

PRESS-PARTY PARALLELISM IN TURKEY AND IN THE UK

by

SALİH BAYRAM

Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Sabanci University
Spring 2011

© Salih Bayram 2011
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

PRESS-PARTY PARALLELISM IN TURKEY AND IN THE UK

Salih Bayram

PhD, Political Science, 2011

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu

Keywords: press-party parallelism, Turkish press, British press, elections, content analysis

This is a study of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, which refers to the degree to which the newspaper system parallels the party system. The study first provides a descriptive account of the history of press-party parallelism in the two countries. In the Turkish case, there was no discernible overall trend, from higher to lower parallelism or otherwise, but a number of ups and downs. In the British case, an overall decline is observed over time, but this conclusion is qualified by the differences in the behavior of the different segments of the British press.

The study then provides an evaluation of the modernization, commercialization and party system explanations. We do not see, contrary to the prediction based upon modernization approach, a smooth decline in parallelism over time, nor do we observe lower levels of parallelism in the commercialized periods in the two cases. Ideological polarization and cleavage voting, on the other hand, do seem to contribute to higher levels of political parallelism in the press.

In the last part of the study, newspapers coverages prior to 2007 elections in Turkey, and 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections in the UK were analyzed using a word-count based methodology. Contrary to our expectations, the level of parallelism was higher in the Turkish press than in the British press, and biased content in newspapers was not limited to opinion pages only, with news articles being just as biased as, and in some cases even more biased than, the opinion articles.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE VE İNGİLTERE’DE BASIN-PARTİ PARALELLİĞİ

Salih Bayram

Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora, 2011

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu

Anahtar Sözcükler: basın-parti paralelliği, Türk basını, İngiliz basını, seçimler, içerik analizi

Bu çalışmada, gazete sisteminin parti sistemi ile ne kadar paralellik gösterdiğini anlatan basın-parti paralelliği kavramı Türkiye ve İngiltere örnekleri üzerinden incelenmektedir. İlk olarak basın-parti paralelliğinin bu iki ülkedeki tarihi gelişimi incelenmiştir. Türkiye örneğinde, zaman içinde daha fazla paralellikten daha az paralelliğe doğru veya bunun dışında bir tek yönlü süreç değil, değişik dalgalanmalar gözlenmiştir. İngiltere örneğinde ise basının tamamı dikkate alındığında zamanla daha az paralellik gözlenmiş, ancak İngiliz basınındaki farklı piyasa segmentlerinin davranışları birbirinden farklı olmuştur.

Çalışmada ayrıca basın-parti paralelliği ile ilgili modernleşme, ticarileşme ve parti sistemi açıklamaları da incelenen iki örnekten yola çıkılarak değerlendirilmiştir. Modernleşme açıklamasının öngörüsünden farklı olarak, paralellikte zaman içinde sürekli bir azalma gözlenmemiş, ayrıca ticarileşmenin daha fazla olduğu dönemlerde paralelliğin daha az olacağı beklentisi de karşılanmamıştır. İdeolojik kutuplaşmanın ve grup aidiyetine bağlı oylamanın güçlü olduğu dönemlerde ise, hipotezlere uygun olarak, paralelliğin daha yüksek olduğu gözlenmiştir.

Çalışmanın son bölümünde Türkiye’deki 2007 seçimleri ile İngiltere’deki 2001, 2005 ve 2010 seçimleri öncesindeki gazete içerikleri kelime sayımına dayanan bir yöntem kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Beklentilerimizin aksine, Türk basınındaki paralelliğin İngiliz basınındaki paralellikten daha yüksek olduğu ve her iki örnekte de sadece köşe yazılarının değil, tarafsız olması beklenen haber yazılarının da yanlı bir tutum sergilediği, hatta çoğu zaman gazetelerdeki haber içeriğinin yorum içeriğinden daha yanlı olduğu gözlenmiştir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Fatoş Gökşen for encouraging me to pursue graduate studies instead of another line of career, and for introducing in her undergraduate classes many canonical texts on media and communications, which form part of the inspiration for this dissertation.

I would also like to thank Sabancı University, TÜBİTAK, and Yalova University, all of which provided financial support in various forms at different stages of the preparation of this dissertation.

My advisor Prof. Ali Çarkoğlu has been very friendly and supportive throughout the process, and provided much valuable and timely guidance. Prof. Sabri Sayarı and Prof. Ayşe Öncü made insightful comments on earlier drafts of the thesis, and provided critical advice that greatly improved the final product. Faculty and friends at Sabancı Univeristy also deserve mention for a superb scholarly atmosphere.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife and our kids, who have been a great source of joy, for making this whole process a pleasant journey.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I.....	1
CHAPTER 1	2
INTRODUCTION	2
1.1. Aims of the Study.....	3
CHAPTER 2	7
LITERATURE REVIEW	7
2.1. Normative Considerations	9
2.2. Empirical Literature	22
2.3. Explaining Parallelism	25
2.4. Conclusion.....	31
CHAPTER 3	33
METHODOLOGY	33
3.1. Political Parallelism and Its Components	33
3.2. Empirical Study of Press-Party Parallelism	36
3.3. Methodology Used in This Study.....	47
PART II.....	70
CHAPTER 4	71
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE TURKISH PRESS	71
4.1. Political Parallelism in First Turkish Newspapers – Until the First Constitutional Period (1831 - 1876).....	72
4.2. Political Parallelism in the First Constitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908).....	77
4.3. Political Parallelism in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918).....	80
4.4. Political Parallelism During the War of Independence (1918-1923).....	83
4.5. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Press	86
4.6. Political Parallelism in the Early Republican Era (1923-1931)	88
4.7. Political Parallelism in One-Party Era (1931-1946)	90
4.8. Political Parallelism in Transition to Democracy (1946-1950)	92
4.9. Political Parallelism in the Democratic Party Era (1950-1960)	95
4.10. Political Parallelism in 1960s, Beginnings of Class Politics (1961-1970)	97
4.11. Political Parallelism in 1970s, Left-Righth Polarization (1974-1980)	100
4.12. Political Parallelism in 1980s, ANAP Governments (1983-1991)	102
4.13. Political Parallelism in 1990s, Coalition Governments (1991-2002)	104
4. 14. Conclusion	107
CHAPTER 5	109
POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE BRITISH PRESS 1945 - 2005.....	109
5.1. Periodization	110
5.2. Segmented Nature of the British National Press	112
5.3. Endorsement Parallelism	114
CHAPTER 6	121
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS	121
6.1. Overall Level of Parallelism and Trends.....	122
6.2. Evaluating Explanations	124

PART III	135
CHAPTER 7	136
POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN NEWSPAPER CONTENT: COMMENT IS FREE, BUT FACTS ARE SACRED	136
7.1. Coverage Parallelism in the UK	138
7.2. Coverage Parallelism in Turkey	142
7.3. Word Choice Parallelism in Turkey.....	143
7.4. Word Choice Parallelism in the UK.....	145
7.5. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in Turkey.....	146
7.6. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in the UK.....	148
7.7. Conclusion.....	151
CHAPTER 8	154
CONCLUSION	154

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 - Functions Mass Media are Expected to Perform for Democracy.....	16
Table 2.2- Level of Political Parallelism.....	23
Table 3.1- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in British National Dailies Prior to 2001, 2005 and 2010 Elections	59
Table 3.2- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in Turkish National Dailies Prior to 2007 Elections	59
Table 3.3- Most Distinguishing Phrases between AKP and CHP Election Manifestos in 2007	63
Table 4.1- Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Period Prior to the Proclamation of the First Constitution.....	76
Table 4.2 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the First Constitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II	78
Table 4.3 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Second Constitutional Period.....	80
Table 4.4 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers during the War of Independence	83
Table 4.5 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Early Republican Era	89
Table 4.6 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in One-Party Era.....	90
Table 4.7 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in Transition to Democracy.....	93
Table 4.8 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Democratic Party Era	95
Table 4.9 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1960s	97
Table 4.10 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1970s	100
Table 4.11 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1980s	102
Table 4.12 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1990s	105
Table 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Quality, Mid-Market, and Popular Papers	112
Table 5.2. Cover Prices and Cost of Advertising in National Dailies	114
Table 5.3 - Views on Trends in Political Parallelism	116
Table 5.4. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK.....	117
Table 5.5. Newspaper Endorsements in the UK General Elections 1945-2010.....	119
Table 6.1 Political Parallelism and some Explanatory Variables in Turkey	126
Table 6.2 Political Parallelism and some Explanatory Variables in the UK	127
Table 6.3 - How Explanations Offered Fit the Turkish and British Cases	133
Table 7.1- Amount of Coverage - Party References in British National Dailies on Election Eves	139
Table 7.2- Coverage Parallelism in News and Opinion Content of British National Dailies	141

Table 7.3- Amount of Coverage - Party References in Turkish National Dailies Prior to 2007 Elections.....	143
Table 7.4- Preference for the Abbreviation “AK Parti” over “AKP” in Turkish Newspapers.....	144
Table 7.5- Ratio of the word Conservative to Tory in British National Dailies.....	145
Table 7.6 – Pro-AKP vs. pro-CHP Positions among Turkish Newspapers.....	146
Table 7.7- Pro-Conservative vs. pro-Labour Positions among British Newspapers	149
Table 7.8- Deviations from Mean Conservative vs. Labour Score	150

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Segments by Class, Age, and Gender.....	145
Figure 5.2. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK	149
Figure 6.1 - Levels of Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press	155

PART I

Chapters in this study are grouped in three parts to make it easy to follow, and to guide readers to specific issues of interest for there are multiple aims pursued in the study. Part I consists of the introduction, literature review, and methodology chapters, laying the groundwork for the empirical Parts II and III, which deal, respectively, with the history of political parallelism in Turkey and the UK, and with contemporary press-party parallelism in these two countries.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Press-party parallelism is a term coined by Colin Seymour-Ure in his 1974 book *The Political Impact of Mass Media* to describe the degree to which the newspaper system parallels the party system. In the extreme case, every political party has a newspaper and each newspaper is owned by a political party, the closest approximation to which was probably recorded “in Denmark in early twentieth century, when each town had four newspapers, representing the four major political parties” (Hallin & Mancini, p. 27). Of course, organizational ties –here in the form of ownership- are not the only indicator of parallelism: parallelism is also reflected in readership patterns –when readers of a particular newspaper are also members or supporters of a particular party-, and in what Seymour-Ure calls “loyalty to party goals” (p. 163) as expressed in newspaper content.

Although this is a study of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, it would probably be best to make it clear at the outset that this is not a “comparison” of two cases in the strict sense of the term, but more of a “parallel reading” whereby the same phenomenon is examined in two separate cases. Also, the author’s main interest lies in political parallelism in Turkey, and the UK mainly served as a country to compare with Turkey. The UK was an ideal choice to serve in a parallel reading, because it was in the UK that the term press-party parallelism was invented, and the public awareness about the issue is unusually high in the UK. The UK is also considered to be an outlier among the countries of the liberal model because of its high levels of political parallelism,¹ which

¹ Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that the high level of political parallelism observed in the UK makes it different from other countries of the liberal model, which also include the US, Canada, and Australia. In terms of the development of a mass press, professionalism, and the role of the state in the media, the UK is similar to other liberal model countries, but in terms of its political parallelism characteristics, the UK is closer to the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist countries.

warrants more explanation. A parallel reading together with Turkey could help explain this outlier position better.

1.1. Aims of the Study

This study has three partially overlapping aims, one descriptive, one theoretical, and one methodological.

Following a review of the literature in Chapter 2 and the presentation of the methodology used in the study in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 serve to accomplish the descriptive aim of the study, which is to provide a historical overview of the development of political parallelism in the Turkish and the British press. Chapter 4, on the history of political parallelism in the Turkish press, covers the period from the publication of the first Turkish newspapers in 1830s to the 2002 elections, and is more ambitious than Chapter 5, which covers post-war political parallelism in British press. The contribution made by Chapter 4 to the literature stems from collecting and re-classifying information already contained in the secondary literature on Turkish press history, and not from original research into the archives. This effort, however, has brought two benefits: First, it allowed a first time attempt to produce system-wide measures of parallelism in clearly defined historical periods, using a detailed methodology uniformly applied throughout the chapter so that we can compare levels of parallelism in different historical periods. We can now answer questions like whether press is more politicized today compared to, say, the 1950s, or how the Ottoman periods compare with the early Republican periods in terms of the political positions taken by newspapers. Secondly, the chapter on the history of political parallelism in the Turkish press can be used as a reference to look up information on the political positions of individual newspapers in different historical periods, with detailed notes about content (did *Akşam* publish the Aga Khan letter defending the Caliphate in early 1920s?), author evaluations (did the authors of the various books on Turkish press history consider *Hürriyet* in 1950s to be a pro-DP paper or an anti-DP one?), organizational connections (what sort of an organizational connection did *Vakit* have with the CHP in 1930s?), and legal actions faced by papers (was *Sabah* among the papers sued by RP's Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan in 1997 for inciting a coup d'état?). Descriptive aims of Chapter 5 are more modest, presenting a

table of endorsements made by national dailies in elections 1945 to 2010, combining and updating previous similar tables by various authors. Chapter 5 also provides the necessary background for Chapters 6 and 7, by two brief sections on post-war British political history and the segmented nature of the British national press.

The main theoretical aim of the study, accomplished in Chapter 6, is to evaluate three explanations of political parallelism (modernization, commercialization, and party system characteristics), based upon historical data from Turkey and the UK. The following hypotheses, which arise from the review of the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 and are laid out in more detail there, will be tested using data from the Turkish and the British cases: Hypothesis I: As we move from the earlier to the more recent periods, level of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK will decrease because of the modernization effect, which, among other things, means increasing differentiation between spheres of life, and in our case, between the functions of communication and politics. Hypothesis II: In periods when the press can be said to be more commercialized, political parallelism will be lower compared to non-commercialized periods, because in a commercialized environment, papers try to reach the widest audience possible, and avoid alienating large chunks of their potential readership by presenting politically biased content. Hypothesis III: a) Periods with a higher number of parties in the system will also have higher levels of political parallelism. b) Periods with higher levels of ideological polarization will also have higher levels of political parallelism. c) Periods with minority or coalition governments will have higher levels of political parallelism, and periods with single party governments will have lower levels of political parallelism. d) Periods with higher levels of cleavage voting will also have higher levels of political parallelism.

The methodological aim of the study, no less important than the first two and accomplished in Chapters 3 and 7, is to seek an answer to the following question: Is it possible, using a content analysis method that does not require human coding, to answer some substantial questions concerning party-political positions of newspapers in different countries? Chapter 3 seeks to answer this question by reviewing the different content analytical strategies employed by researchers to study political parallelism so far, and by presenting another methodology, based upon the work of others (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2007), that employs word counts to identify party-political positions. This method first identifies the ‘most distinguishing phrases’ that differentiate Party A’s manifesto from Party B’s, and then measures the frequency of these phrases in the coverage of individual newspapers. Thus, it becomes possible not only to assign

partisanship scores to individual newspapers, but also to calculate a system-wide measure of parallelism in the press. Newspaper coverages prior to 2007 parliamentary elections in Turkey, and 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections in the UK will be analyzed using this method, and the party-political positions taken by Turkish and British national dailies in these elections will be identified, which will then be used to calculate system-wide levels of parallelism. The method used, which produces results with high face validity despite the fact that it does not involve human coding, is easily applicable in multi-country contexts as well, because it does not require assembling teams of experts who know the languages spoken in the countries to be studied.

Chapter 7 also contributes to the descriptive and theoretical aims of the study. With regards to description, it will be possible, for the first time in the literature, to directly compare levels of political parallelism in the content of Turkish and British newspapers, calculated using the same measure. The chapter's contribution to the theoretical aims of the study, on the other hand, is two-fold: First, we will be able to evaluate levels of parallelism in the Turkish and British press, now that we have comparative figures. We expect the level of parallelism in the UK to be higher than the level of parallelism in Turkey, which will serve as Hypothesis IV, because there is a tradition of declaring political positions on election eves in the British press, in the form of endorsements, and Turkish newspapers avoid such open position taking, instead situating themselves as neutral actors. Chapter 7 will present us with data to test this hypothesis.

The second contribution of Chapter 7 to the theoretical aims of the study arises from the fact that it allows measuring parallelism in news and opinion contents of the newspapers separately, and thus makes it possible to evaluate how much the Turkish and British newspapers conform to the normative criterion of limiting bias to opinion contents, keeping the news supply, in the words of C. P. Scott (1921), "untainted". If parallelism in news contents turns out to be lower than parallelism in opinion contents, then we will be able to say that Scott's (1921) advice, on the whole, is followed. Moreover, because we assign parallelism scores to individual newspapers, we will also be able classify papers as those that do follow Scott's (1921) advice, and those that do not. In this classification, there are four possible categories in which we can place individual dailies: I- Balanced in both news and opinion, II- Biased in both news and opinion, III- Balanced in news, biased in opinion, and IV- Balanced in opinion, biased in news. We will be able to fit the Turkish and British newspapers, based upon their coverage prior to the elections under study, into this classification, and be able to answer questions like the

following: Which type is the most common in which system? Are Type I newspapers more numerous in the Turkish press or in the British press? Are all categories populated or do some remain as hypothetical categories? More specifically, are there any actual papers that fit into the Type IV category, presenting a balanced opinion diet and a biased news coverage? And if so, what does this mean? Which motivations may lead papers to follow this strategy?

Chapter 2 provides the literature review to put these and other questions in context, by examining the normative, the empirical, and the theoretical issues involved in turns.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Press-party parallelism is studied in the literature under various names like press partisanship (Curtice, 1997; Brynin & Newton, 2003; Donsbach, 1997; Coe et al., 2008; Kuhn, 2005; Mughan and Gunther, 2000), party-media alliance (Sampedro & Pérez, 2008), pillarization in the media (Semetko, 1998), party affiliation of media (Mancini 2000), fragmentation of the media (van der Eijk, 2000) and “congruity between the editorial bias [...] and newspaper readers’ political leanings” (Luchessi 2008), but none of these formulations match the level of specification at which Seymour-Ure defined the concept. Bias (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Gunther, Montero & Wert, 2000; Luchessi, 2008; Dalton et al., 1998; Coe et al., 2008; Kuhn, 2005; Weatherly et al. 2007), advocacy (Janowitz, 1975/2000; Jakubowicz, 1995/2000), selective criticism (Semetko & Schoenbach, 2003), balance (Coe et al., 2008), objectivity (Tuchman, 1972/2000), impartiality (Mughan & Gunther, 2000), and fairness (Lichter, 2001) are some of the other concepts that are used to refer to the political positioning of specific media outlets or journalists, with implications for parallelism. Two of these terms, press partisanship and media bias, need to be distinguished from press-party parallelism in more detail because they feature prominently in the literature and usually convey different meanings.

The term “media bias” is generally used to refer to overall bias in the system, as in “there is a liberal bias in the US media”, and is extensively studied in the US context. In their meta-analysis of media bias studies on the US, Dave D’Alessio and Mike Allen (2000) find 59 individual articles studying bias in the elections between 1948-1996, all using quantitative methods. Although they fail to confirm that there is an overall conservative or liberal bias in the US media, they note that this is not because every media outlet is un-biased, but because the liberal bias in some is canceled out by the conservative bias in others. This is exactly the distinction that is captured by the notion of

press-party parallelism, which enables us to differentiate cases where there is no overall media bias towards one side because the differently aligned media cancel each other out, from cases where there is no overall media bias because each media outlet is neutral. The former situation would be one characterized by high press-party parallelism, whereas the latter would be characterized by low press-party parallelism.

Press-party parallelism is also different from the notion of “press partisanship”. A media system may be characterized by high partisanship and strong positions taken on issues, but unless the partisanship in the media somehow fails to replicate the system of antagonisms and alliances that is present in the party-political arena, it is difficult to speak of a parallelism. Two analytical cases in which there would be high partisanship but low parallelism are the following: 1. All the media are supporters of a specific party, although there are other parties competing in the system. In this case, the pluralism of the party system would fail to be reflected in the media system, which would be highly skewed towards one side. 2. Specific media outlets take sharply divergent positions, but support different parties on different issues. This would be the case when “the positions in the media system develop [...] regardless of party allegiances” (Eilders 2002). In a two-party system where one of the parties stands for liberal economic policies and hawkish foreign policy, and the other party stands for welfare policies and a dovish foreign policy; the media system should also follow the same alignment of political positions for parallelism to be the case. If the media consists of players that are liberal and dovish, or welfarist and hawkish, we cannot say media system parallels the party system, even when it is highly partisan.

In a significant contribution to the notion of press-party parallelism, Hallin and Mancini (2004) introduce the term “political parallelism”, noting that press-party parallelism in the strict sense is in decline, but political parallelism is still common in the form of media organizations being associated “not with particular parties, but with general political tendencies” (p. 27). As an example, they mention the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, which is “a paper of the right-center, not narrowly of the Christian Democratic Party” (p. 27). The difference between the notions of press-party parallelism -as defined by Seymour-Ure (1974)- and political parallelism -as defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004)- can also be thought of as one of degree: Press-party parallelism would be the extreme case of political parallelism. Parallelism, political parallelism and press-party parallelism will be used interchangeably (unless otherwise noted) in this study.

2.1. Normative Considerations

The first question to be answered before proceeding to a review of the empirical literature on political parallelism is, why study at all? Some of the normative concerns offered in the literature include the following:

- Independence of the media is compromised when there is parallelism. This is a concern raised by Víctor Sampedro and Francisco Seoane Pérez (2008) in their study of the media in 2008 Spanish general elections. They note that the mainstream media “played along” the strategies of the two main parties, the PSOE and the PP, and helped them push the smaller nationalist parties and the post-communist left to the margins. The synchronization of media coverage with party strategies was so obvious that “hook phrases” produced by candidates to gain publicity would be “repeated or questioned in the media, depending on whether the particular news outlet was supportive or hostile to the candidate” (p. 341).

- Parallelism results in deceptive reporting. This concern is also raised by Sampedro and Pérez (2008). They note that some outlets “initiated rumors and smearing campaigns” (p. 341) designed to help the candidate they support, even spreading conspiracy theories.

- Parallelism reinforces audiences’ pre-conceptions. This concern is raised by Jonathan S. Morris (2005) in his study of the CNN’s and Fox News Channel’s respective audiences. Watching channels that provide information which fits one’s pre-conceived beliefs and notions only strengthens those pre-conceptions.

- Parallelism breeds further polarization. Morris’s (2005) another concern is that by reinforcing audiences’ pre-conceptions, parallelism “contribute[s] to further polarization of the public and constrain[s] future attempts at an open dialogue” (p. 73).

- Combined with commercialization, parallelism results in political sensationalism. This is a concern raised by Paolo Mancini (2000) in his article on commercialization and party affiliation in the Italian media. In his own words, “political sensationalism means dramatization and intensification of political conflict. To attract viewers and readers, events must be produced that, like in the ancient Roman circuses, pit political rivals against each other in dramatic, exciting, and involving confrontations” (p. 322). Political sensationalism, in turn, escalates conflicts and makes their peaceful solution more difficult.

- Parallelism leads to “a substantial lack of criticism” when there is a consensus on an issue between the political rivals. This concern is raised by Christiane Eilders (2000) in her study of the German quality papers’ response to Germany’s participation in the Kosovo War, the first of its kind since the World War II. Eilders notes that there was very little criticism of the Germany’s involvement in the war, and whatever criticism that existed was of a procedural nature, not touching upon the fundamentals, reflecting the near consensus between the political parties in the Bundestag concerning the issue.

- When there is parallelism, there is no longer a single electorate. This concern is raised by Cees van der Eijk (2000) in his study of the media environment in Netherlands. Eijk argues that political parallelism in the form fragmentation of the media and of the audiences “undermines the notion of a single electorate (or, in more archaic terms, a polity) whose members are exposed to the same information and debates and make choices on the basis of their different values or priorities” (p. 339).

- Parallelism might foster instability. This is a concern raised by Vicky Randall (1998) in his conclusion to the edited volume *Democratization and the Media*, based on the case studies of Poland (Millard, 1998) and Mali (Myers, 1998). In Randall’s words, “the possibility is raised that allowing different parties or religious or ethnic communities freedom of expression through their own media outlets could foster political division and instability (p. 247).

Although the normative concerns raised in the literature cover a wide range from the independence of the media to negative effects on the audiences, they are all connected with the meta-concern of quality of democracy in a modern society and the media’s role in it. Few of the studies on political parallelism make the connection between their normative concerns and the theory of democracy explicit.² In the following sections, I review the literature on media and democracy and analyze the implications of political parallelism for the quality of democracy.

² For notable exceptions, see Eilders (2002), Donsbach (1997) and Hallin and Mancini (2004).

2.1.1. Early Literature and Social Responsibility Theory of the Press

“In modern societies, [...] public deliberation is (and probably must be) largely *mediated*, with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens talking to the each other and to the public through mass media of communication.” (Page, 1996, p.1, emphasis in the original)

“If one were to ask the seemingly ludicrous question ‘Is democracy imaginable without any mass media?’, the answer is ‘Yes, of course, and it would look remarkably like ancient Athens’.” (Scammell, 2000, xl)

The argument about the crucial role that the mass media play in a modern democracy parallels in some ways the argument for representative democracy. The issue of scale, with which Robert A. Dahl was “fascinated” (2007, p. 130) and wishes to have studied in more extensive detail, is what connects the idea of representation and role of media. Just as it is impossible, at a scale larger than city states, to have democracy without representation, it is practically impossible to have meaningful communication about public matters without the mass media. In Benjamin I. Page’s (1996) words, “Even if we were, as AT&T puts it “all connected”, we could not all converse simultaneously” (p.4), which is why public deliberation is “mediated” in modern societies and professional communicators are necessary. Democracy in the absence of “professional communicators” is possible, but as Margaret Scammell puts it, only in ancient Athens.

If the mass media have an essential role to play for the functioning of a modern representative democracy, what exactly is this role to be? Although much has been written on mass media and democracy from early on, the first explicit statements about the role of the media “in prescriptive form” appeared in the aftermath of the World War II, later to be named “the social responsibility theory of the press”. (Bucy & D’Angelo, 1998). The most prominent statements of the social responsibility approach to press are to be found in two reports, one written by the American Commission on the Freedom of the Press in 1947, and the other by British Royal Commission on the Press in 1949.

One of the five requirements that the American Commission enumerates is that the press should be “a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism” (Hutchins Commission, 1947/2004, p.219). For the press to serve as a forum, in turn, it has to be open to all the viewpoints in the society: “all the important viewpoints and the interests in the society should be represented in its agencies of mass communication”. (p. 220) A

similar point is also made in the British Commission's report, which argues that "The number and variety of papers should be such that the press as a whole gives an opportunity for all important points of view to be effectively presented in terms of the varying standards of taste, political opinion and education among the principal groups of the population." (1949, p. 101, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 158), for the press to be able to serve as "a means whereby individuals and groups can express a point of view or advocate a cause" (1949, p. 106, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 157-8). Although the specific functions talked about are somewhat different in the two reports (a forum and a means of advocacy), the prescription is the same: pluralism in media.

2.1.2. Media in Studies of Democracy

Pluralism in the media environment is also what is prescribed in the theoretical literature on democracy, more specifically in Robert A. Dahl's writings. A prominent theorist of modern democracy, Dahl is probably best known for his explication of what a democratic process would entail, and what the necessary institutions for this process would be in a modern day state.

In laying out the necessary components of a democratic process, Dahl (1989) defines "enlightened understanding", one of the five components,³ as having "equal opportunities for discovering and validating [...] the choice that would best serve the citizen's best interests" (p. 112). Interest, in turn, is defined as the choice that would have resulted when a person has "the fullest attainable understanding" (p. 180) of the alternatives to and consequences of a certain course of action. Enlightened understanding then requires – among other things like education- a plurality of views on the virtues and vices of different courses of action to be taken, and "makes it hard to justify procedures that would cut off or suppress information which, were it available, might well cause citizens to arrive at a different decision." (p.112)

One of the ways in which information is cut-off or suppressed is when there is a monopoly over sources of information. This is why Dahl includes "alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group"

³ The other four components are "effective participation", "voting equality at the decisive stage", "control of the agenda", and "inclusion". See Dahl, 1989, pp. 108-119.

among his widely circulated list of “institutions necessary for polyarchy” (1989, p. 233), polyarchy being the word for actually existing democracy. In a modern society, the most important source of information about public matters is the mass media. Hence, pluralism in the media environment –as an operationalization of Dahl’s formulation of “alternative sources of information”- has become one of the most important yardsticks in evaluating the quality of democracy in a country. For example, the first item in the Freedom House's survey of civil liberties, titled Freedom of Expression and Belief, starts out with a question about the presence or absence of pluralism in the media. Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings of countries are probably the most widely cited and generally accepted operationalization of democracy. The Civil Liberties section of the survey, which can be treated as a quality of democracy measure, consists of four items, “freedom of expression and belief”, “associational and organizational rights”, “rule of law”, and “personal autonomy and individual rights”, each measured by several separate questions. The first question of the item “freedom of expression and belief”, is as follows: “Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)” (Freedom House, 2005) As is clear from the note, pluralism is the main concern behind the question about freedom and independence of the media.

In a collection of essays specifically on *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (Beetham, 1994), three out of the four articles with indices of democracy include pluralism in the media environment among their criteria for democracy. Sponsored by the European Consortium for Political Research, the edited volume *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (Beetham, 1994) is a collection of essays specifically on the operationalization of democracy and fills an important void. Of the four articles with indices of democracy (Saward, 1994; Beetham, 1994; Elklit, 1994; Weir 1994), the last three make some reference to pluralism in the media environment in their indices. One of Beetham’s (1994) seven question regarding “the quality and vitality of democracy” is the following: “How open are the media to access from all sections of opinion and social groups, and how effectively do they operate as a balanced forum for informed political debate?” (p. 39) Elklit (1994) takes Robert Dahl’s list of seven institutions for polyarchy as his starting point and defines fourteen operational elements, one of which is “the degree to which political parties have equal access to the mass media” (p. 93, 101). Weir (1994) compares six nations over 16 groups of indicators, one of which is parties’ “access to the broadcast media” under the heading “equalizing electoral opportunities” (p. 132).

As we can see, media is given a prominent place in studies of democracy, both in theoretically oriented writings like Dahl's and in efforts of operationalization with an empirical aim, like the collection of essays in the edited volume mentioned above. The emphasis seems to be over pluralism in the media in the form of parties, individuals or groups having access to the mass media to make their views known. Similarly, democracy is a major concern of media and communication scholars, although their concerns are not only or primarily about pluralism.

2.1.3. Democracy in Media Studies

Lists of functions the mass media are supposed to perform for democracy are offered in a number of studies. Two studies containing such lists, the reports by the British Royal Commission on the Press (1949, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974), and the Hutchins Commission (1947/2004) were mentioned in the section on early literature. The more recent literature on media and democracy also offers such lists, the most prominent of which is probably Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch's (1990/1995). Another relatively recent list is the one prepared by Michael Schudson (1995, as cited in Bucy & D'angelo, 1998). In Table 1, a stylized comparison of these normative lists is presented.

As we can see in Table 1, two of these functions, those of providing information and serving as a forum, are present in all the lists. Two other functions, those of advocacy and watchdog, are present in two lists. The remaining ten functions are mentioned only once. If this list has any representative capacity for the wider literature on media and democracy, we can treat the four shared functions as prominent ones and focus upon them in the remainder of this inquiry.

We have reason to believe that these four functions –which emerged from a comparison of normative lists- are prominent in the wider literature, for they also feature, almost in exact shape, in a major survey of empirical studies on media and democracy. In their introduction to a collection of major articles on *Media, Journalism and Democracy*, Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko (2000) observe that “the literature is concentrated around investigation of media's adequate and inadequate performance of duties in relation to the classic liberal assumptions of democracy” (p. xii). Accordingly,

media inquiry [is] clustered around these three questions:

- *Media and the state*. What in reality is the relationship – that of watchdog or lapdog? How is the ‘watchdog’ ideal enhanced or deformed by state interference and regulation of media ownership and content, by censorship, by the growth of state public relations, and so on?
- *Information*. What kind of information do the media serve us? What is news? How is it selected, constructed, biased, and so on?
- *Representation*. Are the media truly representative of society? Which people and groups are super-served and which neglected in media representation of public opinion? Why? (p. xiii)

The watchdog and information functions re-appear in this survey in almost exact shape, and what Semetko and Scammell (2000) call ‘representation’ corresponds simultaneously to advocacy and forum functions in the normative lists.

2.1.4. Implications of Political Parallelism for Democracy

Now that we have reviewed the normative literature on media and democracy both from the angle of democracy studies and from the angle of media studies, and come up with specific evaluative criteria (pluralism from democracy studies; information, forum, advocacy and watchdog functions from media studies), we can move on to considering the implications of political parallelism for the role the mass media are expected to play in a democracy. Before that, however, a few words on the connection between pluralism and the four functions are in order.

One of these criteria, pluralism, is not a function but a state of affairs. It is possible to treat it as a normative criterion alongside the four functions, but also as a criterion at another level, one that needs to be considered for its implications for the functions in question. This is what Christiane Eilders (2002) does in her discussion of the connection between pluralism and the functions the media are supposed to play. Her list of functions consists of three items; two of them are information and watchdog functions, and one is what she calls “orientation”. Eilders (2002) argues that for all three functions, pluralism in media is a must:

Only if the media is open towards the variety of societal voices, can it disseminate unbiased, comprehensive and complete information. Only if the media is independent of state, party or economic influence, is it able to act as a watchdog supervising the political process. And only if it represents a variety of opinions, can it provide sufficient orientation for the audience and support the audience’s opinion formation. Thus, pluralism may be regarded as the normative basis for a well-functioning democratic media system. (p. 28)

Table 2.1 - Functions Mass Media are Expected to Perform for Democracy

Shared functions	<i>Commission on the Freedom of the Press (1947/2004, p.219-221)</i>	<i>British Royal Commission on the Press (1949, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 157-158)</i>	<i>Blumler & Gurevitch (1990/1995, p.97)</i>	<i>Schudson (1995, as cited in Bucy & D'Angelo, 1998)</i>
Information	"A truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning"	"A clear and truthful account of the events, of their background and causes"	"Surveillance of the sociopolitical environment; reporting developments likely to impinge, positively or negatively, on the welfare of citizens"	"News media should provide citizens fair and full information so that they can make sound decisions as citizens."
Forum	"A forum for the exchange of comment and criticism"	"A forum for discussion and informed criticism"	"Dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power holders (actual and prospective) and mass publics"	"News media should serve as common carriers of the perspectives of the varied groups in society; they should be, in the words of Gans (1979) "multiperspectival."
Advocacy		"A means whereby individuals and groups can express a point of view or advocate a cause"	"Platforms for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy by politicians and spokespersons of other cause and interest groups"	
Wathcdog			"Mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power"	"News media should represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to hold government accountable."
	"Full access of the day's intelligence"		"Meaningful agenda setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including the forces that have formed and may resolve them"	"News media should provide coherent frameworks to help citizens comprehend the complex political universe. They should analyze and interpret politics in ways that enable citizens to understand and to act."
	"The projection of a representative picture of the constituent groups in society"		"Incentives for citizens to learn, choose and become involved, rather than merely to follow and kibitz over the political process"	"News media should provide the quantity and quality of news that people want; that is, the market should be the criterion for the production of news."
	"The presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society"		"A principled resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their independence, integrity and ability to serve the audience"	"News media should evoke empathy and provide deep understanding so that citizens at large can appreciate the situation of other human beings in the world and so elites can come to know and understand the situation of other human beings, notably non-elites, and learn compassion for them."
			"A sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and able to make sense of his or her political environment"	

Note: Based upon Bucy & D'Angelo (1998) and Seymour-Ure (1974).

What is lacking in Eilder's discussion of pluralism is the distinction between internal pluralism and external pluralism, which is a key analytical tool in understanding the implications of political parallelism for democracy. In the absence of this distinction, references to pluralism in the media are necessarily vague. From the second sentence in the quote above, the one about the media being "independent of state, party or economic influence", we get the feeling that what Eilders is referring to is internal pluralism, in the sense of individual media outlets being independent of such influences. In the third sentence, however, the one about "represent[ing] a variety of opinions" and thus "providing orientation", the reference seems to be to external pluralism, in the sense of pluralism achieved at the system level with individual media outlets being associated with specific political stands; how would they be able to provide orientation if they did not have one?

Eilder's suggestion that "pluralism may be regarded as the normative basis for a well functioning democratic media system" would arise few, if any, controversies. Most would agree, and there are even more enthusiastic defenses of pluralism in the media, like the following by Ben H. Bagdikian (1985/2000): "Diversity and richness in the media are not ornaments of a democracy but essential elements for its survival" (p. 97). However, the question of what sort of pluralism a media system ought to have (internal vs. external) gives rise to a strong controversy, in the form of two directly opposing views with passionate advocates. The view that external pluralism is enough for the media to perform its democratic functions is defended by Benjamin I. Page (1996). He argues that in evaluating media performance, "we should look at what all the media have to say [...] We need to pay attention to the totality of political information that is made available" (p. 7). This is because

even ideological bias in the media may not badly distort public deliberation. The crucial factors [...] are competition and diversity. Let opposing views content vigorously in the marketplace of ideas. [...] The average citizen has a good chance of arriving at sound opinions [...] so long as there is vigorous competition among different ideas and interpretations, even if the media are full of bias or contaminated by untruths.

As long as there is competition between the differently aligned media, according to Page, the specific biases of media outlets do not matter.⁴ The view directly opposing this

⁴ Although Page (1996) goes on to criticize the New York Times op-ed pages for failing to display internal pluralism, he makes it clear that he makes this criticism because the New York Times, along with Washington Post, is an authoritative voice in many policy

is that pluralism at the level of individual media outlets is required if the media are to perform their democratic functions. This view is expressed by Wolfgang Donsbach (1997), who discusses the issue in terms of different ways of achieving plurality, and arrives at the conclusion that internal pluralism is what is needed. After examining the media coverage of the 1994 Bundestag elections, which showed the partisan alignment of the German national press, Donsbach makes the following evaluation:

we can call this pattern a virtual plurality: It does not exist at the point of the individuals' information intake, where they make up their minds about parties and candidates. Instead, plurality exists only on the system level. However, *people read papers and not newsstands or news systems*. Thus, while this partisan model achieves an overall plurality in public communication, it does little to convey to individuals a fair and neutral presentation of the alternatives in an election. (p. 166, emphasis by author)

Although the two authors have directly opposing viewpoints on the necessity of internal pluralism, the function that they talk about is the same: information. Page (1996) thinks individual citizens have the ability to reach the necessary information, as long as it is placed "somewhere in the system" (p. 7);⁵ and Donsbach (1997) thinks most citizens do not have this ability, because "people read newspapers not newsstands or news systems" (p. 166). A middle position in the controversy about internal pluralism vs. external pluralism was offered years ago, in the report of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press (Hutchins Commission, 1947/2004), which argued for an ideal combination of "advocates" and "common carriers" in the press (p. 220). Although the Commission's (1947/2004) main concern was with advocacy not with information, their argument about an "ideal combination" applies equally well when considering the function of information. Their argument for an ideal combination rests on the idea that common carriers are the more important channel for making a point of view known, that they have their own prejudices which deny access to some viewpoints, and that smaller advocate outlets act as important checks on the excesses of common carriers:

issues and have considerable impact upon the rest of the media. (p. 117) In other words, Page somewhat moderates his stance on the issue of internal pluralism: In this modified version, internal pluralism is required of major individual outlets, especially if they are practically unchallenged with regards to the coverage of certain issues, as was the case with New York Times on foreign policy issues.

⁵ "If extensive political information is available somewhere in the system, [...] a lot of information, and reasonable conclusions from it, will trickle out through opinion leaders and cue givers to ordinary citizens" (p. 7).

An ideal combination would include general media, inevitably solicitous to present their own views, but setting forth other views fairly. As checks on their fairness, and partial safeguards against ignoring important matters, more specialized media of advocacy have a vital place. In the absence of such a combination partially insulated groups in society will continue to be insulated. (p.220)

This would be the ideal balance between internal pluralism and external pluralism, both having a role to play. To couch it in political parallelism terms -which is inherent in the definition of external pluralism-, some parts of the media system should parallel the party system, some not. Two questions arise regarding the Commission's formulation: First, do the advocates and common carriers have to be of the same sort, or would it be okay if, for example, the television played the role of a common carrier, and the newspapers served as advocates? Second, what are the implications of this ideal combination for other functions besides advocacy? Would a combination of advocates and common carriers serve other functions equally well?

To these questions I now turn. The short answer to the first question would be that the advocates and common carriers need not be of the same type. Neither do they have to be all privately owned: public TV can serve as a common carrier, and private channels can serve as advocates; or the opposite may be the case, with commercial channels acting as common carriers and public channels as advocates. Common carriers and advocates need not be limited by popularity criteria either: it is possible to imagine large-circulation newspapers acting as common carriers and small newspapers as advocates, just as it is possible to imagine small-circulation quality newspapers acting as common carriers and mass circulation tabloids as advocates. The type (TV or print or internet), ownership (public or private) or circulation/rating of the media are not relevant when considering the characteristics that advocate outlets and common carriers ought to have. At a systemic level, the mere presence of advocates and common carriers is enough, whatever their similarities and differences are. From the point of view of the individual citizen, however, different considerations come into play.

For the individual citizen to directly benefit from the existence of both advocates and common carriers, he or she ought to be exposed to both. If most citizens are exposed to only one outlet, then the presence of both common carriers and advocates will not benefit most citizens, the argument about opinion leaders and cue-givers notwithstanding. For example, most observers agree that parallelism is stronger in print press, and relatively weak in TV (Seymour-Ure, 1974; van Kempen, 2007; Donsbach, 1997). In a system with internal pluralism in TV and external parallelism in print press, a citizen

getting all his/her political information and opinion from television will most probably be exposed only to common carriers. Another citizen, using only newspapers to receive political opinion and information would be exposed only to advocates. Since newspaper readership is generally lower than television viewership, being exposed only to common carriers is the more probable of the two scenarios for most citizens of the countries with pluralist media structures, although evaluations must be made on a case by case basis, looking into media use habits of the populations, as well as the nature and degree of pluralism present. Where pluralist media structures are not present, the discussion about internal vs. external pluralism is naturally not relevant.

Turning to the second question, whether this idea of “ideal combination”, as a normative prescription, applies to other functions besides advocacy, the following is in order. To the information function, as I have argued above, the ideal combination of the Hutchins Commission applies equally well. It is better if all relevant information appeared in general carriers, but in case it did not, it is a good idea to have some specialized advocate outlets, which parallel the party system and which have comparative advantage in information gathering if only by virtue of their alignment with political parties. It is not difficult to imagine cases where parties and party supporters would be more willing to provide information to outlets that they think are sympathetic to their own position, instead of talking to the common carriers, which may be perceived as part of the “hostile media”. “Hostile media phenomenon”, which refers to the audience’s perception of “neutral messages to be biased against their own position” (Coe et al., 2008) is an important area of study, with some studies finding absolute, others relative hostile media phenomena. When perceptions of hostile media are common, advocate outlets and their reporters would have a natural advantage over their competitors among the common carriers, at least in some areas of investigation. They would also be better prepared to give space to information deemed unimportant or too trivial to be published in the general carriers, like the nitty gritty details of an election campaign or a candidate’s personal history, which may later turn out to be crucial. These details, in turn, would have remained as trivia so long as they failed to appear at all in the common carriers’ coverage, who have a natural advantage in providing information to the non-partisan or independent or moderate voters, who make all the difference especially in close races. If there were no partisan outlets, this crucial information would be denied to the voters; if there were no common carriers, somebody’s breaking news would be trivia to others, and voters would again be denied sufficient access to possibly crucial information.

Much of what has been said about political parallelism and information function directly applies to the watchdog function as well, which in a sense is provision of information about the wrongdoings of the government. It is the opposition papers that are most eager to find out about and expose scandals or bad performance on the part of the government officials, the reason being that they want the party that they support to be the government, not the other way around. Their success, in turn, depends in part upon their stories getting picked up by the outlets which serve as common carriers.

The last remaining function, that of forum, is probably the most difficult among the four to be fitted into the “ideal combination” framework of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press (1947/2004). This is because forum, by definition, requires a shared platform, one which the common carriers seem better equipped to provide. However, as I have argued before, what goes into the common carriers is, to some extent, a function of what the advocate outlets publish. Certain information and opinion would never have made it to the nationally significant common carriers had they not been picked up by the advocate press in the first place. The metaphor of forum as a high platform, over which only sufficiently prepared –cooked in the advocate press- ideas can climb would probably help fit the forum function into the ideal combination framework. Admittedly, though, the common carriers’ role in the function of forum is more essential, making the “ideal combination” somewhat lopsided, and hence, less ideal. However, since forum is only one among four of our functions, unless we assign this function a theoretically more prominent place, the argument of ideal combination would not be hurt much.

To sum up so far, political parallelism means external pluralism in the media –when there *is* pluralism-, and there are two opposing views concerning internal and external pluralism in the media environment. One of the views is that as long as there is rigorous competition between outlets, political parallelism is not a problem and external pluralism is enough for the media to perform its democratic functions. The other view is that since external pluralism is only pluralism at the system level, and the individual does not really experience it because most people follow single or at most a few outlets, political parallelism does create a problem from the point of view of pluralism. Bridging these two approaches, a middle position was offered years ago in the report of the Hutchins Commission on the Freedom of the Press (1947/2004), which argued for an “ideal combination” of “advocates” and “common carriers”, which means moderate levels of political parallelism in the form of some outlets paralleling the party system, and others serving as common platforms.

After presenting the controversy over internal vs. external parallelism, I applied the “ideal combination” formulation of the Commission to the four democratic functions of the press, which emerges from a review of the normative literature on media and democracy, namely the functions of advocacy, information, watchdog, and forum. I have argued that, although the ideal combination was initially formulated with the advocacy function in mind, it applied equally well to the functions of information and watchdog, and to some degree to the function of forum. To conclude, the Commission’s formulation, which came out after the World War II, stands the test of time and change of contexts, as well as having applicability to other significant functions, and can serve as an important yardstick in evaluating differences in levels and types of political parallelism from a normative point of view.

2.2. Empirical Literature

The empirical literature on political parallelism will be reviewed in this section with special emphasis on geographical distribution, trends over time, and causes and consequences of parallelism in the media.

2.2.1. Geographical Distribution

Single-country studies containing some information about parallelism in the media abound. There are studies detecting or failing to detect some political parallelism in the media systems of the US (Weatherly et al., 2007; Morris, 2005; Lichter, 2001; Endersby & Ognianova, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Coe et al., 2008; Patterson, 1993/2000; Page, 1996), Germany (Semetko & Schoenbach, 2003; Donsbach, 1997; Eilders, 2000; Eilders, 2002; Kaase, 2000), the UK (Curtice, 1997; Brynin & Newton, 2003; Semetko, 2000; Wring, 1998), France (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn, 1998), Italy (Mancini, 2000; Marletti & Roncarolo, 2000), Spain (Sampedro & Pérez, 2008; Semetko & Canel, 1997; Gunther, Montero & Wert, 2000), Netherlands (Semetko, 1998; van der Eijk, 2000), Argentina (Luchessi, 2008), Chile (Tironi & Sunkel, 2000), Japan (Krauss, 2000), Poland (Millard, 1998), and Mali (Myers, 1998).

Besides single country studies, there are also studies that make inter-regional and inter-country comparisons. To the first group belong a number of studies that compare Europe and America in terms of political parallelism (Janowitz, 1975; Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Mughan & Gunther, 2000), each arguing that journalism in Europe is much more politicized in Europe than in the US and parallelism higher. Hallin and Mancini (2004) also make inter-regional comparisons, by comparing and contrasting three groups of countries in terms of their levels of political parallelism. They argue that parallelism is low in the North Atlantic region, and high in North/Central European and Mediterranean regions, groupings of countries defined both by geographical proximity and similarity in political systems. Although Hallin and Mancini (2004) also make some intra-regional comparisons (like that between the US and the UK in the North Atlantic group), their analysis mostly remains at the regional level.

To the best of my knowledge, there are three studies of political parallelism that make inter-country comparisons: Seymour-Ure's (1974) book *The Political Impact of Mass Media*, which places close to twenty countries along five levels of press-party parallelism, ranging from no parallelism in Japan to complete parallelism in the USSR (see Table 2.1); Patterson and Donsbach's (1993, as cited in Hallin & Mancini, 2004) article based upon a survey of journalists, which places Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Italy to the high parallelism category and the US to the low parallelism category; and van Kempen's (2007) article based upon European Election Study (1999, cited in van Kempen), placing the 15 countries that were members of the EU in 1999 into a scale of parallelism ranging from 0 to 100, with the lowest score being that of Germany with 1.0 and the highest score belonging to Greece, with 19.9.

Table 2.2- Level of Political Parallelism

Janowitz (1975); Donsbach & Klett (1993); Mughan & Gunther (2000).	High		Low		
	Europe		The US		
Patterson & Donsbach (1993)	High		Low		
	Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Italy		The US		
Hallin & Mancini (2004)	High		Medium		Low
	Mediterranean		North/Central Europe		North Atlantic
Seymour-Ure (1974)	Complete	High	Medium		Low
	USSR	Scandinavian countries, Benelux, Austria, Israel,	France, Canada, West Germany	United States	Japan

						South Africa, Chile, Colombia											
Van Kempen (2006)	Greece	Italy	Spain	Flanders	Denmark	France	Britain	Sweden	Portugal	Netherlands	Austria	Luxembourg	Wallonia	Finland	Ireland	Germany	Mean
	19,9	14,4	10,5	10	9,1	7,5	7,1	6,8	6,2	5,7	5,3	4,5	2,4	1,8	1,6	1,0	7,1

2.2.2. Trends over Time

A number of single-country studies, in addition to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) broad study spanning three regions, observe trends in political parallelism over time. Some of them also match these trends with other changes going on in the societies under consideration. In much of these studies, the trend observed is toward less political parallelism, although there are cases where increasing parallelism is also observed, as well as no change. Observations of decreasing parallelism exist for Italy (Marletti & Roncarolo, 2000), Netherlands (van der Eijk, 2000), Sweden (van Kempen, 2006), the UK (Seymour-Ure, 2001), the US (Patterson, 1993/2000; Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000) and North/Central European countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Observations of increasing parallelism exist for Italy (Mancini, 2000) and the US (Morris, 2005), and an observation of no change exists for Eastern Europe where parallelism is still high (Jakubowicz, 1995/2000).

Matching trends mentioned include modernization and secularization in Italy (Marletti & Roncarolo, 2000), de-pillarization in Netherlands (van der Eijk, 2000), democratization in Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz, 1995/2000), decline of cleavage politics in Sweden (van Kempen, 2006), commercialization in the US (Patterson, 1993/2000; Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000), and structural differentiation in North/Central Europe (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The matching of these different trends with decline in parallelism results from different explanatory frameworks concerning parallelism in the

media. In what follows, I offer a review and a classification of the different frameworks used in explaining parallelism.

2.3. Explaining Parallelism

The explanations offered can be grouped under three main headings: economical (game theory approaches), sociological (the modernization explanation), and political (party system characteristics).

2.3.1. Game theory approaches

In the studies that make a Europe vs. America comparison (Janowitz, 1975/2000; Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000; Mughan & Gunther, 2000), a common assertion, couched in game theoretical language, is the following: The reason European newspapers are partisan and American newspapers are not is that press in the US is commercialized whereas the European press is not commercialized. In Europe, “the commercialization of the press and hence the necessity to reach the widest audience by non-partisan content came about much later than in the US” (Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000, p. 57); whereas in the US, since they were commercialized from early on, newspapers had “to build and to retain mass audiences” and were “stimulated to produce output that will be viewed by such heterogeneous audiences as relatively objective” (Janowitz, 1975/2000, p. 626). Otherwise, “These audiences respond with sharp criticism to content which distorts that part of the environment with which they are directly familiar; and persistent distortion runs the risk of the loss of specific audience segments” (Janowitz, 1975/2000, p. 626).

In other words, when press is commercialized, “distortion” is not profitable, hence not persistent. This claim is taken up in a number of recent game theoretical articles (Baron, 2006; Anand, Di Tella, & Galetovic, 2007; Xiang & Sarvary, 2007), all trying to explain persistent bias in a market environment with different models. Although I am not in a position to offer any comments on the mathematical proofs of these models, their

mere existence shows that the earlier maxim, that commercialization means a non-partisan press, cannot be taken for granted.

David P. Baron (2006) explains persistent media bias based on the proposition that biased news is low quality news. Because it is low-quality, the demand for biased news is low, and papers with biased news are sold for a lower price. Reporters who write biased news also work for lower salaries. In the end, outlets that sell biased news exist alongside those who sell higher quality, unbiased news, and there could be situations where former could even be more profitable than the latter.

Bharat Anand, Rafael Di Tella and Alexander Galetovic (2007) explain persistent media bias as product differentiation. Because news media also sell opinion, not only information, and people have different tastes for opinion, “the [media] market resembles any differentiated product market” (p. 635). More extreme voices will be part of the media environment “as fixed costs fall (or as demand rises)” (p. 666), making it profitable to target smaller niches. Important empirical support for this argument is provided in a recent paper by Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro (2007), who find that US local newspapers’ partisanship parallel closely the local strength of the Democratic and Republican candidates. On average, the level and direction of bias in US local newspapers is very close to what would have resulted if the papers followed only a profit maximization strategy.

In a counter-intuitive account of media bias, Yi Xiang and Miklos Sarvary (2007) argue that besides “biased consumers” who “want to read (watch) news that is consistent with their tastes or prior beliefs”, there are “‘conscientious’ consumers whose sole interest is in discovering the truth” (p. 611). Presence of media outlets with differing biases, besides satisfying the demand of biased consumers, also benefits conscientious consumers who can thus gather more information by reading different accounts of a reported event.

2.3.2. Modernization

The sociological approach to explaining political parallelism is laid out in Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) excellent discussion of the theory of differentiation in modern societies, as well as in an earlier article by Jakubowicz’s (1975/2000). The following is based upon Hallin and Mancini (2004).

Going back to Durkheim's idea of division of labor in modern societies, the theory of differentiation finds its most explicit statement in Talcott Parsons' writings, who define differentiation, in evolutionary terms, as "a process of social change from primitive to modern societies [...] in which social functions initially fused are separated: politics, for example, is differentiated from religion and from economics" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 77). What this implies for media is that the function of communication also comes to be differentiated from other functions, most importantly for our purposes, from politics. Once differentiated from politics, media no longer parallel the party system.

Critiques of Parsons, who nevertheless continue to play with the idea of differentiation, drop the evolutionary content and make the empirical claim that what is going on in recent times is not differentiation but de-differentiation. More specifically, Hallin and Mancini (2004) refer to the works of Habermas and Bourdieu, whose ideas find widespread application in media studies. De-differentiation can be put, in Habermas' terminology, as the process by which the public sphere –where rational public deliberation took place- is colonized by economic and political interests, by commercialized press and by power-seeking political parties. In Bourdieu's terminology, de-differentiation entails a "field" losing its autonomy, whereas it ought to have its own rules of game. When it parallels the party system, the field of journalism obviously loses its autonomy to the field of politics.

2.3.3. Co-variation with party system characteristics

In his book introducing the concept of press-party parallelism to the literature, Seymour-Ure (1974) also offers some hypotheses associating certain party system characteristics with parallelism. Although his analysis is based upon Jean Blondel's (1970, cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974) somewhat dated terminology for the analysis of party systems –offered in *An Introduction to Comparative Government*-, and the nature of his data does not allow him to explore most of the hypotheses in detail, his propositions are most valuable if only because little has been written on the subject since then.

