

**RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TOLERANCE IN TURKEY**

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
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
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TOLERANCE IN TURKEY**

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PhD Dissertation, Fall 2010

Supervisor: Prof. Ali arkođlu

**Keywords:** Democracy, religiosity, tolerance, democratization, civic culture

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, a new wave of democratization started to be experienced throughout the world. Investigations of these democratization attempts concluded that some countries were more successful in processes of democratization while others embraced more conservative attitudes to maintain the undemocratic status quo. What might be the factor(s) easing/hindering democratization in certain settings? This thesis aims to answer this question. Focusing on the significance of individual attitudes for democratization and the factors shaping these attitudes, the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes is analyzed comparatively across four religious affiliations – Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity- using the 2005-2006 World Values Survey dataset. Once the importance of religiosity to civic culture and tolerance and of the availability of civic culture and tolerance to democratization is shown through the statistical analyses, the thesis turns its attention to a more specific subject; tolerance in Turkey. In-depth interviews conducted with individuals of different religiosity and education levels aim to obtain more detailed information on individual democratic attitudes and motivations behind them. The findings are analyzed to evaluate the relevance of religiosity for the already-known intolerance in Turkey. The divergences with regard to attitudes of tolerance identified within the Turkish public signal the relevance of various factors to shaping tolerance rather than leveling it. Both religiosity and education level, besides many other factors, have significant impacts on tolerance in different aspects.

## ÖZET

DİNDARLIK VE DEMOKRATİK TUTUMLAR:

TÜRKİYE'DE TOLERANS ÜZERİNE AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA

NAZLI ÇAĞIN BİLGİLİ

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**Anahtar sözcükler:** Demokrasi, dindarlık, tolerans, demokratikleşme, vatandaşlık kültürü

Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminin ve Sovyet Blok'unun çözülmesinin ardından, dünya genelinde yeni bir demokratikleşme dalgası hissedilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu demokratikleşme girişimleri üzerine yapılan araştırmalar bazı ülkeler demokratikleşme sürecinde daha başarılı olurken bazılarının demokratik olmayan statükoyu korumak için daha da muhafazakâr tutumlar benimsediği sonucuna varmıştır. Farklı durumlarda demokratikleşmeyi kolaylaştıran/engellenen faktörler neler olabilir? Bu tez bu soruya cevap vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kişisel tutumların ve bu tutumları şekillendiren faktörlerin demokratikleşme için önemine odaklanarak, dindarlığın demokratik tutumlar üzerindeki etkisi 2005-2006 Dünya Değerler Araştırması verilerinin kullanımı ile dört inanç grubu –İslam, Katoliklik, Protestanlık ve Ortodoksluk- arasında karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmektedir. İstatistiksel analizlerle dindarlığın vatandaşlık kültürü (civic culture) ve tolerans için, vatandaşlık kültürü (civic culture) ve toleransın da demokratikleşme için önemi gösterildikten sonra, dikkatler daha özel bir konuya, Türkiye'de toleransa çevrilmektedir. Farklı dindarlık ve eğitim seviyelerinden kişiler ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler kişisel demokratik tutumlar ve bunların arkasındaki motivasyonlar üzerine daha detaylı bilgi edinmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bulgular dindarlığın Türkiye'de hâkim olan, hâlihazırda bilinen, toleranssızlıkla ilişkisini değerlendirecek şekilde irdelenmektedir. Türk halkı arasında gözlemlenen tolerans ile alakalı tutumlardaki farklılaşmalar, çeşitli faktörlerin toleransı seviyelendirmekten ziyade şekillendirmekteki önemini göstermektedir. Hem dindarlık hem eğitim düzeyi, başka pek çok faktörün yanı sıra, tolerans üzerinde farklı boyutlarda anlamlı etkiye sahiptir.

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## INTRODUCTION

The virtues of democracy have dominated political discussions since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Communist Bloc. Huntington (1991) identified three historical waves of democratization that mark significant periods in which several countries made attempts to democratize at the same time. The first wave took place between 1810-1922 when suffrage was widened to a large proportion of the male population in the United States and in many Western European countries. While the number of democracies fell to less than half in the next twenty years under the influence of strong fascist regimes in Europe, the triumph of allies in the Second World War started another wave of democratization (the second wave between 1944-1957) in which independence movements in Western colonies overseas also took place. Yet this wave was also confronted with a reverse wave. Although the third wave had already begun in the 1970s in Southern Europe, the two massive historical transformations mentioned above helped it spread to different parts of the world; i.e. Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Far East, South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these earlier endeavors, widespread attempts of democratization started to be experienced throughout the world only after these globally-influential transformations that took place at the very beginning of 1990s.

Closer investigations of these endeavors to democratize the then-undemocratic countries have concluded that some countries were more successful in processes of democratization, or at least quicker in promising these transformations, while others embraced more conservative attitudes to maintain the undemocratic status quo. Researchers and scholars, then, have directed their attention to this divergence among different countries and several explanations have been provided to give meaning to this discrepancy. What might be the factor(s) easing/hindering democratization in certain



settings? Although different prerequisites to democratization have been suggested, the focus lately has been extensively on the cultural prerequisites. Consensus has been reached that “democracy is more than a set of political institutions” (Gibson, Duch and Tedin, 1992, p.330) and that it requires a congruent mass culture. Democratic culture, frequently labeled as civic culture in the literature, has been defined through some individual attitudes in the political and social spheres, more so in the latter. Socioeconomic development has also attracted attention in these discussions; yet, the recent agreement with regard to the significance of this prerequisite is that its impact can be felt on democracy only through the development of a democratic culture. This explanation added to the centrality of civic culture for democratization. The generally accepted idea is that for the establishment of democracies throughout the world, the first attempt should be development of a civic culture.

What, besides socioeconomic development, might encourage/hinder civic culture development that would pave the way to successful democratization? Identification of these factors was important because the hopes for future democratizations would be shaped accordingly. If the significant factors were permanent and stable, the lack or availability of civic culture would also be permanent; destroying hopes for future developments. Dynamic factors, on the other hand, would suggest hope for development of a civic culture anywhere once these factors are altered in the direction needed. Many different arguments have been made with regard to these determinants; yet, the discussions have usually revolved around religion in explaining the variations in different countries’ potentials for civic culture development and receptivity to democracy.

The Sociology of Religion and disciplines concentrating on social and political phenomena distinguishes between different dimensions of religion. The role of both religious denominations – as the belonging dimension- and individual religiosity – as both the belief and the practice dimensions- are analyzed in these studies. Although there has been some disagreement on the number of dimensions to be emphasized, it was never claimed that the impact of religion can be fully measured through only one of them. The three dimensions mentioned above are the most widely used ones. While the belonging dimension is about the individual’s commitment to a denomination, belief represents the importance of God or religion in one’s life. The practical dimension is the

most down-to-earth aspect, as it is about the frequency of the individual's participation in religious practices. While the impact of religiosity has not been ignored completely, the democratization literature focused more on the significance of different characteristics of religious denominations; measuring religiosity only through its belonging dimension.

With the intention to explain different probabilities of successful democratization through the differences between religious heritages, most theories in the democratization literature focus on compatibility of different denominations with democracy. Huntington fired this compatibility debate by his 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis. He argued that the post-Cold-War world order would be marked by conflicts among civilizations and the main distinction would take place between Western Christianity on the one hand and Muslim and Orthodox worlds on the other. He defined the former to be suitable for representative democracy with its principles; i.e. rule of law, individual rights and secularism. Huntington paid special attention to the Islamic civilization with his claim that a fault line between the West and Islam has been persistent for 1,300 years. The focus shifted even more towards Islamic civilization, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks which were interpreted to be proofs validating Huntington's thesis. The practical invisibility of democracy in most of the predominantly Muslim countries has also strengthened the view that Islam, per se, is incompatible with democracy.

While many scholars have advocated that some intrinsic principles of Islam conflict with democratic norms (Pipes, 1983; Kedouri, 1994; Huntington, 1997; Lakoff 2004; Lewis 1996, 2005), some others have maintained that Islamic concepts such as *ijma* (consensus) and *shura* (consultation) display Islam's compatibility with democracy (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Armstrong, 2000; Hefner, 2000; Mernissi, 1992; Nasr, 2005). What these hypotheses on the nature of Islam have in common is the references they make to the principles of this belief system.

The third approach to the debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy; however, has pointed to the impracticality of labeling religions as pro- or anti-democratic due to their complex natures. This argument is critical of perceiving religions as homogeneous systems of belief due to the fact that any religion can be

interpreted in many different ways at the same time, and the application of these different interpretations would inevitably be different in practice. “History has shown that nations and religious traditions are capable of having multiple and major ideological interpretations or reorientations” (Esposito, 1991, p.434). The possibility of different interpretations of a certain religion across time and space shifted the focus from the permanent principles to the dominant interpretations within the scope of the research. The idea of monolithic civilizations is criticized in this third approach and multi-vocality of religious traditions is advocated. “It is important to avoid monolithic and unidimensional characterizations of political Islam” (Tessler and Grobshmidt, 1995, p.160). Believing in the validity of the third approach and aiming an exploratory inquiry into some social and political phenomena, this thesis attaches more importance to the role of individual religiosity than to the characteristics of religious denominations.

The main research question of this thesis is “What kind of a role, if any, does religiosity play in shaping democratic attitudes?”. The focus on religiosity is a reflection of the importance attributed to individual attitudes in explaining social and political phenomena. Concentrating on the major characteristics of denominations homogenizes them and leads to an analysis of their principles. Social and political research; however, should be done through the interpretations of these principles rather than the written rules, as the former would be stronger in explaining the practical realities. Religiosity is about the application of religious principles into practice through an individual’s interpretation of them. Thus, the relationship between religion and democracy can be better understood through the analysis of individual religiosity. Acting as an important criterion of intra-denomination distinctions, religiosity also reflects the major characteristics of the denominations. Religious people strongly reflect the characteristics of their denominations as they are committed to the principles of their belief systems and act according to them. Comparisons among members of the same denomination with different religiosity levels in terms of their democratic attitudes will display the dynamism of religious interpretations, breeding hope for further democratization in the future. Hence; special attention is given to the role of religiosity in this thesis due to the comparatively weaker emphasis in the literature. However, the impact of belonging is also taken into account in the comparative analyses.

This thesis aims to answer the research question stated above through a two-step analysis. Study 1, as the first step, consists of two quantitative analyses measuring the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes across different denominations. The denominations included in these comparative analyses are Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam. Study 1 does not offer a simple comparison between Christians and Muslims but pays attention to major denominations of Christianity separately. The reason behind the formation of such a model is the vast literature on the distinctions between these groups, even specifically with regard to democratic attitudes. A complete divergence is suggested between Western Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy in terms of receptivity to democracy by Huntington and his followers. Even though both Catholicism and Protestantism have been argued to be compatible with democracy, a highly repeated argument is that different social organizations dominant in these denominations lead to different attitudes among their members. Practically, the World Values Survey also provides these denominations as different answer choices for the question on individuals' self-declaration of their religious membership. The same, however, was not done for Muslims. Moreover, the literature on the differences between Sunni and Shia Islam focuses on diversity in religious principles rather than individual attitudes of democracy.

In both quantitative analyses of Study 1, besides the dimension of belonging, individual religiosity is measured through three different aspects; belief, practice and self-evaluated religiosity. Moreover, the role of education levels and income are also examined in these analyses as they are believed to be the representatives of socioeconomic development on the individual level. In terms of their dependent variables, the two quantitative analyses represent two different dimensions of democratic attitudes. Initially, the individual attitude believed to be crucial for successful democratization was support for democracy. It has been argued that "stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy" (Diamond, 1999, p.168). Later works; however, emphasized the significance of internalizing democratic values. Democratic attitudes, in this sense, involve both belief in the importance of democratic governance and the individual predisposition to democratic attitudes. While the first analysis concentrates on support for democracy, the second one focuses on embracing specific democratic values. The values to be included in these analyses have

been chosen with reference to the discussions on core components of civic culture in the literature. Five democratic values have been found important; trust, civic engagement, gender equality, participation and tolerance.

Study 2 attempts a step further in understanding the relationship between religiosity and democratic attitudes and explores how tolerance is shaped on the individual level in Turkey. Tolerance, among other values, deserves to be discussed in detail because it is the only value directly related to the defining principles of democracy. Democracy is briefly defined as the rule by people. People, in this definition, refer to all the adult population living in a polity. Thus, inclusion of the whole adult population into the decision-making process and the establishment of equality among them form the building blocks of a successful democracy. Defined as respect for diversity, tolerance provides peaceful coexistence of these different groups and enables their incorporation into the social and political system through participation as equal citizens. Comparisons between tolerance and other values found to be important also display that these other values can only be adopted by tolerant people. In other words, tolerance makes the other attitudes possible.

Tolerance has also attracted great attention empirically. Besides the U.S. focused works, tolerance in mostly Orthodox countries of the post-Communist world has also been analyzed in detail as an attempt to support democratization in these countries. The idea was that for the democratization attempts in this region to be successful, tolerance had to be adopted. Although the factors necessary for democratization in the Muslim world have also been discussed in length due to the argument that the Muslim World constitutes another traditionally undemocratic civilization, such a focus on this most relevant value is missing in this region. The tolerance level even in Turkey –the almost seventy years old pro-Western democracy of the Muslim World- is found to be extremely low compared to the tolerance in the Western World. Still; the factors behind such strong intolerance in Turkey have not been questioned yet. Turkey provides an interesting setting for such an analysis due to not only the availability of different minority groups in the society, but also the schisms within the majority. The second study of this thesis elaborates on tolerance in Turkey through face-to-face in-depth interviews with forty respondents. Four groups of respondents were chosen on the basis of religiosity and education level so that the roles of these factors were obviously

observed. The detailed explanations provided by the respondents will provide more information on the significance of all relevant factors in shaping tolerance on the individual level.

All the arguments mentioned above are theoretically discussed in the next chapter. The chapters of Study 1 and 2 follow in order with details on both the methodologies and the findings of the analyses made. Study 1 consists of three chapters. The first one focuses on the methodological details of the two quantitative analyses and talks about the dataset –World Values Survey- and of the variables used in these analyses. The second chapter is completely about the first quantitative analysis on the impact of religiosity on support for democracy. After a description of the model used, the major findings of the multinomial logistic regression is provided. The last chapter of Study 1 uses the control variables of the model in the previous analysis as separate dependent variables and concentrates on the analyses of the impact of religiosity on internalization of different democratic values. These statistical chapters offer an overall understanding of the concepts relevant to the research question of this thesis and suggest comparative analyses of the relationships between them. Through the use of multiplicative variables, the impacts of indicators are separately calculated for the members of each group.

Study 2 provides a more focused analysis on the relationship between religiosity and tolerance in two chapters. In the first one, even before the methodological details of the empirical research on tolerance in Turkey, the concentration on tolerance is empirically supported through the findings of the statistical analyses in Study 1. Comparing the responses provided by the respondents in different groups and using relevant quotations whenever necessary, the last chapter provides a systematic presentation of the findings of the in-depth interviews with an aim to explore the motives behind intolerance in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 1

### STATE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AND QUESTIONS OF INQUIRY ON RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRACY LINKAGE

Intense discussions and the resulting disagreements on the defining characteristics of democratic regimes (Dahl, 1982; Hadenius, 1992; Holden, 1988; Sartori, 1987; Schmitter & Karl, 1993; Vanhanen, 1984, 1990) have led to the concept of ‘democracies with adjectives’.<sup>1</sup> Liberal democracy (Diamond, 1999; Zakaria, 1997), accepted to be the most developed form of democratic government,<sup>2</sup> puts the emphasis on civil rights –i.e. freedom of expression, association and religion and the right to protection from discrimination- besides political rights of voting or holding an office. This shift in focus to individuals and social affairs more than, or at least as much as, the interest in the political actors and the relations of the individuals with the political sphere has directed more attention to cultural prerequisites in discussions on the different democratization experiences in various parts of the world.

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<sup>1</sup> Levitsky and Collier’s (1997) article titled “Democracy with adjectives” points to 600 “diminished subtypes of democracy” produced by scholars to reflect the mismatch between the existing democratic structures and the ideal democracy they had in mind. The two most commonly used labels are “delegative democracies” and “illiberal democracies”. (For further details on these subtypes, see Bollen and Paxton, 2000; Collier & Adcock, 1999; Diamond, 1999; O’Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004; Zakaria, 1997)

<sup>2</sup> The least developed form is usually labeled as electoral democracy –due to the fact that holding of free and fair elections are considered sufficient for democracy in this view- and the models in between that are deficient in different aspects are known as illiberal democracies.

## 1.1. Prerequisites of Democratization

Being inspired by the three-fold categorization used by Putnam in his analysis of the institutional performance among regional governments in Italy in the 1970s<sup>3</sup>, the literature on alternative routes to democratic governance can also be grouped into three categories –institutional design, socioeconomic factors and cultural factors. The supporters of the institutional paradigm argue that the official structure of institutions play a significant role in shaping the political regime in a country (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Rustow, 1970). This approach acted as the motivating factor behind the implementation of the modern West's institutions in different parts of the world in the 1960s so that these regions would also end up with successful democracies. This developmentalist approach had the aim of replicating the process of Western modernization in the developing countries (Wiarda, 1991). Larry Diamond also stressed the importance of institutions of a certain kind for the consolidation of democracy in a certain setting. His conclusion of the whole discussion on democratization was that “the single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is political institutionalization” (Diamond, 1994, p.15). Although the significance of the institutional design has been noted by many important scholars, lately greater emphasis has been put on the other two sets of factors, especially the use of individual-level empirical analyses that have become prevalent in the last two decades. Both socioeconomic and cultural factors have attracted considerable attention separately; yet, the strongest trend recently is to talk about their impacts in cooperation. The focus of this thesis also concentrates on these two factors, leaving the impact of institutional design to other analyses.

Also known as Lipset's hypothesis, the Modernization Theory mentions the democratizing impact of economic development (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Bollen, 1979; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Cutright, 1963; Jackman, 1973; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Despite the great attention paid to economic development, in a broader sense effective socioeconomic modernity. The first order in Rustow's list of conditions under

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<sup>3</sup> Putnam (1993) searched for conditions that create strong, responsive and effective representative institutions through his analysis of the new regional governments established in Italy in the 1970s. He recognized that the institutions in the North were more effective than the ones in the South and he aimed to explain the source of this distinction.



which democracy thrives is occupied by “economic and social background” defined as high per capita income, widespread literacy and prevalent urban residence. Searching for the conditions under which Polyarchies would develop and exist, Dahl (1971) reaches the conclusion that there is a significant association between competitive politics and socioeconomic level (p.62-67).

A widely used criticism towards the idea of wealth producing democracy argues that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates should have acted as ‘the model democracies’ if this claim was to be true (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p.37). Oil rich wealthy countries of the Middle East ruin the thesis that higher economic development makes democratization more likely; and hence proponents of this view aim to propose explanations for these outliers. In oil producing countries, economic development generates a very slight increase in the probability of the transition to democracy whereas the probability of transition becomes five times larger with economic development in other countries (Boix and Stokes, 2003, p.537). This peculiar situation of the Middle Eastern countries is usually explained by the “oil-impedes-democracy” thesis which argues that the wealth in oil resources does not really match with the economic development mentioned in the above discussed arguments.

Three explanations are offered by Ross (2001) as causal mechanisms hindering democratization among the publics of these countries. Besides the “rentier” and “repression”<sup>4</sup> effects that discuss both the authority and power oil brings to the governments of the oil-rich countries, the third effect put forward by Ross is the ‘modernization effect’ which argues that the type of economic growth experienced in oil-rich countries does not bring necessary social and cultural changes for democratization (p.327-328) –i.e. rising educational levels or occupational specialization (p.336)- and hence fall short of bringing about democratization. In this sense, economic growth is important for democratization as long as it produces significant social and cultural changes that actually pave the way to a real democratic regime.

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<sup>4</sup> The “Rentier effect” suggests that resource rich countries use low tax rates and patronage to make their publics economically satisfied so that pressures for greater accountability are relieved. The “Repression effect”, on the other hand, suggests that these countries can spend enormous amounts of wealth, which they get from oil exports, for internal security and hence can easily repress the masses’ attempts for democratization. (Ross, 2001)

Other non-economic explanations have also been provided for the peculiarity of the region. The “influence of Islam and region’s distinct culture and colonial history” (Ross, 2001, p.326) are some of these reasons that have been put forward. The significance of these cultural aspects has long been discussed and these discussions occupy a considerable space within the democratization literature. Religions have been the center of attention in most of these discussions.

Tocqueville, in his groundbreaking work *Democracy in America* (1956), specifically mentioned three principle causes that sustain democracy in America. Besides the context and law, Tocqueville also stressed the role of individual attitudes in keeping the democratic republic in America stable. Among these three principles, he even mentioned the third to be the most important. The literature focusing on the political consequences of cultural attitudes argues that the transition to and the consolidation of democracy requires supportive practices and attitudes among the public. (Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein, 1966; Lerner, 1958)

The political culture approach is critical of the idea that “making democracy work is simply a matter of having the right constitutional arrangements” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.160) as it supports that “democracy is more than a set of political institutions, it requires sustenance from a myriad of political, social, legal and economic values resident in the hearts and minds of the ordinary members of the polity” (Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992, p.330). The emphasis on the importance of cultural values on democratization is that democracy can formally be imposed on any society –in the form of electoral democracy- as institutions can be built under force and elections can be run under the control of a repressive power. Liberal democracy; however, needs mass support, as how well the autonomous choice provided to the citizens in a democracy is used largely depends on mass values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.149). The example of Germany after the First World War is provided to support the view that democracy cannot survive without masses with democratic culture. Although the democracy adopted in Germany after the War was perfect on paper, the people were not ready for it yet and hence that democratic experience resulted in the reign of Hitler. Research on this experience concluded that democracy becomes vulnerable when it is a democracy without democrats (Bracher, 1970). “Formal democracy requires a culture and organization greater than itself” (Heffner, 2000, p.11).

A culture is usually defined as the collection of shared values and attitudes in a society. The argument of political culture theorists is that pro-democratic attitudes of individuals in a society encourage democratic institutions, as collective democratic inclinations necessitate the establishment of institutions answering the democratic demands to keep the political regime functioning smoothly. Emphasizing the significance of these factors, “the political culture school argues that the values, beliefs and skills of mass publics have an important impact on politics in general and on democratic institutions in particular” (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p.141).

Signifying the impacts of both socioeconomic and cultural factors in cooperation, the main argument of the political culture theorists in general has been that economic development has an impact on democracy. Yet rather than being linked directly, the two variables are linked through an intervening variable; that is: democratic political culture, which consists of the political beliefs, attitudes and values flourishing in citizens of a democratically governed country. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) mentioned the significance of this intervening variable as early as in 1950s. Inkeles and Diamond (1980) also focused on the relationship between economic development and these democratic tendencies. Higher per capita GNP of a country was found, by Inkeles and Diamond, to be positively correlated with measures of tolerance, trust, efficacy and personal satisfaction among the citizens of the same country. Inglehart (1990) recently proved the same relationship between economic development, democratic values and democracy. All of these works have concluded that political culture acts as a variable linking higher economic development with stable democracy.

In Putnam’s comparison of Northern and Southern Italy, communities with high economic development were found to have more successful regional governments due to the fact that they were also the more civic communities. After controlling for civic attitudes, economic development was not found to have a direct impact on institutional performance. This argument by Putnam is in complete agreement with Inglehart and Welzel’s claim on the importance of self-expression values as an intervening variable between economic development and democratic governance. In their analysis, economic development was found to be important in shaping both culture and social structure in such a way that it makes the establishment of democracy easier. Although some other factors have also been mentioned to have an impact, in the long run, demands by the masses are likely to overcome all other factors in making democracy more likely in a

country (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). “Development increases people’s resources, giving rise to self-expression values, which give high priority to freedom of choice. Since democratic institutions provide the broadest latitude for free choice, people with self-expression values tend to seek democracy.” (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008, p.131) Economic development reshapes the goals and behaviors of human beings by fulfilling their already-existing physical and material needs. These old objectives are replaced by post-modern, non-material ones that pave the way to humanistic and libertarian values. These values necessitate the establishment of democratic institutions that will satisfy the expectations regarding individual rights and freedoms.

Almond and Verba’s (1963) *The Civic Culture* is the first acknowledged empirical work on the linkage between political culture and democracy. Although the limited number of cases -only five countries- used in this study made statistical analysis impossible, the book is interpreted to have moved political culture studies “from the realm of literary impressions to that of testable propositions” due to the fact that they based their theory on cross-national empirical data. (Inglehart, 1988, p.1204) The aim of the study was to discover the relationship between individual attitudes and motivations on the one hand and character and performance of the political system on the other. Speaking of the political culture of a society, they referred to “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population” (Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p.639). Their conclusion was that the mixture of subject and participant orientations of individuals in a society leads to civic culture that in turn leads to the establishment of democracies. The main contribution of this work to the study of politics was the method employed more than the content of the analysis or the conclusions reached. A shift from states or institutions to individuals as the level of analysis marked an important difference in political studies and has been followed by many other scholars. Following empirical studies also stressed the importance of individual attitudes in maintaining democratic institutions. (Baker, Dalton, & Hildebrandt, 1981; Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Inglehart, 1997; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 2002; Putnam, 1993)

Following this contributory work, in the post-1960s period, the works on democracy ignored the importance of political culture and the explanations provided for successful transitions to democracy in some parts of the world and persistence of authoritarianism in others were dominated by other criteria. Even if political culture was

taken into account as a significant factor, the focus was particularly on the elite, rather than the masses<sup>5</sup>. The 1990s, however, marked the revival of political culture theories that decisively focused on the attitudes and values of the masses through empirical analyses on the individual level (i.e. the leading works of Inglehart and his associates). Diamond (1993), for instance, criticized these earlier analyses of political culture due to their extensive focus on elite culture as, according to him, the ignorance of mass values and attitudes also meant ignoring some elements of political culture, mainly the ones that are more relevant for political developments. (Diamond, 1993, p.11) These new studies of the 1990s reversed the thinking of the earlier theories and argued that the values and choices of the masses would have an impact on elite behavior. Masses with civic values would direct the elites towards similar values and hence would produce elites acting in line with the requirements of democracy.

Adopting the main approach of the recent cultural theories, rather than sticking exclusively on cultural factors, this thesis will take into consideration the significance of socioeconomic development as well. This chapter will talk about civic culture through a discussion on the major factors determining civic culture development- that is, the factors making cultures civic- followed by the core values of a civic culture. Among these values, closer attention will be paid to tolerance and factors determining tolerance levels and tolerance in Turkey will be discussed afterwards.

## **1.2. Factors Determining Civic Culture Development**

As consensus has been reached regarding the significance of a congruent political culture for democratic governance; the question to be answered is “what are the factors making civic culture possible?”. The widely agreed idea that cultures are not totally static has raised hopes for the currently undemocratic settings. The challenge, then, is to recognize the factors keeping some cultures undemocratic and to find the appropriate tools to enable civic culture development. While the dominant religious orientation represents the static dimension, transformations are expected thanks to the

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<sup>5</sup> Two works by two prominent scholars reflected this dominant trend in the end of 1960s explicitly; Robert Dahl’s infamous book *Polyarchy* (1971) and Dankwart Rustow’s (1970) essay on democratic transitions. Later works also focused on the significance of choices of the ruling elite in democratic transitions. (Higley and Burton, 1989; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986)

changing levels of religiosity and socioeconomic development – on the basis of both individual education level and income and the level of material satisfaction in the society.

### **1.2.1. Religion**

Religion, as a social phenomenon, has to be considered in two different dimensions. While individuals can be grouped on the basis of religious heritages in the first instance, different levels of religiosity also generates intra-group divergences. The latter represents the dynamic aspect of religion and hence deserves to be more extensively analyzed. This latter dimension is more important than the former because a group of people cannot be told to make changes in their cultural heritages on the way to democratization while they can be directed towards certain changes in their religiosities, as religiosity is defined as the extent of individuals' cognitive commitment to the general religious beliefs. (Mc Daniel and Burnett, 1990) This aspect of religion has an active individual involvement. The studies on the topic; however, have paid much more attention to the impact of denominations on democratic attitudes.

#### **1.2.1.1. Religious heritage**

Three main variables have been accepted to be significant in determining the scope of cultural zones; historical traditions that also involve religious heritage, imperial legacies and geographical region. (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003, p.358) Among all, religion has usually attracted the greatest attention as a criterion of these groupings. The stability of religious heritage does not indicate complete resistance to transformation. Changing levels of socioeconomic development or other demographic factors might also have some influence on the members of a cultural orientation without eroding the role of cultural heritage altogether. Inglehart and Baker (2000) argued that the empirical evidence from 65 societies showed that values could change under the impact of different factors but they would still reflect their cultural heritage (p. 49). While economic development would bring change in the value systems, members of

different civilizations would follow different paths due to their specific cultural heritages (p. 22).

Cultural heritages mentioned in these discussions almost regularly refer to religious heritages –i.e. religious denominations. Religion, in this understanding, is considered to be a significant source of value orientations and hence is believed to have “a powerful impact on political culture and thus democracy” (Diamond, 1993, p.24). The predominant religious orientation in a society is accepted to be crucial in shaping the prevailing worldviews in that society (Inglehart, 1988, p.1229). The argument that institutions are shaped under the impact of the religious tradition of a society was made even back in the beginning of the twentieth century by Weber. However, the importance of religion and culture has been downplayed in global politics for a long time since then. The recent emphasis on civilizations in observing the world societies, however, reemphasizes the power of cultural communality as an important factor in politics. Following this approach of civilizations, Huntington (1996) divided the world into eight groups -Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, the Confucian world etc.- based on the enduring cultural differences –that were defined as permanent patterns determining the collective behavior of actors. While religion was not the only criterion used in his stratification, most of the civilizations were labeled with the name of the predominant religious orientation in the countries constituting them.

Building upon his earlier concern with the regions still dominated by undemocratic regimes in 1990s, Huntington launched a great discussion on the compatibility of certain religious affiliations with democracy through his later work on ‘Clash of Civilizations’. In talking about the three waves of democratization that have taken place since the 1800s, Huntington concluded that the persistence of autocracy in these regions was a consequence of their undemocratic cultures. The pessimistic ideas about democratization in the Eastern World compared to the pro-democratic West are common to both of Huntington works. Interpreting the post Cold War period in his latter research, Huntington stated that it would be unrealistic to expect the establishment of democracy throughout the world as most cultural traditions are incompatible with this regime type. Although Huntington (1993) believes that most cultures in the world are incompatible with democracy, he defines the Muslim world as the most likely trouble spot and argues that “conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years” (p.31).

Among the civilizations identified above, the main distinction was expected to take place between Western Christianity on the one hand and the Muslim and Orthodox worlds on the other as the former was found to be suitable for representative democracy with its principles; i.e. rule of law, individual rights and secularism. Orthodox countries were initially grouped with Muslim ones in this thesis- on the lowest end of the continuum of compatibility with democracy. Empirically, Inglehart and Baker (2000, p.40) also found out that Orthodox religious heritage had a negative impact on self-expression values. Among the large number of countries analyzed by Inglehart and Welzel, Orthodox ex-communist societies and Islamic societies were found to be below the 30% threshold; that is, less than 30 % of the general public in these societies emphasize self-expression values. 30 % was decided to be the threshold as it was recognized that more than 30 % of the public needed to emphasize these values for even a “formal” democracy to emerge in a country. Although Orthodox or ex-Communist countries were found to be similar to Muslim countries in their compatibility with democratic governance, practically, the extensive focus has been on the latter, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks which were widely interpreted to be proofs validating Huntington’s thesis.

Three approaches to Islam’s compatibility with democracy have been developed in the literature. The practical invisibility of democracy in predominantly Muslim countries has acted as a proof for the view that Islam, per se, is inhospitable to democracy. Some scholars have concluded that Islam and democracy are incompatible due to certain qualities of Islam that act as hindrances to democratization (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1984, 1991, 1996, 1997; Kedouri, 1994; Lewis, 1996, 2005; Pipes, 1983). One of these hindrances is Islam’s irreconcilability with modernity and rational thinking. The so-believed direct involvement of Islam in the public sphere and state affairs constitutes an obstacle for predominantly-Muslim societies to experience Western modernization –that is believed to be based on the principle of secularism. This suspicious view on Islam is based on the idea that a fusion between politics and religion is present within this religious orientation. This idea is provided in detail by Bernard Lewis (1987, pp.xvi-xvii) who states that “the true and sole sovereign in the Muslim view was God, from whose mandate the Prophet derived his authority and whose will, made known by revelation, was the sole source of law”. The conclusion, definitely, is that democracy cannot be established within such a fusion.



Actually, in all religions the deity is the ultimate decision-maker and all human-beings should act according to the God's rules. There is nothing differentiating Islam from Christianity in this respect at the theocratic level. What constitutes the difference actually is the way these teachings have been applied in practice. Withdrawal of religion from the public sphere had already been experienced when the first attempts of democratization were taking place in the Western world. Hence; the Western conception of democracy generally refers to the principle of secularism as a significant enabling condition<sup>6</sup>. Many thinkers, on the other hand, believed that structural differences might exist between various democratic regimes.

In Esposito's view, different democratic structures can be built in different contexts. Different democratic systems have been available even within the Western world and hence establishment of an Islamic democracy –not identical to the Western democracies that have already become the norm- is also an alternative. The difference in the proper relationship between popular and divine sovereignty constitutes the main distinction between the Western and Arab conceptions of democracy. (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991, p. 438) Islamic democracy is defined as having a limited form of popular sovereignty, limited by religious law. Although in a form different from the one available in the West, Islam and democracy can be reconciled. (Esposito, 1999, p.217-218)

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<sup>6</sup> This withdrawal was directed by Enlightenment philosophers who believed in the significance of worldwide modernization which would bring replacement of religion with rationality and secularization. Great emphasis has been put on secularization in Western theories of democratization; however, even the West itself could not have been successful in complete elimination of religion from society in practice. Discussions on "religious and emotionally charged issues such as abortion and euthanasia have grown increasingly salient" in the West (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p.19). For more theoretical discussions on the subject, see Casanova, 1994; Stephan, 2000; Hefner, 1998.

The findings of micro-level empirical analyses also support the argument that religion has kept its importance in the Western world. The World Values Survey has shown that more than three quarters of the respondents in 43 countries still declare to hold a belief in some supernatural deity, 63% declare themselves to be religious, and 70% state that they belong to a religious denomination (Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998). In another survey, the percentage of respondents claiming to believe in God, a universal spirit or a life force was found to be % 61 in Britain and more than % 95 -pointing to an extremely large proportion- in the United States. (Gallup & Lindsay, 1999). The United States has to be specifically mentioned within this discussion as it is usually suggested to be the country that could have established democracy without interfering with the religiosity of its citizens and that acts as a model for liberal democracy without strict secularism –as is understood in some Western European countries, i.e. France (Reichley, 1986; Thiemann, 1996). Inglehart and Baker (2000) also commented on persistence of interest in religion within the Western world and suggested that religion does not lose its significance even when survival is granted. Attendance in religious service might experience a decline; yet, religiosity and spirituality still carry their persisting importance.

Some empirical analyses in the Muslim world have made clear that Muslim people, even the ones who support attributing an important role to Islam in the political sphere, have great enthusiasm for democracy. Jamal and Tessler's (2008) survey research in the Arab world reached the conclusion that individuals favoring an Islamic democracy are not less likely than the ones who prefer a secular democracy to embrace democratic values (p.108). Tessler and Gao's analyses of a series of surveys conducted in Algeria, Jordan and Palestine support the same view that in these countries' individuals supporting democracy do not necessarily support secular democracy. They are almost evenly divided in two camps one that prefers Islamic democracy and one that prefers secular democracy (p.91). These findings also suggest that people who prefer Islam to be dominant on the political scene can still be supportive of democracy in the same way as people who prefer secularization are. Fox and Sandler's (2005) analyses, on the possibility of democracy being established in a context where religion and the state are not totally separated, arrive at the conclusion that lack of such a separation does not undermine liberal democracy. Putting forward the entanglement between religion and the state in almost all Western democracies, they argue that "the same is possible for Islamic states" as well (p.329). All these empirical findings are found to be supportive of Esposito's above-mentioned argument that different types of democracies –even an Islamist democracy- can be established in different contexts.

Besides the thinkers refuting coexistence of Islam and democracy to be impossible, there are many liberal Muslim thinkers who believe that even a Western style democracy can be established in Muslim countries. They interpret Islam to be reformist and progressive and hence capable of incorporating modernist policies. According to them, it is not Islam that is incompatible with democracy but the current understanding and application of Islam which consists of traditional and conservative interpretations. "Current religious groups are not committed to democratic values; they merely want to acquire political power in order to establish an Islamic sociopolitical order, which they define as the 'common good'" (Al- Suwaidi, 1995, p.109).

This outlook represents the second view on the compatibility of Islam and democracy that argues that there is nothing intrinsic in Islam that contradicts democratic values (Beinin & Stork, 1997; Esposito & Voll, 1996; Hefner, 2000; Kramer, 1993; Mernissi, 1992). To prove Islam's accordance with democratic governance, many intellectuals have pointed to Qur'anic concepts i.e. *shura* (consultation), *ijma*

(consensus) and *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) (Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 27-32; Stepan, 2001, p.233-236), that are believed to “provide some intellectual basis for the development of Muslim democracies”. (Anderson, 2006, p. 202) In this view, rejecting the idea that Islam inherently has undemocratic aspects, the rise of authoritarian political Islam in the Middle East is attributed to other, mostly socioeconomic, factors such as “weak economies, illiteracy and high unemployment especially among the younger generation” (Esposito, 1999, 240).

As the practical absence of democracy in the Muslim World has been used as a proof by the supporters of the first approach, arguments for the second view mention that the practical reality is interpreted wrongly. The idea of “Muslim exceptionalism”, indicating something special in Islam that makes the Muslim world inhospitable to democracy is refuted by supporters of the second approach suggesting that it is “Arab exceptionalism”. “Two-thirds of the world’s more than one billion Muslims are currently living under democratically elected governments” (Ibrahim, 2007, p.6); in Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Turkey and Nigeria. The remaining one-third are mostly Arabs and live in the broader Middle East, in Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt. This special situation in the Arab World is explained through the political attitudes of Arab dictators who have learned to use tools of power, oppression and fear in order to keep their societies under control. He further explained that authoritarianism in the Middle East has historical roots.<sup>7</sup>

Empirical information strengthens the relevance of “Arab exceptionalism”. “Among Arab countries at the beginning of the twenty first century, there is not a single democracy” (Minkenberg, 2007, p.902). In non-Arab countries; however, the number of democracies are on rise. Nasr, like Ibrahim, also supports the idea of “Arab exceptionalism” rather than “Muslim exceptionalism” and draws attention to the political openings experienced, since the early 1990s, in a number of predominantly Muslim countries- “all admittedly outside the Arab world” (Nasr, 2005, p.13). Stepan

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<sup>7</sup> The decolonization period Marks the early stages of initial Arab attempts to modernize and democratize. Wars with Israel, at this point, halted the attempts because the military rulers used them as a justification for their authoritarianism. The next step of authoritarianism was developed under the supervision of Soviet rulership. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the Arab dictators turned towards the West and especially towards the United States with the message that if they opened the channels of participation as an attempt to democratize their countries, the Islamist extremists would grasp the power. The Westerners’ stance was clear that they preferred autocrats over theocrats. While fear of radical Islamism is a serious political concern at this point, the danger of losing access to oil reserves of the region under a critical government is also very distressing for the Western powers.

and Robertson (2003) focused their study on 31 non-Arab Muslim countries and concluded that one third of these countries were overachievers when the levels of their economic development are taken into account -meaning that they were even doing better than was expected from their levels of economic development. Non-Arab Muslim countries were found to be 20 times more likely to be electorally competitive compared to Arab Muslim countries. This finding lead Stepan and Robertson to argue that rather than religious ones, the emphasis should be put on political factors -such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and high military spending in the region- in explaining the difference among countries with respect to their achievements in democratization and their tendencies to democratize.

Survey findings indicate that a similar divergence is also available among the publics of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries. It is suggested that the secular understanding has already wended its way through the non-Arab Muslim societies. Although the overwhelming majority of the citizens in both Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries consider themselves religious, 80 % of the respondents in the former believe that religious authorities provide adequate answers to social problems, only 60 % do so in the latter (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, & Meyer, 2007, p.1162). These differences among the Muslim countries refute arguments for large homogeneous civilizations as they signify important divergences within the Muslim civilization regarding individuals' self-identification, religiosity and their views of religious authorities (p. 1166).

Eva Bellin's (2004) response to the discussions on the availability of certain prerequisites of democratization in the Middle East is worth mentioning due to her remarkable point of view on the subject. She agrees that the Middle East and North Africa lack significant enabling conditions of democracy such as a strong civil society, a market driven economy, adequate income and literary levels, democratic neighbors and democratic culture. She; however, does not believe that the lack of these attributes explain the region's failure to democratize. Her argument is that other regions with similar deficiencies -for instance Sub-Saharan Africa with weak civil society, Eastern European countries with state economies, India, Mauritius and Botswana with poverty and geographic remoteness, Catholic and Confucian worlds accused of incompatibility with democracy at different times- have already managed to make democratic transitions. Then, she looks for something special to the Middle East and North Africa. Although the general tendency is to focus on Islam in talking about the peculiarities of

the region, Bellin's conclusion is that it is "the will and capacity of the states' coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative" (p.143). She identifies four variables determining the robustness of the coercive apparatus in a state; good fiscal health, international support, weak institutionalization and low levels of popular mobilization (p.144-147).<sup>8</sup>

The third approach to the compatibility of Islam and democracy, on the other hand, disagrees with interpreting religions as homogeneous entities and hence argues that religious orientations should not be labeled as pro- or anti-democratic. "History has shown that nations and religious traditions are capable of having multiple and major ideological interpretations or reorientations" (Esposito, 1999, p.216). In real world, elements both to support and to criticize democracy can be found in each and every religion (Stepan, 2001) and elements more or less supportive of democracy can be emphasized by dominant figures of any religion at different points in time depending on their intentions with respect to democratization. According to Esposito, appreciating the diversity of Islamic actors is the challenge at this point (p.191). He labels the understanding of a monolithic Islam as a Western myth (p.201) and criticizes the little recognition provided for the differences among Islamic organizations or activists (p.197).

The multi-vocality of religious traditions, contrary to the view of monolithic civilizations, is what is being stressed in this third approach. Hefner (2000) is critical of the generalization about Islam being, by nature, related to state and public affairs and hence being incompatible with democracy. He argues that "there is enormous range of opinion among Muslims on precisely these matters" (p.12). Although Islamists generally ask for a role for Islam in the state, the Qur'an does not command Muslims to establish Islamic states and it even prohibits compulsion. As an alternative to the Islamists, proponents of civil pluralist Islam, "an emergent tradition affirming democracy, voluntarism and a balance of countervailing powers" (p.12), do not want an

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<sup>8</sup> Wealth in the region helps these states to remain authoritarian by two ways. One, by keeping the security apparatuses powerful and two by not collecting any taxes from the people. These states are called rentier states. Western support for authoritarian regimes in the region has been discussed in footnote 7. The structure of the military apparatuses in the region has also supported an antidemocratic trend due to the dominance of patrimonial ties in their organizations. Personal linkage between the coercive apparatus and the regime results in the apparatus's personal identification with the regime and its fierce resistance to political reforms (p.149). Citizens' unfamiliarity with experiments of political liberalization through self-determination also results in low enthusiasm for democratic reforms (p.150).

Islamic state. Public culture, for them, depends on mediating institutions in which citizens develop habits of free speech, participation and tolerance.

Attitudes towards the Rushdie Affair<sup>9</sup> constitute an example of divergence of opinions within Islam indicating that different readings of Islamic teaching are possible. Besides the pluralism within religions, the principles of a religion may breed different interpretations in time. The change in the Catholic Church's attitude to democracy is usually provided as the example in these discussions. Certain religious orientations once known to be antidemocratic, i.e. Roman Catholicism, have been witnessed developing into the most passionate supporters of democracy over time (Elshtain, 2009, p.16).

This third approach to the compatibility debate, then, concludes that due to all different sorts of interpretations possible for any religion, the main focus of analyses among different religious orientations, should be on individuals –who openly claim to be Muslims, Protestants, Catholics etc.- and their attitudes towards democracy rather than on an examination of the theological knowledge. “.. there is nothing intrinsic in Islam, and for that matter any other religion, which makes them inherently democratic or undemocratic. We, the social agents, determine the inclusive or authoritarian thrust of religion. ... In a sense, religious injunctions are nothing but our understanding of them- they are what we make them to be” (Bayat, 2007, p.10).

#### **1.2.1.2. Level of religiosity**

Although a lot of attention has been paid to the role of religion in the processes of democratization, the research has usually been limited to the major characteristics of different denominations. As has been discussed above, the incompatibility of Islam or the pro-democratic nature of Protestantism have been the main spots of discussion. Talking about religious affiliations should be the responsibility of theologians more than social scientists as the latter need to concentrate more on the practical factors in the

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<sup>9</sup> Salman Rushdie is a British Indian novelist who became the center of a major controversy with his fourth novel 'The Satanic Verses' in which he argued that the Prophet Muhammad added verses to the Qur'an and accepted three old deities previously worshipped in Mecca as divine beings in these verses. According to the legend, Muhammad cancelled the verses afterwards, claiming that the devil tempted him to utter these lines. Rushdie; however, claims in his novel that these verses were the words of the Gabriel. His book was banned in eleven Muslim countries. While some Muslim intellectuals defended Salman Rushdie in the name of free speech, a fatwa was issued by Ayatollah Khomeini for him to be killed. (for more details see Pipes, 1990)

society. Making comments on the major characteristics of religious denominations homogenizes them and refers, even if unintentionally, to the principles of these belief systems. Social scientists; however, need to emphasize individual interpretations of these principles rather than the written rules.

Interest in practical realities would shift the focus to individual attitudes and intra-group distinctions within the denominations. Levels of religiosity, among all, constitute the main criterion of intra-group distinctions in a denomination and represent the current understandings of the teachings of a belief system. Democratic attitudes by highly religious members of a denomination would indicate current dominance of democratic interpretations of that belief system.

Karpov (1999a) made the same argument that “if Catholicism is indeed intrinsically hostile to democracy, then individual religiosity will be negatively associated with support for democratic principles” (p.388). Consensus on the availability of differences among denominations in terms of their proximity to democracy necessitates a denomination-wide impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes. If different religious orientations have natural divergences among themselves, changing religiosity levels among their members will not generate the same effects on their attitudes. In empirical analyses; however, religiosity is sometimes measured as an individual characteristic common for all respondents regardless of their religious belonging. Inglehart and Welzel (2009), for instance, analyzed religiosity as such and concluded their analysis that religiosity had negative impact on emancipative values. The weakening of which result in failure of cultural foundation of democracy (p.142). This approach homogenizing all religiosities misses the differences among the denominations extensively discussed within the literature. Another significant point to be mentioned about the measurement of religiosity in the empirical analyses is the focus on two different aspects at the same time; i.e. belief and practice. While the former focuses more on belief in God or importance of religion in one’s life, the second dimension refers to attendance in church or frequency of prayer. Although both have been included in the analyses, the latter has received more attention and aroused more discussion in the literature. In discussions on the practical dimension of religiosity, the emphasis has been put on the influences of church attendance on individuals’ attitudes. The significance of church organizations and characteristics individuals attain through participation in these organizations have long been discussed. The main argument on

this topic has been that most churches mobilize their members to help people outside of their circles (Wood, 1997, p.595). This orientation attained through the churches is interpreted as the democracy-promoting aspect of churches –especially of Protestant churches.

Canetti-Nisim (2004) argues that religiosity has an impact on democracy only through the mediating role of authoritarianism (p.387). According to her, higher religiosity leads to a negative impact on democracy only if it leads to support for authoritarianism. Her argument is that, undemocratic attitudes are not adopted by religious people directly. What they obtain initially is an authoritarian worldview.

### **1.2.2. Economics**

This thesis extensively focuses on individual level analysis, and the influence of economics on the individual level will be measured through household income; that will be discussed in more detail in the next section of demographics. Although it will not be included in the analyses as an independent variable, the development levels of countries stressed by Inglehart and his associates will be referred to whenever needed in interpreting the analyses especially in Study 2. According to them, this level of development represents fulfillment of individuals' material needs and determines the values internalized by them.

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a process of cultural change in the industrial societies with the emergence of generations raised in prosperity and economic security. The dominant cultures in these societies began to change with the changing development level moving these countries towards the post-industrial phase. Economic prosperity and absence of massive wars being widely experienced by young people of the West since 1945 has let them direct their focus from economic and physical security towards a sense of community and the quality of life (Inglehart, 1988, p.1224). Marked with the feeling of satisfaction, the new values appearing across these societies among these young people are labeled as post-materialist values due to the emphasis they put on abstract concepts such as rights, freedoms and on norms like equality, due to the shift in their focus beyond material needs such as economic growth



and physical security. (For this process of value change see Dalton, 1977; Inglehart 1977, 1981)

More recently; however, the label of self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) was seen more appropriate to express the cultural change experienced in the post-industrial societies. These values represent the concerns about better life circumstances, more freedoms and rights. Welzel et. al. (2003), on the other hand, call them emancipative values, as these values emphasize human choice, stressing the importance of individual autonomy over community discipline (p.342).

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that socioeconomic development, with its impact of satisfying the security-oriented needs in a society, leads to an emphasis on autonomy, individualism and self-expression (p.137). As external constraints such as poverty or insecurity recede in a society, emphasis is more widely put on human freedom, individual liberties and self-expression (p.145).

This argument's definition of economic development; however, is not limited to GNP per capita and emphasizes the role of distribution of the labor force in different sectors. Inglehart and Baker (2000) talk about three different phases societies pass through depending on the sector in which the majority of their labor forces are concentrated. These stages are identified as pre-industrial, industrial and postindustrial phases. A high percentage of the labor force in the agricultural sector points to a traditional, pre-industrial society while a high percentage of industrial workers is a sign of an industrial society. Postindustrial society, on the other hand, is marked by a concentration of the labor force in service sector (p.30). The main argument of Inglehart and Baker with regard to these different economic structures is that the shift from one of these phases to another by a society has always resulted in value changes among the public. Once a society has moved from pre-industrial phase to the industrial phase, this shift is accompanied by a change from traditional values to secular-rational ones. When these societies reach the third stage – the postindustrial phase-, they do not proceed in these secular-rational values and rather experience a completely different values change that results in the emergence of self-expression values.

Moving into industrialization, societies become less dependent on nature and this feeling of a greater control over their lives direct people's focus more on

materialistic and secular ideologies and hence less on religion and God. The second move towards postindustrial society, on the other hand, marks a moving away from nature and relationships among individuals become more important. This second shift and its impact on mass values is explained, as was done before by Inglehart (1977, 1997), as consequences of fulfillment of individuals' physical and economic security concerns (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p.20-22). According to this view, democracy results from interplay of economic, cultural and institutional factors. (Inglehart, 1988, p.1229) "If socioeconomic development, emancipative value change and democratization occur, they tend to go together" (Welzel et. al., 2003, p.342). The criterion bringing these three together is that they all foster human choice.

Socioeconomic development helps increase the individual resources and remove constraints on human choice; civic or emancipative values bring free choice and autonomy and official democracy provides legal rights and guarantees to protect individual freedom (Welzel et. al., 2003, p.345). Economically larger means, psychologically stronger motivations and officially more effective guarantees are provided with the three together (p.346). These three indicators are believed to be parts of a single puzzle which in the overall aims to broaden autonomous human choice. Socioeconomic development's impact on cultural values is explained through its role of providing individuals with the abilities to act according to their own individual choices (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.151). Individual concerns change with this feeling of autonomy and stronger emphasis is put on values such as liberty and diversity. The rise of values that stress the significance of liberties and freedoms leads to demands for democratic institutions that would fulfill these individual expectations.

### **1.2.3. Demographics**

Besides the major factors identified in the literature, demographics are always interpreted to be significant for individual attitudes. Civic attitudes are also believed to evolve with changing demographic characteristics. Among these individual characteristics, higher education and higher income are most frequently related to civic attitudes. (Nunn, Crocket, & Williams, 1978; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Rice & Feldman, 1997) Welzel and Inglehart (2009) stressed that "emancipative values tend to become

widespread at high levels of economic development, as people gain higher levels of education ...” (p.133). Although the direction of the relationship between wealth and democracy is still discussed, there is a consensus on the supportive impact of high education levels in support for democratic values (Dahl, 1971; Gibson et. al. 1992, p. 359). One explanation provided for the association between higher education and civic attitudes is that “educated individuals are generally more aware of diverse cultures and tend to be more tolerant of beliefs, values and ways of life different from their own” (Rice and Feldman, 1997, p.1163). Receiving more knowledge on the diversities in the world, people with higher education levels more easily interpret them to be natural facts. They do not have negative prejudices for differences and do not even question the equality of these diverse views. Education is expected to “reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance and respect for individual liberties” (Gibson et al., 1992, p.354) – that are believed to constitute civic culture which leads to democratic attitudes among individuals. The core values of civic culture will be discussed in the next chapter.

With respect to the impact of income on civic attitudes, a similarly coherent relationship is not possible to identify. While several theorists reached the conclusion that higher income fosters civic values (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000), others do not attribute such a positive role to income (Acemoğlu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2008; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Halloran, 2006). This ambiguity in the relationship between wealth and democracy has been explained by Silver (1987) that wealth leads to support for the status quo and hence this turns into support for democracy in a democratic culture and into support for authoritarianism in an undemocratic country. Gibson et. al. (1992), however, made a more radical claim by suggesting that wealth distinctions were not found to have an independent impact on democratic values (p.360). They rather preferred to make some comments on the role of socio-economic status in support for democracy and mentioned that lower socioeconomic classes rank higher in support for democratic values due to their dissatisfaction with their living conditions and hence more willingness to create a change in the system. Hence, support for democratization is expected to be weakest among the highest classes (p. 353-355).

Age and gender are the other two important ingredients of demographic characteristics. In terms of age, younger respondents are usually found to be more supportive of democratic values than those who are older (Gibson et. al., 1992, p.356).

The explanation provided for this finding is that individuals become more conservative as they get older due to the fact that in time people form their opinions about different groups and do not wish to change them. With respect to gender, on the other hand, women are found to be less democratic than men. Although all these indicators are found to generate a certain impact on democratic attitudes of individuals, among the demographic characteristics, the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes seems to be the level of education (p. 359).

### **1.3. Core Values of Civic Culture**

In an attempt to explain the difference in institutional success of new democratic regional governments in Northern and Southern Italy, Putnam (1993) referred to the significance of civic life. His conclusion was that the attitudes dominant in the civic regions of Italy led to good democratic government in the same regions. The prominent representative of political culture theories for the last two decades, Inglehart, tested in his earlier works (1988, 1990) the assumption that civic culture has an effect on democracy with data on general public attitudes for a large sample of twenty-six countries. After a comparative analysis among the citizens of these countries, he reached the conclusion that “over half of the variance in the persistence of democratic institutions can be attributed to the effects of political culture alone” (1988, p.46). Inglehart interpreted this finding as evidence confirming the main thesis of *The Civic Culture* (p.48). Although broad consensus has been reached regarding the impact of culture on democratization, “there is much less agreement on the specifics” (Gibson et. al., 1992, p.332). Different lists have been provided by researchers as the core values of a civic culture; yet, the long discussions on the lists point out that a consensus exists on the significance of certain values as the essential components of a civic culture.

The initial definition of civic culture provided by Inglehart included interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and support for the existing social order. The last aspect in this list was different from the other two due to its focus on individuals’ interpretation of the regime in their countries rather than their values. The earlier approaches stressing the significance of individual attitudes in democratization asserted that public support for the system played an important role in establishing democratic

systems or strengthening them. The legitimacy a political system needs in order to function properly is provided, according to this approach, by mass support for the system and mass confidence in its institutions. (Easton, 1965; Gibson, 1997; Klingemann, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Seligson, 2002) The ingredients of civic culture in Inglehart's terminology changed in time, and the focus shifted more towards values and attitudes of individuals than their ideas about the system. The third element of the initial definition was removed from the list (Inglehart, 1988, p.1215) and the definition of democratic culture began to be extensively dominated by appropriate individual values. These later approaches argued that for successful democratization, regarding democracy to be preferable over other systems of government and having confidence in its institutions is not enough; mass embracement of a broader set of civic values are needed (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.247). These pro-democratic values were labeled as self-expression values in Inglehart's later works. Analyses by Inglehart and his associates proved that self-expression values are the most crucial ingredients of a democratic culture. In this respect, democracy is interpreted to be the "institutional manifestation of social forces emphasizing human choice and self-expression" by Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p.258). Although the focus shifted more to internalization of democratic values, support for democracy is still accepted to be the first step of democratic attitudes and hence both aspects of democratic attitudes are analyzed separately in this thesis within Study 1.

Self-expression values identified by Inglehart and his associates involve various individual attitudes i.e. tolerance of diversity, inclination to civic protest, liberty aspirations, social trust and life satisfaction. "These societies", that rank high on self-expression values, "also rank relatively high on gender equality and tolerance of gays, lesbians, foreigners and other out-groups; show relatively high levels of subjective well-being and interpersonal trust; and emphasize imagination and tolerance as important things to teach a child" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.137). The significance attributed to tolerance, trust and support for gender equality in the definition of self-expression values signifies the vitality of individual liberties and human rights for self-expression values. The anti-discriminatory and humanistic tendency of self-expression values, according to Inglehart and Welzel, "gives these values a largely pro-civic character" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.143).

Civic life in Putnam's analysis is characterized by active, public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian political relations and a social fabric of trust and cooperation. His explanation linking all these values together is that participating in social networks, embracing norms of reciprocity and having high levels of interpersonal trust, individuals can easily take part in coordinated actions and the efficiency of the democratic society is increased this way (Putnam, 1993, p.167). Civic engagement, equal rights and obligations, values of solidarity, tolerance and trust are defined as central aspects of the civic community by Putnam. Rice and Feldman also stress civic engagement, trust, tolerance and cooperativeness as the common attitudes and behaviors of civic citizens. Citizens in a civic culture are expected to respect and trust one another. Different ideas and lifestyles are promoted or at least tolerated. Organizations of various kinds; either political, economic or sport based, almost form the building blocks of a civic culture as they teach their members cooperation and interpersonal trust (Rice and Feldman, 1997, p. 1145). Civic-minded individuals are expected to be joiners in social and political life (1148).

