

**AN EVALUATION OF TURKISH LOCAL ELECTIONS FROM SECOND
ORDER ELECTIONS PERSPECTIVE**

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requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

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ORDER ELECTIONS PERSPECTIVE**

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Turkey, local elections, national elections, logistic regression, second order elections

The second order elections model is a useful tool to explain the dynamics of relationship between voting patterns at different level elections. The model envisages elections other than the national contests subordinate to the national elections, and calls them second order national contests. This study examines the patterns of relationship between Turkish local and national elections using the model of second order elections. Basic assumptions of the model; i.e. lower turnout in second order elections, dominance of national issues in voting decisions of voters, vote loss of incumbent parties in the face of rising votes for the smaller parties in second order contests, are tested using the data from Turkish local and national elections as well as a pre-election survey data.

The inquiry is conducted at two levels: At the aggregate level average turnout rates for different elections are compared. Also volatility, fragmentation and Effective Number of Parties (ENP) indices are calculated for each election. At the individual level a previously conducted pre-election survey data is utilized in order to build up a logistic regression model. The model controls for the effects of various socio-political, economic, ideological and candidate variables on the decision of voters to change or not to change votes between a national and a local election.

These analyses show that although dominated by the national issues (as expected by the model), local issues and candidates are important in Turkish local elections (contrary to the expectations) and local elections do not consistently work in favor of smaller parties.

Rather, they fit to national electoral trends, either by validating existing political trends or by signaling rise of a new arrangement in the political scene.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ YEREL SEÇİMLERİN İKİNCİ DERECE SEÇİMLER PERSPEKTİFİNDEN BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, yerel seçimler, genel seçimler, lojistik regresyon, ikinci derece seçimler

İkinci derece seçimler modeli farklı seviyelerde yapılan seçimlerde ortaya çıkan oy dağılımı kalıplarının birbirleriyle ilişkisini incelemek için kullanılan faydalı bir araçtır. Bu modele göre genel seçimler dışındaki yarışmalar bu seçimlerin sonuçlarına doğrudan bağımlı oldukları için ikinci derece seçimler olarak adlandırılırlar. Bu tez çalışmasında Türkiye'deki yerel ve genel seçimler arasındaki ilişki ikinci derece seçimler modeline göre incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda modelin temel varsayımları; ikinci derece seçimlerde katılımın düşük olması, ulusal konuların seçmenlerin oy davranışında temel etken olması, iktidar partileri ikinci derece seçimlerde oy kaybederken küçük partilerin kazançlı çıkması gibi varsayımlar Türkiye'deki seçim sonuçları ve anket verileri kullanılarak test edilmiştir.

İnceleme iki seviyede gerçekleştirilmiştir: Genel seviyede seçimlerde ortaya çıkan katılım oranları karşılaştırılmış, ayrıca her seçim için siyasal bölünme, seçimler arası oy oranlarında oynaklık ve Etkili Parti Sayısı dizinleri hesaplanmıştır. Bireysel seviyede daha önce yapılmış bir anketin verileri kullanılarak bir lojistik regresyon modeli oluşturulmuştur. Model sosyo-politik, ekonomik, ideolojik ve adaya bağlı tanımlanan çeşitli değişkenlerin seçmenlerin bir yerel ve bir genel seçim arasında oylarını değiştirme veya değiştirmeme kararları üzerindeki etkilerini kontrol etmektedir.

Yapılan analizler, modelin beklentileri doğrultusunda Türkiye'de yerel seçimlerde ulusal konuların oy verme davranışını büyük ölçüde etkilediği, ancak modelin beklentilerinin tersine yerel konuların ve adayların da yerel seçimler üzerinde etkili olduğunu, ayrıca yerel seçimlerin modelde beklendiği gibi her zaman küçük partilerin iktidar partilerine karşı yüksek sonuçlar aldığı seçimler olmadığını göstermiştir.

For Őükran Uyar and Türkan Alevcan

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis dissertation I want to study patterns of the relationship between Turkish local and national elections using the model of second order elections. The study will consist of two main parts, which will also be divided into two parts within themselves. In the literature review I will provide a general description of local government, elections held at the local level and their place within democratic systems. (Rallings and Trasher 1997) Prior to that, however,, the main part of the review on local elections will be devoted to studies that investigate the relationship between local and national elections and especially to the second order elections model. The second order elections model (Reif and Schmitt 1980) is a useful tool that explains the dynamics of voting patterns for different levels of elections. Although the basic model is constructed upon European Parliament elections, second order elections may vary from local to regional and European Parliament elections. Due to this variability, I will review second order elections literature extensively, and special emphasis will be given to studies that analyze local elections from second order perspective like Freire (2004) and Heath et.al. (1999).

The second part of the literature review will survey Turkish local administration and local electoral systems. I will first provide a brief historical introduction of the development of local government in Turkey (Keleş 2000, Özgür and Kösecik 2005, Bayraktar 2007). This part is important in order to understand the place of local elections in the Turkish democratic system. Points to be drawn here are the centralized nature of the Turkish polity and the relative unimportance of the local government; changes in the local administration after the 1980s; the growing importance of local authority as a consequence of immigration and urbanization, and the recent administrative reforms of 2005 that dealt with decentralization. Three levels of local administration in Turkey will be introduced here; namely provincial local government, municipalities and village administration (Polatoğlu 2000).

Village administration is not a concern of this study, so I will focus on provincial local government and municipal elections. At this point a critical evaluation of local elections, i.e. provincial local government and municipal elections, in Turkey will be made. When elections are held, what are the dominant issues during election campaigns, what are the electoral rules applied in local elections? Before beginning an analysis of elections according to second order elections model an introduction covering relevant, yet a very limited number of studies on local elections in the Turkish political science literature will be provided (Çitçi et.al. 2001, İncioğlu 2002, Kösecik 2005). This evaluation will portray the socio-political environment elections are held in and is expected to give preliminary ideas about the relationship between local and national elections.

The second main part will be devoted to data analysis. On the one hand, I will use election data, i.e. vote shares and turnout levels, at the aggregate level in order to test whether basic assumptions of the model hold for Turkish local elections. On the other hand, I will utilize survey data at the individual level in order to see whether voters take local issues into account more than national issues when casting their vote for local elections.

Basic assumptions of the second order model that will be discussed are as follows:

- i. Turnout is lower in second order elections
- ii. Minor parties gain votes against losses of the government parties in second order elections, but voters turn back to their original positions during the next first order election
- iii. Government losses are more pronounced in midterm period
- iv. Outcome is strongly related to incumbent popularity and national issues dominate the elections rather than election specific issues (Norris 1997).

If turnout is lower in local elections, if parties in office lose votes to smaller parties in local elections and they lose by even more in elections held in the midterm, and if people are voting with national issues in their minds rather than local ones, then we can argue that local elections can be regarded as second order races.

I will use aggregate data in order to test three assumptions. The first assumption is the easiest to test since all studies on local elections point to the fact that turnout is lower in local elections. So, even before compiling all turnout data for local and national elections we can say that turnout is expected to be lower in local elections.

In order to see if the second and third assumptions hold election data can be used. Comparisons of volatility, fragmentation and effective number of parties (ENP) indicators for local and national elections will tell us whether voters are freer in casting their votes in local elections.

Volatility index shows the ratio of voters that changed their vote from previous election to the current one (Pedersen 1979). According to the second order model, we would expect volatility to be higher in local elections since people feel freer to vote for smaller parties. Volatility can also be calculated as inter-block volatility, with blocks constituting leftist and rightist parties, and this would show if voters shift between two elections from rightist to leftist parties, or vice versa.

Fractionalization index (F) shows how much the electorate is divided in an election (Rae 1967). It is calculated using the percentage of votes for each party and varies between zero and one. Zero means one party gathers all votes, whereas one indicates the highest amount of fragmentation. ENP is calculated with the formula $1/(1-F)$ and shows the number of effective parties for an election (Taagepera and Shuggart 1989). In second order elections we would expect F to be closer to one and ENP to be higher when compared to national elections.

In general, if local elections are second order elections, where people vote more freely than with regard to national elections, then it should be expected that volatility, fragmentation and effective number of parties should be higher for local elections.

Instructive as they are, aggregate level analysis might not be sufficient to paint the whole picture about the relationship between local and national elections. A better study is possible by utilizing survey data and establishing models for voting behavior at different level elections. Some of the studies on second order elections do this type of analysis. Heath et. al. (1999) use logistic regression models that include variables like

government perception, previous vote and attitudes towards certain policies. They used data from the British Election Panel Study and found that for the 1994 elections British local and European Parliament elections qualified as second order elections. Freire (2004) also uses individual level data from various surveys and his OLS models certify that Portuguese local elections, although more close to national contests than European Parliament elections, also show second order characteristics.

In order to test the last assumption there is not enough individual level data at hand. Actually, it is a methodological question whether suitable survey data can be obtained regarding this issue because depending on the timing of the survey it is highly probable that answers regarding voting behavior at local and general elections would be contaminated by each other. If the survey is held in a time when there is no prospect of elections the respondents would answer according to national political concerns and their local voting behavior would be contaminated by national politics. On the other hand, if the survey is conducted near local elections the risk of contamination is the other way around; while answering the survey the respondent's choice for municipal candidate could reflect itself as the vote choice for the general elections as well.

In order not to test the second orderness directly but in order to test the factors that might be influential over voters in changing or not changing their vote between elections I will construct a binary logit model by using data from the Survey of Electoral Intentions conducted in December 2003 by Türkiye Ekonomik Sosyal ve Siyasal Araştırma Vakfı (TÜSES) and Veri Arastırma, a private research company. The survey is the sixth wave of a series that is conducted by the company using identical methodology and sampling. Numerous books and articles are published on these data. (Tüses 2004) The last survey was conducted in 26 (out of 81) provinces of Turkey on a nationally representative sample. The original sample included 1,806 individuals at or above the voting age of 18 (Başlevent et. al. 2009). This model is expected to show which factors influence changes in voting patterns and some lessons about the nature of two different elections can be drawn from here.

In the survey respondents are asked their last vote choice, which party they would vote for if national elections were held today, which party candidate they would vote for in municipal elections, along with a series of questions that elaborate their choice in the

local elections such as; “Would you vote for the party or the candidate in the local elections?”; “Would you vote for a party in municipal elections that normally you wouldn’t just because you like its candidate” and “Do you think it’s a good thing for your mayor to be a member of the governing party?”.

Party identification, respondents’ left-right placement of themselves and respondents’ evaluation of the government’s economic performance are other indicators that can be used in the analysis. Also, the survey asks respondents about their opinions on the decentralization of government with two questions, “Would you prefer education services to be delivered by the central government or the local authorities” and “Would you prefer health services to be delivered by the central government or local authorities”. In addition, traditional demographic information can be gathered from the survey such as age, education, gender and religiosity.

I will construct a model where the dependent variable is the vote switch between general and local elections. The reference category for the binary logistic model, $y=0$, is voting for the same party in local and general elections and $y=1$, in cases where vote choice for municipality elections is different from the vote choice for general elections. Explanatory factors are demographic variables; age, gender, education and religiosity, candidate identity’s effect on respondents vote choice, respondent’s economic evaluation of the government, left-right placement and party identification. I would expect that the probability of a vote switch is higher for voters who say the candidate himself is more important than the party of a candidate. Religiosity is expected to be non-influential for this case, because AKP voters tend to be more religious and AKP voters in the sample are as high as 60%. Negative economic evaluation of the government is expected to decrease the probability of voting for the same party. The effects of the demographic factors remain to be seen.

These aggregate and individual level analyses can give us clues about whether local elections in Turkey are second level elections. It is expected that although some assumptions of the model will hold true, like lower turnover in local elections and dominance of national issues in the local election period, some assumptions, like small parties gaining votes in local elections and voters turning back to their original positions after voting differently in local elections is not expected to fit the Turkish case.

CHAPTER I: SECOND ORDER ELECTIONS MODEL

Voting is the basic participatory tool for democracies. Modes of democratic participation have expanded considerably over the years. Conventional and unconventional ways of participation have appeared. Some scholars have even become concerned that political participation has expanded to the point that the distinction between political and non-political activities has become blurred (Van deth 2001). However, participating in the elections is still the most conventional most influential and one may argue fundamental way of political participation. The history of democracy is in a way similar to the history of polities trying to set a standard for the franchise vote versus people fighting to earn their right to vote. In today's world the right to vote is an inalienable right of democratic citizens.

Actually, the question now is not about who is eligible to vote, as virtually all adults are eligible, but rather it has become a question as to why people are participating less in elections. Average turnout is in decline in most of the established democracies (Franklin 2004). As many cleavages like left-right, urban-rural and modern-post modern affect voting decisions, one of the major factors in voting is the nature and frequency of elections. In the US, for instance, citizens cast their vote in order to elect the president, state senators, governor, mayor and a vast array of city officials from the sheriff to the attorney general. In Europe, the number of elections is quite less. Actually, an average British citizen living in Oxford casts a vote four times in a five year period, whereas an average resident of Irvine, California has the opportunity to participate in elections nearly four times in a single year (Dalton 2004: 42).

It has been argued that the number and variety of elections leads people to vote less in general in what has been called "voter fatigue"(Dalton 2004: 39-40). For this or that reason turnout is in decline in many democracies. Another effect of the increasing number of voting arenas is that voters are now choosing between elections. The number of elections is extremely high in the US, as mentioned, but to be frank the US is an

outlier in this sense. However, even when you think in the European context people have to cast their votes in many different electoral arenas. The previously mentioned Oxford resident who votes four times in five years probably had to participate in at least three different levels of elections; national, local and European. If he would have been a Spanish citizen living in Barcelona there would be an additional level, the regional one.

In some elections voters don't even care to vote, but when they participate in elections at different levels what is their motivation for casting their votes? What are the criteria for an American voter to choose party in Congressional elections? Are they different from the ones employed in the presidential elections? Do time span between two different elections matter? When a German votes in the Land elections is he really concerned about the Land or is he signaling parties at the federal level with his vote? Last but not least, do European elections have a European character or are they mere reflections of national political debates of each member state?

Of course the answers to these questions changes from one electoral system to another, from one institutional setting to the other one. Together with the development of the political science discipline the first research on the nature of different elections were made in the US. In the US, congressional elections take place two years after presidential elections. This means that they also take place two years before new presidential elections. These congressional elections are called midterm elections and, as they are made at the exact midpoint of two presidential elections, they provide an excellent opportunity to see how the past election at one electoral level (in this case the presidential) affect another at a different level (in this case congressional), and how this in turn affects the next election at the first level. There is a vast literature on the American congressional elections (Jacobson 1992, Niemi and Weisberg 1993).

The main lessons drawn from this literature are; first turnout is lower in these elections and second, the president's party's vote is lower (Reif 1985: 9). When government popularity indices are examined it is seen, not only in US but in democracies allover, that the winning party or coalition's support shows an increase right after the election, then takes a dive near the midterm election period, only to surge to its next equilibrium near the next election. With these insights, it is not surprising that midterm elections in the US, which are carried out at a time the governing president's

popularity has already decreased or about to decrease, reflect this trend. Reif derives the lesson that a midterm election loss does not predict a loss in the next election for the governing party (1985: 9).

The main thrust of this is the assumption that voters see elections at different levels with different eyes and vote accordingly. They think presidential elections are more important than congressional elections. That's why they show up less in congressional elections and vote according to their views of the current government rather than the credentials of the congressional candidates. Does this translate into other political systems? It is argued that it does under the rubric of "second order election model" (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

This terminology was developed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) after the 1979 European Elections in their seminal work "Nine Second-Order National Elections: a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results". Looking at the first European election results Reif and Schmitt argued that European elections should not be seen as supranational "European elections" but only as "second order national elections". First order elections are the ones where national governments are elected and national parliament seats are distributed. General elections in parliamentary systems like Turkey, Britain, the Netherlands or presidential elections like the US or Costa Rica can be given as examples of first order national elections (Norris 1997: 111).

Second order national elections on the other hand, decide outcomes of lesser offices like regional governments, local councils and municipal posts and these elections are open to the influences of national politics. In the words of Jeffrey and Hough, "They present voters with little extra stimulus than that with which they were already confronted in the first order national elections" (2003: 200). Although they base their model on the European elections, according to Reif and Schmitt all "by-elections, municipal elections, various sorts of regional elections, those to a second chamber and the like" should be counted as second order national elections (1980: 8). European elections are just another version of these second elections.

Reif and Schmitt (1985: 8) emphasize that the outcome of second order elections are for the most part a reflection of debates and discussions in the national arena:

If we want to “understand” the results of European elections, we have to bear in mind, just as with any other second-order election, that not only the usual array of long term variables influencing the vote and the short term factors of the particular second order arena determine the result of these elections, but that, in various ways, the political situation of the first-order arena at the moment when second-order elections are being held, plays an important, if not decisive, role in determining the results of the second-order election.