Following Blondel's typology, Seymour-Ure (1974) explores the relationship between the level and types of press-party parallelism and the following five party system characteristics: a) "Number and relative strength of parties", b) "Party goals and ideology", c) "Social bases of support for parties", d) "Party structure", and e) "Functions

and weight of party in the political system” (pp. 184-201). Some of the major hypotheses, or as he calls them “tentative generalizations” (p. 191), that Seymour-Ure offers are as follows:

- *“Parallelism with the press is stronger in multi-party systems than in two or two-and-a-half party systems; but less strong than in one-party systems.”* (p. 191)
- *“Parallelism with the press is stronger in ‘stable’ than in ‘unstable’ party systems. In other words, newspapers and parties are found to have closer links in systems where the relative strength of parties changed little in the 20 years after 1945 than where changes did take place.”* (p.192)
- *“The deeper the cleavages between competing party ideologies, the greater is the probability of press parallelism.”* (p. 194)
- *“Press/party parallelism on the dimensions of organization and goals tends to be more common in imposed than in naturally developing parties.* (p. 197) [i.e. parties that “emerge from a parent group whose goals are already accepted at least by a large section of the polity. The parent groups are likely to have been originally ethnic, religious, tribal/clientele or, in industrial societies only, class based.” (p. 196)] The dimension of reader support is more conjectural. While the role of a newspaper under an imposed party seems likely to attract readers who support it, there seems no reason to suppose reader loyalty to a naturally developed party need be any less.” (p. 197)
- *“Party/press parallelism on the dimensions of press organization and goal loyalty will be higher in centralized than in decentralized parties. [...] The more a party relies on charismatic leadership, the more likely will a newspaper parallel it.”* (p. 198-9)

The reason that Seymour-Ure’s conclusions were only tentative generalizations stemmed from “the difficulty of finding reliable data about the press [...] specially for the tricky dimension of goal-loyalty” (p.189) which refers to the support papers give to party goals as reflected in their content. Studying the dimension of party supporters was also difficult, because “Published data under this heading are [were] extremely skimpy or inaccessible”⁶ (p. 172). Of the three dimensions, the only one on which there was relatively abundant information was the organizational dimension, and Seymour-Ure made heavy use of that dimension.

Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) widely acclaimed work on media systems is another source where we can find hypotheses concerning the relationship between political parallelism and party-system characteristics. However, their framework of reference in

⁶ Data about newspaper reading habits of party supporters are no longer “skimpy or inaccessible”. Many studies routinely cite overlap between the readers of specific newspapers and voters of specific parties as evidence of parallelism, thanks to the widespread use of survey methodology. Thus, Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite three separate surveys to demonstrate the existence of parallelism in readership in Italy, Spain and Britain.

terms of political system characteristics is both more complicated, and works at a more general level. Rather than relating political parallelism to party-system characteristics, they relate a bundle of media system characteristics,⁷ among them political parallelism, to a bundle of political system characteristics, including, but not limited to, party-system characteristics. For example, one of the items in their political system characteristics list is whether the system in question has a consensus democracy or a majoritarian democracy, referring to the classification developed by Arend Lijphart (1999). Lijphart's model, in turn, is partially based upon party system characteristics, with majoritarian democracies usually having two-party systems and consensus democracies usually having multi-party systems. Another item in their political system characteristics list is whether the system in question has polarized pluralism or moderate pluralism, terminology developed by Giovanni Sartori (1976/2005) to classify party systems based upon the number of parties and level of ideological polarization in the system. One last item containing party system related information is individual vs. organized pluralism; organized pluralism referring to the cases where "the different subcommunities [...] develop [...] their own educational, cultural, social and political institutions – ranging from sports clubs to trade unions and political parties" (p. 53), the classic example being Netherlands with its Protestant, Catholic, Socialist and Liberal pillars.⁸ These three hypotheses relating political parallelism to party system characteristics are stated by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as follows:

- "Polarized pluralism tends to be associated with a high degree of political parallelism: newspapers are typically identified with ideological tendencies, and traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism are often strong. [...] Moderate pluralism, on the other hand, is more conducive to the development of commercialized and/or professionalized media with less political parallelism and instrumentalization." (p. 61)
- "Majoritarianism [...] tends to be associated with the notion of the journalist as a neutral servant of the public as a whole, rather than as a spokesperson of a particular political tendency or social group, and with internal rather than external pluralism [...] Consensus systems, on the other hand, are typically multiparty systems, and external pluralism [...] is more likely in the system of multiparty polities, along with other characteristics of political parallelism." (p. 51)

⁷ To be more specific, there are four media system characteristics that Hallin and Mancini (2004) use: 1- Development of newspaper industry, 2-Political parallelism, 3- Professionalization, and 4- Role of the state in media system. (p. 67)

⁸ The remaining two items in Hallin and Mancini's (2004) list, namely the role of the state, and development of rational/legal authority, do not contain explicit references to party system characteristics.

- “Organized pluralism is [...] associated with external pluralism and political parallelism: media tied to political parties, trade unions, and churches, and the notion of journalism as a vehicle for the representation of groups and ideologies develops most strongly in societies characterized by organized pluralism.” (p.54)

The first and second hypotheses of Hallin and Mancini (2004) are shared by Seymour-Ure (1974), who also expected parallelism to be high in multi-party systems, and in systems where cleavages between party ideologies are high (see the first and third hypotheses cited from Seymour-Ure above). The third hypothesis, about organized pluralism, corresponds to Seymour-Ure’s hypothesis about imposed vs. naturally developing parties (fourth item in his list)⁹, but the two works have differing expectations about ‘segmented’ societies where parties ‘naturally develop’: Hallin and Mancini (2004) expects them to have higher parallelism, whereas Seymour-Ure (1974) expects them to have lower parallelism in two of his three dimensions (organizational ties and goal loyalty), and does not expect a differentiation in the last dimension (readership).

In two articles on press-party parallelism van Kempen (2006; 2007) also explores the relationship of political parallelism to a similar party-system characteristic, what she calls cleavage voting. Cleavage voting refers to the “strength of socio-political cleavages” (p. 414) as reflected in the voting patterns. The way van Kempen (2006) operationalizes it, borrowed from Mark N. Franklin (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2006), cleavage voting measures the contribution of such variables as class identity, union membership, urban dwelling and income level to explaining the variance in party preferences. Van Kempen (2006) finds that in Sweden, in the period between 1982-2002, press-party parallelism and cleavage voting moved together: their sizes and direction of movement were almost identical, both moving down from about 14 points (in a scale of 0 to 100) in 1982 to about 6 points in 2002. Pearson’s r was 0.96, indicating strong co-variation. Van Kempen (2006), however, is cautious not to make a causal argument out of this correlation; she discusses two possible explanations for the common movement of the variables, one of them being that both are manifestations of a third phenomenon, the other being that press-party parallelism is just a proxy for cleavage voting. Based upon cross-sectional data from another article (van Kempen, 2007), where the correlation between press-party

⁹ Although Seymour-Ure’s (1974) hypothesis is couched at the level of political parties not systems, it is possible to transfer this hypothesis -about naturally developing parties- to the system level without damaging the integrity of his argument. Societies in which most of the political parties are naturally developed rather than imposed would correspond to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) segmented societies.

parallelism and cleavage voting is a mere 0.02, she dismisses the latter and accepts the former explanation.

To sum up this section on party-system characteristics, we have seen that different studies linked political parallelism to different party system characteristics. Of these, Seymour-Ure's (1974) was the one that contained the largest number of hypotheses, although his data allowed him to draw only sketchy conclusions. Hallin and Mancini's (2004) work drew upon much more improved and contemporary data, but they were mainly interested in inter-regional comparisons, not inter-country ones; and their hypotheses tended to focus upon larger conceptual constructs (like consensus vs. majoritarian democracies) of which party system characteristics were a minor part. Still, it was possible to spot shared hypotheses between the two works, like those about the number of parties in a system and the level of polarization; and a shared variable on which they had differing expectations, what Hallin and Mancini (2004) called organized pluralism and Seymour-Ure (1974) called naturally developing parties. This variable was also taken up in van Kempen's (2006) study, in the form of cleavage voting, who used survey data to explore the relationship between press-party parallelism and cleavage voting.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I first reviewed how the term press-party parallelism was conceived by Seymour-Ure (1974), and later re-defined as political parallelism by Hallin and Mancini (2004), who focused on parallels between media and broad political currents, not individual parties. Then I reviewed the literature on media and democracy, starting with the social responsibility theory of the press, and proceeding with media in studies of democracy, and democracy in studies on media. Information, forum, advocacy, and watchdog functions emerged as shared points in these normative writings, and pluralism emerged as a criterion with implications for all. From the social responsibility theory of the press, I borrowed the idea of a balance between "common carriers" and "advocates", which implies moderate levels of external pluralism in the media, and which will be used in the following chapters in evaluating observed levels of political parallelism.

The second part of this chapter was dedicated to reviewing the empirical literature, and the third part to the theoretical explanations offered to account for variation in levels of political parallelism. With regards to geographical distribution, I have noted a lack of comparative studies on the subject, despite the abundance of single country studies examining political parallelism under different names. With regards to historical trends, most scholars observe a decline over time in different contexts, although observations of increase and no change are also made. I have examined the explanations offered for the variation in levels of political parallelism under the three headings of modernization (the sociological approach), commercialization (the economic approach), and party system characteristics (the political approach).

I return to these explanations in Chapter 6, after presenting the historical data for the Turkish and British cases in Chapters 4 and 5, and make a partial evaluation of the explanations based upon the data from these two cases. In Chapter 3, however, I first need to lay out the different methodologies I have employed in collecting and analyzing the data, and explain why, among many others, I have chosen to make use of these particular methods.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I present the methodology I use in three sections. First, I elaborate upon political parallelism and its components from a methodological perspective. Second, I review the different strategies employed by researchers for empirical study of political parallelism, with a specific focus on content analytical strategies. Lastly, I present the different methodologies employed in collecting and evaluating the data presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 7 of this study.

3.1. Political Parallelism and Its Components

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, press-party parallelism has three aspects: a) organizational ties, in the form of organic links between parties and newspapers; b) readership, in the sense of parties receiving disproportionate support from the readers of certain newspapers; and c) goal unity, as reflected in newspaper content (Seymour-Ure, 1974).

There are two different approaches to the relationship between the three aspects of parallelism. One of these approaches is to treat them as indicators of the same underlying phenomenon, with the implication that when we have knowledge about one, we know about others too. This is the position implicitly taken by Van Kempen (2006) when she claims that her readership survey based study of press-party parallelism in Sweden is also an exercise in content analysis. She argues that “the use of [...] survey data allowed me to study partisanship in the media – something that would normally be done by using labour-intensive content analyses” (p. 417).

Van Kempen's (2006) claim seems to be based upon the assumption that when a political party receives disproportionate support from the readers of a certain newspaper, it is solely or mainly because this newspaper's coverage is supportive of that party¹⁰, and consequently, in systems with high readership parallelism goal unity between parties and newspapers is also high. The other possibility, which Van Kempen fails to consider, is that factors other than goal unity may be responsible for making the voters of a certain political party buy a certain newspaper. One such factor could be the relative price of newspapers. In a hypothetical political system where there are only two political parties, the Party of the Rich and the Party of the Poor, Poor voters could be buying the cheaper Rich Times instead of the more expensive Poor Times, and still voting Poor.

Other such factors can also be at play, or goal unity may actually be the reason voters buy a certain newspaper. The point is, we cannot assume this relationship: whether content parallelism co-exists with readership parallelism in a political system is an empirical question to be answered on a case-by-case basis.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) also employ the "indicators" approach in their otherwise magnificent study of media systems. They cite different sorts of evidence for different countries, and treat these data as indicators of the same underlying phenomenon. For example, in their chapter on the Mediterranean or the "polarized pluralist" model, they report organizational data for Portugal (p. 103) and content analysis data for France (p. 98-100) to make the case that "political parallelism is relatively high" (p. 98) in both cases. For Greece, they report both organizational and content analysis data (p. 98). For Italy and Spain, they report readership data (p. 102, 105) in addition to organizational and content analysis data (p. 100-103, 103-106). Although this is in part a necessary choice in the absence of comparative data, using different sorts of evidence to pass comparative judgment about political systems requires more caution.

The indicators approach creates problems when reaching conclusions about a single political system too. This happens when the researcher encounters apparently conflicting data about the different "indicators". For example, Van Kempen (2007) finds that Germany, which Hallin and Mancini (2004) classify among the countries that have high

¹⁰ Van Kepmen's (2006) argument is also based upon case studies. She argues that "newspaper readership will express partisan bias in media contents. This is supported by Dutch, British and Swedish studies that show that there is a strong relationship between the political preferences of readers and those of their newspapers" (p. 411). The problem with this argument is that the "strong relationship" could be specific to the three countries mentioned; we do not know whether it is present in other countries too.

political parallelism, has the lowest level of parallelism among the countries she studies, describing the results for Germany as “unexpected”. This apparent conflict results because Hallin and Mancini (2004) use organizational (p. 155-6) and content analysis (p. 181) data in their analysis of parallelism in Germany, whereas Van Kempen (2007) uses readership data. From the point of view of the indicators approach, this is a contradiction because we have two results about a single phenomenon that are at variance with each other. One would try to resolve this conflict by, for example, choosing one of the sources over the other because it has better quality, or by the different time frames -if that is the case- the two sources use, etc. From the point of view of the components approach, on the other hand, there is no contradiction to be solved. For unlike indicators, components may behave differently and even move in opposite directions. If newspapers give differential support to parties in their coverage, but readers are not differentiated, this is not contradictory data but richer data about Germany. Van Kempen (2007) drops the indicators approach and makes use of the components approach when explaining the German case: “the German newspaper Bild is known for its clear politically rightist contents, but its readers are not significantly different from the other respondents in the sample. Evidently, German media audiences are relatively amorphous groups in party-political terms” (p. 310). It looks as if studying partisanship in the media still needs to be done by “labour-intensive content analyses”.

The components approach is also the position taken in the original formulation of press-party parallelism by Seymour-Ure (1974). He does not assume that all of the components will jointly be present or absent in a country, and examines all possible combinations of the three components in an elaborate scheme with comments about corresponding cases in the real world. He argues that some of the combinations are more likely than others: “In practice, one would not expect some of the combinations in this [medium] category to exist: It seems improbable, for instance, that parallelism would be high in organization but low in goal loyalty [...] The most probable combinations would seem high goal loyalty [...] with low organization and readers’ partisanship [...]; and ‘high’ organization and goal loyalty with ‘low’ readers’ partisanship” (1974, p. 176). The last combination, “‘high’ organization and goal loyalty with ‘low’ readers’ partisanship” is a description that perfectly fits the German case. It is curious that later researchers chose to overlook these fine points about the relationship between the three components of parallelism and employed the indicators approach that treats them all alike. In the remaining chapters, I treat these three aspects as different components to the extent

possible, although in the Turkish case, due to the nature of the available historical data, use of the indicators approach was a necessary choice. The following is a review of the different methods used by researchers for empirical study of political parallelism.

3.2. Empirical Study of Press-Party Parallelism

Press-party parallelism can be studied using organizational data, readership data, expert surveys, or content analysis, or a combination of them.

3.2.1. Via Organizational Data

Making use of organizational data to study parallelism in press is a favorite strategy among scholars. Seymour-Ure (1974), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Mancini (2000), and Semetko (1998) use organizational data to demonstrate political parallelism in the press.

Organizational data in these studies come in different shapes and qualities. Data about the most outright form of organic link between parties and papers, ownership, which is usually public knowledge and can be traced in official records, is the one used most often. Seymour-Ure (1974) uses ownership data for Britain (p. 161), Russia, France, Austria, and South Africa (p. 170) to demonstrate parallelism. Hallin and Mancini (2004) report ownership data for Spain (p. 103), Italy (p. 100), Netherlands (p. 152), and Austria (p. 156). Mancini (2000) reports ownership data for Italy (p. 320), and Semetko for Netherlands (1998, p. 140).

Researchers use data about other forms of organizational links between parties and papers too. Ownership by affiliated organizations like trade unions and foundations (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p.170-171), ownership by people following party political careers (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 171; Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 155-156, 210), direct subsidies to papers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 103; Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 171), and other forms of support like regular donations by party members (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 154) and help with distribution of copies (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 38) are among the many forms of organizational links that researchers employ to demonstrate parallelism.

The reason organizational data are used so often is two-fold: First, especially in its ownership form, organizational links between parties and papers occupy a major if not the central place among the three components of parallelism. When parallelism in organization is present, parallelism in other components is likely to follow, as Seymour-Ure argues (1974, p. 172), for party management will try to make sure that the paper follows the party's line and that the voters read the paper. The second reason organizational data are used so often is that they are usually public knowledge and require, even for casual observers of press and politics in a country, little extra research.

However, there are limits to the use of organizational data in studying parallelism, the most important of which is that outright ownership, the major form of organizational link, has come to be seen only rarely. Even during the time Seymour-Ure (1974) wrote his treatment, in 1970s, proper party press was in decline both in Britain and in general. "British national newspapers", Seymour-Ure (1974) observed, "are mostly independent [...] on the dimension of organization" (p. 169). In general, "ownership and management of a newspaper by a party [...] was the rule" in the nineteenth century, but "It has become uncommon since the growth of the advertising industry" (p.160).

Even in Scandinavian countries, which have a strong tradition of party press, proper party press is in decline both in number and in importance. The few titles still owned by parties have become marginal players in the press environment. Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite data on Finland and Denmark from Salokangas (1999) and Søllinge (1999), which show a sharp decrease in the number of party-affiliated newspapers in these countries. In Denmark, only 8 papers out of 88 were independent in 1960. In 2002, 14 of the 32 titles were independent (Søllinge, 1999, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

Because they are becoming very rare, examining organizational links between parties and papers is thus not very useful any more as a strategy of studying political parallelism. This is despite the theoretically major place accorded to the organizational component, and despite the fact that organizational links are relatively easy to observe.

In historical studies of political parallelism, however, organizational data are still a major and sometimes the only form of data we can use, for historical data about parallelism in readership and content are usually not available. Readership survey, indeed the survey methodology itself has a very recent history, making it close to impossible to inquire about readership parallelism in the past. (Except via aggregate data. More on this in the following section.) Raw data for studying parallelism in content are available for

earlier periods in the form of collections of newspaper issues, but they are very costly to analyze and thus not very useful beyond providing demonstrative examples.

3.2.2. Via Readership Data

Readership data come in two forms: aggregate data and individual data.

3.2.2.1. Aggregate readership data

Aggregate data are used in earlier studies to demonstrate the presence or absence of press-party parallelism. The main question asked is “whether the vote share of socialist parties more or less equals the circulation share of socialist parties”. If the vote share of socialist parties is higher than the circulation share of socialist papers, then the conclusion is that there is “ ‘under-representation’ in the circulation of the left-wing papers” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 173).

Seymour-Ure (1974) cites aggregate readership and vote share data for Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and Belgium, all of which have under-representation of the left-wing press, and reaches the conclusion that “Many Labour or Communist voters read non-left-wing papers” (p. 173).

This conclusion has two main problems: First, circulation levels, based upon sales figures, are not necessarily a good indicator of exposure levels. It may be the case that the smaller circulation left-wing papers reach a wider audience than the larger circulation non-left-wing papers, if their individual copies tend to be read by more people. With circulation data we can reach conclusions about total sales, but not about actual readership or exposure levels.

At a more basic level, however, -and even if we were to assume that left-wing and non-left-wing papers have a more or less equal sales to exposure ratios- the conclusion, based upon aggregate data, that “many Labour or Communist voters read non-left-wing papers” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 173) is not valid because two different populations, voters and readers, are treated as one to make this argument. If we had data showing that the population of readers is also a representative sample of the population of voters – which, in many cases, is not very likely- then conclusions based upon aggregate statistics

for these two populations could be valid. Because we do not have knowledge about how representative the population of “readers” is as a sample of “voters”, the proposition that “Labour or Communist voters do not read any newspapers” is just as likely to be true as the proposition that “Many Labour or Communist voters read non-left-wing papers” (p. 173) if all we have is aggregate data.

3.2.2.2. Individual level (survey) data

More sophisticated analyses of the relationship between readership and vote choice are possible with individual level data.

At its simplest form, cross-tabulations of readership and vote choice are sufficient to give a good idea about the level of political parallelism in a system. Seymour-Ure uses such cross-tabulations for Britain (p. 168); Hallin and Mancini for Italy (p. 102), Spain (p. 105), and the UK (p. 213); and Brynlin and Newton (2003) for the UK (p. 62).

It is possible to generate a single index from these cross-tabulations for purposes of comparison, similar to the Alford index of class voting mentioned in the previous chapter, in the form of “percent left voters who read left papers minus percent left voters who read non-left papers”. To the best of my knowledge, no one made such use of readership data. Of course, this method would encounter the same kind of problems the index of class voting does. To calculate the index of class voting, it is first necessary to classify political parties as “parties of the working class” and “others”. In an index of readership voting, one would have to classify papers in a similar way, which is even more problematic than classifying parties.¹¹ However, the problem can easily be solved by dropping the general categories of left and right, and by using party names instead. In this case, we would not have a single measure of the overlap between working class and left parties, but multiple measures of the overlap between working class and Party A, working class and Party B, etc. Then, we could take the average of these overlaps to generate an overall measure of cleavage voting or readership parallelism.

¹¹ It needs to be noted that use of aggregate readership data, examined in the previous section, also requires this pre-analysis classification. To find the circulation share of left-wing papers, one first needs to classify papers as “left-wing” and “others”.

More sophisticated uses of individual level exposure data is made by Morris (2005) and Coe et al. (2008), who use, respectively, probit and logit modeling¹² to study the determinants of TV show exposure, among them party identification. They both find that party identification is a significant factor in explaining differential TV exposure, even when other factors like age, income, education, etc. are controlled. The improvement this method (multivariate regression) brings over cross-tabulations is that it becomes possible to isolate the relationship between vote choice and media exposure with control variables introduced.

Another sophisticated use of individual level readership data is made in Van Kempen's studies of parallelism in Sweden (2006) and in EU countries (2007). She develops a measure of press-party parallelism inspired by Franklin's (1992) measure of cleavage voting. Franklin's index is based upon total explained variance in multivariate regressions where attitudes towards individual parties is the dependent variable and cleavage variables like class, religion, gender and the like are independent variables. The average total explained variance, weighted by the vote shares of the parties and varying between 0 and 100, is interpreted as a measure of the strength of social cleavages in determining vote choice.

Similarly, Van Kempen (2006; 2007) uses attitudes towards individual parties as her dependent variable, but takes "exposure to media" variables as her independent variables. "Exposure to newspaper X", "exposure to TV show Y", "exposure to internet site Z" –measured by questions like "How often do you read/watch newspaper/TV show X?"- are entered as separate independent variables in separate regressions for individual parties, and the average total variance explained, weighted by the percent shares of the parties in the parliament, is taken as the measure of media-party parallelism in the system.

One problem with Van Kempen's (2006, 2007) method concerns its applicability, for we would need to have a continuous or at least an interval level measure of attitudes towards parties, an information that we do not always have. This is required because the R^2 statistic, used as the measure of total explained variance, can only be calculated in ordinary linear regression; in logit and probit analyses, more appropriate for categorical dependent variables, a pseudo R^2 is calculated, which cannot be used as a measure of total

¹² Probit and logit are maximum likelihood estimations, designed to handle categorical dependent variables.

explained variance.¹³ Thus, in the absence of an interval level measure of attitudes towards parties, creating parallelism indexes out of cross-tabulations is the only viable alternative.

3.2.3. Via Expert Surveys

Expert survey is a frequently used methodology in political science. Expert surveys are used in measuring left-right positions of political parties,¹⁴ to assess presidential performance (Schlesinger Sr., 1948, cited in Song and Simonton, 2007), to rank political science journals (Mc Lean et. al., 2008), and even to forecast election results (Randall, Armstrong, and Cuzan, 2007). They are especially useful as a way of gathering information when direct measurement is not possible –for example due to the highly abstract nature of the concept measured- or when other methods are too costly.

There are many choices to be made when designing an expert survey, starting with the choice of experts. Academicians and practitioners of the professions involved are the likely candidates expected to have detailed knowledge about the phenomenon studied.

In studying parallelism, journalists are the natural experts who are likely to have intimate knowledge about the political positioning of newspapers. Their observations are thus a valuable source of information about political parallelism in a system. Patterson and Donsbach (1993, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004), in an effort to measure parallelism across systems, ask journalists in Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the US to place parties and newspapers in their countries on a single left-right scale. Journalists in the US place newspapers in the middle of the two parties, contrary to the journalists in other countries who place newspapers closer to parties on the left-right ideological scale, indicating a higher level of political parallelism.

Researchers also make use of other survey questions directed at journalists to study parallelism. Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite studies that find “in the late 1990s 40 to 50 percent of Spanish journalists still considered it an important part of the journalist’s role

¹³ See UCLA Academic Technology Services (n.d.) on the pitfalls of interpreting pseudo R^2 as total explained variance.

¹⁴ See the special issue of *Electoral Studies* (March 2007, Volume 26, Issue 1) on “Comparing Measures of Party Positioning: Expert, Manifesto, and Survey Data” for a number of articles on using expert surveys to measure party positions.

to ‘promote certain values and ideas’ and to ‘influence the public’” (p. 204) to make the case that parallelism in Spain is high. Similar survey data about the advocacy orientations of journalists are used by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in the German case too (p. 180). For Italy, they cite a survey that asks journalists how often they think information and opinion are mixed in news reports (p. 106).

Besides systematic surveys, individual journalists’ opinions regarding varying aspects of their profession are also cited by researchers to demonstrate parallelism. Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite journalists defending their right to take a political stand in Italy (p. 101), Portugal (p. 103) and Spain (p. 105), and an Italian journalist talking about his disappointment when he found out that “journalism was [not] before all else information, fact, news...” (Forcella, 1959, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.101) in discussing parallelism in Southern Europe.

3.2.4. Via Content Analysis

Studying political parallelism via content analysis means looking for disproportionate support in newspaper content for a specific party or parties. Disproportionate support to a political party can be given in one of the following ways: 1) Endorsement, 2) More coverage, 3) Positive (less negative) coverage, 4) Shared agenda, 5) Shared framing, and 6) Shared vocabulary.

3.2.4.1. Endorsement

Endorsements are declarations of open support for a specific party or parties by newspaper managements, expressed, usually on election eves, in the editorial or the leader columns. Endorsement is the most direct form of support a newspaper can give to a political party. Hence, where they exist, they are a good source of information about political parallelism. Brandenburg (2006) uses endorsement data in his study of newspaper coverage before the 2005 UK elections, where he finds that 6 of the 7 papers he examines give partial or weak endorsements.

Two factors limit the use of endorsement data as a source of information on parallelism: First, not all countries have a tradition of newspapers endorsing parties. In

some countries, newspapers collectively avoid declaring open support for political parties or candidates in their editorials, although they may well be giving tacit support in other ways. Naturally, for these countries endorsement data do not exist.

The second factor that limits use of endorsement data is that they give only partial information about the support given to political parties. Whether a newspaper supports a political party in its news reports and other commentary besides the editorial article is a question endorsement data fail to answer. To find out whether support is confined to the editorial page or spread to other pages, additional content analysis strategies need to be employed.

3.2.4.2. More coverage

Another way of giving support to political parties, especially in news articles, is giving them more coverage relative to other parties. More coverage means more visibility on the part of the party concerned, which is usually a good thing. Balkır and her colleagues (2008), in their study of newspaper coverage prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections in Turkey, and Brandenburg (2006), in his study of newspaper coverage prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections in the UK, use more coverage as one of their coding items. They both find that the party in government –AKP in Turkey and the Labour Party in the UK- benefits from “incumbency bonus”,¹⁵ that is, they receive more coverage across the papers.

Although it is very successful in identifying main political actors as perceived by newspapers, coding more coverage is a blunt tool for studying parallelism, for the type of coverage also matters, which is taken up in the next section.

3.2.4.3. Positive (less negative) coverage

It is positive coverage that parties seek, not just more coverage. Positive coverage is like free advertisement for the party concerned –if not better-, and matters more than the amount of coverage. Balkır and her colleagues (2008) find that although AKP was the

¹⁵ For a discussion of incumbency bonus, see Hopmann (2009).

party that got the most coverage across the papers they analyzed, the type of coverage it received was not always positive.

A tendency noted in American (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2006) and British (Brandenburg, 2006) media is overall negativity towards political parties. In such cases, less negative, instead of more positive, coverage indicates differential support. Brandenburg (2006) finds that before 2005 elections in the UK, the general attitude of newspapers towards parties was negative, and newspaper support –in line with their editorial stances- was reflected in the smaller amount of negativity displayed towards the endorsed party.

3.2.4.4. Shared agenda

Up to this point, strategies that analyze only newspaper content were examined. Shared agenda, shared framing and shared vocabulary strategies require, as their names indicate, comparative analysis of two types of content: newspaper content and content produced by political parties.

Just as there is a choice to be made when analyzing newspaper content –whether to look at editorials, other commentary articles or news articles- there is also a choice to be made when analyzing the content produced by parties. Party election manifestos are the most likely candidates as representative texts of parties' political stands, being official documents addressed directly at voters. Their ability to serve as party texts in a comparison with newspaper content, however, is limited by two factors: First, manifestos are mainly about general principles and party policies, not day to day events or recent developments, on which news reports are prepared. That is to say, manifestos and newspaper articles have different subjects, making a comparison between the two difficult.

Second, manifestos and newspapers have different publication periods. Manifestos are published once usually in the beginning of the election campaigns. Even if they were to contain comments and statements about recent developments, they would soon become dated compared to newspaper content, which is published daily.

Press statements issued by parties do not have these problems: They talk about day to day events, and they are issued much more frequently than manifestos are, at a rate, especially on election eves, close to the publication period of newspapers. Thus,

theoretically, their ability to serve as party texts in a comparison with newspaper coverage is higher. They too, however, have a major problem limiting their use: Almost all political parties in democracies publish election manifestos or similar texts that are widely available, but not all parties have a habit of issuing official press statements, using, instead, party leaders' speeches or casual comments to respond to recent developments. Parties also have wildly differing practices with regards to archiving press statements and other frequently produced content, and making these available to the public via their internet sites. Hence, there is a major practical hurdle before using press statements as party texts in a comparison, especially when more than one countries are involved.

In many cases, using manifestos as party texts in the comparison is a necessary choice because manifestos are usually the only party texts collectively available. Moreover, manifestos are not totally out of touch with recent developments: the general principles and party policies laid out in manifestos are likely to be employed by party spokesmen and women (or in press statements) when interpreting new events. In turn, newspapers do not consist totally of reports about recent events. Especially in commentary sections, party policies and political philosophies are discussed, from time to time, from a longer term perspective. Party manifestos thus have a significant capacity to serve as party texts in a comparison with newspaper content.

Brandenburg (2006) uses press statements as party texts in his analysis of shared agenda between parties and newspapers before the 2005 UK elections. The rationale behind looking for shared agenda is as follows: Parties have different issues on which they feel strong. They want to keep these issues on the agenda as much as possible, and play down certain other issues that they think will harm their standing. For example, an incumbent government would probably like to avoid economic issues in a financial crisis, and talk, instead, about foreign relations on which it feels strong. The opposition parties, on the other hand, would like to keep the economy high on the agenda. Newspapers can give tacit support to parties by playing certain issues down and other issues up, in line with parties' preferences.

Parties' preferences, in turn, can be extracted from the texts they produce. If a party devotes ten pages to economy in its manifesto and one to foreign relations, while another makes five press statements on foreign relations for every statement on economy, we can have a clear idea of their relative preferences for the issues on the agenda.

Brandenburg (2006) measures parties' relative preferences for issues on the agenda on the basis of total space, measured in standardized text lines, devoted to different issues

in party press statements. These percentages are then compared with newspapers' preferred issues, measured again by total space devoted in standardized text lines, to find the level of similarity between party texts and newspaper content. He finds that "endorsements [...] translate into agenda bias" (2006, p. 172), in the form of papers promoting the preferred issues of the parties they endorse.

3.2.4.5. Shared framing

Shared agenda is a blunt tool compared to shared framing, like more coverage is compared to positive coverage. What matters is not only which issues are covered, but also how these issues are framed. A war, for example, can be framed in terms of human suffering or national security, or even its effect on the budget and the unemployment rate. Parties may have an equal preference for the issue of war, but differing preferences for how it is framed. Newspapers can give support to parties by using their preferred frames when reporting about the war.

Eilders and Lüter, (2000), in their study of the German newspapers' coverage of the Kosovo war, find that the framing strategies of the German newspapers reflected the make-up of opinion in the Parliament: none "question[ed] the legitimacy of the war", but there was "a distinct pattern of preferred interpretations between liberal and conservative newspapers. [...] conservative editorials tended to frame the war in terms of a necessary and unavoidable reaction to human rights violations by Serbia" whereas "Liberal editorials [...] pointed to the humanitarian consequences and the need for a political solution incorporating the relevant international organizations" (p. 424). Eilders and Lüter's (2000) assertions about German parties' preferred frames, however, are not based upon a systematic content analysis of party texts, but on their own observations. To the best of my knowledge, no study has examined the framing of an issue both in party texts and newspaper coverage.

3.2.4.6. Shared vocabulary

Shared vocabulary is better presented as a research strategy than a way of giving support. It is based upon comparing word frequencies in party texts and newspaper

coverage. A high percentage of shared words between the newspaper and the party texts may be a reflection of more coverage, shared agenda, shared framing, or all of them together.

Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) look for shared vocabulary in their study of newspaper content in the US, using a version of the k-nearest neighbor methodology, which is based upon differences in word frequencies between texts. (More on this in the following section.) They find that local papers parallel the party that is stronger in their area.

In this section, I have reviewed content analysis strategies specific to capturing parallelism in content. None of these strategies, to the best of my knowledge, have been used in a comparative, multi-country setting. In the following section, the specific methodologies used in Chapters 4 (history, Turkey), 5 (history, the UK), and 7 (content analysis, Turkey and the UK) will be presented.

3.3. Methodology Used in This Study

The methodology used in this study is best presented following the Chapter numbers. Chapters 4, 5, and 7 employ different strategies to examine political parallelism in the Turkey and in the UK.

3.3.1. Turkey - Coding Historical Information (Chapter 4)

The method used in Chapter 4 to study history of political parallelism in the Turkish press is based upon coding historical data contained in books on press history.¹⁶ These

¹⁶ For the period until 1960, I use, as my sources, only book length treatments on the general history of the Turkish press. (See the section on ‘Selecting Major Papers’ for this decision.) For the more recent post-60 period, I also use additional sources. To the best of my knowledge, there are eleven book length treatments on the general history of the Turkish press, all in Turkish: Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, *Türk Gazeteciliği*, İstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti, İstanbul, 1931; Hasan Refik Ertuğ, *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi-1*, İstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti, İstanbul, 1931; Fuat Süreyya Oral, *Türk Basın Tarihi, 1919-1965 Cumhuriyet Dönemi*, Doğu Matbaacılık, 1968 (İkinci Kitap); Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü İle Basın*, Güven Matbaası, Ankara, 1971; A. D. Jeltyakov, *Türkiye'nin Sosyo-Politik ve Kültürel Hayatında Basın*

books, however, do not contain information on all aspects of political parallelism. For example, readership surveys in Turkey have a recent history, making it close to impossible to inquire about the readership aspect of press-party parallelism from a historical perspective.¹⁷ On organizational and goal unity (content) aspects, however, we do have ample information, scattered around in books on press history. I have ordered this information –organizational connections of newspapers, and their sympathies for political parties as reflected in their content- together with two other sorts of evidence –author evaluations and legal actions- that give information not on specific aspects of political parallelism, but on the political positions of newspapers in general, and presented it in separate tables for each period. All in all, four different sorts of evidence were coded.

3.3.1.1. Types of evidence

1- Authors' evaluations: Authors' evaluations are observations by the author of a book on press history concerning the political position of the daily newspaper in question, like "this paper supported that party", "the paper was a platform for the expression of such and such political views", or "this paper was close to that party", all of which were coded under this heading. Coding authors' evaluations is like doing an expert survey,

(1729-1908 Yılları), Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1979; Hülya Baykal, *Türk Basın Tarihi 1831-1923*, İstanbul, 1990; M. Nuri İnuğur, *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993; Orhan Koloğlu, *Türk Basını Kuvayi Milliye'den Günümüze*, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1993; Nuri İnuğur, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, İstanbul, 1992; Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*, Literatür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000; Hıfzı Topuz, *II.Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2003. This list excludes works on specific aspects of the press, like Server İskit's work on press laws (Server İskit, *Türkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri*, Ülkü Matbaası, İstanbul, 1939); biographical works like Münir Süleyman Çapanoğlu's *Basın Tarihine Dair Bilgiler ve Hatıralar* (Hür Türkiye Dergisi, İstanbul, 1962); and periodical works like Ömer Sami Coşar's *Milli Mücadele Basını* (Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1961), O. Murat Güvenir's *2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Basını* (Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, İstanbul, 1991), and Nilgün Gürkan's *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950)* (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998). Although these are general treatments, the periods they cover somewhat vary based upon different publication dates and authors' scholarly interests. In general, there are more works on the Ottoman and early Republican periods, whereas the more recent periods are thinly covered.

¹⁷ See Çarkoğlu and Yavuz (2010) for a study on readership parallelism in 2002 and 2007 elections in Turkey.

except that we do not have formal questions and answers, but extract authors' responses from their texts. It should also be kept in mind that authors' evaluations do not give information about any specific aspect of political parallelism –we do not know in what sense was the paper close to the party. For example, Şapolyo (1971, p. 248) and İnuğur (1993, p. 240) describe the daily *Zafer* as a pro-DP paper in 1950s. This evaluation may have been based upon the content of the newspaper, its organizational ties, readership, or all or some of these aspects together; but what matters is that this observation is made. Although it is general information that does not allow distinguishing between different aspects of political parallelism, it still is useful information.

2- Legal action / violence: Sometimes papers are sued by party leaders, suspended or closed down by government agencies, their editors or owners are jailed or exiled or otherwise punished. This information, when used with caution, may convey useful information about the political positions of newspapers. During one-party periods, all punishments and fines –monetary fines, temporary suspensions, closures, warnings, and the like- can be read as signs of an anti-government position, and in multi-party periods, legal action taken by parties or their leaders against press outlets and their writers or owners can be taken as evidence that the paper in question somehow bothers that party.

In addition to legal action, physical violence against newspapers and/or their editors/writers/owners –like assassinations, lootings, and lynchings- can also be used as indicators of the political position of the newspaper in question, if the perpetrators are associated with certain political groups/views. For example, during the Second Constitutional Period, several journalists were assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (See notes for Table 4.3) because they had anti-CUP positions. Like authors' evaluations, this type of evidence tells us something about the political position of the paper in question in general, but not about the specific aspects of readership, content, or organization.

3- Content: Although systematic content analyses of past newspapers are rare, books on the history of the Turkish press frequently cite material from the content of the papers they cover, as evidence of a certain political position taken. These generally take the form of general observations –like “the paper criticized the government's actions”- and demonstrative examples –short excerpts from the editorial or op-ed pages on important days. In addition, we have event-specific examples from the news coverage of papers –like which papers published the Aga Khan letter defending the Caliphate in early 1920s (see notes for Table 4.5) and which papers published Pulliam's articles criticizing Menderes government in late 50s (see notes for Table 4.8). In the absence of systematic

content analysis, this is the closest approximation to a measure of parallelism in content, and when critical dates are selected, even cursory observations on content can be very informative: the divide between the papers that published the Ağa Han letter and those that did not roughly corresponded, respectively, to anti- and pro-government positions; and the different behaviors of the papers in 1950s concerning the Pulliam article reflected different positions towards the Menders government.

4- Organizational connections: Organizational connections between parties and newspapers, like direct ownership, ownership or management by affiliated persons –i.e. MPs, party leaders, prominent public figures associated with certain political stands who may or may not have formal ties to parties-, funding, and provision of content via affiliated persons are coded under this heading. Although outright ownership of a newspaper by a political party or a trade union is rare in the Turkish case (the only examples are *Ulus*, officially owned by the CHP until 1970s, and *Akşam* in 1970s, which was briefly owned by the trade union Türk-İş. See notes for Table 4.9), other forms of organizational connections have been frequently observed.

Once evidence was thus coded, it was now time to make better use of this information, by first selecting major papers, and then classifying papers by political position.

3.3.1.2. Selecting major papers

Tables presented in Chapter 4 consist of two parts. The upper part lists the ‘major’ papers and evidence on their political positions, and the lower half of the tables list the minor papers and evidence on their political positions. This was done for two reasons: First, we do not have as much information about the minor papers as we do about the major papers, not just concerning their political positions, but concerning other paper characteristics as well. So, instead of mixing cases on which we have more information with cases on which we have less information, I decided to present evidence for these two categories separately. Secondly, some sort of a homogenization was also necessary because each paper contributes to the calculation of period parallelism equally, without regard for their relative circulations. Including the minor papers on which we do have information in the calculations of parallelism would exaggerate their importance.

Major papers, in turn, were selected as follows: Because we do not have reliable circulation figures prior to 1960s, and because different authors have different lists of “major papers in this period”, I used, as a criterion of importance, number of mentions in book length treatments on the history of the Turkish press. For example, of the 6 histories of press that cover the period 1946-50 (see notes for Table 4.2), papers that were mentioned in six or five were considered to be major papers of the period. The period prior to the proclamation of the First Constitution is covered by 8 books, and those papers mentioned by all 8 or 7 of them were considered to be the major papers of this period. Although this method has its drawbacks, like possibly favoring interesting papers over others, it is the wiser choice –in the absence of circulation figures- compared to using single authors’ lists of “important papers”, because it draws upon the collective judgment of the scholars. If six authors find Paper A worth covering in their books, whereas only two mention Paper B, then Paper A was most probably a more important paper than Paper B.

Beginning with 1960s, circulation figures become available, with the founding, in 1961, of Basın İlan Kurumu (BİK, Press Advertising Institute), which collected, among other things, information on circulation figures of newspapers to provide a fair distribution of official ads.¹⁸ This has three effects on the way information in tables are organized in Chapter 4: 1- We no longer have to rely on the number of author mentions to determine the major papers, we can instead use circulation figures. Starting with the 1970s, this indeed is going to be the only criterion in deciding which papers to include in the upper part of the tables, and which to leave at the bottom: only papers with a circulation share above 1 percent (period average) according to BİK data will be counted as major papers and included in the upper part of the tables. For 1960s, however, number of author mentions and circulation figures were used together, for the circulation figures start with 1965, not with 1960: all papers that were mentioned by all or four of the five histories of press were counted as major papers, as well as papers with 1 percent or above circulation share. 2- Similarly, we no longer have to rely upon the number of titles in calculating how much of the press paralleled the party system. Instead, we can directly calculate the circulation share of parallel papers. 3- Also, because we no longer have to

¹⁸ BİK’s figures are the only historically available and systematic statistics on the circulation of Turkish national dailies. BİK Istanbul Branch has in its archives monthly circulation data going back to 1965, which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been published elsewhere.

use the number of author mentions as an indicator of being a major paper (and consequently no longer have to limit our author universe), we can now include among our sources other studies as well, in addition to book-length treatments on the history of the Turkish press. This also becomes a necessary choice as we approach the present time, for the number of press histories that cover the most recent periods are very few, whereas scholarly articles and other sources on recent history are more numerous.

Another use of classifying papers into major and minor parts was that it allowed making a more efficient use of the existing evidence. If scholars mention nothing about the political position of a major newspaper, this probably means that the paper did not have a clear or visible or dominant political position. If, on the other hand, scholars mention nothing about the political position of a minor newspaper, this must be interpreted differently: There could be other reasons, -besides the paper not having a clear position- that may explain why no political position is assigned, like lack of information, lack of authors' interest in the issue, or simply lack of space. This distinction will be helpful when we classify papers in terms of their political positions.

3.3.1.3. Assigning papers to pro-, anti-, and mixed categories

On the right-hand side of the tables in Chapter 4, papers are classified as pro-government, anti-government, and "mixed" (or 'pro-DP, anti-DP, mixed', 'left, right, mixed', etc.), based upon an overall evaluation of the evidence. The pro-government category consists of papers that display one or more of the following characteristics: a) The paper is assigned a pro-government position by one or more of the authors. b) The paper publishes pro-government content. c) The paper has an organizational link with the government (including, but not limited to, financial aid, staff support, owners' or journalists' ties to the government, etc.) d) The paper or its journalists are looted, lynched, assassinated, or otherwise subjected to physical violence by political groups in the opposition.

The anti-government category consists of papers that show one or more of the following characteristics: a) The paper is assigned an anti-government position by one or more of the authors. b) The paper publishes anti-government content (including all sorts of criticism of government actions). c) The paper has an organizational link with oppositional groups (owners' ties to such groups, financial backing, help with

distribution, etc.). d) The paper is closed, temporarily suspended, barred from publication or distribution, or its owners and journalists jailed, exiled, tried, etc.

The “mixed” category consists of papers that display one of the following characteristics: a) The paper is deemed to be impartial by one or more of the authors. b) We have conflicting information about the paper, in the sense that different authors assign different positions to the paper, or report conflicting information about its content, organizational ties, and the legal actions it faced. c) No political position information is given about the paper. This applies only to the major papers, which are placed at the upper half of the table. Minor papers on which we do not have political position information are left out of the classification.

3.3.1.4. Limitations

This method, of course, is limited by what is already contained in the secondary literature, and is only successful to the degree the literature on the history of the Turkish press is successful in analyzing its subject. If the literature misses whole points, contains repeated mistakes, or has other shortcomings, these would all be reflected in the quality of the data presented in Chapter 4. What is more, for most of the periods under study (until 1960s), only part of this literature is used: book length treatments on the general history of the Turkish press. There are, however, studies with a periodical focus that could potentially affect the make-up of the tables if they were included, with the data they contained, but we had to limit the number of studies included somehow, not only for practical reasons (it is close to impossible seeing and reading all studies on the history of the Turkish press), but also for methodological reasons (we want to have a limited set of books so that we can make analyses of major vs. minor papers).

Another shortcoming of the method used in Chapter 4 is that we cannot distinguish between components of parallelism, being content with only overall measures, making us somewhat closer to the indicators approach. Evidence on content and organization aspects, for example, were added up in classifying papers by political position, which I argued in the beginning of this chapter is akin to adding up apples and oranges.

Finally, there are period-related differences in the data presented, which complicates the analysis of overall trends and inter-period comparisons. Data for the pre-1960 periods are based only upon book-length general histories of press, whereas post-

1960 periods make use of other literature as well. Post-1960 periods also use circulation figures, which were not available for the pre-1960 periods. In the most recent period, 1990s, detailed content analyses of newspaper coverage are available, making the data presented for this period evidence of a different nature.

3.3.2. The UK – Endorsements (Chapter 5)

Chapter 5 (history, UK) is different from Chapter 4 (history, Turkey) not only in terms of the time periods covered, but also in the methodology used. It covers only the post-war period (1945-2010), and is not based upon coding information contained in books on the history of the British press. The reasons are two-fold: First, history of British press is more heavily studied and goes back further in time, making it difficult to cover all the relevant sources. If we were to make a selection of sources, this would create even more problems than it solves, because the results would be dependent upon the sources selected, and the contribution to the literature would, at best, be minimal. Second, not only is there an abundance of books on the general history of the British press, but the specific subject of history of political parallelism in British press has already been taken up in a number of studies¹⁹, with a two-volume study dedicated to the issue.²⁰ The third reason the methodology is different is that there is a tradition of endorsements on election eves in the British press, which is not seen in the Turkish case and which makes assigning political positions to individual newspapers easier. As a result, only endorsement data accompany the brief literature review in Chapter 5, compiled from similar tables by various authors.

Because newspapers in the UK have a tradition of endorsing the party/parties they support in upcoming elections, it is a relatively straightforward matter to prepare tables showing which daily supported which party in which election, and a number of such tables have already been prepared. Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the task, however, there are differences between tables of endorsement prepared by different sources. For example, the endorsement of *The Times* in 1964 elections was coded as Conservative by Seymour-Ure (1991), and as Conservative/Liberal by Butler and Butler

¹⁹ See Chapter 5 for a review of this literature concerning the post-war period.

²⁰ See Koss (1981, 1984).

(2000). The discrepancy occurs because the newspapers do not declare their positions by waving blue or red flags, or even in single sentences, but in (sometimes lengthy) articles that explain the details and the rationale behind their position, which, at times, may be difficult to simplify in Labor vs. Conservative (vs. Liberal/Liberal Democrat) terms, and open to different interpretations when coding.

In Chapter 5, I have combined endorsement data from different sources (see Table 5.5), with the following rule: If there was a discrepancy in the positions assigned by the researchers (as is the case for the position of the Times in 1964 elections), I chose the one that assigned a more complex position over the other. In the example above, I selected Butler and Butler's (2000) coding over Seymour-Ure's (1991).

A measure of parallelism was devised for each election using the endorsement data, which was the ratio of the number of papers that endorse a single party in that election to the number of all titles in publication at the time of the election. This treats papers that do have a clear political position, but one that is more complex than being simply in favor of a single political party, among the non-parallel part of the press, as opposed to papers that endorse a single party, which are considered to form the parallel part of the press.²¹

²¹ In the section on political parallelism in the Turkish press, data at the level of elections was available only for the final period, the 1990s, and papers that supported one or more parties in at least one election were considered to make up the parallel part of the press. If we were to use the same criteria for the British case (considering all papers that supported one or more parties in at least one election as the parallel part of the press), we would end up having very little variation in the level of parallelism in the post-war period, with almost all papers declaring political positions for each election. The important thing to remember, however, is that in the Turkish case, the election-level data, which consist of observations by researchers about newspaper content, are not functional equivalents of the endorsement data in the British case. The fact there is a tradition of endorsements in the British case and the nature of the endorsement data make it necessary that we adjust our definitions of the parallel and non-parallel parts of the press. In other words, in an environment where everyone declares a political position, what defines partisanship is how closely a paper's position follows that of a single party -not whether the paper declares a political position or not-; whereas in an environment where declaring political positions is not a custom, taking a political position, no matter how complex, suffices to be counted as part of the press system that parallels the politics. Another point that makes direct comparison between the election level data in the two systems problematic is that the electoral system in the UK is more majoritarian, compared to that of Turkey, with its first-past-the-post design. In the Turkish case, where results that require the forming of a coalition are more likely despite the ten percent threshold, endorsing or supporting multiple parties has a different meaning, with coalition implications, than doing the same in the context of the winner-take-all system of the UK, which in most of the cases produces clear winners.

3.3.2.1. Limitations

The most important shortcoming of the endorsement data is that election eve endorsement makes up only a small part a newspaper's content, and may, at times, be contradicted with the news or other editorial content of the paper. It is a one-time measurement, on election eve, and only a very small part of the content offered by the newspaper, the leading article, is taken into account.

Another shortcoming of the endorsement data is that even endorsements are not always crystal clear. Different authors examining newspaper endorsements sometimes have differing interpretations concerning the party endorsed, and consequently come up with different tables.

3.3.3. Content Analysis: Counting Words (Chapter 7)

Chapter 7 is based upon a systematic comparison of party-generated texts and newspaper contents. To be able to make the comparison, however, first, party texts and newspaper texts to be compared need to be selected.

Selection of party texts was already discussed in a previous section in this chapter (section 3.2.4.4), with the conclusion that although press statements, at first sight, look more comparable to newspaper content in terms of covering recent developments and being published more frequently, manifestos also have a significant capacity to serve as party texts in a comparison because they tend to get repeated by party spokesmen and women throughout the campaign, and because newspaper content does not solely consist of reports of recent events and developments, but contains many articles written from a longer-term perspective as well, covering policy issues similar to those covered in manifestos. It was also argued that manifestos have the added benefits of being widely available (even parties who do not have strong press release archives prepare election manifestos), which makes them a necessary choice in most comparative settings, and of having a more or less standardized format, with policies and promises presented under similar sub-headings like economy, security, education, environment, etc., which makes

That should change with the coalition formed following the 2010 elections, but was valid for most of the period under study.

them more comparable. In the following section, the process of selecting and collecting newspaper texts is described, followed by a discussion of the way party texts and newspaper contents are compared.

3.3.3.1. Selecting newspaper texts

Newspapers, like parties, produce and carry many different kinds of content: news, opinion articles, ads, cartoons, and death notices are among the most common. Of these, aiming to select news and opinion articles, because they are more textual than visual, and because the newspaper is not paid to publish them, is an easy first step in identifying newspaper content to be used in the comparison. However, the content selected need not only be textual and non-paid, but also similar, to the degree possible, to the party texts to be used in the comparison, so that we have a high signal to noise ratio, focusing attention only on those articles that are most likely to cover issues covered by manifestos.

Articles presented in the politics section of a newspaper are more likely to contain stories relevant to the election campaign and party manifestos, than articles in, say, the sports or the celebrity sections. Thus, it looks like a natural choice to focus on the politics pages of newspapers in selecting newspaper content. However, there are three considerations, two theoretical and one practical, that make this option less than desirable. The first consideration is that newspapers have different practices with regards to compartmentalizing their content into sections. Although they are almost uniform in having a section called politics, what individual papers include under this section varies considerably: while some politics sections focus narrowly on national parliamentary politics, others may include local, environmental, and legal issues as well, covered in the former under separate sections. In other words, the politics sections of newspapers are not always functionally equivalent: if we were to collect newspaper articles based on newspapers' own classification of their content, we would not be collecting the same thing in each case.

The second theoretical consideration, connected to the first point, is that news or opinion articles printed on other pages may have proper political content as well. Especially the economics and foreign news sections frequently contain articles that have something to do with the elections, and to a lesser degree, art and sports pages as well. If

we were to collect only those articles published on politics pages, we would be missing many relevant stories.

Finally, the practical consideration is that in most cases, it is easier to conduct a word search to identify relevant articles than to look up the individual sections. Hence, a word/phrase search strategy was used in selecting the relevant news and opinion articles from newspapers. Party names and abbreviations were selected as phrases most likely to identify relevant content, with the strings “AKP”, “AK Parti”, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi”, “CHP”, “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi”, “MHP”, and “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” being used as search terms in the Turkish case, and “Conservative(s)”, “Labour”, “Libdem(s)”, “Lib Dem(s)”, and “Liberal Democrat(s)” in the British case. All news and opinion articles containing one or more of these strings and published in national dailies in the one week periods prior to the elections under study (UK 2001, 2005, and 2010 parliamentary elections; Turkey 2007 parliamentary elections)²² were collected.

For content from UK newspapers, the “UK nationals” category of the Lexis Nexis Academic database was used, collecting articles from a total of ten national titles.²³ To separate opinion from news articles the section tag of the database was used, with records that had one of the words “editorial”, “comment”, “opinion”, “letter”, “feature”, “leader”, or “debate” in its section label being classified as opinion content, and those that did not as news content.²⁴ The search conducted²⁵ returned a total of 1695 news and 654 opinion articles for 2001 elections, 1543 news and 616 opinion articles for 2005 elections, and 1747 news and 820 opinion articles for 2010. The breakdown of these totals into individual titles is given in Table 3.1.

²² The exact dates were as follows: April 29-May 5, 2010; April 28-May 4, 2005; and May 31-June 6, 2001 for the UK elections, and July 15-21, 2007 for the Turkish election.

²³ Articles from the Sunday editions of newspapers were merged with those from the main paper. The titles *People*, *Morning Star*, and *Business*, included in Lexis Nexis’s category of “UK nationals” were left out since in most accounts these are not included in lists of national dailies, and *Financial Times*, which is not classified among the national dailies by the Lexis Nexis, was added.

²⁴ *Daily Mail*’s section tags contained none of these words, so the *Daily Mail* articles had to be sorted into news and opinion categories by reading. Same was true for *Daily Telegraph* in 2001.

²⁵ A sample search string, for 2010 opinion articles, was as follows: ((labour OR conservative OR libdem OR liberal democrat OR lib dem and SECTION (editorial OR comment OR opinion OR letter OR feature OR leader OR debate)) and Date(geq(04/29/2010) and leq(05/05/2010)))

Table 3.1- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in British National Dailies Prior to 2001, 2005 and 2010 Elections

	2001		2005		2010	
	News	Opinion	News	Opinion	News	Opinion
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	242	121	173	67	225	112
<i>Times</i>	181	160	210	122	245	155
<i>Guardian</i>	298	62	220	56	303	137
<i>Financial Times</i>	258	25	207	41	209	28
<i>Independent</i>	193	95	171	114	146	13
<i>Daily Express</i>	109	33	141	43	149	145
<i>Daily Mail</i>	130	43	131	58	111	63
<i>Daily Mirror</i>	131	90	155	73	135	75
<i>Sun</i>	110	20	83	39	168	58
<i>Daily Star</i>	43	5	52	3	56	34
<u>Total</u>	1695	654	1543	616	1747	820

Articles from Turkish newspapers were collected with the help of a commercial media monitoring service, Interpress, from the print editions of Turkish national dailies. The 15 titles included in the analysis consists of 11 of the 13 papers which had average daily circulations exceeding 100.000 copies in the week prior to the elections,²⁶ 3 titles with daily sales between 50.00 and 100.000 (*Vakit*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Dünya*), and one title (*Radikal*) with a circulation below 50.000. A total of 1260 news and 641 opinion articles were collected. The breakdown of these articles into individual titles is given in Table 3.2, with associated circulation figures.