To talk about the ingredients of a pro-democratic culture, Diamond (1994) counts various attitudes to be crucial for a liberal democracy. Respect for other views, that is, tolerance especially towards opposing views, trust in other actors and in the political environment in general, willingness to compromise, civility of political discourse, feelings of efficacy and participation by the citizens are the main components, according to Diamond, of a political culture that would generate belief in the legitimacy of democracy.

The core values of civic culture on which consensus has been reached within the literature are briefly defined below with respect to their relevance to democratic culture. Four groups of attitudes are discussed in this chapter and the explanations for the specificity of tolerance and for the special attention paid to it are also provided.

### **1.3.1. Trust and Civic Engagement**

Interpersonal trust has been accepted by many scholars as an "attitudinal prerequisite of the establishment of stable democracy". (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Inglehart, 1988, 1990) Trust is mentioned as a significant factor making

collective action possible. Trust helps to maintain peaceful and stable social relations that in turn form the basis for collective and productive behavior (Newton, 2001, p.202). Mutual relationships are believed to exist between trust and civic engagement. Voluntary associations teach trust to their members as they enable various people with different values to work together. Taking place in the same organization, these people understand others, empathize with them and this manner results in moderation and trust in their attitudes. They develop civilized social relations and experience acts of compromise and cooperation. Due to these attributes they have, participation in voluntary associations act as one of the most important constituents of a democratic culture. Developing social solidarity, these associations form the basis of civil society and democracy (Newton, 2001, p.206). Higher trust increases the likelihood of cooperation; however, cooperation also raises trust. Building social capital, according to Putnam, is the key to making democracy work. Social capital, a broader term defined through features of social organizations such as trust, norms and networks, facilitates coordinated actions and hence improves efficiency of the society. “Substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167) makes voluntary cooperation easier.

Banfield (1958), even before Putnam, stressed that much lower levels of trust available in the Southern Italy prevented cooperation among citizens of the region -who are complete strangers to each other- and establishment of vertical ties among them. Inglehart also proved this relationship between higher trust and the flourishing of democratic institutions empirically. His analysis of the World Values Survey data displayed a strong positive correlation between interpersonal trust and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the world (Inglehart, 1999, p.103).

These associations are interpreted to be crucial for democracy also because they provide real governmental accountability. Individuals on their own cannot be as effective as unions and associations in questioning the governmental authority. Hence, for a healthy democracy individuals should be allowed to associate. (Al-Suwaidi, 1995)

To be more precise about the role of trust in democratic culture, an important distinction has to be made with respect to the scope of trust felt by members of a community. If people in a community tend to trust only the individuals who are similar to them in some important respects or only the individuals who belong to their own

groups, the scope of their trust is identified to be highly limited and this type of trust is called 'particularized trust'. Communities marked with this type of trust cannot experience vibrant exchanges and cooperation as interaction will be limited to certain individuals only. Limited cooperation means lower social capital and hence lower likelihood of democratization. The other type of trust, 'generalized trust', does not entail limits in its scope and in this case, trust is directed towards all members of the community. 'Generalized trust' entails risks as trusting unknown and unlike people is interpreted to be threatening; however, it enables individuals to get engaged in exchanges and cooperation and hence to invest in the social capital of the community. While 'particularized trust' isolates people from civic life, 'generalized trust' fosters civic relations among citizens and thus helps the creation of a democratic community. 'Particularized trust' encourages people to form closer ties with their associates and relatives and leaves the others outside. Identifications or labelings of "we" and "they" are frequently made in particularized trust (Uslaner, 1999, p.122-124). Higher generalized trust also means higher tolerance towards people different from the "we". Trusting people are expected to be tolerant and more accepting towards minority cultures (p.141).

Another function civic culture serves -through social trust and cooperativeness generated by it- on the way of democratic governance is to moderate the conflicts within the community. This characteristic has been labeled as the "balanced nature of civic culture" by Diamond (1993, p.14). Trust facilitates vertical ties both among the masses and between the elites and their constituencies. These ties are believed to prevent polarized political conflict and hence keep the system stable, at least to a certain extent (Diamond, 1993, p.14-15).

### **1.3.2. Gender Equality**

Providing support for gender equality is believed to be a crucial attribute of democratic culture as believing in the equality of genders is "a key indicator of tolerance and personal freedom - closely linked with a society's level of democracy" (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p.67). Democratic governance necessitates participation of all different groups in the political process. High inclusiveness has been emphasized by



many theorists including Dahl as a recipe for healthy democratic regimes which Dahl specifically labeled as Polyarchies. Including women in social and political processes would be an important step to take towards complete inclusiveness of the regime. Inglehart and Norris (2003) stress the relevance of attitudes with regard to gender equality for democratization and tend to explain the political difference between the Islamic world and the West through their divergence in issues concerning gender equality and sexual liberalization rather than in their stances with respect to democratic governance. They put the emphasis on their empirical findings that individuals living in predominantly Muslim countries are found to be highly supportive of democratic regimes; yet their culture does not seem to be so hospitable to the ideas of gender equality, and women's rights.

Democracies are expected to attribute equal respect and value to each and every human being they serve, regardless of differences in race, sex or any other personal attribute. A democratic society is made up of equal individuals who make autonomous and responsible choices. Any discrimination, including sexual discrimination, definitely contradicts with the main rationale of democracy. (For details see McDonagh, 2002; Rose, 1995; Sen, 1999) This was not the case in the first examples of democratic governance, as historically the idea of gender equality emerged much later than democracy itself. The first democracies totally excluded women from the political process. However; "democracy is not a static concept" and changes according to the circumstances of the time. The definition of democracy has evolved over time-becoming more and more inclusive - and gender equality has become one of the main constituents of democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.273-274).

### **1.3.3. Participation**

The relevance of democratic participation to democracy is obvious, as it is an aspect of "participant political culture" defined by Almond and Verba (1963) through active roles for individuals in a polity (p.19). Participation is one of the core dimensions of democratic culture because individuals get integrated into the system through these practices and being actively involved in the systemic processes, the individuals are expected to internalize the rules of the democratic game. The individuals would become

democratic under the influence of their feelings of belonging to the democratic processes. A democratic citizen should be interested in public affairs and should take active part in democratic practices (Diamond, 1993, p.14; Inkeles, 1969, p.1120-1141).

Democratic practices such as signing petitions, joining boycotts and attending peaceful demonstrations constitute an important indicator of pro-democratic civic culture because these actions have a strong objective of individual liberty. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p.261-262) label these activities as “elite-challenging activities” and even this name indicates how directly linked these activities are to democratic culture. The individuals involved in these practices are interpreted to act with the aim of pushing the authorities to respond to the citizens’ demands, as well as questioning their authority and status in the society. This critical and questioning stance towards the elite is explained as a sign of the prevalence of democratic culture as democratic governance requires the masses to get involved in the political process and to check the authority of the government. These individuals form a “liberty-oriented and critical public that is able to organize resistance and mobilize people” (p.262). Comparing these democratic practices with membership and participation in voluntary associations, Inglehart and Welzel conclude that elite-challenging activism is even more significant than civic engagement in paving the way to democracy. Furthermore, these activities are also related to civic engagement as they necessitate cooperation between –and hence formation of bridging ties among –citizens that do not know each other. Without bridging ties binding them, these individuals would not be able to mobilize for collective action. It is not personal ties or common historical bonds but common interests and aims that bring these people -who are unknown to each other- together. They usually tend to come together to be more effective on the political authority.

#### **1.3.4. Tolerance**

In the United Nations Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, tolerance is defined as “respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Tolerance is accepting differences, yet at the same time trying to establish harmony out of these differences. Tolerance becomes a possible option only if there is some action or belief opposed, and a tolerant

attitude is preferred among other alternatives only when the individual thinks that there are better reasons to set that objectionable action or belief free. “Tolerance in its briefest definition is explained as respect for diversity” (Corneo & Jeame, 2009, p.691). Availability of diversity is crucial for tolerance as respecting the characteristics similar to ours is not an issue of debate at all. We, by nature, support ideas and attitudes we share. Our acceptance of others is tested only when these others are different from us (Vogt, 1997).

The predetermined goal of tolerance is not the homogenization of a society but is the establishment of mutual respect among the members of a society. Rather than generating similar lifestyles, mutual respect is expected to result in respect for social diversity. In this sense, tolerance leads to diversity rather than uniformity as differences are accepted and even encouraged enthusiastically in a tolerant society. “... The point of toleration is not and never was to abolish “us” and “them” (and certainly not to abolish “me”) but to ensure their continuing peaceful coexistence and interaction” (Walzer, 1997, p.92).

Defining tolerance as putting up with something disapproved has been criticized for its attribution of superiority to the tolerating side. The connotation of hierarchy embedded in the concept of tolerance, in general, has also been widely discussed. This understanding of tolerance is frequently criticized for contradicting the general definition of tolerance as a peaceful and democratic value because it is observed to grant the right of toleration only to a superior party who is authorized to accept or reject the acts or beliefs of some others. “The slave does not tolerate the acts of his master- but endures them” (Valdes, 1997, p.127-128).

This connotation of hierarchy –of the tolerating party on the tolerated- embedded within the concept of toleration does not imply an official status of hierarchy. All individuals keep certain spheres of their lives under their absolute control. This practical reality –that individuals become the superior figure in their lives at certain instances- is also represented in the most widely used questions in empirical analyses of tolerance that usually ask about people's preferences for a tenant or an employee. These two issues exemplify the areas in which individuals become the authority to make their own choices. In those spheres, the individual becomes the person with the competence to prohibit certain acts or to prohibit entrance by certain groups of people. At that point,

the person is free to make a choice between agreeing to have contact with different ideas and attitudes and keeping them completely away from his life. An alternative view, on the other hand, suggests that a person can be called to be intolerant towards a group even though he is not in a position to punish or prohibit the acts or ideas of this group. If the person blames the group very easily, if he swears at its members, if he makes rude jokes about that group, this person can easily be said to be intolerant towards the group in question as the way he acts and speaks shows that he would punish them or prohibit their actions if he had the power (Moreno-Riano, 2006, p.44). Hence; even if the power to prohibit is lacking, an individual can display his intolerance not through prohibition, but through an obviously critical stance.

The direct relationship between tolerance and democracy has been emphasized by many scholars (Gibson, 2006; Inglehart, 2003). Gibson (1992) warned in his earlier work that intolerance creates a culture of conformity and threatens personal freedoms. Democracy defined as rule by the people cannot easily exclude groups from the democratic process. Nunn et. al. (1978) stated that “tolerance for diversity is the core of the democratic process” (p.ix).

Democracy as a system of government requires competition among individuals and groups, participation at least through elections and civil liberties for all citizens. No group should be systematically excluded from this process. Tolerance is thus directly about the principles of democracy, such as support for civil liberties and minority rights. Intolerance constrains the liberty of individual citizens (Gibson, 1992). “Without tolerance, widespread contestation is impossible, regime legitimacy is imperiled and a numbing conformity prevails” (Gibson et. al., 1992, p.337).

Huntington defined democratic culture as “a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise” (Huntington, 1984, p.214). Tolerance is accepted to be one of the most significant attitudes necessary for a democratic society (Scanlon, 2003, p.190). The freedoms prized in a liberal democracy require tolerance. The sixth Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the appropriate institutional framework would not be enough for successful democratization and that democratization “also needs to be embodied in a culture, a state of mind that fosters tolerance and respect for other people, as well as pluralism, equilibrium and dialogue between forces that make up the society” (2003, p.8). Tolerance, in this way of

thinking, is crucial to incorporate disagreements and promote peaceful coexistence among many groups living in a society. According to Inglehart and Norris (2003), the distinction between Islam and the West is more about gender equality and tolerance than about politics. They also explain gender equality as a key indicator of tolerance. Lipset (1994, p.3) mentioned that for a functioning democracy “the principles of underlying freedom of speech, assembly, religion .... and the like” are accepted by the citizenry and the political elites, and added that this would become possible only if different beliefs were tolerated. Tolerance is believed to be crucial to making democracy work (Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1982, p.5).

There is no doubt that tolerance is among the most significant values of civic culture; however, there is even more to say about tolerance to distinguish it from the other components and to explain why it deserves closer attention. On the one hand, tolerance is directly relevant to the definitions and principles of democracy and on the other, the major values and attitudes constituting the civic culture discussed above are made possible through tolerance. Respecting differences mitigates individuals’ perceptions of strangers and helps them attain generalized trust. Individuals who can get along with strangers and different people can take active part in democratic voluntary organizations that are based on bridging social capital. Tolerance is also relevant to democratic participation as liberal democracy necessitates the inclusion of all different groups in the society in the decision-making processes and also necessitates the provision of equal rights to them all. Gender equality, among all, is the most closely linked value to tolerance as this value is an aspect of tolerance. Tolerance asks for equality of all the groups in society and gender equality focuses on genders in this respect. These brief explanations indicate that tolerance deserves closer investigation because it is linked to all the core values of civic culture while it also acts as a defining characteristic of democratic regimes.

Even the minimal definitions of democracy emphasize popular control over government and the extension of this right to political control to the highest proportion of the adult population possible. Defined briefly as the rule by people, democracy requires inclusion; that is making rights and freedoms valid for all the adult population. Thus, for a successfully functioning democracy, tolerance –that is characterized by respect and even encouragement for diversity- is crucial as this democratic value enables coexistence of different groups in a society and their incorporation into the

social and political systems. The rights i.e. to expression, to run for office, to form associations provided to all would solve problems of diversity and would help the establishment of stable democratic systems. Tolerance is believed to be relevant for successful democratization as the widespread adoption of tolerant attitudes encourage provision of rights and freedoms equally to all groups -even to minorities- and these mechanisms integrate all social groups in the system and keep them loyal to democratic procedures so that they do not rise for representation or equality (Seligson & Caspi, 1983, p.55-56).

Lipset's (1959) definition of democracy focuses on the criteria of popular control over the government and extension of this right of control to the maximum number of citizens. "Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office" (p.45). Dahl (1982) focuses on the "people governing themselves" aspect of democracies as he interprets that to be related to all the artifacts "uncovered in the kitchen midden of democracy". In democratic decision-making, the expressed preference of each citizen should be taken seriously. The citizens should have the authority to determine what issues are to be raised in the decision-making process which certainly should not leave any adults out. These criteria, Dahl believes, make the process of decision-making fully democratic (p. 6). The free expression of diverse views glorified in the democracy definitions of many scholars becomes possible only if tolerance is adopted in not only political but also social spheres.

Theoretically, the significance of tolerance for a successful democracy has been agreed upon. The same conclusion has also been reached by several empirical analyses on the subject. The first studies on the tolerance concentrated on the situation in the US. (Nunn et. al., 1978, Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et. al., 1982) Measuring tolerance towards left-wing groups through two national surveys, Stouffer concluded that although the masses were intolerant, the educated and the politically active were tolerant enough to support the democratic system in the US. Following the study of Stouffer, Nunn et. al. used the same questionnaire to measure tolerance in the US after twenty years and they concluded that the American public had become more tolerant. The significant comment they made was that mass support for democratic principles increased in the

US, making democracy more feasible. Political leaders were not the only carriers of American democracy any more. They strongly referred to the significance of adoption of democratic attitudes; i.e. tolerance among them, for a successful democratic functioning. Both studies made clear that even though individuals supported democracy, they were unwilling to apply democratic norms towards the disliked groups.

After the fall of communism, the post-communist world became the focus area of the research on tolerance. (Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Duch, 1993; Guerin, Petry, & Crete, 2004; Karpov, 1999a, 1999b) These studies attempted to comment on the likelihood of the Soviet Union – more generally the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe- to “continue along a more democratic path” (Gibson et. al., 1992, p.330). With the belief in the important role the political culture of citizens would play in this process, they focused on the strength or potential of cultural requisites to democracy in these countries. The extensive focus has been on tolerance in these countries without democratic traditions. Tolerance towards political activity by opponent groups would ensure successful functioning of democratic processes. Gibson (1997) found, with regard to the significance of tolerance for democracy, that engagement in democratic processes, including political tolerance was one of the most important factors shaping people’s actions towards the coup attempted in 1991 in the Soviet Union. Gibson et. al. (1992) stressed the relevance of these studies on tolerance in the post-Soviet world by saying that “there is only one clear instance in which the Soviets seem to reject democratic values –on the acid test of whether to tolerate one’s enemies” (p.360). They also added that “tolerance must be learned if ... democratization is to proceed to a full conclusion” (p.340). Pointing to the significance of tolerance for successful democratization, these studies also aimed to show that intolerance in Eastern Europe is not a quality of Eastern European political cultures but rather a consequence of conflicts in the region. They all attempted to show that the difference between the West and the East was not inherent and the Eastern European culture could also be developed through social modernization that would result in greater tolerance (Karpov, 1999a, p.390).

Two important points need to be stressed about these empirical works on tolerance and will be discussed below. The first one is that these studies all focus on political tolerance; about providing certain groups with necessary equality, freedoms and civil rights. Based on the shifting focus of cultural theories towards individuals and

social relations, this thesis focuses on social tolerance in Turkey in the second study. Social tolerance demands peaceful coexistence of individuals in a society leading them towards civility. The following chapter discusses the distinction between political and social tolerance in more detail. The second important point about the works mentioned above is their focus on tolerance in analyses on democratization in the post-communist Orthodox world. Such a focus is lacking in the Muslim World even though it is the other civilization believed to lack democratic tradition. As many countries of this civilization are hard to include in such research, analyses on tolerance in Turkey should be increased in number. The specificity of Turkey within this civilization is that it is the earliest democracy among predominately Muslim countries. Hence, after the discussion on political and social tolerance, a discussion on the impact of religion and religiosity on tolerance will be provided among other factors determining levels of tolerance. Then, a few works on tolerance in Turkey will be discussed in the last section of this chapter to indicate why an additional one is still needed.

#### **1.3.4.1. Political and social tolerance**

Tolerance as an attitude is analyzed in two different forms; political tolerance and social tolerance, which has also been labeled as belief discrepancy (Robinson, Witenberg, & Sanson, 2001, p.83). The distinction between these two forms is the scope of tolerance. While political tolerance is about extending rights to different groups that are not liked or appreciated, social tolerance focuses on tolerating non-supported others in social relationships. Hence, the political sphere in the former and the social sphere in the latter are required to be marked by tolerance. The literature on democratization has already suggested that individual values and attitudes regarding not only politics, but also the social sphere have a significant impact on democratization. Thus, the significance of social tolerance has already been acknowledged to a certain extent in works on democratization while most of the empirical works have focused on tolerance towards different groups' existence in politics (Jackman, 1972; McClosky, 1964; Nunn et. al., 1978; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Stouffer, 1955). The findings on the relevance of civic culture for democratization; however, suggest that more attention has to be paid to social tolerance so that more accurate predictions about the developments in the



political sphere are made and social tolerance is the focus of this thesis in its third step of analysis.

Political tolerance is about providing civil liberties and political rights to groups that are believed to hold wrong or even perhaps, dangerous ideas (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2001). Political tolerance measures the willingness of individuals in a society to allow political expression –through holding an office- and social expression –through speeches, books or lectures- of certain ideas and identities. Questions on this type of tolerance usually revolve around provision of rights to make a public speech, to teach in colleges or to write books stating their views to disapproved groups besides the core questions on letting these groups vote in elections, run for office or make campaigns before elections (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2001, p.386). The content of these questions signify that the issue, in broader terms is whether to provide these disapproved groups civil rights, especially freedom of speech. (For details on political tolerance, see Owen & Dennis, 1987; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Sullivan et. al., 1982)

Social tolerance, on the other hand, deals with tolerance towards different ideas and attitudes in social relationships and contact. It is defined as “a non-negative general orientation toward groups outside of one’s own”. As this type of tolerance is asked with respect to individuals that are interpreted to be on the margins of the society, the indicators used in surveys to measure individual scores on this specific civic value include questions on tolerance towards immigrants, persons of different races and homosexuals (Dunn, Orellana, & Singh, 2009, p.284). Social tolerance is more directly linked to the individual lives of the members of a society as it is based on individuals’ acceptance to be in close relations with different groups. This type of tolerance does not deal with the political sphere where the emphasis is on representation and public expression of certain ideas. Individual reactions to minorities in social or even the private sphere constitute the major aspect of social tolerance (Persell, Green, & Gurevich, 2001).

Besides inclusion in the decision-making processes and extension of rights, tolerance is also needed in social affairs as social cohesion has to be provided in a democratic society. Democracies require cohesion rather than conflict as only the harmonious coexistence of different groups can lead to successful rule by the people. Almond and Verba (1963), in their early work on political culture, mentioned that

tolerance was a prerequisite to the management of conflict in a democratic society. Democracy does not ignore diversity, on the contrary, in democracies recognition of diversities is accompanied by attempts to establish processes through which differences are expressed in accord. Tolerance is crucial for social cohesion because in the absence of democratic processes, different groups in the society cannot participate efficiently in political and social life and hence cannot feel themselves integrated into the society. Hence, tolerance plays a major role in building social cohesion through opening political and social spheres of life and the processes of participation and decision-making within these spheres to different groups in the society. Tolerance, in this sense, represents the pluralism or diversity dimension of democracy (Tessler & Gao, 2005, p.201). Intolerance, on the other hand, blocks the processes of integration for different groups and hence would lead to at least alienated and even antagonist relations among citizens which would in return make cooperation in the society impossible (Scanlon, 2003, p.201). Rather than cohesion, conflict will dominate the scene under these circumstances.

In advanced democracies of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the shift toward greater emphasis on the individual has already been experienced followed by attribution of higher significance to the internalization of civic values within the democratization literature. Social tolerance, among these values, also attracts higher attention due to its feature of fostering equality among individuals. “Complete social tolerance would entail full recognition and acceptance of the identity and uniqueness of differences that are seen as not reducible to invisibility by their bearers” (Persell et. al., 2001, p.208). Social tolerance implies respect for different ideas and attitudes –that are held by different groups- within the society. This respect for diversities makes peaceful coexistence of different groups in the society possible and encourages them towards integration and participation. These attributes of social tolerance indicate how significant it is for civic culture. The more recent focus on this type of tolerance in researches on democratic attitudes also supports the choice of social tolerance in this thesis.

### **1.3.4.2. Determinants of tolerance**

Besides the concept itself, the factors leading to tolerant attitudes have long been discussed. Various groups of variables have been identified as making a significant impact on individual responses with respect to toleration. These factors cannot be limited to individual characteristics. The structure of the context and the target group in question, besides past experiences are all found to be important in explaining individuals' attitudes regarding tolerance. Beginning with the individual characteristics, all the factors found to be relevant to tolerance level will be discussed briefly below.

#### *1.3.4.2.1 Religion*

The impact of religion on any attitudes has been investigated on the basis of two different aspects; religious affiliation and different dimensions of religiosity. Different arguments have been put forward about the direction of the relationship between these variables and tolerance. Sometimes, intervening variables have also been identified in different studies.

With respect to denominational differences, Stouffer argued that northern Protestants were more tolerant than Catholics while southern Protestants were even less than the latter (Stouffer, 1955, p.151). Considering the subdivisions within Protestantism, Beatty and Walter (1984) concluded that Catholics were more tolerant than ten Protestant denominations while were less tolerant than three of them. Nunn, e. al. (1978); however, accepted Protestants as one group and reached the conclusion that Catholics were less tolerant than Jews and nonbelievers and were more tolerant than Protestants. In the overall, Catholics are found to be more tolerant than Protestants and this difference has been interpreted on the basis of the divergence in these religious orientations. Catholicism's less individualistic focus and the higher importance they attribute to equality are argued to be the major reasons. Protestants, on the other hand, are known for their exclusive individualism (Greeley, 1989).

A lot of studies have already shown that both dimensions of religiosity used in empirical analyses, religious belief and religious practice, have significant influence on tolerance. Church attendance, for instance, was described as a strong predictor of

intolerance by Stouffer (1955). O'Donnell (1993) also argued that religious involvement reduced tolerance. Besides religious practice, personal piety was also found to have a negative impact on tolerance (Steiber, 1980). In a comparative analysis among fourteen countries, six from the Western World and eight countries from the post-Communist world, through the use of 1995-1997 World Values Survey data, Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) concluded that different dimensions of religiosity do not have any static impact on tolerance in all these countries. Religiosity, measured by the importance of religion in one's life was found to be negatively related to tolerance in the US but to be insignificant in the other regions included in this comparison; Western and Eastern Europe. The practical dimension of religion was also found to be significant for tolerance in only one region; i.e. the Western Europe. The significance and positive impact of this dimension representing the frequency of attending religious services in the Western Europe points once again to the tolerance-promoting impact of church participation. Although different findings with regard to both the significance and the sign of these variables of religion are reached in different studies, religion and tolerance are almost never argued to be completely unrelated.

Arguments of limited or no relationship between religion and tolerance have been made when the researchers emphasized the significance of intervening political variables. Some other scholars have argued that it is not the nature of denominations but the radicalism of their social and political views that explains the differences in tolerance levels. Whether a denomination is liberal, moderate or fundamentalist in its outlook is what actually explains tolerance (Gay & Ellison, 1993). A similar finding was also reached by Ellison and Musick (1993) who found that theological conservatism rather than religious attendance influenced tolerance. Smidt and Penning (1982) emphasized the significance of political attitudes in this relationship and said that the relationship between religious commitment and political tolerance was mediated by political attitudes.

Karpov's analysis of the impact of religiosity on tolerance in the United States and Poland also pointed out that religious commitment and participation had highly limited influence on tolerance in both of these countries. Tolerance was influenced by religiosity only when the target group was atheists (2002, p.277). The negative effect of religious commitment and participation on tolerance was explained by the positive association these two dimensions of religiosity had with theocratic beliefs and negative

association they had with social liberalism. His argument was that religiosity was associated with conservative social attitudes and hence had a negative impact on tolerance (p.281). Through the use of 1993 Polish GSS, Karpov reached the conclusion that political authoritarianism, reflected as support for the power of the church, had a large negative impact on tolerance (Karpov, 1999a, p.395).

Rather than reproducing these already conducted analyses, the second study in this thesis explores how tolerance is shaped in individual level and what role religiosity plays in this shaping through proposing the unasked questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’.

#### *1.3.4.2.2 Demographics*

Another important group of variables that are believed to have significant impact on an individual’s tolerance level are personal indicators that mainly consist of age, gender, education and income. The impacts of these personal features have been long discussed and analyzed through various empirical analyses. Agreement seems to exist with regard to the significance and direction of their influence on tolerance. Young age, higher education and higher income are expected to make fostering impacts on tolerance (Karpov, 1999b). Younger people are believed to be more tolerant than older members of their societies (Nunn et. al., 1978; Stouffer , 1955; Sullivan et. al., 1982) due to the fact that older people have already shaped their lives and formed their decisions about different groups. Comparatively new in social life, young people are expected to be more open to alternative ideas and attitudes. As age increases, it becomes harder to accept the legitimacy of, and form relationships with groups that have been perceived to be different and even perhaps dangerous. Various groups have already been labeled as either ‘foreign and outsider’ or ‘similar and familiar’ by older people. Making any alteration in these fixed labels is highly difficult as it means tearing down prejudices in people’s minds. Younger people, on the other hand, are usually new to forming these labels, and hence are more open to alternative labelings. In terms of gender, females are found to be less tolerant than males (Gibson, 1992; Nunn et. al., 1978; Stouffer, 1955).

Among individual characteristics, education and income are more frequently and more strongly related to civic attitudes. The former is interpreted to be even more

important than the latter as Gibson, for instance, labeled it as “the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes” (Gibson, et. al., 1992, p.359; the same has also been argued by Bobo & Licari, 1989; Jackman & Muha, 1984; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Education is believed to foster liberal values, a group of values in which tolerance takes place besides equality, respect for individual liberties and many others (Gibson et. al., 1992, p.354). Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) also found out that education was significantly and positively related to tolerance level in all three regions in their analysis, the U.S., Western Europe and Eastern Europe, even though the changes generated were not so high. Higher tolerance by more educated individuals is usually explained through their higher awareness of diverse cultures and the proximity they attain to them with the help of this awareness (Rice & Feldman, 1997, p.1163). Although smaller, the economic situation of an individual is also believed to have significant effect on individual tolerance (Persell et. al., 2001, p.220-221). As an attempt to express the influences of demographic indicators collectively, Seligson and Caspi (1983) concluded their analysis of Israeli Jews' tolerance towards Israeli Arabs by saying that “younger, less religious, better educated and more affluent Jews express higher levels of general tolerance” (p. 61).

Education and income are argued to have a positive impact on individual tolerance levels as people with higher education and higher income are usually less inclined to perceive different groups as threats. Belonging to the higher echelons of the society they live in, these individuals do not evaluate diverse groups to be threatening for their own survival due to the opportunity of surviving in peace and happiness provided to them by their socio-economic status in the society. Another consequence of higher education is being exposed to different people and different ideas which can lead the educated individuals to get acquainted with divergences and hence not to be afraid or suspicious of them. Individuals with high education levels are critical of stereotypes and form their own more tolerant views about different groups through either the knowledge of positive aspects of different groups they attain or the interaction they have with these groups within the course of their education (Cote & Erickson, 2009, p.1669).

#### *1.3.4.2.3 Outside Factors*

The setting in which a certain group is asked to be tolerated and the characteristics of the target group- that is the identity of the group to be tolerated- have been mentioned as significant outside factors determining an individual's level of tolerance. Hence; it would not be appropriate to link individual tolerance solely to human psychology and personality as such an attitude leads the researcher to make definite claims about each individual's tolerance and to call certain people tolerant and others intolerant at all times. An individual's tolerance level depends on whom and what he/she is asked to tolerate and also on the context or the type of relationship in which he/she is asked to tolerate the other party. "It appears that people are selective about whom and what they will tolerate and under what circumstances they are prepared to be tolerant. Hence it is argued that tolerance cannot be conceptualized as a global structure and should be viewed as multifaceted and context sensitive" (Witenberg, 2000).

The identity of the target group might be significant in determining tolerance level as some people attach higher importance to certain aspects of their identities and hence act more critically towards people who are different from them in this respect. A nationalist person, for instance, might be tolerant towards religious minorities- as he does not put too much emphasis on this aspect of his personality- while he is more critical and sensitive about ethnic minority groups. The so-perceived marginality or extremism of the target group also acts as a significant factor in legitimizing intolerance towards its members. McColsky and Brill (1983) found that a very high percentage of their participants defended 'freedom of speech' as a democratic principle, but such rights were only accorded to 'acceptable' individuals or groups, and not to groups such as Nazi sympathizers. The type of relationship to be formed with the target group in the question also has an influence on individuals' tolerance towards that group due to diverse meanings attributed to different social relationships. Some relationships are interpreted to be formal and remote enough to be endured –even when unknown or disliked groups are involved in it- whereas some others are found to be too intimate to include strangers. Despite showing tolerance for working together with minority groups at the workplace; an individual might be highly sensitive about his household and hence

might not want to be together with them in his apartment building or even in his neighborhood.

#### *1.3.4.2.4. Social Interaction*

As a consequence of the importance and honor it attributes to alternative cultures, tolerance should be the attribute of a modern man who is constantly espoused to differences. Diversity in a society -that is defined as the availability of religious, ethnic and cultural schisms - is said to affect social tolerance in that setting. There are two major hypotheses used in explaining the relationship between intensity of social interaction among different groups and tolerance.

##### *1.3.4.2.4.1. The contact hypothesis*

The contact hypothesis suggests that communication among groups with different characteristics would reduce hostilities between them (Pettigrew, 1998). This interaction with people the individual otherwise would not have the opportunity to meet is expected to lead to an understanding and even approval towards these different perspectives (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994; Stouffer, 1955; Tuch, 1987; Wilson, 1991). The groups may even develop positive feelings towards each other if the interaction promotes a shared goal (Harell & Stolle, 2010). Contact that is “personal, positive, of equal status, voluntary and including shared goals” generate “positive orientations” among the parties of that contact (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Sigelman, Welch, Combs, & Bledsoe, 1996). This ‘right kind of contact’ promotes cooperation, value-sharing, positive feelings and ideas among these people (Cote and Erickson, 2009). An important note to emphasize with respect to the ‘right kind of contact’ is that positive relationships with a small number of people are not usually generalized for the whole group and hence such an interaction does not result in more tolerant attitudes towards this group all the time. Tolerance might easily flow from extensive contact with an overwhelming majority of a group rather than from personal contact with a few members of it (Cote and Erickson, 2009, p.1666).

This theory has been taken even a step further to argue that interaction with different groups would have a positive impact on the relationships these contacting



parties have in general; even on the relationships with groups that did not take part in the interaction. Positive experiences with different people pave the way to a generalized positive view of and hence tolerance towards all different groups (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995). Reduction of prejudice, in this case, extends even to other groups that have not been involved in the contact. Although this idea seems to be highly optimistic, it might be reasonable to accept that a person getting out of his closed community and having contact with different groups becomes more open to alternative views, less hostile towards differences and more tolerant towards previously unknown groups, ideas or attitudes (Harell & Stolle, 2010, p.238). Findings from various researches on social interaction and attitudes have supported the idea that being exposed to alternative ideas and perspectives increases tolerance towards all out-groups (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Dunn et. al., 2009, p.283).

The findings of a comparison of tolerance levels in urban and rural settlements are also found to be supportive of this argument as they indicate that tolerance levels are the lowest among people in rural areas, higher for those in midsize communities and the highest for people in metropolitan centers (Cote and Erickson, 2009, p.1678). This argument recalls the discussion on different types of social capital and the impact of each on the society on its way to democratization. In these debates, the most widely-repeated claim has been that bridging social capital formed between dissimilar people that do not know each other would produce positive outcomes for democracy. The ties that foster tolerance are the ones that are formed among dissimilar groups and those that are not so intense. Forming bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000) or having interaction with out-groups is expected to promote tolerance (Harell & Stolle, 2010, p.239).

#### 1.3.4.2.4.2. The conflict hypothesis

The drawback of the contact hypothesis might be its ignorance of the probability of a hostile contact between different groups, which in turn would foster antagonism rather than tolerance between them and even completely erode the already-existing tolerance among them. Cote and Erikson (2009) agree that all sorts of contact do not breed tolerant outcomes. Economic competition, for instance, as a form of social interaction “can lead to negative orientations toward a competing group” (p. 1666). The

second one of the two major hypotheses regarding the relationship between social interaction and tolerance; namely the threat or conflict hypothesis, focuses on competitive contacts and argues that interaction between different groups leads to heightened intergroup conflict (Blumer, 1958; Tolbert & Grummel, 2003). The claim of this hypothesis is that once the contexts become more diverse, out-group hostilities increase. In Europe, for instance, rising immigration gave way to higher diversity that in return increased prejudices, political opposition and racial discrimination in these countries (Harell & Stolle, 2010, p.239).

This alternative outlook to the impact of diversity on societal peace suggests that coexistence of different values, religions, visions of life, social structures, life styles and behaviors creates tensions in society (Masini, 1990, p.130). According to this view, interaction with different groups results in intolerance and discrimination due to several reasons. The initial factor mentioned is fear of the different. Individuals usually tend to feel suspicious about groups they do not know. People have the tendency to interpret ideas and people unfamiliar to them as dangerous and threatening. Another reason behind intolerance towards out-groups and especially minorities is the scapegoating of these groups by the majority for their worsening living conditions. This attitude is usually adopted against immigrants as they are believed to arrive at the country after the local people. Immigrants, who are not accepted as real members of the society, are blamed for stealing jobs from the majority and also for benefiting from social welfare. In these respects, the majority interprets migrants to be rivals. A third reason, on the other hand, might be historical animosity between the groups. Significant negative memories might lead to formation of stereotypes and prejudices regarding different groups (Mihulka, 2008).

Concerns about the negative impact of diversity on tolerance have been frequently raised in academic debates. Putnam (2007) has argued that diversity leads to erosion of the values of social trust and reciprocity –as individuals refrain from believing in individuals they do not know- in the society and this decline results in lower social capital. Talking about the US, he stated that in racially diverse areas people trust each other less –compared to others living in more homogeneous settings- and are less willing –and even able- to cooperate with each other. The most surprising finding is that this decline in trust, caused by the increasing diversity in the society, is felt even within one’s own group. Putnam is not alone in claiming that diversity leads to

intolerance. Several other studies have also reached the same conclusion with respect to the US context (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Hero, 2003). In this view, diversity is believed to lead to intergroup conflict because the groups “struggle over the same socio-economic resources or for cultural dominance”. Under the impact of these competitions, besides prejudice towards out-groups, commitment to the in-group is also fostered creating at the end highly introvert individuals (Harell and Stolle, 2010, p.239). Increasing diversity, under these circumstances, makes democratic politics more difficult (p.236).

#### 1.3.4.2.4.3. The other hypotheses: Competition, learning and influence hypotheses

Besides these two hypotheses, there are many others talking about alternative ways through which different forms of social interaction influence tolerance; namely the competition hypothesis, the learning hypothesis and the influence hypothesis. The competition hypothesis argues that cooperative contact fosters tolerance whereas competitive interaction leads to intolerance. Focusing especially on the competitive contact, supporters of this hypothesis claim that if certain groups compete for a job, a position or a certain amount of money, it would not be realistic to expect tolerance among them (Cote & Erickson, 2009, p.1667).

The learning hypothesis, on the other hand, focuses on the importance of education for tolerance as it suggests that more knowledge about a group leads to higher tolerance towards its members. Once more information is attained regarding a certain group, the perceptions of it also change. Within the process of learning about the target group, the characteristics they share with the rest of the society are recognized and the group becomes more familiar and less dangerous or less threatening in time (Cote & Erickson, 2009, p.1667).

The influence hypothesis argues that groups or individuals are influenced by each other through contact. Being in contact with tolerant people makes this attitude almost a norm for the parties and all the individuals feel obliged to shape their behaviors accordingly. The opposite effect also becomes true through contact with intolerant people (Cote & Erickson, 20069, p.1668). According to this hypothesis,

rather than the nature or the circumstances of the contact, the attitudes of the group interacted influence the values and attitudes shaped as a result of social interaction.

Taking all these hypotheses together into consideration, it should be argued that the impact of social interaction on individuals' tolerance levels depends on various criteria i.e. the attitudes of the parties interacting, the organization of the context in which the interaction takes place, and the nature of the interaction.

#### *1.3.4.2.5. Individual Perceptions of Threat*

Another determinant of tolerance that deserves to be emphasized is people's perception of their world in general and of the environment they live in in particular. Presence or absence of conflict in a setting shapes people's "needs, concerns and priorities". In situations of conflict individuals feel frightened and hence perceive "the other" as a threat. Widespread threat perception motivates individuals to form stronger ties with the groups they belong to and become more suspicious of the outsiders. In-group love and out-group hate, the so-called feelings of turning more to one's own group and turning further away from others, are observed to be more widespread under these circumstances. Threat perception, due to its natural consequence of generating more inward-looking and more conservative individuals, leads to intolerance (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006, p.571-573).

Conflict and threat are labeled as main antecedents of intolerance (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985). Studying the impact of conflict and of the perceived threat on democratic values, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006) concluded that in times of conflict, peoples' threat perceptions and in-group commitments are raised resulting in a certain decline in tolerance levels, both in general towards outside groups and specifically towards the other side of the conflict. "There is no time like war and conflict to challenge individuals' and societies' democratic norms" (p. 569). In times of conflict, erosion is experienced in democratic values even among the obviously democratic members of the society. "The more dangerous the opponent, the more rigorous the intolerance" (Beach, 1947, p.158). Periods of peacemaking; however, lead to conciliatory views among the masses and decline in threat perceptions. Under these circumstances, inclusive democratic processes are reopened and democratic

values are rebred among the masses. (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et. al., 1982; Sullivan et. al., 1985)

Many people interpret tolerance -not only in times of conflict but also in general- to be frightening. Individuals usually have the tendency “to evaluate people they disagree with as threats to the society” as they believe that ideas they do not share do not contribute to the common good (Scanlon, 2003, p.190). An open and inclusive approach cannot be adopted towards these opponents who are found to be not only different but also threatening. Threat perceptions in these interpretations should not be limited solely to serious threats to survival or life. Besides real security threats, threats to the life-style or subjective well-being of an individual are also accepted within this understanding of threat perception that leads to intolerance and the erosion -or at least weakening- of democratic values. The scope of the expression of threats, then, should not be limited to security problems or violence when discussed with respect to tolerance and democratic attitudes.

#### **1.3.4.3 Tolerance in Turkey**

The above discussed empirical works on tolerance point to the attention tolerance has attracted among the researchers of Eastern Europe. The main motivation behind these studies was to predict the success of these countries in democratization. Believing in the significance of an appropriate culture for democratization and identifying tolerance as the most critical attitude of civic culture, these studies looked for ways to foster tolerance among the masses in these countries. The main shared characteristic of these countries was their membership in the civilizations incompatible with democracy in terms of the categorization of Huntington and his followers. Besides being late to democratization –due to the repressive communist regimes that lasted until the beginning of 1990s-, the pre-dominant religion of most of these countries, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, is the other prominent factor placing them in this category. Predominantly Orthodox, post-communist countries share this category with another known-to-be traditionally undemocratic civilization; Islam. Yet while the former has attached importance to tolerance on the way to complete democratization and aimed to elaborate on this critical attitude, the issue has not attracted enough attention in the

Muslim world. To say nothing of the officially undemocratic pre-dominantly Muslim countries, tolerance has not been sufficiently explored even in Turkey -the longest-running democracy in the Muslim world. Attitudes of tolerance and factors related to them have not been questioned in Turkey and hence the information on the topic does not go much beyond the data attained through multinational surveys.

The obvious conclusion reached out of the available data is that tolerance in Turkey is significantly low. The low level of tolerance in Turkey is displayed on the two graphs below in a comparative perspective. Tolerance, in these graphs, is calculated through a new variable formed by adding four of the well-known neighbor questions of the World Values Survey. These questions ask the respondents to name the groups, out of a list, they would not like to have as neighbors. In generating this new variable, only the questions asking about attitudes towards groups defined through different race, different language, different religion and towards immigrants/foreign workers were added to the calculation. This was a planned choice depending on the definition of tolerance. As has been discussed above, tolerance is about differences and diversities. Attitudes towards homosexuals, heavy drinkers or unmarried couples were left out of the calculation due to the idea that they might reflect cultural differences more than different levels of tolerance. Hence; to avoid misinterpretation in the comparisons, only the groups representing differences without specifying them were involved in the measurement.


The first graph<sup>10</sup> below signifies that mean tolerance level of the Turkish respondents is lower than that of the whole sample of the World Values Survey. An average respondent of the WVS, then, is expected to have a higher level of tolerance compared to an average respondent from Turkey. WVS also offers a comparison among OECD and non-OECD countries. Adding these two groups to the comparison among Turkey and the whole sample, it is found that Turkey's mean value of tolerance is below the average tolerance level in these two groups as well. OECD countries have the highest average level of tolerance followed by the sample as a whole, non-OECD countries and Turkey. It is not surprising to see that the top ranking is occupied by the

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<sup>10</sup> The two graphs in this section that are used to indicate tolerance level in Turkey in comparison to averages in different countries/regions were produced out of the World Values Survey data that has been also used for statistical analyses of this study. The sixth-wave of this comprehensive survey is currently being conducted and the data used in this study comes from its latest available wave. The data for this wave was collected in 2005-2006 from forty-one countries. More information on the WVS will be provided in the next chapter.

OECD countries as they are known to be the most developed countries of the world. This development is not limited to economic criteria only and is believed to involve advancement in human rights and democratic attitudes. Even this single graph alone can be sufficient to display the significantly low level of tolerance by Turkish people though it has to be kept in mind that “lows” and “highs” in this analysis are used in a comparative way, as throughout this analysis mean tolerance level in any country/region is not observed to fall below 5, 8 on a 4-8 scale. The significance of the comparative interpretation becomes more obvious in the second graph that represents the mean tolerance values of all countries included in this wave of the WVS survey. Among the forty-one countries, Turkey is observed to rank thirty-third.

Figure 1.1. Comparison of mean tolerance levels - 1




Turkey is found to be the ninth lowest country in terms of social tolerance among the forty-one countries included in the survey. The countries that are situated close to Turkey on this graph do not represent a certain religious orientation and hence it is impossible on the basis of this graph to claim that a denomination is inherently undemocratic. The shared characteristic of these countries is that they belong to Eastern civilizations. Geographically they all belong in Asia, Africa or the Middle East, although an Eastern European country is found only five rankings above Turkey. The other countries of this region follow it closely. Two countries below Turkey are

predominantly Muslim, representing different geographical regions. Jordan, the lowest country in the ranking, is from the Middle East and Malaysia is in Asia. Except for Rwanda, the other countries below Turkey are all Asian. In terms of religious orientation, they represent Eastern religions –Buddhism and Hinduism. The countries closely above Turkey are also from the Eastern civilization, exclusively from Africa. The two other predominantly Muslim countries in the survey, Morocco and Mali, are very close to Turkey in terms of mean tolerance levels.



Figure 1.2. Comparison of mean tolerance levels - 2



Through these findings, the broad distinction between the Eastern and the Western civilizations are supported to be true in practice. Both geographical regions and religious heritages are observed to have significant roles in tolerance levels. The grouping of Turkey with other Muslim countries and countries from Africa and Asia indicate that tolerance in Turkey – a pro-democratic country with almost seventy years of democratic experience-needs to be explored in detail. This thesis aims to fill this gap focusing not on the level of tolerance but on the details of tolerance in Turkey, specifically on the motivations behind individual attitudes of tolerance.

#### *1.3.4.3.1. The Earlier Studies on Tolerance in Turkey*

The findings of another multinational survey ISSP (International Social Survey Program) conducted in Turkey in 2008-2009 also display the low tolerance levels in Turkey. The questions in this survey were planned to measure political tolerance. The respondents were asked three questions about a person belonging to a different religion or having different ideas about religion; whether they would accept that person to be a candidate in the elections from the party the respondent would vote for, whether that person should be allowed to express his opinions in public places; whether that person should be allowed to publish books expressing his ideas. A four-category scale from 'should certainly be' to 'definitely should not be' was also provided for the responses. The graphs in the report show that in none of these questions the percentage of respondents choosing the first two categories of 'should certainly be' and 'might be' exceeded 50 %. While the percentage goes up to 50 % in the question on candidacy in elections, in the other two questions it even remains at 35 % and 38 % respectively (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009).

Another recent multinational survey analyzing issues related to tolerance in Turkey is Eurobarometer special survey on discrimination -conducted in 2009-comparing the situation in Turkey with that in the EU 27. This special survey was the third in a series of surveys commissioned by the European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. The first wave was conducted in 2006, followed by the second one in 2008. For the first time in the third wave, the survey included three candidate countries; Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia and Turkey. This special survey was conducted as a part of the Eurobarometer wave 71.2. It covers individuals from the respective nationalities of the European Union, resident in member countries who are above 15. In the candidate countries, both the national population and the EU nationals residents in these countries who were able to communicate through the national language, were covered. Multi-stage random sampling was used and face-to-face interviews in the national languages were conducted in people's homes. (Discrimination in the EU in 2009: Special Eurobarometer 317)

This survey briefly concluded that discrimination is an important problem in Turkey. When the responses by the Turkish respondents were compared to that by the interviewees from the EU27, Turks were found to score significantly low in displaying social tolerance. A high proportion of Turkish respondents made clear that they preferred to be friends and acquaintances with only people who were similar to them. While 64 % of the EU respondents mentioned to have a friend or acquaintance from a different religion or belief, this percentage was found to be 24 % for Turks. When the same question was asked for people with a different ethnic origin, 57 % of Europeans and 38 % of Turks provided an affirmative response. The percentages became significantly lower when the target groups were Roma people and homosexuals. 10 % of the Turkish respondents claimed to have a Roma friend whereas only 5 % made the same claim regarding homosexuals. In terms of their feelings about individuals from different categories gaining the highest elected position in Turkey, the Turkish respondents in the overall made clear that they would least like a homosexual, followed by a person over 75. The two least liked individuals following them were people from a different religion and different ethnic origin— different in these identifications referred to difference from the religion or the ethnic origin of the majority. The Turkish people; however, were not observed to have any problems with having a woman in that office.

Regarding the perceptions of discrimination, Turkish respondents were not found to be as conscious as the Europeans to state existence of discrimination in their country. 48 % of the respondents in Turkey, still lower than the percentage of the EU respondents making the same claim, mentioned that there was widespread discrimination in Turkey on the basis of ethnic origin. The Turkish public is also found to be aware of discrimination on the basis of religion and gender. The percentage of respondents stating discrimination in these two dimensions was closer to percentages of

the EU respondents making this claim. The difference of awareness between the Turkish and the European respondents became more obvious with respect to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, disability and age. Although a significant proportion of the Turkish public was observed to report discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion and gender –the most frequently discussed issues in Turkey-, overall at least half of the Turkish population did not report discrimination on any basis, showing internalization of intolerance and discrimination in Turkey, and indicating that intolerance and discrimination have already become the norm at least for some groups in Turkey. (Discrimination in the EU in 2009: The findings on Turkey)

More complex analyses have also been made on the data from these multinational surveys, frequently through a comparison of findings in different years. A report was published in 1999 by Yılmaz Esmer on a comparison of the findings of the 1990 and 1995 waves of the Turkish Values Surveys as parts of the World Values Survey. The report was on the social, political and economic values in Turkey. Talking about the relevance of tolerance towards differences to democracy, Esmer stressed the importance of the internalization of tolerance by not only the rulers and the elite but also the masses (p.85). Measuring social tolerance among the masses on the basis of attitudes towards different groups as neighbors, he reached the conclusion that the Turkish public was found to be intolerant in both waves. He tried to explain Turkish intolerance through some references to the specificities of the Turkish case. Initially, he admitted that accepting drug addicts, heavy drinkers or people with a criminal record as neighbors would be hard for anyone. Then, he attempted to explain intolerance towards homosexuals through the sensitivity of Turkish people on this issue. He also stated that Turkish people might be intolerant towards radical leftists and rightists because these ideas reminded them of violence due to the past experiences of violent clashes between ideological groups in Turkey. Yet in the Turkish people, up to 60 %, were observed to be intolerant towards people from different religions and ethnic groups as well, and Esmer said that it was not really easy to provide any explanations for these significantly high percentages (p.86-87). He left those numbers without any explanation in this report; however, the intolerant attitudes dominant in Turkey need to be examined carefully as development needs elaboration and explanations in advance.

A very recent article by Yeşilada and Noordijk (2010) analyzes changing values in Turkey. They focus on conservatism, religiosity and social tolerance as the changing

values, and rather than the relationship between these values, the focus of attention is on the change observed in them in the last fifteen years, from 1990 to 2005. The major finding with regard to this change is that both religiosity and tolerance increases over time. They also argue that religiosity –actually its belief dimension rather than the practical one- has a significant decreasing impact on tolerance and the increase experienced in both weakens the relationship between them. Even though they reach these findings, Yeşilada and Noordijk do not attempt to provide any explanations for the relationship between religiosity and tolerance. An overview of a limited number of studies on tolerance in Turkey displays that this attitude has not been analyzed deeply in Turkey. The second study of this thesis aims to fill this gap through an attempt to see how intolerance is shaped in Turkey. Besides the availability of ethnic and religious minorities, a more recent division on life-styles makes Turkey a more interesting context for discussions of tolerance. Fierce discussions on Islam and Islamism in the political and social contexts, different arguments on provision of rights and freedoms to minority groups, discussions on providing different groups with minority statuses and the most recent debate on the polarization between the lifestyles of Islamists and secularists prove the relevance of Turkey for an analysis on the motivating factors behind tolerance.

The Republican history in Turkey has been dominated by a struggle between the supporters of Western style modernization and the reactionary movements established in response to these modernization attempts. Throughout its history, the Turkish Republic has always felt itself under the threat of reactionary Islamism and the ideas of secularism and Islamism have formed the basis of this prolonged political and social conflict. Except for 1970s, the major axis of rivalry in Turkish political scene has always been the secular-Islamist distinction.

In time, this competition among the elites has begun to have its reflection on the masses, especially after the single party government formed by the traditionally AKP in 2002 and perhaps even more after its repeat victory in 2007<sup>11</sup>. While the practically

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<sup>11</sup> The Islamist parties in Turkey have all been representatives of the same political movement, the National Outlook Movement. These parties have all been closed by the secular state elite, namely the Constitutional Court, one after another and a new one with a different name; however, with similar cadres and the same ideology has been established. Only after the so-called post-modern coup in 1996 –through which the Islamists realized that they would not have the opportunity to legally participate in the political process if they do not soften their stance or at least their discourse to some extent- and the closure of the Virtue Party in 2001 to be historically more precise, the movement was divided and gave birth to two

religious people began to emphasize how they have been marginalized throughout the Turkish Republican history, the older secular people were anxious about the threat the empowerment of the Islamists will generate for the secular people of the Republic. They have repeated their concerns about social repression on religiously non-practicing individuals. With the help of these comments dominating the political scene and the media, the distinction of secularists and Islamists spread into social interactions. The idea of ‘neighborhood pressure’ raised by Şerif Mardin in 2007 triggered the debate further. This concept was considered to be hard to explain even by Mardin himself and thus triggered long discussions in the Turkish public sphere. The secularists tend to interpret it as a support for their concerns about pressures by the Islamist, conservative people and also by the AKP government, even though Mardin openly stated that this climate of pressure was found among Islamic subgroups independent of the AKP and that if this climate had the favorable conditions to thrive, even the AKP would be obliged to comply with it.

A study (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül, & Şener, 2009) related to this debate attracted great attention in the media and public discussions. It was based on a field research on social life in Anatolia and was conducted in 2009 by a research group headed by Binnaz Toprak. The study was directly labeled as a study on ‘neighborhood pressure’. The aim was to talk to people who, in their points of view, were currently pressured and otherized in Turkish society and to listen to their experiences in detail. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted in twelve Anatolian cities<sup>12</sup> and two neighborhoods – the majority of the populations in these neighborhoods are known to have migrated from different Anatolian cities- in Istanbul. The criteria of this selection was explained in the report as including at least one city from all seven regions of Turkey, leaving out the coastal cities of the Aegean and the Mediterranean that have experienced

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parties at the same time, the Felicity Party and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The latter was known to be the party of the younger members of the National Outlook Movement who claimed to be more moderate. When he established the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, said that they took off the ‘National Outlook shirt’. The party has been in power in Turkey for the last eight years and has been appreciated by many analysts for acting in line with the Western modernization of the Turkish Republic –especially in terms of intensifying the relationships with the European Union and taking serious steps on the way of Turkey’s accession into the Union- at least until recently when Mr. Erdoğan began to be criticized for acting as if he was opting for leadership in the Muslim world. For a detailed account of the political adventure of the Islamist parties in Turkey, see; Toprak, 2005; Tank, 2005; Göle, 1997.

<sup>12</sup> Erzurum, Kayseri, Konya, Malatya, Sivas, Batman, Trabzon, Denizli, Aydın, Eskişehir, Adapazarı, Balıkesir.

development in their tourism sectors. Attention was also paid to the development levels of the cities and the percentage of AKP voters in them so that they show the divergence in Turkey in both respects.

The total number of respondents was 401; 265 men and 136 women. Purposive sampling and snowballing were used and the target groups were limited to secularists, young people, women, Roma citizens, Alevis and Christians. This research was severely criticized for its ignorance of the experiences of religious people. The practically religious masses were not interviewed and Binnaz Toprak explained in later editions why this group was intentionally left out of their analysis by defining the scope of their research to be limited with the otherizations on the basis of religion and conservatism. Study 2 in this thesis points to the attitudes of tolerance by both groups of Muslims in Turkey towards each other paying attention to feelings, ideas and experiences of both groups.

In their research report it was made clear that the stories they heard about fulfilled their expectations of Islamization and discrimination on this basis in the Turkish society. An interpretation heard several times in different cities was that the pictures of Ataturk in shops such as pharmacies or jewelry shops have been taken down by many of these shop-keepers as they need to seem less Kemalist to be able to function in commerce. However, the walls of the shops were said to have been full of these pictures in the past (p. 48). Another frequently mentioned complaint about the neighborhood pressure in Anatolian cities was that people living secular lives could not find appropriate places to drink alcohol. Restaurants and cafes selling alcohol were said to have been pushed towards the suburban places. Through several arguments they came across repeatedly, the researchers reached the conclusion that the Turkish public sphere has been experiencing a change towards Islamization and conservatism and clash of life styles explains the current structure of the society.

#### *1.3.4.3.2. Major Minority Groups in Turkey*

The non-Muslim minorities constitute the only officially recognized minority group in Turkey. The official minority definition in Turkey is provided by the treaty of Lausanne in which only the non-Muslim groups -Armenians, Greeks and Jews- are

recognized as minorities who are provided with the rights to establish their own schools, to provide education in their own languages and to have their own shrines. Such explicit recognition has never been granted to Muslim ethnic groups or sectarian minority groups<sup>13</sup> as the dominant rhetoric of the Republic has been the existence of a uniform homogeneous population in the country. Discussions on coexistence of different groups in Turkey and the rights and freedoms that should be provided to them have dominated the political and social scene in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and have become even more prevalent after the start of membership negotiations with the European Union in 2005. This rhetoric is challenged not only through the public discussions on the subject but also through the attempts of the government i.e. the Kurdish and Alevi initiatives. Even though these attempts have failed to reach their aims until now, they opened the ground for debates on recognition of these groups and their statuses in the society.

