EU/US AND TURKEY TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY

by REINA ZENELAJ

ASSOC. PROF. NIMET BERIKER

(THESIS SUPERVISOR)

EU/US AND TURKEY TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY

APPROVED BY:

Assoc.Prof. Nimet Beriker ………….………

(Dissertation Supervisor)

Prof. Dr. Bahri Yılmaz ………….………

Dr. Emre Hatipoğlu ………………….

DATE OF APPROVAL: 14 JUNE 2011

ABSTRACT

EU/US AND TURKEY TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY

REINA ZENELAJ

Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Resolution

MA Thesis, 2011

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Nimet Beriker

Keywords: mediation, Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, European Union, United States,
Butmir Process, power, identity, reconciliation.

    This thesis assumes a substantial change in the situation of conflict in Bosnia
especially in the sense of political dialogue and economic cooperation due to the
mediation of Turkey which started since October 2009. In addition, it also
acknowledges the failure of the mediation conducted by European Union and United
States jointly in the region of Bosnia Herzegovina during the same month which could
not alter at all the political deadlock. Both mediations agreed on the argument that the
political deadlock and lack of cooperation between parties in the region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina threatens state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the goal of
each mediation was to ensure a permanent recognition of Bosnia- Herzegovina's full
sovereignty.

    The fact that two different mediators worked for the same goal, at the same time
and in the same region but achieved different results triggered our research in looking
further factors that may have determined success in mediation. For this purpose, after
affirming success in the Turkish mediation by looking at the variables of success in

mediation received from a thorough literature review, we searched the literature on determinants of mediation outcome which cited us four main factors determining success in mediation. These are listed as: 1) Characteristics of the Parties, 2) Nature of the Dispute, 3) Characteristics of the Mediator and 4) Mediation Strategies.

Based on the comparative case findings, the analysis shows that multi party regimes, small power differences, positive past relationship, right timing and lack of complex issues facilitate the mediation process. Furthermore, it advocates the argument that low intervention strategies are more successful in post-crisis tensions. However, contrary to the literature, the study demonstrated that individual mediators may be more successful than regional mediators and that successful mediation is not only related to the possession of resources that either or both parties value but it is also related to the ability of the mediators to fulfill their promises and share these resources.

ÖZET

BOSNA'DAKİ ÇATIŞMALARI YATIŞTIRMA SÜRECİNDE AB/ABD VE
TÜRKİYE: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

REINA ZENELAJ

Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Alanında Yüksek Lisans

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nimet Beriker

ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Arabuluculuk, Türkiye, Bosna, Hırvatistan, Sırbistan, Avrupa Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Butmir Süreci, Güç, Kimlik, Uzlaşma

Bu tez, Ekim 2009'dan beri devam eden Türkiye'nin arabuluculuğuyla Bosna'daki çatışma durumunda, özellikle ekonomik işbirliği ve siyasi diyalog anlamında, büyük bir değişikliği varsaymıştır. Buna ek olarak bu tez, aynı ay içinde Bosna-Hersek bölgesindeki Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından ortaklaşa yürütülen politik anlamda hiçbir yenilik getirmeyen arabuluculuğun başarısızlığını da onaylamaktadır. Her iki arabulucu da Bosna-Hersek bölgesindeki taraflar arasındaki işbirliği eksikliği ve politik çıkmazlığın devlet egemenliği ve toprak bütünlüğünü tehdit ettiği argümanı konusunda hem fikirlerdir. Böylelikle, her iki arabuluculuğun amacı da Bosna-Hersek'teki tam egemenliğin kalıcı olarak tanınmasını sağlamaktır.

İki farklı arabuluculuğun aynı amaçla aynı zamanda ve aynı bölgede çalıştığı ve farklı sonuçlara ulaştığı gerçeği araştırmamızı arabuluculukta başarıyı belirleyen diğer faktörleri araştırmaya yöneltmiştir. Bu amaçla kapsamlı bir literatür taramasında elde edilen arabuluculuğun başarı değişkenlerine bakılarak Türk arabuluculuk başarısı teyit edildikten sonra, arabuluculuk sonucunu belirleyici konular hakkında literatür taraması yaptık. Bu bizi arabuluculuktaki başarıyı belirleyen dört ana faktöre götürdü. Bu faktörler şunlardır: 1) Tarafların özellikleri 2) Tartışmanın doğası 3) Arabuluculuğun özellikleri 4) Arabuluculuk stratejileri.

Bu karşılaştırmalı çalışmanın bulgularına dayanarak analiz sonucu, çok partili rejimlerin, küçük güç farklılıklarının, olumlu geçmiş ilişkinin, doğru zamanlamanın ve karmaşık sorunların olmaması arabuluculuk sürecini kolaylaştırdığını göstermektedir.Buna ek olarak bu çalışma düşük müdahale stratejilerin kriz sonrası gerginlikte daha başarılı olduğu düşüncesini savunmaktadır. Buna rağmen literatürün aksine bu çalışma, bireysel arabulucuların bölgesel arabuluculardan daha fazla başarılı olabileceğini göstermektedir. Aynı zamanda başarılı arabuluculuk sadece bir tarafın veya her iki tarafın kaynaklara sahipliğiyle ilgili olmasıyla değil, aynı zamanda bu kaynakları paylaşmak ve sözlerini yerine getirmek konusunda arabulucuların yetenekleriyle ilgili olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this study is to look at the main factors determining mediation success or failure. To achieve this objective, we compare the EU/US and Turkey mediations in Bosnia Herzegovina and look at the variables that determined success in the Turkish case and failure in the EU/US attempt. The overarching goal of the two mediations which started in October 2009 was to maintain Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity which was threatened by the current political deadlock. Therefore, keeping in mind that the mediation outcomes and mediators were different and region, timing and goal of intervention were almost the same, through the focused comparative methodology, we attempted to look at whether there were further factors determining success or failure in mediation.

1.1 Why Bosnia?

Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) is still a country in transition. Although the war came to an end in 1995 and the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats negotiated a peace agreement mediated by the United States, the EU and Russia, the country still remains a potential area for conflicts. Since it was established in the form of two semi-autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, representatives of the Republika Srpska have repeatedly asserted the right to secede

from Bosnia Herzegovina. Currently, two major Croat parties excluded from the government of the Federation, refused to recognize its legitimacy and formed their own assembly. Additionally, they have called for separation from the Federation and the creation of a third "Croat" entity which further threatens the fragmentation of the country.

After fifteen years, the international community's efforts to stabilize the country have produced no result. Recently, the international community has become unwilling to directly intervene in the country fearing a backlash of the Bosnian Serb leaders. Thus it has decreased its support for the Office of High Representative which can fire and take other actions against local leaders and parties as well as impose legislation in order to implement the peace agreement, and led European Union to enhance its role as an inducement for centralization and consolidation of the Bosnian State. The criteria of US and EU for Bosnia relate to constitutional reforms to make Bosnia's central government institutions more effective so that the country can become a candidate for NATO and EU membership.

What triggered our research on the Bosnian Conflict was exactly the reason that despite the fact that Bosnia still remains a potential problematic area not only for the Balkans but for Europe as well; the international community has lost interest in it. Continuous failures to realize the given objectives and achieve the conditions for consolidating the state structures have increased the internal tensions and may risk challenging the regional stability. In this understanding, it becomes clear that there are a lot of essential political issues that need to be resolved and mediated by international actors. Our study wanted to grasp this momentum, when the international mediation became so crucial, by analyzing the role of the two most important mediation attempts undertaken to ameliorate the political deadlock in Bosnia and to push the country toward Euro-Atlantic integration. We compared the mediations of EU/US under the framework of the "Butmir Process" and Turkey by addressing the following questions:

1. Which factors or determinants affect mediation outcome? Which of these strategies or techniques appeared to be more successful?
2. Do the findings of this study affirm the current literature on mediation success?

On the one hand, European Union appears to be a very influential actor in regional politics due to its ability to offer access to Europe's greatest organization and one of the world's largest markets. Additionally, EU can offer to Bosnia the privilege of engaging in political dialogue on a daily basis and interacting culturally with no border barriers. Although not yet a hard power, EU can prepare it to adopt reforms on human rights, democracy and the rule of law that are so necessary to realize peaceful integration and regional stability. Moreover, United States as a strong hard power can aid Bosnia to become a member of NATO, the world's largest regional military organization. Thus, it could ensure security and order and signal an end to tensions for violent conflicts and civil crisis, due to the main principle of NATO stating that an attack against one member of NATO shall be considered an attack against all members.[1] Therefore, Bosnia would not only gain domestically by establishing peace within the country but also internationally, by improving foreign relations at a regional level and even beyond that. Thus, a successful EU/US mediation meant a step nearer to long-term peace and sustainability.

On the other hand, Turkey has been one of the most favorite countries for Bosnia Herzegovina due to their deep historical, cultural and social bonds. It has supported Bosnia during the war and contributed to its reconstruction. Additionally, Turkey has shared common goal with Croatia such as the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, regional cooperation and establishment of peaceful relations. Furthermore, despite several tensions with Serbia, Turkey recognizes Serbia's central importance to establish peace and thus it supports its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Currently, Turkey has widened its cooperation with the three countries in various fields such as economy, culture, education, health etc.

Although both actors enjoy a positive and legitimate position in front of their parties, the results of the mediations demonstrated that this characteristic of the mediator is not enough to conduct a successful mediation process.

---

[1] Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, retrieved on 8 June 2011

1.2 Thesis Outline

After the Introduction Chapter, Chapter Two introduces a research on how the scholars defined success in mediation and after obtaining a list of variables, we reviewed the literature on mediation outcome which gave us a framework of the main determinants needed to conduct a successful mediation process.

Before moving to the case studies, it was crucial to provide a chapter on the historical background of the conflict in Bosnia in order to learn the historical context that the conflict emerged and evolved and the attitudes and conditions of each actor in certain times. Therefore, Chapter Three served this purpose.

The Fourth Chapter introduces the comparative case study methodology used in this study and explains the technique of research employed to establish the relation between the literature on mediation and the characteristics of the cases.

Answers of our research questions start to be given in Chapter Five, which analyzes all features of the "Butmir Process" or the EU/US mediation and reveals the outcome of the intervention.

Chapter Six fulfills the same objective of looking at the mediation conditions of Turkey and analyzing its characteristics according to the framework obtained from the literature review.

The last chapter compares the findings obtained from the two previous chapters on the mediation cases of EU/US and Turkey and assesses the methods of each mediation. It ends up by some concluding remarks about the impact of this study on the overall mediation literature.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Mediation is one of the most widespread forms of conflict management techniques that includes a third party assistance to two or more contending parties to reach to a solution without resorting to force.[2] Although it follows no structure or set of process, it certainly needs to be non-coercive in nature, *ad hoc* in orientation and voluntary in performance and structure. [3] The main objective of any mediator is to change, reduce or at best resolve the conflict through reliance on persuasion, appeals to logic, and the use of information and of other material, political resources that the mediator applies during the process.

Jacob Bercovitch recognizes three dimensions of the mediation process: One dimension comprises the relationship between the conflicting parties and the mediator; the second one involves the behavior of each contending party shaped within the mediation context and the third dimension relates to the outcomes that come out of the process. [4] All these dimensions intertwine according to the parties' interests, the mediator's interests and the overall interests of managing the conflict. This helps us

---

[2] Kleiboer, M. 1996. "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation".*Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 40:2, p.1

[3] Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2, p.2

[4] Bercovitch, J. 1995**.** *Resolving Iinternational Conflicts: the Theory and Practice of Mediation,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. ch.1, p. 3

understand the reason behind different kinds of mediation behavior and outcomes, but at the same time it also reveals the complexity of a conflict. Due to this, the field required very detailed and systematized researches in order to provide insights of the various methods to use in mediation processes and variables to interplay in mediation decisions that enable the accomplishment of the desired outcomes. Hence, the study of mediation has been dominated by various approaches. Some of the scholars have tried to explore mediation through the single case study tradition, whereas some others have applied game theories, experimental studies or used interviews, observations and other empirical tools.[5] In all the cases, the main goal has always been to analyze the main factors and variables that affect the mediation process and build up frameworks or structures that lead to successful mediation outcomes.

Therefore, this part seeks to explore the methods of how successfully to manage a conflict; however, before considering it, we need to develop a clear understanding of what genuinely constitutes success. The issue of assessing outcomes of conflict mediation processes is a tricky one and the evaluation criteria has often been taken for granted, however defining mediation success is part of a wide interdisciplinary discussion. For the purpose of our study, this section will present a comprehensive review of the main criteria for successful intermediary interventions introduced in the mediation literature.

2.1 Measuring Success in Mediation

The most common dependent variable used to measure success has been reaching an agreement.[6] "By successful outcomes we mean producing a ceasefire, a partial settlement, or a full settlement "(Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 199, 8; Kriesberg

---

[5] Bercovitch, J. 2004. "Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts" *Armed Forces & Society* Winter.30:2, p.155

[6] Sander, F.1995. *"The Obsession With Settlement Rates". Negotiation Journal*. 11:4, p. p. 329-332

1991, 19; Susskind and Babbitt 1992, 31). The most positive effect of an agreement is that it stops the dispute and avoids the costs of leaving the dispute unresolved. [7] Kressel and Pruitt indicate that statistics that have taken settlements as the main criteria of evaluating success, suggested that 60 -80% of the mediation cases from various fields tended to be successful and in private sector US- labor relations area, the statistics produced even higher rates. [8]

However, two years later Bercovitch and Langley produced stricter criteria for success than simply considering a ceasefire, partial or full settlement. They argue that in the context of international conflict, a ceasefire, partial or full settlement can be classified as a success if it occurs within a four week period. [9] Yet, William Ross did not consider the criterion as satisfactory enough, thus pointed out the argument that a successful mediation ideally secures to the disputants an agreement with high joint payoffs; the so- called integrative or win- win agreement. The disputant themselves may not reach an integrative agreement; therefore, a good mediator should create insights that produce win-win agreements.[10] However, is integrative success an objective measure or it does it also depend upon the subjective evaluation? Honeyman, (1990) states that it is equally important for the parties to see the integrative agreement's outcomes as fair and desirable and feel that the satisfactory agreement was reached with no pressure from the mediator.[11] Therefore, mediators need to carefully balance the objective high joint outcomes with each side's subjective satisfaction.

Finally, the mediation intervention is called a success if the parties show willingness to implement the agreement. A research conducted by McEwen and Maiman in 1989

---

[7] Ross, W. 2000. "Measuring Success in Mediation". *Mediation Journal*. 1:1, p.5

[8] Kressel K. and Pruitt D.1989. *Mediation Research*, San Francisco: Jossey- Bass .p.394-435

[9] Bercovtich J. and Langley J. (1993) " Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A theoretical and Empirical Analysis," *Peace & Change*. 18:1, p. 3-25

[10] McGrath, J. 1966. "A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation." in R. V. Bowers (ed.), *Studies on behavior in organizations: A research symposium Athens*, GA: University of Georgia Press. p. 101-134

[11] Honeyman, C. 1990. "On evaluating mediators". *Negotiation Journal*. 6:1, p. 23-36.

showed that parties implement agreements that come out of mediation procedures more readily than they do from other procedures like adjudication.[12]

Prior to them, success in mediation was defined as a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator within five days after the first attempt.[13] However, for some other scholars simply accepting a mediator does not indicate to us anything about the success in mediation process or mediation outcome. For this purpose, Blair Sheppard, who was one of the first scholars to present a systematic discussion of the notion of mediation success, argued that we need to distinguish between success in process or a successful outcome.[14] For instance, success may be achieved if the parties felt empowered during the mediation process or perceived that their concerns were successfully addressed, although it might appear as there was no successful outcome. Therefore, Sheppard later joined by Jessica Katz Jameson, defined *fairness, efficiency, satisfaction and effectiveness* as the main indices of success.[15] As fairness appears to be an elusive concept itself, the scholars suggest measuring it by concrete indicators as: level of process neutrality, disputant control, equitability, consistency of results and consistency with accepted norms. Next to it , they argue that concrete measurement of fairness may mean little to parties if they themselves do not perceive the proceedings to be so, therefore "perception of fairness" is considered to be a priori than any other concrete measure of success. In addition, participants' satisfaction is also largely related to personal perception and quality. In other words, satisfaction comes out as a result of achieving a goal or accomplishing some objectives, the sort of which are very specific to the personality of the parties and the environment of the conflict. So, thinking of how open to interpretation these concepts are, the above mentioned scholars have admitted that the clearest indicator of measuring mediation success is the quality of effectiveness. Here, effectiveness is associated with any positive impact like moving from violent to non-violent behavior,

---

[12] McEwen, C. A., & Maiman, R. J. 1989. "Mediation in small claims court: Consensual processes and outcomes" in K. Kressel & D. G. Pruitt (eds.) *Mediation Research*.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 53-67

[13] Frei, D.1976. " Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of Mediation" *Peace Science Society International Papers*. 26:1, p. 69

[14] Sheppard, B.H, 1984. "Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework". *Research in Organizational Behavior*. 6:1. p. 141-190

[15]Jameson. J.K.1999. "Toward a Comprehensive Model for the Assessment of Intraorganizational Conflict: Developing the Framework". *International Journal of Conflict Management*. 10:3 p. 268 - 294

signing an agreement, accepting a ceasefire or settlement, or agreeing to a U.N. peacekeeping force, among others. If any of these changes has occurred due to the mediation efforts, the mediation attempt can be classified as successful.

However, while this variable can be easily measured and thus suggest us a concrete outcome, in itself it does not say much about the mediation process. For example, what if the signing of an agreement takes an inordinately long time to achieve or costs several times what it should have."[16] Therefore, can we say that an effective mediation outcome does indicate success even if it was not efficiently managed? According to Susskind and Cruikshank, it is not, however for Sheppard and Jameson, as long as any of the above mentioned criteria do not stand alone, but are accompanied by at least one or two more other criteria, like satisfaction and fairness or satisfaction and effectiveness, then we can speak of a truly successful outcome without necessarily fulfilling all four criteria. In other ways, fairness in the mediation process and outcome cannot alone characterize a successful mediation if parties are not satisfied or if the process has not been effective and/or efficient. The same logic counts for all other indices.

As already noted above, Susskind and Cruikshank (1997) followed a similar line by including both fairness and efficiency in their framework but at the same time they replaced satisfaction and effectiveness variables of Sheppard and Jameson with wisdom and stability. In addition, they give to efficiency the most weight. To them, "an agreement may not be all that elegant, but if it is achieved within a reasonably short time without entangling too many people, there is much to be said for it".[17]

Holmes and Miller (1976) advocated that in case there is no immediate agreement out of the mediation process, success is achieved if the mediator has been able to clarify the main issues and motives of each sides' to make or withhold concessions.[18] Part of it is also to help the parties overcome *mental heuristic errors*. Thompson (1998) and Neale and Bazerman(1991) explain the mental heuristic error as a process in which one or both parties relate their bargaining positions to incorrect variables. For instance,

---

[16] Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2. p.6

[17] Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2, p.6

[18] Holmes, J. G., & Miller, D. T. 1976. "Interpersonal conflict". İn Thibaut, J. W , Spence, J. T. & Carson, R. C. (eds.) *Contemporary topics in social psychology*). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. p. 265-308

suppose we are in a house sale negotiation in which a house owner wants to sell the house at the price of $45.000, whereas the customer can offer only $35.000. After a few days, the same customer receives an offer from another house seller to get a house that is similar to the previous one at a price of $30.000. Now, the customer will accept the first offer only if the owner agrees to sell it for at least $30.000. On the other side, the owner until now has never made a discount of more than $10.000 and thinks that if he lowers the price to $35.000, he will have made the biggest discount he has ever offered to any of his customers, and thus thinks that the deal will be achieved. However the agreement does not satisfy the customer, who now has a new limit. At last, the house owner may end up selling the house for a price lower than $30.000 because he may not have any other customer who offers above that price. So, the mediator should avoid such mental heuristic errors by informing each side about the other and warning them of how mental errors can often reduce their prevalence.