Table 3.2- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in Turkish National Dailies Prior to 2007 Elections

Segment	Newspaper	News	Opinion	Circulation
Quality	<i>Hürriyet</i>	74	71	590323
	<i>Zaman</i>	119	38	587039
	<i>Sabah</i>	72	48	484893
	<i>Milliyet</i>	103	49	224591
	<i>Vatan</i>	72	64	197065
	<i>Akşam</i>	75	43	185058
	<i>Türkiye</i>	46	16	154333

²⁶ *Güneş* and *Bugün*, which sold, respectively, 162.239 and 102.084 copies a day on average in the week prior to the elections were excluded from the list because they were not covered by the Interpress archive at the time. Sports titles *Fanatik* and *Fotomaç* were also excluded. Sales figures were taken from the media news portal Medyatava, “16.07.2007 - 22.07.2007 tarihleri arasında gazete satış raporu”, retrieved November 1st, 2010 from <http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp>

Segment	Newspaper	News	Opinion	Circulation
	<i>Star</i>	77	30	137500
	<i>Yeni Şafak</i>	88	39	121085
	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	165	90	75834
	<i>Vakit</i>	115	59	67956
	<i>Dünya</i>	40	13	53706
	<i>Radikal</i>	108	37	35517
Tabloid	<i>Posta</i>	64	24	649127
	<i>Takvim</i>	42	20	258839
Total		1260	641	

Once the newspaper and party-generated contents to be compared are thus selected, it is now time to select phrases that will form the basis of the comparison.

3.3.3.2. Selecting text features

Texts can be compared over a number of features. Among others, we can compare the length of texts (which text is longer), measured in words or characters; their use of punctuation (which text contains more question marks?); or the frequency of certain words or phrases that are theoretically significant (which text uses the word “AKP” more frequently, as opposed to the phrase “AK Parti”, the official abbreviation preferred by party managers?). Depending upon the purpose of the task at hand, any one of these features can be appropriate.

In Chapter 7, word/phrase frequencies will be used as features over which to compare texts. It still remains, though, to decide which words/phrases to compare. There are two approaches to selecting the words/phrases to be used: Either there is a pre-defined set of specific words/phrases that are theoretically significant, like in the “AKP” vs. “AK Parti” example above, or the selection of words/phrases is part of the process of comparison, which would be the case if we were to create, for example, lists of “top ten most frequent words” in the two texts to compare these lists. I will be using both of these approaches in Chapter 7, to be employed for different purposes.

Three groups of phrases will be used as text features to compare newspaper contents: Frequency of party names (to study amount of coverage), preferred words when referring to parties (to study overlap with party preferences), and most distinguishing phrases (to study overlap with party preferences more systematically).

a) Frequency of party names as a measure of amount of coverage: To study amount of coverage, researchers use different strategies: Balkir et al. (2006) code up to ten main actors for each story, with actors being party leaders or party candidates. Brandenburg codes “party and/or candidate references” (p. 163) in each standardized text line. I search for party names and abbreviations to examine amount of coverage. The same party names and abbreviations (“AKP”, “AK Parti”, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi”, “CHP”, “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi”, “MHP”, and “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” for Turkey, and “Conservative(s)”, “Tori(es)”, “Labour”, “Libdem(s)”, “Lib Dem(s)”, and “Liberal Democrat(s)” for the UK) used in selecting newspaper articles will be used this time to analyze amount of coverage.

b) Word choice when referring to parties: It is no secret that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) of Turkey wants newspapers, indeed all actors, to use the abbreviation “AK Parti” (also meaning “Clean Party” in Turkish), which is the official abbreviation, instead of the shorter and less glorifying “AKP”. Indeed, party officials have a number of times stated this preference in strongly worded statements.²⁷ Thus, the degree to which newspapers conform with this preference can serve as a proxy measure of how much a newspaper supports the Justice and Development Party. A similar situation exists in the British case as well, with the Conservative Party not preferring use of the word Tory to mean modern day Conservatives. The official website of the Conservative Party, Conservatives.com, is clear as to the preferred word choice of the party: The frequency of the word Tory is less than one tenth of the frequency of the word Conservative in site’s overall content (See Table 7.4). Labour.org.uk is also clear in this respect: They prefer the word Tory over Conservative when referring to the Conservative Party (See Table 7.4). The same applies in the Turkish case as well: AKP not only stated its express preference for the abbreviation “AK Parti” over “AKP”, but also used the former much more frequently in its official website, Akparti.org.tr (6100 over 429, Google search conducted November 25, 2010). CHP, on the other hand, used the abbreviation “AKP” much more frequently in its official website, chp.org.tr (561 over 43,

²⁷ AKP leader and Prime Minister Erdoğan said “The abbreviation of our party’s name is AK Parti, not AKP. Those who insist on saying AKP, to be honest, have no sense of democratic ethics, no sense of political ethics, and no good manners.” “Bizim partimizin kısaltılmış adı AK Parti’dir, AKP değil. AKP diyenler, ne yazık ki demokratik noktadaki etik kurallara uymadan, siyasi etiği hiçe sayarak, bunu edep dışı söylemektedirler, bu kadar açık ve ağır söylüyorum.” (AKP değil Akp Parti, *Hürriyet*, June 3, 2009). Also see Yıldırımkaaya (2009, June 5).

Google search conducted November 25, 2010). Thus, if we detect meaningful differences between newspapers, and if we find some of them to conform with one party's preference, while others conform with the other's, then we can attribute this difference to differential support for parties. The logic of the third text feature to be used, explained in the following section, is similar: we will learn, from a systematic comparison of party texts, the relative preferences of the parties for different phrases, thus identifying the phrases that distinguish the most between party texts, and then use these phrases as text features over which to compare newspaper content.

c) Most distinguishing phrases: A third set of text features, or lists of phrases, are selected using the chi-square statistic. Pearson's chi-square²⁸ is frequently used in textual analysis to identify the most distinguishing words/phrases between two texts. The need to use this somewhat sophisticated tool arises because more naïve statistics, like the ratio between the frequencies of words in the two texts compared, fail in the task, especially for the words/phrases that are used in only one of the texts and not in the other.²⁹

In 2007 elections, the two-word and three-word phrases³⁰ that distinguished the most between AKP and CHP manifestos, according to chi-square ranking, were as follows:

²⁸ See Appendix C for the details of chi-square calculation.

²⁹ Compare “% CHP” column in Table 9 to chi-square column. If a phrase is not used in the AKP manifesto, it will have the same % CHP value regardless of how frequent that phrase is in the CHP manifesto. Chi-square statistic, however, does differentiate between the phrase “chp iktidarında” (used 19 times in CHP manifesto and 0 times in AKP manifesto) and the phrase “cumhuriyetin temel” (used 3 times in CHP manifesto and 0 times in AKP manifesto), assigning 0,0006 to the former and 0,0001 to the latter.

³⁰ This table is for demonstrative purposes only, and reports the top 50 phrases according to chi-square ranking. In the calculations that follow, all phrases that had a chi-square value higher than 0,00001 were used. The following procedures were also applied in the pre-analysis period: 1- In the calculations reported, only two-word and three-word phrases were used, following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007). Including single words or phrases with more words contribute little to the overall results compared to the computational burden they bring. 2- Another pre-analysis operation conducted on the texts to be analyzed was the deletion of very common words, also called stopwords, a routine procedure in quantitative text analysis that excludes words like “and”, “or”, etc. from the analysis. For English texts, the Snowball stopword list was used (An English stop word list, n.d.), and for the Turkish texts, the stopword list developed by the Natural Language Processing group at Fatih University (2010) was used. 3- Another pre-analysis operation conducted by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) but not in present study is segmentation, which strips words down to their roots, so that the words “make” and “making” are treated as the same word. Segmentation was not applied because

Table 3.3- Most Distinguishing Phrases between AKP and CHP Election Manifestos in 2007

Most distinguishing CHP phrases	# in CHP Manifesto	# in AKP Manifesto	% CHP	chi square	chi square	% AKP	# in CHP Manifesto	# in AKP Manifesto	Most distinguishing AKP phrases
chp_iktidarinda	19	0	1,00	0,000649	0,000603	1,00	0	193	ak_parti
hedef_alacagiz	18	0	1,00	0,000615	0,000222	1,00	0	71	ak_parti_iktidari
uretime_dayali	9	0	1,00	0,000307	0,000222	1,00	0	71	parti_iktidari
5_yildir	7	0	1,00	0,000239	0,000175	1,00	0	56	iktidarimiz_donemin
sahip_cikacagiz	6	0	1,00	0,000205	0,000165	1,00	0	53	onumuzdeki_donem
dis_kaynak	6	0	1,00	0,000205	0,000159	1,00	0	51	2002_yilinda
dis_rekabet	6	0	1,00	0,000205	0,000096	0,97	1	38	devam_edecektir
terorle_mucadelede	6	0	1,00	0,000205	0,000096	0,97	1	38	iktidari_doneminde
kibris_rum	6	0	1,00	0,000205	0,000094	1,00	0	30	parti_iktidari_donem
tarimsal_uretim	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000080	0,95	2	39	2006_yilinda
terorle_mucadele	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000072	1,00	0	23	milyon_ytl
semt_konseyleri	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000066	1,00	0	21	uluslar_arasi
gerekli_siyasi	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000066	1,00	0	21	olarak_gormektedir
kuzey_irak'taki	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000062	1,00	0	20	parti_iktidarinda
hedef_alinacaktir	5	0	1,00	0,000171	0,000062	1,00	0	20	ak_parti_iktidarinda
gerekli_siyasi_irade	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000050	1,00	0	16	kultur_sanat
saglayacagiz_ulkemiz	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000050	1,00	0	16	buyuk_onem
uygulamaya_koyacag	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000047	0,96	1	22	milyar_ytl
destek_saglayacagiz	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000047	0,96	1	22	ozel_sektor
irade_ortaya	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000047	1,00	0	15	ytl_iken
akp_iktidari	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000047	1,00	0	15	devam_edilecektir
mali_piyasalar	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000047	1,00	0	15	sosyal_yardim
dayali_hizli	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000044	1,00	0	14	ilk_defa
etkinlik_kazandiracagi	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000041	1,00	0	13	yili_sonunda
islerlik_kazandiracagi	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000037	1,00	0	12	milyar_dolara
basvuru_burolari	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000037	1,00	0	12	milyar_dolar
cari_acik	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000037	1,00	0	12	yeni_donemde
dayali_hizli_buyume	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000037	1,00	0	12	hak_ozgurlukler
siyasi_irade_ortaya	4	0	1,00	0,000137	0,000037	1,00	0	12	2006_yili
hizli_buyume	7	3	0,70	0,000127	0,000036	0,92	2	24	devam_edecegiz
sabit_sermaye	5	1	0,83	0,000126	0,000034	1,00	0	11	ak_parti'nin
yukse faiz	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000034	1,00	0	11	dar_gelirli
yukse reel	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000034	1,00	0	11	icme_suyu
konseyleri_basvuru	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000034	1,00	0	11	yerel_yonetimler

currently, software used in segmentation requires a level of programming knowledge exceeding that of the author. This is a probable cause of contamination in the data, making our calculations more blunt, but does not introduce any bias, for it affects all texts in the same way. 4- Another pre-analysis operation was the deletion of some page headers. Manifesto texts used were extracted from the .pdf versions of the manifestos, and the pdf versions have a practice of using different headers on odd and even pages. Of these page headers, generally one is something like "... party manifesto" running throughout the text, and the other is the chapter title, running only a couple of pages. Manifesto titles were deleted but chapter titles were retained, for they do represent issues emphasized by the party.

Most distinguishing CHP phrases	# in CHP Manifesto	# in AKP Manifesto	% CHP	chi square	chi square	% AKP	# in CHP Manifesto	# in AKP Manifesto	Most distinguishing AKP phrases
1_mart	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000034	0,92	2	23	temel_hak
dogu_guneydogu_an	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	temel_hak_ozgurluk
duzenlemeleri_yapac	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	milyar_ytl'ye
yargi_onunde_hesap	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	onumuzdeki_donem
risk_sermayesi	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	iken_2007
halkin_guvenligi	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	karar_alma
uretime_dayali_hizli	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	iken_2006
rekabet_gucunu_artir	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	rekabet_gucumuzu
butce_disiplinini	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000031	1,00	0	10	yillik_donemde
esnaf_sanatkârlarin	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	diyanet_İsleri_baska
sermayenin_tabana	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	İsleri_baskanligi
buyuk_kentlerde	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	uluslararası_alanda
yargi_onunde	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	2007_yilinda
guney_kibris	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	parti_iktidarinin
yukse_k_yargi	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000028	1,00	0	9	ak_parti_iktidarinin
cumhuriyetin_temel	3	0	1,00	0,000102	0,000027	0,94	1	15	ayni_zamanda

The names of the two parties, CHP and Ak Parti, rank first in the list of most distinguishing phrases, providing an early check on the validity of the chi square ranking. Looking down the list, we can discern the overall strategies of the two parties, and some of the issue areas they emphasized the most during the campaign. The overall strategy of the AKP manifesto seems to consist of emphasizing its record in the 5 years of government, frequently citing relevant statistics (“*milyon ytl*” -million ytls-, “*milyar ytl*” -billion ytls-, “*ytl iken*” -was ... ytls-, “*milyar dolara*” -to ... billion dollars-, “*milyar dolar*” -billion dollars-, “*milyar ytl'ye*” -to ... billion ytls-) concerning the period (“*iktidarımız döneminde*” -during our government-, “*(AK) parti iktidarı döneminde*” -during AK Parti government-), and promising to continue (“*devam edecektir*” -will continue-, “*devam edeceğiz*” -we will continue-) these policies in the following period (“*önümüzdeki dönemde*” -in the following period-, “*yeni dönemde*” -in the new period-, “*önümüzdeki dönem*” -the following period-). The strategy of the CHP manifesto, on the other hand, seems to be based on avoiding statistics concerning the previous 5 years of AKP government, and making many promises, as indicated by the high frequency of future tense statements (“*hedef alacağız*” -we shall aim-, “*sahip çıkacağız*” -we shall protect-, “*hedef alınacaktır*” -shall be aimed-, “*uygulamaya koyacağız*” -we shall apply-, “*destek sağlayacağız*” -we shall support-, “*etkinlik kazandıracacağız*” -we will make it

efficient-, “işlerlik kazandıracağız” -we will make it work-, “düzenlemeleri yapacağız” -we shall make the arrangements-).

The issue areas emphasized by the AKP include economic goals³¹, basic rights and freedoms³², social welfare³³, local governments³⁴, Directorate of Religious Affairs³⁵, and culture³⁶, all of which can be argued to be the issues AKP felt most at ease. Economic goals³⁷ and local governments³⁸ are issues that are emphasized by the CHP as well; but the Kurdish issue³⁹, Cyprus⁴⁰, relations with the US⁴¹, agriculture⁴², corruption⁴³, and the secular character of the Republic⁴⁴ are areas exclusively emphasized by the CHP.

To examine party parallelism and bias in British national dailies, we need to identify the most distinguishing phrases that differentiate British party manifestos from each other. Table 3.4 reports the top 25 most distinguishing Conservative and Labour

³¹ As indicated by the YTL and dollar statistics cited above, and the phrases “*özel sektör*” -private sector-, and “*rekabet gücümüzü*” -our competitiveness-.

³² “*hak (ve) özgürlükler*” -rights and freedoms-, “*temel hak*” -basic rights-, “*temel hak (ve) özgürlükler*” -basic rights and freedoms-.

³³ “*sosyal yardım*” -social assistance-, “*dar gelirli*” -the poor-.

³⁴ “*içme suyu*” -drinking water-, “*yerel yönetimler*” -local governments-.

³⁵ “*diyanet işleri başkanlığı*” “*directorate of religious affairs*-, “*işleri başkanlığı*” -directorate of ... affairs-.

³⁶ “*kültür (ve) sanat*” -culture and art-.

³⁷ “*üretim dayalı*” -based on production-, “*dış kaynak*” -foreign resources”, “*dış rekabet*” -foreign competition-, “*mali piyasalar*” -financial markets-, “*cari açık*” -current deficit-, “*dayalı hızlı*” -rapid ... based on-, “*dayalı hızlı büyüme*” -rapid growth based on-, “*hızlı büyüme*” -rapid growth-, “*sabit sermaye*” -fixed capital-, “*yüksek reel*” -high real-, “*yüksek faiz*” -high interest rates-, “*risk sermayesi*” -risk capital-, “*rekabet gücünü artıracak*” -to increase competitiveness-, “*bütçe disiplinine*” -budget discipline-, “*sermayenin tabana*” -capital to base-.

³⁸ “*semt konseyleri*” -neighborhood councils-, “*konseyleri başvuru*” -council application-, “*başvuru büroları*” -application bureaus-, “*büyük kentlerde*” -in large cities-.

³⁹ “*terörle mücadelede*” -in the fight against terrorism-, “*terörle mücadele*” -the fight against terrorism-, “*kuzey irak'taki*” -in northern Iraq-, “*doğu (ve) güneydoğu anadolu*” -southern and southeastern Anatolia-, “*halkın güvenliği*” -security of the people-.

⁴⁰ “*kıbrıs rum*” -Greek Cypriot-, “*güney kıbrıs*” -southern Cyprus-)

⁴¹ “*1 Mart*” -March 1st - referring to the motion, rejected in the TGNA on March 1st, 2003, to allow US soldiers use Turkish land in invading Iraq.

⁴² “*tarımsal üretim*” -agricultural production-.

⁴³ “*yargı önünde hesap*” -accountable before law-, “*yargı önünde*” -before law-.

⁴⁴ “*cumhuriyetin temel*”, -the basic ... of the Republic-

phrases in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 election manifestos. Although this is not the place to analyze party manifestos and strategies in detail, the following observations are in order.

Compared to the Turkish party manifestos, British ones seem to make more use of catchy, repeated slogans: “It’s time for common sense” (Conservative 2001), “Britain forward not back” (Labour 2005) “Are you thinking what we’re thinking” (Conservative 2005) are most notable examples of this practice. Naturally, these slogans appear at the top of our most distinguishing phrases lists.

Looking at party strategies, Labour seems to have put a strong emphasis on its track record in government on every election eve, with the phrase “since 1997” appearing in all three lists among the top phrases. This emphasis is supported by statistics in 2001 and to some extent in 2005, with the phrase “per cent” being frequently used to make quantitative points. The 2010 Labour manifesto is not so fond of statistics, instead emphasizing “tough choices” to be made, probably a reflection of the economic crisis Britain -along with most of the world- went through during Labour’s third consecutive term. Indeed, when we examine the ratio of the frequency of the phrase “per cent” in consecutive elections, a very telling trend emerges: In 2001, Labour is very confident about its track record, and uses the phrase a total of 92 times in its election manifesto, compared to a mere 6 times in the Conservative manifesto, placing the expression at the very top of the most distinguishing Labour phrases list (ratio: 15,3). In 2005, Labour’s enthusiasm for percentages seems to have waned somewhat (53 times), however, the expression remains in the list of most distinguishing phrases because Conservatives seem to be still avoiding statistics (8 times) (ratio: 6,6). In 2010, Labour loses even more of its confidence in statistics, using the expression 41 times, but it is the big jump in Conservatives’ use of the phrase (from 8 to 17) that takes it out of the most distinguishing phrases list (ratio: 2,4). It seems like we can use the ratio of the use of percentages in manifestos as an indicator of parties’ confidence in their statistics, and indirectly, as a measure of the incumbent’s performance, with implications for its vote share in the coming elections.

The phrase “Conservative government” is at the top of the most distinguishing Conservative phrases lists in all three elections, indicating that promises concerning future made up a very important part of the Conservative Party’s strategy in these elections. The Conservative focus in 2001 was on “cutting taxes” and “stronger society”. In 2005, the emphasis on “lowering taxes” remained, but it was supplemented with a strong rhetoric for “controlled immigration”, “controlling borders”, and border “control police”, along

with retaining “national control” in EU matters. In 2010, the single most favorite word in the Conservative manifesto was change, with promises to “change the economy”, “change society”, and “change politics”. Notably, taxes and migration, traditional themes in Conservative politics, do not appear to have been strong emphases in the 2010 elections.

These comparisons, although interesting in and of themselves, mainly serve, for the purposes of this study, to provide some face validity to a chi-square based selection of phrases. To systematically examine how these party strategies are reflected in newspaper contents, Chapter 7 looks at the relative frequencies of the most distinguishing phrases in individual newspapers.⁴⁵ In other words, newspaper contents are compared with each other based upon what we learn from the comparison of party texts. This, in turn, is done by looking at which newspapers give more space to the so-called AKP phrases, and which newspapers give more space to the CHP phrases. To make these calculations in a systematic manner, the Wordscores program developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) is used.

Wordscores works by assigning “reference” texts (AKP and CHP manifestos in this case) certain numeric values, and then calculating estimates for “virgin” texts (newspaper contents in this case) as to where they stand in relation to the reference texts, using the relative frequencies of words or phrases (see Appendix C for a detailed example of Wordscores calculations). These estimates are then used as party scores of individual newspapers, and as inputs in the calculation of system-wide parallelism measures, reported in Chapter 7.

⁴⁵ Note that calculations reported in Chapter 7 are not restricted to the top 25 or top 50 phrases, but include all phrases with a chi-square value higher than 0,00001.

Table 3.4- Most Distinguishing Labour and Conservative Phrases in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 Party Election Manifestos

Labour phrase	2010				2005				2001			
	L	C	L	C	L	C	L	C	L	C	L	C
national renewal	14	0	0	43	18	0	1	30	92	6	0	30
tough choices	12	0	0	22	22	1	0	9	39	2	1	28
next parliament	21	4	0	21	15	0	0	9	19	0	0	16
living standards	11	0	0	21	53	8	0	9	28	2	0	16
stage national renewal	11	0	0	17	12	0	0	9	16	0	0	16
next stage national	11	0	0	16	11	0	0	6	15	0	0	16
stage national	11	0	1	17	11	0	0	6	15	0	0	15
next stage	11	0	0	14	17	1	0	5	20	1	0	13
challenge britain	10	0	0	13	17	1	0	5	14	0	1	13
national care	10	0	0	12	10	0	1	6	13	0	0	11
national care service	10	0	0	11	9	0	0	4	18	1	0	10
older people	17	3	4	20	9	0	0	4	12	0	0	10
per cent	41	17	0	10	9	0	0	4	12	0	0	7
creative britain	9	0	0	10	9	0	0	4	12	0	0	6
higher education	14	2	0	10	9	0	0	4	11	0	0	6
global future	8	0	0	10	8	0	0	4	11	0	0	5
democratic reform	8	0	0	10	8	0	0	3	11	0	0	5
since 1997	13	2	0	10	8	0	0	3	11	0	0	5
care service	10	1	1	12	8	0	0	3	11	0	0	5
family life	7	0	0	9	8	0	0	3	11	0	0	5
families older	7	0	0	9	8	0	0	3	10	0	2	7
crime immigration	7	0	0	9	8	0	0	3	10	0	0	4
families older people	7	0	0	9	8	0	0	3	10	0	0	4
green recovery	7	0	3	15	7	5	0	3	10	0	0	4
communities creative	7	0	0	8	7	0	0	3	10	0	0	4
britain	7	0	0	8	7	0	0	3	10	0	0	4
conservative					conservative				conservative			
government					government				government			
change economy					change economy				change economy			
big society					big society				big society			
change society					change society				change society			
change politics					change politics				change politics			
make politics					make politics				make politics			
low carbon					low carbon				low carbon			
promote national					promote national				promote national			
national interest					national interest				national interest			
protect environment					protect environment				protect environment			
addition will					addition will				addition will			
public sector					public sector				public sector			
politics make politics					politics make politics				politics make politics			
further will					further will				further will			
better value money					better value money				better value money			
promote national					promote national				promote national			
interest					interest				interest			
jobs tax					jobs tax				jobs tax			
better value					better value				better value			
make britain					make britain				make britain			
economic model					economic model				economic model			
change politics make					change politics make				change politics make			
back nhs					back nhs				back nhs			
country europe					country europe				country europe			
value money					value money				value money			
fight back crime					fight back crime				fight back crime			
per cent					per cent				per cent			
public services					public services				public services			
three years					three years				three years			
since 1997					since 1997				since 1997			
labour committed					labour committed				labour committed			
next three					next three				next three			
next three years					next three years				next three years			
welfare state					welfare state				welfare state			
economic stability					economic stability				economic stability			
new labour					new labour				new labour			
criminal justice					criminal justice				criminal justice			
living standards					living standards				living standards			
modern welfare					modern welfare				modern welfare			
real terms					real terms				real terms			
ten-year goal					ten-year goal				ten-year goal			
frontline staff					frontline staff				frontline staff			
local authorities					local authorities				local authorities			
labour believes					labour believes				labour believes			
every child					every child				every child			
every region					every region				every region			
ten per cent					ten per cent				ten per cent			
ten per					ten per				ten per			
safe communities					safe communities				safe communities			
million people					million people				million people			
create new					create new				create new			
common sense					common sense				common sense			
conservative government					conservative government				conservative government			
next conservative					next conservative				next conservative			
it's time					it's time				it's time			
next					next				next			
government					government				government			
time common					time common				time common			
time common sense					time common sense				time common sense			
it's time common					it's time common				it's time common			
foot mouth					foot mouth				foot mouth			
long term					long term				long term			
sense means					sense means				sense means			
common sense means					common sense means				common sense means			
cut taxes					cut taxes				cut taxes			
sense conservatives					sense conservatives				sense conservatives			
common					common				common			
conservatives					conservatives				conservatives			
town country					town country				town country			
people businesses					people businesses				people businesses			
stronger society					stronger society				stronger society			
rural communities					rural communities				rural communities			
conservatives give					conservatives give				conservatives give			
post offices					post offices				post offices			
civilised country					civilised country				civilised country			
time served					time served				time served			
free trade					free trade				free trade			
individuals families					individuals families				individuals families			

3.3.3.3. Limitations

Although it does enable us to answer some important questions, the content analysis method employed in Chapter 7 has two major shortcomings:

1- Loss of detail: The method produces a single measure for the texts analyzed: how much a virgin text resembles the reference texts. Based upon these resemblance scores, we make further analyses of newspapers' support for specific parties and overall parallelism in the system. Beyond the presence and degree of support, however, we gain no other knowledge about the texts analyzed. We could, however be interested in questions that go beyond the presence or degree of support. For example, even if we know that *The Guardian* supported Labour and the *The Telegraph* supported the Conservatives in the 2005 elections, we may still want to learn about the content of the Guardian's support for Labour: Did it support Labour on Iraq War, on immigration, or on economic issues? Similarly, was *The Telegraph* supportive of all Conservative policies, or only of some of them? On which issues was *The Telegraph* closer to the Labour line? We cannot utilize the method used in Chapter 7 to answer these questions, which require a substantive reading of the texts in question.

2- Establishing validity: As Slava Mikhaylov, Daniel Laver and Kenneth Benoit (2008) note, "the debate over computerized versus hand-coded content analysis largely revolves around the tradeoff between reliability and validity. Proponents of computerized schemes [...] cite perfect reliability in their favor, and struggle to demonstrate validity, while hand-coded schemes such as the CMP claim validity as a central advantage and then devote huge resources to attempts to enhance reliability" (p. 3). This study proposes to use a computerized scheme that solves reliability problems, but establishing validity will be a challenge.

Now that I have laid out the methodology used in detail, it is now time to present the empirical results. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the data on history of political parallelism in the Turkish press, gathered from the secondary literature on press history.

PART II

Part II deals with the history of political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK. Chapter 4 reviews history of political parallelism in the Turkish press from 1830s to 2002, and Chapter 5 reviews history of political parallelism in the British press from 1945 to 2010. Chapter 6 offers an evaluation of the theoretical explanations based upon historical data from these two cases.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE TURKISH PRESS

To understand the present state of political parallelism in the Turkish press, it is first necessary to examine the roots of journalism in Turkey, and track the history of parallelism through the many different political periods. In the process, we would learn a lot about the conditions surrounding press-party parallelism in Turkey, observe –if any- the regularities in the relationship between the political environment and press partisanship, and see if there are any over-time trends; all of which would help put the present state of political parallelism in the Turkish press in –historical- perspective.

As with so many things, a historical account of political parallelism in the Turkish press would be lacking without a glance –if cursory- at the late Ottoman period. In what follows, I track the history of political parallelism from the late Ottoman period, when Turkish journalism started, to the 2002 elections –the most recent period will be taken up in Chapter 7-, using the secondary literature on the Turkish press, and following a commonly used periodization with slight changes⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ The periods I use are as follows: 1- Until the First Constitutional Period (- 1876), 2- First Constitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908), 3- Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), 4- War of Independence (1918-1923), 5- Early Republican Era (1923-1931), 6- One-Party Rule (1931-1946), 7- Transition to Democracy (1946-1950), 8- DP Governments (1950-1960), 9- 1960 Coup and Its Aftermath (1960-1971), 10- 1971 Intervention and Its Aftermath (1971-80), 11- 1980 Coup and ANAP Governments (1980-1991), 12- The Era of Coalitions (1991-2002).

4.1. Political Parallelism in First Turkish Newspapers – Until the First Constitutional Period (1831 - 1876)

In multi-party democracies, press-party parallelism is easy to define. Main political positions are crystallized into political parties, and the press system parallels the party system to the degree papers are aligned with different parties. In one-party and no-party regimes, because (additional) parties are not allowed to exist, political parallelism has to be defined in relation to positions towards the government. In other words, for purposes of analysis, no-party and one-party regimes can be treated like a two-party system where one of the parties is the government and the other is the opposition. The press system parallels the party system to the degree the press is divided into pro-government and anti-government camps.

To see whether this was the case in the period between 1831 and 1876 –from the publication of *Takvim-i Vakayi*, the first Turkish newspaper,⁴⁷ to the adoption of the First Constitution- we need to look at the political alignments of individual papers in some detail. The early years of this period deserve special emphasis because it is here that the roots of Turkish journalism lie. Practices adopted in this period are certain to affect practices in later periods, because early titles like *Ceride-i Havadis*, *Tecüman-ı Ahval* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* also acted as schools of journalism that trained the journalists who published their own papers in the following periods.

Comparing the roots of journalism in Southern Europe, where political parallelism is high, to Northern Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini (2004) make the following observation: “The media developed in Southern Europe as an institution of the political and the literary worlds more than of the market. In Northern Europe and North America, the commercial bourgeoisie, whose success in a market economy depended on a steady flow of reliable information about trade, navigation, technology, and politics, played a key role in the development of the first newspapers” (p. 90). In Southern Europe, on the other hand, “the purpose of the nineteenth century newspaper [...] was the expression of ideas” (p. 91). Hallin and Mancini (2004) also cite Balzac, as a

⁴⁷ More properly, *Takvim-i Vakayi* is the first Turkish newspaper published in what is contemporary Turkey. The first newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, *Bulletin des Nouvelles*, was published by the French Embassy in İstanbul in 1795. The first newspaper in Turkish, *Vakayi-i Misriye*, was published in 1828 in Egypt by the governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha. (Topuz, 2003, p. 13, 34)

contemporary witness on Southern Europe, defining the word ‘press’: “the word adopted to express everything that is published periodically in politics and literature” (quoted in p. 91).

Early Turkish journalism fits the picture Hallin and Mancini (2004) draw for Southern Europe, but not perfectly. The first Turkish newspaper, *Takvim-i Vakayi*, was founded by the initiative of Sultan Mahmud II, owned and staffed⁴⁸ by the state, sent to prominent state officials around the country (Şapolyo, 1971, p. 104), and contained news about the state. The Sultan was very involved in the project, so much so that he personally chose the name for the paper⁴⁹, intervened in typographical errors,⁵⁰ and did some editorial work, trying to have the staff simplify their language.⁵¹ The paper, however, was not all about the state. Besides official news, non-official news was also given (Şapolyo, 1971, p.104). Of the six parts of the paper, one was reserved for news on commerce and prices, one for sciences, and one for foreign news.⁵²

The first Turkish newspaper, then, belonged to the political world in the sense that it was owned and managed by the state, but also belonged to the world of market in the sense that it contained news on commerce and prices too.

Ceride-i Havadis, the second Ottoman paper to be published in Turkish and considered by many to be a semi-official paper because it received a monthly aid from the state, also displays a dual character, but its market aspect is stronger. Published by

⁴⁸ Official chronicler of the state, Esat Efendi, was assigned as the director of the paper. (Kabacalı, 2000, p.19)

⁴⁹ Sultan Mahmud II was given a list of suggestions for the paper’s name, but he liked none of them and came up with his own, *Takvim-i Vakayi*. See Topuz (2003, p. 15), Kabacalı (2000, p. 49); Şapolyo, 1971, p. 101)

⁵⁰ Kabacalı (2000) cites the following from the Mahmud II: “Basılan Takvim-i Vakayi nüshalarında yine bazı harfler tam çıkmayıp eksik çıkmakta olduğundan ve bu hususa özen gösterilip dikkat edilmemesi daha önce de yinlendiğinden, yine öyle eksik harf görülmesi sözü geçen tezgahın henüz kullanılmamasından mıdır, yoksa özensizlikten midir?” (Nesimi Yazıcı, *Takvim-i Vakayi “Belgeler”*. Ankara, 1983, p. 33, 94-95. Quoted in Kabacalı, 2000, p.51)

⁵¹ İnuğur (1993) cites the following from Mahmud II: “Umuma neşrolunacak şeylerde yazılacak elfaz (sözler) herkesin anlayabileceği surette olmak lazımdır. Öyle (çetrgerdune) ve (tevsen) gibi şeylerin Türkçe olarak tashihi muktazidir.” (p. 178, quoted from Hıfzı Topuz, 100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi, İstanbul, 1973, p.7)

⁵² The six parts were as follows: Internal news (Umur-u Dahiliye), Military News (Mevad-dı Askeriye), Foreign News (Umur-u Hariciye), Sciences (Fünun), Assignments of Religious Personnel/Scholars (Tevcihat-ı İlmiye), and Commerce and Prices (Ticaret ve Es’ar). (Baykal, 1990, p. 53)

William Churchill, an English tradesman residing in Istanbul, who was also a reporter for the British newspaper *Morning Herald*, *Ceride-i Havadis* expanded its narrow readership during the Crimean War with fresh news from the front. Its irregular supplement, *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis*, which was published before the regular ten day period of the main paper as important news arrived, became so popular that it later replaced the main paper.

The second Turkish newspaper, then, belonged to the world of market in the sense that its publishers actively tried to increase the sales by improving news content and by introducing a novel product in the form of an irregular supplement with fresh news. *Ceride-i Havadis* belonged to the world of market in two other respects too: It was the first Turkish newspaper to publish private ads to generate revenue, and it placed a major emphasis upon economic news. According to Şapolyo (1971), “its content consisted mainly of economic news” (p. 111). According to Jeltyakov (1979), the content of *Ceride-i Havadis* “mainly interested local and foreign tradesmen” (p. 46).

The third and the fourth Turkish newspapers, which appeared in 1860s, some 20 years after *Ceride-i Havadis* started publication and 30 years after *Takvim-i Vakayi* did, were Agah Efendi’s *Tercüman-ı Ahval* and Şinasi’s *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Both men were among the founders of the Society of Young Ottomans, who wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy, and their papers belonged more strongly to the political and the literary worlds than to the world of market. The political and the literary worlds, in turn, were so intertwined in these years that it made little sense to make a distinction between the two. This was not only because the two worlds shared prominent figures –Şinasi was the writer of the first modern play in Turkish, *Şair Evlenmesi*, and Namık Kemal, who managed Şinasi’s paper after he went to Europe, was also a successful playwright, a novelist, and a poet. Both men were also members of the Young Ottomans.- but also because controversies in literature had open political connotations. The controversy over the need to adopt Western literary forms and to simplify the language did not arise from the whims of eccentric literary men, but pitted reformers against the conservative forces in the society. Jeltyakov (1979) argues that “the new language and the new literature started by Şinasi and Namık Kemal on the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkar* aimed to help the progressive forces in their struggle against the feudal order” (p.55). This was the reason that the polemic between Şinasi and *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis* over a grammar mistake drew large audiences and *Tasvir-i Efkar* sold 20-24 thousand copies, the highest figure enjoyed by a Turkish newspaper until then (Jeltyakov, 1979, p. 55).

Three of the first four Turkish newspapers, then, belonged more clearly to the world of politics (*Tercüman-ı Ahval*, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, and *Takvim-i Vakayi*) both content-wise (literary polemics with political connotations and open criticism of government in *Tercüman-ı Ahval* and *Tasvir-i Efkar*; official news, decrees and orders in *Takvim-i Vakayi*) and organization-wise (founders of *Tercüman-ı Ahval* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* were also prominent members of the Young Ottomans; *Takvim-i Vakayi* was founded, financed, staffed, and distributed by the state).

One of the papers, *Ceride-i Havadis*, on the other hand, belonged more clearly to the world of market, especially in terms of content (it had more news than political commentary, and its news content consisted mainly of economic news), but also in terms of organization (*Ceride-i Havadis* did receive some funding from the state, but in other organizational matters like staffing and distribution, it was independent. State funding must also have decreased in importance as the paper increased its sales and started to publish private ads).

To widen our scope and make a fuller analysis of political parallelism in the period before the Proclamation of the First Constitution, we need to look at all the papers published in this period, and see if there is a pro-/anti- government divide in the press.

Table 4.1 lists all the papers published in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1876. It excludes papers published in languages other than Turkish, provincial papers published outside Istanbul, and papers published by Young Ottomans in Europe and other parts of the world. Satirical papers (like *Hayal*, *Meddah*, *Diojen*, *Çaylak*, *Çingiraklı Tatar*, etc.) and thematic papers that target specific audiences like those on theater (*Tiyatro*), child education, and military (*Ceride-i Askeriye*) were also left out. The upper part of the table lists the ‘major’ papers of the period, and the bottom half displays the relatively minor papers.⁵³

Table 4.1 shows that, of the 19 major papers published in the period before the proclamation of the First Constitution, 2 were pro-government, 9 were anti-government, and 8 were in the middle, with mixed content or organizational connections. This is quite a lop-sided picture, with much more papers being on the opposition rather than being pro-government, although the picture is moderated with a substantial middle group of papers that do not have clear pro- or anti-government positions.

⁵³ See Chapter 3 on how the ‘major’ papers were selected and on other details concerning the preparation of the tables in this chapter.

Table 4.1- Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Period Prior to the Proclamation of the First Constitution

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
1 <i>Takvim-i Vakayi</i>	8		¹ x	² x														P	Pro-Gov't
2 <i>Ceride-i Havadis</i>	8	³ x		⁴ x														P	
3 <i>Hakayik-ül Vakayi</i>	7			⁵ x						⁶ x								PI	Mixed
4 <i>Basiret</i>	8			⁷ x	⁸ x			⁹ x					¹⁰ x					PA	
5 <i>Muhib-bi Vatan</i>	8	¹¹ x						¹² x										PA	
6 <i>Sadakat</i>	7												¹³ x						
7 <i>Mümeyyiz</i>	7																		
8 <i>Vakit</i>	7																		
9 <i>Sabah</i>	7																		
10 <i>Utarit</i>	7				¹⁴ x				¹⁵ x	¹⁶ x								AI	
11 <i>Tercüman-ı Ahval</i>	8				¹⁷ x	¹⁸ x	¹⁹ x	²⁰ x										A	
12 <i>Tasvir-i Efkar</i>	8				²¹ x	²² x	²³ x	²⁴ x										A	
13 <i>Muhbir</i>	8				²⁵ x	²⁶ x	²⁷ x	²⁸ x					²⁹ x					A	
14 <i>İbret</i>	8				³⁰ x	³¹ x	³² x	³³ x										A	
15 <i>Ayine-i Vatan</i>	8				³⁴ x	³⁵ x		³⁶ x										A	
16 <i>Terakki</i>	8					³⁷ x		³⁸ x					³⁹ x	⁴⁰ x				A	
17 <i>Hadika</i>	8					⁴¹ x		⁴² x										A	
18 <i>İstikbal</i>	8							⁴³ x										A	
19 <i>Muhip</i>	7							⁴⁴ x										A	
20 <i>Vakayi-i Zaptiye</i>	5	⁴⁵ x																P	
21 <i>Şark</i>	6		⁴⁶ x					⁴⁷ x										PA	
22 <i>Mir'at</i>	2				⁴⁸ x	⁴⁹ x												A	
23 <i>Devir</i>	5				⁵⁰ x			⁵¹ x										A	
24 <i>İttihat</i>	5																	A	
25 <i>Sirac</i>	6				⁵² x			⁵³ x										A	
26 <i>Medeniyet</i>	6							⁵⁴ x										A	
27 <i>Kevkeb-i Şarki</i>	4							⁵⁵ x										A	
28 <i>Asır</i>	6																		
29 <i>Takvim-i Ticaret</i>	4																		
30 <i>Mecmua-i Maarif</i>	4																		
31 <i>Selamet</i>	3																		
32 <i>Müsavat</i>	3																		
33 <i>Veled-ül Cevaib</i>	2																		
34 <i>Arkadaş</i>	2																		
35 <i>İbretname-i Alem</i>	1																		

Note: A: Author evaluation C: Content O: Organization L: Legal action n: Number of books that mention the paper

From another angle, close to 60 percent (57 %) of the papers have a pro- or anti-government position. If we take this figure as a measure of the degree of political parallelism in the system, what we have in the period before the proclamation of the First Constitution is moderate parallelism,⁵⁴ a picture consistent with our analysis of the first Turkish newspapers, which, overall, displayed a dual character with some papers belonging to the world of politics and literature and some to the world of market. When newspapers did belong to the world of politics in this period, they did so pre-dominantly on the side of the opposition, criticizing the actions of the government and acting as a platform for the propagation of ideas of political reform along constitutional and parliamentary lines. Few papers, indeed only two, took active pro-government positions.

Two questions arise from the analysis of political parallelism in this period: First, is the moderate parallelism that characterizes these early and formative years of Turkish journalism carried over to the future periods? Second, does the pro-opposition lopsidedness of the Turkish press remain intact, disappear altogether, or change nature? It is now time to turn to the First Constitutional Period and the reign of Abdulhamid II to partially answer these questions.

4.2. Political Parallelism in the First Constitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908)

When we look at Table 4.2, the first thing that draws attention is the drastic reduction in the number of papers published. A total of 18 newspapers are mentioned in

⁵⁴ Of course, this picture would have changed quite substantially if we were to include the papers Young Ottomans published outside the country. From the infamous Ali Pasha decree of 1867, which introduced a harsh press regime, until Ali Pasha's death in 1871, Young Ottomans published numerous papers in Turkish and in European languages outside the country, all of which supported the idea of political reform to limit the Sultan's authority. Their inclusion would tip the balance towards more parallelism. However, papers published outside the country by Young Ottomans before the Proclamation of the First Constitution, and by Young Turks before the Second Constitution of 1908, are left out because, first, their inclusion would swell the analysis, and second, they lie in the margins of the Turkish press, finding only limited opportunity to enter the country and reach their target audiences.

the 6 books that cover this period, compared to the 35 titles of the previous era.⁵⁵ The reason for this reduction is the harsh press regime of the “Oppression Era”, as it is usually called, that followed the brief Constitutional Period, which lasted only 14 months. Many papers were closed down, including the state owned *Takvim-i Vakayi*, and the government was not very enthusiastic about giving new licenses.

Table 4.2 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the First Constitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial				Other				Overall		
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L			
1 <i>Tercüman-ı Hakikat</i>	6			1 x											2 x				P	Pro-Gov't
2 <i>Ayine-i Vatan</i>	6			3 x															P	
3 <i>Sabah</i>	6	4 x						5 x											PA	Mixed
4 <i>Takvim-i Vakayi</i>	6	6 x		7 x				8 x											PA	
5 <i>İkdam</i>	6			9 x				10 x											PA	
6 <i>Muhib-bi Vatan</i>	6																			
7 <i>Basiret</i>	6					11 x		12 x											A	Anti-Gov't
8 <i>Vakit</i>	5					13 x		14 x											A	
9 <i>Saadet</i>	3	15 x		16 x										17 x					P	
10 <i>Tarık</i>	2			18 x				19 x											PA	
11 <i>Malumat</i>	4			20 x2		21 x		22 x											PA	
12 <i>Selamet</i>	3																			
13 <i>Müsavat</i>	3																			
14 <i>Tercüman-ı Şark</i>	2																			
15 <i>Mecmua-i Şark</i>	2																			
16 <i>Servet</i>	1																			
17 <i>Hakikat</i>	1																			
18 <i>Osmanlı</i>	1																			

Of the 8 major titles, 2 were pro-government, 2 were in the opposition, and 4 were in the middle. 50 percent of the papers had clear political positions, implying, as before, a moderate level of parallelism. The dominant position of the pro-opposition papers is no longer, with equal numbers of pro- and anti-government papers in the parallel part of the Turkish press.

⁵⁵ Papers published by Young Turks outside the country are not included in this count. *Takvim-i Vakayi*, which from 1861 onwards became more of an official gazette than a newspaper (Baykal, 1990, p.49; Topuz, 2003, p.16), was included in the list because it was closed down by the Sultan in this period, showing, at least as perceived by the authorities, that it had a political impact.

Another difference, compared with the earlier era, is the make-up of the evidence, which is generally thinner in this period. We have fewer author evaluations and fewer content examples from this era regarding political positions taken. What we do have as evidence for political parallelism in this era mostly consists of legal actions taken against papers and journalists –implying an anti-government position for the paper concerned-, and organizational connections with the government, in the form of financial aid and owners’ relations with prominent state officials –implying a pro-government position. For example, compared to *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, *Muhbir*, and *İbret* of the previous period, which had all four anti-government boxes filled (author evaluation, content, organization, and legal action), we have *Basiret* and *Vakit* in this period as opposition papers, and they have only two boxes filled, content and legal action. Their opposition, in other words, is thinner. Similarly, compared to the pro-government papers of the earlier era (*Takvim-i Vakayi* and *Ceride-i Havadis*), which had two boxes filled each (content and organization for the former, author evaluation and organization for the latter), we have *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* and *Ayine-i Vatan* in this period, with only organizational evidence for their pro-government position. In general, then, we can say that the political character of the “parallel” part of the Turkish press –which remained the same in size relative to the non-parallel part- was muted down.

To sum up our observations for this period, there was a drastic reduction in the number of papers published, the dominant position of the opposition papers ended with equal numbers of pro- and anti-government papers, and moderate parallelism continued to be the case with the caveat that it is a thinner parallelism. That Abdulhamid’s reign was more authoritarian in character than the previous era probably explains many of these changes, especially the reduction in the number of anti-government papers and in the total number of papers published. Part of the explanation, however, lies with the fact that more sophisticated measures were taken against the opposition press. In fact, blunt legal/administrative action like closure and suspension was used more frequently in the previous period: A total of 12 papers faced such action in the period before the Proclamation of the First Constitution, compared to 5 in Abdulhamid’s reign. By limiting the number of licenses given and by using refined measures against opposition press like lists of forbidden words, special agencies for press censure, and a much more generous use of financial aid (Topuz, 2003), Abdulhamid II was able to prevent anti-government content before it was published, rather than punishing it afterwards. This should also

explain the thinner character of parallelism seen in this period, muting any evidence on political positions down.

4.3. Political Parallelism in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918)

In the Second Constitutional Period that brought the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to power, political parallelism is higher than in earlier periods. Of the 18 major papers published in this period, only 3 have mixed political positions, with the remaining 15 (83 %) having clear pro- or anti-CUP positions. Compared to the moderate levels of 50 percent in the reign of Abdulhamid II and 57 percent in the period before the Proclamation of the First Constitution, this figure means a significantly higher level of political parallelism.

Looking at Table 4.3, we can also see that anti-CUP papers outnumber pro-CUP papers. The balance that existed in the earlier period between the pro- and anti-government papers in the parallel part of the press is now tilted towards the opposition.

Table 4.3 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Second Constitutional Period

Newspapers	n	Pro-CUP				Anti-CUP				Impartial				Other				Overall			
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L				
1 <i>Tanin</i>	5	1 x		2 x	3 x									4 x					P	Pro-CUP	
2 <i>Şura-yı Ümmet</i>	5	5 x			6 x														P		
3 <i>Tasvir-i Efkar</i>	5	7 x		8 x															P		
4 <i>Vakit</i>	5	9 x																	P		
5 <i>Basiret</i>	5	10 x																	P		
6 <i>Sabah</i>	5								11 x										I	Mixed	
7 <i>Tercüman-ı Hakikat</i>	5	12 x			13 x				14 x										PAI		
8 <i>Sırat-ı Müstakim</i>	5												15 x								
9 <i>Mizan</i>	5				16 x	17 x	18 x	19 x												A	Anti-CUP
10 <i>Volkan</i>	5				20 x	21 x	22 x	23 x					24 x							A	
11 <i>Serbesti</i>	5				25 x	26 x		27 x												A	
12 <i>Hukuk-u Umumiye</i>	4				28 x			29 x												A	
13 <i>Sada-yı Millet</i>	4				30 x			31 x					32 x							A	
14 <i>İkdam</i>	5				33 x	34 x							35 x							A	
15 <i>Osmanlı</i>	5				36 x	37 x							38 x							A	
16 <i>Yeni Gazete</i>	5					39 x							40 x		41 x					A	
17 <i>Alemdar</i>	5							42 x												A	

Newspapers	n	Pro-CUP				Anti-CUP				Impartial				Other				Overall
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	
18 <i>İştirak</i>	4								43 x					44 x		45 x		A
20 <i>Metin</i>	1	46 x																P
21 <i>Millet</i>	1	47 x																PA
22 <i>İttifak</i>	1	48 x																A
23 <i>İleri</i>	1																	A
24 <i>İttihad</i>	1	49 x																A
25 <i>Payıtaht</i>	1	50 x																A
26 <i>Hürriyet</i>	1																	A
27 <i>Servet</i>	1	51 x																A
28 <i>Zaman</i>	1	52 x																
29 <i>Ahali</i>	1	53 x																
30 <i>İstikbal</i>	1	54 x																
31 <i>Servet-i Fünun</i>	3								55 x									
32 <i>Saadet</i>	3	56 x							57 x									
33 <i>Şehrah</i>	1							58 x					59 x					
34 <i>Tanzimat Hakimiyet-i</i>	2						60 x								61 x			
35 <i>Milliye</i> ⁶³	1												62 x					

A third characteristic in this period is the unusually high number of papers published.⁵⁶ A total of 35 titles are mentioned in the five books that cover the period,⁵⁷ most published in the early months before the CUP decided to tighten its grip on the press after the March 31 incident.

A fourth characteristic of the period, not visible in Table 4.3, but hidden in the make-up of the evidence is that the legal action category in this stormy period, which also contains Balkan Wars and World War I, consisted mostly of violent actions by political

⁵⁶ Kabacalı (2000) notes that in the eight months' period from the Proclamation of the Second Constitution, close to 350 newspapers and other periodicals were published. The sudden increase in the number of papers published in this period is the subject of a book by Orhan Koloğlu (2005).

⁵⁷ In addition to these 35 titles, Baykal (19909) and Kabacalı (2000) give long lists of other papers published, on which they give little information. The titles that appear in their lists, which were not included in the Table 3 for lack of space, are the following: *Adalet, Ahrar, Bayrakdar, İnkılab, İttihat ve Terakki, Sada-i Haki Vazife, Hak, Protesto, Hakikat, Hayret, Hak Yolu, Havadis, İctihad, Hamiyet, Devlet, Hayal-i, Cedid, Haberdar, Rençber, Rivayet, Tevhid-i Anasır, Tenvir-i Efkar, Teşvk, Tcelli, Tasavvuf, Tevsii Mezuniyet, Fazilet, Cuma, Baskın, Siper, Şark, İtimat, Hilal, İkbal, İtilaf, Hikmet, Muahede, Darbe, Ramazan, Nimet, Meslek, Ziya, Zühre, Millet ile Musahabe, Alem, Hilal-i Osmani, Müdafaa, Akvam, Yeni İstanbul, Türkçe İstanbul, Söz, İnkılab-ı Beşer, İrşad el-Müslimin, İslam.*

groups –like looting and assassinations- instead of administrative/punitive measures by the government –like closure, suspension, etc. Leader writers of anti-CUP papers *Serbesti*, *Hukuk-u Umuiye*, *Sada-yı Millet*, and *Şehrah* were assassinated by gunmen known to be associated with the Committee, but acting, allegedly, outside the command of the CUP headquarters; and *Tanin* and *Şura-yı Ümmet*, prominent pro-CUP papers, were looted by the mob during the March 31 incident, which was fuelled in part by the anger directed at the police, who, the protestors claimed on purpose, failed to capture the assassins.

As a fifth characteristic, we can mention the unusually high number of papers with “other” political positions, displayed in the fourth column in Table 4.3, whose political stands are not fully captured by the pro-/anti-CUP dichotomy. For example, *İkdam* and *Osmanlı* are not only anti-CUP papers, they are also supporters of the Liberal Party (Ahrar Fırkası), which was founded by followers of Prince Sabahattin and defended decentralization and economic liberalism. Similarly, the label “anti-CUP” fails to do justice to the political positions of *Volkan* and *Beyan-ül Hak*, which defended pro-Islamic political views. Papers owned or managed by Ali Kemal –*Peyam* and for a brief period *İkdam*-, who later served as a minister in Damat Ferit’s cabinet, were, according to İnuğur (1993), proponents of the Ottomanist view in the press (p. 315). The first socialist newspaper, *İştirak*, was also published in this period.

Finally, we can say that the political parallelism of the era is not only higher but also thicker compared to the reign of Abdulhamid II, with multiple pieces of evidence leading us towards the political positions taken by papers.

The unusually high number of papers published and the thicker nature of parallelism in this period needs to be explained by the freedom of press that came after many years of “oppression”, as the reign of Abdulhamid II is usually called. In the brief period of freedom that lasted from the proclamation of the Second Constitution on 24 July 1908 to the March 31 incident on 13 April 1909, many papers were published, and all sorts of political positions, including those against the Union and Progress, found the opportunity to be voiced in the press.

The high level of parallelism, the high number of papers with “other” political positions, and the frequency of violent actions against newspapers and journalists, on the other hand, needs to be explained by reference to the fact that these were years of turmoil for the Empire, with a new authority, Union and Progress, replacing the old one, the Empire continuously losing land, many different political groups forming around varying

ideas on “how to save the Empire”, and finally, WWI going on, contributing to the lack of authority in the country and the general feeling of anarchy. In this environment, it must have been difficult for journalists and newspapers to avoid taking strong positions – because too much is at stake to remain aloof- and being easy targets for violence.

The higher percentage of anti-CUP papers among the parallel part of the Turkish press in this period can be explained by the disappointment in CUP rule following initial enthusiasm, exacerbated by the CUP’s failure to stop independence movements around the Empire and the extra hardships brought upon the society by WWI.

4.4. Political Parallelism During the War of Independence (1918-1923)

Also referred to as the era of National Struggle, the period from 1918 to the formation of the Republic in 1923 is in many ways similar to the preceding Second Constitutional Period.

Political parallelism is high, even higher than the previous period, with only 2 of the 16 major papers having mixed positions, and 14 (87,5 %) having clear pro- or anti-National Struggle (NS) positions. Like in the previous era, the parallelism of the period is also a thick one, with multiple boxes of evidence filled. The number of papers published⁵⁸ and the number of papers taking “other” political positions –besides being pro- or anti-national struggle- are also high.

Table 4.4 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers during the War of Independence

Newspapers	n	Pro-NS				Anti-NS				Impartial				Other				Overall				
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L					
1 <i>Atı</i>	6	1 x	2 x	3 x	4 x												5 x				P	Pro-NS
2 <i>Yenigün</i>	6	6 x	7 x	8 x	9 x																P	
3 <i>Akşam</i>	6	10 x	11 x	12 x	13 x																P	
4 <i>Vakit</i>	6	14 x	15 x	16 x	17 x																P	
5 <i>Tanin</i>	5	18 x	19 x		20 x												21 x				P	
6 <i>Tasvir-i Efkar</i>	6	22 x	23 x																		P	

⁵⁸ Starting with this period, papers published in Ankara are also included in the list. Before 1960s, when truly national networks of newspaper distribution were set up, only papers published in Istanbul had a national distribution, however delayed. Starting with this period, but especially after Ankara was made the capital of the new Republic, papers published in Ankara also gained a national character.

