

**AN ANALYSIS OF LEADER-MEDIA CONFLICTS
THROUGH CENTER-PERIPHERY PARADIGM:**

**COMPARING MEDIA REACTIONS AFTER DAVOS
UPHEAVAL OF R.T.ERDOGAN AND DURBAN-II SPEECH
OF M. AHMADINEJAD**

BY

CIHAN KILIC

**Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social
Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

Sabancı University

July, 2010

ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF LEADER-MEDIA CONFLICTS THROUGH CENTER- PERIPHERY PARADIGM:

COMPARING MEDIA REACTIONS AFTER DAVOS UPHEAVAL OF R.T.ERDOGAN AND DURBAN-II SPEECH OF M. AHMADINEJAD

Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2010

Supervisor: Dr. Ayse Betül Çelik

Key Words: leader-media conflict, center-periphery

On January 29, 2009, at the Davos International Meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out after the moderator didn't allow him to speak during a debate with the Israeli president Simon Peres. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at the United Nations Durban Review Conference on Racism on April 20, 2009. Delegates from twenty-three countries walked out of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN Durban Review Conference held in Geneva in response to his remarks.

The purpose of this study is to endeavor a question a possible link between leader-media conflicts and center-periphery dynamics. The main aim of such exploration is to provide a better understanding to current leader-media conflicts thus pursue a better resolution. The results of the research suggest that there is a certain parallelism between leader-media and center-periphery conflicts. Historical traumas and value differences affect the course of conflict between a leader and the media.

ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF LEADER-MEDIA CONFLICTS THROUGH CENTER- PERIPHERY PARADIGM: COMPARING MEDIA REACTIONS AFTER DAVOS UPHEAVAL OF R.T.ERDOGAN AND DURBAN-II SPEECH OF M. AHMADINEJAD

Uyumsuzluk Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi 2010

Supervisor: Dr. Ayse Betül Çelik

Key Words: medya, uyumsuzluk, merkez-çevre

29 Ocak 2009 tarihinde Türkiye Cumhuriyet başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan İsrail cumhurbaşkanı Simon Peres ile münazarası sırasında moderatör konuşmasına izin vermeyince Uluslararası Davos Konferansı'nı terk etmişti. 20 Nisan 2009 tarihinde ise İran cumhurbaşkanı Mahmud Ahmedinejad Birleşmiş Milletler Irkçılığa Karşı Durban Gözden Geçirme Konferansında yaptığı konuşma sırasında 23 ülkenin delegeleri konferansı terk etti.

Bu çalışmanın amacı lider-medya çatışmaları ve merkez-çevre ilişkileri arasında bir bağlantı olup olmadığının değerlendirilmesidir. Böyle bir sorgulamanın amacı günümüz lider-medya çatışmalarına daha derin bir anlayış sağlayıp daha sağlıklı bir çözümleme sunulmasını olası kılmaktır.

Çalışmanın sonuçları göstermektedir ki lider-medya çatışmalarının sürecinde merkez-çevre söylemi ile paralellikler oluşmaktadır. Tarihi travmalar ve değer farklılıkları lider-medya arası çatışmanın sürecini etkilemektedir.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	5
2.1 Leader and Media Conflicts.....	5
2.1.1 Leadership types.....	7
2.1.1.1 Political Leadership and Media.....	11
2.2 Media, Public Opinion and Reality.....	13
2.3 A Brief Look at Turkish and Iranian Media	18
2.4 Center-Periphery Conflicts.....	33
2.4.1 Center and Periphery.....	33
2.4.2 Centralized Periphery and Marginalized Center.....	34
2.4.3 Center-Periphery Conflicts in Turkey and Iran.....	35
2.5. Conclusion: The Parallels between Leader-Media and Center-Periphery Conflicts.....	40
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY.....	44
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS.....	48
4.1 Turkish Case.....	48
4.1.1 Control.....	48
4.1.1.1 Legitimacy.....	50
4.1.1.2 Status Quo.....	53
4.1.1.3 Trauma.....	55
4.1.2 Style.....	58

4.1.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality.....	58
4.1.2.2 Individualistic vs. Collectivist Culture.....	60
4.1.3 Right.....	64
4.1.3.1 Position.....	64
4.2 Iranian Case.....	66
4.2.1 Control.....	67
4.2.1.1 Legitimacy.....	68
4.2.1.2 Trauma.....	70
4.2.2 Style.....	72
4.2.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality.....	73
4.2.3 Right.....	75
4.2.3.1 Nation vs. Religion.....	76
4.3 Cross Relational Analysis.....	78
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	81
APPENDIX	85
REFERENCES.....	91

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this research is to analyze the leader media-conflicts through a center-periphery perspective. Media analysis can provide deeper understanding of social relations as it contributes to social construction of reality. This research argues that leader-media and center-periphery conflicts have certain parallelism and this can be discovered by looking through conflict resolution lenses.

The importance of this study is to link the conflict resolution field with political science and political communication disciplines. Harmonizing a political science theory (centre-periphery) with conflict resolution theories (leader-media conflicts) allows us to recognize a possible link between political science and conflict resolution.

Furthermore, this research brings a new contribution to conflict resolution field by aiming to analyze intergroup conflict through centre-periphery dynamics. The notion of centre-periphery had only been used in conflict resolution in examining post-Soviet intergroup conflicts in ex-Soviet countries. These studies focus on the redistribution of power between the center and the periphery in these countries. The establishment of new political system is analyzed through decentralization and center-periphery dynamics experienced in the USSR¹. For example, While Linz and Stepan examine the role of center-periphery

¹ Aleksandr Libman, "Cycles of Decentralization in the Post-Soviet Space", **Russian Politics and Law**, Volume 48, Number 1, January-February 2010, pp.10-14.

dynamics in democratic transition² Michnik, Adam and et al. question the role of center-periphery relations within the USSR while establishing a transitional justice in these developing political systems³. However, there has not been any attempt to examine conflicts that had been instigated by the course of modernization. Consequently, this research will explore the relationship between the field of Conflict Resolution and the studies driven over the notion of Global South. There are critics emphasizing Conflict Resolution studies as a Western-oriented discipline⁴. The belief that considers Conflict Resolution as Western oriented and that also accuses the field for only being defined according to Anglo-Saxon culture can be refuted by maintaining a successful application of Conflict Resolution theories to a non-Western setting.

A case study will be introduced about the leader-media interactions after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 's Davos speech⁵ and the Durban speech of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad⁶. Those two incidents are chosen because of several similarities between them:

² Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe**, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London. 1996, pp.366-370.

³ Adama Michnik, et al. "Czechoslovakia." In J. Neill Kritz, (ed.), **Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes Vol.II: Country Studies**, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1995, pp.542-544.

⁴ Paul E. Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective", **Negotiation Journal**, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 1993, pp.361-369 and Anthony Wanis- St. John, "Thinking Globally and Acting Locally", **Negotiation Journal**, Volume 19, Number 4, October 2003, pp. 389-396.

⁵ At the Davos International Meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stormed out after the moderator didn't allow him to speak more. During the debate whereas he gave 25 minutes to the Israeli Simon Peres and only 12 minutes to the Turkish Prime Minister. Erdogan said: "*Peres, you are raising your voice because you're trying to hide your guilt, I would raise my voice, too and I could if I want, but in terms of respect I am not going to... You know very well how to kill people, I know how you kill babies ... The Torah says: Thou Shall not Kill, but killing is taking place (by Israel).*" When Erdogan attempted to continue his argument the moderator kept cutting his talk and frustrating him, not letting him finish. Erdogan angrily left

First, both of those incidents took place just before elections. Turkey held local elections on 29 March 2009, and Iran's tenth presidential elections took place on 12 June 2009. Pre-election period provides an atmosphere where conflict between leader and media is as manifest as possible. The mass media is essential to conduct fair elections. A free and fair election is not only about casting a vote under proper conditions, but also about having adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself so that voters can make an informed choice. A legitimate election with no freedom of media would be a contradiction in terms. So, even in autocratic political systems, a pre-election setting provides a certain degree of liberalism in media. The prime concern in pre-election atmosphere is the right of voters to full and accurate information. Parties and candidates are entitled to use the media to get their messages across the electorate. The media itself has a right to report freely and to scrutinize the whole election process. This scrutiny is itself an important additional safeguard against interference or corruption in the management of the election. Finally, the electoral management body has a crucial need to

Davos vowing to never return after stating he only got 12 minutes but Peres got 25 minutes to speak. This incident has caused both positive and negative reactions in Turkey.

⁶ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at the United Nations Durban Review Conference on Racism on April 20th, 2009. While Ahmadinejad's speech drew negative reactions worldwide, the speech generated positive coverage in Iran. Members of Iranian parliament issued a supportive joint statement alongside other congratulatory remarks, a Tehran city council member offered support for the speech, and several newspapers wrote favorable editorials, while some commentators from the general public on an Iranian newspaper website wished that Ahmadinejad would pay similar attention to domestic priorities. Delegates from twenty-three countries walked out of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN Durban Review Conference held in Geneva in response to his remarks. In the speech, Ahmadinejad said: *"Following World War Two, [western powers] resorted to making an entire nation homeless on the pretext of Jewish suffering. They sent migrants from Europe, the United States and other parts of the world in order to establish a totally racist government in the occupied Palestine. In compensation for the dire consequences of racism in Europe, they helped bring to power the most cruel and repressive, racist regime in Palestine."*

communicate information to the electorate – and to a variety of other groups, including the political parties and the media itself⁷.

Secondly, the two leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad share similar backgrounds: They both come from a conservative periphery⁸, they both administered municipal, local entities before becoming a national leader and they both are continuously criticized for applying populist approaches.

In the next section, the first part of the literature review examines the notion of leadership and how media and leaders interact. Then, the next part concentrates on how media portrays reality and in what ways it can oppose leaders. Thirdly, the conflictual relationship between center and periphery and how it is interpreted in post-modern conjuncture is illustrated by giving examples from Turkish and Iranian history.

⁷ http://www.edb.utexas.edu/resources/team/Lesson_3.pdf

⁸ Both Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were born and raised in suburbs. Ahmadinejad's family moved from Iranian province to Tehran's suburbs when he was four years old. Similarly, Erdogan's family moved to Istanbul's suburbs when he was thirteen. They were both raised by religious families who had low incomes.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Leader and Media Conflicts

When interpreting conflict-related information people use their cognitive processes. Referring to one's cognitive values in analyzing others' behaviors or values makes it difficult to take the other's perspective into consideration, therefore views of the other also appears to be self-centered. Parties in conflict tend to develop mirror images of the self and the other⁹. They have tendencies to view themselves as the good side who struggles for their self-defense, while the other side is inherently evil. These attitudes eventually lead to further escalation.

In international conflicts, existential fears about national survival and identity incite conflict escalation. It can also lead to extreme violence in the name of self-defense. Leaders may manipulate mass group loyalty by emphasizing people's needs for security and self-transcendence, which highlights a strong attachment to conflict norms. Hence, tendencies for conciliation are labeled as weak and disloyal, or even as treasonous¹⁰. National or social leaders can manipulate common cognitive biases. These leaders have the opportunity to name a person, instance or even a whole country as a target

⁹ William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, "A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), p.325.

¹⁰ David Lake and Donald Rothchild cited in Janice Gross Stein, in **Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict**, Crocker, A. Chester, Hampson, Fen Osler & Aall, Pamela (eds.), United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2001, p.190.

of hostility¹¹. Additionally, they can manipulate enemy images in a way that these images self-fulfill and self-reinforce themselves. Conflict images are very resistant to disconfirmation. Inconsistent information may be explained away in ways that reconfirm the original image¹².

On the other hand, national or social leaders might also have a positive effect on negotiation processes. For example, if leaders learn from failure they can be contributing to de-escalation. If failure challenges the status quo, it stimulates changes for solutions far more easily.

In brief, as it is mentioned previously, leaders may affect the course of conflict in various ways. This study focuses on the conflict between leaders and media. In this research, in order to apprehend how and why leader and media conflict with each other, first, the definition of leadership is given. Then the areas in which these two actors face conflict are highlighted. In the last part, the characteristics of Turkish and Iranian media are enumerated for being able to evaluate the areas of conflicts through these cases.

¹¹ Conflict Research Consortium Staff, Book Summary of The Functions of Social Conflict by Lewis Coser at <http://www.crimo.org/booksummary/10142/>.

¹² Leaders are important figures in effectuating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Self-fulfilling prophecy can be summarized as an initially wrong statement that alters actions and therefore comes true. Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when a party's beliefs about their adversary cause them to act in ways that actually provoke the adversary's expected response. The adversary's provoked response is then taken as a confirmation of the party's original expectation, and a vicious cycle evolves. Vicious cycles can also occur when the other party, who is unaware of our expectations, does nothing to disconfirm them, and so implicitly confirms worst expectations. People tend to break off interaction and communication with those they dislike. When this happens, people become stuck in autistic hostility, that is, their hostility is perpetuated by their refusal to communicate.

2.1.1 Leadership Types

The topics of leadership and media effect are generally studied under the propaganda issue. The main study that elucidates these notions is Gunther and Mughan's *Democracy and the Media*¹³. However, the definition of leadership, media effect and propaganda are subject to various discussions. Leadership comprehends a wide range of roles that have a profound influence on the international system. This notion contains an ambiguity as it can be employed for various types of people in diverse contexts. As a matter of fact the subject of leadership appears to be one of the most observed and least understood phenomena in academia¹⁴. The notion of leadership etymologically highlights conflictual relations: the root of the word is "leith", meaning "to go forth and die"¹⁵. Consequently, a leader would be a person leading a group towards another in order to commit a violent act, thus, a person creating a conflict. Even if the committed act is not violent, a leader, basically, mobilizes a group to dominate another. In brief, leaders come into conflict because they lead in the interest of the part that they represent and eventually they will encounter other leaders defending the interest of their own group. Also, they may be confronted with their own groups because groups, by definition, do not constitute homogenous entities, thus represent diverse interests, some of which can clash with those of the leader. Such attitude compels "leadership" as an appealing subject of conflict studies.

¹³ See Shlomo Shpiro, "Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism", **Politics**: 2002 Vol. 22(2), pp.76-85 and Martin Staniland, "The Rhetoric of Centre- Periphery Relations", **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, Vol.8, No.4 (Dec,1970), pp.617-636.

¹⁴ J.M. Burns, **Leadership**, New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1978, p.2.

¹⁵ John W. Gardner, **On Leadership**, New York, The Free Press, 1993.

There have been various efforts to examine the difficulty of both determining and predicting personality characteristics or traits of leaders and their associated effects on public policy, especially in social psychology literature. The findings of these studies demonstrate that most people illustrate an inconsistency in behavior across varied situations¹⁶. However, the greatest challenge this line of research faces, would be the inherently wide variation in personality types within the human population. As a result, in part, it is difficult to successfully predict behavior based on personality type. This might lead us to concretize the belief that any criticism committed over a leader's personality is actually directed to his roots with the social class that he is from. Good leadership is not based on personality type but more likely to be related to the identification with the social entity.

In the political psychology literature, there is a well-developed body of research on the ways that individual leaders influence international politics. Hermann et al. argue that leadership style is one of the fundamental determinants of a state's foreign policy¹⁷. According to Hermann and others, variance in leaders' personality structure is likely to affect how leaders use their political influence in distinct ways, especially in the realm of foreign policy. This generation of political psychology research typically leader typologies. One common category used to separate leaders is whether they seem to be more

¹⁶ For these studies, see D.Bem and D. Funder, "Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing the Personality of Situations", **Psychological Review**, 85, 1978, pp. 488-501; J. D. Barber, **The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House**, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1992; Jerrold M. Post, **The Psychological Assessment of Individual Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton**, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003.

¹⁷ G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw. **Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals**. *International Studies Review*, 2001, p.3.

ideological or more pragmatic in their approach to challenges. Another way to divide leaders is to compare those who are goal driven with those who seem more responsive or reactive to the events around them¹⁸.

Likewise, Hermann et al. view several factors as critical when cataloging individual leaders: responsiveness to constraints, openness to new information, and solving problems versus developing relationships¹⁹. All these three categories also demonstrate how important media can be in leadership success. Media can reclaim constraints by maneuvering public opinion. Consequently, media contributes to the formation of constraints. Especially, in countries where political engagement is limited, the media can also act as an instrument to vocalize public needs. Moreover, media being the source of information can be crucial for a leader's right move. As Hermann et al. suggest, the quality of a leader can be assessed also by evaluating his openness to new information. As this new information can be mainly sustained from the media, media plays a pivotal role for leader's success. Moreover, media can monitor if the leader solves problems or develops relationships. The media announce the needs, the constraints that the public propounds. Likewise, media monitor if these needs were satisfied by the responsible. In other word media has the role to announce if public's demand were met or not.

