

GERMAN SOCIAL PREFERENCES TOWARDS TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION

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
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Key Words: liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism, social preferences, political parties, public opinion.

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to explain the social preferences in Germany towards Turkey's EU membership, the factors that shape these preferences and their relative impact on Turkish accession. The major political parties and the public are identified as two significant domestic groups whose preferences influence the national position on Turkey. Particularly, the impact of SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and FDP is substantial in this respect. The public impact is more limited and indirect. The attitude of these domestic groups is shaped by material and identity-based concerns over Turkish membership. The major political parties tend to assess Turkish accession in terms of the security and economic benefits it will bring to the EU. The material benefits of Turkey's inclusion are the primary determinants which shape the position of the social democrats, the Greens and the liberals. On the other hand, the identity and culture based concerns influence the stance of CDU/CSU. The public attitude is mainly determined by the perceived economic and cultural threats posed by Turkey's membership. Particularly, the perceived cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states play an important role in the increasing public opposition against Turkish accession.

TÜRKİYE’NİN AB ÜYELİĞİ VE ALMANYA: ALMAN TOPLUMUNUN BAKIŞI

Fatma Gerenli

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Anahtar Kelimeler: liberal hükümetlerarası teori, yapısalcılık, toplumsal tercihler, siyasi partiler, kamuoyu.

ÖZET

Bu tez Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği konusunda Almanya’daki toplumsal tercihleri, bu tercihlerin oluşumunda rol oynayan faktörleri ve bu faktörlerin Türkiye’nin AB’ye katılımı üzerindeki görece etkilerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Almanya’nın bu konudaki tutumunu belirleyen belli başlı toplumsal gruplar arasında önemli siyasi partiler ve kamuoyu ön plana çıkmaktadır. Önemli siyasi partiler ve kamuoyunun tercihleri uzun vadede Almanya’nın Türkiye’ye yönelik tutumunu etkilemekte ve yönlendirmektedir. Özellikle, SPD, CDU/CSU, Yeşiller ve FDP gibi siyasi partilerin bu konudaki etkisi oldukça büyüktür. Kamuoyu bu konuda daha sınırlı ve dolaylı bir etkiye sahiptir. Siyasi partilerin ve kamuoyunun Türkiye’ye yönelik tercihlerinin şekillenmesinde güvenlik ve ekonomiye dayalı beklentiler ve kültürel eksenli endişeler rol oynamaktadır. Siyasi partiler, Türkiye’nin üyeliğini değerlendirirken bu üyeliğin Avrupa güvenliğine ve ekonomisine sağlayacağı kazançları göz önüne alma eğilimindedirler. Türkiye üyeliğinin getireceği maddi kazançlar Sosyal Demokratların, Yeşillerin ve Liberallerin Türkiye’ye yönelik tutumlarını belirlemede öncelikli rol oynamaktadır. Öte yandan, CDU/CSU’nun bu konudaki tutumunu kültür ve kimlik eksenli endişeler şekillendirmektedir. Kamuoyu ise Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğini hem maddi hem de kültürel bir tehdit olarak algılamakta ve bu tehdit algısı kamuoyunun bu konudaki tutumunu belirlemektedir. Özellikle, Türkiye ve AB üye devletleri arasındaki kültürel farklılıklar kamuoyunun Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine yönelik muhalif bir tutum takınmasında etkili olmaktadır.

To my beloved family / Canım aileme

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CSU	Bavarian Christian Social Union
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
FDP	Free Democratic Party
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1963 Ankara Treaty, the attempts of Turkey to become an EU member have continued. In 1959, following Greece, Turkey applied for the European Economic Community membership. The answer from Brussels was neither absolutely positive nor negative. Brussels did not reject the application, however based on the argument that the EEC and Turkey were not yet ready for a full membership, it offered an association agreement to Turkey and Greece which would eventually lead to a full membership. Article 28 of the agreement laid the legal ground that if Turkey ‘fulfilled the obligations arising out of the Treaty’, the possibility of its membership to the EC would be examined by the member states.¹

In 1987, another historic step was taken when Turkey officially applied to the EC for full membership. However, the Commission Opinion in 1989 was not much different than the 1959 Brussels opinion when the Commission recommendation to the Council was to revitalize the Association Agreement since neither the EC nor Turkey was yet ready for a full-membership. In 1995, another significant development took place when Turkey concluded the Customs Union Agreement, the preceding step before the full membership as so anticipated in the Ankara Agreement. After this development, Turkey had to wait until the 1999 Helsinki Summit where it was finally granted the candidate status. Eventually, in 2005, nearly 50 years after the first application of Turkey to become a member to the EEC, the accession negotiations were started. According to the negotiating framework, which was laid after the opening of accession negotiations, Turkey is required to implement the *acquis communautaire* fully by completing 35 chapters that were specified in the framework. So far only one chapter was successfully closed.

¹ Ankara Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey. Article 28.

The ultimate result of the negotiations is not definite; because the EU reiterated several times that it is an open-ended process, which may not result in full-membership. That is, even if all of the chapters are closed, the outcome of the negotiations will not be determined by fulfilling the required criteria and implementing the *acquis* alone, but other factors will be influential, too. The key factor will be the stance of the member states towards Turkey, because the decisions on enlargement are taken with unanimous voting at the European Council, where the member states are the ultimate decision-makers. The preferences of member states towards Turkey will determine the direction for Turkey's long way towards Europe.

This thesis aims to analyze the social preference formation towards Turkey's EU bid in Germany and argue that the domestic preferences in Germany have an impact on Turkey's EU membership. The literature on the EU-Turkey relations mostly deals with the state-level preference formation in the member states. However, the domestic preference formation in individual member states in terms of Turkey's EU accession is not widely studied. The thesis aims to contribute to the literature by its analysis of social preferences in one of the largest member states in the EU. Germany's support for Turkish membership is crucial, because it is one of the largest member states and has relative influence over other member states through its economic power. However, the current German position towards Turkish accession is marked by opposition. Contrary to its supportive attitude before the late 1980s, Germany has been rather skeptical on Turkey's accession. This change in Germany's attitude has been determined mainly by the increasing opposition of the domestic groups against Turkey's EU bid. Therefore, Germany forms a good case study to investigate the influence of domestic groups on national preference formation in terms of Turkish membership and analyze the determinants which affect the preference formation among these groups.

The relations between Turkey and Germany date back to the 19th century to the Ottoman Era. The relationship between these two countries started with the exchange of experts in military and civil administration, and developed into an alliance in World War I. After the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the relationship has continued in different ways. During the Cold War, Turkey was considered to be an indispensable part

of the Western security system, and this role of the country was of special importance for the Federal Republic of Germany, one of the front-line states of the Cold War. Starting in 1960s, another development took place which has had a great impact in shaping the German-Turkish relations. This development was the migration of a large Turkish population to Germany as *Gastarbeiter* (guest-worker) after the conclusion of a recruitment treaty between West Germany and Turkey in October 1961.

Both during the Ottoman Empire and the Republican Era, the relationship between Turkey and Germany was defined as 'friendly. However, in the recent decades, with the growing Turkish population in Germany and Turkey's EU bid, the trajectory of this relationship has taken a slightly different turn. Even though, there was no overt opposition to Turkey's EU bid until the late 1980s, with the chancellorship of Kohl and the rise of the Christian Democrats to power in coalition with the Free Democrats, the opposition to a possible Turkish entry to the EU has become more manifest. The rhetoric of the political party leaders and the public opinion polls demonstrate this trend very much.

The social preference formation is under the influence of various groups. These groups can be categorized as political parties, social classes, interest groups, legislators and the public.² Within the framework of this thesis, two of these domestic determinants in Germany, the political parties and the public will be examined. There is an obvious divide among these groups on the Turkish issue. Whereas one side fiercely opposes the country's membership to the EU, the other side supports it. This trend can be examined by looking at the rhetoric of the party leaders and members and the public opinion polls conducted by the EU.

² Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game." *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Eds. Robert Putnam, et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. p. 435.

In terms of the political parties, the largest divide is between the Social Democrats, which are represented by SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), and the Greens, and Christian Democrats represented by CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) and CSU (Bavarian Christian Social Union) and to some extent the FDP (Free Democratic Party). While the Social Democrats and the Greens support Turkey's full membership to the Union, CDU/CSU fiercely oppose full-membership, and are more supportive of a 'privileged partnership' instead. The FDP does not have a clear-cut position towards Turkey. It neither openly supports the Turkish membership like SPD and the Greens, nor opposes it as rigidly as CDU/CSU. The rhetoric of the political party leaders and party members has made this attitude most obvious. The SPD leaders such as Schroeder often made statements in favor of Turkey; the CDU leader Angela Merkel has followed the lead of her predecessor Helmut Kohl, and so far made statements against Turkey's EU bid and argued that full-membership is not a reasonable option in the Turkish case, but the relations should continue in the form of a 'privileged-partnership'.

A similar divide exists among the public on Turkey's EU bid. While some portions of the public support Turkey's EU accession in line with the SPD and the Greens, other parts are in great opposition like the CDU/CSU. The public opinion polls conducted by the European Commission, along with some nation-wide surveys demonstrate that the opposition to a possible Turkish EU membership has increased. The proportion of the public that is concerned and suspicious of a Turkish membership has far exceeded the proportion that supports Turkey's EU bid.

The reasons for support and opposition are driven by various determinants. Firstly, there is great concern about the possibility of another immigration wave from Turkey. The fear of immigration has both economic and social implications. Considering the rising level of unemployment in Germany, especially after the German Reunification in 1990, the possibility of immigration from Turkey has been a source of concern among the public. In addition to a flux of workers who may have an impact on

the job market and the social welfare system, the fear of immigration also adds to the level of perceived cultural threat among the public.³ The large number of Turkish population living in Germany is another determinant which influences the public preference formation. The reasons of opposition and support for Turkey's EU bid are both utility-driven and identity-based at the public level and the political party level. Indeed, these two domestic groups are in a constant interaction, and the opinion of one group on the Turkish issue is bound to be influenced by the other group, and vice versa. The rhetoric of the political party leaders and members influence the preference formation among the public, and the preference of the public, i.e. domestic voters, has an impact on the political parties through elections.

This thesis is mainly composed of four chapters. The first chapter will provide a general theoretical framework and define concepts which will be repeatedly used throughout the thesis. Liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism will be the form the main theoretical foundation of this study. The stance of the political parties and the public opinion towards Turkey's accession will be analyzed from both the liberal intergovernmentalist account and the constructivist approach. These two approaches will be discussed in the first chapter.

The second chapter will present a brief history of the German-Turkish relations. The course of the relations starting from the late 19th century to the recent years will be analyzed. Major international developments played an important role in determining the relations of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic with Europe in general and Germany in particular. Therefore while analyzing the relationship between these countries, international context will be taken into consideration. The analysis of historical relations between Germany and Turkey will enforce a more comprehensive understanding of the current determinants shaping this relationship.

³ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." *European Union Politics*. 8.2 (2007): 258.

In the third chapter, the social preference formation at the political party level will be discussed in detail. The rhetoric of the party leaders and members provides tangible resource in defining the preference at this level. Therefore, the speeches and statements of the party leaders and important opinion makers will be elaborated. The division among the political parties on the Turkish issue will be analyzed in depth in relation to the decisions made during the rule of each party. The stance of the major parties which have conflicting approaches to the Turkish issue will be defined. In addition to statements and decisions related to Turkey's EU bid, some major decisions of the political parties on the existing Turkish community in Germany will be examined.

The final chapter will endeavor to explain the preference formation at the public level. Both the utility-driven and identity-based determinants of the preference formation will be analyzed in detail. The economic and social implications of a possible wave of immigration will be argued in relation with the threat perception among the public. The impacts of the existing Turkish population in Germany on the preference formation at the public level will be discussed. The public opinion polls conducted by the European Commission will provide the main sources for the analysis of the public preferences on this issue.

CHAPTER I

Theoretical Premises of German Preferences

The European integration is mainly driven by the EU member states. The domain of the supranational institutions is rather limited, mostly to issues of low politics, such as trade and agriculture. The integration in terms of “high politics” is controlled by the individual member states.⁴ The relative influence of the nation-state on the European integration has been discussed since the onset of the integration. Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are the main European integration theories which question the impact of the nation state on the integration.

According to neo-functionalism, which was the prominent European integration theory from the late 1950s to the early 1970s⁵, as the European integration deepened, the states would no longer be the sole authority in giving direction to the integration, but the transnational interest groups and supranational authority would be the main actors.⁶ For neo-functionalists, the states would forego their competence in making decisions

⁴ Hoffman, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of the Western Europe.” *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Ed. Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 170.

⁵ Rosamond, Ben. *Theories of European Integration*. New York: St. Martins Press, 2000. p. 54.

⁶ Haas, Ernst. “The Uniting of Europe.” *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Ed. Nelsen, Brent F. And Alexander Stubb. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 147.; Lindberg; Leon. “Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses.” *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. p. 155.

related to integration by transferring power to supranational authorities when they were confronted with complex problems.⁷ Neo-functionalism was formulated in the golden age of supranational authority which was on the rise during 1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, it provided a “plausible account” for the European integration at the time.⁸

Nevertheless, later developments refuted the major claim of neo-functionalism. It has become more evident that the national states remained to be the main actors in the integration process. Starting with the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965, developments like Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, the formation of the European Council in 1974 confirmed the supremacy of the states repeatedly. The developments showed that “cooperation was possible among sovereign states, but only when it was in their own interest; the member states were quick to halt or reverse integration when it no longer met their needs.”⁹ Taking into consideration the insufficiency of neo-functionalism to provide an explanation for these developments, another theory with a new configuration of the relative power of the decision-making bodies in the EU was required. Liberal intergovernmentalism was the theory that filled this gap. The explanatory power of liberal intergovernmentalism vis-à-vis other theories rests with its inclusion of the state-level in explaining the European integration and its emphasis on state actors.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism:

The core argument of intergovernmentalism, that the states are the main actors in decision-making in the EU, lies in the realist theories of the international relations and from this aspect Moravcsik’s approach can be compared to the rational intergovernmentalist approach, which was introduced by Stanley Hoffman in 1966. Rational intergovernmentalism claims that states are the main actors in driving the

⁷ Rosamond, Ben. *Theories of European Integration*. p. 59.

⁸ Ibid. p. 72.

⁹ Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Choice for Europe.” in *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. ed. by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 239.

European integration. The decisions with respect to European integration are taken and the national preferences are through strategic bargaining at the state level.¹⁰ However, Moravcsik's theory differs from classical intergovernmentalism exactly at this point. In contrast to the state-centrism of classical intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism introduces a second level, the societal level, in preference formation. From this perspective, liberal intergovernmentalism also takes from the liberal theories of international relations in that it stresses the impact of societal groups in defining the national preferences. While adding the societal level to the preference formation, Moravcsik builds on Putnam's two-level game analogy. Putnam argues that "at the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies", and the governments aim at realizing the domestically defined interests at the international level.¹¹ In this sense, liberal intergovernmentalism has a two-tiered approach to European integration.

The first level is comprised of the intergovernmental account which is based on the assumption that states are the main actors in EU integration. State actions are "purposively directed toward the achievement of a set of consistently ordered goals or objectives."¹² According to intergovernmentalism, states are motivated by their objective of furthering their material interests. Therefore while explaining integration; the intergovernmentalist approach posits the convergence of material interests as the driving force. Material interests, both economic and security interests have always been at the center of the integration. Moravcsik defines integration as "the policy response of modern welfare states to rising economic interdependence."¹³ The states agree to

¹⁰ Nelsen, Brent F. And Alexander Stubb eds. *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 164.

¹¹ Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." in *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Process*. p. 436.

¹² Moravcsik, Andrew. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.", *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 31.4 (1993): 476.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 481.

integrate further as long as it creates material gains or maintains the status quo. The decisions to widen or deepen integration are all bound by the cost-benefit calculations of the member states.

States pursue their material interests at the interstate bargaining table. The relative bargaining power of the member states is determined by the intensity of their preferences.¹⁴ As a result, the relative bargaining power of each member state is redefined according to the issue dealt with. Moravcsik lists three determinants that influence the relative bargaining power of the states. The first is the unilateral policy agreements, i.e. threats of non-agreement. When the status quo in a member state constituted a better alternative than the benefits an agreement would bring, the member state is more likely to reject the agreement.¹⁵

The second determinant is forming alternative coalitions and the threat of exclusion. This type of determinant is influential, when the interests of two or more states converge on a specific issue, and they want to form an alternative coalition to conclude an agreement on it. In such cases, the other states face the threat of exclusion, and this situation increases the relative bargaining power of the states who are party to the alternative coalition.¹⁶

The third determinant is the “compromise, side-payment and package deals”¹⁷. Package deals usually takes place when “when two countries have highly asymmetrical interests in various issues which permit each to make concessions valuable to the other at relatively low cost”. In package deals, several issues are linked together to an

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 476.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p. 476.

agreement, and nearly each member state finds the agreement favorable in some aspect. However, whereas package deals are important in that they provide a middle ground to conclude an agreement, since they have “important domestic distributional consequences”, they also “create winners and losers in all countries that are party to them”¹⁸.

In all these bargaining situations, the larger states are more advantageous. The larger states are advantageous in situations when there is a threat of non-agreement, because being “prosperous” and “relatively self-sufficient”, they do not gain as much as the “smaller, poorer, more open neighbors” from the agreement. Likewise, when there is a threat of exclusion from an alternative coalition, larger states are at an advantage, since their participation is essential for a “viable coalitions”¹⁹. Consequently, when the EU is considered, states like Germany, France and United Kingdom, are deemed to be more advantageous in interstate bargaining than smaller member states.

So far the influence of the member states in the policy formation in the EU is analyzed. As for the supranational institutions, Moravcsik explains their role using the functional regime theory and defines the institutions as “passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules”²⁰. In contrast to neofunctionalism, the supranational institutions are not the main actors in the interstate bargaining and policy formation in the EU, but they complement the states by providing “domestic legitimacy and credibility to member state initiatives”, and they help the governments to “overcome domestic opposition”. The governments also use the supranational institutions as “scapegoats for unpopular policies or undemocratic processes”²¹. However the role of the supranational institutions in intergovernmentalism is certainly not limited to the abovementioned

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 508.

