Kemalist encroachment on Turkish politics." Simten Çoşar and Aylin Özman "Centre-right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim face", *Contemporary Politics*, 1469-3631, Volume 10, Issue 1, (2004), pp 57-74.

[11] 75 % of Greek Cypriots voted "NO" and 65 % of Turkish Cypriots "YES" to the Annan Plan referendum. Detailed results are given in Chapter 4.

authority and power of the president[12] in the Turkish political system has been

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[12] The political position of the President is defined as following in the Turkish Republic Constitution article 104 which was made in 1982:

ARTICLE 104. The President of the Republic is the Head of the state. In this capacity he or she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation; he or she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.

To this end, the duties he or she shall perform, and the powers he or she shall exercise, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles of the Constitution are as follows:

a) Those relating to legislation:

to deliver, if he or she deems it necessary, the opening address of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the first day of the legislative year,

to summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to meet, when necessary,

to promulgate laws,

to return laws to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered,

to submit to referendum, if he or she deems it necessary, legislation regarding amendment of the Constitution.

to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment in part or entirety of certain provisions of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content,

to call new elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

b) Those relating to executive functions:

to appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his or her resignation,

to appoint and dismiss Ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister,

to preside over the Council of Ministers or to call the Council of Ministers to meet under his or her chairmanship whenever he or she deems it necessary,

to accredit representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey,

to ratify and promulgate international treaties,

to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,

to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces,

to appoint the Chief of the General Staff,

to call the National Security Council to meet,

to preside over the National Security Council,

to proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his or her chairmanship,

to sign decrees,

to remit, on grounds of chronic illness, disability, or old age, all or part of the sentences imposed on certain individuals,

to appoint the members and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council,

to instruct the State Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, investigations and inspections,

to appoint the members of the Higher Education Council,

to appoint rectors of universities.

expanded considerably in the Constitution of 1982. Özbudun claims that "the 1982 Constitution–again reflecting the values and interests of state elites- was even less trustful than its predecessor of the "national will," elected assemblies, political parties, politicians, and all other civil society institutions such as trade unions, professional organizations, and voluntary associations".[13] He also affirms that the real intent was "to create a strong presidency, which the makers of the 1982 constitution (almost all of whom were military officers and civilian bureaucrats) assumed would long be controlled by the military".[14] On the other hand, the status of presidential accountability and non-accountability should also be taken into account while discussing the power of the president. Under article 105, it was stated that "no appeal shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic on his or her own initiative".[15] Özbudun argues that this statement aims "to keep him [the president] politically irresponsible".[16] As a result of these regulations, the office of the presidency has become tutelary body acting over the parliament. Thus the presidency has been regarded by the secular establishment as the guardian of the republic and their privileged status.[17]

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c) Those relating to the judiciary:
to appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one- fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.

The President of the Republic shall also exercise powers of election and appointment, and perform the other duties conferred on him or her by the Constitution and laws. This text is available on the website of Turkish Grand National Assembly: This info is obtained from following webpage: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm

[13] Ergun Özbudun, "The Politics of Constitution Making" in *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 56.

[14] *Ibid.*, p.56

[15] http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm

[16] Özbudun, "The Politics of Constitution Making" in *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, p.37.

[17] Taraf, "Sivil Anaysa Formu -4-" (25 May 2009) avaliable on http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/34372.htm

In this context, as was expected, when the AKP decided to nominate a candidate,[18], the bureaucratic and military elite perceived this action as an attempt to take over the secular Turkish state by the Islamist government.[19] Consequently, in the process of presidential elections in 2007, the depth of the political fault line between the "Islamist" and the "secularist" political actors revealed itself with such clarity that the public was split into irreconcilable camps, leaving no room for nuanced political positions. Toprak and Çarkoğlu argue in their survey, "Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey", that "despite these positive changes, at the time we conducted this study in May 2006, there were already signs of an increasing polarization between one might call the "secularist" vs the "Islamists""[20], politicians from the opposition parties, many rectors and scholars from universities participated in the protest demonstrations[21] and published a declaration[22] about the presidential elections claiming that what was at stake in the presidential elections was nothing other than the future of the political regime in Turkey, whether Turkey would stay as a secular republic or become a theocratic state regime. During this process, the parliament was the scene of highly vehement debates, mutual accusation, and rude speeches between

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[18] Abdullah Gül was nominated as the presidential candidate by AKP on 25th April 2007.

[19] It should be also pointed out that all presidents had been elected among military generals for 19 years. After the constitution of 1982, Kenan Evren, who was the chief commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, elected as the president again from the military officials. Only after him, Turgut Özal as the first civilian president was elected. For a detailed discussion, see http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/34372.htm

[20] Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* [*Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey],* (İstanbul: Tesev Publication, December 2006), p.11.

[21] Protest meetings were organized in many cities (Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and so on) of Turkey in order to protest the AKP government and its presidential candidate and they were called as republican demonstrations by public and media. For a detailed media coverage, see:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/world/europe/30turkey.html?scp=13&sq=turkey&st=nyt

For a detailed information about the background of the protest demonstrations, also see: M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 14, No: 3, (Fall 2007).

[22] Erdoğan Teziç, the chairman of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), on behalf of the board members spoke out that, "There is no doubt that executing this kind of work requires impartiality. An impartial president is the assurance of our political regime." http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-603196

the two political parties: AKP and CHP. In addition to the parliamentary discussions, NGOs and the public in general participated in the process through demonstrations, press meetings, and declarations. It was also reported as "the crisis came to a head last week after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamic-oriented party nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to be Turkey's next president"[23] in foreign media coverage. The escalation of the crisis reached a stalemate when the military published on its web page a declaration emphasizing its opposition to the AKP's candidate, Abdullah Gül. This was considered by many scholars, journalists, public authorities and the public as an "e-memorandum"[24], a kind of military intervention, where the military "openly displays its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary" concerning the issue of secularism, into the civil political domain to stop the existing ruling power. The government responded to the military's intervention in an unprecedented way which clearly reminded all that the military is responsible to the prime minister and any declaration against this institution or any such attempts are unimaginable.[25] Nevertheless, the election process was blocked when the Turkish Constitutional Court reinterpreted the constitution, with its decision annulling the first round of the presidential election and requiring all of 367 deputies to be present in the parliament in the election.[26] This amendment of the Constitutional Court made it

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[23] "Secularism and Democracy in Turkey"
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/opinion/01tue2.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=turkey&st=nyt

[24] The Rector of Middle East Technical Univesity, Prof. Dr. Ural Akbulut first called the statement of the military as e-memorandum. Additionally, it was covered on media as such calling: "the statement -- widely termed a military memorandum due to its extraordinarily harsh tone -- was issued only minutes before midnight on Friday. The statement was dubbed an "e-memorandum," or even an "e-ultimatum," by some and threatened action if the government did not do more to preserve the republic's secular tradition" on http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=110566 ,

[25] The government spokesperson, Cemil Çiçek, made a speech after government meeting on 28 April 2007. For the details of this speech, see:
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=109749

[26] Discussions about the quorum to hold the first round of the presidential election in the parliament had started February 2007. For a detailed report, see:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/world/europe/02turkey.html?scp=17&sq=turkey&st=nyt
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=110073

impossible for the current formation of the parliament to elect the president.[27] Thus, the government decided to hold an early general election in July 2007.

Similar to the first case, the political interaction and the process were also saturated with political conflict between almost identical main actors are almost identical. Additionally, the dynamics of the interaction are also very similar to the Cyprus case involving the CHP and the military (the bureaucratic and military elite) and the AKP (the elected government). Not surprisingly then these two processes have many similarities. What unanticipated in these two processes was the different patterns of interactions that took place even though almost the same actors involved and thus the two processes evolved differently. The main distinction between the two cases is the interest of the international actors and their impacts on the processes. Their existence of those is found to be one of the main determinants regarding the nature of the domestic political interactions. Therefore, the main discussions in this analysis are the nature of the political interaction of Turkish domestic politics in certain cases, the interaction of the actors, and the influence of the international actors --whether the international actors are involved or not—on both cases.

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[27] According to the Constitution, of 1982, article 153 states that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. For a detailed information, see:
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm

8. Decisions of the Constitutional Court
    ARTICLE 153. The decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. Decisions of annulment cannot be made public without a written statement of reasons.
    In the course of annulling the whole, or a provision, of laws or decrees having the force of law, the Constitutional Court shall not act as a law-maker and pass judgment leading to new implementation.
    Laws, decrees having the force of law, or the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly or provisions thereof, shall cease to have effect from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the annulment decision. Where necessary, the Constitutional Court may also decide on the date on which the annulment decision shall come into effect. That date shall not be more than one year from the date of publication of the decision in the Official Gazette.
    In the event of the postponement of the date on which an annulment decision is to come into effect, the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall debate and decide with priority on the draft bill or law proposal, designed to fill the legal void arising from the annulment decision.
    Annulment decisions cannot be applied retroactively.
    Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on the administrative authorities, and on persons and corporate bodies.

In both cases, these politically influential players are the policy-makers and main decision units in Turkish domestic politics. Both issues are perceived as crucial indicators of the struggle between the defenders and the challengers of the *status-quo*.[28] Regarding this power struggle, İnsel argues that:

"The instinctive reactions and fears of the laicist elite in the face of the AKP and the political stance it represents have their source mainly in the anxiety of losing a hegemonic position; they reflect a certain kind of class position. The clash between the radical laicist and islamists is not only a clash between modernizationists and traditionalists, but also a clash between the high (havas) and the low (avam) dating from the final period of the Ottoman Empire".[29]

Although tense interaction and political bargaining are considered natural elements of political life in the discourse of political science[30], this issue could be studied more deeply based on process tracing analysis, utilizing the tools both of political science and of conflict resolution disciplines. This thesis aims to provide a dynamic analysis of political interactions in the context of Turkish domestic politics. Additionally, this research also introduces a different perspective in analyzing the process of issues and nature of the interaction within the Turkish political context compared to outcome-oriented evaluations or a casual-relational analysis or a power band approach. In this regard, this research is a process-based analysis.

1.2   Methodology

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[28] Ali Bulaç in his interview with Muhsin Öztürk stated that the secular establishment does't want the system to be normalized, to transfer the executive power to public, to have fair and equal distribution of income, to spread of fundamental rights and freedoms to whole society, to be integrated Turkey to its regional developments and processe since all of these developments threaten their privilieged and granted position in the execution. Muhsin Öztürk, *27 Nisan Öncesi ve Sonrası Siyasi Röportajlar [Political Interviews before and after 27th of April]*, (İstanbul, Zaman Kitap, 2008)

[29] Ahmet Insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly* Vo: 102, No:2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), p.299.

[30] For instance, Lewis Coser (1956) emphasizes that the existence of political conflicts can be useful both for coalition building and for keeping the balance of power. Coser, L (1956) The Functions of the Social Conflict. Glencoe, I11: Free Press. To give another For example, Pirages (1976), similar to Coser's claim, states that conflict is important both within political organizations and in establishing coalitions in a political system.

The analysis of the policy-making processes of the two cases is examined through   process tracing with likert scale coding. The declarations, official statements, and public speeches of the actors which are collected via newspaper (*Radikal*)[31] web pages and official web sites of the actors are the data. After encoding this data, the comparison of two conflictual issues is developed. The data are collected between these periods: for the process of presidential election in 2007, the period starts with 1 January, 2007 and ends with the election of Abdullah Gül as the president on 28 August 2007; for the process of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, the period starts with 1 January, 2004 and ends with the referenda held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004.

1.3   Aim of the Study

Through this analysis, my aim is to present a dynamic analysis of the nature of the political interaction as well as actor's interactions in Turkish domestic politics based on two conflictual cases. While volumes have been written about political conflicts in Turkey, there is little research on the subject of political interactions that engages the conceptual tools and frameworks of both political science discipline and the field of conflict resolution. Turkey has been experiencing domestic political debates and very tense and escalating processes since the beginning of the 2000s. Through this analysis, another aim is to present a detailed picture of the tense political interactions and important insights in Turkish domestic politics. Consequently, the final aim is to contribute to existing literature on the relations of domestic and international politics.

The organization consists of six chapters. Chapter one presents the aim and importance of the study.

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[31] Radikal is a national wide daily newspaper published in Turkey in Turkish. Due to its easy access to online and broad archive, it is chosen to collect data for the case analysis. There is not any sort of ideological preferences in chosing it.

Chapter two is the literature review section and consists of two main sections: political science and conflict resolution literature.

Chapter three presents the method of the research and explains how process tracing methodology is used in analysis of the two cases.

Chapter four interprets the cases through focusing on the positions and perceptions of the actors and their critical concerns related to the cases.

Chapter five displays the comparative analysis of the political interaction and thus findings, which have been determined through data codification, are presented in the figures as well as in comments. The importance of Chapter Five lies in what the analysis shows based on actors-based and case-based illustration as well as a general comparison to see the nature of interaction and the dynamic of policy-making process.

Finally, the last chapter presents theoretical and policy implications of the analysis.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

I will first present a review of the relevant literature chiefly on policy and decision making from the fields of political science and mainly on political negotiation and conflict from the fields of conflict resolution. In this section I will first provide a review of the political science literature on i) policy and decision making models ii) veto player theory iii) basic definitions of coalition building and interaction. Secondly, I will present the conflict resolution literature on i) negotiation and types of negotiation ii) political crises iii) political interaction iv) political conflict and studies on political conflicts.

Firstly, the political science literature presented in this thesis analyzes the political interactions within policy and decision making models Moreover, the theories of these models explain the policy and decision making stages and their characteristics. Secondly, conflict resolution literature on political interaction focuses on negotiation processes and tries to define the nature of the political interaction. Below, I would like to introduce first the political science literature on policy and decision making and then conflict resolution literature.

2.1 Political Science Literature

Political science literature on policy and decision making presents six different clusters of approaches on policy making. Firstly, the features affecting the policy making process are presented. Secondly, policy making models and mechanisms are introduced. In the third section, decision making models and mechanisms are given. These three sections provide the theoretical framework of policy and decision making. The fourth section explains the veto player theory of George Tsebelis. Fifthly, the

coalition building approaches are presented. Lastly, the concept of interaction is briefly introduced.

2.1.1 Features Affecting Policy Making Process

A very initial definition of policy making is identified as "policy making is a process which is particularly complex, analytical and political".[32] This complex, analytical and political process includes three main features: political entities, a political environment, and political bargaining. These features have been considered as influential elements in the process.

The first aspect which is presented in the literature is the political entities which are defined as "prime ministers, presidents, party secretaries, standing committees, military juntas, cabinets, bureaucracies, interagency groups, legislatures, and loosely structured revolutionary coalitions".[33] Specifically, political parties are viewed as very important elements in the policy making process. Regarding this, McCally argues that "the organization of the party, then, is of vital importance in the policy-making process. A study of the individuals and groups making up the political party is thus a starting point in any explanation of the party's contribution to policy making".[34] In addition, according to Thomas, political parties have a critical role in the political process[35] and Yishai defines that role as partisan.[36]

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[32] Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 4

[33] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Summer, 2001), p. 47

[34] Sarah McCally, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March, 1973), p. 57

[35] Clive S. Thomas, *Political parties and interest groups : shaping democratic governance,* (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 2001) , p. 16

[36] Yael Yishai, "Interest Groups and Political Parties: The Odd Couple", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August-September (1995)

The second aspect is the political environment. Birkland argues that "the policy environment contains the features of the structural, social, political and economic system in which public policy making takes place".[37] These four systems are explained in Birkland's work in detail. The structural environment is defined according to the structure of politics and the government such as whether the country is rules by two-party system or parliamentarism.[38] The social environment is composed of "the nature and composition of the population and its social structure".[39] The composition of the population includes "the distribution of age, gender, and other attributes of the population". The economic environment has many variables such as "the distribution of wealth in a society, the nature and the distribution of capital, the size and composition of industry sectors, the rate of growth of the economy, inflation, and the cost of labor and raw materials".[40]

The political environment is separately presented since it includes two components which are indicated as a "national mood"[41] and political culture. The national mood is considered to have an effect on policy making since it is argued that "that national mood changes from one time to another in discernible common lines, that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes".[42] Birkland also explained the national mood concept as "how we feel about government, public problems, and the effectiveness of government and other institutions in successfully addressing these problems".[43] It is also underlined that the national mood and trust is important in government for public policy in the sense that "the legitimacy of democratic political systems depends in large part on the extent to which the electorate trusts the government to do what is right at least most of

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[37] Thomas A,.Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* (Armonk, N.Y. M.E. Sharpe, c2001) p.194.

[38] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making.* p.195

[39] *Ibid.,* p.197.

[40] *Ibid*, p. 198.

[41] John W Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*, (New York : Harper Collins, 1995)

[42] *Ibid,p.146*

[43] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.200

the time".[44] The second component of the political environment is political culture described as "the long-standing ways that people think about politics and how they behave in politics".[45] Other than that, the definition of political culture is also introduced as "a shared set of knowledge, attitudes and symbols that help to define the procedures and goals of politics".[46] Thomas's definition differs from Anderson's in the sense that the former focused on how political culture works; however, the latter explains what constitutes political culture. Birkland also compared these two components saying that "political culture is much more consistent than national mood and has a substantial influence over the types of issues that are most likely to succeed as policy initiatives".[47]

The third aspect is political bargaining which shapes the political process. Initially, in the general sense, McCarty defines the term of political bargaining as "two actors negotiate to change an exogenously given status quo policy".[48] In this bargaining, McCarty identifies the actors as one who makes the proposal and the other as the one who vetoes it. Therefore, it can be argued that political bargaining includes two components: making a proposal and vetoing it. Bargaining is also presented as a process of government formation, which consists of various political actors and political negotiations as well, in the context of parliamentary democracies.[49] Young defines the bargaining process in general as a process which "involves two or more parties who can make and accept offers, who can compromise with each other, and

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[44] Ralph Erber and Richard R. Lau, "Political cynicism Revisited: An Information-Process Reconciliation of Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of Changes in Trust in Government", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34,No: 1 (February, 1990), p. 236

[45] James Anderson, *Public Policy Making*, 4th ed. (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 2000), 205 – 210 cited in Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making, p.201*

[46] Clive S. Thomas, *Political parties and interest groups : shaping democratic governance,* (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 2001) , p. 16

[47] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.201

[48] Nolan McCarty, "Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining", *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 44, No. 3 (July., 2000), p. 506

[49] John D. Huber and Nolan McCarty, "Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 2 (June., 2001), pp. 345-360

who can achieve mutual gains".[50] Young's definition is based on a win-win solution which has been not necessarily the aim of the political parties involved in the process of policy making in the cases in this thesis.

In the literature, political bargaining has been attributed to a process, and so models have also been developed accordingly. The model of political bargaining was first developed by Romer and Rosenthal.[51] Regarding the first models, McCarty, argues that "formal models of political bargaining generally emphasize the importance of the allocation of prerogatives such as proposal and veto rights among the bargainers"[52] and bargaining is also driven by an exogenous *status quo*. Based on these criticisms, McCarty develops the sequential-choice model which s/he defines as a "generalization of a model developed by Baron and Ferejohn"[53] and in this model "bargaining is driven by endogenous expectations about the future".[54]

2.1.2 Policy Making Models and Mechanisms

Various models have been generated and developed to present the system of policy making in a more comprehensive and systematic way. These main models of policy making are presented in this section. Although distinctive methodologies are applied through these models, the basic commonality is that all models have logical systematic stages and the policy-makers follow these stages without missing any of them. To begin Richardson's "Four-Stage Model" presents four-stages of the policy-making process. The first stage is named the *agenda setting* where various interest groups endorse diverse ideas and resolutions in response to problems or interests. The second stage is where *ideas are formulated into policies* with an aim to resolve the

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[50] H. Peyton Young, Negotiation Analysis, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, c1991), p. 89.

[51] Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, "Political Resources Allocation, Controlled Agenda, and the Status Quo", *Public Choice* No:33 (1978), pp. 27-44

[52] Nolan McCarty, "Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining", p. 506

[53] David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn. 1989a. "Bargaining in Legislatures", American Political Science Review Vol: 89 No: 4. pp: 1181-1206

[54] Nolan McCarty, "Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining", p. 508

problem or issue. The third stage is the development and consideration of alternatives where finally a *policy is made*. The last stage is the *implementation* of this policy. Richardson (1996) defines each process as complex in itself and argues that the relation between these can bring up more complexity. Consequently, he sums up by saying that "these processes are dynamic, fluid, and loosely joined".

The next model belongs to Kingdon which is known as "Stream Metaphor"[55] model. Basically, his model includes three streams to set the agenda in which each has different groups, agencies, institutions, and individuals. The first stream is "the politics stream"[56] which "encompasses the state of politics and the public opinion"[57]. The second one is "the policy stream" that "contains the potential solutions to a problem". Finally, the third one is "the problem stream" that "encompasses the attributes of a problem and whether it is getting better or worse…".[58]

Figure 1: Kingdon's Streams Metaphor

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[55] John W Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*, 1995. Birkland states that "this book has become very influential in policy studies and is used to explain policy making in many different fields" Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.278.

[56] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.223

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*,p.224.

The third model is presented by Sabatier as "The Advocacy Coalition Framework"[59] in this model the basic idea is that "interest groups are organized in policy communities within a policy domain"[60]. Two or four groups in advocacy coalitions are introduced and these groups participate in "policy debate, competing and compromising on solutions based on their core values and beliefs"[61]. There are also "policy brokers"[62] which are defined as mediators for the competition within a coalition.

The last model is called the "Punctuated Equilibrium"[63] which is used to explain the process by which policy is made in the United States. According to Birkland, they argue that:

> "The balance of political power between groups of interests remains relatively stable over long periods of time, punctuated by relatively sudden shifts in public understanding of problems and in the balance of power between these groups seeking to fight entrenched interests".[64]

The main theory of this model is *political monopoly* which "corresponds with the idea of policy subsystems".[65] In this monopoly, dominance is held over policy making by a group and policy-making is controlled by that group. Nevertheless, there are certain situations: when media attention is greater, meaning that an "increased attention to a problem usually means greater negative attention to it" and when "groups can seek access to the courts or other units of government to gain access to policy debate"[66], and this monopoly can be broken.

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[59] Paul A. Sabatier, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach,* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993)

[60] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.224

[61] *Ibid*., p.225

[62] *Ibid*.,

[63] Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[64] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.227.

[65] *Ibid*., p.227.

[66] *Ibid*., p.228

2.1.3 Decision-Making models and Mechanisms

The main identification of a decision is presented by Brikland and Hermann. Brikland defines a decision as a "key to the common definition of 'public policy' and as 'what government chooses to do or not to do' is the idea of a decision".[67] Hermann also argues that "decisions are sought to deal with problems"[68] and generated by policymakers.

The decision making process has also been shaped through various mechanisms and mainly those are presented in this section. According to Brikland, "the decision making process begins after an issue or a problem is placed on the agenda and it makes its way through the legislative process until it comes close to the *decision agenda*".[69] "Garbage Can" and "Models II and Model III" are presented as two main models for the decision making processes in Birkland's work. The *first* one is the "garbage can"[70] model developed by Cohen, March and Olsen which contains three streams: participants, problems and solutions and "in each of these streams; various elements of decision making float about".[71] In order to explain the model the authors use universities which are also called "organized anarchies".[72] Richardson also mentions this model in his book "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies", where he more explicitly states that "organized anarchies have three general properties: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation".[73]

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[67] *Ibid.*, p.228

[68] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework", p. 53

[69] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.209

[70] Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice", Administrative Science QuarterlyVol: 17 (1972), pp. 1-25.