If we are to point out the basic premises of the second order model we can enumerate four major points:

- i. Turnout is lower in second order elections because “less is at stake” than in first order elections.
- ii. Smaller parties are likely to gain support in second order elections. There will be less tactical voting, because voters will feel freer to vote what is in their minds without the fear of wasting votes.
- iii. Governing parties are more likely to lose votes in midterm second order elections while the opposition gains support.
- iv. Voters are aware that although they can punish incumbents either by voting with their hearts in second order elections, instead of tactical voting or voting for another party in order to signal grievances with current policies, they can return to their original positions “when it really matters” in the next first order election. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 200)

This first/second order elections distinction is now the established framework of analysis for European elections. (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Marsh 1998; Jeffrey and Hough 2003; Hix and Marsh 2007) Marsh (1998) analyzes the relationship between European and national elections by replicating Reif and Schmitt’s work with four sets of European election results. His findings “underline essential insights of the second order election model” (1998: 606). There is clearly an anti-government change in the votes and votes shifted from bigger parties to smaller ones.

One important point made by Marsh is the distinction between countries where parliamentary elections are about government formation, in his words alternation, like Britain or Germany and countries where even parliamentary elections are more about

expressing political identity rather than government formation, which is non-alternation. Actually his addition of this distinction to the analysis also verifies second order insights. In alternation countries where parliamentary elections have a genuine first order character second order effects are more stressed. However, in countries where even the general elections lack a first order character, i.e the Netherlands, the difference between national and European elections are less visible. (Marsh 1998: 606-607)

In a recent article Hix and Marsh (2007) sought to find an answer to the question of whether or not European voters still use European elections to punish national parties or use their votes with European issues in mind. In their analysis of six sets of European elections held between 1979-2004 it appears that European elections are still considered by the voters to be of the second order category. According to their findings, 40% of the vote change between European and national elections is a consequence of the transfer of votes from larger parties to the smaller parties (Hix and Marsh 2007: 495). Although they find that anti-EU parties fare better in elections the effect of overall European concerns seems to be minor. Hix and Marsh conclude that “European elections should not be seen as solely second order national elections. However, “Europe” remains at best a minor element in these elections in most cases. While the EU itself has undergone very significant change since its first European Parliament elections in 1979, these general findings were as true in 2004 and they were in 1979” (Hix and Marsh 2007: 506).

1. Local Elections and Second Order Election Model

Local elections are an integral part of democratic systems all over the world. Local governments are formed through local elections and it is argued by some scholars that the democratic ethos of a political system is represented through elections held at the grassroots level where people choose executives who run the offices that are of most immediate concern to them (Çukurçayır 2002, Keleş 2000, Görmez 1997). However, it is interesting to see that local elections all over the world are considered of secondary importance with respect to national contests. This is true both for the constituencies,

because turnout rates trail those of national elections, and for scholars studying electoral politics. It is argued that national political issues are the main determinant of voting behavior at the local level, rather than local issues that are ideally expected to be the main concern of voters (Köseçik 2005: 254).

Since every year local by-elections are held in some constituencies in Britain, local elections literature is relatively rich in British political science. Rallings and Trasher in their book “Local Elections in Britain,” (1997) try to make their case for the importance of local elections in Britain and argue that local elections have local breadth, at least to some extent. On the other hand, many scholars see local elections as “little more than referenda on the current standing of the national political parties” (Newton 1976 in Rallings and Trashers 1997). Another view sees local elections as “state sponsored public opinion polls” (Rallings and Trasher 1988 in Köseçik 2005: 254). Again, according to Alexander local elections can be evaluated as a vote of confidence by the electorate for the policies of the national government (Alexander 1982 in Köseçik 2005).

It appears that there is a consensus on the secondary importance of local elections. One wonders whether this consensus is the reason for the lack of systematic studies on the potential link between local and national elections results. As cited above, many scholars argue on the case, however, the arguments are either based on how local elections are covered in the media on the issues debated by national parties or on the idea that local election results resemble national election results. However, these claims are not investigated in their own right most of the time (for exceptions see Freire 2004, Heath et.al. 1999, Rallings and Trasher 1997).

Here, I would like to enter the topic of the second order elections model. The second order model fares successfully through many rounds of European Parliament elections. Yet, although the model is devised after European elections, as mentioned before it is not limited to European elections. All regional, local, and municipal elections are deemed second order elections. Surprisingly however, the second order election model is only limitedly used beyond European elections. This is all the more surprising when we consider that the very first study on the relationship of different levels of elections in the European scene was made in 1977 by the German political

scientist Rainer Dinkel (1977), who studied the relationship between German Land elections and federal elections.

Dinkel tested the hypothesis that in Germany parties in the federal government suffer losses in regional elections. He calculated “expected vote share” for parties in the Land elections. Expected vote share for a party in a given Land is the average of that party’s vote in two consecutive federal elections in that Land. If a party had 40% in a Land in one federal election and 30% in the next one, then the expected vote share for the party in the regional Land election is 35%, the average of two federal elections. He found that in almost all instances federal government parties fared worse than expected in the Land elections. Dinkel also checked for electoral cycle effects and found that federal government parties performed worse when Land elections were in the midterm. Government parties still underperform in regional elections, but when regional elections are held at the beginning or at the end of the electoral cycle their losses are less than in midterm elections. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 201)

Despite this early first attempt, the literature analyzing second order elections other than the European elections has been barren until recently. Most of the few studies treating local elections as second order elections use British election data. McLean et. al. for instance, differentiates between second order elections and argues that “some second order elections are more second order than others” (1996: 4).

Another study by Heath et. al (1999) similarly argued that the second order election model applies to British local elections, albeit with less force than it applies to European elections. I find Heath et. al.’s contribution to the literature especially important because they employ individual level survey data in their analysis which is lacking both in the initial analysis of Reif and Schmitt and in most of the ensuing literature. Studies on second order elections are mostly working on aggregate election data and this is a weakness for a model that bases itself on assumptions about individual voting behavior. Heath et. al.’s study confirms aggregate level results at the individual level, however with a modification: British voters consider local elections as less second order than European elections because “more is at stake” in local elections (Heath et. al. 1999: 406).

Recently it has been discovered that the second order election model could be useful in studying elections in multilevel (federal) systems. European Urban and Regional Studies Journal devoted a specific issue to multilevel electoral competition (2003 vol. 10(3)) In many articles in that issue the second order election model was used in order to explain the relationship between regional and national elections. Jeffrey and Hough (2003) reemployed Dinkel's methodology in order to compare election results in two countries, Germany and Spain. They also used a dissimilarity index in order to measure how much the vote share of each party differed from national to local elections.

Jeffrey and Hough found limited support for the second order election model with German and Spanish data. In Spain, the federal government party received less than the expected vote share, as calculated with Dinkel's method. However, contrary to expectations, they fared better in midterm elections than at other times. Also, opposition parties received nearly the same amount of votes as the governing parties and they did worse in midterm elections, although they were expected to do well (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 202-204). In Germany, on the other hand the data confirms Dinkel until 1990. Yet, after reunification the east-west cleavage gained significance. After 1990 federal parties performed worse in regional elections, not because the opposition did well, but rather because smaller parties outperformed themselves as defenders of territorial interests. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 204-205)

Authors conclude that in places where territorial cleavages are not deep regional and general elections show similar patterns and as predicted by the second order election model regional election results are mainly subject to developments in the national arena. On the other hand, where territorial homogeneity is lost and regions are more vocal about their demands, which may include demands for independence as, in Spain, then the second order character of regional elections is diminished. Regional concerns become more dominant in determining election results. Moreover, even within the same country some regional elections carry second order election character, whereas some of them differentiate themselves from the yoke of the national arena and operate under a dominant regional logic. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 210-211).

“In sum, the obvious analytical lens for exploring regional elections, that of ‘second orderliness’ is found wanting. Regional elections are evidently less open to domination by statewide debates than, say, European or local elections” (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 211).

Although the conclusion they have reached seems plausible a methodological note should be made on Jeffrey and Hough’s study. Different research supports the idea that second orderliness of different elections may change, however Jeffrey and Hough’s study is marred with methodological and data problems in reaching this conclusion.

First of all, Dinkel’s model is a very simplistic one with only one explanatory variable. At a time when the electoral process is becoming more diverse and complicated it is naïve to use Dinkel’s methodology and to explain this complex relationship between voters and multilevel administrative units.

More importantly, Jeffrey and Hough arbitrarily choose four Autonomous Communities of Spain, namely Castilla-La-Mancha, Catalonia, Galicia and Extremadura and analyzes their election results. Spain has 17 Autonomous Communities and we are not presented with any justification as to why these four communities are included in the study. Probably, if the analysis is made with election results from all communities we would see a different picture, one where the second order character of regional elections is more pronounced with some regional modifications.

As more studies are done on local and regional elections as second order elections it becomes apparent that “not all second order contests are the same” (Rallings and Trasher 2005). Parliamentary and/or presidential elections have supremacy over others because “more is at stake”, yet it is rational to expect a rank-order between different second order elections and research seems to support this argument. Also in multilevel systems it is possible that different regions show different characteristics in the same second order election.

Pallarés and Keating (2003) in their study of Spanish elections find that the second order model holds to a great extent for the Spanish case, albeit with some

modifications. Especially in Catalonia and in the Basque country regional concerns are more emphasized than national ones. This leads Pallarés and Keating to conclude that although the second order model generally holds true, “there is a constant interaction between the two levels and, while state-level arena and party system may be dominant, it has been conditioned in important ways by the process of decentralization” (2003: 252). Recently new works appeared surveying the applicability of second order election model to local elections outside Britain (Freire 2004) and some others compared different second order elections with each other (Skrinis and Teperoglou 2006).

With respect to treating local elections as second order two studies especially stand out: Freire (2004) and Heath et. al.(1999). Before turning to local elections in Turkey I would like to discuss Freire extensively because I borrowed a great deal of his methodology in my analysis of Turkish local elections. Freire, in his article titled “Second Order Elections and Democratic Cycles in Democratic Portugal” first describes the party system and electoral system in Portugal and then compares national elections, European Parliament elections and local elections in Portugal using a number of tools. He uses these tools at two levels: In the aggregate level he compares turnout rates and volatility in the electoral system for different level elections. At the individual level he constructs an OLS model that measures the impact of ideological and socio-demographic factors in different level elections. Finding that ideological and socio-demographic factors are more successful in explaining national elections, he concludes that people are more likely to change their votes in second order elections. I will use a similar methodology in the ensuing analysis in order to distinguish between first and second order elections. But before that I shall discuss literature on local elections in Turkey.

2. Local Elections Literature in Turkey

The picture drawn in the literature for local elections in the world is more or less the same for Turkey. Turnout rates are lower for local elections in Turkey as they are in other parts of the world. According to Çitçi (1989, 1996) voting behavior at the local

level is determined by national political concerns; Falay et. al. (1996) argues that conducting all local elections (municipality, headsman, provincial local government elections) in one day keeps voters out of focus on the local agenda and voting according to the national agenda becomes more convenient. According to Kalaycıoğlu (1994) the distribution of municipalities in local elections and the distribution of MPs in national elections resemble each other, and this leads one to question the locality of local elections (cited in Kösecik 2005). Similarly, İncioğlu (2002) points out that local election results fit into national patterns until joint elections in 1999. These analyses describing the relative unimportance of local elections in the face of national elections partly reflect global patterns, but also point to the centralist tendencies of the Turkish state and the weakness and unimportance of local government, and hence the unimportance of local elections (Polatoğlu 2000, Bayraktar 2007).

When we look at the literature on Turkish politics it is seen that studies on local elections are conspicuously scarce. Actually we can talk about a scarcity of studies on elections in general in the Turkish political science literature (Sayarı and Esmer 2002) and an incredibly small amount of that limited literature is devoted to local elections. Nonetheless, a review of the existing literature on local elections follows.

Özcan (2000) looks at determinants of voting behavior at the individual level by analyzing data from the 1987 and 1991 national elections and the 1989 local elections in İstanbul. Özcan does not include variables to distinguish between national and local elections and finds that some variables (previous vote choice and religiosity) affected voting behavior in the 1987 national and 1989 local elections. His predictions for the 1991 elections included many more socio-economic variables including, inter alia, age, region of birth, political attitudes and father's education. The main argument of Özcan's paper is that early socialization and previous party preferences have an effect on voting behavior. Özcan not only argues that the same variables affect voting behavior at different level elections, but also does not care to differentiate between national and local elections in his models.

İncioğlu (2002) provides an overview of local administration in Turkey and then makes a descriptive analysis of electoral behavior in the 1999 local elections for a number of selected provinces. These elections are important in the sense that in 1999

local and national elections were held at the same time. According to her inferences from this descriptive analysis, in some provinces where there is a strong Islamist contender national and local vote choices differ, but in provinces where centralist parties compete local vote preferences parallel national preferences.

Akarca and Tansel (2006) analyze the role of the economy in Turkish elections by using results from national and local elections together. With a sample of 25 national, local and by-elections they investigate the effect of economic variables on voting behavior and find that Turkish voters take economic factors into account in their vote choices, but only look one year back when making their assessment. They also find that incumbents lose votes in elections due to the depreciation of their political capital and, more importantly, that opposition parties gain more votes in local and by-elections since voters use these elections as an opportunity to diffuse power.

In a recent study Çulhaoğlu (2007) investigates the determinants of turnout in national and local elections. Her models test how socio-economic, institutional and party system variables determine turnout in national and local elections. She finds an increasing impact of socio-economic variables for election turnout in all types of elections. Although turnout for local elections is traditionally lower, Çulhaoğlu points to similar patterns of fluctuation observed in the turnout for both national and local elections.

Other than these analytical studies the works of Tuncer (1994), Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2000, 2004) and Turan (2008) are important for local elections literature. These studies are invaluable data sources for Turkish local elections. Tuncer (1994, 2000) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) provide detailed data at the provincial level for 1994, 1999 and 2004 local elections, respectively. Turan (2008) gives an overview of local elections since Turkey's first elections, gives general data for each election like overall vote shares, mayorships, and the number of municipal parliament members won by each party for the three big cities of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Turan also describes the socio-economic and political developments of each election period and gives anecdotal evidence as to why the winners and losers of elections won and lost votes. As valuable as they are, these studies, especially Tuncer's, are nothing but compilations of data on local elections. They document rather than analyze local elections.

The same problem that I already cited surfaces here as well. We do not have systematic studies on the nature of local elections. That is to say, we do not know whether local elections precede or succeed national patterns nor we do we know if there are common factors shaping voting behavior in all local elections. Furthermore, we also don't know if there are election specific factors influential at different levels in different elections unless studied within a common model. Unless studied at the level of individual survey data, it is also unclear whether voters cast their ballots in local and national elections with the same determining factors in mind. I believe that the second order elections model, which I already elaborated above, can be a useful tool in order to study the relationship between local and national elections.

Before analyzing Turkish local election patterns with respect to national elections and how they fit the second order elections model, I should give a historical analysis of the Turkish local administration and the development of legislation on local administrations both in terms of structure and electoral rules. This is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II: LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN TURKEY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

In this chapter I will present a portrait of local administration in Turkey. The presentation will start with the historical development of local administration, followed by a description of its bureaucratic structure. These are important in order to determine the importance of local government and hence the importance of local elections in Turkey. Related to local elections the basic characteristics of the electoral system in local elections will also be introduced in the last part of the chapter. This will prepare the ground for an analysis of local election results compared to national elections at the aggregate level.

1. Historical Development of Local Administration in Turkey

Any study on the history of local administration in Turkey is bound to start with the historical legacy of the Ottoman era and the bureaucratic state tradition coming from that period. The dominant centralist state structure and its effective control of other sources of power is often mentioned in terms of a center-periphery duality with differing visions of the state and modernization (Mardin 1973). Heper (1985, 1997) also asserts the same point. According to him “the Ottoman political system evinced characteristics neither of patriomonalism nor of different versions of feudalism. The system had unmistakable signs of bureaucratic centralism-domination, if not a smothering, of civil society” (1997: 26).

These features also translated into a lack of local administration in the Ottoman times; until the nineteenth century there was nearly no interaction between the center and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire. (Keleş 1992 in Çelenk 2009: 46) The local

affairs were run by unofficial networks and the state's interest in local affairs was limited to tax collecting and conscription at times of war. The occurrence of local administrative bodies was only seen in the nineteenth century after the Empire decided to open itself to the world both politically and economically. One should also note the effect of the creation of corporate local administration bodies by Western powers aiming to strengthen the status of religious minorities in the Empire (Heper 1997: 27).