²¹ Ibid. p. 516.

functions. The governments delegate their power to make *ad hoc* decisions on certain issues to semi-autonomous central institutions. In addition to delegation, states pool their sovereignty through qualified majority voting, making collective control over certain issues possible. However, governments only delegate power to supranational institutions or pool their sovereignty only when such decisions are not likely to produce consequences against their interests.²²

The second tier of liberal intergovernmentalism is the societal level preference formation. In this level, multiple domestic groups with divergent interests bargain with each other to influence the national preference formation. The preference formation at the societal level is not much different from the state level in the sense that it happens as a result of strategic bargaining. Similar to the relative bargaining power of the states, the bargaining leverage of the societal groups stems from their “identity”, “the nature of their interests” and “their relative influence on domestic policy”²³. Liberal intergovernmentalism argues that these societal groups form pressure on national governments both at the national level and the international level. At level I, different societal groups with divergent interests compete to influence the preference formation in favor of their benefit. Then the national preferences defined domestically are bargained at the international level. At this level the governments are compelled to conclude an agreement that will satisfy the domestic groups. In short, “groups articulate preferences; and governments aggregate them.”²⁴ Consequently, “governments participating in international negotiations are both empowered and constrained by important societal groups, which calculate their interests in terms of the expected gains and losses from specific policies.”²⁵ The societal groups define a “bargaining space” for the governments. When the costs and benefits of an agreement are important and risky;

²² Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p.511.

²³ Ibid. p. 483.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid. p.487

the governments have a rather limited bargaining space at the international level. However, when these costs and benefits are “ambiguous, insignificant and the risk is low”, the governments have a more flexible bargaining space. The governments are constrained by the domestic groups, because they have to satisfy the interests of these groups to stay in office, otherwise they risk the possibility of being re-elected.

The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation.²⁶

The influence of the domestic groups on national level preference formation is the most conspicuous feature of liberal intergovernmentalism which distinguishes it from both neofunctionalism and rational intergovernmentalism. The increasing opposition to Turkey’s membership in member states like Germany, France and Austria cannot be interpreted only through institutional or state-level explanations. Turkey’s full membership to the EU is still ambivalent, even after it has implemented many reforms to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, it is mentioned repeatedly that the negotiations is an open-ended process and even if Turkey fulfills all the criteria, it may not be granted full-membership. Some member states, namely France and Austria, declared that even if an accession agreement is prepared, their decision on Turkey’s entry will be determined after a referendum in these countries. Turkey’s role as an asset for European security structure is still preeminent, especially for energy security and the country’s role as a mediator in the Middle East and Caucasus.²⁷ Turkey’s economy has

²⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p. 483.

²⁷ Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. “The European Union’s Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective.” *Journal of European Integration*. 30.1 (2008): 65, 69.

also proven to survive within a free market²⁸, and it was mentioned in a Commission Progress Report that Turkey was a “functioning market economy”²⁹. The state level approaches fall short of providing an explanation for the increasing opposition towards Turkey’s EU bid at the domestic level. Therefore, liberal intergovernmentalism was chosen as the fundamental theory within the framework of this thesis, since the thesis aims to analyze the domestic level of preference formation in Germany. The political party level and public level support and opposition to Turkey’s EU entry in Germany will be examined using liberal intergovernmentalism. The first proposition of this thesis is that the perceived material interests of Turkey’s inclusion will influence German domestic preferences, and domestic preferences will shape Turkey’s accession.

However, the material interests are not the sole determinants that shape the attitude of the domestic groups. The identity-based concerns also impact the preferences of the societal groups. The compatibility of Turkey with the European identity and culture is a deep concern especially for the public. Therefore, the liberal intergovernmentalism is insufficient to provide a comprehensive explanation for domestic level preference formation, because it only focuses on the material interests of the domestic groups in analyzing their preferences. It falls short of explaining the concern of the domestic groups about Turkey’s possible impact on European collective identity. In order to make a thorough analysis of German social preference formation towards Turkey’s EU membership, liberal intergovernmentalism should be complemented with another theory which provides identity-based explanations to European integration. Therefore, constructivism will form the second theoretical pillar of this thesis, especially in analyzing the public opinion in Germany on the Turkish issue.

²⁸ Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. “Baç-Müftüler, Meltem. “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EU’s Internal Dynamics.” *International Studies Perspectives*. 9 (2008): 210.

²⁹ European Commission, *Progress Report for Turkey*, November 2006. p. 29.

Constructivism:

As stated above, the utility-driven concerns of the domestic groups are not the only factors that shape their preferences. The fact that Turkey is different from the EU member states in terms of culture and identity also constitutes a great concern for the majority of the public. Turkey's membership is perceived as a threat to the European identity and culture. Therefore, in order to analyze these concerns, the constructivist approach will be adopted along with the liberal intergovernmentalist account. Constructivism is based on the idea of 'collective identity', that "actors are assumed to belong to a community whose constitutive values and norms they share"³⁰. The shared values and norms which construct a common European identity are mostly defined through a shared history, religion, democracy and human rights. Considering the shortcomings of other European integration theories to provide identity-based explanation, constructivism has been applied by some scholars to analyze integration.³¹ Risse, et al. base European collective identity on:

a common historical heritage dating back to ancient Greece, to Christianity as a shared religious experience, or a community of liberal democracies and social market economies in the sense of a 'Kantian pacific federation'.³²

³⁰ Schimmelfenning, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization*. 55.1 (2001): 62.

³¹ See Risse, Thomas. "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization*. 54.1 (2000): 1-39; Sjursen, Helene. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40.3 (2002): 491-513.; Neumann, I., and Welsh, J. "The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society." *Review of International Studies*. 17 (1991): 327-348.

³² Risse, Thomas, et al. "To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union." *European Journal of International Relations*. 5.2 (1999): 154.

Risse applies the “logic of consequentialism” and the “logic of appropriateness” dichotomy of March and Olsen³³ to define the impact of social norms and values on actors’ behavior. Whereas the logic of consequentialism focuses on the material interests to shape actor preferences and is based on the rational choice theory; the logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, stresses the impact of norms and identities on actors’ behavior. Within the rationale of the logic of appropriateness, actors’ behaviors are shaped by “rules that associate particular identities to particular situations”³⁴. In the logic of appropriateness, it is mainly argued that actors have multiple identities and these identities are “invoked depending on the policy area in question”³⁵. Identities are defined and redefined through social interaction.³⁶

While the European collective identity is defined through shared norms and values, the construction of another identity, the other, who did not possess these norms and values, was essential in reinforcing this definition. Neumann and Welsh argue that the construction of ‘the other’ played an important role in constructing ‘us’, the European collective identity.³⁷ Neumann and Welsh claim that culture is the core of collective identity formation in Europe and they analyze EU-Turkey relations from a

³³ For detailed information on “logic of consequentialism” and “logic of appropriateness” see March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” *International Organization*. 52.4 (1998): 943-969.

³⁴ March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” *International Organization*. 52.4 (1998): 951.

³⁵ Risse, Thomas, et al. “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union.” p. 155.

³⁶ March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” p. 952.

³⁷ Neumann, I. , and Welsh, J. “The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society.” *Review of International Studies*. 17 (1991): 331.

“logic of culture” rationale. In their analysis, “the Turks” constitute the other against which the European collective identity is formed.³⁸

Considering the prolonged claim of Turkey to become an EU member, and the exceptional course of this process, and finally the increasing levels of opposition to Turkey’s EU membership in some member states, the constructivist approach provides a reasonable explanation to analyze EU-Turkey relations. The countries which applied to the EU long after Turkey’s application have already been granted membership, even though some of them fell short of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria as well as Turkey. Considering the exceptional process of EU-Turkey relations, and the increasing public opposition against Turkey’s membership reinforces the identity-based explanations on this issue. For the purposes of this thesis, the constructivist theory will be applied to analyze the role of the collective identity and the perception of cultural threat at the societal level preference on Turkey’s EU membership. The second proposition of this study is that the German public’s perceptions of Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ will determine its accession to a certain degree. This thesis will explore and test these two propositions from two different logics over the German position towards Turkey.

³⁸ Neumann, I. , and Welsh, J. “The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society.” p. 330.

CHAPTER II

The German-Turkish Relations: A Historical Analysis

The historical analysis of German-Turkish relations is conducive to understand the current dynamics in Germany towards Turkey's EU membership. The course of these relations was rather stable, defined as 'friendly' for almost a hundred years. The material interests at the state level were crucial in shaping these relations in the 19th century through the end of the 20th century. Both countries benefited from this relationship in terms of economic and security interests. However, towards the end of the 20th century, the course of the relations underwent a considerable change. Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security interests of Germany were redefined in terms of its relations with Turkey. The demise of the Soviet Union led to realignment in Germany's foreign policy prerogatives.³⁹ In addition, the German Reunification in 1990 resulted in a switch in Germany's economic priorities.⁴⁰ These developments were accompanied by the increasing Turkish population in the country which is a crucial factor shaping the public opinion towards Turkey.⁴¹

The economic and security concerns in Ottoman Empire shaped its attitude towards Germany, whereas in the Republican Era it was mainly the economic and to some extent identity concerns which outlined this relationship. Even though, the

³⁹ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. Ed. Erhan Yazar. Ankara: Türk Strateji ve Güvenlik Çalışmaları Grubu, 2000. p. 196.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 161.

⁴¹ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." p. 259.

international developments mentioned above had also impacts on Turkey, the magnitude and nature of it was very different from their impact on Germany. The major impact of these developments was the change in the perception of the West Europe on Turkey's role in the Western security system. The security concerns prevalent during the Cold War era had tied Turkey to the Western bloc and helped to define Turkey's relations with the European Community.⁴² After the demise of the USSR, the attention shifted from Turkey to Central and Eastern European states.⁴³ Anchoring these states to the EU became a priority and the candidacy of these countries was announced in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. Turkey's candidacy was once again postponed. At the time, widening of the EU towards central and Eastern Europe was important to Germany. Therefore, when the accession negotiations with the CEEC started, Germany acted as a patron to these countries until they were granted full membership in 2004.⁴⁴ However, Germany did not assume such a role for Turkey, and the rhetoric of the major party leaders and opinion makers and the increasing opposition of the public show that such a patronage is not likely to occur in the near future. In order to understand the change in Germany's attitude towards Turkey, the relations will be analyzed in three phases.

2.1. Ottoman Empire - German Relations in the Late 19th to Early 20th Century

The relations between the Ottoman and Germany started in the 1880s, a time period when both empires were undergoing tremendous changes. Germany had been founded in 1871, when Bismarck succeeded in uniting the German states under an

⁴² Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe." *Turkish Studies*. 1.1 (2000): 29.

⁴³ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 196.

⁴⁴ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Lauren McLaren. "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey." *European Integration*. 25 (2003): 22.

empire. With the help of Bismarck, Wilhelm II assumed the throne of the newly founded empire. After its foundation Germany started to industrialize in a rapid rate. The rapid industrialization engendered the necessity to open to new markets. However, most of the markets had already been shared by the established colonial powers in Europe such as Britain and France. In this case, Germany had two policy choices, either to compete with Britain or France in the same markets which would very likely lead to conflict, or it had to find new markets. Until 1885, Bismarck was determined to pursue the second policy choice, and aimed at achieving a 'Concert of Europe' without getting into conflict with old powers like Britain and France. As a result, he decided to implement an overseas colonial policy, thus eschewing to turn to the Balkans and the Near East in the empire's quest for a market.⁴⁵

However, Bismarck's balance policy did not last very long, and in 1890 he was removed from his office by Wilhelm II. Contrary to Bismarck's balance policy, Wilhelm II was determined to pursue a much more aggressive policy towards Britain and France. Instead of an overseas colonial policy, the empire turned to Central Europe, the Balkans and the Near East.⁴⁶ The Near East was especially important because this region could provide the empire with vast sources of energy which was crucial for the progress of German industrialization.⁴⁷ All of the above reasons increased the necessity for Germany to start relations with the Ottoman Empire.

While Germany was occupied with finding markets and expanding its area of influence, the Ottoman Empire on the contrary was going through a rather problematic period.⁴⁸ The Ottoman Empire had been defeated in a war against Russia in 1877-78

⁴⁵ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998. p. 41.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 67.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 45.

(93' Harbi), and this defeat had dire consequences for the empire. The Congress of Berlin in 1878, following the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878, resulted in grave consequences for the Ottoman Empire, with the loss of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Thessaly.⁴⁹ More importantly, the Congress of Berlin was a platform where the major powers of the time, namely Russia, Britain, France and Austria-Hungary, made it clear that they intended to partition the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁰ As a result of this Congress, and the attitude of these powers against itself, the Ottoman Empire had to realign its foreign policy.⁵¹ Faced with the threat of partition by these powers, the Ottoman Empire had to form a new alliance with a new partner. At the time, Germany was the only power which did not evidently support the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, when Germany started to build an area of influence in the Ottoman Empire in economic terms with an urge to find new markets, the Ottoman Empire was in no position to decline it.⁵² In addition, according to the Ottoman Empire, Germany was “the least threatening power among the European imperialist powers” and was the only “power that had not colonized Muslim territory”⁵³.

Another crucial development following the Congress of Berlin was the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyük-u Umumiye*) in 1881. The Ottoman economy was on the verge of going bankrupt. With the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the control of the economy was given to Britain, France, German Empire, Italy, Austria-Hungary and representatives of the Ottoman Bank. The revenue from certain sectors was collected directly by the creditor countries, and the infrastructural investments were carried out by foreigners, too.⁵⁴ The rapid

⁴⁹ Zürcher, Eric Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005. p. 122.

⁵⁰ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 45.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 45.

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 54.

⁵³ Zürcher, Eric Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. p. 124.

⁵⁴ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 46.

industrialization of Germany and its quest for new markets, and the hardships the Ottoman Empire was going through in terms of the external threat to its territorial unity and the problems in its military, economic and civil administration made the start of relations between two empires inevitable.

The relations started with the exchange of military and civil experts between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The defeat in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War had revealed the urgent need for reform in the military.⁵⁵ The first group of military experts and generals from Germany arrived at the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s, and this trend continued until the end of the World War I. The fact that the military service was compulsory in the German army and the war strategies of the army which proved to be successful were among the reasons why Abdülhamid II chose the German military officers and generals to reform the Ottoman army. In time Ottoman army officers were sent to Germany for training. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany in terms of military were not constrained to the exchange of military experts. It was accompanied with a boost in the trade in arms between two empires. The Ottoman Empire's trade with German arms factories increased steadily. In addition to the military, there was an urgent need for reform in the civil administration, especially in customs, finance and police organization. Experts in these fields were also sent from the German Empire.⁵⁶

However, the main development shaping the Ottoman-German relations was the construction of the Baghdad Railway. The railway was planned to start from Berlin and end in Baghdad. Baghdad railway was important for the Ottoman Empire in the sense that it would strengthen the central authority by connecting the periphery to the center, and it would also ease the shipment of troops very much.⁵⁷ For Germany, the railway

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 103.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 85.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 136.

was much more significant, mainly because it would connect the empire with vast sources of raw materials especially oil. Asia Minor and Mesopotamia would provide the empire with extensive agricultural resources; Mosul and Kirkuk would provide the oil to meet the empire's increasing need of energy.⁵⁸ The territory of Germany was not suitable to produce 'strategic agricultural products' such as cotton and wheat⁵⁹, and Syria, Iraq and Asia Minor were rich in any type of cereals, while Mesopotamia was famous for its cotton production⁶⁰.

In sum, the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire were determined mostly by material interests. These material interests were mainly products of the balance of power in the 19th century in Europe. The security concerns of the Ottoman Empire obliged it to seek for new partners at the international arena. Germany was the most expedient country to form an alliance with, since it had not colonized any Ottoman territory and it seemingly supported the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire. Germany pursued such a policy because in order to benefit from the agricultural and energy resources in Asia Minor and Near East, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was essential.⁶¹ Becker summarizes the basic motivation of Germany in its relations with the Ottoman Empire as follows:

...because of our geographical location and our industry's need for new markets, we turn to Turkey. Every European country has a living space in the underdeveloped East. Britain has Egypt; France has Tunisia; Italy has Tripoli; Austria has Bosnia and Russia has Montenegro and indirectly Balkans. We had nothing. But now our living space is Turkey.⁶²

⁵⁸ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 155.

⁵⁹ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 2.

⁶⁰ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 155.

⁶¹ Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 67.

⁶² Becker quoted in Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*. p. 66. (My translation)

After the Baghdad Railway project was launched in 1903, the German - Ottoman relations continued without any interruption. Even the 1908 events, the dethroning of Abdülhamid II and the declaration of the second constitutional monarchy, did not affect these relations and the Young Turks continued to promote the German influence on the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, when the World War I started in 1914, the elites in the Ottoman Empire, especially the leaders of the ruling Ittihadist government, were eager to enter the war on the German side. On November 11, 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the German side after the famous Goeben and Breslau incident. Both empires were defeated in the World War I and had to sign very harsh treaties.

The interests of the Ottoman Empire and Germany converged on security and economic matters, and the definition of these interests did not change notably until the end of the World War I. As Wilhelm II, the German emperor, stated in a speech in 1898 during a visit to Damascus, “Germany would be a friend to the Ottoman Sultan and the entire Muslim world”⁶³, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany continued to expand during the reign Abdülhamid II and Young Turks until 1918. The balance of power prevalent in the 19th century Europe was vital in expansion of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany in this period.

2.2. The Republican Era: Turkey - Germany until late 1980s

The end of the World War I caused a decrease in the intensity of relations between Germany and Turkey. After being defeated severely, both of the empires were forced to sign treaties with very harsh conditions. Due to the tremendous changes both parties went through, the relations could not be restored until the end of the World War II.

⁶³ Kramer, Heinz and Maurus Reinkowski. *Die Türkei und Europa: Eine Wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Publishing, 2008. p. 86.

The major change on the Turkish side was the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The foundation of the Republic was a total departure from the Ottoman legacy in many aspects. The new state was based on the rule of law, it chose nationalism as a unifying force instead of multicultural or religious identity, and it had a secular structure.⁶⁴ The primary goal of the founding leaders of the Republic was the recognition of Turkey as a European state and its admission to the Western world. In order to achieve this goal, an intense reform package was launched between 1923 and 1938. All of these reforms were based on Western ideas and systems.⁶⁵ This Westernization process was different from that of the Ottoman Empire in that the Western ideas and systems were adopted as a whole, whereas in the Ottoman Empire only some aspects of the Western world were taken.⁶⁶ The European ideas were observable in nearly every aspect of the social life; in education, the law system, dressing codes and styles, even in music.⁶⁷ The aim of modernization in the Western style and being recognized as a part of the European system started in this era and played an important role in shaping Turkey's relations with Europe and defining its security and foreign policies.