[71] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.214

[72] *Ibid.*, p.214.

[73] Jeremy J. Richardson, *European Union : power and policy-making*. (London ; New York : Routledge, 1996), p.84.

Secondly, Models II and Models III were developed by Allison. His book "Essence of Decision"[74] is considered one of the outstanding studies in terms of the "development of three models of decision making and their application to the missile crisis case".[75] According to Allison's modeling, decision making has two ways: Organizational Process (Models II), which is also called as "the bureaucratic politics model" and Governmental Politics (Models III) which is defined as "the model of political conflict".[76] Birkland states that "decisions in this model are the product of competition and negotiation among the president, top government executives, bureaucrats, legislators, and other interested parties".[77] Allison also defines this process in a more comprehensive explanation:

> "The governmental politics model see no unitary actor but rather many actors as players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics".[78]

This model demonstrates how the decision-making process, whether at the national or international level, is complex and requires multi-level analysis and analysis of interaction between different actors in the government as defined as players.

The *third* decision making model by Putnam is "the Logic of Two-Level Games"[79], which mainly analyzes the decision making process within the foreign

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[74] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

[75] Birkland, *An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of public policy making,* p.273.

[76] *Ibid.*, p.215.

[77] *Ibid.*, p.216.

[78] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,*. p.255.

[79] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460

policy context at an international relations level.[80] Putnam., in his well-known article "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games" presents this model in detail and basically argues that domestic politics affect the foreign policy making as well as the fact that domestic politics and international relations indeed interact yet many theories have focused little on that interaction. Unlike the realist paradigm, he basically involves domestic factors that are considered influential in foreign policy making. As domestic determinants for foreign policy relations, he lists as follows: "parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections".[81] His theory proposes two-level of analysis of which the first is at the international level (Level I) and the second is at the national level (Level II). The argument, which is that the relationship between these two levels is dynamic, is very clearly stated by Putnam. Additionally, Putnam also discusses 'the state' concept which is based on as central decision-makers and he rejects the "state-centric" understanding which "represents a unitary actor-model". He argues that "on nearly all important issues 'central decision makers' disagree about what national interest and the international context demand".[82]

The *fourth* model is Hermann's "Decision-Unit Framework"[83] which is one of the prominent frameworks used in the literature to explain elements and core aspects in the decision-making process. Hermann's work has been built upon studies of various researchers[84] who develop models on foreign policy decision making. As a general explanation, these studies which aim to generate decision-making models

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[80] Patrick James and Athanasios Hristoulas, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 327-348

[81] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", p.432

[82] *Ibid.*, p.432.

[83] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework".

[84] Hermann listed researches as following: 't Hart, 1990; Maoz, 1990; Vertzberger, 1990; Bender and Hammond, 1992; Khong, 1992; Welch, 1992; Caldwell andMcKeown, 1993; Evans, Jacob- son, and Putnam, 1993; Hagan, 1994; Kupchan, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Hudson, 1995; 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius, 1997; George and George, 1998; Stern and Verbeek, 1998; Sylvan and Voss, 1998; Allison and Zeli- kow, 1999; Rosati, 2000.

focus on "bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, presidential advisory systems, governmental politics, leadership, coalition politics, and the strategies for dealing with domestic opposition".[85] Based on this literature, Hermann in his research, aims to develop an integrated framework with these existing studies. There are three decision units which are "found in the various political entities"[86] in Hermann's study. These units are "the powerful leader, the single group and the coalition of autonomous actors".[87] Three basic aims are introduced in this decision-unit framework: i) to develop a general framework that researchers can use to study decision-making, ii) to show using several of methods how policy-making can serve to predict future explanations, iii) to understand foreign policy making in different political settings in other countries.

Hermann proposes that "when problems are recognized, decision units are generally convened to deal with them".[88] Figure 2 for example shows decision units framework:

Figure 2: Decision-Unit Framework

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[85] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework", p. 48.

[86] *Ibid.*, p.47

[87] *Ibid.*, p.47

[88] *Ibid.*, p.53

Decisions are made by policymakers and political analysts.[89] Hermann explains these policymakers have certain aims and purposes which are significant to them as well as which they work to achieve them under their administration. He argues that "…as they begin to take action on such goals and objectives, they encounter problems in their domestic and international environments that challenge what they want to do".[90] In the framework, Hermann first put the term "inputs" and explains it as "the inputs to the framework represent the stimuli from the international and domestic environments to which the authoritative decision unit is responding".[91] A problem is defined as something that "is recognized when policymakers state that something is wrong, needs attention or presents an opportunity for gain if action is taken".[92] Therefore, problems are considered as "the trigger" or "reason" to engage this framework. The part *"occasions for decision"* is explained as "representing the instances in coping with a problem when the policymakers are faced with making a choice".[93]

Decision Units:

The authoritative decision unit composed of three types as explained following:

Predominant Leader: When only one character has the power to decide on foreign policy if it is necessary and to influence all counter-parties.

Single Group: When a group of people who are also the members of the one group have the power to make decisions.

Coalition of Autonomous Actors: When separate individuals, representative of various groups come together and make decisions for the government all together; none of these separate groups or individuals has power to decide on anything alone.[94]

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[89] Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), John C. Galvin, "Breaking Through and Being Heard". *Mershon Inter- national Studies Review* (1994). Vol: 38. pp.173-174, Joseph Kruzel, More a Chasm Than a Gap, But Do Scholars Want to Bridge It? *Mershon International Studies Review* (1994) Vol: 38, pp.179-181.

[90] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework", p. 53

[91] *Ibid*., p.52.

[92] *Ibid*., p.52

[93] *Ibid*., p.54

[94] *Ibid*., pp.56-57.

Based on Hermann's analysis, there appeared six different possible outcomes in a decision-making process: i) one party's position prevails; ii) concurrence; iii) mutual consensus and compromise; iv) lopsided compromise; v) deadlock; vi) fragmented symbolic action. Hermann explains that "in each case the outcome of the process indicates the endpoint of the decision in terms of the preferences of those involved"[95] Table 1 (Hermann, 2001, p. 72) is shown below:

Range of Preferences Represented in Decision	Distribution of Payoffs	
	Symmetrical	Asymmetrical
One Party's	Concurrence (All own decision; see decision as final; move to other problems)	One Party's Position Prevails (Only one party owns decision; others monitor resulting action; push for reconsideration if feedback negative)
Mixed Parties'	Mutual Compromise/ Consensus (Members know got all possible at moment; monitor for change in political context; seek to return to decision if think can change outcome in their favor)	Lopsided Compromise (Some members own position, others do not; latter monitor resulting action and political context, agitating for reconsideration of decision)
No Party's	Deadlock (Members know no one did better than others; seek to redefine the problem so solution or trade-offs are feasible)	Fragmented Symbolic Action (No members own decision; seek to change the political context in order to reconstitute decision unit)

Table 1: Characteristic and Implications of Process Outcomes

The *seventh* model Conn's Model of Political Decision Making, (Figure 3) illustrates the "conflict resolution and the political process".[96]

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[95] *Ibid.*, p.64

[96] Paul H. Conn, *Conflict & Decision Making: an Introduction to Political Science* (New York : Harper & Row, c1971), p.63.

Figure 3: Conflict Resolution and Political Process

In the beginning of this process in the illustration, Conn starts with a conflict which is between institutions and organizations or institutions and structures; then he continues with the "generation of demands" where "that the participants strive for

activation or **politicization** of their conflict".[97] This act, activation or politicization, leads to parties forming coalitions in order to strengthen their positions in the conflict. Conn defines the next step as a second phase of the process when policy decision-making happens. The last step, as the illustration shows is the step of "execution and integration".[98] The political decision making process occurs "when the demands have been articulated, the strategies drawn up, the coalitions formed, and all the necessary resources mustered, a conflict is at last ready for the political battlefield".[99] At this stage, parties have four options: *avoidance, tabling, acceptance and rejection* that parties in the decision-making processes.[100] In short, these responses are explained by Conn in the following ways: the first one *avoidance,* is a response that "political authorities can ignore a conflict".[101] Parties may hold a position to avoid a conflict due to the fact that they may see the issue as unimportant and therefore not want to waste energy and time with that seemingly unimportant issue.[102] The second one is *tabling* which is explained as a very similar response to avoidance; however, the reason for tabling is very different to the reason for avoidance. In tabling, the comparison of issues or conflicts is the case, stated by Conn as "a particular conflict is seen as a lower-parity issue compared with existing conflicts".[103] The second reason for *tabling* is related to the resources which could be used to resolve the conflict. This situation is explained by Conn as tabling occurs "when the conflict is of such magnitude that decision makers either do not have enough information to deal with it affectively or feel that they cannot commit the resources necessary to solve the problem".[104] As the third response, decision-makers carry out *acceptance* which Conn relates these positions with "resolutions, legislations, programs, bureaucratic decisions".[105] In addition, Conn also divides acceptance into two types: *temporary acceptance*

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[97] *Ibid.*, p.63

[98] *Ibid.*, p.63

[99] *Ibid.*, p.72

[100] *Ibid.*, p.73

[101] *Ibid.*, p.73

[102] *Ibid.*, p.73

[103] *Ibid.*, p.73

[104] *Ibid.*, p.74

[105] *Ibid.*, p.74

"marginal action" and *permanent acceptance* "ideological acceptance".[106] The last response of decision-makers is *rejection* which could be "on ideological grounds, or be pragmatic or be comprehensive or incremental".[107]

The theory of "checks and balances" which was first defined in the constitutional papers in 18th century as well as in the American Constitution underlies the concept of the veto player.[108] The decision-making process is also held by groups in governments "legislative committees, cabinets, military juntas, politburos of ruling parties, and executive councils".[109] These groups are defined as "at the core of the bureaucratic process".[110] In the government, decisions are taken by the members of the political parties. These members can vote for or against which is known as veto power.

2.1.4 Veto Player Theory

Veto player theory is another stream of study in explaining policy making and policy makers.

George Tsebelis defines and then elaborates on this theory of veto player in the field of comparative politics and policymaking.[111] The veto player theory is described

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[106] *Ibid*., pp.78-79.

[107] *Ibid*., p.81

[108] Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. (New Haven ; London : Yale University Press, 1984), Kent R. Weaver, and Bert A. Rockman. *Do Institutions Matter*? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1993).

[109] Charles F. Hermann, Janice Gross Stein, Bengt Sundelius, Stephen G. Walker, "Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Summer, 2001), p.133.

[110] *Ibid*., p.133.

[111] George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism", *British Journal of Political Science* Vol: 25 (June, 1995a), pp: 289-326. George Tsebelis.. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies" *In Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, ed. Herbert Doering. (New York: St. Martin's 1995b) pp. 83-111. George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93,

as "veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo".[112] The function of the veto player is also described as one "who can block the adoption of a policy".[113] According to Tsebelis, in the logic of policy-making process, a certain number of veto players should agree on a policy change in order to carry out a change of the status quo.[114] He lists three characteristics which he argues matter:

"The policy stability of a political system depends on three characteristics of its veto player: their number, their congruence (the difference in their political positions) and their cohesion (the similarity of policy positions of the constituent units of each veto player)".[115]

In Tsebelis's article two types of veto players are defined: institutional and partisan veto players. Institutional veto players are found in the presidential system as the president and chambers; while partisan veto players are known as political parties in parliamentary systems.[116] Tsebelis points out the difference between institutional and partisan veto players: "according to the constitution, the agreement of institutional veto players is a necessary and sufficient condition for policy change, while the agreement of partisan veto players is, *strictly speaking*, neither necessary nor sufficient".[117] It is also argued that in Westminster systems[118] "dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while

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No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 591-608. George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis", *Governance*, (2000) Vol: 13, No:4 pp. 441-474.

[112] George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism", p: 289

[113] *Ibid.*, p.305.

[114] *Ibid.*, p.315.

[115] *Ibid.*, p.301.

[116] *Ibid.*, p.289

[117] *Ibid.*, p.302

[118] The Essence of the Westminster model is stated as "majority rule" (Lijphart, 1984: 4). Lijphart lists nine features of Westminster model of democracy as: "concentration of executive power: one party and bare-majority cabinets; fusion of power and cabinet dominance; asymmetric bicameralism; two-party system; one-dimensional party system; plurality system of elections; unitary and centralized government; unwritten constitution and parliamentary sovereignty; exclusively representative democracy" Arend Lijphart, *Democracies : Patterns Of Majoritarian And Consensus Government In Twenty-One Countries* , pp.6-9.

coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players".[119]

In terms of distance between veto players which Tsebelis identifies as congruence, he claims that each partisan player is different and is counted as separate veto player since each of them may have distinctive positions regarding various policies. Regarding institutional veto players, Tsebelis focuses on two institutions: chambers and presidents. He argues that "two institutional veto players with different political compositions should be counted as two distinct players".[120] Besides this, he also emphasizes that if an institutional veto power is not a formal power, it would not be considered as a veto player.[121] Tsebelis also argues that there can be additional powers that intend to act as a veto player such as *interest groups* in some political systems; *the army* is also considered as a veto player in particular issues and *courts* are also given as an example of veto players.[122]

Lastly, Tsebelis describes the third characteristic of veto player which he depicts in the unusual metaphor of an egg yolk is the size of the yolk of each veto player[123]. This variable which proposes that "policy stability decreases when the size of yolk of each veto player increases"[124] depends on "how cohesive a party is: cohesive parties have smaller yolks".[125] The definition of cohesion is also stated as "difference of positions within a party *before* a discussion and a vote take place inside the party".[126] Nevertheless, he also states that "a party with big ideological differences among its members is not necessarily non-cohesive".[127]

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[119] George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism", p: 289

[120] *Ibid.*, p.305.

[121] *Ibid.*, p.305.

[122] *Ibid.*, p.311.

[123] *Ibid.*, p.311.

[124] *Ibid.*, p.311.

[125] *Ibid.*, p.311.

[126] *Ibid.*, p.311.

[127] *Ibid.*, p.311.

Tsebelis also emphasizes that the veto player theory does not depend on the political structure: presidentalism or parliamentarism; bicameralism or unicameralism; two-party or multi-party systems.

It is also claimed as "the best known line of work in modern political science relating the rules of inclusion and exclusion of political actors to the relative difficulty of policy change is the veto players' theory of George Tsebelis and others".[128] Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi have studied the literature and found that the veto player theory has been applied to the field of many studies and majors ranging from fiscal adjustment[129], to international trade arrangements[130]; from inequality[131], to the European Union decision-making processes. According to Ganghoff, veto theory "systematically relates a veto player to the potential for policy change in a political system".[132]

2.1.5 Coalition building

Research on coalition building mostly focuses on parliamentary systems rather than coalition building at the international level. According to Pfetsch, coalition building is very significant in decision-making processes in the sense that any

[128] Carlos Scartascini, Ernesto Stein, and Mariano Tommasi, How Do Political Institutions Work? Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions, and Policy Adaptability, Preliminary draft, (April 2008), p.2.

[129] Oliver Pamp, "Partisan Preferences Squeezed Through Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment Decisions in the European Union". Mimeo, Jean-Monnet Centre of Excellence, Free University of Berlin, (2007).

[130] Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, Jon C. Pevehouse, "Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements" Prepared for the 2005 ISA conference, January 26, 2005.

[131] Vicki Birchfield and Markus Crepaz, "The Impact of Constitutional Structures And Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol 34, No: 2 (October, 1998)

[132] Steffen Ganghoff, "State of the Art Article: Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis", *Swiss Political Science Review*, (2003), Vol: 9, No:2 p.1

minority group may increase its power through coalition building in the international environment.[133]

Coalition formation is also explained by Conn in an illustration of the political process of conflict resolution.[134] Coalition formation is the first step in this process and defined as forming alliances with like-minded allies to gain support for the accomplishment of those own demands and this situations is considered to "allow participants to multiply their resources and thereby to compete for rewards in an arena where their single cries might have gone unheard".[135] He also points out the costs of and the strategies of coalition formation in his book.

2.1.6 Interaction

According to Conn, interaction is one to the conditions for a conflict to appear. Conn includes references to March and Simon saying that "the parties to conflict will engage in conflict only if there is a necessity for them to interact with each other or if both the contestants are subject to the same common authority".[136] The emphasis on authority can be considered to be one of the characteristic reasons why actors are in conflict in both cases in this study.

Patchen also lists many variables of the probable determinants of interaction which have been researched. As variables he states "the objective situation: relative power, conflict of interest, communication channel"; "characteristic of the parties: ideology, motives, group decision-making processes"; "subjective orientations of the

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[133] Frank R. Pfetsch, *Negotiating Political Conflicts*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

[134] Conn, *Conflict & Decision Making: an Introduction to Political Science*, p.63.

[135] *Ibid*., p.65.

[136] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organization, (New York: Wiley, 1958) p.121.

parties: perception of the other's intention"; and "the strategies of interaction: behaving noncooperatively and then switching to cooperation".[137]

To conclude, this section consists of the presentation of the policy and decision making models, and veto player theory as well as the definitions of coalition building and interaction from the political science literature. *Firstly*, to start with, models mentioned above: i) Richarson's 'Four-stage model', ii) Kingdon's 'Stream Metaphor', iii) Sabater's The Advocacy Coalition Framework', iv) 'Punctuated Equilibrium' as policy making models, v) Alison's Model II and Model II, vi) Putnam's model, vii) Hermann's 'Decision-Unit Framework and viii) Conn's Model on Political Decision Making, have not been applied to analysis in this thesis. The reason for this lies in the fact that these models have mostly been applied to either policy making process in parliament or foreign decision making process; however, the policy making processes analyzed in this thesis are realized between both elected political parties (CHP and AKP) and the military. Additionally, because these models lack a way to assess the impact of the international actor on the domestic policy making process, it could be argued that the models and mechanisms presented above cannot be comprehensively and truly applicable to the analysis which is undertaken in this thesis. Only Putnam points out that international and domestic politics have an influence on each other's sphere. However, there is no other study that focuses on this relationship. As a result of these, I develop a new approach which takes into account more dynamic aspects of the issue at stake rather than providing descriptive model for relatively static issues. Nevertheless, these models are significant in order to present how the political science field analyzes and explore political interaction in policy and decision making.

Secondly, veto player theory is valuable in the sense of presenting the positions taken by the actors. Therefore, although the analysis is not purely conducted based on this theory, it is still important and relevant to this research regarding the introduction of characteristics and positions of the policy and decision maker who shaped the political interaction.

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[137] Martin Patchen, "Models of Cooperation and Conflict", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14, No.3 (Sep., 1970), pp. 389-407.

Thirdly as a general observation, most articles and studies[138] which have been published in political science literature include researches using quantitative methods or statistical analysis as well as having specific case analysis rather than exploring of the nature of the interaction. In this regard, these studies are not directly relevant to this thesis.

In summary, none of these theories, models and explanations presented are directly relevant to what this research focuses on and this lack initiated the need to develop a new model for the analytical/methodological purposes of this study.

2.2   Conflict Resolution Literature

This section presents relevant explanations regarding the interaction analysis. The main reason for visiting the conflict resolution literature on interaction analysis is to present how interaction, especially political interaction, is studied and perceived in research. In this section, mostly definitions and understandings of certain concepts and approaches are introduced rather than theoretical models and frameworks. This section starts with negotiation and its definition. Secondly, political negotiation which has been mostly studied through development of a model is presented. Thirdly, integrative and distributive negotiation styles are defined. Fourthly, the research and

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[138] Kristopher W. Ramsay, "Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No.4 (Aug., 2004), pp.459 – 486; Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 255-282; Irving Lichbach and Ted Robert Gurr, "The Conflict Process: A Formal Model, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 3-29, George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism", *British Journal of Political Science* Vol: 25 (June, 1995a), pp: 289-326. George Tsebelis.. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies" *In Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, ed. Herbert Doering. (New York: St. Martin's 1995b) Karmeshu, Jain and Mahajan 1990; DeRouen JR. and Sprecher, Christopher, "Initial Crisis Reaction and Poliheuristic Theory", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 1, (2004), pp.56-68; Nolan McCarty, "Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining", *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 44, No. 3 (July., 2000), p. 506

studies on crisis management, crisis negotiations and political crisis are visited. As a fifth part, the various definitions and interpretations of political conflict are presented. The sixth and seventh sections indicate models and projects which have been developed about the subject of political conflict. Lastly, the definition of cooperation is given.

2.2.1 Negotiation

In a very broad and general definition, "negotiation is a form of conflict behavior, which occurs when two or more parties try to resolve a divergence of interest by means of conversation".[139] Negotiation is also described as a complex human activity.[140] This complex human activity can be between individuals, groups, organization, political units[141] as well as within them.

Negotiation is presented as a joint decision-making process.[142] Zartman defines this process as one "in which both parties are necessary to the decision, or, otherwise stated, in which each party has veto power".[143] Pruitt and Carnevale affirm that negotiation is one of the procedures which occurs in joint decision making. Young also defines negotiation as a central activity in many subjects such as "diplomacy, politics, religion, the law, and the family".[144] Zartman additionally concludes that the decision-making processes should consider negotiation in satisfying both parties which are to decide on the decision and the process should be dealt with the actual decision-making is done through negotiation. Zartman lists three main modes of social decision-making: coalition, judication and negotiation which he clarifies these models

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[139] Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement,*(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004) p.56.

[140] Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders, and John W. Minton, *Essentials of Negotiation* (Chicago : Irwin, c1997), I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Dec., 1977), pp. 619-638,

[141] Dean G. Pruitt, Peter J. Carnevale, *Negotiation in Social Conflict*, (Buckingham: Open Universty Press, c1993).

[142] Dean G. Pruitt, Peter J. Carnevale, *Negotiation in Social Conflict*,

[143] I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process", p. 623.

[144] H. Peyton Young, *Negotiation Analysis*.

in decision-making process as "negotiation is one of a limited number of decision-making modes".[145] According to Zartman, negotiation basically means "a process of two (or more) parties combining their conflicting points of view into a single decision".[146] Thompson also defines negotiation as a decision-making process not at the political level but at the interpersonal one and he underlines that people experience negotiation in their everyday lives.[147]

In the negotiation literature, it is argued that the analysis of the negotiation process could contribute to predicting the outcome of the negotiation as well as understanding the forerunner conditions and effecting variables in negotiation.[148] The fact that there are certain influential factors, learning of some important information regarding the adversary parties position or events or decisions as called "turning points" may turn the process into escalatory or de-escalatory situations are also presented.[149]

2.2.2   Political Negotiations

Ikle and Leites have researched the existing models of political negotiations and consider the models, such as "price theory" and "games of strategy", helpful to understanding the real situations; however they argue that "these theoretical tools seem to be of but limited use for the complex reality"[150] needed to study political

[145] I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process", p. 620.

[146] *Ibid.*, p.622.

[147]Leigh Thompson, *The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator.* (Upper Saddle River, N.J:Prentice, 2001)

[148] Laurie R. Weingart, Jeanne M. Brett, Mara Olekalns and Philip L. Smith, "Conflicting Social Motives in Negotiating Groups", November 15, 2006 online avaliable: http://server1.tepper.cmu.edu/seminars/docs/Weingartpaper.pdf

[149] Daniel Druckman,. "Case-Based Research on International Negotiation: Approaches and Data Sets", *International Negotiation*, (2002) Vol:7, pp. 17-32

[150] Fred Charles Ikle and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Game Theory, Bargaining and International Relations (Mar., 1962), p.19.

negotiations. They aim to develop a theory of negotiations through the formalization of the process of negotiation rather than give a definite description of political negotiations.