Local administrative councils were established and strengthened after the Tanzimat Edict of 1839. However, the first municipality was only established in 1855 in Istanbul and its council members and head were appointed by the central government. It was not until 1913 that provincial administrations acquired a corporate status (Heper 1997: 26). According to Ortaylı (2000) "the local administrative institutions were the product of efforts by the central bureaucracy to establish more efficient political control over empire" and according to Köker (1995) "the local assemblies were primarily loyal to the centre instead of the local community" (cited in Çelenk 2009: 46). Decentralization did not go beyond 'deconcentration,' in the words of Heper (1997), and this was evinced in the Municipal Law of 1877 which "established a tutelage over local administrative bodies and perceived them as an extension and representative of the central authority" (Ortaylı 2000, cited in Çelenk 2009: 46).

This was not much of a tradition to be transferred from the Empire to the newly established Turkish Republic. The status of local administration in the Turkish Republic shows some continuity in that local governments are weak.. This continuity was further reinforced by a group of ruling elites with a mindset that was skeptical of society's ability to govern itself. In the words of Atatürk "there is a need at the beginning of any understanding, to go not from below upwards but from above downwards" (quoted by Rustow 1991, cited in Bayraktar 2007).

Against this backdrop, at the very beginning of the republic, actually before the declaration of the republic, there was a short period of local administrative autonomy that had never been enjoyed before. The 1921 constitution envisaged an autonomous local administration. Accordingly, departments and villages were to be administered by local councils which were selected for two years and appointed their own presidents. These bodies were responsible for arranging public services related to local foundations,

education, health, economy, agriculture and charity (Bayraktar 2007). This rather unusual arrangement of local administration, however, was not long lived and with the new constitution of 1924 these regulations were altered in favor of the central authority. According to Bayraktar (2007) this exceptional situation occurred because of the dominance of local notables in the First Assembly. The center took the ropes of power into its own hands after elections were held and the Second Assembly had convened in 1924. The Law on Villages was accepted in 1924. The idea was to draft separate laws for different levels of local administration but later this idea was dropped. Instead, a universal municipal law was accepted and came into effect in 1930. This law stayed in effect for 75 years until it was replaced in 2005.

According to many sources this law was designed as a municipal system that was an extension of the central government responsible for carrying out public services at the local level. The municipal system was structured at three levels; provincial local administration, municipalities and villages. A uniform municipal structure was set up in the whole country regardless of cultural, economic or geographic differences. The law stipulated numerous duties for local administrations like urban infrastructure, town planning, control of clean food, health services, cultural activities, housing etc. However local bodies were never endowed with the necessary material and human capital to fulfill these duties. Local resources were transferred to the central authority and distributed from there to municipalities; the planning and funding of public works was carried out by state agencies like the Bank of Municipalities (Bayraktar 2007).

Local governments were subject to directions from several ministries and had nearly no chance of doing something on their own due to lack of resources and authority. The system was based on the “principle of delegation not devolution”. Even mayors needed to be approved by the Interior Ministry in order to be sworn in and start their job. Accordingly, the center held the idea that “the central and local governments together formed a unified entity” (Heper 1997: 28). Of course this entity was to be controlled by the center and local administrative bodies were banned from making decisions on political issues by the 1930 Municipal Law.

Multi-party elections were introduced in 1946, however, not much changed to adapt the local administration to the multi-party system. In fact, local administrations

were tied more closely to the bureaucratic control of the center. Until the 1970s, officials in control of local administrations and the governing party often belonged to the same party. When the municipality was not from the government party, then the system added partisan political pressures onto the already tight central control which enfeebled local administration.

After the military coup of 1960 a new constitution was established in 1961. This constitution, as it did in other parts of the administrative system, brought about significant changes in local administration. However, a question mark remained whether the spirit of the constitution could be transferred to the actual functioning of local administration through the necessary laws and regulations. The 1961 constitution called for the separation of central and local government. It was the 1961 constitution that regulated local administrations as constitutional bodies. (Turan 2008: 103) One of the most significant changes was the abolition of direct control by the central government over the local government and the commissioning of an independent judiciary for the inspection local authorities. The 1961 constitution foresaw decentralization and greater autonomy for local administrations. For instance, until 1963 mayors were elected by municipal councils that could take office only after the president ratified the selection after it was offered to him by Ministry of Interior Affairs. This was subsequently changed and mayors began to be elected directly by the electorate (Turan 2008: 104). Though symbolic, this shows the new constitution's vision of local administration. That said, this does not change the fact that changes introduced by the new constitution were mainly symbolic and far from creating a truly decentralized local administration.

According to the constitution, "the administration formed a whole with its organization and functions and the centre-local relations were based on the principle of deconcentration". This principle allowed the center to have branches at the local level that would act on behalf of the center along with elected local bodies (Çelenk 2009: 47). According to Heper central governments were only interested in local governments to the extent they could contribute to national economic development (1997: 29-30). Also, with the new planned economic policy put forth by the central government increasing amounts of public spending was undertaken with the help of the new local branches of the central government. From 1960 to 1972 the share of the local governments within

total public revenues decreased from 16,35% to 5,67%. In the urban planning area, the responsibility of local government regarding public works and urbanism were transferred to the central authority (Bayraktar 2007).

In the 1970s persisting problems of local administration became more and more severe. There are a couple of reasons for this. First of all, Turkey had been urbanizing at high rate since the end of World War II. In 1975 the proportion of population living in municipalities, that is the urban population, had reached 57%. In comparison it was only 23% in 1927. During the same period of nearly 50 years, the number of municipalities increased from 460 to 1654 (Heper 1997: 29). In spite of this the basic legislation of the 1930 Municipal Law stayed intact. The ratio of municipal revenues to public revenues stayed the same, meaning that despite the increasing number of municipalities no new revenue had been generated for local administrative bodies. The economic and legislative arrangements were far from responding to the rapidly urbanizing society and this exacerbated the problems of municipalities.

Moreover, especially in the second part of the 1970s cohabitation occurred; the municipalities of big cities were captured by center-left parties whereas the government was most of time in the hands of center-of-the-right coalition parties. In this context, the traditional ignoring of the local administration by the government turned into a competition between different political fractions. This led to an increase of administrative tutelage of the center over municipalities. The answer to problem was the new municipalism movement born from a collective effort of a number of social democratic mayors. This movement aimed to include all social classes into the decision making process and asked for devolution rather than the delegation of power. However, this movement turned out to be unfruitful and when we came to 1980 municipalities were gripping with increasing “urban problems, inadequate resources and domineering central governments” (Heper 1997: 30)

The new political system initiated after the 1980 military coup brought further centralization in every aspect of political life, including local administration at the beginning. However, after the return to a multi-party system and the start of the Motherland Party government in 1983, a relative strengthening of municipalities in terms of authority and financial resources was observed. For instance, the financial

resources of municipalities were doubled between 1980 and 1986, and tripled between 1980 and 1993, rising from 4.65% to 13.4% of national budget (Bayraktar 2007). One should note that these financial resources were still in control of the central government. As a result the autonomy of the municipalities was linked to whether the government party in office was also in the municipal executive. In the case of cohabitation, as it was seen in the 1970s, the central authority turned the screws to limit the acting space of the municipalities.

One of the most important developments of the post-1980 period was the creation of metropolitan municipalities in 1984 (Heper 1987). Metropolitan municipalities were first established in the most populous urban centers of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir and then gradually their numbers increased. Currently there are 16 metropolitan municipalities. The Metropolitan Municipalities Law of 1984 brought a two-tiered municipal administration. District municipalities were preserved but above districts a new Metropolitan municipality was erected. Additional resources and services, some from the central government like Interior Ministry and Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement and some from the districts, were transferred to metropolitan municipalities (Çelenk 2009: 48). Also, the same law that created metropolitan municipalities gave the right to prepare and approve urban plans.

The 1990s and 2000s passed with debates and attempts on the decentralization of local administration. Some of these attempts succeeded, while others remained mere proposals. In 1998, the Prime Ministry tried to introduce a “Draft Law on Public Administration Reform,” however, this did not go anywhere. Another draft was introduced in 2001, however, this draft also could not be debated in the parliament before the elections. The main objection during public debates on these drafts was the claim that these reform attempts were harming the unitary structure of the state. Decentralization is seen not from the perspective of local democracy, but rather from the perspective of maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. Similar concerns were also voiced during debates on the draft law on public administration reform in 2003 (Çelenk 2009). However, this time the reform draft was voted on in parliament and accepted. Although vetoed by the president after this initial acceptance, this reform draft, which was actually a series of laws on SPAs, municipalities, metropolitan municipalities and Basic Principles of Public Administration and Its Reformation,

finally came into effect and it appears as the single most important attempt to reform and democratize the local administration of Turkey. With these laws the tutelage of the center was alleviated, the resources of local administrations have expanded and various units within local administrative bodies have been strengthened and become more open to participation (Turan 2008: 377-382)

2. Structure of Local Administration in Turkey

There are three layers of local administration in Turkey: Special provincial administrations (SPA), municipalities and villages.

Special provincial administration represents the hand of the central government in the local arena. In each province, which currently amounts to 81, SPAs are established. They are charged with assisting central government agencies at the local level. SPA has an idiosyncratic structure constituted with a mixture of local elections and appointments by the center. It consists of the Provincial General Council and the Provincial Standing Committee. The Provincial General Council members are elected by popular vote from districts and the number of members to be elected from each district is determined according to the population of the district. Elections for Provincial General Council are held together with municipal elections. The Provincial General Council convenes once a year in order to decide and control yearly public services to be provided and approves the budget.

The Provincial Standing Committee is the executive branch of the Special Provincial Administration. The Standing Committee consists of members elected by the General Council from among its members. This committee examines accounts and controls the operations of public services. The governor is an important part of the provincial administration because it is the representative of the center. Governors are appointed by the center to each province, they are not popularly elected and until the massive changes in the local administration in 2005, the governor was the natural president of the Provincial General Council. Also, until the aforementioned changes

were made in the law, the decisions of the General Council and the Standing Committee was subject to approval by the governor (Polatoğlu 2000: 158). Until recently, a local branch, whose members are popularly elected, was subject to government tutelage. Although it has a secondary role SPA has many duties, which are comfortably conducted by municipalities as in any other established democracy. The duties of a SPA are to help build roads, bridges, hospitals, various educational facilities, establish chambers, open bazaars, exhibitions etc. (Bindebir 2004: 16-17). However, until recently the financial resources of SPAs were insufficient in allowing them to fulfill these duties.

In the new Special Provincial Council Law accepted by the National Assembly in 2005 natural presidency of the governor is abolished, it is stipulated that the General Council chooses its president among its members. Also the obligation of approval of the governor for General Council decisions is abolished. Another change is made in the Basic Principles of Public Administration and its Reformation Law also came into effect in 2005. According to the provisions of this law all local branches of the central administration are to be abolished and all their duties together with their budget, revenues, physical resources and properties will be handed over to the Special Provincial Administration. This is seen as an important step in creating a new local administration that is more autonomous and more open to citizen participation (Tuncer 2008: 377-378).

The first Turkish municipality was established during the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul in 1854. It was the municipality of Pera, a non-Muslim foreigner dominated county of Istanbul, which at the time was the most urban part of the town. In fact, 14 municipalities were planned for Istanbul at the time, but due to fiscal difficulties only one could be established. At the time the municipality of Pera was justified because the area was populated with people who would appreciate the value of municipal services (Turan 2008: 3). This establishes a very good example of how the state in Turkey sees and organizes local administration. Although many municipalities were established in the following years it was in the Republican era that municipalities had a special law. The Municipal Law was ratified in 1930 and remained in effect until 2005.

According to Turkish law municipalities are local authorities established to run local services in areas with more than a population of 2000 (Bindebir 2004: 18). Districts are also eligible to set up municipalities regardless of their population. The number of municipalities in 2005 was slightly over 3200 (Sağbaşı et.al. 2005: 2). The distribution of these municipalities can be found in the table below. However, this number has dwindled recently. In March 2009, the government accepted a law that abolishes municipalities in places where the population has dropped to under 2000 according to the last census. The same law also foresees merging some smaller districts with bigger ones and creating some new districts. According to this some 836 municipalities are supposed to be abolished.

However, this law was accepted just before the local elections and most of the municipalities applied to the court and retained their municipal status for the 2009 local elections, arguing that they already had the status at the time the local elections process had started. The High Court upheld this appeal and decided for elections to be held in the municipalities that are supposed to be abolished. According to Erdem (2009) there were 3225 municipalities before the aforementioned law had been accepted. After the law the number of municipalities was supposed to decrease to 2247. However, after the appeals by the abolished municipalities and the decision of the High Court to uphold these appeals, the 2009 local elections were conducted in 2941 municipalities. According to the numbers of Ministry of Interior there are 2948 municipalities in total after the last arrangements.

Table 1: Number of Municipalities in Turkey

Type of Municipality	Number
Metropolitan	16
Metropolitan District	143
Province	65
District	749
Urban zone	1.975
Total	2.948

Source: Ministry of Interior – General Directorate for Local Authorities (www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr)

The rights and duties of municipalities are counted as follows in Bindebir (2004: 18);

Municipalities are authorized:

- To impose and enforce rules and municipal prohibitions where prescribed by law,
- To punish those violating the prohibitions,
- To collect municipal taxes, duties and fees,
- To set up drinking water, city gas, electricity and transport facilities and networks or transfer their operational rights
- To run transport vehicles within the municipal borders.

In order to provide these services municipalities seek revenues from various local sources like municipal taxes, local property tax, revenues from rents and enterprises, government transfers and loans. Bindebir provides the ratio of 80% of municipality revenues coming from the central government. 42% of municipality revenues come only from central government tax revenue shares (Bindebir 2004: 6-7). Loans for municipalities are mostly provided by İller Bankası, or the Bank of Provinces. This bank is not a commercial bank but it is a state agency established solely for the purpose of providing preferential loans to municipalities. Also many municipal taxes are subject to the approval of the central government, which increases the reliance of local administrations on the central authority.

The smallest local administrative organ, after the villages, is the urban zones (belde in Turkish), then comes districts and the biggest local administration units is the province. There are 892 districts and 81 provinces in Turkey as of 2004. Nearly 2000 municipalities consist of what are called urban zone municipalities with a population of close to 2000. Some of the provinces are organized as metropolitan municipalities. A province has to have a population of more than 750,000 inhabitants in order to be a metropolitan municipality. Districts under these metropolitan municipalities are called metropolitan districts. Metropolitan municipalities have a more centralized structure and are empowered to discuss and approve some of the decisions of metropolitan district municipalities (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 2004: 7-13).

A municipality consists of a Municipal Council, a Municipal Standing Committee and a Mayor (Polatoğlu 2000: 158).

The Municipal Council is the policy making body of the municipality elected by popular vote. The council has the power to approve the municipal budget and table a “vote of confidence” on the mayor. The Standing Committee consists of municipal

bureaucrats and members of the council and acts as the executive body of the municipality. Lastly, the mayor is the executive of the municipality directly elected by the people. The mayor “prepares the budget, enforces municipal ordinances and regulations, manages public properties and carries out other duties assigned to him by the municipal council” (Polatoğlu 2000: 159). Mayors are the most powerful public figures in the municipalities. Their power and influence has increased since the implementation of direct mayoral elections in 1963. After the reforms in the 1980s mayors came to resemble presidents in a presidential system of government with considerable administrative as well as financial powers (Bayraktar 2007). Successful metropolitan mayors found themselves to be important political figures in the national arena and their rise from local politics to top national posts became frequent.

3. Characteristics of Elections and Electoral System in Local Elections

Given this backdrop local elections in Turkey are characterized by a number of features. Çitçi et.al. (2001) investigated local elections from 1963 to 1999 because relevant data is only available after the 1963 local elections. Before that time it is impossible to find country wide data on local elections. According to Çitçi et.al.

- All local elections are dominated by national elections. Although election specific issues maintain considerable space along with the candidate and local issues, national issues are always the main determinate of elections.
- Very few parties prepared election manifestos specifically for local elections.
- Local election campaigns are mainly run by party leaders, not by local candidates.
- In the period 1963-77 local elections were evaluated as indicators of upcoming national political developments and used as instruments in the formation of government in the national arena.
- In the period after 1984, local elections are not seen as instruments of shaping the national arena, but they are seen merely as public opinion polls for the parties.
- In each period local elections reflect the national political arena: In the 1960s two big parties, AP and CHP, dominated the polls; in the 1970s the political structure

began to fragment; after the 1980 coup local elections reflect the constant shake up in the political system with the rise and fall of different parties.

In general, turnout for national elections appear to be higher than turnout for local elections. (2001: 2-4, also Kösecik 2005)

Historically there were different electoral rules applied for different local offices at different levels. For municipal councils a plurality system was used until 1963. Until the 1946 elections for Provincial General Council were double degree double ballot votes. Mayors were elected with double degree vote until 1963; Municipal council members voted for the mayor after the council was elected with a majority vote. After the 1961 constitution elections for mayor were held using the single ballot majority formula, whereas provincial council and municipal council elections were held with proportional representation using the D'Hondt formula. All types of local elections including those for headman, municipality and provincial council were conducted together. Local elections were held every five years.