In the meantime, Germany also underwent historic changes. The Versailles Treaty laid very harsh conditions on Germany. The Treaty compelled Germany to take the whole responsibility for starting the war, and to pay a considerable amount of war reparations. In addition, the Treaty included clauses which challenged the territorial integrity of the empire, and strictly restricted rearmament. Having been already devastated by war, these clauses deteriorated the condition in Germany extensively. Because of the internal situation and developments in Germany between two world

⁶⁴ Müftüleri-Baç, Meltem. *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997. p. 17.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Müftüleri-Baç, Meltem. *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. p. 16-17.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

wars, the Turkish-German relations were very limited compared to the pre-war period. The interwar era was a period when both Turkey and Germany redefined their security and economic interests, and it was obvious that these interests did not converge as much as they did in the pre-war era. Especially for the Turkish Republic, the security threat coming from the old world powers had been eliminated after World War I, which substantially changed its security policy. As for Germany, the defeat in World War I had different repercussions in that Germany had to sign the Versailles Treaty and abide to it. As above mentioned, the severe conditions the Treaty laid on Germany resulted in the formation of a rather aggressive policy towards other European powers and some ethnic groups within Germany, and its security and foreign policies were shaped in line with this aggressive policy. On the other hand, being able to decline the conditions laid by the Sevres Treaty as a result of the War of Independence and the foundation of the Republic, Turkey followed a more reserved foreign policy and contrary to Germany, Turkey supported the status quo.⁶⁸ In addition to the divergence in the security interests between Germany and Turkey, their economic interests diverged as well. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Near East, which played an important role in Germany's relations with the Ottomans, was lost. Therefore, the prospects for benefiting from the Near East in terms of its abundant agricultural and energy resources vanished, eliminating one important determinant in Turkish-German relations. In short, during the interwar period, the interests of Germany and Turkey mostly diverged rather than converging.

The policies followed by the national socialists resulted in some contact between Turkey and Germany. However this contact was very limited with the migration of Jewish professors and scientists in German universities to Turkey after the 1933 law passed due to the aryianization policy of the national socialists rearranged the employment law and aimed at removing the "politically untrustworthy" from the public offices.⁶⁹ As this law was passed in Germany, the reform program was continuing

⁶⁸ Zürcher, Eric Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005. p.291, 293.

⁶⁹ Kramer, Heinz and Maurus Reinkowski. *Die Türkei und Europa: Eine Wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte*. p. 148

uninterruptedly in the Turkish Republic and these professors and scientists were employed in Turkish universities and contributed to the development of science in Turkey. They were especially influential in the foundation of vocational colleges.⁷⁰ The literature on the relations between Turkey and Germany in the interwar period is very limited. The developments in Germany resulted in a decrease in the intensity of relations. The relations were not revived until the end of World War II.

In the aftermath of World War II, Turkey eventually found the opportunity it had been seeking for almost three decades to become a part of Europe. The onset of the Cold War led to the formulation of a new identity for Europe based on security. The resultant bipolar system of the Cold War and the perceived threat against the expansion of communism in the European countries resulted in the convergence of security interests among most European countries and the USA. In order to counteract a possible Soviet aggression, NATO was formed in 1949. Within this security system, Turkey played a crucial role because an attack on Turkey by the USSR and its inclusion into the Soviet Union would be a huge threat against the Western Alliance. By entering Turkey, the Soviet armies could easily attack the Western alliance.⁷¹ Turkey was at the crossroads to balance the pressure the Soviet Union could exercise on the Western alliance. It was an important player in the “southern flank” of NATO to “provide a front line for the Western defense”⁷². Therefore the exclusion of Turkey from this security system would lead to high costs. As a result, Turkey’s relations with Europe expanded during the Cold War period. It was included in any organization founded to promote European security and integrity. Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, was one of the founding members of OECC and it signed an Association Agreement with the EC in 1963.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. *Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe*. p. 31.

⁷² Ibid. p. 30.

The security interests of Turkey also converged with the security concerns of Europe, because the Soviet Union posed a direct threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The nature of relationship between Turkey and Russia which was based on a reciprocal non-aggression agreement prevailing since 1925 had been altered by the Soviet Union after 1945. The Soviet Union demanded a revision in the 1936 Montreux Convention which would include the Soviet Union in the control of the straits, and claimed two Turkish cities, Kars and Ardahan. After this aggressive shift in Russian policy towards Turkey, the inclusion in the European security system was essential for Turkey.⁷³

As above mentioned, one of the primary goals of the founding leaders of the Turkish Republic was to be a modern European state. An immense reform package was implemented in line with this ideal. Therefore, in addition to the security concerns, Turkey's inclusion into the European security system would make it possible to prove its Europeanness and become a part of the European collective identity. Until the end of World War II, the Turks were still perceived as the 'other' by the European. It was finally in the Cold War period when the collective European identity was re-defined on the basis of security concerns and within this new collective identity, Turkey would no longer be perceived as the 'other'. In building this collective identity, NATO was the decisive factor. By acting as a uniting force throughout Europe against a common external enemy, NATO helped to create a 'security community'⁷⁴ and promoted a sense of belonging together. During the Cold War, NATO came to be a symbol of Europeanness. Therefore, by becoming a member to NATO and other European organizations, Turkey could confirm its Europeanness.

The relations with Germany were also determined within the context of the security concerns in the Cold War. Being defeated in World War II, Germany was

⁷³ Müftüleri-Baç, Meltem. *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. p. 30.

⁷⁴ Deutsch, Karl et.al. "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area." *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. ed. by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003. p. 123.

divided into two occupational zones administered by the allied forces. In 1949, the division of the country was ascertained when two separate governments were formed in the West and East Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany represented the West Germany and was included in the Western bloc; whereas The German Democratic Republic represented East Germany and became a part of the Eastern bloc. Germany's inclusion into the Western bloc was extremely important in forming a common defense against the Soviet Union. The USA was determined to anchor the Federal Republic of Germany to the Western bloc. West Germany had a quick economic recovery in the 1950s and US incentive played an important role in it. In addition, it became a member of NATO, OECC and was one of the founding members of the EC. The perceived threat from the Soviet Union anchored the Federal Republic of Germany firmly to the Western bloc, since it wanted to be "under a security umbrella provided by the West".⁷⁵ During the Cold War period, Turkey only had relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.⁷⁶

Turkey's relations with Germany changed in line with the Cold War dynamics. Turkey's significant role in the European security system was crucial in shaping its relations with Germany during the Cold War. The West Germany was one of the front line states of the Cold War, therefore among other considerations; the role of Turkey in the containment of the Soviet Union and in the formation of a common defense against the Soviet threat was decisive in its relations with Turkey.⁷⁷ Considering the crucial role of Turkey in the European security system, the Federal Republic of Germany was the main supporter of Turkey in its every attempt to become a part of Europe.⁷⁸ This

⁷⁵ Nicoll, William, and Trevor C. Salmon. *Understanding the European Union*. Harlow; New York: Longman, 2001. p. 418.

⁷⁶ Kramer, Heinz and Maurus Reinkowski. *Die Türkei und Europa: Eine Wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte*. p. 141.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 156.

⁷⁸ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 211.

support continued until the end of the 1989, when the end of the Cold War caused major changes in the security interests of Europe and in the definition of the European collective identity. However during the Cold War, the relations between Turkey and Germany were intense.⁷⁹

In addition to the security aspect, the Cold War and the division of Germany led to the tightening of the economic and social relations between these two countries. The German economic recovery after World War II was quick and consequently the amount of the labor force required by the high levels of industrialization kept increasing. However, having lost a large proportion of its young male population in the war, the Federal Republic of Germany could not meet this rising demand. The division of the country also contributed to the shortage in the labor force, because with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the West Germany was deprived of a large number of potential workers who were stuck in East Germany and could not pass to the West Germany. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany had to rely on foreign labor force. Hence, it signed bilateral recruitment agreements with other countries to fill this gap. It was during this period when Turkey also signed a bilateral recruitment agreement with West Germany in October 1961, and the everlasting Turkish migration to Germany started, a development which was to play a decisive role in Turkish-German relations in the future, especially in German domestic preference formation towards Turkey.

Until the 1960s, the relations between these countries were mostly at the state-level and did not include much social interaction between the Turkish and German society. Even though, in the 19th century some German military experts came to the Ottoman Empire and some Turkish military officers went to Germany, the number of these experts was limited and they had a limited area of contact. Therefore the exchange of military experts during this period did not result in a high level of interaction between the Turkish and German societies. It was similar in the Republican Era, when German

⁷⁹ Kramer, Heinz and Maurus Reinkowski. *Die Türkei und Europa: Eine Wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte*. p. 141.

professors migrated to Turkey in the 1930s. Both in the 19th century and the 1930s, the interaction between German and Turkish groups took place mainly at the elite level, and the social interaction at the public level did not start until the 1960s. The actual interaction between these societies began with the immigration of Turkish workers and this immigrant Turkish population has played a crucial role in shaping the German social preference towards Turkey in the later periods.

The systematic immigration of Turkish workers started with the conclusion of the bilateral recruitment agreement between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1961, and it accelerated in the very few years following the agreement. By the early 1970s, almost 100,000 workers annually migrated to Western Europe.⁸⁰ The immigration continued to rise until the 1980s when it finally stabilized. The workers were the first group to immigrate to these countries, but soon the workers were followed by their spouses and children. During the 1960s and early 1970s, mainly the workers immigrated to the Western Europe based on the bilateral recruitment agreements. However, this immigration pattern changed in the mid-1970s when these workers were followed by their spouses and dependants. In the 1980s, the number of new workers immigrating to Western Europe was very limited and immigration occurred mostly due to reasons such as family unification. Therefore, the number of immigrant Turkish population in the 1980s was relatively stable.⁸¹ Today there more about four million Turkish immigrants in Europe, and more than two million of these immigrants live in Germany.⁸²

⁸⁰ Martin, Philip. *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labor Migration to Western Europe, with special reference to the Federal Republic of Germany*. Geneva: International Labor Office, 1991. p. 21.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 75.

⁸² Kramer, Heinz and Maurus Reinkowski. *Die Türkei und Europa: Eine Wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte*. p. 151.

Among the Western European states, the Federal Republic of Germany was the main state which received the highest number of Turkish people. Martin states that eighty percent of Turkish immigrants' destination was the Federal Republic of Germany between 1968 and 1973.⁸³ The number of Turkish immigrants increased steadily; in 1961 there were only 9,200 Turkish people in the country, and by 1962 this figure had already risen to 18,000. The number of Turkish workers employed in the country reached 616,000 by mid-1974.⁸⁴ However after the mid-1970s, the increasing number of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, especially the Federal Republic of Germany started to cause concerns. Most of the recipient countries halted the recruitment of non-EC immigrants, and the Federal Republic of Germany was one of them. Even though, recruitment of new immigrant workers was limited, the existing workers were allowed to stay in the host countries and keep working there and they were also allowed to reunify their families.⁸⁵

The anti-foreigner sentiments in most of these states had already been invoked, and even though the immigrant workers were allowed to stay in the host countries and reunify with their families, they encountered some difficulties in using this right. For example the family members who wanted to join their families under family unification were not granted work permits. In the early 1980s, return incentives were offered in the Federal Republic of Germany to facilitate the departure of immigrant workers and families back to their home countries. However, the range of these incentives was limited and they were not very effective in persuading the immigrant population to depart.⁸⁶ Partly due to these incentives and other reasons such as retirement, some immigrants returned to Turkey. As for the remaining immigrants, the main policy followed by the German governments was the integration of the immigrant population

⁸³ Martin, Philip. *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labor Migration to Western Europe, with special reference to the Federal Republic of Germany*. p. 24.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 21, 25.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 26.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 83.

to the German society. However, in practice, the integration policy of the governments has not always yielded successful results. The integration problem has not been fully resolved yet, and practices like the prohibition of dual citizenship or the contradictory attitudes of political parties on the Turkish issue complicate the issue further. Finally, the increase in the anti-foreign sentiments among the German public adds to the problem.⁸⁷

Unlike the previous periods, the Turkish-German relations in this period had significant social repercussions. The immigration wave has been especially crucial in this respect. Before the 1960s, the relations were conducted at the state-level, and there was very slight or even no social involvement. In this sense, the immigration movement brought the German and Turkish societies together for the first time. The social interaction between the German society and Turkish immigrants has been decisive in the formation of German domestic preference on the Turkish EU bid. The German society's perception of the Turkish identity has been mainly based on the immigrant Turkish population. This identity was not perceived as European, but as being the 'other', the 'different'. Even though, Turkey was considered to be a part of the European identity at the state-level which was then defined through security concerns prevalent in the Cold War period, at the societal level the Turkish identity was not acknowledged as being a part of the European collective identity. The definition of collective European identity varied across different levels of interaction, and whereas Turkey fit in one of these identity definitions, it was completely marginalized in the other.

The perception of the Turkish population as the 'other', the integration problems which resulted both from the contradictory integration policies followed by the German governments and from the immigrant population, the rise in unemployment are all determinants, among others, that shape German society's attitude towards the Turkish community. The fact that the Turkish immigrants who were expected to return to

⁸⁷ The attitude of the political parties and public towards the Turkish issue will be elaborated further in Chapter III and IV.

Turkey eventually, remained in Germany permanently caused some resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments among the German society. The ‘guest workers’ had now turned into permanent residents; and they had no intention to leave. All of these factors were and still are influential in determining Turkey-Germany relations.

Even though, the immigration of Turkish workers had some negative repercussions after the mid-1970s, it generated very fruitful results in the 1960s and 1970s for both of the countries in economic terms. The immigrant workers were essential for the functioning of the German economy by filling the labor gap, and they were like the engine of industrial development in the country. The immigrants were effective in increasing the productivity, the profits and keeping down the wages. Since the majority of the immigrant workers were unskilled, they worked in the jobs that were declined by Germans. They could take longer shifts, and worked at nights and weekends thus fostering productivity and profitability. With regard to the Turkish economy, the immigration of Turkish workers proved beneficial in two ways. First of all, the German labor market acted as a vacuum for the surplus in the Turkish labor market. Annually, around one-third of the unemployed labor force migrated to Western Europe, which relieved the burden on the Turkish labor market. Secondly, the remittances brought to Turkey by the immigrant workers supplied the foreign currency to buy raw materials and machinery for the Turkish industry.⁸⁸

In sum, during this period the security and economic concerns prevalent in the Western world determined Turkey-German relations at the state-level on one hand, and on the other hand the societal factors came into play for the first time.

⁸⁸ Martin, Philip. *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labor Migration to Western Europe, with special reference to the Federal Republic of Germany*. p. 44.

2.3. A New Turn in Turkish-German Relations with Turkey's EU Bid

The Turkish-German relations took a completely different turn at the end of the 1980s. Until then the relations between these two countries could be considered as 'friendly'. Although there was dissatisfaction at the societal level, the security concerns were preponderant over the societal concerns, and the relations were not affected by the dissatisfaction at the societal level. Germany supported Turkey in its every attempt to become a part of the European system. It was one of the ardent supporters when Turkey applied to the EC in 1959. However, its attitude towards Turkey, especially on Turkey's EU bid, has changed to a great extent since the end of the 1980s. Both domestic factors and international developments played a role in the shift in Turkish-German relations in this period; the end of the Cold War, German Unification and the increasing domestic opposition to Turkey's EU membership.

During the Cold War, Turkey's inclusion into the European security system was essential. Turkey's strategic location and its role in the 'southern flank' of NATO determined the country's relations with Western Europe.⁸⁹ At the time, along with the other Western European states, the security interests and foreign policy formation of the Federal Republic of Germany were shaped by the security concerns prevalent during the Cold War.⁹⁰ However, with the end of the Cold War, the common security threat which united the Western Europe vanished. Consequently, the security and foreign policies of European states were redefined. Turkey-German relations were affected by end of the Cold War in that Germany's foreign policy priorities were also redefined and Turkey lost its strategic importance for Germany considerably.⁹¹

The collapse of the bipolar system and the removal of the Soviet threat relieved all of the Western European states, but the impact of these developments was more

⁸⁹ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. p. 30.

⁹⁰ Nicoll, William, and Trevor C. Salmon. *Understanding the European Union*. p. 418.

⁹¹ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 196.

substantial on Germany in two ways. With the demise of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum emerged in the Central and Eastern Europe. This region was considered to be the German hinterland⁹² and was essential for Germany's security. In order to promote the stability in the region and deter any development that can pose a threat to its security, Germany took immediate measure to fill this power vacuum which emerged with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to tie the Central and Eastern Europe to the West. The former foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, stated that the exclusion of Central Eastern Europe from the EU would increase the possibility of conflicts in the region making "Europe a continent of uncertainty" and in such a case, "Germany in particular would be the big loser."⁹³ Consequently, after the 1990, the German security and foreign policy was redefined in line with this goal.

In addition to the security concerns regarding this region, Germany's attitude towards the Central and Eastern Europe was influenced by the perceived economic benefits the region would provide. The growing economy of Germany once again forced the country to find new markets. In this sense, the Central and Eastern Europe would provide markets for Germany.⁹⁴ Due to these concerns, Germany prioritized the relations with Central and Eastern European countries, and took initiatives to include them to the EU. Especially during Germany's Council presidency in 1994, the eastern enlargement was one of the main topics in its agenda, and several steps were taken to accelerate their accession to the EU like the 'security dialogue' which was envisaged to provide guidance to the CEEC in this process.⁹⁵ Germany's support was prominent during their application, negotiation and accession to the Union. As a result of these developments, the relations with Turkey lost their priority. The support Germany gave

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ *The Economist*. "A Survey of European Union Enlargement." 19 May 2001. http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_GNNSRD

⁹⁴ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 105.

⁹⁵ Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005. p.147.

to Turkey in the Cold War era was channeled to the Central Eastern European countries. The 1997 Luxembourg Summit was a clear demonstration of the change in Germany's attitude towards Turkey. It was declared in the summit that ten Central Eastern European countries, with Malta and Cyprus, were granted candidacy to the EU. Turkey was not included in the list of candidates.

The security and economic concerns regarding the Central and Eastern Europe, however, was not the only reason of the change in German position. The repercussions of the German Reunification in 1990 also had a considerable impact on Germany's attitude towards Turkey in this period.⁹⁶ The integration of the East Germans generated problems. The increase in unemployment was one of the problems in the aftermath of unification. The inclusion of an additional labor force created pressure on the labor market. The socio-cultural integration of East Germans was another concern. After having lived in a completely different social and economic setting, the East Germans had difficulties in integrating to West Germany. In order to promote the integration of these people, the German identity was emphasized, since it would provide a common bond that would keep these two distinct groups together.⁹⁷ This identity was defined on ethnic lines.⁹⁸

The rise in unemployment and the emphasis on the German identity triggered an increase in the anti-immigrant sentiments in Germany that had already been prevalent since the mid-1970s.⁹⁹ Even though it had been almost thirty years since the first group of Turkish immigrants arrived in Germany, they were still not accepted as a part of the

⁹⁶ Aksu, Yusuf Ziya et al. *Çıkarlar, Çatışmalar, Çözümler: Tarihten Geleceğe Türk-Alman İlişkileri*. p. 161.