In the general sense, the main element of the negotiation process is defined as 'opposing interests'.[151] Pfetsch also explains the negotiation process of political science within the international context and gives examples from international negotiations.

Zechmeister and Druckman argue that "political negotiators differ in how responsible they must be to the groups that they represent. Their "office-holding may depend on the extent to which they satisfy their constituents, both in terms of achieving favorable outcomes, and in terms of loyalty to the group's initial position".[152]

2.2.3   Integrative-Distributive Negotiation

In literature, negotiation has two basic types which are distributive and integrative negotiation, which have been defined, described, as well as analyzed by various scholars.[153] Raffia argues that "two-party bargaining can be divided into two types: distributive and integrative"[154] and he explains distributive negotiation as "one single issue is, such as money, under contention and the parties have almost strictly opposing interests on that issue".[155] The situation is shaped on the logic of when one gets more, the other gets less. Distributive negotiation refers to slicing the pie and to negotiating with existing resources. Therefore the satisfaction of both sides is hardly

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[151] Frank R. Pfetsch, *Negotiating Political Conflicts*, p.4.

[152] Kathleen Zechmeister and Daniel Druckman, "Determinants of Resolving a Conflict of Interest: A Simulation of Political Decision-Making", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), p.67.

[153] (Zartman, 1977; Thompson, 2001; Raiffa, 1982)

[154] Howard. Raffia, *The art and science of negotiation (*Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1982) p. 33.

[155] *Ibid*., p.33.

to be achieved. On the other hand, integrative negotiation is known as a 'win-win solution' based on expanding the pie and so expanding the resources which facilitate reaching an outcome which satisfy both sides' interests. Integrative negotiation is described as possibly occurring in a situation "in which two-parties and several issues to be negotiated".[156] In this case, negotiators are defined not as strict competitors and both parties can get more because "they can cooperate in order to enlarge the pie that they eventually will have to divide".[157] Interactive negotiation is also defined in various concepts as the "problem-solving workshop",[158] and "third-party consultation"[159] . Integrative negotiation is defined as 'soft' negotiation[160] by Pfetsch. He states that in 'soft' negotiation, the aim is to satisfy both sides' all concerns through having mutual agreement.

Distributive and integrative is also referred to cooperative and competitive negotiation.[161] Competitive negotiation processes, similar to distributive negotiation, happen when "the goals of one party are usually in fundamental and direct conflict with the goal of other party" and the resources are again limited and fixed. Similarly,, cooperative negotiation processes resemble integrative negotiation and the adversary parties hold "positive moments to increase the potential gains relative to no agreement".[162] However, there is a third type of bargaining style which is called mixed-motive[163] that includes both cooperation and competition.[164]

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[156] *Ibid.*, p.131

[157] *Ibid.*, p.131

[158] Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving: An Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application in the Middle East", *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 190-198

[159] Ronald J. Fisher, "Interactive Conflict Resolution", in W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen (eds.) *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques*, (USIP Press, Washington D.C. 1997)

[160] Frank R. Pfetsch, *Negotiating Political Conflicts*,

[161] Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders, and John W. Minton, *Essentials of Negotiation*.

[162] *Ibid.*,

[163] Max H. Bazerman and Margaret A. Neale, *Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation* (Free Press, 1991)

[164] Jeffrey T. Polzer, "Intergroup Negotiations: The Effects of Negotiating Teams", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 678-698.

2.2.4 Crisis Management/ Crisis Negotiations/ Political Crisis

The definition of the term "crisis" in political science literature varies based on the type of crisis which is argued by scholars. The crisis can be related to the societal reaction which is defined by James and Hristoulas who argue that "crisis activity may be a function of a change in the behavior of the domestic polity" and who list the five activities which make crisis activity more likely as follows: "assassinations, riots, political strikes, armed attacks and protest demonstrations".[165]

Gilbert and Lauren, in their paper "Crisis Management", define crisis within the international context to argue that "they [crises] occur suddenly, demand quick decisions by leaders under intense pressure, threaten vital interests, and raise enormous uncertainties about war and peace".[166] The authors claim that the subject of crisis management has only been recently studied within international relations disciplines and they propose that policy makers and scholars in this field believe that this initiative would help states to develop better policies regarding their future. The authors also provide a critique of the literature on crisis management and thus argue that the nature of crisis or crisis management itself has not been analyzed in an analytical way but more in descriptive way. They also focus on crisis and crisis management at the international level.

Gilbert and Lauren also discuss a different view of crisis and crisis management study and question whether a policy maker should focus on maximizing gains or avoiding war or both while s/he is dealing with crisis. The first group[167] is perceived as defining the situation of crisis and crisis management with zero-sum situation according to Gilbert and Lauren. Basically, the crisis is seen as "a contest with an opportunity to increase benefits and further one's ambitions by successfully managing

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[165] James and Hristoulas, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States", p.335.

[166] Arthur N. Gilbert and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), p.642.

[167] Kintner and Schwarz, 1965; Garnett 1975; Buchan, 1966; Bell, 1971; Mahoney and Clayberg 1979

an adversary and manipulating his behavior by threats".[168] However, the conflict in the second group is seen as "no opportunity at all but rather as a source of potential disaster which, if not managed, will result in war".[169] Scholars[170] underline the importance of shared risk, mutual desire to avoid escalation, and a common interest to escape disaster. As pointed out by Gilbert and Lauren, other theorists try to combine these two approaches with an aim "to reconcile both the conflicting issues and the common interests of a crisis".[171] Although the authors mostly analyze the international crisis in their article, they emphasize that crisis management theory should also take into consideration foreign as well as domestic elements in the decision-making process and argue that "bargaining occurs not only between states, but also within states or groups of states".[172]

Besides this, in order to predict the likelihood of crisis, it is claimed that "conflict carrying capacity" of political systems is also very crucial.[173]

2.2.5   Political Conflict

In the literature, there is not a common definition of political conflict. Three main definitions exist to delineate political conflict according to various studies. In this section, these studies and definitions are presented.

First, political conflict is seen as a hostile situation "in which two political groups, antagonistic to each other, are engaged to open confrontation".[174] The two

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[168] Gilbert and Lauren, "Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique", p.645.

[169] *Ibid*., p.646.

[170] Lipson, 1966; Perlmutter, 1975.

[171] Gilbert and Lauren, "Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique", p.646..

[172] *Ibid*., p.653.

[173] Doug Bond, J. Craig Jenkins, Charles L. Taylor, and Kurt Schock "Mapping Mass Political Conflict and Civil Society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development of Event Data", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Aug., 1997), p.561.

parties engaged in the hostilities are referred to as 'the hostile group' (the challengers) and 'the ruling group' (regime). Due to the fact that the challengers find their interest at variance with the interest of regime, political conflicts emerge between these groups.[175] In this definition, civil strife, collective violence and revolution are presented as the areas of study of political conflict.

Second, similar to the first definition, political conflict is indicated in the form of *protest* and *rebellion;[176] protests*, *riots*, *strikes* and *political demonstration,.[177] interactions* which are hostile and compelling between citizens and states in the form of again rebellion and protest.[178] A similar definition of confrontation includes such actions as *political demonstrations*, *riots*, *clashes*, *general strikes*, *coups d'états*, *clandestine armed attacks*, *guerilla and civil warfare*,[179] between collective actors over political issues is also presented by Gurr and Lichbach. The same type of incidents (assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla wars, major government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations) is also defined as factors of domestic conflict by Rummel, in his quantitative analysis, "Applied Factor Analysis".[180]

Third, political conflict is "an actual or perceived incompatibility of interest, opinions or values between two or more political entities".[181]This general definition

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[174] Karmeshu, V.P. Jain, A.K. Mahajan, "A Dynamic Model of Domestic Political Conflict Process" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), p. 253

[175] *Ibid.*, p.253.

[176] Mark Irving Lichbach and Ted Robert Gurr, "The Conflict Process: A Formal Model", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 3-29

[177] Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, "Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 196-209.

[178] J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic Political Conflict", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 18, (1992), pp. 161-185

[179] Lichbach and Gurr, "The Conflict Process: A Formal Model", p. 4.

[180] R. J Rummel,. *Applied Factor Analysis*. (Northwestern University Press, 1970)

[181] Golec Agnieszka, "Conflict Construal and Conflict Resolutıon: the Role of Need for Cognitive Closure and Group Norms". Abstract Paper on Polish Academy of Sciences

refers to a conflict between following the political entities "prime ministers, presidents, party secretaries, standing committees, military juntas, cabinets, bureaucracies, interagency groups, legislatures, and loosely structured revolutionary coalitions"[182] rather than between political entities and any other group.

In the literature, the underlying reasons and concerns of political conflict are also presented. Pirages argues that the function of political process is to control conflicts which are inherited in organized societies and states political conflict occurs due to the scarcity of position or resources.[183] Pfetsch, basically argues that political conflict as a value-based conflict can be related to national identity or territorial issues, and he claims the concerns of political conflicts are public goods which are either "national interests or values, such as national territory and its border (national independence), constitutional rights (self-determination), as well as the monopoly over decision-making".[184] Conn also differentiates conflicts as political and nonpolitical according to the style of the resolution.[185] In his classification, for instance, conflicts between people do not require political means in the resolution phase; however, if political institutions such as "courts and legislatures" are chosen to resolve the disputes or disagreements, then conflicts can be considered political. In fact, he basically argues that "the character of political institutions is such that as long as they are effective, they are the ultimate or authoritative agents for the resolution of conflict".[186] Jeckins and Schock propose that the theories of 'political process and global structures' should be integrated to 'power struggle approaches' which claim that conflict is inherent and the main determinants of domestic conflicts are considered as power structures. They also affirm that those who "are the most deprived or frustrated either in absolute terms

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Warsaw School of Advanced Social Psychology, (2003)

[182] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework, p.47.

[183] Dennis Pirages, *Managing Political Conflict,* (Sunbury-on-Thames: Nelson, 1976).

[184] Frank R. Pfetsch, *Negotiating Political Conflicts*, p.17.

[185] Paul H. Conn, *Conflict & Decision Making : an Introduction to Political Science*.

[186] *Ibid.*, p.3

or relative to their expectations, are the most likely to participate in political conflicts".[187]

2.2.6   Models of Political Conflicts

There are two models[188] which have been developed to analyze conflict processes and the unit of analysis is protest or rebellion rather than the political conflict between political entities. In their study, Karmeshu, Jain and Mahajan (1990) attempt to develop a model to understand the interactive process that regimes and challengers experience during the political conflict process.[189] The authors also underline that these interactive processes have been ignored in the model developed by Lichbach and Gurr. The authors argue that "[in the model] they have highlighted the underlying control parameters of political conflict which at a critical value (point) could lead to discontinuous jumps in the level of hostility".[190] Through the analysis, they suggest that "if a regime chooses a policy of total confrontation and refuses to accommodate its challengers in any manner by alleviating their grievances, then it would ensure that the conflict would escalate indefinitely…".[191]

2.2.7   Projects on Political Conflicts

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[187] J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic Political Conflict", p.165.

[188] The first model is "Five-Component Additive Model of Dometic Political Hostility (Over-view of Dynamic Structure) by Karmeshu, Jain and Mahajan (1990). The second model is "A Structural Equation Model of the Conflict Process" by Lichbach and Gurr (1981).

[189] Karmeshu, V.P. Jain, A.K. Mahajan, "A Dynamic Model of Domestic Political Conflict Process".

[190] Lichbach and Gurr, "The Conflict Process: A Formal Model", p. 253.

[191] *Ibid*., p.260.

There also two important data collection papers on political conflict: the KOSIMO Project developed by the Department of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg[192] and a workshop paper[193] by Jackman and Boyd.

2.2.7.1 KOSIMO Project

In the Kosimo project which is presented in an article entitled "Databank on political conflict" the authors state that "an integrated and dynamic databank contains nonviolent and violent as well as domestic and international political conflicts on a global scale between 1945 and 1998".[194]. They argue that this integrated databank will pilot the more concrete suggestions about political conflicts both for past and future explanations. Regarding the project, it is important to point out that violent conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia have been coded as a violent form of political conflict. However, there is not a clear definition of political conflict. This study of the Kosimo project brings out two main critiques: the first one is that the conflict data base is all about violent conflicts such as wars; the second one is that not only are the cases violent but conflict literature also captures only the violent stages of the conflict.

The study also shows that frequency of domestic conflicts has increased during the period between 1945 and 1998. As a reason, Pfetcsh and Rohloff argue that

> "The issues involved in political conflict and the contextual setting have changed considerably over the past 50 years. Ideology, decolonization, geo strategic power conflicts, and hegemonic wars have by and large disappeared. Instead, the international agenda is dominated by local and regional power conflicts as well

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[192] Frank R. Pfetsch and Christoph Rohloff, "Kosimo: A Databank on Political Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 379-389

[193] Robert W. Jackman and William A. Boyd, "Mutiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 434-458

[194] Frank R. Pfetsch and Christoph Rohloff, "Kosimo: A Databank on Political Conflict", p.379.

as politicized minority conflicts in fragmented societies in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia".[195]

2.2.7.2   The Workshop Paper

The Workshop Paper is presented by Jackman and Boyd and examines "the costs and benefits of multiple source coverage in the context of measuring political conflict since 1960 "within 30 black African countries".[196] The data for this research is collected from "a wider study of political change in Third World countries".[197] The data are composed of six variables defined as six components of political violence: riots, anti-government demonstrations, political strikes, armed attack events, assassinations, and deaths from group violence.[198] In conclusion, the researchers state that "it is easy to exaggerate the benefits that accrue from collecting comparative data on political conflict from a variety of sources".[199]

Although the KOSIMO project has different foci than does this thesis, it is still important to present the interpretation and perception of the concept of political conflict in academic studies. It can is clearly seen that the classification of political conflict is divided into two groups: violent and nonviolent. However, clear identification cannot be reached. This project is significant because it introduces an example regarding the political conflict. While this example may not be a very good one, it shows that there is not a proper and completely appropriate work related to political conflict and crisis analyzed in this thesis. On the other hand, in the workshop paper, it can also be seen that the description of the political conflict is similar to the second definition which has been explained above. In any case, both of these studies are related to political conflicts even though their understanding differs.

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[195] *Ibid*., p.383.

[196] Robert W. Jackman and William A. Boyd, "Multiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict".

[197] *Ibid*., p.439.

[198] Dougles A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence - A Cross-National Causal Analysis, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

[199] Robert W. Jackman and William A. Boyd, "Multiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict".p.456.

2.2.8 Cooperation

According to Axelrod (1984), cooperation or an emergence of cooperation is very much related to the way people think and act in their social, political, and economical relations.[200] Axelrod states, in his later book "The Complexity of Cooperation", that "cooperation occurs when people organize themselves into groups to compete with each other" and adds that "it takes place in many forms, including alliances among nations, strategic partnerships among businesses, and coalitions among political parties in parliamentary democracies".[201]

To conclude, this part presents various definitions and models from the Conflict Resolution literature which focuses on interaction analysis. Firstly, the argument of negotiation as a decision-making process and the distinction between negotiation styles are relevant to this thesis since the interaction is presented as policy and a decision making process. Secondly, the definition of negotiation as a competitive or cooperative process is also helpful to define political interactions in this thesis. Both of these relevant remarks are helpful to define the nature of the interactions in this study. Thirdly, the definition of political conflict by Golec opens a space to study the conflict between political entities, mainly political parties and actors in this thesis. Therefore, the meaning of the political conflict in this thesis is in line with Golec's definition rather than the general perception of the political conflict which is between the masses and the elite group. Therefore, in this thesis, this definition is taken into consideration in explaining and analyzing the political interaction. These are the main concerns that are relevant to this study.

On the other hand, the following observations are also seen in the conflict resolution literature. To begin with 'political negotiation', it is not studied through research; rather some analyses have been developed about this concept. The aim of introducing this study is to give a general framework for the basic terms. Secondly, as a general perception, political conflict is defined as a conflict between the public

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[200] Robert M Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, [s.l.]: (Basic Books, c1984).

[201] Robert M Axelrod, *The Complexity Of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models Of Competition And Collaboration,* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.7.

(masses) and the elite group (ruling group) in the form of protest, rebellion, and demonstration. This analysis is not built up on this understanding; however, it is valuable to present these as well. Additionally, the Kosimo Project also shows that political conflict might be violent or nonviolent; the project thus is a good example to indicate that the CR literature has also captured violent conflicts as political conflict.

3   METHODOLOGY

The third chapter explains the methodology undertaken in this thesis. Besides this, the research question is also presented in the following section. Mainly, this chapter consists of three sub-sections: i) research methodology and research question, ii) the methodology as process tracing, iii) data collection: unit of analysis and likert scale model, iv) procedures.

3.1   Research Question and Research Methodology

In this thesis, the following research question is addressed: *What is the nature of political interaction in Turkey? In what ways do the actors interact with each other in sensitive domestic political discussions? Do the structure of political environment and the existence of an international audience affect the actors' interaction and the nature of the interaction?*

Before going into the sub-sections, in order to give an introductory picture of the methodology, it is important to understand what kind of research this thesis has undertaken. According to Neuman exploratory research findings answer the"What" question and do not often come up with concrete answers.[202] The exploratory research is defined as such if the issue is new and has not studied before; thus, rather than developing concrete answers, the researcher can generate different questions which may lead to further research.[203] As a research technique, Neuman states the qualitative techniques are mostly used in exploratory rather than quantitative researches. Based

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[202] William Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods : Qualitative And Quantitative Approaches*, **(**Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003).

[203] William Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods : Qualitative And Quantitative Approaches*.

on above mentioned explanations, this research is exploratory comparative case study research which is implemented using process tracing methodology. In addition, the unit of comparison is the interaction process. A last point is that although this research is based on data coding analysis, it is not undertaken with a quantitative technique. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to analyze the process of the interaction of two extremely critical cases through coding the actors' interaction: moves and actions.

3.2   Process-Tracing Method

As a method, process tracing is very useful and applicable technique in analyzing cases through focusing on the interaction process and its dynamics. According to Druckman (2004), process tracing is a qualitative method for analysis in time-series and is a method to research an historical process to determine a hypothesized process was realized or not.[204] Druckman's definition of process tracing analysis is mostly relevant to negotiation or mediation processes. However, he points out that "the availability of detailed information about the process enables a researcher to code the events or moves made by the actors"[205] which the research in this thesis is precisely based on that is, the codification of the moves (explanations, declarations and statements) made by the actors during the processes of the cases.

Nevertheless, the actual understanding of the process tracing methodology, which is used in this thesis, is based on the work of George and Bennett.[206] As a methodology, process tracing is defined as a research method which analyzes the data on the causal processes and intervening variables. It can also be applied both to micro

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[204] Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods Of Inquiry For Conflict Analysis,* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004)

[205] Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods Of Inquiry For Conflict Analysis,* p.205.

[206] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences,* (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2005).

and macro level analysis rather than the individual level.[207] The main characteristics of this methodology can be stated as testing a theory and theory development through identifying the causal process. It is also argued that it develops many clarifications within a case. Another valuable beneficiary aspect to my research is that "process tracing can assess to what extent and how possible outcomes of a case were restricted by the choices made at decision-points along the way".[208] Therefore, process tracing is commonly used in decision-making process analysis because by tracing the decision-making process, certain predictions can be developed.

The first reason for using this methodology in this research lies in the following explanation: "process-tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories".[209] In this regard, the authors propose the use of this method as it provides an analysis of "deviant cases", the understanding of which can enhance the general theory.[210]

This thesis aims to contribute and generate new dynamic implications for the existing theories. Thus, the use of this methodology is very applicable in analyzing the cases of this thesis. The second motivation in applying this methodology in the analysis of the data is because "process-tracing provides a common middle ground for political scientists and other scientists who are sensitive to the complexities of historical events but are more interested in theorizing about categories of cases as well as explaining individual cases".[211] This argument explains the categorization of the data of this research, yet not the exposition of the cases.

In summary, this methodology can be used in four different analyses: i) testing a theory and theory development, ii) making predictions iii) causal analysis and iv)

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[207] George and Bennett. *Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences,* p.206.

[208] George and Bennett. *Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences,* p.213.

[209] *Ibid.,*p.215.

[210] *Ibid.,*

[211] *Ibid.,*p.223.

explanation of individual cases and outcomes. In this thesis, process tracing methodology is used to provide a method for the fourth one: to explain the cases and outcomes of the analysis.

3.3   Data Collection and Data Codification

The main source of this research is the data collected between these periods: for the process of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, the period starts with 1 January, 2004 and ends with the referenda held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004; for the process of presidential election in 2007, the period starts with 1 January, 2007 and ends with the election of Abdullah Gül as the president on 28 August 2007.

Data collection is based on internet research conducted on two main kinds of resources. The first one is the online archive of the newspaper *Radikal*,[212] and the second one is the official web pages[213] of the actors defined in the thesis. The data are composed of the official speeches, declarations, papers announced publicly, published or released by the actors. In addition, the official web page of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM)[214] is a secondary source which was sometimes checked along with the online newsletters in English: *Turkish Daily News* and *Today's Zaman*.

Data are coded according to the scales explained in the section below. Codification has been attained as following. Firstly the data are coded by myself and then in order to calculate inter-coder reliability it is coded by an independent coder who has been taught in a training process about definitions of the scales, coding, and presentation of coding. A pilot codification has been conducted in order to solve misconceives and misunderstandings about the coding. The independent coder conducted coding on the randomly selected data from both cases and each actor. The results for the inter-coder reliability are presented as follows: Percentage agreement

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[212] www.radikal.com.tr

[213] The government party, AKP: www.akparti.org.tr ; The main opposition party, CHP: www.chp.org.tr; The military, Turkish General Staff: www.tsk.mil.tr

[214] www.tbmm.gov.tr

between the main coder (myself) and the independent coder is 0.925 for the Annan Plan case and 0.863 for the Presidential Election case.

3.3.1 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the official declarations, press meetings' papers belonging to the military, of AKP and CHP, speeches of the political party leaders and of the members in the public meetings, in the parliament and in group discussions. The interactions and relationships between these actors may be determined or shaped by ideological differences, or formed in order to keep *status-quo* in parallel to the traditional approach to policy making. However, these determinants are not included in this study since, only the process is analyzed rather the causal relationship of the cases. As pointed out above, these influential determinants can be studied further after this thesis generates theoretical and policy implications regarding the interaction of the actors and the nature of these interactions.

3.3.2 Likert Scale Model

According to Neuman "scaling is based on the idea of measuring the intensity, hardness, or potency of a variable".[215] Manheim and Rich also define the scaling methodology as "a procedure in which we combine a number of relatively narrow indicators into single , summary measure that we take to represent the broader, underlying concept of which each is a part.[216] Additionally, Neuman states that the scaling method has two main purposes. Firstly, scaling is helpful "in the conceptionalization and operationalization processes".[217] Secondly, scaling can be

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[215] Neuman, *Social Research Methods : Qualitative And Quantitative Approaches*, p.196.

[216] Jarol B Manheim and Richard C. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis : Research Methods In Political* **;** with contributions by Donna L. Bahry, Philip A. Schrodt**,** (White Plains, N.Y. : Longman, c1995), p.171.