Conflict studies broadly examine the notion of leadership by distinguishing between leaders who exacerbate and ameliorate conflicts. Various scholars generate diverse

¹⁸ Paul Humphreys and Dr. Ronan McIvor (eds.), **Interorganizational Relationships and The Implications for Leadership and Organization Development**, Bradford, Emerald Group Publishing, 2006, <http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/search~S9?/aHumphreys/ahumphreys/1,38,58,E/1856~b1210904&FF=ahumphreys+paul&2,3,1,0/indexsort=-> .

¹⁹Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, **International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters**. Foreign Policy 100, 1998, p.127-135.

typologies in order to categorize leaders. As Barbara Kellerman indicates the first thing that appeals while examining the leadership literature is that there exists two major streams of leadership: corporate and administrative²⁰. John W. Gardner develops the concept of "cross-boundary" leaders²¹, who are capable of working effectively at both levels²². Likewise, Peggy Dulany employs the term "bridging" leadership²³, and gathers case studies from throughout the world documenting how leaders have effectively linked disparate, and often hostile, constituencies²⁴. Additionally, William Ury highlights "third side leadership", signifying a type of leadership that would be a "healing force between opposing sides"²⁵. As these studies broadly indicate, research on leadership mainly focuses on evaluating the leader's position while he interacts at various levels. However, in this research the main aim is to focus on the interaction itself: the confrontation between leader and media. The main aim is to gain a deeper understanding about how political leaders and media interact with each other when there is an incompatible goal between them. This assessment will be analyzed through centre-periphery confrontation because it is supposed that characteristics of center-periphery confrontations might provide us a deeper understanding.

²⁰ Barbara Kellerman, **Bad Leadership: What is it? How it happens? Why it matters?**, Cambridge, Harvard Business School Press, 2004, p.233.

²¹ Cross-boundary leadership necessitates an ability to perform at different levels in order to achieve a certain goal. For example, a leader should collaborate across boundaries with counterparts in other departments, organizations, and levels of government.

²² John W. Gardner, **On Leadership, op. cit.**

²³ Bridging leadership is a style of leadership that focuses on creating and sustaining effective working relationships among diverse actors and stakeholders. By "bridging" different perspectives and opinions often found across the breadth of different stakeholders, a common agenda can begin to be developed and shared in order to find solutions to social and economic problems.

²⁴ <http://www.alliancemagazine.org/online/html/aooct07a.html>

²⁵ Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, Bruce Patton, **Getting to Yes**, New York, Penguin, 1991, p.25.

2.1.1.1 Political Leadership and Media

A political leader is one who occupies an established political position or any person, in or out of such a position, whose political activity has more influence upon a group's behavior than the activity of the average member²⁶. Leader and media come across each other in various grounds. According to one paradigm, the mass media are essentially dependent to a society's institutionally dominant power-holders. Dominant power-holders' opinions are regularly sought and their ideologies and interests are reinforced. On the other hand, according to a contradicting thesis, the mass media is itself that possess power. It's the mass media who define and shape reality. Proponents of the first paradigm support that it is possible to control and manage information by direct and indirect involvement of media²⁷. Adversely, partisans of the second thesis defend that media are "dominant institutions of contemporary society to which other institutions must conform"²⁸. Both of these theses underline a conflictual relation between leader and media: In both cases, attempts to control the flow of information can be observed.

Politicians need to be connected with the communication channels that are controlled by the mass media, consequently, politicians become obliged to adapt their messages to the formats and genres demanded by the media²⁹. Likewise, journalists cannot perform their

²⁶ Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman (eds), **Political leadership for the new century** (electronic resource). Imprint Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2002.p.9

²⁷ Steve Chibnall, **Law and Order News**, Routledge, 2003, p.13.

²⁸ Lawrence Schneider, "Book Review: Media Logic", **Journalism Quarterly**; Autumn 80, Vol. 57 Issue 3, p.512

²⁹ Nelson W. Polsby, **Community Power and Political Theory**, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980

duty of political examination without access to politicians for information³⁰. Consequently, each side of the interaction offer each other access to a resource it values. However, there are views that neglect leaders' dependency on media because they defend that media cannot be as influential as argued by others. According to this view, people are not blank sheets; they bring their identities to their reading of a newspaper. For example, Chomsky rejects the view that media enables the public to control the political process by providing a pluralism of ideas, information and opinion. Chomsky indicates that the media monitors the limits of debate in ways that protect the state interests in society³¹.

In brief, political leaders and media are interdependent to each other. Such interdependence might be considered a motivation to maintain a peaceful coexistence. However, literature illustrates various conflicts between political leaders and the media. Root causes of these conflicts might be summarized as the continuous will of a political leader to control both economic factors and political structures in order to remain in power. The ultimate goal of a political leader is to remain in power³². In addition to root causes, direct causes such as a sudden change in policy or an economic downturn might incite conflicts between political leaders and media. To summarize, political leaders and media clash with each other because of the incompatible goal of maintaining the power. However, the political leader, as the primary actor in this conflict, exposes offensive attitudes and behaviors. These attitudes and behaviors are natural and inherent to the notion of being a political leader. A

³⁰ **Ibid.**

³¹ Note that there are some critics of the Chomsky's position : Does Chomsky really demonstrate cohesive elite action, rather than assert it? Does he underestimate the autonomy of journalists, and their ability to resist pressures from owners such as Murdoch. (for example Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil succeeded to resist Rupert Murdoch).

³² Gabriel Almond, "The Study of Political Culture", in Lane Crothers and Charles Lockhart (eds), **Culture and Politics**, St. Martin's Press, NY, 2000. P. 2-4.

political leader sees the media as a tool that can be utilized to secure or gain political influence³³. “Reputation becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility.”³⁴ In the case of democracy, it is primarily the public that can grant credibility and legitimacy to a political actor. For political leaders, the media is an essential arena to win the hearts and minds of a target audience. A political leader enters into conflict with the media over the control of announcing who is good, who is bad. Likewise a political leader conflicts with the media over defining what is good and what is bad.

2.2 Media, Public Opinion and Reality

The mass media plays a crucial role for contemporary politics. In the transition to liberal democratic politics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the media was one of the fields of confrontation. Democratic politics places emphasis on the mass media as a site for democratic demand and the formation of “public opinion”³⁵. The media is seen as a tool which empowers citizens, and as a force that can obligate government to change policies³⁶. The media is not just neutral observers but is a political actor itself. Mass media can influence public opinions to how to view the world. Newspapers, radio, and television are

³³Gadi Wolfsfeld, **Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1997, pp. 56-58.

³⁴ Joseph Nye qtd. in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela R. Aall (eds.), **Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World**, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 395.

³⁵ William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes, Theodore Sasson, “Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality”, **Annual Review of Sociology**, Vol. 18 (1992), pp. 373-393

³⁶ **Ibid.**

usually the main links with the outer world. A reporter might be the only source of information about the development of a conflict³⁷. How the reporter frames the conflict can create a bias so that the audience favor one party or one solution, over another. As a matter of fact, the media is crucial in presenting and explaining conflicts, as well as preventing them from escalating. Consequently, the field of conflict resolution is also interested in how to work with the media effectively³⁸.

The media can publicize the principles of human rights and other moral norms, and can act to enforce those norms by publicizing violations³⁹. It can also focus public censure on hate groups⁴⁰. It can publicize and support peace-keeping operations⁴¹. The media can act as a de facto messenger for parties who lack any other means of communication⁴². The media can educate the parties about each other's interests, needs, and core values, and help to confirm the parties' claims of transparency⁴³. Likewise, the media can help parties to denounce dehumanization of the other⁴⁴. The media can help educate the parties and public about existing conflict resolution resources, and about other successful cases of

³⁷ Johan Galtung, "High Road, Low Road,"

http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/p07_highroad_lowroad.html.

³⁸ Loretta Hieber, "Media as Intervention",

http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/p16_intervention.html.

³⁹ Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (eds.), **Democracy and the Media**. Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 404.

⁴⁰ **Ibid.** p.205.

⁴¹ Gadi Wolfsfeld. **Media and the Path to Peace**, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.225-228.

⁴² **Ibid.**

⁴³ Mehdi Semati, **Media, Culture and Society in Iran**, New York, Routledge, 2007, p.5

⁴⁴ Loretta Hieber, **op. cit.**

conflict management⁴⁵. The media may itself reframe the issues in ways which make the conflict more tractable. They may aid the parties in reframing issues, and in formulating possible solutions. The media may also help maintain a balance of power amongst political parties. Besides, mass media should essentially facilitate pluralist debate and the free formation of public opinion in what Jürgen Habermas calls the “public sphere⁴⁶”.

Stuart Hall has stressed the role of the media in reproducing ideology. He emphasizes that Thatcherism in Britain acquired hegemony in the eighties mainly by the dominance and control of the agenda by the tabloid press⁴⁷.

The media can also work to deflate rumors and propaganda. Propaganda appears to be the area where media and leadership research intersect. Propaganda is designed to manipulate others' beliefs and induce action in the interest of the propagator by inculcating messages into the listeners' minds. It involves the use of images, slogans and symbols to play on decisions and emotions. The ultimate goal of propaganda is to persuade the recipient of the message to come to voluntarily accept the propagandist's position as if it was one's own. The term propaganda was first used in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV issued the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide to counter the growing Protestant threat in order "to reconquer by spiritual arms" those areas "lost to the Church in the debacle of the sixteenth

⁴⁵ Indigenous Conflict Management Mechanisms,

http://www.caii.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/Dashboard_CAIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox4.htm

⁴⁶ Jürgen Habermas, **The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society**, , The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1991, p. 305.

⁴⁷ Stuart Hall, “ Culture and Power”

http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2190&editorial_id=10337

century.⁴⁸" Henceforth, propaganda has become a common element of politics and war. As new communications technologies have evolved, propagandists have also developed new methods to reach increasingly large audiences in order to shape their views. Propaganda generally aims to construct a noble leader image to which individuals in the domestic population can feel connected. At the same time, propaganda often attempts to rally the domestic public to action creating fear, confusion, and hatred by portraying the antagonist as an abominable figure⁴⁹. In brief, propaganda is usually employed to dehumanize the other⁵⁰. Stereotyping and scapegoating are common tactics in this regard. In its modern usage, propaganda also tends to be characterized by some degree of institutionalization, mass distribution, and repetition of the message.

Furthermore, media also possesses an agenda-setting function. The agenda-setting process can be considered as an inevitable effect of newsgathering by large organizations which constitute a large part of the mass media. McCombs and Shaw in their study, which is conducted in the United States during the 1968 presidential elections, explore the agenda setting function of the media⁵¹. A sample of floating voters was asked to plot the key issues of the election. Simultaneously, news from the mass media which focused on the election, were collected and their content was analyzed. The results showed a solid correlation between the two accounts of most important issues presented by news media at that time.

⁴⁸Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, **Propaganda and Persuasion**, California, Sage Publications, 1999, p. 72-73.

⁴⁹J.E. Combs, and D. Nimmo, **The New Propaganda: The Dictatorship of Palaver in Contemporary Politics**, New York Longman, 1993

⁵⁰ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, **op. cit.**

⁵¹M. McCombs, and D.L. Shaw, "The Agenda-setting Function of the Mass Media", **Public Opinion Quarterly**, 73, 1972, pp.176-187.

“The evidence in this study that voters tend to share the media’s composite definition of what is important strongly suggests an agenda-setting function of the mass media”⁵².

In brief, mass media plays a crucial role in forming and reflecting public opinion. As the media connects the world to individuals and reproduces the self-image of society, it has a strong social and cultural impact upon society. This is predicated upon its ability to reach a wide audience with a strong and influential message. Marshall McLuhan uses the phrase “the medium is the message” as a means of explaining how the distribution of a message can often be more important than content of the message itself⁵³. The way and the time of presentation of the message might change the perception of the viewer or the reader. For example, how the media chooses to frame issues can result as the media acting as a catalyst either to escalation or de-escalation. It is through the persuasiveness of media such as television, radio and print media that messages reach their target audiences. In brief, media has been largely responsible for structuring people’s daily lives and routines⁵⁴.

All of these aspects of media prove to us that media have the capability to portray, manipulate and control reality. Media can inculcate what is right or socially reconstruct core values. Accordingly, contradicting values of center and periphery can also be observed through media. For example, through newspapers those promote “right” attitudes and “right” moves of a leader, the previously mentioned contradiction gains momentum.

⁵² **Ibid.**

⁵³ Marshall McLuhan and Fiore Quentin, **The Medium is the Message**, San Francisco, Hardwired, 1964 pp. 8-9, 26-41.

⁵⁴ O’Reagan, “Australian Television Culture” in Robert Clyde Allen and Annette Hill, **The Television Studies Reader**, Routledge, NY, 2004, pp.79-80.

2.3 A Brief Look at Turkish and Iranian Media

Certain similarities and differences between Turkish and Iranian media can be traced while analyzing their media characteristics. To begin with, the most important difference can be highlighted as tight restrictions over media in Iran. Iran is rated as “not free” by Freedom House Report 2009. This status can also be confirmed by the reports that Reporters sans Frontières provide⁵⁵. On the other hand, Turkey is qualified as a “partly free” country by the very same report. This status can also be affirmed by the “Media-Watch Reports” presented by bianet⁵⁶. The Ahmadinejad government had declared that the duty of the media is to report and support government actions, but not to comment on them. According to the Freedom House Report “fear of stepped-up penalties has reinforced a trend toward self-censorship and inhibited public criticism of the president”⁵⁷. Islam has been the official religion of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The media is accountable to Islamic Law and heavily censored by the ruling religious clerics. The press cannot criticize government leaders who are also religious leaders. And other religious tenants must be upheld in social, cultural, and political arenas. Reformists desire freedom of association, freedom of the press, and a more open society; they believe that a free press means free people. Reformist publications are frequent targets of censorship, confiscation, suspension, fining, and banning⁵⁸. Consequently, journalism in Iran can be considered as a dangerous profession, especially if an individual worked for a reformist publication or adhered to a journalistic ethic of truth regardless of personal fate, which could mean threats, arrest,

⁵⁵ <http://en.rsff.org/iran.html>

⁵⁶ http://www.bianet.org/files/doc_files/000/000/106/original/biarapor_2009.html

⁵⁷ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=384&key=201&parent=19&report=79> .

⁵⁸ **Ibid.**

imprisonment with or without formal charges, accusation of espionage, isolation, or even torture, banning, murder, and execution⁵⁹.

In theory, Iran provides constitutional protection for the press, but the Press Law outlining the purpose and duties of the press shows the true limits put on journalists⁶⁰. The Press Law details a long list of “don'ts” for journalists, preventing free publishing under threat of punishment, which is also detailed in the Law.⁶¹

Iran's Press Law established the Committee for Suspension of the Press within the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. This Committee, dominated by reformists, monitors the press and brings charges. Any charge brought against a newspaper or a journalist is heard by the conservative-dominated Press Court. All Press Court hearings and trials are to be open to the public, but it would be misleading to state that this is the case in reality. Juries are mostly conservative and often ignored, dismissed early, or consulted after decisions are issued⁶². From April 2000 to mid-2002, the judges in the Press Court have been pressing charges against individuals and publications, and circumventing the Committee⁶³.

Censorship certainly occurs in the city, but it is self-censorship that is the largest concern in the provinces⁶⁴. Provincial journalists are cautious. They do not have enough funds, and they have no modern printing operations. These small provincial papers have limited

⁵⁹ **Ibid.**

⁶⁰ A. Bahrapour, “A comparative review on publication of the press after the Islamic Revolution”, **Rasaneh Quarterly**, Vol.14 No.4, pp. 82-93, 2002.

⁶¹ **Ibid.**

⁶² A. Mirzaei, “Economic and social obstacles in front of scholarly-intellectual publications in Iran”. **Negah-e Nou August**, Vol. 37 No. 7, p. 11-24, 1998.

⁶³ **Ibid.**

⁶⁴ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=384&key=201&parent=19&report=79>.

circulations. Consequently the capability of these papers as a source of news for the population is limited. As a consequence provincial Iranians rely on international broadcast media such as the BBC, or Radio Free Europe for information.

Between 1997 and 2001, reformist Mohammed Khatami's first term, "serial newspapers" became common. "Serial newspaper" is a term to explain a situation when the publication of a paper is closed down, and publishers reopen with the same staff and editorial stand but under a new title. Examples of such serials that include three or more publications are common. In June 2002 the CPJ claimed that at least 52 newspapers and magazines have been closed between 1997 and 2001, despite President Khatami's reformist position on the press.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reports, the reformist point of view can still be heard in *Iran*, *Kar-o Kargan*, *Aftab-e-Yazd*, *Etemaad*, *Hayat-e No*, and *Hambasteghi*. However, the CPJ also states that many of these newspapers have softened in tone. They still argue for reform, but they no longer write about government officials or issues that could be perceived as national security. This leads us to consider that censorship has in a way succeeded.