Newspapers	n	Pro-NS				Anti-NS				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
7 <i>Payıtaht Tercüman-ı</i>	6	²⁴ _x																P	
8 <i>Hakikat Hakimiyet-i</i>	5	²⁵ _x	²⁶ _x															P	
9 <i>Milliye</i>	6		²⁷ _x	²⁸ _x														P	
10 <i>Sebilürreşad</i>	5	²⁹ _x													³⁰ _x			P	
11 <i>İkdam Ceride-i</i>	6	³¹ _x	³² _x							³³ _x								PI	
12 <i>Havadis Peyam-ı</i>	5																	Mixed	
13 <i>Sabah</i>	6				³⁴ _x	³⁵ _x	³⁶ _x	³⁷ _x					³⁸ _x						A
14 <i>Alemdar Türkçe</i>	6				³⁹ _x	⁴⁰ _x		⁴¹ _x					⁴² _x	⁴³ _x	⁴⁴ _x				A
15 <i>İstanbul</i>	5				⁴⁵ _x	⁴⁶ _x		⁴⁷ _x					⁴⁸ _x		⁴⁹ _x				A
16 <i>Serbesti</i>	6							⁵⁰ _x							⁵¹ _x			A	
20 <i>Öğüt Hukuk-u</i>	4	⁵² _x	⁵³ _x															P	
21 <i>Beşer</i>	4		⁵⁴ _x	⁵⁵ _{x2}														PA	
22 <i>Minber</i>	3		⁵⁶ _x	⁵⁷ _x									⁵⁸ _x		⁵⁹ _x			A	
23 <i>Hadisat</i>	2		⁶⁰ _x		⁶¹ _x													A	
24 <i>İstiklal</i>	2	⁶² _x												⁶³ _x				A	
25 <i>Zaman</i>	2	⁶⁴ _x																A	
26 <i>Memleket</i>	2	⁶⁵ _x																A	
27 <i>Tan-2</i>	1	⁶⁶ _x											⁶⁷ _x					A	
28 <i>Tarık</i>	1	⁶⁸ _x																	
29 <i>İfham Seyyare-i</i>	1	⁶⁹ _x											⁷⁰ _x						
30 <i>Yeni Dünya</i>	4		⁷¹ _x										⁷² _x	⁷³ _x	⁷⁴ _x				
31 <i>İdrak</i>	4												⁷⁵ _x		⁷⁶ _x				
32 <i>Yeni Gazete</i>	3												⁷⁷ _x						
33 <i>Emek</i>	3														⁷⁸ _x				
34 <i>Şarkın Sesi</i>	2												⁷⁹ _x						
35 <i>Tan-1</i>	2												⁸⁰ _x		⁸¹ _x				
36 <i>Selamet</i>	2																		
37 <i>Köy Hocası</i>	2																		
38 <i>Ankara</i>	2																		
39 <i>Mefkure</i>	2																		
40 <i>Akvam</i>	2																		
41 <i>Hakikat</i>	1																		
42 <i>Yeni İstanbul</i>	1																		
43 <i>Evkat</i>	1																		
44 <i>Hikmet</i>	1																		
45 <i>Söz</i>	1																		
46 <i>Türk Dünyası</i>	1																		
47 <i>Vahdet</i>	1																		

Newspapers	n	Pro-NS				Anti-NS				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
48 <i>Yeni Şark</i>	1																		
49 <i>Yirminci Asır</i>	1																		

Among the parallel part of the press, pro-national struggle papers have a clear majority, with 10 papers supporting the movement and 4 opposing. Scholars studying this period make further distinctions among the papers based upon their positions towards the National Struggle. Koloğlu (1993) describes political alignments in this period as follows: “On the one hand, there was the oppositional press of Istanbul and Anatolia, on the other, pro-National Forces (Kuva-yi Milliye) papers. Besides these, there was also an Ankara press, which was personally directed by Mustafa Kemal and which shaped the future Turkey” (p. 12). A similar, tri-partite classification is also made by İnuğur (1993) for the Anatolian press of the period: “Papers that led the National Struggle, papers that supported it, and papers that tried to weaken the National Struggle” (p. 351). A different tri-partite classification is made for the Istanbul press of the period by Topuz (2003) and İnuğur (1993). Topuz (2003) describes the press environment of Istanbul in those days as follows: “On the one hand there were supporters of the National Struggle [...] On the other hand, those who fiercely opposed the National Struggle [...] The rest had sympathies for the resistance movement in Anatolia” (p. 98). İnuğur (1993) describes the third group as those who “sometimes support one and sometimes support the other, and sometimes express sympathy for the resistance movement in Anatolia too” (p. 344). The final categories in these tri-partite classifications (papers that “led” and that “had sympathies for” the struggle) were collapsed into the pro-National Struggle category in Table 4.4.

Papers that “led the struggle” in Atatürk’s “personal direction”, however, deserve further emphasis, not least because they draw attention to Atatürk’s rather strong involvement in press and journalism. Being the founder of the Republic and its first President, the involvement of such a prominent political figure in the press should have implications for press-party parallelism in later periods.

4.5. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Press

The story of Atatürk's involvement in the press is best told through following the roles he assumed in this regard. Atatürk got involved in the press as a student aspirant, as a fake journalist, as a newspaper owner, as a columnist, as a distributor, as a manager, as a content provider, and finally as a regulator.

1) *Student aspirant*: His earliest encounter with active journalism starts in the military school. A group of students, in Mustafa Kemal's leadership, prepare a hand-written newspaper to be distributed among the students, and when it is found out, receive a mild punishment of verbal warning from the commander of the military school.⁵⁹ Upon graduation from school and waiting for their assignments in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal and his friends continue their journalism activity, along with a secret committee they formed, but this time they get arrested and stay in jail for a few months. They are let go after the commander of the military school, Rıza Pasha gets involved in the case on their behalf.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Atatürk's account of this newspaper, in his own words, is as follows: "Mektep talebesi arasında okunmak üzere, mektepte el yazısıyla gazete tesis ettik. Sınıf dahilinde ufak teşkilatımız vardı. Ben idare heyetinde idim. Gazetenin yazılarını çoğunlukla ben yazıyordum. [...] Rıza Paşa'ya haber vermişler sınıfı bastı. Yazılar masa üzerinde ve ön tarafta duruyordu. Görmemezliğe geldi. Ancak dersten başka şeylerle iştil vesilesi ile tevkifimizi emretti. Çıkarken yalnız izinsizlikle iktifa olunabilir dedi. Sonra hiçbir ceza tatbikatına lüzum olmadığını söylemiş." ("We established a hand-written newspaper to be read among the students. We had a small organization at class. I was a member of the executive committee, and wrote most of the articles published in the paper. [...] Someone informed Rıza Pasha about us, and he raided the class. Articles were on the table at the front. He pretended he did not see any of them, but ordered that we be arrested for being occupied with non-educational activities. As he left the room, he said cancelling our vacations would be sufficient. Later, we learnt, he said no punishment was necessary.") (İnuğur, 1992, p.15-16, quoted from Hikmet Bayur, Atatürk, p.12)

⁶⁰ Atatürk's account of these events is as follows: "Yüzbaşı olarak mektepten çıktuktan sonra İstanbul'da geçireceğimiz müddet zarfında bu işlerle daha iyi iştil için bir arkadaş namına bir apartman tuttuk. [...] Bizi tevkif ettiler. [...] Gazete çıkardığımızdan, teşkilat yaptığımızdan, apartmanda çalıştığımızdan, hülâsa bütün bu işlerden dolayı maznun bulunuyorduk. Daha evvelki arkadaşlar itiraflarda bulunmuşlar. Birkaç ay bizi mevkuf tuttuktan sonra bıraktılar. Serbest bırakılmamızın Rıza Paşa'nın mesaisi neticesinde olduğunu kendisi söyledi." ("When we graduated from the military school as captains, we rented an apartment for one of our friends during our stay in Istanbul, to be able to take better care of these activities. [...] They arrested us. [...] We were suspect for publishing a newspaper, establishing an organization, working out of an apartment, in sum for all of these activities. Some of our friends had made some confessions. They kept us in jail for a couple of months and then let go. Rıza Pasha later told us himself that we were let go thanks to his efforts.") (Kasım, 1999).

2) *Fake journalist*: In 1912, when Mustafa Kemal went to Libya to help organize the resistance against the Italians, he used the fake identity of journalist Şerif Bey (Baykal, 1990, p.323).

3) *Newspaper owner*: In 1918, Mustafa Kemal returned to Istanbul from the front in Syria, and for a while, did not have an active military duty. In these days, he provided the capital for the newspaper *Minber*, formally owned by his friend Fethi Okyar, withdrawing his savings that were invested in pearl trade (Topuz, 2003, p. 117; İnuğur, 1992, p. 19). The paper was a failure in financial terms, and closed within two months.

4) *Columnist*: According to İnuğur (1992, p. 20) many unsigned editorials of *Minber* were written by Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal also wrote editorials for *İrade-i Milliye* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, organs of the national struggle in Anatolia, and a series of columns in *Kurun (Vakit)* in 1937, on the then unresolved issue of Hatay, under the signature of the paper's leader writer, Asım Us (Topuz, 2003, p. 165).

5) *Distributor*: According to Koloğlu (1993), one of the first things Atatürk did in Anatolia, within the seven months of his landing in Samsun, was to capture and control the network of newspaper distribution (p. 22).

6) *Manager*: Mustafa Kemal was practically the manager of the papers *İrade-i Milliye* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, organs of the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, as the president of the 'representative committee'. He personally chose the names and the personnel of the papers, gave detailed editorial orders (like no bylines in *İrade-i Milliye*), and referred to *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* as "my newspaper" in later accounts (İnuğur, 1992, p. 23-24, 26).

7) *Content provider*: Anadolu Agency (AA) was founded during the early days of the War of Independence, in 1920, by Mustafa Kemal's order (İnuğur, 1992, p. 28), to feed the pro-resistance papers and local resistance groups around the country with news on the activities and official views of the leadership of national struggle.

8) *Regulator*: After the first GNA was assembled and the government formed, the efforts of the leadership regarding press moved beyond providing content to regulating activity, and a General Directorate for Press and Communication (Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) was founded on 7 June 1920. Anadolu Agency was also to work under this directorate. Responding to a question asked in the Parliament on whether the Directorate does its job properly, Mustafa Kemal gave the following answer: "All the

newspapers were given detailed orders on which line to follow, and inspected. [...] Only one paper did not follow the orders.”⁶¹ (Kolođlu, 1993, p. 36)

Getting involved in press and journalism at so many levels and in so many roles, Mustafa Kemal was, it seems, a journalist-cum-politician as much as he was a soldier-cum-politician. This should have some consequences for the following periods, most probably as a factor pulling towards more, instead of less, parallelism.

4.6. Political Parallelism in the Early Republican Era (1923-1931)

The boundaries of this era, unlike earlier ones, are not self-evident. Some scholars choose Atatürk’s death as the natural ending point for this period (Oral, 1968), some cover the whole 1923-1945 period as the period of Republican reforms (Kolođlu, 1992), and some examine 1923-1927 as a prelude to the following one-party regime (Zürcher, 2004). The year 1930 is also taken as a turning point in some treatments (Berberoglu, 1992), taking economic criteria into account, with the state getting more involved in the economy in 1930s.

Because my concern in this study is to homogenize periods in terms of political fault lines and positions taken in the press, I chose 1931 as the ending point of this period. Before 1931, the new regime had to deal with two major waves of opposition, one formed around the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) in 1924-1925, the other around the controlled experiment of Free Republican Party (SCF) in 1930. After SCF’s closure towards the end of 1930, no such opposition is observed. 1931 is also an important year for the press: 1931 press law is the first major legislative activity in the TGNA concerning press. Until that time, the press law of 1909, amended many times, was in effect (İnuđur, 1992, p.105). The most important article of the 1931 press law was the one that gave the government the authority to “temporarily suspend” the publication of papers that damage

⁶¹ The quote, in Turkish, is as follows: “Bütün gazetelere ne yolda kalem kullanacaklarına ilişkin tarafımızdan yönerge verilmiştir ve izlenmiştir. [...] Buna yalnız uymayan bir gazete olmuştur.” The question was asked in the Assembly session on 26 September 1920. (Kolođlu, 1993, p. 36)

“the general policy of the country” (İnuğur, 1992, p. 105; Topuz, 2003, p. 159), which, in effect, meant that the government could close down any paper because of the vagueness of the wording and because no upper limit was defined for “temporary suspension” (Güvenir, 1991).

In the early Republican period from 1923 to 1931, the upward trend in parallelism continued, with only 1 of the 15 major papers having a mixed position, and 14 (93 %) having clear pro- or anti-government positions. The parallelism of the era is also a thick one, with multiple boxes of evidence for political positions taken filled. Unlike in the earlier period, however, there is a significant decrease in the number of papers published, and in the number of papers with “other” political positions. The political conflict in the country, it seems, is simplified and positions taken towards the new regime became primary, marginalizing other political positions.

Table 4.5 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Early Republican Era

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial			Other			Overall			
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
1 <i>Vakit</i>	6	x ¹	x ²	x ³														P	Pro-Gov't
2 <i>Akşam</i>	6	x ⁴	x ⁵	x ⁶														P	
3 <i>Milliyet</i>	6	x ⁷	x ⁸	x ⁹														P	
4 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	6	x ¹⁰		x ¹¹														P	
5 <i>Son Saat</i>	5	x ¹²																P	
6 <i>İleri</i>	6			x ¹³														P	
7 <i>Hakimiyet-i Milliye</i>	6			x ¹⁴														P	
8 <i>İkdam</i>	6			x ¹⁵		x ¹⁶		x ¹⁷										PA	Mixed
9 <i>Tanin</i>	6				x ¹⁸	x ¹⁹	x ²⁰	x ²¹										A	Anti-Gov't
10 <i>Vatan</i>	6				x ²²	x ²³	x ²⁴	x ²⁵										A	
11 <i>Tevhid-i Efkar</i>	6				x ²⁶	x ²⁷	x ²⁸	x ²⁹										A	
12 <i>Sebilürreşat</i>	5				x ³⁰		x ³¹	x ³²										A	
13 <i>Son Telgraf</i>	6				x ³³			x ³⁴										A	
14 <i>Yarın</i>	6				x ³⁵		x ³⁶	x ³⁷					x ³⁸					A	
15 <i>Son Posta</i>	5				x ³⁹													A	
16 <i>İnkılap-1</i>	4	x ⁴⁰	x ⁴¹	x ⁴²														P	
17 <i>İstiklal</i>	4							x ⁴³										PA	
18 <i>Aydınlık</i>	3							x ⁴⁴										A	
19 <i>Orak-Çekiç Tercüman-ı</i>	2							x ⁴⁵					x ⁴⁶					A	
20 <i>Hakikat</i>	4																	A	
21 <i>İnkılap-2</i>	1																	A	

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
22 <i>Yeni Türkiye</i>	1																	A	
23 <i>Yeni Ses</i>	1																	A	
24 <i>Ekonomi</i>	1																		
25 <i>Ankara Gazetesi</i>	1																		
26 <i>Hergün</i>	1																		
27 <i>Hür Gazete</i>	1																		
28 <i>Hür Adam</i>	1																		

In the parallel part of the press, again unlike in the earlier period, there is a perfect balance: 7 papers oppose the new regime, and 7 support it. It should be kept in mind, however, that few of the opposition papers made it to the chronological limit of 1931, many being closed down by the government for their publications or owners' and journalists' political activities (See notes for Table 4.5).

4.7. Political Parallelism in One-Party Era (1931-1946)

Compared to the Early Republican Era, political parallelism in 1931-1946 period is both lower -9 out of 13 papers (62 %) have clear pro- or anti-government positions-, and thinner. Following three continuous periods of high political parallelism in the Second Constitutional Period, War of Independence and the Early Republican Era, parallelism in this period is at moderate levels again, close to where it started before the proclamation of the First Constitution. That these three periods were times of intense and sometimes violent political conflict probably explains the high levels of parallelism seen from 1908 to 1931. These years saw the Balkan Wars, WWI, War of Independence, constitutional monarchy replacing Abdulhamid's rule and then turning into some sort of a military rule in the hands of CUP strongmen, followed by anarchy during the War of Independence, and the foundation of the Republic with a radical reform program that had to overcome much fierce resistance. Newspapers and journalists were not cool observers of these events, but active participants in them, taking strong political positions and aligning with political parties, and –when parties were not present- with other political forces.

Table 4.6 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in One-Party Era

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		

Newspapers	n	Pro-Gov't				Anti-Gov't				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
1 <i>Vakit</i>	6	1 x	2 x	3 x														P	Pro-Gov't
2 <i>Ulus</i>	6	4 x		5 x														P	
3 <i>Tanin</i>	6	6 x		7 x									8 x		9 x			P	
4 <i>İkdam</i>	6	10 x																P	
5 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	6	11 x		12 x				13 x					14 x	15 x				PA	Mixed
6 <i>Akşam</i>	6			16 x			17 x						18 x					PA	
7 <i>Tasvir-i Efkar</i>	6												19 x		20 x				
8 <i>Yeni Sabah</i>	5														21 x				
9 <i>Tan</i>	6				22 x	23 x		24 x					25 x		26 x			A	Anti-Gov't
10 <i>Yarın</i>	6				27 x			28 x										A	
11 <i>Vatan</i>	6				29 x		30 x						31 x					A	
12 <i>Son Posta</i>	5							32 x					33 x					A	
15 <i>Zaman</i>	5							34 x										A	
16 <i>Bugün</i>	3	35 x																P	
17 <i>Yurd</i>	1		36 x															PA	
18 <i>Akın</i>	4					37 x												A	
19 <i>Hergün</i>	4																	A	
20 <i>Haber</i>	3																	A	
21 <i>Yılmaz</i>	2																	A	
22 <i>İnkılap</i>	1																	A	
23 <i>Çankaya</i>	1																	A	
28 <i>Ankara Haftası</i>	1																	A	

The decrease in the political nature of the press in this period is observed by other authors too. According to İnuğur (1992), between 1931 and 1938, “newspapers started to emphasize non-political issues” like “tabloid news, fiction, short stories and foreign news” (p.162). Wrestlers’ stories were another peculiarity of this period, which, İnuğur (1992) notes, appeared in almost all newspapers. İnuğur (1993) explains this trend by reference to the restrictive press environment of the period, instituted by the press law of 1931 against the background of armed opposition to the regime between 1925 and 1930, with Sheikh Said Rebellion, the attempt on Atatürk’s life in İzmir, and the infamous Menemen incident. In a similar account, Koloğlu (1993) observes that “The brakes on politics encouraged papers to cover other issues. The place reserved for movies, sports, and interesting events from around the world increased. [...] Reading the pre-1939 papers, one can easily get the feeling of a happy and peaceful Turkey. [...] Everybody knew that everything was not perfect, that especially the peasants lived under dire

economic conditions, but the regime of that time did not want to hear such criticisms” (p.77).

In the parallel part of the press, the balance between pro- and anti-government papers roughly remained in place, with 5 papers in the opposition against 4 pro-government papers. The number of papers published also remained low, with a slight decrease.

Most of the oppositional content in this period is seen towards the end of the period, during the WWII years. The increase in the number of papers with other political positions is also a side effect of the WWII, with some papers supporting Germany and others supporting the Allies.

WWII years and its immediate aftermath form a most interesting period in Turkish press history,⁶² demonstrating the efforts of a one-party regime to keep the newspapers in line, the different foreign policy preferences of newspapers, and the way these preferences are connected to their positions towards the one-party regime. Oppositional papers generally supported the Allies, which they referred to as the pro-democracy alliance, with the hope that if the Allies won, the one-party regime would have to loosen its grip on the opposition and take further steps towards democratization. When the Allies did win, opposition papers *Tan* and *Vatan* used this to make the case that Turkey needed to become a multi-party democracy to take its proper place in the new international order being formed. Against such arguments, Falih Rifkî Atay, the leader writer of the CHP party paper *Ulus*, argued that the war was not won by democracies against one-party regimes –since one of the Allies, USSR, was also a one-party-regime- and that democracy was possible in a one-party regime too (Atay, as cited in Gürkan, 1998, p.165).

The pro-government papers’ position in WWII, on the other hand, was shaped, more than anything else, by the government’s concern to stay out of the war, and swung from a pro-Ally position in the beginning of the war, to a pro-Germany attitude when the Nazis seemed to be winning, and then back to the pro-Ally position at the end of the war, in line with the government’s maneuvers to keep Turkey out of the war (Güvenir, 1991).

4.8. Political Parallelism in Transition to Democracy (1946-1950)

⁶² Two great sources on this period are Güvenir (1991) and Gürkan (1998).

In some respects, the period between 1946-1950 is a continuation of the preceding one-party period. The same party that ruled the country since the foundation of the Republic remained in power (alternation in government was not achieved), and more important than that, there are serious doubts about the “free and fair” character of the 1946 elections, which is the reason why many authors start the multi-party era with 1950 elections. In other respects, the period between 1946-1950 is part of the multi-party era. First of all, elections were held in which more than parties participated, meaning the CHP had to tolerate first the idea then the practice of a second party; and what is more demonstrative of the presence of a race, the CHP has made some very major policy changes in this period, including but not limited to liberalizing the press regime on the eve of the 1946 elections and opening training courses for prayer leaders before the 1950 elections, moves that were clearly aimed at winning more votes. For these reasons, it is best to treat the years between 1946 and 1950 as a separate, transitional period. This decision is also supported by our concern to homogenize periods in terms of their political parallelism characteristics. Political parallelism in this era is in many respects different from both pre-1946 and post-1950 periods.

The downward trend in parallelism continues, as can be seen in Table 4.7, with 8 of the 16 major papers having mixed positions, and 8 (50%) having clear pro-CHP or pro-DP positions. This makes the parallelism of the era a moderate one, similar to the preceding one-party period. Again similar to the one-party period, parallelism is also thin, with few papers having multiple boxes of evidence filled. There is a slight increase in the number of papers published, from 13 to 16 major papers.

Table 4.7 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in Transition to Democracy

Newspapers	n	Pro-CHP				Pro-DP				Impartial				Other				Overall		
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L			
1 <i>Vakit</i>	6	1 x	2 x	3 x															C	Pro- CHP
2 <i>Ulus</i>	6	4 x		5 x															C	
3 <i>Tanin</i>	6	6 x	7 x																C	
4 <i>Akşam</i>	6	8 x		9 x	10 x				11 x										CDI	Mixed
5 <i>Milliyet</i>	6																			
6 <i>Hergün</i>	5												12 x							
7 <i>Son Telgraf</i>	5																			
8 <i>Yeni İstanbul</i>	5																			
9 <i>Tan</i>	6												13 x							
10 <i>Yeni Sabah</i>	6				14 x		15 x		16 x				17 x		18 x				DI	
11 <i>Hürriyet</i>	6				19 x				20 x	21 x									DI	

Newspapers	n	Pro-CHP				Pro-DP				Impartial				Other				Overall					
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L						
12 <i>Vatan</i>	6					22 x	23 x	24 x											D	Pro- DP			
13 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	6					25 x		26 x											D		Pro- DP		
14 <i>Tasvir</i>	6					27 x								28 x					D			Pro- DP	
15 <i>Son Posta</i>	5					29 x													D				Pro- DP
16 <i>Zafer</i>	5					30 x													D				
17 <i>Memleket</i>	1			31 x															P				
18 <i>Zaman</i>	1			32 x															PA				
19 <i>Kudret</i>	3				33 x			34 x					35 x		36 x				A				
20 <i>Yeni Çağ</i>	1				37 x								38 x						A				
21 <i>Demokrasi</i>	1				39 x														A				
22 <i>Demirkırat</i>	1						40 x												A				
23 <i>Gerçek</i>	2												41 x			42 x			A				
24 <i>Tek Dünya</i>	1												43 x						A				
25 <i>Barış</i>	1												44 x										
26 <i>Yaprak</i>	1												45 x										
27 <i>Yurtta</i>																							
27 <i>Kalkınma</i>	1												46 x										
28 <i>Nuhun Gemisi</i>	1												47 x										
29 <i>Beşer</i>	1												48 x										
30 <i>Son Saat</i>	3																						
31 <i>Gece Postası</i>	3																						
32 <i>Yarın</i>	2																						
32 <i>Herşey</i>																							
33 <i>Memleket İçin</i>	1																						

Because WWII is over, positions taken towards the warring sides are out of the table, leaving few papers with positions other than those towards CHP and DP. The race between the party in government and the newly founded opposition party is the main political conflict around which the parallelism of the era is defined. Unlike in the one-party era, opposition to the government is not amorphous, but formed around a political party. From this period onwards, we can speak of press-party parallelism proper, instead of political parallelism.

Among the parallel part of the press, pro-DP papers outnumber pro-CHP papers by a ratio of 5 to 3. The pro-/anti-government balance of the early Republican era (7:7), slightly deformed in favor of the opposition in one-party years (4:5), now seems to be even more strongly tilted towards the opposition (3:5). Other authors also note the pro-DP press environment of the pre-1950 years. Topuz (2003) quotes Sadun Tanju making the following observation: “As time went by, the number of pro-opposition papers increased,

which was only natural. For the opposition promised the best of everything in thought and in action” (Tanju, as cited in Topuz, 2003, p. 192). It will be interesting to see how this picture changes after the 1950 elections, which brought the opposition party to power.

4.9. Political Parallelism in the Democratic Party Era (1950-1960)

The press environment of the Democratic Party (DP) era is in many ways different from the preceding period. First of all, there is a significant increase in the number of papers published, although most of these are minor papers mentioned by a few authors only. More significantly, the downward trend in political parallelism is reversed: 10 of the 15 papers (67 %) have clear pro- or anti-DP positions, meaning parallelism in this era became quite high, following two periods of moderate parallelism in one-party and transition periods.

Table 4.8 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Democratic Party Era

Newspapers	n	Pro-DP				Anti-DP				Impartial			Other			Overall			
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
1 <i>Zafer</i>	5	1 x	2 x	3 x	4 x													P	Pro-DP
2 <i>Son Posta</i>	5	5 x	6 x	7 x	8 x													P	
3 <i>Milliyet</i>	6	9 x	10 x	11 x									12 x					P	
4 <i>Yeni Sabah</i>	6			13 x					14 x	15 x								PAI	Mixed
5 <i>Dünya</i>	5			16 x	17 x	18 x	19 x	20 x	21 x									PA	
6 <i>Yeni İstanbul</i>	5																		
7 <i>Hergün</i>	5																		
8 <i>Akşam</i>	6					22 x				23 x								AI	
9 <i>Ulus</i>	6					24 x	25 x	26 x	27 x									A	Anti-DP
10 <i>Hürriyet</i>	6					28 x	29 x	30 x	31 x									A	
11 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	6	32 x				33 x		34 x	35 x				36 x					A	
12 <i>Vatan</i>	6					37 x	38 x		39 x									A	
13 <i>Son Telgraf</i>	5	40 x				41 x	42 x											A	
14 <i>Son Havadis</i>	5							43 x	44 x				45 x					A	
15 <i>Vakit</i>	6							46 x										A	
16 <i>Haber</i>	2	47 x	48 x															P	
17 <i>Büyük Doğu</i>	2		49 x	50 x										51 x				P	
18 <i>Hür Ses</i>	3	52 x		53 x		54 x		55 x										P	
19 <i>Tercüman-2</i>	2	56 x																P	
20 <i>Hakimiyet</i>	2	57 x																P	

Newspapers	n	Pro-DP				Anti-DP				Impartial				Other				Overall	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L		
21 <i>Bugün</i>	1	58 x																P	
22 <i>Yeni Cephe İstanbul</i>	1	59 x																P	
23 <i>Ekspres</i>	4		60 x															P	
24 <i>Medeniyet</i>	4		61 x															P	
25 <i>Havadis</i>	2		62 x															P	
26 <i>İnkılap</i>	1		63 x															P	
27 <i>Türk Sesi</i>	1		64 x															P	
28 <i>Halkçı</i>	4				65 x	66 x	67 x	68 x										A	
29 <i>Yeni Gün</i>	2					69 x	70 x						71 x					A	
30 <i>Kudret</i>	3				72 x								73 x					A	
31 <i>Tercüman-1</i>	4		74 x				75 x											A	
32 <i>Pazar Postası</i>	1						76 x						77 x					A	
33 <i>Kervan</i>	2							78 x										A	
34 <i>Son Saat</i>	3																		
35 <i>Hür Vatan</i>	2																		
36 <i>Akın</i>	2																		
37 <i>Ankara Ticaret</i>	1																		
38 <i>Hizmet</i>	1																		
39 <i>Millet</i>	1																		
40 <i>Merhaba</i>	1																		

Again unlike in the one-party and transition periods, parallelism in 1950s is thick with multiple pieces of evidence pointing towards the political positions taken. Two papers in the pro-DP camp, *Zafer* and *Son Posta*, have all four boxes filled, meaning they had organizational connections with DP, pro-DP content, faced legal action showing their pro-DP position (their managers and columnists were prosecuted after the 1960 coup), and were considered to be pro-DP papers by the authors covering the period. Similarly, two papers in the anti-DP camp, *Ulus* and *Hürriyet*, had four boxes filled: they had organizational connections with the opposition, anti-DP content, faced legal action showing their anti-DP position (*Hürriyet* was sued by the foreign minister of the DP government, and *Ulus*'s publication was suspended for two months after the Pulliam trials – see notes for Table 4.8 for more on Pulliam trials), and they were considered to be anti-DP by the authors covering this period.

The most important difference with the pre-1950 period, however, is the reversal in the positions of formerly pro-DP papers. *Vatan*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Son Telgraf*, and *Tercüman-1* shifted from a pro-DP position to an anti-DP one towards the middle of the decade. The shift is most dramatic in *Vatan*'s case, which was the paper that published DP founders'

articles even before the party was founded, and whose owner, Ahmet Emin Yalman, was a personal friend and political advisor to the leaders of the DP in opposition. Once the honeymoon between the press and the DP was over, *Vatan* became one of the fiercest critics of the DP rule, and Yalman faced prosecution in old age, being jailed in March 1960 when he was 72, for publishing the translation of American journalist Eugene Pulliam's articles, originally published in US newspapers, criticizing the DP government. After the reversals,⁶³ the balance between pro- and anti-DP papers was 3 to 7, with DP facing an even harsher press environment than what the CHP faced in pre-1950 years.⁶⁴

4.10. Political Parallelism in 1960s, Beginnings of Class Politics (1961-1970)

A common observation regarding the press environment in the post-coup period is that it had a pluralist character, in the sense that “each and every left or right fraction had its own publication” (Koloğlu, 1993, p. 105). Not only was it possible to divide papers into left and right camps, but divisions and differences within these camps were reflected in the press scene as well, although this applied more to the magazine press than to newspapers. Topuz (2003) observes that in this period, “every color, every tendency within the left was represented in the press” (p. 238), and Kabacalı (2000) notes that “many magazines representing views from the farthest right to the farthest left end of the political spectrum were published” (p. 229). The phenomenon might be expected to be reflected among national dailies as well, in the form of being associated with the general political tendencies of left and right, if not with specific left or right fractions.

Table 4.9 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1960s

⁶³ Positions prior to reversals are shown in Table 8 with thick borders around the evidence box.

⁶⁴ At least this is the case when we focus upon the major papers that are mentioned by most of the authors. Among the minor papers whose positions we know, pro-DP papers outnumber anti-DP ones by a ratio of 2 to 1 (12 vs. 6). However, there are seven minor papers whose positions we do not know, which could tip the balance the other way, which is the reason minor papers are not included in the analyses in the first place.

Newspapers	# of authors mentioning	% Circulation (1965-70)	"Right"				"Left"				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)	
			A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L				
1 <i>Tercüman Son</i>	5	13,4	1 x	2 x						3 x									R	Right	6/15 (%40)	23,9
2 <i>Havadis Yeni</i>	5	3,6	4 x	5 x															R			
3 <i>İstanbul</i>	4	3,1	6 x																R			
4 <i>Zafer</i>	4	0,5	7 x																R			
5 <i>Adalet</i>	1	1,4	8 x																R			
6 <i>Bugün-1</i>	1	1,3	9 x												10 x				R			
7 <i>Hürriyet</i>	5	38,2								11 x									I	Mixed	3/15 (%20)	39,9
8 <i>Yeni Sabah</i>	5	-																	I			
9 <i>Dünya</i>	4	1,1																	I			
10 <i>Milliyet</i>	5	13,4					12 x								13 x				L	Left	6/15 (%40)	32,3
11 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	5	8,1				14 x	15 x	16 x							17 x				L			
12 <i>Akşam</i>	5	7,3	18 x			19 x		20 x			21 x				22 x				L			
13 <i>Günaydın</i>	5	2,2				23 x		24 x											L			
14 <i>Ulus</i>	5	0,9				25 x		26 x											L			
15 <i>Vatan</i>	5	0,4						27 x											L			
16 <i>Babralide Sabah</i>	1	0,5	28 x												29 x				R			
17 <i>Bizim Anadolu</i>	1	0,1		30 x												31 x			R			
18 <i>Hakimiyet-i Milliye -3</i>	1	-	32 x																R			
19 <i>Haber</i>	3	0,6								33 x									I			
20 <i>Kudret</i>	2	-													34 x				O			
21 <i>Öncü</i>	2	-													35 x				O			
22 <i>Tanin</i>	3	-																				
23 <i>Son</i>	2	-																				
24 <i>Bugün-2</i>	1	-																				
25 <i>Hareket</i>	1	-																				
26 <i>İrade</i>	1	-																				
27 <i>Yarın</i>	1	-																				
28 <i>Ekspres</i>	1	0,6																				
29 <i>Yeni Gazete</i>	1	0,4																				
30 <i>Yeni Tanin</i>	1	0,4																				
31 <i>Son Baskı Ankara</i>	1	0,2																				
32 <i>Telgraf</i>	1	0,1																				
33 <i>Hergün</i>	1	0,6																				

Newspapers	# of authors mentioning	% Circulation (1965-70)	"Right"				"Left"				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)
			A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L			
34	<i>Son Saat</i>	0,5																			
35	<i>Havadis</i>	0,4																			
36	<i>Medeniyet</i>	0,3																			
37	<i>Hür Anadolu Ankara</i>	0,1																			
38	<i>Ekspres</i>	0,1																			
39	<i>Başkent</i>	0,1																			
40	<i>Tasvir</i>	0,1																			
41	<i>Yeni Gün</i>	0,1																			

“Right”: pro-AP, anti-CHP, right, conservative, nationalist, pro-Islamist, anti-communist

“Left”: pro-CHP, anti-DP, left.

* Circulation shares include papers with less than 1 percent circulation share, shown in the lower part of the table, as well.

Note: All daily papers published in Istanbul and Ankara were included in the tables up to this period, including the 1960s, for this is the closest approximation we have to the definition of “national dailies” prior to 1970s. From 1970s onwards, only papers on which BİK collected circulation information and which were published in Istanbul will be included in the tables, for it was the major Istanbul papers that turned truly national.

Indeed, when we look at Table 4.9, we can see that the upward trend in parallelism continues, with 12 of the 15 major papers in this period having left or right positions (80 %), and only 3 having mixed positions (20 %). The circulation share of these three papers, however, is quite high (39,9 %), for the highest circulation newspaper of the period, *Hürriyet*, is among the mixed papers. Compared to the 1950s, however, the parallelism of the period is a thin one, with most papers having only one or two boxes filled in Table 4.9.

Overall, then, we can say that the press scene in 1960s, including the daily press, was crowded with papers associated with left or right, with few mixed titles, but this numerical ascendancy was not reflected in circulation shares to the same degree (with as much as 40 percent of newspaper readership reading papers classified here as mixed), and the associations of national dailies with political currents being not as strong as in the earlier period, with few evidence being available pointing towards the positions they take.

4.11. Political Parallelism in 1970s, Left-Righth Polarization (1974-1980)

In 1970s, a decline is observed in parallelism, both in terms of the number of major parallel titles (4 out of 7, 57,2 %), and the circulation shares received (46,4 %). When we look at the bottom half of Table 4.10, however, a somewhat different picture emerges: we can see that many daily newspapers, representing various left and right fractions, continue to be published, although they fail to capture significant circulation shares. Many of the small circulation newspapers also prove to be short-lived, as few of these titles continue publishing into the 1980s.

Table 4.10 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1970s

Newspapers	% Circulation (1974-79)	Right				Left				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)*	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L				
1 <i>Tercüman</i>	18,7	1 x	2 x															R	2/7 (%28,6)	25,0	
2 <i>Son Havadis</i>	1,1	3 x	4 x														R				
3 <i>Hürriyet</i>	28,1									5 x								I	3/7 (%42,9)	50,8	
4 <i>Günaydın</i>	21,4									6 x								I			
5 <i>Ayrıntılı Haber</i>	1,1																				
6 <i>Milliyet</i>	14,2					7 x	8 x												L	2/7 (%28,6)	21,4
7 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	5,3					9 x	10 x	11 x										L			
8 <i>İstanbul</i>	0,7	12 x	13 x																R		
9 <i>Milli Gazete</i>	0,6	14 x	15 x	16 x															R		
10 <i>Hergün</i>	0,6	17 x	18 x																R		
11 <i>Sabah (Babalide Sabah - D. Ve T. Sabah)</i>	0,6																				
12 <i>Ortadoğu</i>	0,5	19 x		20 x															R		
13 <i>Güneş</i>	0,5	21 x	22 x	23 x															R		
			24 x																R		

Newspapers	% Circulation (1974-79)	Right				Left				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)*
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L			
14 <i>Millet</i>	0,5	²⁵ _x	²⁶ _x															R		
15 <i>Yeni Asya</i>	0,4	²⁷ _x	²⁸ _x	²⁹ _x														R		
16 <i>Bayrak</i>	0,3	³⁰ _x	³¹ _x	³² _x														R		
17 <i>Bizim Anadolu</i>	0,3			³³ _x														R		
18 <i>Türkiye (Hakikat)</i>	0,3	³⁴ _x	³⁵ _x	³⁶ _x														R		
19 <i>Yeni Devir</i>	0,1	³⁷ _x	³⁸ _x	³⁹ _x														R		
20 <i>Haber</i>	0,2										⁴⁰ _x							I		
21 <i>Ekonomi Politika</i>	0,8				⁴¹ _x	⁴² _x												L		
22 <i>Yeni Ortam</i>	0,4				⁴³ _x													L		
23 <i>Vatan</i>	0,4				⁴⁴ _x	⁴⁵ _x												L		
24 <i>Akşam</i>	0,2						⁴⁶ _x											L		
25 <i>Aydınlık</i>	0,2				⁴⁷ _x													L		
26 <i>Gün</i>	0,8																			
27 <i>Dünya</i>	0,6																			
28 <i>Ekspres</i>	0,2																			
29 <i>Son Saat</i>	0,2																			
30 <i>Özgür</i>	0,2																			
31 <i>Hakimiyet</i>	0,2																			
32 <i>İstiklal</i>	0,1																			
33 <i>Zaman</i>	0,1																			
34 <i>G. A. Son Posta</i>	0,1																			
35 <i>Hürses</i>	0,1																			
36 <i>Ankara</i>	0,1																			
37 <i>Aktüel Gazete</i>	0,1																			

* Circulation share totals include papers with than 1 percent circulation share as well, shown in the lower part of the table.

Two more points deserve attention concerning the press environment of 1970s. The first point is that compared to 60s, there seems to be a polarization towards a small number of big papers and a great number of small papers. Only seven papers, indeed, have circulation shares above 1 percent, compared to 11 in the 60s, when the circulation share distribution was more egalitarian; and 31 papers have circulation shares of less than 1 percent. The total circulation share of small papers, for the first time, exceeds 10

percent. The second point is that more of the small circulation papers have known political positions. Of the 31 daily newspapers with circulation shares less than 1 percent, 18 have known political positions. In the 60s, we had political position information on only 3 of the 19 papers with less than 1 percent circulation share. If we were talking about a party system, it would be fair to characterize that system as both polarized and fractionalized.

4.12. Political Parallelism in 1980s, ANAP Governments (1983-1991)

Starting with 1980s, not only “left vs. right” stops being a practical way of classifying papers, it also becomes increasingly difficult to capture the political conflict with bi-polar schemes. Although I use the pro-ANAP vs. anti-ANAP dichotomy to describe the press environment of the period, it should be noted that it has its downsides, expressed in the great number of papers with “other” positions in Table 4.11. The category of "other" for the first time exceeds pro- anti- and mixed positions, at least in terms of the number of papers if not in circulation share.

Table 4.11 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1980s

Newspapers	% Circulation (1984-90)	Pro-ANAP				Anti-ANAP				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)*	
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L				
1 <i>Sabah</i>	6,3																	P	Pro-ANAP	1/10 (%10)	6,3
2 <i>Günaydın</i>	11,7																	PI	Mixed	6/10 (%60)	75,4
3 <i>Güneş</i>	6,2																	PI			
4 <i>Hürriyet</i>	26,5																	PI			
5 <i>Tercüman</i>	7,6																	PA			
6 <i>Milliyet</i>	11,5																	PA			
7 <i>Tan</i>	12,0																				
8 <i>Cumhuriyet</i>	4,6																	A	Anti-ANAP	1/10 (%10)	4,6
9 <i>Türkiye (Hakikat)</i>	5,7																	O	Other	0 (%0)	1,

Newspapers	% Circulation (1984-90)	Pro-ANAP				Anti-ANAP				Impartial				Other				Overall	Number of Titles	Circulation share (%)*
		A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L	A	C	O	L			
10 <i>Bulvar</i>	3,8															35	x	O		
11 <i>Milli Gazete</i>	0,64													36	x			O		
12 <i>Yeni Nesil</i>	0,31													37	x			O		
13 <i>Yeni Devir</i>	0,22													38	x	39	x	O		
14 <i>Son Havadis</i>	0,19													40	x			O		
15 <i>Ortadoğu</i>	0,15															41	x	O		
16 <i>Bizim Anadolu</i>	0,13															42	x	O		
17 <i>Dünya</i>	0,57																			
18 <i>Yeni İstanbul</i>	0,33																			
19 <i>Ayrıntılı Haber</i>	0,28																			
20 <i>Aktüel Gazete</i>	0,28																			
21 <i>Hürses</i>	0,19																			
22 <i>Özgür</i>	0,2																			
23 <i>Söz</i>	0,16																			
24 <i>Millet</i>	0,15																			
25 <i>Son Saat</i>	0,13																			
26 <i>İstiklal</i>	0,13																			
27 <i>Son Telgraf</i>	0,06																			
28 <i>Ekspres</i>	0,06																			
29 <i>Son Posta</i>	0,04																			

That being said, 1980s emerge as the period with the lowest level of political parallelism in the Turkish press throughout the Republican and even the pre-Republican eras: 6 out of 10 major papers, with a total circulation share of of 75,4 percent, have mixed political positions towards the ANAP governments, remaining impartial or combining praise with criticism. Only one major paper is associated with a pro-ANAP position, and similarly only one with an anti-ANAP position, and two papers are associated with positions that are not captured by the pro- and anti-ANAP dichotomy. All in all, 4 major newspapers, representing about 22 percent of the circulation share, can be said to have clear political positions paralleling the party system.

4.13. Political Parallelism in 1990s, Coalition Governments (1991-2002)

Being the most recent period, the nature of the information we have about the political parallelism characteristics of Turkish newspapers in 1990s is different from the earlier periods. It is not only that we have a smaller number of press histories covering the period, and plenty of academic articles, but also detailed content analyses of newspaper coverages on election eves are available. In addition, the period is a truly multi-party one, and it is close to impossible to capture the different political positions using dichotomous schemes. Hence, Table 4.12 is different from the previous tables in the following ways: 1- Proper party names are used instead of general political currents. 2- Evidence for the 1995, 1999, and 2002 elections are presented separately from other observations on political position. 3- When classifying papers, those that took sides in at least one of the elections were taken to constitute the parallel part of the press, and those that did not were taken to constitute the non-parallel part, and the level of parallelism calculated accordingly. Thus, this table is not directly comparable to the previous ones, but it is my best shot at a period-long and system-wide measure of parallelism.

Parallelism in this period is quite high, with 11 of the 15 major newspapers taking sides in at least one of the 1995, 1999, and 2002 elections, which, together with minor newspapers that did so, accounted for 86,1 % of the newspaper sales during the period. Only 4 of the major newspapers did not take sides in these three elections, accounting for a mere 9,4 % of the circulation share, and it is noticeable that all four of these papers are tabloid titles. Thus, 1990s emerge as one of the periods with the highest levels of political parallelism in the Turkish press, together with the turbulent years of WWI and the War of Independence.

Table 4.12 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1990s

Newspaper & Circulation share (1992-2002)	1995	1999	2002	Other	Overall	# of Titles	Circ. share (%)*
1 Sabah	Pro-DYP ¹ Anti-ANAP ²	Pro-ANAP ³ , DSP ⁴ Anti-DYP ⁵ , FP ⁶	Pro-ANAP ⁷ Anti-AKP ⁸ , DSP ⁹	X ¹⁰	+		
2 Hürriyet	Pro-ANAP ¹¹ , CHP ¹² Anti-DYP ¹³	Pro-ANAP ¹⁴ , DSP ¹⁵ Anti-DYP ¹⁶ , FP ¹⁷	Pro-ANAP ¹⁸ , CHP ¹⁹ Anti-DSP ²⁰ Mixed-AKP ²¹	X ²²	+		
3 Milliyet	Pro-ANAP ²³ Anti-DYP ²⁴	Pro-ANAP ²⁵ , DSP ²⁶ Anti-DYP ²⁷ , FP ²⁸	Pro-CHP ²⁹ Anti-DSP ³⁰ , AKP ³¹	X ³²	+		
4 Türkiye		Pro-DYP ³³ , MHP ³⁴	Pro-MHP ³⁵ , AKP ³⁶	X ³⁷	+	Parallel (Took sides in at least one election.)	11/15 (%73,3)
5 Zaman		Pro-FP ³⁸ , MHP ³⁹	Pro-AKP ⁴⁰	X ⁴¹	+		
6 Posta		Anti-FP ⁴²	Anti-AKP ⁴³	X ⁴⁴	+		
7 Star			Anti-AKP ⁴⁵ , CHP ⁴⁶ , ANAP ⁴⁷	X ⁴⁸	+		
8 Akşam			Anti-AKP ⁴⁹ , CHP ⁵⁰ , ANAP ⁵¹	X ⁵²	+		
9 Yeni Yüzyıl		Pro-ANAP ⁵³ , DSP ⁵⁴ Anti-DYP ⁵⁵ , FP ⁵⁶		X ⁵⁷	+		
10 Cumhuriyet		Pro-ANAP ⁵⁸ , DSP ⁵⁹ Anti-DYP ⁶⁰ , FP ⁶¹	Pro-CHP ⁶² Anti-AKP ⁶³ , ANAP ⁶⁴	X ⁶⁵	+		
11 Vakit		Pro-FP ⁶⁶ , MHP ⁶⁷		X ⁶⁸	+		
12 Takvim				X ⁶⁹	-		
13 Gözcü					-		
14 Bugün				X ⁷⁰	-		
15 T. Ve D. Güneş					-		
16 Yeni Asır		Anti-FP ⁷¹			+		
17 Millî Gazete		Pro-FP ⁷²		X ⁷³	+		
						4/15 (%26,7)	9,4

Newspaper & Circulation share (1992-2002)	1995	1999	2002	Other	Overall	# of Titles	Circ. share (%)*
18 Radikal		Anti-FP ⁷⁴	Mixed-AKP ⁷⁵	X ⁷⁶			0,6
19 Yeni Şafak		Pro-FP ⁷⁷	Pro-AKP ⁷⁸ Anti-ANAP ⁷⁹ , CHP ⁸⁰	X ⁸¹			0,3
20 Son Havadis		Anti-FP ⁸²		X83			0,0
21 Ateş				X84			0,9
22 Dünya							0,8
23 Meydan							0,6
24 Yeni Günaydın				X85			0,5
25 Ortadoğu				X86			0,3
26 Yeni Asya				X87			0,3
27 Tercüman							0,2
28 Süper Tan				X88			0,1
29 Hürses				X89			0,1
30 Yeni İstanbul							0,1
31 Özgür							0,1
32 Yeni Nesil							0,1
33 Ayrıntılı Haber							0,1
34 Yeni Devir							0,1
35 Bizim Anadolu							0,0
36 Yarın							0,0
37 İstiklal							0,0
38 Son Saat							0,0
39 Son Telgraf							0,0
40 Aktüel Gazete							0,0

4. 14. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed political parallelism in the Turkish press from a historical perspective. The main contribution of the chapter to the literature stems from the collection and re-classification of information already contained in the secondary literature, not from original research into archives that would introduce new information. Also, circulation shares of the daily newspapers from 1960s to the present, taken from the archives of *Basın İlan Kurumu* (BİK, Press Advertising Institute), were presented, for the first time to the best of my knowledge, to identify major papers in each period. For the periods for which reliable circulation information is not available, number of author mentions were used as the criterion of being a major paper. To limit the universe of sources to be coded, attention was restricted to book-length treatments on the history of the Turkish press, with articles and works that cover specific periods being left out.

Four types of information on individual newspapers were collected (author evaluations, content, organization, and legal action), and papers in each period were classified into parallel (anti- or pro-government or a specific party) and non-parallel categories, based upon an overall evaluation of the evidence collected. This classification also served as our measure of overall level of parallelism in the system for the period under study.

The first period, from the publication of the first Turkish newspaper, *Takvim-i Vakayi* in 1831 to the adoption of the First Constitution, was examined in more detail for this is where the roots of Turkish journalism lie. It was found that papers published in this period belonged more to the world of politics, with heavy state involvement, but that commercial motives were also present. After a start with moderate levels, political parallelism declined even further during the era of Abdülhamid II, but increased significantly with the Second Constitutional Period, and remained so throughout the WWI, War of Independence, and the Early Republican Period. After moderate levels of parallelism from 1930s to 80s, ANAP governments of the 80s saw the lowest level of parallelism, and the 90s saw one of the highest levels.

An analysis of these overall trends and an evaluation of the explanations offered in the literature are provided in Chapter 6, in comparison with the British case. Before that, however, Chapter 5 examines history of political parallelism in the British press.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE BRITISH PRESS 1945 - 2005

Hacker: Don't tell me about the press, I know exactly who reads the papers: the Daily Mirror is read by people who think they run the country; the Guardian is read by people who think they ought to run the country; the Times is read by people who actually do run the country; the Daily Mail is read by the wives of the people who run the country; the Financial Times is read by people who own the country [...]
Sir Humphrey: Prime Minister, what about the people who read The Sun?
Bernard: Sun readers don't care who runs the country [...]
From "A Conflict of Interest", a 1987 episode of the BBC drama *Yes, Prime Minister*

Unlike in the Turkish case, political parallelism in British press is heavily studied.⁶⁵ A survey of the general histories of British press, with the aim of extracting and presenting the information on political positions of the newspapers would thus add less to the literature than the survey for the Turkish press history does. Origins of the British newspapers also go back further in time, making it more difficult to do justice to all the periods covered, if all periods were to be included. Hence, given limitations of time and resources, and the small returns expected, the survey of the political positions of British newspapers will be limited to post-war Britain. In this chapter, I present a review of the literature on the history of political parallelism in the British press since 1945. First, however, two sections on the periodization of post-war British political history and on the segmented nature of the British national press are in order, to provide some context.

⁶⁵ A two volume study dedicated to the subject is Stephen E. Koss's (1981, 1984) *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain*.

5.1. Periodization

1945 is not an arbitrary cut-point in time. It represents an important turning point for the British society: Post-war Britain was in many respects different from the pre-war Britain, not least because of the ‘consensus’ on social welfare policies pursued, which affected many areas of life from education to work conditions to the health system.

Besides the policies followed, 1945 was also a significant cut-point for the structure of the political system: The current two-party system with strong single party governments has its roots in the immediate post-war years. Until the most recent 2010 elections, as Hazell et. al. observed, “every election in the postwar era bar one has returned a majority for either Labour or the Conservatives (8 times each), with the size of the majority ranging from 3 to 179”(p.10). It was “only after the Second World War” that “single party majority government bec[a]me the norm” (p. 18). Indeed, from 1900 to 1945, there were more coalition or minority governments than single-party majority governments, and they ruled the country for longer periods (Hazell et. al, p. 18).

1945 can be treated as a natural cut-point for the press system as well, though to a lesser degree than is the case for the political system, for it represents the strengthening of certain trends which started earlier: World War I marked the beginning of the dominance of the national press over the provincial⁶⁶, but the greatest decline in the number of provincial papers was recorded in the post-war period.⁶⁷ “The quality-popular distinction was sharply drawn by 1945” (p. 32), but the “polarisation between the quality and popular press with the disappearance of the middle-market, middlebrow newspapers” (Williams, 1998, p.213) was a thing of the post-war years.⁶⁸ Seymour-Ure summarizes the trends in

⁶⁶ Seymour-Ure observes that “Before the First World War, a London-based metropolitan press had coexisted with a vigorous provincial press, whose luminaries (Yorkshire Post, Manchester Guardian, Scotsman and so on) were not completely overshadowed by the London papers in either circulation or editorial authority.” (p. 21)

⁶⁷ “They fell one by one, like apples off a tree, but with the largest loss between 1955 and 1964.” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 43).

⁶⁸ Kevin Williams (1998) summarizes the trends after war as “the slow decline of the British newspaper industry”. The specific trends he mentions are as follows: ” the national daily newspapers have strengthened their hold over the industry at the expense of the Sunday, provincial daily and local weekly press. Within the national press there has been a polarisation between the popular and the quality press with the disappearance of the middle-market, middlebrow newspapers. The rise of the tabloid newspaper [...] the development of a new kind of newspaper - the free sheet [...] an

the British press in the 1945-1990 period as “concentration, conglomeration and internationalization [...] These features were not new. [...] Far more than before, however, and far more substantially [...] they stand out as dominant features.”

In histories of British politics, just as in press histories, different periodizations are made regarding the post-war Britain. Some treat the whole 45-79 period as the period of consensus,⁶⁹ others start the consensus era with different cut points, some at 51 (Pearce and Stewart, 1996), some at 64 (Lynch, 2001). Although the cut points of different historical periods are not supposed to be a point of contention and are set partially with practical considerations in mind, the researcher at least has the responsibility to define these limits and defend them with reference to the purposes of the study. In this regard, the following is in order.

1945, 1979 and 1997 are somewhat natural cut points for a political periodization, for they represent, respectively, the starting point of a succession of Conservative and Labour governments. The argument is mostly over the period from 1945 to 1979, and more specifically, on where the Consensus Era starts and ends.

Consensus may have two meanings: Consensus on the policies followed, and consensus on the policies promised to be followed. If the first meaning is taken, it is true that every post-war government until 1979 had a significant social welfare component in their policies. From the point of the view of the structure of the party system and the nature of the competition between the parties, however, it is the second meaning of consensus that matters: consensus on the policies promised to be followed. On that account, it is the wiser choice to start the consensus era with the 1955: In the 1945, 1950, and 1951 elections, the gap between the Conservative and Labour election manifestos was considerably large, as measured by the left-right positions of the parties assigned by the CMP (Klingemann at. al., 2006). Although the Conservative Party started to move towards the left from 1950 onwards, the gap can only be said to be closed in the 1955 elections.

The period 1945 to 1955, then, was one of contention not consensus, at least so far as election manifestos were concerned. From 1955 to 1979, the distance between the

increasingly competitive environment as newspapers fought for a decreasing number of readers [...] a further concentration of ownership in the national and regional press.” (p. 213)

⁶⁹ See Krieger (2010). For two studies that similarly start the consensus era with 1945 but end it at 1970 and at mid-70s, respectively, see Studlar (2007) and Hauss (2009).

Labour and Conservative Party manifestos remained at relatively low levels, with the Conservatives moving significantly to the left of their earlier position in 1950s, and the Labour moving somewhat to the center in 1960s. Starting with the October 1974 elections, but more dramatically with the 1979 elections, the distance between the left-right scores of the two main parties increased again, with both parties reverting back to their earlier positions. This was the case until the 1997 elections. In 1997, it was the Labour this time that moved significantly to the opposite direction of its earlier position, just like the Conservatives did in 1955, even crossing the 0 line that separates left from right positions for the first time in its history. The distance between the two parties remained low in the 2001 and 2005 elections too. As of the time of this writing, manifesto data were not yet available for the 2010 elections.