[217] Neuman, *Social Research Methods : Qualitative And Quantitative Approaches*, p.195.

used in quantitative measures to test hypothesizes. In this thesis, the likert scale model is used in order to analyze the interaction of the actors in both cases. Although Neuman argues that the likert scale model is mostly used in survey research, in this thesis, rather than survey, a dynamic analysis is exercised through coding the data through the likert scale coding model. Because it allows the researcher to show the general picture as well as, most importantly, providing a comparison between two cases, the likert scale coding model is used.

The likert scale coding consists of 5 scales. Each speech, declaration and announcement which actually constitutes the data, is coded in accordance with these scales in terms of its content.

3.3.3 The Explanation of Competitive – cooperative organization/scale

This line includes five main sub-titles which are competitive, somewhat competitive, neutral, somewhat cooperative, and cooperative.

Code	Scale	Explanation
1	Competitive	The discussion between the actors is held in a highly tense atmosphere and it is also held through media speeches rather than face to face discussions. This includes the speeches or explanations of actor(s) which blame(s) and criticize(s) the other actor(s) for creating crisis and making the process hard to talk.
2	Somewhat Competitive	Rather than blaming each other, actors mostly express their position for the crisis. However; the tone is again negative and competitive.
3	Neutral	Actors simply declare their positions and opinions about the crisis and there is nothing about blaming the other actor or its actions.
4	Somewhat Cooperative	Actors state their own position but the tone is more cooperative and actors are close to creating cooperation in the next steps.
5	Cooperative	Actors are ready to work together in cooperation. Actors encourage each other to work together and express their pleasure about the process.

Table 2: Explanation of the Scales

3.4 Procedures

Data are generated through tracing political interaction per actor, per event and per time. Example of data codification according to the scale is presented below:

Code	Scale	Data
1	Competitive	"The new policy line shows that we have entered an era when we are given instructions and obey what others say. Today, it is Cyprus, tomorrow, there will be other issues taken up with such a mentality. There is no end for it."[218]
2	Somewhat Competitive	"Those who held political power for years but failed to show the necessary political will are now criticizing us, even though they know the truth. We will not stoop to their level and shrink from our responsibilities. Being the government, we have to be committed to show this will."[219]
3	Neutral	"There is an expectation that the military should always expose its certain position by declaring yes or no for any important issue and it actually has to be and this certain position should be shared with the public and we are respectful to that. However, it shouldn't be expected that the military has always taken a side, a party, and should share these opinions with the public."[220]
4	Somewhat Cooperative	"Turkey as a whole should be in search of its president. Political parties and society should contribute to this process. The president must be an honest, distinguished and neutral person who matches the description stated in the Constitution and absorbs the Charter very well; obviously he should be someone who has no desire to change the pillars of the Constitution bluntly or secretly and no desire to tail a political party. Compromise must be genuine. Unilateral imposition or quadruple-imposition makes no difference. Conciliation on a presidential candidate cannot be mandated by a multiple-choice test. If

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[218] Hürriyet Daily News, "Baykal: Government submissive on Cyprus talks" (18 April 2004) available on http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=baykal-government-submissive-on-cyprus-talks-2004-02-18

[219] Hürriyet Daily News, "Erdogan: Annan plan reflects our priorities" (7 April 2004), avaliable on http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-annan-plan-reflects-our-priorities-2004-04-07

[220] The original quote is avaliable on http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/nisan2004/ana.html

		the Prime Minister pays visits to parties, I hope he will have a 'none of the above' choice among the options."[221]
<u>5</u>	<u>Cooperative</u>	"A summit chaired by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was held yesterday at the Presidential Palace. During the three-hour-plus meeting, top officials including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal and National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Senkal Atasagun discussed a new Cyprus plan prepared by the Foreign Ministry and other related institutions. The officials fully approved the plan, which uses UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Cyprus plan as a basis, and resolved to solve the Cyprus issue as soon as possible through negotiations."[222]

Table 3: Example of Data Codification

The next chapter is followed with the case presentations which cases are presented in general and actors' positions in each case are introduced in detail.

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[221] Hürriyet Daily News, "Baykal' President Profile" (12 July 2007), avaliable on http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=baykal-include-none-of-the-above-choice-in-akps-presidential-candidate-list-2007-07-12

[222] This data is considered as cooperative since the military and the AKP gathered to discuss the Annan Plan and ultimately agree to start negotiations. This is cooperative scale for both the military and the AKP. Document is available on http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinicerikarsiv.aspx?Id=6&Tarih=20040109&Haftalik=0#%200

4   CASE PRESENTATION

Chapter 4 presents the cases: the Annan Plan in 2004 and the Presidential Election in 2007. Firstly, backgrounds of the cases are introduced; secondly, the positions and perceptions of the actors are explained based on data collected.

4.1   The Annan Plan in 2004 for the Cyprus Problem

The first AKP government's[223] new approach to the Cyprus problem revealed the fault lines in its domestic politics as a very dense process of political conflict appeared around the Cyprus issue. In 2002, the AKP, came to power holding the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections.[224] One of the first actions of the newly formed government was to develop and implement new policies on the protracted conflict of Cyprus. Although the military and the CHP together have been defenders of *status-quo*, the military distinguished itself from CHP and took a more moderate position in interactions with the AKP. Moreover, the military and the AKP stated their commitment to work together in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement for each side in Cyprus.[225]

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[223] First AKP Government was in power between 2002 and 2007.

[224] In the overall voting, AKP had 34.34 %; CHP had 19.41 % of the votes. In the parliament, AKP had 365 seats and CHP had 177 seats. Although AKP had the simple majority of the seats, it was not enough to make constitutional amendments. Therefore AKP did not hold the absolute majority power in the national parliament. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/specials/1419_turk_elections/page2.shtml

[225] For a detailed analysis regarding the relations between the AKP and the military in period given, see: Metin Heper, "The Justice and Development Party, Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 6 No:2 (2005): 215-231. Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Emel Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", *Turkish Studies,* Vol:7, No:2, (June, 2006), 261-273.

The discussions which continued would lead to the negotiations of the Annan Plan proposed by Kofi Annan the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the subsequent 24th April 2004 referenda on the island. The Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in the referendum,[226] and after that the Cyprus issue seemed to come to another gridlock. Currently, the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots are still holding negotiations in Cyprus.

In the following sections, the general background of the Annan Plan case, and the actors' position and perception about the case are presented.

4.1.1   General Background

The Cyprus problem has occupied the agenda of Turkish politics since 1950. Briefly,[227]

- In January 1950, Turkey accepted that the island belonged to England
- Through the mid-1950s, the slogan as well as the policy changed to "either Cyprus, or death" and in the same year the idea of division of the island was discussed and policy was shaped around the idea "either division, or death" in December 1955.
- In 1960, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was recognized by Turkey.
- In 1974, the issue continued escalate and the conflict led to a war which is known as the "Cyprus Peace Intervention to protect the human security and human rights of Turkish Cypriots" by the Turkish Republic.

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[226] 76 % of Greek side voted "no" and 65 % of Turkish side voted "yes". See Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Emel Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union". 400.000 people from Greek side and 200.000 people from Turkish side voted in the referendum. For a detailed results, see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus

[227] This section very briefly explains the general foreign policy of Turkey since 1950s. Rather than chronological history of Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus, the evolution of Annan Plan and its assessments by the political actors in Turkish politics are presented. For a detailed historical research, see: Ali Çarkoğlu and William Hale, "Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Relations" in Part 14, *The Politics of Modern Turkey: Critical Issues in Modern Politics*, Vol: III (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.153-191.

- In February 1975, the status of Turkish Cypriots started to be called as "the Federation of Cyprus Turkish State" by Turkish authorities.
- In 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot side established their own state the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" and Turkey has been the only state to recognize it since then.
- In June 1989, calling Cyprus a Federation with two parts was adopted by Turkey.
- In 1997, the idea of uniting the Northern Cypriots with the Turkish Republic was started to be spoken.
- In January 2003, the position, which emphasized preserving national security was very crucial, was adopted.[228]

It has been almost sixty years that Turkey has been a party to the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, there have been very different and sometimes contrary policies such as on the one hand intervention into Cyprus and on the other hand recognition of a federation with two parts. These policies have been usually determined by political parties and mainly the leaders of political parties as well as the military domain. The main determinants of this inconsistent Cyprus policy can be stated as the westernization attempts of Turkey, the security and strategic anxieties of the military and public opinion (Kınacıoğlu and Oktay, 2006). Especially public opinion regards the Cyprus issue as a national issue and this determinant has mainly stressed the political parties and military, and affected their domestic as well as international politics.

Throughout these sixty years, various resolution attempts have been developed either by the Guarantor states[229] or the international organizations such as the United

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[228] This berif explanation is written by Baskın Oran and published on Agos Newspaper on 29 Jan 2004. For a detailed historical background of the Cyprus issue and Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus, see: Halil Çivi, "Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs [Cyprus From Past to Present]", in Dr. İrfan KALAYCI, *Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik Bir Tartışma [Cyprus and its Future: A Economic-Political Discussion],*(Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2004).

[229] .Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey states under ARTICLE 2:

Nations. One of the plans that has been widely known and negotiated several times by the parties is the Annan Plan. Although the Annan Plan was developed by the secretary-general of the UN, Kofi Annan, during the 1990s, the roots of the plan go back to the 1970s. The backbone of the Annan Plan was based on common policies regarding the resolution which had been decided in negotiations between Makarios and Denktaş on 12 February 1977 and between Denktaş and Kipriyanou on 19 May 1979.[230] The discussion in 2004 actually started in 2002 and the Annan Plan has been changed and revised five times during the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and between Turkey and Greece between 2002 and 2004.

In domestic politics, the negotiation of the Annan Plan also caused many discussions between the political parties, between the political parties and the military, between the political parties and the interest groups as well as within the public domain. Two main opinions arose leading to the evolution of two main camps of disagreement about the Annan Plan. On the one hand, there is a group[231] who is against the Annan Plan and they perceive agreement on the plan would lead to the end of freedom for and perhaps even lead to the end of the existence of Turkish-Cypriots on the island. Therefore, the fundamental argument of this group is that the Annan Plan would propose a united Cyprus state, which is not acceptable since the Greek Cypriots would be the powerful community and might assimilate the Turkish Cypriots, ignoring the existence of two communities. Thus, this group seeks to have

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"Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concern them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island". William Mallinson, *Cyprus : a modern history(*London ; New York : I.B. Tauris) 2005 p. 143.

[230] Mehmet Hasgüler, "Annan Planı Öncesi ve Sonrası Kıbrıs [Cyprus Before and After the Annan Plan]", in Dr. İrfan KALAYCI, *Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik Bir Tartışma [Cyprus and its Future: A Economic-Political Discussion],*(Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2004).

[231] The first group mainly involves CHP and defenders of status-quo. The second group involves AKP and partly the military. Although the military is counted as the defenders of statud quo, it is way of communication on public is mostly in line with neutral approach in the case of Annan Plan.

two equal and independent separate states with two separate communities. According to this group, the Annan Plan does not also consider the security and strategic concerns of Turkey. On the other hand, the second group[232] believes that there should be a solution because all other resolution attempts have failed and because Turkey has become a candidate for EU membership. Therefore, this group defends the positive sides of the Annan plan and states that the parties should negotiate and come to an agreement based on this plan. Moreover, they believe that Turkey would be helpful in making the Turkish Cypriots reach a mutually beneficial agreement. Before the talks - between the military and the government- began in 2004, in 2003 there were also domestic discussions between the government and the military as well as the TRNC and tense explanations by Tayyip Erdoğan which were considered as the breakup of Turkish foreign policy of the past 40 years. This initial process is affirmed as following:

> "The Turkish position on Cyprus was divided mainly into two camps: on one side, President Sezer, the TRNC President Denktaş, and the Turkish military; on the other side, the JDP and the opposition parties in the TRNC. All the other political parties in Turkey, including the opposition Republican People's Party and prominent political figures such as Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, were supporting the former. In fact, it would not be far-fetched to argue that the unity on Turkey's Cyprus policy since 1950 cracked for the first time."[233]

These discussions took part in domestic politics and the political parties-the government and the opposition-, the military, the interest groups, and NGOs announced their opinions and stated their positions regarding the Annan Plan. The issue has occupied the political agenda as well as the public discussion for a long time. Nevertheless, when the AKP won the national legislative election on 3 November 2002 and the issue was brought to the table, the discussion started over again yet in a different way. The Cyprus issue has been a complicated and complex story in the process of Turkey's EU membership adventure starting in the 1990s. It was not directly linked to Turkey's EU membership; however, the candidacy of Cyprus in the

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[232] The second group involves AKP and partly the military. Although the military is counted as the defenders of statud quo, it is way of communication on public is mostly in line with neutral approch in the case of Annan Plan.

[233] Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.265.

EU has had a trigger effect on Turkey's position toward the resolution of Cyprus problem. Moreover, EU officials have repeated many times that there is no connection between Turkey's EU membership and Cyprus and they emphasized that the resolution of Cyprus problem is not one of the Copenhagen criteria during the December summit, in 2002 and later on.[234] Another explanation is according to Robins, the underlying reason for this retreat, which is introduced as domestic one, is the influence of Kemalist establishment "which labeled the government naive and inexperienced".[235]

As a result, the situation in 2003 is different than in 2004 in the sense that it would be very difficult to say that the military was still in the same camp. At the beginning of 2004, it was observed that although the aggressive opposition of the CHP and the opposition in Cyprus had continued, the military and the AKP government worked together and led to the process being finished which was the realization of the referendum in Cyprus. The process which is analyzed in this thesis starts in January 2004[236] when the domestic actors agreed to evaluate the issue again in a cooperative way.

The Annan Plan negotiation in Turkish domestic politics starts on 8 January 2004 which is very important because the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, hosted a summit with the participation of the prime minister, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of defense, the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, and high level bureaucrats and generals from the military to discuss the Turkey's Cyprus policy. At the end of

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[234] Rasmussen's statement "We see no connection between Turkey's EU membership and Cyprus ... We have no intention of giving up the Copenhagen criteria in return for Cyprus", Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.264.

[235] Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a "post-Islamist" Government and a Kemalist State", International Affairs, Vol: 83, No:1, (2007), p.289.

[236] The date 8 January 2004 is very important due to the fact that the presidency, the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, hosted a summit with the participation of the prime minister, the ministery of foreign affairs, ministery of defence, the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, and the high level bureaucrats and generals from the military to discuss the Turkey's Cyprus policy. At the end of this meeting, the participants agreed to forster the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem through taking the Annan Plan as a resolution plan and decided to collobratively work.

this meeting, the participants agreed to encourage the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem through taking the Annan Plan as a resolution plan and decided to work collaboratively. Following that meeting, three National Security Meetings[237] which shaped the Turkey's Cyprus policy were held till the referendum. These meetings were attributed as very significant in the sense that the government, the AKP, and the military came together, discussed the position that Turkey would take and finally the actors stated their willingness to work together in cooperation in the process. Erdoğan and Özkök also met privately a couple of times without any participants from the government or the military.[238] Moreover, other than the NSC meetings[239] and private talks, the military officially sent its strategic plan and opinion paper to the prime ministry three times.[240] All these interactions show that there had been active communication between the AKP and the military which is considered as important in making national consensus on the Cyprus Annan Plan.

Subsequently, the AKP's visit to the US to ask for 'back-up' support in the negotiations on the Annan Plan was also important. In January, both the US administration and the EU officials officially declared their support for the Annan Plan and stated their position seeking a resolution based on the plan. Not only did the AKP officials visit the EU countries and the US, but also the EU officials came to Turkey and announced their support for the Annan Plan and their gratitude of Turkey's attempts in the process. These kinds of explanations and statements promoted the AKP's domestic position in negotiations with the domestic actors such as the military as well as influencing the domestic actors in the sense that the military

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[237] Three National Security Meetings on 23rd January, 31st March and 1st April in 2004

[238] Two private meetings between Erdoğan and Özkök were organized: on 7 February and 21 March in 2004.

[239] In the Constitution (1982), the members of the NSC is defined as following: "the National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. Depending on the particulars of the agenda, Ministers and other persons concerned may be invited to meetings of the Council and their views heard".

[240] On 15th February, 9th March and 28th March in 2004.

chose to work in coordination with the government. Table 3 is drawn to present all the activities and interaction in the process.

The overall interaction is shown below:

Date	Event
8 January 2004	The meeting at the Presidential house with the participation of the president, the prime minister and the chief of the General Staff of the army as well as the ministry of foreign affairs and high level bureaucrats and generals.
13 January 2004	The government was established in TRNC after the general elections.
14 January 2004	A briefing meeting by the military to the Prime Minister.
16 January 2004	High-level general İlker Başbuğ's Statement.
19 January 2004	Verheguen's message that both sides in Cyprus should decide to hold referendum of the Annan Plan.
23 January 2004	1st NSC Meeting.
24 January 2004	Erdoğan met Kofi Annan in Davos.
25 January 2004	The US administration[241] stated that they appreciated the start of the Cyprus negotiation under the auspices of the UN and encouraged all parties to the conflict to finalize the Annan plan and hold the referendum.
26 January 2004	Erdoğan and Gül went to the US and asked them to support the Turkey's position in the negotiations.

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[241] Radikal, "ABD: Elinizi çabuk tutun" (25 January 2004) available on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=103793

"ABD Türkiye'nin, BM gözetiminde Kıbrıs müzakerelerinin yeniden başlamasına yönelik desteğinin memnuniyetle karşılandığını açıkladı. Dışişleri Sözcüsü Adam Ereli, MGK toplantısının ardından yapılan açıklamanın önemli olduğunu söylerken, "Biz, tarafların, BM Genel Sekreteri'nin taleplerine mümkün olduğu kadar çabuk uymaları ve Annan Planı'na dayalı müzakereleri, planı sonuçlandırıp, belli bir tarihte referanduma koymayı kabul ederek yeniden başlatmaları gerektiğine inanıyoruz" dedi. Ereli, "Bu adımları atmak üzere bütün tarafları cesaretlendiriyoruz. Dışişleri Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi Tom Weston, Ankara'nın talebi doğrultusunda Ankara'ya gitti ve Kıbrıs'ta çözüme yönelik görüşmelerini sürdürecek" ifadelerini kullandı".

29 January 2004	Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly[242] assessed the position of Turkey in the Cyprus negotiation as pragmatic and open-minded.
First week of January	Heated discussions between Erdoğan and Denktaş.
2 February 2004	Baykal's statement that Turkish foreign policy's 30 years stance had been broken.
4 February 2004	Annan's speech that stated everybody seemed ready to start the negotiations.
7 February 2004	Government meeting to evaluate the Annan's letter.
7 February 2004	Bilateral meeting between Erdoğan and Özkök.
8 February 2004	CHP accused the AKP of blackmailing the public.[243]
11 February 2004	CHP threats and warnings[244] toward the Cyprus policy of the AKP.
14 February 2004	The EU's position[245] was clearly acknowledged by Jean Christophe Filori, the spokesperson of the European Commission.
15 February 2004	The AKP officials informed the opposition: Foreign Ministry Bureaucrat Uğur Ziyal informed the CHP vice-president Onur Öymen; Foreign Ministry group informed the True Path Party about the domestic negotiations on the Annan Plan; Prime

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[242] Radikal, "Annan'ın takvimi: Martta uzlaşma, nisanda referandum" (21 January 2004), avaliable on: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=104221

[243] Radikal, "Baykal: Hükümet şantaj yapıyor" (8 January 2004), avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105490

[244] Radikal, "'Kanıma Dokunuyor'" (11 February 2004). avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105801

Basically, Deniz Baykal's statements: "the Cyprus policy of the AKP frozen my blood"; "The AKP used double language" and "we could interpellate in the national parliament if it is necessary",

[245] Radikal, "AB taraf olmuyor" (14 February 2004). available on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=106193

"Our role is to support the UN. We don't have any intention to be a party or have an official role in this conflict. this could only happen if all parties invite us to do so" Jean Christophe Filori, the spokesperson of the European Commission,

	Minister Erdoğan sent an information note to the MHP's leader Devlet Bahçeli; and Abdullah Gül informed the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Bülent Arınç.
15 February 2004	The military delivered an official paper stating their position and including their concerns to the government (1st one).
16 February 2004	Frits Bolkestein, a member of the European Commission said that the commission would contribute to the island's peace process.[246]
17 February 2004	TUSİAD declared its appreciation with the Cyprus policy.
18 February 2004	General Discussion on Cyprus policy and Annan Plan in the TGNA between the CHP and the AKP.
27 February 2004	The military's monthly press information meeting.[247]
9 March 2004	The military delivered an official paper stating their position and including their concerns to the government (2nd one).
22 March 2004	The negotiations started in Switzerland.
28 March 2004	The military delivered an official paper stating their position and including their concerns to the government (3rd one).
31 March 2004	NSC Meeting but Erdoğan and Gül could not participate.
1 April 2004	NSC Meeting with participation of Erdoğan and Gül.
5 April 2004	The Annan Plan was discussed within the government bureaucrats.
6 April 2004	TGNA was informed about the ongoing process of Annan Plan and Cyprus negotiations by Abdullah Gül.
13 April 2004	The military's statement[248] on Cyprus. This statement

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[246] European Commission's Bolkestein: "We Will Contribute To The Peace Process On Cyprus" available on
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/chr/ing2004/02/04x02x17.htm#%207

Similar speeches by the EC and UN bureaucrats made throughout the process. For detailed information, see
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/arsiv/?bulten=Newspot

[247] The overall statement is avaliable on
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/subat2004/ana.html

	presented the concerns and position of the military.
15 April 2004	Denktaş's speech at the Turkish National Grand Assembly and he affirmed that Cyprus is being lost.
Till the referendum	The domestic accusations continued between the CHP and the AKP as well as between Denktaş and the AKP. And Denktaş announced that he would vote against the Annan Plan.
24 April 2004	The referendum for the Annan Plan was held in Cyprus (South and North Cyprus). The outcome of the referendum was 65 % of Turkish Cypriots voted "yes" and 76 % of Greek Cypriots voted "no" to the Annan Plan. Therefore, the Annan Plan was rejected.

Table 4: Summary of the Political Development in Annan Plan Case

4.1.2 The position and the perception of the actors about the Annan Plan

This section provides the general observations and explanations about the positions and perceptions of the actors regarding the Annan Plan in 2004. Each actor has taken different positions and perceived the Annan plan and negotiations over the Plan according their interests.

4.1.2.1 AKP

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[248]Avaliable on:
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/nisan2004/ana.html

The AKP[249] had been established just 15 months before the general elections in 2002. The AKP came to power after the general legislative elections on 3 November 2002 holding 363 seats out of 550 in the TGNA and constituted the single party government. As a political party, the AKP officials refer to themselves as a conservative-democratic political party.[250] The AKP leaders were the previous politicians of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) which was formed within the Turkish Islamist Movement[251] *milli görüş (national outlook[252]),* and which had been in power in coalition governments during the 1970s and 1990s. Regarding this, although the AKP tried to express itself as more modern than the RP, it was still argued that the core ideology of the AKP had not changed and it was a continuum of the RP.[253] Therefore, the first perception that the AKP had roots of the Islamist movement created very serious suspicions in public opinion about whether the AKP would establish a kind of Islamist state and draw the country away from the secular and

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[249] For detailed information about AKP and developments after AKP's victory in November 2002 general election, see: Recep Yener, Interview *Türk Sağı ve AKP[Right-wing of Turkey and AKP]*, Hasan Bülent Kahraman; söyleşi Recep Yener. (İstanbul : Agora Kitaplığı, c2007).; Bilâl N. Şimşir, *AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs : Araştırma* (İstanbul : Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003); Metin Heper, "The Victory of Justice and Development Party in Turkey", *Mediterranean Politcs,* Vol.8 No:1 (Spring 2003). pp. 127-134. Ahmet İnsel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly* Vol:2, No:3, (Spring/Summer 2003). Metin Heper, "Conservative-Democratic Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party in Turkey", in Ibrahim : Abu –Rabi (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* (New York: Blackwell). For information from official web page of AKP, see: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/akparty.html

[250]Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı (The Programme of Justice and Development Party), Ankara 2002.