In addition, if the mediator has helped the parties to resolve some of the issues despite not enough issues to reach an agreement, the mediation should be considered as successful since the parties may be closer to an agreement than they would be without the assistance of a mediator. [19] Furthermore, Kochan & Jick (1978) argued that if the parties have made any substantial concession or have made concessions to their respective limit, the mediator may have done all she/he can do because an additional concession that would lead to an agreement can be made until one or both disputants change their limits.[20] Related to this, a mediator may have still performed a valuable service if he has made the disputants expand the range of options and avoid them becoming mentally "locked" into their respective settlement options.[21]

One additional criterion measure for success in mediation is the presence/absence of the narcotic effect. [22] According to it, a mediation process is considered to be successful if the parties do not become dependent upon the mediator. In other words, despite having reached an agreement or not, if the parties repeatedly turn to a mediator

---

[19] Ross, W. 2000. "Measuring Success in Mediation". *Mediation Journal*. 1:1, p.8

[20] Kochan, T. A., & Jick, T.1978. "The public sector mediation process: A theory and empirical examinations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 22:1, 209-240.

[21] Ross, W. 2000. "Measuring Success in Mediation". *Mediation Journal*. 1:1, p.10

[22] Ibid, page 11

whenever a future disagreement arises without previously showing serious efforts to resolve it themselves, then they are victims of the so called "narcotic effect". Thus, even if a mediator has accomplished any or all of the previous criteria, the occurrence of the "narcotic effect" may be a sign of failure rather than a sign of success.

Apart from all these, Keashley, Fisher, and Grant (1993) substantiate that rapport building in mediation processes is more important than issue settlement[23]. Through it, they imply that improving the quality of the relationship between the parties by especially reestablishing trust (Ross & La Croix, 1996; Ross & Wieland, 1996) leads to at least the de-escalation of the conflict if not its full resolution. Here, the mediator should undertake the important measure of successfully defining the power issues in the relationship and help the parties to a have a more cooperative motivational orientation. Bush and Folger (1994) and Weingarten and Douvan (1985) has named the process as "transformative" rather than "transactional" mediation by attaching to a successful mediator more the role of a counselor than an issue oriented problem solving agent.

A different approach of evaluating success in mediation comes from Tamra d'Estree that identifies the terms *conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation* as indicators that measure degrees of mediation success.[24] Conflict settlement and conflict resolution, as the two most notable outcomes, differ from each other in that a settlement reduces or eliminates the destructing part of the conflict generating behavior, whereas conflict resolution builds a relationship that not only resolves the conflict but even prevents its reemergence. Bercovitch advocates that the nature of conflict decides for the conflict management tools. For instance, if the conflict is small in scale, interpersonal or group conflict and interest based, then resolution would be a proper measure of success. However, when the conflict is large in scale, complex and value based, success would best be defined as the ability to settle the conflict and to end its damaging aspects. Actually, a similar discussion is sustained within international relations literature as well, in which the neo-realist supporters

[23] Keashly, L., Fisher, R. J., & Grant, P. R. 1993. "The comparative utility of third party consultation and mediation within a complex simulation of intergroup conflict." *Human Relations*, 46:3, 371-393.

[24] D'Estree, T.P, 2001. "Changing the Debate About Success in Conflict Resolution Efforts", *Negotiation Journal*, 17:2, p.101-109

consider attempts for conflict resolution to be unrealistic since conflicts are defined as a natural part of the power politic behavior. On the other hand, the idealists stand for a resolution of all malleable parts of social situations as conflicts are thought to be born out of structural discrepancies. Overall, the conflict management literature seems to favor the idealist understanding by positioning conflict resolution inherently superior to settlement.[25] Furthermore, settlement sometimes is even seen as half damaging because it leaves the conflict open to chances of it erupting again. Nevertheless, the literature also emphasizes that conflict resolution is not always feasible like in cases when the negative feelings are too deep and the conflict is old, for that a cease fire or a settlement might be the only way forward. To conclude, the nature and the level of the conflict impact the means and goals of the process and thus, the evaluation of the notion of mediation success. [26]

Success in mediation becomes an even more elusive criterion when it is separately evaluated according to short term and long term success and when especially short term success is studied as a potential antecedent of long term success. There is a common agreement among many social scientists that identifying key issues in a conflict, structuring the agenda, suggesting new ideas and exhibiting empathy toward the disputants are some forms of mediator behavior that contribute to short term success (Carnevale, Lira, & McLaughlin, 1989; Donohue, 1989; Zubek et at., 1992). However, Pruitt, Peirce,McGillicuddy, Welton and Castrianno were more concerned with the impact of the short term success in the long term process. Keltner (1987) and Pruitt& Rubbin (1986) argued that win- win agreements lead to compliance and improved relations between the parties. Hence, they assumed that reaching a sound agreement would predict long-term success.

Short term success would be dependent upon reaching *an agreement, immediate satisfaction with the agreement or goal achievement* and long term success would be fulfilled if a compliance with the agreement has occurred, the relations between the parties are improved or if there doesn't appear any new problem between

---

[25] Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2,p.296

[26] ibid

them.[27]Contrary to what scholars believed, the research study that consisted of 73 community mediation cases showed that no relationship was found between short-term and long-term success[28]. For instance, clarity and feasibility of the agreement reached in the short-term did not mean that the parties would comply with it or that relations among them would be improved in the long term. However, although simply reaching an agreement or the quality of the agreement does not on its own make up long-term success, agreements that resolve immediate issues have greater long-term significance when the parties have friendly relations and trust each other and when contracts (especially in commercial and labor – management cases) are supported by courts and business practices.

In addition to all these, Haas's (1986) success index comprises a more general approach of success in mediation by focusing on the behavioral impact of international mediation. To him, a mediation can be classified as fully successful when it makes a great difference to or settling a dispute; it is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiation and dialogue between the parties; its success is limited when it achieves only a ceasefire or break in hostilities and finally it is unsuccessful when it has no impact on the dispute.[29]

Lastly, a very straightforward way of evaluating outcomes in mediation and determining their success or failure has come from Weiss who suggests measuring the effect of mediation against the goals it sets out to accomplish.[30] To examine it, we need to approach mediators before the mediation starts and ask about their goals and expectations and after the mediation ask them on whether their goals have been accomplished or not. Bercovitch calls it as a process of measuring the objective outcomes by reference to mediator's subjective evaluation of their goals. [31]

---

[27] Pruitt D., Robert S.Mc., Neil B.W., Gary L.C., Lynn M. 1993. "Long-Term Success in Mediation." *Law and Human Behavior*.17:3. p.317-318

[28] Ibid, p. 322

[29] Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*. 28: 1. p. 9

[30] Weiss. C 1972. *Evaluation Research: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness*. N.J.: Prentice-Hall

[31] Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2, p.298

To conclude, as the above review suggests, the term success in mediation has been evaluated from a range of simply being accepted as a mediator within five days after the first attempt to achieving efficiency, satisfaction and effectiveness. Table I offers a summary of the main variables introduced in this section.

TABLE I

SUCCESS IN MEDIATION (A SUMMARY)

1. **Entering into mediation within 5 days after the first attempt.**
2. **Reaching an agreement; ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement.**
3. **Reaching an agreement; ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement within four week period.**
4. **Making a great difference to or settling a dispute.**
5. **Achieving Fairness, Efficiency, Satisfaction and Effectiveness.**
6. **Achieving Wisdom, Stability, Fairness and Efficiency.**
7. **Fulfilling the pre-mediation goals.**
8. **Attaining Integrative Agreements and being able to implement them.**
9. **Managing or settling value based conflicts and resolving or transforming interest based conflicts.**
10. **Clarifying issues and/or resolving some of the issues**
11. **Making concessions on unresolved issues and/or making concessions to their respective limits.**
12. **Expanding the range of options.**
13. **Avoiding the narcotic effect.**
14. **Overcoming mental heuristic errors.**
15. **Improving relations between parties**
16. **Lacking of new problems between them.**
17. **Reestablishing trust between parties**
18. **Dealing successfully with power issues in the relationship**
19. **Helping the parties have a more cooperative motivational orientation.**

2.2 Determinants of Mediation Outcome

The model developed by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Willein (1991) identifies contextual and process attributes as independent variables in the study that interact to affect the mediation outcome which is the dependent variable. Regime type, power disparity between disputants and the nature of disputants' former relationship are the three characteristics of the disputing parties that highly influence the effectiveness of international mediation. [32]The study affirms the already existing idea that disputes involving two multi party regimes are generally more successful than those involving other regime types and the one-party state dyads are the least successful in mediation attempts. In addition, the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the greater the effectiveness of international mediation (Ott, 1972; Young, 1967). Next, the study reveals that the probability of successful mediation appears to be the highest when parties are not only equal in power but are both relatively weak states. Lastly, Deutsch (1973) positions the previous relationship between the parties to be as one of the most important determinants of conflict outcomes. The probability of successful mediation is higher when mediating between friends and lower when mediating between historical adversaries.

In addition, Ott (1972) argues that the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the nature of the dispute. Firstly, to be effective, mediation must take place at the right moment. Although there is little agreement as to what constitutes a 'right moment' generally, the longer the dispute goes on, less likely will the mediation result in success. Actually, the main disagreement on this issue goes among Edmead (1971), who thinks that mediation will mostly succeed if it is attempted at an early stage, before the disputants begin to inflict heavy losses on each other, and others like Northedge and Donelan (1971) who suggest that mediation is more effective, when a

---

[32]Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. " Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research.* 28: 1. p.10

conflict has gone through a few phases and it must not be initiated if the sides have not shown any willingness for the amelioration of the conflict. The research conducted by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) proposed that although on the one hand longer disputes generally mean less chance for mediation; on the other hand there is a need for a minimum amount of time to pass before mediation becomes successful. In order to be able to conduct a successful mediation, disputing parties need to be at the stage of revaluating their policies and that mostly occurs after some crises or crisis like conditions are fulfilled. (Druckman 1993, 1994; Touval and Zartman 2001)[33]

Secondly, the chances of a successful mediation depend on the frequency of mediation attempts as well (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991). For instance, the probability of a successful mediation increases after one or two previous mediation attempts and decreases if the same mediator is attempting for the third or fourth time. Therefore, the duration of the dispute should go hand in hand with the issue of the timing of mediation when deciding for mediation.[34]

Thirdly, scholars argue that the factor of dispute intensity is not less important than dispute duration. Jackson (1952) and Young (1967; 1968) suggested that the mediation will be accepted and be more successful if the intensity of the dispute is greater. Contrary to them, Brockner (1982), Burton (1969) and Modelski (1964) were among the firsts to claim that the greater the intensity, the higher the losses, the more polarized the parties' positions will become and so more will the parties want to "win at all costs". To support this view, Bercovitch added that international disputes with 100 – 500 fatalities are more successful when compared to international disputes with more than 1000 fatalities.

Apart from all these, the nature of the dispute is highly characterized by the issues in the conflicts. A successful conflict management process and a successful mediation outcome highly depend upon the importance the parties attach to the issues involved. Bercovitch claims that mediations involving topics of ideology and independence are hardly negotiable whereas issues of security and sovereignty are more

---

[33] Beardsley K.C. Quinn D.M Biswas B. Wilkenfeld J. 2006 "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50: 1 p.61

[34] Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. " Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*. 28: 1. p.10

resolvable. This also explains why during the Cold War, when ideology was mainly the issue of dispute, only one out of ten disputes of this category resulted in some success, whereas in non-ideological conflicts, mediation was more effective at a ratio of 13 out of 31 conflicts[35]. However, Ott (1972) argues that unless national security interests are at stake, any mediation has good chances of resulting in success. [36] Whereas, Lewicki and Litterer (1985) group the conflict issues into tangible and intangible ones by including concrete elements of a case such as money, property and objectionable behavior as tangible issues and principles, moral rules or beliefs about one's rights as intangible issues. To them, often, intangible issues , although not listed in the formal agenda, may be more important than tangible issues as they represent values and human needs that are felt and as such are ' not for trading'.[37] Therefore, both the conflict parties and the mediator should pay attention to them; otherwise they may trigger rigid positions and hostile behaviors and thus bring the process to a deadlock. [38]

Furthermore, Moore (1986) considers issues in dispute from a different aspect. To him, mediations are more manageable if issues are not complex. In other words, more complex the dispute is, less are the chances for an effective mediation. [39] Alternatively, some other scholars argue that more complex disputes enable greater opportunities for trade- offs and thus increase the chances for successful mediation. (Bercovitch 1984; Fogg 1985; Kolb 1983)

Another essential variable is related to the identity and the characteristics of the mediator. For Young (1967), Jackson (1952) and Northedge & Donelan (1971), impartiality remains at the heart of successful mediations in many situations.[40] However, for Susskind & Cruickshank (1987), Zartman & Touval (1985), Brookmire &

---

[35] Ibid. p.14

[36] Bercovitch J. and Langley J. 1993. "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 36:4 p.676

[37] Burton, J. W. and D.J.D. Sandole. 1987. "Expanding the debate on generic theory of conflict resolution: A response to a critique." *Negotiation Journal*. 3:1 p.97-100.

[38] Zubek J.M. Pruitt D.G. Peirce R.S. 1992. "Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short- Term Success in Mediation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 36:3 p.550

[39] Moore, C. 1986. *The mediation process*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.p. 394-435

[40] Smith J. 1994 "Mediator Impartiality:Banishing the Chimera", *Journal of Peace Research*. 31:4 p. 445

Sistrunk (1980), mediation is not an exogenous process but a structural extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation; therefore, rather than impartiality, a successful mediation is related to the possession of resources that either or both parties value. [41]In addition, Frei's data (1976) concludes that mediation attempts by superpowers are more likely to be successful than mediation attempts by medium or small powers. From a different perspective, international mediators with their high prestige and the wide array of possible strategies are best at resolving high intensity conflicts; whereas regional mediators are better resolving low-intensity conflicts due to their proximity, cultural similarity and comparative informality. Yet, individual mediators appear to be the least effective at achieving settlement when compared to international and regional mediators despite their state background. (Bercovitch&Gartner, 2006). In addition to all these, previous mediation efforts are important as they may have influenced the current conflict management outcome but they do not surely determine the existing outcomes.[42]

Other than these, scholars have also identified variables that examine the relationship between mediation behavior and mediation outcome. As many of them agree, this is the most critical variable affecting mediation outcome (Kochan &Jick, 1978), since the above mentioned attributes are valid for the other conflict resolution tools as well. To state it more clearly, the above mentioned variables would affect the negotiation process and outcome in almost a similar way, but what would decide for the chances of resolving conflicts through mediation techniques rather than using the other strategies like negotiation, adjudication etc, are the impact of the characteristics but mostly the effectiveness of tools employed by the mediator.

The mediator may decide to adopt a fairly passive role, by simply acting as a channel of communication between the parties and exhibiting very little control over the interactions between the disputants (Burton 1984; Bercovitch 1992; Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Hopmann 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996; Bercovitch 1997 etc.) or he may use directive strategies by making substantive suggestions and pressuring the parties to accept them. From the low end of the spectrum to the high end of it, the

---

[41] Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. " Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research.* 28: 1. p.10

[42]Bercovitch J. and Gartner S.S 2006 "Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation ? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 32:4 ,p. 329-354

mediator can use conciliation-facilitation; procedural; directive; substantive; supervisory and sometimes unspecified strategies. When moving from the lowest to the highest end, the mediator starts with facilitating communication, controlling some aspects of the process of mediation, to affecting the content and process of negotiation and manipulating cost-benefit structures of the parties.[43]

The main goal of the mediator is to use the right techniques that identify agreements within the Zone of Agreement[44] that is the overlapping range of possible nonviolent outcomes. Therefore, as actors do not have complete information regarding their opponents' capabilities and intentions, a facilitative mediator would ensure that the disputant parties have access to all possible necessary information so that they can best estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes. The low level mediation activity may include providing good offices or revealing information that mediators might have gathered independently. On the other hand, formulation or procedural mediation include mediators who propose new solutions to the disputants and help the actors to more easily choose an existing mutually acceptable alternative (Touval and Zartman 1985; Hopmann 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996; Bercovitch and Houstan 2000). Finally, the manipulative or directive/ substantive mediation uses the mediator's position and leverage to influence the negotiation process. The main achievement of mediators using high intervention tools is to expand the zone of agreement and increase the immediate costs of continuing conflict by offering carrots – direct compensation, the enactment of favorable economic policies or other diplomatic concessions or sticks – economic / diplomatic sanctions, the threat of direct military intervention etc.

For some scholars, the more active strategies have shown to be the most effective ones. (Hiltrop, 1985; Pruitt, 1989; Bercovitch, 1989). However, a study conducted by Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas & Wilkenfeld (2006) and supported by Bercovitch & Gartner (2006) claimed that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve commitment problems and ensure a reduction in post crisis tensions, whereas, manipulative mediation is more useful and effective in securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement. Hence, the latest research strongly challenges the

---

[43] Beardsley K.C. Quinn D.M Biswas B. Wilkenfeld J. 2006 "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50: 1 p.58-86

[44] ibid, p. 7

notion that mediation is mostly effective when it is directive and shows that low-key intervention may be more beneficial that it has been conventionally believed. Therefore, in a conflict which passes in different stages from escalation, stalemate to crisis reduction a balance of styles should be used if mediators are to maximize their overall effectiveness.[45]

To conclude, literature on determinants of mediation outcome indicates that 1) Characteristics of the Parties, 2) Nature of the Dispute, 3) Characteristics of the Mediator and 4) Mediation Strategies comprise the most important variables affecting success or failure in mediation. Figure I summarize all the indices introduced in this section.

---

[45] Beardsley K.C. Quinn D.M Biswas B. Wilkenfeld J. 2006 "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50: 1 p.58 -86

FIGURE 1

DETERMINANTS OF MEDIATION OUTCOME

1.REGIME TYPE
2.POWER STATUS
3.PREVIOUS RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER

1.POWER
2.RANK& IDENTITY
3.RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES
4.PREVIOUS MEDIATION EXPERIENCES

1.DURATION & TIMING OFINTERVENTION
2.INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE
3.TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED

1.LOW INTERVENTION (CONCILIATION-FACILITATION)
2.MIDDLE INTERVENTION (PROCEDURAL, FORMULATION)
3.HIGH INTERVENTION (DIRECTIVE, SUBSTANTIVE, MANIPULATION.
4. SUPERVISORY
5. UNSPECIFIED

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many conflicts in history remain in our memories for their great number of violent deaths and displaced persons and refugees but mostly for their bewildering mystery. The most challenging part of each conflict has been about how to explain the detailed causes of the conflict and more importantly to understand why a solution to these conflicts is so evasive.

The purpose and the organizational structure of this background part is threefold. First, it offers a thorough understanding of the background to the conflict by initially looking at the key demographics and identification of major actors. Next, the paper goes on with a brief strategic overview which traces the policy actions and options that have been used since the outbreak of civil war. Finally, it addresses key instruments of national policy and international diplomacy after the post – Dayton agreement by illuminating those strategies that aimed to promote conflict resolution although the promise for a favorable outcome was not always fulfilled.