5.2. Segmented Nature of the British National Press

The national press system in the UK is quite sharply divided into the three segments of quality, midmarket, and popular papers. The three segments differ, most significantly, in the class backgrounds of their readers, and consequently, in the make-up of their revenues, which also has implications for the marketing strategies they employ. Table 5.1 lists the breakdown of the readership of the three segments of papers into binary class, gender, and age categories, taken from National Readership Survey data. As we can see in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, it is class that differentiates the most between the readers of the three segments, although there are gender and age differences too.

Table 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Quality, Mid-Market, and Popular Papers

	Class		Age		Gender	
	abc1	c2de	15-44	45+	Men	Women
Quality	19,5	2,9	9,0	13,4	12,8	9,6
Mid-market	15,7	9,1	6,3	18,5	12,3	12,5
Popular	19,3	33,5	27,5	25,3	29,7	23,1
<u>sum</u>	<u>54,6</u>	<u>45,4</u>	<u>42,8</u>	<u>57,2</u>	<u>54,7</u>	<u>45,3</u>

Figure 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Segments by Class, Age, and Gender



Note: Figures and data based upon National Readership Survey, April 9-March 10, 2010, available at <http://www.nrs.co.uk>.

Quality: *The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, Financial Times*; Mid-Market: *Daily Mail, Daily Express*; Popular: *The Sun, Daily Mirror/Record, Daily Star*

The different class make-up of the readership of the three segments is also reflected in the structure of their revenues and their marketing strategies. Around 20 per cent of the revenues of the popular papers come from advertising, as opposed to around 60 percent in the case of the quality papers (Sparks, 1999, p. 51). This is because, as Colin Sparks (1999) puts it,

Paid-for newspapers, like most advertising-supported media commodities, exist in what is called a ‘dual product market’. There is one market in which the newspaper sells itself to the consumers. From this, it raises circulation revenue. There is, however, a second market in which the newspaper sells its readership to advertisers wishing to gain the attention of large numbers of particular kinds of people. From this it raises advertising revenue. (p. 51)

The popular press are under market pressure to try to reach the widest possible audiences, and thus must prioritize the kinds of material that will sell vast quantities. Quality newspapers are much less interested in maximizing circulation, and are concerned to prioritize the kinds of material that will sell to particular kinds of people. Indeed, for them, maximizing circulation can be counter-productive. (p. 53)

The different strategies are also reflected in the cover prices and advertising rates of the newspapers. Table 5.2, reproduced from Sparks (1999), shows the cover prices and the cost of advertising for reaching 1000 readers of the ten national dailies, as of 1997.

Table 5.2. Cover Prices and Cost of Advertising in National Dailies

Newspaper	Cover price	Cost of advertising
<i>Sun</i>	0,25	3,40
<i>Star</i>	0,28	4,52
<i>Mirror</i>	0,30	4,30
<i>Mail</i>	0,35	5,08
<i>Express</i>	0,35	7,24
<i>The Times</i>	0,35	9,98
<i>Telegraph</i>	0,40	15,15
<i>Independent</i>	0,40	16,15
<i>Guardian</i>	0,45	12,17
<i>FT</i>	0,70	46,86

Note: Reproduced from Sparks (1999, p. 52). Both figures are in pound sterling. Cost of advertising is per 1000 readers, for black and white pages.

The quality papers can charge higher advertising rates for their small but wealthier audiences and earn most of their income from advertising revenues, whereas the popular papers, read mostly by the manual workers, charge lower advertising rates, and earn most of their income from circulation revenues. Thus, circulation is a bigger concern for the popular papers, whereas retaining the upper class make-up of their readership is a bigger concern for the quality papers, even at the expense of having lower circulations. This also has implications for the different trends observed in political parallelism characteristics of the three segments.

5.3. Endorsement Parallelism

In this section, I first review the arguments and the controversies about post-war trends in content parallelism in the British press, and then present the endorsement data for the parliamentary elections from 1945 to 2005, compiled from secondary sources, under four headings: 1- Immediate post-war (1945-1955) 2- Consensus era (1955-1979) 3- Conservative governments (1979-1997) 4- Labour governments (1997-2010). A measure of content parallelism is developed based upon the endorsement data, and an effort is made to settle some of the controversies in the literature with regards to the post-war trends in content parallelism.

5.1.1. Post-War Trends: The Literature

Table 5.3 lists the views on post-war trends in content parallelism in the British press. Two points of controversy arise in these views. The first is whether there is a uniform post-war trend (from more to less parallelism), or a number of ups and downs. The second is whether the immediate post-war period is part of the consensus era or a distinct period deserving separate treatment.

The major sides to the first controversy are Stephen Koss with his two volume study on political parallelism in the British press (1981, 1984), and James Curran and Jean Seaton with their influential book *Power Without Responsibility* (1997), which includes a chapter on British press history. Koss (1982) argues that “By 1947, the party attachments of papers [...] were effectively abandoned. [...] newspapers grew steadily more catholic and less partisan in their ordinary news coverage. (p. 4, cited in Curran & Seaton, 1997, p. 71). Curran and Seaton (1997) confront this argument head on, which they see being “echoed by many other accounts of the post-war press” (p.71), and draw a more complicated picture with ups and downs, not a single trend. They argue that the power of the interventionist press barons, which is a factor making newspapers more partisan, continued in the immediate post-war years, waned in the 60s and early 70s, and then “re-asserted” from mid 70s onwards. Together with the general political environment of the country, the degree of proprietor control, according to Curran and Seaton, explains the degree of partisanship of newspapers as well. In 1960s and 70s, “The devolution of authority within newspaper organizations, at a time of broad political consensus, encouraged a more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary.” Increased partisanship from 1974 onwards, on the other hand, coincided with “the re-assertion of hierarchical control” in 1970s (p. 77).

Anthony Weymouth (1996) “echoes” Koss by describing a single trend when he argues for “progressive depoliticisation of the national press since 1945” (p. 42); and Seymour-Ure (1991, 1995), Tunstall (1995), and Deacon et al. (2001) draw complicated pictures with ups and downs, like Curran and Seaton (1997) do.

Table 5.3 - Views on Trends in Political Parallelism

	Immediate post-war (roughly 45-55)	Consensus era (roughly 55-74)	Increasing polarization (roughly 74-95)	mid-90s onwards
Tunstall (1995)	high (1945-55, p. 240)	low (1955-76, p. 240)	high (76 onwards, p. 240)	
Curran&Seaton (1997)	high ("immediate post-war", p. 72)	low ("60s and early 70s", p. 72-3)	high ("74 onwards", p. 73)	-
Deacon, Golding & Billig (2001)	low ("the first decades after the war", cited in Brandenburg, 2006, p. 159)		high ("70s and 80s", cited in Brandenburg, 2006, p. 159)	low ("since early 1990s", cited in Brandenburg, 2006, p. 159)
Seymour-Ure (1991, 1995, 1998)	low ("for 30 years after the war", 1991, p. 199)		high ("the Thatcher era", 1991, p. 201)	low ("since the mid 1990s", 1998, p. 43, cited in Brandenburg, 2006, p. 159)
Koss (1984)	low ("by 1947", 1984, p. 4, cited in Curran&Seaton, 1997, p. 71)		-	-
Weymouth (1996)	low ("since 1945", p. 42)			-

The second point of controversy, or more accurately point of difference, is among the latter group who see multiple trends in the post-war period: whether the immediate post-war years are part of the consensus era, or a distinct period deserving separate treatment. Tunstall (1995) and Curran and Seaton (1997) prefer to treat the immediate post war years as a distinct period, Seymour-Ure (1991, 1995) and Deacon et al. (2001) treat them together with the following period. Seymour-Ure (1991) argues that “For 30 years after the war the trend was away from full-blooded party bias” (p. 198). Similarly, Deacon et al. (2001) see the period until 70s as one of decreasing political parallelism in the press. On the other side of this controversy, Tunstall (1995) argues that the immediate post-war period, from 1945 to 55, needs to be treated separately from “the two decades from the arrival of Macmillan in 1957 to the departure of Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in 1976” during which press partisanship was comparatively lower than immediate post-war years. Similarly, to Curran and Seaton (1997), the immediate post-war period is different from 60s and early 70s, in that the latter was characterized by “a more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary” (p. 77).


5.1.2. Post-War Trends: Endorsement Data

The overall trends in the level of parallelism, based upon the endorsement data for the post-war period, do allow us to take sides in the controversies mentioned above. Table 5.4 lists political parallelism measures for each period (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 on how these measures were calculated), based upon the endorsement data given in Table 5.5.

Table 5.4. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK

	Period I	Period II	Period III	Period IV
Quality	0,78	0,44	0,65	0,55
Mid Market	1,00	0,93	0,92	0,75
Popular	1,00	0,93	0,83	0,83
All titles	0,93	0,77	0,80	0,71

Figure 5.2. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK



Two points deserve mention when we examine Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2. The first is that although there does seem to be a trend from more to less parallelism when we compare the overall figures for the first period (0.93) with the most recent final period (0.71), the trend is not a uniform one; there are ups and downs. The second point is that the ups and downs in the overall figures result mostly from the behavior of the quality papers, not the mid-market or popular papers which conform to the picture of a uniform declining trend. It seems to be the case that the quality papers, which follow politics more closely, are more likely to take tactical positions in line with the changes in the political

environment; whereas mid-market and popular papers, as a whole, follow a different logic: they grew increasingly less partisan over time. As to the first controversy in the literature, then, there seems to be evidence to support both sides, with the proviso that they apply to different segments of the newspaper market: Higher levels of parallelism and uniform declining trend in the mid-market and popular segments, lower levels of parallelism and ups and downs in the quality segment.

As to the second controversy, the evidence is more conclusive: the data support the authors that treat the immediate post-war separately from the following consensus period, especially with regard to the quality papers. There is a dramatic decline from 0.78 to 0.44 from Period I (immediate post war years, 1945-55) to Period II (consensus era, 1955-1974) in the political parallelism of the quality papers. Mid-market and popular papers also display less parallelism in the second period compared to the first, although the differences are not quite as dramatic (from 1.00 to 0.93).

Chapter 6 will provide an assessment of the modernization, commercialization and party system characteristics explanations based upon these trends and trends observed in the Turkish case.

Table 5.5. Newspaper Endorsements in the UK General Elections 1945-2010

	1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	1974	1974_2
Quality	Daily Telegraph	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con
	The Times	None	Con	Con	Con	Con/Lib	More Lib	Con/Lib	Con/Lib	Con/Lib
	(Manchester) Guardian	Lib	Lib	Lib/Con	Lib/Con	Lab	Lab/Lib	Lab/Lib	Con/Lab/Lib balance	More Lib influence
	Financial Times	-	-	-	-	Qualified Con	Uncommitted	Uncommitted	Con	Con/Lib
	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mid-market	Daily Express	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con
	Daily Mail	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con/Lib coalition
	Daily Herald/Sun	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	-	-	-
	News Chronicle	Lib	Lib	Lib	Lib	-	-	-	-	-
	Today	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Popular	Daily Mirror	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab
	Daily Sketch/Graphic	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	-	-
	Sun	-	-	-	-	-	-	Lab	Con	Coalition
	Daily Star	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(Continued)

	1979	1983	1987	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010
1	Daily Telegraph	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con
2	The Times	-	Con	Con	Euro Sceptic	Lab	Lab, more cons	Con
3	(Manchester) Guardian	Lab/Lib	Not Con landslide	Lab more Lib Dems	Lab/Lib	Lab/Lib	Lab, more lib dems	Lib
4	Financial Times	Con	Con	Not Con majority	Lab	Lab	Lab	Con
5	Independent	-	Uncommitted	Uncommitted	Lab/Lib	Uncommitted	More lib dems	Lab/Lib
6	Daily Express	Con	Con	Con	Con	Lab	Con	Con
7	Daily Mail	Con	Con	Con	Con	No Labour landslide	No Lab victory	Con
8	Daily Herald/Sun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	News Chronicle	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	Today	-	Coalition	Con	-	-	-	-
11	Daily Mirror	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab
12	Daily Sketch/Graphic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	Sun	Con	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	Lab	Con
14	Daily Star	Uncommitted	Con	Uncommitted	Lab	Lab	Uncommitted	Uncommitted

Note: Based upon Seymour-Ure (2001) and Butler & Butler (2000, cited in Stoddard, 2010) for 1945-1997; Boothroyd (n.d.) for 1964-9; Deacon & Wring (2001) for 2001; Brandenburg (2006), Scammell & Harrop (2005), and BBC (2009) for 2005; Stoddard (2010) for 2001-2010, Greenslade (2010) for 2010. Whenever there was a conflict between endorsement data from different sources, the one that assigned a more complex position was selected ('Lab, more lib dems' over 'Lab'). Grey cells represent positions that are more complex than simply endorsing a single political party.

CHAPTER 6

HISTORICAL TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS

Chapters 4 and 5 examined history of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the UK. Although they used different time periods, it is possible to make a parallel reading of the historical trends in these two cases and their relationship with the explanations offered in the literature. In what follows, levels of parallelism and trends over time in the Turkish and British cases will be examined,⁷⁰ and the explanations offered in the literature, namely the modernization, commercialization, and party system explanations, will be evaluated to see how well they fit these two cases. First, however, a brief account of the major differences and similarities between press systems in Turkey and in the UK is in order, to provide some context for the the parallel reading.

Differences between Turkish and British press systems are numerous:

- First English newspapers emerged in 1600s, one of the earliest in the world, whereas the first Turkish newspaper was published in 1830s.

- Newspaper readership has been historically very high in Britain, and is still so, whereas comparatively, it is very low in Turkey.

- The national press system in the UK has been very stable and closed: Most newspapers in the list of UK national dailies boast histories dating back to the 19th century, and consequently I use practically the same list for all periods under study in the British case, with minor changes. The most recent entry to the UK national newspaper market is *Independent*, launched in 1986. In Turkey, the oldest newspaper still in publication is *Cumhuriyet*, launched in 1920s. Next comes *Hürriyet*, launched in 1948,

⁷⁰ Direct comparison of levels of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, however, is postponed to Chapter 7, because data presented in Chapters 4 and 5, being of different types, do not allow direct comparison of levels of parallelism. What they do allow is the comparison of trends in political parallelism, and this is what the present Chapter does.

and *Milliyet*, launched in 1950. Most of the other papers still in publication date back to 80s or 90s, with the most recent entry into the Turkish national newspaper market being *Habertürk*, launched in 2009. Consequently, devising lists of Turkish national dailies published in different periods is a major task in itself, with many titles appearing and disappearing each period.

Major similarities between Turkish and British press systems are the following:

- In both cases, a vibrant national press dominates the press scene, with weak development of local papers, in contrast to systems where local press is more dominant (the US), or where both local and national press is strong (France).

- In both cases, large-circulation tabloid newspapers exist alongside the quality papers.

With these initial considerations in mind, the following is a parallel reading of the trends in the two cases in more detail, with a focus on political parallelism characteristics.


6.1. Overall Level of Parallelism and Trends

Looking at Figure 6.1, we observe that political parallelism in the Turkish press fell below the 50 percent line only once, during the 80s, and in all other periods, it was higher than 50 percent, with an overall average of 68.9 percent for all the periods (see Table 2). This places Turkey together with countries that have moderate to high levels of political parallelism, between the Mediterranean and North European countries in Hallin and Mancini's classification. It could be misleading, however, to make an evaluation based upon overall figures, for there is significant variance over time in the level of parallelism.

Parallelism starts at quite moderate levels in the pre-1876 and the First Constitutional periods, around 50 to 60 percent of the major papers in these periods having clear political positions; then there is a big jump with the Second Constitutional Period to 80-90 percent levels of parallelism, which continues until the end of the One-Party Era, a significant decline starting with the transition to democracy in late 1940s up to the 1990s; and another big jump in 1990s from around 30 to 80 percent. This picture contradicts the declining trend observed in many other places, or any continuous historical trend at all. What we have in this picture, rather, is a number of ruptures and changes in

both directions that need to be explained with reference to the specific characteristics of the concerned periods, not with reference to a meta-historical narrative.

Figure 6.1 - Levels of Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press



Political parallelism in the UK followed a different trend (see Figure 5.2). Overall, there was a significant decrease, from 93 percent in the immediate post-war period (1945-1955) to 71 percent in the most recent period (1997-2010), with that percent of national titles endorsing single parties on election eves. The individual segments, however, behaved differently: There was an overall decrease in parallelism of the mid-market and popular papers, and ups and downs in the quality segment that are not captured by any single trend. The overall picture, then, was one of a significant decline, accounted for by declines in the mid-market and popular papers.

From a normative point of view, the picture is not perfect in Turkey, but not very dark either. Except for the turbulent period of 1908-1946 and the 1990s, the level of political parallelism is at moderate levels, varying within 20 percentage points of the 50 percent level. Deviations from the desired norm, on the other hand, mostly took the form of higher, not lower parallelism, except for the 1980s when there was a less than desired level of parallelism. In sum, the Turkish press historically had a mild problem of over-parallelism, advocate outlets being more strongly represented in newsstands than common carries were, but the situation got worse during the final years of the Empire and the early years of the Republic, and more worryingly, in the recent period of 1990s.

In the UK, content parallelism was very high, with most papers endorsing single parties on election eves, but this is not necessarily bad from a normative point of view, because endorsements are in essence opinion pieces written by the editorial managements of newspapers. Although an endorsement-based measure of content parallelism is useful for observing trends in parallelism, we would need to consider the news contents of the papers as well to make a meaningful normative evaluation, which I do in the following chapter for the most recent period.

6.2. Evaluating Explanations

In this section, sociological (modernization), economic (commercialization), and political (party system characteristics) explanations offered in the literature to account for variation in levels of political parallelism, detailed in Chapter 2, will be examined to see how well they fit the Turkish and British cases. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present some variables associated with these explanations in summary form, separately for the Turkish and British cases.

6.2.1. Modernization

Explanations relating political parallelism to modernization, positing a continuous process of the society getting more and more specialized and the functions of communication and politics growing more and more separate as a result, meaning a decrease in political parallelism over time, do not apply to the Turkish case. This is not only because the downward trend from 1950s onwards ends abruptly in 1990s, but also because the beginnings of Turkish journalism in 1830s starts with quite moderate levels of political parallelism. The high levels of political parallelism observed between 1908 and 1946, then, needs to be explained, not with reference to these periods being less modernized and the following periods more modernized, but with reference to something else. The reason probably lies with the fact this time span was a very turbulent period that contained the Balkan Wars, World War I, War of Independence, constitutional monarchy replacing Abdulhamid II's rule, then turning into some sort of a military rule in the hands

of CUP strongmen, followed by anarchy during the War of Independence, and the foundation of the Republic with a radical reform program that had to overcome much resistance. Because the stakes were very high during these years of intense conflict, newspapers and journalists probably stopped being cool observers of the events, and turned into being active participants in them, taking strong political positions and aligning with political parties, and –when parties were not present- with other political forces. This line of an explanation would fit the historical reality of the Turkish case better.

In the British case, we have fewer periods under study to fully evaluate the modernization explanation, but the data we do have for the post-war period show that there indeed was a decline in endorsement parallelism, from 93 percent in the period between immediate post-war years (1945-1955) to 77 percent in the consensus years (1955-1979), and after a slight increase during the Thatcher era (1979-1997), to 71 percent in the most recent period (1997-2010).

6.2.2. Commercialization

We have imperfect evidence to evaluate how well the game theory approach to explaining parallelism applies to Turkey and the UK, which argues that when the press is commercialized there is less parallelism because individual outlets cannot afford to lose big segments of their readers and choose balanced reporting instead of aligning with political forces which is sure to alienate some readers. Although there are some theoretical arguments advanced in the literature against this explanation (see Chapter 2), what we are concerned with here is how well it fits the empirical data for the Turkish and British cases.


Table 6.1 Political Parallelism and some Explanatory Variables in Turkey

Periods	Political Parallelism	Modernization	Economy*	# of parties	Ideological Polarization**	Government Type	Strength of Cleavage Voting***
Prior to 1876	63,2	Less					
First Const. & Abdulhamid II	50,0						
Second Const. Period	88,9						
War of Independence	87,5						
Early Republican Period	93,3		Market	One party			
One-Party Era	84,6		State	One party			
Transition to Democracy	62,5		State	Two-party	Moderate	Single party	
Democrat Party Era	66,7		Market, State	Two-party	Moderate	Single party	
60s Beginnings of Class Politics	68,1		State	Multi-party	Polarized	Coalition, Single Party	Strong
70s Left-Right Polarization	51,8		State	Multi-party	Polarized	Coalition	Weak
80s ANAP Governments	31,0		Market	Multi-party	Moderate	Single party	
90s Era of the Coalitions	79,7	More	Market	Multi-party	Polarized	Coalition	Strong
	<u>68,9</u> average						

* Based upon Öniş and Şenses (2007) for the post-50 period, and Eroğlu (2003) for the earlier periods.

** Based upon Sayarı (2002) and Çarkoğlu (1998). ***Based upon Figures 3 and 4 in Hazama (2003).

Table 6.2 Political Parallelism and some Explanatory Variables in the UK

Periods	Endorsement Parallelism	Modernization	Economy	Two-party- partyness*	Ideological polarization**	Gov't type*	Cleavage Voting***
I (45-55)	0,93	Less	State Dominated	92,4%	35,7	Only single party majority governments	
II (55-79)	0,77		State dominated	85,0%	23,1	Mostly single party majority governments, but coalition and minority governments as well	0,13
III (79-97)	0,80		Market dominated	75,0%	58,3	Mostly single party majority governments, but a minority government as well	0,13
IV (97-2010)	0,71	More	Market dominated	69,8%	15,3	Only single party majority governments	0,11

* Based upon Hazell et al. (2009).

** Based upon Klingemann et. al. (2006).

*** Author's calculation based upon BES data.

The difficulty of evaluating commercialization explanation partly arises because commercialization of the press is not easy to measure. We can use circulation numbers (higher circulations, higher commercialization), cover prices of newspapers (lower prices, higher commercialization), or advertising spending on newspapers as a percentage of GDP (higher spending, higher commercialization) as proxy measures of commercialization, and they would probably be of use in cross-sectional comparisons. For over-time comparisons, however, there is confounding factor of the introduction of TV, which caused declines in standardized circulation numbers and advertising shares of newspapers. For example, total sales figures are increasing in absolute numbers but decreasing as a percentage of the population in both cases, but it is impossible to separate the effect of the introduction of television from these figures. In other words, the newspapers may have become more, not less, commercialized despite the declining levels of newspaper readership.

What we do have, however, is information about the general character of and dominant players in the economies of the two countries in the different historical periods. If the newspapers' finances can be argued to have been affected by the general character of the economy and the economic policies pursued by the governments, then we have an indicator, however imperfect, of the level of commercialization in the press: The level of state involvement. The press is commercialized to the degree market forces shape the economy, and less commercialized when state is the dominant actor shaping the economy.

When we look at the parallelism data in this light (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), we see that on average, parallelism was higher in Turkey in periods when market forces were more dominant, which seems to contradict the game theory explanation put forward. Although parallelism took the biggest dive (from 51.8 to 31.0, going below the 50 percent line for the first time) in the 1980s, which corresponds with the biggest jump from state- to market-led economy following the so called 24th of January decisions, it increased to 80 percent in 1990s, a period still characterized by market forces, not by state intervention.⁷¹ The British case, on the other hand, fits the commercialization explanation: Although there was a slight increase from 0,77 in Period II (55-79) to 0,80 in

⁷¹ There is also a context-specific explanation for the dive in 1980s: In many accounts, the 1980s are seen as a period of de-politicization in the society as a whole, following the highly politicized environment of 1960s and 1970s and also as a result of a conscious effort on the part of the military regime.

Period III (79-97), a period of privatization and less state intervention in the economy, average parallelism was lower (around 0,75) in market-dominated than in state-dominated (around 0,85) periods. Thus, the game theory explanation positing a decline in parallelism with commercialization is supported by data from the UK, but it is not supported by data from Turkey. In any case, it must be kept in mind that the measure of commercialization I used was a rather rudimentary one.

6.2.3. Party-System Characteristics

Four party system characteristics will be evaluated to see how well the hypotheses that use them fit the Turkish and British cases. The hypotheses are those offered by Seymour-Ure (1974), and Hallin and Mancini (2004), relating the number of parties, the level of ideological polarization, the type of government (single-party vs. coalition/minority), and the strength of cleavage voting to political parallelism. (See Chapter 2 for details on these hypotheses.)

6.2.3.1. Number of parties

Seymour-Ure expects one-party systems to have the highest level of parallelism, followed by multi-party systems, and the two party systems to have the lowest level of parallelism. When we look at Table 6.1, we see that this expectation does not fit the Turkish case well. The average levels of parallelism for the one-party, multi-party, and two-party periods are 89.0, 57.7, and 64.6, respectively. It is true that the one-party periods have the highest level of parallelism, but the ordering between multi-party and two-party systems is reversed: In the Turkish case, multi-party periods, on average, display a lower level of parallelism than the two-party periods.⁷²

In the British case, all four periods are basically two-party periods, however, the two-partiness of the system, defined as the total vote share of the largest two parties,

⁷² Although it can be argued that the exceptionally low level of parallelism in the 1980s, which can be considered to be an outlier, plays an important role in the average being lower, the results do not change much when we recalculate the average ignoring the 1980s: The new average for the multi-party periods then becomes 66,5, which is not significantly higher than the figure for the two-party periods.

declines over time, from 94 percent in the immediate post-war period, to 70 percent in the most recent period (See Table 6.2). The highest level of content parallelism was observed in the period when two-partyness of the system was also at its highest, and the lowest level of parallelism was observed when the two partyness of the system was also at its lowest, just the opposite of what is expected: Seymour-Ure's (1974) expectation was that two-party systems would have the lowest level of political parallelism. Considering the Turkish and British cases together, we can say that the number of parties does not have the hypothesized relationship with parallelism in either of the cases.

6.2.3.2. Ideological polarization

The expectation that ideological polarization would be associated with higher levels of political parallelism is shared by Seymour-Ure (1974) and Hallin and Mancini (2004). Looking at Table 6.1, we observe that this indeed is the case in Turkey, with the polarized periods of 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s having a higher level of parallelism on average (66.5) than the moderate periods of transition to democracy, 1950s, and the 1980s (53.4).⁷³

In the British case, we have a more quantitative measure of polarization, based upon the coding of relative emphases placed upon left and right issue areas in party election manifestos. Although the most ideologically polarized period, 1979-1997, is not the period with the highest level of political parallelism, the least ideologically polarized period, 1997-2010, is the period with the lowest level of political parallelism. What is more, the direction of change in all periods is the same in both the level of polarization and the level of political parallelism: the decreases in ideological polarization from Period I to II and from Period III to IV are reflected in the level of political parallelism as well. Similarly, the increase in polarization from Period II to III is reflected in the level of political parallelism as well. Considering the Turkish and the British cases together, we can say that ideological polarization does have the hypothesized relationship with the level of political parallelism in press.

⁷³ If we were to include the war years (Second Constitutional Period and War of Independence) as polarized periods, the difference would be even larger but I have avoided the urge because the hypotheses are couched in party-political terms.

6.2.3.3. Government Type

There is no specific hypothesis linking government type to the level of parallelism, but Hallin and Mancini associate majoritarian systems with low levels of parallelism and consensus systems with high levels of parallelism, following the classification made by Arend Lijphart. Although consensus and majoritarian systems are differentiated over a number of variables, like the number of parties, the electoral system, the structure of interest groups, etc., one of the most important variables is the type of government. Majoritarian systems mostly have single party governments with large majorities in the parliament, and consensus systems usually have coalition governments with no single party having a large enough majority to form a government by itself.

Looking at Table 6.1, we can see that this expectation fits the Turkish case as well. On average, periods with single party governments have lower levels of parallelism (53.4) than periods with coalition governments (65.8). In the British case, single-party majority governments were the norm in all periods, with brief interludes of minority or coalition governments in Periods II and III.⁷⁴ In Period II, following the February 1974 elections, a Labour minority government took office (first minority government in the post-war period) which lasted less than a year. Following the October 1974 elections, Labour had a lead of 3 seats and formed a majority government, but this lead was lost in 1976, and the Labour government was forced to seek the support of the Liberals to survive, which resulted in 1977 in the so-called Lib-Lab pact, which is the closest approximation to a coalition in the post-war period. Finally, in Period III, the last few months of the Major government was a minority government. Thus, as opposed to Periods I and IV, which saw only single-party majority governments, brief interludes of minority and coalition governments were experienced Periods II and III, more so in the former.

Periods I and IV, which saw only single party majority governments, have, respectively, the highest and the lowest political parallelism levels. Thus, the hypothesized relationship between the type of government and level of political parallelism, which was observed in the Turkish case, is not observed in the British case. Overall, then, our evaluation of the government type hypothesis remains inconclusive.

⁷⁴ The following is based upon Hazell & Paun, 2009.

6.2.3.4. Cleavage Voting

Although cleavage voting is related to political parallelism explicitly only in Van Kempen's study on Sweden, Seymour-Ure's and Hallin and Mancini's hypotheses about 'naturally developing parties' and 'organized pluralism' can be studied using the cleavage voting variable. Both of these terms refer to a situation in which social groupings and political groupings overlap to a significant degree, or from the point of view of the individual, membership in social groups is a strong determinant of one's political views and behavior, which is exactly what the notion of cleavage voting tries to capture.

Direct measurement of cleavage voting requires survey data. However, in the absence of survey data for earlier periods, other measures have also been used in the literature as indicators of cleavage voting. Two such indicators are electoral volatility, which captures the net swing of votes between parties, and inter-bloc volatility, which captures the net swing of votes between party families. The reasoning behind using electoral volatility and inter-bloc volatility as indicators of the strength of cleavage voting is as follows: If membership in social groups is an important determinant of vote choice, then this should have a stabilizing effect upon the vote shares of political parties, for membership in social groups is a long term phenomenon that is not subject to short term change. If people kept changing their votes while at the same time remaining members of the same social groups, then their membership in these social groups was not an important determinant of their vote choices.

In an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between social cleavages and electoral volatility, Yasushi Hazama (2003) argues that social cleavages do not always have a stabilizing effect:

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? [...] The results showed that in the long term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. (p. 362)

It is this relationship between social cleavages and inter-bloc volatilities that we can use as a measure of strength of cleavage voting. The strength of cleavage voting column in Table 6.1 is prepared based upon Hazama's study, and captures the strength of the relationship between social cleavages in Turkey -namely the Sunni religiosity, Kurdish

ethnicity and Alevi sectarianism- and cleavage type inter-bloc volatilities, calculated using provincial level data.

Looking at Table 6.1, we observe that the two periods with strong cleavage voting, 1960s and 1990s, have higher levels of parallelism, 68.1 and 79.7 respectively, than the period with weak cleavage voting, 1970s with a parallelism level of 51.8. The expectation of higher parallelism when cleavage voting is strong is met in the Turkish case.

In the British case, we can use a more direct measure of cleavage voting because survey data are available.⁷⁵ Cleavage voting remained constant at 13 percent in Periods II and III, and slightly decreased in Period IV to 11 percent. In periods II and III, content parallelism also stayed constant at around 80 percent, and decreased in Period IV to 71 percent. Thus, cleavage voting and content parallelism do seem to be moving together.

If we were to make an overall evaluation, the following is in order: Explanations based upon commercialization and the number of parties do not fit the evidence in either of the cases. Modernization explanation fits the British case and not the Turkish one, and government type explanation fits the Turkish case and not the British one. Ideological polarization and cleavage voting are the only explanations that fit the evidence in both cases. In future studies with more countries, this evaluation can serve as a guideline in selecting which variables to focus upon and which to leave out.

Table 6.3 - How Explanations Offered Fit the Turkish and British Cases

Explanation	Turkey	UK
Modernization	-	+
Commercialization	-	+
Party System Characteristics		
Number of Parties	-	-
Ideological Polarization	+	+
Government Type	+	-
Cleavage Voting	+	+

The evaluation, however, is hampered by the fact that historical trends in the two cases were not examined using the same methodology. If we were to study political

⁷⁵ Although different measures of cleavage voting are available for the British case, I used the easy to interpret method of deviations in vote shares, also used to calculate readership parallelism. The figures reported in Table 2 are averages of class (Golthorpe 5-item class scheme), region (England, Scotland and Wales), and religion (no religion, Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Other) cleavages. See Chapter 5 on the details this calculation..

parallelism using the same measure in both cases, comparisons would be more meaningful and we could potentially rule out more explanations. The following chapter offers a content analysis of the newspaper contents in Turkey and in the UK in the most recent period, employing the same methodology in both cases.

PART III

Part III focuses on contemporary political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, using content analysis of newspaper coverages prior to recent elections in the two countries.

CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN NEWSPAPER CONTENT: COMMENT IS FREE, BUT FACTS ARE SACRED

A newspaper is of necessity something of a monopoly, and its first duty is to shun the temptations of monopoly. Its primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of presentation must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong. Comment is free, but facts are sacred. "Propaganda", so called, by this means is hateful. The voice of opponents no less than that of friends has a right to be heard. Comment also is justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It is well to be frank; it is even better to be fair.

Charles Prestwich Scott (1921)

Which part of a newspaper's content reflects the paper's position? Is it the "news" sections of the papers that we should focus on to examine the political position of a paper, or the comment (opinion) sections? Or is it only the "editorial" (leading) articles, explicitly attributed to the paper, that define the (official) position of a newspaper? From a normative point of view, one that is crystallized most famously in an article by Charles Prestwich Scott, *Manchester Guardian's* editor from 1872 to 1929, and one that can be said to be still relevant today, the answer is clear. If newspapers do have a political position, they should reflect it in their opinion content, leaving the news content "untainted"; what is more, "Comment also is justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It is well to be frank; it is even better to be fair" (Scott, 1921).

With these normative considerations in mind, this chapter has one overarching aim: to apply a model for detecting differential treatment in newspapers, developed by the author building upon the work of others (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2007), to newspaper coverage of 2007 Turkish parliamentary elections and to 2001, 2005, and 2010 UK parliamentary elections. In so doing, I will be digging further

into the content aspect of political parallelism, differentiating more coverage from positive coverage, and news parallelism from opinion parallelism.

The ability to treat parallelism in news and opinion contents separately will also allow me to evaluate how well national dailies in Turkey and in the UK perform against standards set by Scott (1921). If the newspapers are following Scott's advice, we would not expect much of a parallelism in news content, with differential treatment of parties by newspapers being limited to opinion pages, if present at all.

Also, because a uniform measure of parallelism is being applied in the two cases, I will be able to directly compare levels of political parallelism in the British and the Turkish cases, something that was not possible based upon the historical data in previous chapters. In Chapter 6, I compared the *trends* in the two cases, because the historical data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 were of different types and did not allow direct comparison of *levels* of parallelism in the two cases.

In what follows, I first briefly discuss what to expect from a direct comparison of the levels of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, and then present data on coverage parallelism, word choice parallelism, and issue emphasis parallelism in recent elections in the two countries.

The only study that gives us a hint as to what to expect from a comparison of the levels of political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK is Hallin and Mancini's (2004) landmark study on *Comparing Media Systems*, where they identify the UK as an exceptional case among the countries of the liberal model -which consists of the UK, the US, Canada, and Australia- because of its high levels of political parallelism. The liberal model, on the whole, has the lowest levels of political parallelism compared to the moderate pluralist (Northern and Central European) and polarized pluralist (Mediterranean) models, with the exception of the UK, which has an "unusually high" (p. 213) level of political parallelism. Hallin and Mancini also note that, "It is no coincidence that the concept of 'press-party parallelism' was developed in Britain where [...] the press has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely" (p. 208). Thus, we should expect the UK to have a level of parallelism that is at least as high as the level of parallelism in the Mediterranean countries, among which Turkey can also be included.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Hallin and Mancini do not include Turkey in their survey of the Mediterranean countries, but we do know that the "polarized pluralist model" has a wider applicability, not confined to Southern Europe. In a study on Latin America, Mancini and Papathanassopoulos (2002) find it to share many characteristics with the Southern

Another reason for expecting the level of parallelism in the UK to be higher is the practice of endorsements made by British national dailies on election eves. Not only all the national dailies take a position regarding the election, whether it be endorsing the Conservatives or the Labour or calling for strategic voting so that there are more LibDems in the Parliament, they are also proud of their role in the elections, and sometimes boast about how influential they were in the outcome: *The Sun*'s oft-quoted headline following the 1992 elections, "It's the Sun wot won it" attests, if not to actual influence, than at least to a consciously and publicly embraced political role, which is unthinkable in the Turkish press. In the Turkish press, taking sides in a political debate, let alone publicly endorsing parties on election eves, is very much looked down upon. "Doğan media vs. Erdoğan media", "CHP media vs. AKP media", "*yandaş medya vs. malum medya*"⁷⁷ are terms frequently used in debates on political positions of the media outlets to score points, and they are meant to be insults, not neutral descriptions of reality. Some Turkish columnists did declare which parties they will vote for in the 2007 elections and urged their readers to follow suit, but even this had news value and was unthinkable in a leading article undersigned by the paper itself. Thus, we can state Hypothesis IV also as follows: Given the public attitudes against taking political positions among the Turkish newspapers, and the opposite practice of open endorsements among the British dailies, the level of political parallelism in the Turkish press should be lower than the level of parallelism in the British press.

7.1. Coverage Parallelism in the UK

One way of giving differential support to preferred parties is giving them more coverage. Although it matters to the utmost degree whether this coverage is positive or negative, we may still gain some insight into differential treatment only by looking at how much more coverage one party receives relative to others, in which newspapers. In their study of the coverage of the 2007 parliamentary elections in four Turkish newspapers

European media systems. In a study on where Turkey fits in this picture, Uce and De Swert (2010) find Turkey to be "a clear example of the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model." (p. 71).

⁷⁷ Literally meaning "partisan media" and "certain media", the first of these phrases is used exclusively to refer to the pro-AKP and the latter to the anti-AKP media.

over a 10 week period, Balkir et al. (2008) find that “AKP or AKP politicians and candidates were the most visible actors in newspaper coverage”, however, “strong visibility did not provide a positive tone for the AKP; on the contrary, the tone towards the AKP and AKP politicians was highly critical and negative” (p. 207). Balkir et al. (2008) explain stronger visibility of the AKP with reference to AKP’s “status as the governing party” (p. 207). In his study of the coverage of the 2005 parliamentary elections in 7 British newspapers over a 30 day period, Brandenburg (2006) similarly finds that “all papers tend to over-represent the Labour party”, which, “By and large, [...] can be attributed to the fact that Labour is the incumbent party” (p. 166). Brandenburg (2006) cites another study on the 2002 Irish elections (Brandenburg, 2005), which also found that “both coalition partners, Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, received sizeable over-representations”, to conclude “Incumbency appears to generate coverage bias, irrespective of party size or properties of the party system” (p. 166). A further conclusion of Brandenburg (2006), however, is that although “systematically and massively over-representing the endorsed party or parties and marginalizing opponents” was not the case, there were visible differences between newspapers with respect to strategic behavior when giving coverage: whereas some papers “deviate[d] moderately from the overall pattern in the expected direction (*Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Independent*)”, others “applied coverage bias in more strategic fashion (*Sun, Times, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail*)” (p. 167).

Table 7.1 shows amount of coverage the three main parties received in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 parliamentary elections in the UK (see Chapter 3 on how these scores were calculated).

Table 7.1- Amount of Coverage - Party References in British National Dailies on Election Eves

		LibDem		Labour		Conservative		Total
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
2001	comment	410	10	1957	49	1597	40	3964
	News	1108	11	4756	48	4038	41	9902
	all	1518	11	6713	48	5635	41	13866
2005	comment	374	11	1670	51	1242	38	3286
	News	1604	17	4362	46	3504	37	9470
	all	1978	16	6032	47	4746	37	12756
2010	comment	945	20	1999	42	1828	38	4772
	News	2768	22	5117	40	4955	39	12840
	all	3713	21	7116	40	6783	39	17612

Overall, Labour was the party that received the most coverage in British national dailies, measured as the number of party references, in all three elections. Thus, our expectation that the incumbent party receives the highest amount of coverage, based on Brandenburg's (2005) and Balkir et al.'s (2008) previous observations, is met. However, Labour's lead in the coverage poll, so to speak, is significantly diminished in the 2010 elections, during which Labour was still the incumbent party. It seems like future incumbency, as well as current incumbency, is a factor in determining the amount of coverage, given that the Conservative Party emerged as the leading party from the 2010 elections.

Looking at the direction of change in amount of coverage received by individual parties, it seems like we could have predicted, with some success, the increase or decrease in parties' shares of popular vote. The rise in Liberal Democrats' share of the popular vote, from 18.3 % in 2001, to 22.0 % in 2005 and to 23.0 % in 2010 is also reflected in their share of coverage: references to the Liberal Democrats made up only 11 percent of all party references in the British national dailies' coverage prior to 2001 elections, but it made up 16 % prior to 2005 elections, and 21 % prior to 2010 elections. Labour's fall in 2010 is also reflected in the amount of coverage, with a dramatic decrease from 47 % in 2005 elections to 40 percent in 2010. The rise in Conservative Party's share of popular vote is reflected in newspaper coverage in 2010, but not in 2005. Overall, in 5 of the 6 transitions the direction of change in a party's coverage followed the direction of change in that party's vote share: when a party increased its share of the popular vote from one election to another, national dailies also increased the space devoted to covering that party, and vice versa.

The breakdown of these overall results, by individual newspapers, is given in Appendix B. Looking at individual titles' behaviors, it can be seen that there are important differences between newspapers with regards to the amount of coverage allocated to the three parties. Although most papers did give the incumbent more coverage, inter-paper differences that can be attributed to party choice also existed. For example, the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, the only two papers to openly endorse the Liberal Democrats (see Table 5.5), consistently gave more coverage to Liberal Democrats in their news content than did other papers (see Appendix B). Similarly, the news coverage of the *Financial Times*, which endorsed Labour in 2001 and 2005 elections and the Conservatives in 2010, closely reflected its endorsements: in 2001 and 2005, Financial Times used the word Labour more often than it used the words Conservative or Tory (647

to 491 in 2001, and 555 to 451 in 2005), but in 2010 the situation was reversed: the word Labour was used 415 times whereas the words Conservative and Tory were used 514 times.

Other instances of overrepresentation may be found by examining Appendix B further, but summary statistics would provide us with a general picture easier to interpret. If there were no inter-paper differences, we would expect the coverage share of the parties to be the same in all newspapers. We cannot expect the coverage to be equally distributed between the three parties in allotments of 33.33 percent, but we can expect, for example, both the *Guardian* and the *Financial Times* to allocate, say, 15 percent of their coverage to the Liberal Democrats, and 30 percent to Labour, etc. Thus, the extent to which papers differ *from each other* (not from a pre-set standard like equal shares or shares of the popular vote) in terms of coverage allocated to individual parties can serve as a proxy measure of coverage parallelism. Table 7.2 reports how much newspapers differ from the mean percentage allocated to individual parties. The smaller this figure, the more similar newspapers are to each other in terms of coverage percentages.

Table 7.2- Coverage Parallelism in News and Opinion Content of British National Dailies

	2001		2005		2010	
	Comment	News	Comment	News	Comment	News
Con	8	3	5	3	5	4
Lab	10	2	7	3	6	4
Lib	6	3	4	4	4	2
Average	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>

Note: Figures are average absolute deviations from mean. Standard deviations also display the same pattern. Absolute deviations were preferred because they are easier to interpret.

We are now in a position to evaluate whether the allocation of amount of coverage in British national dailies, as a whole, conformed to the normative standards set by C. P. Scott (1921) in his famous article. Arguing that “Comment is free, but facts are sacred”, Scott expected the newspapers to be fair and balanced in their news coverage, while allowing for some element of bias in commentary. If we look at coverage parallelism in opinion and news articles, we can see that, of the three periods under study, 2001 election eve was the closest approximation to Scott’s ideal. In 2001, the allocation of news coverage to the three main parties was similar across all the newspapers (Labour news made up about the same percentage of all news in individual newspapers), whereas the papers significantly differed in terms of how frequently they mentioned the names of individual parties in their opinion articles (for example, on average, papers gave 10

percent more or 10 percent less space to commentary on Labour). Facts were sacred and comment was free. In 2005, however, comment also became somewhat sacralized, with newspapers starting to devote similar amounts of space to commentary on individual parties. The average absolute deviation in opinion articles decreased from 0,08 to 0,05. In 2010, the news and opinion sections, on the whole, were hardly distinguishable from each other in terms of how much the newspapers differed from one another. Coverage parallelism in news articles increased from 0,03 to 0,04, whereas coverage parallelism in opinion articles remained as 0,05. This time, news became somewhat free. We do not have a fixed yardstick for Scott's advice, but taking the figures for 2001 as a basis for comparison, we can say that on the whole, comment became somewhat sacralized in the last decade, and news became somewhat freed: coverage parallelism have decreased in opinion articles, and increased in news articles.

Figures from Turkey would provide us with another yardstick to evaluate coverage parallelism in the UK.

7.2. Coverage Parallelism in Turkey

Table 7.3 reports the frequency of party names in Turkish newspapers prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections. In line with the finding of Balkir et al. (2008), which was limited to four newspapers only, it can be seen that AKP was the party whose name was repeated most frequently in news and opinion content of Turkish national dailies prior to the 2007 elections, enjoying the incumbency bonus seen in other contexts as well.

Compared to the British case (2010 elections), the difference between opinion and news content is similarly small, but parallelism is somewhat higher, with Turkish newspapers differing from each other -in how they allocate coverage to individual parties- to a greater extent than do British newspapers.

Unlike in the British case, Turkish newspapers do not openly endorse parties on election eves, limiting what can be said about the behavior of individual papers. At this point, we are not in a position to attribute differences between coverage shares to party choice. In the following sections, however, we will have more precise tools that measure support more directly, thus enabling us to better interpret the differences between coverage amounts.

Table 7.3- Amount of Coverage - Party References in Turkish National Dailies Prior to 2007 Elections

Newspaper	Comment							News						
	AKP		CHP		MHP		total	AKP		CHP		MHP		total
	#	%	#	%	#	%		#	%	#	%	#	%	
<i>Hürriyet</i>	309	63	106	22	72	15	487	190	50	112	30	76	20	378
<i>Zaman</i>	234	43	171	31	138	25	543	288	37	272	35	211	27	771
<i>Sabah</i>	264	56	118	25	93	20	475	112	45	86	35	50	20	248
<i>Milliyet</i>	228	52	131	30	79	18	438	318	55	165	29	92	16	575
<i>Vatan</i>	296	56	130	25	104	20	530	305	54	144	25	121	21	570
<i>Akşam</i>	128	46	90	32	60	22	278	213	46	132	28	121	26	466
<i>Türkiye</i>	60	57	21	20	24	23	105	103	38	91	34	75	28	269
<i>Star</i>	114	37	96	31	101	32	311	169	32	195	37	169	32	533
<i>Yeni Şafak</i>	148	61	71	29	24	10	243	302	37	259	32	250	31	811
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	525	64	199	24	99	12	823	833	52	543	34	227	14	1603
<i>Vakit</i>	189	29	272	41	200	30	661	380	35	338	31	367	34	1085
<i>Dünya</i>	45	56	27	34	8	10	80	115	45	83	33	57	22	255
<i>Radikal</i>	178	55	85	26	60	19	323	468	52	258	29	171	19	897
<i>Posta</i>	48	37	55	42	27	21	130	153	47	118	36	57	17	328
<i>Takvim</i>	62	44	29	21	49	35	140	38	35	46	43	24	22	108
Total	2828	51	1601	29	1138	20	5567	3987	45	2842	32	2068	23	8897
Deviation		9		5		6			7		3		5	
Average				7							5			

7.3. Word Choice Parallelism in Turkey

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) of Turkey wants newspapers, indeed all actors, to use the abbreviation “AK Parti” (also meaning “Clean Party” in Turkish), which is the official abbreviation, instead of the shorter and less glorifying “AKP”. Indeed, party officials have a number of times stated this preference in strongly worded statements. Thus, the degree to which newspapers conform with this preference can serve as a proxy measure of how much a newspaper supports the Justice and Development Party.

Table 7.4 reports the frequencies of both versions of the abbreviation, and the ratio of the use of “AK Parti” to “AKP” in individual newspapers.

Table 7.4- Preference for the Abbreviation “AK Parti” over “AKP” in Turkish Newspapers

Newspaper	Comment			Newspaper	News		
	AK Parti	AKP	AK Parti/AKP		AK Parti	AKP	AK Parti/AKP
<i>Türkiye</i>	59	0	∞	<i>Türkiye</i>	97	6	16,17
<i>Yeni Şafak</i>	115	32	3,59	<i>Yeni Şafak</i>	282	18	15,67
<i>Vakit</i>	136	53	2,57	<i>Star</i>	154	14	11,00
<i>Star</i>	74	40	1,85	<i>Zaman</i>	237	45	5,27
<i>Zaman</i>	125	107	1,17	<i>Vakit</i>	298	78	3,82
<i>Takvim</i>	30	32	0,94	<i>Sabah</i>	38	71	0,54
<i>Dünya</i>	18	27	0,67	<i>Dünya</i>	23	92	0,25
<i>Posta</i>	18	29	0,62	<i>Posta</i>	19	133	0,14
<i>Radikal</i>	55	111	0,50	<i>Takvim</i>	4	34	0,12
<i>Sabah</i>	60	204	0,29	<i>Akşam</i>	20	193	0,10
<i>Akşam</i>	22	102	0,22	<i>Hürriyet</i>	12	176	0,07
<i>Vatan</i>	11	284	0,04	<i>Radikal</i>	25	443	0,06
<i>Hürriyet</i>	4	303	0,01	<i>Vatan</i>	6	298	0,02
<i>Milliyet</i>	1	227	0,00	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	4	828	0,00
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	1	522	0,00	<i>Milliyet</i>	1	317	0,00

As we can see from the table, there is a clear-cut distinction between papers that prefer the “AK Parti” abbreviation, and those that prefer “AKP”. The distinction is so sharp, especially at the poles, that some newspapers use their preferred abbreviation almost to the total exclusion of the other. *Türkiye* at the “AK Parti” camp, and *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Vatan* at the “AKP” camp seem to be especially rigid in their attitudes. We can safely assume that the five papers located at the upper part of Table 7.4 are pro-AKP papers, whereas those located at the bottom are anti-AKP ones.

With this insight now gained, we can interpret individual differences in coverage shares better. *Milliyet*, *Vatan* and *Cumhuriyet* are the three papers that devote the largest space to AKP news (55, 54, and 52 percent, respectively, see Table 7.3), whereas *Vakit*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Zaman*, and *Türkiye* are among the papers that devote the smallest space (35, 37, 37 and 38 percent, respectively, see Table 7.3). The reason most probably is that bias mostly takes the form of criticizing the party opposed rather than glorifying the party supported, a phenomenon observed by Brandenburg (2005) in the British case as well. Because papers are more concerned -or more comfortable- with criticizing political parties, they show their support by attacking foes, not by praising friends.

7.4. Word Choice Parallelism in the UK

Going back to preferred word choices in referring to the political parties, a similar situation exists in the British case as well. Conservative Party spokespeople do not oppose the word as strongly as AKP does, but the preference for the word “Tory” as opposed to “Conservative” when referring to the Conservative Party does seem to be associated with an anti-Conservative Party position. Like in the “AK Parti” example in Turkey, Conservative is the official name, but the word Tory is also frequently used in press discourse. When we look at the ratio of the use of these words, reported in Table 7.5, we can see that in all three elections, *Mirror*, the only paper that endorsed Labour in all post-war elections, was the paper with strongest preference for the word Tory as opposed to Conservative in its news content; and the *Daily Telegraph*, the only paper that endorsed Conservatives in all post-war elections, was the paper with the strongest preference for the word Conservative over Tory, if we were to leave the *Financial Times* aside, which in some accounts is not considered among the national dailies for its economics-heavy content.

Table 7.5- Ratio of the word Conservative to Tory in British National Dailies

	2001		2005			2010			
	Conservative	Tory	Conservative/Tory	Conservative	Tory	Conservative/Tory	Conservative	Tory	Conservative/Tory
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	311	345	0,90	235	255	0,92	319	326	0,98
<i>Times</i>	153	287	0,53	243	332	0,73	296	453	0,65
<i>Guardian</i>	318	481	0,66	245	310	0,79	423	564	0,75
<i>Financial Times</i>	280	211	1,33	277	174	1,59	246	268	0,92
<i>Independent</i>	250	423	0,59	141	267	0,53	330	355	0,93
<i>Daily Express</i>	60	205	0,29	85	141	0,60	165	258	0,64
<i>Daily Mail</i>	67	162	0,41	122	175	0,70	64	98	0,65
<i>Daily Mirror</i>	37	185	0,20	56	269	0,21	89	361	0,25
<i>Sun</i>	48	166	0,29	27	80	0,34	61	220	0,28
<i>Daily Star</i>	16	33	0,48	31	39	0,79	13	46	0,28
Conservatives.com*							3630	284	12,8
Labour.org.uk*							236	322	0,73

* Counts for the Conservatives.com and Labour.org. uk are the results of a Google search conducted on December 25, 2010, and thus reflect content from previous years as well.

Looking at Table 7.5, it is obvious that there is also a market segment element in the the word choice between Conservative and Tory, with popular papers, on the whole, using the word Tory the most, quality papers using it the least, and mid-market papers being in the middle. However, the observations we make concerning the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily Mirror* are still valid even when we restrict the comparison to individual segments: Among popular papers, *Daily Mirror* is the one with the strongest preference for the word Tory, and among quality papers, *Daily Telegraph* is the paper with the strongest preference for the word Conservative, barring *Financial Times*.

7.5. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in Turkey

Table 7.6 reports the scores received by Turkish newspapers for AKPness vs. CHPness on 2007 election eve, based upon the level of overlap between individual papers' contents and party manifestos, where +1 represents AKP and -1 represents CHP. (See Chapter 3 on how these scores were calculated.)

Table 7.6 – Pro-AKP vs. pro-CHP Positions among Turkish Newspapers

		Comment		News	
		# phrases	Score	# phrases	Score
Reference Texts	AKP Manifesto	3,107	1,00	3,107	1,00
	CHP Manifesto	21,774	-1,00	21,774	-1,00
Virgin Texts	<i>Vakit</i>	363	0,33	639	0,26
	<i>Yeni Şafak</i>	225	0,25	605	0,50
	<i>Zaman</i>	367	0,21	649	0,10
	<i>Türkiye</i>	171	0,20	213	0,60
	<i>Dünya</i>	154	0,17	409	-0,04
	<i>Takvim</i>	112	0,14	54	0,28
	<i>Star</i>	148	0,14	358	0,25
	<i>Sabah</i>	177	0,08	173	-0,01
	<i>Radikal</i>	222	0,00	571	-0,24
	<i>Akşam</i>	153	-0,09	159	-0,40
	<i>Milliyet</i>	202	-0,11	182	-0,20
	<i>Posta</i>	103	-0,15	103	-0,25
	<i>Vatan</i>	183	-0,22	227	-0,14
	<i>Hürriyet</i>	257	-0,26	616	-0,30
	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	467	-0,45	792	-0,18
	Deviation*			0,18	

*: Average absolute deviation from mean

Turkish newspapers, in the run up to the 2007 elections, seem to be neatly divided into pro-CHP and pro-AKP camps, with around half the papers examined receiving

negative scores (indicating positions closer to CHP than AKP), and around half receiving positive scores (indicating positions closer to AKP than CHP). This divide closely overlaps with the divide observed in the preference for “AK Parti” vs “AKP” abbreviation (see Table 7.4), with all the papers that use the party's preferred abbreviation (*Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, Türkiye, and Star*) also receiving positive scores for AKPness in their news and opinion contents. The only paper that preferred the abbreviation “AKP” over “AK Parti”, but received a positive score in Table 7.6 is *Takvim*, one of the two papers managed at the time by the state agency SDIF.

If we were to look at the average deviation from mean, reported in the last row of the table, and take this figure as an overall measure of political parallelism in the Turkish press, a curious feature emerges: there is more parallelism in the news sections of the newspapers than in the comment sections, in some cases news contents receiving scores as high as 0,50 (*Yeni Şafak*) and 0,60 (*Türkiye*). Compared to the news content, the comment sections of the newspapers seem relatively more balanced, with the highest score being -0,45 (*Cumhuriyet*). Overall, parallelism in news articles is 7 percentage points higher than parallelism in opinion articles (0,25 compared to 0,18).