#### 1.3.4.3.2.1. Alevi

Alevi constitute the major sectarian minority group in Turkey<sup>14</sup>. They have homogeneously supported the secularist foundations of the Republican regime as they interpret the secularism of the state as a protection against violation of their rights and freedoms by the Sunni majority. Although the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the secular Republic in 1923 reduced certain legal pressures on Alevi, not much has been resolved in practice. Their problems continue on the daily basis in terms of both officially provided religious freedoms and social interaction with Sunnis. Alevi still ask for several rights and freedoms, i.e. for official recognition of their

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<sup>13</sup> However, the section of the treaty that is concerned with the minority rights clearly stipulates that the articles therein “shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.” In article 38, it is stated that “full and complete protection of life and liberty of all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion” should be granted. Based on this clause, all minority rights, be it of the Muslim or non-Muslim origin, could find protection under Lausanne Treaty.

<sup>14</sup> Although a solid determination of the size of their population is practically impossible due to the massive migrations of Alevi in urban settlements and their tendency to keep their sectarian identities secret in the public realm, population estimates vary between 10-20 percent of the total population. The percentages are usually found to be below 10 % when individuals are directly asked whether they are Alevi or not. An alternative method was used by Çarkoğlu (2005) and Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006) to reach more accurate percentages and the respondents were asked whether they had pictures of Ali or the Twelve Imams –holy figures in Alevism- in their houses. Bringing the findings of all three questions together, Çarkoğlu and Toprak reached the conclusion that 11, 4 % of their respondents were Alevi.



worship places, cemevis, as shrines and for being exempt from compulsory religion courses in elementary and secondary schools.

With respect to their social presences, Alevis report experiencing serious discrimination. Toprak et. al. (2009) concluded that among the target groups, Alevis constitute the group that is most frequently exposed to societal pressures and prejudices. Alevis tell that they need to follow Sunni practices or at least to pretend to follow in order to have a place in social and commercial networks of their societies. During Ramadan, for instance, they cannot find any open restaurants to have lunch in, and even the Alevi coffeehouses put curtains on their windows so that the inside cannot be seen from outside –that is the eating, drinking and smoking Alevis are not recognized by the fasting Sunnis outside. Alevis reveal that the stereotypes they most frequently hear about themselves are “Alevis are dirty”, “the food they cook cannot be eaten”, “Alevis have deviant sexual relationships, even with their family members”. The few exceptional positive comments regarding Alevis are heard through sentences with ‘but’; “... is an Alevi but a good person” or “... is an Alevi but an honest person”. The same Alevi interviewees of this research; however, also note that these prejudices about them are not shared by all Sunnis and that they have many Sunni friends. What they talk about is more of an expression of a general psychology and feeling of exclusion (pp. 64-86).

Regulation of social life in Turkey on the basis of Sunni religious rituals makes life harder for Alevis, especially as the times of communal practices like Friday prayer times and Ramadan alter the ordinary flow of life, even for Alevis, most of whom actually do not follow them. The shortening of lunch breaks during Ramadan, for instance, is an example of changes experienced in the structure of everyday lives. Alevis interpret Ramadan to be the month of hardship for themselves also because usually in this month their identities –which they usually prefer to keep concealed- become known. Alevis add that once their identities are recognized, they experience various adversities in business life such as being fired directly, being eliminated initially during the job application processes, facing injustice in their promotions etc. (*Türkiye’de Azınlık Hakları Sorunu*, 2006, p.112-119).

#### 1.3.4.3.2.2. Kurds

The other victims of the Turkish state's rhetoric of a unified, homogenous population were Kurds. At the very beginning of the Republic, the Kurds' existence in Turkey was recognized; however, the 1924 constitution refrained from providing constitutional protection for their cultural rights. From 1930 onwards, the official view became even harsher and the doctrine of the state was that there were no Kurds in Turkey. This principle endured until the 1990s. Kurds have never constituted the main target of discriminatory practices<sup>15</sup> -such as prohibition from public office, confiscation of their properties, wealth tax or campaigns such as "Citizen talk Turkish!"- as these attempts have mainly intended to control the non-Muslim minorities even though some of them, for instance the campaign regarding the Turkish language, also affected Kurds. Kurds -like other Muslim minorities in the country- were invited to assimilate. One frequently employed method of assimilation was forced migrations from the Kurdish villages in the South Eastern part of Turkey with the purpose of dividing the Kurdish community and hence depriving them of power. This; however, was not the only tool used by the state. The state also aimed to make Kurds forget their language and thus, their culture. This was accomplished through the ban on teaching and broadcasting in any language other than Turkish -keeping the rights of the Lausanne minorities apart- in the 1982 constitution. The 1980s were marked with this ban while in 1991 the law was removed, legalizing speaking and singing in Kurdish. The 1990s and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century witnessed fierce discussions on the use of the Kurdish language in Turkey. A long way has been made since the 1980s and by 2010, the state channel TRT has its own channel broadcasting in Kurdish and language courses in Kurdish are being provided in some universities. The discussion of the 2000s in this regard is whether Kurdish should be set free as a language of education.

A law enacted in 1972 had banned naming children in Kurdish as it said in the text that the new born children could not be given names that were not appropriate to the Turkish national culture, ethic codes, traditions and customs, or that would offend the Turkish public. Change in this area came with a new law enacted in 2003 which set a new criterion for naming children which was limited only with appropriateness to ethic codes and with not offending the Turkish public opinion. The negotiations with

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<sup>15</sup> For a general analysis of these discriminatory practices committed by the Turkish state, see Oran, 2004.

the European Union and Turkey's enthusiasm to enter the EU enabled governments to implement these developments in official regulations with regard to the Kurdish identity more easily and more quickly. The EU in this sense helped democratization –even if still incomplete- in Turkey (*Türkiye'de Azınlık Hakları Sorunu*, p.105-111).

The primary problems experienced by Kurds in social affairs regard communication problems on one hand and violence and crime associated with this group on the other. Parallel to the official bans, the use of Kurdish has been widely criticized by the Turkish public. Even though the bans on the use of the Kurdish language have been at least mitigated with the recent legal changes, the public reaction cannot be controlled. For the individuals opposed to the Kurdish overtures attempted by the government, the issue has become even more sensitive, and hearing Kurdish has become even more maddening as they believe that Kurds now intentionally prefer to speak Kurdish in public just to display their power and because they have been spoilt by the government. The second repeated complaint by the Kurds is that the public opinion associates them with the PKK and that they are blamed for any violent act or crime committed around them.

The state's approach towards these Muslim minorities in Turkey- the Alevis and the Kurds- has been to accept them as full-fledged citizens of the Republic once they agree to act in line with the assimilationist policies of the state. Their identifying features have been unrecognized by the state and have been interpreted to be threatening by the public in general. As these different identities have started to be discussed more frequently in the last few years, suspicion towards these groups increased even more. Alevis and Kurds have the opportunity to live in peace in Turkey if they behave like the majority and do not make their differences obvious. Yet; as identity politics attracts significant attention today, these discussions are expected to dominate the Turkish social and political scene for a long time.

In the overall, it is proved that the commitment to plural democracy is missing in Turkey. The discussion at the beginning of this chapter represented the consensus on the significance of democratic culture for liberal democratic governance and a primary prerequisite of democratic culture is to fight for the rights and freedoms of all groups in the society, rather than for those of one's own group only. The famous survey by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006) demonstrates that such a democratic attitude is missing in

Turkey. Within the nation-wide sample, only 43 % of the respondents supported that the headscarved girls should enter the university freely; 18 % believed that the same criteria used for any high school graduate should also be applied to graduates of Religious Vocational Schools in university entrance examinations<sup>16</sup>; 11 % supported that Kurds should have the opportunity to receive education in their mother tongues and 5 % agreed that the state should financially support cemevis –the Alevi house of worship. These findings indicate that the Turkish public in general has a “closed understanding of democracy” in which only the rights of the “we” are supported while the rights of the “others” are not cared about at all. The other, at this point, does not represent only the non-Muslim minorities and includes Alevis and Kurds and even the secular or practicing Muslims depending on the characteristics of the respondent. Hence; being different in Turkey is problematic for members of any group and this “difference” changes depending on the time and the context. Even some members of the majority face discrimination in Turkey in certain places and at certain times. Sometimes being a secularist and in some other times being an Islamist leads to experiences of social exclusion.

#### **1.4. Conclusion**

A shift of focus to individuals and social affairs experienced with the glorification of liberal democracy led to extensive focus on cultural prerequisites of democracy. The consensus has been reached that democracy becomes vulnerable without democrats. Socioeconomic development and cultural factors, once accepted to be alternative prerequisites to democratization, are interpreted to be cooperative in the later cultural theories. Socioeconomic development is believed to lead to the development of civic cultures that encourages democratization. Besides socioeconomic development, religion –as both religious heritage and level of religiosity- has been emphasized as a prominent factor in shaping cultures. Although the literature has focused on the significance of the major characteristics of different denominations, the

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<sup>16</sup> When the survey was conducted in 2006, lower coefficients were used in calculating the scores of the Religious Vocational School graduates in the university entrance examination compared to the ones used for graduates of any high other school in Turkey. In 2010; however, the AKP government changed this practice and even though the coefficients have not been standardized totally, the difference has been reduced to a considerable extent.

impact of the level of religiosity is more strongly emphasized in this thesis due to several reasons. Focusing on the inherent nature of the denominations ignore the heterogeneity of these groups and also the possibility of change in the interpretations of religious principles across time or context. The level of religiosity; however, reflects the current interpretation of a certain denomination. If a conservative interpretation dominates the current understanding of a certain religion in a setting, then the highly religious members in that setting provides undemocratic responses. For social interpretations, it is healthier to get a sense of different denominations through the attitudes and responses of their believers. Moreover, religiosity is not as static as the nature of a denomination. The dynamism of religiosity opens it for change, providing hope for the future of currently-undemocratic settings.

Among the four core values of civic culture –trust and civic engagement, participation, gender equality and tolerance-, tolerance deserves extra attention due to its centrality to defining the principles of democratic governance. It is directly about maximum inclusiveness, rule by the people and equality emphasized in the definitions of democracies. The discussions on the relevance of these values to democracy also indicate that the other attitudes become possible only through tolerance. Empirical studies have also proved the significance of tolerance to democracy. Various researches on tolerance in Eastern Europe have attempted to find out the deficiencies in this region with respect to successful democratization. Not limiting the scope of their analyses to the level of tolerance only, these researchers also aimed to find out factors relevant to fostering tolerance in these countries, and religion attracted attention as one of the factors keeping these individuals intolerant. Although alternative arguments have also been made, the relationship between religion and tolerance has never been denied.

The thesis follows with a two-level research project. Study 1, following this chapter, consists of two quantitative analyses on the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes. Democratic attitudes are represented by both of its dimensions, support for democracy and internalization of democratic values in separate analyses. The results are also controlled for demographics, most importantly for education level and income –the individual level indicators of socioeconomic development. Study 2 focuses on social tolerance as the most relevant democratic attitude. Pointing to the significantly low level of tolerance in Turkey situating it among the members of Eastern civilization despite its pro-Western orientation and almost 90 years of democratic experience, this

study displays the significance of understanding the factors behind intolerance in Turkey. While the impact of religiosity is still the center of attention, other motivations shaping tolerance are also discussed. The central role of religiosity in discussions regarding Turkey proves the country's relevance to this research as the question attempted to be answered by this thesis is the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **DESIGN OF INQUIRY AND METHODOLOGY FOR STUDY 1 ON SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY, RELIGIOSITY AND CIVIC VALUES**

The following quantitative analyses examine the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes across four different religious affiliations. Such comparisons produce viable results only when data for the members of all affiliations come from the same dataset. The World Values Survey (WVS) is special in this regard with its wide scope, i.e. forty-one countries in the latest wave. Below, a brief introduction to the WVS will be provided followed by an explanation on the categorization of respondents for comparison and the variables used in the analyses will be described with a special attention on how the newly generated ones were developed.

#### **2.1. The Significance of the World Values Survey**

The WVS began as a Western European project carried out by the European Values survey group. The initial scope of the survey was limited to ten Western European countries in 1981. The widespread interest in the project widened its domain and it was later on, reproduced in fourteen additional countries. In terms of the subject matter, the main focus of the survey was on cultural change. The findings of the first attempts had proved the practical existence of cultural changes and thus had led to a boom in public attention given to the survey. Then the decision to launch it globally was taken. Following the one in 1990, new waves of the survey were designed to be suitable for serving this global purpose. Three waves have already been conducted in 1995, 2000 and 2005 and the fifth wave is being carried out currently and is planned to be

finished by 2012. From 1995 onwards special attention has been given to the non-Western world as the development of a democratic culture in the Third Wave democracies was of great interest to the researchers. This interest in values and democratization helps to find questions on either religiosity or democratic attitudes within the WVS.

The dataset used in the statistical analyses of this study is the latest available wave of the WVS. The dataset was collected between 2005 and 2006, from forty-one countries. Countries from the Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa are all within the scope of this survey. While the Muslim respondents are mainly from predominantly Muslim countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Mali, Turkey, Morocco and Jordan, minority Muslims in different parts of the world are also involved. Table 2.1. below signifies that 80,4 % of the Muslim respondents surveyed in this wave are from predominantly Muslim countries and the rest come from Africa, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Far east, with a notable lacuna in Latin America.. The following analyses do not concentrate on any one of these regions or countries because the aim is to compare members of different denominations regardless of their locations.

The same wide scope is true for other denominations as well. As Table 2.2. displays Roman Catholics, for instance, are mostly from Western Europe and Latin America. Yet; there are also Catholics from South Korea, Ghana, Slovenia and Romania within the sample.



Table 2.1. Percentage of Muslim respondents by country

Egypt	21,3
Indonesia	14,3
Mali	11,0
Turkey	10,2
Morocco	9,2
Jordan	9,1
Malaysia	5,3
pre-dominantly Muslim	80,4
Ghana	1,8
Rwanda	1,7
Ethiopia	1,2
Bulgaria	0,8
South Africa	0,4
China	0,4
Trinidad and Tobago	0,4
Thailan	0,3
Serbia	0,3
Switzerland	0,2
Zambia	0,2
Slovenia	0,1
Germany	0,1

\* countries with percentages lower than 0,1 have not been included in the table

Table 2.2. Percentage of Roman Catholic respondents by country

Mexico	8,0
Peru	7,6
Spain	6,8
Poland	6,7
Brazil	6,4
Italy	6,3
Rwanda	5,6
Argentina	5,3
Sweden	4,8
Slovenia	4,8
Chile	4,3
Andorra	3,9
Switzerland	3,6
Zambia	3,6
Burkina Faso	3,4
Germany	3,0
South Africa	2,6
Australia	2,3
Ghana	2,3
USA	1,8
South Korea	1,8
Trinidad and Tobago	1,5
Romania	1,0

\* countries with percentages lower than 1,0  
have not been included in the table

## **2.2. Grouping the Respondents on the Basis of Religious Affiliations**

To enable the denomination-wise comparison, the respondents were grouped, in the following analyses according to their self-declared religious affiliation. The WVS question “Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?” forms the basis of this measurement. Regardless of the country they live in, respondents’ self-declaration of their affiliation was used as the criterion of grouping. In most studies on the subject, the comparison between members of different affiliations is done through choosing a couple of countries to represent each affiliation according to the dominant religious orientation in the country. Turkey, for instance, is chosen to represent Muslims whereas Russians represent Orthodox Christians and the Dutch represent the Protestants. The sample then is limited to citizens of these countries and affiliations are represented by respondents from one or two countries. In the following analyses, however, individuals with the same declared affiliations were put together. Moreover, the impact of living in a certain country is controlled for. The variable asking respondents the countries they live in was recoded into forty-one binary variables. These variables take the value of 1 only for respondents living in the country they represent and of 0 for all the others. Rather than focusing on members of a certain affiliation living in a particular region or in a couple of countries, all respondents claiming to belong to that affiliation were grouped together. Individuals who claimed to belong to Islam were coded as Muslims, others stating membership in Roman Catholicism as Catholics etc. As an answer to the belonging question, 20, 4 % of the respondents claimed to be Muslim, 12, 4 % to be Orthodox, 14 % to be Protestant and 30, 1 % to be Roman Catholic.

Table 2.3. Percentage of respondents on the basis of denominations they belong

Roman Catholic	30,1
Muslim	20,4
Orthodox	12,4
Protestant	14
Buddhist	6
Evangelical	4,3
Hindu	3,8

The following comparative analyses consist of solely these four groups due to two different reasons. Among the seven answer options directly provided in the survey<sup>1</sup>, only the members of these four affiliations constitute more than 10 % of the total sample. These comparatively large percentages are significant in two respects. First of all, they provide sufficient number of respondents for comparison. At the same time they indicate the importance of these groups within the world's population. These four groups are the major religious affiliations in the world and they occupy a critical space in social and political discussions. According to this theoretical outlook, Jews could also be included in these analyses as this group also attracts much social and political attention throughout the world. Initially, Judaism was added to the list of denominations analyzed, however, they had to be dropped from the model afterwards because the number of respondents who claim to be Jewish form just 0, 3 % of the total sample and such a huge gap between the sizes of the groups impedes statistical comparison.

The grouping in this study is not just limited to different religions and takes into consideration cross-denominational differences within Christianity as well. The first explanation to this preference is practical. The World Values Survey offers denominations of Christianity as answer choices for the question on individuals' religious affiliation, then the respondents also provided their answers accordingly. The percentages of respondents belonging to different sects of Christianity also imply that

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<sup>1</sup> There is also the option of 'other' in the questionnaire. The results indicate that many respondents preferred that option yet none of them ever exceed 1, 6 % of the total respondents and indeed most of them are below 1 %.

they should be analyzed separately. Otherwise, more than half of the sample would be taken as Christians and comparisons would be flawed. The significance of denominational differences within Christianity has also been stressed by many earlier studies. Recently conducted analyses on the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes such as trust (Begue, 2002), tolerance (Karpov, 2002), social capital (Uslaner, 1999), civic engagement (Smidt, 1999) and subjective well-being (Ellison, 1991), have already claimed that the significance and direction of religiosity diverge among not only religions but also different denominations of Christianity (Ellison, 1991; Schwadel, 2005; Smidt, 1999). The conclusion is that different interpretations within Christianity lead to different attitudes among their followers.

Huntington's (1984, p.207-208) comparison between predominantly Protestant and Catholic countries on the basis of democracy levels also supports evidence for the meaningful denominational differences within Christianity. The results put forward by Ronald Inglehart (1999) in his study about trust and democracy, proves the assertion that belonging to different religions and denominations creates divergence in individual attitudes. His findings display that cross-religious and even cross-denominational differences are visible among the trust levels of individuals. "Protestant and Confucian-influenced societies consistently show higher levels of interpersonal trust than do historically Roman Catholic or Islamic societies" (Inglehart, 1999, p.92). Interpretations of denominational differences should not refer solely to theological differences. Organizational divergences among denominations might also generate different attitudes. "Both doctrinal and structural aspects of the religions could play a role" (Huntington, 1984, p.208) in shaping social and political phenomena. Inglehart refers to the significance of organizational differences in comparing Catholic and Protestant societies in terms of civic values internalization.

Why do Catholic societies rank lower on the interpersonal trust than Protestant societies? Again, it seems to reflect the principle that horizontal, locally-controlled organizations are conducive to interpersonal trust, while remote hierarchal organizations tend to undermine it. The Roman Catholic Church is the very prototype of a hierarchal, centrally controlled institution; Protestant churches were smaller, relatively decentralized and more open to local control. (Inglehart, 1999, p.92)

## 2.3. The Variables Used in the Quantitative Analyses<sup>2</sup>

### 2.3.1. The Dependent Variable: Democratic Attitudes

Democratic attitudes are analyzed in this study in both of its dimensions discussed in the literature review; i.e. the ideas about democratic governance and internalization of democratic values. In the first analysis, support for democracy acts as the dependent variable and the impacts of belonging and of individual religiosity on it are measured. Demographics and the major components of civic culture briefly discussed in the literature review are also included in the model as control variables. In the second analysis these values are used as dependent variables separately and this time the impacts of different aspects of religion on these values are measured. Demographic variables are again used as control variables.

Support for democracy, the dependent variable of the first analysis, is measured through the importance attributed to living in a democratically governed country. The question “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is ‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘absolutely important’ what position would you choose?” in the 2005-2006 World Values Survey is used as the dependent variable in this model. This variable had to be recoded before the analysis because its original form with ten categories would make it impossible to draw informative conclusions out of this analysis as moves among adjacent scores would not result in significant and meaningful differences. Then, the variable was recoded, decreasing the number of available answer categories from ten to three. Responses 1, 2 and 3 on the ten point scale were recoded as 1 indicating “evaluating living in a democratically governed country to be unimportant”; 4, 5, 6 and 7 were recoded as 2 indicating “indifference”; 8, 9, 10 were recoded as 3 indicating “evaluating living in a democratically governed country to be important”. The new variable then was coded as `importance_of_democracy`.

The idea that led to the use of this specific question as the indicator of individual support for democracy was that if a condition of the society is important for an

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<sup>2</sup> A table providing descriptive statistics for all the variables used in these statistical analyses can be found in the Appendix I.

individual, then he/she will evaluate that feature to be valuable and will be ready to spend some effort to achieve it. Attributing importance to democracy, then, will signify one's support for it. The preference for this specific indicator also contributes to the conceptual appeal of this research as this item is a new one that has been included within WVS only in this latest wave. This study is among the first works providing a cross-national analysis through this particular question. A question previously used as an indicator of support for democracy was a more straightforward one directly asking about respondents' views on having a democratic political system. The exact wording of the question was "would you say having a democratic political system is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, very bad way of governing this country?". Another frequently asked question was about respondents' personal views on certain characteristics of democracy. Four different statements are listed as the answer options and respondents are asked to evaluate and state their level of agreement with them. "Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government" is usually the most widely heard one of these responses. The first quantitative analysis' focus on the question regarding the importance attributed to living in a democracy is significant as it helps avoid a replication of earlier studies.

### **2.3.2. Religiosity as the Main Independent Variable**

Although the belonging aspect of religion is also analyzed in this study and comments are made on the compatibility debate, the main independent variable of this study is religiosity which is measured through three different questions. It is widely accepted that such a complicated and multi-dimensional concept as religiosity cannot ever be represented by a single indicator in any analysis; Stark and Glock made the complexity of this concept clear by saying that "church membership, belief in religious doctrines, an ethical way of life, attendance at worship services, and many other acts, outlooks and conditions can all denote piety and commitment to religion" (Stark & Glock, 1968, p.11). Each one of these different aspects of religiosity has not been mentioned very frequently. The general tendency, however, has been to gather them in two different dimensions; belief and practice. The discussions on the role of religiosity in the postmodern era signify that these two aspects of religiosity do not always go hand-in-hand. Different trends in different dimensions of religiosity indicate that an

individual might be religious in one of these dimensions yet not so religious in the other. The postmodern era, for instance, is usually evaluated as one of a decline in practical dimension of established religions, yet of at least stability, or even a rise in the belief/spiritual dimension. Personal preferences, ideas and beliefs have a role in shaping the balance between these aspects of religiosity. Regardless of the era, there have always been people strongly believing yet not reflecting it in practice. Different scores in these different dimensions can result in diverse ideas and attitudes; hence, public opinion surveys have usually included questions on at least two different aspects of religiosity.

Two of the three questions used for measuring religiosity in the following analyses might be interpreted as representatives of these two widely employed dimensions of religiosity; belief and practice. Importance of religion in one's life is directly about the belief aspect, whereas the question on the frequency of attendance in religious practices represents practical religiosity. The question on 'importance of religion' is a part of a longer list through which the respondents are asked to rate the importance of certain things in their lives. Four answer options have been provided in these questions; very important, rather important, rather unimportant and very unimportant- coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. However; as has been done with all variables of religiosity, this variable was recoded as a dichotomous variable (options 1 and 2 recoded as 1 indicating importance of religion in one's life and 3 and 4 recoded as 0 indicating unimportance) for this study so that interpretation of the results would become easier. Rather than trying to talk about the impact of each shift from 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 etc., the change generated by only one shift - from religion being unimportant in one's life to its being important will be focused on. Support for democracy and the embrace of democratic values by individuals in whose lives religion is important will be compared to that of people who do not attribute importance to religion at all.

The question measuring the practical dimension of individual religiosity has been frequently used as an indicator of this aspect in various analyses. It asks about frequency of attendance in religious services by members of Christian denominations and frequency of prayer for Muslims. The seven answer options provided were reduced to two again making the variable dichotomous; 1 indicating frequent participation and 0 rare or none attendance in religious services. Hence; the frequencies of "once a month, once a week and more than once a week", that were originally coded as 3, 2 and 1



respectively, were recoded as 1 due to the idea that they point to frequent participation and the other four options of “only on special holidays, once a year, less often, practically never”, that were originally coded as 4, 5, 6 and 7, as 0 because they signal rare participation, if not a complete absence of it. The impact generated by this variable, then, is explained as the change created by frequent attendance in religious practices compared to rare or no attendance at all.

The third variable used to measure religiosity has been labeled as “self-evaluated religiosity” as it directly asks about individuals’ perceptions of themselves in terms of their religiosity. Originally, the question provides respondents with three alternatives for self-identification; they would call themselves either a religious person, not a religious person or an atheist. This indicator has also been recoded into a binary variable in which non-religious and atheist identifications were brought together under one label “non-religious person” and coded as 0 while the first option was kept as it is, with its original code 1. The percentage distribution of responses also encouraged such a two-fold grouping due to the large difference between “stating to be religious” and the other two categories. While 71,47 % of the total respondents claimed to be religious, only 23,30 % declared to be nonreligious and the percentage for atheists was found to be much lower; just 5,23 %. Even if this category of self-evaluated atheism was left alone, it would not bear significant comparisons because of the huge difference between the percentage of respondents who call themselves religious and that of the ones who prefer to call themselves atheists. Hence, although atheism and non-religiosity are different things, they are gathered together in one variable because the aim of the comparison at this step is to see the difference generated by one’s considering himself to be religious rather than anything else. All these three variables of religiosity have been coded as dichotomous variables and in the process of recoding special attention was paid to attributing higher scores to higher religiosity in each one of these variables so that no confusion is experienced in interpretation.

### **2.3.3. The Major Components of Civic Culture**

Various definitions have been provided for civic culture and a variety of suggestions have been made to determine its components. The long discussion on the

topic that occupies a considerable space in the first chapter signifies that a complete consensus on the ingredients could not have been reached; however, some attitudes have been agreed to signify democratic characteristics. Trust, tolerance and membership in voluntary associations seem to constitute the core elements of this list of agreed-upon factors. Tolerance and trust are especially emphasized for their relevance to collective behavior and hence their link to civic engagement in this respect. Individuals embracing these two values respect others who hold different views, do not act suspiciously towards unfamiliar people and as a result agree to cooperate with a large group for a shared purpose. Diamond (1994) defines tolerance as willingness to make compromises which in return solves collective action problems.

In social and political spheres of life, once processes of participation and decision-making are opened to different groups through tolerance, it also helps establishing social cohesion in a society. This cooperation among individuals is highly significant for democratization as democracy –defined as the rule by people– necessitates individuals’ collective participation. These three ingredients of the democratic culture, then, can easily be interpreted as the parts of a single puzzle. The coexistence of the three paves the way to the democratic experiences. (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Inglehart, 1988, 1990; Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 1999)

Besides tolerance, trust and civic engagement, participation and support for gender equality are the other two attitudes believed to indicate democratic orientation of the respondents. The significance of citizen participation in the decision making processes and of citizens’ willingness to take part in democratic practices for democratization is obvious. Support for gender equality, on the other hand, is an important ingredient of democratic culture as any discrimination, including sexual discrimination, contradicts with the main rationale of democracy. (For details see McDonagh, 2002; Rose, 1995; Sen, 1999)

As the main focus of the WVS has been cultural change since the first time it was used, a lot of questions measuring democratic attitudes can be found in this survey. Several variables relevant to each component of democratic culture are available in the dataset and hence the civic values included in these analyses are factor scores of a number of indicators. Before moving into the findings of these analyses, it has to be

clarified how these new variables have been generated out of several others already available in the dataset.

### **2.3.3.1. Tolerance**

Tolerance has usually been measured through the standard question of whom the respondents would not like to have as neighbors. The same question is asked for nine different groups; drug addicts, people of a different race, people who have AIDS, immigrants, homosexuals, people of a different religion, heavy drinkers, unmarried couples living together, and people who speak of a different language in that order. The 1-2 coding scheme of these variables was transformed into 0-1 where 1 indicates that the specific group in question is not mentioned as an unwanted neighbor and 0 shows it's being mentioned. The 1s and 0s have been attached to these responses in order to fulfill the general coding rule of this study that higher scores signal higher commitment to democratic values. These recoded versions of the nine questions on unwanted neighbors were run in a factor analysis to be able to see whether these variables can be brought together for a new single variable that alone measures tolerance.

The results in Table 2.4. display that these variables cannot generate a single indicator of tolerance. While tolerance towards drug addicts, homosexuals, heavy drinkers and people with AIDS cluster in Factor 2; tolerance towards the other five groups get clustered in Factor 1. The formation of the two different factors out of this analysis signals that there are two different types of tolerance. Factor 2 might be labeled as tolerance towards out-groups, due to the defining characteristics of the groups mentioned in the variables loaded in this factor. The four groups included in this factor are different from the others on the basis of their “threatening identities”. They might be interpreted to be frightening due to their potential for creating unrest and chaos in the neighborhood. While homosexuals and people with AIDS are expected to bring about ethical chaos, threat-perceptions regarding drug-addicts and heavy drinkers who are likely to lose self-control after a certain point are much more serious. Hence; tolerance of this sort, which is represented by Factor 2 on this table can also be called “High-Tolerance” – tolerance that is hard to internalize, especially due to the marginality of the

target groups. Tolerance for the other six groups; however, gather in Factor 1 which can then be referred to as just “Tolerance” as it is more widespread and easier to embrace.

Table 2.4. Factor loadings for indicators of tolerance

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
	<b>Tolerance</b>	<b>High-Tolerance</b>	
<b>Tolerance-different-religion</b>	<b><u>0,78</u></b>	-0,05	0,39
<b>Tolerance-different-race</b>	<b><u>0,77</u></b>	-0,04	0,40
<b>Tolerance-different-language</b>	<b><u>0,76</u></b>	-0,07	0,41
<b>Tolerance-immigrants</b>	<b><u>0,72</u></b>	0,09	0,48
<b>Tolerance-unmarried-couples</b>	<b><u>0,56</u></b>	0,37	0,55
<b>Tolerance-drug-addicts</b>	-0,24	<b><u>0,75</u></b>	0,39
<b>Tolerance-heavy-drinkers</b>	-0,08	<b><u>0,71</u></b>	0,50
<b>Tolerance-homosexuals</b>	0,20	<b><u>0,71</u></b>	0,46
<b>Tolerance-AIDS</b>	0,45	<b><u>0,53</u></b>	0,52

**Proportion** 0,32 0,22

**Rotation**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
<b>Factor 1</b>	0,96	0,28
<b>Factor 2</b>	-0,28	0,96

The variable generated out of Factor 1 has been used in the statistical analyses of this study due to two different reasons. One of them is that high-tolerance is not easy to observe among the masses as individuals are more suspicious of the target groups in that category compared to the ones included in Factor 1. As tolerance is not widespread

around the world at all, it would be too ambitious to search for high tolerance in this study. The second reason, on the other hand, is more about a theoretical discussion on tolerance. The limits of tolerance have long been debated and certain groups were argued to be left out of the scope of tolerant attitudes. Drug addicts, for instance, were included in this category of not-to-be-tolerated groups, besides criminals, vandals etc., in some of these discussions. Moreover, the larger proportion belonging to this factor on the table above signifies that it explains a higher percentage of the total variance.

Among the five groups targeted in Factor 1, only four, which exclusively focus on groups defined as being different from the respondent in certain aspects, are chosen for the following analyses to concentrate on tolerance towards differences rather than towards some ethical issues. Tolerance is defined, in the literature, as accepting diverse people, diverse opinions and behaviors even when they are disapproved. Individuals' tolerance becomes an issue of debate when they are confronted with an "other". (Robinson et. al., 2001; Vogt, 97; Witenberg 2000) Based on these arguments mentioned in more detail in the literature review, the target groups included within the tolerance measurement in the comparative analyses are people with different races, different religions, different languages and also immigrants. Tolerance with regard to unmarried couples is left out due to the idea that the stance towards ethical issues diverge among societies according to their cultural traditions and thus might be misleading in comparing attitudes of tolerance in these societies.

A new factor analysis among these four questions asking about attitudes towards groups different from the respondent in various respects encourages gathering them together in a new single variable as the factor loadings for each question become higher in this second analysis. The percentage of total variance explained by this factor also increases considerably. This new Factor 1, then is recoded as tolerance\_neighbor and used as the indicator of tolerance in the following analyses.

Table 2.5. Factor loadings for the chosen indicators of tolerance

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
	<b>tolerance_neighbor</b>	
<b>Tolerance-different-race</b>	<b><u>0,80</u></b>	0,36
<b>Tolerance-different-religion</b>	<b><u>0,79</u></b>	0,38
<b>Tolerance-different-language</b>	<b><u>0,78</u></b>	0,40
<b>Tolerance-immigrants</b>	<b><u>0,75</u></b>	0,45
<b>Proportion</b>	0,61	

### 2.3.3.2. Interpersonal trust

The efficiency of democratic society is believed to be increased through coordinated actions among citizens that become possible only when they trust each other. Trusting individuals are usually active members of their societies, making compromises and considering ideas different from theirs. These attitudes foster moderation, cooperation and accommodation; the ingredients of pro-democratic culture according to Diamond.

Interpersonal trust has also been measured through several variables of the WVS in the statistical analyses of this study. The process of deciding on the most significant trust questions was not an easy one. The decision was to put all relevant questions together in a factor analysis in order to see how well they get grouped among themselves. The frequently used question on the appropriate way of dealing with people -“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”- was chosen initially. The code of trusting answer option “most people can be trusted” was kept as 1; however the suspicious option “need to be careful” was recoded as 0 instead of 2. This new version of the variable was coded as interpersonal\_trust. Another frequently used trust question, asking about the respondents’ evaluation of human-beings in general- whether they usually try to be fair or they try to take advantage whenever they have the chance- was

also added to the group of questions that would be categorized. As no recoding was needed, only the name of the variable was changed into `advantage_fair`.

Besides these two regularly used questions, a new set of questions -used for the first time in this latest wave of the WVS-, that ask about trust towards different groups of people separately has been included in the factor analysis. These six variables were recoded before they were put into the factor analysis. The codes for the answer options were reversed to bring them in line with the general coding scheme in which higher scores are associated with higher democratic values. The four-category scale offered for responses, in this new form, represents an interval from ‘do not trust at all’ to ‘trust completely’. When all these eight variables about trust were put into factor analysis, it was found out that they formed three different groups, suggesting that trust as a component of democratic culture should rather be measured by three different variables in the following analyses.

Table 2.6. Factor loadings for indicators of trust

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
	<b>trust_</b>	<b>trust_</b>	<b>general_</b>	
	<b>unknown</b>	<b>known</b>	<b>Trust</b>	
<b>Trust-another-nationality</b>	<b><u>0,88</u></b>	0,06	0,05	0,22
<b>Trust-another-religion</b>	<b><u>0,87</u></b>	0,08	0,01	0,24
<b>Trust-first-meeting</b>	<b><u>0,68</u></b>	0,24	0,24	0,24
<b>Trust-family</b>	-0,07	<b><u>0,78</u></b>	-0,05	0,39
<b>Trust-neighborhood</b>	0,24	<b><u>0,73</u></b>	0,16	0,39
<b>Trust-personally-known</b>	0,39	<b><u>0,61</u></b>	0,11	0,47
<b>Interpersonal_trust</b>	0,17	0,1	<b><u>0,71</u></b>	0,46
<b>advantage_fair</b>	0,01	0,02	<b><u>0,81</u></b>	0,35
<b>Proportion</b>	0,28	0,20	0,16	

(Table 2.6. continued)

**Rotation**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
<b>Factor 1</b>	0,81	0,5	0,32
<b>Factor 2</b>	0,57	0,81	0,17
<b>Factor 3</b>	-0,17	-0,32	0,93

Table 2.6. shows that the last two variables can be brought together within a single variable that represents trust for the humanity in general. Factor 3 where these variables loaded was labeled as *general\_trust* and was used as one indicator of interpersonal trust in the analyses. The three variables above them gather within Factor 2 with high factor loadings. The questions in this second group focus on trust towards family, neighborhood and people respondents know personally. It is obvious that the common characteristic of the people targeted in these three variables is their familiarity to the respondent. Referring to this commonality, Factor 2 was named as *trust\_people\_known*.

The first three variables are observed to come together and form a new variable representing a different type of tolerance. The three groups asked about in this set of variables are all strangers to the respondent as they are the people the respondent meets for the first time, people of another religion or of another nationality. The name of this factor score was, then, recoded as *trust\_people\_unknown* and added to the model besides the other two indicators created. Conducting factor analysis among these eight variables helped in grouping interpersonal trust into three forms for the following analyses. Without the use of this method, the tendency would be to place all these variables within a single indicator of trust, which would mean ignoring the significance of different types of trust and hence making inadequate interpretations.

Besides the findings of the factor analysis, the literature on trust also emphasizes the relevance of the different types of trust in democratization discussions. Trust towards only the personally known people is not generally interpreted to be a valid sign of democratic characteristics. Individuals who feel themselves under threat interpret their small, close-knit communities as a safe haven for themselves. Such an



organization would foster intimate ties and hence intimate interpersonal trust among the people who know each other individually at the expense of generalized trust that is directed towards anybody, even towards complete strangers (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.141). Trust within a wider scope is evaluated to be a more appropriate signal of democratic attitudes as trusting unfamiliar people leads to active cooperation of citizens who need to collectively participate in the social and political processes in a democracy. Lack of generalized trust implies an absence of trust for fellow citizens in general, and under these circumstances perceptions about elections become more pessimistic and even sometimes elections are believed to pose serious threats to the well-being of some citizens. The fear that “once elections are lost, all access to political power will be lost” becomes widespread when general trust is absent in a country. When fellow citizens or groups are evaluated to be untrustworthy, losing the government means losing not only political but also social power; leaving the person with the feeling of complete powerlessness. In such a setting, elections and thus democracy appears to be threatening rather than liberalizing. When trust prevails in a country; however, citizens believe that even if they lose political power this time, they always have the possibility of grasping it again. Hence; levels and scope of interpersonal trust in a society “predict the existence and stability of democratic regime” (Sullivan & Transue, 1999, p.641) there.

#### **2.3.3.3. Civic engagement**

Another essential component of civic culture included in the following comparative analyses is membership in voluntary associations. This aspect of democratic culture cannot be considered apart from the previously analyzed two values. These associations are known to be in the contexts of moderation and cooperation. They teach both tolerance and trust to their members so that they can succeed in making various people work together for a certain aim harmoniously. Based on these discussions, membership in these associations –the attitude that is also known as civic engagement – has been used as another essential component of democratic culture in this study. This indicator took part in these analyses as a factor score of six different variables that are actually part of a set of questions on membership in different organizations; including church or religious organizations; sport or recreational organizations; art, music or educational organizations; labor unions; political parties;

environmental organizations; professional organizations; humanitarian or charitable organizations; consumer organizations. Three of these nine questions were dropped from the list even before the factor analysis due to some theoretical considerations. Civic engagement, in this study, implies voluntary involvement in organizations dealing with social or personal issues. These three, however, indicate membership in religious and political organizations. Thus, they are left out of the measurement of civic engagement but are used in the analyses as indicators of other components.

Membership in church or religious organizations is directly related to the major independent variable of this study, religiosity. Putting these interrelated variables separately into the analyses would impede the evaluation of the significance and the impact of both of these variables. Membership in a labor union or a political party is also related to another component of civic culture -democratic participation- and used within the measurement of that component.

The to-be-used six questions were then recoded so that, whether active or passive, membership would be represented with 1 and not belonging to the organization with 0. Examining the percentages of respondents falling into each category, it is recognized that this is the right way to deal with these questions. With regard to sport organizations, for instance, while 70 % of the sample is found not to belong to this type of organizations, active and inactive memberships in them together add up to only 29 %. The total percentage for the two forms of membership is not found to be higher than this for any other organization and is generally significantly below it. If these two types of membership were dealt with separately, it would be harder to make a significant comparison among the three categories – not belonging, active membership, passive membership- due to the low percentages of respondents in the last two categories. The high factor loadings in Table 7 signify that these six variables can be gathered together into a single item. This Factor 1 was then recoded as engagement\_civic and has been used in the analysis.

Table 2.7. Factor loadings for indicators of civic engagement

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
<b>civic_engagement</b>		
<b>Organization-environmental</b>	<b><u>0,80</u></b>	0,36
<b>Organization-consumer</b>	<b><u>0,78</u></b>	0,40
<b>Organization-charitable</b>	<b><u>0,76</u></b>	0,42
<b>Organization-professional</b>	<b><u>0,74</u></b>	0,45
<b>Organization-art</b>	<b><u>0,73</u></b>	0,46
<b>Organization-sport</b>	<b><u>0,66</u></b>	0,57
<b>Proportion</b>	0,56	

#### **2.3.3.4. Democratic Participation**

Besides membership in a political party, three other activities have been included in the analyses as democratic practices; these are signing petition, joining boycotts and attending peaceful demonstrations. The question on membership in a political party was among the set of questions mentioned above within the scope of civic engagement. Hence; this specific variable was recoded –as was also done with its counterparts used for civic engagement- into two answer options of either being a member or not, neglecting the difference between active and inactive membership. The other three variables; however, form another set of questions among themselves in the WVS. The common question in all of them is whether respondents “have done, might do or would never do under any circumstances” these political actions. By adding “might do and have done” together, the answer options of these questions were also reduced to two. While these two options together were coded as 1, claims of “would never do” were coded as 0. This coding scheme was preferred so that democratic participation or at least potential for democratic participation were assigned a higher score than abstention from democratic practices. Placing these two answer options under one code did not create any problems as the total percentage of respondents answering them were never found to be so high to make a comparison impossible. The

new versions of these variables were coded as petitions, boycotts and demonstrations respectively.

Table 2.8. Factor loadings for indicators of democratic participation

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
	<b>democratic_</b>	
	<b>Participation</b>	
<b>Demonstrations</b>	<b><u>0,86</u></b>	0,27
<b>Boycotts</b>	<b><u>0,85</u></b>	0,29
<b>Petition</b>	<b><u>0,85</u></b>	0,28
<b>Membership-political-party</b>	<b><u>0,22</u></b>	0,95
<b>Proportion</b>	0,55	

The high factor loadings of the first three variables indicate that they can easily be brought together under a single indicator. Although the factor loading for the last variable is not really high, it did not form a new factor and still kept its place within Factor 1, indicating that although membership in a political party does not fully correspond to the category implied by the other three acts, all four can be brought together as the former was still placed in the same factor. This Factor 1 was included in the analysis with the label democratic\_\_participation.

Both democratic participation and civic engagement were included in the analyses as two different aspects of ‘participant political culture’ defined by Almond and Verba (1963) through active roles for individuals in a polity (p. 19). Such roles are not limited to voting or to a rising interest in politics but include high levels of information, knowledge, opinion formation and organizational membership as well. Participation is one of the central elements of democratic culture due to the fact that it integrates individuals in democratic processes and helps them internalize the rules of the democratic game. Active interest in public affairs and participation in civic actions are considered as the main characteristics of a democratic citizen (Diamond, 1993, p.14; Inkeles, 1969).

Democratic participation in terms of signing petitions, joining boycotts and attending peaceful demonstrations is an important indicator of pro-democratic civic culture because these actions have a strong objective of individual liberty. “Elite-challenging activities”, as is used by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), are relevant to civic culture development due to their role of driving the authorities for a response to citizen demands. Taking part in the political process to control the power-holders, individuals in a democracy are expected to form a “liberty-oriented and critical public” to become effective over the elites. These activities are appropriate tools to use for this attempt to strengthen mass control over the political process.

### **2.3.3.5. Gender Equality**

The last component of civic culture to be included in these comparative analyses is support for gender equality which is related to both tolerance and personal freedoms at the same time. One major aspect of democratic governance is to integrate the largest proportion of the population possible into political processes. This norm of inclusiveness calls for removing discrimination, including sexual discrimination, from the society so that all citizens can freely participate in the social and political spheres.

Gender equality has been measured through three variables –that have also been adopted by several other surveys and used in various analyses. Two of them address individuals’ responses to statements regarding the abilities of women to make good political leaders and good business executives while the third one asks whether university education is as important for girls as it is for boys. No recoding was needed for these variables as higher scores already meant democratic attitudes in their original form. The statements have a sexist connotation and hence disagreement with them means support for gender equality. The high factor loadings for all variables in the table make it clear that these three variables would easily load into one single factor. Hence this Factor 1 was included in the analysis to represent support for gender equality with the label `gender__equality`.

Table 2.9. Factor loadings for indicators of gender equality

	<b>Factor 1</b> <b>gender_</b> <b>Equality</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
<b>Men-business-executives</b>	<b><u>0,85</u></b>	0,21
<b>Men-political-leaders</b>	<b><u>0,85</u></b>	0,28
<b>Men-education-important</b>	<b><u>0,76</u></b>	0,42
<b>Proportion</b>	0,70	

Based on the vast literature on civic culture, these five values have been selected to reflect individuals' appropriateness to democratic living in the comparative analyses of this study. The significance of these mass attitudes for liberal democracy has been discussed in the first chapter with reference to earlier empirical explorations and theoretical arguments.

Among the components of democratic culture widely focused on within democratization debates, life satisfaction, or subjective well-being in other words, was intentionally left out of this study. Inglehart has always used this indicator in his analyses due to the idea that individuals who are happy with their lives would be more accepting and more outgoing in their attitudes. The same people would be expected to provide higher support for democratic transition in their countries. This tendency would also be observed among individuals scoring low on subjective well-being in authoritarian regimes. This variable; however, has not been included in the following analyses because of some concerns regarding the direct relationship between well-being and democratic attitudes. Being happy with one's life might lead to support for democratic governance among people living in democracies as a way of maintaining the status quo. Hence; this attitude would not be easily interpreted as a real support for the norms of democracy itself. The people living in authoritarian countries, on the other hand, might be dissatisfied with their lives not because they do not live under a

democracy, but because they are repressed on the basis of some very essential aspects of their lives. Thus, while being critical of the current ruler's repressiveness, they might at the same time prefer an authoritarian government headed by their own group. This line of thinking has paved the way to uncertainty with respect to the role of subjective well-being as an indicator of civic culture and thus the exclusion of this component from the group of democratic values used in this study.

#### **2.3.4. Demographics as Control Variables**

The other set of control variables is demographics that consist of age, gender, education level and household income. Age, in this wave of the World Values Survey, is directly measured through the answers provided for the previous question on respondents' year of birth. The age range is 15-94, where the mean is 40,83 and standard deviation is 16,22. Age was used in this raw form in these analyses. Gender is coded, on the survey sheet, according to the sex observation of the correspondent. The only change generated in this variable for these analyses was the code for female respondents. The 1-2 coding scheme of the variable was changed into 0-1 so as to not deviate from the standard coding system used for dichotomous variables in this study. With this recoding, 1 still indicates male respondents; however, females are coded as 0 rather than 2. Then, a positive relationship between gender any other variable indicates men higher scoring than women in terms of that indicator.

In the original form of the WVS questionnaire, nine answer options are provided for the question on respondents' level of education- that is the highest educational level attained by respondents. The high number of options put forward for all different levels in detail makes it almost impossible to make solid comparisons between attitudes of individuals with different education levels. To make comparison easier and to keep up with the general structure of the independent variables of these analyses, the coding system of this variable was simplified and it was recoded into a dichotomous variable so that 0 indicates the highest educational level attained to be below complete secondary school and 1 refers to any level higher than this. This threshold was chosen because in international standards incomplete secondary education and anything lower –that is either no education, some years of primary school, complete primary school education

or some years of secondary school- really means low education. The years of compulsory education in most European countries approximately coincide with this level. As the threshold is interpreted to be too low at first sight, the tendency might be to expect a gathering of respondents in the second category; however, a big gap cannot be observed among the percentages of respondents falling into these two new categories. While 36 % of the respondents fall into low education level, 64 % are placed in the other category. Moreover, the mean value of this new variable with a 0-1 range is found to be 0,60 indicating that the respondents are rather dispersed with respect to their education levels.

Demographic variables, the most important of all being education level and income, have been included in these analyses with the intention to control for the expected impact socioeconomic development, on the individual level, is believed to have on democratic attitudes. Both of these indicators have been found to be closely linked to civic attitudes. Income in the WVS is not asked on personal basis. The available income measurement focuses on household income that includes all sources of income for a family such as wages, salaries and pensions. This variable was included in the following analyses with its original coding scheme that is based on a 1-10 scale where 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 10 the highest one.

### **2.3.5. Affiliation Variables and the Multiplicative Forms**

The last group of variables to be discussed denotes the belonging dimension of religion for the four affiliations. The relevant question asks respondents directly the religion or religious denomination they belong to. This variable was coded into four different binary variables, each one representing one of the affiliations within the scope of these analyses. In creating the variable distinguishing Muslims from the rest, for instance, the respondents who claim to be Muslims were coded as 1, the ones who claim to be affiliated with the other three faiths were coded as 0 and the remainder, belonging to other groups, out of the scope of this study, was coded as missing. The same was done for all four affiliations included in this comparison. Besides including these affiliation variables within the analysis in their raw form as representatives of the belonging dimension, new multiplicative variables were also created using them. These



multiplicative variables were formed by multiplying all independent variables -each one of the dimensions of religiosity, indicators of democratic culture and demographics- with affiliation variables separately. This method was preferred because it enabled the researcher to observe the impact generated by a certain independent variable on the ideas and attitudes of the members of different affiliations in a comparative way. A variable, for instance, might be significant for one of these affiliations and not for another. Or the impact of a certain variable might be positive for the members of one affiliation and negative for the others. Hence, each and every independent variable mentioned above was used in the analysis in this multiplicative form so that the results can be easily comparable across affiliations.

The last point to be emphasized with respect to the methodological details of this analysis is that the number of observations was limited to 21.557 throughout the statistical analyses in this study, even though when the variables are asked to be summarized separately, the number of observations never falls below 30.000. This decrease in the number of observations occurred because if an observation was found to be missing for one of the variables or groups used in the analyses, that observation was totally left out of the dataset. It is important to keep the number of observations constant throughout all the analyses in a comparative study as comparisons become more credible with this precaution taken. This standardization avoids suspicions that the observations getting in and out of the analyses might be causing the differences in findings and hence leading to misinterpretations in comparisons between different affiliations.

## **2.4. Conclusion**

This chapter provided information on the dataset and the variables used in the following analyses. The details about the already available variables and about the processes of new variable generation were explained so that the findings put forward in the next two chapters can be interpreted more easily. The grouping of respondents on the basis of self-declared religious affiliations was also emphasized to make sense of the comparisons made in the next two chapters. Paving the way to a better understanding of

the findings, this chapter offered an account of the methodological details relevant for the both quantitative analyses.

Study 1 will proceed with two chapters in which the findings of the statistical analyses are displayed following a very short account of the specific method used in each one. The first analysis searches for the impact of membership in the four affiliations, of religiosity, of demographic factors and of the components of democratic culture on the importance attributed to democracy while the second one concentrates on the components of civic culture and evaluates the impact of belonging, of religiosity and of the demographic factors on these values.

## CHAPTER 3

### RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY


The first analysis in Study 1 measures the impact of religiosity on the first aspect of democratic attitudes, support for democracy. Besides the three variables measuring the different dimensions of individual religiosity, the belonging aspect of religion is also used as major independent variables. These variables are added to the model in their multiplicative forms so that the impact of each is calculated separately for the four affiliations. Demographics and some important components of civic culture are added to the model as control variables.

Support for democracy in this analysis is measured through the importance attributed to living in a democratically governed country. As has been explained in the previous chapter, the original variable measuring importance attached to this type of governance was recoded for these analyses and a new variable with a scale of 1-3 was formed. Although the scaled format of the new dependent variable, *importance\_of\_democracy*, pointed to an ordered logistic regression<sup>1</sup>, the parallel regressions assumption was tested and it was found out that the assumption had to be

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<sup>1</sup> Also called as ordered logit, this regression model is used for ordinal dependent variables. Ordinal variables are defined as categorical variables in which the categories have an obvious order. However, researchers have been frequently warned to be careful about concluding that their outcome is indeed ordinal. Ordered logit supposes that regression coefficients are identical across each regression –that is across each comparison between different categories available. If they are not, parallel regressions assumption is violated and this regression model cannot be used as the variable is not really ordinal.

rejected<sup>2</sup> as the  $\text{prob} > \text{chi}^2$  was found to be 0,0000; less than the expected threshold of 0,05 in a 95 % confidence level. Multinomial logistic regression instead of ordered logistic regression was preferred for this analysis as the dependent variable was believed to be nominal rather than ordinal. Within the newly arranged three sectioned scale; “attach unimportance to democracy”, “indifference” and “attach importance to democracy”; the group in the middle was chosen as the reference category so that factors that lead to both considering democracy to be unimportant and considering it to be important could be analyzed at the same time. While the reference person is believed to stay at “indifference”, the impact of all independent variables on this person’s moves to both sides (the moves are presented in the diagram below) will be analyzed in this first step of comparative analyses.



The model might seem rather complicated at first sight due to the availability of high number of multiplicative interaction variables. The aim behind this structural preference was to make explicit the impact of changing levels of all independent variables among members of these four affiliations separately on their support for democracy. These forms of variables are used whenever it is believed that the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable depends on another variable; mostly a contextual one. Within the scope of this analysis, for instance, the impact of changing levels of education on the importance attached to democracy might be completely different among members of different affiliations. Hence, membership in different affiliations is an indicator giving shape to the relationship between independent variables and support for democracy. Questions such as “what is the impact of more frequent religious practice by Muslims on their support for democracy?”; “how does getting older among Catholics influence their support for

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<sup>2</sup> The assumption was tested; initially with the original variable in WVS (question v162) and then with the new variable (importance\_of\_democracy) which was generated by recoding v162 into three categories. Each time  $\text{prob} > \text{chi}^2$  was found to be 0,0000. As the probability was found to be less than 0,05 (probability level required at % 95 confidence level), the assumption was rejected and hence ordered logistic regression was not used.

democracy?” are answered with the help of multiplicative interaction variables. Multiplying age with the binary variable for Catholics, for instance, gives age for Catholics only and when multiplied with the variable for Muslims, it provides changing values of age among the Muslim respondents. The model consists of the multiplicative version of each chosen indicator with the four affiliation variables one by one. Besides these multiplicative forms, the four affiliation variables are also present in the analyses in their raw forms representing the belonging aspect of religion.

Among the four affiliations included in this analysis, Muslims were chosen as the reference category. Hence; within the model, no variable label is observed to include the word “Muslim”. The constant and the coefficients of the unmultiplied independent variables in the equation represent the impact of different indicators on Muslims’ support for democracy. The coefficients of all multiplicative independent variables, on the other hand, represent how the difference created in each group’s support is different from the change generated in the support by the reference category. The coefficients on the tables, thus, do not show the direct effect of an independent variable on the importance attributed to democracy by members of the three denominations of Christianity. They rather display how different a certain independent variable’s impact on the support by these respondents is from the impact on the support by Muslims generated by the same independent variable. To obtain the absolute impact of any indicator on one of these three affiliations’ support for democracy, the coefficient of the multiplicative variable has to be added to the coefficient of the same variable in the Muslim column, only if the latter is statistically significant, however. This method makes it possible to compare the difference- generated by each and every independent variable- in the importance attributed to democracy by members of all four affiliations.

Before moving into the findings of the multinomial logistic regression analysis, a descriptive analysis will be conducted so that the four affiliations are initially compared on the basis of their average scores in support for democracy and the three indicators of religiosity.

### 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

The three graphs below display how the four affiliations rank with respect to support for democracy and the three dimensions of religiosity. The placement of the groups on the graphs was determined by their mean values of these indicators. The graphs illustrate that there is no significant difference among denominations in terms of the importance they attach to democracy, while the groups are observed to be more dispersed on the basis of different dimensions of religiosity.

Figure 3.1. Mean values- importance of religion and importance of democracy




Figure 3.2. Mean values- self-evaluated religiosity and importance of democracy





Figure 3.3. Mean values- religious attendance and importance of democracy



On a 1-3 scale, the importance attached to democracy by overall Muslim respondents is 2, 78; that is above the average importance attached by Orthodox respondents which is 2, 73 and below the mean scores of Protestants and Catholics that are 2, 84 and 2, 79 respectively. The scores for all four affiliations are very close, indicating that none of these affiliations is significantly different from the rest in terms of its members' support for democracy. On a scale of 1-3, all the scores are placed between 2, 73 and 2, 84; which definitely constitutes a very small range. Besides the closeness of the average scores of importance among themselves, their proximity to the upper limit of 3 that represents full support indicate that members of all four affiliations attach great significance to democracy. The largest difference takes place between the importance attributed by Orthodox and Protestant respondents and even the difference between the mean values of these two groups is only 0, 11 –which is minimal on a scale of 1-3. Protestants are marked as the group with the highest importance attached to democracy; however, they do not seem to be placed highly above the others. This close emplacement of all affiliations would be found surprising by supporters of some of the previously mentioned theories that advocate incompatibility of Islam -at least Islam or even perhaps both Islam and Orthodox Christianity- with democracy.

Theorists arguing for the inhospitality of Islam to democracy argue that the Islamic cultural heritage by nature is undemocratic (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington 1984, 1991, 1996, 1997) and hence members of this affiliation never support democratic governance and even interpret democracy as a rival ideology. However; various empirical analyses have already found out that support for democracy in predominantly Muslim countries is at least as high as that in countries dominated by other religious affiliations. Support for democracy across the Arab World, for instance, is not persistently found to be lower than that in any other world region. In the presidential elections of 2005, the turnout was 70 % in Palestine, a very high percentage signifying how eager Palestinians were to have a say in how they would be governed. The same enthusiasm was displayed in Iraq by images of voters happily showing their inked fingers as a sign that they casted their votes (Ibrahim, 2007, p.7-8).