Mohammed Khatami, a moderate Shi'a cleric, can be considered as a reformist and seeks to offer Iranians more freedom in their daily lives: freedom of association, the press, expression, etc. During his mandate between 1997 and 2005, he tried to adapt liberal reforms. However, Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who came to power in 1989, a conservative committed to maintaining Islamic traditions and a conservative society, has the authority and opportunity to hinder Khatami's reform efforts, which include a more free press in Iran.

In 2002 the Islamic clerics ruling Iran held power over the media. In part democracy, in part theocracy, Iran's Constitution establishes three branches of government, including an elected president, parliament and the Supreme Leader. The constitution also offers the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, the ability to approve presidential and parliamentary candidates, and make judicial appoints. As a result Khamenei has maintained conservative courts that support his positions⁶⁵.

In Iran, media has a critical role in democratization in the absence of real political party. Since the post-1997 reform movement, the State has been omnipresent in the press⁶⁶: Iranian communication is largely liberalized by privatization however the state is still reluctant to give up its ideological control over the media. The post-revolutionary state in Iran began to restrict market-relations, confiscated major assets of the Iranian bourgeoisie and nationalized major aspects of Iran's industry, including its communications system. Since the end of the war with Iraq, the process of "reconstruction" had started. In the frame of this process, market-driven development and economic policies have been key aims of the state. A continuous fall in crude oil prices after mid-1997 made the implication

⁶⁵ As an example the "*Harim incident*" that was annotated by World Press Freedom Review can be emphasized: According to the "World Press Freedom Review," on 8 March 2000, the conservative weekly *Harim* was accused of mocking and criticizing President Khatami. Khatami, who has no control of the judiciary, pleaded over state radio on March 11 for an open jury trial for the publisher. However as the process took a long time to be concluded he needed to state that "if the press is not allowed to operate in Iran, then people will turn to sources we have no control over."

⁶⁶ Mehdi Semati (ed.), **Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State**, London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

of reformist economic policies impossible. Such fall in oil prices also resulted in reduced industrial capacity utilization, and led to massive workers' layoffs⁶⁷.

The government's privatization efforts were largely unsuccessful because the essential preconditions for such structural change—an open trading system, an effective regulatory framework, an active capital market, a competitive banking system, an impartial judiciary, and a predictable political environment for private investment—simply did not exist in Iran⁶⁸. In addition, the closely-related social scourges of endemic corruption, high divorce rates, widespread drug addiction, child labor, younger-age prostitution, violent urban crimes, and increased underground economic activities⁶⁹.

This process has been contested by continuous popular protests. These protests caused further fragmentation of the ruling elites and intensification of internal factionalism as well as aggravating the dispute over state's policies, implications of these policies and the very definition of the Islamic state.

Iran and the Iranian revolution are usually presented as examples of conflict between tradition and modernity. The transfer of power to the new ruling body has been viewed as the revenge of "tradition on modernity"⁷⁰. Modernization discourse considers the transformation of societies as a mechanical change from agricultural and primitive to

⁶⁷ Jahangir Amuzegar, "Khatami and Iranian Economic Policy at Mid-Term," **The Middle East Journal**, Autumn, 1999, pp. 534-540.

⁶⁸ Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Third Plan: An Appraisal," **Middle East Policy**, Volume XIII, Fall 2006, Number 3.

⁶⁹ Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Theocracy under Siege." **Middle East Policy**, Volume X, Spring 200, Number 1.

⁷⁰ H. Mowlana and L. Wilson, **The passing of modernity: Communication and the transformation of society**, Longman, NY, 1990.

industrialized, urbanized and rational nation-states⁷¹. Such “development” did occur in Iran but it was accomplished by using the tools of despotism. The legacy of this “tradition”, despotism, has played a major role in the underdevelopment of the Iranian media. If the “western” history that Lerner had mentioned failed to repeat itself in Iran and much of the “developing” world, the history of Southern Europe provides some clues to the nature and development of the press in Iran. Much in like Southern Europe,⁷² the Iranian press developed as part of the world of literature and politics. Most press proprietors, from the constitutional revolution (1906-1911) to the present day, have been well known literary or political figures. That is to say, in Iran, there have not been any distinct figures as “journalists”. Figures from literary or political worlds used the tools of journalism to investigate and report events and issues. This shows us that the media in Iran, where political engagement is limited, are also functioning as political tools.

Journalism has remained politically charged and a politicized profession and the level of state involvement and intervention (in terms of economic and political control) have been highly visible. Undoubtedly, and as Hallin and Mancini argue in their analysis of the Southern European media system, the strong presence of institutions of “ancien regime”, most notably the strong presence of monarchy and conservative religious institutions and ulema (religious leaders), have made the transition to “modernity” a long, difficult and conflictual process⁷³.

⁷¹ D. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East**, Free Press, NY, 1958.

⁷² D. Hallin, P. Mancini, J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, **Comparing media systems. Mass media and society**, Arnold, London, 2005, p.220.

⁷³ **Ibid, p.223.**

The increased marginalization of the pre-capitalist mode of production, feudal and patriarchal relations, increased urbanization, literacy and the rapid spread of technological and organizational changes have all contributed to an eruption of new and dynamic energies and new forms of struggles⁷⁴. Sections of the Iranian ruling elites have tried to accommodate changes by offering some form of re-evaluation and reassessment of the entanglement between “Islam” and “modernity”, painfully trying to reconcile “Islam” with “democracy” and human rights. In the 1990s, and especially since the landslide victory of President Khatami in 1997, increasingly the word Iran has replaced Islam, nation (mellat) has replaced umma (community of faithful), and discourse of civil society has replaced the discourse of Westoxication⁷⁵.

Article 44 of the Constitution called for massive nationalization of all large-scale industries and specified a number of industries, including telecommunication and broadcasting. Likewise, Article 49 enabled the confiscation of thousands of private companies and the transfer of them to newly formed foundations (bonyads)⁷⁶.

However, the commitment to the breaking of monopolies that included telecommunication has been halted because it would have necessitated the Islamic Republic of Iran’s unequivocal negation of its revolutionary claims and would have implied the formal

⁷⁴ Arif Dirlik, “Modernity as History. Post-Revolutionary China, Globalization and the Question of Modernity”, *Social History*, Volume 27, Issue 1 January 2002, pp.16-20.

⁷⁵ *gharbzadeghi*, غربزدگی

⁷⁶ Bonyads are charitable trusts in Iran that dominate Iran's non-petroleum economy. They control approximately 20% of Iran's GDP. They are exempt from taxes and government control, moreover, they acquire vast amount of subsidies from government. For further information see, Afsin Molavi, **The Soul of Iran: A Nation’s Journey to Freedom**, Norton, 2006.

abandonment of its remaining popular base⁷⁷. Nevertheless, the state has managed to show a good degree of commitment to make necessary changes in order to accommodate private capital and encouraging foreign investment. In 2004, the disputed Article 44 of the Constitution, which limited private ownership and had put radio and television, the post, telegraph and telephone services under the “state sector”, was finally revised. Revision of Article 44 of the Constitution has removed the last “legal” barriers to privatization for the major industries in Iran, which includes the postal service and communications. Such revision lifted the limitation of selling shares of major state-owned companies to the private sector.⁷⁸

The number of publications, including daily publications, has increased rapidly, despite the harsh economic realities of Iran and the political and legal barriers. The number of national television channels has also increased from two to six. During Khatami’s presidency alone, from 1997 to 2003, the number of telephone lines increased by 127 percent; the figures for rural areas have witnessed a similarly sharp increase by 144 percent. Access to mobile phones has seen one of the sharpest increases; from 135,219 in 1997 to 2.5 million in 2003, indicating an increase of 1,748 percent. While Iran is still lagging behind richer countries in the region, it has registered the biggest increase in usage of Internet in the region⁷⁹. It should be obvious that in recent years Iran’s communication industry has emerged as one of the fastest growing economic sectors and in this process, the state has emerged as the dominant media capitalist. Privatization of the communication industry has been one of the key aspects of the recent economic plans but remains a contentious issue.

⁷⁷ S. Behdad and P. Alizadeh (eds), **Iran’s Economy: Dilemma of an Islamic State**, I.B. Tauris, London, 2000.

⁷⁸ http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/story/2006/07/060703_he-privatizations.html.

⁷⁹ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm>.

Terms such as “public” and “private”, “restricted” and “free”, “state” and “market” have formed some of the most controversial pairings of categories in modern liberal societies. Success, progress and freedom in this narrative have been measured according to the degree of separation between these pairings and the increased “undermining” of the role of the state. It is in this context that certain normative assumptions about the nature of communication in the global South have resurfaced, which see the state as the main obstacle/problem in the development of media and as the main enemy of media freedom, and the market as the solution. Such arguments are echoed across the globe in what seems to be a new round of struggle for freedom of media.

The Iranian media market does indeed reflect the broader picture of the Iranian political economy, which is marked by the presence of massive and large-scale state-owned corporations on the one hand, and the petty production and small enterprises on the other. It is deeply marked by a divide between some large state-owned companies on the one hand, and individual titles on the other. The most important player might be stated out as *Kayhan*, the biggest and one of the oldest publishers in Iran, which is under the control of the Supreme Leader and currently publishes 13 titles. Other daily publications include *Kayhan International* (published in English since 1959, claiming to be the oldest English paper in the country), *Kayhan Arabia* (published in Arabic since 1980), and the daily sport newspaper *Kayhan Varzeshi*. The firm also publishes *Kayhan* in Turkish, as well as a number of weekly and monthly publication that include the monthly *Kayhan Farhangi* (published since 1984), weekly *Zan-e Rouz* (Today’s Woman, published since 1964), bi-monthly *Kayhan Caricature* (published since 1992), and weekly *Kayhan Havaie* (published primarily for Iranians living outside Iran). Since 1985 *Kayhan* also ventured

into publishing books after the creation of its book-publishing arm, *Sazeman Entesharat Kayhan*.

The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), since its launch in 1998, has become one of the key newspapers in the country. IRNA publishes six other titles, some of which do compete with similar titles published by other firms including *Iran Daily* (the country's third English newspaper), *Iran Varzeshi* (a daily that is part of a growing market in Iran specializing in sports news coverage), and *Iran Javan* (yet another title from a major player targeting a younger readership). In addition to these, IRNA also publishes the monthly *Iran Azin* (focusing on interior design), *Iran-e Saal* (which provides an annual report of Iran's significant events), and *Iran Sepid* (the only publication in the Braille language in the region).

Undoubtedly, in countries where historically the press has emerged as an agent of modernization, and where the process of "modernization" is top-down, the link between the state and the press is inevitable. The press is used to assimilate masses into modernization by the ruling elite. As a result of such legacy, in the newspaper market, the state has been a major competitor and in most cases the dominant player. A number of factors have contributed to the dominance of the state in this sector. In the first place, the economic realities of the press industry and the associated risks of producing a newspaper with no or little tradition of democracy is not an attractive prospect for the private sector. Heavy and expensive machinery, lack of proper distribution networks (roads, rails, etc.), and difficulties in producing viable and credible newspapers where there are no political and social accountability and transparency are a major turn-off for private investors.

To conclude, in Iran, much of the state's political legitimacy rests on the state use of force as its ultimate sanction. The struggle to claim monopoly over the means of symbolic violence, namely the attempt to islamize the media, however, has played a significant role, and in the current climate cannot be separated from the former. Nevertheless, there exists a visible opposition, units and policies, in addition to individual and institutional differences and interests.

When we examine the Turkish press, it is clear that the press has continually played an important role in Turkish political, social and cultural life. The fact that the press was introduced to Turkish society in the mid-19th century, at a time when the country was facing intense political change both at home and in foreign affairs, helped to shape the role of the press⁸⁰. During the same period, the Balkan Wars and the First World War also incited changes in the Turkish press. Through this frame, it can be stated that Turkish press taught Turkish public about the crucial role of the press that could play in communications, propaganda and organization. The Turkish press also played a critical role during the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, as well as during the transition to a multi-party system⁸¹.

The emergence of newspapers and print media in the later Ottoman Empire had a profound impact on sociocultural and political life. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, many restrictions on the press were lifted, and there followed a short-lived explosion of periodical publications. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the press became subject to the centralization as other institutions, and essentially it became an

⁸⁰ Hıfzı Topuz, **II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi**, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2003.

⁸¹ **Ibid.**

organ of mass mobilization for the Republican People's Party. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National sovereignty) in Ankara and *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) in Istanbul were left as the only national papers in 1925, and most regional papers were under government control by the time of a press law in 1931⁸². By 1935 there were thirty-eight daily newspapers in the country (twenty-two in Istanbul, six in Izmir, and two in Ankara. With multiparty politics in 1946 came liberalizing measures, including less restrictive press laws, and the emergence of real mass circulation newspapers such as *Vatan*, *Milliyet*, and *Hürriyet*, which saw themselves less as instruments of political mobilization and more as means of information for citizens in a democratic system⁸³. Under the Democrat Party a more liberal press law was passed, but by 1953 the ruling party tried to silence political opposition and the press, resorting to closures and jailing critics. The coup of 1960 was followed by a liberalization of the press, and journalists themselves drew up a Code of Ethics that was signed by all the major papers. These liberties were restricted after the coup of 1971, and again after that of 1980, but the public's expectation of an independent press was irreversible⁸⁴. Through the 1990s Turkey was criticized by several human-rights organizations for imprisoning journalists. With the new legislation in line with European Union requirements, press restrictions have been lifted gradually and critical and investigative journalism has become characteristic of some newspapers. As a matter of fact, the total number of magazines which was 20 in 1990, reached 110 in 1999⁸⁵.

⁸² Kemal Karpat, "The Mass Media: Turkey.", **Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey**, edited by Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964.

⁸³ **Ibid.**

⁸⁴ Metin Hepar and Tanel Demirel, "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.", **Middle Eastern Studies**, 32, no. 2 (1996), pp. 112 - 114.

⁸⁵ *Birgün Pazar eki*, 17 Nisan 2010.

In Turkey, freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Constitution. According to the article 28 of 1982 Constitution, it is not necessary to obtain permission or provide financial guarantees to establish a publishing house⁸⁶. Freedom of the press can only be restricted for the purposes of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others or for protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or for ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary. However, revision of the media law in 2002 meant that government control of the National Broadcasting Council (RTÜK) became tighter than ever⁸⁷. Journalists daring to criticize state institutions or touch taboo subjects, such as the Kurdish problem and the part played by the army in political life, are still censored, fined heavily and prosecuted without sufficient reason.

Another aspect of Turkish press is its effectiveness for forming public opinion. It is an area that attracts the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the written press in Turkey is experiencing an important concentration problem. Although there are 21 newspapers at the national level, a significant portion of them are situated among a few groups. One of these is the Dogan Media Group. The Milliyet newspaper, founded by Ali Naci Karacan on 3 May 1950, transformed into a large publication group in the 1990s⁸⁸. A total of 8 of the newspapers published nationwide belong to the Doğan Media Group. The Bilgin Media Group also has an important place in the Turkish press world with its newspapers, magazines and other partnerships within its structure. The İhlas Group is also another known media group with its newspaper, news agency and television both in the press and in other fields of activities.

⁸⁶ **Ibid.**

⁸⁷ Nilay Karelmas, "Turks Get Some of the News Not All," **World Press Review** , Vol. 48, No. 12. (Dec. 2001) Available from <http://www.worldpress.org>.

⁸⁸ http://kurumsal.milliyet.com.tr/kurum_profil_menu_1.asp .

After examining both Iranian and Turkish cases, common characteristics of the media systems in Iran and Turkey can be enumerated as low newspaper circulation, a tendency towards political instrumentation of the media, limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession and regulatory agencies. In both countries, “clientélism” based relationships coexist in a complex relationship with other forms of political formations. In general, in these two countries, journalism tends to accentuate commentary and newspapers to represent distinct political tendencies. There is a strong tendency in both countries for media to be controlled by private interests with political alliances and ambitions which seek to use their media properties for political ends. The instrumentation of the news media by oligarchs, industrialists, parties or the state implies a limited journalistic autonomy.

Another characteristic which these two countries have in common is that clientelism accredits a pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support.

On the other hand, the main difference between Turkish and Iranian press can be highlighted as the level of censorship. Developments in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the Iranian regime’s sense of insecurity and helped harden its repressive policies. The ruling clerics have tightened restrictions on freedom of expression and remain distrustful of broader political participation. According to Freedom House’s Map of

Freedom, Turkey is classified as “partly free” where Iran is named as a “not free” country⁸⁹.

Such characteristics illustrate us how media can function as a social resource of various political alignments. Thus, once again, it would be useful to connote that the conflict between center and periphery can be more profoundly comprehended through media analysis. Let us now conceptualize center and periphery conflict to better understand its effect on leader media clashes.