When we examine the behavior of individual newspapers, with a comparative look at their news and opinion contents, three types of newspapers can be discerned: a) those with balanced news and biased opinion content, b) those with bias in both news and opinion content, and c) those with balanced opinion but biased news content.⁷⁸ The first of these types is the closest to the ideal expressed by C. P. Scott: to them, facts are sacred (or balanced) but comment is free. In Turkey, *Dünya* and *Sabah* were the representatives of this type in the run-up to the 2007 elections (-0,04 news to 0,17 opinion, and -0,01 news to 0,08 opinion, respectively) and *Zaman* (0,10 news to 0,21 opinion) to some extent. Most of the Turkish national dailies can be included in the second category, with *Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Türkiye, Takvim, Star, Posta, Vatan, Hürriyet, and Cumhuriyet* having (same directional) bias in both of their news and opinion contents. The third category, with biased news but curiously balanced opinion content, is exemplified best by the paper

⁷⁸ A fourth, theoretical type would be those with balanced coverage in both news and opinion content, but the Turkish press scene does not seem to contain such newspapers. The paper that came closest to this ideal in the run up to the 2007 elections was *Sabah*, managed at the time by the state agency SDIF because its owners were being tried on fraud charges.

Radikal (-0,24 news to 0,00 opinion parallelism), but to some extent by *Akşam* (-0,40 news to -0,09 opinion) and *Milliyet* (-0,20 news and -0,11 opinion) as well.⁷⁹

If we were to speculate as to the reasons why some papers choose to follow the third strategy, we could argue that it has something to do with the fact that bias in opinion is easier to detect, and for determined editors, thus easier to eliminate. If you have 3 pro-CHP columnists and 2 pro-AKP ones, throw in one more pro-AKP columnist, and you are pretty much done. Bias in news articles, however, is more difficult to detect, for news articles have to be more subtle in making arguments, in part due to the strong normative reaction against observed bias in news: “”Propaganda”, so called, by this means is hateful” (Scott, 1021). So, balancing editors have less of an incentive to purge their reporters (they can legitimately claim to be balanced in news content already), and when they do have the incentive, it is not as easy or as straightforward a task as balancing the columnists, for unlike columnists, reporters are rarely publicly associated with specific political views.

7.6. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in the UK

To see if this phenomenon (biased news, balanced opinion) is peculiar to some Turkish newspapers only or observed in other press systems as well, we can look at political parallelism among British national dailies. Table 7.7 reports the scores received by British national dailies in 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections, where 1.00 represents The Conservative Party and -1.00 represents the Labour Party.

⁷⁹ To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time this phenomenon is being observed, at least in the academic literature. Observations along these lines were first made by Hincal Uluç, a columnist of the daily *Sabah*, who accused his own paper of being balanced in opinion but biased in news contents, in favor of the ruling AKP. Although this observation is contrary to the findings of the present study, for I find *Sabah* to be balanced in news and biased in opinion content, the title of being the first to draw attention to the phenomenon belongs to Uluç.

Table 7.7- Pro-Conservative vs. pro-Labour Positions among British Newspapers

		2010				2005				2001			
		Comment		News		Comment		News		Comment		News	
Ref.		Score	# phrases	Score	# phrases	Score	# phrases	Score	# phrases	Score	# phrases	Score	# phrases
Texts	Lab Manifesto	-1,00	33219	-1,00	33219	-1,00	3671	-1,00	3671	-1,00	5043	-1,00	5043
	Cons Manifesto	1,00	3152	1,00	3152	1,00	843	1,00	843	1,00	14609	1,00	14609
Virgin Texts	Daily Telegraph	0,12	1866	0,15	259	0,08	528	0,04	1554	-0,01	737	-0,17	1719
	Times	0,10	2072	0,05	3284	0,07	943	0,00	1429	-0,08	105	-0,21	1000
	Guardian	0,01	154	0,03	3999	-0,05	583	0,00	1682	-0,10	483	-0,11	2177
	Financial Times	-0,01	505	-0,05	4646	-0,02	469	-0,05	1959	-0,29	327	-0,33	191
	Independent	-0,01	175	-0,02	3002	-0,12	344	-0,05	1055	-0,09	727	-0,12	1849
	Daily Express	0,09	115	0,04	1864	0,45	529	0,02	105	0,02	205	-0,18	456
	Daily Mail	0,08	1373	-0,05	1700	0,05	753	0,00	1122	-0,02	516	-0,18	732
	Daily Mirror	0,08	552	-0,09	1638	-0,22	252	0,11	658	-0,11	426	-0,30	367
	Sun	0,14	661	0,20	1662	-0,09	103	0,08	272	0,07	97	0,02	308
	Daily Star	0,50	138	0,34	164	0,48	5	0,20	346	0,13	24	0,19	101
		Average	0,11		0,06		0,06		0,04		-0,05		-0,14

It seems like Labour was most successful in getting its message repeated in press coverage in 2001, with almost all of the newspapers receiving negative scores, indicating pro-Labour positions. This ability of Labour decreased in 2005, with around half the papers now receiving negative scores; and in 2010 the situation was completely reversed, with almost all of the newspapers receiving positive scores, indicating a pro-Conservative position. Thus, it seems that, overall, the press coverage of the parties shifts with the change in political climate from election to election. However, individual differences between newspapers remain. *Daily Mirror*, the only British daily to consistently endorse Labour in all post-war elections, is the paper with the highest Labour score in 2010 and 2005, and only second to *Financial Times* in 2001. The *Daily Telegraph*, the only British daily to consistently endorse Conservatives in all post-war elections, is the paper with the highest Conservative score in 2010 and 2005 elections.

Because the balance between Labour and the Conservatives in the press discourse seems to have been achieved at different points in different elections, we need to look at how much and in what direction newspapers' scores differed from the average score, not the from the theoretical middle ground of 0.00. Table 7.8 reports these deviations from the mean score.

Table 7.8- Deviations from Mean Conservative vs. Labour Score

	2010		2005		2001	
	Comment	News	Comment	News	Comment	News
Mean Score	0,11	0,06	0,06	0,04	-0,05	-0,14
Daily Telegraph	0,01	0,09	0,01	0,00	0,04	-0,03
Times	-0,01	-0,01	0,01	-0,04	-0,03	-0,07
Guardian	-0,10	-0,03	-0,11	-0,04	-0,05	0,03
Financial Times	-0,12	-0,11	-0,09	-0,09	-0,24	-0,19
Independent	-0,12	-0,08	-0,18	-0,08	-0,04	0,02
Daily Express	-0,02	-0,02	0,39	-0,01	0,07	-0,04
Daily Mail	-0,03	-0,11	-0,01	-0,03	0,03	-0,04
Daily Mirror	-0,03	-0,15	-0,29	0,07	-0,06	-0,16
Sun	0,03	0,14	-0,15	0,04	0,12	0,16
Daily Star	0,39	0,28	0,42	0,17	0,17	0,33
Average absolute deviation	0,09	0,10	0,17	0,06	0,08	0,11

Note: Negative figures represent scores below average, indicating pro-Labour positions, and positive figures represent above average scores, indicating pro-Conservative positions.

Because we have three elections to consider, and because newspapers seem to have displayed varying behavior over time, a straightforward classification of the newspapers in terms of their news and opinion parallelism is not possible. In comparison with the Turkish case, the following observations are in order.

Unlike in the Turkish case, where balance in both news and opinion content was only a theoretical category, most newspapers in most elections were balanced in the UK (had about average scores), in both their news and opinion contents (cells without shading, 11 instances out of 30), the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Times* being the papers representing the category the best. The next most populous category was those dailies with bias in both news and opinion content (cells with the darkest shading, 9 instances out of 30), *Daily Star*, *Financial Times*, and *Independent* best representing the category. Papers where facts were sacred (balanced) and comment was free (biased) made up the third most populous category (cells with the lightest shading, 5 out of 30), represented best by *Guardian*, which was edited by C. P. Scott, the person who came up with the motto “facts are sacred”. And finally, papers with balanced comment and biased news, represented in the Turkish case by the daily *Radikal*, also made up 5 out of 30 instances, but this seems to be a fairly new phenomenon, with four of the cases being observed in 2010.

Over time, there is a decrease in the number of papers that are balanced in both news and opinion contents (6 to 2 from 2001 to 2010), and an increase in the number of papers balanced in opinion and biased in news (1 to 4).

The last row of Table 7.8 reports the average absolute deviation from the mean score, which can be used as a measure of overall parallelism.⁸⁰ These figures indicate that the highest parallelism was observed in 2005 opinion contents (0,17), and the lowest in 2005 news contents (0,06). In 2001 and 2010, overall parallelism in news and opinion contents were close to each other, with parallelism in news being slightly higher than parallelism in opinion. Compared to Turkey, these figures are rather low: prior to 2007 elections, news parallelism in Turkey was 0,25 and opinion parallelism 0,18.

7.7. Conclusion

This chapter, which examined political parallelism in the content of the Turkish and British newspapers on election eves, has come up with answers to a number of important questions:

1- How do levels of parallelism compare in Turkey and in the UK?

British dailies had lower levels of parallelism, at least in the most recent period and as far as content parallelism was concerned, a conclusion we could not reach in the previous chapters because we were not able to compare levels of parallelism directly, and had to be content with comparing trends. Now that we have applied the same methodology in both cases, we can say that parallelism in the Turkish press is higher (about 0,22 in 2007 elections) than parallelism in the British press (about 0,9 in 2010 elections).

⁸⁰ It should be noted that this is a measure of overall parallelism concerning the Labour vs. Conservative dichotomy. A more comprehensive measure of parallelism in the system should take Labour vs. LibDem and Conservative vs. LibDem parallelisms into account as well. These calculations are not reported here to keep the presentation simple, but parallelism concerning the Labour vs. Conservative dichotomy was the highest in all three elections, with newspapers being less differentiated with regards to the positions in the other two dichotomies. The same applies to the Turkish case: It is the AKP vs. CHP dichotomy that differentiates the papers the most, although a more comprehensive measure of system parallelism should take AKP vs. MHP and CHP vs. MHP dichotomies into account as well.

2- Do newspapers in Turkey and the UK generally follow Scott's (1921) advice? That is to say, do they keep parallelism limited to their opinion pages?

With regards to keeping opinion where it belongs -in opinion articles- both Turkish and British newspapers failed, with British papers performing somewhat better: In Turkey, news sections of the papers, overall, were more parallel than the comment sections (0,25 to 0,18 in 2007 elections). In the UK, news sections of the newspapers were more parallel in the 2001 and 2010 elections, and comment sections in the 2005 elections (see Table 7.8). It seems that, overall, comment was free but news was even freer.

3- Are there differences between newspapers with regards to the relative level of bias in their opinion and news contents?

Yes, there are. Different newspapers like to serve bias in different amounts, and in different cups. Some papers offer balance in news and bias in opinion, whereas others do the opposite, offering balance in opinion but bias in news. We could speculate that these different mixes probably appeal to different customer niches in the market.

3- Do incumbent parties in Turkey and the UK enjoy what is called the incumbency bonus, and are there differences between the amount of coverage given to political parties in different newspapers that can be attributed to political preferences?

The answer to both of these questions was yes. AKP clearly enjoyed an incumbency bonus, with its name being more frequently used in both news and opinion contents of the Turkish newspapers prior to the 2007 elections (see Table 7.3). In the UK, Labour similarly had a clear lead in terms of how frequently its name was cited in the 2001 elections, but this lead was diminished somewhat in 2005, and significantly diminished in 2010 (see Table 7.1). There were significant differences between papers in terms of the differential coverage of the parties, and some, not all, of these differences were attributable to political preferences on the part of the newspaper managements.

4- Are there any differences between newspapers with regards to preferred phrases when referring to the political parties?

The answer to this question was an unqualified yes: both in Turkey and in the UK, something we can call politics of naming is in place when referring to the political parties, more severe in the Turkish case⁸¹. Some newspapers use the abbreviation AKP much

⁸¹ A similar phenomenon is observed by Bayram (2009) with regards to the coverage of turban/headscarf related issues in Turkish dailies, with a huge divide separating those

more frequently than the official abbreviation “AK Parti” when referring to the Justice and Development Party, and others use “AK Parti” much more frequently (Table 7.4). This divide was later found to have an almost perfect overlap with the divide in support for AKP vs. CHP (compare Table 7.4 with Table 7.6). A similar situation was also observed in the British case with regards to the word Conservative vs. Tory, the former being more preferred by the Conservative Party (see Table 7.4). There was, however, also a market segment element to the word choice in favor of Conservative vs. Tory, with popular papers employing the word Tory more frequently.

5- One overarching question throughout the chapter was whether we could make meaningful content analysis -using quantitative methods- that is able to answer some significant questions concerning press-party parallelism. The answer to this question was also an unqualified yes: using carefully constructed methodologies, we were indeed able to explore political parallelism related issues in some depth.

papers that prefer the word turban over headscarf from those that prefer headscarf to turban.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In the introductory chapter, I stated that his study had three major aims: The descriptive aim of the study was to map out the history of parallelism in the Turkish press and in the British press, the theoretical aim of the study was to evaluate modernization, commercialization and party system explanations, and the methodological aim was to see if meaningful content analysis was possible using word counts. The following is an account of the degree to which these aims have been accomplished, and their implications.

In Chapter 2, which provided a review of the relevant literature, I first examined how the term press-party parallelism was conceived by Seymour-Ure (1974), and later re-defined as political parallelism by Hallin and Mancini (2004), who focused on parallels between media and broad political currents, not individual parties. Then I reviewed the literature on media and democracy, starting with the social responsibility theory of the press, and proceeding with media in studies of democracy, and democracy in studies on media. Information, forum, advocacy, and watchdog functions emerged as shared points in these normative writings, and pluralism emerged as a criterion with implications for all. From the social responsibility theory of the press, I borrowed the idea of a balance between “common carriers” and “advocates”, which implied moderate levels of external pluralism in the media, and which was used in the following chapters in evaluating observed levels of political parallelism. The second part of this chapter was dedicated to reviewing the empirical literature, and the third part to the theoretical explanations offered to account for variation in levels of political parallelism. With regards to geographical distribution, I have noted a lack of comparative studies on the subject, despite the abundance of single country studies examining political parallelism under different names. With a parallel reading of the Turkish and British cases, this study provided a

multi-country perspective, if not a comparative one in the strict sense of the term. With regards to historical trends, I noted that most scholars observe a decline in parallelism over time in different contexts, although observations of increase and no change were also made. I have examined the explanations offered for the variation in levels of political parallelism under the three headings of modernization (the sociological approach), commercialization (the economic approach), and party system characteristics (the political approach), which were partially evaluated in Chapter 6.

Chapter 3 provided a review of the different methodologies so far used by researchers to study political parallelism, and placed the methods used in this study in context, as well as providing justification for their use and noting their limitations. In previous studies, use of organizational data was the most preferred method, because of its availability and the direct information it provides. With the decline of official ties between party organizations and press outlets, however, organizational data ceased being as useful and practical as it used to be, and coupled with the rise of survey methodology that made analyzing readership patterns in more detail possible, readership surveys came to be used very frequently to demonstrate parallelism between newspaper audiences and party bases. Content analysis has been present from the beginning, but systematic content analyses, in the Turkish case in particular, have been missing except for the most recent periods, and were only rarely used in a comparative context. After evaluating the pros and cons of the different methods so far employed, I presented the methods used in Chapter 4 (coding of historical data in books on Turkish press history), Chapter 5 (endorsement data) and Chapter 7 (word-count based content analysis) of this study.

In Chapter 4, I have reviewed political parallelism in the Turkish press from a historical perspective. The main contribution of the chapter to the literature stemmed from the collection and re-classification of information already contained in the secondary literature, not from original research into archives that would introduce new information. Also, circulation shares of the daily newspapers from 1960s to the present, taken from the archives of *Basın İlan Kurumu* (BİK, Press Advertising Institute), were presented, for the first time to the best of my knowledge, to identify major papers in each period. For the periods for which reliable circulation information was not available, number of author mentions was used as the criterion of being a major paper. To limit the universe of sources to be coded, attention was restricted to book-length treatments on the history of the Turkish press, with articles and works that cover specific periods being left out. Four types of information on individual newspapers were collected (author evaluations,

content, organization, and legal action), and papers in each period were classified into parallel (anti- or pro-government or a specific party) and non-parallel categories, based upon an overall evaluation of the evidence collected. This classification also served as our measure of overall level of parallelism in the system for the period under study.

The first period, from the publication of the first Turkish newspaper, *Takvim-i Vakayi* in 1831 to the adoption of the First Constitution, was examined in more detail for this is where the roots of Turkish journalism lie. It was found that papers published in this period belonged more to the world of politics, with heavy state involvement, but that commercial motives were also present. After a start with moderate levels, political parallelism declined even further during the era of Abdülhamid II, but increased significantly with the Second Constitutional Period, and remained high throughout the WWI, War of Independence, and the Early Republican Period. After moderate levels of parallelism from 1930s to 1980s, ANAP governments of the 1980s saw the lowest level of parallelism, and the 1990s saw one of the highest levels. Overall, levels of parallelism in Turkey went below the 50 percent mark only once, during the 1980s, and in other periods fluctuated between medium to high levels. There was no discernible overall trend, from higher to lower parallelism or otherwise, but a number of ups and downs. Periods of war and intense political conflict seem to have contributed to higher levels of parallelism, probably because stakes were higher, and periods of relatively muted political conflict, like the reign of the Abdülhamid II and Özal governments of 1980s, saw lower levels of political parallelism in the press.

Chapter 5 started out with a review of post-war British political history and the segmented nature of the British daily press, to provide some background to the discussion that follows. To examine the trends in political parallelism, endorsement data were used, which showed a complicated picture with different conclusions for the different segments of the British daily press: there were higher levels of parallelism and uniform declining trend in the mid-market and popular segments, compared to lower levels of parallelism and ups and downs in the quality segment. The parallel reading of the Turkish and British cases provided me with a larger number number of more or less homogenized historical periods, which were used as a basis for the evaluation of theoretical explanations in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 provided a partial evaluation of the modernization, commercialization, and party system characteristics explanations, which were turned into three hypotheses as follows:

Hypothesis I (modernization): As we move from the earlier to the more recent periods, level of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK will decrease because of the modernization effect, which, among other things, means increasing differentiation between spheres of life, and in our case, between the functions of communication and politics.

Hypothesis II (commercialization): In periods when the press can be said to be more commercialized, political parallelism will be lower compared to non-commercialized periods, because in a commercialized environment, papers try to reach the widest audience possible, and avoid alienating large chunks of their potential readership by presenting politically biased content.

Hypothesis III (party system characteristics): a) Periods with a higher number of parties in the system will also have higher levels of political parallelism. b) Periods with higher levels of ideological polarization will also have higher levels of political parallelism. c) Periods with minority or coalition governments will have higher levels of political parallelism, and periods with single party governments will have lower levels of political parallelism. d) Periods with higher levels of cleavage voting will also have higher levels of political parallelism.

Evaluation of these hypotheses in Chapter 6 on the basis of data from the Turkish and British cases led to the following findings: --Explanations based upon number of parties did not fit the evidence in either of the cases. In both Turkey and the UK, multi-party periods had lower, not higher levels of political parallelism compared to two party periods. --Modernization and commercialization explanations fit -albeit imperfectly- the British case but not the Turkish one. There was no decline with modernization in the Turkish case, and the commercialized periods had actually higher levels of political parallelism compared to periods when state was more active in the economy. In the British case, on the other hand, there was a decline that accompanied modernization, and commercialized periods had lower levels of parallelism. --The government type explanation fit the Turkish case and not the British one. In Turkey, periods with single party governments, as predicted, had lower levels of parallelism compared to periods with coalition governments. In the UK, although most post-war British governments were single party governments, the few years of coalition-like arrangements and minority governments did not result in higher levels of political parallelism. --Ideological polarization and cleavage voting were the only explanations that fit the evidence in both cases. Periods with high ideological polarization were also periods with high political

parallelism in both cases. Similarly, periods with higher levels of cleavage voting saw higher levels of political parallelism in both Turkey and the UK. I concluded that in future studies with more countries, this evaluation can serve as a guideline in selecting which variables to focus upon and which to leave out.

Chapter 7 provided a first-time attempt at direct comparison of levels of political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK through uniform application of the same methodology in two cases. More specifically, newspaper contents on recent election eves in the two countries under study were examined using a word-count based methodology that was designed to make newspapers' party-political positions visible. Newspaper coverages in the one week leading up to the 2007 general elections in Turkey, and 2001, 2005 and 2010 general elections in the UK were examined. All articles that contained the name or the abbreviation of any political party were collected using word searches, from the Lexis-Nexis database in the British case, and from the Interpress media monitoring service in the Turkish case. For each election, this selection method turned up around 2000 articles, news and opinion articles combined.

Three groups of phrases were used as text features to compare newspaper contents: Frequency of party names (to study amount of coverage), preferred words when referring to parties (to study overlap with party preferences), and most distinguishing phrases (to study overlap with party preferences more systematically). The first of these features showed that incumbent parties in both countries (AKP and the Labour Party) enjoyed what is called in the literature the incumbency bonus, receiving more coverage than other parties in their respective systems. However, the amount of coverage individual newspapers gave to parties did not follow their political preferences in the Turkish case, with pro-AKP papers giving more coverage to CHP and pro-CHP papers giving more coverage to AKP. This observation led me to conclude that papers were giving "negative" support to their preferred parties, a phenomenon observed in other national contexts as well, attacking the foes instead of praising the friend. This may arise from the wish of the newspapers to hide their support, or in other words to provide a more subtle form of support so that they can pretend being at equal distance to all, because praise is a more easily detectable form of support.

The second feature showed that Turkish newspapers were sharply divided into two camps, one of which used the abbreviation "AK Parti" much more frequently than the abbreviation "AKP", and the other camp doing just the opposite. Because AKP leaders repeatedly condemned the use of the latter and stated their preference for the former in

strongly worded statements, differences in the use of these two phrases by daily newspapers tell a lot about the papers' political positions. "AK Party" also means "Clean Party" in Turkish, and it is clear why the party leaders prefer this abbreviation. Papers that conformed with the party's preference most probably did so because they too wanted to associate AKP with "cleanliness", and papers that avoided the phrase "AK Party" most probably did so because they did not want to make this association.

A similar situation was observed in the British case as well, with pro-Labour papers using the word "Tory" more frequently when referring to the Conservative Party, and pro-Conservative papers using the word "Conservative", indicating that what we can call politics of naming is not limited to the Turkish case only. Although Conservative leaders, to the best of my knowledge, has not stated a preference for either of the words over the other, they clearly use the word "Conservative" much more frequently compared to the word "Tory" on their official websites, which reflects their preferences.

The third feature was based upon the identification of "most differentiating phrases" between manifestos of two parties and then comparison of newspaper coverages on the basis of these phrases. Manifestos are official party texts issued prior to elections in most democratic countries, and they state parties' promises and stances on various issues. As such, they are the most authoritative sources where we can identify parties's positions on a wide range of issues. The divide observed among Turkish newspapers with regards to the use of "AK Parti" vs. "AKP" was replicated almost in identical form with regards to the use "most differentiating phrases", an observation that lends credibility to the method used and demonstrates its validity. Based upon their bias scores, *Vakit*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Zaman*, *Türkiye*, *Dünya*, *Takvim*, *Star*, and *Sabah* were the pro-AKP papers in the run-up to the 2007 elections, and *Radikal*, *Akşam*, *Milliyet*, *Posta*, *Vatan*, *Hürriyet*, and *Cumhuriyet* were the pro-CHP papers. Practically all Aydın Doğan papers (*Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Vatan*⁸², *Posta*, *Radikal*) preferred CHP to AKP, as well as *Cumhuriyet* and Mehmet Emin Karamehmet's *Akşam*. Of the pro-AKP papers, *Vakit*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Zaman* and *Türkiye* are known to have religious owners, *Sabah* and *Takvim* at the time of the election were managed by the SDIF (Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) because their owner owed money to the state, and *Star*, previously owned by Cem Uzan, was owned by Ethem Sancak and Ali Özmen Safa. The divide between British newspapers was not as

⁸² At the time of the election, *Vatan* was owned by Bağımsız Gazeteciler Yayıncılık, but was later sold to Doğan.

sharp, with British dailies, on the whole, having positions more similar to one another with regards to using parties' "most differentiating phrases". This Chapter also allowed making comparisons between overall levels of parallelism in Turkish and the British press. Contrary to our expectation, the level of parallelism was higher in the Turkish press than in the British press, which long has a tradition of endorsing political parties on election eves.

Another use of the content analysis data offered in Chapter 7 was that it allowed evaluating newspaper contents in terms of how well they conformed with the normative criterion of "comment is free, facts are sacred". Again contrary to our expectation, biased content in newspapers was not limited to opinion pages only, with news articles being just as biased as, and in some cases even more biased than, the opinion articles. Also, different newspapers served bias in different amounts, and in different cups. Some papers offered balance in news and bias in opinion, whereas others did the opposite, offering balance in opinion but bias in news.

A classification of papers in terms of how their biased content was distributed resulted in the following observations: Most Turkish newspapers, including *Vakit*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Türkiye*, *Takvim*, *Star*, *Posta*, *Vatan*, *Hürriyet*, and *Cumhuriyet* were biased both in their news and opinion contents in the run up to the 2007 elections. *Dünya*, *Sabah* and *Zaman* were balanced in their news coverage but biased in their opinion content. *Radikal*, *Akşam* and *Milliyet*, on the other hand, were biased in their news coverage, but served a curiously balanced opinion diet. The category of newspapers balanced in both news and opinion was empty.

The British daily press in the last three elections (2001, 2005, 2010) presented a very different picture. The category of balance in both news and opinion, only a theoretical category in the Turkish case, was the most populous category in the UK, with *Daily Telegraph* and the *Times* representing the category the best. The next most populous category was bias in both news and opinion content, with *Daily Star*, *Financial Times*, and *Independent* best representing the category. Papers where facts were sacred (balanced) and comment was free (biased) made up the third most populous category, represented best by *Guardian*. And finally, the phenomenon of balanced comment and biased news, represented in the Turkish case by the daily *Radikal*, was present in the British case as well, but it was a fairly new phenomenon, with many of the cases being observed in 2010.

Going back to the aims of the study stated in the introductory chapter, the following is in order: With regards to the descriptive aim, we now have a history of political parallelism in the Turkish press both in summary format and in detail, based upon evidence pulled out from books on the history of the Turkish press and presented in tables. We now know that the level of parallelism in 1990s was very high compared to the 1980s, but not as high as it was in the Early Republican period or the WWI years. History of political parallelism in the British press was already heavily studied. This study did not make a claim to have contributed to this area of inquiry, but combined and presented tables of post-war election endorsements, which showed that there was an overall decline in content parallelism in the UK, a conclusion qualified by the differences in the behavior of the different segments of the British press.

With regards to the theoretical aim, we now have an -albeit partial-evaluation of the modernization, commercialization and party system characteristics explanations. The modernization and commercialization explanations only imperfectly fit the historical trends observed in political parallelism in the Turkish and the British press, whereas some of the party system characteristics (polarization and cleavage voting) behaved as expected in both of the cases.

With regards to the methodological aim, the word-count based methodology employed in the content analysis chapter of this study has shown that it indeed is possible to answer some important questions on political parallelism using a quantitative approach that requires no knowledge of the languages spoken in countries under study. Based upon a measure of the overlap between party-produced texts and newspaper-produced texts, the method was able to group papers in terms of their positions towards the main political parties, and then produce an overall measure of political parallelism in the press.

The study, of course, had a number of limitations, both method- and content-wise. The method used in Chapter 4 on the history of political parallelism in the Turkish press was limited by what is already contained in books on press history, which means any repeated mistakes in this literature, omissions, or other deficiencies were replicated in this account as well. Chapter 5 on the history of political parallelism in British press used endorsement data, which present valid information in a summary format on the political positions of newspapers, but which constitute only a tiny portion of the overall content of a newspaper: a couple of lines in a leading article. The content analysis method used in Chapter 7, which used a computerized scheme, had no reliability issues but establishing validity was a challenge. Also, the method used in that chapter produced a summary

measure of the support newspapers gave to individual parties, but provided no other detail as to the form and content of that support.

Content-wise, the British press part of the study was limited to the post-war period, leaving more than two centuries of press history out. The Turkish press part of the study, on the other hand, had the opposite problem: the most recent period of 2000s was studied using only content analysis, leaving significant changes observed in the ownership structure of the Turkish press out of the analysis. A fuller analysis of press-party parallelism in 2000s would need to take these changes into consideration as well.

Notes for Table 4.1

The 8 histories of press that cover this period are those by Selim Nüzhet Gerçek (1931), Hasan Refik Ertuğ (1931), Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), A. Jeltyakov (1979), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri İnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of SNG, HRE, EBŞ, AJ, HB, Nİ2 (there are two works by Nuri İnuğur used in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- In the “Introduction” to *Takvim-i Vakayi*, published five days prior to the first issue of the newspaper, the aims of the paper were laid out. One of these aims was “to let the foreigners learn the official view of the Ottoman government” (Koloğlu, 1981, p. 67, quoted in AK, p. 49). This was taken as evidence that there is pro-government content in *Takvim-i Vakayi*.

2- As many authors note, *Takvim-i Vakayi* was state-owned, the most outright form of organizational connection a newspaper can have.

3- Four authors, EBŞ, AJ, AK, and HB identify *Ceride-i Havadis* as a pro-government paper, although the exact terms they use vary. According to EBŞ, *Ceride-i Havadis* was “pro-government instead of being critical of the government’s actions” (p. 112). AJ describes *Ceride-i Havadis* and its follower, *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis* as “pro-government papers” (p.86). According to AK, *Ceride-i Havadis* “defended the interests of the Ottoman government” (p. 61). Finally, HB argues that “this paper continuously supported the actions of the government” (p.56).

4- All eight authors that cover this period mention that *Ceride-i Havadis* received a monthly payment of 2500 *kuruş*s from the state. Financial aid is a form of organizational connection.

5- *Hakayik-ül Vakayi* was founded in 1870 by Rüştü Bey and Filip Efendi. Nİ2 notes that Filip Efendi was called “journalist of the Sultan” by his colleagues (p. 250). Because the political views or connections of newspaper owners and editors are considered to be a form of organizational connection, *Hakayik-ül Vakayi* had the organization box filled in the table.

6- According to AJ, *Hakayik-ül Vakayi* “did not make its political sympathies or antipathies clear” (p.88), pointing towards an impartial position.

7- HT, AJ, SNG, and EBŞ mention that *Basiret*’s founder Ali Efendi received 300 golden liras worth of aid from the state when the paper was founded in 1869. *Basiret* was published until 1878.

8- During Abdulhamid’s reign, *Basiret* criticized Hüsnü Pasha’s behavior, the governor of Istanbul (HT, Nİ2, HB, EBŞ). Criticism of government or its officials is taken as anti-government content.

9- Because of its criticism of Hüsnü Pasha (see note 8), *Basiret*’s owner Ali Efendi was jailed for four months (HT, Nİ2, HB, EBŞ). Another legal action the paper faced was temporary suspension when it re-published an article originally published in *Levant Herald* on the deficit in Ottoman treasury (AJ, p.91-92). Also see note 15.

10- *Basiret* had two other identifiable political positions, besides being pro- or anti-government. One of these was pro-German, the other conservative. *Basiret* had a pro-German position regarding the French-German war of the times, as mentioned by all eight authors covering the period, and received financial aid and press equipment from

Bismarck as a gift once the war was over. According to AJ, *Basiret* also had “conservative tendencies” (p. 86). AJ quotes Gopdlevskiy, who argues *Basiret* “followed a religious-backward line in internal politics” (p.86).

11- *Muhib-bi Vatan*, owned by Anton Efendi, was also published under the names *Hülasat’ül Efkar*, *Mamalik-i Mahrusa*, *Türkistan*, *Efkar*, and *Mirkat*. The paper was, according to AJ, “like a well behaved tool in the hands of the government” (p. 91).

12- *Muhib-bi Vatan*’s publication was temporarily suspended (HRE, p.225; SNG).

13- According to Nİ2 (p. 249), HB (p. 83), and HRE, *Sadakat* –founded in 1875 and owned by Mehmet Efendi- had a pro-Islamic character.

14- *Utarit*, owned by Abdullah Bey and Musullu Sami, “joined the oppositional stand of *Tasvir-i Efkar* in 1866”, together with *Muhibir* and *Ayine-i Vatan* (Nİ2, p. 204; HB, p. 64). This increase in the number of oppositional papers provoked the infamous Ali Kararname (Decree of Ali) in 1867, which gave the government extraordinary powers “to take preventive measures and punitive actions outside the press law in effect” (quoted from the Decree of Ali Pasha in HB, p. 65) and resulted in the flight of Young Ottomans to Europe.

15- Following Ali Kararname (see note 14), *Muhibir*, *Ayine-i Vatan*, *Utarit*, *İbret*, *Basiret*, *Hülasat’ül Efkar* (*Muhib-bi Vatan*), and *Şark* were closed down by the government (Nİ2, p. 206).

16- According to HB and HRE, conflicting ideas were defended on the pages of *Utarit*: “On the one hand, there was talk of the Sultan’s rights, on the other, articles defending a National Parliament were published” (HB, p. 70; for similar observations, see HRE, p. 212). This was taken as evidence that there is balanced content in *Utarit*.

17- Founded in 1860 by Agah Efendi, *Tercüman-ı Ahval* is described by AJ as follows: “the main organ of the developing bourgeois-liberal opposition” (p. 53).

18- The government, especially its education policy, was criticized on the pages of *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (HB, AJ, Nİ2, HB, HRE, EBŞ).

19- The founder of *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, Agah Efendi, was a prominent member of the Young Ottomans (AJ, AK, HT, Nİ2, HB, HRE, EBŞ).

20- *Tercüman-ı Ahval*’s publication was suspended for two weeks following Ziya Pasha’s articles criticizing the educational policy of the government (EBŞ, Nİ2, HRE, HT, AJ). Later, Agah Efendi had to go to Europe following his Young Ottoman friends (HT, AK, Nİ2, HRE, EBŞ).

21- *Tasvir-i Efkar*, founded in 1862 and owned by Şinasi, is described as an opposition paper by AJ, Nİ2 (p. 204), and HB. AJ argues that “that *Tasvir-i Efkar* was the organ of the political opposition became clear in 1867”, “with the publication of unruly governor of Egypt Mustafa Fazıl Pasha’s letter, in which he asked, speaking in the name of Young Ottomans, for political reform” (p. 56).

22- *Tasvir-i Efkar* criticized the government on many occasions. Educational policy of the government –that natural sciences were not given due attention in schools- and government’s inaction in the face of widespread poverty were among the subjects of criticism (AJ, p. 56). For other examples of government criticism on the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, see HT, Nİ2, HB, HRE, and EBŞ.

23- Şinasi and Namık Kemal, editors and managers of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, as well as its prominent columnists, were also members of the Young Ottomans.

24- Şinasi and Namık Kemal went to Europe fearing prosecution for their political views.

25- *Muhbir*, founded in 1866 and owned by Filip Efendi, is described as an opposition paper by AJ, Nİ2, and HB.

26- Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha criticized the government in their articles published in *Muhbir* (AK, AJ, HT, Nİ2, EBŞ).

27- Ali Suavi, a prominent columnist and manager of *Muhbir*, was a member of the Young Ottomans.

28- The paper's publication was temporarily suspended "for it made a habit of criticizing the government" (HT, p.24). Also, Ali Suavi went to Europe in 1867 with other Young Ottomans, and published *Muhbir* in London as an organ of the Young Ottomans.

29- According to HRE, "the most progressive ideas of the time were published in *Muhbir*" (p. 211).

30- According to AJ, *İbret* was "the first example of [...] oppositional political press." (p. 89) *İbret* was founded in 1871 by Aleksandr Sarrafyan and rented by Namık Kemal in 1872 because Kemal was not able to get a license for himself.

31- According to HT, AJ, Nİ2, HRE, SNG, EBŞ, and HB, many articles criticizing the government were published in *İbret*. AJ mentions articles by Namık Kemal, in which political freedom and citizenship rights were defended and Mahmut Nedim Pasha's government was criticized, and articles attacking the prosecution of newspapers and book censure (p.90).

32- Namık Kemal, responsible manager and leader writer of *İbret*, was also a member of the Young Ottomans.

33- In April 1873, *İbret* was closed down by the government, and Namık Kemal sent to exile in Cyprus, where he stayed until 1876 (HT, AJ, Nİ2, HRE, SNG, EBŞ, HB).

34- Founded in 1866 by Eğribozlu Mehmet Arif Bey, *Ayine-i Vatan* was also published under the names *Vatan*, *Ruzname-i Ayine-i Vatan*, and *Istanbul*. Nİ2 and HB describe *Ayine-i Vatan* as an opposition paper. See note 14.

35- According to HRE and HB, *Ayine-i Vatan* "used to criticize the government and support the Young Ottomans" (HRE, p. 212; HB, p. 70).

36- "The publication of *Ayine-i Vatan*, *Vatan*, *Istanbul*, *Muhib*, *Kevkeb-i Şarki* and other newspapers was suspended many times following the Ali Kararname of 1867 (AJ, p. 85; see note 14 for Ali Kararname).

37- According to Nİ2 and HB, articles criticizing the government were published on the pages of *Terakki*, founded in 1868 and owned by Ali Raşit and Filip Efendi.

38- In 1870 and 1874 *Terakki*'s publication was temporarily suspended (Nİ2, HB, AK, HRE).

39- AJ mentions *Terakki* among the "moderate liberal papers" (p. 87).

40- "On foreign political issues, *Terakki* defended pro-French views, and entered into polemics with the pro-German *Basiret*" (AJ, p. 87).

41- Founded in 1869 by Aşir Efendi, *Hadika* was rented by Ebuzziya Tevfik in 1872, and published many articles criticizing the government, including those on "the reasons

for Turkey's backwardness" (AJ, p. 58). HRE, Nİ2, and HB also mention that there was criticism of government on the pages of *Hadika*.

42- For its critical content, the publication of *Hadika* was temporarily suspended (AJ, Nİ2, HB, HRE, SNG) and Ebuzziya Tevfik exiled (Nİ2, HB, HRE, SNG).

43- Founded by Teodor Kasab in 1875, who also owned satirical titles, *İstikbal*'s publication was suspended for four months in 1876 (AJ, p. 92).

44- See note 36.

45- Founded in 1869 by Mutasarrıf Bursalı Şakir Bey, *Vakayi-i Zaptiye* had a "semi-official character" (Nİ2, HB, HRE, SNG).

46- Owned by an Italian named Bordiyano, *Şark* published "articles that attacked Namık Kemal and his friends", who represented the opposition to the Sultan (AJ, p.91).

47- See note 15.

48- Founded by Mustafa Refik Bey in 1863, *Mir'at* lasted three issues only and published parts of Montesquieu's "Reflections on the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire", which, at the time, was "considered to be a criticism of the Ottoman political institutions" (AJ, p. 58).

49- Mustafa Refik Bey, owner of *Mir'at*, was a member of the Young Ottomans (AJ, EBŞ).

50- Founded in 1870 by Ahmet Mithat Efendi and published under the name *Bedir* when it was closed, the paper criticized Ali Kararname (Nİ2, p. 248; see note 14) and Mithat Pasha (HB, p. 75).

51- *Devir* was closed down the first day it was issued. Its follower, *Bedir*, was also closed down by the government (Nİ2, HRE, HB).

52- Owned by Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Sirac* published an article titled "Our government cannot live without debt" (AJ, p. 91).

53- Following the article criticizing the government's debts, *Sirac* was closed down (AJ; SNG, p. 62; HB, p.79; EBŞ, p. 154).

54- Published in 1874 by Eğribozlu Mehmet Arif Bey, *Medeniyet* was closed down by the government after publishing a caricature of Sultan Abdülaziz (Nİ2, p. 248).

55- See note 36.

Notes for Table 4.2

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), A. Jeltyakov (1979), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri İnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of EBŞ, AJ, HB, Nİ2 (there are two works by Nuri İnuğur used in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* and *Saadet* received monthly financial aid from the state. *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, founded in 1878 and owned by Ahmet Mithat Efendi, received 120.000 *kuruşs*, whereas *Saadet* received 36.000 (AJ, p. 114; Nİ2).

2- According to HT, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* was a progressive paper (p. 66).

3- According to Nİ2, *Tarık*, *Ayine-i Vatan (İstanbul)*, *Saadet*, and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* were among the papers that received financial aid from the state.

4- *Sabah*, founded in 1876 and owned by Mihran Efendi, “was a platform for the defense of the oppression regime”, according to HB (p. 83).

5- *Sabah*'s publication was temporarily suspended for a typographical error: “Şevketlu Abdülhamid” (His Majesty Abdulhamid) was misspelled as “şu kötü Abdülhamid” (that bad Abdülhamid), with the drop of the Arabic letter “lam” (Nİ2, p. 266).

6- AJ describes *Takvim-i Vakayi* in this period as a “semi-official paper” (p. 114).

7- *Takvim-i Vakayi* was owned and staffed by the state.

8- “*Takvim-i Vakayi* was [...] among the papers closed down in March 1878, when the Ottoman Parliament was disassembled” (AJ, p. 114). According to Nİ2, the reason for *Takvim-i Vakayi*'s closure was a typographical error.

9- *İkdam*'s owner, Ahmet Cevdet, “formed a close relationship with the Palace, and succeeded in keeping this relationship for many years to come” (HT, p. 68). For similar observations, see HB (p. 129) and Nİ2 (p. 284).

10- *İkdam*'s publication was suspended several times for typographical errors. In one occasion, the phrase “leyle-i mes’ude” (happy night) was misspelled as “leyle-i mesude” (black night) in an article on the anniversary on Abdülhamid's enthronement, with the drop of the Arabic letter “ayn” (HB, p. 127; EBS, p. 221).

11- Ali Suavi's last article before his failed attempt to overthrow Abdülhamid II was published in *Basiret* (HT, EBS, Nİ2, AK, AJ).

12- After the Ali Suavi incident (see note 11), *Basiret* was closed down by the government and its owner, Ali Efendi, was exiled (HT, EBS, Nİ2, AK, AJ).

13- *Vakit* criticized Istanbul's police chief Bahri Paşa (AJ, p. 114).

14- Following Bahri Paşa criticism (see note 13), *Vakit* was closed down (AJ, p. 114; HB, p. 82).

15- According to AJ, *Saadet* followed an anti-Young Ottoman political line (p. 119).

16- See note 1.

17- AJ argues that “the most reactionary social forces who opposed everything that was new not only in literature but in all areas of life and defended the preservation of feudal-Islamic traditions gathered around *Saadet*” (p.119).

18- See note 3.

19- *Tarık* was closed down by the government in 1899 (AJ, p. 118).

20- *Malumat*'s owner, Baba Tahir, had a close relationship with the Sultan (Nİ2, p. 268).

21- Yunus Nadi, who at the time was a columnist of *Malumat*, wrote against the Sultan in his articles (HT, p.103; Nİ2, p. 339).

22- Yunus Nadi was exiled to Midilli (Lesvos) in 1901 (HT, p. 103; Nİ2, p. 339).

Notes for Table 4.3

The 5 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri İnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of EBS, HB, Nİ2 (there are two works by Nuri İnuğur used in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- *Tanin*, founded in 1908 by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tevfik Fikret, and Hüseyin Kazım, is described as a pro-CUP paper by all five authors covering this period (EBŞ, p. 175; HB, p. 158; HT, p. 83; AK, p. 134; Nİ2, p. 308).

2- *Tanin*'s owner and chief columnist Hüseyin Cahit was a member of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives from Union and Progress Party (HT, Nİ2, AK, HB). In 1914, the party officially became the owner of the paper (AK, HB, Nİ2).

3- *Tanin*'s building was looted by the mob during the March 31 incident (HT, EBŞ, HB, Nİ2, AK).

4- According to Nİ2 (p. 315) and HB (p. 168), *Tanin* was a pan-Turkist paper.

5- All five authors agree that *Şura-yı Ümmet* was a pro-CUP paper (HT, p. 83; Nİ2, p. 311; HB, p. 158; EBŞ, p. 172; AK).

6- *Şura-yı Ümmet* was among the papers looted by the mob during the March 31 incident (HT, Nİ2, HB, EBŞ, AK).

7- According to EBŞ, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, re-published by Ebuzziya Tevfik and Süleyman Nazif in 1908 and having nothing to do with Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkar*, was a pro-CUP paper.

8- According to AK, *Tasvir-i Efkar*'s owner, Ebuzziya Tevfik, was a supporter of the Union and Progress.

9- EBŞ gives the following list of pro-CUP papers in this period: *Vakit, Tasvir-i Efkar, Millet, İttifak, İttihad, Basiret, Payitaht, Servet, Ahali, İstiklal, Metin, Saadet, Zaman* (p. 173).

10- See note 9.

11- According to EBŞ, *Sabah* and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* "seemed to be impartial" (p. 175). According to Nİ2, "the papers that remained impartial in this period were *Sabah* and *Saadet*" (p. 307).

12- According to Nİ2 (p. 281) and EBŞ (p. 147) *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* in this period was at first impartial, than became anti-CUP. According to HB, on the other hand, the paper was at first pro-CUP, then became impartial, and then turned anti-CUP (p. 124).

13- See note 12.

14- HT describes *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* in this period as "trying to remain impartial" (p. 84). Also see notes 11 and 12.

15- *Sırat-ı Müstakim* had a pro-Islamic political stand (HT, Nİ2, HB, EBŞ).

16- *Mizan*, owned by the historian Murat Bey, was an anti-CUP paper according to HT (p. 83), Nİ2 (p. 310), and EBŞ (p. 173).

17- According to AK, *Mizan, İkdam, Osmanlı, and Serbesti* at first supported the protestors in March 31 incident, but then changed position when the Operation Army approached Istanbul (p. 136).

18- According to AK (p. 136) and HB (p. 174), *Mizan*'s owner Murat Bey had anti-CUP political views.

19- One of *Mizan*'s columnists, Zeki Bey, was assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (p. 176). Following the March 31 incident, *Mizan* was closed down and its owner, Murat Bey, was exiled to Rhodes (HB, p. 174).

20- Nİ2 (p. 311) and HB (p. 176) describe *Volkan*, owned by Derviş Vahdeti, as an anti-CUP paper.

21- *Volkan* was the chief propagator of the events known as March 31 incident (AK, Nİ2, EBŞ, HB).

22- *Volkan* was an organ of the association of İttihad-ı Muhammedi (Nİ2, p. 311), which played a prominent role in the March 31 incident.

23- Derviş Vahdeti, *Volkan*'s owner, was sentenced to death penalty after the March 31 incident and executed (EBŞ, p. 172).

24- HT (p. 84) and Nİ2 (p. 311) describe *Volkan* as a “reactionary” paper.

25- HB (p. 158) and EBŞ describe *Serbesti*, owned by Mevlanazade Rıfat, as an anti-CUP paper. EBŞ's list of anti-CUP papers also includes *Hukuk-u Umumiye*, *Osmanlı Millet*, and *Sada-i Millet* (p. 172).

26- See note 17.

27- In April 1909, the leader writer of *Serbesti*, Hasan Fehmi, was assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (EBŞ, HB, HT, Nİ2, AK).

28- According to HT (p. 83), Nİ2 (p. 310), HB (p. 158), and EBŞ (p. 172), *Hukuk-u Umumiye* was an anti-CUP paper.

29- *Hukuk-u Umumiye* was closed down after a short publication period by the CUP government (Nİ2, p. 310).

30- HT (p. 83), Nİ2 (p. 310), HB (p. 175), and EBŞ (p. 172) classify *Sada-i Millet*, owned by the parliamentarian Kozmidis, among the anti-CUP papers of this period.

31- Ahmed Samim, leader writer of *Sada-i Millet*, was also assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (EBŞ, HB, HT, Nİ2, AK).

32- Nİ2 (p. 310) and HB (p. 175) note that *Sada-i Millet* was an organ of the Democratic Party (Fırka-i İbad).

33- Nİ2 (p. 307) and EBŞ (p. 175) note that *İkdam* became a strong anti-CUP paper after Ali Kemal was made the leader writer.

34- HB (p. 130) and Nİ2 (p. 307) note that *İkdam* published articles criticizing CUP policies, especially the censure of the press that the CUP re-introduced after a brief period in power. Also see note 17.

35- Nİ2 (p. 307) and HB (p. 130) argue that *İkdam* defended the Liberal Party's (Ahrar Fırkası) views.

36- See note 25.

37- Founded by Süleyman Nazif in 1877, *Osmanlı* published articles criticizing CUP policies in this period (HB, p. 175). Also see note 17.

38- According to HT, Nİ2, and HB, *Osmanlı* defended the views of the Liberal Party (Ahrar Fırkası).

39- Nİ2 (p. 311) and HB (p. 175) note that articles criticizing CUP policies were published in *Yeni Gazete*, which was owned by Abdullah Zühtü.

40- AK (p. 135) argues that this paper was a supporter of Sadrazam Kamil Pasha.

41- According to Nİ2, the capital for *Yeni Gazete* was provided by Kamil Pasha's son Said Pasha (p. 311). Also see note 40.

42- Founded in 1911 by Refi Cevat Ulunay and Pehlivan Kadri, *Alemdar* was closed down after Mahmut Şevket Pasha was assassinated, and Refi Cevat was exiled first to Sinop, then to Çorum and Konya.

43- HB (p. 184) notes that *İştirak*, founded in 1910 by Hüseyin Hilmi, was closed down by the government in 1912.

44- HT (p. 95) and HB (p. 183) use the word "leftist" to describe this paper, and Nİ2 uses "socialist" (p. 327).

45- Nİ2 (p. 327) notes that *İştirak* was an organ of the Ottoman Socialist Party. *İştirak*'s owner, Hüseyin Hilmi, was also the founder of the party (EBŞ; p. 175).

46- See note 9.

47- See note 9.

48- See note 9.

49- See note 9.

50- See note 9.

51- See note 9.

52- See note 9.

53- See note 9.

54- See note 9.

55- Nİ2 notes that "*Servet-i Fünun*, started to be published daily by Ahmet İhsan, is considered to be impartial" (p. 307).

56- See note 9.

57- *Saadet*, published by Mehmet Efendi and his son Fehmi, "remained impartial in this period" (Nİ2, p. 307).

58- AK and Nİ2 (p. 322) note that one of *Şehrah*'s columnists, Zeki Bey, was among the journalists assassinated by the pro-CUP gunmen.

59- Nİ2 (p. 325) notes that *Şehrah* was an organ of the Freedom and Unity Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası).

60- *Tanzimat*'s owner Lütfü Fkri had, according to Nİ2 (p. 335), an anti-CUP political stand. The paper was also published under the names *Zühre*, *Matbuat*, *Merih*, *Islahat*, *Meşrik*, *Tesirat*, *Takdirat*, *Teşkilat*, *Teminat*, and *İfham*.

61- Nİ2 notes that *Tanzimat*'s owner Lütfü Fikri was also the founder of Moderate Pro-Freedom Party (Mutedil Hürriyetperver Fırka) (p. 335).

62- Published also under the names *Türkiye*, *Selamet-i Umumiye*, *Genç Türk*, *Yeni Ses*, and *Hür Memleket*, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was published by the Democratic Party (EBŞ, p. 175).

Notes for Table 4.4

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri İnuğur (1993), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı

(2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of EBŞ, HB, Nİ2 (there are two works by Nuri İnuğur used in this study), OK, HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- Founded in 1919 by Celal Nuri İleri and Suphi Nuri İleri, *Atı* is classified as a pro-National Struggle (NS) paper by HT (p. 98), Nİ2 (p. 337), HB (p. 203), and AK (p. 135). HT's (p. 98) and Nİ2's (p. 337) lists of pro-NS papers also include *Yeni Gün*, *Akşam*, and *Vakit*. AK's list, which is longer, includes *Vakit*, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, *Akşam*, *İkdam*, *Tecüman-ı Hakikat*, and *Tanin* (p. 135). HB gives the longest list for pro-NS Istanbul papers, which, she argues, except for *Alemdar*, *Peyam-ı Sabah* and *Türkçe İstanbul*, "did not stand against the national struggle, and what is more, did their best to support it in the face of censure and suppression" (p. 203). These papers were –in addition to *İleri-Tasvir-i Efkar*, *İkdam*, *Sebilürreşat*, *Vakit*, *Zaman*, *Yeni Gün*, *Akşam*, *İstikbal*, *Tarık*, *İfham*, *Memleket*, and *Tan*.

2- HT notes that Mustafa Kemal sent the news he wanted published to *İleri*, and the paper published them with different bylines. OK, Nİ2, HB, and EBŞ also note that *İleri*'s coverage was supportive of the NS in Anatolia.

3- HB notes that *İleri* "was among the papers financially supported by the Anatolian government" (p. 211). One of the owners, Celal Nuri İleri was a member of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives, and later of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in its first through fourth terms (OK, p. 13; EBŞ, p. 223).

4- Celal Nuri was among those exiled to Malta in 1920 by the English for their support of the NS (HT, p. 102; Nİ2, p. 338).

5- According to HB (p. 211) and Nİ2 (p. 338), *İleri* also had an anti-CUP political stand in this period.

6- Founded by Yunus Nadi in 1918 and published in Ankara under the name *Anadolu'da Yeni Gün*, this paper is classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, Nİ2, AK, HB (see note 1), and EBŞ (p. 198).

7- *Yeni Gün* published an interview with Mustafa Kemal on 12 October 1919 (HT, p. 103). The paper's headline before the Battle of Sakarya was as follows: "Eskişehir kapını Yunan'ı bekliyor ve içeriye almak üzeredir. Zafer Allah'la beraber olan bizledir" ("The trap of Eskişehir is waiting for the Greek, and is about to close. Victory is with us, for we are with God.") (OK, p. 27). Nİ2, HB, and EBŞ also note that *Yeni Gün*'s coverage was supportive of the NS.

8- *Yeni Gün*'s owner, Yunus Nadi, was a member of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives (HT, p. 103), and a personal friend of Mustafa Kemal's (Nİ2, p. 340).

9- *Yeni Gün* was closed down by the occupation forces for its pro-NS line (Nİ2, p. 340; HB, p. 214; EBŞ, p. 198).

10- Founded in 1918 by Necmettin Sadak, Kazım Şinasi Dersan, Ali Naci Karacan, and Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Akşam* is classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, Nİ2, AK, HB (see note 1), OK (p. 14) and EBŞ (p. 225).

11- "The paper suggested that the readers 'trust the power and the devotion of the National Forces, who are the saviors of the country.' " (HT, p.101, also see for other examples of pro-NS content in *Akşam*) On September 1921, *Akşam*'s headline was as follows: "Cenab-ı Hakka hamdolsun, kahraman milli ordumuz düşmanı tamamıyla tarumar etti." ("Thank God, Our brave national army has completely destroyed the

enemy”) (OK, p. 27). EBŞ, Nİ2, and HB also note that *Akşam*’s coverage was supportive of the NS.

12- Kazım Şinasi, Necmettin Sadak, Falih Rıfki, and Ali Naci, owners and columnists of *Akşam*, had a strong reputation as pro-NS journalists, so much so that they were referred to as “Mustafa Kemal’s princes” in the Istanbul press (Nİ2, p. 86).

13- Falih Rıfki, a columnist of *Akşam* at the time, was arrested by late Ottoman authorities and tried in the War Tribunal called Kürt Mustafa Harp Divanı for supporting the NS in Anatolia (Nİ2, p. 339; HB, p. 216).

14- Founded in 1917 by Ahmet Emin Yalman and Mehmet Asım Us, *Vakit* is classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, Nİ2, AK, HB (see note 1), and EBŞ (p. 190).

15- *Vakit* had the following headline on October 19, 1919, after İzmir’s occupation by the Greek: “İzmir şehidlerinin ruhuna Fatiha” (“May God forgive the martyrs of İzmir”) (OK, p. 13). HB (p. 207) and Nİ2 also note that *Vakit*’s coverage was supportive of the National Forces.

16- Asım Us, who had a strong reputation as a pro-NS journalist in these days, later served in the TGNA from its 3rd through 8th terms (HT, p. 106).