[251] Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union".

[252] Çoşar briefly explained this tradition as following: "The National Outlook tradition has been represented by the National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi*, MNP)–National Salvation Party (*Millî Selamet Partisi*, MSP)–RP– FP–Bliss Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) line throughout a period of almost three decades. The division between 'reformists' and 'traditionalists' was not, in fact, alien to the National Outlook line. The first of such divisions within the National Outlook line was experienced in the last MSP congress in 1978". Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol.10, No: 1 (2004), pp.57–74.

[253]AKP is claimed as viewed as an offspring of the National Outlook tradition: Coşar and Özman, "Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face".

western establishment.[254] However, the very initial attempt of the AKP was to emphasize its willingness to undertake all steps and implement whole policy changes to make Turkey an EU candidate. Starting from the EU summit in December in 2002, the AKP leaders, chiefly Erdoğan and Gül developed very close relationships with the EU member states, lobbied Turkey's candidacy in these countries, and made the necessary amendments in the legislature to be an EU candidate. These type of statements and endeavors about foreign policy issues such as the resolution attempts for the Cyprus problem showed in a way that the AKP had not any concrete policy to prove these suspicious. Therefore, the AKP constituted the government and ruled the country till the general legislative election which was held on 22 July 2007.

Within the context of the Annan Plan, the position of the AKP has always been made clear by statements that declare support for a mutual agreement and resolution. Especially Erdoğan and Gül lobbied the issue in the US and at the EU level and tried to convince them to support the Annan Plan and Turkey's position. The AKP refused to stay with the status quo and insisted that it had to be changed. Thus, Gül, in his explanation, expressed that there were two alternatives for Turkey: either to support the resolution or to keep the status quo and if the status quo was kept, there would be problems in getting Cyprus accepted by the world.

Additionally, the AKP also affirmed its readiness to compromise and work in cooperation with the army in domestic discussions regarding the Annan Plan. In this sense, the AKP differentiated the Annan Plan negotiations between the military and the government that is the plan was related to the military in the sense of security and it was related to the ministry of foreign affairs in the sense of politics. Therefore, it has been always the case that the AKP stated their position as one of working with the military within the context mentioned above in the process. Indeed, this policy has been implemented through the whole process in which the AKP has been in government. The general policy has been introduced by Heper as follows:

> "… just as the military strove to develop a *modus Vivendi* with the government, the AKP government, too, tried to achieve the same goal. Both Gül and Erdoğan

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[254] Ahmet Insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey*", The South Atlantic Quarterly* Vo: 102, No:2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), pp. 293-308,

, as prime ministers, suggested that the government and the military should get together as often as necessary and go over the issues on which the military is sensitive."[255]

This approach can be an explanation as to how the AKP sustained the relationship with the military in general in the Annan Plan process in 2004.

The relation of the Annan Plan with the EU had also been another discussion topic between the actors in the process. The AKP kept emphasizing that Cyprus would join the EU by the 1st May, so they associated the resolution of Cyprus issue and the membership of Turkey to the EU. Kınacıoğlu and Oktay's following observation is very valuable to introduce the AKP's, determination:

"Erdoğan's decisiveness this time and throwing his weight behind the new initiative by intensifying the pressure on Denktaş stemmed mainly from two factors. First, the fact that the Greek Cypriot side would become an EU member by May 1, 2004 increased the time pressure for the solution of the Cyprus issue, a factor repeatedly underlined by the EU officials as a would-be obstacle for Turkey's getting a date for accession talks in December 2004. Second, Erdoğan's assertiveness can also be explained by his consolidated political position and hold on the parliament after one year in the office as the Prime Minister."[256]

Although Erdoğan and other AKP officials clearly stated that the resolution in Cyprus is not a necessary condition to the Turkey's EU candidacy nor is it one of the Copenhagen criteria, Erdoğan's statement[257] which underlined that they, as the government, should consider the process after May 1st indicated that Erdoğan actually thought that the Cyprus problem could be an obstacle for Turkey to be the EU candidate.

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[255] Metin Heper, "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 2, (June 2005), p.224.

[256] Müge Kınacıoğlu And Emel Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", *Turkish Studies* Vol. 7, No. 2, (June 2006), p. 268.

[257] Erdoğan's speech in Turkish "1 Mayıs'tan sonraki süreç ne getirecek, ne götürecek bunun hesabını yapıyorlar mı bunu konuşanlar. Bunun hesabını yapmak lazım." Avaliable on: http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=3487&kategori=1

4.1.2.2   CHP

The CHP[258] is the political party which founded the Turkish Republic and it was established in 1923. The CHP was the only political party at that time ruled the Turkish Republic until the general national election in 1946. After that the CHP had mostly been in coalition governments at different times. The very last time that the CHP was in power, as a political party, was during the coalition government between 1995 and 1996 (during the III. Çiller Government)[259]. Since that time the CHP has been as opposition party and during the AKP government between 2002 and 2007, the CHP had been the main opposition party in the national government.

During the process of the Annan Plan in 2004, the CHP was completely against the Annan Plan negotiations as well as the policy making methods of the AKP. Thus, the main stance of the CHP was basically based on criticism of the AKP and the Annan Plan. Regarding the AKP, the policy and attempts of the AKP were seen as a very dramatic shift from the Turkish Foreign Policy of Cyprus which had been implemented for 30 years as well as a resignation in foreign strategic interests. The CHP also criticized that the unease created by the Annan Plan was ignored but without considering the CHP the plan was opened to discussion by the AKP officials.

According to the CHP, the plan, itself, was totally wrong and it was a critical dissolution of Cyprus rather than a resolution[260] to Cyprus since the plan proposed the one united state with two communities rather than two independent states. This proposition was believed to moving away from the situation which was held in

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[258] For detailed information about CHP, see: Sinan Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish politics : the Republican People's Party, secularism and nationalism* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009); Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer, *CHP: 1965-1980: Türk siyasal yaşamında ortanın solu* (İstanbul : Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2006); Hikmet Bilâ, *CHP, 1919-1999* (İstanbul : Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999). 2nd ed.

[259] The president of the CHP Deniz Baykal was the Ministry of Foreign Affiairs and vice-prime minister between 30. 10.1995 and 06.03.1996 in coalition government of True Path Party-DYP- and the CHP. www.tbmm.gov.tr

[260] Radikal, "Meclis Kıbrıs'ı tartıştı"(7 April 2004) available on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=112440

1974.[261] The CHP argued that if the Annan Plan was accepted, the TRNC would be shared with the Greek Cypriots as well. Additionally, the CHP also claimed that the prime minister both in Turkey and TRNC as well as people who would vote for it did not know about the Plan. The CHP officials argued that the acceptation of the Annan Plan in Cyprus would affect Turkey in the sense that Turkey would have to give more concessions in its foreign policies.

4.1.2.3   The Military

The Turkish Armed Forces, the military, was one of the founding elements of the Turkish Republic. The military has had a right to be involved into politics from time to time through either military coups such as the 1960, 1971 and 1980 coup d'états or 'soft' interventions such as through sending a note to the government as happened in 1997 and in 2007. Yet, according to Heper, since 1999, the effect of Turkey's position and attempts to be a candidate to the EU has changed this approach in general. It was the case that the head of the army, Özkök emphasized that political and military aspect of issues should be differentiated at the beginning of the AKP government.

The military did not get involved in either political aspect of the Annan Plan nor the political discussion. The generals and the officials from the military especially avoided making any political statement about the Annan Plan. Kınacıoğlu and Oktay made the following statement about the stance of the military:

> "The stance of the Turkish military during the whole course of the negotiations was one of restraint. The occasional statements by top military officials have mostly underlined a viable and just solution on the island, and military officials were cautious not to make statements that could affect the course of the negotiations in any way. On April 13, 2004, before the referenda, outlining the pros and cons of the Annan plan and reiterating the significance of Cyprus for Turkey's security and regional stability, the Chief of General Staff Özkök pointed out the plan's failure to provide permanent derogations as the most serious deficiency. Nevertheless, he also stated that Turkey's parliament and the Turkish Cypriot people had the final say on the proposed Cyprus deal based on

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[261] Deniz Baykal's speech is avaliable on
http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=158

the Annan plan. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that the Turkish military's approach, which is traditionally sensitive to the Cyprus issue and considers it a "national cause," can be characterized as one of prudence."[262]

In the process, the military shared its opinion and position about the plan with the government through the NSC meetings. Three NSC meetings were held as well as three military position papers being sent to the Prime Minister. Therefore, as Kınacıoğlu and Oktay pointed out, the military could be considered as neutral in the political discussions over the Annan Plan which had been contrarily experienced till then.

4.2 The Presidential Election in 2007 in Turkey,

The second case of this thesis is the Presidential Election held in 2007. The incidents which happened during the process were also called political crisis and presidential crisis. Yavuz and Özcan point out that the real problem in Turkey was the "radical polarization of society, which is an outcome of Turkey's political ethos of creating a secular and national society through the means of the state"[263] In the Presidential election process, these radical polarized societies, which are called the "secularist" vs the "Islamists", clearly appeared. This polarization has also been evolving at the administrative level for years and when it reached its peak point with the exaggeration of political parties and the military in 2007, the presidential crisis dramatically happened. The section below provides a general background about the case of the Presidential election and an explanation of the position and perception of the actors about the Presidential Election in 2007.

4.2.1 General Background

[262] Kınacıoğlu and Oktay, "The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey's Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.269.

[263] M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, Crisis In Turkey: The Conflict Of Political Languages, *Middle East Policy*, Vol:14, No: 3, (Fall, 2007), p.118.

During this process, the parliament housed hot debates, mutual accusations, and flaming speeches between the two political parties: the AKP and the CHP. In addition to the parliamentary discussions, labor organizations,[264] interests groups,[265] and the public in general participated in the process through demonstrations, press meetings, and declarations. In the final stage of the crisis, the escalation reached its peak when the military establishment published a declaration on its web page, emphasizing its position and strict standing against the AKP's candidate. This positioning was considered by many scholars, journalists, public authorities and the public as an e-memorandum, a kind of military intervention, which occurs when the military "openly displays its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary" concerning the issue of secularism. Therefore, it was a military intervention into civil political domain to stop the existing ruling power. The government responded to the military's intervention in an unprecedented way which clearly reminded all concerned that the military is responsible to the prime minister and any declaration against this institution or any such attempts are unimaginable. Nevertheless, the crisis was taken into a new phase when the Turkish Constitutional Court reinterpreted the constitution, with its decision annulling the first round of the presidential election and requiring of all 367 deputies to be present in the parliament in the election. Therefore, this decision made it impossible for the current formation of the parliament to elect the president. Thus, the government had to run for an early general election on 22 July 2007.

Regarding the political camps that led to this crisis, Balkır (2007) sums up the division of the society in her argument:

> "With the rise of AKP, the 'security barrier' erected by the former status quo powers to guard themselves against challenging elements has failed to function. Over the past four and half years, the ruling AKP has worked carefully to convince both the secularist and conservative elite of the country that, though it was coming from an Islamic background, it has 'changed and progressed' and become centrist. However, the current political map of Turkey shows a sharp divide between AKP and the secularist opposition. The people supportive of the AKP, other Islamist or Islamist-nationalist groups, and those who may not support the AKP under normal conditions but consider the attitudes taken against the ruling party as anti-democratic have supported the AKP in the polls of 22

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[264] Such as KESK, Hak-İş, Memur-Sen, Türk-İş, TİSK.

[265] Such as TUSİAD, TOBB, MUSİAD, Committee of University Rectors.

July. On the opposite side, the hard-core secularists, Kemalists, nationalists as well as those who feel that there is a fundamental threat to their way of secular living are supportive of the main opposition CHP, Democratic Party (DP), Young Party (GP) and the extreme rightist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)"[266]

Three breaking points are observed in the analysis of the process. These are i) the announcement of the presidential candidate ii) the e-memorandum iii) the decision of the Constitutional Court. In order to present the background of the case, these points should be introduced and briefly explained. To begin with, the process until the announcement of the presidential candidate had been experienced mostly between the AKP and the CHP. The involvement of the military was seen as very limited (but a very significant and influential intervention, even so) with the exception of some official declarations defining the president's characteristics. In this first process, although there were certain cooperation attempts, the nature of the discussion and the interaction was very tense, aggressive and competitive. However, the interaction became even worse when the AKP introduced Abdullah Gül as a presidential candidate. The initial reaction from the CHP was based on the argument that Gül had the same ideological identity as Erdoğan had which was believed to be a threat to the regime. Balkır points out that "the opposition accused the government of endangering the country's secularist traditions by proposing a presidential candidate whose wife wears a headscarf".[267] Even though CHP's leader Deniz Baykal congratulated Abdullah Gül on being a candidate, he affirmed that Gül should leave his political and ideological beliefs aside, but he also emphasized that the CHP would closely follow his presidency. Balkır states that "Erdoğan decided to drop his candidacy, the possibility of which had brought severe criticism from secular forces that had been on the streets demonstrating against him, due to his previous Islamist political views".[268] The process continued with the publication of the e-memorandum and the Constitutional Court's decision. Needless to say, the military e-memorandum which was considered as an intervention into politics was the second turning point. The brief statement of the e-memorandum read "The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the

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[266] Canan Balkır, "The July 2007 Elections in Turkey: A Test for Democracy", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:12, No:3, (2007), p.417.

[267] *Ibid.,* p.415

[268] *Ibid.*

unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey".[269] This intervention was unexpected as Abdullah Gül stated as well as unimaginable as Çemil Çiçek stated in the counter statement of the government. The military statement also proved how much importance was attributed to the issue of presidential election by the military and thus showed that the military still believed it had the right to warn the government which is not the case in democratic regimes. Lastly, the decision of the Constitutional Court had a very significant impact on the process through the regulation of the quorum for the TGNA meeting. Because of that decision, the government, the AKP, had to call a general election since the AKP could not reach the quorum 367 in the parliament. After the decision was made to run the general election, the interaction between the actors, mainly between the AKP and the CHP became more insistent and they blamed each other of sustaining the political crisis. The importance of and the critical power of the Constitutional Court are highlighted by Balkır when he states that the Constitutional Court and the Presidency have been institutions to fill the absence of a check and balance system such as a Senate institution and argued that these institutions implicitly check and balance the system based on the 1982 Constitution.

The overall interaction with important dates is shown based on date in Table 4.

Date	Event
12 January 2007	Erdoğan's speech stated that they would not seek for a compromise with the CHP.
2 March 2007	TUSİAD's statement to the political parties to compromise (1st one).
6 March 2007	Baykal's speech stated that if there is no compromise, there would be crisis.
March 2007	The discussion over '367' case started.
8 March 2007	Baykal's meeting with the TUSİAD.
9 March 2007	Arınç's meeting with the TUSİAD.
29 March 2007	TUSİAD's statement to the political parties to compromise (2nd one).

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[269] *Ibid.*

5 April 2007	Various statements from the labor organizations: Hak-İş, Memur-Sen, Türk-İş; from the interest groups: TUSİAD, MUSİAD, Rectors Committee, TOBB.
13 April 2007	Press Meeting of the military: Büyükanıt's speech to state the loyalty of the president to the principles of the republic.[270].
14 April 2007	Tandoğan Demonstration in Ankara (1st Republic Meeting).
25 April 2007	The official presidential candidate of the AKP was announced as Abdullah Gül.
25 April 2007	Comments on the Gül's candicacy from political party leaders: Erkan Mumcu (Motherland Party), Devlat Bahçeli (Nationalist Moverment Party), Zeki Sezer (Democratic Leftist Party), Recai Kutan (Saadet Partisi), Doğu Perinçek (Labor Party).
27 April 2007	Parliament Meeting, 1st round of the presidential election was held but 367 votes were not found to elect the president in the 1st round.
27 April 2007	Midnight e-memorandum of the military was published on www.tsk.mil.tr at midnight.
28 April 2007	The government's reply was read by Cemil Çiçek and the government stated its stance to support the democratic system and emphasized the military's official hierarchical position in Turkey's governing system.
28-27 April 2007	The CHP took the issue of 367 to the Constitutional Court.
30 April 2007	TUSİAD's statement which considered the e-memorandum as anti-democratic movement.
1 May 2007	The Constitutional Court decision that accepted 367 as a quorum to gather in the parliament for the presidential election.
1 May 2007	Abdullah Gül's statement: "I am still a presidential candidate".
6-7 May 2007	Parliament Meeting, 1st round of the presidential election was

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[270] Radikal, "Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tarif etti" (13 April 2007) available on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218257

	held but 367 votes again were not found to elect the president in the 1st round. Therefore, based on the new Constitutional amendment, the election of the presidential was cancelled.
7 May 2007	Abdullah Gül resigned from the President candidacy.
? May 2007	The decision of the government to run the general elections on 22 July 2007.
22 July 2007	The General Elections in Turkey.
13 August 2007	Abdullah Gül was again a presidential candidate.
15 August 2007	Gül's visit to MHP, DSP, BBP and independent candidates.
16 August 2007	Labor Unions' statements: DİSK, Türk-İş, TİSK, Hak-İş.
16 August 2007	Gül's visit to TOBB.
18 August 2007	Gül's visit to TUSİAD and MUSİAD.
20 August 2007	Presidential Election 1st Round Meeting, 367 was reached with the participation of the MHP.
27 August 2007	TSK, the military, published its note for the 30 August Victory Bayram 3 days early and once more emphasized the uneasiness of the military about the presidential candidate.
28 August 2007	Presidential Election 2nd Round Meeting and Abdullah Gül was elected as the eleventh President of Turkey.

Table 5: Summary of Political Developments in Presidential Election Case

4.2.2 The position of the actors in the process

In this section, the position of the actors during the process is going to be introduced. Firstly, the presidency as an institution has had a very important power such as appointing high level bureaucrats to significant institutions for the consistency of the regime and a symbolic power representing the Turkish Republic and its secular stance. This perception had been upheld for many years in Turkish politics and thus the presidency has been considered as a veto or control power upon the government.

4.2.2.1 AKP

In the beginning of the process, the AKP chose to be silent and decided not to discuss or negotiate the presidential candidate. The AKP bureaucrats thought that the process was fair and they had a right to keep silent. Later on, the AKP changed its position and decided to talk to the some NGO's representatives as well as discuss the issue within the party administration. Nevertheless, the decision on the candidacy of Gül had been reached without any discussion within the AKP or with any other political party. After the political crisis appeared and peaked with the e-memorandum and the Constitutional amendment, their position shifted to blaming the 'other' party which was mainly the CHP and partly the military for creating the crisis. To a certain extent, the AKP's position can be argued as competitive. Another issue is about the perception of the presidency as an institution by the AKP. According to the statements made by the AKP bureaucrats, the presidency belongs to everybody in the country, to 70 million citizens not an elite group or such.[271] Moreover, related to the discussion of '367' case, the AKP's officials continuously emphasized that they would elect the president as had happened in previous elections and thus stated that they would not look for 367 deputies to be present in the parliament to start the election of the president.

4.2.2.2   CHP

CHP's position had been mostly stated by Deniz Baykal. Three issues should be explained regarding the CHP's position. First, from the beginning of the process, the CHP pressured the AKP to declare its candidate and blamed it for creating a political crisis (presidential crisis). The issue of deciding who would be the presidential candidate had been very much publicized in the statements of the CHP. The CHP claimed that the AKP perceived the presidency not as an institution but a place to conquer and thus the election of the president was also a process of conquest.[272]

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[271] The original quotation is avaliable on
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=18562&kategori=1

[272] The original quotation is "Bu anlayışın sonucu Çankaya, cumhurbaşkanı seçilecek bir mevki olmaktan çıkmış, fethedilecek bir zirve hâline dönüşmüştür" avaliable on

Second, the CHP perceived the presidency as an institution as a control center which has the authority to veto inaccuracies in the administration as well as to represent the regime. Additionally, Deniz Baykal stated that at the time when a political power, which had a tendency to make mistakes, was in government, the importance and value of the presidency had been increased.[273] It was also the case that "if Gül was elected, the AKP would control the presidency, the government and the parliament" (Balkır, 2007: 415) which was completely unacceptable by the CHP. As a third issue, the CHP had continuously affirmed the characteristics of the president such as loyalty to the principles of the regime, secularism and etc. Lastly, the CHP assessed its own position and strategies which it had implemented as successful in protecting the country from a crisis and chaos as well as the regime from a threat.

4.2.2.3 The Military

The military is also presented as a party to the April 2007 crisis by Yavuz and Özcan and they introduce the military's position as an "opposition party" (2007: 125). In this thesis, the military's position is presented in two ways: prior to the e-memorandum and after the e-memorandum based on observations of the process. Prior to the military declaration and the declaration of Gül's candidacy, the military statements defined the characteristics of the president as a person who was loyal to the core values of the republic from their heart.[274] Moreover, the head of the army,

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http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=338

[273] The original quotation is "Cumhurbaşkanlığı bizde, rejimimizin bir anlamda hem temsil bakımından hem de yönetiminde yanlışlıkların engellenmesi açısından çok önemli fren yetkileri olan, yanlışa engel olma şansına sahip, en yukarıdan yanlışa engel olma şansına sahip, en tehlikeli yanlışları önleyebilme şansına sahip fevkalade önemli bir yönetim noktası. Cumhurbaşkanlığı bu bakımdan çok büyük önem taşıyor, hele yanlışlığa eğilimli bir siyasi iktidarın iş başında bulunduğu dönemlerde, Cumhurbaşkanlığının değeri, önemi çok daha artıyor" avaliable on http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=337 .

[274] Radikal, "Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tarif etti" (13 April 2007) available on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218257

The orginal quotation is "seçilecek cumhurbaşkanı aynı zamanda TSK'nın başkomutanıdır. Bu yönüyle seçimler TSK'yı yakından ilgilendirmektedir". "Hem

Büyükanıt reminded all concerned that the president would be the leader of the army, too and added that within this context the military is highly and truly interested in the presidential election. These statements were very crucial and very significantly shared with the public and thus exposed the uneasiness of the military.

Hence, the e-memorandum was a position statement and clearly a warning to the government:

> "The problem that [has] emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. [The] Turkish armed forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. It has been observed that some circles have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, and have increased their efforts recently. Those activities include requests for redefinition of fundamental values of the Republic and attempts to organize alternative celebrations instead of our national festival symbolizing the unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the mentioned activities, which turned into an open challenge against the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real goals under the guise of religion….Those who are opposed to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk,' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute."[275]

As was expressed in the statement, the military reminded the government that they would not hesitate to use their rights which are stated in the Constitution. This statement was not simply a position statement, but very critically a warning to the government in order to make the government rethink its position and actually to give up its position. In this sense, this powerful threat had gone down into Turkey's history as another political crisis and military intervention.