The most recent wave of the Arab Barometer survey project was carried out in 2006 when it was found out that “86 percent of those interviewed believe that democracy is the best form of government and 90 percent agree that democracy would



be good or very good system of governance for the country in which they live” (Jamal & Tessler, 2008, p.97). Another series of surveys -supported by a grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation- also found that the percentages of people finding democracy favorable were very high in the countries of the Muslim world they focused on, namely in Algeria, Jordan and Palestine. Conducted in 2003-2004, these surveys indicated that 88 percent in Algeria and 95 percent in Jordan claimed to believe that democracy is a “very good” or “fairly good” way of ruling their country. 84 percent in Palestine and 91 percent in Jordan agreed that despite its limits, democracy is superior to other political systems (Tessler and Gao, 2005, p.88). The World Values Survey, carried out between 1999 and 2002, also represented “broad support for democracy among Arab men and women” (p.86). Rejecting the validity of the conception of Muslim exceptionalism, these findings suggest that there is nothing peculiar about the culture or religious orientations of Muslims that make them inhospitable to democracy, or to state in other words, that make democracy unacceptable for them. The conclusion Tessler and Gao (2005) reached as a result of these series of surveys is that there are democratic aspirations apparent in the peoples of the Middle East; however, they “are not transformed into democratic institutions” due to the practices of Arab leaders who would “do everything possible in order to stay in power” (p.84).

On the basis of the three dimensions of religiosity, the ranking among the four denominations do not stay the same. While Muslims are found to be the most religious group in terms of the belief dimension, Protestants have higher scores in the practical dimension. The change in scores of a denomination across different dimensions of religiosity is obvious for Orthodox. The Orthodox people rate the lowest in claiming importance of religion in their lives and in their stated frequency of religious attendance. The low scores by the members of this denomination of Christianity can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that most of the Orthodox people, today, are living in post-Communist countries that have experienced an erosion of religion in all spheres of life under Communist regimes. The same people approach the other three groups in the third dimension of religiosity. Many Orthodox people in the sample -even as many as the Muslims, Protestants or Catholics doing so- label themselves as religious individuals, even though they rank below the others in the other two dimensions. The four affiliations come closest in this aspect of religiosity as the average score of self-

evaluated religiosity does not fall below 0,80 in any one of these affiliations. In a different reading, this finding can be interpreted that 80 % of the members of each affiliation label themselves as religious people. A comparative examination of the three graphs together supports the idea that “being religious” is not interpreted in the same way in every context and thus a multi-dimensional analysis of the concept provides the researcher with a deeper understanding of individual beliefs and practices and certainly of their impact on other attitudes.

The Orthodox respondents seem to significantly diverge from the members of other three affiliations with respect to the importance of religion in their lives. While the percentages of respondents providing positive responses to this question are very high for all other affiliations –for instance 95 % for Muslims-, only 13 % of the Orthodox respondents argue that religion is important in their lives. The percentages of respondents making this claim are high among Protestants and Catholics, 87 % and 74 % respectively, as well. In terms of participation in religious practices, Protestants are found to be the most active group, as their mean score of attending religious services is 0, 75. Protestants are followed by Muslims and Catholics in this dimension with average scores of 0, 68 and 0, 56 in order. Orthodox respondents also rank the lowest in this dimension with a mean of only 0, 39. When the means in all three dimensions of religiosity are compared within the affiliations separately, it is recognized that the lowest percentages are observed in frequency of religious practice. This finding signifies that regardless of religious affiliation, people can easily evaluate themselves to be religious or state that religion is important in their lives; however, participation in religious practices necessitates a stronger commitment and less people are found to be religious in this dimension. This trend is observed to be true for all affiliations except for Orthodox Christians. Among Muslim respondents, for instance, the percentage claiming to participate frequently fall to 68 % while the percentages providing affirmative responses in the other two dimensions within the same group hover around 90 %. A decrease of at least 15 % is also observed among Catholics and Protestants. Orthodox respondents display a different trend as the lowest mean score of these respondents is attained for importance of religion. In fact, the percentages of religious Orthodox respondents approach the percentages of religious members of other three affiliations only in self-evaluated religiosity.

All these findings, especially the differences observed among different dimensions of religiosity, empirically prove that religion and religiosity are complicated concepts and a multi-dimensional analysis provides a better understanding of them. Another important conclusion that can be drawn out of this analysis of mean values is that the members of these affiliations are found to be religious and supportive for democracy at the same time. The Protestants' ranking first or second in terms of religiosity in each of these dimensions is a challenge to the idea that religiosity in general is hostile to, or at least incompatible with, democracy as Protestants are also found to be the group that provides the highest support for democracy. In short, both support for democracy and individual religiosity are common among both Muslims and Christians of different denominations. The three graphs confirm that religiosity does not prevent individuals from attaching importance to democracy or in the other way around support for democracy does not lead to loss of religiosity among members of any one of these affiliations.

### **3.2. Findings of the Multinomial Regression**

To go beyond the likelihood of their coexistence and analyze the impact of religiosity on support for democracy across these four affiliations, a multinomial regression was run for the variable measuring the importance attached to living in a democratically governed country. The impact of belonging, individual religiosity, demographics and democratic values on the likelihood of both moves mentioned above by members of four affiliations are analyzed in separate tables below.

#### **3.2.1. The Impact of Religion**

Table 3.1. displays only the impacts of belonging and religiosity. The values for both the moves and all the denominations are displayed on the same table. An important point about the values on the table is that the coefficients of the variables used for

Christian denominations are not absolute values and reflect only the difference between the impacts on these denominations and that on Muslims.

In moving from “indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy”, there is no significant difference between Muslims and any of the other affiliations. The only statistically significant coefficient, among all the membership indicators, belongs to Muslims in the first move and its sign is negative; indicating that Muslims are less likely to move from “being indifferent to democracy” to “considering it unimportant” compared to the members of the Christian denominations included in these analyses. Reading the table in more detail, it can be easily recognized that being a Muslim decreases the likelihood of the first move by nine times.

In the second move, that is the move from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”, Protestants mark themselves to be different from the reference category. The coefficients for membership in both Islam and Protestantism are observed to be significant and positive in this move. As has been explained above, the coefficients of all variables on the table, except for the ones on the column of Muslims, are relative values. The coefficient of membership by Protestants, in this case, signifies the difference between the impacts of being a Protestant and of being a Muslim on the second move. Hence, to be able to obtain the direct impact of membership in Protestantism, the two coefficients need to be added, providing Protestants with an even higher coefficient of 7, 15 (obtained through the sum of coefficients in the Muslim and Protestant columns that are 2, 52 and 4, 63 respectively). This finding, then, implies that identifying oneself both as a Protestant and as a Muslim makes the move from “indifference towards democratic governance” to “attaching importance to living in a democratically governed country” more likely; however when the two affiliations are compared among themselves Protestants are more likely- almost three times more likely- than Muslims to attribute importance to democracy. This finding regarding Protestants is not surprising as the pro-democratic attitude by Protestants has been supported both historically and theoretically.

Historically, modernization and processes of democratization are told to have emerged first in Protestant countries. Before 1900, 75 percent of all existing democracies were predominantly Protestant (Huntington, 1991). Theoretically, some of

the main ideological components of the Protestant Reformation; i.e. tolerance, acceptability of resistance to rulers and rule as a covenant between ruler and ruled, are believed to be among the enabling conditions for democracy. The Protestant Reformation included “a boost for individualism and voluntarism and the emergence of cultural diversity” which in turn brought democracy in the societies where this revolutionary upheaval took place (Minkenberg, 2007, p.893). The values mentioned in this explanation of the Reformation coincide with the agreed-upon components of democratic values discussed in length in the first chapter. Self-expression values are defined to put greater emphasis on individual autonomy and on individual rights and freedoms that can be fulfilled only through democratic governance. Participation in voluntary associations is also found to be relevant to democratization as this voluntary activity fosters social solidarity among the citizens and hence forms the basis of civil society and democracy (Newton, 2001, p.206). Cultural diversity, on the other hand, paves the way to tolerance in the society. The acceptance of diversity leads to coexistence between different groups and their cooperation in social and political processes. Huntington defines democratic culture to be less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise” (Huntington, 1984, p.214).

Another important note to make with regard to Table 3.1. is that the coefficient of membership in Islam is found to be positive in the second move. This significant and positive coefficient indicates that being a Muslim increases the likelihood of a move to “attaching importance to democracy”. Under the influence of a large literature on Islam’s incompatibility with democracy, this finding is interpreted to be surprising as this literature is dominated by arguments on Islam’s natural antagonism to the norms of democratic governance. Hence; the expectation from Muslims is a tendency to attach unimportance to democracy or at least stay indifferent due to the incompatibility their cultural heritage has with this regime type. This inclination would be reflected in the table through by a negative coefficient in the second move even if not accompanied by a positive one in the first move. The findings of this analysis; however, demonstrate that Muslims are likely to support democracy no less than Catholic or Orthodox Christians.

Table 3.1. The impact of religion on both moves

	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>
<b>“indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy”</b>				
<b><u>being a member</u></b>	<b>-9,15*</b> (0,005)	-5,37 (0,184)	-6,15 (0,177)	-11,46 (0,400)
<b><u>importance of religion</u></b>	1,19 (0,128)	-1,54 (0,336)	<b>-1,78*</b> (0,043)	-1,74 (0,054)
<b><u>self-evaluated religiosity</u></b>	-1,21 (0,592)	-1,73 (0,286)	1,44 (0,400)	1,65 (0,304)
<b><u>religious attendance</u></b>	1,18 (0,562)	-1,30 (0,553)	-1,25 (0,509)	-1,30 (0,465)
<b>“indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”</b>				
<b><u>being a member</u></b>	<b>2,52*</b> (0,001)	<b>4,63*</b> (0,042)	3,80 (0,413)	2,26 (0,539)
<b><u>importance of religion</u></b>	<b>1,18*</b> (0,000)	1,26 (0,686)	<b>1,-1,30*</b> (0,000)	-1,01 (0,171)
<b><u>self-evaluated religiosity</u></b>	<b>1,44*</b> (0,003)	<b>-1,18*</b> (0,014)	<b>1,06*</b> (0,031)	1,15 (0,163)
<b><u>religious attendance</u></b>	1,07 (0,504)	-1,20 (0,261)	1,09 (0,502)	<b>-1,32*</b> (0,045)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at 95 % significance level

With respect to the indicators of religiosity -see Table 3.1.-, in the first move, the only significant impact is created by the importance attributed to religion by Catholics. The importance of religion in Catholics' lives is found to be significant in determining their support for democracy. The negative sign of the coefficient in the first move indicates that a Catholic attributing importance to religion in his/her life is less likely to consider democracy to be unimportant compared to his/her counterparts in whose life religion is not important. In other words, Catholics who attach importance to religion tend to stay in the "indifference" category rather than moving into the "considering democracy unimportant" category. This finding signifies a pro-democratic impact of religiosity in this dimension even though it is only for members of one of the four affiliations, falsifying the argument that higher religiosity acts as an impediment to democratic attitudes. With regard to the members of other affiliations, none of the three dimensions of religiosity is observed to make a significant impact on their first move.

In the second move from "indifference" to "attaching importance to democracy", besides the importance attributed to religion in one's life, self-evaluated religiosity also shapes Catholic support for democracy. The coefficient of the variable *importance\_religion* is found to be negative for this group again in the second move. As the numbers in the tables of this analysis reflect relative values, this minus sign in the coefficient should not be directly interpreted as an indication of the negative relationship between this dimension of religiosity and the move into "considering democracy important". These relative values are calculated into absolute ones by adding them to the coefficients for Muslims only if the latter is also found to be statistically significant. However; the coefficient of *importance\_religion* for Catholics is larger than the coefficient of the same variable for Muslims in absolute value as well; implying that the absolute impact generated by this indicator on Catholic support for democracy is still negative ( $-1,30 + 1,18 = -0,12$ ). In this second move, attributing importance to religion makes Catholics 12 % less likely to argue that being governed democratically is an important issue. Bringing together the findings with regard to the impact of the importance attributed to religion in a Catholic's life in both moves, it can be concluded that Catholics who state that religion is important in their lives tend to stay indifferent to democracy rather than moving into either ends; importance or unimportance.

Self-evaluated religiosity among Catholics; however, indicates a higher likelihood to move into “attaching higher importance to democracy” with its positive sign in the second move. Attributing importance to religion in one’s life decreases the probability of this second move by 12 %; while, claiming to be a religious person increases it by almost 50 %; after again adding the coefficient for Catholics (1, 06) to the one for Muslims (1, 44) so that the absolute impact of the indicator on Catholics’ support for democracy is calculated. When both are taken into account, a claimed-to-be religious Catholic who also says that religion is important in his/her life is 38 % more likely to argue that living in a democratically governed country is important compared to a Catholic who says that he/she is not a religious person and that religion is not important in his/her life. While the different dimensions of religiosity have different levels of impact, even in different directions on Catholic support for democracy, the overall relationship between religiosity and Catholics’ evaluation of democracy is positive.

This finding refutes the general claim that religiosity, regardless of the religious affiliation, hinders the processes of democratization. The supporters of this argument emphasize the significance of Western modernization and secularization for democratic governance. Later ideas on the relationship between religiosity and democratization; however, are found to correspond with the above-mentioned findings in regard to the religiosity by Catholic respondents. These more recent hypotheses have more specific focuses and distinguish certain religions from others in terms of their compatibility with democracy. A common view is that Christianity –contrary to the expectations of the general argument- fosters democratization and this idea is supported by the historical knowledge that the Christian world is where democracy rose and developed. This point of view, on the other hand, has a skeptical view towards Islam and argues that being a Muslim, is completely different from Christianity in terms of the attitudes towards democratization, and prevents or at least slows down democratization. The empirical findings explained below challenges this later claim as well showing that Muslim religiosity also leads to higher support for democracy.

A Muslim who labels himself a religious person is 44 % more likely to claim that to be governed democratically is important compared to a Muslim who does not label himself as such. The importance attributed to religion in one’s life also makes a



significant and positive impact on Muslims' support for democracy. A Muslim attributing importance to religion is 18 % more likely to move from "indifference" to "attaching importance to democracy", compared to his/her counterparts who do not provide an important place to religion in their lives. When a Muslim appears to be a religious person in both of these dimensions, his/her probability to attribute high importance to living in a democratically governed country increases by 62 %; which definitely is a substantial percentage. More religious Muslims, in these dimensions, are found to state a higher support for democracy, refuting even the second argument –that even though it is possible for certain religions to be supportive of democratization, Islam per se is undemocratic- mentioned above. If this claim were to be true, more religious Muslims who would be more committed to the so-called "undemocratic" Islamic doctrines would attach less importance to democracy. Changing frequencies in religious attendance; however, do not have a significant impact on the importance attached to living in a democracy by Muslims.

The findings on the impact of religiosity on the importance attributed to democracy show that religious Muslims, in any dimension of religiosity, are not found to be less supportive of democracy compared to non-religious Muslims. If any religious orientation is per se incompatible with democratic governance, the expectation will be that the importance attributed to democracy is lower among the more religious members of that affiliation, as these individuals are more strongly bounded to the principles of their belief systems. This outlook with regard to Islam has not been empirically supported, either in this analysis or in any other analyses on the subject, i.e. the analysis carried out by Jamal and Tessler (2008) with the Arab Barometer survey data. Then, the general conclusion of the various empirical analyses might be stated as that either the belonging to or individual religiosity among Muslim people cannot be the direct indicators of the practical persistence of authoritarian regimes in the predominantly Muslim countries. Jamal and Tessler's more specific conclusion on this issue is that "explanatory power is to be found in political judgments rather than religious orientations" (p.106).

Among the believers of Protestantism, only self-evaluated religiosity makes a significant impact on support for democracy. Protestants who claim to be religious are 25 % more likely –compared to the ones claiming to be non-religious- to argue that

being ruled by democracy is important. More religious Protestants with respect to this aspect of religiosity are observed to provide higher support for democracy. All the dimensions of religiosity are not found to be significant in the importance attributed to democracy by members of all these affiliations at the same time. Yet; it is obvious that whenever a dimension of religiosity is found to be significant for the importance attached to democracy by Protestants and Muslims, it has a fostering impact on this dependent variable. The same positive relationship; however, does not hold true for Orthodox Christians. Orthodox respondents attending religious practices frequently are found to be 32 % less likely to move from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy” compared to the ones who do not get involved in frequent religious practice. Hence; the more frequent attendants of religious services in Orthodox Christianity tend to stay indifferent to democracy rather than providing direct support for it.

Throughout this analysis, any dimension of religiosity is never observed to direct members of any affiliation towards a move into “considering democracy unimportant”. This is true even for individuals who belong to Islam, the most expected-to-be undemocratic of all denominations included in this study. Religious Muslims are found to provide higher support for democracy compared to nonreligious Muslims. An uncertainty with regard to the positive impact religiosity has on the importance attached to democracy may appear only in the analyses of Orthodox and Catholic respondents whose religious members in certain dimensions of religiosity are observed to stay indifferent to democratic governance rather than considering it important. Frequent religious attendance among Orthodox Christians is found to decrease the probability of “attaching importance to democracy” while the importance of religion is observed to have the same effect on Catholics.

The findings with regard to Orthodox respondents might perhaps be interpreted as follows; discussing the graphs provided above, it has already been mentioned that Orthodox people often call themselves religious; however, only a very small proportion of them are frequently involved in religious practices. Less than 40 % of the Orthodox respondents state that they attend religious service frequently. This small percentage, compared to the percentages of members of other affiliations making the same claim, indicates that religious participation is not common in Orthodox societies. Under these

circumstances, the Orthodox people frequently attending religious services might be considered the most conservative members of their societies, who are afraid of new things and are more strongly bounded to the traditional authorities. As membership in Orthodox Christianity alone is not found to make people less supportive of democracy, Orthodox Christianity as a belief system cannot be argued to be incompatible with democracy. It should just be noted that one dimension of religiosity, that is religious attendance, makes Orthodox people less likely to move into “considering democracy important”; however, it should also be recalled that these scores do not take them back to the claim that “living in a democratically governed country is unimportant” as well.

The findings discussed above refute two important arguments regarding the compatibility debate and the role of religions in democratization. Although the compatibility debate marks Islam as “the religious orientation most incompatible with democracy”, Table 3.1. suggests that Christians in general are not found to be more likely than Muslims to attach importance to democracy. Membership in Islam has a positive impact on support for democracy and only the Protestants are found to have a higher probability to provide this support. The second objection put forward by the findings of this analysis targets the argument that explains the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world through the negative relationship between religiosity and democratization. The empirical findings; however, display that higher religiosity never results in attributing unimportance to democracy in any of the four affiliations. Actually in many cases dimensions of religiosity are even found to foster support for democracy.

### **3.2.2. The Impact of Civic Values**

Another set of variables that are believed to be strong indicators of support for democracy are the components of civic culture. The consensus in the literature is that individuals with higher scores in these values are more supportive of democratic governance. “Countries with high levels of these civic culture attitudes are expected to be more likely to adopt and sustain democracy over time than countries with low levels, regardless of socioeconomic factors such as level of economic development” (Muller & Seligson, 1994, p.635). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also argue that for democracy to be

preferable over other systems of government in a country, a broad set of civic values need to be embraced by the masses (p.247). Table 3.2. below displays the impact of seven pre-determined components of civic culture on importance attributed to democracy. The significance of these values has been theoretically discussed in the literature review and their empirical formation has been explained in the previous chapter.

Table 3.2. The impact of civic values on both moves

	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>
<b>“indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy”</b>				
<b><u>tolerance</u></b>	1,14 (0,189)	<b>-1,78*</b> (0,000)	-1,12 (0,428)	<b>-1,45*</b> (0,005)
<b><u>general trust</u></b>	-1,07 (0,603)	1,39 (0,083)	-1,77 (0,708)	-1,38 (0,068)
<b><u>trust people known</u></b>	1,12 (0,374)	-1,18 (0,332)	-1,21 (0,187)	-1,21 (0,253)
<b><u>trust people unknown</u></b>	-1,10 (0,430)	-1,21 (0,304)	-1,10 (0,510)	-1,18 (0,309)
<b><u>civic engagement</u></b>	<b>1,46*</b> (0,001)	<b>1,02*</b> (0,027)	<b>1,13*</b> (0,049)	<b>-1,28*</b> (0,026)
<b><u>democratic practice</u></b>	-1,06 (0,653)	-1,23 (0,286)	1,04 (0,796)	-1,07 (0,678)
<b><u>gender equality</u></b>	-1,18 (0,220)	1,33 (0,158)	<b>1,38*</b> (0,050)	1,08 (0,639)

(Table 3.2. continued)

**“indifference” to  
“attaching importance  
to democracy”**

<b><u>Tolerance</u></b>	<b>1,25*</b>	<b>1,06*</b>	1,16	(0,005)
	(0,000)	(0,006)	(0,090)	1,08
<b><u>general trust</u></b>	1,08	1,09	1,02	(0,257)
	(0,081)	(0,206)	(0,700)	1,16
<b><u>trust people known</u></b>	<b>1,25*</b>	1,14	1,20	(0,199)
	(0,000)	(0,100)	(0,411)	<b>1,14*</b>
<b><u>trust people unknown</u></b>	-1,05	1,12	<b>1,15*</b>	(0,038)
	(0,265)	(0,088)	(0,009)	1,08
<b><u>civic engagement</u></b>	<b>1,17*</b>	<b>-1,09*</b>	<b>-1,00*</b>	(0,314)
	(0,001)	(0,000)	(0,007)	1,27
<b><u>democratic practice</u></b>	<b>1,17*</b>	1,22	1,18	(0,106)
	(0,000)	(0,437)	(0,835)	1,24
<b><u>gender equality</u></b>	<b>1,21*</b>	1,18	1,26	(0,696)
	(0,000)	(0,676)	(0,410)	(0,696)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

Among these seven attitudes, only three –tolerance, civic engagement and gender equality- play a significant role in the first move. Even these values –except for civic engagement- are not significant for members of all affiliations at the same time. Tolerance, for instance, is significant for Protestant and Orthodox respondents. The coefficients of this indicator for these two groups are found to be negative and a negative coefficient in this move indicates that scoring high in this variable makes individuals less likely to claim that living in a democracy is not important. In other words, negative impact in this move actually points to a democratic impact as lower probability to attach unimportance to democracy means higher likelihood to support

democracy. Besides the expected direction of change generated in support for democracy by tolerance, the magnitude of this change -Protestant respondents with higher tolerance become 78 % less likely to attach unimportance to democracy while the percentage change generated is 45 % for Orthodox respondents- also fulfills the expectations of the literature that civic values are the major prerequisites of democracy.

While the impacts of tolerance on the first move are not surprising, some unexpected findings have been reached with respect to the two other significant components of democratic culture in this move. What is astonishing about these indicators –civic engagement and gender equality- is that their coefficients in this first move are found to be positive, indicating a fostering impact of these values on considering democracy unimportant. The positive signs of the coefficients of civic engagement in this move, for all the affiliations –except Orthodox Christianity<sup>3</sup>-, indicate that being a member of these voluntary organizations increases the probability of moving into “attaching unimportance to democracy” from “indifference”. This finding is highly surprising because these organizations have been accepted as the most favorable settings for democratization due to the cooperative acts taking place and tolerance prevailing among their members.

The significant and positive impact of gender equality on Catholics’ move from “indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy” also deserves attention because this relationship implies that believing in the equality of genders make Catholics more likely to argue that living in a democratically governed country is not important. Pro-democratic individuals; however, are expected to be supportive of human rights; that is protecting the rights and liberties of socially subordinate groups such as women. Democratization necessitates the acknowledgement of equal respect and value to each and every human being, regardless of differences in race, sex or any other personal attribute. Any discrimination, including sexual discrimination, definitely contradicts with the main rationale of democracy. This result indicating a negative

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<sup>3</sup> Although the sign of the coefficient for Orthodox Christians is observed to be negative at first sight, this negativity implies that change in the importance attributed to democracy by Orthodox respondents is negative just relative to the impact this indicator creates in Muslims’ support. The absolute change is calculated by adding - 0, 28 (the coefficient for Orthodox) to 0, 46 (the coefficient for Muslims) and it is still found to be + 0, 18.

relationship between support for gender equality and support for democracy among Catholics seems to challenge the general view on the significance of gender equality as an aspect of receptivity to democracy.

Moving from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”, most components of democratic culture are found to breed significant and positive impact on support for democracy. The cultural indicators are found to be significant for most of the affiliations this time. Tolerance, for instance, is found to be significant for members of all affiliations except for Catholics, and higher tolerance indicates higher importance attributed to democracy by these respondents. Bringing this information together with the findings mentioned above regarding the role of tolerance in the first move, empirical support for the positive relationship between tolerance and support for democracy becomes even stronger. Higher tolerance is observed to keep Protestants and Orthodox respondents at “indifference” rather than moving to “attaching unimportance to democracy” and then to take them from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”.

The magnitude of the impact generated by this indicator on the first move is much larger than the one attained in the second move as higher tolerance among Protestants decreases the likelihood of moving towards unimportance by 78 % (the value in the table is used directly in this case as the coefficient for Muslims is not statistically significant), whereas it increases the likelihood of moving into “considering democracy important” just by 30 % (adding again 1, 24 of Muslims to 1, 06 of Protestants). The same is true for Orthodox respondents as the impact generated by tolerance among this group is 45 % in the first move and 31 % in the second. Among Muslims; however, different levels of tolerance make a difference only in the second move where higher tolerance makes Muslims 25 % more likely to attribute importance to democracy. Surprisingly, change in the level of tolerance does not create any change in Catholics’ attitudes towards democracy. The argument for the statistically significant pro-democratic impact of tolerance has already been made in the literature. Tolerance, perhaps with trust, is the most widely discussed value among all other democratic values. More than a value enriching or strengthening it, tolerance is usually argued to be a requisite of democracy.

General trust, surprisingly, is not found to be significant for any affiliation at all. It is the only component of democratic culture that is found to be insignificant for members of all affiliations in both moves. However; as the other two indicators measuring trust are found to be significant for some of these affiliations in their moves towards “importance”, it can be concluded that trust still matters as a democratic value; and that more specific trust questions play a more important role in reflecting individual attitudes towards democracy. General trust towards human beings in general does not make any impact on support for democracy, while trust towards some specific groups explains at least a part of individuals’ support for democracy.

Regarding the Muslims, for instance, it is found out that Muslims who trust people they know are more likely to support democracy than the Muslims who do not trust these people. Among Catholics and Orthodox trusting people they do not know increases the likelihood of attaching importance to democracy. The findings with respect to trust towards personally unknown people by Catholic and Orthodox respondents coincide with the major arguments in the literature on the role of trust in civic culture. Hypotheses emphasizing the significance of culture in democratization argue that individuals who can trust even people they do not know will be less suspicious and more cooperative towards their co-citizens and will be willing to participate with them in decision-making. This information on the significance of trust support the arguments that higher trust fosters support for democracy, even though the type of trust that is significant changes across denominations. Among Protestants trust does not generate any statistically significant change.

The findings about the impact of civic engagement on support for democracy are not easy to interpret, and are even confusing at first sight. Among Protestants, Catholics and Muslims, membership in a higher number of these voluntary organizations increases the likelihood of moving from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”. Recalling the impact this same variable generated in the first move towards “attaching unimportance to democracy”, it can be concluded civic engagement does not pose an obvious effect on support for democracy. Muslim, Protestant and Catholic respondents with higher civic engagement are found to be attracted to both poles of the scale at the same time, and do not stay in the central category of being



“indifferent towards democratic governance”, instead, move to attributing either importance or unimportance to living in a democratically governed country.

This complex tendency generated by civic engagement can easily be interpreted as an unexpected finding at first sight as a vast literature –discussed in the first chapter– on this subject tends to suppose that membership in voluntary associations play a crucial role in increasing mass support for democratization. Tocqueville (1840) is considered to be the grandfather of this view as he, analyzing the roots of American democracy, concluded that voluntary associations are “schools of democracy”. Putnam (1993, 2000); on the other hand, argues that membership in these organizations leads to a civically strong society that eases establishment of democracy in that setting. These organizations are believed to be necessary for an efficient and healthy democracy. Building interpersonal trust through close ties members form among themselves, these organizations; whatever their nature or content is, increase civic engagement and hence build social capital.

Findings similar to the ones achieved in this analysis were also reached by Hofmann (2004) in his test for compatibility of Islam and democracy which he concluded that higher civic engagement did not result in higher support for democracy. His interpretation of this finding pointed to the idea of “dark side” of civic engagement that points to the associations functioning as inward-looking and homogenous entities in which there is actually no room for foreigners and outsiders (p.671). These attributes of the organizations Hofmann talks about would hinder development of democratic attitudes and support for democracy among their members due to the fact that participation in these voluntary associations no longer means respect for diversity, trusting strangers or cooperation with co-citizens.

Being inspired by the arguments of Hofmann and the empirical findings of this analysis, the concluding remark about the confusing impact of civic engagement on importance attached to democracy might be that the nature and the characteristics of an organization matter in providing their members with democratic attitudes and support for democracy. The significance of this component of democratic culture for many affiliations in both moves indicates that civic engagement is important in shaping individual attitudes towards democracy; yet, by taking people to the poles in both

moves, it also signifies that it is not easy to talk about the direction of its impact on support for democracy. The type of social capital established within a certain organization will be influential in determining whether membership in that organization will result in higher support for democracy.

Several structural characteristics of voluntary associations play an important role in shaping the values attained by their members through this membership and hence their proximity to democracy. Besides the inclusiveness of the organizations, the forms of dominant relationships among their members are also significant in determining the impact of civic engagement on individual attitudes towards democracy. Inward-looking associations closed to strangers do not lead to tolerance as they bring together either people that already know each other or individuals that share some important characteristics, ideas or values. The positive relationship between civic engagement and democracy; however, is usually explained by the fact that voluntary associations bring diverse people together and teach them to tolerate each other and to cooperate for common purposes. The types of ties formed within such organizations, usually labeled as bonding ties, also hinder spread of democratic values as they can bring already close people closer while completely leaving the strangers out. Tolerating others and asking for freedoms and liberties for all are not encouraged in these organizations.

In addition to providing cooperation with strangers and hence leading to respect to others, voluntary associations that are believed to pave the way to strong embrace of democratic attitudes ensure reciprocity through establishing horizontal ties among their members. Organizations dominated by vertical bonds, on the other hand, are hierarchically organized and what flourishes in these settings is a culture of authority rather than one of equality or liberty. In these hierarchical associations where even the members do not have an equal standing among themselves, it will be unrealistic to search for tolerance or trust towards strangers. The inequality in these settings makes itself explicit through the attitudes of the top cadres who differentiate themselves from the rest of the organization and demand special privileges. Under these circumstances, the other members cannot find any motives to fight for equality and liberty and rather look for ways to dominate as well. Participation in these groups does not teach individuals even the major components of democratic culture i.e. equality, tolerance, trust. These associations can only breed authoritarian figures.

Horizontally linked organizations where the actions take place through cooperation rather than command or order function as the incubator of democratic culture. Generalized reciprocity and interpersonal trust becomes possible only when all members in an organization believe in the significance of equality and are ready to collaborate with anyone to reach their purposes (Sullivan & Transue, 1999, p.645-46). Traditional institutions; such as churches, labor unions and political parties, are usually believed to be organized around vertical lines and hence are not expected to add much to the culture of a society towards democratization. Hence; if membership in these types of hierarchical organizations is found to be declining, this should not be a concern for establishment of pro-democratic civic culture or for support for democracy in a society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.262). In other words, low civic engagement in a society cannot be initially taken, before focusing on the structural characteristics of the organizations analyzed, as a sign that that society is not appropriate for democratization.

The need to concentrate on the type of relationships dominating various voluntary associations in order to figure out the impact their members will make on democratization has been resolved in the literature through a distinction between bridging and bonding social capital. Civic culture and support for democracy becomes available only through bridging social capital that indicates existence of looser ties among people that do not know each other well and that might even have disagreements on some crucial issues. In this form of social capital, democratic values and attempts to realize them in practice are generalized for a wider community and are not limited to the members of the organization only. Promoting values on freedoms and liberties, these organizations make democratization more likely (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.248). Bonding social capital, on the other hand, fails to extend these values and requests for rights and freedoms to a more general population. While close ties are formed among the members, outsiders are interpreted to be strangers rather than co-citizens and hence any relationship with them is entirely rejected. Membership in organizations dominated by these closed bonds refers to the dark side of civic engagement –as Hofmann (2004) has already remarked (p. 671)- and is expected to move people towards “attaching unimportance to democracy” whereas membership in pro-democratic organizations will foster support for democracy.

In this analysis on the importance attributed to living in a democratically governed country, the components of democratic culture have been included as control variables. Within the political culture literature, it has been frequently argued that higher scores in these values make people more supportive of democracy. This belief in the significance of these values for democratic attitudes has led to the decision to involve these indicators within this analysis due to the consideration that once they and other demographic characteristics are controlled for, the direct impact of religiosity on ideas about democratic governance will be easier to grasp. Besides easing the recognition of the impact of religiosity, the significance and the signs of these values' coefficients strengthen the idea that the availability of these traits leads people to consider living in a democratically governed country as desirable. Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) expectations with respect to the importance of self-expression values on democratic characteristics are supported in this analysis as even when it is controlled for demographic variables- such as income and level of education-, most of these components of democratic culture are found to be significant and to have a remarkable positive impact on direct support for democracy. Hence, it can easily be concluded that, even if not the strongest, self-expression values are important predictors of support for democracy.

### **3.2.3. The Impact of Demographics**

Variations in the other set of control variables, demographics– see table 3.3.-, do not result in highly significant changes in the level of support provided for democracy. Age; for instance, does not create any considerable impact on evaluations of democracy by members of any affiliation. While none of the demographic variables makes a significant influence on respondents' attitudes towards democracy in moving from “indifference” to “attaching democracy to be unimportant”, considerable change is created by the other three variables in the second move towards “attaching importance to democracy”. Male members of Catholic and Orthodox denominations of Christianity are found to provide higher support for democracy than their female counterparts.

Table 3.3. The impact of demographics on both moves

	Muslim	Protestant	Catholic	Orthodox
<b>"indifference" to</b>				
<b>"attaching</b>				
<b>unimportance to</b>				
<b>democracy "</b>				
<b><u>Age</u></b>	1,00 (0,745)	1,00 (0,990)	-1,02 (0,652)	-1,00 (0,923)
<b><u>Gender</u></b>	-1,19 (0,488)	1,35 (0,416)	1,06 (0,844)	1,50 (0,205)
<b><u>level of education</u></b>	-1,16 (0,355)	-1,00 (0,993)	-1,21 (0,302)	1,22 (0,344)
<b><u>household income</u></b>	-1,02 (0,768)	-1,11 (0,207)	-1,05 (0,466)	1,04 (0,578)
<b>"indifference" to</b>				
<b>"attaching importance</b>				
<b>to democracy"</b>				
<b><u>Age</u></b>	1,01 (0,121)	1,00 (0,399)	1,00 (0,220)	-1,00 (0,482)
<b><u>Gender</u></b>	-1,01 (0,899)	1,09 (0,491)	<b>1,26*</b> (0,032)	<b>1,35*</b> (0,019)
<b><u>level of education</u></b>	<b>1,33*</b> (0,000)	<b>1,12*</b> (0,024)	<b>1,17*</b> (0,031)	1,29 (0,691)
<b><u>household income</u></b>	<b>-1,07*</b> (0,001)	-1,05 (0,522)	<b>1,01*</b> (0,002)	<b>1,07*</b> (0,000)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

Education is the demographic indicator with the widest impact as higher levels of education lead to “attaching higher importance to democracy” among Muslims, Protestants and Catholics. The increases generated by this indicator of socioeconomic development are remarkable as it is 33 % for Muslims, 45 % for Protestants and 50 % for Catholics. The findings regarding the impact of education fulfill the expectations that socioeconomic development results in more democratic attitudes. While the general expectation about income’s impact is also in the same direction, the empirical findings suggest that higher income has an opposite influence on Muslims’ and Catholics’ evaluation of democracy. Catholic and Muslim respondents with higher income are found to provide less support, compared to the believers of the same affiliations with lower incomes, for democracy whereas income does not seem to be effective in Protestant and Orthodox attitudes towards democratic governance. It has to be recalled at this point that different arguments have also been made in the literature with regard to the relationship between income and democracy. Although the general tendency has been to claim that higher income fosters civic attitudes, alternative views –approaches arguing for a lack of relationship or even a negative relationship have been mentioned in Chapter 1- have also been put forward. Empirically, these alternative views are found to be more accurate in explaining the role of income in importance attached to democracy.

#### **3.2.4. On the Basis of Denominations**

To bring all these findings together and analyze them on an affiliation basis, four graphs- one graph for each affiliation- were created so that it became possible to see which variables have an impact on the importance attached to democracy by members of each affiliation separately and also to see the levels of impact<sup>4</sup> generated by these variables. Besides the strength of the impacts, these graphs make clear the direction of the effects created in both moves while statistically insignificant impacts are not displayed in these graphs at all. The lighter black bars represent the second move from “indifference” to “importance” where positive values signify an increase in the

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
<sup>4</sup> The numbers in these graphs are absolute values, not relative any more.

likelihood of moving towards “attaching importance” whereas negative values imply a decrease in this likelihood; pointing to an increase in the probability of staying at indifference. The move from “indifference” to “unimportance”; however, is represented by the darker black bars where this time positive values indicate higher likelihood of moving towards unimportance while negative values still signify higher probability of staying at indifference.

#### **3.2.4.1. Islam**

When a dark colored bar extends to the right-hand side of the graph, it means that the sign of that indicator’s coefficient is positive; implying an encouraging effect for moving people from “indifference” to “not supporting democracy”. As the first graph above makes clear there is only one variable carrying these characteristics; that is civic engagement. With the exception of civic engagement, higher score in none of the found-to-be significant variables lead Muslims towards “attaching unimportance to democracy”. The situation with civic engagement is unique in the sense that it makes Muslims move from the mid category of “indifference” to both ends of the scale at the same time as a light colored bar is also situated on the same side of the graph for civic engagement. Light colored bars are representatives of the second move from “indifference” to “attaching importance to democracy”. Placed at the right-hand side, the light bar for civic engagement implies that higher scores in this variable move individuals from “indifference” towards providing higher support for democracy. Thus, higher civic engagement encourages both the first and the second moves at the same time. Yet, the length of the bars signifies that a move towards unimportance is 29 % (the difference between 0, 46 and 0, 17) more likely.

Figure 3.4. Muslim –importance of democracy



Higher income, on the other hand, also makes a negative impact on Muslims' evaluation of democracy and it discourages Muslims from moving into higher support for democracy. Muslims with higher income; however, do not move into "attaching unimportance" as well, they just stay indifferent as a light colored bar exists for this variable, but is situated on the left-hand side of the graph implying that the sign of the coefficient in the first move is negative. If a coefficient is negative in the first move from "indifference" to "attaching unimportance to democracy", it means that this indicator keeps people at "indifference". The effect of higher income is also found to be much smaller than expected as the percentage change created by higher income in support for democracy is just 7 %.

The other variables that are significant for Muslims' support for democracy all have encouraging impacts indicating that higher scores in them result in attaching importance to democracy. Among these variables, self-evaluated religiosity is observed to have the most substantial impact. If a Muslim regards him/herself to be a religious person, his/her probability of supporting democratic governance increases by 44 %.



Moreover, another dimension of religiosity, the importance of religion in one's life, is also found to be significant and to encourage moves into higher importance attached to democracy by Muslims. The increase in the likelihood of moving towards "importance" generated by this latter dimension of religiosity; however, is limited to 18 %.

As the third dimension of religiosity, religious attendance, is not found to make a statistically significant influence, it is reasonable to conclude that higher religiosity in any dimension among Muslims does not lead them consider democracy to be unimportant. On the contrary, all statistically significant dimensions of religiosity are found to encourage support for democracy. This finding is very important to mention as it challenges two highly popular arguments at the same time. One of these arguments is about religiosity in general; asserting that higher religiosity in any context or time impedes democratization due to the irrational and intolerant natures of religions. The second argument is perhaps a more famous one; that is, the incompatibility of Islam with democracy. The empirical findings of this analysis; however, display that more religious Muslims attribute higher importance to democracy. This conclusion definitely contradicts the idea of Islam being incompatible with democracy because if a religion per se is accepted to be antidemocratic, then higher religiosity among the members of that religion would be expected to lead to lower support for democratic governance.


Another important finding regarding Muslims is that four out of six cultural variables, leaving civic engagement out due to its special position of leading to both ends at the same time, are found to have significant and positive impacts on their evaluation of democracy. It is then important to conclude that these cultural variables certainly play a critical role in determining support for democracy by Muslims and they always have a motivating impact. Trust has been included within this analysis in three different forms. For Muslims, the only significant type of trust is trusting people respondents know personally and higher trust of this sort increases the probability of attaching importance to democracy by 25 %. Tolerance's motivating impact on support for democracy is also as high as that of trust and is found to be 25 % as well. Believing in gender equality also makes Muslims more supportive of democracy although the magnitude of influence is less than the ones created by tolerance and trust. Claiming absence of difference between genders increases the likelihood of attributing importance to democracy by 21 % and involvement in democratic practices such as

joining boycotts and signing petitions lead to an increase by 17 %. The other set of control variables, demographics, were not found to be as influential as the indicators of democratic culture. Besides the above mentioned impact of income, changes only in education level create a difference in Muslim support for democracy. Higher education makes Muslims 33 % more likely to attribute importance to democracy. Believing in the significance of individual support for democratic governance in democratization, fostering democratic values –especially tolerance and trust- and higher education among Muslims might be suggested as a way of easier democratization in the currently undemocratic predominantly Muslim countries.

#### **3.2.4.2. Protestantism**

The first point that deserves attention in the graph of Protestants is that only four variables, overall, are found to be significant for Protestant support for democracy. Among the dimensions of religiosity, only self-evaluated religiosity is observed to be significant for democratic attitudes by Protestants by encouraging “attaching importance to democratic governance”. Protestants who consider themselves to be religious are 26 % more likely to believe in the importance of living in a democracy compared to the members of the same affiliation that do not call themselves religious. Thus, the widely-expected negative impact of religiosity on support for democracy cannot be observed among Protestants as well. With respect to the indicators of democratic culture, only tolerance seems to significantly foster positive ideas about democracy among Protestants, although four of these indicators were found significant in shaping Muslim evaluation of democracy. Higher tolerance is found to be significant for Protestants in both moves. In the first move, the coefficient for tolerance is negative- as the dark colored bar for this indicator is situated on the left hand side- implying that higher tolerance discourages a move from “indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy”. In the second move, as a continuation of the previous trend, the variable gets a positive coefficient; this time encouraging the move from “indifference” towards “attaching importance”. When the impacts of tolerance in both moves are brought together, it is obvious that higher tolerance leads Protestants to higher support for democracy.

Figure 3.5. Protestant –importance of democracy



The bizarre influence of civic engagement holds true for Protestants as well. Higher involvement in civil organizations takes Protestants to both ends of the importance scale and the values on the graph show that it is 40 % (the difference between 0, 48 and 0, 08) more likely to direct them towards attaching unimportance. While civic engagement has a role of taking Muslims to both ends, it was observed to lead Muslims more strongly towards a lower support for democracy. These two findings together indicate the darker side of civic engagement- that is fostering vertical ties and hierarchical relationships among the members- seems to be more dominant than its egalitarian, open and hence democratic side. Among the demographics only education is found to be significant. Higher education increases the likelihood of support for democracy by Protestants by a large percentage, that is 45 %. The strong positive impact of education level on attaching importance to democracy is evident for both Muslims and Protestants, supporting the arguments in the literature for the significance of higher education in democratic attitudes.


### 3.2.4.3. Catholicism

There are two surprising findings on Figure 3.6. below. The first one is about a dimension of religiosity, importance of religion. Although it was found to encourage support for democracy among Muslims and to be insignificant among Protestants, a higher importance of religion keeps Catholics at indifference; hindering both moves. Both the dark colored and the light colored bars for this variable are situated on the left-hand side of the graph, implying that the coefficients of this indicator on both moves are negative. If religion is important in a Catholic's life, that individual tends to stay indifferent to democratic governance. Self-evaluated religiosity; however, repeats its encouraging impact strongly for Catholics as well and religious attendance is again found to be insignificant.

The second surprising finding is about one of the components of civic culture; support for gender equality. The dark bar on the right side for this variable indicates that this value does not have the generally expected positive relationship with support for democracy. Support for gender equality has been particularly stated as a significant requisite of democracy due to its relevance to the norms of inclusiveness and equality. It has been accepted to be a crucial attribute of democratic culture as believing in the equality of genders is “a key indicator of tolerance and personal freedom –closely linked with a society's level of democracy” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p.67). Catholics supporting gender equality; however, were empirically found to be 38 % more likely to state that living in a democratically governed country is unimportant.

Among the other components of democratic culture, civic engagement again has the same surprising effect on Catholic support for democracy; that is taking Catholics to both ends of the importance scale. When both moves are taken into account, it is again recognized that higher civic engagement increases the likelihood of attaching unimportance to democracy much more strongly than the likelihood of considering it to be important. This finding common for the three affiliations analyzed until now signifies that the darker side of civic engagement is more influential than its pro-democratic aspect. The third significant democratic value on Catholic support for democracy –trust for unknown people- has the expected positive impact.

Figure 3.6. Catholic –importance of democracy



Demographic variables, except for age, are also found to be meaningful in explaining Catholic support. Male members of the affiliation are found to be 26 % more likely to attribute importance to democracy compared to their female counterparts. The positive influence of education is also repeated among Catholics with even a larger percentage. Higher education is discovered to make Catholics 50 % more likely to support democracy. The impact of income is once again observed to be in line with the alternative views that do not attribute a continuous positive role to income in democratization. Although it does not take Catholics towards “considering democracy to be unimportant”, higher income is observed to decrease the likelihood of Catholic respondents’ moving into “attaching importance” by 6 %.


### 3.2.4.4. Orthodox Christianity

Education is, surprisingly, found to be insignificant for Orthodox. Among demographics, only gender makes a statistically significant impact on Orthodox support

for democracy. Male members of this affiliation are found to be 35 % more likely to support democracy compared to their female counterparts. Gender is significant only for two –Catholic and Orthodox- of the four affiliations used in this analysis and both of the analyses suggest that men are more supportive of democratic governance than women.

Among the dimensions of individual religiosity, the significance of religious practice for Orthodox Christians becomes obvious on this graph as well. Even though religious attendance is not found to be significant in determining support for democracy by members of the other three affiliations, it is marked as the only dimension of religiosity that affects the Orthodox evaluation of democracy. Frequent attendance in religious services is observed to decrease the likelihood of attributing importance to democracy by 32 %. This does not mean that higher scores in this indicator move Orthodox individuals towards “attaching unimportance to democracy”. Rather Orthodox Christians active in religious practices stay in “indifference”. Three out of seven components of civic culture are significant for importance attached to democratic governance by Orthodox Christians. Among them, tolerance continues with its pro-democratic tendency among this affiliation as well. In the first move, higher tolerance makes Orthodox respondents 45 % less likely to move into “attaching unimportance” and in the second move it helps them take a further step towards individual support for democracy, by increasing their likelihood of “attaching importance” by 38 %. Another statistically significant value, trusting unknown people, increases the likelihood of Orthodox support for democracy. Another important finding to be mentioned about the members of Orthodox Christianity is the difference observed in the steady trend of civic engagement. As this indicator has been found to lead members of the other three affiliations to both ends of the importance scale at the same time, membership in a higher number of organizations is observed to decrease the likelihood of “attaching unimportance” by Orthodox respondents, keeping them at “indifference”. This finding is also significant in terms of displaying the “democratic side” of civic engagement, at least to a certain extent, as the highly engaged Orthodox respondents are found to succeed in staying at “indifference” whereas the highly engaged members of the other affiliations are pulled to both ends of the scale and even more strongly to the “unimportance” pole.

Figure 3.7. Orthodox –importance of democracy



Considering all these four graphs together, it is found out that none of the variables included within this analysis has a steady trend of leading individuals towards “attaching unimportance to democratic governance”. However; a number of variables have a continuous positive impact on support for democracy. Self-evaluated religiosity, education and tolerance are the most easily recalled ones. Self-evaluated religiosity; for instance, is observed to have a significant and positive effect on this support provided by members of all the affiliations except Orthodox Christianity. Among the three dimensions of religiosity, self-evaluated religiosity is the most significant and the most democratically encouraging one. Respondents, belonging to all affiliations except Orthodox Christianity who label themselves as religious individuals are more likely to consider democracy to be important. Although not all dimensions of religiosity have such encouraging influences on support for democratic governance, none of the three dimensions ever leads members of any affiliation towards “attaching unimportance to democracy”. Importance of religion among Catholics and religious attendance among Orthodox only keep these respondents at “indifference”. Thus, a complete turning away

from democracy is never triggered by any dimension of religiosity. Higher religiosity, at most, impedes moving into “attaching importance to democracy” and makes the respondent stay at “indifference”.

Tolerance, among the components of democratic culture, has the most stable trend as it has a significant and positive impact on support for democracy by members of all affiliations, except by Catholics for whom this value is not statistically significant. The same can also be argued with regard to trust if the three types of trust used in this analysis are taken into account all together. A more detailed analysis, on the other hand, recognizes that the type of trust that is significant for this support changes from one affiliation to another. Regardless of the different types available, the significant positive impact of interpersonal trust on democracy is what the literature has argued for (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.256). While none of the indicators of trust is significant in the Protestant evaluations of democracy, trusting known people is found to be significant for Muslims and trusting unknown people is for Catholic and Orthodox respondents. Among these two variants of trust, trusting unknown people seems to be more democratic as trust towards strangers leads to cooperation among different segments of the society, resulting in the collective involvement in political processes that is needed for a successful democracy. The type of trust found to encourage democratic attitudes among Muslims- trusting personally known people-, on the other hand, is usually expected to increase the importance of pre-existing ties among closed communities that do not result in democratic living. Trust has been valued as an enabling condition of democracy due to the belief that trusting individuals are the active members of their societies, making compromises and paying attention to ideas different from theirs. These attitudes foster moderation, cooperation and accommodation, the ingredients of pro-democratic culture according to Diamond. Hence, comments on the impact of trusting personally known people should be made more carefully as this type of trust will probably not encourage compromises or respect for diversities because of the prevailing similarities between the respondent and the trusted. The empirical findings on Muslims; however, show that even this type of trust results in higher support for democracy among them.

Another important point to emphasize with respect to the components of democratic culture is that, except for civic engagement, which creates complex results



throughout the analysis, four out of the six cultural characteristics are found to be significant for Muslims and this number never exceeds two for any other affiliation included in this analysis. While tolerance, trust for known people, democratic practice and support for gender equality are significant in determining Muslim support for democratic governance, tolerance is the only democratic value found to be important for Protestants. Only two components of democratic culture are observed to have statistically significant impacts on importance attached to democracy by both Catholics and Orthodox. These are trust for unknown people and gender equality for Catholic and tolerance and trusting unknown people for Orthodox support for democracy. The large number of cultural components –especially when compared to the number of values generating difference in other affiliations- significant for Muslim support for democracy indicates that cultural characteristics play an important role in determining Muslims’ evaluation of democratic governance. So, a suggestion of these findings is that in order to advance the provision of legitimacy to democratic governance and support for it among Muslims, these values need to be emphasized and promoted. These individuals, adopting the democratic culture, in return, will provide support for democratic governance and even ask for democratization.

### **3.3. Conclusion**

Macro level analyses- focusing on countries, societies or regimes- on support for democracy by members of different denominations have mostly reached the conclusion that religious affiliations diverge among themselves in terms of their stance towards democracy and based their arguments on strong democracy in the Western Christian World, both Catholic and Protestant, and its weakness in predominantly Muslim countries. The argument sometimes even went further to the claim that Christianity is a prerequisite of democracy as successful liberal democracies have been established only in the settings where Christianity is available. Stepan labels this viewpoint as the “fallacy of unique founding conditions”; that is defined as thinking about co-existing factors as if they were in a cause-effect relationship (2000, p.44). His argument is that two different conditions might be available together in a certain setting and this does not

always mean that one is a consequence of the other. As democracy was primarily established in the Christian World and as this region is the area where democracy's most successful implementations can be observed, the mistake of linking democracy's emergence to the availability of Christianity in these settings is being committed. However; historically democracy, in the West, was established against the opposition by the Catholic Church.

One of the most significant concerns of Study 1 was to see whether this purported relationship between democracy and religion is spurious; that is whether any variables other than religious affiliations create this difference in practical existence of democracy in certain parts of the world and not in others. The first empirical analysis conducted within this study shows that when the model is controlled for demographic variables and components of democratic culture almost no significant difference can be observed among religious affiliations in terms of their members' support for democracy. Moreover, higher religiosity in any of these affiliations never results in attaching unimportance to living in a democratically governed country. Hence; these findings refute both of the widely discussed arguments on religion and democracy. One is that religion, as a phenomenon, is incompatible with democracy. The other, which is a more recent version, is that Islam and Orthodox Christianity are incompatible with democracy. The tables and graphs above indicate that membership in these affiliations does not have a negative impact on support for democracy. Moreover, higher religiosity does not result in undemocratic claims and attitudes by members of any affiliation; even in Islam or Orthodox Christianity.

The major conclusion of this chapter is the lack of a significant difference among members of different affiliations in terms of their support for democracy. On the individual level, in other words, none of these affiliations seem to be incompatible with democratic governance. This conclusion has also been reached by other earlier analyses through which Islamic nations were found to be highly similar to Christian ones in providing support for democracy. Fares al-Braizat's (2002) analysis on religiosity and support for democracy, for instance, revealed that "support for democracy is very high in Islamic societies" (278). Although predominantly Protestant countries were found to have the highest scores on support for democracy, predominantly Islamic, Catholic and Orthodox societies were also found to be highly supportive of this type of regime. On

the scatter plot, the Islamic countries were placed at the right top corner; indicating both high religiosity and high support for democracy among their citizens. Hofmann's (2004) micro-level analysis also reached the conclusion that "Muslims tend to evaluate the concept of democracy at least as favorably as Christians" (p.668). In many Islamic countries surveyed, including Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey, more than 90 % of the public gave their support to democratic institutions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.264).

These findings suggest that there is a powerful demand, on the individual level, for democracy in the Islamic world. A quick look at the social and political structures of Islamic countries; however, demonstrates that this support for democracy is not actualized in practice. The reason for this discrepancy between individual claims and political realities has usually been explained through the positive image democracy currently has throughout the globe. Democracy is being glorified in discourse since the end of the Cold War when all its rivals were defeated. Since then, people throughout the world have accepted that democracy is the "correct answer" for any question of political systems and that support for democracy is the politically correct attitude.

Practically; however, serious deficiencies prevail. Attempts have been made to explain the invisibility of individual support for democracy in the politics of these countries and two major arguments have attracted more attention. While some scholars refer to the despotic leaders and hierarchical political and social structures in these countries, another point mentioned is about the democratic characteristics of individuals. Inglehart (2002) concluded that agreement with the statement that "Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing this country" is a very weak predictor of how democratic that society actually is. "At this point in history, almost everyone endorses this item- but it does not necessarily tap a deep-rooted commitment to democracy" (p.148). Even though agreeing with this statement means explicit support to democracy and breeds hopes for democratization, the availability of a culture of trust, tolerance, political activism, well-being and of people valuing freedom of speech and self-expression is an even more powerful predictor of democracy (p.150). Although "most of the research on the linkages between mass attitudes and democracy has focused on overt support for democratic institutions"- that is directly asking about one's support for democracy, it can easily be displayed that some other attitudes,

namely the ingredients of self-expression values “are even better indicators of the extent to which a society’s political culture is conducive to democracy” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.263). People who are democratic in their attitudes are expected to be more supportive of democracy and even perhaps more willing to work for the establishment of democracy in their countries. Inglehart and Norris (2002), depending on the findings of their empirical analyses, argued that the main distinction between the West and the Muslim world is not about democracy, but is about “social beliefs about gender equality and sexual liberalization” (p.15). Minkenberg (2007) also agreed that the main reason behind the democratic deficit in Islamic countries was “the patriarchal structures and overall subjugation of women to men in these societies” (p.902). These arguments and findings, then, have recently withdrawn the scholarly attention from highly political discussions revolving around the individuals’ direct evaluations of democracy and other governance types and directed it more towards cultural values and attitudes.

The question, in mind, then should be whether members of different affiliations can also be closely placed on scales that measure the extent to which they adopt the major civic values. Different religious orientations’ compatibility with democracy will be explored through the adoption of civic values and the impact of religiosity on the internalization of these values will be investigated in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RELIGIOSITY AND CIVIC VALUES**

In recognizing the high support for democracy by members of all four affiliations and the encouraging impact of religiosity on this support, Chapter 4 questions the role of religion on the absence of democracy in certain parts of the world from a different perspective. With reference to the discussions on the significance of civic values rather than explicit support for democratization in a region, the already used components of democratic culture are separately used as dependent variables in this chapter and differences among the members of four affiliations with respect to their levels of these values are analyzed. Besides the focus on the importance of belonging, the impact of individual religiosity on these values is also analyzed. Before the regressions, comparison among the four denominations is provided through a descriptive statistics based on the mean values of all groups with respect to each one of the democratic values.


#### **4.1. Descriptive Statistics**

The graphs below display where each group is situated; first within the range in which each value is defined, then in relation to the mean value of the overall sample and thirdly in relation to each other. While the value range on the horizontal axis in each graph demonstrates the range in which that particular variable is defined in the dataset, the vertical axis is arranged to be situated at the mean value of that indicator for the whole sample so that the average scores of each affiliation can be evaluated with respect

to the overall mean value. The length of the bars and the values attached to them enable a comparison among the denominations.