⁹⁷ Piper, Nicola. "Citizenship and National Identity in Reunified Germany: the Experience of the Turkish Minority." *Political Thought and German Reunification: The New German Ideology?* Ed. by Howard Williams et al. New York: St. Martins Press, 2000. p. 101-102.

⁹⁸ Watts, Meredith W. *Xenophobia in United Germany: Generations, Modernization and Ideology*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. p. 63.

⁹⁹ Piper, Nicola. "Citizenship and National Identity in Reunified Germany: the Experience of the Turkish Minority." p. 108.

German society.¹⁰⁰ The identity-based approach to promote the integration of East Germans emphasized the ‘otherness’ of the Turkish immigrants more. The anti-immigrant sentiments reached such a level that at some point they turned into violent actions. The Solingen incident in 1993 is a prominent example of it. The ‘otherness’ of the Turkish population was not only stressed by the public, but the anti-immigrant statements were used increasingly in the rhetoric of the political parties.

In Germany, anti-immigrant sentiments are the main determinant in domestic opposition towards Turkey, because some domestic groups are very much concerned of another wave of immigration.¹⁰¹ This concern can also be observed in the rhetoric of some political party leaders and opinion makers. In this respect, CDU/ CSU are the major political parties with a considerable opposition to Turkey’s EU accession based on identity concerns. The CDU/CSU was the governing party in Germany when the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision not to involve Turkey in the enlargement process was taken. It can be argued that Germany’s opposition to grant Turkey the candidate status in that round was determined by the concerns of the governing party.¹⁰²

The 1998 German elections, however, engendered a shift in Germany’s position towards Turkey. The CDU/CSU government was replaced by the coalition government of SPD and the Greens. Contrary to CDU/CSU, the red-green coalition supported Turkey’s EU bid. In 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was finally granted the candidate status, and the red-green coalition that was in power at the time. However, in the following elections, SPD and the Greens lost ground to CDU/CSU and FDP. The

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 101.

¹⁰¹ McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” p. 254.

¹⁰² Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and McLaren, Lauren. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey.” *European Integration*. 25 (2003): 23.

German attitude towards Turkey altered with changes in the governing party after the late 1980s.¹⁰³

The societal concerns, however, are not the sole determinants in Germany's attitude towards Turkey after the 1990s. In terms of security and economic interests, Turkey is still an important partner. Even though, the role of Turkey was uncertain for a short period of time with the end of the Cold War, the later developments both in Europe and in the other parts of the world reassured the substantial role Turkey could play in the European security system. The post-Cold War system, indeed, defined a more multilateral role for Turkey. The regional conflicts which arose in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 9/11 attacks led to realignment in the security and foreign policy of the EU. Promoting security and stability in the region became one of the primary goals of the new foreign and security policy of the EU. In this respect, Turkey became an important asset once more with its "geostrategic location, its military capabilities and its membership in NATO, and its role as a mediator between the Eastern and Western cultures"¹⁰⁴.

During the Cold War period, the EU was much of a regional actor whose influence area was basically limited to Europe. It was not endowed with a role in providing security and defense in the area. In this sense, it was mainly dependent on NATO and the USA. Even though there were some attempts to attribute such a role to the EU such as the creation of WEU, these attempts were mostly unsuccessful. However, with the demise of the bipolar system, the EU started to embark a different role in the international arena, and began to emerge as an international actor, with "traits of an embryonic military actor"¹⁰⁵. It started to develop a separate security and defense

¹⁰³ Political party positions on the Turkish issue will be analyzed in detail in Chapter II.

¹⁰⁴ Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. "The European Union's Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective." pp. 65, 69.

¹⁰⁵ Oğuzlu, Tarık. "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 'Security' Perspective." *Security Dialogue*. 34.3 (2003): 288.

identity than NATO. The revitalization of WEU, the formation of the CFSP pillar in the Maastricht Treaty, the decision to launch the Rapid Reaction Force and the Battle Groups were all attempts to realize this aim. In this sense, the military capabilities of Turkey with very large standing army and modern war technology became an important asset for the EU at this point to enhance its hard power capacities. Additionally, Turkey's NATO membership was perceived as another asset for the EU security and defense policy, especially with the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision when the EU claimed automatic access to NATO assets. The EU was granted the right to access NATO assets with the 2002 Istanbul Document, which also gave Turkey the full rights for voting and participation in the EU operations in which the NATO assets were used and in operations concerning the security of Turkey. Even if the NATO assets are not deployed, Turkey would be asked in. Thus Turkey got the opportunity to "provide input to ESDP"¹⁰⁶, and its role in EU's new security and defense structure was strengthened.

In addition to the benefits Turkey would provide with its military capacities and NATO membership, the geostrategic location of Turkey has been another significant determinant in EU-Turkey relations, especially in terms of energy security. The geostrategic location of Turkey makes it neighbors with the Black Sea region, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Its relations with the Black Sea region through the Black Sea Economic Co-Operation Project and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union play an important role in the region. The role of Turkey in these regions is especially important for the EU because the energy supply of the Union is provided from these regions and Turkey stands at a crossroads where most of the energy pipelines emerging from these regions reach to Europe. Thus Turkey's role in the energy supply security of the Union is crucial. "EU imports approximately 60 percent of its energy needs from Turkey's

¹⁰⁶ Missiroli, Antonio. "EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management: no Turkish Delight for ESDP." *Security Dialogue*. 33.1 (2002): 21, 22.

neighboring regions and attaches utmost importance to secured access to these resources.”¹⁰⁷

The 9/11 attacks emphasized another role Turkey could play in the EU security and defense system. The attacks showed that Turkey’s role as a mediator between Eastern and Western cultures would be essential for the EU if it wanted to promote security and stability, and to prevent the diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism in the neighboring regions. All of these factors impacted the EU-Turkey relations in general. Germany’s security interests cannot be considered separately from those of the EU. Therefore, the Turkish-German relations were influenced by emerging role Turkey could play in the post-Cold War system. From this perspective, the inclusion of Turkey into the EU was perceived as beneficial at the state-level. However, the opposition to Turkey’s EU bid at the domestic level kept growing in this period, creating a division between the state-level and domestic level preferences.

Conclusion:

To sum, the current dynamics that shape the social preference formation cannot be explained without the historical analysis of Turkish-German relations. The historical analysis shows that the convergence of security and economic interests between Germany and Turkey was the main driving force in German-Turkish relations for a very long time. During the late 19th and early 20th century, the abundant agricultural and energy resources in Asia Minor and Near East were the main motivation for Germany to start relations with the Ottoman Empire. As for the Ottoman Empire, the perceived external threat against its territorial integrity was the main determinant in its relations with the German Empire. The relations which started with the exchange of experts in military and civil administration in the 1880s got closer as in the early 20th century and evolved into an alliance in World War I. After the war, due to internal changes both

¹⁰⁷ Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. “The European Union’s Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective.” p. 70.

countries were going through, there was a halt in the relations in the interwar period. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the security concerns united these two countries on a common ground again. The NATO partnership was especially significant in strengthening the relations between Turkey and Germany. Similar to the previous phase, the German-Turkish relations were determined by the convergence of security and economic concerns in this period. In this sense, the trajectory of the Turkish-German relations was relatively straightforward until the 1980s. The relations between Germany and Turkey can be analyzed using a rational intergovernmentalist approach until the 1980s. However, the influence of the domestic groups on German-Turkish relations increased after the 1980s, particularly in terms of opposition to Turkey's EU membership. The presence of guest workers contributed to the change in German view towards Turkey considerably, especially at the societal level. In addition, the changing needs of Germany redefined the Turkish-German relations.

CHAPTER III

Major Political Parties in Germany and their Stance towards Turkey's Accession

This chapter examines the stance of the major political parties towards the 'Turkish issue' and their relative impact on the overall preference formation. In this view, the stances of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FPD) will be examined in detail.

State-level explanations fall short of explaining the major turns in Germany's attitude towards Turkey's EU bid. The change in Germany's preferences towards Turkey between 1997 Luxembourg Summit, when Turkey was excluded from the enlargement list, and 1999 Helsinki Summit, when it was finally granted the candidacy status is a prominent example of it. Germany overtly supported both decisions. Since these decisions were so different, German position could be seen as contradictory. Within these two years, there was no major shift in Germany's security or foreign policy which could have engendered such a change. The repercussions of the end of the Cold War and German Reunification had been left far behind. There was no major development that led to realignment in German foreign and security policy. Turkey's role in the European security and economic structure had been stable for some time. The regional conflicts in the Balkans proved that Turkey would be indispensable the European security system. In addition, the conclusion of the Customs Union agreement in 1995 was important in reinforcing Turkey's role in the EU in economic terms. Therefore none of these developments are sufficient to explain the change in German attitude between 1997 and 1999.

The change in Germany's position towards Turkey is not confined with the 1999 Helsinki Summit. The relation between these two countries in terms of Turkey's EU bid is characterized by ups and downs. As explained in the second chapter, Germany's attitude towards Turkey was rather supportive during the Cold War years and it backed Turkey's application to the EC in 1959. This supportive attitude continued until the second half of the 1980s and Germany's support for Turkey was replaced by its antagonism, and when Turkey applied to EC in 1987, it could no longer rely on Germany. The antagonism which prevailed until 1998 was once again replaced by a supportive attitude and this change had a profound impact on Turkey's EU bid with 1999 Helsinki Summit decision and 2002 Copenhagen Summit when it decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey after an evaluation of 2004 Progress Report. Yet this positive atmosphere in German-Turkish relations in terms of Turkey's EU membership was to alter once again after 2005. The state-level explanations which provided a more or less thorough picture of Turkish-German relations have become insufficient since the second half of the 1980s. Consequently, it is necessary to turn to domestic developments that took place in Germany after the late 1980s. The analysis of the societal level preference formation will provide a more thorough explanation for the shifts in Germany's attitude towards Turkey's EU bid.

The societal level preference formation will be analyzed in light of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist account and Putnam's two-level game approach. As explained in further detail in the first chapter, the state preferences are defined domestically. There are various societal groups with divergent interests which compete with each other trying to influence the preference formation. The "identity of these societal groups, the nature of their interests and their relative influence on domestic policy" are the main determinants of foreign policy formation.¹⁰⁸ The fact that the interests are defined at level I by certain societal groups constrains the governments at the international bargaining table. Since the governments have to depend on "the

¹⁰⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." p. 483.

support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies”¹⁰⁹ to stay in power, they have to satisfy the interests of influential domestic groups in interstate bargaining. Putnam identifies the domestic groups as parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators, and the public.¹¹⁰ In analyzing the social preference formation in Germany, only the political parties and the public will be examined. Even though it is beyond doubt that the other domestic groups have considerable impact on the social preference formation, the available data in the field is insufficient to assess such impact. On the other hand, the impact of the political parties and the public can be relatively estimated by looking at the party programs and the statements made by the party leaders and major opinion makers on the issue and by analyzing the public opinion polls.

There is a clear rift among the major political parties on the Turkish issue. The SPD and Greens overtly support the accession of Turkey to the EU. The CDU/CSU fiercely opposes Turkey’s full-membership, and the FDP seems quite uncertain on its position. While it doesn’t oppose Turkey’s full-membership as much as CDU/CSU, it does not support Turkey’s EU bid as openly as SPD and the Greens. Similar to FDP, The Leftist Party is uncertain on its stance towards the Turkish issue. It does not oppose a Turkish membership completely, but argues that Turkey has to implement more reforms to improve its human rights record and the minority rights especially as regards to the Kurdish population.¹¹¹ However, the position of the Leftist Party on the Turkish issue is not as evident and influential as SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game.” *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Eds. Robert Putnam, et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. p. 435.

¹¹¹ Die Linke. “Solidarität, Demokratie, Frieden – Gemeinsam für den Wechsel in Europa.” Das 2009 Europawahlprogramm der Partei die Linke. Available at the website of the Leftist Party:

http://die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/disput/2009/disput_maerz2009_wahlprogramm.pdf

The support or the opposition of these political parties is influenced by various determinants. The economic and security concerns shape the attitude of those parties which support Turkey's membership, whereas the identity concerns seem to influence the stance of CDU/CSU. In addition to economic, security and identity based concerns, the vote concerns of the political parties affect their attitude on the Turkish issue. Turkey's EU membership has become a highly politicized issue in Germany which influences the vote choice of the citizens. Since Turkey's EU membership is supposed to have tangible consequences on the ordinary citizens, like in the case of immigration, the citizens are inclined to vote for the parties in line with their own preferences on the Turkish issue. The citizens who support Turkey's entry to the EU are most likely to vote for SPD and the Greens, while the ones who oppose such a development would vote for CDU/CSU or FDP.¹¹² Consequently, the vote choice of the citizens influences the attitude of the political parties to some extent, since they "require the support of the domestic voters" to stay in power or to assume the power.¹¹³

The national preference formation towards Turkey is significantly influenced by this division among the political parties on this issue. The major shifts in Germany's attitude towards Turkey mostly coincide with the changes in the governing party. When the CDU/CSU is in power, the support of the German government to Turkey's EU

¹¹² Schoen, Harald. "Turkey's Bid for EU membership, contrasting views of public opinion, and vote choice. Evidence from the 2005 German federal election.." *Electoral Studies*. 27 (2008): 345-46.

¹¹³ The impact of the domestic voters on the parties' attitude formation is hard to assess, since there are numerous other variables in determining the policy choice of the citizens. However, considering that Turkey's accession to the EU will have more perceivable impacts on the ordinary citizens compared to other enlargements, it is likely that this issue will influence the vote choice of the citizens.

membership diminishes. The Kohl government and 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision is a clear illustration of this. When the SPD and the Greens make up the government, on the other hand, evidently this trend is reversed, and the support for Turkey increases tremendously. The Schröder government and the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision demonstrate this fact clearly. The ‘relative influence’ of these parties on the preference formation is outstanding, concerning the fact that either SPD or CDU is the governing party or in a coalition government in which the Greens or the FDP is the coalition partner. This fact increases the relative influence of these parties in preference formation at the domestic level.

3.1. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD):

SPD has been an ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. Consequently, it has been repeatedly stated by the party leaders and important opinion makers that Turkey had to be anchored to the EU with full-membership. The turning point for this came with the 1998 national elections in Germany. After assuming power in 1998, the Schröder government initiated several attempts to bring Turkey closer to the EU. In this sense, the period 1998-2005 was very fruitful in Turkey’s EU bid, since the SPD took over the government from CDU/CSU and FDP coalition and formed a coalition with the Greens. After seizing the power, the relations between Germany and Turkey were recovered quickly, and contrary to the Kohl government, Germany became the ‘historical ally’ of Turkey in European matters once again. Critical developments which altered the course of EU-Turkey relations, such as the decision to grant Turkey the candidate status, and start accession negotiations, were taken during the rule of the Red-Green coalition. The Schröder government’s support was unrelenting in all of these developments. The Red-Green government showed its determination to depart from the Kohl government’s Turkey with its attempts to compensate for the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision by drafting a proposal for Turkey during its Council presidency. The proposal was presented at the Cologne Summit 1999, yet it was rejected.¹¹⁴ But still it

¹¹⁴ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and McLaren, Lauren. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey.” p. 24.

was an important attempt on the side of the Schröder government to show its good intentions on this issue.

The potential economic and security benefits of Turkey's inclusion to the EU were influential in determining the coalition government's attitude towards Turkey which was openly stated by Schröder and Fischer. Fischer emphasized the strategic role Turkey has played in the European security system for 50 years, and argued that given the increase in the regional conflicts requires a redefinition of this role.¹¹⁵ He states that "Turkey no longer lies in the periphery in strategic terms ... [but] is located at the crossroads between three crisis-prone regions: the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus and the Middle East and at the crossroads of important energy, transportation and communication networks",¹¹⁶ and even claims that Turkey is now "in the center of [EU] security"¹¹⁷. Schröder backed Fischer by asserting that the government's supportive attitude towards Turkey was to some extent motivated by "regional circumstances", and "the unstable Middle East and Asia" adds to Turkey's "unique situation in the region as regards Europe's interests."¹¹⁸ The 9/11 attacks further reinforced the strategic importance of Turkey in terms of stability and security in the region. Turkey's role as a mediator between the Western and Eastern cultures has become vital. It has been stressed by Schröder and Fischer that Turkey plays a vital role in the region as a "bridge to other Islamic states"¹¹⁹. In this view, the security benefits of Turkey's inclusion were

¹¹⁵ Fischer, Joschka. "Turkey's European Perspective: The German View." *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. 3.3 (2004): 4.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ *Turkish Weekly*. "German FM Fischer Attacks Merkel's Turkey Policy." 25 August 2005. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/18477/german-fm-fischer-attacks-merkel-s-turkey-policy.html>

¹¹⁸ İnal, Nuray Nazlı, and Düden Yegenoglu. "German and French Leaders' Views on Turkey's EU Membership." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2005. URL <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2333>

¹¹⁹ SPD. "Hamburg Programme: Principle Guidelines of the Social Democratic Party of Germany." adopted at the Federal Party Conference of the SPD on 28 October 2007. p. 17.

considered essential for the EU and the security concerns were at the heart of SPD's and the coalition government's support to Turkey. On the other hand, the costs of its exclusion were perceived to be very high by the Schröder government. The foreign minister Fischer once stated that "the EU might shut the doors on Turkey; however this could come at a tremendous cost"¹²⁰. As a result, Turkey's full membership to the EU was always in the agenda of the Schröder government.

The economic benefits seem to be another motive for the SPD support. Turkey is an important trade partner of the EU, and Germany is the main economic and commercial partner of Turkey in the EU with high amounts of bilateral trade and high levels of German investment in Turkey. The accession of Turkey to the EU is expected to bring about a boost in the foreign direct investment in Turkey "because of the implementation of the EU standards and the further consolidation of Turkey's political and economic stability."¹²¹ The economic, political and legislative reforms which Turkey would be compelled to implement in the EU accession process are supposed to create a more credible environment for foreign direct investment. In addition to being a more credible and stable market for the EU, Turkey would "function as a gateway to countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the entire Middle East region"¹²² thus providing other markets for German investment.