Bosnia – Herzegovina owns a particular geographic nature sitting in the Balkans and laying across important lines of communication from the interior of Europe to the coast of Adriatic. As such, it attracted the attention and ambitions of outside military powers from Byzantines to World War II. In this way, the region passed from the control of one multinational empire to another. The Slav invasion established the linguistic identity of the region, whereas the Romes and Byzantiums brought their religious and education characteristics by founding on this way the branches of two ethnic groups based on religion,

which would later be known as the Croats of the Roman Church and the Serbs of the Orthodox Church. [46]

After the fourteen and fifteen centuries, population movements were rare in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Slav population differed among each other in religious lines. After the Ottoman Invasion, a group of them returned to Muslims whereas the other Christian and Orthodox portion became the wards of their respective churches. Nevertheless, they shared the same historical experiences, economic conditions and even a distinct 'oriental – Islamic Cultural Heritage' developed in the territories under the Ottoman rule, reflected in the adoption of Turkish and Arabic words and terms, the style of dress, art and architecture etc.[47] However, despite these commonalities, the people of Bosnia developed a common feeling of homeland, which actually never developed into the idea of a Bosnian nation.[48]

Firstly, the Slavic Muslim population called themselves as ' Turks', a term which meant for them 'adherent to Islam' until the region felt under the control of the Austrians , where to identify oneself as a 'Turk' was perceived as an indication for opposition. [49] Therefore, a great number of the Slavic Muslim population began to describe themselves as Muslims whereas a small number of the Muslim elites began to call themselves 'Muslim Serbs' as a reflection of their attraction to the independent Serbian state as a potential counterweight to the Austrian power. On the other side, some of the other Muslims began to declare themselves as Croats, mostly due to the increasing education of Muslim children in Serbo- Croatian Schools. In this way, the Austrian occupation hastened the formation of a segmented society in which Serbs, Croats and Muslims would live their lives within the framework of their own Serb, Croat or Muslim institutions. [50] As such, the Muslim identity had been transformed from a thoroughly religious identity to a broadly ethnic, even national identity, through which the Muslims would distinguish themselves from both the Croats and the Serbs.

---

[46] Slack J.A and Doyon R.R 2001. "Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38:2 p.141

[47] Andjelic N. 2003. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*. London: Frank Cass Publishers

[48] Clark M.E. 1999. " A Unified and Multiethnic Bosnian State: Achievable Goal or Impossible Dream?", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 6: 2 p.235

[49] Burg S.L and Shoup P.S. 1999 *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention,* London: M. E. Sharpe. p.19

[50] Ibid. p.20

During all this time, Bosnia has never been an independent state, even in 1918 when a national council meeting in Sarajevo, Bosnia- Herzegovina asked for its adherence to Yugoslavia. However, interesting enough the country was never fully assimilated in modern times due to it being relatively vast, largely inaccessible and ethnically indigestible. [51]

Bosnia Herzegovina did not look up as an emerging nation; therefore, its inclusion into Yugoslavia's structure in 1918 remained of no surprise. Since then Bosnia became an object of conflict and negotiation between the Croatian and Serbian nationalism where even its territorial boundaries apart from the nationalistic features were often adopted according to the scenario of the conflict.[52] Only in 1943, Bosnia- Herzegovina's boundaries were considered constitutionally inviolable after the communist leader Tito elevated it at the status of a republic, equal to the other five republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia).[53] Nevertheless, for about 75 years, the boundaries of Bosnia Herzegovina were considered administrative in nature as can be internal boundaries. As such, many secret agreements were made, like the transfer of Bosnia – Herzegovina's only usable outlet to the sea on the bay of Boka Kotorska at Herceg- Novi to Montenegro, and other partitions were realized without regards of Muslims interests. [54]

The intensity of ethnic and nationalistic feelings as principle objectives of the individual Balkan Republics ran counter to the multi- ethnic, egalitarian idea; however this was not the major reason for conflict. The most popular idea has been that Bosnian conflict should be explained in terms of ancient ethnic hatred[55] yet before 1992, the three ethnic communities of Bosnia Herzegovina were distributed among disconnected ethnic majority areas that differed from nearly homogenous to nearly evenly divided. Therefore, since the ethnic settlement was

[51]Ibid. p.18

[52] Slack J.A and Doyon R.R 2001. "Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Journal of Peace Research,* 38:2 p.141-142

[53] Ramet S.P. 2006. The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005.Bloomington: Indiana University Press p.164

[54] Burg S.L and Shoup P.S. 1999 *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention,* London: M. E. Sharpe. p.21

[55] Sekulic´ D. Massey G.and Hodson R. 2006. "Ethnic intolerance and ethnic conflict in the dissolution of Yugoslavia", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 29:5. p.803

not something new but rooted in the past, none of the ethnic groups could seek for neither a territorial or for a cultural autonomy. Until 1992, most of the Muslims which made up around 44% of the overall population were concentrated in urban areas, whereas Serbs and Croats making up around 33% and 17% respectively tended to inhabit rural areas. In other words, a given district could be populated by a Muslim majority in the urban-centered areas but was surrounded by a Serb-Croat population in the countryside, which clearly shows a peaceful cohabitation of different ethnicities. [56]

With the final collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was stimulated to hold a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia after Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had already achieved it. The goal of the ethnically diverse republic was to establish itself as a nation by envisaging a democratic confederation of three ethnically based groups (Muslims, Serbs and Croats). However, the Croats and Serbs were against their inclusion in the Bosnian borders and the elections of the three nationalist parties claiming to represent the three ethnic communities together with the election of Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim leader, as the head of the collective republic presidency triggered further resistance and violent rebellions. Even before Bosnia- Herzegovina held the referendum, the two other ethnic groups had expressed their willingness to unite to their mother countries and to even form a separate republic within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina as it was the case of the Serbian claims for the Republika Srpska.[57]

Even though the independence was approved and recognized by United States and the major European countries, it could not prevent an open warfare between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian forces which one year later would advance to a three way war between the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks. More than 4.4 million people, which constituted almost half of the population, had been driven from their homes, around 250.000 people were dead and around 2 millions left the country either as refugees or as internally displaced.[58] The war reached the peak in July 1995 with the Srebrenica Massacre organized and realized by the

---

[56] Marko J. 1996. "The Ethno-national Effects of Territorial Delimitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina."The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in cooperation with European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) (eds.), *Local Self-Government. Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities*. Zürich. p.121

[57] Dichter. A.S. 1994. *Actions and Options in the Bosnian Conflict: A Strategic Analysis and a Strategic Approach Towards Conflict Resolution*, CJCS Strategy Essay Writing Competition Entry .Alabama: USA. p. 20

[58] Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. 2003. *Comparative indicators on refugees, displaced persons and returnees, property law implementation and reconstruction in BiH from 1991 to 30 June 2003*. Sarajevo: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbian forces which targeted the killing of around 8000 men and boys together with 25.000 – 30,000 Bosniaks[59].After three years of bitter fighting among the Bosnian groups and the Yugoslav army, the Western Countries supported by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), imposed a final ceasefire, named as Dayton Agreement. The Dayton Agreement was successful in imposing an extremely important ceasefire and thus establishing a negative peace, but it left the country undivided and ethnonationalism undefeated as the agreement framework did not address the political structure that had caused the war. Dayton Agreement decided for a federation state where 51% of the land would make up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 49% constituted the Bosnian Serb Republic.[60] Since then, the International Community remained highly present in civilian and military affairs, especially with the position created for the High Representative, an international office responsible for monitoring the implementation of the civilian acts decided in the Dayton agreement. In addition to that, since seven years, international military presence is assured by around 1600 European Union troops after NATO's mission ended in December 2004. [61] Despite all international efforts, the fears for a renewal of the conflict have not been totally removed and continue to be promoted due to the high level of support to ethnic based political parties and due to the fact that almost 40 percent of the displaced returnees have not reoccupied their homes yet.[62]

Under the decisions of the Dayton Peace Accord, each entity control their own budgets, expenditures on infrastructure, healthcare and education. However, the multiple ethnic veto power has paralyzed the decision making process and the system functions only in cases the High Representative, who actually is responsible for monitoring the implementation of Dayton Accord, pressures the process and directly intervenes. Even at the legislative level, approval of any decision requires the votes of at least one third of the members of each entity

[59] Clark. W.K. 2001. *Waging Modern war: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat,* Wilmington, NC, U.S.A. PublicAffairs; 1st ed. p.325

[60] Chandler. D. 2000. Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. London: Pluto Press; 2nd ed. p.72

[61] Muehlmann. Th. 2007. "Police Restructuring in Bosnia Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally- Led Security Sector Reform", *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1: Special Supplement. p. 15

[62] O'Loughlin, J. and Tuathail G. Ó. 2009. "Accounting for Separatist Sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Responses". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32:4 p. 591–615

in the House of Representatives, which makes the states heavily dependent upon the support of the entities and decreases its competences.[63] Nevertheless, the process itself would be working unless parties had a strict nationalistic direction and perceive their positions as extremely diverging and conflicting with each other.

The current political situation has highly frustrated and concerned the public that the continuous political confrontations may result in violence.

"Before the war a referendum happened and it brought us to bloodshed. People are very scared of this talk about referendum in RS. It reminds them of the period right before the war. Even the word referendum makes people disturbed and produces fear."[64]

In addition, people in Bosnia are also worried that the current political deadlock has endangered the economic situation where unemployment rates have reached high levels largely due to the fact that access to jobs depends on political and personal connections.

As a response to the current situation, EU suggests the conduct reforms that would lead to the establishment of a single, central and a multi ethnic state. As, Wolfgang Petritsch, the third High Representative, argued, the general objectives of the international community are "…to reform the courts, to strengthen the judiciary and central institutions like the presidency and the council of ministers so that leaders have the tools to mend their blighted country. By creating a true civil society, a society that is based on ethnic cohesion, not division, we can enable the people to tackle corruption and other social ills for themselves."[65] Since Bosnia- Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe in 2002, the international community has intensified its calls to speed up constitutional reforms that have led state institutions into a deadlock since the entity and party- agendas have blocked the decision making process. As such, European Union in collaboration with United States has initiated two mediation attempts named as 'Prud Process' in November 2008 and 'Butmir Process' in October 2009, which endeavored to trigger dialogue between key domestic political

---

[63] Sebastián S. 2001. "Breaking the Impasse: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia" Fride: Policy Brief. p. 2

[64] Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo and Saferworld. 2010. The Missing Peace: The Need for a Long Term Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/The%20missing%20peace%20-%20English%20reduced.pdf retrieved on 25 March 2011, p.21

[65] Petritsch,W. 2010 "The Future of Bosnia Lies with its People", http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=3188, retrieved on 21 March 2011

stakeholders on concrete institutional reforms that would improve the functioning of the country's democratic institutions[66]. However, both mediations have failed so far.

On the other side, the Turkish government initiated its own mediation effort to maintain BiH's sovereignty and territorial integrity by reconciling the states of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Firstly, Turkey established a consultation mechanism between Serbia and Bosnia- Herzegovina in October 2009 that aimed to contribute to the reconciliation process between Serbia and Bosnia and thus encourage Serbia to influence the Serbs in Bosnia. [67]Next, in January 2010, the Turkish government established a similar consultation mechanism among Bosnia- Herzegovina and Croatia. Important results rose out of this mediation attempt like the adoption of the *Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans* on 24 April 2010 signed by Bosnia- Herzegovina and Serbia.[68] In addition to these, relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was agreed that BiH would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament adopted the *Declaration of Srebrenica* in March 2010 by which it officially apologized for its role in the Massacre in 1995.[69]

Following these outcomes, the end purpose of this paper is to analyze the Butmir attempt and the Turkish initiative by comparing the different mediation determinants of EU/US and Turkey on the case of Bosnia. The fact that the two mediations were held in the same region, for the same goal and at a very near time helps us to control our comparative cases and understand better the determinants that affected the outcome. Nevertheless, before we dig into this analysis, it is crucial to provide a more detailed chapter on the applied comparative methodology.

---

[66] Assembly debate on 26 January 2010 (4th Sitting) (see Doc. 12112, report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs: MM. Çavuşoğlu and Sasi). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2010 (4th Sitting). See also Recommendation 1894.2010. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1701.htm, retrieved on 25 March 2011

[67]Yinanç B.2010. "Excluded by US and EU, Turkey Undertakes Own Mediation in Bosnia" Hurriyet Newspaper. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=excluded-by-us-and-eu-turkey-undertakes-its-onw-mediation-in-bosnia-2010-01-15 , retrieved on 20 March 2011

[68] Istanbul Triletaral Summit Declaration.24 April 2010. Istanbul. http://www.seecp-turkey.org/icerik.php?no=60, retrieved on 20 March 2011

[69] Poulain L. and Sakellariou A. 2011. "Western Balkans: Is Turkey Back". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back , retrieved on 9 May 2011.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Comparative research is generally defined as the most efficient method to discover causal relations between various outcomes and configure variables that intervene in the process or remain static. Scholars have defined five types of comparative case studies listed as:

1. The single case study
2. The single case study over time
3. Two or more cases at a few time intervals (Focused Case Comparisons)
4. All cases that are relevant regarding the research question under review or Most Similar Systems Design (Aggregate Case Comparisons)
5. All relevant cases across time and space or Most Different Systems Design. (Aggregate Case Comparisons)[70]

Although they do not consider the single case study as genuinely comparative, they assert that single case study helps develop hypothesis and reasons of validation and observe whether or not the general results hold up in a more detailed analysis. However, for the purpose of this study, our interest is in the *Two or more cases at a few time intervals* type which otherwise is called as 'focused comparison'.[71] This research is generally preferred when the problem is difficult to analyze with a large number of cases. Daniel Druckman (2005) calls the focused

---

[70] Pennings P. Keman H. and Kleinnijenhuis J. 1999. *Doing Research in Political Science : An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics.* London: Sage. Ch. 3

[71] Druckman D. 2005. *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict* Analysis London: Sage. Ch. 4

comparisons as an attempt to impose the logic of experimentation on a small number of cases.[72]

Our study endeavors to compare the mediations of EU/US and Turkey started two years ago to reconcile the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of exploring the background and methods of each mediation and analyzing the outcomes achieved on this sensitive conflict. The reason that this study applies comparative case study researches is because they are generally used to examine patterns of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to terms with their diversity. Other than that, by employing a comparative case study approach, we try to eliminate the central weakness of the single case study method by incorporating comparisons into a research design. Thus, we aim that this comparative case study will be more revealing and more valuable.[73]

The first task of a Focused Case Comparison study is to specify the research problem and search for existing theories that bears on those issues. In our study, we aim to learn determinants of mediation success or failure in EU/US and Turkey mediations. To fulfill this objective, we looked at the literature on the determinants or factors of mediation outcome as well as we explored how the literature defined success in mediation.

Secondly, the comparative research requires specifying the independent, intervening and dependent variables that enter into the controlled comparison of cases. In our study the dependent variables is success in mediation and it is measured through independent variables listed as: (1) Characteristics of the Negotiating Parties which included (a) Regime Type, (b) Power Status and (c) Parties' Previous Relations with each other. (2) Nature of the Dispute that included (a) Duration and Timing of Intervention, (b) Intensity of the dispute, (c) The Type of Issues Involved.. (3) Characteristics of the Mediator that included (a) Power, (b) Rank & Identity, (c) Relationship with Parties, (d) Previous Mediation Experiences, and (4) Mediation Strategies defined as (a) Low Intervention or Conciliation- Facilitation Strategy, (b) Middle Intervention or Procedural- Formulation Strategy, (c) High Intervention or Directive, Substantive and Manipulative Strategy, (d) Supervisory and (e) Unspecified. The purpose of the study is to reveal the intervening variables.

---

[72] Ibid. p. 210

[73] Neuman, W.L. 2003. *Social Research Methods : Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* 5th ed. Boston : Allyn and Bacon. Ch.14

Thirdly, the focused comparative research demands the selection of appropriate cases for the controlled comparison. In other words, we should define the universe from which the cases are selected and assure that the cases to be compared come from the same class or universe of cases. In our study, we looked at all mediation activities undertaken in Bosnia after the Bosnian war which target Bosnia Herzegovina's post war tensions because the mediations before and during the war had a completely different scope and objective from the mediations after the war. While the mediations before and during the war aim the establishment of ceasefire, after war mediations work for consolidation of Bosnia Herzegovina state structures. From all post-war mediation cases, we picked the case of EU/US and Turkey for two main reasons: firstly, both attempt to ensure the permanent sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia which is threatened by the current political deadlock and secondly, both mediations start at a nearly same time. In this way, by comparing two mediation attempts done for the same region which is Bosnia; for the same goal which is maintenance of its permanent sovereignty and territorial integrity; and at almost the same time, October 2009, we decreased the differences of the cases and helped to maintain the comparison controlled.

Fourthly, the causal relations between various outcomes and configurations of independent and intervening variables were discovered by analyzing the determinants of mediation outcome for both cases. From the beginning of this study, I know that the outcome of the mediations and the characteristics of the mediators are different. The Butmir Process was unsuccessful and produced no result whereas the mediation conducted by Turkey produced successful outcomes in several aspects. For instance, the mediation was successful in reaching several agreements and improving the relations between parties. Abdullah Gül, Haris Silajdzic, and Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia respectively, signed the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic development. [74]. Next, relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was agreed that BiH would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament adopted the

---

[74] Jelovac E. 2011."Destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Twenty Years Later in Karadjordjevo". *The Journal of Turkish Weekly.* http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2822/destiny-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-twenty-years-later-in-karadjordjevo.html , retrieved on 20 May 2011

Declaration of Srebrenica by which it officially apologized for its role in the Massacre in 1995.[75]

Apart from the outcome, we also know that the region, timing and goal of intervention are similar. Therefore, we will look at whether there are further factors determining success or failures in mediation.

The last task for a comparative case study research is to formulate the questions to be asked of each case in the controlled comparison. As already stated in the Introduction Chapter, our study addressed the following questions:

2. Which factors or determinants affect mediation outcome? Which of these strategies or techniques appeared to be more successful?
3. Do the findings of this study affirm the current literature on mediation success?

At the end, the performed analyses intend to address, refine or elaborate the theory articulated in the beginning. Daniel Druckman argues that few Conflict Analysis and Resolution theories are formulated precisely enough to permit rigorous testing; yet focused comparisons can identify causal patterns that occur in our interested cases.[76]

To conclude, our study employed a normative comparison research method which points out the most successful alternative among those studies differently from the descriptive comparison which simply states the similarities and differences without attaching a normative evaluation.[77] The evaluative criterion is "success" defined according to the literature and measured from the starting point until the end of the process.

---

[75] Poulain L. and Sakellariou A. 2011. "Western Balkans: Is Turkey Back". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back , retrieved on 9 May 2011

[76] Druckman D. 2005. *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict* Analysis London: Sage. Ch. 4

[77] http://www2.uiah.fi/projects/metodi/172.htm , retrieved on 8 June 2011

CHAPTER 5: CASE I- EU/ US MEDIATION PROCESS

The Butmir Process was the most serious mediation attempt after Dayton, motivated by the need to ensure Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity by revising the political arrangements of the Dayton Accord that strengthens the central governance, by replacing the Ministerial Council with an appropriate government and by granting more power to the office of the President. The political crisis that occurred in 2009 demonstrated the country's political immaturity and the government's inability to react against institutional paralysis. As such, the European Union supported by United States initiated talks among Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Sulejman Tihić of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Haris Silajdžić of the party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zlatko Lagumdžija of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Dragan Čović of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) ,Božo Ljubić of the Croatian Democratic Union 90 (HDZ 90) and Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) leader Branislav Borenović , to accommodate the constitutional changes and pave the way to self administration by terminating the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[78] The negotiation process was held in two rounds, 19 – 20 October 2009, led by Carl Bildt, as the EU representative, and assisted by James Steinberg, the US representative.[79]

---

[78] Youngs R. 2010.The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment, Baltimore:The John Hopkins University Pressp.43

[79] Resolution 1701. 2010**. "**Functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Parliamentary Assembly" http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1701.htm , retrieved on 10 January 2011)

EU openly stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina can never acquire membership unless the OHR closes down and Bosnia ceases to be a quasi-protectorate. Apart from that, the international mediators even warned the political leaders that the failure of talks would negatively impact the EU visa liberation policy for Bosnia.[80]

The fact that the ethnic parties had very intense aggressive relationships in the past mostly due to the war in 1995 makes negotiation harder, however is it the characteristics of the parties and the nature of the dispute that inhibited the joint EU/US attempt to make even a symbolic progress towards a consensus or is it something beyond that? This part will seek to analyze the reasons of failure by applying the characteristics of the case to the above mentioned theoretical framework.