17- Mehmet Asım Us was tried in the Kürt Mustafa War Tribunal as the leader writer of *Akşam* for supporting the National Forces (Nİ2, p. 361); and Ahmet Emin Yalman, one of the owners of the paper, was exiled to Malta by the English (HT, p. 106; Nİ2, p. 341; HB, p. 211).

18- Re-published by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in 1922, *Tanin* is classified as a pro-NS paper by AK (p. 135).

19- *Tanin* made its pro-NS position clear by the editorial in its first issue, written by İsmail Müştak Mayokan (HT, p. 117).

20- Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Tanin*’s owner, was among those exiled to Malta by the English (AK, p. 135; EBŞ, p. 190; Nİ2, HB).

21- According to HT (p. 98), Nİ2 (p. 347), and HB, *Tanin* continued to be pro-CUP in this period.

22- *Tasvir-i Efkar* was classified as a pro-NS paper by AK, HB (see note 1), and OK (p. 14). HT describes the political position of the paper in this period as “NS sympathizer” (p. 98), different from NS supporters proper. HT’s list of sympathizers also includes *İstiklal*, *İkdam*, and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*. In a similar account, Nİ2 describes this paper as a “sympathizer”, “who sometimes supported one, and sometimes supported the other” (p. 344). Nİ2’s list of sympathizers also includes *İkdam* and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*.

23- *Tasvir-i Efkar* was the paper that published Mustafa Kemal’s picture during the National Struggle first (HT, p. 116). The paper also published an interview with Mustafa Kemal, conducted over the telegraph (HT, p. 116). Following the Greek occupation of Bursa, *Tasvir-i Efkar*’s headline on 15 July 1920 was as follows: “Fatihlerin Yavuzların türbelerini bırakıp gidecek misiniz?” (“Are you going to leave Fatih’s and Yavuz’s tombs and go?”). Nİ2 (p. 343), HB (p. 203) and EBŞ (p. 190) also note the pro-NS content of *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

24- Founded in 1921 by Sedat Simavi, *Payitaht* is described as a pro-NS paper by Nİ2 (p. 115) Sedat Simavi also published *Dersaadet* in this period.

25- *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* in this period is classified as a pro-NS paper by AK (see note 1) and HB (p. 217), and as an NS sympathizer by HT and Nİ2 (see note 22).

26- Nİ2 (p. 347) and HB (p. 217) note that *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*'s coverage was supportive of the National Forces.

27- Mustafa Kemal wrote un-signed editorials for *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, laying the principles and initial formulations of the National Struggle (Nİ2, HB, EBŞ). The paper's title is translated into English as "National Sovereignty".

28- *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, published in Ankara, was the organ of the National Struggle, owned first by the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, then by the Republican People's Party (CHP) (HT, HB, EBŞ, Nİ2, OK, AK).

29- HB includes *Sebilürreşat* in her list of pro-NS papers (See note 1). Nİ2 also notes that the paper supported the national struggle.

30- Most of the columnists of *Sebilürreşat*, also published under the names *Beyan-ül Hak* and *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, had pro-Islamic political views (HT, p. 98; HB, p. 220; Nİ2, p. 350). EBŞ notes that *Sebilürreşat* was published by the Second Group, the opposition to Mustafa Kemal in the first Grand National Assembly (p. 202).

31- HB and AK include *İkdam* in their lists of pro-NS papers (see note 1), and HT and Nİ2 in their lists of sympathizers (see note 22).

32- *İkdam*'s headline on 14 April 1921 was as follows: "Mustafa Kemal Anadolu'ya hayat vermiştir." ("Mustafa Kemal gave new life to Anatolia.") (HT, p. 114). HB (p. 205) and EBŞ also note that the coverage of *İkdam* was supportive of the NS.

33- According to Nİ2 (p. 347) and HB (p. 213), *İkdam* was, in the beginning of the National Struggle, "in the middle."

34- Mihran Efendi's paper *Sabah* was named *Peyam-ı Sabah* in 1920 and its management was left to Peyam's leader writer Ali Kemal. *Peyam-ı Sabah* is classified as an anti NS paper by EBŞ (p. 191), HT (p. 98), Nİ2 (p. 276), HB (p. 119), OK (p. 12), and AK. HT's (p. 98), Nİ2's (p. 341), and HB's (p. 203) lists of anti-NS papers also include *Alemdar* and *Türkçe İstanbul*.

35- According to HB (p. 119), HT (p. 109), EBŞ (p. 191), and Nİ2 (p. 344), *Peyam-ı Sabah*'s content had an anti-NS character.

36- Ali Kemal, leader writer of *Peyam-ı Sabah*, served as the Minister of National Education and Minister of Internal Affairs (HT, p. 107).

37- Once the war was over, Mihran Efendi, *Peyam-ı Sabah*'s owner, "sold everything he had, and fled to Europe" (HT, p. 109; Nİ2, p. 278). Leader writer Ali Kemal was lynched by a mob when under arrest, due to the negligence of the authorities (HT, OK, EBŞ, HB, Nİ2).

38- According to HB (p. 120), *Peyam-ı Sabah* was an organ of the Freedom and Unity Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası).

39- According to HT, Nİ2, HB (see note 34), OK (p. 19), AK, and EBŞ (p. 191), *Alemdar* was an anti-NS paper.

40- HT gives examples from *Alemdar* showing its anti-NS position, like the following: "Bu millet İttihatçıları ve Kuvayı Milliye'yi istemiyor. İnşallah onların kafasına adalet kazmasının indigini yakında göreceğiz." ("This nation does not want the CUP men nor

the National Forces. We will hopefully see the axe of justice falling on their heads.”) (p. 112). HB (p. 231) and Nİ2 (p. 342) also note the anti-NS coverage of *Alemdar*.

41- *Alemdar*'s owner, Refi Cevat Ulunay, was included in the list of 150 personae non gratae of Turkey (EBŞ, p. 191; HT, p. 112; OK, p. 53; Nİ2, p. 342).

42- According to Nİ2 (p. 342) and HB (p. 230), *Alemdar* had an anti-CUP position in this period.

43- See note 40.

44- According to HT, *Alemdar*'s owner, Refi Cevat Ulunay “had two big enemies: Union and Progress, and the National Forces” (p. 112).

45- Nİ2, HB, and HT (see note 34) include *Türkçe İstanbul* in their lists of anti-NS papers.

46- Nİ2 (p. 341), HB (p. 227), and EBŞ (p. 191) note that *Türkçe İstanbul*'s coverage was anti-NS.

47- *Türkçe İstanbul*'s owner Sait Molla was also included in the list of 150 personae non gratae of Turkey (OK, p. 53; HT).

48- Nİ2 (p. 341) notes that *Türkçe İstanbul* was a supporter of Freedom and Unity Party.

49- Sait Molla was a member of the Association of Friends of England in Turkey (İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti), and a supporter of Freedom and Unity Party (HT; HB, p. 228).

50- OK notes that *Serbesti*'s owner Mevlanazade Rıfat's name was included in the list of 150 personae non gratae of Turkey.

51- Mevlanazade Rıfat, *Serbesti*'s owner, was a member of the Freedom and Unity Party (OK, p. 53).

52- Published in Ankara in 1921 by Abdülgani Ahmet Bey, *Öğüt* was described as a pro-NS paper by Nİ2 (p. 353), EBŞ (p. 200), and HB (p. 260).

53- HB (p. 261) notes that *Öğüt*'s content had a pro-NS character.

54- Published by İsmail Hami Danişmend, *Hukuk-u Beşer* had pro-NS content on its pages, the most famous example of which is Osman Nevres's (i.e. Hasan Tahsin) articles, who is known to have started the armed resistance against the Greek occupation of İzmir (HT, p. 118; OK, p. 66; Nİ2, p. 352).

55- See note 55.

56- *Minber* contained news on Mustafa Kemal in almost all of its issues, Mustafa Kemal wrote unsigned articles for the paper (Nİ2, p. 20), and, as HT notes (p. 117), the paper published anti-mandate, pro-NS articles.

57- Part of the capital for *Minber*'s publication was personally provided by Mustafa Kemal (HT, p. 117; Nİ2, p. 17).

58- About the position of *Minber* towards the CUP, there are two conflicting accounts: HT argues that “the paper ran a large scale campaign against the CUP” (p. 117); whereas Nİ2 argues that one of the reasons for *Minber*'s publication was “to prevent the unfounded attacks against the CUP, of which Fethi Bey [official owner of the paper and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal's] was a former member” (p. 19). In an article devoted to

the paper and its position towards the CUP, Tevetoğlu (1988) reaches the conclusion, after a close reading of the articles published in the paper, that overall *Minber* was critical of the CUP and its activities (Tevetoğlu, 1988).

59- Nİ2 notes that *Minber* was founded to defend the views of Ottoman Pro-Freedom People's Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası) (p. 19), which was founded by the paper's official owner, Ali Fethi Okyar, and which shared offices with the paper (Nİ2, p. 17). Also see note 58.

60- Owned by Mehmet Tevfik Efendi, *Hadisat* published Süleyman Nazif's famous article "A Black Day" ("Kara Bir Gün") when Istanbul was occupied (OK)

61- Süleyman Nazif was exiled to Malta after his article "A Black Day" (See note 60).

62- HB includes *İstiklal* in her list of pro-NS papers (see note 1), and HT in his list of sympathizers (see note 22).

63- HT (p. 115) gives a pro-mandate example from this paper: "Amerika Kabul etmezse, İngiltere'ye veya başka bir memlekete manda teklif edilmelidir." ("If the US refuses, then we should offer mandate to Britain or to another country.") (Leader writer Rauf Ahmed).

64- See note 1.

65- See note 1.

66- Not to be confused with Ali Şükrü Bey's *Tan* in Ankara, this *Tan* was published in Istanbul and is included in HB's list of pro-NS Istanbul papers (See note 1).

67- According to HB (p. 224) *Tan* defended British mandate for Turkey.

68- See note 1.

79- See note 1.

70- According to HB (p. 225), this paper was an organ of the National Turkish Party (Milli Türk Partisi) and defended American mandate.

71- HT gives the following pro-NS example from *Seyyare-i Yeni Dünya*, published in Ankara: "We are receiving news from all around the country that our soldiers are fighting with a great enthusiasm" (p. 136).

72- HB (p. 284) and EBS (p. 195) note that *Seyyare-i Yeni Dünya* was a pro-Çerkes Ethem paper, who was a prominent leader of irregular forces in the national struggle, and named a traitor when he refused to join the regular army being formed.

73- Oral (1968, p. 89) notes that under the title of the paper, the following quote from the Communist Manifesto regularly appeared: "Workers of the world, unite!" ("Dünyanın fikara-i kasibesi birleşiniz.")

74- The paper's owner, Arif Oruç, was known for his pro-communist views (Oral, 1968, p. 89).

75- *İdrak*, founded in 1919 by İştirakçi Hilmi, was a leftist paper (HT, p. 95).

76- İştirakçi Hilmi, owner of the paper, is also the founder of the short lived Turkish Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası) (HT, p. 95).

77- Published by Mahmut Sadık, *Yeni Gazete* was a pro-American mandate paper (HB, p. 224).

78- *Emek*, published in Ankara, was an organ of the People's Socialist Party (Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası) (HT, p. 48, citing from K Yust, *Anatoliskaya Peçat* [Anadolu Basını], Tiflis, 1922)

79- Published in Ankara by Salih Hoca, Erzurum representative in the first GNA, *Şarkın Sesi* supported the opposition against Mustafa Kemal in the Parliament (HB, p. 320; EBŞ, p. 202).

80- Published in Ankara by Ali Şükrü Bey, Trabzon representative in the first GNA, *Tan* (not to be confused with *Tan* published in Istanbul, see note 66) “supported the Second Group, that is to say, the conservatives” (HB, p. 321).

81- *Tan*'s owner, Trabzon representative Ali Şükrü Bey was one of the leaders of the Second Group in the first GNA (EBŞ, p. 203).

Notes for Table 4.5

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBŞ, Nİ, OK, HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- OK (p. 55) and EBŞ (p. 222) describe *Vakit* as a pro-government paper.

2- *Vakit* did not publish the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter, which was sent by prominent Indian Muslim leaders Aga Khan and Emir Ali to Istanbul newspapers in 1923, addressing Prime Minister İsmet Pasha and asking the caliphate to be retained. The papers that did publish the letter were *Tanin*, *İkdam*, and *Tevhid-i Efkar* (HT, p. 144; Nİ, p. 46; OK, p. 61; EBŞ, p. 234). *Vatan* and *Akşam*, along with *Vakit*, did not publish the letter. Asked in the trial (see note 17) about their decision not to publish, *Akşam* and *Vakit*'s managers said it was because the letter did not fit their political views, whereas *Vatan*'s manager said that they did not have the letter (HT, p. 145).

3- Mehmet Asım Us, *Vakit*'s leader writer, served in the TGNA from its 3rd through 8th terms (OK, p. 71). Other journalists who served in the Parliament in this period included Falih Rıfki Atay (*Ulus*), Yunus Nadi (*Cumhuriyet*), Hakkı Tarık Us (*Vakit*), Mahmut Soydan (*Milliyet*, *Politika*, *İnkılap*), and Ahmet Cevdet (*İkdam*) (OK, p. 71).

4- FSO (p. 76) and EBŞ (p. 225) describe *Akşam* in this period as a pro-government paper.

5- *Akşam*, along with *Vakit*, did not publish the Ağa Han & Emir Ali letter for political reasons. See note 2.

6- *Akşam*'s leader writer Necmettin Sadak also served in the TGNA (EBŞ, p. 225).

7- Founded in 1925 by Atatürk's directive, with capital from İşbank (Nİ, p. 83) and under the management of Mahmut Soydan, Siirt representative in the TGNA, *Milliyet* “became a semi-official paper of the government” (FSO, p. 79). OK also describes *Milliyet* as a pro-CHP paper.

8- In 1926, Atatürk's memoir was published in *Milliyet*, with the byline Mahmut and Falih Rıfki, dictated to them by Atatürk in person (EBŞ, p. 231).

9- *Milliyet*'s manager, Mahmut Soydan, was a member of the TGNA (Nİ, p. 83; EBŞ, p. 231; FSO, p. 79; OK, p. 71).

10- *Cumhuriyet*, published in Istanbul by Yunus Nadi, “became the most authoritative representative of the Republican regime in Istanbul” (Nİ, p. 69), and “a defender of the Turkish reforms” (FSO, p. 77).

11- Mustafa Kemal chose the name for Yunus Nadi’s paper himself (Nİ, p. 64; OK, p. 62; EBŞ, p. 228), who was a personal friend of his.

12- Published from 1925 to 1929 by Selim Ragıp and Ekrem Bey, *Son Saat* is described by OK as “close to the People’s Party” (p. 63).

13- Celal Nuri İleri, *İleri*’s owner, served in the 1st through 5th terms of the TGNA (HT, p. 102).

14- *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* became the organ of the CHP when the party was founded (FSO, p. 74).

15- See note 3.

16- *İkdam* was one of the papers that published the Ağa Han & Emir Ali letter (See note 2).

17- Ahmet Cevdet, *İkdam*’s owner, was among the journalists tried in the Istanbul Tribunal of Independence, along with Hüseyin Cahit –*Tanin*’s leader writer- and Velid Ebuuzziya –*Tevhid-i Efkar*’s leader writer-, which was formed at the request of the Prime Minister İnönü following the controversy around caliphate in 1923. The journalists were all acquitted (HT, p. 145; Nİ, p. 46; EBŞ, p. 234; OK, p. 61; HB, p. 126).

18- EBŞ (p. 234) and FSO (p. 120) describe *Tanin* in this period as an opposition paper. FSO’s list of opposition papers also includes *Tevhid-i Efkar* and *Vatan*.

19- *Tanin* was among the papers that published the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter (See note 2). *Tanin*’s pro-caliphate content in these days also included a letter by Istanbul Bar Association’s President Lütü Fikri, who was a former member of the Parliament, addressed at the Caliph himself and asking him not to resign (HT, p. 144; Nİ, p. 45), and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s articles, in one of which he argued “If we let go of the Caliphate, Turkey, with its population of 5-10 millions, will become a minor player in the Islamic world” (HT, p. 144). *Tanin*’s coverage of the Progressive Republican Party’s (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TCF) activities –the first opposition party to be founded in the history of the Republic- was also sympathetic: It gave the news of police investigation in TCF headquarters using a strong language, describing it as a “police raid” (HT, p. 149).

20- *Tanin*’s leader writer Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was known for his anti-government (EBŞ, p. 225) and pro-caliphate (HT, p. 143) political views.

21- For its pro-opposition stand, *Tanin* and its owner Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın faced prosecution. Yalçın was tried in Istanbul Tribunal of Independence for his pro-caliphate views in 1923 (see note 17) and in Ankara Tribunal of Independence in 1925 for his pro-TCF views (see note 19), where he was sentenced to exile in Çorum, a small Anatolian town at the time (Nİ, p. 55). *Tanin* was closed down following the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu), passed in 1925, along with *Vatan*, *Tevhid-i Efkar*, *Son Telgraf*, *İstiklal*, *Sebilürreşat*, *Aydınlık*, and *Orak-Çekiç* (HT, p. 148; Nİ, p. 53; OK, p. 63).

22- FSO (see note 18) and EBŞ (p. 234) describe *Vatan* in this period as an opposition paper.

23- *Vatan* did not publish the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter because the letter did not reach them (see note 2), but there was pro-caliphate content on the pages of *Vatan*: A speech by Rauf Orbay, Mustafa Kemal's friend in the War of Independence and rival after the war was won, arguing that caliphate is the best form of government, was published in *Vatan* (HT, p. 144).

24- Ahmet Amin Yalman, *Vatan*'s leader writer, was an opponent of the government (EBŞ, p. 227) and a supporter of Rauf Orbay (HT, p. 144).

25- *Vatan* was among the papers closed down after the Law on the Maintenance of Order (see note 21). Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan*'s owner, was tried in the Elazığ Tribunal of Independence in 1925, along with journalists from *Tevhid-i Efkar*, *Son Telgraf*, and *Sebilürreşad* (Nİ, p. 55; HT, p. 152; EBŞ, p. 224).

26- *Tevhid-i Efkar* is described as an opposition paper by FSO (see note 18), EBŞ (p. 234), and HT (p. 154). HT's list also includes *Sebilürreşad* and *Son Telgraf*.

27- *Tevhid-i Efkar* was among the papers that published the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter (see note 2). Reuf Orbay's speech defending caliphate was also published in *Tevhid-i Efkar* (see note 23).

28- Velid Ebuzziya, *Tevhid-i Efkar*'s leader writer, was known for his pro-caliphate views (HT, p. 143).

29- *Tevhid-i Efkar* was among the papers closed down after the Law on the Maintenance of Order (see note 21). Velid Ebuzziya was among the journalists tried in Istanbul (see note 17) and Elazığ (see note 25) Tribunals of Independence. Velid Ebuzziya was not invited to a meeting Atatürk had with major journalists in İzmir in 1921 (HT, p. 146; Nİ, p. 49).

30- *Sebilürreşad* is described by EBŞ (p. 235) and HT (see note 26) as an opposition paper.

31- Eşref Edip, *Sebilürreşad*'s leader writer, was known for his pro-caliphate political views (HT, p. 143).

32- *Sebilürreşad* was among the papers closed down after the Law on the Maintenance of Order (see note 21). *Sebilürreşad*'s manager was among the journalists tried in Elazığ Tribunal of Independence (see note 25).

33- *Son Telgraf* is described as an opposition paper by EBŞ (p. 235) and HT (see note 26).

34- See note 25.

35- *Yarın*, published in 1929 by Arif Oruç, is described as an opposition paper by HT (p. 155), Nİ (p. 92), OK (p. 66), and AK (p. 189); as an anti-CHP paper by Nİ (p. 92), and as a pro-SCF (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, Free Republican Party) paper by HT (p. 136), Nİ (p. 92), and AK (p. 189).

36- *Yarın* was protected by Fethi Okyar, EBŞ argues (p. 236), who was the leader of the SCF.

37- *Yarın* was closed down by the government (Nİ, p. 93; AK, p. 189; EBŞ, p. 236), its columnists were arrested (Nİ, p. 93; AK, p. 189) and then fled to Bulgaria (Nİ, p. 93; EBŞ, p. 236).

38- OK describes *Yarın* as a paper of the left (p. 66).

39- *Son Posta*, founded in 1930 by Zekeriya Sertel, Selim Ragıp Emeç, Ekrem Uşaklıgil, and Halil Lütfü Dördüncü, is described as an opposition paper by Nİ (p. 103), HT (p. 155), and AK (p. 189); and as a pro-SCF paper by OK (p. 66) and AK (p. 189). AK (p. 189) and HT (p. 155) also note that *Son Posta*'s and *Yarın*'s pro-SCF positions resulted in a significant increase in their circulations.

40- *İnkılap*, published in 1928 by Ali Naci Karacan in Istanbul –not to be confused with *İnkılap* published in Ankara by Aka Gündüz-, was a self-professed pro-CHP paper: In its first issue, the leader column read: “Mustafa Kemal [...] founded the People’s Party. We are from that party. We are non-paid, but sincere staff of that party” (Nİ, p. 88). Nİ also describes the paper’s position as anti-SCF (p. 89).

41- On its first issue, *İnkılap* published a letter by İsmet İnönü, the leader of the People’s Party, advising the paper on how to become a successful newspaper, penned at the request of *İnkılap* (Nİ, p. 88).

42- See note 41.

43- See note 21.

44- See note 21.

45- See note 21.

46- EBŞ describes Orak-Çekiç as a paper of the left.

Notes for Table 4.6

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBŞ, Nİ, OK, HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- *Vakit* “supported the activities of the government on every occasion” (Nİ, p. 129)

2- Atatürk wrote leader columns of *Vakit* from 22 to 26 January 1937, under the signature of Asım Us, on the then unresolved issue of Hatay (HT, p. 165; Nİ, 130).

3- *Vakit*'s leader writer Asım Us served in the TGNA (See note 3 for Table 4.5).

4- *Ulus* “voiced the views of the government and the CHP” (HT, p. 164) in this period, and was “the official organ of the CHP and the state” (OK, p. 71).

5- *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, named *Ulus* in 1934, was owned by the CHP in this period too.

6- Re-published in 1943 by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Tanin* is described as a pro-CHP paper in this period by HT (p. 180) and AK (p. 203).

7- Nİ notes that *Tanin*'s owner Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was a supporter of the CHP in this period (p. 203).

8- HT describes *Tanin* in this period as an anti-left paper (p. 180), and OK describes it as a pro-Ally paper (p. 81).

9- Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Tanin*'s owner, was a defender of anti-German and anti-Soviet political views during WWII (Nİ, p. 193-194).

10- *İkdam* in this period, according to Nİ, was a “defender of Atatürk’s principles and reforms” (p. 151).

11- HT describes *Cumhuriyet* in this period as a pro-government paper (p. 162).

12- Yunus Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*'s owner, was a personal friend of Atatürk's, and according to Falih Rıfki Atay, Atatürk considered *Cumhuriyet* to be his own paper (HT, p. 162).

13- *Cumhuriyet*'s publication was suspended in 1934, 1940, and 1941 for 10, 90, and 1 days for "damaging the general policy of the country" (Nİ, p. 72), a power given to the government by the 1931 Press Law.

14- HT (p. 170), Nİ (p. 169), and OK (p. 81) describe *Cumhuriyet*'s position in WWII as pro-German.

15- Nadir Nadi, Yunus Nadi's son and one of the columnists of *Cumhuriyet*, wrote: "Today, there is the living reality of German power in Europe, which comes from the German unity. [...] Trying to destroy the German unity by arguing that it is a threat for Europe is like trying to run the history backwards" (HT, p. 170). ("Bugün Avrupa'da bir Alman kudreti yaşanıyor. Bu, Alman birliğinden gelir. [...] Avrupa için bir tehlike olacağını ileri sürerek Alman birliğini parçalamaya uğraşmak, tarihi tersine yürütmek gayretine benzer.")

16- *Akşam*'s leader writer, Necmettin Sadak, served in the TGNA (EBŞ, p. 225).

17- In 1934, *Akşam*'s publication was suspended for 10 days, along with *Cumhuriyet*, *Son Posta*, and *Zaman* (FSO, p. 122).

18- HT (p. 180) describes *Akşam*'s position in this period as left of center.

19- HT (p. 180) describes *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in this period as a nationalist paper. OK notes the paper had a pro-German position in WWII (p. 81).

20- Nİ notes that columnists known for their nationalist views wrote in *Tasvir* (p. 203).

21- *Yeni Sabah*, founded by İsmail Safa and Cemalettin Saraçoğlu in 1938 had Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın as the leader writer, who was known for his anti-German views (Nİ, p. 169).

22- Published by Mahmut Soydan, *Milliyet* (see note 7 for Table 4.5) was bought by Ahmet Emin Yalman, Zekeriya Sertel and Halil Lütfü Dördüncü in 1935, and named *Tan*. In 1938, other partners left due to a conflict over the paper's political position (HT, p. 163; Nİ, p. 125), and Zekeriya Sertel decided the paper's line. EBŞ (p. 237) and AK (p. 190) identify *Tan* under Sertel's management as an opposition paper.

23- HT cites the following from Sertel's articles in *Tan*: "Our last hope could be the Grand National Assembly. But it represents the CHP, not the nation, and cannot initiate the establishment of real democracy" (p. 179, citing from Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, p. 246. Yaylacık Matbaası, İstanbul, 1968).

24- In what is usually referred as the "*Tan* raid", *Tan* headquarters were looted in 1945 by protestors, most of them students, in some accounts organized by the CHP Istanbul branch (HT, p.181-184), along with the press facilities of a left-wing magazine. In 1950, Zekeriya Sertel and Sabiha Sertel had to leave the country (HT, p. 181-184; EBŞ, p. 237, AK, p. 190; FSO, p. 157).

25- *Tan* is described by HT (p. 180) and EBŞ (p. 237) as a leftist paper; and as pro-Soviet by HT (p. 182), Nİ (p. 126), and OK (p. 81).

26- Nİ notes that *Tan*'s columnists were known for their socialist tendencies (p. 125).

27- Re-published in 1930s by Arif Oruç, *Yarın* was an opposition paper (Nİ, p. 94).

28- *Yarın* was closed down by the government (Nİ, p. 94).

29- Re-published in 1940 by Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan* is described as an opposition paper by HT (p. 180).

30- Nİ notes that Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan*'s leader writer, was a liberal opponent of the government (p. 178).

31- OK (p. 81) and FSO (p. 145) note that *Vatan* had a pro-Ally position in WWII.

32- See note 17.

33- The paper had a pro-German position in WWII (Nİ, p. 169).

34- See note 17.

35- Nİ argues that *Bugün*, published in 1938 by Ali Naci Karacan was "a defender of Ataturk's principles and reforms" (p. 150).

36- *Yurt* was published by CHP in 1933 as a wall-paper for peasants (EBŞ, p. 237).

37- Published by Ahmet Ağaoğlu in 1933, *Akın* was a paper Ataturk disliked (HT, p. 164, citing from Samet Ağaoğlu, *Babamın Arkadaşları*, p. 175-178; Nİ, p. 132).

Notes for Table 4.7

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBŞ, Nİ, OK, HT, and AK, to save from space.

1- *Vakit* is described as a pro-government paper in this period by Nİ (p. 200).

2- Nİ cites the following from Asım Us, the leader writer of *Vakit*: "Those who think there is a need for a second party besides CHP must not touch CHP's foundations, which forms the only cement that binds our national unity together in this country, whatever else they do" (p. 201).

3- Asım Us, *Vakit*'s leader writer, served in the TGNA (see note 3 for Table 4.5).

4- HT describes *Ulus* in this period as a pro-government paper (p. 190).

5- Nİ notes that the paper's party ownership is emphasized by the following phrase that appeared under the title of the paper in this period: "CHP Ulus Müessesesi, -Çankırı Caddesi, Ankara" ("CHP Ulus Foundation, -Çankırı Street, Ankara") (p. 208).

6- Nİ notes that after the 1946 elections, of the three papers that published DP leader Celal Bayar's allegations of fraud, two were closed down (*Yeni Sabah* and *Gerçek*), whereas *Tanin* was not, because it was a pro-government paper (p. 202).

7- Nİ gives examples of *Tanin*'s anti-opposition coverage in this period (p. 195).

8- Nİ counts *Akşam* among the pro-government papers of this period (p. 200).

9- *Akşam*'s leader writer Necmettin Sadak served in the TGNA (EBŞ, p. 225), and in the government as the Foreign Minister from 1948 to 1950, during which time *Akşam* was published without a leader column (HT, p. 188).

10- After the Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1945, a United Office (Birleşik Büro) was founded by *Tasvir*, *Vatan*, *Yeni Sabah*, and *Akşam* to better follow the news.

Nİ argues that this made “the four largest circulation papers of Turkey allies against the CHP government”, because the United Office gave pro-DP, anti-CHP news (p. 201).

11- HT (p. 188) argues that *Akşam* “remained outside the political controversies” in this period. Nİ notes that “polemics against the DP” were not published in *Akşam* (p. 222).

12- Nİ (p. 226) describes *Hergün* as “a paper that represents the right-wing view”.

13- HT (p. 213) observes that *Tan* in this period was “re-published with a new understanding, free from left-wing views”. Nİ (p. 229) notes that in 1948, Ali Naci Karacan “tried to bring together a new cadre of columnists to make the paper, known until then as an organ of extreme left-wing currents, a defender of Atatürk’s principles and reforms”.

14- See note 10.

15- See note 6.

16- Nİ notes that articles that attack both CHP and DP were published in *Yeni Sabah*, as the following quote illustrates: “Real democracy in this country will be established by the nation despite the CHP and despite the Democrats” (p. 148-149).

17- Nİ (p. 149) describes *Yeni Sabah* as a pro-MP (Nation Party, Millet Partisi) paper.

18- License holder for the paper is Sadık Aldoğan, one of the MP’s founders (Nİ, p. 149).

19- Nİ describes *Hergün* as a right-wing paper (p. 226). Published in 1947 by Mehmet Faruk Gürtenca, this paper is not to be confused with Vala Nurettin and Nizamettin Nazif’s *Hergün*, published in 1933.

20- Founded in 1948 by Sedat Simavi, *Hürriyet* is described as a pro-DP paper by HT (p. 214) and FSO (p. 154).

21- According to HT, *Hürriyet* “was published by the principles of independence and impartiality in this period of heated party debates” (p. 186-187).

22- On the right-hand side of *Hürriyet*’s first issue, İnönü’s picture and an article by İnönü were published, and on the left-hand side, Bayar’s picture and an article by Bayar (HT, p. 186; Nİ, p. 232).

23- *Vatan* is described as a pro-DP paper by HT (p. 188), FSO (p. 145), and EBŞ (p. 227); and as an anti-CHP paper by FSO (p. 145).

24- *Vatan* frequently published articles by DP leaders (HT, p. 188), and criticized President İnönü (HT, p. 216-217).

25- According to HT, *Vatan*’s chief columnist “acted like an advisor to DP leaders on many issues” (p. 188).

26- According to Nİ (p. 184) and HT (p. 188), *Cumhuriyet* in this period supported the newly founded DP.

27- Nadir Nadi, leader writer of *Cumhuriyet* after his father’s death in 1945, was elected to the Parliament as an independent from the DP list (Nİ, p. 185).

28- *Tasvir*, according to HT (p. 189), Nİ (p. 201), and EBŞ (p. 247), was an anti-CHP, pro-DP paper in this period.

29- FSO describes *Vakit* in this period as an anti-communist, pro-democracy paper (p. 148).

30- According to HT, *Son Posta* was “an enthusiastic supporter” of the DP in this period (p. 190).

31- HT (p. 190), FSO (p. 154), and AK (p. 199) describe *Zafer*, founded in 1949 and published in Ankara, as a pro-DP paper.

33- Re-published in 1948 by Halil Lütfü Dördüncü and Ali Naci Karacan, *Tan* this time did not have a left tendency (HT, p. 213), and became a “supporter of Atatürk’s principles and reforms” (Nİ, p. 229).

34- *Memleket* was published by CHP as the Istanbul issue of party paper *Ulus* (FSO, p. 149).

35- *Zaman* was published by Nusret Safa Coşkun between 1948-1954 “with CHP’s support” (FSO, p. 154).

36- Previously published as *Kuvvet*, *Kudret* was a pro-DP paper (FSO, p. 151; Nİ, p. 387; EBŞ, p. 254).

37- In 1949, *Kudret*’s publication was suspended and its manager sent to jail (FSO, p. 151).

38- When the MP was founded, *Kudret* became a pro-MP paper (FSO, p. 151).

39- After MP’s foundation, *Kudret* was published by that party (EBŞ, p. 254).

40- FSO describes *Yeni Çağ* as a pro-DP paper (p. 148).

41- FSO notes that *Yeni Çağ* was an anti-communist paper (p. 148).

42- FSO describes *Demokrasi*, published in 1946, as a pro-DP paper (p. 158).

43- Published in 1947, *Demirkırat*’s leader writer was Prof. Kenan Öner, president of DP’s Istanbul branch (FSO, p. 151).

44- FSO describes *Gerçek*, *Beşer*, *Nuhun Gemisi*, *Yaprak*, and *Barış* as “the major pro-communist papers” (p. 169).

45- See note 6.

46- *Tek Dünya* was an organ of the Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi), and supported Swedish socialism (FSO, p. 150).

47- See note 44.

48- See note 44.

49- *Yurtta Kalkınma* was an organ of National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) (FSO, p. 152).

50- See note 44.

51- See note 44.

Notes for Table 4.8

The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials

of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBŞ, Nİ, OK, HT, and AK, to save from space.

- 1- Nİ (p. 240) and EBŞ (p. 248) describe *Zafer* as a pro-DP paper.
- 2- Articles by DP leaders and members of parliament were frequently published in *Zafer* (Nİ, p. 241).
- 3- *Zafer* was published by “DP supporters” (HT, p. 224), and received official ads disproportionate to its circulation share (HT, p. 203; Nİ, p. 269).
- 4- After the 1960 coup, *Zafer* was closed down and its managers were brought to court (EBŞ, p. 248; HT, p. 224; Nİ, p. 244).
- 5- Nİ describes *Son Posta* in this period as a pro-DP paper (p. 351).
- 6- Nİ gives examples of pro-government content on *Son Posta* pages (p. 351).
- 7- Selim Ragıp Emeç, *Son Posta*’s owner, was elected to the TGNA from DP’s list in 1950 and in the two following elections (Nİ, p. 351).
- 8- Selim Ragıp Emeç, *Son Posta*’s owner, was tried in Yassıada along with DP leaders and sentenced to jail for four years (Nİ, p. 351).
- 9- AK identifies *Milliyet* in this period as a pro-DP paper (p. 215).
- 10- Nİ cites the following from Ali Naci Karacan, *Milliyet*’s owner and leader writer: “People’s Party did something very important in this country in 25 years: Reforms. Reforms and that was all” (p. 259).
- 11- Ali Naci Karacan, *Milliyet*’s owner, was a supporter of DP (Nİ, p. 259).
- 12- “In 1959 [...], with the influence of young columnists, the paper started to lean towards the left” (Nİ, p. 321).
- 13- “Safa Kılıçlıoğlu, who bought the paper [*Yeni Sabah*] in 1948 had very close relationships with DP leaders, especially with Adnan Menderes” (HT, p. 223).
- 14- After 1969, *Yeni Sabah* was not able to receive any official ads, which form an important source of revenue for newspapers, along with *Ulus*, *Yeni Gün*, and *Dünya* (HT, p. 203).
- 15- Articles attacking both the DP and the CHP were published in *Yeni Sabah* in this period (HT, p. 223).
- 16- Falih Rıfki Atay, *Dünya*’s leader writer, formed good relationships with the DP, and was criticized harshly for it by the CHP, for he had served as the leader writer of the CHP party paper *Ulus* for many years (HT, p. 221; FSO, p. 178).
- 17- In the Pulliam trials, the case against *Dünya* was dropped by DP leader Menderes’s consent. (HT, p. 206) In Pulliam trials, papers that published American journalist Eugene Pulliam’s articles criticizing the DP government –*Dünya*, *Ulus*, *Vatan*, and *Kervan*- were tried and their managers sentenced to varying jail terms, except for *Dünya* (HT, p. 206; Nİ, p. 348).
- 18- HT (p. 220), AK (p. 215), and EBŞ (p. 245) describe *Dünya* as a pro-CHP paper, and FSO as an opposition paper (p. 178).
- 19- “Falih Rıfki ruthlessly criticized the DP government in the leader columns he wrote for *Dünya*” (Nİ, p. 277).

20- Falih Rıfki, *Dünya*'s leader writer, had served as CHP party paper *Ulus*' leader writer for many years (Nİ).

21- See note 14.

22- Nİ argues that from 1952 onwards *Akşam* became an opposition paper (p. 329).

23- According to HT "*Akşam* chose to follow an impartial policy after the 1950 elections" (p. 219). According to Nİ, *Akşam* was impartial until 1952 (p. 329, also see note 22).

24- *Ulus* in this period is described as an opposition paper by HT (p. 223) and FSO (p. 75), and as a pro-CHP paper by EBŞ (p. 249).

25- *Ulus* was among the papers that published Pulliam's articles (see note 17). Nİ gives examples of criticism of DP government published on *Ulus* pages (p. 352).

26- *Ulus* was owned by the CHP.

27- *Ulus*' publication was suspended in the Pulliam trials (see note 17), and the paper was not able to receive official ads from the DP government (see note 14).

28- HT identifies *Hürriyet* in this period as a pro-CHP paper (p. 214).

29- *Hürriyet* criticized the DP government on many occasions, like in its decision to send Turkish troops to Korea without due process in the Parliament, and in the confiscation of CHP's properties (HT, p. 214). Nİ also notes that *Hürriyet* criticized the government in this period (p. 273).

30- Nİ notes that Sedat Simavi, *Hürriyet*'s owner, was the leader of the opposition press in its fight with the DP government (p. 273).

31- Foreign Minister of the DP government sued *Hürriyet* (HT, p. 214).

32- In its initial years in government, *Hürriyet* supported the DP (HT, p. 217).

33- HT (p. 217), Nİ (p. 286), and AK (p. 220) identify *Hürriyet* as an opposition paper in this period.

34- Towards the end of the decade, *Cumhuriyet*'s editor in chief Ali İhsan Göğüş was elected to the Parliament from CHP (HT, p. 218). Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*'s leader writer was no longer a DP supporter (HT, p. 217).

35- *Cumhuriyet*'s editor in chief Ali İhsan Göğüş was arrested in late 1950s (HT, p. 218).

36- In mid 1950s, *Cumhuriyet* started to lean towards the left, which, HT argues, happened with Cevat Fehmi Başkurt's influence, who served in a managerial position in these years (p. 217-218).

37- A strong supporter of the DP in opposition, *Vatan* became an opponent of the DP in government. HT (p. 214) and FSO (p. 146) identify *Vatan* in this period as an opposition paper.

38- *Vatan* was among the papers that published Pulliam's articles (see note 17).

39- Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan*'s leader writer, was tried in the Pulliam trials and sentenced to jail in his old age (see note 17).

40- In its initial years in government, *Son Telgraf* supported the DP (Nİ, p. 143).

41- After a while, *Son Telgraf* became an opposition paper (Nİ, p. 143).

- 42- Nİ gives examples of *Son Telgraf*'s anti-DP content in these years (p. 143).
- 43-Cemil Sait Barlas, *Son Havadis*'s owner, was a former CHP minister (HT, p. 244).
- 44- Cemil Sait Barlas was arrested before the 1957 elections (HT, p. 244).
- 45- Published in Ankara in 1951, *Son Havadis* was a pro-socialist paper (FSO, p.179). HT describes the paper's position as "social democrat" (p. 244).
- 46- *Vakit*'s leader writer Asım Us was a former CHP parliamentarian.
- 47- HT (p. 246) and FSO (p. 190) describe *Haber*, published in Ankara, as a pro-DP paper.
- 48- "Half of the first page on 6 May 1960 [just three weeks from the coup in May 27] was reserved for a large picture of people cheering for Menderes" (Nİ, p. 384).
- 49- Nİ gives examples of pro-DP, anti-CHP content on the pages of *Büyük Doğu* in these years. (p. 289)
- 50- Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Büyük Doğu*'s owner, was a supporter of DP (Nİ, p. 289), and received financial help from the party (Nİ, p. 289; FSO, p. 184).
- 51- Necip Fazıl Kısakürek had pro-religious political views (FSO, p. 184).
- 52- Published by Cavit Oral, a former CHP minister, *Hürses* was a pro-CHP paper, but changed course after Cavit Oral joined the DP and became minister of agriculture again.
- 53- See note 52.
- 54- See note 52.
- 55- See note 52.
- 56- Published in 1955 by Semih Tunca and Tefvik Erol, and bought in 1961 by Kemal İlicak –not to be confused with Cihat Baban's *Tercüman*, published in 1950-, *Tercüman* is identified as a pro-DP paper by FSO (p. 181).
- 57- Published in Ankara by Hikmet Yazıcıoğlu in 1954, *Hakimiyet* is identified as a pro-DP paper by FSO (p. 184).
- 58- Published in 1958 by Fuat Süreyya Oral, *Bugün* was a supporter of the DP (FSO, p. 182).
- 59- Published by Osman Hamit Tat in 1950, *Yeni Cephe* was a pro-DP paper (FSO, p. 177).
- 60- Mithat Perin, *İstanbul Ekspres*'s owner, was a DP supporter. (FSO, p. 178) This was the paper that published news of Ataturk's house in Salonica being set on fire, which led to the 6-7 September incidents in 1955, the looting –by a mob- of workplaces owned by Christian minorities in Istanbul (HT, p. 222).
- 61- Feyzi Boztepe, a member of the Parliament from DP, published *Medeniyet* in Ankara in 1954 (FSO, p. 184).
- 62- *Havadis* was among the papers that received official ads disproportionate to its circulation share (HT, p. 203).
- 63- *İnkılap* was published in Ankara in 1957 by DP Parliamentarian Memiş Yazıcı (EBS, p. 254).
- 64- *Türk Sesi* was published by Mükerrerrem Sarol, a DP Parliamentarian, in 1954 (FSO, p. 181).

65- *Halkçı* is identified as a pro-CHP paper by Nİ (p. 293).

66- Ni gives examples of anti-DP content on the pages of *Halkçı* (p. 296).

67- HT (p. 197) and AK (p. 216) note that *Halkçı* was published by CHP supporters when Ulus was closed down.

68- *Halkçı*'s leader writer Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was sentenced to jail in 24 September 1954, which strained the relations between the DP government and the press (HT, p. 197).

69- Nİ gives examples of anti-DP content on the pages of *Yeni Gün* (p. 337).

70- *Yeni Gün*'s leader writer Cihat Baban was a former DP member who left the party in 1956 and joined the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi) (Nİ, p. 318).

71- *Yeni Gün* was published by the supporters of Freedom Party (AK, p. 216; Nİ, p. 318).

72- *Kudret* is identified as an opposition paper by FSO (p. 151).

73- *Kudret* was a pro-Nation Party (Millet Partisi) paper (Nİ, p. 387; FSO, p. 151; EBS, p. 254).

74- Published in 1950 by Cihat Baban and four businessmen (see note 56), *Tercüman*'s leader writer –Cihat Baban- was a DP Parliamentarian until 1956, when he joined the Freedom Party (Nİ, p. 315; AK, p. 216).

75- See notes 70 and 74.

76- *Pazar Postası* was published by former CHP minister Cemil Sait Barlas in 1951 (FSO, p. 178).

77- *Pazar Postası* defended “scientific socialism” (FSO, p. 178).

78- See note 17.

Notes for Table 4.9

The five histories of press that cover this period are as follows: Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1971), Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following notes, in the form of EBS, Nİ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: Oktay (1987), Demir (2007), Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, September 11), Akkoca (2006, January 2).

1- *Tercüman* is described by HT as pro-AP, who argues that it became “a mouthpiece of the AP and especially Süleyman Demirel (p. 243). AK describes the paper as one of the “representatives of the rightist view” (p. 22).

2- Nİ notes that the leading articles signed *Tercüman* “always targeted CHP and contained arguments attacking the managers of that party” (p. 404).

3- EBS notes that *Tercüman* in this period “kept its impartiality” (p. 247). One issue that arises with this description is what to do with claims of impartiality that are not shared by other authors (only EBS classifies *Tercüman* as impartial, against strong opposition from a number of authors, compare with note 1). I chose to include *Tercüman* among parallel papers, preferring HT's and AK's interpretations. A similar issue that arises is what happens when there is a contemporaneous conflict between the organizational evidence and content evidence, which is the case for *Akşam* in this period.

See note 18 for this issue. The evidence boxes for both issues are emphasized by thick borders.

4- AK describes *Son Havadis* and *Tercüman* as “representatives of the rightist view” (p. 22).

5- Nİ cites pro-AP content from a leading article by Mümtaz Faik Fevik (p. 402), and observes that the *Son Havadis* columnist Orhon Seyfi Orhon, also a literary figure, kept criticizing CHP in his columns (p. 427).

6- EBŞ describes *Yeni İstanbul* as an “AP supporter” (p. 246).

7- EBŞ describes *Zafer* as “a supporter of AP” (p. 248).

8- EBŞ describes *Adalet* as “a supporter of AP” (p. 250).

9- Akkoca (2006, January 2) describes *Bugün* and *Babıalide Sabah* as “papers with Islamist sentiments”.

10- See note 8.

11- EBŞ observes that *Hürriyet* in this period “kept its impartiality” (p. 242).

12- In the post-coup period, Demir (2007) observes, “Halit Kıvanç penned articles making fun of Bayar and other DP leaders” (p. 166).

13- HT describes *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam* and *Milliyet* in the post-coup period as “papers that supported Atatürk’s Reforms” (p. 238).

14- An article titled “The only way out for Turkey: Socialism”, by Sadi Alkılıç under the pseudonym Hikmet Alkılıç, was published in *Cumhuriyet* on December 12th, 1962, as part of an article contest the paper organized. The paper was prosecuted for publishing this article, with the accusation that it spread “Communist propaganda”, and its editor Kayhan Sağlamer was arrested (HT, p. 239; Nİ, p. 383).

15- HT cites the following from Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*’s owner at the time: “In the period preceding March 12th [referring to the military intervention in March 12th, 1971] *Cumhuriyet* turned into a paper read by all leftists with a Marxist origin, either underground or open. Something novel was happening on *Cumhuriyet*’s pages that was not seen in its history of 39 years, from its inception to 1962. *Cumhuriyet* became a paper where leftists communicated with each other and through which they conveyed their messages to the public. They publicized the magazines and newspapers they published via ads on *Cumhuriyet*’s pages. We published their engagement, wedding, birth and death notices. A meeting they organized, a march, a protest, a conference, a panel, these were all advertised on our pages” (p. 240).

16- See note 13.

17- See note 12.

18- HT notes that *Akşam*’s owner, Malik Yolaç was elected to the TGNA as an independent from AP’s list (p.241). He also notes that *Akşam*’s columnists “had leftist tendencies”, and “eventually [paper’s owner, Malik] Yolaç had to sell *Akşam* to [the trade Union] Türk-İş in 1971” (p. 241). These pieces of information raises the issue of what happens when there is a contemporaneous conflict between the organizational evidence and content evidence, in other words, how to classify right-owned papers with left-writers/managers, which is the case for *Akşam*. I chose to classify *Akşam* among the left-wing papers for eventually what matters is what gets to be published on the pages of the newspaper, a better indicator of who controls the paper than ownership.

19- Nİ describes *Akşam* as “the foremost among papers with left tendencies in the period 1965 to 1971” (p. 332). HT notes that “*Akşam* followed a left-leaning policy” despite its owner Malik Yolaç.

20- HT notes that *Akşam*’s columnists “had leftist tendencies”, and “eventually [paper’s owner, Malik] Yolaç had to sell *Akşam* to [the trade Union] Türk-İş in 1971” (p. 241). Oktay (1987) argues that in 1960s, left views started to be voiced for the first time by columnists writing in mainstream papers, like Çetin Altan, İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal, and Aziz Nesin. The papers these columnists have written in included *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Tanin*, and *Günaydın* (p. 63-65).

21- HT notes that *Akşam*’s owner, Malik Yolaç, was “apolitical, not a leftist nor a rightist” (p. 241).

22- See note 12.

23- Demir (2007), Cem (2008), and Özkan (2008) note that towards the end of the 60s, *Günaydın* had an anti-Demirel character, leader of the AP at the time. Demir quotes (2008) Metin Münir as saying that “the campaign *Günaydın* ran against Demirel was so intense and effective that it led to divisions within the AP and to the 1971 military intervention” (p. 210).

24- Oktay (1987) notes that one of the papers where Aziz Nesin, a columnist with left views, has written was *Günaydın* (p. 63).

25- Nİ observes that *Ulus* was “a mouthpiece of the CHP” in this period (p. 392).

26- *Ulus* was owned in 1960s by İsmail Rüştü Aksel, who became CHP Secretary General in 1961 (HT, p. 246; Nİ, p. 391).

27- Naim Tirali, owner of *Vatan* from 1962 to 1975, was elected to the TGNA from Giresun as a CHP MP (HT, p. 247).

28- See note 9.

29- See note 9.

30- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Bizim Anadolu*’s owner, Mehmet Emin Alpkan was “a follower of the ideal of saving Turks all over the world from bondage and giving them back their freedom”.

31- See note 30.

32- EBŞ notes that *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was “a supporter of AP” (p. 250).

33- Nİ notes that *Haber* was published with the motto “impartial daily” under its banner (p. 385).

34- Nİ notes that towards the end of 1961, MP leader “Osman Bölükbaşı’s propaganda talks, meetings, visits, and criticisms made up most of the first page of the paper, and articles with similar subjects are seen in other pages as well” (p. 388).

45- EBŞ notes that *Öncü* was “a supporter of the YTP”, a short-lived political party founded in 1960s, not to be confused with YTP founded by İsmail Cem and Hüsamettin Özkan in 2002.

Notes for Table 4.10

The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows: Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred in the notes

as Nİ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: Oktay (1987), Sucu (2005), Demir (2007), Akkoca (2006, January 2).

1- Oktay (1987) refers to *Tercüman*, *Hergün*, *Bayrak*, *Ortadoğu*, *Millet*, *Son Havadis*, *Yeni Asya*, and *Milli Gazete* as “right wing newspapers” and “the rightist press” (p. 119, 123).

2- Oktay (1987) cites examples from *Tercüman*, *Hergün*, *Bayrak*, *Ortadoğu*, *Millet*, *Son Havadis*, *Yeni Asya*, and *Milli Gazete*, which he refers to as the “right-wing newspapers”, concerning their coverage of the so-called “May 1st incidents” of 1977, in which 34 people were killed.

3- Nİ notes that “the leading articles signed *Son Havadis* usually targeted the CHP, the idea of the left of center, Metin Toker, and Abdi İpekçi” (p. 428). Also see note 1.

4- See note 2.

5- Oktay (1987) counts *Hürriyet* and *Günaydın* among “papers with an impartial attitude”, as opposed to left-wing and right-wing papers (p.124).

6- See note 5.

7- Oktay (1987) describes *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, and *Politika* in this period as “papers that were supportive of the doctrinaire or social democratic left” (p. 121).

8- Oktay (1987) cites examples from *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, and *Politika* concerning their coverage of the so-called “May 1st incidents” of 1977.

9- See note 7.

10- See note 8.

11- A serious fight breaks out within *Cumhuriyet* following İlhan Selçuk’s arrest in 1970s, and Nadir Nadi leaves the paper. The fight is mainly between shareholders who are not comfortable with the left-wing character of the paper, and those, represented by Nadir Nadi, who are. Eventually, paper’s circulation falls following Nadi’s leave, and other partners feel compelled to call him back (Nİ, p. 424).

12- Nİ notes that “*İstanbul* in this period [1979] was an opponent of Ecevit government” (p. 440).

13- Nİ notes that “anti-communism is the general theme in most articles” published in the daily *İstanbul* (p. 440).

14- Nİ notes that *Milli Gazete* is published to defend the “National View” movement, led by Erbakan (p. 442). OK describes *Milli Gazete*, along with *Orta Doğu*, *Sabah*, *Yeni Asya*, and *Yeni Devir* in this period as papers of “the religious right” (p. 118) Also see note 1.

15- See note 2.

16- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Milli Gazete* and *Yeni Devir* were owned by MSP.

17- OK describes *Hergün*, *Bayrak*, *Millet* and *Türkiye* as papers of the “nationalist right” (p. 118). Oktay (1987) notes that “Hergün, Millet, Bayrak and Ortadoğu were open supporters of MHP” (p. 76). Also see note 1.

18- See note 2.

19- Oktay (1987) describes *Sabah*, *Bugün*, *Yeni Asya*, *Hakikat*, *Yeni Devir*, and *Milli Gazete* as “the daily papers of the Islamist current” (p. 71). Also see note 14.

20- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Sabah* was published by a religious group led by Hüseyin Hilmi Işık.

21- See notes 1, 14, and 17.

22- See note 2.

23- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Ortadoğu* was published “with the support of Aydınlar Ocağı and nationalist-religious faculty members from universities in Istanbul, by a cadre led by Prof. Dr. Erol Güngör”.

24- Nİ notes that *Güneş* “published articles that attacked the left, and especially the Ecevit government, and defended right-wing views” (p. 447).

25- See notes 1 and 17.

26- See note 2.

27- See notes 1, 14, and 19.

28- See note 2.

29- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Yeni Asya* was published “with the great efforts of the Risale-i Nur followers”.

30- See notes 1 and 17.

31- See note 2.

32- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Bayrak* was published by Millet Partisi.

33- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Bizim Anadolu* was owned by Mehmet Emin Alphan, a proprietor with nationalist views.

34- See note 17.

35- Nİ notes that *Türkiye* “was a paper that published ideas representing the nationalist and conservative views” (p. 435).

36- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that *Türkiye* was published by the followers of Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, a religious figure.

37- See notes 1, 14 and 19.

38- See note 2.

39- See note 16.

40- Nİ notes that *Haber* was published with the motto “impartial daily” under its banner (p. 386).

41- OK describes *Ekonomi Politika*, *Aydınlık*, *Demokrat*, *Yeni Ortam* and *Vatan* in 1970s as “papers of the left” (p. 118). Also see note 7.

42- See note 8.

43- See note 41.

44- See notes 7 and 41.

45- See note 8.

46- Nİ notes that in 1970s, *Akşam* was owned by the trade union Türk-İş for a while (p. 332).

47- Oktay (1987) describes *Aydınlık* as a paper of the left (p. 57). Also see note 41.

Notes for Table 4.11

Sources: The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows: Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred to in these notes as Nİ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: Oktay (1987), Çalışlar (2006), Demir (2007), Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, September 11), Sucu (2005), Koz (2007), Finkel (2000), Akkoca (2006, January 2), Tek (2006).

1- Demir (2007) argues that Özal “stopped Sabah’s opposition by awarding them a building contract for 25.000 homes” (p. 189).

2- See note 1.

3- See note 1.

4- Çalışlar (2006) notes that *Günaydın* in this period “supported Özal in internal politics” (p. 42).

5- Finkel argues that “[Asil] Nadir [owner of *Günaydın* and *Güneş*] unquestionably acquired his press empire with the encouragement of Turgut Özal to counter the influence of a hostile press. One columnist was fired because he had poked fun at Özal” (p. 165). Cemal (2008, September 11) argues that “Özal encouraged Asil Nadir to enter the press market against Simavi’s *Hürriyet*.”

6- Oktay makes the following observations on *Günaydın*: “The major aim of the paper seems to be increasing sales. Thus, it has no problems with having a leftist content today, and a rightist one tomorrow” (p. 140).

7- Çalışlar (2006) argues that *Günaydın* “has a tendency towards chauvinism regarding Turkish foreign policy” (p. 42).

8- See note 5.

9- Çalışlar (2006) makes the following observations on *Güneş*’s efforts to be a balanced paper: “When it was first published, *Güneş* claimed to offer a democratic platform. The big transfers it made also supported this impression. On the one hand, Güneri Civaoglu brought together names like Cüneyt Arcayürek, Çetin Altan, İsmail Cem, and Bedri Korama [all left intellectuals], and on the other, tried to combine this group with the team it brought from Tercüman [a right-wing paper]” (p. 37).