In the 1982 constitution these formulas were retained and currently they are still in effect. Also, a constituency barrage was introduced after 1982. This barrage is not a fixed percentage, like the 10% threshold in the legislative elections but rather a ratio. Candidates who garnered less than one tenth of the votes in an electoral district are excluded from the ballot. Seats are then distributed to the remaining candidates in proportion to their votes. This regulation is still in use.

Currently, local elections are conducted according to the provisions of the Local Elections Law at three levels: SPA, municipality and village: Provincial general council elections for SPA; municipal council and mayoral elections for the municipality; headsman and council of the elderly for the village. Headmen are elected at the village level. SPA elections are held on a provincial basis since there is one SPA in each of 81 provinces. Until 2005, the appointed governor was the head of the SPA, but with the changes in the law the head of SPA is now elected from among the members of the elected Provincial general council by the council itself (Turan 2008: 378). At the municipality level council members and the mayor are elected.

In the provincial general council elections each district is accepted as an electoral district. These are multi-member districts with a minimum of 2 members. The number of members for each district is determined according to population. İstanbul has 225 members in total, whereas Bayburt province has a total of 8 members. In total, there are 3208 members of the provincial council from 81 provinces. (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 2004: 8)

In municipal elections urban zones (“belde” in Turkish), districts, provinces and/or metropolitan provinces are each separately accepted as an electoral districts for mayoral and municipal council elections. The number of municipal council members ranges from 9 to 55 depending on the population of the municipality. In 2004 there were 34537 members elected in 3209 electoral districts. (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 2004: 8)

CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS of LOCAL ELECTIONS at the AGGREGATE LEVEL

In the first chapter I presented a theoretical model which was followed in the second chapter by a detailed discussion of the basic features of local administration together with the electoral system in local elections in Turkey. With this chapter I will start to evaluate patterns in Turkish local elections. As mentioned, my evaluation will start with aggregate level data. First, comparative turnout levels in national and local elections are evaluated in order to see whether turnout rates in different level elections are in line with the expectations of the second order model. Later, I will look at three indicators that show the change in vote distribution between elections; namely fragmentation, volatility and Effective Number of Parties (ENP). In line with the expectations of the second order model national and local elections are expected to show different characteristics in these indicators.

1. Voter Turnout in National and Local Elections

The second order election model contends that turnout rates are lower in second order elections than in national elections since “less is at stake.” Consequently it is expect that turnout in local elections will be lower. In fact, many studies on election turnout already confirm that turnout in local elections is uniformly lower than national elections all over the world (Morlan 1984). This is also the case in Turkey (Çitçi et.al. 2001). However, a close examination of turnout rates and their comparison with national elections show that turnout differences between national and local elections are

increasingly narrowing, especially after 1980s. Moreover, in the 1990s and 2000s we witness elections where turnout for local elections exceeded national elections.

As explained in detail above, local elections are held at four levels at the municipal level: Provincial council elections, municipal council elections, elections for mayor of municipality and metropolitan mayor. Here I will use provincial council and mayor of municipality election turnout rates in order to compare local elections with national elections. Provincial councils are the least powerful of the local administration bodies. However, in all local elections voters tend to show up more for these elections than mayor of municipality and municipal council elections. Probably due to this high turnout local elections for provincial council are argued to emulate national election results. Mayor of municipality elections are important because mayors are the most popular figures of local administration and it can be argued that elections for mayor are reflective of local and candidate specific effects on voting behavior more than other type of election (Çitçi et.al. 2001).

In the table below turnout rates for national, provincial council and mayoral elections can be found. In total there are 12 national and 10 local elections. The national elections results since the first multi-party elections are included, yet local elections start from the 1963 elections. This is because it is impossible to find proper election results for local elections held in the 1950s. Two local elections were held in that period, in 1950 and 1955, but there are no national turnout or vote share data concerning these elections in the state archives. Only turnout rates for some big cities can be accessed. For this reason these two elections are not included in the analysis.

When we look at national turnout rates the assumption of the second order model holds. The model expects higher turnout rate for national elections and average turnout rate for national elections is 81,05%, whereas it is 77,75% for the provincial council elections and 73,29% for mayor of municipality elections. Yet a close examination of turnout rates over time tells a different story.

Table 2: Voter Turnout in National and Local Elections

Election Years	National Election	Provincial Council	Mayor
1950	89,3		
1954	88,6		
1957	76,6		
1961	81,4		
1963		77,6	69,3
1965	71,3		
1968		65,7	59,4
1969	64,3		
1973	66,8	61,7	56
1977	72,4	60,4	53,1
1983	92,3		
1984		91,0	85,6
1987	93,3		
1989		81,5	78
1991	83,9		
1994		92,2	90,5
1995	85,2		
1999	87,1	86,9	85,2
2002	79,1		
2004		75,28	71,7
2007	84,2		
2009		85,3	84,1
Average	81,05	77,75	73,29

Source: Çulhaoğlu 2007 and www.ysk.gov.tr


Below are the average turnout rates for three types of elections by decade. On average, national election turnout seem to be higher than the other two types of local elections. However, in the 1990s the average turnout for local elections, both for provincial council and mayor, exceeded national elections. The highest turnout for local elections was observed in the 1994 local elections with 91% turnout in provincial council elections. One observation about the comparison of turnout rates is the close proximity of turnout rates in national and local elections, especially provincial council averages. In the 1960s the provincial council election turnout average is only 1% lower than national elections. In the 1970s the gap widened to 8%, while in mayoral elections turnout plummeted down to nearly 50%. In the 1980s turnout for national elections is more than local elections by at least 5%, but after the military coup of 1980 turnout increased nearly 20% on average for all elections. This increase continued for local elections in the 1990s and for the first time local election turnout rates surpassed the national election average. In the 2000s turnout rates for all elections showed a decline and trailed back to 80%. Turnout for national elections remain higher than local elections on average, however, as in the 1960s the difference in the average is as small as 1%.

Table 3: Average Turnout Rates in National and Local Elections

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
National elections	84,8	72,3	69,6	92,8	85,4	81,65
Provincial council		71,65	61,05	86,25	89,55	80,25
Mayor		64,35	54,55	81,8	87,85	77,9

Related to these points, one of the important lessons to be drawn from here is that turnout for all types of elections are shifting in sync. Turnout starts with a high average of 84,8 in the 1950s. In the 1960s it floats around 70% both for national and provincial council elections, trailed by mayoral elections. In the 1970s it declines to a level of 60%, although turnout was a little bit higher for local elections. In the 1980s turnout for all types of elections jumps up nearly 20%. In the 1990s, local elections turnout continues to rise, whereas the national elections turnout rate declined but still maintained a level of 85%. In the 2000s turnout rates for all elections fell to 80%. National election turnout rates are higher than local elections, however, the difference between national and provincial council elections is as small as 1,4%.

Figure 1: Turnout in National and Local Elections, 1961-2009



Similar patterns of turnout in different kinds of elections shows that local elections are influenced by national political developments and the national state of affairs. When we look at the figure above the pattern is shown more clearly; turnout rates almost move in parallel. This is in conjunction with the second order model in that local elections are under the influence of national politics. However, average turnout rates do not validate the turnout assumption of the second order model. Although turnout on average is higher for national elections the difference is only about 2,5%, and most of the time as little as 1% using decade averages.

More importantly, we observe higher turnout rates for local elections compared to national elections in 1994 and 2009. In 1994 the turnout for provincial council elections was 92,2%, nearly 8% higher than the previous national elections of 1991. As indicated before, the decade average for the 1990s is higher for local elections than national elections. In the last local elections in 2009 the turnout rate again surpassed the previous national election of 2007 by about 1% for provincial council elections and mayor of municipality elections. These figures challenge the assumptions of many turnout studies in the literature as well as one of the main assumptions of the second order model.

The rise in voter turnout can be partially linked to compulsory voting adopted after the 1980 coup. In other democracies it is observed that compulsory voting increases the turnout rate. This is also observed in Turkey in the 1980s. In the 1989 elections compulsory voting was not applied in local elections and as a result that election witnessed a significant decline in voter turnout when compared to other elections held in the 1980s (Köseçik 2005: 260). However local elections turnout continued to rise in the 1990s. Even for the mayor of municipality elections the difference in turnout rates between national elections and mayoral elections significantly declined over the years. On average, turnout rates in national elections trailed that of mayoral elections in the 1990s. The discrepancy between turnout rates was once as high as 15% in the 1990s, but narrowed down to only 3% in the 2000s. Köseçik (2005: 259) shows that with the exception of a couple of countries like Italy and Luxembourg, where local turnout is traditionally higher than national elections, turnout rates in Turkey are already high in national elections and the discrepancy between national and local elections is smaller compared to European countries.

In 1973, 1977 and 1999 national and local elections were carried out in the same year. In 1999 all elections were held on the same day. Another indicator of the rising importance of local elections can be found in a comparison of turnout rates for these elections. In 1973, local elections turnout trailed that of national elections by about 10%. In the 1977 elections this gap widened and rose to nearly 20% for mayoral elections compared to national elections. In the 1999 elections, however, overall turnout was higher than 85% and nearly the same for national, provincial council and mayor of municipality elections.

Looking at this analysis of turnout rates some conclusions can be reached. First, it is apparent that socio-political developments in the national arena affect both national and local elections in the same way and a clear pattern is observed in participation in all elections. Second, local elections are gaining importance in the eyes of the electorate and political actors compared to national elections. Turnout rates are very close to national elections and in some instances local turnout surpasses that of national elections. As indicated in the literature review this can be attributed to rapid urbanization (İncioğlu 2002), changing administrative systems, the creation of relatively powerful municipal bodies like metropolitan municipalities and the increasing prospect

of transfer for successful local politicians to the national arena. Last but not least, looking at these inferences it would not be wrong to conclude that the turnout assumption of the second order model is not fulfilled completely for Turkish local elections. Although local election campaigns are dominated by national debates it can be argued that local elections have their own unique characteristics and cannot be evaluated as one-to-one reflections of national elections (Çarkoğlu 2009). This is evidenced by the increased turnout levels in local elections compared to elections at the national level.

2. Fragmentation, Volatility and Effective Number of Parties (ENP)

In this second part of the chapter I will compare national and local elections according to three different indicators. According to the assumptions of the second order model there is less tactical voting and voters feel freer to vote for small parties. This leads to a decrease in the vote share of big parties and increases the showing of small parties. That is why we would expect the number of parties to increase in second order elections. According to Powell (1982), party system attributes can be measured through party linkages to social groups; level of support for extremist parties; fragmentation and volatility of support (Çulhaoğlu 2007: 58) Among these measures volatility, fragmentation and effective number of parties (ENP) indices are useful tools to measure changes in the vote distribution in the political arena. I will calculate these indices both for national and local elections and their comparisons are expected to tell us whether the assumptions of the second order model holds for Turkish local elections or not.¹ In this section I will first make an analysis of fragmentation and volatility in the Turkish elections and then make a comparison of fragmentation, volatility and effective number of parties indices for national and local elections in order to see whether they validate the assumptions of the second order model for local elections.

¹ All indexes are calculated by the present author from official Turkish election data. For national election data since 1950 see Tuncer and Danacı (2003) and www.yzk.gov.tr. For local election results see Turan (2008) and www.yzk.gov.tr

According to Çarkoğlu (2002), the first defining characteristic of the Turkish party system is the high level of electoral volatility. Average volatility since the first competitive elections in 1950 is nearly 23 percent. This means that nearly a quarter of voters changed their votes from one election to the other. Akgün (2001) reports from Mainwaring (1998) that this amount is 20.5% for Latin American countries, which are known for their high degree of volatility. As Turkish democracy is subject to interventions from outside (i.e. military interventions), high electoral volatility can be attributed to party closures and forced mergers as a result of these outsider interventions. Yet, especially in the elections after the 1990s voters shifted their preferences in large amounts from one party to another in order to punish parties for their performance. Between the 1999 and 2002 elections, for example, nearly half of the electorate switched parties.

There is a pattern in this shift of the electorate between parties from one election to another. The Turkish electorate is shifting from one party to another, but it is mainly shifting to the right no matter what the name of the party is. Pro-Islamist and nationalist parties, which can be dubbed extreme right parties, gained 11% of the vote in 1987. Following a steady rise they increased their support to 17% in 1991, 30% in 1995, 35% in 1999 and 54% in 2002. AKP alone garnered 46,6% of the vote in 2007 elections. Although the volatility between parties seems apparent, there appears to be an established trend that in future elections voters are most likely to vote for rightist parties even if they change their party preference. When asked to place themselves in a left-right continuum 22.5% defined themselves as moderately or extremely right in 1990. In 2002 this figure nearly doubled to 42.9% with 24.1% defining themselves in the extreme right position. (Kalaycıoğlu 1999, Çarkoğlu Ergüder and Kalaycıoğlu 2002)

A second characteristic of the Turkish party system is the fragmentation of the electorate. Not only have the election results become more fragmented, especially after the 1980s, but parties are splitting into smaller groups despite this fragmented portrait. In the three elections held in the 1950s, the DP and CHP together garnered around 90% of the vote. (Başlevent et.al. 2004) However, after 1960 the system became more fragmented in nearly all elections. The effective number of parties increased from 1.4 for the first competitive elections in 1950 to 4.8 in the 1999 elections. One of the

reasons for this fragmentation is the undemocratic character of party organizations. As party elites are very intolerant against intra-party opposition it facilitates fragmentation of parties in post election periods. It is surprising to see that the party system became more fragmented in the post-1980 period despite a 10% threshold, which had been deliberately initiated by the military regime after the 1980 coup in order to prevent this exact situation. According to Sayarı (2002: 17), military interventions proved to be the main force behind fragmentation since the 1960s. When we look at the figures, it is seen that fragmentation stepped up after the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980.

Regarding the constant increase of fragmentation in the system Çarkoğlu (2002: 139) counts the following historical factors:

- i. Military interventions persistently altered the party system, closed many parties and prevented the development of long term voter attachment to the parties.
- ii. The institutional and legal structure of the party system gives no incentive to party elites to connect with people. Party elites are more concerned with distributing patronage than contacting people and making them part of the organization.
- iii. Party organizations do not depend on people in terms of resources. They derive their funds via patronage relations and from state funds rather than mobilizing people.
- iv. Party organizations lack ideological content and do not feel any incentive to mobilize people through civic involvement.
- v. Younger voters view elections from a more economic perspective. Since they lack ideological commitment to any party it is easier to shift their vote from one party that underperforms economically to another that is expected to do better.

One should also mention that changes in the electoral system add to fragmentation in the system. In line with Duverger's law (Duverger 1972) the plurality system employed between 1950 and 1960 led to a two-party system and various types of proportional representation (PR) employed after 1960 created a multi-party system. It is Powell's (1982) assertion that PR electoral systems are more likely to lead to

fragmentation and that is what we observe in the Turkish polity. How the system resisted various measures like the 10% threshold and kept increasing fragmentation is an idiosyncrasy of Turkish politics. In addition to the factors mentioned above, Kalaycıoğlu (1997) mentions rapid mobilization, deepening cultural cleavages and the disruption of political socialization processes lead to increased fragmentation and volatility. Changes in constitutional and other legal designs, the end of the Cold War and deepening ethnic strife are cited by Kalaycıoğlu as factors contributing to the deepening cleavages and hence fragmentation of the electorate (cited in Başlevent et.al. 2004: 310).

Incidentally, I should mention that although fragmentation and volatility both appear to be high in Turkey, they should not necessarily be moving in the same direction. They sometimes part ways: For instance, fragmentation continues to increase while volatility decreases in the 1990s and this is not all unexpected. Volatility may go up because people choose to change votes from their previous parties to new ones, however as it happened in 2002, this may accompanied by a decrease in fragmentation. In 2002 volatility was high because people deserted governing parties en masse and dominantly voted for two major parties, AKP and CHP. Therefore, there occurred a slight decrease in fragmentation in 2002.²

Now I would like to present my calculations of fragmentation, volatility and ENP indices for national and local elections.

Fractionalization index (F)³ shows the current diversity of the electorate, meaning how many different parties gained meaningful results in the election.⁴ F varies between 0 and 1. It reaches a minimum of zero when one party receives the entire popular vote. As the number of parties receiving relatively small electoral support increases the index will approach one.

² For all calculated fractionalization and volatility index values see figures and tables below.

³ Fractionalization is used interchangeably with the term “fragmentation” in the literature. Following the convention, these terms are used interchangeably in this text.

⁴ The fractionalization index (F) is calculated by using election outcomes $i=1, \dots, N$ parties in the following formula: $F = \{1 - \sum_N (\text{Vote } \%)^2\}$. See Rae (1967)

Volatility index shows the ratio of voters that changed their vote from last election to the current one.⁵ Volatility index varies between 0 and 1. If V=0 for an election year, this means in the election all parties garnered exactly the same votes they get in the previous election. If V=1, this points to a completely instable political system.