5.1 Characteristics of the Parties

The post-war Bosnian state was founded on a multi-party regime type where holding elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered to be a priori as more than everything else; it supports the idea that the country's political system holds elements of democracy. However, in practice, the electoral process obstructed the reconciliation process as the dominant political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), The Croatian Democratic Union of *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base most of their programmes on the protection of interests of their respective ethnicities.[81] Whereas, the parties who have a state-wide political, social and economic programme, like Social Democratic Party (SDP), Party for *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc remained in the minority and they were unable to attract the majority of the people and establish sustainable

---

[80] Alic A. 2010. "Bosnian Impasse Over 'Dayton Two' " *International Relations and Security Network* http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=109294, retrieved on 24 April 2011

[81] European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. " The Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina" *Briefing Paper*. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Briefing_Paper_KS.pdf retrieved on 30 March 2011. p. 51

political infrastructure.[82] Therefore, political parties polarized along ethnic lines undertake narrow and sectarian reforms after they achieve electoral success and thus conditions of group insecurity and mutual distrust prevail. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been characterized by a burdensome decision-making process ruled by inefficient institutions.

At the end of the war, the parties decided on a line that would divide Bosnia into two main entities: the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina which included the areas controlled by the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian Croats and Republika Srpska which included the lands claimed by the Bosnian Serb leadership before the war. However, in order to reverse ethnic cleansing and restore ethnic integration, the Dayton Agreement tried to invest the three main ethnic groups with adequate political and legal representation in the country's governing institutions between those who favored an independent central state and those who claimed for autonomy from it. [83] The constitution that came out of the Dayton Accord aimed to preserve ethnic identity and ensure that no single ethnic power would dominate national, legal or political structures.

All institutions at the state level, otherwise called as 'common institutions' include one part Bosniak, one part Croatian and one part Serb in order to maintain a system of check and balances. For instance, the Presidency consists of three representatives from the ethnic groups who rotate the position of Chair but who nevertheless need to act in consensus in order to adopt a particular provision.[84] In the same way, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly that consists of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives include representatives from each ethnic group where one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb serve as the Chair and Deputy Chairs with the condition of Chair rotating among the three selected representatives.[85] Furthermore, even the Constitutional Court that acts to uphold the national constitution or checks whether any provision of an Entity's law is consistent with the national constitution or not, is composed of two Bosniaks, two Croats, two Serb members selected by the Republika Srpska National Assembly and three members selected by the President of the European

---

[82] Ibid, p. 53

[83] Mansfield A.M. 2003. " Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Columbia Law Review*.103:8. p. 7

[84] Bosnia & Herzegovina Constitution, Article V, Bosnia & Herzegovina Constitution. Article V(2) (c). 22. Ibid. Article V(2)(d). http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/bk00000_.html , retrieved on 5 May 2011

[85] Ibid Article IV(3)(b).

Court of Human Rights who should not be citizens of Bosnia- Herzegovina or any other neighboring state. [86]

Slack and Doyon (2001) argued that the internal and external political interests made up the first main reason behind the division of the Bosnia-state into ethnic nationalist groups hostile to one another. Nevertheless, other social dimensions that prepared the population to mobilize had already existed before. Byrne and Carter (1996) add six social processes as history, religion, demographic, political institutions, economics and psycho-cultural factors that provide a political background of either peaceful or hostile ethnic nationalism. [87] Yet, all of them agree that the religious, economic and psycho-cultural factors are not the direct causes of collective actions, but they serve as antecedents manipulated by political action. In this understanding, it is wrong to view the Bosnian conflict as ethnic based and accept the ethnic fractures as historic and which will remain for the future. A recent study conducted by O'Loughlin (2010) reveals that older people have more friends from different nationalities due to the nature of pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina with mixed communities and younger people showed higher preferences for mixed friendships. Therefore, while electoral politics in the case of Bosnia seems still ethnic based and as such the 'ethnic card' is usually played for electoral purposes, the ordinary people are willing to consider cross- ethnic cooperation.[88] As such, there is a need to close the gap between the ethnic elites and their constituents in order to be able to transform relations from adversary to amicable ones.

---

[86] Ibid. Article. VI(1) (a), (b)

[87] Sean B. and Carter N. 1996. "Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in Northern Ireland and Quebec", *Peace and Conflict Studies*. 3:2 . p. 1

[88] J O'Loughlin, J. and Tuathail G. Ó. 2009. "Accounting for Separatist Sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Responses". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32:4 p. 640

5.2 Nature of the Dispute

The Bosnian conflict risks state sovereignty and territorial integrity because of the political impasse that resulted from two confusions: the Dayton Agreement did not clearly specify the nature of the Republica Srpska and that of the Bosnia- Herzegovina state itself and none of the entities had a clear understanding of the proper focus and functioning of the state politics as a system.[89] Debates on revising Dayton in order to make a constitution comply with the political terms of European Union have failed due to a lack of political will and consensus from local leaders to have a more functional constitutional structure that will lead to EU accession and the withdrawal of international presence.

Although we don't have a great number of fatalities to measure dispute intensity, the political impasse has spilled over the economic sphere where tens of thousands of people lost their jobs as a result of failure to ensure cooperation and fiscal coordination. As such, a quarter of working population seems to be unemployed and the other remaining majority gains low salaries and pensions. Apart from that, the political deadlock has also blocked the resolution of the refugee issue; as such 120, 000 citizens continue to be considered as internally displaced. [90]

Therefore, the current state of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina mostly resembles to a stalemate as all ethnic groups remain deeply divided over the status of the state. While Bosniaks demand for a stronger government, Serbs support a weak state that would provide

---

[89] Office of High Representative in Bosnia. 2009. "Amid 'Political Impasse', Bosnia and Herzegovina at Crossroads in Bid for Euro-Atlantic Integration." *United Nations Security Council 6222nd Meeting* http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9795.doc.htm , retrieved on 3 May 2011

[90] ibid

them with autonomy rights and Croatians sometimes tend to claim for a third entity given the internal power struggles.

In this regard, in the absence of local level political will, some have advocated for international intervention to push local leaders to address the required political changes. To be effective, mediation must take place at the right moment. Although the conflict in Bosnia has passed several phases, the parties had not yet shown any willingness for the amelioration of the conflict. After the Butmir Process, Premier of Republica Srpska Milorad Dodik called for the local leaders to convene together to find a way out of the constitutional crisis without international mediation; however, no local leader showed interest in. This clearly demonstrates that the parties were not themselves ready for negotiation and there was no way that any mediation of this type would make a difference. [91] In addition, the mediation initiated at a point when three ethnic parties were preparing for electoral campaigns and thus the situation left little room for compromise. Instead, the process somehow triggered leaders of the ethnic parties to consolidate their nationalistic positions and power and increase the support for their electorate.[92] However, on the other hand, further delays to constitutional reform may also have jeopardized Bosnia's future into the structures of European Union and NATO. Progress in terms of constitutional reform and closure of the Office of High Representative was made a precondition for faster visa liberalization, EU candidate status and NATO Membership Action Plan. Thus, the decision to postpone visa liberalization for Bosnia Herzegovina, which was claimed by EU representatives to be directly related to the negative results of parties' negotiations on the constitutional arrangements, would further deepen the crisis and would increase the number of people believing in a discrimination of EU against the Bosniaks and reaffirming their perception that the government cannot influence in any ways on this issue.[93]

The Butmir Process aimed to prevent state fragmentation in Bosnia by seeking to resolve the issues of constitutional reform, division of state and military property and the future of the Office for High Representative. It seeks to remove the political impasse through

---

[91] Biserko S. 2009. "Belgrade and Banjaluka: Together for Partition of Bosnia".*Helsinki Bulletin*. 49. p.3

[92] Yonemitsu.M. 2009. "Failure on Three Fronts". *European Voice.Com.* http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/failure-on-three-fronts-/66276.aspx, retrieved on 17 May 2011

[93] Abaspahic.H and Bajrovic. R. 2010."Perspective of EU Policy Towards Bosnia and Herzegovina" *EUROAD: Center for Policy and Governance* http://www.boell.eu/downloads/Abaspahic_Bajrovic_EUROAD_Policynote.pdf ,retrieved on 10 May 2011, p.2

a package of constitutional, governance and political reforms that would enable the centralization of state system. Any meaningful constitutional change would mean reformulating the country's power structures and adhering more power to centralized institutions. On the one hand, Bosniaks and Croats agreed on changing the balance of power but they found the reforms as not substantive enough. However, on the other hand, Milorad Dodik that politically leads the Serbs in Bosnia claims that he is not going to concede any Serb autonomy. [94] In addition, the representatives of Republica Srpska were more open to negotiations on state and military properties since that would bring the closure of the OHR as well but they showed strong resistance to the fulfillment of constitutional reforms which in fact to them meant losing some sovereignty.

Lastly, although some scholars argue that when we have more than one issue, we can develop more space for trade- offs, sometimes complexity makes mediations less manageable. Here complexity is not understood as multiple issues but issues which contradict the outcomes of each other. For instance, although OHR was not present physically in the Butmir process, making its future an integral part of the talks damaged its credibility as a neutral actor and complicated the negotiations. The main Bosniak parties (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, SBiH, and Social Democratic Party, SDP) considered the Office of High Representative as their main negotiating leverage and they did not agree to fulfill the objectives that required its closure until the constitutional reforms are completed; whereas the Republica Srpska wanted to agree on property reforms that would push for OHR closure but not on constitutional reforms. [95]Therefore, complexity triggered a deadlock in the process.

To sum up, the Butmir process was mostly focused on the realization of constitutional reforms that would enable state centralization and division of state and military properties. The existence of complex issues and the lack of political will to come to an agreement somehow hardened the process.

---

[94] Karajkov R.2009. "From Dayton to Butmir: The Future of Bosnia" *World Politics Review*. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4614/from-dayton-to-butmir-the-future-of-bosnia, retrieved on 20 May 2011

[95] International Crisis Group. 2011. "Bosnia: Europe's Time to Act". *Europe Briefing*. 51. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/B059-bosnia-europes-time-to-act.aspx , retrieved on 10 May 2011. p. 1

5.3 Characteristics of the Mediator

The first main factors determining the characteristics of the mediator are its power, rank and identity. EU's biggest asset that makes it an influential actor in these types of mediations is its ability to offer access to Europe's greatest organization that is European Union. Once, a country is member of EU, it enjoys economic benefits by getting access to one of the largest markets of the world; political privilege by engaging in political dialogue with many powerful countries on a daily basis but also greater opportunities for cultural interactions due to free visa regimes.

The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU in 2008, showed its full commitment at least at the political level to becoming a member of EU. Apart from it, a great majority of Bosnian population (around 87,5%) would vote in favor of EU membership, which counts for commitment toward EU membership at the public level as well.[96] In this way, EU is continuously gaining a more crucial role in Bosnia Herzegovina and it is expected to become more powerful when OHR closes and EU takes the lead for monitoring the country's process toward European integration.[97]

Traditionally EU has mostly been characterized as a 'civilian power' which implies the use of diplomatic and economic tools rather than military force. It assisted Bosnia Herzegovina since 1996 in economic, governance, energy and infrastructure projects by providing support for sustainable economic development and preparing Bosnia-Herzegovina for EU integration. In addition, European Union provided around € 3 million in order to help Bosnia- Herzegovina develop its institutional capacity in formulating and implementing a

---

[96] Juncos A.E. 2005. "The EU's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?". *Southeast European Politics*. 6:2. p. 91

[97] Rossini A.2011. "A Stronger Europe in Sarajevo" *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*. http://greengopost.com/a-stronger-europe-in-sarajevo/ ,retrieved on 23 May2011

trade policy framework that promotes exports and foreign investments as well as brings sustainable development and economic growth. Similarly, EU has promoted regional economic development as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation in energy sector by investing almost € 4.5 million in it. [98] Progresses on these key issues do not only help BiH establish a framework that meets EU membership criteria but also make a direct impact on the standards of living for the whole population.

As such, EU had also developed a normative aspect of its relations with Bosnia Herzegovina. The objective of the economic assistance was to push the country adopt reforms on human rights, democracy and the rule of law and encourage cooperation in the Balkan region which provides a framework for long-term solutions to the conflicts in it. Yet, according to some scholars, European Union has not been able to gain primary leadership in the region as actually United States has absorbed it since it favored the military intervention by NATO in 1995. [99]

Therefore, the Butmir process, which was jointly initiated, organized and led by European Union and United States' officials, integrated the long-term and softer EU power in the region with the United States tougher and short term power.

Actually, while many Balkan states and people view the European Union as the most prominent framework to establish stabilization in the region, they are not sure about EU's capability to realize reforms. In Bosnia, EU has lost some credibility among locals due to the long and tiring accession process which does not have clear strategies over the implementation and benefits of multiple stages.[100] For instance, while EU signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008 although Bosnia-Herzegovina had not fulfilled all necessary conditions, it strictly stuck to its conditions regarding the visa liberalization. Apart from that, firstly, EU did not approve visa liberalization for Bosnia although it had reached a comparable progress level; then it made visa liberalization policy dependent upon the developments in the Butmir process. The international mediators continuously warned local politicians that the success of Butmir talks would be linked to

---

[98]Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia Hercegovina. "EU assistance to BiH". http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=clanak&CID=20&jezik=2&LID=35, retrieved on 30 March 2011

[99] Juncos A.E. 2005. "The EU's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?". *Southeast European Politics*. 6:2. p. 96

[100] Sebastian S. 2010. "Seizing Momentum in Bosnia". *Fride: Policy Brief*.54. p.3

potential EU visa liberalization for Bosnia. [101]Yet, although the Butmir talks failed, in November 2010, the Council of European Union declared visa liberalization for Bosnia Herzegovina. This again demonstrates EU's lack of clear strategies in the eyes of local parties in Bosnia in the implementation of multiple stages toward EU integration.

In addition, the ethnic parties in Bosnia are still unwilling to exchange their ethnic-based autonomy for an EU perspective. In this context, the Serbian parties in Bosnia especially consider the EU agenda as a pretext to decrease the status of the autonomous Republica Srspska. Therefore, they refuse to undertake and implement reforms related to EU accession at the expense of their territorial or political authority. [102]

Regarding the role of United States in Bosnia, it has strongly supported Bosnia Herzegovina's integration into Euro- Atlantic structure. Yet, although a strong and hard power in the whole region especially during the war years, the local parties perceive US impact as decreasing since 2004. Militarily, that is related with the fact that in 2004 NATO-led political forces were replaced by the EU-led forces. Whereas politically, US were not effective enough in making the local parties accept constitutional reforms in2006. Apart from that, the plans to eliminate the OHR in which US diplomats play significant roles, signals further decline of US impact in BiH[103].

As a matter of fact, the United States provided large amounts of aid to Bosnia in the first years after the war, however through time the total aids have been declining and nowadays the monetary amount is quite modest. The current US administration has allocated $53.474 million aid for Bosnia that will generally cover political and economic reforms and in more specific terms, the Foreign Military Finance (FMF) sector and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs(NADR). [104]

More importantly, United States has focused on strengthening state level institutions; thus its relationships with local ethnic parties in Bosnia have been shaped accordingly. It

---

[101] Abaspahic.H and Bajrovic. R. 2010."Perspective of EU Policy Towards Bosnia and Herzegovina" *EUROAD: Center for Policy and Governance* http://www.boell.eu/downloads/Abaspahic_Bajrovic_EUROAD_Policynote.pdf ,retrieved on 10 May 2011, p.1

[102] Sebastian S. 2010. "Seizing Momentum in Bosnia". *Fride: Policy Brief*.54. p.2

[103] Woehrel S. 2011. "Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*. p. 8

[104] FY2010 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Justification, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010cbj/pdf/index.htm/, retrieved on 5 March 2011

disagrees and criticizes Dodik's opposition to a stronger central government and it openly advocates against the partition of Bosnia. The partition scenario would highly favorize the nationalist Serbs and Croats who believe they are not equally represented in the Bosnia-Herzegovina entity and dissatisfy the Bosniaks who would lose the most in case this arrangement is realized. [105]

Nevertheless, when looked at their past mediation experiences in post war Bosnia, both United States and European Union have failed so far in all initiatives undertaken to reconcile the local ethnic parties at the political level and realize the needed constitutional arrangements toward a centralized state system. In March 2006, although they managed to convince the leaders of major political parties to agree on some sort of constitutional amendments which were known as the 'April Package', the legislation was not approved by the needed two-thirds majority in the state parliament. [106] The proposal aimed to replace the three-member government presidency with a single presidency, strengthen the Bosnian state parliament and increase the powers of the prime minister.

Similarly, the Prud process was another initiative undertaken by European Union and United States to bring together leaders of political parties and help resolve issues related to the constitutional amendment on the status of Brcko district and on the organization of population census in 2011.[107]However, the Bosnian Muslim leader Sulejman Tihic faced harsh criticism both within his own party of Democratic Action, SDA and the opposition. Thus the meetings were too vague but the international mediators saw them as the only platform that included representatives from three ethnic parties and that could resolve the disputes. However, the negotiations stopped after the Bosnian Central Government' State Protection and Investigative Agency declared a document that alleged Dodik and many other officials of Republica Srspka to be corrupted. He, as a response demanded the other two leader s of the Bosniak and Croat entity to recognize the secession of Republica Srpska from Bosnia and said that he was considering to withdraw all officials of Republica Srska from central institutions and to hold referendum on independence. From that point, the talks lost any momentum they had gained.

---

[105] Steven W.2011. "Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*. p. . 9-10

[106] Joseph E.P and Hitchner R.B. 2008. "Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is Not Enough" *United State Institute of Peace Briefing*. p. 5

[107] Resolution 1701. 2010. **"**Functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Parliamentary Assembly" http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1701.htm **,** retrieved on 10 January 2011)

To conclude, European Union and United States remain the most powerful actors that can impact Bosnia economically, politically and militarily. In case the ethnic units in Bosnia show serious efforts for progress, both EU and US has much to offer. More importantly than all, through EU Bosnia can become part of the largest regional organization in Europe; whereas through US, it can gain legitimacy to become part of the largest militaristic organization that is NATO. Both would not only contribute to establish peace within the country but also improve foreign relations at a regional level and establish long term peace and sustainability. However, although they are powerful and influential actors in Bosnian politics, EU identity is often challenged due to its inability to fulfill the promises or grant the carrots on time. In addition, their past mediation experiences to maintain sovereignty through constitutional arrangements have proved unsuccessful. While, sometimes they have been blamed from the Serbian entity for diminishing their highly autonomous territorial and political sphere, some other times they have been blamed from the Bosniak parties for bringing reforms that are not substantive enough. The Butmir Process was also associated by similar atmosphere and outcomes.

5.4 Mediation Strategies

Firstly, the Butmir Process, led by the joint initiative of EU/US with the aim of making changes to the state constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina and fulfilling the necessary conditions for the closure of OHR, was an ad hoc initiative with the main tendency of achieving instant solutions. EU and US mediation included leaders of the main political parties and did not include any representatives neither from the state and entity institutions nor from the local experts and non-governmental institutions.

Positive outcomes from the talks in Butmir related to reforms toward a centralized state system were made a precondition for faster visa liberalization, EU candidate status and NATO Membership Action Plan. The EU representative, Carl Bildt, continuously repeated that "Bosnia Herzegovina cannot get a free ticket to Europe" and that "If conditions for

participation in Euro-Atlantic integration are not met, Bosnia-Herzegovina will fall behind other countries in the region".[108]The mediators hoped that this message would reach to the citizens and they would pressure the local parties to react to the situation.