⁸⁹ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/MOF09.pdf>

2.4 Center-Periphery Conflicts

2.4.1 Center and Periphery

Like media and leadership subject, the notion of “center- periphery” is also examined through paradigms of various disciplines. The terms center and periphery are frequently used to define geometrical position in space. Every center is defined towards its periphery. Departing from this geometrical definition, it can be stated that center is defined by a periphery that encompasses it and, likewise, the presence of a periphery necessitates a center. This geographical definition is also reflected on political understanding of a center-periphery notion. In ancient Greece the geometrical center of the city is formed by the marketplace which is also a public space of decision making. In the medieval age the city’s center is occupied by religious functions as monasteries and churches, while the early twentieth century city center circulates around a central square with administrative buildings⁹⁰.

According to Shils, the center of society possesses an order of values, and thus, bears a control over the periphery⁹¹. Shils adds that center and periphery interact dynamically. The authority and influence of the central value system over the periphery deliberately change based on the proximity between peripheries and the center⁹². The center is a system of

⁹⁰ Ayse Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, no. 2 ,April 1996, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ayse.htm>

⁹¹ E. Shils, **Center and Periphery: Essays in Macro Sociology**, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975

⁹² **Ibid.**

values and beliefs, which reign society⁹³. Moreover, Shils defends that moving away from the center towards the periphery weakens the attachment to the central value system⁹⁴. Shils criticizes, in a way, a possible consolidation of a fix center-periphery image within the societies. He indicates that there has always been a degree of negotiation, which either leads towards rejection or affirmation of ideas. Frequent contacts between center and periphery foster mutual awareness and wider acceptance of the central value system, however, at the same time, such frequency also increases the extent of “dissensus” or “rejection of the central value system.”⁹⁵ In brief, the interaction between center and periphery is currently so high that there should not be a homogeneous set of values neither for center nor for periphery. An interacting set of values would obstruct distinctive center and periphery identities.

2.4.2 Centralized Periphery and Marginalized Center

Even though the role of center and periphery changes in the course of history, their representations remain in relationship to their spatial definitions. Recently, the terms “centralized periphery” and “marginalized center” were introduced in the literature and such an introduction fostered an emancipation of these terms from their geometrical place. The discourse on the “centralized periphery” indicates a shift of interest from the center to the periphery. The term, “centralized periphery” is employed to highlight a continuing

⁹³ **Ibid**, p.3

⁹⁴ **Ibid**, pp.,9-11

⁹⁵ **Ibid**, p.11

desire towards the center⁹⁶. This aspect of shift of axes can be observed both in Iran and in Turkey. The number of extremely wealthy families possessing holding companies in rural areas of Turkey has increased. These conservative nouveau-riches reclaim to be more visible and aim to adapt their values to the core of social-political structure. Likewise, in Iran, children of the Iranian Islamic Revolution are formed in a way to replace “elite” in Iranian institutions⁹⁷.

2.4.3 Center-Periphery Conflicts in Turkey and Iran:

Historically, in Western cities, the spatial center operated as the arena of political discourse where sovereign power was displayed. Such operation generates the idea that the desire towards the center is a will of displaying power⁹⁸. At this point, it should be stated out that certain societies have stronger centers than others⁹⁹. Here, the Ottoman Empire and Iran emerge as interesting examples. In the Ottoman Empire, a long-lasting center was supported by a sophisticated network of institutions¹⁰⁰. Attributing a distinctive characteristic to Turkish social-formation and its state is an approach widely used in

⁹⁶ Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan Ketil Rod, **Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory**, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/BUHAUG_DisagragatingEthno-NationalistCivilWars.pdf

⁹⁷ Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi (eds.), **Iran in the 21st century: politics, economics and conflict**, New York, Routledge, 2008p.41-44.

⁹⁸ **Ibid.**

⁹⁹ Şerif Mardin, **Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey**, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 2006, p.298.

¹⁰⁰ **Ibid**, p.299

analyzing state-society relations in Turkey. It is emphasized that Turkish society shows significant differences from both Western social-formation and Islamic societies¹⁰¹.

In Turkey, the modernist secularists representing the center define modernity as a mode of being free from all traditional and religious meanings. To be modern is defined as following specific rules, symbols, slogans, politics and cultural codes, all of which are defined by the secularist establishment. On the other hand, new periphery claims that the individual choice itself is the foundational principle of modernity. According to Serif Mardin the top-down, Jacobian model of Turkish modernization had always “collided with the moderate and conservative modernity of the ordinary Turkish people”¹⁰². This has created a deep tension between the elites and the people. For Mardin, the top-down analysis of Turkish modernization is damaged by a conflicting attitude of religion versus secularism, tradition versus modernity, empire versus nation, reason versus science, progressive enlightenment versus dogmatism. Mardin sees this reductionism as an essential function of the Kemalist ideology of nation building in the early decades of the 20th century. Nevertheless, he also links it to the “recent attempts to define a Turkish authenticity¹⁰³” as a replay of secular nationalism. Replacing Muslim communitarianism with a secular nation-state identity, the founders of the modern Turkish Republic had hoped to change the “superstructure” of Turkish society¹⁰⁴ and create a new “central value

¹⁰¹ Galip Yalman, *The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies?* in Sungur Savran and Neşecan Balkan (eds), **The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State**, New York, Nova Science Publishers Inc, 2002, p.24

¹⁰² Serif Mardin, *op. Cit.*, p.301.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

system¹⁰⁵”. Through this point of view, it can be stated that the new agents of modernization in Turkey are asserting the traditional parameters of power sharing. Traditional actors of the periphery are being empowered by new domestic debates about democracy as well as the new opportunities created by globalization. Periphery is empowered by a constant talk of democracy, identity claims, the European Union, civil society institutions, virtues of local governance. As a result, Turkey’s large periphery put pressure on the center for power sharing. However, it would be also problematic to nominate a conflict of power sharing between the elite and the masses, the upper class versus the lower class or the rich versus the poor. In both groups, rich and poor, educated and non-educated, young and old, men and women can be depicted. As a matter of fact, using the term center and periphery while analyzing the power sharing conflict, would be more compromising.

Nevertheless, Mardin’s approach over center-periphery development in Turkey can be criticized through various points. The first point is that Mardin explains characteristics of Turkish social formation in relation to Western social developments. Such explanation refers to a relativist context¹⁰⁶. As Turner indicates, “Orientalism set out to explain the progressive features of the Occident and the social stationariness of the Orient¹⁰⁷.” He states that the eastern societies are seen as a deviant case since they were unable to develop

¹⁰⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 230.

¹⁰⁶ Yalman, “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective”, **op. cit.**, p.24.

¹⁰⁷ Bryan Turner, **Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism**, London, Routledge, 1994, p.22.

the institutions taken as the causes of Western dynamism and democracy. Hence, the East is defined by the absence of such institutions and the asserted lack of development¹⁰⁸.

According to Mardin, the basis of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation stands upon the absence of the factors that gave rise to the development of a civil-society in the West. However, at this point, it appears that Mardin's definition of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation is related to his conceptualization of Western development. The role of cities in the rise of capitalism in the West is highly debatable¹⁰⁹. However, Mardin claims that the creation of the modern state included "a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers and later, industrial labour¹¹⁰." The autonomy of the periphery was also protected in the West which allowed an integrated structure.

Mardin states that centre and periphery can be used as key concepts in explaining Turkish politics. According to Mardin, every "society has a centre"¹¹¹. Various conflicts between centre and periphery took place in the process of centralization. The consequences of these conflicts played an important role in the formation of Turkish political structures and cultures¹¹².

¹⁰⁸ Turner, **op. Cit.**, p.23. See also Simon Bromley. **Rethinking Middle East Politics**, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1994, p.7.

¹⁰⁹ Ellen Meiksins Wood, **The Origin of Capitalism**, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1999, 1-27

¹¹⁰ Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?", **Daedalus**, no. 102, 1973, p.169.

¹¹¹ **Ibid.**

¹¹² **Ibid.**, p.170

For Mardin, centre and periphery were two related worlds. “No attempt was made for a more complete integration when loose ties proved workable.¹¹³” The main connections between the centre and periphery were religious institutions, the judicial system and the tradition of public works. The modernization process incited periphery to move away from the centre. The peripheral forces defined themselves with religious rituals and identities. Technological developments and innovations led to better penetration of the centre into the periphery, however the vice-versa, the control of the centre by the periphery was never seen¹¹⁴. For Mardin, the centre-periphery duality remained the basic duality in the Republican period. The duality of Turkish politics is claimed to be between the leader and the masses, between public and leaders who do not want to share power between them. These basic dualities continue to shape the Turkish political structure¹¹⁵.

The Ottoman legacy was inherited by the new Turkish state. Since the basic gap was between a dominant centre and a fragmented periphery, Turkish politics “lacked a tradition of multiple confrontations as a way of resolving conflicts¹¹⁶.” Similar arguments and analyses can also be applied to Iranian modernization. Iran has always been a multi-ethnic and multicultural country¹¹⁷. Local politics have been neglected even after the 1979 revolution, which was in a sense a populist revolt against the Westernized elite.

¹¹³ **Ibid.**, p.171

¹¹⁴ **Ibid.**, p.169-170.

¹¹⁵ Şerif Mardin. **Bütün Eserleri 6, Makaleler 1, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset**, İstanbul, İletişim, 2002, p. 118.

¹¹⁶ Metin Heper, **The State Tradition in Turkey**. Northgate, The Eothen Press, 1985, p.149

¹¹⁷ Kaveh Ehsani, “Islam, Modernity, and National Identity”, **Middle East Insight**, 11-5, July-August 1995, p. 49.

Centralized state building efforts were initiated during the Reza Shah Pahlavi era¹¹⁸. This centralization incited Tehran to dominate Iran's political, commercial and cultural life¹¹⁹. Most of the westernized elites lived in the capital¹²⁰. Reza Shah created an administrative system whose aim was to reach from the center as far as possible to the periphery¹²¹. This attitude created similar problems that Turkish modernization process has encountered: the Westernized, elite center and the conservative periphery had conflicting values. The efforts to assimilate periphery by inculcating western values escalated the conflict.

2.5 Conclusion: The Parallels between Leader-Media and Center-Periphery Conflicts

The literature review allows us to contemplate that studies on leadership mainly focus on leader's position while s/he interacts at various levels. There is a lack of focus on the interaction itself and this study aims to focus on the interaction itself by analyzing the confrontation between leader and media.

National or social leaders can manipulate common cognitive biases. These leaders may maneuver mass group loyalty by manipulating people's needs for security. Leader may

¹¹⁸ Chahryar Adle and Bernard Hourcade (eds.), **Téhéran: Capitale Bicentenaire**, Paris and Tehran, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992.

¹¹⁹ **Ibid.**

¹²⁰ Bruno Rémond and Jacques Blanc, **Les Collectivités Locales**, Paris, Presse de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique and Dalloz, 1999, pp.32-33.

¹²¹ Kazim Vadi-i, **Idara ve Taqsimat-i Kishvari-i Iran**, Barrishia-i Tarikh-i 4 (Summer 1969), p.95.

come into conflict with the media which would reveal and expose leaders' manipulations. Especially, in countries where political engagement is limited, the media can act as a tool to vocalize public benefits. Likewise, the media can monitor if the leader solves problems or develops relationships. Mass media can influence public opinions on how to view the world. A reporter might be the only source of information about the development of a conflict. How the reporter frames the conflict can create bias so that the audience favor one party or one solution over another. As a matter of fact, the media is crucial in presenting and explaining conflicts, as well as preventing them from escalating.

Likewise, media also possesses an agenda-setting function. The agenda-setting process appears to be an effect of newsgathering by large organizations which constitute a large part of the mass media. Similarly, mass media plays a crucial role in forming and reflecting public opinion. As the media connects the world to individuals and reproduces the self-image of society, it has a strong social and cultural impact upon society. All of these aspects of media illustrates that media has the capability to portray and control reality. Media can socially reconstruct core values.

Root causes of leader-media conflicts might be summarized as the continuous will of a political leader to remain in power. The literature on leader-media conflict demonstrates that good leadership is not based on personality type but more likely to be pertained to the identification with the social entity. This might lead us to concretize the belief that any criticism committed over a leader's personality is actually directed to his roots with the social class that he is from. This characteristic gives the idea that the conflict between center and periphery can be more profoundly comprehended through a media analysis.

The literature review reveals certain similarities and differences between Turkish and Iranian media. Common characteristics of the media systems in Iran and Turkey can be enumerated as low newspaper circulation, a tendency towards political instrumentation of the media, limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession and regulatory agencies. There is a strong tendency in both countries for media to be controlled by private interests with political alliances. On the other hand, the main difference between Turkish and Iranian press can be highlighted as the level of censorship. The ruling clerics in Iran have augmented restrictions on freedom of expression.

The literature on center-periphery relations indicates that the center of society possesses an order of values, and thus, manages a control over the periphery. Nevertheless, even if the frequent contacts between center and periphery foster mutual awareness and wider acceptance of the central value system, such frequency also increases the extent of “dissensus” or “rejection of the central value system”. Recently, the terms “centralized periphery” and “marginalized center” were introduced in the literature to explain the shifts in center-periphery dynamics. The discourse on the “centralized periphery” indicates a shift of interest from the center to the periphery. The term, “centralized periphery” is employed to highlight a continuing desire towards the center.

To conclude, the conflict between the axis of center and periphery highlights a value conflict. As John Burton indicates, it would be harder to negotiate on value-related

issues¹²². Value-related conflicts generally focus on relations between cultural groups¹²³. In a value-related conflict negotiating is harder because positions, interests and needs of each party are based on cognitive notions. Parties have difficulties in defining a solid, concrete relation between each other; thus finding commonalities and conciliating both parties becomes harder and more complicated. So, while leader and media come into conflict over value-related issues, a deeper analysis of the debate might be necessary to highlight possible latent causes.

¹²² John Burton, **Conflict: Resolution and Provention**, NY, St. Martin's Press, p.1990. p. 23.

¹²³ Mohamed Rabie, **Roots of Conflict**, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, Proager Pres Connecticut&London, 1994.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The aim of this paper is both to understand leader-media conflicts through examining center-periphery relations and trace possible parallelism between the courses of center-periphery and leader-media confrontations. Thus, the main methodological effort is to conduct a discourse analysis by employing operational tools to detect similar patterns between previously indicated arenas of confrontations. This is a qualitative analysis which relates to the scrutiny of language, semiotics and conventions found in narrative and genre. In such a way, this study employs newspapers as sources of data in order to examine leader-media conflicts from a center-periphery perspective. The main reason to use newspapers is being able to categorize them according to their closeness to leader or to the opposition. The unit of analysis is newspaper columns and hard news which reflect newspapers' values and positions in a social spectrum. It is through a newspaper's columns and hard news that the reader can get news from the newspapers' point of view.

The data are collected after the archive search over the selected newspapers. Every sections of these newspapers were scanned in order to trace statements relevant to this study. Collected statements were marked according to the categories that appeared through literature review (control, style, right)¹²⁴. These categories provided starting points and as the data analysis evolved new categories and sub-categories emerged. These new categories enabled providing a deeper understanding to leader-media confrontations.

¹²⁴ For numerical distribution of statements see appendix, tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 .

During the data analysis, the objective was to elucidate how categories were linked to each other. After thoroughly analyzing possible aspects of leader-media and center-periphery conflicts the parallelism between these conflictual relations can be summarized under three categories: “Control”, “Style” and “Right”:

Firstly, there is a continuous struggle between media and leader as well as between center and periphery over the domination of control. Media can criticize a leader for not being capable of keeping things under control. Such criticism might ignite a conflict with leader as it may lead to the fall of the leader. The leader may want to control media, thus, control the flow of information. Media can resist against this attempt. Similarly, both center and periphery enter in a conflict in order to influence and control social political formation of the society.

Secondly, media comes into conflict with a leader over his style of handling problems or issues. Center and periphery emphasize contradicting life-styles and values. Actors in center and periphery try to influence each other.

Last but not least, media and a leader can be currently in conflict over what is the right attitude, to handle internal or external problems. Center and periphery confront each other to accustom their values to the core of political structure in order to define the “right”, the correct, the just attitudes according to their terms

The newspapers are analyzed within their countries, and then a cross-analysis between Turkey and Iran had been carried out in order to find similar patterns. The relationship among categories had led to new directories and potential hypothesis. As the research of

Miles and Hubermann¹²⁵ suggest, I started with some general themes derived from literature review and added more themes and sub-themes as I progressed. In order to help to unveil possible relations among categories I utilized the technique of memoing by continually writing down the thoughts that emerge through data analysis.