The SPD position towards Turkey is also shaped by Turkey's democratic credentials. Therefore, the intense reform package Turkey has launched to comply with the Copenhagen criteria constitutes another motive for the support of the SPD and the Schröder government. The reforms implemented by Turkey are welcomed by both the EU and Germany. It is assumed that these reforms have "strengthened Turkey's

¹²⁰ İnal, Nuray Nazlı, and Düden Yegenoglu. "German and French Leaders' Views on Turkey's EU Membership."

¹²¹ Fischer, Joschka. "Turkey's European Perspective: The German View." p. 5-6.

¹²² Ibid. p. 5.

democracy and the rule of law”¹²³ in the country. In this sense, Turkey is expected to form an example for the other countries in the region as a country of Muslim majority with a full-fledged democracy and rule of law, a good human rights record and a country which respects minority rights. Turkey would act as a dispenser of European values. The “globalization of fundamental values” has been considered to be vital in eliminating a “religious and cultural clash of civilizations between the Islamic Arab world and the West”¹²⁴ in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The role of Turkey as a dispenser of European values has been emphasized repeatedly by Schröder, Fischer and in party manifests and programs.¹²⁵ Schröder encouraged the AKP government to continue with the reform process in a visit to Ankara.

In addition to the security and economic concerns, the Turkish population in Germany is another crucial factor influencing SPD’s pro-Turkish attitude. There are around 500,000 voters of Turkish origin in Germany today. Many of these people became German citizens thanks to the attempts of the Schröder government. Social Democrats argued that the inclusion of Turkey in the EU would help to solve the problems related to immigration and minority rights.¹²⁶ When the Schröder government assumed power, the decisions regarding the Turkish immigrants were shaped by this policy of the SPD. The government took several steps to ameliorate the integration and naturalization of the immigrants. There are more than 2 million Turks in Germany, and nearly 700,000 of them have become German citizens. The integration and

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 4.

¹²⁵ For detailed information see: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. “Schröder: Türkei kann sich auf Deutschland verlassen.” 23-ebruary 2004. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/482/355311/text/>

The Principal guidelines of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Hamburg Programme, <http://www.spd.de/de/politik/grundsatzprogramm/index.html>;

The European Manifest of the Social Democratic Party for the European Parliament Elections of 2009, http://www.spd.de/de/pdf/spezial/eurodel/081208_Europamanifest_2009_final.pdf

¹²⁶ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and McLaren, Lauren. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey.” p. 24.

naturalization of the Turkish community have been on the agenda of German governments since the 1970s when it was realized that the *Gastarbeiter* had become permanent residents. However, until the late 1990s, most governments failed to take satisfactory steps that would expedite the integration. The problem of integration and naturalization of the Turkish population was not dealt with effective means, and the legal status of the immigrants was defined by the 1965 Foreigners' Act (*Ausländergesetz*) which was very limited in its scope because it was originally designed to regulate the work and residence permit of the guest workers.¹²⁷ The Act became very insufficient as the number of Turkish workers who decided to settle in Germany permanently increased and in the 1990s it was completely futile in regulating the legal status of more than 1,5 million Turkish people living in Germany. The Foreigners' Act was not revised until 1990. The German governments and the society refused to accept the fact that the guest workers had actually become permanent residents. Until 1990s the prevalent idea was that:

The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization [...] the granting of German citizenship can only be considered if a public interest in the naturalization exists [...] the personal desires and economic interests of the applicant cannot be decisive.¹²⁸

Thus the Turkish immigrants, some of whom had been living in Germany for more than thirty years, remained as 'foreigners'. They were not perceived as a part of German society. Even though the governments made some attempts to expedite integration at the societal level, since these attempts were not complemented with amendments in the legal status of immigrants, they were not very effectual. Full integration still required a redefinition of nationality which would grant the immigrants the right to obtain citizenship. The nationality was defined on ethno-cultural lines and

¹²⁷ Anıl, Merih. "No More Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990-2000." *Dialectical Anthropology*. 29.3 (2005): 454-55.

¹²⁸ Hailbronner, Kay and Renner, Günther. *Staatsangehörigkeit Kommentar*. München: C. H. Beck, 1998. quoted in Ruud Koopmans. "Germany and its Immigrants: an ambivalent relationship." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 25.4 (1999): 630.

the principle of *jus sanguini* constituted the basis of citizenship.¹²⁹ Even though, there were some revisions to the 1965 Foreigners' Act in 1990 and 1993, the requirements for the naturalization of immigrants were still very harsh. According to the 1990 Foreigners' Law, the immigrants between 16 and 23 years of age were required to have resided in Germany for eight or more years, and foreigners above 23 were asked to have lived in Germany at least 15 years.¹³⁰ It was the 1999 new German Nationality Act which introduced the *jus soli* principle to the definition of nationality and citizenship.¹³¹ The new law gave the children born in Germany the right to obtain German citizenship, and enabled them to retain dual citizenship until the age of 23.¹³² Another amendment was the shortening of the time period the foreigners had to spend in Germany before acquiring citizenship. With the new Law, foreigners were required to have eight years of habitual residence to obtain citizenship as opposed to the fifteen years that the previous acts required.¹³³ By introducing this Law, Germany took an important step to fully integrate the immigrant population to German society.

The role of the SPD was crucial in these developments. The new Citizenship Law was introduced by the Schröder government in its first year of rule. The attempts to give "birthright citizenship" to foreigners had already started before 1999. The SPD had submitted four proposals to reform the nationality law in 1885, 1988, 1989 and 1993.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Anıl, Merih. "No More Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990-2000." p. 453.

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 455.

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 454.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ For detailed information see the official website of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Germany:
<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/WillkommeninD/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht.html>

¹³⁴ Murray, Laura. "Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? Explaining the Evolving Positions of German Political Parties on Citizenship Policy." *German Politics*

The expedition of integration of immigrant population to German society has long been on the agenda of SPD and it is emphasized both in the rhetoric of the party leaders and in the party programs. It is underlined in the party programs that “Germany is a country of immigration” which is considered to have “enriched [the] country in business and culture”. It is argued that the integration of the immigrants to society can be realized by “giving [the immigrants] all opportunities to take part in the life of [the] society.”¹³⁵ The 1999 new Citizenship Law was a vital step to achieve this goal. The Citizenship Law also effected the Turkish-German relations, showing once again the positive attitude of SPD towards Turkey, and also helped to increase the prestige of SPD among the Turkish population in Germany. It is estimated that there are approximately 700,000 Turkish immigrants who became German citizens. The Citizenship Law was influential in the increase in the number of Turkish people who took German citizenship.¹³⁶ This number is expected to increase further if dual citizenship is allowed. According to the current Citizenship Law, the immigrants cannot retain dual citizenship, and have to choose between German or Turkish citizenship. The right to dual citizenship was included in the proposal of Schröder government in 1999; however it was rejected due to the opposition of CDU/CSU. As well as the security and economic concerns, and the party’s commitment to expedite the integration of immigrants to the German society, the increasing number of German voters of Turkish origin is considered to be influential in shaping the attitude of SPD towards Turkey. For instance, Kohl criticized Schröder’s pro-Turkish attitude by claiming that Schröder “wants more than anything to win votes, and hopes his support for Turkey will win him the sympathy of the Turkish voters.”¹³⁷

and Society. 33 (1994): 23-56. quoted in Aml, Merih. “No More Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990-2000.” p. 462.

¹³⁵ SPD. “Hamburg Programme: Principle Guidelines of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.” adopted at the Federal Party Conference of the SPD on 28 October 2007. p. 20.

¹³⁶ Kramer, Heinz. “Turkey’s EU Negotiations at the Mercy of Conflicting Interests.” SWP Comments. 43 (2005) :3.

¹³⁷ *Der Spiegel*. “Ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl Weighs In on Turkey.” 15 December 2004.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,332953,00.html>

The red-green coalition was defeated in 2005 federal elections and was replaced by CDU/CSU and SPD coalition. After this defeat Schröder announced his resignation. During his term in office and after his resignation, Schröder assured the Turkish government many times that Germany would back Turkey's EU bid. Before the negotiation talks started on 3 October 2005, in an interview with a Turkish journalist, he reassured that the EU would keep its promise in terms of Turkey's EU bid by saying that "Turkey has fulfilled all its promises, now it is time we honor ours."¹³⁸ Schröder continued to support Turkey even after he left office in 2005. Just before he left, he declared that the German foreign policy on the Turkish issue would not alter during the rule of the new government, and that the privileged partnership would not be considered as an alternative option since the full accession talks had already started.¹³⁹ SPD supported the full-membership of Turkey to the EU. Schröder and other opinion makers in the SPD have so far criticized the 'privileged partnership' option proposed by the CDU leader Angela Merkel. Schröder argued that "privileged partnership alternative could neither meet the current developments nor the promises given to Turkey."¹⁴⁰ In short, between 1998 and 2005 the Schröder government was very supportive of Turkey's EU membership and took tangible steps to ameliorate the Turkey-EU relations such as the 1999 Cologne Summit proposal. Schröder was a prominent figure in this process; he acted like a "patron for Turkey"¹⁴¹ during this period.

¹³⁸ *Hürriyet*. "Schröder: EU's Turn to Honor its Promise." 27 July 2005.

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=schroder-eus-turn-to-honour-its-promise-2005-08-27>

¹³⁹ *EU Observer*. "Schröder Reassures Turks on Berlin Leadership Change." 13 October 2005.

<http://euobserver.com/9/20087>

¹⁴⁰ *Hürriyet*. "Ayrıcalıklı Ortaklık Önerisi Sözümüzün Karşılığı Değil." 19 February 2004.

<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=203997>

¹⁴¹ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and McLaren, Lauren. "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey." p. 24.

The pro-Turkish policy of SPD, however, did not change after Schröder resigned.¹⁴² The party's support for Turkish membership was reassured in the rhetoric of the party members. In 2006, Kurt Beck, the SPD party leader of the time, warned that "closing the door to Turkish membership" would be "a capital mistake" and added that an alternative to full-membership would not be "an adequate offer".¹⁴³ Similar to Beck, Steinmeier who became the foreign minister of the grand coalition government also expressed support for Turkey. In line with the overall SPD policy, he stated that the reform packages which have been implemented to conform to the criteria should be supported, and added that with these reforms "Turkey will show that democracy, human rights and the rule of law can be realized in a predominantly Muslim country."¹⁴⁴ He also emphasized the importance of Turkey's "integration with the EU for the integration of the Turkish community in Germany"¹⁴⁵. The pro-Turkish stance of the foreign minister was influential in tempering the German attitude towards Turkey during the grand coalition. The SPD support for Turkey which was much evident during the red-green coalition continued after the 2005 elections and it is still prevalent.

In sum, the SPD support has been based on the prospective material benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU in terms of security and economics. According to SPD, Turkey is highly important for the European security with its military capacities, NATO membership, geostrategic location and mediator role. These determinants shape SPD preferences from the security perspective. Turkey is already an important trade partner

¹⁴² "The German Turkey Debate under the Grand Coalition." ESI Discussion Paper. 2006. p. 1.
URL http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_94.pdf

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ *Bild*. "Keine Endloss-Debatten über Türkei Beitritt." 28 June 2006.
<http://www.bild.de/BTO/news/aktuell/2006/06/28/steinmeier-interview/steinmeier-interview-tuerkei.html>

¹⁴⁵ *EUObserver*. "German Foreign Minister Backs Turkey's EU Bid." 15 October 2008.
<http://euobserver.com/9/26935>

of Germany. But if it becomes a full member to the EU, the Turkish market will be attract more foreign direct investment, because the reforms which are to be implemented in the accession process will make the Turkish market more stable and credible. In addition, Turkey will help the EU to open to new markets in other regions such as Caucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. These potential economic benefits also determine the pro-Turkish stance of SPD. Another determinant shaping the stance of SPD is the Turkey's democratic credentials. According to SPD, the reform package which Turkey has to implement in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria will increase its democratic credentials. The increase in democratic credentials of Turkey is important, because it can set an example to other countries with predominantly Muslim populations.

3.2. Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Bavarian Christian Social Union:

Contrary to the supportive attitude of SPD for Turkey's full-membership to the EU, CDU/CSU has been the source of uncompromising opposition to Turkey's EU bid. The party leaders and opinion makers have often stated that Turkey's inclusion to the EU with full-membership would be a liability rather than an asset. Instead of full-membership, a special partnership which would still anchor Turkey to the EU without endowing it with the same rights granted to other member states is considered to be a more viable option among the CDU/CSU circles. Thus Turkey would be neither completely included to the EU system nor fully excluded. In opposition to SPD, whose support for Turkey mainly derived from security and economic concerns; the opposition of CDU/CSU is essentially based on cultural differences between Turkey and the EU countries. Thus, while basically utility-driven concerns define the attitude of Social Democrats towards Turkey, the identity-based concerns are influential in shaping the policy of CDU/CSU on the Turkish issue. In this sense, liberal intergovernmentalist account of Moravcsik which provides reasonable explanations for the preference formation on the SPD side falls short of explaining the CDU/CSU opposition. The constructivist approach provides more exhaustive explanations in analyzing the reasons of opposition on the German center-right.

According to the constructivist approach, a collective European identity is one of the driving forces of the European integration which cannot be merely explained through the convergence of material interests. “Actors are assumed to belong to a community whose values and norms they share”¹⁴⁶ and in the EU case, the collective European identity is defined through “a common historical heritage dating back to ancient Greece, to Christianity as a shared religious experience, or a community of liberal democracies and social market economies”¹⁴⁷. Other communities who do not share these values and norms are considered as “the other”.¹⁴⁸

The CDU/CSU attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession is very much in conformity with this line of thought. The fact that Turkey does not share the collective culture, common history and religious experience of the other member states shapes the CDU/CSU policy on the Turkish issue which is often reiterated by the party leaders and major opinion makers. Turkish culture was regarded as utterly different from the European collective identity, and this perception was evident in the decisions taken as regards to Turkey’s EU aspirations. It was during the Kohl government in the 1990s when the attitude of the CDU was expressed clearly for the first time when the Kohl government opposed to the inclusion of Turkey in the next enlargement round in 1997 Luxembourg Summit. The position of the Kohl government in this summit caused tension between Turkey and Germany, and the Turkish prime minister of the time, Mesut Yılmaz, accused the EU for “discriminating against Turkey for religious reasons” and claimed that “the German Chancellor in particular was determined to turn the EU

¹⁴⁶ Schimmelfenning, Frank. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” *International Organization*. 55.1 (2001): 62.

¹⁴⁷ Risse, Thomas, et al. “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union.” *European Journal of International Relations*. 5.2 (1999): 154.

¹⁴⁸ Neumann, I., and Welsh, J. “The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society.” *Review of International Studies*. 17 (1991): 331.

into a Christian club.”¹⁴⁹ Schröder had also criticized Kohl for creating an “impression that Turkey, with a largely Muslim population, is left on the outside because of borders of faith”.¹⁵⁰

The identity based concerns played an important role in shaping the attitude of successive CDU/CSU leaders and opinion makers. Both Merkel and Stoiber expressed several times that Turkey did not fit in the European collective identity because it was culturally too different. “The common historical heritage and common values on the basis of Christianity and humanism”¹⁵¹ constituted the European identity according to Stoiber, the former chairman of the CSU, who several months later added that “Europe is a community of values, [...] if we want to make the European Union an intellectual center, then I say Turkey has no place here.”¹⁵² This attitude of CDU/CSU was also reflected on the decisions related to the Turkish community in Germany. The CDU/CSU did not share the pro-immigrant approach of the SPD and the Greens, and when the Schröder government initiated the revision of the citizenship law, the CDU/CSU rejected fiercely the proposal for dual citizenship.¹⁵³ Instead, the CDU/CSU adopted an anti-immigrant stance. The former party leader Kohl even stated that

¹⁴⁹ Kramer, Heinz. “Germany: The Reluctant and Indispensable Ally.” *Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkish Relations*. Ed. Ömer Taşpınar. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 18 . 2005. p. 23.
URL <http://www.aicgs.org/documents/polrep18.pdf>

¹⁵⁰ *NYTimes*. “Schröder, Kohl’s Rival, Outlines Terms for Entry: a Place for Turkey in the EU?” 04 August 1998.
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/04/news/04iht-turkey.t_0.html

¹⁵¹ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. “Stoiber: Beitritt der Türkei kommt nicht in Frage.” 21 March 2006.
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/333/395121/text/>

¹⁵² *Deutsche Welle*. “Stoiber Speaks Out Against SPD and Turkish EU Membership.” 16 October 2006.
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2205390,00.html>

¹⁵³ Anıl, Merih. “No More Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990-2000.” p. 463.

“Germany is not a country of immigration”¹⁵⁴. Due to this clear anti-immigrant rhetoric and the Christian identity of the parties, the Turkish population does not influence the stance of the CDU/CSU as much as it affects the attitude of SPD and the Greens. As stated above, the Turkish voters might be one of the factors that influence the supportive attitude of the SPD and the Greens. However, obviously gaining the support of the Turkish voters is not a concern for CDU/CSU. It can be argued that these parties target to gain the votes of a different electoral body with their Christian identity and anti-immigrant approach. Therefore, the Turkish voters do not concern CDU/CSU.

The opposition of CDU/CSU was rigid during the red-green coalition from 1998 to 2005, and Merkel and Stoiber criticized the pro-Turkish attitude of the Schröder government. It has been disclosed that Merkel and Stoiber sent a letter to Schröder and other EU leaders to convince them for offering Turkey a privileged partnership instead of full-membership before an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers where the opening of accession negotiations were going to be discussed. It was stated in the letter that “accepting Turkey would overburden the EU politically, economically and socially and would endanger the European integration process.”¹⁵⁵ Because of these reasons, along with the “continuous refusal of Turkey to recognize the Republic of Cyprus” and its “still-significant problems in upholding and imposing human rights”, Merkel and Stoiber demanded that the negotiation framework would also include “the perspective of a privileged partnership with Turkey.”¹⁵⁶

Ever since the introduction of the idea by Merkel in 2004, the privileged partnership is perceived as the only way that Turkey could be included in the EU among the CDU/CSU. The concept of privileged partnership suggests the formation of a special relationship between Turkey and the EU which would fall short of full-

¹⁵⁴ Kramer, Heinz. “Germany: The Reluctant and Indispensable Ally.” in “Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkish Relations.” p. 24.