10- Demir (2007) notes that in an article signed by its owner, Erol Simavi, *Hürriyet* called Özal a dog in May 1988, but made a complete u-turn prior to the referendum in 1988, asking him in its headlines to “stay, don’t leave us”.

11- See note 5.

12- In a Ph.D. dissertation dedicated to studying political cartoons published in Turkish newspapers of the period, Koz (2007) makes the following observations on cartoons in *Hürriyet*: “Unlike Demirel, Özal is drawn as a person who lacks the ability for analytical thinking, oppressive, who cannot make rational decisions, who has no knowledge of economics or management, and ‘negative’” (p. 398). Özcan (2008, September 15) notes that one of the most memorable moments of the fight between Özal

and Simavi, *Hürriyet*'s owner, was the open letter Simavi wrote on April 11, 1988, with the headlines reading "Press is the first estate". Also see note 10.

13- Demir (2007) quotes the following from Emin Çölaşan, then a prominent columnist of *Hürriyet*, on his efforts to end the ANAP government and role in the formation of the 1991 coalition between SHP and DYP: "I talked to Uğur Mumcu [a prominent columnist writing in *Cumhuriyet* at the time], and said 'Why don't we take the initiative and have these two (Cindoruk and Çetin) meet, so that they can form a coalition and we get rid of ANAP". Demir (2007) notes that the two eventually met in Çölaşan's house, which was the beginning of the process that led to the formation of the DYP-SHP coalition in 1991.

14- Çalışlar (2006) makes the following observation on *Hürriyet*: "It is clear that the paper was trying to strike a balance between the dominant forces" (p. 41).

15- Oktay (1987) describes *Hürriyet* in this period as "a paper with liberal tendencies" (p. 140).

16- Çalışlar (2006) notes that Oktay Ekşi, the leader columnist of *Hürriyet* at the time, was among the founders of SODEP, a left-wing political party founded after the 1980 coup.

17- Çalışlar (2006) argues that "There were two distinct tendencies within the paper [*Tercüman*]: the news and opinion pages supported the ANAP government, whereas Nazlı Ilıcak and some other columnists supported DYP" (p. 38). Koz (2007) has the following to say about the political cartoons published in *Tercüman* at the time: "Cartoons in *Tercüman* [...] construct Özal as a more 'positive' leader compared to other party leaders" (p. 400).

18- HT makes the following observation on *Tercüman*: "Between 1983 and 1993, that is to say, during the Turgut Özal era, Kemal and Nazlı Ilıcak [owner of *Tercüman* and a columnist of *Tercüman*, respectively] supported the True Path Party [DYP] and criticized Özal on every occasion" (p. 293).

19- Oktay (1987) argues that "Ilıcak [*Tercüman*'s owner] tried to make the paper a right-wing daily from the first day onwards" (p. 141). Demir (2007) observes that "Tercüman was a prominent right-wing paper of the time" (p. 189). Çalışlar (2006) argues that *Tercüman* had "a pro-religious and anti-communist mission" and cites examples from the paper (p. 39). Tek (2006) describes *Tercüman* as a right-wing paper (p. 168).

20- Tek (2006) compares news on political violence in *Tercüman* and *Hürriyet*, and finds that the former mostly reports violence attributed to leftists with few reports on incidents attributed to rightists (15 to 1), whereas the latter does the opposite, mostly reporting on incidents attributed to rightists and ignoring those attributed to the leftists (19 to 3) (p. 180). Sucu (2005) notes that following the publication in *Hürriyet* of an obituary on İsmail Bilen, leader of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* fiercely criticized *Hürriyet*. Also see note 19.

21- Oktay argues in 1987 that *Tercüman* is "currently managed by an ultra-nationalist team" (1987, p. 141).

22- Çalışlar (2006) argues that "*Milliyet* under Çetin Emeç's management [...] paralleled the government" (p. 35).

23- Çalışlar (2006) observes that Mehmet Barlas, the leader columnist of *Milliyet* at the time, "was among the most respectable journalists of the time among government

circles. When he got his leg broken in Davos, Prime Minister Özal personally visited him and his wife, and the President sent best wishes from thousands of kilometers away” (p. 34).

24- Demir (2007) argues that “towards the end of 1980s, the entire Babiali [a reference to the daily press] surrendered to Özal, except for *Cumhuriyet* and to some extent *Milliyet*” (p. 207).

25- Tek (2006) describes *Milliyet*’s position in the aftermath of the 1980 coup as “left-of-center” (p. 168). Oktay (1987) argues that “Under Abdi İpekçi’s management, *Milliyet* became a platform for the expression of democratic left tendencies” (p. 140).

26- Oktay (1987) observes that after it was bought by Aydın Doğan, *Milliyet* “combined its previous social democratic tendency with a populist tendency [...] two of the columnists, Mümtaz Soysal and Teoman Erel kept this democratic left approach alive” (p. 140).

27- Çalışlar (1987) describes *Cumhuriyet* in this period as “the only paper opposing Özal” (p. 44). Also see note 24.

28- Koz (2007) observes that Özal is drawn in *Cumhuriyet*’s cartoons as “a leader who is ‘inconsistent’, ‘insincere’, and who ‘lacks the ability to make rational decisions’” (p. 398).

29- See note 13.

30- Oktay (1987) makes the following observation on *Cumhuriyet*: “It was not the organ of any one left party, but tried to reflect, via its columnists, the views of both the social democracy and the doctrinaire left” (p. 139). Tek (2006) describes *Cumhuriyet* in this period as a paper “on the left” (p. 168).

31- See note 20.

32- HT notes that following “an article by Osman Ulagay after the 1991 elections, supporting the formation of a coalition between ANAP and DYP against the SHP”, a fight over editorial policy broke out within *Cumhuriyet*, with eventual victory of İlhan Selçuk and his friends, who first left the paper and then returned back, ousting the previous management (p. 290).

33- Oktay (1987) describes *Türkiye*’s position in this period as “between Islamism and nationalism” (p. 101). Çalışlar (2006) argues *Türkiye* was “addressed to a conservative and right-wing audience” (p. 22).

34- See note 36 for Table 4.10.

35- Nİ notes that *Bulvar* had a following among right-wing readers, especially because of Nazlı Ilıcak’s columns (p. 483).

36- Nİ describes *Milli Gazete* as “the organ of Welfare Party” (p. 443), and Oktay (1987) counts *Milli Gazete*, together with *Yeni Nesil* and *Yeni Devir*, among “the daily newspapers of the Islamist current” (p. 73, 78).

37- See note 36.

38- See note 36.

39- Oktay (1987) notes that İsmet Özel, “after he joined the Islamist camp [...] wrote articles for *Yeni Devir*” (p. 78). Also see note 39 for Table 4.10.

40- See note 20.

41- See note 23 for Table 4.10.

42- See note 33 for Table 4.10.

Notes for Table 4.12

Sources: The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows: Nuri İnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred to in these notes as Nİ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: Oktay (1987), Hortaçsu & Ertürk (2003), Konrad-Adenauer Vakfı (1999), Görmüş (2002, July 13; September 25; October 9), Çalışlar (2006), Demir (2007), Arsan & Tunç (2007), Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, September 11), Sucu (2005), Koz (2007), Finkel (2000), Akkoca (2006, January 2), Öksüz (2007), Karalı (2001, February 8), Dursun (2006), Dağtaş and Dağtaş (2007), Kösebalaban (2004), Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000), Gül and Gül (2000).

1- Demir (2008) notes that prior to the elections in 1995, “the Sabah group strongly supported Çiller” (p. 208), leader of the DYP at the time. Finkel (2000) also identifies *Sabah* in this period as a pro-DYP paper (p. 154). Cemal (2008, September 11) notes that “Çiller had good relations with Dinç Bilgin [Sabah’s owner], and had a big fight with Aydın Doğan [owner of *Hürriyet*]”. Karalı (2001, February 8) cites the following from the leader column of *Sabah* on May 11, 1997, signed *Sabah*, addressed at Çiller: “Sabah, which she accuses today, supported her until she formed the Refah-Yol coalition”.

2- Cemal (2008, September 11) notes that Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP’s leader, “had good relations with Aydın Doğan [*Hürriyet*’s owner], and had a big fight with Dinç Bilgin [*Sabah*’s owner]”. Özcan (2008, September 15) also notes that prior to the 1995 elections, there was “a big fight between *Sabah* and Mesut Yılmaz”. Özcan (2008, September 15) cites the following headline from *Sabah*, published on December 5, 1995: “Mesut Yılmaz, accomplice of shariah-followers”. Özcan (2008, September 15) notes that Mesut Yılmaz sued *Sabah* for some of its headlines in the run-up to the 1995 elections, and won a 950 million liras worth of compensation.

3- In a detailed content analysis of the newspaper coverage on the eve of the 1999 elections, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, and *Cumhuriyet*, which they collectively refer to as “the mainstream/liberal media” “supported ANAP and DSP, but refrained from supporting the DYP, and FP was the party that received the most negative coverage in these newspapers”. Karalı (2001, February 8) notes that in May 1997 Şevket Kazan, Minister of Justice at the time, sued the papers *Sabah*, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, *Yeni Asır*, *Hürriyet*, *Radikal*, *Son Havadis*, *Son Çağrı*, and *Posta* “for provoking a coup d'état”.

4- See note 3.

5- See note 3.

6- See note 3.

7- In their detailed study analyzing the content of the newspapers in the run-up to the 2002 elections, Tunç and Arsan (2007) observe *Hürriyet*’s and *Sabah*’s content to be positive towards ANAP, and *Cumhuriyet*, *Star*, *Yeni Şafak*, and *Akşam* to have a negative tone towards ANAP, in their cover pages and politics pages. The following positions also emerge from the content analysis of cover pages and politics pages reported in this study (p. 100): Pro-CHP: *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*. Anti-CHP: *Star*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Akşam*. Pro-AKP: *Zaman*, *Türkiye*, *Yeni Şafak*. Anti-AKP: *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Sabah*, *Radikal*, *Vatan*, *Star*, *Akşam*. Pro-MHP: *Türkiye*. Pro-GP: *Star*. Görmüş (2002, September 25) observes

that “Sabah seems to be flirting with ANAP”, and cites examples from the paper’s coverage.

8- In a series of articles published in *Zaman* prior to the 2002 elections, Alper Görmüş (2002, September 25) examines the print media’s coverage of the parties, and cites the following from an article signed *Sabah*: “Yes, Tayip Erdoğan will always feel the sword of Law No. 312 over his head. Saying ‘I have changed’ is not enough, he should not have read that poem”. Also see note 7.

9- Görmüş (2002, July 13) argues that prior to the 2002 elections, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah* “voted for the ‘new formation’”, referring to the group that splintered from DSP. Also see note 7.

10- Also see notes 3, 22, 32, and 69.

11- Finkel (2000, p. 154), Görmüş (2002, October 9), Özcan (2008, September 15), and Cemal (2008, September 11) describe *Hürriyet*, together with other Doğan papers, as a pro-ANAP paper prior to the 1995 elections. Özcan (2008, September 15) notes a phone conversation between Ertuğrul Özkök, *Hürriyet*’s editor, and Güneş Taner, an ANAP minister, where the two speak about a business deal. Also see note 2.

12- Demir (2007) notes that when Baykal was elected the president of CHP, *Hürriyet*’s headlines were very supportive: “A leader is born”, “Baykal’s second victory” (p. 208).

13- Demir (2007) notes that “Doğan Group’s support for Çiller came to an end as the 1995 elections neared”, and cites examples from *Hürriyet* criticizing the DYP. In return, Prime Minister Çiller ordered an investigation into Dışbank’s sale to Doğan (p. 208). Özcan (2008, September 15) also notes that relations between Doğan papers and Çiller, once very warm, later cooled down, with Çiller eventually accusing Doğan of extracting undue state incentives, and Doğan publicly responding that he would hang himself in the Taksim square if any of these accusations were proved to be true. Also see note 1.

14- See note 3.

15- See note 3.

16- Görmüş (2002, October 9) cites the following headline from *Hürriyet* one week prior to the elections in 1999: “Çiller’s lies”. Also see notes 3 and 12.

17- See note 3.

18- See note 7.

19- See notes 7 and 21.

20- See note 9.

21- Görmüş (2002, September 25) notes that on the ban that prevented Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections, *Hürriyet*’s leader columnist Oktay Ekşi and editor Ertuğrul Özkök had opposing views, “balancing each other out”. Görmüş (2002, September 25) also argues that *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Vatan* followed a policy of supporting CHP against AKP prior to the 2002 elections. Öksüz (2007) observes that “prior to the November 3, 2002 elections, Doğan papers mostly carried negative news on AKP” (p. 75). Also see note 7.

22- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) include *Hürriyet* in their list of secular, as opposed to religious, papers, and describe *Hürriyet*’s political position as follows: “supports liberal economic values” (p. 2024). Kösebalaban (2004) describes *Hürriyet* as a “secular” paper (p. 55), and its columnist Oktay Ekşi as “the veteran Kemalist columnist of *Hürriyet*” (p.

54). Demir (2007) quotes from Ergun Babahan the following on Doğan and Bilgin papers' support for YDH (New Democracy Movement): "The cartel had become so powerful that [...] even the headlines started to be written from a single center. You would remember that all the major newspapers had the mission to keep YDH in the headlines" (p. 203-4). Özcan (2008, September 15) argues that during its fight with Çiller, *Hürriyet* "tried to promote Mehmet Ali Bayar as the new leader candidate". Also see notes 3, 32, 52, 65, and 69.

23- See note 11.

24- See note 13.

25- See note 3.

26- See note 3.

27- See note 3.

28- See note 3.

29- See note 21.

30- See note 9.

31- See note 21.

32- Dursun (2006) has the following to say about *Milliyet*'s political position: "The best-selling newspapers (such as *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, etc.) have always had a secularist and sometimes Kemalist ideological tendency" (p. 170). Kösebalaban (2004) describes *Milliyet* as "a leading secular newspaper that also hosts a few liberal columnists" (p. 53). *Milliyet* was briefly owned by Korkmaz Yiğit in 1998, an incident which, as Demir (2007) quotes from İsmet Berkan, was a reflection Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's "efforts to create a media of his own" (p. 213). Also see notes 3, 22 and 69.

33- Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that in the run-up to the 1999 elections, "Türkiye, which has a conservative-right policy, but which is also a representative of the large-scale media, preferred DYP and MHP" in its election related coverage.

34- See note 33.

35- See note 7.

36- See note 7.

37- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include *Türkiye* in their list of "moderate Islamist" parties, along with Yeni Şafak and Zaman. Dağtaş and Dağtaş (2007) describe *Türkiye* as a representative of the "nationalist-conservative right" press (p. 77), and Tunç and Arsan (2007) as a paper that "has a nationalist-conservative line" (p. 102). Also see notes 33 and 68.

38- Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that in the run-up to the 1999 elections, "the Islamist wing of the conservative press (*Akit* and *Zaman*) supported FP and MHP."

39- See note 38.

40- Görmüş (2002, September 25) notes that the decision banning Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections "was openly criticized by the columnists' and other op-ed articles in Zaman". Also see note 7.

41- Gül and Gül (2000) describe *Zaman* as "an Islamic newspaper" (p. 7), Kösebalaban (2004) as a "conservative" paper (p. 56), Dursun (2006) "the newspaper of

the Fethullah Gülen (followers of the Nursi path) religious community” (p. 171), and Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) as “reflect[ing] the views of the Nur movement” (p. 2024). Also see notes 37, 38 and 68.

42- See note 3.

43- See note 21.

44- See note 89.

45- See note 7.

46- See note 7.

47- See note 7.

48- *Star* was owned by Cem Uzan, leader of the GP which ran in 2002 elections (Demir, 2007, p. 227). Görmüş (2002, September 25) observes that *Star* “was published as a propaganda bulletin for the Genç Parti [Young Party]”.

49- See note 7.

50- Görmüş (2002, September 25) observes that “*Akşam*, owned by the Karamahmet Group, drew attention by its opposition to CHP using IMF-BDDK-Kemal Derviş”. Also see note 7.

51- See note 7.

52- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include *Akşam* in their list of “extreme nationalist right” papers, which also includes *Hergün*, *Son Çağrı*, and *Ortadoğu* (p. 793). Tunç and Arsan (2007) describe *Akşam*, *Vatan*, and *Hürriyet* as “papers that have a liberal right editorial policy” (p. 102).

53- See note 3.

54- See note 3

55- See note 3

56- See note 3.

57- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) include *Yeni Yüzyıl* in their list of secular papers, and describe its political position as “espousing liberal economy” (p. 2024). Also see notes 3 and 89.

58- See note 3.

59- See note 3

60- See note 3

61- See note 3.

62- See note 7.

63- Görmüş (2002, September 25) observes that concerning the ban that prevented Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections, “*Cumhuriyet*, as you might have guessed [...] was among the papers that did not try to conceal their joy”. Also see note 7.

64- See note 7.

65- Kösebalaban (2004) describes *Cumhuriyet* as “Turkey’s most authentically Kemalist daily” (p. 56), and Dağtaş and Dağtaş (2007) treat it as a representative of the “center-left” press (p. 77). Sucu (2005) notes that “*Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet* published

this text [Öcalan's get well soon wishes for Musa Anter] in protest against the ban on Özgür Gündem's publication" (p. 50). Also see note 76.

66- See note 38.

67- See note 38.

68- Çalışlar (2006) describes *Akit*, *Zaman*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Türkiye*, and *Milli Gazete* as "Islamist papers" (p. 24). Finkel (2000) describes *Akit* as "one of the most radical of the Turkish press" (p. 159). Also see notes 38, 81 and 83.

69- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include *Takvim* in their list of "centre-right" papers, which also includes *Günaydın*, *Hürriyet*, *Pazar Postası*, *Milliyer*, *Sabah*, *Son Havadis*, and *Tan*.

70- When *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet* published condolences after Musa Anter's assassination, Sucu (2005) notes that *Bugün* fiercely criticized the two papers.

71- See note 3.

72- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) observe that *Mili Gazete*, along with *Yeni Şafak*, "supports the major religious political party in Turkey".

73- Yumul and Özkırımlı's (2000) list of extreme Islamist right papers consists of *Milli Gazete*, *Akit*, *Yeni Asya*, and *Selam* (p. 793). Also see notes 68 and 72.

74- See note 3.

75- Görmüş (2002, September 25) cites the following headline from *Radikal* concerning the ban that prevented Erdoğan from running in 2002 elections: "We do not have democracy after all". Also see note 21.

76- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include *Radikal* and *Cumhuriyet* in their list of "center-left" papers (p. 793).

77- Demir (2007) notes that Nazlı Ilıcak, a member of Parliament from FP, was also a columnist for the daily *Yeni Şafak* (p. 224). Also see note 70.

78- Görmüş (2002, September 25) observes that *Yeni Şafak* was among the papers that criticized the ban that prevented Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections, calling the decision "A dynamite to the election".

79- See note 7.

80- See note 7.

81- Dursun (2006) describes *Yeni Şafak* and *Akit* as "Islamist papers" (p. 170), and Tunç and Arsan (2007) observe that *Yeni Şafak* "followed an Islamic line" (p. 102). Ksebalaban (2004) describes *Yeni Şafak* as "Islamist leaning" (p. 54). Also see notes 37, 68, and 72.

82- See note 3.

83- See note 69.

84- See note 89.

85- Also see note 69.

86- Also see note 52.

87- Also see note 73.

88- Also see note 69.

89- Yumul and Özkırmılı (2000) include *Hürses*, along with *Yeni Yüzyıl*, *Hürses*, *Global*, *Ateş*, *Bizim Gazete*, *Posta*, and *Turkish Daily News*, in their list of “liberal” papers (p. 793).

Appendix A

Literature on Cleavage Voting

Although the idea that there are social roots to political phenomena existed long before *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, the notion of cleavage received its most authoritative exposition in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's (1967) widely read introduction to this volume. In their review of the literature on social cleavages, Jeff Manza, Clem Brooks, and Michael Sauder (2005) trace the origins of the notion of cleavage to the works of Marx and Weber, where important key terms like class and status referred to the conditioning effect of social structures upon political phenomena. They observe that empirical works based upon ecological data in the first half of the 20th century were followed, in the postwar period, by the works of Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and their students in Columbia University (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948, and Berelford, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954, cited in Manza et al., 2005), which later came to be referred to as the Columbia school in voting studies. Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) work came in the wake of these early studies, and was the most influential in terms of drawing attention to social determinants of voting behavior.

In terms of election studies, or more specifically voting choice studies, the social determinants approach was the earliest one to appear, especially as practiced in the work of Columbia school. Usually referred to as the sociological approach (Campbell et al., 1980; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Jones, 2001, Molina & Perez, 2004), the quest for social correlates of voting behavior like religious affiliation, class, and place of residence formed the backdrop against which the Michigan school of election studies –which is usually referred to as the socio-psychological approach with its emphasis upon individual attitudes in addition to social characteristics in predicting the vote choice- set out to define the distinctiveness of its theoretical foundations. The two approaches are sometimes treated together to make their contrast sharper with a third approach in voting studies (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Jones, 2001), the so-called rational-choice model or the spatial model, associated with the work of Anthony Downs (1957, cited in Lewis-Beck et al., 2008), which conceives of the voters as actors trying to minimize the distance between their preferred ideological positions and the bundles of positions actually on the offer, those of the parties. For the purposes of this study, however, the sociological and socio-psychological approaches are better left separate.

What separates the notion of cleavage voting, which can be thought of as the embodiment of the sociological approach, from a more general voter characteristics

approach is that only those characteristics of the voter that reflect membership in social groups are counted. When social group membership is a significant predictor of vote choice, we can speak of a cleavage. What separates, in turn, social groups from mere demographic groups is that, following Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair's (1995) definition of cleavage, their members are conscious of their collective identity, and they have some form of an organizational presence in the larger society. Thus, religious and ethnic groups, as well as class, are easily defined as social groups in most cases, whereas the 'socialness' of gender and age groups is more problematic and probably shows more variation from country to country.

The notion of cleavage also needs to be distinguished from mere political divisions, Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1995) warn us. The presence of issues that deeply divide society into hostile political camps, like the issue of abortion, is not enough to treat that divide as a cleavage. The camps should also, at least to some extent, draw disproportionate support from different social groups. In other words, cleavage is what results when there is an overlap between social divisions and political divisions.

Defined as such and treated as a hypothesis to be empirically tested across cases and not as a universal theory about the strength of social determinants, the notion of cleavage voting gave rise to a huge literature exploring variation across political systems and trends over time. Excellent reviews of this empirical literature already exist (Gallagher et al., 1995; Mair, 1997; Dalton, 2004; Maor, 1997); hence I will only make general observations.

The biggest controversy in the literature seems to be over whether there is a decline in cleavage voting, and the biggest concern with the class cleavage, other cleavages usually receiving cursory treatment. The reason the question of decline received so much attention is probably the so-called freezing hypothesis, set forth in Lipset & Rokkan's (1967) introduction, which seems to have fascinated multiple generations of political scientists. The following quote from Lipset & Rokkan (1967), about freezing, is very popular among the academics working on parties and cleavages: "The party systems of 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s" (p. 50). This quote appears, en bloc, in at least 46 individual books,⁸³ some arguing for the continuing relevance of cleavages, others against.

⁸³ A search for the quote in Google Book Search returned 46 separate titles containing the passage. Retrieved 5 November 2008, from

The focus on the class cleavage is no less strong than the focus on freezing. Because class is a key concept of modern social sciences independent of its implications for cleavage voting, this is only to be expected, and many empirical treatments of cleavage voting start out with the class (Dalton, 2004; Gallagher et al., 1995). There are even two book length treatments on the subject of class voting; the one by Mark N. Franklin (1985), *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-83*, which argues for the declining relevance of class as a basis for voting in the UK, the other a volume edited by Geoffrey Evans (1999), *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in a Comparative Context*, which argues that class still is an important determinant of vote choice. The focus on class is not a bad thing in itself; however, a singular focus upon class cleavage, to the point of equating it with the notion of cleavage as such, may lead to erroneous conclusions, especially when conclusions reached about class voting are extended to other cleavages without separate evidence. This is another way of saying that observed decline in class cleavage is not necessarily an indication of de-alignment, meaning a weakened role for social determinants in voting behavior; it may also be the indication of a re-alignment, meaning other cleavages may be gaining in strength (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 1995; Katz, 2001). For example, in his study of cleavage voting in English speaking democracies, Richard S. Katz (2001) finds that the class cleavage declines in the UK from 1964 to 1992, whereas regional, religious, and urban-rural cleavages gain in strength, becoming stronger predictors of vote choice. In Australia, on the other hand, from 1967 to 1996, all cleavages decline together.

A third observation regarding the literature on cleavages is that some of the contradictions in empirical claims are due to the different operationalizations of the concept of cleavage voting. For the earlier periods for which survey data are not available, cleavage voting –or more specifically, change in cleavage voting- is measured indirectly, via indicators –usually classic party system characteristics- like volatility, total share of established parties, and fragmentation. Of these, volatility receives the heaviest emphasis, the reasoning being that if social groups are associated with specific parties, the vote shares of parties should not fluctuate widely from election to election. If the vote choices of individuals are not based upon constantly changing short term considerations but upon membership in social groups, which hardly changes, then there should not be large

http://books.google.com/books?lr=&q=the+party+systems+of+the+1960s+%22reflect,+with+few+but+significant+exceptions%22+the+cleavage+structures+of+the+1920s&num=30&as_brr=0&sa=N&start=0

fluctuations in the vote shares of individual parties. In an oft-cited article, Pedersen (1979/n.d.) uses data showing increased volatility to argue that “even if party systems may still reflect the traditional cleavage structure in the society, the significant exceptions that Rokkan and Lipset were talking about are no longer few, but constitute a larger and growing part of all European party systems” (para. 3). However, using volatility data on individual parties as an indicator of cleavage voting has its dangers.

In a significant contribution to the literature on cleavages, one that parallels Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) contribution to the notion of press-party parallelism –by re-conceptualizing it as political parallelism- Bartolini and Mair (1990) make the case that what matters from the point of view of cleavages is inter-bloc volatility, transfer of votes from one bloc to another, rather than intra-bloc volatility, exchange of votes between individual parties on the same bloc (cited in Mair, 1997). They then show that there is no dramatic increase in inter-bloc volatility figures in Europe as a whole, and argue for the continuing validity of the freezing hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). What matters more for the purposes of this study is not their empirical evaluation, but the conceptual improvement they brought by freeing the notion of cleavage from its association with individual parties and making it about general political tendencies in the form of party blocs.

For the more recent period for which survey data exist, direct measures of cleavage voting are possible. Two direct measures of cleavage voting are the Alford index and Franklin’s (1992) measure based upon explained variances. Alford index, widely used in studies of cleavage voting, is named after its developer Robert R. Alford, and refers to the difference between the percentage of working class voting for parties of the left, and the percentage of other classes voting for the parties of the left. Although it is a very useful and simple measure of class voting, and has the ability to be applied to other cleavages, it sometimes gives rise to differing measures because of the prior need to classify parties into two camps. When parties are classified differently, the resulting measure is also different. For example, Katz (2001) classifies the Democratic Labor Party of Australia on the right hand of the spectrum, in contrast to Alford (1967, cited in Katz, 2001) who classified it as a party of the working class, and their results vary. This creates an additional problem for comparative efforts because political systems are likely to vary in terms of their parties’ ability to be unambiguously identified with larger political currents, which would make Alford’s index a tool with varying precision in different contexts.

Franklin's (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2007) measure based upon the sum of explained variances has two merits compared to the Alford index: First, no prior classification of parties is required; if there is differential support among the social groups for any specific party, it is captured by the measure. By implication, because it is not affected by error in the classification of parties, it is more useful in comparative research. The second improvement is that it is possible to assess the effects of multiple cleavages simultaneously, and separate the effect of a cleavage from the effect of another, partially overlapping cleavage. This is an important improvement, especially if we are interested in the overall level of cleavage voting, in addition to individual cleavages. For example, if we were interested in the level of overall cleavage voting in a country where only class and ethnic cleavages exist, and where they partially overlap, adding up the Alford indexes for these two cleavages would be a poor measure of overall cleavage voting; it would give an inflated result.⁸⁴

Links between press-party parallelism and cleavage voting

Because it is a major variable that appears in all three studies, and because it is conceptually close to the notion of press-party parallelism –we can think of cleavage voting as social group-party parallelism- the connection between cleavage politics and political parallelism deserves further reflection. I have argued in Chapter 2 that there is a conceptual affinity between the notions of press-party parallelism and cleavage voting. In practice, we can imagine three ways in which the two concepts can be linked.

First of all, we can think of press-party parallelism as being already contained in the notion of cleavage politics. This would mean that our definition of cleavage politics is defined wider, requiring congruence not only between social groups and parties, but also between social groups and other societal institutions, including media outlets, which would actually be the definition of a segmented or pillarized society, best exemplified by the Netherlands before 1960s. Although it is possible, as Kris Deschouwer (2001) does, to think of pillarization as the extreme case of cleavage politics where divisions run deeper, the two concepts are better kept separate, not least because we gain in precision by use of

⁸⁴ Franklin's index, in turn, is criticized because it uses ordinary least squares regression for dichotomous variables (Evans, 1999). Although this is a fair criticism, the problem is easy to solve, by using continuous variables like party sympathy scores in cases where the data are available, as Van Kempen (2006) does. There is a big debate on the proper measure of class and cleavage voting in the literature (Goldthorpe, 1999), and many different measures of cleavage voting have already been devised. See the chapter on methodology for more on measures of cleavage voting.

specialized terms. We could say, however, that both cleavage voting and press-party parallelism are features of a pillarized society.

A second way to conceptualize press-party parallelism in cleavage terms is by considering it as yet another cleavage, at the same level with class, religion and gender cleavages. In this scheme, audiences of different media outlets would be treated as distinct social groups. However, we would run the risk of stretching the notion of social group too far if we applied it to audiences. Another reason not to use this terminology is that it could blind us to situations where political parallelism in the media is high but cleavages are weak, or vice versa.

Thirdly, we could link the literatures around these concepts, instead of linking the concepts themselves, and see if they can benefit from each other. Study of press-party parallelism already benefits from the literature on cleavage voting, as is apparent in van Kempen's (2006; 2007) use of Franklin's (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2007) method in measuring parallelism. Another way cleavage literature can be of help in studying parallelism is by drawing attention to the possibility that individual cleavages may be moving in opposite directions, meaning some may be gaining strength while others are weakening. The implication of this insight for measures of press-party parallelism is that an overall measure of parallelism in the media, however useful in comparative terms, may conceal crucial information about the structure of parallelism. For example, we may find that media in Country A have a medium level of parallelism, but this knowledge alone is not enough to make a substantive evaluation about the implications of parallelism in this country. We would also like to know, in addition to the level of overall parallelism, whether there are any common carriers in the media environment or whether all media outlets are advocates, to use the Hutchins Commission's (1947/2004) terminology. When the parallelism scores of individual outlets are averaged, we miss this crucial information; media systems which contain both strong advocates (high parallelism) and common carriers (low parallelism) could receive a similar rating with systems that have only moderate advocates (medium parallelism), both being classified as medium parallelism cases. We need to use measures that are sensitive to this variation in structure.

Study of cleavages, in turn, can benefit from the literature on press-party parallelism. More specifically, Seymour-Ure's (1974) distinction between the three manifestations of press-party parallelism (organization, goal loyalty, and supporters) may be of use. The focus in the study of cleavages is almost singularly upon the last aspect, exploring the differential support of members of different social groups for different

political parties. However, it would probably be useful to study social group-party parallelism (cleavage politics) as expressed at the organizational level and in the form of shared goals too. An example to the organizational expression of cleavages would be the Labour Party's links to the affiliated unions, who have a say in the governing of the party. Such information about formal links between parties and organizations associated with social groups is valuable in itself regardless of the percentage of working class voting for the Labour Party. So is information about shared goals between social groups and parties –which may or may not have organizational links- as expressed in the content of their publications and activities. An example from the US would be the shared goals between the Democratic Party and the ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now), which is arguably an association for the less well to do in the society⁸⁵, and which, despite having no formal links to the party, consistently endorses Democratic nominees. Although difficult to quantify, the extent to which civil society organizations, especially those associated with major social groups, have shared goals with political parties would be a valuable addition to our knowledge about political systems.

⁸⁵ On its official web page, ACORN is defined as “the nation's largest grassroots community organization of low- and moderate-income people.” (ACORN, n.d., para. 1)

Appendix C

Chi-square and Wordscore Calculations

	# CHP (a)	# AKP (b)	AKP Probability (c)	"AKP vs CHP"ness (d)	# Newspaper X (e)	# Newspaper Y (f)	+ Newspaper X (g)	+ Newspaper Y (h)	+ CHP Manifesto (i)	+ AKP Manifesto (j)	chi-square
ak_parti	0	193	1	1	20	4	20,00	4,00	0,00	193,00	0,0440
ak_parti_iktidari	0	71	1	1	13	1	13,00	1,00	0,00	71,00	0,0132
parti_iktidari	0	71	1	1	17	2	17,00	2,00	0,00	71,00	0,0132
iktidarimiz_doneminde	0	56	1	1	4	10	4,00	10,00	0,00	56,00	0,0102
onumuzdeki_donemde	0	53	1	1	40	0	40,00	0,00	0,00	53,00	0,0096
2002_yilinda	0	51	1	1	2	6	2,00	6,00	0,00	51,00	0,0092
parti_iktidari_doneminde	0	30	1	1	1	4	1,00	4,00	0,00	30,00	0,0053
devam_edecektir	1	38	0,97	0,95	0	2	0,00	1,90	0,95	36,05	0,0041
iktidari_doneminde	1	38	0,97	0,95	0	1	0,00	0,95	0,95	36,05	0,0041
2006_yilinda	2	39	0,95	0,90	3	0	2,71	0,00	1,80	35,20	0,0023
yurt_disi	6	4	0,40	-0,20	0	3	0,00	-0,60	-1,20	-0,80	0,0338
hizli_buyume	7	3	0,30	-0,40	1	0	-0,40	0,00	-2,80	-1,20	0,0490
etkin_olarak	5	2	0,29	-0,43	2	0	-0,86	0,00	-2,14	-0,86	0,0358
reel_faiz	5	2	0,29	-0,43	4	1	-1,71	-0,43	-2,14	-0,86	0,0358
yasal_idari	4	1	0,20	-0,60	6	2	-3,60	-1,20	-2,40	-0,60	0,0332
disi_muteahhitlik_musavirlik	4	1	0,20	-0,60	0	40	0,00	24,00	-2,40	-0,60	0,0332
dogu_guneydogu	4	1	0,20	-0,60	10	4	-6,00	-2,40	-2,40	-0,60	0,0332
sabit_sermaye	5	1	0,17	-0,67	2	17	-1,33	11,33	-3,33	-0,67	0,0439
hedef_alacagiz	18	0	0	-1	1	13	-1,00	13,00	18,00	0,00	0,2027
chp_iktidarinda	19	0	0	-1	4	20	-4,00	20,00	19,00	0,00	0,2143
Total	81	655			130	130	80,80	43,12	52,12	626,12	
				Score (11)			0,62	-0,33	-0,64	0,96	
				Transformed Score (12)			0,58	-0,61	-1	1	

1. Calculation of Chi Square

(a)=Frequency of the word in CHP Manifesto.

(b)=Frequency of the word in AKP Manifesto.

$$\text{Chi square} = \frac{[(a*(655-b)) - (b*(81-a))]^2}{[(a+b)*(a+(81-a))*(b+(655-b))*((81-a)+(655-b))]}$$

2. Calculation of Wordscores

(c)=(b/(655+81)) / ((a+b)/(655+81)) Probability with which this word is associated with AKP Manifesto as opposed to CHP Manifesto.

(d)=(2*c)-1 "AKP vs CHP"ness where AKP is 1 and CHP is -1

(e)=Frequency of the word in Newspaper X

(f)=Frequency of the word in Newspaper Y

(g)=e*d Contribution of the word to the "AKP vs. CHP"ness of Newspaper X.

$(h)=f*d$ Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of NewspaperY.
 $(i)=a*d$ Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of CHP Manifesto.
 $(j)=b*d$ Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of AKP Manifesto.
 $(Kg)=(\text{sum } g)/(\text{sum } e)$ $(Kh)=(\text{sum } h)/(\text{sum } f)$ $(Ki)=(\text{sum } i)/(\text{sum } a)$ $(Kj)=(\text{sum } j)/(\text{sum } b)$
 $(L)=[((2*(K-(-0,64))) / (0,96-(-0,64)))] - 1$

Note 1: Scores reported in the main text are transformed scores, denoted by L in the above calculations, also called the MV transformation in Wordscores program.

Note 2: The sample calculations above assume that the texts contain only these 20 phrases. In calculating the scores reported in the main text, attention was restricted to those phrases that had a chi-square value above 0,00001.

Bibliography

- ACORN (n.d.). *Who is ACORN?* Retrieved 12 November 2008, from <http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=12342>
- AKP değil Ak Parti. (2009, June 3). *Hürriyet*.
- An English stop word list. (n.d.). Retrieved February 15, 2011 from <http://snowball.tartarus.org/algorithms/english/stop.txt>
- Anand, B., Di Tella, R., & Galetovic, A. (2007). Information or opinion? Media bias as product differentiation. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 16(3), 635-682.
- Bagdikian, B. H. (2000). The U.S. media: Supermarket or assembly line? In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 39-52). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *Journal of Communication*, 35, 1985.)
- Baron, D. P. (2006). Persistent media bias. *Journal of public economics*, 90, 1-36.
- Bayram, S. (2009). Reporting hijab in Turkey: Shifts in the pro- and anti-ban discourses. *Turkish Studies*, 10(4), 511-538.
- Bayram, S. (2010). Political parallelism in the Turkish press: a historical interpretation. *Turkish Studies*, 11(4), 579-611.
- Beetham, D. (1994). Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit. In D. Beetham (Ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (pp. 25-43). London: Sage Publications.
- Beetham, D. (Ed.). (1994). *Defining and Measuring Democracy*. London: Sage Publications.
- Berberoglu, B. (1992). *The Political Economy of Development: Development Theory and the Prospects for Change in the Third World*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1995). Political communication systems and democratic values. In *The Crisis of Public Communication* (pp. 97-109). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1990).
- Brynin, M., & Newton, K. (2003). The national press and voting turnout: British general elections of 1992 and 1997. *Political Communication*, 20(1), 59-77.
- Bucy, E. P., & D'Angelo, P. (1998). The crisis of communication for citizenship: Normative critiques of news and democratic processes. Paper presented at the *Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Communication Theory & Methodology Division*, Baltimore, MD.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Coe, K., Tewksbury, D., Bond, B. J., Drogos, K. L., Porter, R. W., Yahn, A., et al. (2008). Hostile news: partisan use and perceptions of cable news programming. *Journal of Communication*, 58(2), 201-219.
- Coşar, Ö. S. (1961). *Milli Mücadele Basını*. İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları.
- Curtice, J. (1997). Is the sun shining on Tony Blair? The electoral influence of British newspapers. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 2(2), 9-26.

- Çapanoğlu, M. S. (1962). *Basın Tarihine Dair Bilgiler ve Hatıralar*. İstanbul: Hür Türkiye Dergisi Yayınları.
- Çarkoğlu, A. (1998). The Turkish party system in transition. *Political Studies*, 46, 544-571.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Yavuz, G. (2010). Press-party parallelism in Turkey: an individual level interpretation. *Turkish Studies*, 11(4), 613-624.
- Çarkoğlu, A., & Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2007). *Turkish Democracy Today : Elections, Protest And Stability in an Islamic Society*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- D'alessio, D., & Allen, M. (2000). Media bias in presidential elections: A meta analysis. *Journal of Communication*, 50(4), 133-156.
- Dahl, R. (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (2007). [Interview with Richard Snyder]. Robert A. Dahl: Normative theory, empirical research, and democracy. In G. L. Munck & R. Snyder (Eds.), *Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics* (pp. 113-149). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dalton, R. J. (2004). Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change. In L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, & P. Norris (Eds.), *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* (pp. 189-209). London: Sage Publications.
- Dalton, R. J., Beck, P. A., Huckfeldt, R., & Koetzle, W. (1998). A test of media-centered agenda setting: newspaper content and public interests in a presidential election. *Political Communication*, 15(4), 463-481.
- Deschouwer, K. (2001). Freezing pillars and frozen cleavages: Party systems and voter alignments in the consociational democracies. In L. Karvonen & S. Kuhle (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited* (pp. 199-215). London: Routledge.
- Donsbach, W. (1997). Media thrust in the German Bundestag election, 1994: News values and professional norms in political communication. *Political Communication*, 14(2), 149-170.
- Donsbach, W., & Klett, B. (2000). Subjective Objectivity: How journalists in four countries define a key term of their profession. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. xx-xlix). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *Gazette*, 51, 1993)
- Eilders, C. (2000). Research note. Germany at war: Competing framing strategies in German public discourse. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 415-428.
- Eilders, C. (2002). Conflict and consonance in media opinion: Political positions of five German quality newspapers. *European Journal of Communication*, 17(1), 25-63.
- Elklit, J. (1994). Is the Degree of Electoral Democracy Measurable? Experiences from Bulgaria, Kenya, Latvia, Mongolia and Nepal. In D. Beetham (Ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (pp. 89-111). London: Sage Publications.
- Endersby, J. W., & Ognianova, E. (1997). A spatial model of ideology and political communication: voter perceptions of news reporting. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 2(1), 23-39.

- Erođlu, N. (2003, October) Türkiye'de iktisat politikaların gelişimi. Paper presented at 80. *Yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sempozyumu*, İstanbul. Retrieved March 13, 2010, from <http://www.genbilim.com/content/view/5014/190/>
- Evans, G. (Ed.). (1999). *The End of Class Politics?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Farnsworth, S. J., & Lichter, S. R. (2006). *The Nightly News Nightmare: Television's Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988-2004*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Franklin, M. N. (1985). *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freedom House (2005). *Methodology*. Retrieved 11 November 2008, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005>
- Gallagher, M., Laver, M., & Mair, P. (1995). *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2007). *What drives media slant? Evidence from U.S. daily newspapers*. Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago and NBER. Retrieved 12 November 2008, from <http://faculty.chicagosb.edu/matthew.gentzkow/biasmeas081507.pdf>
- Goldthorpe, J. H. (1999). Modelling the pattern of class voting in British elections. In G. Evans (Ed.) *The End of Class Politics?* (pp. 59-83). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gunther, R., Montero, J. R., & Wert, J. I. (2000). The media and politics in Spain: From dictatorship to democracy. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 28-84). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gürkan, N. (1998). *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Güvenir, Ö. M. (1991). *2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Basını*. İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları.
- Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hallin, D. C., & Papathanassopoulos, S. (2002). Political clientelism and the media: Southern Europe and Latin America in comparative perspective. *Media, Culture and Society*, 24(2), 175-195.
- Haus, C. (2009). *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Hazama, Y. (2003). Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey: toward convergence? *The Developing Economies*, 41(3), 362-387.
- Hazell, R., Akash P., Chalmers, M., Yongi B. & Haddon, C. (2009). *Making Minority Government Work: Hung Parliaments and the Challenges for Westminster and Whitehall*. London: Institute for Government.
- Hopmann, D., & Erik, A. (2009). Incumbency bonus in election news coverage explained: the logics of the political system and the media market. Paper

presented at the annual meeting of the *International Communication Association*, Marriott, Chicago, IL

http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm

- Hutchins Commission (2004). The requirements. In J. D. Peters & P. Simonson (Eds.) *Mass Communication and American Social Thought* (pp. 218-221). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Original work published 1947).
- İskit, S. (1939). *Türkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri*. İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası.
- Jakubowicz, K. (2000) Media within and without the state: Press freedom in Eastern Europe. M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 353-368). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *Journal of Communication*, 45, 1995).
- Janowitz, M. (2000). Professional models in journalism. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 109-119). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *Journalism Quarterly*, 52, 1975).
- Jones, B. D. (2001). *Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and Governance*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jones, R., Armstrong, J., & Cuzan, A. G. (2007). Forecasting elections using expert surveys: an application to U.S. presidential elections. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Political Science Association*, Chicago, IL.
- Kaase, M. (2000). Germany: A society and a media system in transition. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 375-401). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kasım, N. (1999). *Gazi'nin Hayatı 1881-1938*. İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları.
- Katz, R. S. (2001). Are cleavages frozen in the English-speaking democracies? In L. Karvonen & S. Kuhle (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited* (pp. 65-92). London: Routledge.
- Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., & MacDonald M.. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koloğlu, O. (2005). *1908 Basın Patlaması*. İstanbul: Bas-Haş Yayınları.
- Krauss, E. S. (2000). Japan: News and politics in a media-saturated democracy. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 266-302). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krieger, J. (2010). The making of the modern British state. In M. Kesselman, J. Krieger, & W. A. Joseph (Eds.) *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas* (pp. 48-60). Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
- Kuhn, R. (1998). The media and the public sphere in Fifth Republic France. In V. Randall (Ed.), *Democratization and the Media* (pp. 23-41). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Kuhn, R. (2005). Television and l'insécurité in the 2002 French presidential election. *European Journal of Communication*, 20(2), 181-198.

- Lewis-Beck, M. S., Norpoth, H., Jacoby, W. G., & Weisberg, H. F. (2008). *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lichter, S. R. (2001). A plague on both parties: substance and fairness in TV election news.
- Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1974). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (pp. 1-64). New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1974). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Luchessi, L. (2008). Politics and media in the 2007 Argentine presidential elections. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 13(3), 345-351.
- Lynch, M. (2001). *An Introduction to Modern British History, 1900-1999*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Mair, P. (1997). *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mancini, H. (2000). How to combine media commercialization and party affiliation: The Italian experience. *Political Communication*, 17(4), 319-324.
- Manza, J., Brooks, C., & Sauder, M. (2005). Money, participation, and votes: Social cleavages and electoral politics. In T. Janoski, R. Alford, A. Hicks, & M. A. Schwartz (Eds.), *The Handbook of Political Sociology* (pp. 201-226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maor, M. (1997). *Political Parties and Party Systems: Comparative Approaches and the British Experience*. London: Routledge.
- Marletti, C., & Roncarolo, F. (2000). Media influence in the Italian transition from a consensual to a majoritarian democracy. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 195-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McLean, I., Blais, A., Garand, J. C., & Giles, M. (2009). Comparative journal rankings: a survey report. *Political Studies Review*, 7(1), 18-38.
- Millard, F. (1998). Democratization and the media in Poland 1989-97. In V. Randall (Ed.), *Democratization and the Media* (pp. 85-105). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Molina, J. E., & Perez, C. (2004). Radical change at the ballot box: causes and consequences of electoral behavior in Venezuela's 2000 elections. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 46(1).
- Morris, J. S. (2005). The Fox News factor. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 10(3), 56-79.
- Mughan, A., & Gunther, R. (2000). The media in democratic and nondemocratic regimes: A multilevel perspective. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and*

- Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 1-27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Myers, M. (1998). The promotion of democracy at the grass-roots: The example of radio in Mali. In V. Randall (Ed.), *Democratization and the Media* (pp. 200-216). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Natural Language Processing Group. (2010) Turkish stop word list 1.1. Retrieved September 12, 2010 from <http://nlp.ceng.fatih.edu.tr/?p=101>
- Öniş, Z., & Şenses, F. (2007). Global dynamics, domestic coalitions and a reactive state: major policy shifts in post-war turkish economic development. *Metu Studies in Development*, 34(2).
- Page, B. I. (1996). *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Patterson, T. E. (2000). Fourth branch or fourth rate? The Press's failure to live up to the founders' expectations. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 3-12). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *Political Communication*, 10, 1993)
- Pearce, M., & Stewart, G. (1996). *British political history, 1867-1995 : democracy and decline*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Pedersen, M. N. (n.d.). *Electoral volatility in Western Europe, 1948-1977*. (Excerpted from 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', *European Journal of Political Research*, 7(1), 1979). Retrieved November 12 2008, from <http://janda.org/c24/Readings/Pedersen/Pedersen.htm>
- Randall, V. (1998). Concluding comments. In V. Randall (Ed.), *Democratization and the Media* (pp. 240-248). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Sampedro, V., & Pérez, F. S. (2008). The 2008 Spanish general elections: 'Antagonistic bipolarization' geared by presidential debates, partisanship, and media interests. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 13(3), 336-344.
- Sartori, G. (2005). *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Colchester: ECPR. (Originally published 1976).
- Saward, M. (1994). Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization. In D. Beetham (Ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (pp. 6-24). London: Sage Publications.
- Sayarı, S. (2002). The changing party system. In S. Sayarı and Y. R. Esmer (Eds.) *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey* (pp. 9-32). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Scammell, M. (2000). Democracy and the Media. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. xx-xlix). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.
- Scammell, M., & Semetko, H. (2000). The media and democracy. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. xi-xx). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.
- Semetko, H. A. (1998). Media and politics in the Netherlands. Introduction: polders, pillars, and understanding Dutch democracy. *Political Communication*, 15(2), 139-147.

- Semetko, H. A. (2000). Great Britain: The end of news at ten and the changing news environment. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 343-374). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Semetko, H. A., & Canel, M. J. (1997). Agenda-senders versus agenda-setters: Television in Spain's 1996 election campaign. *Political Communication*, 14(4), 459-479.
- Semetko, H. A., & Schoenbach, K. (2003). News and elections: German Bundestag campaigns in the Bild, 1990-2002. *Harvard International Journal of Press & Politics*, 8(3), 54-69.
- Seymore-Ure, C. (2001). The national daily press. In J. Bartle & D. Griffiths (Eds.) *Political communications transformed: From Morrison to Mondelson* (pp. 87-109). Hampshire: Palgrave.
- Seymour-Ure, C. (1974). *The Political Impact of Mass Media*. London: Constable.
- Song, A. V. & Simonton, D.K. (2007). Personality assessment at a distance. In R. W. Robins, R. C. Fraley & R.F. Krueger (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 308-311). New York: Guilford Press.
- Studlar, D. T. (2007). From collectivist consensus to 21st century neoliberalism: orders and eras in postwar Britain. *The Forum* 5(3).
- Tevetoğlu, F. (1988). Atatürk'le Okyar'ın çıkardıkları gazete: Minber. *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, 13(5), 183-193.
- Tironi, E., & Sunkel, G. (2000). The modernization of communications: The media in the transition to democracy in Chile. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 165-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tuchman, G. (2000). Objectivity as strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. In M. Scammell & H. A. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 109-119). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted from *American Journal of Sociology*, 77, 1972).
- Uce, V., & De Swert, K. (2010). Introducing Turkey to the three media system models: the content of TV news in eleven countries. In B. Dobek-Ostrowska, M. Glowacki, K. Jakubovicz, & M. Sükösd (Eds.) *Comparative Media Systems: Eyorpan and Global Perspectives*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- UCLA Academic Technology Services. (n.d.). "What are pseudo R-squareds?" Retrieved February 8th, 2011 from
- van der Eijk, C. (2000). The Netherlands: Media and politics between segmented pluralism and market forces. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 303-342). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Kempen, H. (2006). Press-party parallelism and its effects in Sweden: A longitudinal study 1979–2002. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 29, 406–422.
- Van Kempen, H. (2007). Media-party parallelism and its effects: A cross-national comparative study. *Political Communication*, 24(3), 303-320.
- Weatherly, J. N., Petros, T. V., Christopherson, K. M., & Haugen, E. N. (2007). Perceptions of political bias in the headlines of two major news organizations. *International Journal of Press & Politics*, 12(2), 91-104.

- Weir, S. (1994). Primary Control and Auxiliary Precautions: A Comparative study of Democratic Institutions in Six Nations. In D. Beetham (Ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (pp. 112-154). London: Sage Publications.
- Wring, D. (1998). The media and intra-party democracy: 'New' Labour and the Clause Four debate in Britain. In V. Randall (Ed.), *Democratization and the Media* (pp. 42-61). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Xiang, Y., & Sarvary, M. (2007) News consumption and media bias. *Marketing Science*, 26(5), 611-628.
- Yıldırımkaaya, G. (2009, June 5). Ak Parti mi, AKP mi?. *Hürriyet*.
- Zürcher, E. J. (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I.B.Tauris.

Secondary Sources on the History of the Turkish Press

A. Books on General History

- Baykal, H. (1993). *Türk Basın Tarihi 1831-1923*. İstanbul: Afa Matbaacılık.
- Ertuğ, H. R. (1931). *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi-1*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti.
- Gerçek, S. N. (1931). *Türk Gazeteciliği*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti.
- İnuğur, M. N. (1993). *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- İnuğur, N. (1992). *Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti.
- Jeltyakov, A. D. (1979). *Türkiye'nin Sosyo-Politik ve Kültürel Hayatında Basın (1729-1908 Yılları)*. Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü.
- Kabacalı, A. (2000). *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*. İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları.
- Koloğlu, O. (1993). *Türk Basını Kuvayi Milliye'den Günümüze*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı.
- Oral, F. S. (1968). *Türk Basın Tarihi, 1919-1965 Cumhuriyet Dönemi*. Doğu Matbaacılık.
- Şapolyo, E. B. (1971). *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü İle Basın*. Ankara: Güven Matbaası.
- Topuz, H. (2003). *II.Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.

B. Periodical/Thematic Works, Articles (post-1960)

- Akkoca, M. (2006, January 2). Camia ile sonraki temaslarım. *Önce Vatan*.
- Arsan, E., & Tunç, A. (2007). *Gazetelerde Seçim Var, 2002 Genel Seçimlerinin Yazılı Basında Sunumu: Bir İçerik Analizi*. İstanbul: Yalın.Yayıncılık.
- Cemal, H. (2008, September 11). Kavga ve gerilim değil, barış ve uzlaşma ortamı! *Milliyet*.
- Çalışlar, O. (2006). *12 Eylül ve Andıçlanan Gazetecilik*. İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık.
- Dağtaş, B. & Dağtaş, E. (2007). Sivil itaatsizlik örneği olarak 'Cumartesi Anneleri' eylemlerinin Türkiye basınındaki sunumu. *Kültür ve İletişim*, 10(1), 71-104.

- Demir, V. (2007). *Türkiye'de Medya-Siyaset İlişkisi*. İstanbul: Beta Yayınları.
- Dursun, Ç. (2006). The struggle goes on: the discursive strategies of the Islamist press in Turkey. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 14(2), 161-182.
- Finkel, A. (2000). Who guards the Turkish press? A perspective on press corruption in Turkey. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 147-166.
- Görmüş, A. (2002, July 13). Gazetelerle seçim. *Zaman*.
- Görmüş, A. (2002, October 9). 'Dizayn' çabası 'tarafsızlığı' besliyor. *Zaman*.
- Görmüş, A. (2002, September 25). Seçim olsun, Tayyip'siz olsun. *Zaman*.
- Gül, S. S., & Gül, H. (2000). The question of women in Islamic revivalism in Turkey: a review of the Islamic press. *Current Sociology*, 48(2), 1-26.
- Hortaçsu, N., & Ertürk, E. M. (2003). Women and ideology: representations of women in religious and secular Turkish media. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 33(10), 2017-2039.
- Karalı, H. (2001, February 8). Bir sürecin anatomisi: Medya 28 Şubat'ın neresinde? *Zaman*.
- Konrad-Adenauer Vakfı (1999). *Türkiye'de Medya ve Seçimler*. Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Vakfı.
- Koz, K. A. (2007). *Siyasal karikatürlerde lider imajı: 1987 genel seçimleri bağlamında parti liderlerinin Türk basınında karikatürize edilişi*. Unpublished master thesis, Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Kösebalaban, H. (2004). Turkish media and sport coverage: marking the boundaries of national identity. *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 13(1), 47-64.
- Oktay, A. (1987). *Toplumsal Değişme ve Basın : 1960-1986 Türk Basını Üzerine Uygulamalı Bir Çalışma*. İstanbul : Bilim/Felsefe/Sanat Yayınları.
- Öksüz, O. (2007). Kamuoyu oluşum sürecinde basın-siyaset etkileşiminin etik açıdan değerlendirilmesi. *Selçuk İletişim*, July 2007, 66-81.
- Özcan, Z. (2008, September 15). Medyanın Güçle İmtihani. *Aksiyon*.
- Sucu, M. (2005). *12 Eylül Yasakları*. İstanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık.
- Tek, H. (2006). *Darbeler ve Türk Basını*. İstanbul: Bilgeoğuz.
- Yumul, A., & Özkırmı, U. (2000). Reproducing the nation: 'banal nationalism' in the Turkish press. *Media, Culture & Society*, 22, 787-804.