Three newspapers from Turkey and three other from Iran are selected in order to collect data. Those six newspapers are selected by the consideration of their circulation numbers and their manifest positions in examined leader-media conflicts. Circulation number is accepted to determine the remarks of how influential the newspaper is. Data from Iranian media are amassed from Etemaad, Irna and Kayhan. Etemaad represents the center opposing the leader M. Ahmadinejad. Its affiliation with the Executive of Construction Party¹²⁶ (*Hezb-e Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi*) attests its manifest position. On the other hand, Kayhan represents the conservative periphery because its circulation is so high in the most poor and conservative regions of Iran¹²⁷. Finally, Irna will represent a control group in this research being relatively neutral towards central and peripheral identifications. All of these three choices are based upon Mehdi Sameti's and BBC's evaluations on the Iranian print media¹²⁸. Likewise, *Yeni Şafak*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Radikal* are chosen from the Turkish press. *Yeni Şafak* represents the peripheral, leader-aligned media and *Cumhuriyet* exemplifies an opposition to the peripheral leader figure. *Radikal* is accepted as a control

¹²⁵ Miles and Hubermann qtd. in Daniel Druckmann and Paul F. Diehl (eds), **Conflict Resolution**, London, Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 609-611.

¹²⁶ The party being founded by the members of Rafsanjani cabinet is not only reformist but also accommodates several elites especially in its executive board. For example the secretary general of the party is the former mayor of Tehran and four of the founders of the party are doctorates who had accomplished their PhD's in the United States. For more information see *Media, culture and society in Iran: living with globalization and the Islamic state* pp.20-22.

¹²⁷ Mehdi Semati (ed), **Media Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State**, New York, Routledge, 2007, p.18.

¹²⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4308203.stm.

unit trying to maintain equidistance towards the peripheral leader figure and the pro-Kemalist center. The archives of Etemaad, Irna and Kayhan are examined applying a time limit between April 20, 2009 and April 27, 2009. April 20 is the date when Ahmadinejad gave his speech at the United Nations. Similarly the archives of Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet and Radikal are analyzed within a time interval starting from January 29, 2009 until February 05, 2009. These periods are chosen because it has been seen that the reactions between media and leaders are condensed within these dates. After these dates, the subject over which leader and media interact changes.

As case studies, Erdoğan 's Davos talk and Ahmadinejad's UN speech have been selected. The main reason for choosing these two incidents is that both of them have occurred just before elections. Consequently, the press is accepted to function in a relatively braver and free mode. Selecting R.T. Erdoğan and M. Ahmadinejad is crucial because the similar background that they share lead to similar personal images that are possessed by their opposition media. Both leaders are not inherently members of the center or the political elite but originally they come from the peripheries and they are both members of conservative families. They both have been "mayors" of metropolitan cities. They both had been members of non-political organizations. M. Ahmadinejad has linked with Pasdaran and R.T. Erdoğan has linkend with Iskenderpasa Convent. Furthermore, the label used for them by the opposition media is the same: Islamist/Populist. Last but not least, during the speeches both leaders were in a pre-election era. Both leaders targeted a common name as their "rival": Israel and both of these targeting speeches had domestic impacts in return. As a matter of fact, this period leads to observe the effect of political culture in leader-media conflicts more comprehensively.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

The three categories (Control, Style and Right), which were derived through literature review, provided starting points for performing an analysis on collected data. The analysis had enabled to develop other categories and sub-categories. In brief, I started with general themes acquired through literature review and built up more themes and sub-themes as I progressed.

4.1 Turkish Case

After the examination of Cumhuriyet, Yeni Şafak and Radikal newspapers between 30.01.2009 and 07.02.2009, 91 news excerpts are drawn from Cumhuriyet, 68 from Yeni Şafak and 76 from Radikal.

4.1.1 Control

The term control signifies the struggle to be in charge and in control especially of the flow of information. In both Turkish and Iranian cases, political leaders aim to win the elections to be in charge of political power. They aim to require the media to not harm their chances of winning the elections. In such a way, the issue of control is directly linked with upcoming elections. The leaders are willing to remain in power and the media is inclined to

remain in the control of news-making process. Leader and media come into conflict when media publish news which would endanger the possibility of remaining in power for the leader.

The conservative side has aimed to point out that the actions of Erdoğan during the Davos summit were simply spontaneous, natural acts against cruelty. Furthermore, the actions of Erdoğan have been considered as an attitude on behalf of whole Turkey. Yeni Şafak continually emphasizes that Erdoğan was representing the whole country and how he was welcomed in Turkey by all layers of society. Here we can recognize that the periphery unceasingly seeks for legitimacy for its existence and recognition. According to Yeni Safak, Erdoğan's reaction was nothing but a legitimate act purely done to express Turkey's attitude towards the Gazze situation. The columnist, Fehmi Kuru, repetitively underlines that this act cannot be considered as a trick to augment the party's votes for coming elections because the vast majority in Turkey wanted Erdoğan to react in such a way¹²⁹. Likewise, several surveys that highlight the acknowledgement for Erdoğan's actions in Davos summit are published in the newspaper¹³⁰. Numerically, by percentages, the massive support stemming from all parts of society for Erdoğan has been accentuated by Yeni Şafak.

On the other hand, the first thing that Cumhuriyet accentuates is that Erdoğan possesses the ambition to be the "single man in command"¹³¹ and that Davos was the clearest example of this ambition. Throughout history Ataturk was the only individual to have the right to be the "single man" and now Erdoğan was trying to monopolize "power" under

¹²⁹ Fehmi Kuru in Yeni Safak, 01 February 2009

¹³⁰ Yeni Safak, 01 February 2009.

¹³¹ Tek adam

his “control” in order to “demolish the values” that the only rightful single-man, Atatürk, developed. The fact that Erdoğan neglected his advisors and diplomats’ suggestions during the Davos summit indicates his plans to take the ultimate control. Likewise, Erdoğan’s reactions have been interpreted as a play for augmenting support just before the elections.

Lastly, when we look at Radikal, we see that it both criticizes and glorifies Erdoğan’s actions in Davos. However, when Erdoğan blames media for relating the Davos incident with elections, Radikal increases the tone of criticism by highlighting a possible inclination of Erdoğan to put pressure on media.

4.1.1.1 Legitimacy:

In this study the title “legitimacy” represents the constant search of popular acceptance of an authority. Through this understanding, both in Yeni Şafak and Cumhuriyet, the views of experts of news from the international press are presented in order to acknowledge or negate Erdoğan’s actions. By highlighting international support or criticism, media aims to validate Erdoğan’s reminiscence in power or negate Erdoğan’s representation of Turkey in the international arena.

First, when we look at conservative periphery, it can be seen that Yeni Şafak has accentuated reactions from the Muslim countries (such as Iran, Egypt, Jordan, etc.). According to Yeni Safak, the actions of Erdoğan have been emphasized as an act of

representation of the oppressed majority¹³². Such upheaval was possible since now, with Erdoğan, the majority which has been neglected for ages by the minority that administered the foreign policies, finally found a way to get heard in the international arena. The true voice of Turkey was finally heard. To illustrate the situation, Tamer Korkmaz gives an example from an Ömer Seyfettin story called “the caftan with pink pearls”¹³³. The story is glorified as being embedded in the minds of all Turks, “regardless of social strata”¹³⁴. In brief, the periphery clearly feels the need to express that the leader is representative of whole Turkey, not just the party.

On the contrary, the statements in Cumhuriyet expose that exhibiting a showdown over the Palestinian conflict is in a way a signal of the will to Islamize Turkey. The act of being the porte-parole of Muslim “brothers and sisters” in Gaza, Palestine was de facto acting as a Caliph.

On the other hand, as the word “Caliph” had been articulated in the conservative newspapers, two days after the Davos incident, Cumhuriyet accentuates the “sly”, “subtle”

¹³² Salif Tuna in Yeni Şafak, 02.01.2009.

¹³³ The story is about Muhsin Çelebi who was introduced to the reader as an “honorable” gentleman who had “little regard for bureaucratic chores” and stayed clear of hypocritical government regularity all his life. He is summoned by the grand vizier to carry a letter from the sultan to Shah Ismail of Persia, who is known to be extremely disrespectful and belittling towards emissaries coming from Istanbul. He put all his estates as collateral to purchase the most precious caftan, an overcoat, completely embroidered with precious pink pearls. When he entered Shah Ismail's palace, his outfit attracted the attention of the courtiers as well as the shah himself. When Shah Ismail, on his throne, did not show Muhsin Çelebi a place to sit during the audience, the sultan's emissary laid down his caftan on the floor and sat on it. After a short discussion with the shah and delivering the sultan's letter, Muhsin Çelebi exited the court leaving his caftan with precious pink pearls behind, and when he was reminded to get it, he said a Turk could not put on his caftan after having sat on it.

¹³⁴ Tamer Korkmaz in Yeni Safak, 02 February 2009.

plans of Islamist entities even more¹³⁵. Furthermore, as a search of international legitimacy for their thoughts, Cumhuriyet has put the stress on negative reactions from the Jewish lobbies either in Europe or in the United States. There was also the legitimacy issue while questioning whether Erdoğan 's actions were representing the majority of Turkey's citizens' feelings.

Moreover, Cumhuriyet highlights Davos incident as a part of *taqiyya*¹³⁶ and hypocritical plays of AKP and nominates this incident as a play pre-planned in order to increase the votes. On the 30th of January, as Erdoğan returns to Turkey, he denies the interpretation of Davos a plan to increase votes of AKP and blames certain media to fabricate false claims¹³⁷. At this point, Cumhuriyet reciprocates intensively underlining that Erdoğan , the leader, intend to take control over the media. As a result, Cumhuriyet questions Erdoğan 's legitimacy as a leader as he has tried to take control over the media. Cumhuriyet defends that Erdoğan 's attempts to take media under control are the signs of his will to act as a tyrannical commander¹³⁸. Cumhuriyet questioned Erdoğan 's legitimacy by denying his capability of being a leader. The very first statements that have appeared in Cumhuriyet about Erdoğan 's attitude at Davos underlined how "out-of-date" these actions were. There have been several recommendations to Erdoğan about how to react on the international platform. The most popular advice for him was to read Lausanne Memoires and figure out

¹³⁵ Ümit Zileli in Cumhuriyet 05.02.2009.

¹³⁶ Taqiyya is a religious permit for Muslims, mentioned in the 106th verse of An-Nahl sura, allowing them to conceal their faith when under threat, persecution or compulsion.

¹³⁷ <http://www.trt.net.tr/haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=ae5750f4-f892-4af2-8e1b-2f81b5c900e9>.

¹³⁸ Erol Manisalı in Cumhuriyet 02.02.2009, Orhan Bursalı in Cumhuriyet 03.02.2009.

how to act as a “civilized” diplomat¹³⁹. Cumhuriyet has indicated that a leader should have known the codes of Davos and should have acted upon according to such rules; otherwise if a leader does not have any idea about those codes or rules, he does not belong there. Such statements were clearly accusing Erdoğan of being incapable to be a leader.

Finally, Radikal, on the other hand, does not provide any comment that questions Erdoğan’s legitimacy as a leader. Even if Erdoğan’s style is criticized by some columnists such as Altan Öymen¹⁴⁰, these criticisms do not relate with comments which questions if Erdoğan’s should represent Turkey, especially in the international arena. These criticisms mainly focus on the leader’s style.

4.1.1.2 Status quo:

Another notion that leader-aligned media and opposition media conflict with each other is about the status quo. Status quo, in this study stands for the position regarding the current existing state of political affairs. The position that defends status quo underlines a will to maintain the political dynamics as they are. While Yeni Şafak defends the necessity of a change in status quo that had kept Turkey incapable of utilizing its full potential, Cumhuriyet punctuates that a “different and dangerous kind of mentality¹⁴¹” is taking over Turkey’s administration.

¹³⁹ Erdal Atabek in Cumhuriyet 02.02.2009.

¹⁴⁰ Altan Öymen in Radikal, 31.01.2009.

¹⁴¹ Ümit Zileli in Cumhuriyet, 05.02.2009.

In this part, the term status quo is utilized as defending the current state and position of political and social affairs. While examining the articles collected from columns and hard news from selected newspapers, we realize that the periphery expresses a necessity to change Turkish foreign policy dynamics; on the other hand the center accentuates the importance of clinging to the position that has been assimilated since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

To begin with, Yeni Şafak has characterized the leader “Erdoğan ” as a “hero” blessed by holy mightiness¹⁴². The term hero has always been linked with religious connotations such as blessed or canonized. A leader has been able to reach the statute of being a hero by his piousness because the subject was being able to resist and revolt against cruelty committed towards innocent Muslim brothers and sisters. So, the idea is to embrace piousness in order to progress into further success in the international arena that Turkey has never experienced before.

Adversely, Cumhuriyet has highlighted a dangerous shift in foreign policy that would alert a dramatic and dangerous change in Turkey’s position. Cumhuriyet has defended that it is crucial for Turkey to maintain its neutral position in the international arena rather than taking sides. Likewise, the statements disclose that Erdoğan ’s attitude was “wrong” because it will most probably lead Turkey to lose Jewish lobby’s support in the Armenian Genocide issue. Moreover, Cumhuriyet blames Erdoğan for losing USA’s support for several critical issues. In brief, Cumhuriyet castigates Erdoğan ’s behaviors also for

¹⁴² Yeni Şafak, 01.01.2009.

damaging the status quo. Consequently, the countries who welcome Erdoğan's actions in Davos are labeled as only being "third world countries"¹⁴³.

Lastly, Radikal, as the control group, does not provide any data that signal a criticism or appreciation of a change in Turkey's position in the international arena. The columnists do not discuss whether the status quo in foreign or internal policies have changed.

4.1.1.3 Trauma:

The notion trauma indicates a psychological trauma that occurred as a result of a traumatic event. Through this perspective, a point that has been emphasized by Yeni Şafak is the possibility of a coup d'état which could be initiated by Israel. Now that the periphery has the control of political dynamics, it feels threatened by being run over by "external forces"¹⁴⁴. At this point, a "trauma of coup d'état" or a "trauma of 28th February"¹⁴⁵ could be stated. At the monthly meeting of the National Security Council on 28 February 1997, the military presented the government with a list of 18 measures to restrain Islamic activity

¹⁴³ Hikmet Çetinkaya, Cumhuriyet, 03.02.2009.

¹⁴⁴ İbrahim Karagül in Yeni Şafak, 03.02.2009.

¹⁴⁵ At the top of the measures that National Security Council undertook on 27 February 1997, there was a proposal to extend compulsory continuous education from five to eight years. The aim was to shut down the middle school sections of Imam Hatip schools. According to the military these Imam Hatip schools were used to inculcate anti-secularist values. Although Erbakan (the head of the Islamist "Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*)", that was a member of a coalition government at that time) initially agreed to the measures, party officials admitted that implementing these measures would alienate the party's grassroots. The military continually augmented the pressure by encouraging NGOs to manifest against government as well as holding series of public meetings to warn about the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the military did not abstain from informing journalists that a "full-blooded" coup remained as an option of last resort. As a result of the forceful public pressure and erosion of coalition's parliamentary majority because of resignations from the True Path Party (center right party, coalition partner) Erbakan resigned from prime ministership on 18th June 1997.

such as: restrictions on the Islamist media, the closure of Koranic schools and courses, and so on.

On the other side, when Cumhuriyet's statements are examined their trauma might be pointed out as early upheavals in the Turkish Republican history. Just after the declaration of Republic and the abolition of caliphate, there have been several religious risings aiming to bring down the secular republican regime. This fear has been put out when Yeni Şafak has earnestly accentuated Turkey's obligation to respect Ottoman legacy and try to "return to its origins"¹⁴⁶. The right move is described as leaving the current understanding of diplomacy that holds Turkey in fitna¹⁴⁷ and disturbances and respecting and evaluating Ottoman legacy that has been neglected since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Ottoman Empire has been known as the alternative power of its time and Turkey should follow this example.

Finally, Radikal, once again, does not present any data that underline an historical event which would cause a trauma. None of the excerpts from Radikal has indicated previously mentioned historical event.

To sum up, under the issue of "control" the leader-media conflict through center-periphery paradigm can be summarized around three extents: First, the periphery does not want to lose control of political dynamics that it had earned recently and continually seeks for legitimacy. Likewise, it has a constant fear of being overthrown by the military. Consequently, the data analysis allowed us to highlight a sub-category of "status-quo". The

¹⁴⁶ Yeni Şafak, 31.01.2009.

¹⁴⁷ Fitna is an Arabic word meaning secession and upheaval. It is usually used by referring to the first civil war within the Islamic Caliphate that took between 656 and 661. This civil war broke the unity of the Muslim ummah and resulted in division of Islam between Shi'a and Sunni sects.

analysis of leader-media conflict after the Davos incident, enabled us to become aware of a struggle between center and periphery about whether to preserve the status quo in domestic and international policies or not.