Effective number of parties (ENP) is another measure of party system fragmentation also used comparing different political systems. It allows us to count the number of parties in a party system by weighting parties according to their strength. Vote share or seat share in the parliament can be used as weight. Here, I will use vote share in order to calculate effective number of parties.⁶

Table 4: Volatility, Fragmentation and ENP for national elections, 1961-2007

National elections	Volatility	ENP	Fragmentation
1961		3,39	0,7
1965	24,5	2,71	0,63
1969	11,4	3,33	0,7
1973	24,85	4,31	0,76
1977	13,35	3,12	0,68
1983		2,85	0,65
1987	35,65	4,11	0,75
1991	17,25	4,67	0,78
1995	21,5	6,16	0,83
1999	19,3	6,79	0,85
2002	50,9	5,43	0,81
2007	14,45	3,48	0,71
Averages	23,31	4,19	0,73

⁵ Volatility index (V) is calculated by using $i=1, \dots, N$ parties in the following formula: $V = \frac{1}{2} \sum_N (|\text{Vote\%}_{i,t} - \text{Vote\%}_{i,t-1}|)$. See Pedersen (1979)

⁶ ENP calculated with the formula $(\text{ENP}) = 1 / (1 - \text{Fractionalization Index})$. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979), Taagepera and Shuggart (1989) on ENP


Table 5: Volatility, Fragmentation and ENP local elections, 1963-2009

Local elections	Volatility	ENP	Fragmentation
1963		2,9	0,65
1968	12,6	3,08	0,67
1973	23,6	3,8	0,74
1977	8,15	2,7	0,63
1984		3,87	0,74
1989	29,9	4,72	0,78
1994	17,75	6,22	0,83
1999	21,3	6,91	0,85
2004	47,8	4,3	0,76
2009	13,5	4,26	0,76
Averages	21,82	4,27	0,74

These indices tell us how fractured the electorate is from one election to another and within the time of the current election itself. As indicated above, according to the expectations of the second order election model fragmentation should be higher in local elections because voters feel freer to leave bigger parties and vote for smaller parties in elections where less is at stake. Accordingly, ENP is expected to be higher in the second order elections. As more parties get votes the number of effective parties increases. According to the expectations of the second order model, volatility indices for different elections are not expected to have a clear pattern because as voters punish incumbents or signal grievance with policies in the local election, they are expected to turn back to their initial positions in the next first order election. Also, due to the freedom felt by the voters to change their vote in second order elections I would expect vote swings to be more pronounced in the second order elections.

Before interpreting the trends in national and local elections I should reiterate that these indices are calculated with the election data after the 1961 elections because country wide local election results are not compiled for local elections until the 1963 local elections.

Figure 2: Comparative Volatility Indices for National and Local Elections



Volatility in national elections is 23,31% on average whereas it is 21,82% in local elections for provincial council. The volatility index itself shows volatility over elections. It hit a low point in the 1969 national elections with 11,4% and recorded its highest value in the 2002 national elections with 50,9%. This means that in 1969 only 11,4% of the electorate change their vote from previous election to the current one, whereas in the 2002 elections nearly 51% of the electorate changed their votes compared to the previous elections in 1999. In local elections volatility is also high with an average of 21,82%. This means that in each provincial council election at least one fifth of the voters are changing their votes when compared to the previous local election. The lowest volatility is observed in the 1977 elections. Only 8,15% of the electorate changed votes. It is interesting to note that national elections held in the same year also witnessed one the lowest volatility figures at only 13,35%. The highest volatility is observed in the 2004 elections with 47,8%. Note that the highest volatility for national elections is observed in the previous national elections of 2002.


It is seen that volatility of national elections is higher than volatility of local elections. Here I calculated volatility for national elections by comparing each national election result with the previous national election and for local elections by comparing

results of each local provincial election with the previous local elections. This is also the way used in Freire (2004).

However, a better comparison of national elections with the local elections can be made by putting all elections together and calculating volatility for each local election with compared to the previous national election. Similarly for each national election volatility is calculated in comparison to the previous local election. This way we can truly grasp the difference of vote choice between national and local elections.

Below are the results for volatility index calculated with the dataset comprising all national and local elections after 1961.

Figure 3: General Volatility Index



The results are telling. Here we can see that volatility in local elections are generally higher than volatility in national elections. Highest volatility rates are observed in 1984 local elections and in 2002 general elections with more than 40% of the voters changing their votes with respect to the previous elections. Higher rates of volatility for local elections with compared to previous national elections means that voters are more likely to spread their votes from one national election to the next local election. However, not all local elections show higher volatility, in some election years national elections are more volatile.

Notice that both local and national elections were held in the same year two times; in years 1973 and 1977. In 1999 both elections were held in the same day. Looking at volatility rates for these elections and comparing volatility for elections held in same years can be instructive. For 1973 elections both national and local volatility are higher than 20%, national elections showing 1% more volatility than local elections with 24,75%. In 1977 local elections are more volatile than national elections, with comparing both to the 1973 national elections. In 1999 again national elections are showing more volatility than local elections held in the same day.

It is expected according to the model that volatility in local elections will be higher. Yet the indices do not match up to this expectation. Volatility in national elections is higher on average. Out of three elections when national and local elections were held in the same year, only in 1977 was volatility for municipal council elections 5% higher than the national elections volatility rate. Other than that national elections always showed higher volatility.


When we look at general volatility index, local elections show higher volatility in some elections, but then again, in some other elections volatility in national elections surpass previous local election volatility. As already indicated, general volatility for the same year elections are similar. In 1977 local election volatility is higher, whereas in 1973 and 1999 national elections are more volatile.

More importantly, similar to the inferences from the turnout rate debate, separate volatility trends for national and local elections show nearly one to one correspondence. The highest and lowest volatility elections are the same for both types of elections and also it can be seen in the figure that fluctuations in volatility in the two types of elections are following each other. They go up and down at the same time. This is also the same for the general volatility. Although local elections are more volatile with respect to national elections in general, electoral volatility, either computed with the same type of elections or compared with other types, follow a similar movement pattern over years.

This evidence can be used to invalidate assumptions of the second order model because according to the aggregate data Turkish voters are not behaving more free to

change their votes in local elections and turn back to their original parties in national elections. Rather, it seems that national trends in volatility, just as with turnout, are reflected in local elections behavior.


Figure 4: Comparative Fragmentation Indices for National and Local Elections



When we look at Fragmentation a similar pattern is observed. In national elections the average fragmentation is 0,73 compared to 0,74 in local elections. Fragmentation never drops lower than 0,6 in Turkish elections. Remember, this index shows how fractured the electorate is as it gets closer to 1. For the elections held after 1961 the lowest fragmentation is observed in the 1965 national elections with a ratio of 0,63 and highest fragmentation is in 1999 elections with 0,85. In the provincial council elections on the other hand, the lowest fragmentation ratio is observed in the 1977 elections with 0,63. Two elections held in the 1960s also reveal a low level of fragmentation at 0,65 and 0,67. The highest fragmentation is seen in the 1990s. In the 1994 local elections fragmentation is 0,83, only to rise up to its highest value in 1999 with 0,85. For the elections of 1973, 1977 and 1999 in which both elections were held in the same year, fragmentation ratios are similar; in 1973 fragmentation of the electorate in both elections is about 0,75, then in the next elections of 1977 it falls down to 0,65 for both types of elections. In the 1999 elections fragmentation is the highest for both elections

at 0,85. It should be noted that the equal fragmentation value might be due to the fact that the elections were held on the same day in 1999.

Figure 5: Comparative ENP Indices for National and Local Election



Expectedly, ENP moves along with fragmentation; ENP is 4,19 in legislative elections while it is 4,27 for local elections. ENP for both elections can be counted as the same. To repeat, we would expect the effective number of parties to be much higher in local elections than in the national elections. Again, the difference is not high but the expectation is that ENP would be higher in local elections as smaller parties purportedly have an advantage to collect more votes in the second order. ENP peaked in the 1990s reaching 6,91 in the provincial council elections and 6,79 in the national elections of 1999, with a sharp decline in the 2000s. For the last elections, ENP in national elections is 3,48 whereas for local elections it is a little bit higher, 4,26.

Looking at this data it is hard to find supporting evidence for the second order model. If the assumptions of the second order model were true, then we should have experienced a fractured electorate in the local elections and a more coherent one in the national elections. However, on average fragmentation is nearly the same for both elections. In addition, as shown in the figure and in accordance with the movements in turnout and volatility, fragmentation in both types of elections follow the same pattern

with only slight differences. This again shows that fragmentation in general is affected by national political debates. It can be argued that voters are not showing their discontent for the governing parties and not voting for smaller parties in the local elections. However, depending on the timing of the local elections they are either signaling the direction of the vote change in the next national election or following previous national elections patterns.

CHAPTER IV: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

It has been repeatedly argued in this study that previous works on the local elections usually lack individual level analysis that investigates the factors affecting the voters in their local vote choice. Second order election model makes certain assumptions about individual level decision making in different level elections, yet again studies based on this model also miss the individual level analysis based on survey data, most of the time. In this chapter, following the analysis of aggregate vote distributions and turnout levels in different level elections, in Turkey, I will embark upon individual level analysis by constructing a regression model using data from a previously conducted voting intentions survey.

1. Data and Methodology

In this chapter I use data from the Survey of Electoral Intentions conducted by Veri Araştırma in December 2003-January 2004. This survey is a part of a series of surveys conducted in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 with the same methodology by TÜSES and Veri Araştırma. These surveys have been used in many academic publications (Başlevent et. al. 2004, Tüses 2004, etc.). The survey data used in this dissertation is previously used in Başlevent et.al. (2009). The survey is conducted in 26 out of 81 provinces of Turkey with a nationally representative sample of 1806 respondents. 689 of these respondents (38,2% of the sample) are defined as residents of rural areas, whereas 1117 of the respondents (61,8%) are residing in urban Turkey.

In the survey rural population is defined as people living in places with a population less than 20.000, and people living in areas with a population of more than 20.000. However, municipalities are established in places with a population of more than 2.000. When we look at village-city distinction, in the sample 19,5% of the respondents are picked from the villages and 80,5% from the cities. Accordingly, first I have excluded respondents living in rural areas with a population of less than 2.000 from the dataset because they can only vote for village headman but cannot vote for municipal offices in the local elections. Excluding 352 respondents living in the villages decreased the size of the sample to 1454.

Later I have dropped respondents who responded undecided, did not vote or no answer for questions “Which party did you vote for in the last general elections of 2002” and/or “Which party candidate would you vote for district and/or metropolitan mayorships in the upcoming local elections in March?” Voters who were not at the voting age at the time the last elections were hold are excluded as well since they are not in a position to provide answer to the “last vote” question. Also respondents who gave “Don’t know” answers to the relevant questions that will be operationalized as independent variables and included in the model are excluded from the sample (These relevant questions and transformations made in the variables are explained in detail below). After these, sample size shrank to 683 and all investigations are conducted with this sample.

In the survey respondents are asked which party they voted in the last general elections, which party they would vote for if the general elections are held today and which party candidate they would vote for in the upcoming metropolitan and/or district municipal elections. The dependent variable will be the vote switch between the general and the local elections. I would like to investigate the factors that effect people in changing their votes from the general elections to the local elections. In order to do this I will use binary logistic regression.

Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is qualitative in nature (Kennedy 2008). Logistic function is bounded by 0 and 1; this quality makes it a better function to predict qualitative dependent variables that are expressed as dummy variables, than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), because OLS may predict values above 1

and below 0. Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation in order to predict the change in the dependent variable. However, unlike OLS it does not predict the change in the dependent variable by regressing it on the independent variables. Logistic regression first transforms the dependent into logit variable and estimates probability of an event occurring or not in terms of odds ratios (Garson 2009). So the logistic coefficients reported in the regression output should be read as change in the logit caused by a unit change in the independent variable. Coefficients, shown as B coefficients in the SPSS output, can take any value between plus and minus infinity, positive values indicating an increase and negative values indicating a decrease in the logit of the dependent. 0 B coefficient means the independent variable does not affect the probability of the dependent.

The odds ratio on the other hand, indicated as Exp (B) in the SPSS output, is the natural logarithm of the B coefficient. So when B equals 0, odds ratio is equal to 1 and it means the independent variable does not affect the dependent variable. If the odds ratio is less than 1 it means the independent variable decreases the logit, hence the odds of the event and if the odds ratio is bigger than 1, it means that the independent variable increases the odds. I will present both logistic coefficients and odds ratios for the regressions and use odds ratios in order to interpret the results.

One point not to be missed in interpreting the logistic regression output is the type of data for independent variables. In binary logistic regression, SPSS takes the lower category as reference and predicts the higher category by default. Here, according to my dependent variable changing votes between elections (1) is predicted and voting for the same party in both elections (0) is taken as the reference category. Interpretation of independent variables, however, depends on the type of the data. If the independent is continuous, odds ratio is the factor by which the odds change for the dependent variable after one unit change in the independent variable. It can simply be read as the percent increase in the odds of the event. If the independent variable is categorical, highest category is taken as the reference and odds ratios are calculated for all other categories of the categorical independent variable according to the reference category. If the independent variable is dichotomous, meaning it only has two categories (usually 0 and 1) the lower category is taken as the reference and the odds ratio reported is calculated for the higher category.

As I am interested in vote change between general and local elections dependent variable is defined as 0 if the respondent voted or inclined to vote for the same party in both general and local elections and 1 if the respondent indicated different party choices for different elections. Changes in the independent variables operationalized below are expected to account for changes in the probability of people voting for the same party in both general and local elections compared to changing their votes.

2. Model Specification

As indicated, dependent variable is set as the vote switch between general and local elections. In the survey the respondents are asked for their vote choice in the last general elections together with their hypothetical party and party candidate choices for general and municipal elections if the elections were held today. Initially I planned to construct two models; in the first model the dependent would be the vote switch between actual vote in the last elections and the vote for local elections if the elections were held today. The second model, on the other hand, would take vote switch between two “if the elections were held today” questions, both for general and local elections.

However, due to the limitations of survey methodology I had to drop the second model. After excluding no answer/don't know responses sample size for respondents indicating a vote behavior for both elections if the elections were held today drops down to 810. In this sample only 13,7% of the respondents indicated a different vote choice, the rest 86,3% named the same party as their vote choice in the hypothetical general and local elections. Unfortunately, this does not allow enough variability to run statistically significant tests with the data.

Given the lessons drawn from previous survey methodology literature, this is not unexpected. Since the survey is not held before an election period, where respondents are expected to develop ideas about their vote choice, when respondents are asked to

indicate a party choice they are tempted to respond the same way, irrespective of the type of election (Çarkoğlu 2009).

For this reason I constructed the dependent variable according to the answers given to the questions “Which party did you vote for in the last general elections of 2002?” and “Which party candidate would you vote for district and/or metropolitan mayorship in the upcoming local elections in March?”. Voters in the sample who switched their votes coded as 1 and who voted for the same party, irrespective of the party choice, coded as 0. In metropolitan areas respondents are asked for the prospective vote choice both for the metropolitan (büyükşehir) and district (ilçe) municipalities, whereas in places without a metropolitan municipality, they are only asked for their vote choice in district municipality elections. I took metropolitan municipality vote choice if the respondent is living in a metropolitan area and merged it with district municipality vote choice of the respondents who are living outside metropolitan areas and later used it to code the dependent variable. This dependent variable is named `vote_switch`.

In the sample 26,6% of the respondents indicated that they changed their vote choices from general election to local elections, whereas 73,4% of the respondents same party choice for both elections.

Table 6: Vote Switch

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	501	73,4	73,4	73,4
1	182	26,6	26,6	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Explanatory variables are consisting from economic and non-economic factors. Non-economic variables include, first of all, standard demographic variables; age, gender, education, religiosity, residence in metropolitan areas (metropolitan).

Age is entered as a control variable in order to see whether ageing leads to a difference in voting in general and local elections. age is entered as a continuous variable in the model. In the table below grouped age characteristics of the sample can be found. Age groups are as follows: Group 1: Age 18-20; Group 2: Age 21-24; Group

3: Age 25-39; Group 4: Age 40-54; Group 5: Age 55 +. Largest group of the sample, with 41,4%, is the third group, aged between 25 and 39.

Table 7: Age Group

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	22	3,2	3,2	3,2
2	67	9,8	9,8	13,0
3	287	42,0	42,0	55,1
4	184	26,9	26,9	82,0
5	123	18,0	18,0	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

In the survey females are coded as 1 and males as 2. I recoded the gender variable and give males 0, while leaving females as 1. As seen in the table 53,4% of the respondents are male and 46,6 percent are females.