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vatandaş hem TSK'nın bir personeli olarak cumhuriyetin temel değerlerine sözde değil özde sahip olan bir kişinin cumhurbaşkanı seçilecek olmasını umut ediyoruz" The English translation of this speech is presented as "someone who truly respects the principles of the republic, not someone who pretends to do" Yavuz and Özcan, **"**Crisis In Turkey: The Conflict Of Political Languages**",** p.130.

[275] *Ibid.*, p.120.

Consequently, all the actors indicated their positions through public speeches, official declarations and statements. For the above mentioned explanations, all actors took competitive positions which are analyzed in this thesis and explained in detailed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, Yavuz and Özcan suggest that the main motivation of the crisis is "the Kemalist establishment's animus toward the AKP and Erdoğan's style of managing the presidential election. They accused Erdoğan of confusing the AKP parliamentary group and the synergetic nature of Turkish society".[276]

The next section presents the findings based on an analysis of the cases introduced in detail above. The observations are also pointed out after the general introduction of the analysis.

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[276] *Ibid.*, p.121.

5 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This section consists of two main parts. First, result of the analysis per case are presented in each case section. The figures display the percentage of the actors' way of interaction according to the codification of the data. The figures provide a general visual result of the data codification. After each actor's data codification is presented, the finding and discussion section follows. This section presents observations regarding the actors' interaction. The first section also contains the comparative analysis that is developed to compare the data for the actors' interaction and to display the nature of the interaction for each case.

Secondly, the general comparison of the cases and actors' interaction are introduced again based on figures developed through data analysis. It starts with the Annan plan case and continues with the Presidential election case.

5.1 Annan Plan – 2004

This section presents the demonstration of analysis and findings of the actors' interaction over the Annan Plan in 2004. Figures display the cooperative and competitive scores of the actors for the Annan Plan case.

5.1.1 AKP

The AKP, as the government, started the negotiation process to resolve the Cyprus Problem based on Annan Plan framework at the beginning of January 2004. Throughout the process, the AKP interacted with the other actors in ways such as cooperative, competitive and neutral. In this section, the AKP's manner of interaction,

codification results, and the main issues during the process which made the AKP either cooperative or competitive are presented.

According to the data codification, AKP interaction between CHP and the Military was coded in all scales. Figure 4 shows the competitive and cooperative scores of the AKP in the Annan plan case. As can be seen from figure 4, it is certain that the cooperative scale is the highest compared to the other scales 38 %. This result is also the highest percentage of the cooperative scale when compared with the other actors' cooperative scales. This highest scale is predicted and expected due to the fact that the AKP's policy on Cyprus problem has considerably shifted in the sense that they emphasized the resolution based on mutual agreement as well as they really lobbying this issue to reach a consensus in domestic politics as well as in international politics. The some-what cooperative score is 13 %. It could be argued that the overall cooperative scores of the AKP in this case is over 50 %. Another important result is that the AKP had 25 % neutral score. Therefore, more than 75 % of the overall score can be claimed as cooperative through including the neutral scale. This result shows us that the AKP's moves and interaction occurred mostly in a cooperative way.


Figure 4: AKP in the Annan Plan (2004)

The total number of the data collected is 64 which the highest number collected for an actor in the case of Annan Plan. Because each and every speech of the prime-minister and other ministers are published either on the AKP's webpage (www.akp.org.tr) or in an online-newspaper (www.radikal.com.tr) the number of pieces of data is that many. Although there were hundreds of declarations, speeches and press meetings, and releases done by the AKP regarding the Annan Plan, they were not directly related to the interaction of the AKP with other actors in the process. Rather, they are mostly related to the position of the AKP in the negotiations with the UN and Northern Cyprus. Therefore, they were not collected as data. Table 5 is the list of division of the data among the scales. As shown in table 5, 7 pieces of data are coded as competitive, 8 pieces data as somewhat competitive, 16 pieces data as neutral, 8 pieced data as somewhat cooperative and 25 pieces data, which was the highest number, are coded as cooperative.

1-Competitive	7
2-Somewhat Competitive	8
3-Neutral	16
4-Somewhat Cooperative	8
5-Cooperative	25
Total	64

Table 6: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – AKP, Annan Plan 2004

Consequently, AKP's interaction can be characterized mostly as cooperative according to results of the figure 5 and table 5.

5.1.2   CHP

Figure 5 shows the competitive and cooperative scores of the CHP in the Annan Plan case. As can be seen from figure 5, the competitive scale is 75 % which is the

highest percentage for all actors. The somewhat competitive scale is 15 %. Both of these scales prove that the CHP's style of interaction in the process is 90 % competitive. The neutral score of the CHP is 10 %. It is also shown in figure 5 that the CHP's moves and actions have not been coded in somewhat cooperative and cooperative scales. Therefore, these scales are zero.


Figure 5: CHP in the Annan Plan (2004)

Table 6 presents the distribution of the number of pieces of data collected for the CHP in the case of Annan Plan. The total number of pieces the data is 20 of which 15 coded as competitive; of which 3 coded as somewhat competitive; and of which 2 coded as neutral. As it can clearly be seen, there is not any data coded in the sections for somewhat cooperative and cooperative which indicates that the CHP had not made any speeches or declarations in a cooperative way.

1-Competitive	15
2-Somewhat Competitive	3
3-Neutral	2
4-Somewhat Cooperative	0
5-Cooperative	0
Total	20

**Table 7: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale –
CHP, Annan Plan 2004**

5.1.3 The military

Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that the military had kept their neutral position
during the discussions in the process. The neutrality score is the highest at 63 %
compared to other scales. The second highest score is the cooperative scale with 31 %.
Taking neutrality and cooperativeness into consideration as a positive and cooperative
mode of interaction, the overall score is 94 %. The least percentage is the somewhat
competitive score with 6 %. It can also be seen in figure 6 that, the data have not been
coded for the competitive and somewhat cooperative scales which thus has 0 %

Figure 6: The Military in the Annan Plan (2004)1

Table 7 lists the number of pieces of data collected for the military in the case of Annan plan. It can be seen that 16 pieces of data have been collected. 10 of the pieces are coded as neutral. 5 of them are coded as cooperative and only one piece is coded as competitive.

1-Competitive	0
2-Somehow Competitive	1
3-Neutral	10
4-Somehow Cooperative	0
5-Cooperative	5
Total	16

Table 8: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – the Military, Annan Plan 2004

5.1.4 Findings and Discussion

This section presents observations regarding the actors' initial moves and actions in the interaction. These observations are generated from the content of the data which is composed of the speeches, declarations and statements of the actors. All of these components form the interaction between the actors. Basically, there are two types of observations appeared. The first one is the actor's initial position declaration through official statements. The second one is the actor's reaction to the other actors' speeches and statements. Taking these observations into account, the following part presents main issues which arise from the observations in data analysis.

5.1.4.1 AKP

As a result of more detailed analysis, there are five main observations that should be pointed out to present the AKP's co-operatively style of interaction.

The first finding is related with the nature of the interaction between AKP and the military. The AKP makes its position clear by emphasizing the good relations with the military and the collaboration between the institutions such as the presidency, the military and the government in making the national policy on Cyprus issue. Especially the Prime Minister (PM) Tayyip Erdoğan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Abdullah Gül emphasized several times that the military and the AKP were closely working together in the policy making process. The interaction between these two actors was even analogized by Abdullah Gül as a very organic and intermingled one: "such as the relations between bone and body [*et-kemik olayı*] that intersected and existed together".[277] In addition, according to the AKP, the Cyprus issue is closely related to both the Turkish Armed Forces for security reasons and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for political concerns; therefore, the AKP stated that instead of working separately and combining the positions on this issue later, both institutions should start   collaborating from the beginning.[278] Moreover, Tayyip Erdoğan   gave an interesting answer to the question about how they dealt with the reactions of some groups in the military and in the state administrative body: that they tried to look at the full side of the glass and added that the important thing is the historical decisions made by the governing groups[279]. In addition, both Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdoğan also denied many rumors about the disagreement between the AKP and the military on Cyprus policy. As a last indicator of cooperativeness, the AKP bureaucrats also liked and supported the Chief of Turkish General Staff Hilmi Özkök who stated that it shouldn't be expected that the military would always share its position and its political opinion in public. These statements and speeches by the AKP are coded as cooperative since all these indicate the AKP's willingness to work together and, moreover, encourage the other actors to work together. Additionally, the AKP

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[277] Radikal, "'Kıbrıs çözülmezse sıkıntılı şeyler olur'" (10 January 2004).. Avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=101929

"Dışişleri ile Genelkurmay arasında görüş ayrılığı iddialarına sert çıkarak "Dışişleri ile Genelkurmay et ve kemik gibidir" diyen Gül, Kıbrıs tutum belgesinin, MGK'da görüşülebileceğini, ancak MGK'nın bu konuda karar vermeyeceğini söyledi"

[278] Radikal, "Erdoğan, Annan'a çağrıda bulunacak"(15 January 2004) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=102592

[279] Radikal, "'Çözümden dönmek yok'", (27 January 2004) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=103995

expressed its pleasure about the policy making process and interaction between them and the military.

Secondly, crucial meetings occurred between the AKP and the military where they came together, discussed the Annan Plan, and generated a road map for the Turkish government for the negotiations with the General-Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan. The first one was organized by the presidency on January 8, 2004 with the participation of the government, the military officials, the president, and high level civil and military bureaucrats. This meeting could be considered as the start date of this cooperative interaction on the Cyprus issue between the military and the AKP. This meeting also resulted in a consensus to start the negotiations with the UN in order to achieve a mutual resolution for Turkey and Northern Cyrpus. This was the initial meeting between the actors in 2004. The second one was the NSC meeting held on January 23, 2004 with the participation of all NSC members.[280] The outcome of this meeting mattered in the sense that the consensus being reached was necessary to take the initial steps to restart the negotiation process in Cyprus. The participants also underlined their political commitment to resolve the problem through negotiations by taking the Annan Plan into consideration. The third meeting, which is the second NSC meeting, with the agenda of Cyprus issue, was held on March 31, 2004 again with the members of the NSC just without the presence of Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül since they were in Switzerland for the negotiations over Annan Plan with Kofi Annan. Thus, another NSC meeting was organized on April 1, 2004 with their participation as well. The importance of NSC meetings lies in the significance of the NCS as an important institution. In other words, even though this institution – the NSC- is an advisory council, the decisions are not binding and the final decisions made by the government, it is still a crucial institution where the members discuss critical and highly sensitive political issues regarding the position of Turkey's policy, generate important statements and develop influential policies which have actually had a de facto influence on the overall politics of Turkey, so far. Therefore, these meetings

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[280] The Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, Minister National Defence, Minister Internal Affairs, and Minister Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Land, Navy and Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.

should also be pointed out in order to present the influence of AKP's interaction during the process. AKP's statements regarding these meetings are coded either cooperative or neutral since some of them just repeated the position rather than declared any cooperative endeavors.

The third important observation is related to the discussions of approval of the Annan Plan either by the parliament or by the government. Firstly, the Cyprus policy was argued as a national state policy by the Minister of State Beşir Atalay. Regarding the approval of the plan by Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan affirmed that the approval of the Annan Plan would be made by the TGNA. However, this idea was then reversed by the statement of Ömer Çelik from AKP who stated that it was not necessary for the plan to be approved by the TGNA but anyone from the government could sign the approval. This issue and few discussions are coded in neutral section since these were just about the AKP's own political position.

Fourthly, the Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek suggested that cooperation should be developed in domestic politics over the Annan Plan discussions. In contrast to this, it was emphasized several times that this issue shouldn't be a subject of the domestic political discussions. The reason behind these explanations is that local elections[281] were about to be held in Turkey. Therefore, some speeches and declarations accused the AKP's Cyprus policy of moving away from the general Turkish foreign policy during the election process by the opposition parties. In this case, two types of coding have been used: on the one hand, cooperative while Cemil Çiçek talked about cooperation for the domestic discussions, on the other hand, competitive while the AKP officials criticized the CHP for exploiting the policy in its election speeches related to the Cyprus policy of the AKP.

Lastly, the government – the AKP – twice gave information officially to the TGNA and all political parties in the parliament. In this regard, first, the foreign ministry bureaucrat Uğur Ziyal informed the CHP vice-president Onur Öymen, another committee from the ministry of foreign affairs informed the True Path Party, and also an information note was sent to Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist

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[281] Local municipality elections were held on March 29 in 2004 in Turkey.

Movement Party. Abdullah Gül also informed Bülent Arınç, the President of the TGNA. Secondly, an information session was organized by Abdullah Gül to whole TGNA on April 6, 2004, about the negotiations held in Switzerland. Both these attempts were considered as cooperative actions and coded accordingly.

In international relations, the AKP pursued an active policy with Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül going to the US to ask for support of the US administration and they considered these negotiations with the US administration as a diplomatic victory. Moreover, they also took that discussion to the EU level and the EU acknowledged its support for the resolution of the Cyprus problem through the Annan Plan. Nevertheless, because the unit of analysis is the domestic interaction rather than international interactions, the relations of the AKP to the international actors are not seen as data and coded.

As a result of the codification, the AKP's cooperative percentile was the highest since the AKP stated speeches and made declarations mostly such as mentioned above. Nevertheless, competitive interaction was also ranked at 11 %, indicating AKP's lack of total cooperation during the process. This competitive interaction had been mostly actualized towards the CHP not the military. One of the most common statements in which competitive interaction was apparent were those in which the AKP officials, particularly Tayyip Erdoğan, told the AKP not to undertake particular effort to convince the opposition party about the Annan Plan and the Cyprus policy of Turkey but just to meet them in the parliament to inform all parliamentarians about the process. The AKP officials also criticized and blamed the CHP for making the issue a subject of the domestic politics, thus blurring the process in order to satisfy the CHP's political interests. Additionally, during the discussions in the TGNA, Onur Öymen – the CHP Vice President criticized the government for not taking the necessary measures. Abdullah Gül responded by saying that the only response that the government had not taken was to declare war and he asked the CHP whether they would do that. Abdullah Gül's comment also revealed that CHP had ideological obsessions. Moreover, Tayyip Erdoğan stated that he did not find the criticisms of the CHP sincere and constructive, that he respected them but he did not care about them which is interesting political doubletalk. Lastly, the vice-president of the AKP, Dengin

Mir Mehmet Fırat,[282] as well, criticized the position of some political parties which was to provoke discussion and make propaganda in order harm the referendum process of the resolution of Cyprus problem. These main issues constitute the totality of AKP's competitive interaction.

Another significant result which should be taken into account is the neutral interaction, which forms one-fourth of the score. Here, the AKP reiterated its position and opinions about the issue without touching on any relational emphasis or comparing its position with any other actor or blaming any actor.

The general argument about the AKP's interaction could be that the AKP as the ruling party and the government had been very active both in domestic political interactions, the core of this analysis, and in the international negotiations as well. In domestic interaction, it is clear that the AKP always underlined the collaborative work between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces, the military, and showed that collaborative work as legitimate proof to foster its position both in the public opinion and in international negotiations.

5.1.4.2 CHP

From the beginning of the process, CHP had always positioned its declarations and speeches against the Annan Plan and the AKP's foreign policy making on the Cyprus problem. During the process, Deniz Baykal, the CHP president made almost all the declarations and speeches regarding the issue from the CHP. In other words, 17 statements out ot 20 were made by Deniz Baykal. Therefore, examples and observations from Baykal's speeches   introduce the CHP position   in the process. The general observations regarding the CHP's interaction are presented below.

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[282] Dengin Mir Mehmet Fırat's original quote: "Fakat maalesef Türkiye'deki bazı siyasiler ve siyasi partiler doğrudan doğruya, bağımsız kabul ettiğimiz, ona saygı göstermek zorunda olduğumuz KKTC içerisinde bu yapılacak referandumda bir taraf olarak propaganda yaptıklarını üzülerek müşahede ediyoruz. Yetki alanına girmediği halde doğrudan müspet veya menfi bir propagandanın içerisine giren siyasiler, çıkacak sonucun gereklerini yerine getirmek durumundadırlar."available on http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=4564&kategori=3

Firstly, Deniz Baykal, criticized the Cyprus Policy of the government in general. According to Baykal, the current AKP's Cyprus policy ignores Turkish strategic and security concerns. He stated that a very dangerous breaking point had appeared in relation to the 80 year-old Turkish foreign policy, the like of which had not been experienced for 80 years. This abandonment of previous policy was perceived as *fait accompli* by the CHP. As a solution, Deniz Baykal asked for the national government to stop following this policy and take control. Baykal also accused the AKP of blackmailing the public into accepting the Annan Plan[283] by presenting the Annan Plan as the only resolution. In addition, Baykal's most striking declaration is his criticism of AKP and its Cyprus policy as not having concrete plans only abstract policies; that the AKP used dual language and spoke differently within domestic politics than in international ones; and lastly, that the Cyprus policy was presented as a national one, a position which the CHP opposed. Moreover, Baykal dramatically added that this presentation as national policy froze his blood[284]. According to Baykal, the national policy of Turkey should be decided in the TGNA and in the NSC not solely by the government. That speech revealed a huge gap in the understanding and perception of the AKP and the CHP over Cyprus Annan Plan.

All these speeches and declarations blaming the AKP are considered as competitive actions and coded accordingly. Moreover, from the CHP, Cemil Topuz's comment claiming that Turkey did not have a concrete Cyprus policy encouraged many institutions and people to participate in the policy making process. Topuz also criticized the policy of AKP, saying "a situation without resolution is not a resolution" and blamed the AKP of accusing previous politicians of not presenting a concrete resolution plan. This Cyprus policy of the AKP was even believed to be an abandonment of the foreign policy of Turkey followed since the Lausanne Agreement, a period which is again considered as shaping the core values and lines in Turkey's foreign policy.

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[283] Radikal, "Baykal: Hükümet Şantaj Yapıyor"(8 January 2004) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105490

[284] Radikal, "'Kanıma Dokunuyor'" (11February 2004) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105801

As a second issue, the CHP, particularly Deniz Baykal, disapproved of the Annan Plan and believed that the Annan Plan would make Turkey give more concessions about the Cyprus problem. Baykal's speeches directly relate to the Annan Plan itself. For instance; he officially called the Annan Plan not a resolution but as a dissolution plan which tried to dissolve the Cyprus Turkish side.[285] Furthermore, the plan was not seen as a peace agreement but as a plan to dispose of all foreign policies on Cyprus that had been implemented for 30 years. Furthermore, it was believed by the CHP side that the plan would create one nation (Greek Cypriots) in the South, yet two nations (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) in the North rather than the only one nation which is only the Turkish Cypriots.

Nevertheless, in one of the statements, the CHP started to negotiate over the Annan Plan to reach a mutual resolution, yet again added that accepting the Annan Plan as presented was not a resolution. Another critique regarding the Annan plan is about the lack of knowledge of the Prime Minister of Turkey, of the President of Northern Cyprus and of the people who would specifically vote for the plan.

The third observation is that the CHP criticized the AKP's policy making on the Cyprus issue. The main accusation is related with the fact that the AKP shaped its own secret agenda on Cyprus during the visits to the US. According to CHP CHP, a secret compromise occurred between the AKP and the US administration in Washington which was in total contrast to the policy that was discussed and decided on in the NSC meetings.[286] Therefore, the CHP asked for information sessions for the opposition and the parliament as well as the public to explain that secret compromise and agenda.

Fourthly, it is important to point out the understanding of the NSC institution by the CHP. CHP vice-president Onur Öymen stated that the NSC might not be a decision-making institution but a significant and crucial institution which should be seriously taken into account

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[285] Radikal, "Meclis Kıbrıs'ı tartıştı" (7 April 2004) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=112440

[286] Radikal, "Baykal: Hükümet Kıbrıs'ta emrivaki yapıyor" (6 February 2004) avaliable on. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105262

In conclusion, the interaction between the CHP and the AKP has been experienced competitively with a high degree of accusation and blame on the part of the CHP. These observations explain how the CHP can be classified as the most competitive actor in the case of Annan Plan.

5.1.4.3   The Military

Neutrality is at 63 %, the highest among all the actors' in both cases; thus the military could be called as the most moderate actor in this process. This result also shows the military's trying to keep its position and not wanting to take part in political discussions regarding domestic policy-making, a position which is actually reversed in the 2007 presidential election. Observations regarding the neutral position and neutral way of interaction of the military are presented below.

Firstly, there are some general remarks about the process. It should be mentioned that the military took its position to find a fair and permanent resolution through negotiations for the Cyprus problem. In the beginning of the process, this emphasis was acknowledged in the introduction of all official declarations released by the military. The second general and important issue is that the military's long standing avoidance of argument and disagreement with the AKP-the government- in public, and denial of the speculations about any disagreement between them.

There are two main results   which are the neutrality and the cooperativeness of the military. Firstly, the content of data which is coded as cooperative is composed of the military's statements which emphasize   collaborative work with the government through participation in the National Security Meetings (NSC). For instance, it was stated that regarding the Cyprus issue the general opinion of the military was actually formed by the discussion among the military officials as well as the gendarme officials in the meetings on December 19, 2003 and January 2, 2004. According to the explanation in the military releases, this general opinion was shared with the participants (the President, the PM, the ministers, and the civil and military bureaucrats) at the meeting held in the presidency on January 8, 2004.

Secondly, the neutrality of the military was the highest among all actors. This result is important in the sense that the military did not involve itself in daily political discussions which is as should be in democratic societies and regimes. For instance, one quote by the Hilmi Özkök perfectly explains the neutrality of the military as follows:

"There is an expectation that the military should always expose its certain position by declaring yes or no for any important issue and it actually has to be and this certain position should be shared with the public and we are respectful to that. However, it shouldn't be expected that the military has always taken a side, a party, and should share these opinions with the public."[287]

The neutrality scale is formed based on speeches and declarations of the military, which emphasize that their concerns are by and large related to strategic position of the military in the Northern Cyprus, which have been mostly made at the end of the NSC meetings

A different observation also appeared during the analysis of the data which stated the importance of Cyprus in the Turkish Arm Forces' eyes. According to Hilmi Özkök's speech two significant concerns appeared regarding the Cyprus Problem. The first one is the responsibility to provide security for the Turkish Cypriots which has been agreed by the Guarantee agreement,[288] and the second one is the strategic role of Cyprus in the context of Turkey's security which is also stated in the Treaty of Alliance.[289] Moreover, Özkök added that these two concerns, which actually underline

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[287] The original quote is avaliable on
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/nisan2004/ana.html

[288] The Treaty of Guarantee was signed in 1960. It was agreed that "Greece the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution. They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island" (article 1).

[289] Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1960 and regarding the status of Greek and Turkish military it was agreed that: "Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty. The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus" (article 4).

the critical and sensitive position of Turkey in the process, have been and will be permanent. He also affirmed this statement in another speech and said that it was not only important to protect Turkish Cypriots but to maintain Turkey's security as well.

It is also very clear that the military did not experience competitive interaction. Nevertheless, 6 % of the somewhat competitive interaction came from the Hilmi Özkök's speech which stated that the existence of cooperation was not totally verified since they did not agree on all issues. He also underlined that the general framework which was shaped in the NSC on January 23 was not totally followed[290] by the AKP during the negotiations with the UN officials. Hilmi Özkök again explained the somehow uncomfortable situation within the military through basically stating that it wouldn't be right to share the issue with public and the media due to the fact that the process they were going through might harm the domestic interaction and added that if they had an explanation, it would also be unfair to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who then might react similarly which could lead to a deadlock in the interaction as well as in the policy making process.

As a last remark, the overall data collected for the military is 16; as the lowest number, this shows that the military did not declare its positions or opinions on the issue as much as the other actors.