EU and US played a manipulative role in the negotiations by warning the immediate costs of losing the opportunities of EU and NATO memberships in case a solution to the current political stalemate was not achieved. In addition, they played a directive or substantive role by not simply facilitating the communication but by offering the reform package themselves. However, the political leaders of local parties were unsatisfied with the strategies followed and the proposals made by the mediators. According to Milorad Dodik, the talks were mainly directed towards principles rather than details of the constitutional reform, whereas the Croatian Representatives declared that the mediators offered a document that was too ambitious and almost unacceptable for all parties. According to him, in the beginning the negotiation process should have dealt with technical issues such as state property and conditions for visa liberalization and European integration and leave constitutional reforms for later as parties' positions on that issue are very divergent. Apart from it, the leader of the Party for BiH; SBiH president Haris Silajdzic considered the process on the harm of democratic citizens of BiH since entity voting as the major problem in BiH was almost not mentioned in the package.[109]

Actually, although the Butmir Process was a good idea, the mediating actors seem unwilling to commit the amount of time and effort to conclude the process. At the moment that Dodik rejected the initial package, they quickly lowered the standards in order to make it more acceptable for him. However, this did not only impede the establishment of a more functional country but also opened the way to accommodate more extreme political options. The lack of clear strategies was also a result of the fact that the mediators had little to offer in exchange of reforms to those parties that would lose as a result of it.[110]

Apart from all these, the international mediators created a sense of emergency in Butmir by suggesting that extra-institutional and coercive means were necessary to change the

---

[108] " 'Butmir Process' to be Continued".2009. http://www.emportal.rs/en/news/region/102096.html, retrieved on 25 May 2011

[109] ibid

[110] Bieber F. 2010. "Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *European Policy Center*. p.3

country's political structure. In other words, the mediator did not treat the issues as part of the BiH's conflict dynamics but as requirements to be fulfilled in order to approach EU membership.

To conclude, the EU/US mediation initiative was led by a high intervention strategy on substantive issues such as constitutional reforms and closure of OHR. The mediators offered a constitutional reform package to the negotiating parties which called for the establishment of a centralized state system as a precondition for the closure of OHR which is also a precondition for BiH accession to European Union. Lastly, it offered a 'quick fix' solution to the parties by giving a sense of emergency to the situation and suggesting coercive means to change the current political structure. Table Two summarizes all the discussions conducted in this chapter.

TABLE 2

<div style="border:2px solid black; display:inline-block;">**BUTMIR PROCESS**</div>

Characteristics of the Parties		Nature of the Dispute	
REGIME TYPE	• Multi Party Regime • Political Parties Polarized Along Ethnic Lines	**DURATION AND TIMING OF INTERVENTION**	• During October 2009 • Just Before the Elections in 2009
POWER STATUS	• No Power Differences • No Singe Ethnic Power to Dominate National, Legal or Political Structures	**INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE**	• Tens of Thousands of People have lost jobs • A quarter of working population is unemployed • 120.000 citizens continue to be internally displaced
RELATIONS WITH PARTIES	• In a Stalemate	**TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED**	• STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY • Constitutional Reform • Division of State and Defense Property • Closure of OHR

Characteristics of the Mediators		Mediation Strategies	
POWER & RANK AND IDENTITY	• EU- The Most Influential Actor – Soft /Normative Power • US- It's Contribution Has Been Decreasing – Hard Power	**LOW INTERVENTION**	X
RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARTIES	• EU-Positive but Sometimes Blurry US- Positive	**MIDDLE INTERVENTION**	X
PREVIOUS MEDIATION EXPERIENCES	• EU/ US – Failed (April Package and Prud Process)	**HIGH INTERVENTION**	• A combination of Carrots and Sticks (EU & NATO integration) • "Quick Fix" Strategy

CHAPTER 6: CASE 2 – MEDIATION OF TURKEY

In October 2009, the Turkish government initiated its own mediation efforts to ensure state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia through a reconciliation process. Turkey's interest in intervening in Bosnia was triggered by its concern toward the policies of EU that it perceived as favoring the Bosnian Serbs and ignoring the rights of Bosnian Muslims. In addition, it also criticized US for its unwillingness and lack of interest to deal with the problem of Bosnia Herzegovina.[111]

Turkey believed that the situation in Bosnia is deteriorating and the lack of consensus among political factors to revise the constitution that came out of Dayton Accord may get the country out of control. The threats for referendum from Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Croats' increasing perception of seeing themselves part of separate entity have particularly worried Turkey and pushed it to start a consultation mechanism with the effort of reconciling the sides. [112]

Firstly, Turkey started its mediation effort by an informal meeting between the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia which was held in Istanbul on 10 October 2009 during the South East European Cooperation Process meeting. This meeting

---

[111]Yinanc B.2010. "Successful Turkish Mediation Puts Bosnia Back on Agenda". *Hürriyet Daily News.* http://gajerseys.com/n.php?n=bosnia-back-on-world-agenda-with-turkish-mediation-2010-05-23 , retrieved on 10 May 2011

[112] Yinanc B.2010. "Excluded by US and EU, Turkey Undertakes Own Mediation in Bosnia" *Hurriyet Daily News* http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=excluded-by-us-and-eu-turkey-undertakes-its-onw-mediation-in-bosnia-2010-01-15 , retrieved on 10 May 2011

was then followed by four other similar meetings until Abdullah Gül, Haris Silajdzic, and Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia respectively, signed the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic development. [113]

On a separate track, Turkey convened the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to have their first trilateral meeting in Zagreb, in January 2010. On the one hand, the meetings would be repeated once every three months and on the other hand, the presidents of the three countries will meet separately on the sidelines of every international meeting. At the end of these meetings, Croatia voiced its strong support of Bosnia-s NATO membership aspirations.

Therefore, Turkey has worked on two separate but parallel tracks which resulted in mutual calls for strong support of Bosnia Herzegovina's territorial integrity and sovereignty and its aspirations toward EU and NATO membership. In addition, the three countries decided to launch common projects to sustain regional stability and economic development establishing new air, sea and land transportation routes. To conclude, this introduction part will be followed by a new section that will analyze the conditions of Turkey in mediating the Bosnian conflict according to the theoretical structure applied in the case of EU/US mediation.

6.1 Characteristics of the Parties

Democratic regimes in Serbia and Croatia emerged in 2000s, after the fall of authoritarian regimes of the presidents Milosevic and Tjudman respectively. Since 1990s until now, Serbia changed its name and territory three times; therefore democratic regime building was strongly related with post-war reconstruction and state building. Democratic transitions in both countries were characterized by the transition from war to peace, from command

---

[113] Jelovac E. 2011."Destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Twenty Years Later in Karadjordjevo". *The Journal of Turkish Weekly.* http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2822/destiny-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-twenty-years-later-in-karadjordjevo.html , retrieved on 20 May 2011

economy to liberal market economy and from single party rule to pluralist democracy.[114] Croatia's transition was mostly influenced by the Milosevic factor, the Gorbachov factor as well as global collapse of communism in 1989. Yet, the appearing political elite were the one which shifted from the nomenclature into pluralized political elite. In other words, the old reformers continued their political life in a new plural context.

Civil society remained one of the main factors that established democratic regimes in Serbia and Croatia. In each case of electoral breakthrough, the popularity of the authoritarian leader had declined significantly. Citizens were actively engaged in campaigns and voting and they were optimist about their ability to challenge the authoritarian rules.[115] In addition, the transition was realized under the influence of internal resistance and pressure from below.

Although the changed party regime followed the ex communist model at a great extent, it is still possible to note some divergent points from the single party regime system. In addition, Croatia and Serbia which were the most authoritarian countries among all post-communist states actually experienced dramatic democratic improvements after the elections in 2000. In the 2003 parliamentary elections in Serbia, there were presented around 20 electoral lists with the participation of candidates from more than 50 political parties and organizations. Similar to that, the Croatian governmental system shift from a presidential system to a parliamentary one enabled the required democratic transition. In addition, the democratic transition established an autonomous political society with a party system and regular elections.[116]

The most influential exogenous factor that influenced regime change in Serbia and Croatia is European Union conditionality which is based on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria as well as on full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Now that the main perpetrators of Bosnian war,Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mlladic have been captured, it may be argued that Serbia has come closer to European

---

[114] Ljubojevic A. "Party Systems Change in Serbia and Croatia Caught Between EU Conditionality and National identity", www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/578.pdf , retrieved on 10 May 2011. p.1

[115] Bunce V.J. 2009. "Post Communist Ambiguities" *Journal of Democracy*. 20:3. p. 98

[116] Maldini.P and Vidović D. 2007.*Transition in Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences and future Perspectives.* Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre. p. 57

Union. However, the trials are still used by nationalist forces to show them as a victimization of Serbs and to radicalize Serbian politics. **[117]**

Regarding Bosnia, the regime underwent a considerable change with the intensification of conflict and the outbreak of war. As it was already stated in the previous section, holding elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered to be a priori as more than everything else; it supports the idea that the country's political system holds elements of democracy. However, in practice, the electoral process obstructed the reconciliation process as the dominant political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), The Croatian Democratic Union of *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base most of their programmes on the protection of interests of their respective ethnicities.[118] Whereas, the parties who have a state-wide political, social and economic programme like the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Party for *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc remained in the minority and they were unable to attract the majority of the people and establish sustainable political infrastructure.[119] Therefore, political parties polarized along ethnic lines undertake narrow and sectarian reforms after they achieve electoral success and thus create conditions of group insecurity and mutual distrust. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been characterized by a burdensome decision-making process ruled by inefficient institutions.

In terms of power status, through history Bosnia has been politically peripheral and caught between more powerful outer political forces. Firstly, at the end of the 19th century, the Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements fused into Bosnia after the decline of Ottoman Empire, with the single aim of absorbing it into a Greater Croatia or Greater Serbia. Secondly, Bosnia physically suffered the civil war of Yugoslavia in World War II. Thirdly, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was caught in the midst of a civil war due to the nationalist

---

[117] Peskin V. 2008.*International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Coopeartion.* New York: Cambridge University Press. p.64

[118] European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. " The Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina" *Briefing Paper*. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Briefing_Paper_KS.pdf retrieved on 30 March 2011. p. 51

[119] European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. " The Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina" *Briefing Paper*. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Briefing_Paper_KS.pdf retrieved on 30 March 2011. p. 53

propaganda war between Croatia and Serbia to dominate Yugoslavia and to attract their compatriots to their respective countries.[120]

Actually, nowadays Bosnia remains the weakest state when compared to Croatia and Serbia. It lacks a consolidated state structure as the international community still retains an extraordinary civilian and military presence with the positions of High Representative that oversees the implementation of civilian aspects of the government and EUFOR that assumes responsibility for military stabilization operations.

Economically, Bosnia-Herzegovina was among the poorer areas of the old Yugoslav Federation and remains one of the poorer countries in Europe. The war damaged or destroyed most of the economy and infrastructure in Bosnia, caused the death of around 100.000 people and displaced half of the population. Privatization remains low and unemployment remains high as official rates tell about a 40% of unemployed people. Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy is still regarded as a transition economy; as such it looks at EU membership as a driver to economic growth and development. [121]

At the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia established itself as a regional military leader after leading a successful coalition of Montenegrin, Bulgarian and Greek troops to seize the remaining Ottoman controlled territories in Europe. Few years later, Serbia became the dominant partner in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the collapse of Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I. In addition, although the Federation of Yugoslavia, formed by the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina after the second World War to avoid Serbian domination; actually it were the Serbian Communists that ruled Yugoslavia's political life. The Serbian communists were successful enough to transform the federation from an agrarian economy to an industrialized society. However, by the 1980s, the economy of Yugoslavia started to collapse.

Starting from the 1980s until 2000s, Serbia engaged in several wars mostly with Kosovo and Bosnia but also with other countries of the federation that sought independence. Its president's, Slobodan Milosevic, radical nationalism dragged the country toward the most

[120] Lampe, J. R. 1999. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. New York: Cambridge University Press.p 81

[121] United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. "Background Note: Bosnia-Herzegovina". http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm , retrieved on 29 May 2011

tremendous wars of the twenty-first century. Serbia suffered an area of mismanagement of its economy due to an extended period of international economic sanctions and damage to infrastructure and industry during the NATO strikes in 1999. [122]

At the end of dark ages for Serbia, the economic progress became substantial but unemployment, high corruption and labor unrest remain the ongoing political and economic challenges of Serbia. However, as in the case of Bosnia, economic reform has been highly driven by the country's aspiration to become member of European Union. Although, many sectors still need structural reforms, Serbia has managed to adopt modern legislations conform to EU and international standards in almost all areas of the economy.

After Montenegro approved the referendum decision of separating from Serbia in June 2006, Serbia declared itself as the continuity of the state union and retaining membership in all international organizations and institutions.[123]

Lastly, throughout history, Croatia moved from Hungarian authorities to Ottoman rule, from the Austrian monarchy to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. After the fall of communism in Europe, around 1990s, the country gained independence from the Yugoslav federation after a war conflict between the Croats and the Serbs. Finally, the permanent cease-fire between the two was signed in the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.

The first progress of Croatia was noticed after 2000 in terms of implementing the Dayton Accord, regional cooperation, refugee returns, democratization and national reconciliation. It became a member of NATO in April 2009 and it is now in the final stage of EU accession negotiation which is expected to be concluded in June 2011.

Economically, Croatia managed to rapidly industrialize and diversify its economy at the end of World War II and thus becoming one of the wealthiest of the Yugoslav Republics, however the economic infrastructure experienced massive damages as a result of the war. The economy grew strongly again after 2000 but several substantial challenges remain such as

---

[122] Central Intelligence Agency.2011. " Serbia".https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html, retrieved on 29 May 2011

[123] United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. "Background Note: Serbia". http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm , retrieved on 29 May 201

unemployment, high foreign debts, finalization of the privatization process and many others.[124]

Therefore, none of the countries is a regional power and as such there does not exist a vast power difference among the three. Yet, when comparing their power status, it is clear that Bosnia- Herzegovina mainly remains behind. Croatia slightly leads by being a member of NATO and a candidate country for EU membership whereas the other two remain potential candidates. [125] In addition, Croatia remains active in the Balkan region by supporting its neighbors' Euro-Atlantic progress and managing to deal some post-conflict issues such as the status of refugees displaced during the war years.

As regard of the countries past relationships, before the 1990s, Croatia and Bosnia were members of the Yugoslav federation and Croatia's rivalry was mainly directed towards Serbia. However the relations between Bosnia and Croatia deteriorated with the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina due to the support of Croatia to the Bosnian Croat leadership. The rule of the authoritarian Franjo Tudjman brought the relationships to an even more dramatic situation as despite his recognition of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo in 1992; two years later, he supported the Bosnian Croats struggle against the same government. In addition, the Croatian state, led by him, failed to implement the requirements of the Dayton Peace Agreement although Croatia supported the formation of a Bosnian Muslim- Bosnian Croat Alliance at the end of the Bosnian war.

Nevertheless, relationships mended after the elections in 2000 which were gained by Mesic who made his first foreign visit to Sarajevo and was welcomed as a friend of Bosnia Herzegovina.[126] In April 2010, Croatian President Ivo Josipovic apologized for crimes committed in Bosnia from 1992- 1995. In his speech he added:

"I deeply regret that the Republic of Croatia contributed to it with its policy in the 1990s. I am deeply sorry that this policy contributed to the suffering of people and to the divisions which still affect us."[127]

---

[124] Central Intelligence Agency.2011. " Croatia" https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html, retrieved on 29 May 2011

[125] European Commission Enlargement: Candidate Countries.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/index_en.htm, retrieved on 2 May 2011

[126] Frucht R.C. 2004.*Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture*. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO.p.470
[127] "Croatia Apologises for Bosnian War Crimes" 2010. http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatia-apologises-bosnian-war-crimes-news-448002 , retrieved on 11 May 2011.

Therefore, the president's speech signaled the beginning of a new era in terms of the relationships between Croatia and Bosnia by recognizing the mistakes from the past times and setting the stage for lasting peace, stability and prosperity toward a common European future. On the other side, the relationships between Serbia and Bosnia had their worst time during the war 1992-1995. The International Court of Justice charged Serbia with genocide against the Bosnian Muslims during the war years and found it in violation of international law for not preventing the Srebrenica massacre. In addition, although Serbia has signed the Dayton Agreement, which means respecting the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina, the Bosnian parts often blame the Serbian leaders for not doing anything to influence the Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, to halt his actions that aim to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia's central government institutions.[128]

To conclude, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have passed a history of intense conflict where massive killings and destruction were recorded in three years war after Bosnians self declaration of independence. Nevertheless, after the war, the security has been established due to the presence of international actors (NATO, EUFOR); however relations are not still transformed into amicable ones. To conclude, it wouldn't be proper to call the ethnic communities as historical adversaries as for a long time in history (both in Ottoman times and in Yugoslavia) they have co-lived and even shared the same nationality of being Yugoslavs[129]; despite that, relationships between the ethnic communities at the political level after the cease fire are mostly characterized to be in a stalemate.

---

[128] Woehrel S. 2011. "Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*. p. 3
[129] Note: Through the early 1980s , the population in most parts of Yugoslavia became more heterogeneous due to the increase in number of mixed marriages, as such it noted a rise in the percentage of those who defined themselves as 'Yugoslav' rather than as members of any particular ethnic community. What's more, heterogeneity was concentrated in the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, parts of Croatia bordering Bosnia- Herzegovina and Voyvodina.

6.2 Nature of the Dispute

16 years after the Dayton Peace Negotiation was signed, Bosnia-Herzegovina still carries the burden of not having a stable and secure state structure. Continuous debates on constitutional reforms have brought the country to a stalemate and diminished its prospects toward EU membership. As already stated in the previous chapter, the political deadlock spilled over to economic and refugee issues as well where a quarter of the population is recorded to be unemployed and tens of thousands still remain as internally displaced. In this context, Turkey initiated its mediation effort in October 2009 and the process has not finished yet.

While the dissatisfaction of Bosnian Serbs and Croats with their respective positions within the state remains an important issue of the political impasse, lack of positive relationships between Bosnia-Herzegovina with Bosnian Serb and Croats' respective kin states have deteriorated the situation[130]. Therefore, the main issue of the dispute within Turkey's mediation context has been ensuring a permanent sovereignty and territorial integrity for Bosnia by improving the relationships of Bosnia with both Serbia and Croatia.

Related to it, the negotiation process firstly focused on the lack of a permanent recognition of the territorial integrity in Bosnia. Although Dayton Agreement which ended the war in Bosnia, is a supra-national settlement that was signed by both Croatia and Serbia, both countries were often blamed for not implementing the requirements of the Dayton Agreement and for not fully consolidating their position against actions taken by Bosnian Serbs and Croats in Bosnia to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Dayton Agreement mostly served to secure a temporary recognition of the territorial integrity of the country and it did not offer a permanent settlement to the ongoing conflicts playing out largely at the level of individual communities.[131] Some consider Bosnia to experience its worst times since the end of the war because the failure to form a government since October elections directly attacked the legitimacy of state institutions.

---

[130] Bancroft I.2010. "Strengthenin the External Dimensions of Dayton Bosnia" Global Experts: Analysis on Demand. http://www.theglobalexperts.org/comment-analysis/strengthening-external-dimensions-dayton-bosnia, retrieved on 15 May 2011.

[131] Innes M.A. (ed.) 2006. *Bosnian Security after Dayton* : *New Perspectives.* London: *Routledge.* p. 174

Although violence does not seem to be imminent, the International Crisis Group evaluated the situation as a deep conflict in which violence would be a real prospect in the near future. [132] In addition, the need to reaffirm the territorial integrity, sovereignty and legal identity of Bosnia Herzegovina became a central issue especially after the continuous threats of the Bosnian Serbs to hold a referendum on internationally imposed laws and central judicial bodies in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Next, the legal arrangements that came out of the constitution in Bosnia ensure that no ethnic group dominates the national political structure. However, the constitution has created a paradox in itself by impeding the integration of the people of BiH and focusing on the ethnic composition Bosnia's political structure. The fact that all main governing structures at the state level are created in tripartite schemes, consisting of one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb, show that all members of the institutions defend the so- called vital interests of their respective ethnicity. Therefore, the legal identity of BiH became another important issue to be negotiated in the process of reconciliation mediated by Turkey.[133]

Apart from it, the Dayton Peace Accord did not include any arrangement for the reduction of armed forces and demobilization of ex-combatants. The main motives of the Dayton negotiators were to end the war and separate the parties as well as maintain a weak Bosnian State with two strong entities. Therefore, the agreement left the country without any concrete measurement on confidence-building and establishing sustainable peace.[134] Although the parties signed a separate agreement on Confidence and Security Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, its framework included only measurements on armed forces and military agreements. However, confidence building includes also one of the key areas for capacity building in post-conflict countries necessary to establish trust, cooperation and solidarity between groups and communities as the basis for collective action. This does not only involve communication between members of a group but also dialogue between ethnic communities to accept, tolerate and reestablish contacts between ethnicities across political

---

[132] "Bosnia Faces Post-War Crisis: ICG".2011. http://news.maars.net/blog/2011/05/07/bosnia-faces-worst-post-war-crisis-icg/ ,retrieved on 17 May 2011

[133] Rajchel K. Esanu R. MacBain A. Rohwerder B. 2010. " Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Reconstruction" *Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies*. p. 16-17

[134] Innes M.A. (ed.) 2006. *Bosnian Security after Dayton* : *New Perspectives.* London: *Routledge.* p. 159

and geographical spaces. [135] In this context, the mediation process laid special emphasis on the development of the relations between parties and establishing confidence.