Table 8: Gender

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	365	53,4	53,4	53,4
1	318	46,6	46,6	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Education variable has four categories; 1- primary school or less; 2- secondary school graduate; 3- high school graduate; 4- higher education. I leave these categories as they are. In the model education is marked as a categorical variable. SPSS treats categorical independents variables as dummy and calculates coefficients and odds ratios according to taking highest category as a reference. In this case higher education is taken as the reference category in the model. In the sample 66,5% of the respondents have finished primary school or less; 10,7% have finished secondary school; 17,0% of the respondents have high school diploma and only 5,9% have higher education.

Table 9: Educational Attainment

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	454	66,5	66,5	66,5
2	73	10,7	10,7	77,2
3	116	17,0	17,0	94,1
4	40	5,9	5,9	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

In many studies on electoral behavior in Turkey religion is found to be a significant factor (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000, Kalaycıoğlu 1999). In the survey respondents are asked to state their degree of religiosity in a five scale category, 1 indicating “very religious” and 5 being “not having any religious faith”. First I reversed these categories and recoded them as 1 being “not having any religious faith” and 5 being “very religious” in order to use this as a continuous variable. 51,5% of the respondents say they are religious, whereas 15,6% indicate that they are very religious.

Table 10: Religiosity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	8	1,2	1,2	1,2
2	12	1,8	1,8	2,9
3	189	27,7	27,7	30,6
4	360	52,7	52,7	83,3
5	114	16,7	16,7	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

I also coded religiosity as a dummy variable. In religiosity dummy categories 4 and 5, respondents who indicated they are religious or very religious, are coded as 1 and the other three categories as 0.

Table 11: Religiosity Dummy (reldum)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	209	30,6	30,6	30,6
1	474	69,4	69,4	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

67,1% of the respondents in the sample defined themselves as religious or very religious.

Another important variable will be place of residence. Other than the urban-rural and village-city distinction respondents are classified according to living in a metropolitan municipality or in a district municipality. I would like to see whether living in metropolitan municipalities, that are the most developed and populous areas of Turkey, has any effect on local vote choice. I have coded metropolitan variable as a dummy variable, for respondents who can vote for a metropolitan municipality coded as 1 and the ones in the districts as 0.


Table 12: Metropolitan Residence

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	291	42,6	42,6	42,6
1	392	57,4	57,4	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

In the sample 57,4% of the respondents are residents of metropolitan municipalities, while 42,6% of the respondents are living in districts.

Left-right placement of the respondents is also another standard variable included in the voting behavior models and I have included it here with the variable name left_right. In the survey respondents are asked to place themselves in a left right continuum in a 10 point scale with 1 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right.

Figure 6: Left-Right Placement of Respondents



As seen from the chart most of the respondents define themselves either in the center or to the right of the center. While 23,7% of the respondents define themselves at the center, 15,5% of them are in the immediate right of the center (responding 6 in the scale). In total 59,2% of the respondents define themselves in the right, with 12,2% in the extreme right. On the other hand, only 17,1% of the sample define themselves in the left. Only 4% of the respondents place themselves in the extreme left. This is also consistent with the party vote choices of the respondents, a conspicuous majority of the respondents expressed intention to vote for right or far right parties.

“Say, a very well respected person in this area whom you have trusted declared his candidacy for mayorship from a party which you don’t think of voting before or a party that you don’t like. Would you vote for the aforementioned person anyways?”

Answers to this question in the survey can be very valuable for understanding changes in voting behavior between different elections. If a respondent indicates that he will not vote for a party he dislikes even if he thinks the candidate is a respectful one, than we might expect that he is less likely to switch votes, because candidate is not an effective factor on respondent’s voting behavior. In the survey answers to this question are categorized as 1 = yes, 2 = no, 3 = it depends. I turned this into vote_candidate variable by recoding “no” answers as -1, “yes” answers as +1 and “it depends” answers as 0. 50,7% of the respondents indicated that they will not vote for a disliked party even if they like the candidate whereas 31,2% said they can vote for the candidate even if he is from a party they will not vote for normally.

Table 13: Vote Intention for the Candidate

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
-1	346	50,7	50,7	50,7
0	124	18,2	18,2	68,8
1	213	31,2	31,2	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Party identification is regarded to be a critical variable that determines party choice in the previous voting studies (Kalaycıoğlu 2008). In the survey the respondents are asked for their party identification with the question “As of today, which party you do you feel close to your heart, and like its views?” I have recoded major parties AKP, DYP, CHP, MHP, DEHAP, GP and merged other parties as a single category under the name others. I coded party identification as a dummy variable with AKP as the reference category. This dummy variable has six categories: chpdum, dypdum, mhp dum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum

Kalaycıoğlu (2008) reports that 67,1% of the respondents in his study expressed identification with a party and this is already too high for a country like Turkey where political arena is experiencing constant fluctuations and parties are new. As I have only included voters who voted in the last elections and the ones who expressed party choice

for the local elections, party identifiers are as high as 93%. Only 3,4% of the sample expressed no party identification and 3,7% did not answer the question. In the sample 59,5% of the respondents indicate that they identify with AKP; 14,6% with CHP; 4% with MHP; 3,8% with GP; 3,5% with DYP and 2,8% with DEHAP.

Table 14: Party Identification

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
AKP	406	59,4	59,4
ANAP	6	0,9	0,9
DYP	24	3,5	3,5
CHP	100	14,6	14,6
BBP	4	0,6	0,6
ÖDP	6	0,9	0,9
SP	4	0,6	0,6
DSP	4	0,6	0,6
MHP	27	4,0	4,0
BTP	1	0,1	0,1
DEHAP	18	2,6	2,6
TKP	2	0,3	0,3
IP	2	0,3	0,3
YTP	3	0,4	0,4
GP	26	3,8	3,8
SHP	1	0,1	0,1
EMEP	1	0,1	0,1
None	23	3,4	3,4
No answer	25	3,7	3,7
Total	683	100,0	100,0

Ethnic and religious identity can also be a factor in determining vote choice and in order to see whether these are effective factors in changing the probability of voting for the same party in different elections I included two identity variables in the model, Alevi and Kurd identities, as dummy variables. In the survey respondents are asked define them with the question “Which one(s) of the following would you use if someone asked you to identify yourself?” and they are presented with 20 ethnic or religious identity categories, like Turk, Kurd, Alevi, Sunni, Zaza, Armenian, etc. Respondents are allowed to pick more than one of these categories, so a respondent could choose to be a Sunni-Turk, Sunni-Kurt or any other combinations s/he chooses to be.

In Turkey, Alevis constitute the second biggest Islamic sect after Sunni Muslims. Although the exact number is not known, population of Alevis is estimated from 10 to 20% of the total population in Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000, Güneş Ayata and

Ayata 2002). Alevis are most likely to vote for center-left parties (Başlevent et. al. 2004, 2009). Respondents who picked Alevi category as at least one of the identity categories that define them are coded as 1 and the rest are coded as 0. In the sample 6,6% of the respondents define themselves as Alevi.

Table 15: Alevi Identity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	638	93,4	93,4	93,4
1	45	6,6	6,6	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Kurds on the other hand constitute the biggest ethnic group after Turks in Turkey. Again, there are no exact numbers, but the amount of people of Kurdish origin is assumed to constitute 12 to 20% of the population. Ethnically aware Kurds are supposed to vote for DEHAP According to Güneş Ayata and Ayata (2002) between one-third and one-quarter of Kurds vote for DEHAP. However, DEHAP never managed to get 10% vote share to surpass the national threshold in general elections (Başlevent et. al. 2004, 2009). As like Alevis I coded respondents who picked Kurd as an identifier as 1 and the ones who do not as 0. In the sample 8,6% of the respondents chose Kurd identity as at least one of the identifying categories for themselves.

Table 16: Kurd identity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	624	91,4	91,4	91,4
1	59	8,6	8,6	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Economic factors also have important effects on voting behavior (Akarca and Tansel 2006, Başlevent et. al. 2009, 2004, Çarkoğlu 1997). In the survey, respondents are asked various questions about economy like “Do you think economic conditions in Turkey had gone better or worse in the last 12 months?” “Do you think economic conditions in Turkey will go better or worse in the next 12 months?” “Had your family’s economic conditions gone better or worse in the last 12 months?” “Do you think your family’s economic condition will go better or worse in the next 12 months?”

The questions are asked on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating that economic condition of the country or respondent’s family gone much better, 2 indicating the

conditions gone better, 3 indicating the conditions are the same, 4 indicating the conditions had gone worse and 5 indicating that conditions had gone much worse. I recoded the categories in reverse 1 being much worse to 5 being much better.

Table 17: Personal Economic Views

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	17	2,5	2,5	2,5
2	159	23,3	23,3	25,8
3	278	40,7	40,7	66,5
4	216	31,6	31,6	98,1
5	13	1,9	1,9	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

I will use respondent's view of his family's economic conditions in the last 12 months as an independent variable in the model, named econ_pers. Here I am using past economic evaluations as the basis of voting behavior. 40,7% of the respondents in the sample replied their family's economic conditions are the same, 31,6% responded their conditions had gone better while 23,3% responded their family's conditions had gone worse.

In voting studies good economic performance is expected to increase support for the incumbent government, whereas bad performance is expected to lead to vote loss (Akarca and Tansel 2006, Başlevent et.al. 2009). Above mentioned questions are useful in showing voters' view of economic conditions however they cannot be directly used in the model since they lack responsibility attribution. Here a respondent may indicate that his family's economic condition had gone better in the last 12 months but this does not necessarily mean that the improvement is due to the good performance of the government and vice versa.

Another question in the survey can be used in order to provide responsibility attribution "Is the government responsible with your family's economic conditions had gone better or worse in the last 12 months?" The answers to this question are 1 = yes, 2 = no and 3 = don't know. I have excluded respondents with "don't know" answer from the sample as missing and recoded the variable as a dummy, econ_govt, with 1 being yes and 0 being no.

Table 18: Government's Responsibility in Economic Conditions

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	173	25,3	25,3	25,3
1	510	74,7	74,7	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

25,3% of the respondents do not hold the government responsible for their family's economic conditions whereas 74,7% thinks the government is responsible with their household's economic condition.

Later I created the interaction variable `econ_int` by multiplying variables respondent's view of family's economic conditions (`econ_pers`) and government responsibility with the economic conditions (`econ_govt`). This interaction variable is expected to pick up effects of economic conditions on voting behavior.

Table 19: Econ_int

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	173	25,3	25,3	25,3
1	15	2,2	2,2	27,5
2	126	18,4	18,4	46,0
3	186	27,2	27,2	73,2
4	173	25,3	25,3	98,5
5	10	1,5	1,5	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Another interaction variable is created for the category of people who thinks that their economic conditions had gone worse in the last 12 months. First, I created a dummy variable `econbad`; who thinks that the conditions had gone worse. Categories 1 and 2 are coded 1, and the ones who think their conditions are the same or had gone better are coded 0. 25,8% of the respondents think economic condition of their households had gone worse, the rest 74,2% either thinks their economic conditions stayed the same or improved in the last 12 months.

Table 20: Dummy for Bad Economic Views

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	507	74,2	74,2	74,2
1	176	25,8	25,8	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

Later I created the interaction variable (econbad_int) by multiplying this dummy with the variable econ_govt. This variable is created as an alternative to the variable econ_int and expected to pick up the difference in voting behavior between respondents who think that their economic conditions worsened because of government’s economic policies and the ones that does not.

Table 21: Econbad_int

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	542	79,4	79,4	79,4
1	141	20,6	20,6	100,0
Total	683	100,0	100,0	

In the sample 20,6% of the respondents indicate that their household economic conditions had gone worse in the last year and they attribute responsibility for this situation to the government. Remaining 79,4% either do not think that their economic conditions worsened or they do not keep the government responsible for their economic conditions.

3. Regression Models

I will develop a series of regression models. The dependent variable will be the same for all of them: vote switch between general and local elections. In order to predict the probability of vote change in different elections I will use above operationalized economic and non-economic independent variables. In the base model the dependent variable would be vote_switch. Independent variables would be standard demographic variables: gender, age, education (entered as a categorical variable) metropolitan (dummy variable for metropolitan municipality residence), religiosity, left_right, vote_candidate (categorical variable created from the question “would you vote for a well respected candidate from a disliked party”), chpdum, dypdum, mhp dum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum (all party dummy variables for party identification), alevi (dummy variable for Alevi identity), kurt (dummy variable for Kurd identity), econ_pers (evaluation of respondents’ household economic conditions), econ_govt

(dummy variable for government's responsibility in economic conditions), `econ_int` (interaction variable created by multiplication of `econ_pers` and `econ_govt`)

4. Hypotheses about Independent Variables

age, gender, metropolitan and education are entered as control variables. Their effects, if any, are to be seen. Looking at the high ratio of AKP voters in the data set, and given that metropolitan municipalities are dominated by AKP, I would expect living in a metropolitan area to decrease the odds of vote switch between elections. About education; many studies showed that AKP voters are predominantly from low-education categories (Başlevent et.al. 2009). Especially for lower education categories I would expect the effect to be negative for vote switch, if the variable turns out to be significant.

Many studies reported that left-right distinction is meaningful in the Turkish context (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, Çarkoğlu 1998, Esmer 2002). In this sample nearly 60% of the sample defined itself in the right of the left-right continuum. I would expect moving to the right would effect the vote switch negatively; that is rightists would be more likely to keep their votes same in the local elections given the similar amount of AKP voters in the sample, so `left_right` would decrease the odds of vote switch.

religiosity variable is expected to be significant and high degrees of religiosity are also expected to decrease odds of vote switch, because AKP voters are also known for their high degree of religiosity.

`vote_candidate` variable is expected to turn significant. As indicated before SPSS takes highest category as reference for categorical variables. Here respondents who said that they can vote for the candidate irrespective of his party are taken as reference and I would expect that responding “no” or it “depends” to the same question would decrease the odds of vote switch.

It would not be wrong to expect that a party identifier is more likely to stick to his vote in different elections. Here I expect especially AKP and CHP identifier dummies, *akpdum* and *chpdum* to be significant (AKP identifiers are about 60% and CHP identifiers are about 15% of the sample) and both of them are expected to decrease odds of vote switch in different elections. GP is an exceptional case here. Because of the idiosyncratic character of the party and the leader dominance it would not be surprising if being a GP identifier, *gencdum* variable, increases the odds of the vote switch.

Identity variables *alevi* and *kurt* are also supposed to decrease odds of a vote switch in the elections if they turn to be significant variables.

Economic variables are found to be working in favor of the government when economy going well and against it when it is going bad. (Çarkoğlu 2008) The interaction variable *econ_int* in the model picks up the respondents who think their economic conditions changed because of the government. I expect this variable to decrease odds of switching votes given the high rate of AKP voters in the sample and given the fact that the economy was taking off at the time of the survey. Government's responsibility in economic conditions, *econ_govt*, by itself is expected to decrease the odds as well, if it turns out to be significant.

Other coded economic variables, *econbad* and *econbad_int* are expected to increase odds of vote switch since they pick up the effects of bad economic conditions attributed to government.

5. First Regression Model

The output of the first regression is as follows. If I am to interpret these results, I will start with the significance tests for the model. There are two joint significance tests for the model in the binary logistic regression. "Omnibus tests of model coefficients" table shown in below is reported by default by the SPSS. This method tests whether the

predictors are capable of jointly predicting the dependent variable with applying a chi-square test. According to the significance value and the significance level we conclude if at least one of the predictors is significantly related with the dependent variable.

Here the significance is 0,00 for the model that means I can conclude the independent variables are jointly significant in predicting the dependent at all significance levels.

Table 22: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for the First Regression

	Chi-square	Df	Sig.
Step	79,970	21	0,000
Block	79,970	21	0,000
Model	79,970	21	0,000

Table 23: Model Summary for the First Regression

	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
Step 1	711,925(a)	0,110	0,161

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Another test for joint significance is Hosmer and Lemeshow test. This test also uses chi-square distribution and tests whether there is a difference between observed and predicted values. If the goodness of fit significance level is more than 0,05 then we fail to reject the null hypothesis, which is “there is no difference between observed and predicted values.” In this model significance value is 0,481 which is way higher above 0,1 and 0,5 significance levels indicating that there is no difference between observed and predicted values and the model fits the data.

Table 24: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the First Regression

	Chi-square	Df	Sig.
Step 1	7,522	8	0,481

Classification table tally how much of the predicted values are correctly predicted according to the actual observed values. Classification table, however, does not use the actual values but uses an arbitrary cut off point, mostly 0,50, in order to classify correct and incorrect predictions. For instance, if the a success, that is 1, is predicted between 0,5 and 1 then it is assumed to be predicted correctly. Likewise, if a failure, that is 0, is

predicted between 0 and 0,5 then it is assumed to be predicted correctly. If the model predicts all values correctly then the percentage is 100%. It is better for the model to have a highest prediction percentage as possible.