Radikal aims to reflect views from both sides. This can be affirmed by the number of statements that criticize and acknowledge Erdoğan 's style during the Davos summit. However, the collected data illustrate that Radikal has possessed a certain degree of inclination towards center's approach about periphery's willing to take a control over media. Nonetheless, the reason for such inclination might be shown as Erdoğan 's blaming over the media for fabricating false news. Right after Erdoğan 's return to Turkey, there have been several news accentuating that the showdown at Davos and welcoming by masses at Istanbul were all pre-planned.

The importance of Radikal for these arguments is that it reveals the dialectic conflict between center and periphery by demonstrating other approaches. For example, the Peace and Democracy Party¹⁴⁸ has a different interpretation about Erdoğan 's attitude at Davos; their views that had been exposed via Radikal make us understand that Cumhuriyet and Yeni Şafak incite each other by acting upon center-periphery dynamics. BDP did not comment whether Erdoğan's actions were "civilized" or not but underlined the necessity to be direct also in internal politics.

¹⁴⁸ Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP). BDP is a political party that was established in 2008, after the launch of the closure case of Democratic Society Party (DTP) because of its alleged connections with PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, a separatist organization which is listed as a terrorist organization) .

4.1.2. Style

In this section the term style is considered as the way of utilizing communication assets. The category style allows us to analyze criticisms that evaluate the leader's way of acting, especially in international arena. Comments about Erdoğan 's style of expressing his discontentment have been linked with "westernization" discussions. Erdoğan 's actions were either "not civilized" or "an example of a true Turkish leader". As the comments from Cumhuriyet and Yeni Şafak are compared, another subcategory emerges under style caption: center and periphery conflict progress parallel to a conflict between materialism and spirituality. Here we observe periphery's objection to distant, ruse diplomatic games and praising "honourable", "dignified" showdowns. On the other hand, Cumhuriyet criticized the style of Erdoğan as "unsophisticated" and out-of date in today's complex world.

4.1.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality

The title of materialism vs. spirituality emphasizes the difference on whether evaluating somebody's actions by basing on spiritual, religious values or pragmatic parameters.

First, while examining the periphery reactions over the style of Erdoğan 's disposition at Davos, two phases emerge: First the actions of Erdoğan have been tried to be justified. The rightfulness of Erdoğan 's "storm-out" has been accentuated by enumerating several reasons to behave in such manner. The stress has been put on "agitation" and "incitation"

committed by Simon Peres¹⁴⁹. Then, the next phase is to glorify the attitude: the emphasis has been put on how “honourable” and “dignified” the action was¹⁵⁰. As it can be perceived by the chosen adjectives that have been employed to approve Erdoğan ’s gestures, a new sentimental approach to materialist diplomacy has been adorned.

Furthermore, according to the statements in Yeni Safak, Erdoğan has exerted a new technique: It has been stated that by such a “showdown” Erdoğan brought parties much closer to “solution”¹⁵¹. It has been stated seven times that such a “showdown” was in a way the missing link for the necessary leadership that would lead to solutions. It is continually declared that leadership necessitates such “manifest confrontations”¹⁵². Moreover, such new attitude in diplomacy should be celebrated as “losing the masks”¹⁵³ and “denunciation of mumming”¹⁵⁴ and finally adapting a limpid, transparent democracy. The best style to handle conflicts is emphasized as being direct and sincere.

On the other hand, Cumhuriyet has criticized Erdoğan for acting as a typical “Eastern politician” thus giving a “wrong” message to the international community about Turkey¹⁵⁵. Erdoğan ’s Davos attitudes have been entitled also as a “new Ahmadinejad incident”¹⁵⁶.

Three days after the the Davos showdown, periphery side highlights the charisma of Erdoğan and as reciprocation Cumhuriyet implies that periphery has no idea what to value in order to be successful in the international arena. They blame chasing cheap “charisma”

¹⁴⁹ Tamer Korkmaz, Abdullah Muradođlu in Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009.

¹⁵⁰ <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=02.02.2009&c=12&i=166686>.

¹⁵¹ Abdullah Muradođlu in Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009.

¹⁵² **Ibid.**

¹⁵³ Yusuf Kaplan in Yeni Şafak, 02.02.2009.

¹⁵⁴ **Ibid.**

¹⁵⁵ Cüneyt Arcayürek in Cumhuriyet, 31.02.2009.

¹⁵⁶ Cumhuriyet, 01.02.2009 and 02.02.2009.

rather than wisdom¹⁵⁷. The periphery is also blamed for being out of date because according to Cumhuriyet, glorifying the term charisma, has been only cherished during the 30s and 40s which had led to a disastrous Second World War experience. Erdoğan is also accused for effectuating a line of policy without any principles. Erdoğan is pursuing “Kasimpasa Model¹⁵⁸” of policy and this degrades Turkey’s credibility¹⁵⁹.

Lastly, in Radikal, one can see news and columns that cherish¹⁶⁰ and that reprove¹⁶¹ Erdoğan’s style of acting in Davos.

4.1.2.2 Individualistic vs. Collectivist Culture

Individualism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the individual. Individualists view themselves as independent and slightly connected to the groups of which they are a part of¹⁶². When establishing a level of their commitment to others, individualists balance the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship; the level of commitment generally correlates with the level of perceived benefit¹⁶³. The term “individualism” was first used by Alexis de Tocqueville in his leading-

¹⁵⁷ Nigün Cerrahoğlu in Cumhuriyet, 31.02.2009.

¹⁵⁸ The term “Kasımpaşa Model” is employed by Center to accentuate Erdoğan’s “vulgar” style of handling conflicts. Erdogan being raised in Kasımpaşa, a faubourg in Istanbul, utilizes “uncivilized” codes of this neighbourhood also as a Prime Minister.

¹⁵⁹ Hikmet Çetinkaya, 03.02.2009.

¹⁶⁰ Hasan Celal Güzel, Radikal, 01.02.2009 and Namık Kemal Zeybek, Radikal, 31.01.2009.

¹⁶¹ Türker Alkan, Radikal, 31.01. 2009 and Halık Şahin, Radikal, 31.01.2009.

¹⁶² Geert Hofstede, **Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind**, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p.261.

¹⁶³ **Ibid.** p.260.

edge work Democracy in America. Since then, individualism and its presumed antithesis, collectivism, have been the focus of many studies. Individualists generally hold that humans are fundamentally atomistic, and that they voluntarily join groups to further their own goals. The good of a group can only be an aggregate of the good of individuals. According to individualistic perspective, reason is the source of all knowledge. Consequently, individualists believe that emotions are programmed by subconscious rational processes that can be consciously reprogrammed when necessary. Self-reliance and competitiveness can be pointed out as main individualistic characteristics. When personal goals conflict with group goals, individualists tend to give priority to their personal goals¹⁶⁴. In brief, through the lenses of individualistic culture, a leader should emphasize ambiguity in language use in order to help ensure that a conflict does not “get out of control.” Likewise, for the leader maintaining emotional calm and reserve in style is crucial.

On the other hand, collectivism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the group¹⁶⁵. Collectivists view themselves as interdependent and closely linked to one or more groups¹⁶⁶. Maintaining a commitment to a group is always important, even when obligations to the group are personally disadvantageous. Norms, obligations and duties to groups are collectivist societies’ members’ primary concerns, and they tend to place a high value on group harmony and solidarity¹⁶⁷. Respect and cooperation are main

¹⁶⁴ Harry C. Triandis, **Culture and Social Behavior**, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1994, p.12

¹⁶⁵ **Ibid.** p.34-35

¹⁶⁶ **Ibid.** p.43-44.

¹⁶⁷ **Ibid.**

collectivistic values. When personal goals conflict with group norms, collectivists tend to conform to group norms¹⁶⁸. Collectivists also consider emotion and intuition to be sources of knowledge above and beyond reason, emerging from some instinctive, non-rational source. In brief, collectivist understanding can be considered as fostering a style that uses an indirect language, with more emotion shown during conflict. The credibility of each party in the dispute is gauged by how emotionally expressive and intense they are.

Consequently, differences at validating spirituality or materialism might be linked to different set of values between individualistic and collectivist societies. Center, advocating for the obligation to be aligned with the “West”, appreciates individualistic traits. On contrary, periphery, questioning the necessity of trying to be “Westernized” by unnaturing social structure, de facto supports a collectivist set of values.

The definition of culture should also be presented in order to be able to locate the subject of individualistic and collectivist culture in this research’s context. Even though there is not a unique definition of culture, it can be put out as the practices and the values common to a population living in a given setting¹⁶⁹. Culture is not a stable, fixed fact; it is malleable. It changes to relate to the symbolic dimension of life. New concepts and symbols emerging in daily life effect culture. What is meaningful; what is important? Who we are in relation to the others? The answers of all these questions are culturally determined. Culture helps to encode the messages that shape our perceptions, attributions, judgments, and ideas of self

¹⁶⁸ Geert Hofstede, **op. cit.**, p. 250-251

¹⁶⁹ Marc Howard Ross, **The Management of Conflict : Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective**, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 20-24

and other¹⁷⁰. Hence, cultures can incite conflicts. Culture might be considered as a fixed factor in conflict. Whether it plays a central role or influences it latently, culture is always present in the course of conflict. Through this perspective, when acknowledging or negating leader's style, parties are dependent on their cultural codes.

In brief, peripheries support for negating ruse diplomatic tactics and affirming a struggle for "Islamic community" might be linked to their cultural traits that favor collectivist approach. On the other hand, center's position that defends the obligation to favor nation's benefits instead of Islamic community might be connected with their link to individualistic culture. Likewise, center evaluates leader's actions by basing on pragmatic measures in order to calculate benefits and losses. This attitude might also be considered as an effect of the individualistic culture.

Last but not least, another aspect under the style section is that the periphery insistently looks for legitimacy for Erdoğan's actions. This search for legitimacy is similar to the search presented in the Control section. There have been four different communications that illustrate the support for "how" Erdoğan reacted. Affirming reactions that acknowledge Erdoğan's style of handling the conflict, from the opposition parties (CHP,MHP,DSP), from the Jewish community in the United States, from famous artists, from various parts of the society are repetitively conveyed to readers.

¹⁷⁰ Theodore Shwartz, Geoffrey M. White, Catherine A. Lutz (eds.), **New Directions in Psychological Anthropology**, NY, Cambridge University Pres,1992, p.17.

4.1.3 Right

The “right” category utilizes the term right both as being “morally right” and “factually correct”. The first statements could be put under style and control titles, however as the discussion and analysis have gotten deeper, the subjects were linked with questioning what is morally right or factually correct. Both, Yeni Şafak and Cumhuriyet have started by commenting on Erdoğan ’s style of acting but as the days go by the statements have reflected an evaluation about vision and values.

To begin with, right after the Davos incident, the statements in Yeni Şafak had concentrated on being “factually correct”. The statements were highlighting that “Peres accepted his fault” and the international and local community were approving Erdoğan as the “correct” side. However, beginning with the third day after the Davos storm-out, the statements focus on creating a different culture and being right at exposing “different set of values”. At this point the issue of legitimacy appears again: While Yeni Şafak enumerates support from international and local authorities, Cumhuriyet lists counter-arguments about Erdoğan ’s success.

4.1.3.1 Position:

The term “position” indicates an abstract place in socio-political continuum. In this study, parties’ positions might briefly be considered as being pro-East or pro-West. It has been discussed in Yeni Şafak that current diplomacy was “western fabricated” and thus was not

apt to Turkey¹⁷¹. Dominant western powers were controlling and manipulating the conflicts by the tools that they have “created”. So, in order to be able to stand against “oppression”, “injustice” and “atrocities”¹⁷², new sets of values and tools should be operationalized and Erdoğan was the leader who was initiating this “right” move. Yet again, Yeni Şafak expresses several statements from international press that certifies such change. There is a distinctive need to justify that such an initiative is the right move. Another point that has been expressed by Yeni Şafak can be considered as a will to change the status quo. Columnists discuss creating a “Sarajevo culture”¹⁷³ instead of a Davos culture, meaning that demolishing an away-from-public, elitist pure materialist Davos culture and maintaining Sarajevo culture that is based on “sharing”.

On the other hand, Cumhuriyet has claimed that Erdoğan’s act was a kind of declaration of not being on the “right” side. Such attitude was a clear intent to break with the Western world and trying to consolidate the bond with the Arab world. Erdoğan’s attitude should not be seen as taking the side of the oppressed, but should be interpreted as putting religious values and benefits over national values and benefits. So, Cumhuriyet announces that being in the international arena as a mouthpiece for Gaza signals the Islamisation of Turkey.

¹⁷¹ Nazif Gürdoğan, Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009.

¹⁷² **Ibid.**

¹⁷³ According to Nazif Gürdoğan the “Davos culture”, which is based on consumption, should be replaced by the “Sarajevo Culture” which is based on sharing.

4.2 Iranian Case

The first important thing to note in the Iranian case study is Iran's "not-free status" attributed by the Freedom House. The opposition in Iran generally transmitted its messages latently. Especially, criticisms which were directed to Ahmadinejad's attitudes during Durban-II conference ceased suddenly and this might be related to heavy surveillance by government.

There has been a distinct difference between the number of news drawn from Kayhan and Etemaad. While 52 news were drawn from Kayhan, only 24 news excerpts were drawn from Etemaad. This difference might be linked to the heavy surveillance of government over media and to the consequence of auto-censorship. Vast number of imprisoned journalists and banned newspapers might be inciting journalists to perform auto-censorship.

IRNA, the control group for the Iranian case, possesses neither negative nor positive comments about Ahmadinejad's speech at the Durban conference. Only eleven articles have been drawn from IRNA. It was quite interesting to not find any positive comments. However, it would be necessary to accentuate that negative reactions from the international media were also not reflected by the agency. IRNA was always as brief as possible while giving the news.

4.2.1 Control

The conservative part of the Iranian case, *Kayhan*, does not mainly focus on the control issue. It is probable that as the opposition media in Iran is under strict control through censorship and amendments, the conservative media might not need to keep the control issue on the agenda. Yet, the statements in *Kayhan* underline that the Durban conference and that the attitude that Ahmadinejad displayed, affirmed the reasons that assert him being in charge.

On the other hand, the first issue that attracts attention while examining statements drawn from *Etemaad* is that the criticism over Ahmadinejad's attitudes start with comments over his style. Behrooz Behzadi indicates that the aggressive style that Ahmadinejad presented at the Durban conference was summarizing why Iran lacked support in the international arena¹⁷⁴. However, two days after the Durban conference, the criticism about Ahmadinejad's "uncivilized" manners totally ceases. This can be related to the strictness of the Iranian regime about criticisms related with leaders' personalities. Then, the evaluations and criticisms focus on how the leader wants to "control" all the media tools. Again, Behrooz Behzadi underlines that any criticism to Ahmadinejad was reflected by government aligned media as an act of treason¹⁷⁵. This shift might be considered a way of highlighting the discontent of not being able to express ideas about how Ahmadinejad does not possess the appropriate attitude to represent Iran in the international arena. The most frequent statement that can be traced in *Etemaad* are about how Ahmadinejad wants to

¹⁷⁴ Behrooz Behzadi, *Etemaad*, 31 Farvardin 1388.

¹⁷⁵ Behrooz Behzadi, *Etemaad*, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

utilize any opportunity in order to stage a misleading heroic image¹⁷⁶. Likewise, Ahmadinejad has been criticized for trying to employ such an important event as a tool for propaganda. It is believed that Ahmadinejad's attitudes had been planned in order to attract votes for the upcoming elections¹⁷⁷. In brief, the opposition media underline how Ahmadinejad exploited Durban conference in order to increase his votes in the upcoming elections.

As it was seen in the Turkish case, in both parties there is a constant effort for sustaining legitimacy by giving comments from the international media.

4.2.1.1 Legitimacy:

Kayhan, being close to the government circles, highlights the international support for Ahmadinejad's speech. The comments of the world leaders that find his speech honourable and right were quoted in the newspapers. Especially the support from the Lebanese and Syrian press were highlighted¹⁷⁸. This illustrates the search of periphery for their recognition as the power holder. Constant criticisms over Ahmadinejad's capability of representing Iran well especially in the international arena might have forced leader-aligned media to underline international support. Ahmadinejad's legitimacy has always been questioned because before 2005 presidential elections he had never run for office.

¹⁷⁶ Elyas Hazrati, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁷⁷ Ali Malihi, Etemaad, 01 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁷⁸ Kayhan, 01 Ordibehesht 1388.

Before entering the 2005 presidential elections, he had been the mayor of Teheran for only two years and he had been appointed, not elected. This appointment has been evaluated as by-passing elections and as a result Ahmadinejad has always been experiencing an encounter with the legitimacy question. Even if he won the presidential elections of 2005 by 62 percent, the reliability of these elections were also questioned. Consequently, the news gathered from international press that supports Ahmadinejad's actions in the Durban Conference can be interpreted as a reflex to validate Ahmadinejad's standing in power.