#### 4.1.1. Tolerance

Figure 4.1. Mean values of tolerance



With respect to tolerance, members of the two affiliations of Western Christianity, Catholics and Protestants, are placed above the overall mean of the range (0, 01). A comparison among them, on the other hand, shows that even the difference between the average tolerance scores of these two groups is considerably large. Catholics are observed to be the most tolerant group with an average score of 0, 24, that is highly close to the top score of the range; 0, 60. They are followed by Protestants (0, 07) and Orthodox Christians (0, 02) in order. Orthodox Christians are observed to be situated above the overall mean with just a very small difference of 0, 01. Hence; it might be more appropriate to state that Orthodox respondents are not different from the sample in general in terms of their levels of tolerance. Muslims (-0, 42), on the other hand, are placed much below the other three affiliations and also below the overall mean. Although Muslims did not diverge from or were not placed below the three sects

of Christianity in terms of support for democracy in the previous analysis, they are observed to be significantly lagging behind in terms of tolerance, found to be one of the major components of civic culture. The previous chapter displayed the significance of tolerance for support for democracy empirically. Theoretically, this value is also accepted to be one of the strongest predictors of democratic culture paving the way to democratic living, as intolerant individuals are closed individuals rather than open-minded cooperative democratic citizens. Even this single graph within the second empirical analysis supports the argument that rather than political inclinations and direct support for democracy, the adoption of civic values and attitudes better explain the different practical experiences with democracy in different regions of the world due to the proximity of all the mean values to the highest score of the scale. These bars being situated on the right end of the scale indicate high tolerance among the whole sample.

The following graphs on the other indicators of democratic culture also make clear that even though Huntington's expectation of a significant difference between Western Christianity, that is Protestant and Catholic Christianity, on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other is not proved to be significant in terms of direct support provided for democratic governance, such a distinction is explicitly visible in terms of internalization of the components of democratic culture. Taking the already stated argument by Inglehart and Norris –regarding the distinguishing role of ideas on gender equality across civilizations- one step further, the statistical analyses in this study together signal that the West and the Muslim World are different on the basis of adopting democratic attitudes rather than of providing support for democracy. Except for trust in known people, Orthodox Christians and Muslims are found to have the lowest average scores while Protestants and Catholics rank the highest. A comparison among the average scores in all these values indicates that these four affiliations can be grouped in two; Protestants and Catholics together in one group and Muslims and Orthodox Christians in another –in line with the arguments for the differences between the Western and the Eastern civilizations.

#### **4.1.2. Interpersonal Trust**

The only exception to this standard grouping of Western Christianity above and the other religious affiliations following them is trust for familiar people which is indeed questioned as an indicator of democratic culture. Trust is relevant to democratization because it makes collective action possible. Democracy, defined as rule by the people, necessitates collective and productive behavior within the society that becomes possible only through peaceful and stable social relations among the different segments of the society. In order to survive in peace and coordination, these different individuals should tolerate each others' diversities and should not be suspicious of each other –they should trust each other (Newton, 2001, p.202). Trusting individuals are more willing to make compromises and do not easily dismiss ideas they disagree with (Uslaner, 1999, p.122). The efficiency of a democratic society is increased by the coordinated actions of masses that have high levels of interpersonal trust among themselves (Putnam, 1993, p.167). Trust for known people; however, cannot encourage any of these attitudes valued in democracies as encouraging trust for people the individual is familiar with might bind him/her even more strongly to his/her closed community, promoting suspicion of outsiders. This type of an attitude would alienate people from democratic living rather than bringing them closer to it (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.141).

The three graphs below on different dimensions of interpersonal trust make clear that individuals obtain different attitudes when trust is asked for different target groups. General trust and trust for unknown people do not breed different findings and the same ranking across the four affiliations is obtained in both of these dimensions of interpersonal trust. Trust for known people; however, is different –almost completely reversing the ranking. The above-mentioned two-fold categorization (Western-Eastern) of the four affiliations holds true for general trust and trusting unknown people as well. In these types of trust, Protestants have the highest average score followed by Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians in order. In terms of trusting known people; however, Muslims become the first ranking affiliation and Protestants have the lowest mean score. These findings on trusting unknown and known people together tell a lot about the cultural differences between the Western and Eastern civilizations as defined and used by Huntington and scholars following him. The different scores attained for these



groups' trust towards different targets imply that the Eastern civilization consists of more protective and inward-looking individuals and is identified with a more conservative culture that promotes perceptions of threat against the strangers. This is explicit enough in the findings regarding Muslims' scores on these two types of particularized trust. While they are found to be the only group placed above the overall mean with regard to trusting known people, they clearly lie below it for the other types. Western civilization, on the other hand, is observed to be open to different people and non-members. These comparisons imply that the cultural attributes of the Western Christians are explicitly more prone to democratization. Even this information on different dimensions of trust supported by members of these affiliations may efficiently serve as an explanatory factor for the practical availability and lack of democratic governance in different regions of the world.

Figure 4.2. Mean values of general trust




Figure 4.3. Mean values of trusting known people






Figure 4.4. Mean values of trusting unknown people



When the above-displayed three graphs of mean values on different indicators of trust are comparatively evaluated among themselves, the conclusion should be that general trust and especially trusting strangers is difficult for members of all affiliations. Trusting individuals the respondent is familiar with, on the other hand, is certainly the easiest indicator of democratic culture used in this study. While the mean value of the whole sample for trusting known people approaches the higher end of the scale, it stays much behind the arithmetic mean of the scale of trusting unknown people. Although the three affiliations of Christianity score lower than the overall mean in trusting known people, the average values of these affiliations are still observed to be far from the lower end –and even the arithmetic mean- of the scale.

### 4.1.3. Civic Engagement

Figure 4.5. Mean values of civic engagement




The general trend of Western Christianity at the top and the other two affiliations below them is observed with respect to mean values of civic engagement as well. The sample as a whole scores very low in civic engagement. On a scale between -0,61 and 3,05 the overall mean is found to be 0,06. Three out of the four affiliations are even situated below this very low mean. Only Protestants score higher than the

mean of the whole sample and the ranking among the four groups follows the trend. Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians follow Protestants in order.

#### **4.1.4. Democratic Participation**

With respect to participation in democratic practices, Protestant and Catholic respondents are placed above the mean of the overall sample -0, 06. The bars representing the scores of Orthodox Christians and Muslims, on the other hand, lie on the left side of the graph due to their low means. Even the Protestant and Catholic respondents are not observed to approach the highest scores available. The positions of Muslims and Orthodox Christians are worse, as they are below the overall mean attained from scores of all respondents in World Values Survey from 41 different countries. Although the other components of democratic culture used in this thesis are indirectly linked to democratic governance through the establishment of a congruent political culture, democratic participation has a more direct link to democratization. Participation integrates individuals in democratic processes and helps them internalize the rules of the democratic game. Active interest in public affairs and participation in civic actions are considered as the main characteristics of a democratic citizen (Diamond, 1993, p.14; Inkeles, 1969). Taking into account the importance of mass participation in political processes for democracy, this empirical finding might also be used in explaining the lack of democratization in predominantly Muslim and Orthodox regions of the world.


Figure 4.6. Mean values of democratic participation



#### 4.1.5. Gender Equality

In terms of supporting gender equality, Protestants are found to be placed just at the overall mean with their average score of 0,09 while the other two Christian affiliations score above it, in the order of Catholics and Orthodox Christians from the highest to the lowest. Muslims; however, are found to score below the overall mean, lagging significantly behind the mean values of the other three affiliations. This noteworthy finding with regard to Muslims' receptiveness to democratic culture has been the expectation in the literature. Inglehart and Norris (2003) even suggested that the true clash of civilizations took place on the basis of gender equality and sexual liberalization. "In other words, the values separating the two cultures have much more to do with eros than demos" (p.65).

Figure 4.7. Mean values of gender equality



The seven graphs above and their interpretations show that these affiliations diverge among themselves more obviously when the emphasis is put on the adoption of democratic values rather than on political support for democracy. Furthermore, on the macro level information on the practical absence of or failure of democratization in predominantly Muslim and Orthodox regions seems to be explained more appropriately with a comparison of average scores on cultural variables. A comparison among the findings of these two analyses suggests that democratic values are more important than direct support for democracy in explaining practical differences in terms of political systems in various regions of the world. Yet, the role of religiosity in these macro level observations and arguments should not be dismissed and the role of religiosity in determining the extent to which these values are adopted by members of different affiliations should also be analyzed. The following regressions use these democratic values separately as dependent variables and the impact of the three dimensions of religiosity and demographic variables on the espousal of these values by members of the four affiliations is investigated.

## **4.2. The Findings of Linear Regression Models Run for Each Civic Value**

Going beyond the comparison of mean values, the regression analyses discussed below explore the impacts of religion and demographics on civic values. All these values are represented by variables formed as factor scores of several questions within the survey, thus Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to analyze the impacts of the independent variables on these variables.

### **4.2.1. Tolerance**

To begin with tolerance- see Table 1-, the first point to be mentioned is that Muslims are found to be significantly different from members of the three sects of Christianity in terms of their tolerance level. Being a Muslim, rather than a Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox Christian, has a negative impact on the tolerance level. This finding coincides with the interpretations made on the graph of average tolerance levels in which Muslims were found to rank the lowest among all four affiliations. Although the sects of Christianity are not found to be significantly different from each other- that is belonging to one or another of these affiliations makes no difference-, being a Muslim results in a considerable decrease in the level of tolerance. Among the demographic variables, age is found to be significant only for Muslims. Older Muslims are found to be less tolerant than younger ones; however, the difference created is in actuality, quite small. Male Orthodox Christian respondents are also found to be less tolerant compared to their female counterparts. Although the literature expects a strong positive relationship between education level and tolerance due to the interpretation of educated people as open-minded people forbearing with differences, the table displays that higher education makes a positive impact on tolerance level only for Muslims. Table I makes clear that except for household income, demographics in general do not result in statistically significant large differences in individual tolerance levels by members of any one of the four affiliations used in this study.

Table 4.1. Linear regression -Tolerance

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,552</b> (0,000)	-0,230 (0,055)	0,040 (0,698)	0,104 (0,428)
<b>age</b>	<b>-0,002*</b> (0,029)	0,002 (0,218)	0,001 (0,277)	0,002 (0,293)
<b>gender</b>	0,023 (0,397)	0,029 (0,458)	-0,053 (0,114)	<b>-0,082*</b> (0,043)
<b>education</b>	<b>0,068*</b> (0,000)	0,042 (0,090)	0,015 (0,486)	-0,014 (0,586)
<b>household income</b>	<b>0,057*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,060*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,059*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,040*</b> (0,000)
<b>importance of religion</b>	-0,105 (0,079)	<b>0,225*</b> (0,004)	0,079 (0,226)	0,086 (0,230)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	-0,040 (0,326)	0,025 (0,675)	0,057 (0,250)	0,010 (0,862)
<b>religious attendance</b>	-0,032 (0,339)	0,081 (0,107)	0,019 (0,639)	-0,011 (0,820)

p values in parentheses


\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

Household income is special as it affects the tolerance level of members of all affiliations at the same time. Before interpreting the numbers on the table, it has to be noted that, in this analysis, as was the case with the first analysis on importance attached to democracy, the coefficients for the three sects of Christianity reflect the relative impacts of the independent variables; relative to the impact generated on that of Muslims, on the relevant democratic value by these respondents. Hence, those coefficients should be added to the coefficient for Muslims -only if the coefficient for Muslims is found to be significant for that particular variable- to be able to attain the absolute influences. While the coefficients on Table 4.1. report just the relative impact, Figure I displays the absolute values attained after simple calculations of addition or subtraction, enabling a full-fledged comparison among all affiliations and all variables.



In reading the graphs, besides the darkness and brightness of the bars, the order in which they are placed should also help. For all indicators, the order of the affiliations is the same with the order stated in the legend at the right; Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim from top to the bottom. The statistically insignificant impacts are represented just by '0'. These bar graphs also enable comparison of the magnitude of impacts generated by different variables. The length of the bar representing the influence generated by being a Muslim, for instance, indicates that this is the variable with the greatest impact followed by the importance of religion for Protestants.

Figure 4.8. Tolerance



The only dimension of religiosity that is found to be significant in explaining the level of tolerance by members of any affiliation in this study is importance of religion in one's life. This variable is observed to have a positive impact on Protestant scores of tolerance. If religion has an important place in a Protestant's life, his/her level of tolerance increases by 23 %. This might be interpreted as a surprising finding as higher religiosity has usually been associated with a more conservative outlook or being suspicious of outsiders. This single finding alone, however, cannot be sufficient to claim that this idea on the negative relationship between religiosity and tolerance has

been refuted with these empirical results, as the positive relationship holds true for members of only one affiliation and that is true for only one particular dimension of religiosity. No other dimension of religion is found to be significant in determining tolerance by members of different affiliations. While Muslims score lower in tolerance when compared to the members of other affiliations- this was found to be the case in the mean score graphs as well-, religious Muslims are not observed to be more intolerant than their non-religious counterparts. Then, can the motive behind this low level of tolerance by Muslims be Islam itself? A more detailed analysis based on direct references and explanations of Muslims might be more useful in learning about the motives behind the Muslim intolerance.

#### **4.2.2. Trusting Known People**

Table 4.2. makes explicit that religiosity does not result in any significant change in trusting known people, one of the three dimensions of interpersonal trust used as a component of civic culture. Membership in three of these four affiliations; however, creates a significant change in this type of trust. While being a Muslim does not generate any significant change, belonging to three denominations of Christianity all have negative effects on this dimension of trust. When the magnitudes of their impacts are compared, it is found out that the largest negative impact is generated by being an Orthodox Christian, followed by membership in Catholicism and in Protestant Christianity respectively. Hence it can be concluded that trust for known people is the lowest among Orthodox Christianity. Figure II makes this comparison on membership variables even more visible. All three bars lie towards the negative end of the scale and their lengths are not observed to be so different from each other.

All demographic variables except gender are significant in determining Muslim trust towards the people they know. Older age, lower education and higher income are found to foster this type of trust among Muslims, while only older age seems to do this for Protestants. The other demographic indicators do not have any statistically significant impact on level of Protestant trust towards people they are familiar with. Among Catholics, on the other hand, male members are observed to have a higher trust of this sort than their female counterparts. With respect to trust towards personally

known people among Orthodox Christians, the demographic characteristics of the respondents do not seem to matter at all.

Table 4.2. Linear regression -Trusting known people


	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	0,005 (0,957)	<b>-0,397*</b> (0,001)	<b>-0,406*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,434*</b> (0,001)
<b>age</b>	<b>0,003*</b> (0,010)	<b>0,003*</b> (0,027)	0,000 (0,913)	-0,002 (0,254)
<b>gender</b>	-0,032 (0,265)	0,063 (0,117)	<b>0,121*</b> (0,001)	0,067 (0,109)
<b>education</b>	<b>-0,035*</b> (0,048)	0,014 (0,588)	0,031 (0,158)	-0,006 (0,833)
<b>household income</b>	<b>0,017*</b> (0,019)	0,009 (0,336)	0,012 (0,148)	0,006 (0,542)
<b>importance of religion</b>	0,099 (0,111)	-0,048 (0,549)	-0,013 (0,852)	-0,054 (0,473)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	0,073 (0,084)	-0,037 (0,559)	-0,015 (0,777)	0,071 (0,255)
<b>religious attendance</b>	0,023 (0,503)	0,023 (0,659)	0,068 (0,107)	0,078 ( 0,105)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

The graph below shows that besides the belonging dimension of religion, none of the independent variables included in this analysis, except for affiliation membership, really have a considerably significant effect on trusting known people. What attracts attention is that individual religiosity is completely statistically insignificant for members of all affiliations. Membership in Christian denominations decreases the likelihood of trusting known people. Male Catholics are observed to encourage trust of this type and the magnitude of the change is not so small.

Figure 4.9. Trusting known people



### 4.2.3. Trusting Unknown People

The level of trust for unknown people, on the other hand, is shaped by the impact of a higher number of indicators; especially when the indicators of religiosity are taken into account. Being a member of any one of these four affiliations has a negative effect on this type of trust. This finding supports the interpretation made on the graph of mean values of this dimension of trust that it is hard for all individuals, regardless of their religious orientation, to trust people that are complete strangers to them. It is membership in Catholicism that creates the largest decrease in this indicator of trust. The coefficient for Muslims is -0, 497, indicating a decreasing impact and also negative values for the other three affiliations on the table that denote the negative impact generated by membership in them is even larger. Individual religiosity among Christians, on the other hand, has an encouraging impact. The same; however, does not hold true for Muslim religiosity.

Table 4.3. Linear regression -Trusting unknown people

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,497*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,286*</b> (0,019)	<b>-0,450*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,390*</b> (0,003)
<b>age</b>	0,000 (0,852)	<b>0,005*</b> (0,000)	0,001 (0,250)	0,002 (0,111)
<b>gender</b>	0,045 (0,105)	-0,030 (0,447)	-0,025 (0,453)	-0,009 (0,824)
<b>education</b>	<b>0,079*</b> (0,000)	-0,028 (0,266)	0,011 (0,602)	0,004 (0,889)
<b>household income</b>	<b>0,019*</b> (0,006)	-0,014 (0,139)	0,005 (0,545)	<b>-0,020*</b> (0,047)
<b>importance of religion</b>	-0,091 (0,131)	0,130 (0,098)	<b>0,168*</b> (0,011)	0,076 (0,297)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	<b>-0,085*</b> (0,041)	-0,020 (0,743)	0,065 (0,197)	-0,020 (0,738)
<b>religious attendance</b>	<b>-0,096*</b> (0,004)	<b>0,121*</b> (0,017)	<b>0,129*</b> (0,002)	<b>0,146*</b> (0,002)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

The findings with respect to the influence of religiosity on trust towards unknown people deserve attention, as different dimensions of religiosity are found to have diverging effects on this type of trust. While participation in religious activities increases trust towards personally unknown people by members of the three sects of Christianity, it has a decreasing impact on this type of trust by Muslims. When the magnitudes of the impacts generated by this variable, regardless of the direction, on members of the different affiliations are compared, it is found out that the largest impact is generated for Muslims. Religious attendance is not the only indicator of religiosity that has a negative effect on this type of trust by Muslims. A Muslim who considers him/herself to be a religious person is also found to have lower trust towards unknown


people compared to the ones who do not claim to be a religious individual. This dimension of religiosity, on the other hand, is not observed to be significant for the members of any other affiliation. Another example for the encouraging relationship between religiosity and trusting personally unknown people is observed through importance attributed to religion in one's life by members of Catholicism. Catholics who consider religion to be an important part of their lives are found to have higher levels of this type of trust compared to the ones that do not consider it to be important.

An overall comparison of the impact of religiosity on trusting unknown people by members of different affiliations suggests that when a dimension of religiosity is found to be significant for members of any one of the Christian denominations, its impact is observed to be encouraging higher trust while whenever an indicator of religiosity has a significant effect on Muslim trust for people they do not know, the impact is observed to be negative. Both self-evaluated religiosity and religious attendance have a decreasing impact on this type of trust by Muslim respondents. Among Christians; however, religious attendance has an obvious positive impact promoting trust towards unknown people. This positive relationship between religious attendance in Christianity and trust is usually explained with reference to the church organization in Christian belief system. Christians, by becoming a member of a certain church, form close relationships with other members of their churches even though they do not know each other well. These close relationships and active cooperation among the members require that they trust each other and hence do not refrain from acting together.

Trust towards strangers is interpreted to be a strong sign of democratic culture as civic relations among citizens only become possible though "generalized trust" – discussed in more detail in the first chapter- defined as trusting unknown and even previously disliked people. Higher generalized trust also motivates individuals for higher participation in collective actions. This strong relevance of trusting strangers in democratic culture indicates that the empirically observed negative relationship between religiosity and trusting unknown people at this step might be supportive of the broader argument on the relationship between Muslim religiosity and democratic attitudes. It is still not easy to conclude that Islam is the major reason behind distrust or deficient democratic characteristics among Muslims; however, the finding is clear that Muslims frequently attending religious services and Muslims evaluating themselves to be

religious display lower levels of trust towards personally unknown people compared to their counterparts who are not religious in these dimensions. Among the members of Christian affiliations; however, higher religiosity in some dimensions leads to higher trust for strangers refuting the broader claim on the incompatibility of religiosity, as a phenomenon, with democracy.

Figure 4. 10. Trusting unknown people



Demographic indicators are not found to result in significant changes to this type of trust. Higher income and higher education display encouraging impacts on Muslim trust for unknown people. While higher income was observed to have a positive relationship on trust toward familiar people as well, individuals with lower education levels were more inclined to score higher in this dimension of trust. These findings with regard to different dimensions of particularized trust together –recalling that trust for unknown people is the most democratic form of trust- support the generally-supported theoretical argument that higher levels of socioeconomic development, more strongly represented through education level, lead to a higher predisposition to democratic culture. Higher income among Orthodox Christians; however, results in a decrease in

this type of trust albeit with a very small change. While gender is not found to be significant for members of any affiliation, age has a significant impact on trust by Protestants. Older Protestants are observed to display higher levels of trust than their younger counterparts.

#### **4.2.4. General Trust**


Besides these two types of particularized trust, the differences with respect to general trust, the third dimension of trust used in this analysis, also need to be mentioned. Belonging to Orthodox Christianity does not result in any statistically significant change in general trust. Membership in other three affiliations; however, results in reduced general trust by the respondents. The decrease in general trust generated by membership in Islam is the smallest, compared to the decreases created by belonging to Protestant or Catholic Christianity.

While gender is not found to be significant for any affiliations' generalized trust- as was also the case for trust towards personally unknown people-, age is statistically significantly and positively related to general trust by Muslims, even though the impact is almost unrecognizable. Education and income seem to be influential on more of the affiliations and the magnitude of the impacts become much more important, especially in education. Referring to the arguments on the relevance of socioeconomic development for establishment of a democratic culture, this thesis, since the very beginning, has focused on education level and household income, among demographics, as the individuals level indicators of socioeconomic development. The significance of these two indicators, especially of education level, was also supported in the analysis in Chapter 3. Higher levels of education were found to lead members of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism towards "attaching importance to democracy". The magnitudes of the impacts were also observed to be considerable as the percentage changes generated never fell below 30 %. While older age increases the general trust by Muslims by only 0, 002, higher education lowers their trust by 0, 435. Education is surprisingly found to be negatively related not only to Muslim trust but also to general trust by Catholics and Protestants. Higher education decreases the level of general trust of these groups by 0, 365 and 0, 265 in order. In short, educated people are found to be less trusting towards the public in general. This finding on the direction of the impact of



education on general trust contradicts the belief in the democratizing effect of socioeconomic development. This finding, then, might be more appropriately explained through the fact that educated people know more about the world and are more aware of the diversity of individuals in the public, and thus they find it difficult to interpret human beings to be trustworthy. Higher income, on the other hand, is observed to simply increase general trust by Orthodox and Protestant respondents and is found to be insignificant for the other two groups.

Figure 4.11. General trust



The dimensions of religiosity are totally found to be insignificant to general trust by Protestants and Catholics. For Orthodox respondents, attributing importance to religion in one's life increases general trust; however, evaluating oneself to be religious decreases it. When the two findings are interpreted together, general trust by an Orthodox respondent who attributes importance to religion in his/her life and regards him/herself to be religious at the same time is 0,161 lower than that by an Orthodox who does not claim to be religious and who does not grant importance to religion in his/her life. Among Muslims; however, only the importance of religion makes a significant impact on their general trust and the impact is observed to be negative;

implying that higher importance of religion in a Muslim’s life decreases the general trust of that individual by 0, 157. These findings regarding Muslims and Orthodox Christians together signify that higher religiosity within these groups has a negative impact on the level of trust they have towards the human beings in general.

Table 4.4. Linear regression -General trust

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,394*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,311*</b> (0,009)	<b>-0,201*</b> (0,050)	0,000 (0,999)
<b>age</b>	<b>0,002*</b> (0,029)	-0,001 (0,639)	<b>-0,002*</b> (0,047)	-0,003 (0,054)
<b>gender</b>	0,010 (0,705)	-0,026 (0,497)	-0,051 (0,121)	-0,033 (0,410)
<b>education</b>	<b>-0,435*</b> (0,009)	<b>0,070*</b> (0,004)	<b>0,080*</b> (0,000)	-0,026 (0,319)
<b>household income</b>	0,011 (0,092)	<b>0,019*</b> (0,043)	0,005 (0,523)	<b>0,033*</b> (0,001)
<b>importance of religion</b>	<b>-0,157*</b> (0,008)	0,080 (0,298)	0,112 (0,084)	<b>0,209*</b> (0,003)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	0,015 (0,716)	0,083 (0,165)	-0,033 (0,498)	<b>-0,213*</b> (0,000)
<b>religious attendance</b>	0,061 (0,063)	-0,039 (0,436)	0,063 (0,118)	0,004 (0,939)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

#### 4.2.5. Civic Engagement

With respect to civic engagement, a small number of variables are found to be significant. Among the dimensions of religiosity, only religious attendance has a

significant impact upon membership in voluntary organizations and only by members of just one of the four affiliations included in this analysis; Protestant Christianity. More frequent attendance in religious services has a positive impact on membership in voluntary associations by members of this denomination. In terms of the belonging dimension of religion, only being Muslim results in a statistically significant change in civic engagement. Being Muslim rather than Christian of any denomination decreases membership in these organizations. Membership in other affiliations does not create any significant change in this indicator at all. Commenting on the compatibility debate on the basis of civic engagement, the findings reached with regard to this component of democratic culture in the first analysis have to be recalled. The confusing impact of this indicator of support for democracy led to the conclusion that engagement in voluntary organizations can lead to considering democracy both important and unimportant based on the nature of the organizations and hence civic engagement per se cannot be viewed as a sign of democratic attitudes. This finding on the negative relationship between belonging to Islam and civic engagement, then, should not be directly interpreted to have explanatory power for the practical lacuna of democracy in the Muslim World.

Among the demographics, age is not found to be significant for any one of the four affiliations. Gender and education are observed to be significant in Muslims' membership in voluntary associations. Male Muslims display higher participation in these organizations compared to their female counterparts. Among Orthodox respondents, however, females are more likely than males to belong to voluntary associations, even though the change generated is almost unrecognizable. Higher education among Muslims also increases civic engagement and higher income unsurprisingly has the same encouraging impact.


Table 4.5. Linear regression -Civic engagement

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,912*</b>	0,095	-0,032	0,175
	(0,000)	(0,420)	(0,753)	(0,176)
<b>age</b>	-0,000	-0,000	-0,001	-0,002
	(0,904)	(0,946)	(0,321)	(0,285)
<b>gender</b>	<b>0,102*</b>	-0,020	-0,004	<b>-0,098*</b>
	(0,000)	(0,593)	(0,904)	(0,014)
<b>education</b>	<b>0,141*</b>	0,011	-0,002	-0,034
	(0,000)	(0,660)	(0,920)	(0,188)
<b>income</b>	0,007	<b>0,025*</b>	<b>0,023*</b>	0,005
	(0,304)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,597)
<b>importance of religion</b>	-0,053	-0,022	0,065	-0,010
	(0,367)	(0,779)	(0,314)	(0,890)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	0,000	-0,114	0,100	0,090
	(0,999)	(0,057)	(0,051)	(0,131)
<b>religious-attendance</b>	0,019	<b>0,177*</b>	0,057	-0,033
	(0,570)	(0,000)	(0,153)	(0,170)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level


Figure 4.12. Civic engagement



#### 4.2.6. Democratic Participation

Membership in all four affiliations is found to be significant for and negatively related to democratic participation. Although on Table 4.6. only the coefficient for Muslims appears to be negative, it has to be recalled that the coefficients of other affiliations on the table represent the impacts of membership on their democratic participation only relative to the impact experienced in Muslim participation. Adding these coefficients to that of Muslims, the absolute changes experienced by these variables are also found to be negative and these absolute changes are shown in Figure 4.13. However, still the largest decrease in democratic participation is generated by Muslims as the coefficient for this group is -0, 564. The absolute values, shown on the graph below, for other affiliations are smaller in magnitude- the length of the bars also signify this- implying that the decrease generated in their democratic participation is smaller.

Figure 4.13. Democratic participation



Among the dimensions of religiosity, only the importance of religion is observed to generate a significant impact on democratic participation by members of all four affiliations included in this analysis. While attributing importance to religion in one's life decreases involvement in democratic acts by the members of Orthodox and Catholic Christianity and also by Muslims, it is observed to increase democratic participation by Protestants. Protestants who regard religion to be important in their lives, get more occupied with these types of activities compared to their counterparts who do not believe that religion is important in their lives. Among all these changes generated by this variable, the greatest impact is felt by Muslims. The other two dimensions of religiosity, on the other hand, are not found to have any statistically significant influence on respondents' involvement in democratic practices.

Table 4.6. Linear Regression -Democratic participation

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,564*</b> (0,000)	<b>0,301*</b> (0,011)	<b>0,213*</b> (0,037)	<b>0,310*</b> (0,016)
<b>age</b>	<b>-0,004*</b> (0,000)	-0,001 (0,436)	-0,002 (0,200)	-0,001 (0,375)
<b>gender</b>	<b>0,211*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,083*</b> (0,029)	<b>-0,080*</b> (0,015)	-0,056 (0,162)
<b>education</b>	<b>0,202*</b> (0,000)	-0,027 (0,257)	<b>-0,042*</b> (0,043)	<b>-0,082*</b> (0,002)
<b>income</b>	<b>0,039*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,056*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,030*</b> (0,000)	<b>-0,020*</b> (0,038)
<b>importance of religion</b>	<b>-0,215*</b> (0,000)	<b>0,229*</b> (0,003)	<b>0,154*</b> (0,017)	<b>0,157*</b> (0,027)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	-0,058 (0,148)	-0,055 (0,354)	-0,011 (0,818)	-0,089 (0,133)
<b>religious-attendance</b>	0,045 (0,172)	-0,089 (0,071)	-0,026 (0,510)	-0,034 (0,458)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

With respect to demographics, income, education and gender are found to be important for most of the affiliations. Income is significant for all affiliations and except for Protestants, higher income has an encouraging impact on democratic participation. The expectation of an affirmative relationship between higher socioeconomic development and democratic culture is realized among the members of three affiliations. As another indicator of socio-economic status, education is also expected to be important in determining and encouraging the activeness of respondents in the democratic processes and this expected positive relationship between higher education and democratic participation is found to hold true for the same respondents; i.e. Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox. Yet, Protestants again form an exception here as this

variable is observed to be statistically insignificant in shaping their democratic activities. In terms of gender, except for Orthodox respondents, male members of the three affiliations are found to be participating more, perhaps signifying that even within democratic religious orientations –i.e. Protestantism and Catholicism- women do not have equal opportunities to access the political processes. Age; however, is significant only for Muslims among whom older people participate less in these types of activities. The change created by this variable; however, is almost unnoticeable.

#### **4.2.7. Gender Equality**


As the last component of civic culture to analyze is support for gender equality, the first independent variable to focus on should also be gender. Although throughout this analysis, men were almost always found to be more supportive of democracy, with respect to this last value, being a male is found to decrease the support provided for this democratic attitude in all the affiliations except Protestantism, among the members of which gender as an indicator does not generate any significant difference. As the dependent variable in this regression is measuring support for the idea that women are not and hence should not be considered different from men, women tend to support this view more enthusiastically than male members of the same affiliations. The insignificance of this variable for Protestants, on the other hand, implies that the idea of gender equality among Protestants does not diverge based on the gender of respondents.

Continuing with the impact generated by demographics, higher education again seems to have a considerably large impact on support provided for gender equality among Muslims. Higher income, even though the extent of the impact is much less than the one created by education, also has a significant affirmative relationship with support for gender equality among Muslims. The significance of these individual level indicators of socioeconomic development has already been recognized in the analysis of other democratic values and even in the previous chapter on support for democracy. Income is observed to have a negative relationship with this democratic value by Orthodox Christians. The extent of this impact is so small that it can easily be ignored. Age is also found to generate very slight changes in Protestant and Catholic support for gender equality. Older Protestant and Catholic respondents are observed to provide lower



support for this idea compared to their younger counterparts. This finding implies how recently the significance of commitment to gender equality has been recognized even among the most pro-democratic affiliations, i.e. Protestantism and Catholicism. In terms of membership in these affiliations, the graph above displays that membership in affiliations other than Protestant Christianity has a decreasing effect on this support. Yet, the lengths of the bars also signify that the largest negative influence is created by being a Muslim. The significant deficiency among Muslims in terms of supporting gender equality is also recognized through the last graph on mean values which displays how low the average score of Muslims is with regard to gender equality.

Figure 4.14. Gender equality



Two dimensions of religiosity, self-evaluated religiosity and religious attendance, are significant in determining Muslim support for gender equality. The signs of the coefficients shown on the table above make it clear that a Muslim who considers him/herself to be a religious person or who attends religious practices frequently, provides lower support for gender equality compared to the Muslims who do not have such claims or who do not report frequent participation. When the two

dimensions are taken into account at the same time, the decrease in support gets even larger. These same indicators; however, are found to have positive relationships with the support provided by other affiliations. Orthodox respondents who consider themselves to be religious, for instance, show higher commitment to this idea of equality. Frequent religious attendance by Protestants also has an impact of increasing support for gender equality by these respondents. For Catholics; however, these two dimensions do not generate any significant difference even though higher importance of religion in their lives lowers the support they provide for this value.

Table 4.7. Linear regression -Gender equality

	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Orthodox</u>
<b>being a member</b>	<b>-0,359*</b>	0,168	<b>0,221*</b>	<b>0,302*</b>
	(0,000)	(0,134)	(0,022)	(0,013)
<b>age</b>	0,000	<b>-0,004*</b>	<b>-0,004*</b>	-0,001
	(0,738)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,350)
<b>gender</b>	<b>-0,420*</b>	0,067	<b>0,068*</b>	<b>-0,079*</b>
	(0,000)	(0,065)	(0,030)	(0,035)
<b>education</b>	<b>0,200*</b>	-0,038	-0,031	-0,040
	(0,000)	(0,098)	(0,112)	(0,103)
<b>income</b>	<b>0,019*</b>	-0,010	-0,015	<b>-0,020*</b>
	(0,003)	(0,243)	(0,053)	(0,035)
<b>importance of religion</b>	0,054	-0,110	<b>-0,141*</b>	-0,110
	(0,336)	(0,129)	(0,022)	(0,102)
<b>self-evaluated religiosity</b>	<b>-0,093*</b>	0,082	0,070	<b>0,136*</b>
	(0,014)	((0,150)	(0,131)	(0,015)
<b>religious-attendance</b>	<b>-0,110*</b>	<b>0,151*</b>	0,059	-0,048
	(0,000)	(0,001)	(0,118)	(0,270)

p values in parentheses

\* implies significance at % 95 significance level

The discussions above say a lot about the civic values and the importance of different factors in determining the level of internalization of these values across the four affiliations. While continuous trends are observed with respect to the impacts of


some of these variables on civic values, some other factors play completely different roles in the attitudes of members of different affiliations. Membership, for instance, is always found to have a negative impact. Education, on the other hand, plays an encouraging role for all values, except for general trust, across the denominations. The role of individual religiosity; however, is not so simple to explain as its different dimensions generate diverse change in the civic values in different denominations. An easier understanding and a more comprehensive comparison will be made possible below with the help of the graphs formed on affiliation basis.

### **4.3. The Findings of Linear Regression Models on the Basis of Affiliations**

In order to bring all this information together in a form that would make the data more easily comparable among affiliations and that would make the impacts of belonging and of different dimensions of individual religiosity more obvious, the bar graphs were recreated on the basis of affiliations. The graphs below concentrate on a single denomination and aim to show the impact of each variable on the democratic values separately. However, the number of civic values analyzed is large enough that one graph with all the independent variables and all the democratic values would be too long to deal with. Hence, there are two graphs for each affiliation; the first one analyzes the impact of belonging and dimensions of religiosity and the second one deals with the impact of demographics on the values. If a variable is found to have an insignificant impact on a certain value for that affiliation, that case is represented by just a zero on the graph.

### 4.3.1. Muslims


Figure 4.15. Muslims -Belonging and dimensions of religiosity on civic values



To begin with Muslims, the most striking point to mention is that neither being a Muslim nor any dimension of religiosity is ever found to have an increasing impact on any one of the seven values included within this analysis. The same independent variables; however, were found to result in higher support for democratic governance among Muslims in the previous chapter. The highest decreases in the Muslim scores of these seven values are being experienced through the membership variable and among them, being a Muslim decreases civic engagement the most, followed by democratic practices. The changes generated by religiosity variables; however, are not so large and are even smaller than any change created by the belonging dimension. While being a Muslim exerts its negative impact on all the values except trusting known people, each dimension of religiosity is found to be significant for only two of these values. Attributing importance to religion in one's life decreases Muslims' democratic participation and general trust while the negative impacts of self-evaluated religiosity and religious attendance are felt in Muslims' support for gender equality and their trust towards unknown people. More broadly, it can be stated that more religious Muslims

display lower generalized trust, provide lower support for gender equality and participate in democratic processes less frequently compared to their less religious counterparts. These three attitudes are among the mostly valued components of civic culture. Trust towards strangers is believed to be an important democratic attitude due to its role of enabling cooperation among citizens. While gender equality is interpreted to be crucial for democracy due to its contribution to the inclusiveness and equality in democracies, democratic participation also has a direct link to democratization as individuals are expected to participate in social and political processes in a democracy. Although none of the dimensions of religiosity are observed to result in large changes, the extents of the impacts generated by importance of religion in one's life, among all three dimensions of religiosity, are found to be the largest.

Figure 4. 16. Muslims –Demographics on civic values




Among the demographic variables, income and education are found to be significant, for Muslims in determining the level of most of these values. This finding signifies the relevance of socioeconomic development towards Muslim democratic attitudes. Income is insignificant only for general trust and civic engagement, and is observed to be positively related to the rest. Education, on the other hand, is statistically insignificant for trusting personally known people and is positively related to all the other values except for general trust on which it exerts a considerable negative

influence. While male members of Islam are found to be more active in civic engagement and democratic practices, female members are more supportive of gender equality. The inactive status of Muslim women in both voluntary associations and democratic practices might be interpreted as the isolation of Muslim women from the public sphere. Being a male decreases the support for gender equality considerably as this value regarding women's status in society and the opportunities they have is naturally supported by female respondents more strongly. The impact generated by age; however, is so small for all the values that it is insignificant and can easily be ignored. Older Muslims are observed to be less tolerant and less active in democratic participation while they score higher on general trust and trust towards known people compared to younger members of Islam.

#### 4.3.2. Protestants


Figure 4.17. Protestants- Belonging and dimensions of religiosity on civic values



Membership in Protestant Christianity is also always negatively related to the values for which it is significant. Being a Protestant is not found to be significant for

tolerance, civic engagement or gender equality. The influence this variable exerts on the other values; however, is considerably large and is constantly negative. Among the dimensions of individual religiosity, self-evaluated religiosity does not generate a statistically significant impact on any one of the democratic values by Protestants. The direction of the relationship between the other two dimensions of religiosity and the components of democratic culture is always positive. Attaching importance to religion in one's life increases tolerance and democratic participation by Protestants; yet, the increase in the latter is almost unrecognizable. The extent of the impact generated by the importance of religion in one's life on tolerance, on the other hand, is the largest created by dimensions of religiosity on any of the values by Protestants. Frequent religious attendance also has an encouraging influence in support for gender equality, civic engagement and trusting unknown people. The crucial point to be mentioned about Protestants is that indicators of religiosity never result in decreasing effects on any one of the civic values. Whenever religiosity is found to have a significant relationship with components of democratic culture among Protestants- that is the case for five values-, the impact is observed to be affirmative.

Figure 4.18. Protestants- Demographics on civic values




All the demographic variables, except income, are found to be significant for at most two out of the seven components of democratic culture. While education is observed to have a negative relationship with general trust, male Protestants are found to be more active in democratic participation compared to their female counterparts. The same conclusions with regard to these two values were also reached in the analysis on Muslims. Hence, the explanations provided for these findings should not concentrate on religion as a significant factor. Age, on the other hand, generates slight differences in gender equality and civic engagement. Older Protestants are observed to be less supportive of gender equality while they tend to provide higher trust towards personally unknown people. Different levels of income result in statistically significant changes in four democratic values; democratic participation, civic engagement, general trust and tolerance although the extent of the changes are small. While higher income results in higher civic engagement and higher general trust, it has a negative relationship with democratic participation and tolerance. Overall, demographics do not seem to be as significant for Protestants as they are for Muslims.

#### **4.3.3. Catholics**

The continuous negative impact of the belonging dimension of religion on democratic values holds true for Catholics as well. Being a Catholic is statistically significant for all values other than civic engagement and tolerance. The extent of the negative impact generated is the highest for trusting unknown people. Individual religiosity is observed to be effective in shaping the democratic attitudes of Catholics and major change is created by the importance of religion in one's life. Self-evaluated religiosity is not significant for any one of the values and religious attendance is found to be significant only for trusting unknown people. Catholics who frequently participate in religious practices are found to score higher on this type of trust. Attributing importance to religion in one's life also has a positive relationship towards this value, while it decreases support for gender equality and participation in democratic practices. The dimensions of religiosity do not exert significant influence upon many of the values in this analysis. These findings all together indicate that higher religiosity may result in different attitudes among Catholics and it is hard to speak of a steady trend with respect to the relationship between religiosity and democratic values.



Figure 4. 19. Catholics- Belonging and dimensions of religiosity on civic values




With respect to demographic indicators, the largest impacts are created by education and gender. Higher education promotes higher involvement in democratic participation; however, it at the same time generates a decrease in general trust, which has been observed among Muslims and Protestants as well. Explanation for this frequently observed relationship between education level and general trust might be made through an alternative to the conflict hypothesis. The argument, then, would be that in the course of the process of learning about different groups, their disliked and even “deviant” characteristics attract attention, leading to a more serious threat-perception about them. Through education, individuals become more aware of diversities and alternative lifestyles, decreasing individuals’ likelihood of trusting human beings in general.

Male Catholics are found to be more active in democratic practices and they also score higher on trusting known people compared to their female counterparts. However; the same subgroup seems to be less supportive of gender equality as is also found to be the case with male members of Islam as well. Age and income, on the other hand, are observed to generate slight changes. Higher income among Catholics fosters higher democratic participation and higher membership in civil organizations whereas it

decreases the level of tolerance by these individuals. These findings regarding economic development at the individual level indicate that individuals with better economic conditions are more active in public and have easier access to the democratic process. With respect to age; older Catholics are observed to be slightly- even almost unrecognizably- less supportive of gender equality.

Figure 4.20. Catholics –Demographics on civic values




#### 4.3.4. Orthodox Christians

Membership's negative impact on democratic values is visible among Orthodox respondents as well. While the impact of this variable is very slight on support for gender equality, considerably large changes can be observed, for instance, in trusting unknown people. Different dimensions of religiosity are observed to be significant for one or two democratic values each and the direction of the relationship becomes sometimes positive sometimes negative. Frequent attendance in religious practices increases trust for unknown people. General trust, on the other hand, is promoted by the importance of religion in one's life but is decreased under the impact of self-evaluated

religiosity. Taking the two together, a claim to be religious and to attribute importance to religion in one's life decreases the general trust the individual has as the impact generated by the former is almost four times larger than that of the latter. Orthodox respondents claiming to be religious provide higher support for gender equality and a higher importance of religion in one's life is found to decrease democratic participation. In such a complicated picture, it is really quite hard to claim any steady trend for the relationship between religiosity and democratic values by Orthodox Christians. Although religious attendance never results in a decreasing impact, the other two dimensions of religiosity are found to have both encouraging and hindering effects on the different components of civic culture. The extent of the impacts generated by dimensions of religiosity is not observed to be large; perhaps except for self-evaluated religiosity's hindering impact on general trust.


Figure 4.21. Orthodox -Belonging and dimensions of religiosity on civic values



Among Orthodox respondents, age is not found to be significant in determining the level of any one of the democratic values. While male members of the group score higher in civic engagement, female Orthodox respondents provide higher support for gender equality –that is the finding in all denominations except in Protestantism- and

show higher tolerance towards diversity. It has to be noted at this point that the extent of the impact generated in civic engagement is so small that it can easily be ignored. Higher education and higher income both promote higher involvement in democratic activities, once more indicating the positive impact of socioeconomic development on democratization. Higher income also encourages general trust and tolerance while it decreases support for gender equality and trust towards unknown people.

Figure 4.22. Orthodox –Demographics on civic values



The decrease generated in democratic values through membership is not unique for Muslims. Membership in any one of the four affiliations never shows an affirmative impact on these values. All the groups have their membership significant for at least four of the seven values and these membership variables always have a decreasing impact on the values they are significant for. However, the graphs displayed at the very beginning of the chapter showed that Muslims, on average, score lower than most of these affiliations in terms of democratic attitudes, except for trusting known people with respect to which it has the highest positioning. Besides this low ranking with respect to mean values in the chosen components of democratic culture, the continuous negative impact generated by different dimensions of Muslim religiosity on various democratic values direct attention towards Muslims as such a negative trend between religiosity and democratic values is not observed among the members of any other affiliation. While all

three dimensions of religiosity are found to have encouraging effects on components of democratic culture among Protestants, a steady trend cannot be observed among Catholics and Orthodox Christians. Another significant point with regard to the dimensions of religiosity is that religious attendance does not display hindering impacts on any values by any Christian affiliation. The other two dimensions; however, are observed to produce diverging effects on different values by Catholics and Orthodox Christians; sometimes encouraging, sometimes hindering. This observed continuous positive influence of religious attendance on democratic values by Christians provides support for the arguments that church membership promotes civic life among Christians.

With respect to the demographics, three important trends need to be emphasized. The first is the encouraging impact of education on civic values across denominations with the clear exception of general trust. The second one is the obvious gender difference observed in support for gender equality. Women provided greater support for this attitude. Lastly, the very small impacts generated by age and income attract attention. Comparison among the lengths of the bars on the demographics displays that these impacts are even unrecognizably small compared to the effects of education level and gender in general.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

As a result of this study, Muslims have become the center of attention as they are one of the groups with the lowest levels of civic values, while religiosity is observed to have a negative impact on their democratic attitudes. In contrast, however, neither belonging nor religiosity were found to have lowering effects on Muslim support for democracy. The next step in this thesis, then, should be an attempt to explain the motivations behind Muslims' low scoring in democratic values as the empirical findings of this study show that Muslims rank among the lowest two in terms of the components of democratic culture even though they were found to be supportive, as supportive as the members of Christian affiliations, of democracy in the first analysis.

Although a vast majority of the members of Orthodox Christianity and Islam claim to find democracy important, they stay much behind the members of the other two affiliations in terms of displaying democratic attitudes. Inglehart and Welzel also reached the conclusion in their book (2005), that many people who do not emphasize self-expression values provide support for democratic governance. Adopting democratic values and attitudes is different from paying lip service to a socially desirable concept; democracy. The respondents cannot guess the correct answers in the questions on civic values as these questions have no direct reference to democracy in their wording. Under these circumstances, they are expected to answer the questions more sincerely. The information provided signifies that the divergence among different cultures no longer revolves around the support for democracy as this type of support has already been widely adopted. The point of distinction is directly about individual values and attitudes.

Study 2 aims toward a detailed investigation of reasons behind Muslims' low scores in democratic values and the role attributed to religiosity within this context. Rather than answering questions of whether Muslims are supportive of democracy, whether they are tolerant or whether they trust others etc., the actual goal to be fulfilled through the in-depth interviews is to search for the main motives behind the comparatively undemocratic attitudes of Muslims. Do Muslims explain the mindset behind these certain attitudes through their religion, through their culture or through any other special factor? The interviews will focus solely on one component of civic culture; tolerance, the relevance of which to democratic characteristics has been discussed in the literature review. Empirical reasons supporting the choice of tolerance will also be mentioned at the beginning of the next chapter. Study 2 consists of two chapters; the first one explaining the method used and the second one exploring the findings reached with the detailed investigation on tolerance.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **DESIGN OF INQUIRY AND METHODOLOGY FOR STUDY 2 ON RELIGIOSITY AND TOLERANCE**

#### **5.1. The Need for In-depth Research on Tolerance**

The empirical analyses within Study 1 have shown that in explaining the differences in actual level of democracy in different parts of the world, one's attention should be on the intrinsic preferences for democracy through the embracement of emancipative values rather than on verbal support for it. The adoption of emancipative values at the individual level implies how inherently an individual prefers democracy as internalizing these values develops support for and commitment to democratic governance. The focus of this second study is not how intrinsically these values are accepted by different groups of people. The goal, rather, is to understand the main motivations behind individuals' attitudes and inclinations with respect to democratic values. Referring to the literature, two factors might be argued to lead to differences in embracement of emancipative values by different groups; either the dominant religious affiliation among the members of the group or the level of socioeconomic modernization they have experienced. The second study of this thesis aims to find out the main incentives behind Turkish Muslims' attitudes of tolerance. Is it Islam, low socioeconomic development or another factor that leads to Muslim low scores in democratic values? A combination of some of these factors might also be relevant to the goal of Study 2.

Among the democratic values analyzed in the first study, tolerance was chosen for this detailed analysis. The theoretical significance of tolerance as an important

aspect of democratic politics has been discussed in the literature review and in this chapter several findings from the two statistical analyses in Study 1 are recalled so that the empirical significance of tolerance as an ingredient of democratic culture is also proved. How the two quantitative analyses paved the way to an in-depth research on tolerance is explained below.

With respect to the importance attributed to democracy by members of different affiliations, tolerance plays an obvious encouraging role. Except for Catholics, the members of all affiliations were found to be enthusiastic about living in a democratically governed country once their tolerance levels got higher. Although most of the cultural variables were not found to be significant in determining the likelihood of moving from “indifference” to “attaching unimportance to democracy”, tolerance was found to have a negative impact for members of two affiliations. The negative impact in this move signifies that higher tolerance by Protestants and Orthodox led to a decrease in their probability of moving into “unimportance”.

The pro-democratic impact of tolerance was visible in the second move, from “indifference” to “attaching importance”, as well. Higher tolerance by Muslims, Protestants and Orthodox resulted in higher likelihood of “attaching importance” to living in a democratically governed country. When Table 3.2. is analyzed carefully, it can be recognized that civic engagement and support for gender equality are also found to be significant in both moves at the same time. There are certain reasons behind the concentration on tolerance -among these three values- for a detailed investigation. The arguments below are explanations for not choosing the other two values as the focus of attention. The first explanation regards why civic engagement was not preferred even though it was observed to be influential on support for democracy by members of even a higher number of affiliations. The problem with civic engagement was that it made a positive impact on the dependent variable in both moves; signifying that higher civic engagement increased the likelihood of two movements at the same time; one towards unimportance and the other towards importance. As the direction of the impact created by this specific democratic value was not clear, it was not chosen for the deeper investigation. The second explanation concerns gender equality. When the impact of this value is analyzed in detail, it is realized that the variable was significant for only one of the four affiliations in each move. In short, with respect to the first empirical



analysis explained in detail in Chapter 3 it is reasonable to prefer tolerance as the subject of deeper analysis as its pro democratic impact was clear and it exerted this encouraging impact on the members of a number of affiliations in each move -two in the first and three in the second move. Moreover the magnitude of the impact generated by changing levels of this value was considerably large, especially in the first move.

Referring to the second empirical analysis within Study 1, it can once again be concluded that tolerance deserves to be examined in more detail. The first finding supporting this choice is that tolerance was one of the two values for which Muslims were found to rank the lowest in terms of mean values and for which the mean values of Muslims were measured to be significantly below even that of the group that was the closest to them. The mean value of tolerance by Muslims was found to be -0, 42 much lower than even the Orthodox mean score of 0, 02 –that was the second lowest among the averages of all four affiliations. A similarly large gap was also available between mean scores of support for gender equality by Muslims and Protestants- the group closest to Muslims with respect to averages in this value. Among these two values, the preference was made for tolerance due to the questions it brought to mind regarding the motivation(s) behind the low scores by Muslims. Even more decreasing impact of religious attendance and self-evaluated religiosity on Muslim support for gender equality encouraged the argument that Islam is the major reason behind Muslims' low scores in democratic culture.

None of the three dimensions of religiosity; however, seemed to make any significant influence on tolerance. This finding that being a Muslim decreased tolerance while any dimension of religiosity did not generate a larger decreasing impact on Muslims' tolerance raised the question “is it really Islam that leads to this low level of tolerance among Muslims or might there be another reason behind it?”. Study 2 was planned from the beginning as a step to provide deeper explanations for the low levels of democratic values by Muslims. Choosing tolerance among the five values analyzed in Study 1 seems to be reasonable as the findings regarding tolerance questions the argument that low levels of civic values by Muslims is entirely due to the negative impact of Islam. If Islam was the main motive behind Muslims' low level of tolerance, higher religiosity would lead to even lower tolerance as higher religiosity would mean

wider adoption of “intolerant Islam” in individual lives. The findings of the empirical analyses do not prove this to be the case.

Findings from several other studies on democratization support the arguments made by this thesis with respect to the importance of democratic culture in this process and the significance of tolerance among these values. Gibson et. al.'s (1992) conclusion regarding the importance of democratic values in determining Soviet respondents' proximity to democracy supports the claims of this study in two respects. First of all, their conclusion that even though Soviets provide widespread support for democratic institutions, rights and liberties, they seem to reject democratic values approves the argument of this study that rather than verbal support, attitudinal support for democracy acts as the distinguishing factor among different faiths in terms of their compatibility to democratic governance in practice. Their special focus on tolerance as the most relevant democratic value in these discussions also provides support for the choice of this study with regard to the detailed investigation (p. 360). The preference of Gibson et. al. and the supportive findings they reached show that this study deals with the most critical democratic value. The methodology of the Study 2 on tolerance in Turkey is discussed in detail below.

## **5.2. How to Measure Tolerance?**

Tolerance has usually been measured through surveys in political science and sociology. This method provides information on how tolerant certain groups of people are and specifically towards certain groups. The inclusion of respondents from different social groups also enables a comparison among these groups in terms of their tolerance levels and the types of tolerance they have. The shortcoming of the method is that it is inadequate to grasp the depth of the concept. As has been mentioned within the discussion on factors determining the level of tolerance, besides the personal characteristics, individual tolerance also depends on the context and the target groups in question. Under these circumstances, it becomes important to understand who does not tolerate whom, under what conditions and definitely why. This “why” aspect is specifically important to understand which of the discussed factors play a prominent

role in individual tolerance. Hence; a complete analysis on tolerance should refer to these details which cannot be attained through survey research.

Psychologists prefer analyzing attitudes and morality through dilemma-like stories so that people's judgments on these incidents are observed. Moreover how people reason about and how they justify their reactions are also explored. These justifications reflect the motivations behind individual attitudes and provide the researcher with the opportunity to learn which determinants of tolerance play a more prominent role in shaping individual attitudes. "Typically, such a methodology maps children's, adolescents' and young adults' reasoning and judgments, using stories or dilemmas that present a character with conflicting events requiring resolution" (Witenberg, 2007, p.435; also see Dunn, Cutting & Demetriou, 2000; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Piaget, 1965). Learning about the motives and explanations behind individuals' attitudes of tolerance is important as sometimes people have unexpected intentions behind their attitudes. "Examining the reasoning process" behind the tolerant or intolerant judgments and attitudes, this method provides "a better insight into how tolerance to human diversity emerges and is supported" (Witenberg, 2007, p.435-436). As this thesis aims to learn about the significance of different motivations behind low tolerance by Muslims, this method of dilemma-like stories were initially interpreted to be more appropriate to the goals of this thesis.

This method was recently (Thomas & Witenberg, 2004) used in a research measuring racial tolerance among young Australians. The young people were asked to resolve three short dilemma-like stories which would be resolved through attitudes of tolerance. The key figures in these stories towards whom tolerance was asked were people from Aboriginal, Asian and English backgrounds reflecting the ethnic composition of and identity discussions in the Australian society. The initial aim of the stories was to examine to whom and under what circumstances the participants were willing to extend their tolerance. The second aim complicated the discussion even more. During the interviews, the same event was told in three different versions; asking separately for tolerance towards people's beliefs, speeches and actions within each story. The respondents were then asked to justify their responses.

One story concerned a person from an Aboriginal background who was not allowed to move into a street on the grounds that people from an Aboriginal

background are dirty and drunk. Another story involved a person of an Asian background not being allowed to join a sports club on the grounds that people from an Asian background sell drugs. The final story was about a person from an English background who was refused work on the grounds that people from an English background are lazy. (p.16)

The initial attempt within the second study of this thesis was to analyze tolerance through an application of this approach to the Turkish case. Both the contexts and the groups were adapted to the circumstances of the Turkish society. Four stories were written regarding tolerance towards different minority groups in different relationships and the three-fold asking format for belief, speech and act was also applied into all these four dilemmas<sup>1</sup>. The first one of these dilemmas was about a man who believed that the job applications of gypsies should not be taken into evaluation as they had a tendency to commit robbery. The second one was about a shopkeeper who believed that Kurdish customers could be served the last as they were unemployed and hence would not be in a hurry. The third dilemma was about a belief that homosexuals should not be allowed to live in neighborhoods where families lived as they brought indecency to the places they lived in. The last one of the stories was about a man who believed that Muslims should not get married with non-Muslims as non-Muslims did not attribute enough importance to family life.

It was initially believed that this method would be appropriate to answer the questions of this study; however, the application was held with twelve respondents with different demographics as the first step when it was realized that it did not produce meaningful results. All the respondents uniformly tended to make tolerant comments severely criticizing the intolerant figures in the stories. Making prejudiced generalizations for the groups in question was disapproved by the respondents and the most common response they provided was that “all groups are mixed; having both good and bad members”. The respondents usually used their life experiences to challenge the prejudices of the actors in the stories. Homosexuals were perhaps the only group towards whom some of the respondents agreed with an intolerant view. As these stories could not differentiate the respondents, it can be concluded that exploring tolerance – indeed any other individual attitude as well- through stories revolving around others’

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<sup>1</sup> The details of the dilemmas can be found in both Turkish and English in Appendix II.

lives might not be a good idea due to the fact that people tend to easily display more tolerant attitudes when they do not comment on their own lives. Indeed, the use of dilemmas was also criticized before for “lacking relevance and ecological validity” (Robinson et. al., 2001, p.84). Another problem observed in using this method was that most of the respondents had difficulty in recognizing the distinction between belief/speech and act during the interviews and thus provided the same reactions to these three versions repeatedly. Only some of the highly educated respondents realized the divergence and the rest got bored as in their minds the questions were repeating themselves. Due to the shortcomings of this method, another method was tried that yielded meaningful results. This new method is in a sense similar to the one explained above yet it focuses on people's own lives and leads them towards making choices among different target groups so that they provide more definite answers with respect to their attitudes of tolerance. The respondents are also required to explain their choices as an answer to the main question of the Study 2: “what are the main motives behind low Muslim scores in tolerance –to be generalized to civic values in general?”. The details of this new method are discussed below in detail.