¹⁵⁵ *Deutsche Welle*. “Conservatives Say No to Turkey Again.” 26 August 2005. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1692114,00.html>

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

membership but would still promote a closer relationship than the Customs Union. The privileged partnership would entail the deepening of EU-Turkey relations in three aspects. First of all, the free market area which was activated with the conclusion of the Customs Union in 1995 could be expanded to cover all goods. Turkey and the EU could work in cooperation to promote civil society, environmental protection, health care and education and to foster small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, Turkey could be further incorporated into the CFSP and ESDP. Finally, the collaboration between Turkey and the EU could be intensified among the offices and institutions under the Justice and Home Affairs to fight against terrorism, extremism and organized crimes.¹⁵⁷ Even though, the concept of privileged partnership foresees a significant enhancement of cooperation in various fields, it would deprive Turkey of many rights that are to arise from full-membership. Hence the idea of privileged partnership is strongly rejected by Turkey and stated firmly that any alternative to full-membership of the European Union will not be accepted.¹⁵⁸ However, the CDU/CSU has kept to their privileged partnership rhetoric so far. Merkel stated in 2004 that they wanted “a special partnership, a third way with Turkey.”¹⁵⁹ In 2009, before the federal elections in Germany, she showed that her proposition for a ‘privileged partnership’ has not changed when she suggested that “it [did] not make any sense for the EU to continuously expand if it leaves the Union unable to operate” and added that she preferred a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership.¹⁶⁰ Stoiber supported Merkel’s proposition and claimed that

¹⁵⁷ CDU/CSU. “Privilegierte Partnerschaft. Die europäische Perspektive für die Türkei.” Beschluss der Präsidien der Christlich Demokratischen Union und der Christlich-Sozialen Union am 7 März 2004.

URL <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/080304-beschluss-tuerkei.pdf>

¹⁵⁸ *Euractiv*. “Turkey shocked by Franco-German election rhetoric.” 11 May 2009. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/eu-elections/turkey-shocked-franco-german-election-rhetoric/article-182187>

¹⁵⁹ *Deutsche Welle*. “German Opposition Stays Tough on Turkey’s EU Bid.” 16 February 2004.

<http://www.deutsche-welle.com/dw/article/0,,1115813,00.html>

¹⁶⁰ *Euractiv*. “Turkey shocked by Franco-German election rhetoric.” 11 May 2009.

he would do “everything within his legal power” to achieve a privileged partnership with Turkey.¹⁶¹

The privileged partnership rhetoric is repeatedly articulated in the party programs of CDU and the coalition agreements between CDU/CSU and SPD, and CDU/CSU and FDP. In the basic policy program of the CDU, it is argued that the full-membership cannot be taken as the only option for new members, and a privileged partnership is the right solution in the Turkish case.¹⁶² The same rhetoric is preserved in the wording of the coalition agreements with both SPD and FDP. Even though, the SPD had a much assertive position towards Turkey and supported the full-membership of Turkey to the EU, due to pressure from CDU/CSU, the privileged partnership was proposed as an alternative to full-membership in the 2005 coalition agreement. It was stated in the coalition agreement that:

Should the EU not have the capacity to absorb Turkey, or Turkey not be able to comply completely and in full with all of the commitments which membership entails, Turkey must be linked to the European structures as closely as possible and in a way that further develop its privileged relationship with Europe.¹⁶³

The coalition agreement further stressed the open-ended nature of the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The very same rhetoric was adopted in the

¹⁶¹ *Euractiv*. “Rehn: Turkey is already a ‘privileged partner’ of the EU.” 13 July 2005. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/rehn-turkey-privileged-partner-eu/article-142431>

¹⁶² CDU. “Freiheit und Sicherheit: Grundsätze für Deutschland.” Das Grundsatzprogramm der CDU. p. 101. available at the CDU website: <http://www.grundsatzprogramm.cdu.de/doc/071203-beschluss-grundsatzprogramm-6-navigierbar.pdf>

¹⁶³ The Coalition Agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD. “Germany is a responsible partner in Europe and the World.” p. 7. available at CDU website: http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05_11_11_Coalitionagreement_foreignpolicy.pdf

2009 coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP.¹⁶⁴ In both agreements, the absorption capacity of the EU and the full compliance of the membership criteria by Turkey are taken as basis for Turkey's full-membership.

The inclusion of Turkey into the EU as a full member is regarded as threatening to the European integration and the operation of the EU by the CDU/CSU, and the staunch opposition of these parties to a prospective Turkish membership, which is mainly based on identity concerns, has not been abolished so far. However, similar to SPD and the Greens, the CDU/CSU cannot underestimate the benefits of Turkey, tied strongly to the EU, in terms of security and defense. Therefore, it has been strongly stressed in the concept of the privileged partnership that close cooperation between Turkey and the EU in CFSP, ESDP and JHA is vital. Merkel has reiterated in her speeches several times that Germany wanted to have close relations with Turkey, because Turkey was excessively significant for "security and geopolitical reasons"¹⁶⁵. The military capacities of the country, its NATO membership, the mediator role it has been embarked in the post-Cold War system, in addition to its role in the energy security of the EU, have made Turkey an indispensable partner for the EU in security matters. Therefore, the rigid opposition of CDU/CSU towards Turkey's EU membership might be replaced by a more moderate position in the forthcoming years. For the time being, Merkel has reassured Turkey that she won't block Turkey's accession negotiations and *pacta sunt servanda* will apply¹⁶⁶ and this position still prevails.

¹⁶⁴ The Coalition Agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP. "Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt." p. 117. available at CSU website:
http://www.csu.de/dateien/partei/beschluesse/091026_koalitionsvertrag.pdf

¹⁶⁵ *Deutsche Welle*. "German Opposition Stays Tough on Turkey's EU Bid." 16 February 2004.

¹⁶⁶ *Euractiv*. "Merkel: Berlin Won't Stand in the Way of Turkey's EU Bid." 28 November 2005.
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/merkel-berlin-won-stand-way-turkey-eu-bid/article-150009>

To recapitulate, the opposition of CDU/CSU against the Turkish accession is shaped by identity-based concerns. Turkey is considered as incompatible with the European identity and culture. Particularly, in terms of religion-based differences, Turkey does not comply with the European identity, considering that Christianity is one of the keystones which construct this identity. The Christian-based values are especially stressed by CDU/CSU. The emphasis on these values is one of the distinguishing elements that shape the identity of these parties. However, Turkey is still regarded as an important partner in European security. Therefore, close cooperation with Turkey in CFSP, ESDP and JHA is desired. In order to facilitate cooperation in these fields, CDU/CSU suggest that Turkey is anchored to the EU through a 'privileged partnership'. This alternative to full-membership will anchor Turkey to the EU without including Turkey into the decision-making mechanisms.

3.3. Alliance '90/The Greens

The position of the Greens on the Turkish issue is very much in conformity with that of SPD. Similar to SPD, the Greens have been a strong supporter of Turkey's EU bid. The determinants that shape the attitude of the Greens on this issue and the reasons for their support to Turkey's full-membership are mainly based on economic and security concerns like SPD. The Greens formed a coalition with the SPD in 1998 and stayed in power until 2005, and influenced the decisions regarding Turkey's EU accession which were taken during the term of the red-green coalition. Joschka Fischer, the leader of the Green party, who served as the foreign minister of the coalition government, was very influential in the pro-Turkish attitude of the government and he stood out with his evident support to Turkey's EU membership. His rhetoric on the Turkish issue was very akin to that of Schröder. Like Schröder, he expressed frequently that the inclusion of Turkey to the EU was vital for the European security system. The security concerns were at the heart of Fischer's pro-Turkish rhetoric. As abovementioned, in an article he published in 2004, Fischer drew attention to the strategic role Turkey would play in the European security structure in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. He claimed that during the Cold War, "Turkey [laid] on the fringe",

whereas in the post-Cold War system it was “in the center of [the EU] security”.¹⁶⁷ Turkey, therefore, was to be included into the EU system at all costs with full-membership. Fischer criticized CDU/CSU for their opposition towards Turkey’s EU bid. He argued that “the promises that [had] been made by the German governments for over the past 43 years” were to be kept and blamed Merkel and Stoiber for being “blind”¹⁶⁸ in their attitude. When it was decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, Fischer expressed his contentment as:

Europe is the winner today. What has been promised for decades is now entering its decisive phase, which will last a long time. [...] The Eastern Mediterranean will be crucial for peace in the 21st century, not only for Turkey, but for Europe as a whole.¹⁶⁹

Another determinant for the support on the side of the Greens is the prospective economic benefits that Turkey’s membership would bring. As Fischer argued in his article, the membership of Turkey would provide the EU with a secure and stable market for foreign direct investment and it would be a gateway to other markets in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, Turkey would provide the EU with “young and skilled labor force” and it would bring “extensive economic development potential to Europe”, and as a result the inclusion of Turkey would not be

¹⁶⁷ *Turkish Weekly*. “German FM Fischer Attacks Merkel’s Turkey Policy.” 25 July 2009.

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/18477/german-fm-fischer-attacks-merkel-s-turkey-policy.html>

¹⁶⁸ *Deutsche Welle*. “Conservatives Say No to Turkey Again.” 26 August 2005.

¹⁶⁹ *BBC News*. “In Quotes: Turkey-EU talks deal.” 4 October 2005.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4307730.stm>

¹⁷⁰ Fischer, Joschka. “Turkey’s European Perspective: The German View.” p. 5. (The rhetoric of Fischer is analyzed in more detail in the SPD section under the Schröder government.)

an “asset for the Europe’s security only but the EU would also benefit economically”¹⁷¹ from Turkey’s inclusion.

The economic and security concerns, however, are not the only determinants in shaping the preferences of the Greens on the Turkish issue. In addition to the prospective economic and security benefits, the prioritization of multiculturalism in the party agenda is another factor which affects the preference formation towards Turkey. Contrary to CDU/CSU, the cultural differences of Turkey do not constitute a source of concern for the Greens. This liberal approach of the party is also evident in its position towards immigration. Unlike CDU/CSU, immigration is not perceived as a threat to German society but as an asset. Like SPD, the Greens support the full-membership of Turkey to the EU, and any alternative to full-membership is not considered acceptable. They argue that the accession negotiations with Turkey should be “reliable and fair”, and a privileged partnership would mean “the breach of promise” given to Turkey forty years ago.¹⁷² In line with Fischer, the current party leader, Cem Özdemir, has opposed to the privileged partnership proposal of the CDU/CSU, and stated that the goal of the accession negotiations is the full-membership of Turkey.¹⁷³

In sum, the pro-Turkish attitude of the Greens is very much similar to SPD. The economic and security benefits of Turkey’s inclusion, together with the liberal approach of the party in terms of tolerance to different cultures and its positive attitude towards immigration and immigrants are the main determinants which shape the supportive

¹⁷¹ Die Grünen. “Für Ein Besseres Europa: Europawahlprogramm von der Grünen 2009.” p. 150.
http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Europawahlprogramm/Europawahlprogramm.pdf

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ *Die Welt*. “EU Beitritt der Türkei: Özdemir Sauer auf ‘Provinzpolitiker’ CSU.” 08 January 2010.
<http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article5773424/Oezdemir-sauer-auf-Provinzpolitiker-der-CSU.html>

attitude of the Greens towards Turkey's membership. Turkey's central role in the European security in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks are especially emphasized. Besides, Turkey is regarded as essential for the EU, since Turkey would provide a secure market for foreign direct investment and supply labor force to the EU, as well as be a gateway to other markets in the region.

3.4. Free Democratic Party (FDP)

The FDP does not have a clear-cut position towards Turkey's EU membership as the other parties. It is neither an ardent supporter of Turkey like SPD and the Greens, nor does it oppose to Turkey's EU bid as the CDU/CSU. The position of FDP could be regarded as relatively neutral on the Turkish issue. According to the political party position, the prospects of Turkey's EU membership depend on the fulfillment of the accession criteria and the absorption capacity of the EU.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, it does not propose a privileged partnership if Turkey cannot fulfill the criteria or if the EU does not have the capacity to absorb Turkey like CDU/CSU. On the other hand, it has not argued for the full-membership of Turkey as overtly as SPD and the Greens. Thus far the statements as regards to this issue have focused on the reforms Turkey has undertaken to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. While the reforms in the constitution and legislation have been appreciated, Turkey is encouraged to continue with the reform program by the FDP leader Guido Westerwelle to promote "freedom of opinion, press and religion" which are considered the cornerstones of common European values".¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ FDP. "Ein Europa der Freiheit für die Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts: Programm der Freien Demokratischen Partei für die Wahl zum VII. Europäischen Parlament 2009." 17 Januar 2009.

<http://www.liberales.de/files/2077/FDP-Europawahlprogramm2009.pdf>

¹⁷⁵ *Die Welt*. "Türkei Besuch: Westerwelle fordert faire Gespräche über EU-Beitritt." 07 January 2010.

<http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article5761915/Westerwelle-fordert-faire-Gespraeche-ueber-EU-Beitritt.html>

The rhetoric of Westerwelle, who became the foreign minister of the CDU/CSU - FDP coalition government, has indicated changes in the attitude of FDP. In a visit to Ankara, the foreign minister showed clearly that FDP would not go along with the CDU/CSU policy towards Turkey. The FDP leader promised that Turkey's EU bid would be considered "without prejudice"¹⁷⁶. Even though, the same rhetoric is adopted in the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP as regards to Turkey's EU membership as the grand coalition agreement, which favors a privileged partnership if Turkey fails to comply with the accession criteria or if the EU cannot absorb Turkey, the attitude of Westerwelle seems more moderate than his coalition partners. In this sense, Westerwelle might follow the line of his predecessor, Steienmeier and balance the rigid opposition of CSU towards Turkey. The economic interests seem to have played a role in Westerwelle's position towards Turkey since during his visit to Turkey; he announced that "Germany had a great interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey, partly because of the economic ties between the countries"¹⁷⁷. Since the position of FDP towards Turkey's EU bid is not clear yet, it is hard to evaluate the determinants that shape its attitude on this issue. However, it is relatively evident that the identity based concerns are not extremely influential in shaping the preference of FDP on the Turkish issue. Rather its attitude might be explained from an intergovernmentalist perspective, since based on the rhetoric of Westerwelle, the material interests seem to have affected the preference formation of the FDP.

Conclusion:

This chapter argued and analyzed the extent to which Turkey's EU membership has created a rift among the major political parties in Germany, namely SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and FDP. The parties' preferences differ on several issues with respect to

¹⁷⁶ *Die Welt*. "CSU Rejects Foreign Minister Westerwelle's Turkey Policy." 08 January 2010.
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5101312,00.html>

Turkey, yet the main division is on the nature of the partnership to be established between Turkey and the EU. Whereas SPD and the Greens strongly support Turkey's inclusion into the EU structure as a full member, CDU/CSU favor the formation of a privileged partnership between Turkey and the EU. FDP has not yet explicitly stated its position regarding the nature of the relationship. Another division exists on the nature of the determinants that shape the attitude of these parties towards Turkey's EU bid. While utility-driven concerns are the main determinants for SPD and the Greens, the identity-based concerns define the stance of CDU/CSU. As for the FDP, it is early to make a clear-cut assumption, but it seems likely that the utility-driven concerns might be effective in the preference formation of the party. Considering the nature of factors which determine the position of these major parties, it can be argued that the intergovernmentalist account explains the position of SPD, the Greens and the FDP more thoroughly, whereas the constructivist account provides more exhaustive explanations for the opposition of CDU/CSU. In fact the material and ideational concerns are in interplay with one another in shaping the position of the German political parties. Each party perceives some material and ideational concerns from Turkey's accession; however the relative influence of these concerns on the preference formation is not identical. While for SPD, the Greens and FDP, the material benefits are prioritized over ideational concerns, CDU/CSU preferences are primarily shaped by ideational concerns. Even though, CDU/CSU also perceive material benefits from Turkish accession especially in terms of security, their stance is not primarily shaped by these prospective benefits, as much as SPD and the Greens.

According to the utility-driven explanations, the military capacity, geostrategic location and the mediator role of Turkey make the country an indispensable partner for the European security system. The economic potential with a credible and stable market, attractive for foreign direct investment and the labor force that Turkey would provide make it an important partner for the European economy. The important role of Turkey in the European security system is also affirmed by Merkel several times in her rhetoric, but CDU/CSU have kept their staunch opposition to Turkey's full-membership to the EU. Instead they suggest a privileged partnership which will enable the EU to

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

establish close cooperation with Turkey especially in the CFSP, ESDP and JHA of the EU without including the country to the decision-making mechanism. Even though, Turkey has rejected the idea so far, CDU/CSU has retained their proposal for a privileged partnership and their rigid opposition to Turkey's full-membership.

The conflicting attitudes of the major parties on the Turkish issue have been reflected on the government policies and affected the decisions related to Turkey's EU bid. The decisions that were taken during the Kohl government, which opposed to Turkey's EU accession transformed into the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision which excluded Turkey from the next enlargement round. On the other hand, the decisions taken during the red-green coalition favored Turkey's EU bid and resulted in turning points such as 1999 Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey the candidate status. In addition to the decisions related to Turkey's EU membership, the decisions concerning the Turkish immigrants in Germany, such as the revisions of the citizenship law, has been affected by the division between the SPD-Greens and CDU/CSU.

In addition to their impact on the national preference formation, the political parties' position and preferences towards Turkey are also important in assessing the public's position on the Turkish issue. The attitude of domestic voters in issues related to the EU is considerably moulded by the elite cues.¹⁷⁸ In this sense, the political parties shape the public opinion towards Turkish accession to a certain degree. The public, in turn, influences the party preferences through elections. The next chapter addresses the German public's support for Turkey's accession because the public opinion is important to shape both the political party preferences and the national preferences on Turkish membership.

¹⁷⁸ Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren. "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 32.4 (1994): 462.

CHAPTER IV

An Analysis of Public Opinion in Germany towards Turkey's EU Membership

This chapter discusses the public support for Turkey's accession and analyzes the determinants that mould the public opinion with respect to Turkey from a utilitarian and identity-based approach. Public opinion is an important element in determining both the party preferences and national preferences towards European integration and enlargement. The role of the public was very trivial in the foundation of the European Union and the integration in the successive three decades. The European Project was mainly driven by the political and technocratic elite through a "permissive consensus", and public opinion and support for integration were issues that received almost no attention.¹⁷⁹ Even though, the European Parliament was founded in 1957, up until 1975, the members of the parliament were appointed by the member states. The first direct elections for the European Parliament took place in 1979. The direct elections gave the European public a limited sphere to exert influence on the integration. However, since the role of the EP was constrained to an advisory body with very slight impact on the decision-making, the public sphere was also very restricted. The democratic deficit, which is still an unresolved problem, was acute until the late 1980s. The institutional reforms proposed in the 1987 Single European Act helped to expand the power of the EP in the decision-making and hence provided the public with a broader sphere for "institutionalized deliberation and decision-making"¹⁸⁰.