In contrary, Etemaad emphasized Bernard Kouchner's comments about Ahmadinejad's speech. Kouchner commented on the reasons to the desertion of several UN delegates while Ahmadinejad was giving his speech¹⁷⁹. Kouchner accused Ahmadinejad for damaging the nature of the Durban conference by giving an anti-Semite speech. However, Etemaad has been severely criticized by Kayhan for collaborating with the "Zionists". According to Kayhan, criticizing Ahmadinejad's discourse is in a way denying the crimes committed by the "Zionist regime". After such accusations, Etemaad has not published any more views from the international authorities. Several imprisonments of journalists and bans against newspapers might have caused Iranian opposition to be more reticent in pursuing criticism on certain subjects. Reporters without Borders rank Iran's press situation as very serious and underlines that Iran has more journalists in jail than any other country¹⁸⁰. Such pressure over opposition media incites center's trauma caused by Iranian Islamic revolution. Center's trauma can be traced between the lines while transmitting the news. On the other hand periphery reflects its own trauma, which is discussed in length, below.

¹⁷⁹ Etemaad, 31 Farvardin 1388.

¹⁸⁰ <http://en.rsf.org/iran-iran-12-03-2010,36684.html>

4.2.1.2 Trauma:

Most of the statements that are made in Kayhan, focuses on the rightfulness of values that Ahmadinejad represented in his Durban speech. It has been emphasized that Ahmadinejad's attitude was definitely right because it was a bearing against "inhumane organizations of the West"¹⁸¹. World public opinion had to be aware of the "Zionist conspiracies" and Ahmadinejad made it possible¹⁸². Moreover, Kayhan underlined that the Durban conference could be considered as a trap but Ahmadinejad managed to avoid falling into this trap. The periphery constantly highlighted possible traps that are prepared by the West. The constant fear from traps planted by the "evil West" can be linked with the periphery's historical trauma: The Iranian history incites Iranian periphery to align center with "imperialism". In 1963, the Shah, under the direction of the U.S., embarked on a development program of economic, political and social reform which was launched by the Shah under the name of White Revolution. Designed by the U.S. policymakers, this program was apprehended, especially by the Iranian periphery, as a comprehensive imperialist effort to head off upheaval from below, strengthen the Shah's regime, and turn Iran into a modern, more industrial society with a growing middle class and wider opportunities for foreign capital¹⁸³. This revolution was considered hostile against periphery as it did not aim any mobilization for the peasantry. Coupled with a program of selling state-owned industries to private investors and encouraging capitalist agribusiness and co-operatives, land reform helped "move landlord capital into industry and other urban

¹⁸¹ Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan, 01 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁸² **Ibid.**

¹⁸³ Fred Halliday, **Iran: Dictatorship and Development**, pp. 106-07, 110.

projects and to lay the basis for a state dominated capitalism in city and countryside”¹⁸⁴. Such Jacobin westernization attempt forced Iranian periphery to perceive the notion of “West” in a negative connotation.

On the other hand, Iranian revolution can be considered as an act to throw Iranian center away from the political power. Despite the westernization, modernization attack initiated by the Shah, the periphery was living not benefitting from these attempts. Over-ambitious socio-economic program of the Shah brought economic shortages and inflations that mostly the periphery endured¹⁸⁵. Consequently, Iranian periphery supported a revolution that overthrew Iranian center from the power. Right after the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution the opposition inside the revolution was suppressed. National Democratic Front was banned in August 1979 and Muslim People’s Republican Party was banned in January 1980. Moreover, in August 1979, after the election of the constitution-writing assembly several newspapers and magazines opposing Khomeini’s idea of theocratic rule by jurist were shut down¹⁸⁶. Such oppression created a trauma for center that caused a constant fear from current regimes’ political dynamics. For example, as indicated in “control” section of the Iranian case, Etemaad constantly underlines the difficulties that they encounter while they try to pursue their jobs¹⁸⁷. Throughout the news exerted from Etemaad the pressure over them is accentuated and the reader can understand their purpose for a more liberal regime. This purpose might also be articulated as an effect of their fear from being cleared away, which can be related to their trauma.

¹⁸⁴ Nikki R. Keddie, **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**, Yale University Press, USA, 2003 p. 144.

¹⁸⁵ Robert Graham, **Iran: The Illusion of Power**, Croom Helm, London, 1978, pp.17-19.

¹⁸⁶ Ashgar Schirazi, **The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic**, I.B. Tauris, London, New York, 1998, pp.50-52.

¹⁸⁷ Behrooz Behzadi, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

4.2.2 Style:

To begin with, Kayhan cherished Ahmadinejad's style, as it was again the same in the Turkish case, for being "direct" and "bold". His attitude of not halting to read where several delegates were leaving the room was embraced as a noteworthy act¹⁸⁸. This acknowledgement can be considered as a symbolic relief for Iran's marginalized peripheral ruling class. This class, being isolated for around about thirty years, was staying in the UN conference room, which symbolized the international system, where some others were feeling obliged to leave. This time, an attempted act of isolation was keeping them in the international milieu. Kayhan has repeatedly underlined that the desertion of some delegates was not Ahmadinejad's fault because the ones that had left exhibited their unwillingness to hear the voice of the "Iranian people". Iran was willing to cooperate and communicate with Zionist regime and Western collaborators were refusing even to communicate.¹⁸⁹ So, Ahmadinejad was successful in showing how collaborative Iran was but at the same time he exposed this will of collaboration without giving any compensations.

On the other hand, in the very first news in Etemaad about Ahmadinejad's Durban performance, the main criticism has been that Ahmadinejad does not know the rules of how to act in the international arena¹⁹⁰. Ahmadinejad and his advisors were blamed for not knowing how to employ diplomatic skills to gain support in an international setting¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ Hossein Shariatmadari, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁸⁹ Kayhan, 02 Ordibehesht 1388

¹⁹⁰ Ali Malihi, 01 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁹¹ Jamileh Darol-Shafaie, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

Furthermore, Ahmadinejad has been accused for emitting a bad image of Iran and Iranians. It is questioned if it has to be Ahmadinejad who represents a country which constitutes “a civilization of five thousand years”¹⁹². Ahmadinejad’s incapability of being a political leader was proven by his inconvenient acts in Durban conference¹⁹³.

Yet again, similar to the Turkish case, while Kayhan was utilizing words that has acquired spiritual connotations, Etemaad intended to evaluate Ahmadinejad’s performance through a more pragmatic perspective.

4.2.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality.

The adjectives that are most frequently used to describe Ahmedijad’s are “dignified¹⁹⁴” and “honourable¹⁹⁵”. Ahmedinjad’s position during the Durban conference was cherished also by linking Ayatollah Khomeini’s philosophy. Kayhan underlined that Ahmadinejad gave a lesson on how to apply Ayatollah Khomeini’s principles to diplomacy. His politeness and dignity while giving his speech gave a lesson of love to the entire world that he had learned from Imam Khomeini¹⁹⁶. Ayatollah Khomeini, as a leader that had defended a theocratic system put religious and moral values ahead of pragmatic needs. For example, Khomeini strongly opposed close relations with neither Eastern or with Western bloc. He suggested

¹⁹² Hegameh Shahidi, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388.

¹⁹³ Etemaad, 01 Ordibehesht, 1388.

¹⁹⁴ Hossein Shariatmadari, 31 Farvardin 1388.

¹⁹⁵ **Ibid.**

¹⁹⁶ Kayhan, 31 Farvardin 1388.

that Islamic world should form its own bloc¹⁹⁷. He based this belief on spiritual, religious values rather than a pragmatic calculation of world dynamics. This understanding influences peripheral political figures throughout their experiences in the political arena.

On the other hand, Etemaad, criticized Ahmadinejad's speech for not being able to appraise the chance to re-bond Iran with the outer world. He has also been blamed for just accusing other countries in his speech but never mentioning any projects about Iran. Hence, Etemaad underlined the difficulty to consider Ahmadinejad's speech as a successful foreign policy act. Here, we see that Etemaad exposed a pragmatic calculation of what would be beneficial for Iran's position in the international arena. Religious and moral evaluation of Ahmadinejad's attitude was tried to be kept aside. Besides, Khomeini has been criticized by the opposition as unsuccessful in pursuing a beneficial foreign policy. The opposition underlined that even if it was Saddam Husayn of Iraq who started the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, Iranian forces went on the offensive in July 1982; and it was Khomeini who continued the fighting for another six years. The war, which cost some 300,000 lives and uncounted billions of dollars, ended in discreditable failure for Khomeini, who likened the decision to accept a cease-fire to "drinking poison." Moreover, from Khomeini's perspective, allocating so many resources to Iran-Iraq war meant postponing the spread of the revolution to Lebanon and Afghanistan¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁷ Baqer Moin, **Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah**, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2000, pp.54-62.

¹⁹⁸ K. L. Afrasiabi, **After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy**, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994, pp.31-35.

4.2.3 Right

Kayhan propounded that Ahmadinejad exposed a right attitude by underlining that his actions were apt to the road Ayatollah Khomeini traced. Khomeini expressed that the essential of Iranian Islamic revolution was to serve the interests of Islam and the divine government” of the Islamic state¹⁹⁹. Here we see periphery, influenced by the doctrines of Ayatollah Khomeini, validates religion over nation.

On the other hand, when we evaluate the statements in Etemaad through the grills of moral rightfulness, it would be fair to state that the main point is Ahmadinejad’s fault at putting personal benefits over national benefits. According to Etemaad, Ahmadinejad should have utilized this opportunity to ameliorate Iran’s image in the international arena. However, he aimed to employ this opportunity as a way to increase his popularity at home. This would bring us to mention another conflict between leader-aligned media and opposition media: a conflict between having an emphasis on nation or religion.

¹⁹⁹ John Esposito and R. K. Ramazani (eds.), **Iran at the Crossroads**, Palgrave, UK, 2001, pp.133-138.

4.2.3.1 Nation vs. Religion

The title of Nation vs. Religion highlights the difference between leader-aligned media and opposition media on whether privileging the notion of “Iranian nation” or “Islamic community”. Leader-aligned media advocates that Iran’s development is related with Islam’s rise and growth. On the other hand, opposition media defends that Iran’s citizens’ needs are neglected in order to pursue the delusion of being the leader of Islamic world.

Kayhan has continually indicated how Ahmadinejad was standing against Zionist conspiracies and “fighting” in the name of the entire world of Islam. As Khomeini accentuated the necessity to fight against Zionism and Western imperialism, periphery embraced the thought of prioritizing the idea of being the guardian of Islamic revolution. During his speech in Qom, in 13 March 1979, Khomeini said: “Don't listen to those who speak of democracy. They all are against Islam. They want to take the nation away from its mission. We will break all the poisonous pens of those who speak of nationalism, democracy, and such things.”²⁰⁰ This quote elucidates periphery’s dedication to put religion over nation, Islam over nationalism. Ahmadinejad, being a member of the

²⁰⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini qtd in Yonah Alexander, Milton M. Hoenig, **The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East**, Greenwood Publishing Group, USA, 2008, p.26.

periphery and a committed follower of Khomeini acts according to these thoughts. Ahmadinejad underlines, in every occasion, his commitment to Imam Khomeini²⁰¹.

On the other hand, according to Etemaad, the main aim of the Durban Conference should have been improving foreign relations instead of “cheap”, “populist” showdowns. As stated earlier, Ahmadinejad’s speech focused on blaming other countries for their various actions but did not talk enough about Iran. However this opportunity could have been employed to tell the “right” things about Iran and present them its true image. Moreover, Ahmadinejad has been blamed for brandishing a populist culture which has no principles. The statements focus on the leader’s incapability of providing a vision for the future. However, we cannot trace any comments that clearly indicate the necessity to privilege the notion of “nation” rather than “religion”. In the Iranian context, it would be critical and controversial to express such an argument directly. Such expression would be contradicting to Khomeini’s discourse, which is not tolerated in Iran.

To conclude, the analysis of the Iranian case enables us to see that the conflict between leader-aligned media and opposition media starts in the style section. The opposition media criticizes the style of the leader in handling crisis; on the other hand leader-aligned media cherishes his actions by underlining the virtue in his moves. However, as the days go on, the discussions appear to be about the nature of the political regime. Center and periphery clash with each other whether the emphasis should be on “nation” or on “religion”. It is

²⁰¹ For example, on October 25th, 2005 during his speech at the Ministry of Interior conference hall in Teheran, he said “ *The Imam(Khomeini) said this regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time*”. In this infamous speech, it can be realized that Ahmadinejad’s rage against Israel is shaped with the sayings of Imam Khomeini.

also possible to trace periphery's fear from "West" and center's fear from "the institutions Islamic Revolution. Center and periphery's traumas can also be realizing in the frame of leader-media conflict that appeared after the Durban II speech of Ahmadinejad.

4.3 Cross-Relational Analysis

First of all, comparing the Turkish and Iranian cases allowed us to recognize the difference between media developments in free and not free countries. This is obvious in both quantitative and qualitative analysis. While the number of news from both sides was almost equal in the Turkish case, in the Iranian case, there was a major difference between the center and the peripheral news. Qualitatively, there is also a difference in the way center and peripheral media presented these conferences in Turkey and in Iran. In Iran, the opposition media had to convey messages latently. However in Turkey, the opposition media, Cumhuriyet was able to publish serious accusations about the leader.

Nevertheless, even if the level of freedom is different between two countries, in both cases there was a constant effort for validating legitimacy for their arguments. Both the periphery and the center were trying to support their positions and arguments by presenting comments from several authorities. This constant attempt to look for international validation of their political representation might be interpreted as an indicator of problems in their political regime. If there has been a functioning democracy in these countries, theoretically the legitimacy of political power holder could have been validated thorough fair elections. However, even after maintaining the majority of the votes²⁰², peripheral

²⁰² Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections in 2005 by taking 62% of the votes and AKP won the general elections of 2007 by collecting 46,58% of the votes.

leaders in these countries needed to highlight international support for their mandate's legitimacy. These attempts to validate their mandate through international support were clearly seen after the discourse analysis.

Another conflict can be observed over what have been discussed under the title of the "status quo". In Iran, the center advocates a change in order to alternate the dynamics that had been set after the Islamic revolution. However, in the Turkish case, the center promotes maintaining the status quo in order to hinder a fully "centralized periphery". In Turkey, the defense of status quo by the center can be explained by their fear of experiencing an Islamic revolution in Turkey. The center in Turkey is afraid of change because the center believes that there is a possibility of experiencing the same process that Iran experienced after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The fear of being totally put out of the political arena might be forcing the center to defend a status quo of political dynamics in Turkey. On the other hand, in Iran, the periphery defended the necessity to preserve the status quo in political arena because the periphery fear that any change in political life or regime might cause a total collapse of the regime. The complex political regime in Iran though to be viable only because of the charisma of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini and since his death there is always a fear of a total collapse of this complex political regime.

It has been salient to detect that both in Turkey and Iran, the periphery employed words with spiritual connotations. On the other hand center tried to pursue analysis based on relatively pragmatic measures.

Yet again, it has been appealing to contemplate that each party to the conflict, but especially the periphery, possessed certain traumas. For an inter-group conflict to occur,

the opponents must have a sense of collective identity about themselves and about their identity²⁰³. The historical traumas might help to build up these collective identities.

According to Cohen and Young²⁰⁴, groups and social classes form their image, the meaning of their lives and their appraisal of those who are not part of them through the media. The media supplies public “social knowledge”. It serves as a base for the formation of a personal identity and the distinction between us and others. As in many other social fields, media coverage also involves issues of power. The access of different social groups to the media is not equal. For example in the Iranian case, because of the power disparity, the opposition media had little opportunity to diffuse its arguments. This fact is evident both in the extensive and favorable coverage of “powerful” groups that contribute to the endorsement of their legitimacy as those with power. In both Turkish and Iranian cases the group that was aligned with the current political power aimed to legitimize its values, political positions and lifestyles. In brief, as it has been seen throughout this study, media is effective in confirming constructed collective identities.

²⁰³ Louis Kriesberg, **Constructive Conflicts from Escalation to Resolution**, Rowman & Littlefield, NY, 2003, p.91.

²⁰⁴ S. Cohen and J. Young, **The Manufacture of News. Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media**, Sage Publications, London, 1981.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main aspiration of this study was to provide a different approach to leader-media conflicts by looking from center-periphery paradigm. I believed such analysis would provide a more complete understanding of why leaders and media conflict with each other. As mentioned in the second chapter, literature review revealed that leader- media and center- periphery conflicts show certain parallelism and this parallelism can be summarized under three sections.: “control”, “style” and “right”. These three categories provided me a starting point to work on through a discourse analysis. As new categories and sub-categories emerged, understanding the role of social structuring over leader-media conflicts become clearer.