Furthermore, the eruption of violent ethnic conflicts following the disintegration of Yugoslavia undermined regional stability. The importance of Bosnia Herzegovina for the stability and security of the region does not only cover the Balkan Peninsula but the whole European continent. Given the ethnic composition of the country, its history and its relations with other neighboring countries show that Bosnia is pivotal to the stability in Europe. The international community has named the Dayton Accord as part of a work in progress and agrees with that the agreement did not function to establish a consolidated Bosnia-Herzegovina but only to build up the Bosnian State. For that, the Butmir talks were an attempt to resolve this deficiency. For the same reason, Turkey considers regional stability as another important issue to be realized during the reconciliation process. To achieve it, Turkey suggested cooperating on areas of economy, energy, culture and environment.[136]

Last but not least, the reconciliation process mediated by Turkey focused on the issues of crimes and victims of war as well as Serbia's policies toward Republika Srspska. Serbia's policy toward Republika Srpska is also highly related with the issue of maintaining territorial integrity, sovereignty and legal identity of Bosnia Herzegovina. Whereas, the lack of measures and lack of determination about resolving the issues of crime and victims of war would mean inability to cope with the past and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes. Showing commitment and achieving results on this issue would highly contribute to reduce the pain and provide some sort of proofs that the persons who committed crimes could not evade justice.[137] In addition, the capture of war criminals was also an important step for Serbia to integrate into Euro-Atlantic Structures. Thus, Serbia's membership in European Union and NATO would be an important step toward sustainable regional stability.

---

[135] Sterland B. 2006. "Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo" *International NGO Training and Resaerch Centre*.Praxis Paper No.9, p.8

[136] Biserko S. 2010. "Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Key to Regional Stability" *Bosnian Institute* http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2672, retrieved on 24 May 2011

[137] "Turkey Welcomes Capture of Serb War Criminal Mladic" 2011. *Today's Zaman*. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=245264&link=245264, retrieved on 24 May 2011

6.3 Characteristics of the Mediator

Geographically, economically, politically and militarily, Turkey is without doubt important for all regions surrounding it. Turkey is almost equally effective in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East simultaneously. While Greece for instance can be a regional power for the Balkans or Russia a visible power in Central Asia and the Caucasus; they are hardly serious regional powers in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey's power largely stems in its strategic location. [138]

Since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1922, Turkey's political, economic and security have lied with the West. Turkey entered NATO in 1952 and it serves as one of the leading states in it by controlling the straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean and sharing borders with three main countries which are considered a threat for the West; Iran, Iraq and Syria. In addition, Turkey is one of the most powerful countries of the organization; firstly because it owns the largest military after that of USA. Secondly, NATO's Air Component Headquarters are located in Izmir, Turkey and thirdly, Turkey took charge of a NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command in Afghanistan in April 2007.[139] In addition, Turkish Navy is a regional naval power and that is working to develop capacities to project power beyond Turkey's coastal waters. Actually, all Turkish military structures are heavily involved in NATO, multinational and UN operations. [140]

Besides its relationships with NATO, Turkey is a member of many other international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UN and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Turkey is also a member of World Trade

---

[138] Rubin B.M. Kirişçi K.2001.*Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging Multiregional Power*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p..8

[139] "Background Note: Turkey". 2011.United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm , retrieved on 29 May 201

[140] "Turkey" Central Intelligence Agency. 2011 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html , retrieved on 29 May 2011

Organization and has many free agreements with European Free Trade Association and Israel. As the above range shows, Turkey has been willing to participate and cooperate with different multilateral and bilateral frameworks. [141]

Turkey and EU relationship are not only understood as a foreign policy issue but also within a powerful domestic frame as well. Turkey's power would highly increase by becoming a member of European Union, firstly because the country would receive certain economic benefits from EU membership and secondly because full membership in European Union would mean an irrevocable acceptance of Turkey's European or Western nature[142].

The first bilateral relations between Turkey and EU have emerged in 1959 when the European Economic Community Council of Ministers accepts Ankara's application for full membership. Four years after, Turkey and EEC sign the Ankara Agreement which secures Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union. From this time on until the 1980's, the two meet to draw out the detail of implementation of the agreement until the European Community decides to officially suspend the Ankara Agreement in January 1982 as a result of the military coup d'etat happening in Turkey on September 1980. Relations improved again in 1985 and reached their peak in October2005 when the accession negotiations started[143]

Currently, Turkey EU relationships are in a stalemate as 18 of the 33 areas of negotiation chapters are blocked and 8 chapters are frozen. Both the Turkish politician and Turkish public are highly dubious that European Union will ever grant membership to Turkey. While in 2002, European Union process was a central platform in the campaign of the governing Justice and Development Party, nowadays, politicians rarely mention it. In addition, pro EU demonstrations which were very widespread in 2004 are less common in Turkey nowadays.[144]

---

[141] "Background Note: Turkey". United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm , retrieved on 29 May 201

[142] Çarkoğlu A. and Rubin B.M. (eds). 2003. *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p.81

[143] "EU- Turkey Relations". *European Commission Enlargment*. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm, retrieved on 18 May 2011

[144]Head J. 2011. "Keeping Turkey Focused on EU Challenge" *BBC News*. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11326425, retrieved on 21 May 2011

After the 2000's, Turkey adopted a new and more assertive foreign policy that does not diverge it from the West but does not either make United States and Europe the only concern for Turkey's diplomacy. The drastic growth in Turkish economy has changed the focus of its foreign policy as well. Currently, Turkey is known to experience the greatest economic growth in Europe and to be the third country with the highest economic growth in the world. Per capita incomes have increased three fold within not even a decade and foreign direct investment flows have increased 20 folds. Therefore, one of the main components of Turkish foreign policy becomes the economic aspirations to get new export markets and receive more foreign direct investments. [145]

Turkey's power is increasing through a number of different initiatives as well. The country has developed a number of connections throughout the region by playing a constructive role in Middle East peace process and by convincing along with Brazil, Iran to sign some commitments related to its nuclear program as well. Turkey's increasing influence in the world has been shown also when it was elected to the United Nations Security Council after 47 years with the votes of 150 countries out of 190 countries in total. Apart from it, Turkey has made itself visible in world politics due to its engagements in many mediation efforts between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, different groups in Lebanon and in the Balkans. Lastly, it has asserted its presence through a large amount of humanitarian aid that is delivered in 98 different countries of the world. [146]

Apart from the domestic economic and political patterns, Turkey's international relationships have been highly dependent upon the way its identity has been perceived by the international actors. As a matter of fact, the modern identity of Turkey has almost been framed according to three main pillars: secularism, nationalism and republicanism. In the Turkish model, secularism meant restriction of public religious practices to the minimum. Nationalism was highly related to accepting all citizens of Turkey as Turkish rather than labeling them according to their ethnicity. Lastly, republicanism referred to the role of state and army in economic and social affairs. This frame has often changed through the modern history of the Turkish Republic however the tradition has mostly been challenged by the

---

[145] Ülgen S.2011. "Turkey Rising" Carniege Endowment for International Peace. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42272#Economy , retrieved on 23 May 2011

[146] ibid

currently governing Justice and Development Party (JDP). [147] While it accepts the secular and republican framework of the constitution, it argues that secularism must be limited to separating mosque and state in a way that allows neither to interfere in the practices of the other. Apart from it, the AKP has taken a hard-line position towards the militant and secessionist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which it accuses of terrorism. But it allowed Kurdish language to be used in the media and schools, by thus distinguishing between peaceful Kurdish and the secessionist ones. In addition, these kinds of measures can bring Turkey in line with European Union positions on minorities and civil rights.

As a matter of fact, since the 1990s, many new independent states of Central Asia and Central Europe saw in Turkey a model country of a democratic, secular and free market society. Actually, although Turkey owns a successful experience in building a modern nation on the remains of an old empire and advancing to a pluralist democracy with a market economy and a secular state, many pointed to Turkey's own domestic problems and its inability to export this model outside. Yet, it still remained as a "big brother" to Turkic people in the world and especially to the Muslim population in the Balkans. [148]

Thus, this perception of identity has also influenced a lot the relations between Turkey and Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia; although this was not the only factor that build up their relations. Bosnia Hezergovina has been one of the countries which had a privileged place on the Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda mostly due to its deep historical, cultural and social bonds. Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan declared that relations between the two countries have always been excellent and that the driving force stemmed from very close ties between the people of the two countries. [149] The situation of the Muslim population of Bosnia Herzegovina during the civil war that was followed by Bosnia's declaration of independence in 1992 gave rise to popular sympathy in Turkey and support for policies to intervene to help the Bosnian Muslims. Although Turkey supported international actions such as the UN

[147] Bishara M. 2007. "A vote on Turkey's Identity". *The New York Times* http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/20/opinion/20iht-edbishara.1.6749019.html, retrieved on 23 May 2011

[148] Kut G. 1994. " Yeni Turk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararasi Ortam" in B.E Behar et al. Bagimsizlarin Ilk Yillari: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kirgizistan, Ozbekistan, Turkmenistan .Ankara : Kultur Bakanligi. p. 13

[149] 'Relations between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina are excellent- Erdoğan" 2009 http://en.trend.az/regions/met/turkey/1601217.html, retrieved on 24 May 2011

peacekeeping forces and the role of NATO to enable peace, it disagreed with the ways the actions were implemented. However, Turkey never took unilateral actions in Bosnia. [150]

After Dayton Accord was signed, Turkey has contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina by actively supporting the implementation of the civilian and military reforms of the agreement which ended the war. More concretely, as a member of the steering board, it joins the work of the Implementation Council and it contributes to the European Union peacekeeping operation named Althea. [151] Throughout years, Turkey has supported the re-establishment of the multi-ethnic, multi- cultural status of Bosnia Herzegovina through maintenance of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders.

Apart from the political sphere, Turkey- Bosnia relations have developed at the economic and trade areas as well. Turkey has financially supported the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina by pledging over 100 million dollars. The Turkish companies helped in reconstructing the houses, factories, hospitals and the infrastructure of the region after the war. In addition, since 9 years the two have signed the Free Trade Agreement. [152]

Furthermore, Turkey supports Bosnia- Herzegovina through numerous projects and activities implemented by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in a wide range of fields including education, health, economy and culture. Although TIKA is present in many other countries in the Balkans, in 2006, Bosnia Herzegovina was the first in receiving the highest amount of aid which went to 25.19 million USD.[153]

Lastly, Turkey supported Bosnia- Herzegovina's integration with Euro- Atlantic institutions including NATO membership and EU accession. It has continuously asserted that a permanent stability in Europe would be impossible without a permanent stability in Bosnia Herzegovina. Moreover, as one of the most potential actors in NATO, Turkey advocates

---

[150] "Foreign Relations" http://countrystudies.us/turkey/87.htm, retrieved on 24 May 2011

[151] "Turkey's Political Relations with Bosnia Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa , retrieved on 25 May 2011

[152] "Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Bosnia and Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa, retrieved on 26 May 2011

[153] Opacin N. 2008. "Bosnia and Herzegovina's Bilateral Relations with Turkey' December". *Centre for Security Studies*. p.5 -6

Bosnia's integration in NATO as a path to strengthen cooperation and move jointly toward solving sensitive issues.[154]

Actually, Turkey's support to integrate into Euro- Atlantic countries goes for all Balkan countries in order to unite the whole region until a united umbrella and make up a better future. In this understanding, Turkey and Croatia have shared common goals such as integration in Euro- Atlantic structures, regional cooperation and establishment of peaceful relations. Since both countries are candidates for EU membership, they share their experiences with each other. [155]

Even though Turkey and Croatia have different geographic and strategic positions and belong to different cultural spheres, their bilateral relations have always been developed. High level visits between the countries have taken place regularly without interruption since the establishment of relations. [156] In 1994, the president of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, would declare that:

"Historically our people share heritage and geography. History is born through mutual ties and cultural influences. It is therefore natural that our countries nurture the feeling of respect, love and friendship for each other. If to this already favorable climate we add modern possibilities and joint will, I believe that we shall promote Turkish-Croatian friendship and cooperation very soon."[157]

As such, Turkey applied a constructive approach in mediating the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims by supporting Croatia's efforts to bring them closer together and establish the federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina within the Washington agreement and by developing a system of tri-lateralism that would further their relations. The positive experience spilled over to the economic sphere in which the relations achieved a peak through the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2002 that covered agricultural and non agricultural products, protection of competition, trade in services and regulation of the

---

[154] "Turkey: Bosnia and Serbia should join NATO, EU" *World Peace Newsletters*.2011. http://www.sify.com/news/turkey-bosnia-and-serbia-should-join-nato-eu-news-international-le3guqbbcdj.html ,retrieved on 26 May 2011

[155]"Turkey, Croatia Agree to Boost Economic Relations" 2007. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7213185.html , retrieved on 26 May 2011

[156] "Turkey's Political Relations with Croatia" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-croatia.en.mfa, retrieved on 27 May 2011

[157]Zuzul M. 1998."Croatia and Turkey; Toward a Durable Peace in Southeastern Europe". Journal of International Affairs. 3:3. p.2

intellectual property. [158] The last agreement of this type reached among the two until now aimed to boost economic and commercial relations and raise the trade volume to one billion euros by the end of 2013[159].

However, as already mentioned above, Turkey had stronger relations with countries which owned a majority of Muslim population like Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo etc. Whenever a conflict took place around Turkey in the former Ottoman lands, Turkey became a target of migration especially for the Muslims of the region which regarded it as a second homeland. Due to the warm attitudes especially between the Bosnian Muslims and the Turkish people, Mlladic, the commander of Milosevic, regarded the Muslims of Bosnia as Turks. Even in the Serbian nationalist marches, the Bosnian Muslims are referred to as Turks. For this purpose, Serbia always opposed the idea of sending Turkish troops in the Balkans.[160] Turkey Serbia relations were highly problematic during the Bosnian war from 1992- 1995 in which Turkey strongly supported the NATO decision to deploy a naval force to monitor the economic sanctions against Serbia. Apart from it, Turkey used its entire military and diplomatic means to persuade the UN permanent members to adopt an action plan that included limited air strikes against Serbia. Furthermore, Turkey was even reported to covertly supply arms to the Bosnian Muslims via Croatia, although nothing official appeared out. Apart from these, Turkey supported the NATO actions against Serbia in the Kosovo war. In May 1999, the United States demanded to use the air base in Turkey as a tool to make pressure on the Serbs although it was not needed in the war.[161] Moreover, Turkey – Serbia relations were strained again in 2008 when Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.[162]

---

[158]" Free Trade Agreements" *Cefta Trade Portal*
http://ceftatradeportal.com/croatia/index.php?lang=en%20&option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=14&Itemid=18%E2%8C%A9=en, retrieved on 28 May 2011

[159] "Turkey, Croatia Agree to Boost Economic Relations" 2007.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7213185.html , retrieved on 26 May 2011

[160]İdris B. (ed.) 2004 *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era* Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004.,p. 145

[161] Hale W. 2002. *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. London: Routledge. p.261

[162]"Turkey, Serbia expand cooperation with visa deal". Today's Zaman.2010
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=1C5485B0DDAC84423B7341C5582C731E?newsId=215877 , retrieved on 30 May 2011

Despite the past tensions, Turkey recognizes the central importance of Serbia to establish peace and stability in the troubled regions of the Balkans. The Turkish ambassador in Serbia would declare in an interview that "Serbia is the key western Balkan country, without which no peace and stability can happen. And if you want war, you need Serbia again!"[163] Serbia is located in a very strategic position in the Balkans and it serves to be the shortest way between Turkey and Western Europe. As such, Serbia remains a very important transit country for the Turkish goods and people. In this understanding, politically Turkey supports Serbia's integration into Euro- Atlantic structures and economically it is being prepared to increase investments especially after the Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2009.

To conclude, past relations of Turkey with Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia have developed in different ways. Turkey has always been firmed in recognizing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and has developed a foreign policy which supported that aim. Even until recently, relationships with the other countries, Croatia and Serbia were built according to that framework. Therefore, Turkey experienced a lot of tensions with both countries when they refused to recognize the independent Bosnia and improved relationships with them when they changed positions toward advocating a sovereign and independent Bosnia. The final encompassing goal of Turkey is to have the three countries united in permanent peace and stability within the umbrella of NATO and EU.

6.4 Mediation Strategies

Turkey's initiative to mediate the conflict in Bosnia was based on the main assumption that the region's stability depends on the consolidation of Bosnia Herzegovina. The active foreign policy of Turkey in the Balkan region was part of Turkey's Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu's overall policy of "zero problems with the neighbors".

---

[163] "Interview: Turkish Ambassador to Serbia". 2010. http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/555, retrieved on 30 May 2011

The first mechanism that Turkey applied as a mediator in the post- Dayton Bosnia conflict has been initiating many meetings between the leaders of the three countries. A result of this initiative was the formation of Trilateral Consultation Mechanisms: Turkey- Bosnia and Hezregovina- Serbia and Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina – Croatia. The meetings between Turkey, BiH and Serbia started in 10 October 2009 in Istanbul during the South East European Cooperation Process meeting and they were followed by two other consecutive meetings in November and December respectively; one after the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the other during the conference of the Alliance of Civilizations for Southeast Europe.

Turkey organized the first stage of improving relations to be the resolution of diplomatic tensions. As such, the fourth meeting of the same format organized in Belgrade on January 2010 resulted with an agreement between BiH and Serbia in which BiH had decided to appoint its ambassador in Serbia. The lack of direct political relations between the countries was because there was no Bosnian ambassador in Serbia and the appointment would act as a start for good neighbor relations. [164]

The fifth trilateral meeting which this time was organized by the heads of the states in February 2010 in Ankara resulted with signing the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic cooperation. The countries agreed on a common vision based on the pillars of security for all, high level political dialogue, economic interdependence and preservation of multi-ethnic, multi- cultural and multi-religious social composition of the region[165]

Furthermore, Serbia undertook an important step in the direction of reconciliation between the people of BiH and Serbia by approving a resolution on March 2010 apologizing for the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995. It expressed sympathy to the victims and apologized for not doing enough to prevent the massacre. Apart from it, Serbia's president Boris Tadic even paid an official visit to Bosnia Herzegovina accompanied by Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan, to attend the ceremony commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre in Bosnia Herzegovina. Turkish officials in this case applied a very low intervention

[164] Jelovac E. 2011."Destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Twenty Years Later in Karadjordjevo". *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*. http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=2104 l , retrieved on 20 May 2011

[165] "24 April Istanbul Triletaral Summit Declaration" Southeast European Cooperation Process: Turkish Chairmanship in Office. 2010. http://www.seecp-turkey.org/icerik.php?no=60, retrieved on 30 May 2011

policy in trying to help the two sides reach an understanding over the content of the apology. The reason behind that is that any pressure from a foreign country in this issue would not work. [166]

In a similar format, Turkey organized tri-lateral meetings between Turkey, BiH and Croatia. Their first trilateral meeting was organized in January 2010 and it was agreed to be repeated every three months. In addition, the heads of the three states would meet in every international meeting they attended. These meetings resulted with an agreement announcing that Turkey and Croatia supports BiH's unity and its aspirations to become a member of international organizations. To realize it, Turkey and Croatia supported on its Membership Action Plan which is a prerequisite to full membership in NATO. The Foreign Minister of BiH considers the support of both countries as extraordinary and declares that getting the Membership Action Plan wouldn't be possible without the constant and active support of Turkey and Croatia. [167]

Dialogue of this type is expected to remain on two separate tracks. In other words, Turkey kept both mechanisms as separate through parallel tracks in order to run things smoothly, although the foreign ministers of the three countries advocated the view to merge the tracks.