¹⁷⁹ Vreese, C.H. et al. "Hard and Soft: Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU." *European Union Politics*. 9.4 (2008): 512.

¹⁸⁰ Eriksen and Fossum distinguish between *strong* and *general* publics by referring to the decision-making power of two different types of public. While the *strong* public has decision-making power and a sphere of institutionalized deliberation, the *general* public does not have decision-making power. According to this differentiation, the institutional revisions in the SEA and successive treaties led to the formation of a strong public in

However, the institutional revisions and the EP alone cannot account for the increase in the role of the public in influencing the European integration. In addition to the EP where the public could have an indirect say in issues related to European integration, the member state citizens started to exert influence on through the domestic channels, namely the national government. In line with the intergovernmentalist account of Moravcsik, in democratic societies, the public can exert influence on the decision-making through “domestic institutions and practices of political representation”.¹⁸¹ The governments are constrained by the interests and preferences of the public, since they need the support of the domestic voters to stay in power.¹⁸² The influence of public on the domestic preference formation in issues related to integration grew as the developments in the EU started to impact the lives of the ordinary citizens increasingly. However, the relative impact of the public is still limited. Only when the majority of the public is united in support or opposition to a certain policy, then the public is more likely to influence the national preference formation through elections. In issues related to the European integration, the public pressure is more evident in terms of opposition to certain policies, which are perceived as a threat to the economic and social well-being of the public. Especially since the early 1990s, the governments are perceptibly constrained by the opposition of domestic voters at home in EU related issues. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is a clear manifestation of this trend. The referendums held in France, the Netherlands and Ireland demonstrated a rigid opposition to the Treaty. Due to the opposition, the ratification process was halted and it lasted two years for the Treaty to be completely ratified. The public constraint on the governments is likely to increase in major developments in the EU like the Turkish membership. France and Austria have announced that they will hold referendums on the Turkish membership, and let the public decide on the Turkish issue. The increase in the

the EU. For detailed information see: Eriksen, Erik Oddvar O. and Fossum, John Erik “Democracy through Strong Publics in the European Union.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40.3 (2002): 402.

¹⁸¹ Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p. 483.

¹⁸² Ibid.

influence of the public in enlargement related issues is not very much in advantage of Turkey. The Eurobarometers show that there is an increasing opposition in some member states against Turkey's EU bid. It is clearly demonstrated that the full-membership of Turkey to the EU is not an acceptable option. The public opinion in Germany on the Turkish issue is not much different from France and Austria with an increasing rate of opposition. According to the Eurobarometer 66, 78% of the Germans oppose Turkey's EU membership and only 16% is in favor of Turkey's membership.¹⁸³ German public opinion and the factors that drive support or opposition for the Turkish accession will be discussed and analyzed in this chapter from a utility-driven and identity-based perspective. First the utility-driven and identity-based approaches to European integration will be explained briefly. The approaches of Gabel and Palmer, and McLaren will be used in explaining public support for Turkish membership along with liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism.

The utilitarian model, proposed by Gabel and Palmer to explain the public support for European integration, suggests that "the welfare gains from integrative policy" determine the attitude of the public.¹⁸⁴ According to Gabel and Palmer, "the level of education", "the occupational skills" and "the income level" are the main factors that influence a person's support for European integration.¹⁸⁵ The liberalization of the labor market introduced another level of competition and made some workers redundant. It eased the migration of unskilled workers from less developed member states to developed countries such as Germany. The immigrant workers constitute a threat to the workers with low levels of education and occupational skills in host countries, because these workers can easily be replaced by the immigrant workers.¹⁸⁶ In

¹⁸³ The European Commission. Eurobarometer 66. September 2007.

¹⁸⁴ Gabel, Matthew. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." *Journal of Politics*. 60.2 (1998): 4.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." *European Union Politics*. 8.2 (2007): 254.

addition, market liberalization enabled the business to move from one member state to another where the companies can find cheap labor¹⁸⁷ and created a second threat for the workers in the developed countries. Gabel and Palmer list the income level as the second factor that affects a person's support for integration. According to the authors, the liberalization of the capital market and the European Monetary Union influence the public support. The people with a high income level can benefit more from the market liberalization because "more open financial markets" provide better investment opportunities, whereas people with low income level are likely to be harmed by these economic policies because "they depend primarily on wages from labor for their welfare" and "capital liberalization reduces their welfare".¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, according to Gabel and Palmer, the capital mobility and European Monetary System limit the social welfare spending, which is another threat to the low-income citizens, because these citizens depend on the social welfare spending.¹⁸⁹ In short, the people with "lower-level job skills and at the lowest income levels" are threatened most by the economic policies in the EU,¹⁹⁰ therefore they are more likely to oppose the European integration and any policy that influences their welfare gains.

In the light of the utility-based approaches, it is highly likely that people who are threatened by Turkey's membership in economic terms will oppose Turkey's EU bid. One of the greatest concerns regarding Turkey's membership is the flux of large numbers of Turkish workers into the developed member states. The immigration of Turkish workers to developed member states such as Germany would create negative outcomes for the low-income unskilled workers in the host countries. In addition, the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Gabel, Matthew. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." p. 5. Also see; Frieden, Jeffrey A. "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance." *International Organization*. 45 (1991): 425-451.

¹⁸⁹ Gabel, Matthew. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." p. 5.

¹⁹⁰ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." p. 254.

companies in the member states would be encouraged to move their business to Turkey for lower wages to decrease their production costs. It is feared that Turkey will be a source of unskilled and cheap labor, a fact which would most threaten the lower-income unskilled workers in the host countries.¹⁹¹ These concerns especially hold true for Germany, which has already experienced a significant flow of Turkish workers since the 1960s. The German public fears of another flux of Turkish workers. They are concerned that the Turkish workers will replace them in the job market. They regard Turkish candidacy as “a strong potential threat to group resources such as social security benefits and jobs”¹⁹² and therefore oppose it. Considering the increasing level of unemployment in the country, it is likely that the utility-driven concerns will shape the German public attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid substantially. The public is already concerned about the unemployment rates and the economy. When asked about the most important concerns facing their country, 58% of the German public listed unemployment as the most significant concern, and 46% named the economic situation in the country.¹⁹³ The unemployment level and the economic situation in the country influence the support of the public for European integration and Turkish membership.

According to McLaren, Hooghe and Marks, De Vreese and Carey, the utility-driven approaches are considered to be insufficient to explain the support and opposition to the European integration and enlargement in all respects. The utility-driven approaches alone fail to provide thorough explanations for the rejection of Turkey’s full-membership bid, whereas other countries which have a fairly worse economy than Turkey with high potential of immigrants are granted membership. The accession of Central and Eastern European countries in a short time after their application forms a good example, a fact which cannot be explained through utility-driven rationale. It was obvious that the economic situation in most of these countries

¹⁹¹ Ibid. p. 256.

¹⁹² Ibid. p. 258.

¹⁹³ Eurobarometer 72. December 2009.

were far worse than Turkey.¹⁹⁴ In this sense, their inclusion would pose a greater threat on the job market and economies of the developed member states. However, the EU was not as hesitant to enlarge to the Eastern Europe as it is towards Turkey. In order to explain these discrepancies in the responses of member states on the Turkish issue, utility-driven explanations should be complemented with identity-based approach. According to this approach, the public's support to the EU related issues is also determined by the perception of cultural threat posed by further integration and enlargement. In contrary to Gabel and Palmer, McLaren, Hooghe and Marks, De Vreese and Carey argue that the "symbolic threat" (i.e. threat to culture and the way of life)¹⁹⁵ that integration and enlargement poses, outweighs the perceived economic threat.¹⁹⁶ In line with this rationale, the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU can be explained through the "kinship" between these countries and the other EU member states.¹⁹⁷ The Central and Eastern European countries are regarded as an integral part of the "European family of nations"¹⁹⁸ with the same ethnic, historical, cultural and religious background. In this sense, they belong to the collective European identity, and this seems to be a sufficient reason to justify their accession to the EU. On the other hand, Turkey is not regarded as a part of the European family because it doesn't share the historical, cultural and religious heritage of other member states, but

¹⁹⁴ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe." *Turkish Studies*. 1.1 (2000): 21.

¹⁹⁵ McLaren, Lauren. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?" *Journal of Politics*. 64.2 (2002): 557-58.

¹⁹⁶ See: McLaren, Lauren. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?"; Carey, Sean. "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics*. 3.4 (2002): 387-413; Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?" *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 37.3 (2004): 415-420; De Vreese et al. "Hard and Soft: Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU." *European Union Politics*. 9.4 (2008): 511-530.

¹⁹⁷ Sjusen, Helene. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." p. 503.

¹⁹⁸ Van den Broek, H. "Europe Revisited: The New Europe and the Lessons of History." quoted in Sjusen, Helene. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." p. 504.

regarded only as a strategic partner to Europe in economic and security aspects.¹⁹⁹ Its inclusion to the EU is essential for the economic and security aspirations of Europe. At the state-level the inclusion of Turkey can be justified through the economic and security benefits Turkish membership is to provide. However, it is highly unlikely that these benefits will constitute a motive for support to Turkey's EU bid at the public level. The perceived differences in the Turkish identity concern the public more than the economic and security benefits of Turkey's inclusion. According to McLaren:

In contrast to the way that many EU official might treat the country – in terms of its level of democracy, economic development etc. – EU citizens are likely to see it also in terms of the *people* who constitute the country (i.e. Turks).²⁰⁰

The indifference of the public towards the security benefits of Turkey's inclusion is also demonstrated in the Eurobarometers. The rate of the respondents who have stated that Turkey's inclusion would strengthen security in the region is far outweighed by the people who think that the membership of Turkey cannot be allowed because of the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states.²⁰¹ The perceived cultural threat is a major determinant in the formation of German public attitude towards Turkey's membership. The Turkish population in Germany plays an eminent role in shaping the public preference in this sense. The Turkish immigrants are still regarded as 'the other', 'the foreigner' in Germany. The differences in their culture, language, and religion are considered to be incompatible with the German and Western identity. These anti-immigrant sentiments among the German public translate into opposition to Turkish membership. McLaren claims that the role of immigration in determining the public attitude towards Turkey's EU accession is decisive. She argues that "high-levels of Turkish migration have created a climate of perceived threat to in-

¹⁹⁹ Sjurksen, Helene. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." p. 504.

²⁰⁰ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." p. 257.

²⁰¹ Eurobarometer 66. p. 226.

group resources and culture” and this threat is embodied as opposition to Turkey’s membership.²⁰² Ugur supports this rationale by stating that the societal forces in Europe regard immigration as “a threat to established visions of identity and societal integrity.”²⁰³ In this respect, in Germany, the country with the highest number of Turkish immigrants in Europe, it is highly likely that anti-immigrant feelings act as an impediment against Turkey’s EU bid. In the following section, the public support/opposition for the Turkish membership will be analyzed both from a utilitarian and constructivist account in association with the anti-immigrant sentiments. It will be argued the public preference formation in Germany is both affected by the economic and identity concerns, and the high levels of migration and the resultant anti-immigrant sentiments are influential in these concerns. This analysis will be made in the light of the quantitative data provided by Eurobarometer 66.²⁰⁴ The Eurobarometer has its own restrictions and

4.1. Utility-Driven Concerns

The liberalization of the capital and labor markets enabled the move of labor, capital and business from one member state to another, which has direct influences on the EU citizens. The impact of the market liberalization on the EU citizens differs

²⁰² McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” p. 254.

²⁰³ Ugur, Mehmet. “Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the ‘Insider’ – ‘Outsider’ Divide in the European Union.” *International Migration Review*. 29.4 (1995): 972.

²⁰⁴ This study is bound by the limitation of the available resources especially in terms of public opinion. The Eurobarometers provide the most relevant information for the aim of this thesis. However, the Eurobarometer has its own restrictions, too. In Eurobarometer 66, the public is mostly treated as homogenous, and the differences between groups are not elaborated. Due to the limited resources, such differences cannot be dwelled upon in detail, and the public is mostly taken as homogenous in this study, as well.

according to their level of education and occupational skills.²⁰⁵ Citizens with higher levels of education and income, and better occupational skills benefit from the market liberalization with better investment opportunities. On the other hand, the people with lower levels of education, income and occupational skills are influenced negatively by the market liberalization. They face the threat of losing their jobs to immigrant workers. They feel insecure about their jobs, income and security benefits. In addition, as a result of market liberalization it is easier for the companies to move to other member states in search of lower production costs, which as a result deprives the unskilled workers at home from potential job opportunities.²⁰⁶ Consequently, the effects of market liberalization on the socioeconomic situations of EU citizens influence their attitude towards European integration. If people benefit from the liberalization of the capital and labor markets, they are more likely to support the integration. However, if they are to suffer from the market liberalization in terms of job and income loss, people will oppose further integration.²⁰⁷

The economic concerns play a significant role on the public preference formation towards Turkey's membership in Germany. In line with the abovementioned rationale, the German citizens who perceive the Turkish membership as a threat on their jobs, income and security benefits, are likely to oppose Turkey's EU bid. The immigration of the Turkish workers as a result of membership is the main concern among the German citizens. If high numbers of Turkish workers immigrate to Germany again, the job market, the national economy and the social welfare system will be overburdened. The Turkish workers will replace the German workers; they will share the social security benefits, and therefore pose a threat to the "in-group resources"²⁰⁸. The fear of immigration and the perceived threat on the individual socioeconomic

²⁰⁵ Gabel, Matthew. "Gabel, Matthew. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." p. 4.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." p. 254.

situation and the national economy are the main determinants which shape the public opposition. Particularly, the German citizens with lower levels of education, income and occupational skills are more likely to oppose to Turkey's EU membership. The results of Eurobarometer 66 are very much in line with this logic of thought. The survey reveals that the fear of immigration is a main concern among the respondents. The respondents were asked to express their opinion on the following statement:

- Turkey's joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed countries in the EU. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.6)

78% of the respondents agreed that the inclusion of Turkey would trigger immigration into developed countries. Only 19% disagreed with the statement. The percentage of the respondents who agreed with this statement was 71% in the Eurobarometer 63 which was conducted only two years earlier than the Eurobarometer 66.²⁰⁹ Due to the decreasing population growth rate, the immigration of the Turkish labor force into developed EU member states is considered to be a positive impact of the Turkish accession in the long run.²¹⁰ The respondents were asked to assess the impact of Turkey's inclusion to rejuvenate the ageing population in the EU member states, most of the respondents did not agree on this statement. The statement was as follows:

- Turkey's accession would favor the rejuvenation of an ageing European population. (Eurobarometer 66, Q34.5)

58% of the German respondents disagreed with this statement, while only 32% supported this claim. Based on the data, it can be argued that the negative impacts of the

²⁰⁹ European Commission. Eurobarometer 63. September 2005. p. 162.

²¹⁰ Baç-Müftüler, Meltem. "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EU's Internal Dynamics." *International Studies Perspectives*. 9 (2008): 210.

Turkish membership, namely immigration and its perceived threats on the job and income security of the German citizens are more influential in shaping the public attitude on the Turkish issue in the short term than the long-term positive impacts for the German labor market.

The economic impacts of Turkish membership are not limited with the immigration of Turkish workers into developed EU member states. The economic level in Turkey is also considered as a threat on the member state economies. It is argued that because of its small economy, the impact of Turkish membership on the EU economy will be “minimal”.²¹¹ On the other hand, Turkey will benefit from the EU economy through the structural funds. In this sense, Turkey’s membership is perceived to be a burden on the EU budget.²¹² The material costs of Turkey’s inclusion also shape the public attitude towards Turkey. It is mainly the net contributors to the EU budget, who pay for the costs of enlargement.²¹³ Hooghe and Marks argue that the public of the net contributor member states can be expected to oppose to the European integration.²¹⁴ Considering that Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, the German public is likely to oppose to the Turkish membership because of the financial burden it would impose on the German economy. The data provided by Eurobarometer 66 supports this claim. The majority of the respondents argued that Turkey has to improve its economic level significantly to be granted the EU membership. The Eurobarometer statement was as:

²¹¹ Ahtisaari, Martti et al. “Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?” Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey. 2004. p. 37. URL http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/report_2004.html

²¹² Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EU’s Internal Dynamics.” p. 211.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration.” *European Union Politics*. 6.4 (2005): 421.

- To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.8)

83% of the German respondents agree with this statement, whereas only 8% of the respondents disagree. In addition to the lessening of the financial burden of Turkish inclusion on the EU budget, the improvement in the Turkish economy would lead to a decrease in the immigration of Turkish labor to the more developed EU member states. In this regard, the concerns stemming from Turkey's economic level are both related to "personal economic prospects" and "national economic prospects"²¹⁵.

The economic situation and the unemployment rates in Germany is another determinant shaping the public attitude towards Turkey. The German public is already concerned about the current economic situation in their country and the increasing unemployment levels. The future prospects of the economic situation and unemployment is also expected to deteriorate. Therefore, they are likely to oppose to the Turkey's inclusion, which is supposed to lay additional burden on the national economy and the labor market. According to Hooghe and Marks, "citizens who feel confident about the economic future – personally and for their country – are likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while those who are fearful will lean towards Euroscepticism"²¹⁶. From this respect, it can be suggested that the current economic concerns and the future economic prospects affect the preference formation of the German public on the Turkish issue. The survey results show that the economic situation in the country and the unemployment are the main concerns of the German public. The Eurobarometer question is as follows:

²¹⁵ Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration." p. 422.

²¹⁶ Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?" *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 37.3 (2004): 414.