### **5.3. Methodology**

#### **5.3.1. The Questions<sup>2</sup>**

The major intention of this method is to direct the respondents to a choice between different target groups for genuine relationships. Asking for the preferences of the respondents helps to attain valid conclusions in two senses. When asked completely open-ended questions on their opinions about tolerance, respondents usually refrain from providing exact answers. In such a structure, they would generally profess tolerance and explain its virtues, regardless of their own stances. The available options, however, normalize making choices in the eyes of the respondents and encourage them to announce what they really think. This form does not destroy the probability of complete tolerance as well. Claiming that “I cannot make any choice among these groups, they are all the same to me at this stage of knowledge about them” signals

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<sup>2</sup> The questions and the cards can be found in Appendix 3.

complete tolerance. The second point to be mentioned is that these available alternatives do not restrict the open-endedness of the method because questions of why play a significant role in gathering detailed information on the topic.

As both the context and the target group have been mentioned as factors shaping level of tolerance, individual attitudes are asked, in this research, for five different groups in three diverse settings. In the first question, the respondent has to decide whom to rent out the flat situated just across the flat they live in. This setting indicates two different relationships between the respondent and the target group at the same time. Besides the landlord-tenant relationship, the tenant becomes a neighbor to the respondent. While the former pays more attention to trust –the landlord entrusts his flat to the tenant-, the latter relationship is more intimate as the neighbors live in close proximity and all the members of the families contact each other somehow. The relevance of neighborhood for tolerance has already been accepted and the survey questions on tolerance largely –including the ones used in Study 1 of this thesis- focus on individual preferences for their neighbors. This first question is tagged with “renting a flat”.

In the second question, the respondent is asked to decide who to hire for a job in his small family company. Trust enters the picture once again as the question directly says that the respondent is looking for a reliable person who would provide smooth running of the business and control the goods bought, sold and left in the store room. The relevance of trust for the two questions discussed points out how interrelated these two components of civic culture are. Tolerating a group indicates that you do not perceive it as a threat, then you can easily trust them. On the other way around, once you trust a person and feel confident that he will not be harmful to you or to the society you will live in, you can easily tolerate him. The tag used for this question is “giving a job”.

The third context is a rather original one through which the connotation of hierarchy in tolerance- discussed in the first chapter- is represented. The respondents are asked to decide for which groups they would want to be employed by, or for those with children, who they wanted their sons to be employed by. This question, labeled as “working for”, is special because it asks the respondents whose authority they would tolerate or would not tolerate over themselves. The expectations of the respondents with

regard to the attitudes of the groups in question towards them form the major point of this question. This peculiarity of the question is expected to breed original and enlightening conclusions.

In all these questions, the settings and the decisions they have to take are explained to the respondents initially and then the alternatives are put in front of them. The respondents are asked to make their choices among the cards put in front of them. The aim is not limited to learning the first and the last choices only. The individuals are required to tell all the rankings they make but they are also given the opportunity to state that they cannot make any differentiation among some of these groups. As has been stated above, they can even say that they cannot make any differentiation among these individuals with the limited information available about them and this will be ‘the tolerant answer’ looked for. Such a response represents total tolerance because arguing that this information is not enough to make preferences among these individuals signals these respondents’ disregard for identities in deciding about the individuals in questions; indicating complete absence of prejudgments regarding these groups.

As the intention of this analysis is to observe respondents’ tolerance towards different groups in society, the identities of the target groups vary while all other possibly relevant characteristics of the individuals in questions are more or less standardized. With respect to “renting a flat”, for instance, age intervals, levels of education, amount of monthly salaries and work experiences are approximately fixed for all the candidate tenants in question. Age intervals, levels and details of education, marital statuses and work experiences are also standardized for the individuals looking for a job. An extra factor added is the status of the young men in terms of military service requirement. The third question necessitates information on both the companies and the bosses. The age interval of the boss, the number of personnel in the company, the goods imported and the working conditions, including the monthly salary are written on the cards, and are standardized for all the employers. Another significant point with regard to this question labeled “working for” is that the identities of the bosses are told through symbols rather than explicit statements. This standardization makes it easier to conclude that individual preferences reflect their stance towards different groups as other relevant factors are so similar that they cannot generate

significant divergence in attitudes. More important than the choices they make, the respondents are also asked to explain their choices in as much detail as possible.

Tolerance is asked towards five specific groups in this analysis. Three of these five target groups are the major minority groups in Turkey; i.e. Armenians, Kurds and Alevis. Minority groups are used to measure tolerance because tolerance deals with diversity in a society and the existence of minorities constitute the main aspects of social diversity. The inclusion of these three groups at the same time is vital because they all represent different diversities in the Turkish society; religious, ethnic and sectarian in order. While Armenians represent the non-Muslim Lausanne minorities – that also include the Greeks and the Jews- in this analysis, Kurds constitute the major ethnic minority group and Alevis are the only numerically significant and largely discussed sectarian minority in Turkey. Furthermore, these minority groups are important to include in this analysis because they are the groups that have aroused intense discussion in Turkish social and political life for the last 30 years. Research conducted in 1569 households throughout 65 cities on social inequality in Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009) asked individuals' perceptions about their own experiences of discrimination. The respondents were asked whether they had ever felt themselves obliged to comply with less than what they deserved in areas such as enrolling into a school, being employed in the private sector, serving as a civil servant, getting a promotion, renting a house, being employed in a municipality, being treated in a public hospital, or seeking justice in courts. The findings indicated that even members of the majority had felt obliged to do so in certain occasions; yet the percentages of Kurdish and Alevi respondents reporting experiences of discrimination were larger than that of the majority in the overall. These findings support that it is critical to analyze these groups with respect to social tolerance in the Turkish context as they explicitly report to have faced intolerance.

The target groups represented on the cards include two other categories signaling a different diversity in the Turkish society that has dominated the social and political discussions for at least a decade. These groups are labeled as observant and non-observant Muslims, referring to their lifestyles. While the members of the former organize their lives according to the principles of their belief system, the latter live more secular lives. None of these groups constitute an ethnic or religious minority yet they



reflect social diversity in terms of ideological orientations and lifestyles. This division of observant and non-observant Muslims is more about observing religious duties and about their views on the public visibility of religion rather than being religious or irreligious. While the secular group does not get involved in religious practices too frequently and asks for a secular social order as well as a political one, the Islamist side observes religious duties and supports and enjoys the public visibility of religion. This divergence in life styles has constituted a point of debate on tolerance in Turkey because each group has the tendency to interpret the other as a threat to its own freedom. A last point to be mentioned with regard to target groups is the presence of Emre –the representative of the unmarried couple living together- as an alternative in the first question. Although not a member of the minority, Emre and his girlfriend are expected to attract criticism and intolerance from at least the religiously sensitive respondents due to the contradiction between their lifestyles and the dominant norms of the Turkish society. Different perspectives towards this couple might arouse discussions and dissociations among the respondents; however, Emre is added as a candidate only to ‘renting a flat’ as disposition towards such a couple make sense only in a neighborhood relationship not in business relations.

Attitudes towards all these different groups in three different contexts were asked in detail to forty respondents. The respondents were chosen on the basis of specific criteria so that a comparison among them reveals the impact of some factors on individual attitudes of tolerance. The sample selection process is explained in detail below.

### **5.3.2. The Respondents**

The major question to be answered through the second study of this thesis is “what are the main motives behind intolerance or, to be more broad, lack of civic culture among Muslims?”. The literature has labeled Islam –the compatibility debate is discussed in the first chapter- as the primary factor while the significance of others has also been emphasized. The claim of Islam’s intolerance is tested at this step. There are two opportunities to observe the impact of Islam on individuals’ attitudes of tolerance. One way is to carefully analyze the explanations of the respondents and search for

references to Islam within them. If the respondents make comments on Islam and what their religion advises them regarding the questions on tolerance, then it can be concluded that Islam has a prominent role in shaping people's attitudes. Expressions such as “our religion does not like those, our religion prohibits being with them” are the statements searched for. The other way is to group the individuals on the basis of religiosity and then compare their responses to see distinctions generated by different levels of commitment to Islamic principles. The argument is that if Islam per se moves people towards intolerance, more religious Muslims would display less tolerance.

With these expectations in mind, religiosity was used as one of the two criteria used to categorize the respondents in groups. A critical point about the religiosity-based-grouping is that it is not a distinction between believers and non-believers or between people claiming to be religious and irreligious. Such divisions would be impossible to make in Turkey as the Turkish public in general tend to call themselves Muslims and perhaps religious Muslims, even the ones who do not participate in any religious practice. Only a very small proportion of Turkish people might claim to be non-believers or irreligious individuals<sup>3</sup>. Everyone in Turkey is religious according to their own criteria. Hence the level of religiosity in this analysis is determined in a stricter sense and really practicing, devout Muslims are separated from the rest in order to make the distinctions between groups more obvious. Performing five daily prayers is the sign of high religiosity among men whereas either observing daily prayers or wearing a headscarf is accepted to be the sign among women.

The other criterion used to group the respondents is education level. The impact of this indicator on answers provided by the respondents is also searched for. Besides the extensive focus on the role of socioeconomic development in civic culture building, the significance of education level on tolerance has also been discussed specifically.

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<sup>3</sup> In a nation-wide survey on religion, society and politics in Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006) found out that only 0, 9 % of their respondents claimed to be ‘totally non-religious’ and 3, 6 % stated to be ‘not so religious’. 33, 9 % chose the option ‘I would be considered religious’ while the percentage became even higher for the option ‘I would be considered considerably religious’ with 46, 5 % of the total sample. 12, 8 % on the other hand, said that ‘I am very religious’. In another survey –the Turkish part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)- on religiosity in Turkey, conducted in 2009, it was found out that 87 % of the respondents evaluated themselves to be highly, rather or slightly religious whereas the percentages for neither religious nor non-religious or for different levels of non-religiosity never exceed 6 %. When these percentages were compared to the ones found for other countries around the world in 1998, the only countries that could be placed close to Turkey in terms of religiosity of their publics were Catholic Poland, Philippines and Portugal besides the United States where Protestant radicalism is the most widespread. Even among these countries of high religiosity, Turkey is found to be at the top of the list (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009).

Several studies have already mentioned the importance of education in attaining a critical stance towards stereotypes and recognition of positive features of different groups (Cote & Ercikson, 2009, p.1669). Education has been agreed to be one of the strongest correlates of tolerance (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Cote and Ercikson, 2009; Jackman & Muha, 1984; Schuman et. al., 1997). Taking these two criteria -religiosity and education level- together into consideration, four groups of respondents have been formed. Besides these two criteria, gender has also been mentioned to be important in determining tolerance. Women were found to be slightly more likely to espouse tolerance (Persell et. al., 2001, p.219). Thus gender was also taken into consideration and ten respondents from each one of the four groups were interviewed, making a total of forty respondents. These ten interviewees in each group consisted of five male and five female respondents.

As the detailed explanation above signifies, criterion sampling was used for this study because the intention was to observe the impacts of religiosity and education level on tolerance. Hence; the individuals fitting in the four cells of the table below were searched for. The thresholds between the high and low religiosity and education level were identified clearly. As has been stated above, high religiosity was understood as observing daily prayers or wearing a headscarf and any Muslims less active in religious practices were grouped in lower religiosity. With respect to education level, only the respondents with high school degree or higher were categorized into higher education. According to these thresholds, the respondents were placed in the four cells; highly religious and highly educated, less religious and highly educated, highly religious and less educated, and less religious and less educated. To reach the most relevant answers to our questions specifically on the impacts of Islam, religiosity and education level on tolerance, criterion sampling was used and thanks to this method appropriate comparisons could be made.

The table below represents the four groups and the number of respondents interviewed for each group. The same 2x2 table will also be used in the following chapter on the analysis of the second study. Major findings for each one of the four groups will be displayed on the following tables.

Table 5.1. The distribution of respondents

		<b>High Religiosity</b>		<b>Low Religiosity</b>	
		<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>
<b>High</b>					
<b>Education</b>		5	5	5	5
<b>Low</b>					
<b>Education</b>		5	5	5	5

The respondents were contacted through the snowball technique. The initial step was to identify one community informant for each one of the four groups. Then, these individuals were asked to recommend other potential interviewees. The first respondents following the informant were also asked to help in this respect. The informants were usually chosen through ‘friend-of-a-friend technique’ rather than interviewing relatives or friends directly with the consideration that the well-known people would lack the necessary seriousness during the interviews. All the individuals acting as intermediaries were warned that they should never say anything about tolerance in persuading others to take part in this research. They should rather say that the interviews were about life, society and social relations. The concern was that new respondents learning that the subject of the interview was tolerance would be alerted about the measurement of this attitude and would shape their responses accordingly. The informants were known by a friend, a relative or a colleague and hence the group they would fit in could be easily set. The respondents recommended by them were expected to be in the same group with the informant who had encouraged them as the people around a person are usually very similar to him/her, at least in some major aspects. Information regarding the new respondents was also gathered from the intermediaries. Also, the group of each respondent was accurately determined through two explicit questions on the two criteria used in grouping.

These questions were asked at the end of the interviews for two reasons. One reason was not to make people alerted about religion or religiosity from the beginning of the interviews. The other consideration was not to arouse suspicion by welcoming them directly with a question on their religiosity. People might have felt offended by such an introduction because of the current sensitivity of the issue of religiosity in Turkey. The education levels were asked easily through the question “Sizin eğitim durumunuz neydi? (What is the highest level of education you obtained?)”. With regard to religiosity; however, the wording had to be done carefully. “Siz namaz kıyıyor musunuz? (Do you pray?)” was the question used, usually followed by a short conversation on the frequency etc. Asking about religiosity after the whole interview was also helpful due to the fact that a certain level of familiarity could be developed by the respondents during the interview. The visibility of headscarf helped in interviews with some highly religious female respondents and they were not asked any questions on their religiosity. Yet; there were also uncovered highly religious female interviewees in this research and both of the questions were directed to them.

### **5.3.3. The procedure of Interviewing and Analyzing**

The interviews were conducted upon setting up a meeting with the respondents in places they would feel comfortable; mostly in the houses or offices of the respondents. The interviews were done in person and attention was paid to the fact that the interviewees were alone during the meeting. In each question, the context and the choices they were expected to make was initially explained to the interviewees in detail and then the cards representing each alternative were put in front of them at the same time. The order of the cards was not fixed but the only set criterion was that the cards representing the majority, i.e. the observant and non-observant Muslims, should not be the first two cards put forward. It was preferred that the cards of the majority and the minority were mixed. The respondents were, then, given a couple of minutes to read the characteristics written on the cards. Time pressure was not imposed on them so that they could read the cards carefully and realize the divergence among them. Then the interviewees were asked to put the cards in order from their first choice to the last. The alternative of avoiding any choice between some or all of these cards was not told to them initially so as not to direct them towards taking an easy way out. This would also

have been directing them towards tolerant responses. Yet, whenever the respondents asked, it was stated that they could put any cards together at one rank if they could not differentiate between them. Once the ranking was finished, going over each preference one by one, the respondents were asked to explain why they made such choices. The interviews took forty minutes on average. Twenty-eight interviews out of forty were tape-recorded; yet, the respondents in the other twelve did not feel comfortable with the tape-recording and hence note taking was used in these interviews. Besides the orders of preferences for each question, important explanations made and experiences told were also briefly written down during the interviews and the details were added once the interview ended and respondents' houses or offices were left.

The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed as the first step of analysis. The transcription was not done word-by-word, instead; summary transcription focusing on key verbatim quotes was used. Still not to miss any details and keeping the general flow of the interviews in mind, the analysis was done by both reading the transcripts and listening to the recordings at the same time. Constant comparison was used in this analysis. The groups of comparison were already set in this study based on the literature. The sampling was also developed from this categorization done on the basis of two important factors, level of religiosity and education level. Interviews by the members of each group were listened to one after another and the similarities and differences between them were focused on. Each interview was compared to the ones before it. However, it was decided that the overall reading of the whole interviews would be confusing and more accurate findings could be produced through a question-based comparison. Thus, the interviews were reread for each question separately and similarities and differences in response to different questions were noted down. Following the intra-group comparisons, the groups were also compared among themselves.

As the sections within the following analysis chapter signify, the first inter-group comparison was done between the two groups of religiosity, followed by another between that of different education levels. These two-group comparisons made clear that there were significant differences between the two groups compared; however, there were also intra-group distinctions necessitating sub-divisions. Hence, the two-group comparisons would not be sufficient to reveal the impacts of these factors on

tolerance completely. The next step was then a four-group comparison searching for the interactive influence of both of these factors. The aim was to find out both similarities within the groups and differences between them through constant comparison of the responses. Besides the impacts of religiosity and education level, the role of other factors expected to determine tolerance levels –mentioned in the first chapter- will also be discussed in the analysis chapter.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **TOLERANCE IN TURKEY**

This reflection on tolerance in Turkey signifies that several variables are needed to explain social phenomena. Many different factors i.e. the context, personal characteristics, past experiences, previous contact and opinions regarding the target groups are found to generate a significant impact on tolerance towards different groups. Only when all these factors are taken into account simultaneously can differences in attitudes with respect to tolerance be explained in a comprehensive way.

The initial aim of this analysis is to see the impact of religiosity and education level on individual tolerance towards different groups and on the motivations behind these attitudes of tolerance. As the respondents have already been clustered into four groups according to these two criteria, the first step of analysis should be to make group comparisons of the responses so that differences generated by these two individual traits can be observed. Some important concepts and aspects that stand out will be mentioned afterwards.

#### **6.1. Group Comparisons in Three Perspectives**

The group comparisons were conducted in three steps. In the first two steps, the impacts of the two major independent variables were observed separately. These two analyses provide comparisons between two groups. While only the role of religiosity is studied in the first one, the findings in the two columns of high and low religiosity were compared. In the second one; however, the impact of only the education level was



examined and hence this time a row-wise comparison. The third step reached a more comprehensive level in which the interactive impact of these two factors was analyzed. The comparison, this time, took place between the four groups. The comparisons made and the major findings in a very short form are displayed on the tables at the very beginning of each section.

To concentrate on the impact of religiosity on attitudes of tolerance in Turkey, a column-wise comparison is done on Table 6.1. An individual's responses for the first and second questions usually represented the same trend while the third question led to some different reactions due to its special structuring of the relationship between the respondent and the target groups. Thus, the comparison in the first section begins with responses to the first two questions and then moves into the analysis of the third.

#### **6.1.1. On the Basis of Different Levels of Religiosity**

In the first two questions, respondents with both high and low religiosity were observed to prefer Sunni Muslims over any other minority group. The top two rankings are almost uniform. However, some alternative trends were also observed under the impact of education level and these will be discussed in the next section, occupied by the representatives of the observant and non-observant Sunni Muslims in the first two questions. The most significant divergence among these two groups of respondents becomes apparent in their choices within this target group. While members of the highly religious group seem to be decisive on the observant Muslim as their first choice in the first two questions, respondents with low religiosity do not display such a steady trend.

**Table 6.1. Responses compared on the basis of different levels of religiosity**

High - Religiosity	Low –Religiosity
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Renting a flat”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim- Mehmet (18/20)<sup>1</sup>            Both observant Muslim-Mehmet and non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (2/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Unmarried couple living together-Emre (20/20)            Before Emre either Alevi-Ali (5/20) or Armenian-Garbis (3/20) or both (12/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Giving a job”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Ahmet (16/20)            Both observant Muslim-Ahmet and non-observant Muslim-Berk (4/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Alevi-Hüseyin (4/20) or Armenian-Artun (3/20) or both (13/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Working for”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Mustafa (12/20) or Armenian-Agop (8/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Alevi-Hasan (2/20)            non-observant Muslim-Murat (5/20) or both (13/20)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Renting a flat”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Both observant-Mehmet and non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (9/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (7/20)            Observant Muslim-Mehmet (4/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Unmarried couple living together-Emre (20/20)            Before Emre either Kurdish- Azad (9/20) Armenian-Garbis (8/20) or Alevi-Ali (3/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Giving a job”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Ahmet (9/20)            Both observant-Ahmet and non-observant Muslim-Berk (7/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Berk (4/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Kurdish-Azad (11/20)            Armenian-Garbis (5/20) or Alevi-Ali (4/20)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>“Working for”:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Non-observant Muslim-Murat (16/20)            Alevi-Hasan and Armenian-Agop and Murat (4/20 )</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Last choice:</u>            Both observant Muslim-Mustafa and Kurdish-Baran (9/20)            Mustafa (6/20) or Baran (5/20)</p>

<sup>1</sup> The numbers in the parentheses display the number of respondents who made these choices over the number of total respondents situated in that cell.

Stating the observant Muslim as the most preferred group, individuals with high religiosity regularly placed non-observant Muslims as their second or third choice – third when Kurds are preferred over nonobservant Muslims. The non-observant Muslim was preferred over all the others only by a group of respondents within the low religiosity group. These are usually individuals who do not feel comfortable with facing different life-styles and even ideas. A young less religious lady stated that “Mehmet Bey ve ailesini tercih etmem. Yaşamlarımız uyuşmaz. Sakallı, elinde tesbihle gezen adamlar, kapalı kadınlar.. Dışarıda ayakkabı çıkarırlar, bağırsırlar falan yok yani yaşayamam ben orada. Benim halimden hareketimden de onlar rahatsız olur. Arkadaşlarım falan gelir. Uyuşamayız yani. O kadar yakın da yaşayamayız bu durumda. (I would not prefer Mehmet and his family. Our life-styles would be completely different. Bearded men with rosaries, covered women... They would leave their shoes in front of the door, shout at each other etc. No, I would not be able to live there. They would also feel disturbed with my attitudes. My friends would come etc. We cannot get along and cannot live so close under these circumstances.)”

Most members of the low religiosity group tend to prefer the observant Muslim as much as they opt for the non-observant and some members even prefer the observant Muslim over the non-observant. These findings indicate that some less religious respondents who are themselves non-observant Muslims believe that an individual fulfilling the religious obligations will not disturb them and might even have some characteristics that make them more preferable to the other groups in question. A less religious interviewee said that “Mehmet Beyler evimi kiralsın, komşum olsun isterim. Doğru düzgün insanlar olur diye düşünüyorum. Birbirimizin yardımına koşarız falan. Komşunun düzgün bir aile olması çok önemli, her an kapılarını çalabilmelisin (I would be happy if Mehmet and his family rented my house and were my neighbors. I think they would be proper people. We would help each other. It is very important that your neighbors are a good family. You should feel free to knock their door any time.)” As a response to the follow-up question whether he would be disturbed with their religious practices and appearances, he said that “yo yo neden etsin ki. Belki bize de iki dua ederler. (no no, why I should be. Perhaps they also pray for us.)” The preference for the observant Sunni Muslim becomes even more widespread among the respondents as a whole in “giving a job” where the text says that the respondent is looking for a trustable

person and the general impression in Turkey is that religious people can be more easily trusted.

The assertion of this comparison is that observant Sunni Muslims are the most widely preferred tenants and neighbors in Turkey. This finding implies that the lifestyle of this group is the least disturbing, as respondents repeatedly talk about conformity in life-styles and disturbing daily practices in stating their preferences in the first question on “renting a flat”. With regard to the second question, the center of attention completely shifts to trustworthiness of different groups, especially of observant Muslims. Discussing the trustworthiness of religious people, several of these respondents also add that sometimes some religious people do not fit this description in practice; however, this group at large is still considered to be the biggest candidate in the society to fulfill the expectation of reliability. Traditionally Turkish people believe that it would be better to live in close proximity to religious people, either as neighbors or in an employee-employer relationship.

In respect to the first question, the reasons suggested to justify this preference is that religious people are not expected to cause any problems in the building as they keep away from the most probable triggering factor of unrest -alcohol. These religious people, thus, would not disturb the families and would not pose any serious threat for peace and security in the building. While the reasoning behind their choices in the first question is explained to be similar life-styles and hence higher probability of peace and rest in the building, with respect to employment the preference of Ahmet –the representative of the observant Muslims in the second question- is explained through another civic value- trust. Civic values are agreed to consist of both tolerance of human diversity and trust in other human beings at the same time. These two values are argued to be closely linked and are also believed to be associated with democratic governance. Individuals displaying high levels of generalized trust are expected to be tolerant and even welcoming towards people out of the group they identify themselves with. More acceptance towards minority cultures, for instance, is what is assumed to be an important trait of trusting people (Uslaner, 1999, p.124-141). The problem with the Turkish case is that the respondents display particularized trust that is targeted towards only the known and familiar people. The responses provided for ‘giving a job’ indicate that Turkish people in general do not trust minorities. Expressions of trust were used usually to justify the respondents’ preferences of Ahmet and Berk –the non-observant

Muslim in the second question- especially of Ahmet, who was chosen for not only being a Sunni Muslim but also for being a religious person. The minorities; however, were never mentioned among the first choices in this question. With this distrust towards minorities, it is hard to talk about a minority-tolerant culture in Turkey.

The respondents who mention Ahmet to be their first preference say that they can trust Ahmet because he would have advanced moral values and the fear of God which they believe would make the individual more honest, trustworthy and prevent intolerable behavior. The illustration one of the female religious interviewees provided to describe the fear of God was really impressive. She stated that “Ahmet dindarlığı sayesinde her zaman izlendiğini düşünür ve bilir ki onu sürekli izleyen ben değilim. Böylece Ahmet her zaman yapması gerekenleri yapar çünkü izlendiğini bilir. Ben ofiste yanında onu kontrol etmediğim zamanlarda bile... İşte Ahmet’te olması gereken bu Allah korkusu sayesinde rahatlıkla ona güvenip ofisimi ona emanet edebilirim. Bence bu bile tek başına Ahmet’i tercih etmem için yeterli. (Ahmet, due to his religiosity, believes that he is being watched all the time and he knows that it is not me who is watching him. Thus Ahmet always does what he is supposed to do because he knows that he is being watched. Even when I am not there in the office to check him... This fear of God Ahmet should have makes me feel more confident in trusting him and leaving my office to him. I think even this alone is enough for me to prefer Ahmet.)” Ahmet is not mentioned to be their first choice by solely the religious respondents. Among the members of the low religiosity group, several respondents place Ahmet either alone or together with Berk at the top ranking. A member of the low religiosity group said that “Dindar bir insanla çalışmak benim lehime olur. Çalmaz, çırpamaz, yalan söylemez... Yani en azından böyle düşünerek alırım ben işe, sonra ne çıkacağını Allah bilir tabi. (It would be to my advantage to work with a religious person. He would not steal, he would not lie. I mean I would employ him with these ideas in mind. But then, only God knows what he would be like.)” The interviewees who do not make any differentiation between Ahmet and Berk state that observance or non-observance of religious duties is a personal matter and should not be a concern of the employer or any other third party.

Besides trustworthiness and honesty, their belonging to the majority was also used as an explanation for preference of Ahmet and Berk; pointing once again to the above-mentioned minority-intolerance among Turkish respondents. Most of the

respondents who mentioned Berk or Ahmet as their first choice stated that they would make this preference due to their way of thinking that “if there is money to be earned, my people should get it first”. An interviewee said that “Ahmet ile de Berk ile de çalışabilirim. İkisi de işini iyi yapar bence. İkisine de güvenebilirim sanırım. Tabi yine ilk başlarda başlarında dururum ama pek sanmam sorun olacağını. Ha niye bu ikisi de diğerleri değil. E şimdi kazanacaksa benim adamım kazansın yani bunlar dururken de kalkıp başkalarını, yabancıları çalıştıracak değilim tabi. (I can work with both Ahmet and Berk. I think they would both do their jobs well. I think I can trust them. Of course, I would be controlling them in the first few days but I do not think that there would be any problems. Then, one may ask why these two individuals and not the others? What I think is that if there is money to be earned, my people should get it first. I mean I would not employ others, strangers when I have the chance of employing these people.)” As was mentioned in the first chapter, tolerance is directly linked with diversity. Respecting and trusting one’s own people is not a matter of discussion at all as everyone does this automatically. The tolerant attitude would be not to get stuck in detailed self-identifications and would be to consider all members of a society as similar and equal citizens and human beings regardless of their religious, ethnic or sectarian backgrounds. These individuals should all call each other as their “own people”. This is not found to be the case in Turkey as the respondents belonging to the majority in Turkey call only Sunni Muslims their own people, signifying that they have a “we-they” distinction in mind leaving all the other groups except Sunni Muslims as “they”. The use of this expression makes clear that the majority in Turkey does not interpret minorities as fully equal and respectable members of their society who deserve to have whatever the majority gets.

In these first two questions, the religious respondents- regardless of their education levels- consistently preferred the observant Muslims. The explanations used for these preferences include expectations such as these people would be honest and trustworthy, they would live proper lives, they would not cause any problems in social life, they would keep their words and they would have the fear of God. They believed that the ideal life should include the fulfillment of religious obligations and people living this ideal life should be preferred over others. Similar expectations with regard to religious individuals and ideal life-styles have been mentioned by some respondents from the low religiosity group as well. The other members of the same group either

refrain from making any distinction between the observant and non-observant Muslims with the justification that an attitude towards religious obligations is a totally personal issue or preferring the non-observant Muslim over others due to their expectations that this target group constitutes the most similar group to them in terms of life-styles and ideas.

As a response to the second question, one of the less religious female interviewees said that she would place Ahmet behind Berk, perhaps even behind the Armenian, Artun, due to the suspicion she had towards religious people and religious communities. Talking about observant Muslims, she immediately recalled the Gulen movement and openly stated that she did not find members of this movement sincere. She continued her comments with an explanation to show that her family was also a religious family and hence what she criticized was not the religion or sincerely religious people but religious communities and especially that particular community which, she thought, deceived people. Using the religious or conservative character of the family as a safeguard against being blamed as an irreligious person is a common attitude among Turkish people who criticize Islam or Muslim religious practices. The prevalence of this tendency shows that Turkey is still a conservative country where some ideas are not easily tolerated. People being critical towards anything practically religious feel the need to prove somewhat that they are not critical of Islam but just of that particular practice or performers of that practice. The interviewee made her anxiety even more obvious and provided a more detailed account of her mother's religious practices, distinguishing her from the members of this movement. She added that "benim annem de başörtüsü takıyor, namazlarında da çok titiz, ama bu insanlar farklı, onların farklı bir amaçları var gibi. (My mother also wears a headscarf and is strict about her prayers, however these people are different, they seem to have a different agenda.)" She provided two examples to support her claims. The first one was the collection of high amounts of money in these community meetings with the stated goal of helping students. The interviewee mentioned that she did not find these arguments convincing. Another example she gave was a direct personal experience of how the members of this community were affecting young children in a negative and even dangerous way. She told that some university students living in the same apartment building with them were helping her son with his courses and she later on realized that they were telling her son negative things regarding Atatürk. According to her, these young men were members of

the Gulen movement and had the intention to spread their ideas among younger generations.

The two categories of respondents grouped on the basis of their religiosity levels are found to diverge slightly also in terms of their least preferred groups in the first two questions. They, almost entirely, leave the minorities last in their orders of preferences in the first and second questions; however, religiosity also has an impact on the organization of these three minority groups among themselves—i.e. Kurds, Alevis and Armenians. Highly religious respondents prefer Kurds over the other two groups and some of these individuals prefer Kurds even over the non-observant Sunni Muslim. Among the two levels of religiosity, more tolerant attitudes seem to be available towards Kurdish people by highly religious respondents. Most of the religious interviewees mentioned that they could not observe any solid base for discrimination against Kurds. The religious respondents were willing to show their support for Kurds or at least refrain from making any negative comments regarding them.

Two different factors might explain the finding that highly religious respondents are more tolerant of Kurds compared to the low-religiosity interviewees who tend to be highly suspicious of the group. One significant explanation is that religious individuals are more sensitive about religious ties and do not believe that ethnic ties should act as serious criteria of division. Religious individuals' sensitivity to religious identity rather than to ethnic identification and their impression that most Kurds are religiously sensitive people might explain why they tend to interpret exclusion and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity as unreasonable. While their suspicious and intolerant attitudes towards Alevis support this argument, tolerant attitudes some members of this group display towards Armenians contradicts with it. Another factor that brings Kurds and religious Sunni Muslims closer might be shared feelings of empathy among oppressed members of the Turkish society. The observant religious individuals in Turkey have long had the feelings of being excluded by the official ideology and the state elite. Kurdish people have also experienced similar feelings on the basis of their ethnic identities. Moreover, some of the religious interviewees directly drew attention to the oppression against Kurds. It is certainly not easy to measure the sincerity of the interviewees; however, the impression received from the comments of religious respondents in this analysis is that the members of the society with the feelings of exclusion aim to empathize with each other and want to be supportive.



The members of the low-religiosity group disagree with the religious respondents regarding the significance of ethnic divisions and mention Kurds besides Armenians and Alevis as their least preferred group in the first two questions. A comparison among attitudes towards these three groups indicates that Kurds constitute the least preferred group of less religious people. Fear was the most common feeling these respondents stated to have towards Kurds. In some cases, these impressions were supported by personal experiences. A less religious male interviewee told that he had a struggle with some Kurdish people in the past and they aimed their guns at him in the middle of the struggle. He used this incident to legitimize his negative feelings and ideas concerning Kurds. These feelings of fear also led to absence of trust towards Kurds in many respondents. One of the female respondents asked “ya örgüt kurarlarsa (what if they establish an organization)” in explaining her concern about giving a job to Kurdish people. With respect to renting their flats, respondents from the low-religiosity group mentioned that they would abstain from choosing Kurds mainly because of the fact that their families would be too crowded. Even if the families were not so crowded, there would be many people visiting them and staying with them. Respondents are obviously suspicious about what this crowd would do in the flat. One of them explained her feelings explicitly; “Şimdi ben evimi kiraya vereyim de ya orada kanunsuz bir iş yaparlarsa o zaman benim de başım yanar. Ben o riski alamam. Neler olabilir düşünmek bile istemiyorum. Evimde örgüt toplantısı yapsalar, ne bileyim silah olsa bomba olsa. Altından kalkamam ben...(Let’s say that I rent my flat to them, if they commit anything illegal in that flat, I will also get in trouble. I cannot take that risk. I don’t even want to think what might happen then. If they organize meetings in my flat, I mean if there are guns and bombs. I can’t get over it.)”

Language is also emphasized as a significant factor that has the potential of generating problems in relationships with Kurdish people. A large number of respondents mentioned that they would not prefer Kurds because they might talk Kurdish among themselves and this would create a problem as the respondents would not be able to understand what they talked about. One of the highly educated members of the low religiosity group told that “Ben iş veririm Kürtlere. Hatta şu anda evde çalışan kadınlardan biri de Kürt. Ama şartlarım var tabi. Kürtçülük yapmayacak. Yapanı tutmam. Bir de dil meselesi var. Birkaç Kürt de olabilir aynı anda ama benim iş yerimde, benim yanımda Kürtçe konuşamazlar aralarında. Ne bileyim ben neler

konuşuyorlar. Bilmem, anlamam lazım. (I would give a job to Kurds. Indeed, one of the women working in the house now is Kurdish. But I certainly have some conditions. They should not get involved in Kurdism. I would not keep the one who does. There is also the language problem. There can be several Kurds in my working place at the same time but they can't speak Kurdish among themselves in my workplace or when they are with me. How can I know what they are talking about? I need to know, I need to understand.)” Raising the language problem also displays the suspicious outlook towards Kurds as attributing so much importance to understanding them is based on the perception that they are inclined to commit dangerous or illegal activities and talk about them easily in Kurdish.

Another important finding regarding attitudes towards Kurds is that this title alone has a negative connotation in the minds of many respondents. In the third question, where the symbols are used instead of mentioning the group identities explicitly, Kurds are represented by a shawl of Diyarbakırspor- the football club of the city of Diyarbakır that is known to be the ‘capital of Kurdistan’ among the public. The respondents who mentioned Kurdish figures in the first and second questions to be their least preferred choices tended not to leave the Kurdish boss, Baran, towards the end of their orders of preferences in the third question. This outcome signifies that “Diyarbakır” sounds better than “Kurd” for most people. There might be two reasons to this tendency. One of them is that when a person is described to be a supporter of Diyarbakırspor and hence to be from Diyarbakır, the respondents do not directly think that he is Kurdish. The state ideology –the mainstream ideology in other words- in Turkey has the inclination to underestimate the percentage of Kurdish population living in Turkey. Being affected by this line of thinking, the respondents of this analysis who belong to the majority also seem to have the same tendency and believe that living in Diyarbakır or a feeling of belonging to Diyarbakır does not necessitate being a Kurd. The other reason behind not interpreting supporters of Diyarbakırspor as threatening as Kurds might be that when a person is identified as a Kurd, too much emphasis is put on his Kurdish identity and the impression given to the respondent is that the person is a Kurdish nationalist. Under these circumstances, the respondents become more likely to interpret being in close proximity with a Kurdish nationalist –not with a Kurd- to be threatening. Both of these explanations signify that more tolerant attitudes are directed towards Kurds only if they leave their Kurdish identities aside or at least they do not

prioritize it. This conclusion regarding the Kurdish minority can be generalized for all minority groups in Turkey. Minorities are respected and tolerated as long as they do not emphasize their differences and even act in line with the majority.

With regard to the least preferred groups, some of the less religious individuals avoid leaving Alevis to the final rankings probably due to the generally accepted view on this group that they live secular lives. Both the non-Muslim minorities and Alevis in Turkey have interpreted Islamists as a threat to their peaceful survival and have seen secularism as a safety valve in this respect. While the non-Muslim minorities stay away from any ideological orientation despite these concerns, Alevis are known to be fierce supporters of secularism and republicanism. This attitude by Alevis brings them in close proximity to some less religious people who are anxious about the empowerment of Islamism in Turkey. In all debates Alevis place themselves in opposition to conservative Sunni Islam and introduce themselves as loyal supporters of secularism in Turkey. This standing by Alevis draws them closer to low-religiosity Muslims in Turkey while arousing feelings of rivalry or even hostility among high-religiosity Muslims. Despite this factor encouraging proximity with Alevis by most members of the low-religiosity group, no obvious difference is observed among the three minority groups and Alevis are still mentioned among the last choices, albeit by a smaller proportion.

The general response provided about Alevis is that they are totally different from Sunni Muslims and hence would not be able to conform to the Sunni life-style. “Would not fit in with us” was the expression used frequently by the majority of respondents to mention that they could not get on well with Alevis and thus would not prefer being close to them. No particular examples can be provided for these so-claimed divergences between Alevis and Sunnis. What are constantly repeated consist of some widely known rumors about Alevis in the Turkish society. Most of these stories refer to immoralities of the Alevis, such as incestuous relationships. One interviewee said that “Aleviler Çingeneler gibidir. (Alevis are like Gypsies)” implying that they do not have a settled organization, a developed family and community life and hence they lack important social norms and values. One female interviewee’s comment regarding Alevis was that “Yaşayamayız biz onlarla, onların hayatı karışık. Uyamazlar bize. Farklı onlar. Farklı şeyler yapıyorlarmış böyle ailede falan. Pek bilmiyorlar onlar yani. Ayıp mayıp yok. Bize uymaz onların halleri. (We cannot live with them, their lives are

disordered. They cannot adapt to us. They are different. They practice different things within families etc. they do not know much... There is no shame or disgrace among them. Their state of affairs would not match with ours.)". The general tendency among the Turkish public is to see Alevis as heretics who do not constitute a legitimate sect of Islam. Once they are identified as heretics, immoral customs are ascribed to them. The general intolerance towards Alevis cannot be explained directly by changing levels of religiosity as individuals with both high and low religiosities are found to be critical of this group.

A comparative analysis of the responses provided for all three questions by each interviewee separately demonstrates that respondents tend to make more positive comments regarding Alevis in the third question in which the Alevi figure is described as an employer who has pictures of Ataturk and Ali on the walls of his office. As less-religious respondents prefer the secular figure of Ataturk, the Alevi boss is stated to be either the second or the third choice by the members of this group. Alevis are among the first choices only in this question thanks to the presence of Ataturk in their depiction. The minority status of Alevis might have also played an important role in the higher ranking they get in the third question. As the power and hence the authority of a target group is accepted in the third question, the respondents in general preferred minorities over the unwanted group of the majority as they are not expected to be too repressive even in a power holding position.

Another factor that let some respondents to make positive comments about Alevis is their personal knowledge of some members of this group. Religious interviewees, in general, are found to be more intolerant towards Alevis; however, one of them mentioned Ali to be his third choice in the first question with the explanation that "Alevileri tanıyorum ve iyi insanlar olduklarını biliyorum. (I know Alevis and hence know that they are good people)". The individuals who argue that it will not be a problem to be close to Alevis are usually the ones who have had some personal contact with this group before. These individuals all expressed that the Alevis they encountered were not so different from themselves. It is hard to interpret such an attitude as tolerant as what is appreciated and supported about Alevis is their similarity to the majority. Most of them report to have Alevi friends who are religious people, sensitive about their families and the society at large. The general observation regarding the Turkish attitudes towards minorities stated above holds true for Alevis as well. Tolerance

towards Alevi is legitimized by their ‘normal’ –that is Sunni like- practices. Sometimes even an absence of a negative impression concerning this group is found sufficient to show tolerance towards them compared to the widely shared views regarding Alevi in the Turkish society, which are dominated by stories of immorality and marginality. For instance, one respondent said that Ali would not be his last preference in the first question as he knew Alevi and knew that they had close family ties.

Even these interviewees making positive comments about Alevi do not argue that this minority group does not constitute any problems or it does not represent marginality. Radical Alevi are explicitly mentioned to pose a serious threat for the peaceful coexistence of different groups in the society and radicalism, in these comments, refers to being insistent on group peculiarities. Alevi emphasizing their differences from the Sunni majority and acting according to them are interpreted to be separatists and are criticized for being radicals. The Turkish public in general loves Alevi as long as they behave like Sunnis. One of the low-religiosity male interviewees with a low education level said that he would not expect to have any problems with Alevi either as neighbors or as business actors. He explained his mindset by adding that “Çok Alevi tanıyorum. Çok Alevi arkadaşım var benim ve bugüne kadar hiçbiriyle bir problem yaşamadım. Hepsi gayet düzgün hayatlar yaşayan tatlı insanlar. Ramazan’da oruç tutarlar, camiye giderler... Ama farklı tehlikeli alevi grupların olduğunun da farkındayım tabii. Evimi tutmak isteyen Kızılbaşsa istemem onu, onların yaşayışları bizimkinden tamamen farklı. Ayrıca ailede toplumda kuralları, ilkeleri yok onların. Benim ailemin onlar ile iyi geçinebilmesi mümkün değil. Zaten ben de korkarım çocuklarım onların yalnız fikirlerinden, değerlerinden, davranışlarından olumsuz etkilenecek diye. (I know a lot of Alevi. I have many Alevi friends and I have never experienced any problems with them. They are all very nice people who live proper lives. They fast during Ramadan and they also go to the mosque. But I also know that there are other dangerous types of Alevi. If the person who wanted to rent my house was a Kızılbaş<sup>2</sup>, I would not choose him because I know that their life-styles are

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<sup>2</sup> Alevi were known as Kizilbas (red-head) until the 16th century. The name Kizilbas was attributed to Ali and his followers due to the supposition that he told his followers to wear a red tie upon their heads in the battles so that they do not slay their own comrades. Kizilbas have been supported by the Safavids in their fight against the Ottomans and hence have been highly vulnerable as a result of the Safavid defeat by the Ottomans in 1514. They retreated to an isolated, rural life-style until the 20th century. The name Alevi later on was substituted for the name Kizilbas which acquired pejorative connotations in the Ottoman times. This label of Kizilbas is still used for Alevi by certain people, especially with the intention to criticize and even discredit them. Individuals with positive feelings towards this group would

totally different from ours and they lack some very important familial and societal norms. It would be impossible for my family to get on well with them and I would be afraid that my children would be negatively affected by the wrong ideas, values and behaviors they have.)”

The statement quoted above makes clear that any positive comments regarding Alevis is directed towards only the Alevis who believe, act and live like Sunnis and do not display much difference from the majority in practice. Other Alevis, on the other hand, are believed to be dangerous and threatening in many respects.

In responding to the third question in which preferences are made to choose employers to work for, the major concern of the highly religious respondents was their freedom to practice their religious obligations in the workplace. A commonly stressed fact is that practicing Muslims need to perform two or three –depending on the time of the year- of the five daily prayers during the working hours. Hence; it is critical that the person they work for is a considerate person in this respect. This idea of freedom in religious practices is not limited to prayers and also involves fasting freely during Ramadan and freely wearing the headscarf –the most visible aspect of observant religiosity. The religious respondents mentioned that this is the main criterion they used to make their choices among the bosses in question. A member of this high religiosity group stated that “Benim için patronun bana karışmaması önemli. Başörtüm ya da namazım yüzünden bana kötü bakılmamalı. Namaz kılmama, oruç tutmama izin verilmeli. Sigara içenlerin sık sık bina önüne çıkmaları normalken benim namaza gitmeme tepki gösterilirse rahat edemem ben. Bu paradan da önce gelir işten de. Namazımı kılamayacaksam ne yapayım ben o işi. Pek çok şirketin de bu konularda rahat olmadığını biliyoruz hepimiz. Çalışanları engelliyorlar, ibadet ettirmiyorlar. Ben şimdi çalıştığım yerden çok memnunum. Baş açık da var kapalı da. Kimse karışmaz. Namaza da giderim, çok rahat yani. (It is important for me that the boss does not limit me. Nobody should criticize me for my prayer or headscarf. I should be allowed to pray and fast. I would not feel comfortable in a working place where smokers’ frequent off-times for smoking are interpreted to be natural and my off-times for prayer draw attention. This is more important than both the money and the details of the work I would do. What would I do in such a company where my religious practices are

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refrain from using this name Kizilbas due to the negative connotation it certainly has in the minds of the Turkish people. For more information on Kizilbaslik, see Melikoff, 1998; Ocak, 2000.

limited? We all know that a lot of companies in Turkey are not free in this sense. They limit the employees and do not let them practice their religions. I am very happy with the place I work for now. There are both covered and uncovered women and nobody interferes with others' practices. I easily practice my prayers. It is so free.)”

The peculiar structure of this question – the peculiarity comes from the fact that respondents are asked to choose a boss to work for- reveals what types of attitudes respondents expect from the groups in question. Once the respondents are asked about working for bosses belonging to different groups, they tend to make comments on the tolerance/intolerance these groups are expected to display towards the respondent rather than talking about their own likelihood of tolerating these employers. This tendency to focus on tolerance by the bosses rather than by the workers is a result of the strong connotation of power hidden in the word tolerance. It has long been discussed that despite its liberal and humanistic sound, tolerance attributes hierarchical superiority to the tolerating party.

In responding to the first and second questions in which they are represented as the decision-makers, the respondents tend to use statements such as “I could not tolerate” or “it would be hard for my mother to tolerate”. However; in the third question when they are told to imagine themselves or their children as employees in different companies, the respondents refrain from making comments about tolerating their employers. They just mention how they would feel about working with such people. This comparison among the responses provided in different settings and the individual roles in them signify that the opportunity to make a choice between tolerance and intolerance belongs to the person who occupies a hierarchically higher position. The general idea, with regard to tolerance, is that only people who are hierarchically superior have the authority to tolerate others. This idea forms a strong link between authority and tolerance.

A comparison among the tendencies of highly and less religious respondents throughout the three questions does not reflect a simple comparison between a tolerant and an intolerant group. Either highly religious or not so religious, the Turkish public in general is found to be intolerant. Perhaps it is expressed in different forms or directed towards different targets, but both of these groups are found to be largely intolerant. The lack of civic culture is obvious among the responses provided. Turkish society

consists of individuals who interpret groups with different ideas, values or life-styles to be threatening and who expect coercion from the “different person” that is situated socially above them. This line of thinking leads people to choose the weak and innocent groups as the authority if they or someone from their own group cannot. Hence; in response to the third question, surprising tolerant attitudes towards Armenians by some members of the high religiosity group are observed. Even more enthusiastically than the less religious respondents, these individuals are found to be willing to work for an Armenian employer or to advise their children to do so. While one explanation for this unexpected attitude might be the confidence that the members of this non-Muslim minority group would never feel so powerful to oppress the people of the majority even when they are the bosses, another justification might be that the officially recognized difference of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey legitimizes this group in the eyes of the Turkish people. Non-Muslim minorities constitute the only group in Turkey that is officially recognized as such and this recognition might be weakening to the threat perception regarding this group, distinguishing attitudes towards them from that towards other religious minorities i.e. Alevis.

The distinction between the opposing sides of the current ideological polarization in Turkey based on life-styles becomes much more obvious in responses to this third question. While both observant and non-observant Sunni Muslims are stated among the first three preferences of most respondents in the first two questions, the ‘ideological other’ is situated at the very end of the orders of preferences in this question. This change in attitudes towards the “ideological other” in comparison to the minorities in Turkey is a result of the different organization of the third question. As the target group is told to be in a hierarchically higher position than the respondent in this question, the “other” within the majority is not preferred because its empowerment is perceived as a serious threat. The minorities, on the other hand, are expected to be the most harmless groups in power because they would still be shy due to their minority status.

The highly religious respondents, for instance, prefer the observant Muslim –due to the similarity in life styles and state of mind- and the Armenian bosses while the non-observant Muslim and Alevi employers are generally refused due to the belief that these employers would not let them be free in their religious practices. The concern directing several highly religious respondents to a choice of the Armenian boss even rather than



the observant Muslim is about the description of the office of the Muslim boss which was interpreted to have an unprofessional sound due to the pictures of the Ka'ba and Bismillah on the wall. Many respondents said that they would not like to work in such an unprofessional company. Among the minorities, Kurds were also not interpreted to be harmful at all. The low religiosity group, on the other hand, perceived Kurds to be threatening and observant Muslims to be restrictive and left both groups to the end of their orders of preferences. What they foresee about working in a company of observant Muslims is pressure by his/her co-workers to join them in religious rituals and practices. Their most preferred groups are non-observant Muslims, Alevis or Armenians as all these groups adopt secular lifestyles and hence guarantee a free space for the secular Muslims. The minority status of Alevis and Armenians also relieve the secular majority.

Besides these five groups discussed above, attitudes towards an unmarried couple living together is also asked in the first question. The responses about this couple will be discussed in more length below. However; just to say a few words on this specific target group, it has to be stated that both groups of religiosity are strictly critical about this living-style while the explanations they provide rather diverge among themselves. Some members of the high-religiosity group made harsher comments on this couple stressing the immorality of such a life-style while the respondents from the low religiosity group emphasized the practical difficulties of living close to such a couple for themselves. Yet; the comments by even the high religiosity group usually concentrated on cultural arguments rather than religious ones. In terms of placement on the order of preferences, Emre –the representative of this couple in the question- is left to the very end by all respondents. Another important fact about responses on this couple is that gender is found to be significant with respect to this issue. While women are more critical of such a life-style, some male respondents are observed to be readier to accept it even though they also make critical responses.

### 6.1.2. On the Basis of Different Levels of Education

Table 6.2. Responses compared on the basis of different levels of education

<b>High Education</b>	<b>“Renting a flat”:</b>	<b>“Giving a Job”:</b>	<b>“Working for”:</b>
	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Mehmet (8/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (7/20)            Both Mehmet and Gökhan (5/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Alevi-Ali (7/20)            Armenian-Garbis (5/20)            Kurdish-Azad (3/20)</p>	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Ahmet (10/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Berk (6/20)            Both Ahmet and Berk (4/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Both Alevi-Hüseyin and Armenian-Artun (9/20)            Kurdish-Berdan (5/20)</p>	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Armenian-Agop (10/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Murat (8/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Non-observant Muslim-Murat (8/20)            Observant Muslim-Mustafa (5/20)            Both Mustafa and Kurdish-Baran (5/20)</p>
<b>Low Education</b>	<b>“Renting a flat”:</b>	<b>“Giving a Job”:</b>	<b>“Working for”:</b>
	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Mehmet (11/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (5/20)            Both Mehmet and Gökhan (4/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Both Alevi-Ali and Armenian-Garbis (13/20)            Kurdish-Azad (5/20)</p>	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Ahmet (14/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Berk (5/20)            Both Ahmet and Berk (1/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Kurdish-Berdan (7/20);            Alevi-Hüseyin (9/20)</p>	<p><u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>            Observant Muslim-Mustafa (13/20)            Non-observant Muslim-Murat (7/20)</p> <p><u>Last choice:</u>            Armenian-Agop (9/20)            Alevi-Hasan (6/20)</p>

The literature and previous researches on tolerance suggest that longer years of education make individuals more tolerant. Analyses on factors determining civic culture development find out that higher education fosters civic attitudes. Gibson et. al. (1992) argue that education, among all demographic characteristics, is the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes. Becoming aware of different cultures and coming across liberal values through education, highly educated individuals are expected to attain civic values, among which tolerance occupies a critical space. The cross-cultural analysis of tolerance in the fourth chapter also displays that higher education among Muslims leads to higher tolerance in this group. Education in the Turkish case; however, was found to lead to higher tolerance to some groups and higher intolerance to some others at the same time. Hence; the impact of education level on tolerance cannot be explained in a linear fashion. The relationship between tolerance and education level is not so direct. Higher education levels were observed to make individuals more tolerant in one dimension while it triggered their intolerance in another. The table below summarizes very briefly the findings of the comparison on the basis of education level.

To put it more frankly, Turkish people with high education levels are found to be more tolerant towards minorities; yet at the same time, the distinction between the 'ideological others' is more strongly promoted among them. Highly educated respondents tend to emphasize ideological divisions more than the majority-minority division while less educated individuals interpret minorities to be complete strangers and even serious threats. Education level has a significant and more-complicated-than-expected impact on tolerance; however, in more detail it should be put forward that rather than the initial preferences, the least preferred groups are more frequently shaped under the influence of education level. There are several explanations to this divergence on the basis of education level.

The first explanation is that highly educated individuals are more ideologically oriented and even polarized in the current situation of the Turkish society and hence have a serious prejudice regarding the 'other' within the majority. In the first two questions, for instance, individuals with lower education levels prefer both groups of majority over the minorities, while higher education lead some of their counterparts – yet still smaller than the proportion making this claim in 'working for' - to state that they would be disturbed with living in close proximity to the ideological other. Less

educated respondents are generally observed to appreciate observant Muslims more than the non-observant ones.

In responding to the first question, some highly educated respondents openly stated that they would feel disturbed to see visibly religious people whenever they opened the door. These “big differences” in life styles, according to them, would hinder peaceful coexistence of these different families. Educated respondents are sure that they could not get on well with a family belonging to the ‘other’ within the majority. This surprising intolerance among the individuals with high education levels might be explained through the fact that these members of the society are more exposed to politics and media- namely the printed media of newspapers and magazines or political discussions taking place on TV or radio stations- where this polarization is more frequently emphasized. Frequent contact with these sources can lead to prejudices regarding the other group.

The highly educated respondents made it clear that they interpret each other as the major threat to their survival in peace and comfort. However; the same critical stance towards each other cannot be observed among less educated members. The responses provided by this latter group also display the sensitivity in the Turkish society regarding the recently fostered ideological polarization; even though from a different perspective. Afraid of being labeled as the opponent of either the Republic or Islam, Turkish people with lower education in general have the tendency to refrain from placing depictions with Ataturk and Ka’ba -that are used as the symbols for Kemalism/Republicanism and Islamism in this question- as rivals. They also avoided stating one of these employers as their least preferred option. As has been stated in the above section on differences with respect to religiosity level, individuals in Turkey –but much more frequently the less educated individuals- do not feel comfortable in criticizing religious ideas or practices. The same also holds true for criticisms towards Ataturk. Even when critical comments on these two sensitive issues are made, they are accompanied by praises for them indicating their importance for the respondent. Most of the less educated respondents mention that they would prefer both Mustafa and Murat –the observant and nonobservant Muslims in the third question- as their first choices because both Islam and Ataturk are very important for them. Respect for Ka’ba and Bismillah was mentioned and the Turkish expression that “everything should begin with Bismillah” was heard several times. The significance of being respectful to Ataturk

and his memory, on the other hand, was explained with the statement that “the Turkish people as a whole owe a lot to him”.

One of the male interviewees belonging to the less educated group commented that the third question was a hard one. The difficulty of this question for the less educated respondents stemmed from its form that led them towards making a choice between the Ka’ba and Ataturk. Avoiding a selection between the two, even the respondents who preferred Mustafa over Murat indisputably added that “Ataturk is our leader”. Indeed, these pro-Ataturk responses were almost more common among the less educated individuals who stated Mustafa to be their first choice. They felt the need to express their respect for Ataturk in their responses because they were anxious about being labeled as an opponent of Ataturk or Kemalism due to their religiosity and their preference for the employer with Ka’ba and Bismillah in his office. These findings regarding the less educated respondents indicate that individuals with lower education levels tend to be more strongly influenced by the existing social order and its norms.

In terms of the least preferred groups, the less educated respondents mention Armenians and Alevis as their least favored groups. As their education levels get higher, the majority more easily accepts and even supports living close to these groups –indeed Armenians more frequently than Alevis. These respondents are more easy-going toward minorities yet they cannot react to the ‘ideological other’ so calmly. The literature suggests that a higher education level provides individuals with feelings of safety in many respects. Taking their places at the highest echelons of the society, people who attain high levels of education feel psychologically, economically and socially safer than the minorities –even safe enough not to interpret them to be threatening. These individuals do not feel themselves in a rivalry for resources with the minority. The same tolerant attitudes are not displayed towards the ‘ideological other’ by the highly educated individuals because that target group also belongs to the majority and hence is expected to have easy access to resources –increasing their potential to be threatening. This attitude displays how demographics -to be more specific socioeconomic development- ease tolerance towards minority groups.