5.1.5   All Actors

This part provides the comparison of these actors in each scale in figure 7 and the nature of the interaction in figure 8 in the process of the case of Annan Plan in 2004. To begin with figure 7, clearly shows that the CHP has been the most competitive actor in the interaction at 75 %. This is the highest score of all scores. The AKP is the second most competitive actor at 11 %. On the other hand, the military has had no competitive interaction at 0 %. As also can be seen from figure 7, all actors have very close percentages (AKP 13 %, CHP 15 %, Military 6 %) for the somewhat

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[290] The original quote is available on
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/nisan2004/ana.html

competitive score. Thirdly, in the neutral scale, the military is the highest one at 63 % of all. The AKP and the CHP also have neutral scores of 25% and 10% respectively. Fourthly, the AKP is the only actor with a somewhat cooperative score: it is 13%. As for the last score, the cooperative one, two actors, the AKP at 38 % and the military at 31 % come into prominence. However, the CHP has not been coded in cooperative scale. Based on figure 7, the first result shows that the AKP and the Military are the most cooperative actors and the interaction between them has taken place cooperatively. The second result obtained from the figure 7 is that the CHP is the most competitive actor and this eventually results in the CHP's interaction being the most competitive. Thirdly, the most neutral actor of all actors is the military at 63%.


Figure 7: Comparison of All Actors in the Annan Plan (2004)

Another explanation is that on the one hand, the CHP has interacted with other parties mostly in competitiveness; on the other hand, the AKP and the military have interacted with each other and the CHP relatively cooperatively.

As shown in figure 8 the nature of the interaction is that actors interacted mostly in cooperation at 38 % and neutrality at 28 %, which is 66 % of the overall interaction. The AKP's high percentage on the cooperative scale as shown in figure 7 contributed to cooperative score of figure 8 and it is the same for the neutral section of figure 8 which is generally composed of the military's neutrality (63 %). It can also be seen

from figure 8 that almost one-third of the overall interaction is competitive and somewhat competitive which is 34% of the total. Competitiveness is raised to 34% by the CHP's competitive interaction: 75 %. Based on this analysis, it can be argued that the actors, AKP and the military, interacted in cooperation at, 66 %, during the domestic political interaction over the Annan Plan case. Therefore, it is obvious that the nature of the process is cooperative in the case of Annan Plan.


Figure 8: All Actors in the Annan Plan (2004)

In the table, the overall data codification with the actor based differentiation is shown. Based on table 8, the number of pieces of data collected is 100 in total. 22 pieces out of 100 are coded as competitive; 12 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive; 28 pieces are coded as neutral; 8 pieces are coded as somewhat cooperative; and finally, the highest number, 30 pieces are coded as cooperative. It can be seen from table 8 that the CHP has 20 pieces of which distribution as follows: 15 pieces are coded as competitive, 3 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive, and 2 pieces are coded as neutral. CHP has no data coded for the somewhat cooperative and cooperative scales. Secondly, AKP has 64 pieces of data which are the highest number of data collected for an actor. The division of data is: 7 pieces are coded as competitive, 8 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive, 16 pieces are coded as neutral, 8 pieces are coded as somewhat cooperative, and 25 pieces are coded as cooperative. Lastly, the military has the least number of pieces of data, 16 pieces are

in total. 10 pieces are coded as neutral and 5 pieces are coded as cooperative. Only one piece of data is coded as somewhat competitive.

Based on table 8, it can be argued that the AKP with its 25 pieces of data coded as cooperatively is the most cooperative actor. However, the most surprising fact is that the CHP hasn't had any single data coded for cooperative or somewhat cooperative. Instead, the CHP has the highest number of data coded for competitive which naturally made it the most competitive actor.

	CHP	AKP	Military	Total
1-Competitive	15	7	0	22
2-Somewhat Competitive	3	8	1	12
3-Neutral	2	16	10	28
4-Somewhat Cooperative	0	8	0	8
5-Cooperative	0	25	5	30
Total	20	64	16	100

Table 9: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – All Actors, Annan Plan 2004

5.2   Presidential Election

This section presents the analysis and findings of the actors' interaction over the Presidential Election case in 2007. Figures display the cooperative and competitive scores of the actors for the Presidential election case.

5.2.1   AKP

Figure 9 shows competitive and cooperatives scores of the AKP's interaction in the Presidential Election case. The results of the analysis show that the process of the presidential election in 2007 was very dynamic for the AKP since AKP's data has been coded in all scales. AKP's interaction has been realized in all scales ranging from 35 % to 10 %. Yet, the highest one is the 35 % competitive scale, anticipated at the beginning of the research. Secondly, the somewhat competitiveness score is at 17 % which is again almost one-fifth of the total.

Taking into account these two scores, the AKP's total competitiveness increases to 52 %, this is more than half of all. Third, the neutral scale is at 27 % for AKP and this is the second highest percentage. The somewhat cooperative at 11 % and the cooperative at 10 % comprise less than one-fourth of the overall data. Based on table 10, it can be argued that, the AKP interacted with other actors mostly in competition.


Figure 9: AKP in the Presidential Election (2007)

The AKP's interaction in the presidential election is coded based on 99 pieces of data for this analysis. This is the highest number of data that was collected for an actor for one case. The division of data among scales is: 34 pieces are coded as competitive; 17 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive; 27 pieces are coded as neutral; 11 pieces are coded as somewhat cooperative; and finally 10 pieces are coded as competitive. It can be seen from table 9 that, the AKP's statements, speeches and so

on are coded as mostly (51 data out of 99) competitive or somewhat competitive. However, only 21 data are coded either cooperative or somewhat cooperative.

1-Competitive	34
2-Somewhat Competitive	17
3-Neutral	27
4-Somewhat Cooperative	11
5-Cooperative	10
Total	99

Table 10: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – AKP, Presidential Election 2007

5.2.2 CHP

Figure 10 shows the cooperative and competitive scores of the CHP in the Presidential case in 2007. The highest score seen in figure 10 is the competitive scale at 41 %. This is followed by somewhat cooperative at 19 %. Both these add up to 60 % f the overall CHP interaction. In the third scale, the CHP had a neutral score of 12%. Fourthly, the somewhat cooperative score is at 9 % and finally cooperative score is at 19 %. Again, the somewhat cooperative and the cooperative scores add up to 28% which is almost one-third of the overall interaction.


Figure 10: CHP in the Presidential Election (2007)

In the codification of the CHP, 81 pieces of data are collected which is very close to the AKP's number. The distribution of the data is shown below in table 10. Over 81 data, 34 are coded as competitive, 15 are coded as somewhat competitive, 10 are coded as neutral, 7 are coded as somewhat cooperative, and finally 15 pieces of data are coded as cooperative.

1-Competitive	34
2-Somewhat Competitive	15
3-Neutral	10
4-Somewhat Cooperative	7
5-Cooperative	15
Total	81

Table 11: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale– CHP, Presidential Election 2007

5.2.3   The Military

Figure 11 indicates the military's cooperative and competition scores in the case of Presidential election. It can be seen from figure 11 that the competitive score is 20 % and the somewhat competition score is 40 %. This result shows that 60 % of the military's overall score is on the competition side. Besides this, 40 % of the score is neutral. What is interesting is that the military has not got any scores in the somewhat cooperative or cooperative scales. Therefore, both scales have been shown as 0 %.

Figure 11: The Military in the Presidential Election (2007)

Table 11 shows the overall number of pieces of data for the military in the case of Presidential Election. This is the least number of the data collected for an actor. Table 11 shows that only one piece of the data is coded as competitive; 2 pieces of the data are coded as somewhat competitive; and the last 2 pieces of data are coded as neutral. There is no data coded for the somewhat cooperative and cooperative scales.

1-Competitive	1
2-Somewhat Competitive	2
3-Neutral	2
4-Somewhat Cooperative	0
5-Cooperative	0
Total	5

Table 12: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – The Military Presidential Election 2007

5.2.4   Findings and Discussions

In this part, the findings and observations from the analysis of data are presented through giving examples from the data itself. This section basically explains what constitutes scores of the actors.

5.2.4.1   AKP

In the presidential election case, the highest score for the AKP is competitive one. This is expected since the actors in presidential elections have been argued to interact competitively due to the lack of the international audience's interests and the subsequent lack of any influence from them. The competitive scale is coded according to AKP's position which is mostly blaming the main opposition party, the CHP, but, rarely the military. The declaration to not take any steps to compromise with the adversary actors is also coded in competitive scale. This process has sub-processes. During the analysis, I realized that the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court, which required the presence of 367 deputies in the TGNA to hold the first round of the election process for the presidency, made an important shift. After this decision, the parliament decided to go for a legislative (national) election and the interaction became much harsher especially between the AKP and the CHP. The second significant development is the issue of the e-memorandum by the military to remind the government that the government was watched by the military.

Considering these very critical developments, this analysis is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the main issues as following: i) nominating a candidate ii) blame and accusation of the CHP by the AKP iii) the AKP's position about the public demonstrations and the discussions over the '367' case iv) the AKP's standing toward the e-memorandum of the military. All these issues present the cooperative, competitive or neutral interaction(s) of the AKP. Besides this, the decision of the Constitutional Court led the parliament to go for a general election. In the process of the election campaign, the tone of the AKP became much more aggressive and they blamed the CHP for everything that had happened during the process before the Constitutional Court's decision.

Firstly, the process began with the discussions about the nomination of a presidential candidate. Regarding this question, the AKP chose to be silent and declared that they would not talk about this issue until April, 2007 which was the time to name a candidate according to the constitution. Since the AKP had the majority of the seats (but not an absolute majority to elect the president on its own in the first round), it was the case that whoever would be the candidate would be the eleventh

president. This choice was explained later by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül that they, as the AKP, did not want to start the discussions about the presidential elections earlier since the discussions could provoke polemics that could harm Turkey especially the Turkish economics. Therefore, they declared that the AKP would nominate a candidate when the time was up. This attitude of the AKP rendered the situation very controversial and escalated the political disagreement between the AKP and the actors to a political crisis. The only explanation done by Tayyip Erdoğan was that the AKP would negotiate the nomination of a candidate for the presidency within the party administration by taking public opinion into consideration through meeting with leaders from institutions and NGOs, as well. Nevertheless, although the candidate was nominated just two days before the parliamentary elections, the discussions had continued more than for 4 months in a very tense atmosphere which was arguably very competitive.

The second important issue was another very competitive interaction which took place between the AKP and the CHP in the process of presidential election in 2007. Initially, the AKP acknowledged that they would not cooperate or compromise with the CHP over a candidate since the CHP has been considered to insult the AKP and the Prime Minister. This was Tayyip Erdoğan's very first justification at the beginning of the process. In addition, the AKP also criticized the CHP creating a tense and escalatory crisis in the process. In this regard, Tayyip Erdoğan stated that they were open to be criticized by the opposition parties, yet the opposition should not polarize, provoke and create conflicts in society. He claimed that they, as the AKP, would not be part of any polarization that was created by the CHP; yet he still invited them to contribute to more constructive political environment at the end of his speech. Not surprisingly, this never happened. In another speech, Erdoğan blamed the CHP also for not bringing any proposal or concrete discussion topic to discuss, but just creating fear in society. Erdoğan also asked particularly Deniz Baykal to declare the CHP's candidate for the presidency and criticized him for commenting on the method used by the AKP for nominating a candidate. These were the general issues that two actors interacted about repeatedly and coded the AKP in competitive section.

Thirdly, public demonstrations, called "Republican Rally", with participation of thousands of people, were organized in many of the big cities of Turkey[291] by the Association of Atatürkist Thought (ADD) (mostly organized by retired generals and military officials) in order to support the secular regime and in fact to oppose the general policy of the AKP in the process of the presidential election as well as to oppose the candidacy of Erdoğan to the presidency. AKP officials considered and respected these demonstrations as a part of the democratic participation process. However, people were also called "bindirilmiş kıtalar" [*motorized masses*] by Prime Minister Erdoğan in his speech in which he also said "they [the participants] held a rally. It's their democratic right. But what about those figures? Some are talking about millions meeting there. It is like our million lira notes".[292] In this speech, Erdoğan actually criticized the media's interpretation and exaggeration of the meetings and the number of people who participated in these meetings. Indeed, in his criticisms about the demonstrations Erdoğan actually reminded the people that it was the parliament would elect the 11th president.

Another crisis within the crisis also occurred during the process. This particular crisis was called the '367' crisis in general. This number was claimed to be the quorum of deputies who should be in the parliament to elect the president. In other words, a parliamentary quorum of 367 deputies was required for voting to be held, which was not the case when the election process started on 27 April, 2007 according to the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision. The actors were inevitably separated again and expressed completely opposite viewpoints of this case. On the one hand the AKP argued that 367 parliamentarians did not to be present but just 184 and explained that only 367 votes over 550 are required in the first round to elect the president-which is accepted the two-thirds of the parliament. On the other hand the CHP, contrarily, argued that 367 were necessary to start the election process in the parliament, in the first round. Although this issue had also been discussed among legal

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[291] The first one was organized in Ankara on 14 April, the second one in İstanbul on 29 April, the rest were orgnaized in İzmir on 14 May, in Samsun on 21 May and in Denizli on 28 May. See: Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Language, *Middle East Policy*. Vol. XIV, no:3 Fall 2007.

[292]Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, "Erdoğan pledges commitment to secular regime" (18 April 2007) available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604014 .

practitioners, lawyers and judges for a while before the parliament gathering on April 27, 2007, the CHP took the issue to the Constitutional Court just after the first round of the election process finished. It was the case that actually the president of the TGNA also did not call the roll to check whether there were 367 deputies or not. Moreover, the AKP accused the CHP of blocking the democratic process and sabotaging the election process even though the AKP officials declared that they trusted the law and the decision by the Court. The first objection of the AKP was that they believed that nothing similar had done in any of the previous president election processes and therefore they argued that it would be unfair to ask for this parliamentary quorum at this time. These discussions are also coded as competitive and somewhat competitive.

The fourth issue is the e-memorandum from the military to the AKP government. That e-memorandum is believed to be the actual reason of this political crisis also known as the presidential crisis. Although the interaction had been competitive and tense from the beginning, the impact of this e-memorandum was considered as a significant intervention to the democratic system of Turkey and shifted the actors', particularly the AKP's tone into the aggressive. Regarding the influence of military in politics, both by Tayyip Erdoğan or Abdullah Gül, they previously stated that the process at that time would be different and for the first time, there would not be any presidential crisis. They also emphasized that Turkey was negotiating with the European Union which meant that nothing like a military intervention was possible. Nevertheless, at serious speech about the characteristics of the possible candidate was made by the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt, who clearly stated that the president should have heartfelt loyalty, not just a token loyalty to the principles of the Turkish republic and its secular organization. That speech was positively considered by Erdoğan but it was obvious that he did not want to go into details about this speech. The military made some other explanations which were not discussed in front of the public by the AKP officials. This situation continued till the e-memorandum of the military which was published at midnight[293] on 27 April, 2007 on the webpage of the military. This intervention was totally unexpected by the AKP

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[293] It is called "the military's midnight statement" by Barçın Yınanç in Turkish Daily News, "Even Gül is not moderate enough for the military" (30 April 2007) available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604866

and many other groups and institutions such as TÜSİAD, TOBB, as well. Since the governments in Turkey had always been overthrown by obvious military coup d'états (in 1960 and 1980) or by these kinds of official declarations such as those that happened on March 12, 1971 and January 28, 1998, the reaction of the AKP was expected to be the same with the previous cases. However, the AKP's response was not in line with the previous cases as harsh as the military statement was. Right after this incident, at a government meeting, the statement was assessed by the Cabinet. It was the spokesman of the AKP, Cemil Çiçek who read the government's statement which called the military statement "unimaginable". It is as follows:

> "In a democratic country governed by rule of law, it is unimaginable that the General Staff, which is attached to the prime minister, make a statement against the government… It is regrettable that there were utterly wrong expressions about the relations between the government and the General Staff. All institutions of our state should be more sensitive and careful… Every problem in Turkey will be resolved within the legal framework and democracy. Any contrary thought or stance is definitely unacceptable. The duty on all individuals and institutions is to help this process proceed smoothly. Painful experiences have shown how different approaches have harmed our country and the nation… Everyone should know that our government is a side more than everyone and more sensitive than everyone when it comes to protection of the basic values of the state, integrity and unity of our country, about Turkey's being secular, democratic and social state governed by rule of law."[294]

This statement basically explains the role and the place of the military under the law in which the Turkish Armed Forces remains under the orders of the prime minister. Actually, this relationship made the military's statement unimaginable since they spoke out against the government- the prime ministry- as well as ignoring democratic rules. It was also underlined that the government was the only institution authorized to protect the core values of the state which are protected under the democratic norms of law. After these harsh statements between the actors, the case was labeled a military-government deadlock.[295] Therefore, it was seen that the AKP side did not want to continue the discussion and chose to be silent in its relationship

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[294]Today's Zaman, "Government hits back at military interference in election process" (28 April 2007) avaliable on http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=109749

[295] Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, "Politics in deadlock; judiciary holds the key" (30 April 2007). Göksel Bozkurt from the Turkish Daily News called the case as such, available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604858

with the army. For instance, Tayyip Erdoğan in his speech, after this incident, stated that they did not intend to keep these discussions alive and prolong them which could cause conflicts between institutions[296]. Instead they intended to erase them on their agenda. According to Abdullah Gül, this e-memorandum was even more surprising than the Constitutional Court's decision and considered the intervention as undermining the image of Turkey. He underlined that he would be the one as the Minister of foreign affairs who would work to fix this image. Additionally, he also mentioned that the society did not deserve chaos since the consequences of this crisis would affect everybody. All the reactions, responses and statements during this process are mostly considered competitive interaction except the data expressing the neutral position of the AKP when they chose not to protract the disagreement.

The other very important influential incident during the process was the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision over the discussions about the '367' case. There were not so many pieces of data coded related to this case. Moreover, they were mostly considered as neutral statements as the AKP officials just stressed their position and opinion about the case. Nevertheless, while the court was discussing the issue, the CHP's statement that affirmed that any decision that was made against the CHP's opinion would lead the country into an environment of conflict was considered as very unfortunate by the AKP. It was also argued that the ideology behind this explanation was not national interests but political ones. The decision of the CHP to take the '367' case to the Turkish Constitutional Court caused a hard-line position within the AKP and then the interaction became harsher between the actors. Even in his speeches, Erdoğan blamed the CHP for not being a representative of the public but of the elite as well as being a representative of the old-fashioned politics[297]. The Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the parliament election for the presidency. Although the official statements of the AKP emphasized their respectfulness towards the decision, chiefly Erdoğan debated and criticized the decision in public meetings in the general election process.

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[296] AKP webpage, (1 May 2007) available on
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=17265&kategori=1

[297] AKP webpage, (16 June 2007) available on
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=17824&kategori=1

Lastly, the AKP also made very competitive statements during the general election process since the existing crisis was exacerbated by the competition. The only exception was when Erdoğan affirmed that he would look for compromise for the presidential elections after the general legislative elections and stated that they did not have any pre-conditions to start negotiations with any political parties. Nevertheless, after the general election, Abdullah Gül was nominated as a presidential candidate once more. Moreover, that time with the participation of the MHP in the parliamentary election, 367 quorum was met to hold the first round and Abdullah Gül was elected as the eleventh president of Turkey in following rounds. The statements of the AKP and public speeches of Erdoğan related to the presidential elections in the process of the legislative elections are coded mainly as competitive.

The only cooperative interaction of the AKP was coded on cases where Gül announced that he would meet with the political parties in the Parliament in order to ask for support. This activity of meeting was repeated in both processes—before the decision to go to the general election and after the general election was held. In addition, before the e-memorandum and the decision of the Constitution Court, Gül and Erdoğan claimed that the process of the presidential election was the most modest and reasonable process that had been experienced so far and there would not be any crisis. These kinds of positive statements have been coded as a cooperative interaction.

5.2.4.2   CHP

The presidential election in 2007 had been a dynamic process for the CHP, as well. As can be seen from figure 9, the interaction of the CHP have been coded in all scales and it is also obvious that the competitive scale is the highest one (41 %) not only for the CHP's chart but also in general. Therefore, according to my data analysis, the CHP, as an actor in the process, was the most competitive actor when compared with the others. From the analysis, an exploration of CHP's interaction and position seems to be possible in three main parts. The three parts which are the CHP as competitive, as neutral and as cooperative are presented through giving examples from specific speeches and statements made by the CHP officials.

For the first part, the CHP had been coded as competitive with 41 %. There are six major issues that explain the competitiveness of the CHP. The CHP's very first criticism is that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan should not be the presidential candidate, and eventually the president, since he had been in a fight to change the core of the Constitution. Therefore, according to CHP, the representation by Tayyip would be wrong and dangerous for Turkish Republic. Deniz Baykal even accused Tayyip Erdoğan of not believing in the Constitution. Baykal also affirmed that one who believes the core values of the constitution should be the president. Moreover, he underlined that this is all about the peace of the country not about Tayyip Erdoğan in particular. These kinds of accusations as well as opposite statements by the CHP were witnessed in the first three months in 2007. This was one of the issues that led to CHP being coded as competitive in the data analysis.

Secondly, compromise' and 'the necessity of compromise' were also the most repeated words that the CHP's leader Baykal stated many times in his speeches and these are coded in both competitive and cooperative scales. As competitive interaction, Baykal in general blamed Erdoğan and the AKP for not compromising on a candidate name and for being silent in discussions. According to the CHP, compromise was a must to continue the process in peace and it was also a must specifically for Tayyip Erdoğan who was thought to be a threat to societal peace and compromise. Through to the end of the process, Baykal also affirmed that if Erdoğan sought to compromise, there would not be any problems or crisis so the AKP and Erdoğan were accused of causing the crisis to happen.

The third issue is about the CHP's criticisms of the selection process of the presidential candidate by the AKP. From the beginning of the interaction, the AKP chose to be silent and decided not to talk about the candidate's name till the week that they had to start. However, this position was continuously criticized by the CHP in claims that the AKP had a secret agenda and would put its candidate in at the last minute which would cause a very dangerous obligation. This position was also considered as a threat for the state of law. These were the initial criticisms of the CHP and after the AKP announced that Abdullah Gül was the presidential candidate for the AKP. The criticism continued with the characteristics and previous political life of

Abdullah Gül. Deniz Baykal argued that Adullah Gul, just like Tayyip Erdoğan, was raised in the ideology of milli görüş [National View][298] which is not welcomed or accepted by the republicans. Abdullah Gül was also chastised for very unsuccessful policies as the Minister of foreign affairs. Deniz Baykal also argued that Abdullah Gül had not a sincere and honest character to be the president. Apart from these, the very initial uneasiness of the CHP was that the situation of Tayyip Erdoğan as the Prime Minister, Bülent Arınç as the president of the TGNA and Abdullah Gül as the president was not appropriate to the nature of the country in the sense that this combination would not serve the core values of the constitution but would have power overall control and balance mechanisms within the regime.[299] After the decision of the Constitutional Court which stated the requirement of 367 deputies presence in the parliament in order to hold the presidential election and after the AKP could not reach that number in their second trial, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal affirmed that the AKP couldn't succeed in electing one of its "militants"[300] as the president and it would not be successful in the future. Later on, the explanations of the CHP have changed in the sense that CHP claimed that they saw the threat coming so that they took precautions. Moreover they cared about the society's sensitivity towards the issue. This position was considered as well as called as success and the CHP officials stated that they were proud of this success. Lastly, after the general election when Abdullah Gül was again nominated as the presidential candidate, the CHP's position did not change its position a lot. Instead the officials declared that they would certainly be respectful to the parliament's decision, yet the CHP would always keep its distance with the presidency.