- What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment? (Eurobarometer 66, QA23)

The majority of the respondents in Germany with 70% regarded unemployment as the most important issue facing their country. 93% of the respondents judged the current employment situation in Germany as bad. The pessimism about the employment situation in the country is well above the EU average and the other member states. In addition, most of the respondents foresaw no considerable developments regarding the employment situation in Germany in the future. When the respondents were asked:

- What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will they be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the employment situation in (our country)? (Eurobarometer 66, QA4)

The results revealed that the respondents were as pessimistic about the employment situation in Germany as they are about the current situation. 46% of the respondents stated that the employment situation in Germany would deteriorate in the next twelve months. The other issue which concerns the German public after the employment situation is the national economic situation. According to the 29% of the respondents, the second important issue facing their country is the economic situation. 55% respondents deemed the current economic situation in Germany as bad, and 46% of them expected a further deterioration in the next twelve years. The education level and the individual employment situation of the respondents influenced their judgment. Both in questions concerning the employment and the economic situation, the answers differed according to the level of education and the occupational status of respondents. People with higher level of education and with a good occupational status judged the employment and economic level in their country relatively good, whereas people with a lower education level and people who were unemployed considered that the employment and economic situations in Germany was rather bad.²¹⁷ Based on the

²¹⁷ Eurobarometer 66. p. 15-16.

survey data, it is clear that the German public does not “feel confident about the economic future”²¹⁸ and therefore the German citizens are likely to oppose the European integration and the inclusion of Turkey to the EU. The respondents with lower level of education and occupational skills are to oppose to Turkey’s membership more rigidly than the respondents with higher levels of education and occupational skills.

To sum, the majority of the German public is reluctant about the inclusion of Turkey to the EU, since they perceive it as a threat to their economic well-being both at the individual and the country level. The German citizens fear that the inclusion of Turkey will lead to further unemployment and lower-wages. The current employment and economic situation in the country is perceived as bad by the majority of the public, and they don’t expect an improvement in the current situation. Most of the respondents were pessimistic that the current situation would even deteriorate in the future. Turkey’s membership would further complicate the current problems, because granting the right of free movement to Turkish workers will result in high-levels of immigration to Germany. Furthermore, the Turkish membership will be a burden on the German economy, because the costs of its inclusion in terms of structural funds will be paid by the net contributor member states, the largest being Germany. These economic concerns shape the attitude of German public towards Turkey to a great extent, and they are in line with the economic rationality aspect of the equation.

4.2. Identity-Based Concerns

The identity-based concerns play a prominent role in the formation of public attitude towards enlargement. The perceived threat to culture and national identity sometimes outweighs the perceived threat to economic well-being of citizens. McLaren

²¹⁸ Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” p. 414.

suggests that the “fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures”²¹⁹ determine the citizens’ attitude towards the European integration. She further argues that especially in the Turkish case, the perceived “threat to culture and way of life” in the member states is substantial.²²⁰ Turkey is perceived to be “too different” than the EU member states in terms of its “culture, social norms and attitudes”²²¹, alongside with religious and historical differences. As abovementioned, the collective European identity is constructed through a “common historical heritage, a shared religious experience, democracy”²²² and human rights. Turkey does not fit into this definition, since it does not share the historical heritage and the Christian experiences, therefore the social norms and values of other member states. In fact, Turkey has been defined as “the other” against which the European identity is formed both during the Ottoman and the Republican Era.²²³ The perception of the Turk as the other in the European identity has not changed drastically, ‘the Turk’ is still perceived as the other in the European identity definition, and this fact influences the preferences of the member states towards Turkey’s accession.²²⁴ The religious differences are especially significant in constructing the European ‘self’ and the Turkish ‘other’. Even if it is not “the established religion in contemporary Europe” as it was in the past, Christianity is still one of the core elements of the European identity.²²⁵ The Christian element in the

²¹⁹ McLaren, Lauren. “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat.” p. 353.

²²⁰ McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” p. 258.

²²¹ Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe.” *Turkish Studies*. 1.1 (2000): 22.

²²² Risse, Thomas, et al. “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union.”p. 154.

²²³ Neumann, I. , and Welsh, J. “The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society.” p. 330.

²²⁴ Stivachtis, Yannis. “Europe and the ‘Turk’: An English School Approach to the Study of EU-Turkey Relations.” *Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities and Constraints*. Ed. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Yannis Stivachtis. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. p. 35.

²²⁵ Ibid.

collective European identity, acts as another impediment for Turkey, a country with a predominantly Muslim population.

The immigrant Turkish population in Europe helps to reinforce the differences in the European and Turkish identity. The Turkish immigrants are not well integrated into the host countries' societies due to inefficient and insufficient integration policies adopted by the governments or in some cases because of the reluctance of the immigrant groups to integrate. The Turkish immigrants are still considered as 'guest workers' or 'foreigners', even though they have been permanent residents of the host countries for almost 40 years. The perceived cultural and religious differences between these groups and the societies of the host countries are reflected on the public attitude towards the Turkish membership. Considering that the majority of the Turkish immigrants residing in Europe concentrate in Germany, it is highly likely that the perceived cultural threat plays an important role in determining the German public attitude on the Turkish issue. The Turks are still referred to as the *Ausländer* or *Gastarbeiter* in Germany. The integration policies pursued so far are inefficient to expedite the full integration of the Turkish community to the German society. Even though, certain steps have been taken to expedite integration such as the revision of the laws pertaining to the status of immigrants and citizenship, these attempts are usually not steady and are very much dependent upon party politics. The public seems divided on the issue. While some German citizens support the integration of the Turkish immigrants to the society, the number of the people who oppose both the presence of the Turkish community in Germany and the Turkish membership to the EU increase. The cultural and religious differences between the German/European identity and the Turkish identity seem irreconcilable to allow for a Turkish accession. The perceived cultural threats influence the German public attitude towards Turkey's EU bid along with the utility-driven concerns. Turkey is not considered to be a part of the collective European identity because it does not share the common characteristics that construct this identity. The Eurobarometer 66 supports this claim. The majority of the German respondents stated that Turkey was culturally too different than the EU member states, and due to these cultural differences, the inclusion of Turkey to the EU should not be allowed. The survey question was as follows:

- The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow it to join the EU. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.4)

74% of the respondents agreed with this statement, and only 24% disagreed. The rate of the respondents that agreed with this statement was 66% in Eurobarometer 63, which was conducted in 2005. The results to this question in other member states which oppose Turkish membership due to perceived cultural threat are more or less similar to those of Germany. In France for example, the respondents who agreed with this statement rated 65%, and in Austria 84%. The differences in the religious experiences and the treatment to women seem to be the main factors that determine the hostility among the public towards the Turkish culture. McLaren argues that “its religious roots” and “the assumptions about the treatment to women” are the main determinants that differentiate Turkey from the EU members.²²⁶ Kramer claims that Turkey is “too Muslim to fit into the EU scheme.”²²⁷ Considering the fact that Christianity is one of the key stones in constructing the collective European identity, the inclusion of a country with a large Muslim population is perceived as a challenge to the core of this identity. Different religions engender different traditions and cultures, and in this line of thought the integration of a predominantly Muslim population into the EU is considered to pose a threat on the European culture and way of life. Eurobarometer 63 included a question on the religious roots of Turkey and the possible impacts of this on the EU member states. The statement was:

²²⁶ McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” p. 267.

²²⁷ Kramer, Heinz. “Turkey and the EU: the EU’s Perspective.” *Insight Turkey*. 8.4 (2006): 29.

- Turkey's accession to the European Union would favor the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values.²²⁸(Eurobarometer 63, QB3.4)

60% of the German respondents disagreed with this statement. In contrary to state-level approaches to Turkish membership, which praise the role of Turkey in mediating between the Islamic and the Western world, the religious differences cause skepticism at the public level.

As above mentioned, the public opposition to Turkey's accession is correlated with the prevalent anti-immigrant sentiments in Germany. The cultural and religious differences between the Turkish and German communities have resulted in hostility towards the immigrants along with other reasons. The integration policies adopted so far have been inefficient. It is still an unresolved question whether the full-integration of the Turkish immigrants to the German society is desired. Even though, political parties like SPD and the Greens and the public to some extent support the integration. The opposition to integration cannot be underestimated, because some integration attempts have been precluded by the opposing groups. The rejection of the dual citizenship is a good example of this approach. The integration of immigrants is even considered as a threat to the German society. In a manifest which was originally published in 1982 it was stated that:

The integration of large masses of non-German foreigners is not possible without threatening the German people, language, culture and religion. Every people, including the Germans, have a natural right to preserve its identity and character in its residential areas.²²⁹

²²⁸ This question was omitted in the Eurobarometer 66.

²²⁹ Göktürk, Deniz et al. eds. *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration 1955-2005*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. p. 112.

Such anti-immigrant feelings have been prevalent among the German society since the mid-1970s. The anti-immigrant sentiments increased even more with the German Reunification which brought a “wave of ethnocentrism and xenophobic aggression”.²³⁰ In addition, the 9/11 attacks reinforced the skepticism about the Islamic roots of the Turkish community. These anti-immigrant feelings influence the public preference formation towards Turkey, and cause an increasing opposition to Turkish membership.

The other issue that drives public opposition to Turkish membership is the human rights record of Turkey. Turkey is required to improve its human rights record significantly to become a member of the EU. In Eurobarometer 66, when asked about their most important values, most of the respondents listed peace and the human rights.²³¹ The respect for human rights has been incorporated into the definition of the European identity. Even though, it has implemented some legal measures such as the abolition of the death penalty to improve its human rights record and to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, according to the annual progress reports of the European Commission, Turkey still has a long way to go. The majority of the German respondents expressed that in order to become an EU member; Turkey has to improve its human rights record substantially. The survey question was:

- To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.7)

93% of the respondents agreed with this statement, while only 4% disagreed. According to the survey results, the concerns about the human rights in Turkey override the concerns about the economic and cultural concerns of the German respondents.

²³⁰ Watts, Meredith W. *Xenophobia in United Germany: Generations, Modernization and Ideology*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. p. 63.

²³¹ Eurobarometer 66. p. 28.




Figure 4.1 Eurobarometer 66 results

As abovementioned, another founding stone of the European identity is assumed to be the common historical heritage among the European countries. Turkey does not share the historical heritage as the EU member states, and this seems to be another motive for the opposition to Turkey's membership at the public level. 60% of the German respondents disagreed with the statement that "Turkey partly belongs to Europe through its history".²³²

In short, the German public oppose to Turkish membership because they assume that the inclusion of Turkey will pose cultural and religious threats. The differences in its culture, religious roots and historical heritage distinguish Turkey from the EU member states. With its divergent culture and Islamic roots, Turkey is still defined as the other in the European collective identity. The existing Turkish community in

Germany also reinforced the perceived differences between the Turkish and the European collective identity. The Turkish immigrants have been regarded as too different in terms of culture and religion to be integrated to the German society. Their full integration has been perceived as a threat to the German culture and way of life. The integration problems and the anti-immigrant sentiments which gathered speed in the aftermath of the German Unification are reflected on the attitude of the German public towards Turkey. In addition to the perceived cultural and religious threats, the human rights record of Turkey is another determinant that influences the public opinion. Turkey is required to improve respect for human rights significantly to become an EU member.

Conclusion:

The German public attitude towards Turkey's EU membership is shaped by a combination of utility-driven and identity-based concerns. The utility-based concerns concentrate on the possible impacts of Turkey's inclusion on the socioeconomic situation of individuals and the national economic situation. Turkey's accession is perceived as a threat on the job, income and social security benefits of German workers. Because of the liberalization of the labor and capital markets, which enables the free movement of workers and capital, it is assumed that if Turkey becomes a member, high levels of Turkish workers will immigrate to Germany, threatening the jobs and income of the German workers. Turkey will be a source of unskilled and cheap labor. The immigration of Turkish workers to Germany will increase the level of unemployment for German workers and decrease the wages. Particularly, the workers with lower levels of income, education and occupational skills worry about the Turkish membership, because they will be affected by the immigration of Turkish workers more than the people with higher education, occupational skills and income. In addition to these individual concerns, Turkey is also perceived as a threat on the national economy. The costs of Turkey's inclusion will be high considering its economic level. The costs of enlargement are mainly paid by the net contributors to the EU budget. Considering that

²³² Eurobarometer 66. p. 28.

Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, Turkey's inclusion is regarded as a burden on the German national economy, as well. The concerns about the current employment and economic situations in Germany and the pessimism about the future also influence the German public opinion on the Turkish issue. As for the identity-based concerns, cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are considered too important to allow for Turkey's accession. Due to its divergent culture, social norms and values, religious and historical roots, and the human rights record, Turkey is not perceived a part of Europe. The role of the Turkish immigrants in Germany and the prevalent anti-immigrant sentiments play a significant role in shaping the public attitude both in terms of utility-driven and identity-based concerns.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Societal groups impact state-level preference formation in EU-related issues. The pressure of the domestic groups on the national governments has especially been manifest in regards to Turkey's long-standing EU bid. This thesis aimed to investigate the influence of the societal groups on the national preference formation on the Turkish issue in Germany. Germany is one of the most influential member states of the EU; therefore the support of Germany for Turkish membership is crucial for Turkey. Besides, considering the change in Germany's supportive attitude towards Turkey's accession in the late 1980s, which was mainly facilitated by the increasing opposition among the domestic groups, Germany forms a good case study to show the impact of the societal groups on the state-level preference formation. Turkey's attempts to become a part of the European system had been constantly supported by Germany until the late 1980s. However, this supportive attitude of Germany was replaced by opposition to Turkey's EU membership. The domestic groups were influential in the shift in Germany's attitude among other factors, such as the paradigm shift engendered by the end of the Cold War.

Two domestic groups have been identified that impact the national preference formation in Germany, namely the political parties and the public. Both groups influence the decision-making on the Turkish issue to some extent. However, the political parties have a larger and more direct impact on national preference formation than the public. Particularly when these parties are in the government, their impact on the Turkish accession becomes more manifest. The ups and downs in German governments' attitude towards Turkey's membership illustrate this point further. The public opinion, on the other hand, is likely to affect the government's decision-making

through means of political representation, mainly via elections. The decisions related to European integration are still to a great extent driven by the elites, and the input of the public on these issues is rather limited. The political party leaders and influential opinion makers shape the public opinion on EU related issues to a certain degree.²³³ The public opinion only gains more importance if the majority of the public supports a certain policy or pursues the same interest, then the influence of the public on the national preference formation is greater. In this sense, the role of the public in the formation of Germany's stance on the Turkish issue cannot be totally underestimated. Considering the predominant opposition to Turkish membership, rated as 78% in the Eurobarometer 66, the German public opinion matters in defining Germany's attitude towards Turkey's accession.

In addition to their relative impact on the opinion formation on the Turkish membership, the political parties and the public differ from one another in terms of the determinants which shape their preferences. The economic and security benefits of Turkey's inclusion play a more significant role in shaping the attitude of the political parties. Turkey's inclusion is perceived as a benefit in terms of its potential contribution to European security and economy. In addition, Turkey is regarded highly important for the energy security of Europe. On the other hand, these factors are not influential in public opinion formation. Public opinion formation is mainly determined by the perceived economic and cultural threat of Turkey's accession.

The impact of the security and economic benefits of Turkey's membership do not affect the stance of the major political parties in the same degree. The major political parties, specified as SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP, are divided in terms of the determinants that shape preference formation on the issue. The SPD and the Greens support Turkish membership ardently. The indispensable role of Turkey in the European system with its military capacities, NATO membership, geostrategic location,

²³³ Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren. "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 32.4 (1994): 462.

mediator role are the primary determinants in the preference formation of SPD and the Greens, as has been consistently reiterated by the party leaders and influential opinion makers. CDU/CSU also emphasize Turkey's important role in European security and economy, however, these concerns are not prioritized in shaping the stance of CDU/CSU towards Turkey. The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states is the central factor which determines the CDU/CSU position in this issue. According to this position, Turkey is to be anchored to the security and economic system of the EU through a privileged partnership without being included to the decision-making mechanisms of the EU. In contrary to CDU/CSU, the ideational concerns do not play an eminent role in the preference formation of the SPD and the Greens. The stance of the FDP is not yet clear-cut. However, the economic benefits of Turkey's inclusion seem to influence the preference formation among the liberals considering the rhetoric of their party leader.

In line with CDU/CSU, the public opinion is considerably shaped by ideational concerns. Turkey's inclusion is perceived as a serious cultural threat to the established European identity and culture. The cultural argument against Turkey accession is mainly religion based. The fact that Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population is regarded incompatible with the European culture and identity. Christianity is still an important element in the formation of the European identity. In this regard, the Muslim roots of the Turkish identity do not comply with the Christian roots of the European identity. The majority of the German public considers Turkey to be culturally too different to be allowed into the EU. The other determinant that shapes public attitude on this issue is the economic concerns over Turkey's accession. In contrary to the state elites, who claim that Turkey's inclusion would be beneficial for the EU in terms of economy, the public regard Turkish membership as a threat to their economic well-being. The fear of immigration is the bottom-line that triggers such concerns. The public associates Turkey's accession with a flux of Turkish workers into Germany. The economic concerns mostly focus on the loss of jobs, income and social security benefits. The economic concerns are not solely personal; the inclusion of Turkey is also regarded as a burden to the national economy. The fear of immigration is the key factor that

stimulates both ideational and economic concerns of the public. Another difference between the public and the political parties in the Turkish issue is that the public is more skeptical about Turkey's accession than the political parties. The political parties regard Turkey's inclusion beneficial to a certain degree. Even CDU/CSU, the most skeptical parties, accept that Turkey is an indispensable partner of the EU in security matters. However, the majority of the public opposes the Turkish membership in Germany, and the importance of Turkey for European security and economy do not temper this opposition.

Germany's support is vital for Turkey's EU bid, since having one of the largest member states' backing will help Turkey considerably to acquire membership. Germany is the largest funding state of the EU, and has relative influence over other member states through its economic might. Currently, the attitude of Germany towards Turkish membership is marked by the increasing opposition at home. Major political parties such as CDU/CSU and the majority of the public oppose Turkish membership. However, it can be assumed that opposition will not determine the German attitude towards Turkey in the long run. All of the major political parties accept that Turkey is an asset for European security and economy. In the post-9/11 security paradigm, Turkey's role will become increasingly important. Particularly, if the EU desires to become a global actor, Turkey's military capacities and mediator role will be invoked even more. These factors temper the opposition of the major parties like CDU/CSU. The rigid opposition of CDU has already been moderated to a certain degree. The rhetoric adopted by Merkel and influential opinion leaders emphasizes the importance of Turkey for the EU security, and it has been stated by Merkel that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* will prevail in Turkey's EU bid. In addition, the opposition of CDU/CSU might be tempered by their coalition partner, FDP. FDP party leader made it clear that FDP is not to follow the line of CDU/CSU on the Turkish issue. The opposition among the public is more likely to prevail, since neither of the factors that trigger such opposition is about to change. It cannot be estimated to what extent the public opposition will shape the national preference formation on the Turkish issue. The public might influence the national preference formation through elections, but whether Turkey's accession is a strong variable that affects vote choice of the domestic voters is another question.

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