Apart from it, Turkey worked to expand cooperation with Serbia Croatia and BiH on diplomatic and economic levels. After the trilateral meetings, Turkey and Serbia signed six agreements including the free visa travel agreement, cooperation in the construction sector and they reviewed their military, cultural and administrative relations. They also held several talks on selling Serbia's main airline (JAT Airways) which is in crisis to Turkish Airline. Lastly, Turkey is undertaking projects to help develop the infrastructure in the Sandzac area which is a province in Serbia populated with Muslims. Apart from that, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Serbia promoted reconciliation between the two leaders of the most important local parties in Sandzac. Similarly, Turkey promoted a boost of economic and commercial relations with Croatia by agreeing to raise the trade volume between the two countries to one

---

[166] "Turkey Sets Stage for Serbian Apology over Srebrenica" Today's Zaman.2010 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-206148-turkey-sets-stage-for-serbian-apology-over-srebrenica.html, retrieved on 30 May 2011

[167] "Turkey and Croatia Pledge Support for Bosnia in Ankara" Today's Zaman. 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-208780-turkey-and-croatia-pledge-support-for-bosnia-in-ankara-talks.html, retrieved on 31 May 2011

billion euro by the end of 2013.[168] A primary target was also to promote economic relations with BiH and to boost its trade volume. An example of cooperation between the two countries was realized between Turkish Airlines and BiH Airlines which noted the first partnership of Turkish Airlines outside Turkey.

To conclude, as already noted above, the main strategy of Turkey was to develop confidence – building measures and discuss issues not only from a trilateral perspective i.e. relations between BiH, Serbia and Croatia but from a regional perspective as well. This was also shown in how Turkey used its one- year chairmanship of the South East European Cooperation Process as a regional framework for its tri-lateral consultation mechanism. [169] In addition, Turkey's mediation targets BiH stability as a necessary measure not only for BiH itself but for Europe as well. As Turkey's President would declare: "We believe that the Balkans is not at the end of Europe, but that is the heart of Europe".[170]

Below, we will provide Table three that summarizes all the discussion done in this chapter on the mediation of Turkey.

---

[168] "Turkey, Croatia Agree to Boost Economic Relations" 2007.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7213185.html , retrieved on 26 May 2011

[169] Eralp D.U.2010. "Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Future Reflecting on the Past."

Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Policy Brief: 46. p. 7

[170] "Turkey says Bosnia and Serbia should join NATO, EU" Today's Zaman 2011.
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=242154&link=242154, retrieved on 31 May 2011

TABLE 3/A

THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY

Characteristics of the Parties		Nature of the Dispute	
REGIME TYPE	• Multi Party Regime (In Serbia& Croatia- after 2000) • (In BiH)Political Parties Polarized Along Ethnic Lines	**DURATION AND TIMING OF INTERVENTION**	• Since October 2009 (continuing) • Before elections (BiH)
POWER STATUS	• A Small Power Difference	**INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE**	• Tens of Thousands of People have lost jobs • A quarter of working population is unemployed • 120.000 citizens continue to be internally displaced
RELATIONS WITH PARTIES	• In a stalemate	**TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED**	• Permanent Recognition of BiH's territorial integrity, sovereignty and legal identity • Improving Relation (Confidence Building) • Resolving the issue of war crimes and victims of war • Cooperation and regional stability

TABLE 3/B

Characteristics of the Mediators		Mediation Strategies	
POWER & RANK AND IDENTITY	• Turkey- A rising power	**LOW INTERVENTION**	Facilitation and Consultation Mechanisms
RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARTIES	• Turkey – Bosnia (Excellent) • Turkey – Croatia (Positive since Turkey mediated the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims and after the fall of Tudjman authoritative regime. • Turkey- Serbia (Negative in the Bosnian War and Kosovo War and strained when Turkey recognized the independence of Kosovo)	**MIDDLE INTERVENTION**	X
PREVIOUS MEDIATION EXPERIENCES	• The mediation between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian War	**HIGH INTERVENTION**	X

CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Mediation Outcome

Based on the literature review on mediation success, we reaffirm that the Butmir Process was unsuccessful and produced no result whereas the mediation conducted by Turkey produced successful outcomes in several aspects. For instance, the mediation was successful in reaching several agreements and improving the relations between parties. Abdullah Gül, Haris Silajdzic, and Boris Tadic, the presidents of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia respectively, signed the Istanbul Declaration which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and called for peace, regional stability and economic development. [171] The declaration succeeded in clarifying the issues of BiH's territorial integrity and sovereignty which was temporarily established in the Dayton Accord.

Next, relations improved at the political and diplomatic level especially after it was agreed that BiH would appoint its ambassador to Serbia and after the Serbian Parliament adopted the *Declaration of Srebrenica* by which it officially apologized for its role in the

---

[171] Jelovac E. 2011."Destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Twenty Years Later in Karadjordjevo". *The Journal of Turkish Weekly.* http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2822/destiny-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-twenty-years-later-in-karadjordjevo.html , retrieved on 20 May 2011

Massacre in 1995.[172] The last factor helped also to reestablish trust between the parties and motivate them to adopt a more cooperative orientation.

Lastly, the mediation made a great difference to settling the dispute but since this is an elusive concept to measure success we are not using it. In addition, we cannot say much whether the pre-mediation goals were fulfilled or whether stability and wisdom is established because the mediation started only two years ago and actually it is not finished yet; therefore we need to wait for some other years to analyze it.

Now, the above analyzes of the two mediation cases led by EU/US and Turkey respectively aimed to provide the main features underlying the conflict background, characteristics of the parties, characteristics of the mediator and mediation strategies that build up the mediation process in each case. To serve the purpose of this study, the last section will compare the findings that came out from each case and match them with the presented theoretical framework in order to draw out important remarks on what made one mediation more successful than the other.

7.2 Characteristics of the Parties

As already in chapter five, since the Dayton Accord that affirmed BiH territorial integrity and sovereignty, the country's political system is characterized by regular elections as one of the main political priorities; therefore this shows that each ethnic group is represented by more than two parties. However, in practice, the electoral process obstructed the reconciliation process as the dominant political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina like the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), The Croatian Democratic Union of *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (HDZ) etc, base most of their programmes on the protection of interests of their

---

[172] Poulain L. and Sakellariou A. 2011. "Western Balkans: Is Turkey Back". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back , retrieved on 9 May 2011

respective ethnicities.[173] Whereas, the parties who have a state-wide political, social and economic programme like the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Party for *Bosnia* and Herzegovina (SBiH)etc remained in the minority and they were unable to attract the majority of the people and establish sustainable political infrastructure.[174] On the other side, the mediation conducted by Turkey included the countries of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia which currently are all organized by democratic features; however prior to 2000, Serbia and Croatia belonged to more authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, at the time of mediation, both ethnic groups in Bosnia and the states of Serbia and Croatia were featured by multi party regimes. As the literature on determinants of mediation outcome demonstrates, multi party regimes are generally more successful than those involving other regime types and the one-party state dyads are the least successful in mediation attempts.[175]

Next, we conclude that in both cases the power difference between the negotiating parties was small or almost zero. In the case of the EU/US mediation, the constitution that came out of the Dayton Accord aimed to preserve ethnic identity and ensure that no single ethnic power would dominate national, legal or political structures. Whereas, in the case of the mediation of Turkey, the power difference was very small in which, among the three countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to remain behind due to the lack of a consolidated state structure and poor economy and infrastructure highly destroyed during the war and Croatia slightly leads by being a member of NATO and a candidate country for EU membership and due to its progress in managing post-conflict issues. However, it is important to keep in mind that none of the countries is a regional power therefore the second criteria established by the literature review that the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the greater the effectiveness of international mediation seemed to be fulfilled in both cases as well, although in the EU/US mediation it is more consolidated.

Thirdly, in both cases the relations between parties were in a stalemate. As presented in chapter five, the ethnic parties are characterized by negative relations at the political level

---

[173] European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. " The Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina" *Briefing Paper*. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Briefing_Paper_KS.pdf retrieved on 30 March 2011. p. 51

[174] Ibid, page53

[175] Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. " Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*. 28: 1. p.10

however at the public level, the older people have more friends from different nationalities and younger people show higher preferences for mixed friendship. This demonstrates that throughout generations, people have either lived in mixed communities or are eager to do that in the future. [176] Yet, the past relations of the ethnic parties originating after the end of the war have historically been negative.

Similarly, BiH, Croatia and Serbia have passed a history of intense conflict in the past where massive killings and destruction were recorded in three years after Bosnians self declaration of independence. After that, the relationships have mostly been negative or remain in a stalemate as no agreement or political dialogue existed between parties. Therefore, although the relationship should not be targeted as historical adversaries, it remained negative. Therefore as according to the literature, the probability of successful mediation is higher when mediating between friends and lower when mediating between historical adversaries, this is one of the determinants that should have hardened the mediation process. Table Four can also help us to note the similarities between the two cases. In other words, although the parties were not the same, their characteristics were almost so.

TABLE 4

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES

	REGIME TYPE	POWER STATUS	RELATIONS WITH PARTIES
EU/US MEDIATION (THE BUTMIR PROCESS)	Multi- Party	No Power Differences	In a stalemate
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY	Multi- Party	A Small Power Difference	In a stalemate

---

[176] O'Loughlin, J. and Tuathail G. Ó. 2009. "Accounting for Separatist Sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Responses". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32:4 p. 591–615

7.3 Nature of the Dispute

Both mediations started in October 2009 and both mediations initiated after the conflict passed several phases. First, the conflict in the case mediated by EU/US has passed several phases before this mediation took place and thus it fulfills one argument shared by all scholars that claims the need for a minimum amount of time to pass before mediation becomes successful. However, what Druckman (1993; 1994) Touval and Zartman (2001) would declare about the need for the parties to be at the stage of revaluating their policies was not taken into consideration as mediation took place just before the electoral campaigns in which parties were actually consolidating their nationalistic positions to increase the support for their electorate rather than reevaluating their policies in order to create space for compromise.

Similarly, the mediation conducted by Turkey was undertaken at a time when continuous debates on constitutional reforms had brought the country to a stalemate, thus respecting the condition put by scholars on the need to pass some 'tests of strength' between parties before initiating a mediation. In other words, the situation was at a stalemate and lack of progress could highly risk not only BiH domestic stability but also BiH and Serbia's future toward Euro- Atlantic integration.

Next, in none of the cases we can measure any fatality according to Bercovich *operationalization*[177], but the conflict caused loss of jobs for tens of thousands of people as a result of failure to ensure cooperation and fiscal coordination. In addition, quarter of working population resulted as unemployed and the other remaining majority gained low salaries and pensions. Apart from that, the political deadlock has also blocked the resolution of the refugee issue; as such 120, 000 citizens continue to be considered as internally displaced. [178] Similarly, the continuous dispute slowed the process of Euro- Atlantic integration and thus

---

[178] Office of High Representative in Bosnia. 2009. "Amid 'Political Impasse', Bosnia and Herzegovina at Crossroads in Bid for Euro-Atlantic Integration." *United Nations Security Council 6222nd Meeting* http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9795.doc.htm , retrieved on 3 May 2011

detained economic and political benefits which would be given through free access to Europe's largest market and through direct and regular contact with Europe's greatest powers. Therefore, what scholars argue that the mediation will be accepted and be more successful if the intensity of the dispute is greater does not hold. Yet, the successful mediation of Turkey supports Brockner (1982), Burton (1969) and Modelski (1964) who claim that the greater the intensity, the higher the losses, the more polarized the parties' positions will become and so more will the parties want to "win at all costs".

Lastly, both mediators aimed to ensure state sovereignty and prevent territorial integrity threatened by the political deadlock. Yet, the dispute issues they selected to achieve the goal were different. The Butmir Process targeted the issues of constitutional change and centralization of state system, closure of Office of High Representative as well as separation of state and military properties. This meant that any meaningful constitutional change would require reformulating the country's power structures by making each ethnic party concede some of its autonomy for the sake of more centralized institutions. According to Dodik, at the beginning, the negotiation process should have dealt with technical issues such as state property and conditions for visa liberalization and European integration and leave constitutional reforms for later as parties' positions on that issue are very divergent.

However, the Turkish mediation, focused on the issues of confidence- building regional stability, cooperation on areas of economy, energy, culture and environment as well as the issues of crimes and victims of war. As it clearly noted, the Butmir Process failed to cover the intangible issues define by Lewicki and Litterar (1985) and focused simply on tangible issues and thus reaffirmed the argument that often, intangible issues, although not listed in the formal agenda, may be more important than tangible issues and if the mediator does not pay attention to them, they may trigger rigid positions and hostile behaviors and thus bring the process to a deadlock. Differently from it, the Turkish mediation dealt with both tangible issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal identity of BiH and intangible issues such as confidence building and war crimes in order to increase trust and cooperation among parties and enable a positive belief that those who commit crimes cannot evade justice.[179]

---

[179] "Turkey Welcomes Capture of Serb War Criminal Mladic" 2011. *Today's Zaman*. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=245264&link=245264, retrieved on 24 May 2011

On the other hand, Bercovitch and Ott claims that mediations involving topics of ideology and security respectively are hardly negotiable whereas issues of sovereignty are more resolvable were reaffirmed by the Turkish case.

Apart from it, what made the Turkish mediation more successful than the EU/US attempt was the lack of complex issues. To clarify it more, according to Moore (1986) mediations are more manageable if issues are not complex. In other words, more complex the dispute is, less are the chances for an effective mediation. [180] Although the Turkish mediation had multiple issues to resolve in the agenda, each issue was complementing the other. For instance, a permanent recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal identity of BiH together with captures of war crimes and recognition of war atrocities trigger trust and build confidence among states and ethnic communities. Once , trust is established, the number of cooperative agreements in the fields of economy, environment, energy etc increase and once the number of cooperative agreements increase, regional stability is enhanced. Lastly, regional stability means quicker integration to Euro- Atlantic structures.

Whereas in the case of the Butmir process, inclusion of OHR which was not present physically in the mediation process, as an integral part of the talks damaged its credibility as a neutral actor and complicated the negotiations. Apart from it, the representatives of Republica Srpska were more open to negotiations on state and military properties since that would bring the closure of the OHR as well but they showed strong resistance to the fulfillment of constitutional reforms which in fact to them meant losing some sovereignty. However, the main Bosniak parties (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina , SBiH, and Social Democratic Party,SDP) considered the Office of High Representative as their main negotiating leverage and they did not agree to fulfill the objectives that required its closure until the constitutional reforms are completed [181]Therefore, complexity in terms of contradicting outcomes triggered a deadlock in the process.

To conclude, both EU/US and Turkey worked on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity and they initiated the mediation process in the same month. However, Turkey became more successful because the issues were selected to resolve the dispute were

---

[180] Moore, C. 1986. *The mediation process*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

[181] International Crisis Group. 2011. "Bosnia: Europe's Time to Act". *Europe Briefing*. 51. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/B059-bosnia-europes-time-to-act.aspx , retrieved on 10 May 2011. p. 1

not complex and touched both the tangible and intangible dimensions. Table Five will summarize the relationship of these determinants with the mediation outcome.

TABLE 5

NATURE OF THE DISPUTE

	DURATION & TIMING OF INTERVENTION	INTENSITY OF THE DISPUTE	TYPE OF ISSUES INVOLVED
EU/US MEDIATION (THE BUTMIR PROCESS)	October 2009 Before Elections in BiH	Middle	SOVEREIGNTY + TANGIBLE ISSUES COMPLEX ISSUES
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY	Since October 2009 (continuing) Before Elections in BiH	Middle	Sovereignty + Tangible and Intangible Issues COMPLEMENTARY ISSUES

7.4 Characteristics of the Mediator

When looking at both cases, European Union is the most impartial actor in the process as even during the war it did not engage in any activity against any of the parties. It established its civilian and military presence in Bosnia only after the Dayton Accord was signed and functioned to ensure security and keep stability. On the other hand, neither U.S nor Turkey has saved this characteristic. Both of them openly advocated their support to BiH territorial integrity and undertook military actions against Serbia after the Srebrenica massacre. Yet, Turkey is perceived to be less impartial as it was often regarded as a "big brother" to Turkic people in the world and especially to the Muslim population in the Balkans. In addition, Turkey became a target of migration especially for the Muslims of the

region which regarded it as a second homeland and due to the warm attitudes especially between the Bosnian Muslims and the Turkish people, Mlladic, the commander of Milosevic, regarded the Muslims of Bosnia as Turks. Even in the Serbian nationalist marches, the Bosnian Muslims are referred to as Turks. However, the perceived partiality did not count much on the Turkish mediation. Therefore, what Young (1967), Jackson (1952) and Northedge & Donelan (1971) argue about impartiality as an attribute which remains at the heart of successful mediations in many situations, does not hold in the case of Turkey.

EU's biggest asset that makes it an influential actor in these types of mediations is its ability to offer access to Europe's greatest organization that is European Union. Once , a country is member of EU, it enjoys economic benefits by getting access to one of the largest markets of the world; political privilege by engaging in political dialogue with many powerful countries on a daily basis but also greater opportunities for cultural interactions due to free visa regimes. However, through US, the country could gain legitimacy to become part of NATO, the largest Western militaristic organization. Both would not only contribute to establish peace within the county but also improve foreign relations at a regional level and establish long term peace and sustainability.

As regards to Turkey, after the Dayton Accord was signed, it offered to BiH aid for reconstruction, military and civilian support as well as cooperation opportunities in many fields such as economy, environment, culture and health. Similar projects were implemented in Serbia and Croatia as well. For instance, it contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina by actively supporting the implementation of the civilian and military reforms of the agreement which ended the war. More concretely, as a member of the steering board, it joins the work of the Implementation Council and it contributes to the European Union peacekeeping operation named Althea. [182] Throughout years, Turkey has supported the re-establishment of the multi-ethnic, multi- cultural status of Bosnia Herzegovina through maintenance of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders.

Apart from the political sphere, Turkey- Bosnia, Turkey- Serbia and Turkey- Croatia relations have developed at the economic and trade areas as well. Turkey has financially supported the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina by pledging over 100 million dollars.

---

[182] "Turkey's Political Relations with Bosnia Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa , retrieved on 25 May 2011

The Turkish companies helped in reconstructing the houses, factories, hospitals and the infrastructure of the region after the war. In addition, since 9 years the two have signed the Free Trade Agreement. [183] Furthermore, Turkey signed the Free Trade Agreement with Croatia in 2002 that covered agricultural and non agricultural products, protection of competition, trade in services and regulation of the intellectual property. [184] In addition, they reached an agreement that aimed to boost economic and commercial relations and raise the trade volume to one billion euros by the end of 2013.[185] Lastly, related to Serbia, Turkey offered it a Free Trade Agreement in 2009 and gave support for its integration into NATO. To conclude, it supports the three countries through numerous projects and activities implemented by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in a wide range of fields including education, health, economy and environment.