Here you can see the classification table for the base regression model. According to the model 74,7% of the predictions are correct. It can be observed that the model is more prone to predict 0's more correctly. 94,2% of the failure cases are predicted correctly, whereas only 20,9% of successes are predicted correctly. Overall it can be argued that a correct prediction rate of 75% is pretty good for the model.

Table 25: Classification Table for the First Regression

	Observed		Predicted		
			vote_switch		Percentage Correct
			0	1	
Step 1	vote_switch	0	472	29	94,2
		1	144	38	20,9
	Overall Percentage				74,7

a. The cut value is ,500

According to the indicators above model fit is pretty high. The overall model is significant and the model fits the data. Now, I can continue with the interpretation of independent variables in the equation. SPSS reports binary logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios in the “Variables in the equation” table. Relevant output for my base regression model can be seen below. “Variables in the equation” table reports logistic coefficients (B), standard errors (S.E), Wald test statistics (Wald), degrees of freedom (d.f), significance (Sig.) and odds ratios (Exp (B)) for each independent variable in the model and the coefficient.

As indicated before, logistic coefficients are estimators of the change in the logit (log odds of the event occurring) caused by a unit change in the independent variables. In the interpretation of the test results, however, it is easier to use odds ratios, Exp (B). Odds ratios are calculated by taking the natural logarithm of logistic coefficients and they indicate the factor by which odds of an event changes according to unit change in the independent variable.

Table 26: Variables in Equation for the First Regression

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
dummy for metropolitan residence (metropolitan)	-0,374	0,191	0,050	0,688
gender	-0,115	0,195	0,555	0,891
age	-0,015	0,008	0,054	0,985
education			0,430	
education(1)	0,037	0,415	0,929	1,038
education(2)	0,425	0,472	0,368	1,530
education(3)	-0,140	0,452	0,756	0,869
respondents' view of their household's economic conditions (econ_pers)	-0,290	0,234	0,215	0,748
dummy for respondents' view of government's responsibility for economic conditions (econ_govt)	-1,212	0,854	0,156	0,298
interaction variable for economic variables econ_pers*econ_govt (econ_int)	0,245	0,272	0,368	1,277
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)			0,000	
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered no (vote_candidate(1))	-0,547	0,202	0,007	0,579
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered it depends (vote_candidate(2))	-1,270	0,310	0,000	0,281
respondent's left right placement (left_right)	-0,112	0,050	0,026	0,894
religiosity	0,050	0,137	0,713	1,052
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum)	1,201	0,456	0,008	3,323
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum)	-0,320	0,347	0,357	0,726
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhp dum)	0,616	0,465	0,186	1,851
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum)	-0,208	0,739	0,778	0,812
dummy for genc party identifiers (gencdum)	1,696	0,455	0,000	5,454
dummy for other parties identifiers (otherdum)	0,703	0,287	0,014	2,020
dummy for alevi identity (alevi)	-0,276	0,451	0,541	0,759
dummy for kurt identity (kurt)	-0,619	0,403	0,124	0,538
Constant	1,806	1,051	0,086	6,085

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econ_pers, econ_govt, econ_int, vote_candidate, left_right, religiosity, dypdum, chpdum, mhp dum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, kurt.

In the model vote_candidate, dypdum and gencdum are significant at 1%; metropolitan, left_right and otherdum are significant at 5%; age is slightly insignificant at 5% and significant at 10%; gender, education, econ_pers, econ_govt, econ_int, religiosity, chpdum, dehapdum, mhp dum, alevi and kurt are insignificant at all levels.

Note that education and vote_candidate are entered as categorical variables into the model because they have more than two categories. SPSS treats them as dummies with more than two categories and makes predictions by taking the highest category as the reference. For education highest category higher education = 4 is taken as the reference; for vote_candidate variable voters who said that they would vote for a well respected candidate from a disliked party are the reference since this answer is coded as 1, whereas “no” and “it depends” answers are coded as -1 and 0 respectively.

Starting with significant variables; Odds ratio for metropolitan is 0,688. According to this regression respondents living in a metropolitan municipality is 0,688 times less likely to vote for different parties in general and municipal elections.

left_right is also a significant variable with an odds ratio of 0,894. According to the model a respondent who is one point on the right in the left-right continuum is expected to be 0,894 times less probable to vote for different parties in both elections. This means that as people move to right in the continuum they are more likely to stick to their party preferences.

vote_candidate is also significant at 1%. This variable is entered as categorical variable and coefficients are calculated by taking answer category yes, coded 1, as reference. I would expect probabilities of other categories with respect to the reference category to be higher. If a voter is indicating that candidate himself is more important than the party then he might be expected to change his party choice more likely than the others and this would decrease his probability to vote for same party in different elections. All three categories for the variable are significant at 1% level, with significance values of 0,00 for the highest category, 0,07 for the second and 0,00 for the third. Odds ratios tells us that it is 0,579 times less probable for a respondent who said that he will not vote for a well-respected candidate if he is a candidate from a disliked party to change parties in elections rather than keeping his vote with compared to the one who said that he will vote for the candidate.

Odds ratio for the category 0 is 0,281. This means that odds of voting for the same party compared to voting for different parties is decreased by a factor of 0,281 if the

respondent answers “it depends”, or 0, to voting for the candidate question compared to the respondent answering “yes”, or 1, to the same question.

Along party identification dummies three variables are significant: *dypdum* is significant at 1% with an odds ratio of 3,323. This means that a DYP identifier is 3,323 times more likely to change his vote in different elections with compared to an AKP identifier because AKP is taken as the reference category for this dummy variable. *otherdum* is significant at 5%. Odds ratio says that an identifier of small parties is 2 times more likely to change votes in elections. This is expected when we think of traditional success of AKP cadres in local government starting with the party leader Tayyip Erdoğan. If a voter is already voting for AKP in the general election, and we can assume that an AKP identifier is, he would not have much reason to chance his vote for the municipal election, at least in terms of local government performance, because AKP municipalities are known for their success in local government. This is expectedly more pronounced in metropolitan municipalities where AKP captured most of the metropolitan cities at the time of the survey with the exception of İzmir Metropolitan Municipality. Small parties and right wing parties like DYP are expectedly lose votes in municipality elections, more likely to AKP.

Also *gencdum* is significant at 1% with an odds ratio of 5,454. It means that Genç Party identifiers are more likely to change votes in different elections, up to 5 times with compared to AKP identifiers. They are more likely to change votes than DYP identifiers too. Odds ratio more than 1 means that the variable increases the probability of the event occurring. In this case it means that being a Genç Party identifier increases the probability of switching votes in general and local elections compared to keeping vote choice the same in different elections by a factor of 5,454.

Genç Party is an idiosyncratic phenomenon in the Turkish politics. Entering the political arena just before the 2002 general elections Genç Party rallied people around a populist-nationalistic rhetoric within an incredibly small amount of time. Party leader was Cem Uzan, a business tycoon and media owner, and he hold an unprecedented political campaign. Party propaganda was hold mainly in the media through television and newspaper ads. Uzan was the only public of the party; he held rallies around the country where he had short but tailor-designed speeches by his publicists followed by

concerts of famous singers and distribution of free food for the followers of the event. The party, other than Uzan himself, was barely functional at the organizational level (Balçı 2003).

Chpdum, mhp dum and dehap dum are insignificant party identification variables. Even though they are insignificant, looking at odds ratios of these variables we can say that the direction of the relationship is estimated correctly by the model. Odds ratios for chpdum and dehap dum are less than 1, 0,726 and 0,812 respectively. This means that CHP and DEHAP identifiers are less likely to change their votes when compared to an AKP identifier. This is also not unexpected given the polarized political environment in Turkey since AKP's ascendance to the government in 2002. Since 2002 elections issues around secularism became hot discussion topics again. The government party's Islamist background brought questions about its attachment to secular principles of the Turkish Republic and most actions of the government increasingly started to be evaluated not in their own right but their relation to secular principles. In this polarized environment CHP became the flag carrier of the secular camp. We can argue that a CHP identifier in this environment is expected to hold on to his party choice because voting has become a way of identity statement rather than a conscious choice between different political alternatives and voting for the best alternative. That is why for a CHP identifier it would not be surprising that he would stick to his party choice in different elections more than other party identifiers.

On the other hand after 2002 elections AKP appeared as a credible alternative to the traditionally Kurdish nationalist party DEHAP in the Kurdish dominated southeastern provinces. It is likely that DEHAP identifiers sticking to their positions in the face of an AKP contention in the elections. If these variables were to be significant, this direction of relationships between dummy categories and the reference category would not be surprising.

This commercial-like political campaign somewhat showed success and although it entered the political arena just a couple of months before the election Uzan's Genç Party managed to garner 7,25% of votes in 2002 general elections. My contention is that this effect of dummy for Genç Party identifiers show voters already recognized one-man-show character of Genç Party and although they identify themselves with the party

or the leader Cem Uzan they are more likely to change votes when it comes to other elections.

age is slightly insignificant at 5% with significance value of 0,054 and it is significant at 10% level. Odds ratio for age is 0,985. This means that as people get older they are more likely to keep their votes. Odds of switching votes decrease as age of the respondent increases. However, this effect is negligibly small.

When we come to insignificant variables; gender appears to be insignificant with a value of 0,555. This tells us that there is no significant difference between males and females in terms of odds of voting for the same party in different elections compared to changing votes.

Education is found to be an important predictor of party choice. Başlevent et. al. (2009) cites Esmer (2002) in arguing that education is repeatedly found to be positively correlated with leftist vote choice. I included education variable in order to see whether level of education is affecting the vote choice in different elections. However none of the categories of the education variable turned out to be significant. Since it is entered as a categorical variable estimates are made according to the highest category, higher education. This category is insignificant in all levels with a significance value of 0,430. Category 1, primary education, and category 2, middle school graduates are found to be decreasing the probability of voting for the same party. The odds ratios are 1,038 and 1,530 respectively. However, both categories are insignificant, with significance values as high as 0,929 and 0,368, again respectively. Category 3, high school, decreases the odds of switching parties in different elections by a factor of 0,869 but unfortunately this category is insignificant with a very high significance value of 0,756.

religiosity is another insignificant variable with a very high value of significance. I find this result pretty surprising. I would expect religiosity to be significant, and especially in this data set religiosity is expected to be increasing probability of voting for the same party because majority of the respondents, 59,4%, are AKP voters and AKP voters are known for their high religiosity. However, this variable turned out to be insignificant with a significance value of 0,713. In the next regression model I will use a dummy variable, reldum, which I created by grouping religious and very religious

people together and coding 1, in contrast to other three categories in the religiosity scale as 0. I expect this variable to pick up positive effects of religiosity on the probability of voting for the same party in different elections.

Among party identification dummies *dypdum*, *mhpdum* and *dehpdum* are insignificant at all levels. Being a DEHAP identifier decreases the odds of switching parties in different elections by a factor of 0,402 but unfortunately this variable is insignificant with a significance value of 0,222.

Ethnic and religious identity variables also proved to be insignificant. Significance values for *alevi* is 0,541 whereas for *kurt* it is 0, 124. Both variables are insignificant at all levels. This means that being an Alevi or a Kurd does not change the probability of voting for the same or different parties in general and local elections.

Economic variables are expected to be effective on vote choice. I include *econ_pers* (respondents' evaluations about their family's economic conditions), *econ_govt* (respondents evaluations about government's responsibility in their economic conditions) and *econ_int* (interaction of *econ_govt* and *econ_pers* variables) variables into the model in order to check for the effects of changes in the economic conditions that can be attributed to government on the vote choice change between general and local elections. As seen on the Variables in the equation table all economic variables, including the interaction variable turned out to be insignificant. Significance values for *econ_pers*, *econ_govt* and *econ_int* are 0,215; 0,156 and 0,368 respectively.

Since I do not want to let economic variables out of the equation I created new variables. It is argued that voters that are happy with government's economic policies are more likely to vote for the government party (Başlevent et.al. 2009) and it is also the contention of the second order model that government parties are more likely to lose votes in the local elections because voters would like to signal them for their unsuccessful policies by switching votes. In order to pick up this effect I created a dummy variable, *econbad*, for people who think that their economic conditions gone bad or very bad in the last 12 months. Later I took the interaction of this variable with *econ_govt*. The new variable, called *econbad_int*, as explained above, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the respondent thinks economic conditions of his

household has gone worse in the last 12 months and if he attributes responsibility for this to the government. In the next regression model I will include these new economic variables in order to see whether bad economic evaluations of the government affect the probability of vote switch in any way.

6. Second Regression Model

In this second model I try to incorporate some insignificant variables by making some transformations on them. The dependent variable again is the `vote_switch`. As I explained in detail above I created `econbad` dummy variable and `econbad_int` by multiplying `econbad` with `econ_govt`. I include these two new variables along with `econ_govt` instead of `econ_pers` and `econ_int` variables. Also I included religiosity dummy `reldum` instead of the original religiosity variable. I am doing these transformations because economic variables and religiosity are important predictors of vote choice in many studies and I expect them to be influential over change of votes between general and local elections. I want to make sure that I operationalized them correctly and entered into the model in the right way.

Below you can find regression outputs for the second model. This model is jointly significant as the previous one. Joint significance of the model is 0,00 so we conclude that independent variables are jointly significant in predicting the dependent variable.

Table 27: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for the Second Regression

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	79,903	21	0,000
	Block	79,903	21	0,000
	Model	79,903	21	0,000

Table 28: Model Summary for the Second Regression

	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
Step 1	711,991(a)	0,110	0,161
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.			

Table 29: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the Second Regression

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	9,786	8	0,280

As explained above Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic shows whether predicted values are significantly different from actual values. The null hypothesis is that “there is no difference between predicted and observed values” so we would like to fail to reject the null hypothesis so that fit between the model and the data is proved. Here significance value is 0,280 for Hosmer and Lemeshow and in this case we fail to reject the null hypothesis, claiming that the model fits the data.

Table 30: Classification Table for the Second Regression

	Observed		Predicted		
			vote_switch		Percentage Correct
			0	1	
Step 1	vote_switch	0	472	29	94,2
		1	144	38	20,9
	Overall Percentage				74,7
a. The cut value is ,500					

When we look at the classification table we can see that the model predicts 74,7% of the cases correctly. This was also 74,7% for the previous model. So there is no difference in the explanatory power of the model.

When we turn to regression results, we see that not much changed from the first regression. Significant variables of the previous regression metropolitan, vote_candidate, left_right, dypdum, gencdum and otherdum are significant in this new model as well. age nearly stays the same, it is slightly insignificant with a significance value of 0,064 now. Except for age, changes in significance values and coefficients of significant and insignificant variables are ignorable. Coding religiosity as a dummy

variable seems to change nothing; reldum is also highly insignificant with significance value of 0,791. Dummy for the Kurdish and Alevi identities kurt and alevi are also still insignificant in this model.

Table 31: Variables in the Equation for the Second Regression

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
dummy for metropolitan residence (metropolitan)	-0,375	0,191	0,050	0,687
gender	-0,125	0,195	0,524	0,883
age	-0,014	0,008	0,064	0,986
education			0,453	
education(1)	0,058	0,414	0,889	1,060
education(2)	0,429	0,472	0,363	1,536
education(3)	-0,121	0,451	0,788	0,886
dummy for respondents with negative view of their household's economic conditions (econbad)	0,528	0,422	0,211	1,695
dummy for respondents' view of government's responsibility for economic conditions (econ_govt)	-0,373	0,239	0,119	0,689
interaction variable for economic variables econ_bad*econ_govt (econbad_int)	-0,453	0,497	0,361	0,635
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)			0,000	
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered no (vote_candidate(1))	-0,542	0,202	0,007	0,581
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered it depends (vote_candidate(2))	-1,250	0,309	0,000	0,287
respondent's left right placement (left_right)	-0,112	0,049	0,024	0,894
dummy for religiosity (reldum)	0,059	0,223	0,791	1,061
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum)	1,196	0,452	0,008	3,305
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum)	-0,314	0,350	0,370	0,731
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhp dum)	0,595	0,461	0,197	1,814
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum)	-0,211	0,739	0,775	0,809
dummy for genç party identifiers (gencdum)	1,708	0,453	0,000	5,515
dummy for other parties identifiers (otherdum)	0,721	0,285	0,011	2,056
dummy for alevi identity (alevi)	-0,275	0,451	0,542	0,759
dummy for kurd identity (kurt)	-0,636	0,403	0,114	0,529
Constant	0,917	0,651	0,159	2,501
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econbad, econ_govt, econbad_int, vote_candidate, left_right, reldum, dypdum, chpdum, mhp dum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, kurt.				

When we look at the economic variables, a similar picture is observed. Dummy variable for household economic evaluations, econbad and interaction of econbad and econ_govt, econbad_int proved to be insignificant, with significance values of 0,211 and 0,361 respectively. This means that people whose economic conditions has gone worse and who keep the government responsible for this does not show any significant

difference in voting for the same party in different elections or switching their votes. econ_govt also proved insignificant however, its significance value is 0,119. This tells me that if other economic variables are dropped from the model this variable could turn to be significant.