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[298] Atacan explains the *milli görüş* movement as "the core of *Milli Görüş]* was formed by the members of a particular Nakşibendi group. But in practice, all these parties represented a loose coalition of different Islamic and conservative groups". See: Fulya Atacan, "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP", *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 6, No:2 (June, 2005), pp. 187-199. Also, Turunc argues that "the AKP's leading cadre is mostly from the Milli Görüş [National Outlook] tradition". For a deatiled analysis of evolution of this tratidion, see: Hasan Turunc, "Islamist or Democratic? The AKP's Search for Identity in Turkish Politics", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol 15. No:1, (April, 2007), pp.79-91.

[299] The original quotation is available on http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=337

[300] This interpretation of the CHP is very extreme calling and is considered as very extreme attitude to call a member of the parliament as such.

The fourth important issue was the opinion and perception of the CHP about the demonstrations. The data showed that the CHP considered these demonstrations as a very important civil society movement and also as a proof of the support for Ataturk's republic. The CHP claimed that the reaction of people had been ignored by the Prime Minister and the AKP government. Regarding the crisis, these protests were argued as a key to solve the crisis in Turkey since they brought out a new dimension into politics and they were also evidence that everybody was aware of the threat. The CHP also stated that the government and the prime minister provoked the creation of a conflictual relation between the state and the society, yet the CHP claimed there was not such a thing. According to the CHP officials' statement, this argument was actually stated earlier than this crisis in July 2005. Therefore they claimed that the CHP had been aware of these attempts long before. As a result, the CHP affirmed that these discussions were not about the presidency but about the survival and future of the Turkish Republic as a secular, democratic, and social state of law.

As a fifth issue, the position of the CHP in the discussions of the "367" case is also coded as competitive. Although in his initial speeches, Deniz Baykal, explained the situation and the CHP's opinion in a more moderate way, by the end of the interaction he began insisting that the Prime Minister should compromise on a candidate considering the "367" case as well. After they took the case to the Constitutional Court, they stated that if the Constitutional Court made a decision that 367 deputies were not required to hold the session, it would lead Turkey into a dangerous conflict.

The sixth and last issue is about the CHP's considerations about the process and the perception of the AKP in the election of the president. One of the CHP worries was based on the explanation of Bülent Arınç, the president of the TGNA, who claimed that the president should be a secular, a civil and a religious person. Upon this statement, Deniz Baykal harshly criticized the AKP. Moreover, according to the CHP, the AKP considered the presidency as a strategic position to be conquered and added new requirements to be the president-such as being religious. However, this type of requirement was totally against the Constitution according to CHP officials. Besides

this, the CHP thought that the prime minister led the process very badly and they were surprised with the consequences.

These six main issues could be proof of the competitive style of interaction and are coded accordingly.

As cooperative interaction, the CHP was coded at 19 %, almost one-fifth of the total. The main cooperative statements of the CHP were made mostly by Deniz Baykal who affirmed the necessity of compromising and emphasized the need for a neutral candidate outside the parliament who could be accepted by all. Since the CHP attached importance to the presidency and considered the presidential election election as concerning the whole, the process was believed to be carried out through compromising, negotiating and collaborating. The CHP even stated that there could be someone from the AKP as a presidential candidate. This statement happened in the very initial stage of the interaction. In addition, during the national election process, just before the election was to be held, the CHP again emphasized that there should be a compromise on the election of the president and repeated their readiness to discuss and negotiate the issue, actions which exemplify cooperative interaction.

CHP was also coded as a neutral in some cases which are mostly related to the official declarations or position acknowledgements regarding the issues on the agenda without declaring any name or any actor. For instance, the fact that Mustafa Özyürek, a deputy from the CHP, considers the statement of the military as a memorandum and Deniz Baykal's declaration that he was surprised and sorry about this e-memorandum by the military was coded as neutral. The fact that the CHP officials perceived their propaganda and hard work during the presidential election process as a success was also coded as neutral because they claimed that they prevented the country from experiencing a presidential crisis.

5.2.4.3   The military

The interaction of the military was coded mostly as competitive, completely opposite to the finding for the military in the Annan Plan process. In this case,

according to the data, the military has been its moderate position to an aggressive and competitive one in almost two-third of the interactions. During the interactions, the speeches by the head of the military Yaşar Büyükanıt and the declarations created the impression that the military was very confident and intended to take control whenever required. Therefore, the detailed analysis has been shaped around some important issues which are obtained from the data analysis. Similar to previous explanations, the military's scores are also explored.

The first significant explanation of the military is about its understanding and perception of the presidency as an institution. Related to that, Yaşar Büyükanıt stated that the president would also be the head of the army and emphasized that, in this regard, the election of the president was very important to the military. It is also the case that he mentioned this argument as a citizen as well as a member of the military and he hoped that the president would be respectful to the essences and core principals of the republic not as a token but with his/her whole heart. In my opinion, it is crucial that the military noticeably stated its opinion on the domestic political discussion. In addition to that, one week after that speech, he said that if there were people who did not understand it, he would wonder about their ability to understand[301]. Clearly, he declared the military's position and tried to give an underhand message to the relevant actors. These explanations are coded as neutral.

The second observation is that these speeches are made to remind the public that the military was aware of its responsibility and when it was time to use that responsibility the military would be ready and not hesitate to take action. This message was clearly given by the military officials and therefore at the societal level, there appeared some groups who wanted the military to overthrow the government by coup d'état, a totally unacceptable act in democratic regimes. These kinds of statements are considered as competitive.

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[301] Radikal, "Orgeneral Büyükanıt: 'Özde' mesajım herkese ulaştı" (20 April 2007) avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218954

The final observation, which is the most critical one, is about the so-called post-modern coup d'état of the military through publishing an official statement[302] on its webpage at midnight on April 27, 2007. The timing of the publication and the content of the statement were very shocking to the many groups which actually supported the democratic election process for the presidency election. Initially, the content of the statement briefly can be summed up as it "… stressed that the TSK [Turkish Armed Forces] was watching the parliamentary presidential vote with concern and warned against questioning the country's secular system and issued a veiled threat of intervention saying it would" openly display its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary."[303]

This statement briefly presents how the military became a party to the political crisis in the presidential election process in 2007. This statement was considered as a coup d'état because of the fact that the military clearly and very concretely affirmed that they would act when it was necessary, actually when they thought it was necessary. The statement also reminded people of the constitutional rights[304] of the military and that they would not hesitate to use these rights. This statement is considered as the only piece of competitive data and it is coded accordingly since it

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[302] "Son günlerde, Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi sürecinde öne çıkan sorun, laikliğin tartışılması konusuna odaklanmış durumdadır. Bu durum, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri tarafından endişe ile izlenmektedir. Unutulmamalıdır ki, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri bu tartışmalarda taraftır ve laikliğin kesin savunucusudur. Ayrıca, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri yapılmakta olan tartışmaların ve olumsuz yöndeki yorumların kesin olarak karşısındadır, gerektiğinde tavrını ve davranışlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koyacaktır. Bundan kimsenin şüphesinin olmaması gerekir. Özetle, Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk'ün, "Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!" anlayışına karşı çıkan herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, bu niteliklerin korunması için kendisine kanunlarla verilmiş olan açık görevleri eksiksiz yerine getirme konusundaki sarsılmaz kararlılığını muhafaza etmektedir ve bu kararlılığa olan bağlılığı ile inancı kesindir." cited from http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklam alari/2007/BA_08.html

[303] Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, "Turkey faces a democracy test" by Yusuf Kanlı (30 April 2007). avaliable on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604829

[304] "Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of the military stipulates that the Turkish Armed Forces are responsible for 'guarding and defending the Turkish republic as defined by the constitution'" see: Soner Çağatay, "How will the Turkish Military React?", *Washington Institute* (2007). Available online access: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1076

contains a threat to the existing administration. In this sense, it is also not surprising not to see any cooperative style of interaction in the process.

5.2.5   Comparison of All Actors

This part briefly provides the comparison of these actors in each scale in figure 12 and the nature of the interaction in figure 14 in the process of the case of Annan Plan in 2004.

Figure 12 shows the comparison of the actors' scores in the presidential election case. It can be seen from figure 12 that the most competitive actor is the CHP with its 41 % competitive score. It is followed by the AKP at 45 % and the military at 20 %. The second score shows the somewhat competitive scale in which the military has the highest score at 40 %. The AKP (17 %) and the CHP (19 %) have very close scores. As has been done in earlier figure explanations, when these two sections are added up for an each actor, they reach very close scores: AKP 52 %, CHP 60 % and the military 60 %. This result indicates that all actors are as competitive as each other in the Presidential election case. On the neutral scale, the military is the highest at 40 %, the AKP is the second highest neutral actor at 27 %, and finally the CHP is the third at 12 %. The fourth scale shows the somewhat cooperative scale in which only AKP (11 %) and CHP (9 %) have scores. The last scale is similar to the previous one in which the AKP (10 %) and the CHP (19 %) are only actors which have scores. The military does not have any scores in the fourth and fifth scales.

Figure 12: Comparison of All Actors in the Presidential Election (2007)

Secondly, figure 13 shows the nature of the interaction in the presidential election case. The nature of the political interaction between the actors is divided into five scales which are shown in figure 13. It can be seen that the competitive scale is the highest one at 37 %. This result indicates that the interaction which took place between the actors was mostly competitive. Besides this, if the second scale, the somewhat competitive at 18 %, is also added to overall competitive scores, then the nature of the interaction is indicated as 55 % competitive. Nevertheless, neutrality is also one-fifth of the overall interaction at 21 %. The fourth score at 10% and fifth score at 14 % can be considered as total cooperation scores and show that 24 % of overall interaction is cooperative.

Figure 13: All Actors in the Presidential Election (2007)

In table 12, the number of pieces of data collected is shown. In total, 185 pieces of data are collected and coded for the presidential election case. 99 pieces of data belong to the AKP; 81 pieces of data to CHP; and only 5 to the military. It can clearly be seen from table 12 that 69 pieces of data are coded as competitive and this number is the highest. 34 data are coded as somewhat competitive; 39 pieces of data are coded neutral which is the second highest number. For the somewhat cooperative scale, there are 18 pieces of data and 25 pieces of cooperative data are coded accordingly. The detailed explanation for each actor has previously been indicated in the above section.

	AKP	CHP	Military	Total
1-Competitive	34	34	1	69
2-Somewhat Competitive	17	15	2	34
3-Neutral	27	10	2	39
4-Somewhat Cooperative	11	7	0	18
5-Cooperative	10	15	0	25
Total	99	81	5	185

Table 13: Distribution of the number of overall pieces of data for each scale – All Actors, Presidential Election 2007

The actors' interaction, as seen in this case, is much more competitive and harsher toward each other than in the previous case. Starting from the competitive part, the CHP is the most competitive actor, a position   very closely followed by the AKP. In this case, it can be argued that both political parties competed with each other. The CHP and the AKP have been coded in all scales.   The AKP is clearly more neutral than the CHP; however the CHP is more cooperative than the AKP in the process of the presidential election in 2007. Nevertheless, the overall competitive interaction of both parties is very close to 60 % and this clearly shows that the process in the presidential election was experienced competitively and so that the nature of the process has been very competitive. It is also shown in figure 14 that the overall process is 55 % competitive in total and only 24 % cooperative which again proves that the nature of the interaction is competitive not cooperative.

The role and position of the military as a very competitive actor turned the nature of the interaction to very competitive as well. Besides the cooperation and competition scales, the neutral scale forms one-fifth of the overall interaction because of the neutral position held by the military and AKP during the discussions.

5.3   Comparative Analysis of the Actors and the Cases

Figure 14 shows the cooperative competitive scores and percentages of the actors for each case separately in one chart. The actors are named AKP 1, CHP 1, and Military 1 which indicates actors for the Annan Plan case and AKP 2, CHP 2, and Military 2 which indicates actors for the Presidential Election case. Taking into account these practical labels figure 14 can be explored. Firstly, it can be seen from figure 14 that, the CHP (CHP 1 at 75 % and CHP 2 at 41%) is the most competitive actor compared with the other actors in both cases. Therefore, although there is a decrease in the score, the CHP kept its competitive position in the presidential election case as well. Secondly, the actual shifts are seen in AKP's and the military's scores. On the one hand, AKP 1 is at 11 % and on the other hand AKP 2 increases to 53 %. It is the same for the military which has no competitive scale in the Annan Plan case as, Military 1; however Military 2 is at 20 %. In the second scale, somewhat competitive, Military 2 is the highest at 40 %, but Military 1 is only is at 6 %. AKP 1 (13 %) and

AKP 2 (17 %) have very close scores similar to CHP 1 (15 %) and CHP 2 (19 %). In the neutral scale, the military (Military 1 at 63 % and Military 2 at 40 %) is again the most neutral party for each case. The scores of AKP 1 (25 %) and AKP 2 (27 %) are very close. In the fourth scale, somewhat cooperative, only AKP 1 has 13 % for the Annan Plan case. AKP 2 (11 %) and CHP 2 (9 %) score in this scale for the presidential election case. Military 1 and Military 2 have not been scored for any of the cases. Finally, the cooperative scale is also very interesting to analyze. AKP 1 is at 38 % and Military 1 is also at 31%; however CHP 1 is at 0 % for the Annan Plan case. Nevertheless, in the case of presidential election, AKP 2 is at 10 %, CHP 2 is at 19 %, yet military 2 is at 0% this time.


Figure 14: Comparison of actors per Case

Figure 15 shows the comparison of the interactions among the actors based on cases. C 1 means the Annan Plan case and C 2 means the Presidential Election case. At first, the nature of the interaction is 22 % competitive for the Case 1, the Annan Plan case; however, it is more competitive in Case 2, presidential election case, at 37 %. Therefore, it can be seen that the nature of the interaction in Case 2 has been more competitive than Case 1. Secondly, the score for somewhat competitive is also the same as the first score. During Case 1, the interaction is 12 % somewhat competitive,

and again in the process of Case 2 the interaction increase to 18 % somewhat competitive. The third scale shows that the nature of the interaction is more neutral in Case 1 (28 %) than in Case 2 (21 %). The somewhat cooperative scale is similar to the first and second scales; Case 1 (8 %) is less than Case 2 (10 %.) by only 2 %. Nevertheless, the big difference happens to be indicated in the last scale, the cooperative scale. It can be seen that the nature of the interaction is 30 % cooperative in the case of the Annan Plan; however, it is only 14 % cooperative in the case of the presidential election. In brief, based on figure 15, it can be argued that the nature of the interaction in the case of Annan Plan is more cooperative than in the Presidential Election case. It can also be argued that the nature of the interaction in the presidential election is much more compete tive than in the case of Annan Plan.


Figure 15: Comparison of the Nature of Interactions

Figure 14 and 15 present the overall compared analysis of the actors based on each case and of the interactions based on each case. During this analysis, there appeared general observations which give some explanations about the nature of the interactions.

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6   CONCLUSION

The conclusion section presents the findings of the overall analysis and the theoretical and policy implications of this analysis.

6.1   Findings

In this thesis, it is argued that the high percentage of the cooperative style of interaction in the process of the Annan Plan discussions in 2004 could be explained by the presence and interests of the international actors which are argued as influencing actors in the interaction.   The results for the AKP and the military verify this argument. The presence of the international actors into the domestic politics makes conflictual political interaction more moderate and cooperative, while the absence of such actors leads relations to become more aggressive and competitive as well as make the actors take a sharper polarization which was an experienced in the process of the presidential election in 2007. More specifically, the presence of an international audience such as the United States and the European Union is the most important influencing factor over the interaction of the actors, Firstly, data analysis shows that the military was as neutral and cooperative as the AKP in the process of the Annan Plan in 2004; however, the military was as competitive as neutral but not cooperative at all in the process of the presidential election in 2007. Therefore, it could be argued that the absence of any influence of international actors would foster and encourage the competitive way of interaction such as the military intervention in the process of the presidential election in 2007. Such an impact is also related with the actor's own position in the international arena and relations. The military has many international relations in this sense such as its membership of NATO, the UN and the EU peacekeeping forces. Due to these relations, it can be claimed that the military did not take a position which could put it in conflict with the interests of the international

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audiences. Secondly, the AKP is the most cooperative actor in the process of the Annan Plan case together with the military. However, its nature of interaction completely changed in the case of Presidential Election case and AKP's interaction turned to be as competitive as the other actors. This conclusion is also explained by the presence and absence of the international audience as well as by the relationship of AKP with those audiences. In the case of the Annan Plan, the US and the EU were also supporting the resolution based on that plan and thus made statements to encourage parties of the Cyprus problem to reach a mutual agreement based on the Annan Plan. Hence, AKP was also supported by these international actors. Besides this, the AKP's relations with the EU for the EU candidacy and with the US in terms of strategic concerns and diplomatic responsibilities did not allow the AKP to pursue a conflictual policy with the domestic actors. Moreover, it was the AKP that wanted to start the negotiations over the Annan Plan in Cyprus, so that these curial relations provided the AKP with support forces and made its position very powerful in domestic discussions. Nevertheless, in the case of presidential election the absence of involvement of international actors provided the AKP to take a competitive stand and pursue its political goals in a competitive way of interaction. The AKP's relationship with the military was found to be held also in a competitive way and it was seen that the actors had taken polarized positions. On the other hand, the CHP is the only actor that has been the most competitive in each case. Its position and interaction has always received the highest score in both cases. This result shows us that the CHP, as a political party or as a main opposition party has not been influenced by the international audience. Furthermore, actually, the CHP has not had international relations with neither the US nor the EU in either case. Instead, its statements and speeches always reflected domestic concerns and the party's considerations.

Secondly, the main interaction had been actualized between the same actors but at the different level. In other words, the main interaction and the negotiation had been mostly taken place between the military and the AKP in the process of the Annan Plan in 2004. The actors came together in the NSC meetings, negotiated over the Annan Plan and Turkey's position to the Plan, and finally came to an agreement and developed a road map for Turkey's standing and role in the process. However, the main interaction had been mainly realized between the AKP and the CHP in the process of the presidential election in 2007. Although they did not come together and

negotiate the issue through meetings etc, they communicated through speeches in public or on TV. In fact, the way of interaction between these two actors was very competitive and the actors criticized and even blamed each other of the occurrence of crisis in the process.

Thirdly, the actors who took part in both cases are the same which are the AKP, the government party; the CHP, the main opposition party; and the Turkish Armed Forces, the military. Moreover, in both cases, it is seen that most of the time the ones who stated the party's position and opinion on the issue were the leaders of the political parties. On the military side, it was mainly the chief of the Turkish General Staff made the statements and explanations. The Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan is the one for the AKP and the president of the CHP Deniz Baykal is the one for CHP who made almost all the announcements, statements and public speeches.

Figure 16 and 17 present the summary of the analysis conducted for each case:

**Figure 16: International Stakeholder Present**

Figure 17: International StakeholderAbsent

6.2 Theory Implications

The first part of literature review consists of the presentation of the policy and decision making models, and veto player theory as well as the definitions of coalition building and interaction from the political science literature. The aim of the presentation is to visit relevant literature in order to find an applicable theory or methodology that might help to conduct this analysis. Therefore, models of policy and decision making and the veto player theory are presented: i) Richarson's 'Four-stage model', ii) Kingdon's 'Stream Metaphor', iii) Sabater's The Advocacy Coalition Framework', iv) 'Punctuated Equilibrium' as policy making models, v) Alison's Model II and Model II, vi) Putnam's model, vii) Hermann's 'Decision-Unit Framework and viii) Conn's Model on Political Decision Making. It is seen that some of these models are relevant with this research, yet they are not sufficient enough to assess the nature of the process which is analyzed in this thesis. The reason for this lies in the fact that these models have mostly been applied to either policy making process in parliament or foreign decision making process; however, the policy making

processes analyzed in this thesis are realized between both elected political parties in domestic politics (CHP and AKP) and the military. Additionally, because these models lack a way to assess the impact of the international actor on the domestic policy making process, it could be argued that the models and mechanisms presented above cannot be comprehensively and truly applicable to the analysis which is undertaken in this thesis.

In summary, none of these theories, models and explanations presented are directly relevant to what this research focuses on which is a dynamic political analysis and this lack necessitated to review the conflict resolution field. For this reason, the second section of literature review presents various definitions and models from the Conflict Resolution literature which focuses on interaction analysis. Specifically negotiation literature and the methodology of process tracing have been beneficial in order to create a theoretical framework in this research.

Consequently, because the existing process and decision making models have not been completely helpful to undertake this process analysis, I develop my own analysis schema and coded the data accordingly. Although this coding method is very new and only applied to these cases, it differently indicates and identifies the conflictual process and the interaction of parties to the conflict. Therefore, this unique property of this study constitutes the different foci of this thesis. To sum up, further studies can develop this model and may apply it to various process analyses of domestic as well as international politics.

6.3 Policy Implications

The Annan Plan case and the Presidential Election cases are both very essential and significant issues in Turkish domestic politics. It could be argued that there are four main issues in Turkish domestic politics, which are considered as taboos which can block any attempt to discuss them or any attempt to resolve them. They have been the Cyprus issue, the Armenian issue, the Kurdish issue, and secularism. Although the first three might relate to international actors and foreign politics, the domestic

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discussions which aim to change the status quo in relation to these issues are still considered as a threat to the unity of the state and the people. Secularism, which is one of the taboos, is very significant issue that has occupied the country's political agenda since it was established. It has always been believed that the secular characteristic of the state should be protected and any threat to this would be eliminated, immediately.

In this thesis, the answers for following researched questions are: *What is the nature of political interaction in Turkey? In what ways do the actors interact with each other in sensitive domestic political discussions? Do the structure of political environment and the existence of an international audience affect the actors' interaction and the nature of the interaction?* To begin with the first question, the nature of the political interaction in Turkey is traced through data analysis. Based on that analysis, on the one hand, the nature of domestic political interaction over the Annan Plan in 2004 is concluded to have taken place cooperatively. On the other hand, the political interaction of the presidential elections was shown to be competitive. The main motive for that difference is presented as the influence of the international actors such as the US and the EU and their relationships with the domestic actors. In this regard, my argument at the beginning of the thesis is supported. As an answer to the second question, it is indicated that the actors have interacted with each other cooperatively in the former case, but competitively in the latter one. Eventually the actors' interaction caused the nature of the interaction process to become either cooperative or competitive. Lastly, the structure of the political environment, which was formed with the existence and influence of the international actors, influenced the nature of the interaction as well as the interaction of the actors. It can be seen that the absence of such actors resulted in the process and the interaction being competitive and aggressive. Hence, what was argued in the beginning was clearly verified. The actor's interdependency with international actors is also another influential determinant in the conclusion. Taking this argument into consideration, it can be claimed that if a domestic actor has a strong and mutual relations with an international actor, then a domestic actor cannot position itself only according to its own interests without considering the interests of the international actor. Nevertheless, a domestic actor with limited involvement with the international community is able to take the liberty to show a competitive stand in achieving its political goals. Based on these arguments, future research may focus on other

domestic political debates such as, the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Cyprus issue, and secularism, in order to assess the impact of the international involvement on the nature of domestic political interactions. Methods and approaches taken in this research are believed to provide a starting point, a framework to investigate future case studies.

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