The learning hypothesis, discussed in the first chapter within the discussion on the significance of social interaction as a determinant of tolerance, focuses on the importance of education for tolerance. Education helps to establish tolerance, as more

information about the unknown or even the disliked group leads to higher tolerance towards them. Easing the flow of information among different groups, education changes individuals' perceptions regarding other groups. Learning about different groups, either through personal contact during education or through what is being taught about them, educated members of a society become more inclined to normalize others as just other ordinary members of their societies rather than potential threats to their peaceful survival. As is emphasized as personal contact during education within the learning hypothesis, frequent contact between different groups in general provides flow of information among them. Through interactions among themselves, the members of these different groups learn a lot about each other and they refrain from easily perceiving the other as a threat. The contact hypothesis argues that intensive interaction between different groups reduces hostility and even leads to the development of positive feelings among them. Contact hypothesis is also relevant to understanding the tolerant attitudes by educated members of the majority in Turkey towards Armenians. Educated individuals usually have more opportunity to come into contact with non-Muslims in Turkey as non-Muslim minorities usually live in expensive neighborhoods and have contact with big companies in business life. Thus, it can be concluded that contact hypothesis is supported in this relationship between Armenians and the Muslim majority in Turkey as the findings imply that frequent contact with Armenians leads to more positive attitudes towards them.

The impact of education level on attitudes towards minorities is obvious in some of the educated respondents' preference of the Armenian boss over even the Muslim employers. At first sight, this choice indicates that the highly educated individuals do not interpret working for a boss from a minority group to be problematic. One reason for this is the above stated fact that the highly educated individuals feel safer and hence do not interpret minorities as potential threats. Moreover, these individuals believe that the minority would not be as harsh or repressive as the majority even when they are the power-holders in a certain setting. The mentality of being a minority would always lead them towards a shy attitude. Although the minorities are in general found to be more easily and willingly tolerated by the respondents with higher education levels, the special preference for Armenians among all the minority groups is obvious. This more positive attitude towards the Armenians might be interpreted as a consequence of this group's officially recognized minority status.

Critical comments on the observant Muslim's (Mustafa) company also came mostly from the respondents with higher education levels who placed him behind the others. Most of the highly educated respondents were determined that the ideal company for them or their children would be the one in which the workers were provided freedom. The anxiety that Mustafa –the observant Sunni Muslim boss- is a conservative person and hence would dictate his own understanding of religion on his workers was repeated several times. In the ideal workplace; however, there should be no limitations or restrictions imposed on people. The unprofessional sound of Mustafa's company was also mentioned by most of these highly educated respondents whether religious or not. One lady from this group said that "Onların ithal edeceği hediyelik eşyanın da son moda, sevimli şeyler olacağını düşünmüyorum. Bu sector, bence, ofis duvarına Bismillah ve Kabe resmi asan birisi için uygun değil. (I do not think that the souvenirs they import will be any trendy, nice things. I do not think that this sector is suitable for a person who places Bismillah and Ka'ba pictures on the walls of his office.)" Another respondent from the same group mentioned that from the descriptions provided he got the impression that the souvenir Mustafa imported could only be again the pictures of the Ka'ba and framed prayers created with calligraphy which he thought would not be a big job, leading to high earnings or significant success.

Besides the orders of preferences provided for each question, the explanations used to provide reasons for these choices were also influenced by changing education levels. The significance of education level in these explanations becomes obvious especially with respect to the attitudes towards the Kurdish minority. Whether supportive or critical, individuals with different education levels diverge in the comments they made about their attitudes towards Kurds. In explaining their preferences regarding Kurdish people, highly educated respondents focus more on ideological discussions whereas individuals with lower education levels attempt to legitimize their preferences through practical experiences. Highly educated respondents who are tolerant towards Kurds mention that they find these ethnic distinctions highly meaningless and that they are against such human-made inequalities. An obviously critical respondent said that "Kürtlük, Türklük nedir ki bunlar? Ben anlam veremiyorum. İnsanların uydurmaları bunlar. Kendimizi kandırıyoruz böyle ben şuyum sen busun. Kim diyor, bu kadar kolay mı böyle ayırmak. Karışmışız sonuçta. Çıkarlar için uyduruluyor bunlar. Ben ayırım falan görmüyorum. Hiç bakmam Kürt mü Türk

mü... İyi insansa kardeşimdir benim, yaşasın insanca. (Kurdishness, Turkishness, what are these? I can't attribute any meaning. These are all human inventions. We deceive ourselves by saying 'I am this and you are that'. Who says this, is this so easy to group people as such? We have been mixed. These are all invented for self-interest. I do not see any real difference. I won't look whether someone is Kurdish or Turkish. If he is a good person, he is my brother, let him live decently.)” Still tolerant of Kurds, the individuals with lower education levels focus more on practical difficulties experienced by Kurdish people and indicate how important their support for such an oppressed group would be. A highly religious interviewee with low education made an emotional comment that “Ezilmişler, eziliyorlar. Hep uzak tutulmuşlar. Bugünlerde çok konuşuluyor ama yine de... Bence destek vermek lazım. Ezilenin yanında olmak. Ezilenin halinden anlamak. Onları düşünmeden yaşamak kolay. Hissetmek, anlamak lazım neler yaşadıklarını. (They have been oppressed. They are being oppressed. They have always been pushed aside. These days, it is being discussed widely but still... I think support has to be provided. To be on the side of oppressed. To understand the state of the oppressed. It is easy to live without thinking about them. What is needed is feeling and understanding how they live.)” This difference in attitudes by respondents with different levels of education is visible among members of the intolerant group as well. While terrorist activities and social unrest caused by the PKK and people killed in these events are stressed by the less educated members of this group, more abstract discussions, such as the problems in the discourse of the PKK or the future troubles faced in divided countries, are made by the ones with higher education levels.


Both levels of religiosity and education level are observed to result in some significant differences in tolerance by Turkish people. However; analyzing their impacts together in coordination will breed more comprehensive and enlightening results. Hence; the next section compares the four cells all together and attempts to decide on the more influential factor – between religiosity and education level- on tolerance.



### 6.1.3. On the Basis of the Interactive Effect of Religiosity and Education

The respondents in this analysis are divided into four groups formed on the basis of both religiosity and education level. Categorized into four cells, the responses of the interviewees in each cell will be compared to the ones in its neighboring cells. The table below displays the number of each cell so that the respondents are sometimes recalled within the text, with reference to the number of the cell they belong. The two-way arrows on it imply that comparisons on those directions will be provided below. The co-existence of both horizontal and vertical arrows at the same time implies that the role of both factors in shaping attitudes of tolerance will be analyzed.

Table 6.3. Interactive analysis with four cells



The larger table below reflects the findings of these comparisons very briefly. The first and last choices of individuals in each cell for each question are specified with the proportion of respondents making that preference. A detailed discussion on these findings follows the table.

Table 6.4. Responses compared on the basis of interactive effect

	<b>High-Religiosity</b>	<b>Low-Religiosity</b>
<b>High Education</b>	<p><b>“Renting a flat”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Mehmet (8/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Alevi-Ali (6/10)                      Armenian-Garbis (4/10)</p> <p><b>“Giving a Job”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Ahmet (10/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Alevi- Hüseyin (6/10)                      Armenian-Artun (2/10)</p> <p><b>“Working For”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Armenian-Agop (8/10)                      Observant Muslim-Mustafa (2/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Non-observant Muslim-Mert (10/10)</p>	<p><b>“Renting a flat”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (8/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Kurdish-Azad (7/10)                      Observant Muslim-Mehmet (3/10)</p> <p><b>“Giving a Job”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Ahmet (6/10)                      Non-observant Muslim-Berk (4/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Kurdish- Berdan (9/10)</p> <p><b>“Working For”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Non-observant Muslim-Murat (10/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Mustafa (06/10)                      Kurdish-Baran (3/10)</p>
<b>Low Education</b>	<p><b>“Renting a flat”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Mehmet (9/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Alevi-Ali (6/10)                      Armenian-Garbis (4/10)</p> <p><b>“Giving a Job”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Ahmet (10/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Alevi- Hüseyin (6/10)                      Armenian-Artun (2/10)</p> <p><b>“Working For”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Hüseyin (10/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Non-observant Muslim-Mert and the                      Alevi-Hasan and the Armenian-Agop                      (8/10)</p>	<p><b>“Renting a flat”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Both observant Muslim-Mehmet and                      non-observant Muslim-Gökhan (6/10)                      Gökhan (3/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Kurdish- Azad (6/10)                      Alevi-Ali (4/10)</p> <p><b>“Giving a Job”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Observant Muslim-Ahmet (6/10)                      Ahmet and non-observant Muslim-                      Berk (4/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Kurdish- Berdan (6/10)                      Both Armenian-Artun and Alevi-                      Hüseyin (3/10)</p> <p><b>“Working For”:</b>  <u>1<sup>st</sup> choice:</u>                      Non-observant Muslim-Murat (6/10)                      Murat and observant Muslim-Mustafa                      (3/10)  <u>Last choice:</u>                      Kurdish-Baran (8/10)</p>

This analysis on the interactive effect of religiosity and education level begins the comparison with the first cell, which produces the most surprising finding; that is tolerance towards –even a strong preference for- Armenians by the highly educated highly religious respondents to “work for”.

Highly educated respondents from the high religiosity group almost uniformly mention their belief that the Armenian boss in question would provide them freedom for their religious practices if they were to work for him. Hence; they declare the Armenian boss to be among their first choices. In broader terms, the two top rankings of the individuals in the first cell are occupied by the observant Muslim and the Armenian bosses. Indeed, the observant Muslim boss is also commonly criticized by most members of this group. One middle-aged male interviewee from this group claimed that the observant Muslim boss might be a conservative person and if that was the case, it would not be a good idea to encourage his son to work in such a place as a conservative boss would dictate his own understanding of religion and of any other issue to his son. It was again repeated during this conversation that not religiosity but a libertarian attitude towards religious practice is what makes a boss perfect.

Another concern for some highly educated religious respondents is the impression of a non-professional environment they get from description of the observant Muslim’s office. Some of them even stated that a lack of any religious symbol sounded better than the presence of a picture of the Ka’ba or Bismillah. These pictures shown in the office of the observant Muslim boss remind the respondents of shops in villages. In the words of the respondents themselves, these companies sound to be “of a village (koylu)” places. These respondents critical of the presence of pictures of the Ka’ba and Bismillah in a workplace mention that they would prefer the Armenian employer over the observant Muslim one due to the unprofessional sound of the latter’s office and hence business. A member of this group explained his ideas about and expectations of the attitudes of the Armenian boss as “Oğluma Agop Bey’in yanında çalışmasını tavsiye ederdim. Orada rahat eder kimse ona karışmaz. Agop Bey’in inançlara, ibadetlere saygılı olacağını düşünüyorum. Her türlü düşünceye de... ayrıca başarılı da olur Ermeniler iş hayatında. O şirkette çalışırsa oğlumun da önü açılabilir. (I would advise my son to work for Agop. I think he would feel free in that company. Nobody would attempt to limit him. I think that Agop would respect different beliefs and religious practices, and also all different ideas. Besides that, Armenians are

successful in business. If he works for that company, my son might also have a bright career.)” Another interviewee from the same group focused more on the questions she had in mind about the company of the observant Muslim-Mustafa. She said that “Mustafa Bey’le ilgili bazı sorular var kafamda. Tutucu biri olabilir. Ben rahat edemem orada, kısıtlar beni. Ticari olarak da ileri gidebileceğini sanmıyorum. Yani böyle demek istemezdim ama dar görüşlü biri olabilir. Bu da beni çok rahatsız eder. Ermeni bir patron ise insanın önünü açar. Onlar bu işi gerçekten çok iyi biliyorlar. Ayrıca son derece de dürüstler. İşte öyle hile falan olmaz, paranızı da zamanında alırsınız. O yüzden, ilk tercihim Agop Bey. Sonra tabi diğerlerindense Mustafa Bey’i tercih ederim. (I have some questions in mind about Mustafa. He might be a conservative person. I would not feel free in such a work place, it would limit me. I also do not think that he can progress in commerce . I would not like to say this but he might be a narrow-minded person. This would irritate me a lot. An Armenian boss, on the other hand, would even make your progress easier. They know commerce very well. They are also very honest. There would be no tricks or anything in their commercial relations, you would also receive your money on time. That is why Agop is my first choice. Then certainly I prefer Mustafa over all the others.)”

These respondents interpreting an Armenian to be at least as favorable as an observant Muslim to work for, are graduates of best universities in Turkey and employees in big Islamic companies. The education they received and the business life they have been engaged in have taught them some positive attributes of certain groups they would not otherwise have the opportunity to even meet. In making explanations to justify their positive attitudes towards Armenians, these highly educated religious respondents refer to their experiences in business life through which they have learned that Armenians are honest, trustworthy and respecting. While higher education does not seem to be directly linked with positive attitudes towards Armenians, it has a significant role in enabling individuals to attain important roles in business life which in return help raising positive feelings towards Armenians thanks to the frequent contact with this group in this sphere. This finding strongly supports the main argument of the contact hypothesis that interaction has a fostering impact on tolerance through reduction of hostilities.

The tolerant –even supportive- attitudes towards Armenians and the emphasis on the professionalism and libertarian attitudes expected from them distinguish the

respondents in the first cell from the ones in the third cell. Although these individuals are also highly religious people, their education levels are lower and this difference is found to result in a lack of optimism with regard to attitudes by Armenians and hence in the Armenians' shift to the least preferred groups. Among the less educated religious respondents, only one interviewee displayed a positive approach to the idea of working for Armenians. Thinking about this group's probability of providing Muslims with freedom of religious practice, she based her expectations on historical knowledge about this group's respect for religious services of Muslims. She said that "Gayrimüslimlerin geçmişte oruç tutan Müslümanlara çok saygılı oldukları anlatılır hep. Çocuklarının Ramazan'da dışarıda yiyip içmelerine de izin vermezlermiş. (It is usually said that in the past non-Muslims were highly considerate of fasting Muslims and did not let their children eat or drink outside in this month.)" In her mind, a member of such a considerate group would provide his employees with the freedom to practice their religious obligations freely.

The respondents in the third cell base their decisions more on the religiosity of the figures in questions and state the observant Muslim to be their first preference as they are not concerned about either the professional appearance of the company or the libertarian environment to be established there. The most appreciated characteristic of the observant Muslim by these individuals is explained to be his religiosity. Similarity in lifestyles is interpreted to be sufficient for this choice. Kurds follow the observant Muslim, as the second choice in the third cell and also take part within the first three rankings of the members of the first cell. The rest are mentioned to be worse choices due to their remoteness to the religious ideas and practices. The most unwanted groups of the respondents in the first and third cell coincide to a certain extent as both leave the Alevi and non-observant bosses to the very end of their order of preferences.

In talking about their least preferred groups to work for, highly educated religious respondents mention that they have no hopes of working peacefully with a secularist or an Alevi boss. The secularist employer is depicted in the question with an office on the walls of which several pictures of Atatürk are placed. The office of the Alevi boss has a picture of Ali besides that of Atatürk on its walls. The first reaction these respondents provided with regard to these two groups was that these two bosses would not employ them or their children. Once pushed forward with the question "but if they do, what kind of an environment, do you think you will face in this working

place?”, they mentioned that these employers would feel uncomfortable with the religious practices they performed and this would create disturbance for both sides.

Some young ladies from this group who wore a headscarf said that they would not expect these two employers, especially the one with Atatürk pictures in his office to employ them due to the headscarves they wore. “Patron büyük ihtimalle presentabl bir çalışan aradığını söyleyip beni reddedecektir. (The employer will most probably say he needs a presentable person to work for him and hence reject me)”, they said in common. The same critical stance towards these two bosses was also mentioned by the general manager of a big Islamic company who stated that he did not expect them to be considerate and libertarian with respect to religious practices of their workers and hence he would not prefer his son to work in such a place. He also added that according to him the ideal workplace was the one in which bosses did not care at all about workers’ clothing or their religious stance. He said that he honestly could not behave so impartially in his own company either, but he had a justification for this attitude even though he did not approve it. He admitted that he preferred religious candidates – especially girls with headscarves- over other applicants in choosing employees for his company. He legitimized his non-egalitarian attitude with the fact that these religious young people were not accepted in many other companies just because they were religious in belief and practice. He added that “Dindar insanların şirketleri bu gençlere olanak sağlayan tek ihtimal. Koç ve Sabancı dini hassasiyeti olan gençleri almaya başlayınca, ben de karşıma gelen tüm adayları yeteneklerine göre değerlendiririm; zaten bence de işe adam almanın en doğru yolu budur. (These companies owned by religiously sensitive people constitute the only available alternatives for these young people. Once Koç and Sabancı agree to employ religious people, I will also evaluate all candidates on the basis of merit which I definitely think is the best way of choosing people to employ.)”

These statements by an educated, middle-aged businessman indicate that tolerance is shaped through social interactions. The attitudes of individuals are shaped by the social structure they live in and the conjuncture of their societies at that specific time period. The current discussions on headscarves and the current significance of the Islamist-secularist polarization have fostered sensitivity on the issues of religious freedoms and exclusion in Turkey. When a topic is discussed at length, the sides of this discussion become clearer and they repel each other with more strength. Individuals

observe how the other side acts and even make guesses about their prospective attitudes and decide in their own manners depending on this information. Hence; tolerance should not be interpreted as an individual attitude flowing one-way from the individual to other groups in question. Tolerance is shaped by the contemporary structures of societies and the interactive forms of relationships formed among different groups of individuals within that structure.

As a broader conclusion of comparison among religious respondents with different education levels, it can be suggested that the level of education has a more significant role than religiosity in determining attitudes towards non-Muslim minorities. The availability of the same distinction between low religiosity respondents with different education levels strengthens this argument even more. Within this group of less religious respondents, the members with high education levels also mention the Armenian boss among their top preferences. However; they never place him before the non-observant Muslim employer who is believed to be the most similar to the respondents in this second cell in terms of world views and lifestyles. The respondents in this group mention that they interpret Armenians to be considerate people and that they cannot observe great differences between their own lives and the life-styles of the Armenians. The individuals in the fourth cell, still less religious but also less educated; are nevertheless found to be skeptical of Armenians even though they do not have high religious sensitivities. Bringing all these findings together, a brief conclusion would be that regardless of their religiosity, less educated individuals are not favorable towards Armenians while respondents with higher education display positive and even supportive attitudes towards specifically Armenians and also more generally towards non-Muslim minorities.

The Kemalist boss is stated to be the first preference of highly educated low religiosity respondents who feel that the company of the non-observant Muslim would be the best workplace for them as they believe that they would not experience any disagreements with the employer in that company. These responses signify that this group of individuals tends to generalize agreement on the significance of secularism and attitudes towards religious practices to agreement in all issues including the ones regarding business life. In their opinion the company of the non-observant Muslim is a place they can work in calm and peace. One middle-aged male interviewee said that “Oğlum Murat Bey’le çalışsın isterim. Murat Bey’in hayata bakışı doğru belli ki. Hem

oğlumun fikirleri ile uyar hem de aslında oğlum ondan bir şeyler öğrenir. Adam Atatürk'ün değerini anlamış, bilmiş düzgün biridir mutlaka. Modern, çağdaş... (I would like my son to work for Murat. It is obvious that Murat's world-view is correct. His ideas would match up with my sons'. Moreover my son would learn from him. Murat realizes the significance of Ataturk, he should be a proper person. Modern...)"

These interviewees in the second cell mention that the Armenian and the Alevi employers would be their second choice, coming before the Kurdish and the religious bosses, due to the expectation that these bosses would have a certain level of respect for Ataturk and for the republican ideology. It was usually added that "Hasan and Agop would not, at least, try to impose some harmful ideas on my son". This expression made clear that the Kurdish identity and the Islamic tendencies are both interpreted to be threatening by highly educated less-religious respondents. This is observed to be an obvious distinction between the interviewees in the first and second cells. While both highly educated groups were found to be more tolerant towards the non-Muslim minorities in the third question compared to their less educated counterparts, they diverge with respect to their attitudes towards the other groups in question. The less religious highly educated individuals are observed to choose both the religious and the Kurdish bosses last. The highly religious individuals with the same education levels; however, place these two groups in their first three preferences –attributing a space for the Armenian boss as well. The most preferred groups –Alevi and nonobservant Muslim- of the respondents in the second cell, on the other hand, are the least preferred groups of their highly religious counterparts. In terms of attitudes towards "the other within the majority" to "work for", the most obvious distinction is observed to be between the highly educated respondents with different religiosity levels. Although imposition of any ideology or life-style on others was severely criticized by the vast majority of educated highly religious respondents, what is disapproved by their less religious counterparts is only imposition of "harmful ideas". "Harmful ideas", in this case, would be defined through these individuals' disapproval for these ideas. Some of the highly educated highly religious interviewees openly stated that they would not prefer even Mustafa –the religious boss- if he was a conservative person and was not a libertarian in terms of religious freedoms. The same suspicious or questioning attitude towards their own first choices could not be observed among less religious respondents. Even when the second and third preferences following the non-observant Muslim are analyzed, it is



impossible to miss the sensitivity to secularism among the highly educated low religiosity respondents.

The highly educated non-religious respondents interpret working in the observant Muslim's company as a serious threat and the explanations they provide for this perception refer to the current discussion on neighborhood pressure in Turkey – which has been mentioned in the first chapter. These interviewees make the warning that this expression of threat does not indicate a threat for physical security or well-being. What they worry about is that the workers in that company would constantly be observing daily prayers and be fasting during Ramadan and they would be excluded for not joining the others in these practices. One of the respondents added that “Eğer bunları onlarla birlikte yapmazsam, benim o iş yerindeki varlığımdan rahatsız olurlar. Benimle vakit geçirmek istemezler, belki soru sormaya, nasihat etmeye falan kalkarlar hatta beni eleştirmeye başlarlar. Böyle bir yerde çalışmayı tabii ki istemem. (If I do not do these things together with them, they will be annoyed with my presence in that workplace. They would not like to spend time with me and perhaps begin to ask questions, give advice and even criticize me. Certainly, that is not the place I would like to work for.)” Another interviewee also agreed that “En başta almayı kabul etseler bu sefer de birlikte huzurlu yaşayamayız bence. Namaza giderken beni de götürmeye çalışırlar, Ramazan'da bir şey yesem bana dik dik bakarlar. Olmaz, olmaz... Huzur kaçır. (Even if they initially agree to employ me, I don't think that we can work together in peace. They would try to take me when they go to pray, if I eat something during Ramadan, they would stare at me. No, no. There would be no peace.)” Besides the disagreement with respect to fulfilling religious obligations, highly educated less religious respondents stated that they would not be able to get on well with a religious employer due to the differences in world views. These respondents tend to place the observant Muslim behind most of the individuals in question because they mainly identify observance of religious duties with membership in religious communities and they interpret these organizations to be seriously threatening.

The low religiosity group, regardless of their education level, places Kurds among their least preferred groups. Especially among less educated members of this group, fear of Kurds is obvious. Usage of the word “fear” pertaining to Kurdish people indicates that respondents in the fourth cell experience difficulty in disassociating Kurds from the PKK. Such an attitude would only be expected from individuals who have

never encountered any Kurds as these individuals would not have personal information about this group and would be more likely to associate the violent acts they hear about on TV with Kurds at large. Referring to the contact hypothesis –arguing that personal contact reduces hostilities- discussed in the first chapter, people who have the feeling of belonging to the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey –the regions where Kurds live in large numbers- would be expected to have a greater knowledge of Kurds and to be more tolerant and even friendly towards them. Hence; a strong threat perception regarding Kurds would not be expected from these people. However; within the scope of these interviews, this fear was mentioned by even respondents who had close ties - through kinship or even marriage- with people from these regions. An example was a female respondent from the low religiosity low education group. She said that “Biz de Malatyalı’yız. Ben oraları bilirim, Kürtleri de bilirim. Bizim gelinimiz var hatta Kürt. Çok saygılı bize karşı, anneme de öyle. Bir yanlışını görmedim ben onun. Ama Kürtlere güven olmaz. Sen arkana bir dönersin, seni sırtından bıçaklar. O yüzden de istemem, çalıştırmam yanımda. Her an kötü bir şeye bulaşabilirler. Onların yarın en yapacağı belli olmaz. (We are from Malatya. I know that region, I know Kurds. We even have a Kurdish daughter-in-law. She is very respectful towards us, towards my mother. I haven’t seen any inappropriate attitude from her. However; Kurds cannot be trusted. Once you turn your back, they can stab you on the back. That is why I would not like to give a job to Kurds. They can get involved in any dangerous or wrong incident at any time. You can never guess what they will do tomorrow.)” This finding is interpreted to be highly surprising as people of this region or even people who know this region would be expected to share a lot with Kurdish people, be aware of their complaints and requests and hence to be more tolerant towards them. With their claims of associating Kurds with violent acts, these respondents refute the major claim of the contact hypothesis that interaction with alternative views and livings makes individuals more open to differences and more tolerant towards groups that would be unknown or unfriendly to them otherwise.

There are several explanations commonly used for the intolerant and even anxious attitudes towards Kurdish people. One statement repeated frequently is that many people have died because of them. A less religious respondent with low education level said that “Ben pek Kürt tanımadım ama tanımak da istemiyorum. Yakın olmayayım onlara. Onlar yüzünden çok insan öldü bu memlekette. Ne bileyim, böyle

düşündükçe... Yakın olmak istemiyorum yani. (I haven't known many Kurds but I do not want to know as well. I would not like to be close to them. Many people have died in this country because of them. I mean, once I think like this... I do not want to be close to them.)” This expression signifies once again how people interpret Kurds to be the same as members of the PKK, which organizes terrorist activities in the Eastern part of Turkey. This line of thinking has two different dimensions. First of all, due to the killings and violent acts experienced, people cannot think of the Kurdish issue in a neutral manner. Thinking sentimentally, people legitimize their intolerant attitudes by illustrating them as a response to the aggressive stance by the Kurds. Besides the sentimentality originating from the killings and violent acts experienced, the perception of Kurds as a threat also plays a significant role in shaping intolerant attitudes towards them. As has been discussed in the first chapter, in the presence of conflict in a certain setting, individuals change their priorities and perceive ‘the other’ as a threat just because they feel frightened. This threat perception leads people to intolerance as it promotes the feelings of suspicion and leads people more towards their own groups. While this intolerance and moving away is valid for ‘all the others’, it is more strongly directed towards the other side of the conflict. Referring to the literature on threat perceptions and presence of conflict, the prevalence of intolerance towards Kurds can be explained through the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army that has dominated the Turkish social and political scene for the last twenty years. The significance of threat perceptions on individual attitudes is not limited to tolerance in the literature and is extended to all democratic norms in general. This argument can also be linked to Inglehart and Welzel’s theory of post-materialism and self-expression values. They also argue that if individuals’ physical security concerns are not fulfilled, they cannot move forward to care about self-expression values which include the democratic norms and values including tolerance. In this sense Turkish people still worry about physical peace and security in the country and do not prioritize the rights and freedoms of the Kurdish minority.

The critical stance of the respondents in the fourth cell is based on the perception of threat and feelings of fear they have regarding Kurds while highly educated members of the same group talk more about ideological disagreements they would have with members of this group. One interviewee from this group said directly that “Anlaşmam ki ben bir Kürtle. Derdi falan başka onun. Başka şeylere takmış kafayı. Hayata aynı

şekilde bakamayız. Onun bakışı da beni rahatsız eder ayrıca. (I cannot get along with a Kurd. His concerns and everything is different. He is obsessed with different things. We cannot see the world from the same perspective. His view would also disturb me.)” Some members of the second cell even mentioned that some illegal acts could be committed by members of these groups and they would not like to witness such acts. An increase in the level of education obtained does not result in higher tolerance towards Kurds even though the literature suggests a positive correlation between education level and tolerance. What is being determined by education level seems to be just the explanations used for the tolerant/intolerant attitudes. Individuals with higher education in general tend to make more theoretical and ideological comments in explaining their attitudes towards Kurdish people whereas the less educated interviewees use more practical facts and their feelings in legitimizing their preferences.

On the other hand, the members of the high religiosity group; as has been mentioned above are found to be tolerant and even supportive towards Kurds. When the impact of education level is analyzed within this group, it is observed that less educated respondents within this group have a stronger sympathy for Kurdish people. The respondents in the third cell believe that Kurds are mostly religious people whose customs and traditions do not significantly diverge from that of the Turkish people- especially those of Turkish Easterners. The fierce discussions about the Kurdish issue frequently taking place in the media have attracted the attention of the members of the third cell to this group lately and have stimulated their empathy for this group. A young lady said that “Komşum ve kiracım olarak benim ikinci tercihim Azad, Kürt olduğu için ve bu konu çok güncel olduğu için. İşler onların tarafından nasıl görünüyor bunu sormak isterim ona. Azad’I tercih ediyorum çünkü Kürtlerle ilgili merak ettiğim çok şey var, ne düşünüyorlar, nasıl yaşıyorlar... O evimi kiraladıktan sonra arkadaşları, ailesi gelir tabi ziyarete. Bu benim için çok güzel olur, daha çok Kürt tanımış, onlarla daha çok konuşmuş olurum. (my second choice as a neighbor and a tenant would be Azad because he is Kurdish and this is a current issue. I would like to hear from him how things are seen from their angle. I would like to choose him because I really wonder a lot about Kurdish people, what they think and how they live. Once he rents my house, his relatives and friends would also come to visit him and this would help me know a lot of Kurdish people and talk to them.)” Her statements indicate that even the most

criticized aspect of Kurdish families –their crowdedness- can be interpreted as an advantage by individuals who are willing to learn more about the Kurdish people.

When responses by all four groups of respondents are brought together, Alevi are found to be the least preferred group among all. The only group that feels sympathy towards them is the group of less religious interviewees with high education levels. The factor that situates these respondents in close proximity to Alevi is that both of these groups are fierce supporters of secularism. These individuals believe in the significance of the ideological polarization between Islamists and secularists and argue that current divergences in life-styles act as the most distinguishing factor among people living in Turkey. Thus, agreement on the appropriateness of secular life-style brings Alevi and low religiosity Sunni Muslims together. The latter feels that it has to support this oppressed minority that has chosen the right way of living even though it sometimes embraces a marginal stance and holds alternative views. The peculiarities of Alevi are endured by this group due to their true choice with respect to a more important issue – i.e. the secular life-style. A highly educated less religious respondent said that, “Aleviler çeşit çeşit. Çok iyileri var, kötülerini de... Ama geneli iyi. Belli değerleri kabul ediyorlar, destekliyorlar bir kere. Cumhuriyetçi adamlar, Atatürkçü. Kim kaldı ki artık böyle. Herkes dönüşte, kaçışta. O zaman kalanları tutacağız, bırakmayacağız. Vazgeçirmeye çalışırlar, koruyacağız. Kim desteklerse onun yanında olacağız artık. (There is great diversity among Alevi. There are very good Alevi and also vary bad. But the majority is good. They at least accept certain values, support them. They are republicans, Kemalists. How many people like this are left? Everybody is going back, running away. Then what we need to do is to keep the ones left, we should not let them go. Others would try to make them give up, we will save them. We would be with the ones who provide support.)”

This only group that displays tolerance towards Alevi constitutes a minority within the majority in terms of the proportion of the population it represents. Even high education level alone is sufficient to make a group exceptional in Turkey where mean level of schooling by adults has been announced to be 6, 5 years in 2010 by the United Nations Development Program (International Human Development Indicators, Turkey. <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR.html>). The distribution of education levels of the representative sample of a nation-wide survey conducted in 2006 indicated that the highest education levels attained by 65, 6 % of the respondents were below high

school and 42, 3 % of the whole sample were only primary school graduates, whereas respondents who received a university education or a higher degree constituted only 10 % of the total sample (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006, p.34). Respondents with high education levels in this reflection on tolerance in Turkey; however, are at least graduates of high school and hence they definitely represent a minority in Turkish society.

The low religiosity of these respondents who are found to be tolerant towards Alevis also distinguishes them from the majority of Turkish public as statistical information shows that most people in Turkey are practically religious and hence are represented by the high religiosity group in this analysis. When the respondents in a nation-wide survey on religiosity in Turkey conducted in 2009 were asked how they would explain religiosity, the most frequently provided response was that “a religious person is the one who complies with religious obligations and who is bound to his/her religious values”. Within the same survey, the respondents were also asked how frequently they went to the mosque except for funerals and it was observed that approximately 60 % of the total respondents claimed to go to the mosque for prayer once or more than once in a week (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). In interpreting these percentages, it has to be recalled that in Islam it is not compulsory to practice daily prayers at mosque with the exception of the Friday prayer which is also believed to be obligatory only for men. Another comprehensive nation-wide survey on religion, society and politics in Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006) indicated that only 36, 5 % of Turkish women stated that they would leave the house without covering their heads (p.24). All this statistical information proves the argument that the group of highly educated non-religious respondents is far from representing the majority in Turkey, which is instead practically religious and has a low level of education. Moreover, the religiosity of the majority is not limited to belief but has a reflection on practices as well. Thus, different groups of religiosity in this analysis have also been differentiated on the basis of participation in religious practices, i.e. prayers for both sexes and headscarves for women. The findings stated above signify that this is the right way of talking about religiosity in Turkey as approximately 60 % of the adult population is found to be practicing Muslims and almost none (0, 9 percent in 2006) states to be irreligious.

The extent of tolerance for Alevis by this less religious group also needs to be questioned as even these respondents refrain from showing support for the characteristic differences of Alevis. This type of an attitude might be, at best, called negative tolerance which is defined as putting up with, enduring or bearing with ideas and traits disapproved. Although negative tolerance is not interpreted to be sufficient for an inclusive democratic culture, especially in Western liberal democracies, it is better than the complete prohibition of the free expression of different ideas, values or cultures. Negative tolerance is considered to be insufficient due to the fact that it falls short of the ideal definition of tolerance that points to supporting or advocating views different from yours. In Turkish society where tolerance is almost totally absent, even negative tolerance might be interpreted as a significant sign of civic culture

Table 6.5. Similarities and differences among the four respondent groups with respect to “working for”

	<b>High Religiosity</b>	<i>In Common</i>	<b>Low Religiosity</b>
<b>High Education</b>	The Armenian or the observant employer the most preferred.	<i>Tolerant towards and even supportive of the Armenian employer.</i>	The Alevi employer among the most preferred. The observant employer among the least preferred.
<i>In Common</i>	<i>The Kurdish employer among the most preferred. The Alevi and the non-observant employers the least preferred.</i>	<u>No preference common for all four groups.</u>	<i>The Kurdish employer among the least preferred. The non-observant employer the most preferred.</i>
<b>Low Education</b>	The observant employer the most preferred.	<i>The Alevi and the Armenian employer among the least preferred.</i>	The observant employer following the non-observant employer.

Table 6.5. above summarizes this detailed analysis on the interactive impact of level of religiosity and education level on tolerance in the third question on ‘working for’. The shared preferences between the members of any two cells are displayed in parts between these cells and are written in italics. These cells in between are labeled with the sign ‘in common’ again in italics. The information special to certain cells; however, are put in their own sections separately.

In responding to the first and second questions on “renting a flat” and “giving a job” respectively, the differences between the groups are observed to diminish; especially on the basis of education levels. Highly religious respondents, for instance, regardless of their education levels, prefer the observant Muslim over anyone else. The respondents in both the first and the third cell also mention in agreement that Alevis and Armenians are their last choices in the first two questions while the Armenian boss is the first preference of many highly religious and highly educated respondents in the third question. The non-observant Muslim, taking place among the least preferred groups of the highly religious respondents with respect to “working for”, moves up and becomes the second choice of highly religious respondents of both education levels in the first two questions. These different responses heard from the same individuals for different questions indicate that the context and the forms of relationships as outside factors play a significant role in shaping individual attitudes of tolerance. The impact of education on tolerance is explicit with respect to “working for” but it almost disappears in “renting a flat” or “giving a job”.

With regard to the comparison on the basis of different levels of religiosity, two major differences attract attention. One of these significant points is that different from the highly religious respondents, individuals belonging to the low religiosity group mention the non-observant Muslim as their most preferred individual in these questions. While he constitutes the first preference of highly educated members of this group alone, the non-observant Muslim shares this position with the observant Muslim in the preferences of the less educated interviewees from the low religiosity group. These respondents placed in this fourth cell are found to be close to observant Muslims throughout the analysis even though they do not frequently participate in religious practices themselves. The other significant difference between the groups of religiosity, regardless of their education levels, is the attitudes towards Kurds. The highly religious respondents put Kurds in their second or third preferences just after the groups of the majority whereas the less religious respondents leave them to the end –alongside the other two groups of minority in Turkey. The table below represents these similarities and differences between the four different groups of respondents in responding to the first and second questions.

The notably large mid-row in the first column of high religiosity displays how similar the responses by highly religious respondents with high education and the ones



with low education are. Another remarkable point is that all four groups of respondents are found to agree upon –even though with different proportions- refusing the alternative of Alevis.

Table 6.6. Similarities and differences among the four respondent groups with respect to “renting a flat” and “giving a job”

	<b>High Religiosity</b>	<b><i>In Common</i></b>	<b>Low Religiosity</b>
<b>High Education</b>		<i>The Alevi among the least preferred.</i>	The non-observant Muslim is the first preference followed by the observant Muslim and the Armenian in order.
<b><i>In Common</i></b>	<i>The observant Muslim is the first preferred followed by the non-observant Muslim and the Kurd in order. The Armenian is among the least preferred.</i>	<u>The only common point for all four groups seems to be placing Alevis among the least preferred.</u>	<i>The Kurd and the Alevi are the least preferred.</i>
		<i>The Alevi and the Armenian are the least preferred.</i>	The non-observant and the observant Muslim constitute the first preference together.
<b>Low Education</b>			

## 6.2. Some Other Points that Attract Attention in the Analysis

### 6.2.1. Convergence in Attitudes towards Emre

The findings of this research on tolerance have been comparatively analyzed above with respect to different responses provided by the four groups of respondents. Both of the independent variables of this analysis, religiosity and education level, are found to produce different trends with regard to tolerance. However; with respect to some target groups or issues, all respondents are found to be in consensus. The most significant one of these areas of convergence is the attitude towards Emre –the

representative of the unmarried couple living together- on the question of “renting a flat”.

This couple is interpreted to the most threatening alternative for the vast majority of respondents, regardless of the group they belong. Although several explanations are provided to legitimize intolerance towards other figures in the questions, Emre is the most easily and the most confidently rejected person throughout these interviews. The type of life Emre and his girlfriend live is severely criticized by the interviewees at large. Expressions as strong as “it cannot be accepted” are used in evaluating their lifestyle. All the comments on Emre signify that living together of unmarried couples is still illegitimate in the eyes of the Turkish public. As intolerance towards this couple is shared among members of all four groups, attitudes towards Emre in the first question cannot function as a distinguishing factor among the four groups of respondents consulted in this analysis. Neither religiosity nor education level has a significant impact on attitudes towards living together of unmarried couples. Within the explanations provided for these preferences, rather than its incompatibility with Islamic teachings, social uneasiness was frequently mentioned as an important reason behind the critical stance towards living together of unmarried couples.

A detailed analysis on these explanations signify that the comments made on Emre by different respondents differ with respect to their harshness even though the place they attribute to Emre in their scale of preferences are highly similar. Divergence in the substance of the comments provided, despite the similarity in the orders of choices displays the importance of using the qualitative method in this analysis. From a survey-dominated perspective, these respondents would all be placed in the same category and would be briefly labeled with intolerance towards Emre and in more general towards the living together of unmarried couples. The explanations accompanying these rankings; however, diverge in their severity. It is true that all groups in Turkey are intolerant towards such a couple. Yet; highly religious respondents are found to be more strictly critical of such a life-style due to their higher sensitivity about traditionally accepted norms and values. A young lady from the high religiosity group made aggressive comments regarding this couple and mentioned that she would not like to have people like them around her in order not to be hurt and not to hurt them. The harshness of her remarks explicitly shows that her feelings are more than discomfort with living close to such a couple. She indicated that the values and norms

she believed in would not accommodate the living together of unmarried couples. She mentioned that she would not choose such a couple as her tenant and neighbor because she knew that she would not be able to tolerate them. Her explanation was that “Bu tür yaşamlara hiç anlam veremiyorum. Aralarında bir ilişki olmasa bile üniversite öğrencilerinin kızılı erkekli aynı evde kalmasını da anlayamıyorum. Ne aklıma ne de kalbime anlatamıyorum bunu. Yani Kabul edemem bunu... Dolayısıyla da onları tercih etmem. (I cannot attribute any meaning to these types of lifestyles. I cannot also understand how university students of different sexes share the same flat even if they do not have a romantic relationship. I cannot tell this to either my heart or to my mind. So clearly I cannot accept this and hence I would not prefer them.)”

This harsh response provided by the young lady point out how the existence of multiple moralities in modern society must not have been internalized by at least some members of the Turkish society. The general intolerance towards Emre signifies that the majority of the Turkish public must not have yet adopted the idea that there is more than one morality identified for the society. These respondents tend to evaluate others’ lives through their moralities which they believe should be the norm for the whole society. Another lady from the low religiosity group also placed Emre at the very end of her preferences in the first question but the comments she made about this couple and being close to them were significantly softer. Rather than mentioning the inappropriateness of their life-style to her norms and values, she talked about practical difficulties she would experience if they were to be her neighbors. She said she would not prefer them because it would be difficult to knock on their doors and ask for anything when needed. This argument indicates how illegitimate this couple is interpreted to be by Turkish people. The couple is interpreted to be so unethical that neighbors do not feel free to contact them easily.

One particular comment on renting one’s flat to Emre and his girlfriend made clear that even people who would not feel uncomfortable with living in close proximity to an unmarried couple would not choose them as the neighborhood would feel uneasy with the existence of such a couple in their living environment, even if the interviewee would not. A young male interviewee said that “Çevre ve hatta karım rahatsız olur bu durumdan, onaylamazlar yani. (The neighborhood and even my wife would feel uncomfortable about this, I mean they would not approve it.)” He also added that “Yoksa ben evil olmayan bir çiftle komşu olmanın, yakın olmanın ciddi bir sorun

olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Benim kız arkadaşları ile birlikte yaşayan arkadaşlarım var. (Otherwise I do not think that living close to an unmarried couple is a serious problem. I have friends living together with their girlfriends.)” This quotation points out also that women are more strongly critical of this living style and men who do not interpret it to be so problematic, feel anxious that their wives would be disturbed with such neighbors.

The responses provided for Emre signal the significance of two institutions in Turkish society –marriage and neighborhood. Emre and his girlfriend were almost always placed at the bottom of the respondents’ scales of preferences just because they are not married and this type of living does not fit the norms of the Turkish society. This stance displays how bound the Turkish people are to the norms of their society and in a sense to their traditions which tell them how hallowed the institution of marriage is. Traditionally, great importance has been attributed to marriage as it meant building a new family and also meant continuation of the nation. This widespread clinging on to the traditions and norms by the Turkish public demonstrates that widespread anomie is not serious problem in Turkish society. This lack of anomie; however, is accompanied by a drawback –underdevelopment of personal freedoms. Personal freedoms are not found to be developed enough in Turkey. Supporting Durkheim’s argument (1951) on the impacts of modernity, it is found out that progress in personal freedoms and consensus on moral values cannot be achieved at the same time.

Age acts as an important factor shaping personal attitudes towards Emre. Younger generation seems to interpret living together of unmarried couples more calmly even if they do not approve it. Gender is also found to make some slight difference. While men interpret the life style of Emre to be more acceptable, women regard it to be insulting and even threatening for his girlfriend. Women in Turkey, regardless of their religiosity and education level, are inclined to think in this way due to their suspicion that men can easily break up with women in these unofficial relationships. The expression of the young male interviewee quoted above indicates how the perspective of men and women diverge with respect to this issue. He openly stated that living close to Emre would not be a problem for him yet his wife would not approve such an arrangement.

### **6.2.2. Context-Sensitivity of Tolerance: The Significance of Relations with Neighbors**

The general intolerance towards Emre and the comments made about living in close proximity to this couple signify how much Turkish people care about identities of their neighbors. Neighbors, in the Turkish context, are not only people living their own lives in their own houses. Neighbors should be easily reached whenever needed. The most frequently repeated description for ideal neighbors, in these interviews, was that it should be easy to get in and out of their houses. Turkish people form close ties with their neighbors and believe that this is how neighborhood should be.

In making preferences for their tenants and neighbors, the respondents, with almost no exception, mentioned Mehmet or Gökhan- the observant and non-observant Muslims- in the first ranking. The availability of the other family members- especially the more fragile ones such as the old mothers, wives and small and young children- within the relationship makes neighborhood a more complicated and sensitive relationship. The respondents try hard to be careful in their selection so that the peace and quiet of the family life is not harmed. They want to be sure that their neighbors are people they can get along with and they believe that this can be provided only if the life style of the neighbors coincides with theirs. Sharing the same building, the neighbors are also believed to constitute an example for their children and selection of the appropriate neighbors becomes even more important in this sense.

The reasoning behind the sensitivity in choosing the most acceptable neighbors was described explicitly by one of the male interviewees who said that Armenians would not be preferred as neighbors due to the fact that living in the same neighborhood would be difficult for both sides. An Armenian would probably drink alcohol and this would disturb at least some members of the neighborhood who are not used to it. He gave the example of his mother and said that his mother would have negative feelings towards the Armenian if she saw him drinking alcohol as nobody else drinks alcohol in their building. This interviewee clearly stated that it was not him who would feel bothered as he himself also drank alcohol from time to time. He was concerned about his mother who was more unfamiliar with alcohol. He also added that the Armenians would also feel uncomfortable with living in their building as certain habits of the Muslim families might be strange and even disturbing for them. The example he

provided for such habits was that families in their neighborhood sometimes visited each other and read the Qur'an together. He thought that under these conditions Armenians might feel uncomfortable.

The context sensitive nature of tolerance has already been discussed in this chapter with respect to the significantly different responses heard in the third question. Although the attitudes with respect to "renting a flat" and "giving a job" have been found to be highly similar, a closer investigation suggests that even these two settings receive slightly different responses from some of the interviewees. Among these two sets of responses it is recognized that the minority groups can find a place among the first orders of preferences in the second question whereas Sunni Muslims –both observant and non-observant- constitute the first choices of most respondents in the first question. For instance, the religious respondents prefer to employ Kurdish people in their companies; however, when it comes to being neighbors with them, they mention several considerations such as the crowded Kurdish families or the Kurdish potential for dangerous activities and place them just in front of Alevi and Armenians. These comparisons indicate that it is not right to consider tolerance as simply a personal characteristic that remains stable regardless of the group to be tolerated or of the context in which tolerance is required. Questions on the household and some others on the business life are certainly found to breed different responses about different groups.

The close ties Turkish people form with their neighbors increase the importance they attribute to the personalities of their neighbors, making it harder for them to tolerate different groups as neighbors . This finding might also be used as a tool to criticize the widely accepted adoptability of multi-national surveys. If neighbors are attributed different roles and hence different levels of importance in different contexts, reaching comparative conclusions about tolerance levels in these settings through these questions might be misleading. More central roles attained to neighbors in Turkish lifestyles make tolerance towards different neighbors harder in Turkey as Turkish neighbors are more than neighbors to each other in the Western sense of the word.

### **6.2.3. Exceptions Based on Personal Experiences**

The findings that have been discussed until now are the mostly repeated trends among the four groups of respondents. However; there are also exceptions to these standard reactions. These exceptional responses regarding the groups in questions usually result from some personal experiences the respondents have had with some members of these groups. Personal experiences are recalled especially when tolerant attitudes towards non-Muslims or Alevi minorities are explained. This tendency indicates that the respondents feel that legitimization has to be verified for being tolerant towards these groups that are generally considered to be unfamiliar and hence threatening by the majority. Individuals who have positive past knowledge about several members of a certain group are found to make affirmative comments regarding the whole group. This empirical evidence provides support for the contact hypothesis which argues that interaction with a certain group of people will erode negative feelings about them and will even foster positive attitudes towards them.

One of the religious male interviewees with high education level said that his first preference, within the scope of the first question, would be the observant Muslim due to the expected similarity between his life style and that of Mehmet, and that none of the other figures were any different from the rest. He added that Armenians or Alevis were not different from non-observant Muslims in his opinion as he was raised in Balat, a once-multicultural neighborhood of Istanbul. He equalized non-observant Muslims with Alevis and non-Muslim minorities in his statement, not as a way of distancing non-observant Muslims but instead as a way of bringing these minorities closer to the majority. He explained this surprising attitude through his childhood experience in Balat which he described as a neighborhood where Muslims had lived with Greeks and Armenians for long years.

Another religious interviewee mentioned that he would name the Armenian figure as his first choice in all three questions and justified his preference by the statement that “Ermeniler’e güvenilir. (Armenians can be trusted.)” His personal experience with Armenians had taken place at the military service where his best friend had been an Armenian young man. This relationship had taught him that Armenians espouse Turkey and hence should not be seen as strangers. He added that as they could be trusted in any respect, Armenians should be preferred for any close ties formed.

A female interviewee, who preferred the observant Muslim at first instance in the first and second questions, said that she would not opt for the employer with the calligraphy of Bismillah and the picture of Ka'ba in his office. She defended her position through a past experience; "Otuz yıl önce evlenip yeni bir şehre yerleştiğimizde eşimle birlikte eve mobilya alacak bir yer arıyorduk. Şehre yeni geldiğimiz için, hiç kimseyi tanımıyoruz. Çarşıda yürürken bir gün bir dükkana girdik ve duvarda Bismillah ve Allah yazıları gördük. Safız ya bunlara güvenebiliriz dedik, ne de olsa dindar adamlar Allah korkusu olur içlerinde dedik. Mobilyamızı aldık ve sadece birkaç ay sonra farkettiler ki adamlar bizi kazıklamış. Yani şimdi ben düşünüyorum da o yazıların falan hiçbir anlamı yok. Ne dindarlık ne de güvenilirlik gösterir onlar. (When we got married and moved to another city thirty years ago, my husband and I were looking for a place to buy furniture to our house. As we were new to the city, we did not know anyone. While we were walking in the downtown one day, we entered a shop and noticed the calligraphies of Bismillah and Allah on the walls. As naïve people, we thought that we could trust these shop-keepers as they were religious people and would have the fear of God. We bought our furniture from there and just several months later we realized that they ripped us off. So now I believe that these writings etc. do not mean anything. They do not really signify either religiosity or trustworthiness of individuals.)"

Considering all these stories told, the conclusion is that personal experiences might have positive or negative impact on tolerance towards a certain group of people depending on the nature of the interaction the respondent has had with the members of the group in question. This finding displays that both the contact hypothesis and the conflict hypothesis might be relevant in explaining attitudes towards a certain group. If the relationships between the respondent and members of the group included competition, hostility or threat-perceptions, negative feelings would be generalized for each others' groups in general. The opposite would also be true if the interaction included amity. Prejudice towards the target group would be erased as a result of such a contact. Regardless of the directions of their influences, personal experiences play a significant role in shaping individuals' attitudes with respect to tolerance towards different groups.

Several important points about the Turkish society in general need to be mentioned before this analysis is concluded. The satisfaction of peace and order in the



society is used as the first criterion in making the orders of preferences. The widely supported view is that the Muslims constitute the most peaceful and the most moral group and hence are preferred over others. The primary assumption is that they would not drink alcohol and thus would not cause unrest in the apartment building, neighborhood or the workplace. In this sense, it would not make sense to place a person who claims to be a Muslim but lives unconcerned with religious obligations among the first choices as he might also drink alcohol and live a more individualist life. However; many respondents made such statements indicating preference for non-observant Muslims due to the importance attributed to another factor -that is sharing of traditions and customs which have a wider scope than attitudes towards alcohol.

An average person in Turkey is found to be conservative about his/her customs and the lifestyle he/she is used to. The minorities are generally interpreted to be strangers they cannot get on well with because of the divergence in traditions. Alevis, Kurds and non-Muslims are believed to have completely different values and habits. These cultural differences are interpreted to be highly important and different cultures are perceived to be threatening. The differences or similarities among distinct groups are evaluated on the basis of traditions. While the ideological polarization between Islamists and secularists plays a greater role in shaping attitudes of highly educated individuals, those with lower education levels are more influenced by these cultural divergences.

A more general observation regarding the attitudes of Turkish respondents with respect to tolerance is that they are aware of the fact that discrimination is not an appreciated manner. This approach has been embraced in discourse and the expression that “of course I do not mean to rank people among themselves, the humanity is important as a whole, every individual is equally valuable for me” was continuously repeated during the interviews. Practically; however, among the forty respondents interviewed, only one less religious lady with low education level declined from putting the figures in questions in an order of preferences. The other thirty-nine did not refrain from mentioning their preferences even though whenever consulted a little longer, most of them used the same rhetoric of condemning intolerance. A religious female interviewee who was a primary-school graduate repeated several times that she would not make discrimination among any of these figures in the questions as for her the only criterion for forming close ties with other people was the person’s belief in God. The

same lady; however, ordered the cards in all three questions eventually and placed the observant Muslim at the top in each case. Regarding the third question, she even mentioned that the boss with the calligraphy of Bismillah and the picture of the Ka'ba in his office would be her first choice because he was probably the most trustworthy person among the others. She also added that Bismillah and the Ka'ba came before everything else for her. This example and many similar others indicate that what Turkish respondents argue in theory and what they do in practice do not coincide as they preach tolerance while acting intolerant towards other groups by stating their unwillingness to be in close proximity to them.

### **6.3. Concluding Remarks**

The main conclusion reached is that Turkish people are largely intolerant. This lack of tolerance is a consequence of their strict commitment to their own identities and traditions. Although tolerance and related to it democracy are defined through compromise among divergent view-points and unity within diversity, the Turkish respondents were found to attribute too much importance to shared characteristics and customs totally ignoring the possibility of consensus among disagreeing parties. This attitude was even more strongly observed among individuals with lower education levels. The same conservative attitude also becomes visible in the Turkish respondents' emphasis on the significance of family life. The preservation of cultural values and traditional life-styles, which is considered to be crucial for the well-being of the community, begins in the family and hence the protection of the family members – especially the women and children- is regarded to be much more significant than provision of security in business relations.

The more careful approach adopted by the respondents in choosing their neighbors compared to the outlook embraced in talking about people they would work with signifies the context-sensitive nature of tolerance. The respondents were observed to display different dispositions towards the same group when asked in different contexts. The widely-observed tendencies discussed above –clinging on to traditions and customs, suspicion and even intolerance towards strangers, and importance attributed to family as a societal institution- make clear that the Turkish society has not

experienced a complete transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* in Toennies's terms<sup>3</sup>. In Durkheim's terminology (1951), on the other hand, personal freedoms in Turkey are not on rise and the danger of anomie has not become pressing for the Turkish society yet. These attitudes observed among the Turkish people and the deficiency in the development of individualism signaled by them indicate that civic culture has also not flourished in Turkey. Civic culture requires cooperation, solidarity and reciprocity among the members of a community. Lack of these values can even lead to the conclusion that democracy in Turkey does not have its roots in the society and hence does not stand firm. Democracy becomes vulnerable when it is a democracy without democrats (Bracher, 1970).

The significance of personal experiences in determining attitudes towards different groups reflects the importance of the role played by personal ties in societal relations in Turkey. This is also a common feature of traditional societies where "both time and space" are "firmly grounded in the local". In these types of societies knowledge is produced through local belief systems and personal experiences. The reliability of a healer in a traditional society, for instance, is based on the community's belief in his/her abilities while in a modern society individuals believe in doctors because "they trust the system of expertise they (doctors) represent" (Allen & Hill, 2004, p.369). Acting on the basis of personal vs. systemic indicators constitutes the main distinction between traditional and modern societies. Attitudes with respect to tolerance are also shaped through the same criterion. In modern societies, individuals are expected to tolerate others not because they know them in person but because they believe in the security provision aspect of the system. Individuals, under these circumstances, do not perceive strangers as threats to their survival and hence more easily act with toleration towards different groups.

The importance of personal ties in shaping dispositions of tolerance, from a different perspective, points to the relevance of theories of social interaction discussed in the first chapter. Examples verifying both the contact and the conflict hypotheses were found in the interviews. The conclusion reached about these hypotheses is that the

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<sup>3</sup> Toennies (2002) saw the modern world as loss of *Gemeinschaft* or human community that was built on kinship and neighborhood. This traditional community nourished collective sentiments such as virtue and honor while the Industrial Revolution and the modern society developed afterwards undermined the importance of family and tradition by fostering individualism. This new form of society was labeled as *Gesellschaft* by Toennies.

nature of the contact between the respondent and members of a certain group determines the permanent values and hence the attitudes towards that group as a whole.

Regarding the impacts of the two major independent variables of this analysis, the briefest explanation is that they do not create much difference in the individual levels of tolerance. As the respondents were generally found to be intolerant, these factors are not observed to move individuals from tolerance to intolerance or vice versa. Education level was found to be most influential in the determination of the target groups that were the least preferred, or to put it more bluntly, those that were not tolerated. Respondents with higher education levels were more tolerant towards ethnic or religious minorities and focused more on the current ideological polarization in Turkey. Traditional cultural divergences were not perceived as serious threats by the highly educated individuals whereas among the respondents with lower education levels, the general tendency was to interpret strangers –i.e. the minorities- to be threatening. These interviewees placed ethnic or religious minorities at the very bottom of their scales of preferences as these groups emphasize identity differences.

The dissimilarity between the target groups of intolerance by the two groups of respondents with different education levels might be explained through Inglehart and Welzel's argument that once individuals' physical and economic security is fulfilled, they direct their attention towards values such as individuality, autonomy and self-expression. The more tolerant attitudes towards minorities by highly educated individuals can be attributed to their feelings of safety due to the high socio-economic status they have in the society. Feeling safe and overcoming threat perceptions of these groups, individuals with higher education levels are expected to tolerate minorities and even support their rights and freedoms. The individuals with lower education levels, on the other hand, easily feel anxious about being excluded as they do not interpret themselves to be indispensable to the society. The members of this group, hence, refrain from being critical about the general principles of Turkish society. They were observed to avoid making aggressive comments about either poles of the ideological divergence in Turkey as talking critically about either the secular Republic or Islam would be threatening for them.