The literature review in this study allowed me to enumerate certain parallelism between leader-media and center-periphery conflicts: There is a constant encounter between leader and media as well as center and periphery over the control of sanctions and enforcements. Secondly, media contradict with leader over his/her style of acting while performing in the international arena or handling a domestic issue. Likewise, center and periphery experience clashing life-styles (which can be summarized as a conflict between modernist and conservative life-styles). Last but not least, media and leader, as well as center and periphery, can be in conflict over the definition of what is right. All these three categories allowed me to unveil sub-categories which elucidate parallelism between leader-media and center-periphery confrontations.

General findings from the discourse analysis illustrated that the media and leader confront with each other like center confront with periphery over the control of information. Media can utilize information to challenge leader's authority and legitimacy. Such criticism might create a conflict with leader that might cause his/her fall of the power. Thereupon, it can be realized that behind the conflicts of leader and media, there exists a "legitimacy" issue. After the analysis of Turkish and Iranian cases, problematic of legitimacy reveals an inconvenience with political regimes of these countries. Even if the leaders won the elections they search for international support and appreciation for their presence in power. Moreover, findings that appeared through data analysis allowed me to underline that leader and media conflicts might be caused by historical traumas. These historical traumas can be viewed as root causes for several leader-media conflicts. Current conflicts might be better understood and analyzed by revealing a possible historical trauma that might be triggering it.

Another point that findings highlight is that leader and media confrontations might reveal latent value differences. One group's fundamental belief about the best way to live may vary radically from the values that are cherished by another group. Parties may have different definitions of rightness. Likewise, parties may give fundamentally different answers to moral questions. When groups have different definition of the right life-style, they may develop incompatible goals that can lead to conflict. Values are stable and people are often unwilling to compromise on value related issues. Sets of values also have an effect on patterns of thinking. So, this study allows us to better understand a leader's decision and conflict with the media because it allows us to include leader's relation to a certain social setting. Media conflict with leader over his/her style of handling problems or

issues. Center and periphery embrace contradicting life-styles and values; and actors in center and periphery try to influence each other. Media and leader can be currently in conflict over what is the right attitude to handle a problem. Center and periphery confront each other to place their values to the center of political structure in order to define the notion of “right”. As seen in the literature review, when interpreting conflict-related information, people use their cognitive processes. John Burton indicates, it would be harder to negotiate on value-related issues. He also adds that in a value-related conflict negotiating is harder because positions, interests and needs of each party are based on cognitive notions. Parties have difficulties in defining a solid, concrete relation between each other; thus finding commonalities and conciliating both parties becomes harder and more complicated. This kind of a confrontation can also be perceived in the analysis of this study.

When Turkish and Iranian cases are compared, it can be seen that the subcategories that emerge through discourse analysis are similar. Yet, in Iranian case, opposition media do not mention any possible traumatic events that would be a part of their collective memory. However, this difference might be because of a strict prohibition of any opposition against the Iranian Islamic revolution.

Another importance of this study is that it provides us the possibility to evaluate the role of democracy in leader media conflicts. Iran and Turkey were selected as parts of this comparative case study because they allowed us to apply a most similar case design. The only difference between these two cases that Iran is qualified as “not free” while Turkey is labeled as a “free” country by Freedom House reports. This study shows that democracy

allows media to represent different sets of values. In Turkey, the opposition media was able to criticize harshly leader's style during his performance in the international arena. Likewise, the opposition media in Turkey was able to speak out its historical trauma, paranoia of an Islamic revolution. However, in Iran, the opposition media did not have any chance to latently express its fears and traumas. Direct criticisms about leader's style in handling an international crisis were limited. The major difference between the number of news drawn from Kayhan and Etemaad illustrates the pressure on opposition media²⁰⁵.

Furthermore, this study also aimed to bring a contribution to conflict resolution field by employing center-periphery dynamics to analyze intergroup conflicts. The notion of centre-periphery had only been used in conflict resolution while examining post-Soviet intergroup conflicts in ex-Soviet countries; however this study utilizes center-periphery paradigm to explain an intergroup conflict mainly linked with modernization process.

To conclude, this study is important because it aimed to combine two dissimilar areas in order to provide a deeper understanding to a relatively less studied subject: leader-media conflicts. In order to approve the validity of this deeper understanding, similar research design might be applied to cases in different region of the world. Such application would help to formulate a better and a more complete evaluation of a leader.

²⁰⁵ This pressure can be practically observed while trying to access internet sites of opposition newspapers. It takes a very long time to open these sites while any other site can be easily accessed at the same time

APPENDIX

Frequency of Data Drawn from Turkish Case

Table 1.1




Table 1.2





Table 1.3



Frequency of Data Drawn from Iranian Case

Table 2.1




Table 2.2




Table 2.3




Table 3

Comparing Themes and Sub-themes in Turkish and Iranian Cases

			Turkey	Iran
CONTROL	legitimacy	Center	Proving inaptness of current political leader	Highlighting pressure exerted on them
		Periphery	Affirming their presence in political power	None
	Status Quo	Center	Maintaining current foreign policy dynamics	Demanding a more liberal regime
		Periphery	Adapting a new understanding in foreign policy	Protecting the complex nature of the current political regime
	Trauma	Center	Ottoman Empire experience	Iranian Islamic Revoltuion
		Periphery	February 28	White Revolution

STYLE			Turkey	Iran
	Materialism vs. Spirituality	Center	Pragmatic measures	Pragmatic measures
		Periphery	Basing on virtue	Basing on virtue
	Individualistic vs. Collectivist culture	Center	Individualistic	Individualistic
		Periphery	Collectivist	Collectivist

RIGHT			Turkey	Iran
	Position	Center	Pro-West	None
		Periphery	Pro-East	None
	Nation vs. Religion	Center	None	Nation
		Periphery	None	Religion

REFERENCES

Documents

- Adle, Chahryar and Hourcade, Bernard (eds.), **Téhéran: Capitale Bicentenaire**, Paris and Tehran, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992.
- Weissman, Mikael, **The Missing Link- bridging between social movement theory and conflict resolution**, Garnet Working Paper No: 60/08

Books

- AFRASIABI, K. L., **After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy**, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994.
- ALEXANDER Yonah and HOENIG, Milton M., **The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East**, USA, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008.
- BARBER, J. D., **The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House**, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1992.
- BEHDAD S. and ALIZADEH P. (eds), **Iran's Economy: Dilemma of an Islamic State**, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000.

- BURNS, J.M., **Leadership**, New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1978.
- CHIBNALL, Steve, **Law and Order News**, Routledge, 2003.
- COHEN, S. and YOUNG, J., **The Manufacture of News. Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media**, London, Sage Publications, 1981.
- COMBS, J.E., and NIMMO, D., **The New Propaganda: The Dictatorship of Palaver in Contemporary Politics**, New York, Longman, 1993.
- CROCKER, A. Chester, HAMPSON, Fen Osler and AALL, Pamela (eds.), **Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict**, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
- CROCKER, A. Chester, HAMPSON, Fen Osler and AALL, Pamela, **Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World**, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2007.
- CROTHERS, Lane and LOCKHART, Charles (eds.), **Culture and Politics**, NY, St. Martin's Press, 2000.,
- DRUCKMANN, Daniel and DIEHL, Paul F. (eds), **Conflict Resolution**, London, Sage Publications, 2006.

- ESPOSITO, John and RAMAZANI, R. K. (eds.), **Iran at the Crossroads**, UK, Palgrave, 2001.
- FISHER, Roger, URY, William L., PATTON, Bruce, **Getting to Yes**, New York, Penguin, 1991.
- GARDNER, John W., **On Leadership**, New York, The Free Press, 1993.
- GRAHAM, Robert, **Iran: The Illusion of Power**, London, Croom Helm, 1978.
- HABERMASS, Jürgen, **The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society**, Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1991.
- HALLIDAY, Fred, **Iran: Dictatorship and Development**, New York, Penguin, 1979.
- HALLIN, D., Mancini, P., CURRAN, J., GUREVITCH, M., **Comparing Media Systems. Mass media and society**, London, Arnold, 2005.

- HUMPHREYS, Paul and McIVOR, Ronan (eds.), **Interorganizational Relationships and The Implications for Leadership and Organization Development**, Bradford, Emerald Group Publishing, 2006.
- HEPER, Metin, **The State Tradition in Turkey**. Northgate, The Eothen Press, 1985.
- HOFSTEDE, Geert, **Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind**, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1991.
- JOWETT, Garth S. and O'DONNELL, Victoria, **Propaganda and Persuasion**, California, Sage Publications, 1999.
- KATZOUIAN, Homa and SHAIDI, Hossein (eds.), **Iran in the 21st century: Politics, Economics and Conflict**, New York, Routledge, 2008.
- KEDDIE, Nikki R., **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003.
- KELLERMAN, Barbara, **Bad Leadership: What is it? How it happens? Why it matters?**, Cambridge, Harvard Business School Press, 2004.

- KRIESBERG, Louis, **Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution**, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

- KRITZ, Neill, (ed.), **Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes Vol.II: Country Studies**, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1995.

- LERNER, D., **The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East**, NY, Free Press, 1958.

- LINZ, Juan J. and STEPAN Alfred C., **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe**, London, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996

- MARDIN, Şerif, **Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey**, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 2006.

- MARDIN, Şerif, **Bütün Eserleri 6, Makaleler 1, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset**, İstanbul, İletişim, 2002.

- McLUHAN, Marshall and QUENTIN, Fiore, **The Medium is the Message**, San Francisco, Hardwired, 1964.

- MOIN, Baqer, **Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah**, New York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2000.
- MOLAVI, Afsin, **The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Journey to Freedom**, NY, Norton, 2006.
- MOWLANA, H. and WILSON, L., **The passing of modernity: Communication and the transformation of society**, NY, Longman, 1990.
- MUGHAN, Anthony and GUNTHER, Richard, **Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- O'REAGAN, **Australian Television Culture**, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1993.
- POLSBY, Nelson W., **Community Power and Political Theory**, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980.
- POST, Jerrold M., **The Psychological Assessment of Individual Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton**, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003.
- RABIE, Mohamed, **Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity**, Connecticut&London, Proager Press, 1994.

- REMOND, Bruno and BLANC, Jacques, **Les Collectivités Locales**, Paris, Presse de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique and Dalloz, 1999.

- ROSS, Marc Howard, **The Management of Conflict : Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective**, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993.

- SCHIRAZI, Ashgar, **The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic**, London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 1998.

- SAVRAN, Sungur and BALKAN, Neşecan (eds.), **The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State**, New York, Nova Science Publishers Inc, 2002.

- SEMATI, Mehdi (ed), **Media Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State**, New York, Routledge,2007.

- SHILS, E., **Center and Periphery: Essays in Macro Sociology**, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975.

- SHWARTZ, Theodore, WHITE, Geoffrey M., LUTZ, Catherine A. (eds.), **New Directions in Psychological Anthropolgy**, NY, Cambridge University Pres,1992.

- TOPUZ, Hıfzı, **II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi**, Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2003.

- TRIANDIS, Harry C., **Culture and social behavior**, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1994.
- TURNER, Bryan, **Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism**, London, Routledge, 1994.
- VALENTY, Linda O. and FELDMAN, Ofer (eds), **Political leadership for the New Century**, Imprint Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2002.
- WARD, Robert and Rustow Dankwart (eds.), **Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey**, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964.
- WOLFSFELD, Gadi. **Media and the Path to Peace**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- WOOD, Ellen Meiksins, **The Origin of Capitalism**, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1999.

Articles

- AMUZEGAR, Jahangir, "Khatami and Iranian Economic Policy at Mid-Term," **The Middle East Journal**, Autumn, 1999, pp-534-552.
- BAHRAMPOUR, A., "A comparative review on publication of the press after the Islamic Revolution", **Rasaneh Quarterly**, Vol.14 No.4, 2002, pp.82-93.
- BEM D. and FUNDER D., "Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing the Personality of Situations", **Psychological Review**, 85, 1978, pp.488-501.
- DIRLIK, Arif, "Modernity as History. Post-Revolutionary China, Globalization and the Question of Modernity", **Social History**, Volume 27, Issue 1 January 2002, pp.16-39.
- ECKHARDT William and WHITE, Ralph K., "A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), pp.325-332.
- EHSANI, Kaveh, "Islam, Modernity, and National Identity", **Middle East Insight**, 11-5, July-August 1995, pp.48-53.

- GAMSON, William A., CROTEAU, David, HOYNES, William, SASSON, Theodore, "Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality", **Annual Review of Sociology**, Vol. 18 (1992), pp.373-393.

- HEPER, Metin and DEMIREL, Tanel, "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.", **Middle Eastern Studies**, 32, no. 2 (1996), pp.109-123.

- HERMANN, G., PRESTON, Thomas, KORANY, Baghat, and TIMOTHY, M. Shaw, **Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals**. International Studies Review, 2001.

- HERMANN, Margaret G. and HAGAN, Joe D., **International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters**. Foreign Policy 10, 1998.

- HERMANN, Margaret G. and HAGAN Joe D., **International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters**. Foreign Policy 100, 1998, p.124-137.

- LIBMAN, Aleksandr , "Cycles of Decentralization in the Post-Soviet Space", **Russian Politics and Law**, Volume 48, Number 1, January-February 2010, pp.8-20.

- McCOMBS, M and SHAW, D.L. "The Agenda-setting Function of the Mass Media", **Public Opinion Quarterly**, 73, 1972, pp.176-187.

- MIRZAEI, A., “Economic and social obstacles in front of scholarly-intellectual publications in Iran”. **Negah-e Nou August**, Vol. 37 No. 7, 1998.

- SALEM, Paul E., **A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective**”, **Negotiation Journal**, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 1993, pp.361-369.

- SANDOLE, J.D., **A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach**

- SCHNEIDER, Lawrence, “Book Review: Media Logic”, **Journalism Quarterly**; Autumn80, Vol. 57 Issue 3, pp.512-512.

- SHPIRO, Shlomo, “Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism”, **Politics**: 2002 Vol 22(2), pp.56-85.

- STANILAND, Martin, “ The Rhetoric of Centre- Periphery Relations”, **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, Vol.8, No.4 (Dec,1970), pp.617-636.

- VADI-I, Kazim, **Idara ve Taqsimat-i Kishvari-i Iran**, Barrishia-i Tarikh-i 4 (Summer 1969).

- WANIS- St.JOHN, Anthony , “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally”, **Negotiation Journal**, Volume 19, Number 4, October 2003, pp. 389-396.

Newspapers

- **Hürriyet**
- **Radikal**
- **Yeni Şafak**

Electronic Sources

- Last accessed on May 25, 2010 to find
AMUZEGAR, Jahangir, “Iran’s Theocracy under Siege.” **Middle East Policy**,
Spring 2003 at
<http://www.mepc.org/journal/journal.asp>
- Last accessed May 25, 2010 to find
AMUZEGAR, Jahangir, “Iran’s Third Plan: An Appraisal,” **Middle East Policy**,
Fall 2006 at
<http://www.mepc.org/journal/journal.asp>,
- Last accessed June 29, 2010 to provide information about Dogan Media Group at
<http://kurumsal.milliyet.com.tr/>

- Last accessed on July 01, for “Iranian Media” at
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>
- Last accessed on May 05, 2010, for “ Indigenous Conflict Management Mechanisms at <http://www.caii.com/>
- Last accessed on April 30, for “Conflict Research Consortium Staff, Book Summary of The Functions of Social Conflict by Lewis Coser “ at
<http://www.crinfo.org/>
- Last accessed on July 01,2010 for “Media and Elections” at
<http://www.edb.utexas.edu>.
- Last accessed March 20, 2010 for country reports about Turkey and Iran at
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>
- Last accessed June 01, 2010, for BUHAUG Halvard, CEDERMAN Lars-Erik, and ROD Jan Ketil, **Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory**, at
<http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/>
- Last accessed on June 01, 2010, for “Iranian Media” at
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/>

- Last accessed on July 01, 2010, for Stuart Hall, “ Culture and Power”
<http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/>

- Last accessed on July 05,
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/>

- Last accessed on June 01, 2010, for KARELMAS, Nilay, "Turks Get Some of the News Not All," **World Press Review** , Vol. 48, No. 12. (Dec. 2001) at
<http://www.worldpress.org/>

- Last accessed July 05,
<http://yenisafak.com.tr/>

- Last accessed May 20, for KADIOGLU, Ayse, "**The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity**," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, no. 2 ,April 1996 at
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/>

- Last accessed on July 11, 2010,
<http://www.etemaad.ir/Released/88-12-10/default.htm>

- Last accessed on July 11, 2010,
<http://www.kayhannews.ir/>

- Last accessed June 01, 2010, for HIEBER, Loretta, "Media as Intervention", **CCR**, Vol.7, No.4, 1998. and
GALTUNG, Johan, "High Road, Low Road", **CCR**, Vol. 7, No.4, 1998 at
<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive>

- Last accessed on August 01, 2010,
<http://en.rsf.org/iran>

- Last accessed on August 01, 2010,
<http://www.bianet.org/files/>