7. The Last Regression

Below I provided the last regression model output; it includes all previous variables only this time I left econ_govt and excluded all other economic variables.

Table 32: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients ofr the Last Regression		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	78,274	19	0,000
	Block	78,274	19	0,000
	Model	78,274	19	0,000

Table 33: Model Summary for the Last Regression

	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
Step 1	713,621(a)	0,108	0,158
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.			

Table 34: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the Last Regression

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	13,502	8	0,096

In these outputs, there are two things to note here: First is the Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic. For the first time in this series of models Hosmer and Lemeshow is significant at 10%. This means that fit of the model to the data is questionable, even though at the 10%.

Secondly, in the equation all independent variables have the same signs and nearly the same magnitudes with previous models. econ_govt turned to be significant at

5% after I exclude other economic variables and its effect is as expected. Thinking government is responsible for economic conditions decreases the odds of vote switch by a factor 0,628.

Table 35: Variables in the Equation for the Last Regression

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
dummy for metropolitan residence (metropolitan)	-0,361	0,190	0,058	0,697
gender	-0,105	0,194	0,589	0,901
age	-0,014	0,008	0,060	0,986
education			0,460	
education(1)	0,083	0,413	0,840	1,087
education(2)	0,443	0,471	0,347	1,557
education(3)	-0,101	0,450	0,822	0,904
dummy for respondents' view of government's responsibility for economic conditions (econ_govt)	-0,465	0,207	0,025	0,628
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)			0,000	
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered no (vote_candidate(1))	-0,553	0,201	0,006	0,575
vote for candidate in the municipality elections- answered it depends (vote_candidate(2))	-1,264	0,309	0,000	0,283
respondent's left right placement (left_right)	-0,114	0,049	0,021	0,892
dummy for religiosity (reldum)	0,072	0,223	0,746	1,075
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum)	1,220	0,450	0,007	3,387
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum)	-0,315	0,343	0,359	0,730
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhp dum)	0,583	0,457	0,202	1,792
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum)	-0,176	0,731	0,810	0,839
dummy for genc party identifiers (gencdum)	1,723	0,442	0,000	5,600
dummy for other parties identifiers (otherdum)	0,716	0,280	0,011	2,046
dummy for alevi identity (alevi)	-0,268	0,449	0,550	0,765
dummy for kurd identity (kurt)	-0,608	0,403	0,131	0,544
Constant	1,005	0,640	0,116	2,732
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econ_govt, vote_candidate, left_right, reldum, dypdum, chpdum, mhp dum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, kurt.				

Now all regressions are conducted I should provide an interpretation of results and see how they fit with the proposed hypotheses:

8. Interpretation of Results According to Hypotheses

age is significant at 10% in all models with an odds ratio of 0,985. This means that age has a miniscule, even negligible, effect on vote switch. Aging decreases the odds of switching votes in different elections.

gender is highly insignificant in all models. It has no effect on vote switch.

metropolitan is significant at 5% and living in a metropolitan municipality decreases the odds of vote switch. It can be argued that in non-metropolitan areas people tend to have closer relationships with candidates and this affects party choice more. Also given the high ratio of AKP voters in the sample and AKP dominance in metropolitan municipalities it is not surprising that metropolitan residence decreases the odds of vote switch.

left_right is significant at 5% with an odds ratio around 0,89 in all models. As expected as respondents move to the right their odds to change votes decreases.

religiosity variable is unexpectedly and highly insignificant in all models. Significance values for this variable are as high as 0,8. This needs an explanation because in all voting behavior models religiosity turns out to be a good predictor of vote choice in Turkey. Reasons for this variable to be insignificant can be manifold: One of the reasons could be the high amount of missing data in the dataset. This warrant is valid for all of the analysis actually; the original dataset has 1806 respondents, however I could only work with a sample of 683 respondents. One might argue that high level of missing data lead to unexpected results. On the other hand, this thinking might not be that credible given the fact that any inconsistency in the sampling supposed affect other independent variables as well.

Another reason, related with the previous one, can be lack of variance in the variable. That is why regression analysis fails to capture effects of this independent variable. In the sample only 3% appears to define themselves as without faith in the requirements of religion or not having religious faith at all. 69% of the sample is either religious or very religious. Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) remark right wing party voters do not differentiate between themselves in terms of religiosity. This might be true in this case and a reason for lack of variance in the variable, which is leading to insignificance.

Yet another reason can be measurement error, however Başlevant et.al. (2009) using same dataset found religion to be a significant predictor of party choice as with other studies using same methodology (for instance Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007). This also decreases the credibility of measurement error explanation and leaves the question in the air as to why this variable is insignificant.

vote_candidate variable also meet the expectations and turned out to be significant in all models at 1%. In line with the expectations responding “no” to the relevant question, which is saying “I will not vote for the candidate but for the party”, decreases odds of vote switch considerably with compared to responding yes. Also responding “it depends” decreases the odds of vote switch too with a factor of 0,283.

For party identification dummies; DYP and other parties’ identifier dummies, dypdum and otherdum turned out to be significant as expected and their effects increase the odds of vote switch with compared to the reference category AKP identifiers. DYP and other parties’ identifiers are more likely to change their party choice. Genc Party dummy, gencdum, also showed an expected effect. This dummy is significant and as expected GP identifiers are more likely to change their votes. As indicated this is because GP is a party that is identified with its leader and does not have any cadres or grassroots mechanisms. It is expected that even GP identifiers would find it hard to vote for GP in local elections. Other party dummies are insignificant but the directions of coefficients are right. If the variables were significant CHP and DEHAP identifiers are expected to be less likely to change their votes with compared to AKP identifiers.

Identity variables alevi and kurt are expected to decrease odds of a vote switch in the elections however they both turned out to be insignificant. According to this data being Kurd or an Alevi does not effect decision on vote change in different elections.

Another problematic point in the analysis is the insignificance of economic condition variables. Neither personal economic conditions (econ_pers) nor government’s responsibility (econ_govt) is found significant. Their interaction (econ_int) also turns out to be insignificant. Dummy coded economic variable econbad and its interaction with econ_govt, econbad_int also did not improve the position. When entered to the model by itself econ_govt turns to be significant and decreases the odds

of party switch as expected, however this time Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic becomes significant at 10% level, putting doubts on the validity of the model.

Here I should cite three studies on voting behavior. Başlevent et.al (2005 and 2009) and Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007). These studies on Turkish voting behavior in national elections use logistic regression analysis in order to distinguish between factors affecting vote choice of voters. Başlevent et. al. (2009) uses the same dataset used in this dissertation. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) use data from their own panel study. About the effects of economic variables they reach different conclusions. Başlevent et. al. in both studies found economic variables to be significant, however Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu argue that economic evaluation about the past or the future does not shape vote choice of voters, especially for two big parties AKP and CHP. If we take this as reference than economic variables showing insignificant values can be acceptable. However, the same data suggests impact on vote choice in Başlevent et. al.'s (2009) analysis. Whether we can interpret these results simply as economic variables having no effect on vote change in different elections, or whether we should suspect from a model specification problem is a question to be answered.

Last but not least education proves to be insignificant at all models at all levels. This is also something to think about. Since we know that low education level voters are more likely to vote for AKP (Başlevent et.al. 2009) it would not be wrong to expect that low education levels decrease the odds of vote switch. In the models, however, education categories not only turn to be insignificant but also their signs are different from expected. Low and middle education categories increase odds of vote switch according to their odds ratios. It should be noted that Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) found education to be insignificant over vote choice between AKP and CHP. If education is not effective on party vote choice, then it might not be that surprising that it turns out to be insignificant on vote switch.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This thesis aims to understand patterns of voting behavior in Turkish local elections and its relationship with national elections. While doing this the second order election model (Reif and Schmitt 1980) is used as a theoretical framework modeling the relationship patterns between different levels of elections. Local elections are often portrayed to be of secondary importance with respect to national contests, however, especially in the Turkish context there is no systematic analysis of the relationship between the two levels of elections. What I have done here is looked at this relationship from the second order elections perspective using data at two different levels: At the aggregate level I used voter turnout since the 1961 national elections, because there is no systematic data about local elections comparable to national election results before the 1963 local elections. I also used the vote shares of parties in both elections order to calculate comparative fragmentation, volatility and Effective number of parties (ENP) indices (Chapter III).

At the individual level I used survey data from the Survey of Electoral Intentions conducted in December 2003 by TÜSES and Veri Araştırma,. This survey data has been used in previous publications (Başlevent et. al. 2009, Tüses 2004) and is conducted by a reputable polling company. Therefore, I find it credible to use. I created a model with the dependent variable defined as the vote switch of the respondents between two different elections, past national elections and the upcoming local elections. Factors affecting vote switch in these elections have tried to be accounted for with this model. I used binary logistic regression in order to test these factors.

According to the second order elections theory people tend to care less about second order elections because “less is at stake”. The second order elections model depends on some assumptions about the nature of second order elections. As mentioned before these assumptions are:

- i. Turnout is lower in second order elections
- ii. Minor parties gain votes against the losses of the government parties in second order elections, but voters turn back to their original positions at the next first order election
- iii. Government losses are more pronounced in the midterm period
- iv. Outcome is strongly related with incumbent popularity and national issues dominate the elections rather than election specific issues (Norris 1997).

I tried to test these assumptions using the above mentioned data analysis. Before that the historical development of the Turkish local administration and its basic characteristics are provided (Chapter II). Historically, the importance of local government is very low in the Turkish state. A strong center tradition not only hampered civil society but also does not permit local authority to flourish out of the control of the center. Local authorities do not have the financial means and bureaucratic power to deliver to the people. This reflected itself in the outlook against local elections. From the voters’ side participation is lower; in some cases it is as low as 20% less than turnout in general elections. From the politicians’ perspective local elections are not political events that are important in their own right, but are viewed as a corollary of national politics. Çitçi et.al. (2001) shows the characteristics of local elections by analyzing elections between 1963 and 1999 and these characteristics clearly show the subservient character of local elections to national politics.

However, one should note changes in the characteristics too. For instance, until the 1980s local elections were used as instruments to alter government formation at the national stage. However, after 1980s these elections changed character and came to be recognized as large public opinion polls. Although still far from valued at its own right, this change is significant in itself. Turnout rates on average also show a rise for local elections especially in the 1990s. One lesson to be drawn from the historical analysis is that these changes in the character of local elections are taking place in hand with

changes in the status of local administration. Turkey has been urbanizing rapidly since the 1950s so that by the 1980s problems with urbanization became unignorable. Significant changes have been made in the laws that relatively strengthen local administration units. These changes not only increased interest in them, but also reflected itself in increased turnout rates by the voters.

In Chapter II I try to test some assumptions of the second order model according to Turkish local elections. The analysis of turnout rates shows two things. First, although turnout rates are low in local elections compared to national ones when looked at election by election, averages by decade are very close. It is even higher in two elections after the 1990s. Secondly, when compared with many European countries, differences between local and national elections are miniscule, even negligible. Therefore, the first assumption of the second order model that “turnout is always less in second order elections” is not sustainable in the Turkish context.

Also in Chapter II, I test the assumption that “government (or big) parties lose votes, and small parties gain in return” by using aggregate level vote shares data. I calculated fragmentation, volatility and ENP indices using vote shares. The basic assumption here is that we expect all these indicators of voter fragmentation to increase if the assumption of second order elections is to hold true. However, it is seen that all indicators either show more fragmentation for national elections or they are the same. Moreover, these indicators move together for both elections, showing that when there is fragmentation in the electorate it is reflected both in national and local elections at the same time. These indicators also fail to validate the assumptions of the second order model for Turkish local elections. It is more like voters are using local election to signal or validate national trends, rather than showing different behavior in local elections.. In this sense it can be argued that more than second order contests, Turkish local elections resemble Anderson and Ward’s (1996) barometer elections.

In Chapter III, I constructed a binary logistic regression model in order to test for factors affecting vote choice in different elections. It is hard to say that this model directly tests second orderness of local elections because the data at hand does not include questions directed at voters investigating their evaluation of local elections compared to national elections or questions directed at local issue factors influencing

vote choice. However, the data set includes vote choices for the last elections and vote intention for upcoming local elections. In addition, the model I constructed investigates differences in this vote choice by using independent variables pertaining to major factors that are known to affect vote choice like the socio-demographic variables of age, gender, education, as well as religiosity and economic evaluations of respondents. Respondents' intention to vote for the candidate as opposed to the party is also included along with traditional left-right self-placement of respondents. The effect of party identification is also controlled for through a dummy variable.

Interpretations of this model and independent variables are provided in Chapter IV. Here I would like to reiterate that this model does not directly test second order effects in local elections. However, through evaluation of significant and insignificant variables we can generate ideas about national election – local election relationships. I would like to direct attention to three independent variables in the model: In the model left-right placements turns out to be significant. This can be a sign of the dominance of national issues in voting decisions. Freire (2004) argues that the effect of ideology in second order elections is less pronounced. On the other hand the vote-candidate variable is significant, meaning that a candidate's personality is influential for people in their decision to change their votes. This can be interpreted as issue or election specific variables to be affective in voting decisions. The economic evaluations of respondents turn out to be insignificant. If this is not a model specification problem and economic evaluations really does not affect vote change between national and local elections, then it means that some national issues are not that influential on second order vote decisions. This tells us that things are not that simplistic as assumed by the second order elections model; that national issues always dominate the scene and election specific issues are not significant.

In the conclusion it would be appropriate to discuss strengths and weaknesses of this analysis. The main strength and potential use of this study comes from its subject matter. It is already mentioned that election studies is relatively limited in Turkish political science literature. Local election studies within this literature comprise a nearly negligible space. I believe that conducting a study in this area is a contribution in itself. Also, this study aims to pass beyond previous studies on the subject through making analysis of local elections by quantitative methodology. To the best of my knowledge, relationship between national and local election results is never studied systematically

before. This study is an attempt in this end and can be regarded as a valuable contribution within the confines of this attempt.

The study is prone to limitations and weaknesses though. Main limitation is due to the survey data used in the study for the individual level analysis. I used TÜSES 2003 survey which includes questions about party choice in local elections as well as vote intention in national elections. As discussed before, working with voting intention data instead of actual vote choices is likely to increase measurement error and hence affect the results of the analysis. Secondly, applying surveys about local vote intention can be all the more problematic. If the surveys are applied in a time where there is no election coming up in the near future it is highly likely that local vote intention and national vote intention would contaminate each other. Respondents in such a survey are likely to respond with the same party choices, without thinking about alternatives. It can be argued that local vote intention would be more contaminated because people mostly think about general economic and political issues in their mind while answering the questions, rather than local issues.

Another limitation is the appropriateness of survey questions for the study. In the introduction it was mentioned that in the TÜSES survey there are questions about people's perceptions of autonomy of local administration like "Do you think it's a good thing for your mayor to be a member of the governing party?" and questions about the degree of autonomy for the local administration. Most of these questions cannot be used in the analysis mainly because they lack responsibility attribution. Since questions are not explicitly linked with vote choice they could not be operationalized as independent variables in the model. Also there are not any questions directly investigating if and how voters differentiate between local and national elections while casting their votes in different elections. For these reasons I have repeatedly underscored that the individual level analysis in this study is not directly investigating second orderness. Rather, it is a preliminary study of factors affecting Turkish voters' different vote choices for different elections.

I would like to draw two general conclusions. For the second order elections model it is already documented that the model does not fulfill its all assumptions in sub-national elections as it did in the European Parliament elections. Pallares and Keating

(2003) and Freire (2004) argued for a need to modify the model for the Spanish and Portuguese cases they investigated. My analysis here also confirms that the model does not fare well with local elections. In the Turkish case, nearly all assumptions of the model are violated. Only dominance of national issues in local elections seems to hold and it is apparent that we do not need a second order elections model to conclude that.

How can we study voting behavior in local elections then? In an ideal world a nation-wide panel study that covers a series of national and local elections and conducted both as a pre-election and post-election survey would be very useful for investigating local voting behavior in relation to national vote. It would be better if the surveys include questions explicitly asking for factors influential on voter's party choice in local and national elections separately, including economic, socio-political and conjunctural factors at the national and local level. Reasons for party choice change over elections should also be asked. Voters' expectations from the local administration, how much power they attribute to local politics, their views about decentralization of local administration should also be included. On the other hand, one should accept that such a tailor-made survey series would be enormously time consuming and costly

The conclusion for the Turkish local elections would be that, although the dominance of national issues is expected to hold as it does for all other countries, one cannot dismiss the growing importance of local elections in the face of national ones. If continuing urbanization is accompanied by further decentralization, it would not be surprising to see local issues dominating local elections in future elections.

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