The initial expectation with regard to the other major independent variable of this analysis, religiosity, was that it would assert its influence most strongly on attitudes

towards non-Muslims. This prospect was based on the idea that religious respondents would be more seriously concerned with religious divergences and hence would be more suspicious of non-Muslim minorities. However, this was not found to be the case. Religiosity was not observed to have an impact on dispositions towards non-Muslims. Changing levels of religiosity was observed to make a significant difference only in attitudes towards the Kurdish minority.

The highly and less religious respondents were observed to converge in their attitudes towards non-Muslims. This specific group of minorities is respected in Turkey and is sometimes preferred even over members of the majority by the highly educated members of both of these groups due to certain talents and knowledge they are believed to have. Alevis, on the other hand, were never preferred over the majority by any group of respondents. They were positively evaluated only by the highly educated members of the low religiosity group in certain cases. The fact that brings Alevis closer to this group is the secular life style they have in common. However; the attitudes of the highly religious respondents towards Alevis are obviously harsher. Thus the question that is raised is what might be the factor that causes the difference in high religiosity respondents' attitudes towards non-Muslims and Alevis? If the motive behind their intolerance towards Alevis was their sensitivity in religious identifications, they would be as intolerant towards non-Muslims. Thus, the impact of official regulations on individual attitudes might be observable in this finding.

Non-Muslims constitute the only officially recognized minority group in Turkey and this formal status might help them receive more accepting and more tolerant responses from individuals in general. In this analysis, attitudes towards non-Muslims were found to be more easy-going than expected. The official minority status provides members of this group with the legitimacy to be different and so the peculiarities they have are not interpreted to be wrong or threatening and are even accepted to be natural. As the same formal status is not granted to Alevis, their difference from the majority is considered artificial. This reasoning leads to the argument that Alevis emphasize these man-made differences just to obtain some benefits. Then, a conclusion might be that the legitimate opportunity to be different is provided to some groups through an official minority status.

This linkage between the official implementation on the one hand and individual values, ideas and attitudes on the other calls to mind Almond and Verba's (1963) stance regarding the relationship between political structure and political culture. In their renowned book *Civic Culture*, they emphasized the significance of political culture for political systems; yet still refrained from specifying a direction of causation in this relationship. They just indicated that the political structure and the political culture in a context are in flux; implying that both has an impact on the other. Some other scholars have also repeated the same two-way relationship. Diamond (1984) also defined the relationship between these two aspects of politics as a reciprocal one. Inglehart (1988) emphasized that democracies are shaped by the interplay of economic, institutional and structural factors, also indicating an interaction between these different aspects.

A more surprising impact of religiosity can be recognized on highly religious respondents' attitudes towards Kurds. More positive dispositions regarding proximity with this group are observed among these respondents. While individuals of low religiosity perceive being close to this group as a threat, more religious interviewees focus on how oppressed Kurdish people are and how unreasonable these distinctions based on ethnic identities are. This tolerance towards Kurds by highly religious individuals might be explained through the higher importance attributed to religious identity by them compared to the attention paid to other classifications. The significance of promoting religious unity as an attempt to end ethnic divisions –these findings support the relevance of this method as well- has long been discussed to be a major solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey if it could be managed successfully. Calls to solidarity through religious identity could be successful in deemphasizing ethnic divisions and in putting an end to the conflict in the South Eastern Turkey. Ethnically Turkish, religious people would play the major role in this peace-making process due to their tolerant tendencies towards Kurdish people.

Among all the target groups used in these interviews, Alevis constituted the least tolerated, and in other words, the most oppressed group, followed by Kurds and non-Muslim minorities in order. Although oppression might not be the right word to explain the relationship between the Islamists and the secularists, social division on the basis of ideological diversity obviously exists in Turkey. The relationship between these two groups of the majority can also be defined as one of intolerance and impatience.

When all these discussions regarding tolerance in the Turkish society are brought together, a major conclusion would be that many different factors play significant roles in determining individuals' attitudes in regard to tolerance. It has been proved that tolerance is not a simple individual trait that can easily be explained through individual characteristics. Outside factors such as the identity of the target group to be tolerated or the context of toleration are also relevant to tolerant dispositions of an individual. Different findings produced for different questions supports the relevance of the context for attitudes of tolerance. The responses for the first two questions indicate that the major minority groups –Kurds, Alevis and Armenians as the representatives of non-Muslims- in Turkey are obviously socially excluded. Regarding the first question, the widespread view is that the best neighbors would be the ones that share similar ideas, values and life-styles with the respondent and his/her family and this similarity is believed to be possible only among Sunni Muslims. Armenians, Alevis and Kurds are all ranked very low on the scale of preferences, although their ranking changes to a certain extent depending on the personal characteristics of the respondents.

The alternative structure of the third question produced different findings. When the groups in question were placed in a hierarchically higher position than the respondent, the ideological polarization was found to attract more attention than the majority-minority division in Turkey. It was observed that the least preferred groups mentioned above move higher on the lists of preferences and the ideological other is placed at the bottom of the lists. It was obvious that being hierarchically under the “ideological other” was interpreted to be the largest threat due to the idea that the members of these two ideologically clashing groups, both belonging to the majority, would not be weak and shy bosses as the minorities were expected to be. There was certainly a suspicion and fear that the “ideological other” would be at least disturbing – perhaps even detrimental- for their survival once it has the authority.

This observation on the respondents' anxiety about the expected coercion by other powerful groups coincides with a major criticism directed towards illiberal democracies. A critical reading of illiberal democracies makes the argument that in these regimes people are afraid to lose power. Individuals feel the fear that they will not be able to get it back once they lose the power. While they seem to be concerned about the functioning of the democratic system in this case, they are also anxious about the attitudes of their fellow citizens. They suppose that the new power-holders will be

authoritarian and even oppressive on them. These expectations from fellow citizens signal Turkish society's intolerance in particular and the lack of a civic culture in a broader sense.

Among demographics, gender and age were found to have some impact even though not as frequently. Both made their influences more strongly felt in responses to the specific target group of unmarried couple living together. Younger people and men were found to be more tolerant towards this couple. The conclusion that these two factors had a limited impact on attitudes of tolerance might indicate two different realities. Either they did not really breed significant results or the small number of observations available in this analysis made it impossible to observe the impact of these factors successfully. To be sure about the relevance of these two arguments, similar research with a higher number of respondents should be made so that the number of male and female respondents and of respondents belonging to different age intervals increase and make a healthier comparison possible.

With regard to the individual factors, personal experience played the most significant role in shaping attitudes towards tolerance; validating the importance of the social interaction hypotheses. The major independent variables, besides all the others, were observed to generate some difference, yet not as much as they had been expected to. Although both of them provide some explanation with regard to attitudes of tolerance by different respondent groups, the most significant conclusions were reached when their impacts were analyzed in interaction. The conclusion, then, should be that tolerance can never be explained as a consequence of a single specific factor. The absence or lack of tolerance specifically or of the civic values in general should be attributed to the interaction of several variables at different levels. This general result suggests that explanations through religions or religiosity –or directly through Islam– would not be sufficient in interpreting the current levels of democratization in different countries of the world.

Another exceptionally important aspect of these findings is their indication of the relevance of in-depth interviews in analyzing individual values and attitudes. The general conclusion of this study is that Turkish people are intolerant signifies that there is no significant distinction among the Turkish public in terms of their tolerance levels. The diversity of attitudes with respect to tolerance in Turkish society can be explained



with regard to a detailed analysis of tolerance towards different groups and on the basis of justifications and motivations provided to give meaning to these attitudes. The Turkish public is commonly intolerant; however, different groups have different explanations for their intolerant attitudes. Thus, a detailed interpretation of these explanations helps in grasping the role played by religiosity and by all other significant factors. If this final analysis had been done through survey research, almost no difference would have been observed among different groups of respondents as they would have been all labeled as intolerant individuals. The in-depth interviews enrich the knowledge on toleration in Turkey as the responses to all three questions include detailed justifications for individual preferences. The comments and expressions made by the respondents display the role of different factors in orienting them towards tolerance/intolerance. Alternative ideas and emotions were heard in these long conversations. The richness of the information provided through the interviews supports the significance of this methodology.

## CONCLUSION

The principle aim of this thesis was to take a step further in understanding the relationship between religion and democracy so that the differences of compatibility with democracy in various regions could be explained more accurately. A contribution of this thesis to the earlier works is its focus on the role of religiosity in this relationship. Emphasizing the significance of the belonging dimension, most of these studies refrained from suggesting a significant role to religiosity in their depiction of the factors assisting and blocking democratization. This thesis attempted to provide a more comprehensive understanding of religion as a social phenomenon; taking into consideration both of its dimensions –belonging and individual religiosity. This more detailed exploration would enable a better understanding of the circumstances paving the way to successful democratization. Religiosity, in this thesis, was not accepted as a personal characteristics shared evenly by all human beings. Rather, the impact of religiosity was analyzed among members of each denomination separately with the idea that more religious individuals in an affiliation would reflect the characteristics of that belief system more strongly due to their higher commitment to its norms. Thus, religiosity and its reflections depended on the affiliation.

Another contribution is the extensive focus on the individual level analysis. The earlier works had the tendency to make generalizations about the affiliations through comparisons on the basis of their principles or of the forms of government dominant in regions where the population predominantly belongs to these denominations. The importance of the differences in the individuals' understanding of belief systems and practicing them is missed by this method. The macro level observations, thus, either ignore

the significance of individual interpretations for religions and how important individual interpretations and attitudes are to the political regimes or accept the then-dominant interpretation as the only alternative. By adopting the individual level analysis, this thesis did not talk about the faiths of Islam or Christianity but rather made comments on individual Muslims, Protestants or Catholics.

The individual level analyses on democratization extensively focused on the cultural requisites, as these factors were directly related to the individual disposition. Although other requisites have also been identified for successful democratization, the recent studies on the subject emphasize the significance of individual attitudes due to the glorification of liberal democracy that stresses the importance of individual rights and freedoms besides the proper institutional arrangements. For a liberal democracy, support by the citizens is essential, and courted through embracing an appropriate culture. Long discussions have taken place on the details of this appropriate culture, which is referred to as civic culture. . Socioeconomic development and religions have been widely accepted as the major factors that give shape to cultural orientations. The impacts of both –on the individual level- on democratic attitudes were analyzed in this thesis.

Two dimensions of individual attitudes have been identified to be important for the democratization processes; i.e. individual support for democratic governance and the adoption of civic values. Both of them were used in this thesis with the intention of finding out which aspect is more relevant to democratization and seeing whether they cause divergences among religious affiliations.

Although the main research question of this thesis considers the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes, this thesis also touched upon some other discussions on the topic. Moving step by step this thesis sought answers to several questions such as;

- Are religious affiliations really different in terms of compatibility with democracy? If yes, how should compatibility be defined; on the basis of support for democracy or of the adoption of civic values?

- What is the role of religiosity in shaping democratic attitudes on both dimensions; i.e. support for democracy and adoption of civic values?
- What is the role of socioeconomic development in shaping democratic attitudes on both dimensions?
- Is Islam, or to be more precise Turkish Islam, incompatible with democracy? In other words, is it really Islam that hinders democratization in the Muslim World?

Avoiding big claims, this thesis reached important conclusions about these questions. With respect to the compatibility debate, no significant difference was observed among the four affiliations in terms of attributing importance to democracy. They were; however, found to diverge in terms of internalization of civic values by their members. In the first statistical analysis in Study 1, it was found out that being both a Muslim and a Protestant increased the likelihood of attaching importance to democracy. This finding certainly refutes the claim that Muslims and Protestants constitute the opposite poles in terms of the support they provide for democracy as in this test they were observed to converge in considering democracy important. The validity of the same argument placing Muslims and Protestants as different ends of a scale; however, was supported by the second analysis in Study 1 in which members of different affiliations were noticed to have different levels of predisposition to democratic values. Then, one of the noteworthy conclusions reached out of this thesis is that the basis of compatibility should be defined before the compatibility of different religious orientations to democracy is discussed.

In the second quantitative analysis in Study 1, Muslims and Orthodox Christians were observed to score lower than Catholic and Protestant Christians on average in six of the seven components of civic culture used in this thesis. The exception is in trusting personally known people, which actually is a debated indicator of democratic culture. Trust is valued in democracies because it is a sign of openness to diversity and of hopes for cooperation in the society. In this sense the more valued trust is trusting unknown people, which denotes motivation for cooperation among the citizens and for participation in the political and social processes. This two-by-two grouping among the four denominations in terms of their average scores of the six civic values fulfills expectations of a division

among civilizations by Huntington and his followers who grouped Muslim and Orthodox individuals in the same group of “deficient in democratization” and Catholics and Protestants in another group of “successful in democratization”.

Bringing the findings of the first and second statistical analyses together, the conclusion reached was that Orthodox and Muslim respondents considered living in a democratically governed country important, while they ranked considerably lower in internalizing civic values. This comparison between the two dimensions of democratic attitudes supports the most recent findings on the compatibility debate which argued that even though democracy is attractive for people living in undemocratic societies, their levels of civic culture fall short of what is needed (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.156). This way of thinking points to the significance of the adoption of democratic values for successful democratization as members of the expected-to-be-undemocratic affiliations were observed to score low in democratic values and were separated from the rest in this regard rather than in terms of support for democratic governance. These findings also support the idea that the respondents in surveys generally accept democratic answers to be politically correct. Individuals, being aware of the global glorification of democracy, give supportive answers whenever they hear questions on democracy. The questions on democratic values, however, do not mention anything about democracy directly and hence critical responses are more easily received for these questions. In light of these findings, it is certified once more that the compatibility debate should rather revolve around internalization of civic values. The significance of individual values in democratization –the main argument of the cultural theories on democratization- was displayed in the first quantitative analysis when they were added to the model as independent variables. This analysis signified the positive impact of these values on support for democracy. Despite the exceptional and confusing position of civic engagement and the exception of gender equality among Catholics, these values were all found to have positive impacts on support for democracy.

Within the first analysis of Study 1 on the importance attributed to democracy, the dimensions of religiosity were not found to make members of any affiliation –for one exception only- move towards considering democracy unimportant. Self-evaluated religiosity was found to have a significant fostering impact on attaching importance to

democracy among members of three affiliations; all the groups in the analyses except for Orthodox Christians. The importance of religion, on the other hand, was also found to promote Muslims' movement to considering democracy important while it kept Catholics in 'indifference'. A real negative effect, however, was exerted on Orthodox Christians by religious attendance, indicating that Orthodox respondents attending religious services frequently tended to attach unimportance to democracy.

These findings all together refuted both of the claims on the impact of religiosity on democratic attitudes. The commonly observed positive relationship between self-evaluated religiosity, for instance, and support for democracy disproves the interpretation of religiosity –regardless of religious affiliation- as an obstacle to democratization. The positive impacts of self-evaluated religiosity and importance of religion on importance attached to democracy by Muslims proves false the expectation that religiosity among members of believed-to-be undemocratic affiliations, mostly discussed through Islam, have an undemocratic effect. As this finding was also accompanied by the positive impact of belonging to Islam on support for democracy, the conclusion was skeptical about not only the general negative impact of religiosity on democratization, but also about the so-called-undemocratic nature of Islam.

The findings of the first quantitative analysis contradict with many –especially the earlier- works on the compatibility debate which used macro-level analyses and concluded that certain affiliations were totally incompatible with democracy. This individual level analysis; however, suggested that even though democracy is not widespread among Muslim countries, Muslims in general regarded living in a democratically governed country as important. An alternative interpretation, on the other hand, might be that members of all different affiliations are aware of the fact that democracy is a socially desirable concept and that they will be considered strange and even deviant if they do not provide support for it. Yet; even this interpretation can lead to optimism for the future of democracy and of the currently undemocratic regions as even the individuals who provide pro-democratic responses just because they are politically correct might be expected to internalize this attitude in time and believe in the significance of democratic governance.

The second analysis on democratic values; however, did not breed as optimistic results as the first one on attaching importance to democracy. It has already been stated above that when the mean values of the four affiliations in the seven democratic indicators included were compared, it was recognized that the Muslims and Orthodox Christians ranked the lowest in all of them, except for trusting personally known people. Optimism about the undemocratic affiliations, but indeed more about Islam, was lost more clearly based on the findings with respect to the impact of religiosity on democratic values. While no dimension of religiosity was ever found to exert a negative influence on any one of the civic values among Protestants, they in turn never generated a democratizing impact among Muslims. Regarding the Catholics and Orthodox Christians; however, both negative and positive impacts could be observed. Religions play significant roles in shaping cultural traits that, however, depend on many other factors besides religion. The third step of the analyses in this thesis aimed to observe in detail what was from religion and what was more from other factors in these democratic attitudes.

The other set of variables explored in this study was socioeconomic development which was measured on the individual level through education level and household income. These two variables were also accompanied by age and gender to control the model for demographics all together. With regard to the impact of this group of variables, the first point to be mentioned is that age and gender were not found to be significantly influential in any one of the statistical analyses; while the other two indicators made significant impacts on both support for democracy and the adoption of democratic values. The positive impact of education on importance attached to democracy was obvious in the first analysis. The same positive impact expected by income; however, could not be observed as increasing household income was found to decrease the tendency of Muslims and Catholics to move into considering democracy important while it did not generate any significant difference among Protestants and Orthodox Christians. In the second analysis, the general trend of these two indicators was observed to be exerting positive influence on democratic attitudes. However; several exceptions were also recognized. For instance, education was observed to have a negative impact on two dimensions of trust; i.e. trusting known people and general trust. While the negative relationship between education level and trusting known people was true for only Muslims, the negative relationship it had with general trust

was observed for members of all affiliations except Orthodox Christianity and thus needs further exploration. Education, for instance, might be expected to lead to deficiencies in civic culture due to the higher awareness of the world it provides to the individual who in return protects him/herself through defensive attitudes rather than adopting an open stance.

Another important point with regard to these two individual level indicators of socioeconomic development is that they were found to be significant for Muslim scores in almost all civic values. This finding might be useful in shaping the democratization policies in the currently undemocratic countries of the Muslim world. Hence, socioeconomic development on the individual level might assist successful democratization in predominantly Muslim countries through a higher commitment to democratic attitudes among the masses in these countries.

The adoption of civic culture would also be expected to play a significant role in Muslim democratization due to the largely positive relationship observed between civic values and Muslim support for democracy. The components of civic culture were most frequently found to be significant for Muslims. While only two of these seven indicators were found to exert significant influence on support for democracy by members of the Christian denominations included in this study, five of them were observed to be significant for Muslims. The repeated affirmative impact of these values on Muslim support for democracy denotes the important role to be played by adoption of civic culture in Muslim democratization.

Among these values, tolerance was chosen for deeper analysis on Muslim democratization. Theoretically tolerance is different from the rest as it is directly related to the defining principles of democracy such as inclusiveness and equality. Empirically the findings regarding tolerance denoted that Muslims have a low mean score of tolerance and the belonging dimension of religion for Muslims has a negative impact on tolerance –as is the case with most civic values. All these findings together legitimize the concentration on tolerance; yet, especially the empirical analyses make it clear that tolerance is not the only value producing these results. Further investigation on Muslim democratization through adoption of civic values should pay attention to the other components of civic culture, for instance, gender equality. Gender equality deserves attention because Muslims also score



significantly low in this attitude. Tolerance was preferred over it in this thesis because theoretically, support for gender equality also seems to be an aspect of tolerance. Tolerance encourages equality among all different groups in a society divided on the basis of various criteria including gender.

Another finding with regard to tolerance attracted even more attention on this component of democratic culture. Although belonging to Islam was observed to have a negative impact on tolerance, none of the religiosity variables were observed to be significant for Muslim tolerance triggering the question ‘What is the major reason behind this negative relationship between being a Muslim and tolerance?’. Although Islam and religiosity have been the most frequently mentioned factors in these discussions, socioeconomic development is believed to be relevant as well. With the intention of understanding the main motivations behind individuals’ attitudes and inclinations with respect to democratic values, in-depth analysis on tolerance in Turkey was conducted in the light of all these findings and discussions.

The respondents were placed into four groups on the basis of the two most relevant factors shaping democratic attitudes as determined in the literature; i.e. religiosity and socioeconomic level represented by education level. Ten individuals from each group were interviewed, making a group of forty people overall. The ten respondents in each group were also equally divided between the sexes. The respondents were asked to choose a tenant who would also be their neighbor, an employer and an employee among the different groups targeted in these questions –i.e. Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, observant Sunni Muslims and non-observant Sunni Muslims. The target groups were selected with the intention of including all the possible divisions within Turkey; ethnic, religious, sectarian and the ones based on different life-styles.

The findings on tolerance in Turkey were not optimistic at all. The responses can easily be interpreted as a sign that civic culture has not flourished in Turkey and a complete transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* has not been accomplished. Yet, the Turkish masses are also aware of the fact that discrimination is not an appreciated or even easily accepted attitude. They do not feel comfortable with expressing their intolerance towards a group. Although intolerance was the common finding for all four groups interviewed,

different explanations were heard from them indicating the significance of listening to individual motives and interpretations in detail. This acknowledgment of the importance of detailed explanations indicates the relevance of in-depth interviews to this study as otherwise the Turkish people would be labeled as intolerant individuals altogether and the divergences within could not have been recognized. These similarities and differences identified within a large intolerant group paved the way to the recognition of various factors significant for shaping tolerance rather than leveling it.

To be clear about the relevance of different factors for tolerance, it should be stated that both religiosity and education level have significant impacts on tolerance in different aspects. Besides these personal factors, the context in which tolerance is asked for different groups also makes a significant effect on the responses. The comparisons on the basis of the main factors, then, were made separately for the first two questions initially and then for the third one. In renting a flat and giving a job, the levels of religiosity were important for the respondents' first choices. While highly religious respondents preferred observant Muslims over all the others, the less religious respondents found the non-observant Muslims to be the most appropriate choice. Yet, the other group of Sunni Muslim was also preferred over the minorities and was mentioned as the second choice. Different groups of religiosity were also observed to diverge in terms of their attitudes towards Kurds. Highly religious individuals displayed higher tolerance towards this ethnic minority group compared to the respondents with lower religiosity. The latter group usually mentioned Kurds among their least preferred groups whereas the former stated them just after the Sunni Muslim majority. Overall, responses to these two questions signify intolerance towards minorities –especially religious minorities- in Turkey as even the less religious group mentioned Armenians and Alevis as their last choices.

The difference in the context and the relationship between the respondent and the target groups resulted in different responses to the third question in which the respondents were asked to choose a boss to work for. Education level was found to be more important than religiosity in shaping responses to this question. The most striking finding with regard to the preferences of an employer was that Armenians and Alevis were placed in the first orders by highly educated respondents in this question, besides or even sometimes above

the group that was found to be the most similar to the respondents. These comparatively tolerant attitudes towards minorities by individuals with higher education levels need further exploration as it is surprising to observe a preference of an Armenian boss by a highly religious respondent –even though the respondent has high education level- in Turkey, a setting with an already accepted intolerant culture. This finding might be interpreted to support the argument that highly educated individuals do not interpret minorities to be threatening for their survival in the society as they are already secure in their places in the upper echelons of the society. Another factor that would make the respondents interpret the minorities to be less threatening than their rivals within the majority is the belief that the minorities would display weaker personalities, even when hierarchically above the respondent. This surprising finding might also be explained with reference to the contact hypothesis which suggests that frequent contact with a group would reduce the prejudice towards it, encouraging higher tolerance. Further research is needed to make more explicit comments on the relevance of these arguments.

In responses to the third question, the “ideological other” was the least preferred target among the highly educated respondents. The respondents with lower education levels; however, did not emphasize such deep divisions within the Sunni Muslim majority and refrained from being critical of either Islam or Kemalism. The ideological polarization, thus, is more common among educated members of the Turkish society who feel more comfortable with objecting to the norms of the public in general. All these findings denote that linear movements of tolerance were not observed with changing levels of religiosity or education although both were significant in determining the form of tolerance by different groups. A last point to be emphasized is that while all these generalizations are made about different groups, personal experiences generate significant individual exceptions.

So, the overall conclusion of this in-depth analysis is that Islam or religiosity cannot be the major reason behind intolerance in Turkey as many other factors also attracted considerable attention in the explanations provided and references to Islam were not often made. Attention might be diverted to the socioeconomic situation of the country. A concluding remark might be that Turkey has not experienced the material satisfaction

explained by Inglehart and Welzel yet and that is why all individuals –regardless of religion or education level- are obviously skeptical about diversity and strangers.

The last words with regard to this thesis and on the prospects for future research on the role of religion and religiosity on democratization is that individual attitudes and as a dimension of it adopting civic values –rather than support for democracy- act as more appropriate tools to explain different experiences with democratization. Both religion and religiosity deserve to occupy a large space in the democratization discussions. While Muslims were observed to be as supportive of democracy as the Christians, being a Muslim led to lower scores in civic values and Muslim intolerance was also supported by the in-depth analysis on the basis of the Turkish case study. The expected negative impact of religiosity was only observed in the second quantitative analysis as higher religiosity generally led to attaching higher importance to democracy. The in-depth analysis, on the other hand, emphasized several other factors relevant to tolerance posing a doubt to the hypothesis that Islam acts as the main hindrance to Muslims' tolerance. It was obvious that in-depth analysis provided a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between religiosity and democratic tendencies. Thus, the conclusion is that as is common for social phenomena, democratic attitudes are hard to explain through a single indicator. Even if religion and religiosity are focused on, it should be recalled that individual interpretations, rather than the written principles of the belief systems practically dominate life and this fact breeds optimism as the dominant interpretations may change in time, paving the way to a more tolerant –or in other words, a more democratic- understanding. As this method was found to be informative and helpful, a better understanding of the relationship between these complex concepts can be provided through the application of the same or similar methods in different regions of the world, i.e. the Middle East and both Western and Eastern Europe separately, so that the opportunity to compare the results reached in different regions becomes available.

## APPENDIX 1

### DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL THE VARIABLES USED

	Mean (St. Dev.)	Response Range	Description
<b>v162. Importance of living in a democratically governed country</b>	8,63 (1,91)	1-10	1= Not at all important 10= Absolutely important
<u>recoded: importance of democracy</u>	2,77 (0,48)	1-3	1= Not at all important 3= Absolutely important
<b><u>Demographics</u></b>			
v235. Gender	0,48 (0,50)	0-1	1= Male, 0= Female
v237. Age	41,45 (16,40)	15-98	
v238. education__level	0,60 (0,49)	0-1	0= Less than secondary education completed 1= At least secondary education completed
v253. Household Income	4,63 (2,24)	1-10	1= Lowest, 10= Highest (in what decile your household is)
<b><u>Denominations</u></b>			
<b>(muslim reference category)</b>			
Roman Catholic (roman_catholics)	0,23 (0,42)	0-1	0= others 1=catholics
Protestant (prots)	0,10 (0,31)	0-1	0= others 1=protestants

Orthodox (orthodox)	0,11 (0,31)	0-1	0=others 1=orthodox
<b>Religiosity</b>			
v9. importance_religion	0,74 (0,44)	0-1	1= Religion important 0= Religion not important
v187. self_evaluated_religiosity	0,72 (0,45)	0-1	1= A religious person 0= Not a religious person
v186. religious_attend	0,51 (0,50)	0-1	1= Frequent attendance in religious service 0= Rare or none attendance in religious service
<b>Interaction variables (denominations and religiosity)</b>			
importance_religion_catholics	0,18 (0,38)	0-1	0= Catholics who claim religion to be not important 1= Catholics who claim religion to be important
importance_religion_prot	0,09 (0,28)	0-1	0= Protestants who claim religion to be not important 1= Protestants who claim religion to be important
importance_religion_orth	0,09 (0,28)	0-1	0= Orthodox who claim religion to be not important 1= Orthodox who claim religion to be important
self_evaluated_catholics	0,19 (0,39)	0-1	0= Catholics who claim to be not religious 1= Catholics who claim to be religious
self_evaluated_prot	0,09 (0,29)	0-1	0= Protestants who claim to be not religious 1= Protestants who claim to be religious
self_evaluated_orth	0,09 (0,29)	0-1	0= Orthodox who claim to be not religious 1= Orthodox who claim to be religious
religious_attend_catholics	0,12 (0,35)	0-1	0= Catholics who claim to attend religious service rarely or never 1= Catholics who claim to attend religious service frequently

religious_attend_prot	0,08 (0,28)	0-1	0= Protestants who claim to attend religious service rarely or never 1= Protestants who claim to attend religious service frequently
religious_attend_orth	0,05 (0,21)	0-1	0= Orthodox who claim to attend religious service rarely or never 1= Orthodox who claim to attend religious service frequently

## COMPONENTS OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

### tolerance\_neighbor

Factor score of;

v35. People of different race not wanted as neighbors	0,83 (0,38)	0-1	1= Not mentioned 0= Mentioned
v37. Immigrants/Foreign workers not wanted as neighbors	0,78 (0,41)	0-1	1= Not mentioned 0= Mentioned
v39. People of different religion not wanted as neighbors	0,83 (0,38)	0-1	1= Not mentioned 0= Mentioned
v42. People who speak a different language not wanted as neighbors	0,84 (0,37)	0-1	1= Not mentioned 0= Mentioned

### general\_trust

Factor score of;

v23. interpersonal_trust	0,25 (0,43)	0-1	0= Need to be very careful 1= Most people can be trusted
v47. advantage_fair	5,66 (2,74)	1-10	1= People would try to take advantage of you 10= People would try to be fair

**trust\_people\_known**

Factor score of;

v125. How much you trust your family?	3,81 (0,47)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely
v126. How much you trust your neighborhood?	2,90 (0,80)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely
v127. How much you trust people you know personally?	2,99 (0,75)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely

**trust\_people\_unknown**

Factor score of;

v128. How much you trust people you meet for the first time?	1,98 (0,78)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely
v129. How much you trust people of another religion?	2,36 (0,83)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely
v130. How much you trust people of another nationality?	2,22 (0,84)	1-4	1= Do not trust at all, 1= Do not trust very much 3= Trust somewhat, 4= Trust completely

**engagement\_civic**

Factor score of;

v25. Sport or recreational organization	0,27 (0,44)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
v26. Art, music or educational organization	0,21 (0,40)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
v29. Environmental organization	0,14 (0,35)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member



v30. Professional organization	0,17 (0,37)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
v31. Humanitarian or charitable organization	0,18 (0,38)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
v32. Consumer organization	0,11 (0,31)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
<b>democratic__practice</b>			
Factor score of;			
v28. Political party	0,18 (0,38)	0-1	0= Do not belong, 1= Member
v96. Signing a petition	0,56 (0,50)	0-1	0= Would never do, 1= Possibly do or have done
v97. Joining in boycotts	0,37 (0,48)	0-1	0= Would never do, 1= Possibly do or have done
v98. Attending peaceful demonstrations	0,50 (0,50)	0-1	0= Would never do, 1= Possibly do or have done
<b>gender__equality</b>			
Factor score of;			
v61. Men make better political leaders	2,52 (0,94)	1-4	1= strongly agree 4= strongly disagree
v62. University education is more important for a boy	3,03 (0,86)	1-4	1= strongly agree 4= strongly disagree
v63. Men make better business executives	2,65 (0,95)	1-4	1= strongly agree 4= strongly disagree

## APPENDIX 2

### DILEMMAS

#### *Dilemma 1*

*Mehmet Bey işe alımlarda çingenelerin başvurularının değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğine inanıyor çünkü çingenelerin hırsızlığa meyilli olduklarını düşünüyor.*

Sizce Mehmet Bey'in hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularının değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini düşünmesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıklayabilir misiniz?

Peki Mehmet Bey'in bu düşüncesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularının değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini düşünmekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Yukarıda bahsettiğimiz Mehmet Bey yanlarında çalıştırmak için işçi arayan arkadaşlarına çingenelerin başvurularını değerlendirmemeleri gerektiğini söylemek istiyor. Çünkü bildiğimiz gibi Mehmet Bey çingenelerin hırsızlığa meyilli olduklarını düşünüyor.*

Sizce Mehmet Bey'in hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularını değerlendirmemeleri gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıklayabilir misiniz.

Peki Mehmet Bey'in çingeneler hakkındaki bu düşüncesini söze dökmek istemesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularının değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini söylemek istemekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Bu bizim Mehmet Bey bir gün kendi manav dükkanı için bir çırak almaya karar veriyor ve bunun için dükkanının ve çevredeki dükkanların duvarlarına ilan asıyor. İlanı görüp gelenlerle 5-10 dk sohbet edip onları yakından tanımaya çalışıyor. Bu gelenlerden birinin çingene olduğunu anladığı anda ise o kişiye başka bir soru sormadan reddediyor çünkü biliyorsunuz ki Mehmet Bey çingenelerin hırsızlığa meyilli olduklarını düşünüyor.*

Peki Sizce Mehmet Bey'in hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularını açıkça reddetmesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız.

Peki Mehmet Bey'in çingeneler hakkındaki bu düşüncesinden dolayı az önce anlattığım şekilde davranması hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de hırsızlığa meyilli oldukları için çingenelerin iş başvurularını değerlendirilmemekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

## ***Dilemma 2***

*Bakkal Ömer bir dükkanda aynı anda çok fazla müşteri olduğunda, müşterileri öncelik sırasına koymak gerektiğini düşünüyor. Bunu yaparken de Kürt müşterilere hep en son hizmet verilmesi gerektiğine inanıyor çünkü Kürtlerin işsiz oldukları için aceleleri olmadığını düşünüyor.*

Sizce Bakkal Ömer'in işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için Kürt müşterilere hep en son hizmet verilmesi gerektiğini düşünmesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Peki Bakkal Ömer'in bu düşüncesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için Kürt müşterilere hep en son hizmet verilmesi gerektiğini düşünmekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Bakkal Ömer diğer dükkan sahibi arkadaşlarına dükkanları kalabalık olduğunda müşterileri öncelik sırasına koymaları ve en son Kürt müşterilere hizmet vermeleri gerektiğini söylemek istiyor çünkü bildiğimiz gibi Bakkal Ömer Kürtlerin işsiz oldukları için aceleleri olmadığını düşünüyor.*

Sizce Bakkal Ömer'in işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için Kürt müşterilere hep en son hizmet verilmesi gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Peki Ömer'in bu düşüncesini söze dökmek istemesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için Kürt müşterilere hep en son hizmet verilmesi gerektiğini söylemek istemesi uygun mu?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Bakkal Ömer, kendi dükkanı kalabalık olduğunda müşterileri öncelik sırasına koyuyor. En son da Kürt müşterilere hizmet veriyor çünkü Kürtlerin işsiz oldukları için aceleleri olmadığını düşünüyor.*

Sizce Bakkal Ömer'in işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için kendi bakkal dükkanında Kürtlere en son hizmet vermesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Peki Bakkal Ömer'in Kürtler hakkındaki bu düşüncesinden dolayı az önce bahsettiğim şekilde davranması hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de işsiz olduklarından aceleleri olmadığı için Kürt müşterilere en son hizmet vermekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

### ***Dilemma 3***

*Ahmet Bey eşcinsellerin ailelerin yaşadıkları yerlere taşınmalarına izin verilmemesi gerektiğine inanıyor çünkü eşcinsellerin yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirdiklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Ahmet Bey'in yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirecekleri için eşcinsellerin ailelerin yaşadıkları yerlere taşınmalarına izin verilmemesi gerektiğini düşünmesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Peki Ahmet Bey'in bu düşüncesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirecekleri için eşcinsellerin ailelerin yaşadıkları yerlere taşınmalarına izin verilmemesi gerektiğini düşünmekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Yukarıda bahsettiğimiz Ahmet Bey arkadaşlarına ailelerinin yaşadıkları yerlerde eşcinsellerin yaşamalarına izin vermemeleri gerektiğini söylemek istiyor. Çünkü bildiğimiz gibi Ahmet Bey eşcinsellerin yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirdiklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Ahmet Bey'in yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirdikleri için eşcinsellerin ailelerinin yaşadıkları yerlere taşınmalarına izin vermemeleri gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Peki Ahmet Bey'in eşcinseller hakkındaki bu düşüncesini söze dökmesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirdikleri için eşcinsellerin ailelerinin yaşadıkları yerlere taşınmalarına izin verilmemesi gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Yukarıda bahsettiğimiz Ahmet Bey ailesi ile birlikte yaşadığı apartmana bir eşcinselin taşınacağını öğrenince hemen apartman yönetim kurulunu toplayıp buna engel oluyor. Çünkü Ahmet Bey eşcinsellerin yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirdiklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Ahmet Bey'in yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirecekleri için bir eşcinselin yaşadığı apartmana taşınmasını engellemesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız.

Siz Ahmet Bey'in eşcinseller ile ilgili bu düşüncesinden dolayı az önce bahsettiğim şekilde davranması hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de Ahmet Bey yaşadıkları yere ahlaksızlık getirecekleri için bir eşcinselin yaşadığı apartmana taşınmasını engellemekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

#### ***Dilemma 4***

*Hüseyin Bey müslümanların müslüman olmayanlarla evlenmemesi gerektiğine inanıyor çünkü müslüman olmayanların aile yapısına gereken değeri vermediklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Hüseyin Bey'in aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayanlarla müslümanların evlenmemesi gerektiğini düşünmesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız.

Hüseyin Bey'in bu düşüncesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayanlarla müslümanların evlenmemesi gerektiğini düşünmekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Yukarıda bahsettiğimiz Hüseyin Bey arkadaşlarına müslümanların müslüman olmayanlarla evlenmelerine izin vermemeleri gerektiğini söylemek istiyor. Çünkü*

*bildiğimiz gibi Hüseyin Bey müslüman olmayanların aile yapısına gereken değeri vermediklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Hüseyin Bey'in aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayanlarla müslümanların evlenmelerine izin vermemeleri gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemesi uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız.

Hüseyin Bey'in bu düşüncesini söze dökmesi hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayanlarla müslümanların evlenmelerine izin vermemeleri gerektiğini arkadaşlarına söylemek istemekte haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

*Hüseyin Bey kızının müslüman olmayan biriyle evlenmesine engel oluyor çünkü müslüman olmayanların aile yapısına gereken değeri vermediklerini düşünüyor.*

Sizce Hüseyin Bey'in aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayan biriyle kızının evlenmesine engel olması uygun mu?

Bu verdiğiniz cevabı biraz açıkla mısınız?

Hüseyin Bey'in bu düşüncesinden dolayı az önce bahsettiğim şekilde davranması hakkında siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce de aile yapısına gereken değeri vermedikleri için müslüman olmayan biriyle kızının evlenmesine engel olmakta haklı mı?

Peki diyelim ki birisi sizin söylediğinizin tam aksini düşündüğünü söylüyor. Bu kişiyi sizin düşüncenizin doğru onun düşüncesinin yanlış olduğuna nasıl ikna edersiniz?

## **Dilemmas (translated in English)**

### ***Dilemma 1***

*Mehmet believes that job applications of Gypsies should not be taken into consideration because he thinks that they are inclined to steal.*

According to you, is it right for Mehmet to believe that Gypsies' job applications should not be taken into consideration because they are inclined to steal?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about this idea of Mehmet? Do you think he is right to believe that the job applications of Gypsies should not be taken into consideration because they are inclined to steal?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Mehmet, we talked about above, wants to tell his friends, who are looking for workers, that they should not take the job applications of Gypsies into consideration because as we know Mehmet thinks that Gypsies are inclined to steal.*

According to you, is it right for Mehmet to want to tell his friends that they should not take Gypsies' job applications into consideration because they are inclined to steal?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Mehmet's desire to express his ideas of Gypsies in words? Do you think he is right to want to say that the job applications of Gypsies should not be taken into consideration because they are inclined to steal?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?



*One day, Mehmet decides to employ someone to help him in his greengrocery and places an announcement on the walls of his shop and of the other shops around. He has a chat with the applicants for 5-10 minutes to know them better. Yet; once he recognizes the person is Gypsy, he immediately rejects the applicant even without asking another question because as you know Mehmet thinks that Gypsies are inclined to steal.*

According to you, is it right for Mehmet to directly reject the job applications Gypsies?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Mehmet's behaving in this way due to this idea he has? Do you think he is right not to take into consideration the job applications of Gypsies because they are inclined to steal?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

### ***Dilemma 2***

*Grocery shopkeeper Ömer thinks that when there are too many customers in a shop, the customers should be put in order of priority. He believes that, when doing this, Kurdish customers should be served the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed.*

According to you, is it right for Ömer to believe that Kurdish customers should always be served the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about this idea of shopkeeper Ömer? Do you think he is right to believe that Kurdish customers should always be served the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Grocery shopkeeper Ömer wants to tell his other shopkeeper friends that when their shops are crowded, they should put the customers in order of priority and should serve Kurdish customers the last because as we know Ömer thinks that they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed.*

According to you, is it right for shopkeeper Ömer to want to tell their friends that Kurdish customers should always be served the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Ömer's desire to express his ideas of Kurds in words? Do you think he is right to want to tell that Kurdish customers should always be served the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Grocery shopkeeper Ömer puts the customers in order of priority when his shop is crowded. He serves Kurdish customers the last because he thinks that they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed.*

According to you, is it right for shopkeeper Ömer to serve Kurdish customers the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Ömer behaving in this way due to his ideas on Kurds? Do you think he is right to serve Kurdish customers the last because they do not have time pressure as they are unemployed?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

### ***Dilemma 3***

*Ahmet believes that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in.*

According to you, is it right for Ahmet to believe that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because they bring immorality to the places they live in?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about this idea of Ahmet? Do you think he is right to believe that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because they bring immorality to the places they live in?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Ahmet, we talked about above, wants to tell his friends that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in.*

According to you, is it right for Ahmet to want to tell their friends that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Ahmet's desire to express his ideas of homosexuals in words? Do you think he is right to want to tell that homosexuals should not be allowed to move to neighborhoods where families live because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in.

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Ahmet, we talked about above, calls the administrative board of the building to a meeting when he learns that a homosexual will move to the building in which he lives with his family and prevents it because Ahmet thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in.*

According to you, is it right for Ahmet to prevent a homosexual to move to his building because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Ahmet behaving in this way due to his ideas on homosexuals? Do you think he is right to prevent a homosexual to move to his building because he thinks that homosexuals bring immorality to the places they live in?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

#### ***Dilemma 4***

*Hüseyin believes that Muslims should not marry non-Muslims because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life.*

According to you, is it right for Hüseyin to believe that Muslims should not marry non-Muslims because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about this idea of Hüseyin? Do you think he is right to believe that Muslims should not marry non-Muslims because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Hüseyin, we talked about above, wants to tell his friends not to let Muslims marry non-Muslims because as you know he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life.*

According to you, is it right for Hüseyin to want to tell their friends that *Muslims should not marry non-Muslims because non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life.*

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Hüseyin's desire to express his ideas of on-Muslims in words? Do you think he is right to want to tell Muslims should not marry non-Muslims because non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life.

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

*Hüseyin prevents his daughter to marry a non-Muslim because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life.*

According to you, is it right for Hüseyin to prevent his daughter to marry a non-Muslim because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life?

Can you briefly explain your answer?

What do you think about Hüseyin behaving in this way due to his ideas on non-Muslims? Do you think he is right to prevent his daughter to marry a non-Muslim because he thinks that non-Muslims do not attribute enough importance to family life?

If someone says that he/she thinks just the opposite of what you said. How would you persuade him that your way of thinking is right and his is wrong?

### APPENDIX 3

#### IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW TEXTS

##### Ev Kiralama

Bir gün eve geldiğinizde karşı dairenizin satılık olduğunu gördünüz. Bunca yıldır çalışıp yaptığınız birikimi değerlendirmek için o daireyi satın almanın çok iyi bir fikir olacağına karar verdiniz. Kiraya verip bilhassa emeklilik yıllarınızda rahat edebileceğinizi düşündünüz. Hem de daire de tam karşınızda olduğu için dairede aklınız da kalmayacaktı. Evi alır almaz sizin sokaktaki emlakçıya dairenin kiralık olduğunu söylediniz. Bütün gün işte olduğunuz için sizin gelen herkesle tek tek uğraşacak vaktiniz yoktu çünkü. Emlakçı 15 gün sonra elinde bir iki kağıtla size geldi. Sizin istekleriniz doğrultusunda ilk elemeyi yapmış sizin beğeneceğinizi düşündüğü beş kişiyle ilgili ayrıntılı bilgileri ise size getirdi. Bunlar emlakçının size getirdiği kartlar.

<b>Mehmet Bey</b>	<b>Gökhan Bey</b>
40'lı yaşlarda	40'lı yaşlarda
Dininin gereklerine uygun yaşayan Sunni Müslüman	Dininin gereklerini pek de gözetmeyen Sunni Müslüman
Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 3 yıldır çalışıyor.	Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 4 yıldır çalışıyor.
Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında	Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında
Evde 4 yıldır evli olduğu eşiyle yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.	Evde 3 yıldır evli olduğu eşiyle yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.
Eşi de kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.	Eşi de kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.
Eşi ev hanımı	Eşi ev hanımı

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Garbis Bey</b></p> <p>40'lı yaşlarda</p> <p>Ermeni</p> <p>Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 4 yıldır çalışıyor.</p> <p>Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında</p> <p>Evde 5 yıldır evli olduğu eşiyle yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.</p> <p>Eşi de kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.</p> <p>Eşi ev hanımı</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Azad Bey</b></p> <p>40'lı yaşlarda</p> <p>Kürt</p> <p>Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 3 yıldır çalışıyor.</p> <p>Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında</p> <p>Evde 2 yıldır evli olduğu eşiyle yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.</p> <p>Eşi de kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.</p> <p>Eşi ev hanımı</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Ali Bey</b></p> <p>40'lı yaşlarda</p> <p>Alevi</p> <p>Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 3 yıldır çalışıyor.</p> <p>Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında</p> <p>Evde 3 yıldır evli olduğu eşiyle yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.</p> <p>Eşi de kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.</p> <p>Eşi ev hanımı</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Emre Bey</b></p> <p>40'lı yaşlarda</p> <p>Dininin gereklerini pek de gözetmeyen Sunni Müslüman</p> <p>Saygın, sağlam bir özel firmada aşağı yukarı 4 yıldır çalışıyor.</p> <p>Aylık geliri 1. 250 – 1. 500 TL arasında</p> <p>Evde 3 yıldır birlikte olduğu kız arkadaşı ile yaşayacak. Çocukları yok.</p> <p>Kız arkadaşı da kendisi de İstanbul'da bir üniversiteden mezunlar.</p> <p>Kız arkadaşı ev hanımı</p>

## İşe Alım

Ufak çaplı alım satımlar yaptığımız aile şirketimize alınan, satılan ve depoda kalan malları takip edecek, işlerin kusursuz işlenmesini sağlayacak güvenilir birisini almak istiyorsunuz. Bu iş için yabancı dil bilinmesine gerek yok. Üniversite mezunu genç biri olması yeterli. Konu ile ilgilenen müdürünüz başvurular arasından ilk elemeleri yapıyor ve size beğeneceğinizi düşündüğü beş ismi getiriyor. Bunlar müdürünüzün size getirdiği, başvuruların tanıtıldığı kartlar.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Ahmet</b></p> <p>20' li yaşlarının ortasında</p> <p>Dininin gereklerine uygun yaşayan Sunni Müslüman</p> <p>İstanbul Üniversitesi, İşletme bölümünden mezun olmuş</p> <p>Askerliğini yapıp gelmiş</p> <p>Bu ilk işi olacak</p> <p>Yeni evli</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Berk</b></p> <p>20' li yaşlarının ortasında</p> <p>Dininin gereklerini pek de gözetmeyen Sunni Müslüman</p> <p>İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat bölümünden mezun olmuş</p> <p>Askerliğini yapıp gelmiş</p> <p>Bu ilk işi olacak</p> <p>Yeni evli</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Artun</b></p> <p>20' li yaşlarının ortasında</p> <p>Ermeni</p> <p>İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat bölümünden mezun olmuş</p> <p>Askerliğini yapıp gelmiş</p> <p>Bu ilk işi olacak</p> <p>Yeni evli</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Hüseyin</b></p> <p>20' li yaşlarının ortasında</p> <p>Alevi</p> <p>İstanbul Üniversitesi, İşletme bölümünden mezun olmuş</p> <p>Askerliğini yapıp gelmiş</p> <p>Bu ilk işi olacak</p> <p>Yeni evli</p>



## **Berdan**

20' li yaşlarının ortasında

Kürt

İstanbul Üniversitesi, İşletme bölümünden  
mezun olmuş

Askerliğini yapıp gelmiş

Bu ilk işi olacak

Yeni evli

## İş başvurusu

21 yaşındaki oğlunuz üniversiteyi bitirdikten sonra askere gidip geliyor ve iş başvuruları yapmaya başlıyor. Başvurduğu şirketlerden beşi onu ilk görüşmeye çağırıyor. Bu görüşmeler sonrası oğlunuz size şirketleri, patronları ve görüşmelerin nasıl geçtiğini anlatıyor. Sizin de fikrinizi almak istiyor.

Oğlunuzun bu beş şirket ile ilgili anlattıkları şunlar.

<p>Patron <b>Mustafa Bey</b> 50’li yaşlarda</p> <p>Masasının hemen arkasındaki duvarda Kabe resmi ve Bismillah yazısı göze çarpıyor</p> <p>Yurtdışından hediyelik eşya getiren bir şirket</p> <p>Şirkette 40-50 kişi çalışıyor</p> <p>Bir satış elemanı arıyorlarmış. İşin sigortası, servisi ve öğlen yemeği var</p> <p>Maaş da 1. 300- 1. 600 TL arasında olacakmış</p>	<p>Patron <b>Murat Bey</b> 50’li yaşlarda</p> <p>Masasının hemen arkasındaki duvarda Atatürk’ün farklı konumlarda çekilmiş resimleri göze çarpıyor</p> <p>Yurtdışından ayakkabı getiren bir şirket</p> <p>Şirkette 40-50 kişi çalışıyor</p> <p>Bir satış elemanı arıyorlarmış. İşin sigortası, servisi ve öğlen yemeği var</p> <p>Maaş da 1. 300- 1. 600 TL arasında olacakmış</p>
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<p>Patron <b>Agop Bey</b> 50’li yaşlarda</p> <p>Agop Bey’in odasının kapısında oldukça büyük bir haç göze çarpıyor</p> <p>Yurtdışından çeşitli takı ve aksesuarlar getiren bir şirket</p> <p>Şirkette 40-50 kişi çalışıyor</p> <p>Bir satış elemanı arıyorlarmış. İşin sigortası, servisi ve öğlen yemeği var</p> <p>Maaş da 1. 300- 1. 600 TL arasında olacakmış</p>	<p>Patron <b>Hasan Bey</b> 50’li yaşlarda</p> <p>Masasının arkasındaki Atatürk resminin hemen yanında Hz. Ali’nin bir resmi göze çarpıyor</p> <p>Yurtdışından çeşitli mutfak malzemeleri getiren bir şirket</p> <p>Şirkette 40-50 kişi çalışıyor</p> <p>Bir satış elemanı arıyorlarmış. İşin sigortası, servisi ve öğlen yemeği var</p> <p>Maaş da 1. 300- 1. 600 TL arasında olacakmış</p>
<p>Patron <b>Baran Bey</b> 50’li yaşlarda</p> <p>Baran Bey’in ofisinin duvarında göze çarpan tek şey bir Diyarbakırspor atkısı</p> <p>Yurtdışından inşaat malzemeleri getiren bir şirket</p> <p>Şirkette 40-50 kişi çalışıyor</p> <p>Bir satış elemanı arıyorlarmış. İşin sigortası, servisi ve öğlen yemeği var</p> <p>Maaş da 1. 300- 1. 600 TL arasında olacakmış</p>	

## In-depth Interview Texts (translated in English)

### “Renting a Flat”

One day, when you came back home, you noticed that the apartment across is for sale. You decided that it might be a good idea to buy that apartment as an investment. You thought that you might rent out the apartment and thus secure your retirement life. Besides, you would not worry about your apartment since it was so close to your own apartment. As soon as you bought the apartment, you made the real estate agent on your street know that you would rent it out and you had no time to spend for the visitors. 15 days later, the real estate agent showed up with a list of candidates for your apartment. Following are the information regarding these candidates.

<b>Mehmet</b>	<b>Gökhan</b>
In his forties.	In his forties.
An observant Sunni Muslim.	A non-observant Sunni Muslim.
Has been working in a reputable private company for three years.	Has been working in a reputable private company for four years.
Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.	Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.
He is going to stay in your apartment with his wife with whom he has been married for four years. They have no children.	He is going to stay in your apartment with his wife with whom he has been married for three years. They have no children.
He and his wife are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.	He and his wife are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.
His wife is a housewife.	His wife is a housewife.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Garbis</b></p> <p>In his forties.</p> <p>Armenian</p> <p>Has been working in a respectable private company for four years.</p> <p>Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.</p> <p>He is going to stay in your apartment with his wife with whom he has been married for five years. They have no children.</p> <p>He and his wife are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.</p> <p>His wife is a housewife.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Azad</b></p> <p>In his forties.</p> <p>Kurd</p> <p>Has been working in a respectable private company for three years.</p> <p>Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.</p> <p>He is going to stay in your apartment with his wife with whom he has been married for two years. They have no children.</p> <p>He and his wife are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.</p> <p>His wife is a housewife.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Ali</b></p> <p>In his forties.</p> <p>Alevi</p> <p>Has been working in a reputable private company for three years.</p> <p>Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.</p> <p>He is going to stay in your apartment with his wife with whom he has been married for four years. They have no children.</p> <p>He and his wife are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.</p> <p>His wife is a housewife.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Emre</b></p> <p>In his forties.</p> <p>A non-observant Sunni Muslim.</p> <p>Has been working in a reputable private company for three years.</p> <p>Monthly salary around 1. 250 – 1. 500 TLs.</p> <p>He is going to stay in your apartment with his girlfriend with whom he has been dating for three years. They have no children.</p> <p>He and his girlfriend are both graduates from a university in Istanbul.</p> <p>His girlfriend is a housewife.</p>

## “Giving a Job”

You are looking for a person who will take care of your small firm by following the purchases and the stocks after the sales. Therefore you want a trustworthy person to hire. He does not need to know any foreign languages for this position. Being young and being a university graduate fulfill your requirements. Your manager brings you information on five candidates that he thinks are appropriate for the position. Following are the names and the characteristics of these candidates.

<p><b>Ahmet</b></p> <p>In his mid-twenties</p> <p>An observant Sunni Muslim.</p> <p>Graduated from Istanbul University, Department of Management.</p> <p>Completed military service.</p> <p>This will be his first job.</p> <p>Just married.</p>	<p><b>Berk</b></p> <p>In his mid-twenties</p> <p>A non-observant Sunni Muslim.</p> <p>Graduated from Istanbul University, Department of Economics.</p> <p>Completed military service.</p> <p>This will be his first job.</p> <p>Just married.</p>
<p><b>Artun</b></p> <p>In his mid-twenties</p> <p>Armenian</p> <p>Graduated from Istanbul University, Department of Economics.</p> <p>Completed military service.</p> <p>This will be his first job.</p> <p>Just married.</p>	<p><b>Hüseyin</b></p> <p>In his mid-twenties</p> <p>Alevi</p> <p>Graduated from Istanbul University, Department of Management.</p> <p>Completed military service.</p> <p>This will be his first job.</p> <p>Just married.</p>

**Berdan**

In his mid-twenties

Kurd

Graduated from Istanbul University,  
Department of Management.

Completed military service.

This will be his first job.

Just married.

## “Working For”

You have a 21 year old son who completed military service after his graduation from university. He applied for several jobs and eventually five of the companies that he applied for invited him for an interview. After the interviews, your son tells you about the companies and their bosses. He wants you to share your views with him on the following lists.

<p><b>Mustafa</b>, the boss.</p> <p>In his fifties.</p> <p>He had a picture of Qa’ba and a script of Bismillah on the wall right behind his table.</p> <p>It is a company that imports souvenirs from abroad.</p> <p>Around 40-50 people work in this company.</p> <p>The company is looking for a salesman. It provides insurance, transportation expenses and lunch.</p> <p>The salary will be around 1. 300- 1. 600 TLs.</p>	<p><b>Murat</b>, the boss.</p> <p>In his fifties.</p> <p>He had different pictures of Atatürk on the wall right behind his table.</p> <p>It is a company that imports shoes from abroad.</p> <p>Around 40-50 people work in this company.</p> <p>The company is looking for a salesman. It provides insurance, transportation expenses and lunch.</p> <p>The salary will be around 1. 300- 1. 600 TLs.</p>
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<p><b>Agop</b>, the boss.</p> <p>In his fifties.</p> <p>He had a cross on the wall right behind his table.</p> <p>It is a company that imports accessories from abroad.</p> <p>Around 40-50 people work in this company.</p> <p>The company is looking for a salesman. It provides insurance, transportation expenses and lunch.</p> <p>The salary will be around 1. 300- 1. 600 TLs.</p>	<p><b>Hasan</b>, the boss.</p> <p>In his fifties.</p> <p>He had a picture of Atatürk and Caliph Ali on the wall right behind his table.</p> <p>It is a company that imports kitchen supplies from abroad.</p> <p>Around 40-50 people work in this company.</p> <p>The company is looking for a salesman. It provides insurance, transportation expenses and lunch.</p> <p>The salary will be around 1. 300- 1. 600 TLs.</p>
<p><b>Baran</b>, the boss</p> <p>In his fifties.</p> <p>He had a Diyarbakır scarf on the wall right behind his table.</p> <p>It is a company that imports construction materials from abroad.</p> <p>Around 40-50 people work in this company.</p> <p>The company is looking for a salesman. It provides insurance, transportation expenses and lunch.</p> <p>The salary will be around 1. 300- 1. 600 TLs.</p>	

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