Therefore, according to the literature on mediation advocated by Susskind & Cruickshank (1987), Zartman & Touval (1985), Brookmire & Sistrunk (1980), mediation is not an exogenous process but a structural extension of bilateral bargaining and negotiation; therefore, rather than impartiality, a successful mediation is related to the possession of resources that either or both parties value. [186] Therefore, the Butmir Process should have been more successful than the Turkish mediation as EU/US could offer bigger assets than Turkey. Despite Turkey's numerous cooperative agreements, even Turkey itself places EU membership as one of the prior goals of its foreign policies. However, to me what made the Turkish mediation more successful than EU/US was that Turkey offered its credits during the mediation process or even before and thus made the promises more credible, whereas EU although perceived to be the most prominent organization to establish stabilization, the parties often doubted the EU's capability to realize promises. For instance, EU did not approve visa liberalization for Bosnia although it had reached a comparable progress level; then it made visa liberalization policy dependent upon the developments in the Butmir process. To the

---

[183] "Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Bosnia and Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa, retrieved on 26 May 2011

[184] " Free Trade Agreements" *Cefta Trade Portal* http://ceftatradeportal.com/croatia/index.php?lang=en%20&option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=14&Itemid=18%E2%8C%A9=en, retrieved on 28 May 2011

[185] "Turkey, Croatia Agree to Boost Economic Relations" 2007. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7213185.html , retrieved on 26 May 2011

[186] Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. " Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research.* 28: 1. p. 10

local parties, this demonstrated EU's lack of clear strategies in implementing multiple stages toward EU integration. Apart from it, the speaker and current president of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic, said during an official visit to Ankara that regional cooperation in the Balkans and enhanced ties with Turkey come before European integration.[187]

Turkey's mediation as an individual state proved to be more successful than the mediation of EU which is a regional organization. Therefore, in the Turkish case none of the views presented in our literature holds ; neither the view that considers international mediators with their high prestige and the wide array of possible strategies best at resolving high intensity conflicts and regional mediators better at resolving low-intensity conflicts due to their proximity, cultural similarity and comparative informality nor that offered by Bercovitch and Gartner in which individual mediators appear to be the least effective at achieving settlement when compared to international and regional mediators despite their state background.

To conclude, since the literature states that previous mediation efforts are important but they do not surely determine the existing outcomes[188], we are not analyzing this feature as in neither cases actually there was a reference to the previous mediation experiences. However, we can find information about the mediator's previous experiences in the respective sections above. Lastly, the relationship between the determinant on the characteristics of the mediator and mediation success will be summarized in the below given Table Six.

[187]"Growing Ties with Turkey More Important than EU, Serbian Parliament Speaker Says." *Today's Zaman*. 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230394-growing-ties-with-turkey-more-important-than-eu-serbian-parliament-speaker-says.html, retrieved on 2 June 2011

[188] Bercovitch J. and Gartner S.S 2006 "Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation ? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 32:4 ,p. 329-354

TABLE 6

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIATOR

	POWER, RANK & IDENTITY	RELATIONSHIP WITH PARTIES	PREVIOUS MEDIATION EXPERIENCES
EU/US MEDIATION (THE BUTMIR PROCESS)	Regional and Superpower	Positive	Yes, but unsuccessful
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY	A Rising Power	Positive (BOSNIA & CROATIA) Mostly Negative (SERBIA)	Yes, Successful

7.5 Mediation Strategies

As this study showed, the mediation guided by manipulative tactics was less successful than the facilitative mediation in our case of post crisis tensions. EU and US played a manipulative role in the negotiations by warning the immediate costs of losing the opportunities of EU and NATO memberships in case a solution to the current political stalemate was not achieved. In addition, they played a directive or substantive role by not simply facilitating the communication but by offering a reform package themselves. However, the political leaders of local parties were unsatisfied with the strategies followed and the proposals made by the mediators. According to Milorad Dodik , the talks were mainly directed towards principles rather than details of the constitutional reform, whereas the Croatian Representatives declared that the mediators offered a document that was too ambitious and almost unacceptable for all parties. Therefore, this study advocates the research conducted by Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas & Wilkenfeld (2006) and supported by Bercovitch & Gartner (2006) which claimed that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve commitment problems and ensure a reduction in post crisis tensions, whereas, manipulative mediation is more useful and effective in securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement.

Although the Butmir Process was a good idea, the mediating actors seem unwilling to commit the amount of time and effort to conclude the process. At the moment that Dodik rejected the initial package, they quickly lowered the standards in order to make it more acceptable for him. However, this did not only impede the establishment of a more functional country but also opened the way to accommodate more extreme political options. The lack of clear strategies was also a result of the fact that the mediators had little to offer in exchange of reforms to those parties that would lose as a result of it.[189]

Apart from all these, the international mediators created a sense of emergency in Butmir by suggesting that extra-institutional and coercive means were necessary to change the country's political structure. In other words, the mediator did not treat the issues as part of the BiH's conflict dynamics but as requirements to be fulfilled in order to approach EU membership.

To conclude, the EU/US mediation initiative was led by a high intervention strategy on substantive issues such as constitutional reforms and closure of OHR. The mediators offered a constitutional reform package to the negotiating parties which called for the establishment of a centralized state system as a precondition for the closure of OHR which is also a precondition for BiH accession to European Union. Lastly, it offered a 'quick fix' solution to the parties by giving a sense of emergency to the situation and suggesting coercive means to change the current political structure.

On the other hand, Turkey worked through a low intervention strategy by facilitating the meetings and building confidence measures through consultative mechanisms. This was demonstrated through the formation of two separate trilateral mechanisms among Turkey-BiH – Serbia and Turkey- BiH – Croatia. The mechanisms aimed to improve relations and establish regular bases for direct meetings. According to Turkey, it was the lack of direct political relations that impeded through years the development of positive outcomes. In addition, it applied a participatory approach in solving the victims of war issue which ended up with a parliamentary resolution from the Serbian side apologizing for the massacre. According to Turkish officials, they helped the parties in only reaching an understanding over

---

[189] Bieber F. 2010. "Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *European Policy Center*. p.2.

the content of the apology as any pressure from a foreign country would not certainly work. Again as the speaker and current president of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic would declare "if regional problems were to be solved by third parties, the price would be hefty, and it will haunt us again."[190]

Lastly, instead of offering carrots/ sticks in a long run as in the case of EU/US mediation, Turkey engaged in cooperative agreement which would immediately ease the economic troubles of the countries. This study strongly follows the conclusions of the *Mediating Regional Conflicts* article written by Beriker (1995) in which she compared four mediation initiatives in the conflict of Bosnia and claimed that the difference between the U.S and other mediation attempts were not only related to the type of leverage they used but also to the extent to which it was used by the mediator and to the extent that it was concrete, certain and thus more credible. [191]

Table Seven serves to summarize the relationship between mediation strategies and mediation outcome presented in this part of the chapter.

Table 7

MEDIATION STRATEGIES

	LOW INTERVENTION	MIDDLE INTERVENTION	HIGH INTERVENTION
EU/US MEDIATION (THE BUTMIR PROCESS)			✓
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY	✓		

---

[190] [190]"Growing Ties with Turkey More Important than EU, Serbian Parliament Speaker Says." *Today's Zaman*. 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230394-growing-ties-with-turkey-more-important-than-eu-serbian-parliament-speaker-says.html, retrieved on 2 June 2011

[191] Atiyas N.B. 1995. "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina". The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science November.542:1.p.199-200

Before concluding, this study offers a joint table of all determinants of mediation outcome in order to understand the factors which caused change in outcome.

TABLE 8

MEDIATION IN BOSNIA[192]

	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES	NATURE OF THE DISPUTE	ISSUES OF THE DISPUTE	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIATOR	MEDIATION STRATEGIES	MEDIATION OUTCOME
EU/US MEDIATION (THE BUTMIR PROCESS)	✓	✓	X	X	X	FAILURE
THE MEDIATION OF TURKEY	✓	✓	X	X	X	SUCCESS

---

[192] X   means different
         ✓   means same or similar.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

This comparative case study was extremely important in affirming some of the main findings in the mediation literature. It showed that the existence of multi-party regime, small power differences and past positive relations between the negotiating parties are crucial for the development of a successful mediation process. It also advocated the viewpoint that the mediation should start with more technical issues with which parties are not very much attached and move to more central issues after some form of collaboration is achieved. In addition, it confirms that the mediator should pay attention to both tangible and intangible issues otherwise unresolved intangible issues may trigger rigid positions and hostile behaviors and thus bring the process to a deadlock.

Apart from it, the comparative case study helped us understand that mediation is more effective, when a conflict has gone through a few phases and it must not be initiated if the sides have not shown any willingness for the amelioration of the conflict. In other words, in order to be able to conduct a successful mediation, disputing parties need to be at the stage of revaluating their policies and that mostly occurs after some crises or crisis like conditions are fulfilled. Next, the comparative case study revealed that the greater the intensity, the higher the losses, the more polarized the parties' positions will become and so more will the parties want to "win at all costs".

However, contrary to the literature, our study demonstrated that individual mediators may be more successful than international or regional mediators. Therefore, the view that mediation attempts by superpowers are more likely to be successful than mediation attempts by medium or small powers did not hold in this case. Apart from it, the study adds that a successful mediation is not only related to the possession of resources that either or both parties value but it is also related to the ability and willingness of the mediators to fulfill their promises and share these resources. Furthermore, as already advocated in current theoretical studies, impartiality did not appear to be an important variable.

Lastly, the study highly supported the research on mediation strategies claiming that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve commitment problems and ensure a reduction in post crisis tensions, whereas, manipulative mediation is more useful and effective in securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andjelic N. 2003. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*. London: Frank Cass Publishers

Atiyas N.B. 1995. "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 542:1

Beardsley K.C. Quinn D.M Biswas B. Wilkenfeld J. 2006 "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50: 1

Bercovitch J. Anagson Th. and Wille D.L. 1991. "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research.* 28: 1. p. 9

Bercovitch J. and Gartner S.S 2006 "Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation ? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 32:4

Bercovitch J. and Langley J. 1993. "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 36:4

Bercovitch, J. 1995. *Resolving Iinternational Conflicts: the Theory and Practice of Mediation,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Bercovitch, J. 2004. "Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts" *Armed Forces & Society* Winter.30:2

Bercovitch, J. 2007. "Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria". *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 7:2

Bercovtich J. and Langley J. (1993) " Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A theoretical and Empirical Analysis," *Peace & Change*. 18:1

Bieber F. 2010. "Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *European Policy Center*.

Biserko S. 2009. "Belgrade and Banjaluka: Together for Partition of Bosnia".*Helsinki Bulletin*. 49

Bunce V.J. 2009. "Post Communist Ambiguities" *Journal of Democracy*. 20:3

Burg S.L and Shoup P.S. 1999 *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention,* London: M. E. Sharpe

Burton, J. W. and D.J.D. Sandole. 1987. "Expanding the debate on generic theory of conflict resolution: A response to a critique." *Negotiation Journal*. 3:1

Chandler. D. 2000. *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*. London: Pluto Press; 2nd ed.

Clark M.E. 1999. " A Unified and Multiethnic Bosnian State: Achievable Goal or Impossible Dream?", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 6: 2

Clark. W.K. 2001. *Waging Modern war: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat,* Wilmington, NC, U.S.A. PublicAffairs; 1st ed.

Çarkoğlu A. and Rubin B.M. (eds). 2003. *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. London: Frank Cass Publishers,

D'Estree, T.P, 2001. "Changing the Debate About Success in Conflict Resolution Efforts", *Negotiation Journal*, 17:2

Dichter. A.S. 1994. *Actions and Options in the Bosnian Conflict: A Strategic Analysis and a Strategic Approach Towards Conflict Resolution*, CJCS Strategy Essay Writing Competition Entry .Alabama: USA

Druckman D. 2005. *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict* Analysis London: Sage.

Eralp D.U.2010. "Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Future Reflecting on the Past."

Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Policy Brief: 46.

Frei, D.1976. " Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of Mediation" *Peace Science Society International Papers*. 26:1

Frucht R.C. 2004.*Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture*. Vol.1. ABC-CLIO

Hale W. 2002. *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. London: Routledge

Holmes, J. G., & Miller, D. T. 1976. "Interpersonal conflict". İn Thibaut, J. W , Spence, J. T. & Carson, R. C. (eds.) *Contemporary topics in social psychology*). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press

Honeyman, C. 1990. "On evaluating mediators". *Negotiation Journal.* 6:1

Innes M.A. (ed.) 2006. *Bosnian Security after Dayton* : *New Perspectives.* London: *Routledge*

İdris B. (ed.) 2004 *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era* Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004

J O'Loughlin, J. and Tuathail G. Ó. 2009. "Accounting for Separatist Sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Responses". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32:4

Jameson. J.K.1999. "Toward a Comprehensive Model for the Assessment of Intraorganizational Conflict: Developing the Framework". *International Journal of Conflict Management*. 10:3

Joseph E.P and Hitchner R.B. 2008. "Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is Not Enough" *United State Institute of Peace Briefing*

Juncos A.E. 2005. "The EU's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?". *Southeast European Politics*. 6:2.

Keashly, L., Fisher, R. J., & Grant, P. R. 1993. "The comparative utility of third party consultation and mediation within a complex simulation of intergroup conflict." *Human Relations*, 46:3

Kleiboer, M. 1996. "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation".*Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 40:2

Kochan, T. A., & Jick, T.1978. "The public sector mediation process: A theory and empirical examinations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 22:1

Kressel K. and Pruitt D.1989. *Mediation Research*, San Francisco: Jossey- Bass

Kut G. 1994. " Yeni Turk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararasi Ortam" in B.E Behar et al. Bagimsizlarin Ilk Yillari: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kirgizistan, Ozbekistan, Turkmenistan .Ankara : Kultur Bakanligi.

Lampe, J. R. 1999. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Maldini.P and Vidović D. 2007.*Transition in Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences and future Perspectives.* Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre

Mansfield A.M. 2003. " Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Columbia Law Review.103:8*

Marko J. 1996. "The Ethno-national Effects of Territorial Delimitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in cooperation with European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) (eds.), *Local Self-Government. Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities*. Zürich.

McEwen, C. A., & Maiman, R. J. 1989. "Mediation in small claims court: Consensual processes and outcomes" in K. Kressel & D. G. Pruitt (eds.) *Mediation Research*.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

McGrath, J. 1966. "A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation." in R. V. Bowers (ed.), *Studies on behavior in organizations: A research symposium Athens*, GA: University of Georgia Press

Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. 2003. *Comparative indicators on refugees, displaced persons and returnees, property law implementation and reconstruction in BiH from 1991 to 30 June 2003*. Sarajevo: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Muehlmann. Th. 2007. "Police Restructuring in Bosnia Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally- Led Security Sector Reform", *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1: Special Supplement

Neuman, W.L. 2003. *Social Research Methods : Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* 5th ed. Boston : Allyn and Bacon.

O'Loughlin, J. and Tuathail G. Ó. 2009. "Accounting for Separatist Sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Responses". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32:4

Opacin N. 2008. "Bosnia and Herzegovina's Bilateral Relations with Turkey' December". *Centre for Security Studies*

Pennings P. Keman H. and Kleinnijenhuis J. 1999. *Doing Research in Political Science : An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics.* London: Sage

Peskin V. 2008.*International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Coopeartion*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Pruitt, D, Robert S.Mc., Neil B.W., Gary L.C., Lynn M. 1993. "Long-Term Success in Mediation." *Law and Human Behavior.*17:3

Rajchel K. Esanu R. MacBain A. Rohwerder B. 2010. " Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Reconstruction" *Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies*

Ramet S.P. 2006. *The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005*.Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Ross, W. 2000. "Measuring Success in Mediation". *Mediation Journal*. 1:1

Rubin B.M. Kirişçi K.2001.*Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging Multiregional Power*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Sander, F.1995. *"The Obsession With Settlement Rates"*. *Negotiation Journal*. 11:4

Sean B. and Carter N. 1996. "Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in Northern Ireland and Quebec", *Peace and Conflict Studies*

Sebastián S. 2001. "Breaking the Impasse: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia" *Fride: Policy Brief*

Sebastian S. 2010. "Seizing Momentum in Bosnia". *Fride: Policy Brief*.54

Sekulic´ D. Massey G.and Hodson R. 2006. "Ethnic intolerance and ethnic conflict in the dissolution of Yugoslavia", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 29:5

Sheppard, B.H, 1984. "Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework". *Research in Organizational Behavior*. 6:1

Slack J.A and Doyon R.R 2001. "Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38:2

Smith J. 1994 "Mediator Impartiality:Banishing the Chimera", *Journal of Peace Research*. 31:4

Sterland B. 2006. "Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo" *International NGO Training and Resaerch Centre*.Praxis Paper No.9

Steven W.2011. "Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*

Weiss. C 1972. *Evaluation Research: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness*. N.J.: Prentice-Hall

Woehrel S. 2011. "Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*

Woehrel S. 2011. "Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service Report*

Youngs R. 2010.*The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment,* Baltimore:The John Hopkins University Pressp

Zubek J.M. Pruitt D.G. Peirce R.S. 1992. "Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short- Term Success in Mediation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 36:3

Zuzul M. 1998."Croatia and Turkey; Toward a Durable Peace in Southeastern Europe". Journal of International Affairs. 3:3.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES

" 'Butmir Process' to be Continued".2009. http://www.emportal.rs/en/news/region/102096.html, retrieved on 25 May 2011

" Free Trade Agreements" *Cefta Trade Portal* http://ceftatradeportal.com/croatia/index.php?lang=en%20&option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=14&Itemid=18%E2%8C%A9=en, retrieved on 28 May 2011

 "Background Note: Turkey". United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm , retrieved on 29 May 201

"Bosnia Faces Post-War Crisis: ICG".2011. http://news.maars.net/blog/2011/05/07/bosnia-faces-worst-post-war-crisis-icg/ ,retrieved on 17 May 2011

"Croatia Apologises for Bosnian War Crimes" 2010. http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatia-apologises-bosnian-war-crimes-news-448002 , retrieved on 11 May 2011.

"EU- Turkey Relations". *European Commission Enlargment*. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm, retrieved on 18 May 2011

"Foreign Relations" http://countrystudies.us/turkey/87.htm, retrieved on 24 May 2011

"Interview: Turkish Ambassador to Serbia". 2010. http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/555, retrieved on 30 May 2011

"Relations between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina are excellent- Erdoğan" 2009 http://en.trend.az/regions/met/turkey/1601217.html, retrieved on 24 May 2011

 "Turkey and Croatia Pledge Support for Bosnia in Ankara" Today's Zaman. 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-208780-turkey-and-croatia-pledge-support-for-bosnia-in-ankara-talks.html, retrieved on 31 May 2011

 "Turkey says Bosnia and Serbia should join NATO, EU" Today's Zaman 2011.
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=242154&link=242154, retrieved on 31 May 2011

"Turkey Sets Stage for Serbian Apology over Srebrenica" Today's Zaman.2010 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-206148-turkey-sets-stage-for-serbian-apology-over-srebrenica.html, retrieved on 30 May 2011

 "Turkey Welcomes Capture of Serb War Criminal Mladic" 2011. *Today's Zaman*.
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=245264&link=245264, retrieved on 24 May 2011

 "Turkey, Croatia Agree to Boost Economic Relations" 2007.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7213185.html , retrieved on 26 May 2011

"Turkey, Serbia expand cooperation with visa deal". Today's Zaman.2010
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=1C5485B0DDAC84423B7341C5582C731E?newsId=215877 , retrieved on 30 May 2011

"Turkey: Bosnia and Serbia should join NATO, EU" *World Peace Newsletters*.2011. http://www.sify.com/news/turkey-bosnia-and-serbia-should-join-nato-eu-news-international-le3guqbbcdj.html ,retrieved on 26 May 2011

"Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Bosnia and Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa, retrieved on 26 May 2011

"Turkey's Political Relations with Bosnia Herzegovina" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa , retrieved on 25 May 2011

"Turkey's Political Relations with Croatia" Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-croatia.en.mfa, retrieved on 27 May 2011

"Turkey" Central Intelligence Agency. 2011 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html , retrieved on 29 May 2011

Abaspahic.H and Bajrovic. R. 2010."Perspective of EU Policy Towards Bosnia and Herzegovina" *EUROAD: Center for Policy and Governance* http://www.boell.eu/downloads/Abaspahic_Bajrovic_EUROAD_Policynote.pdf ,retrieved on 10 May 2011

Alic A. 2010. "Bosnian Impasse Over 'Dayton Two' " *International Relations and Security Network* http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=109294, retrieved on 24 April 2011

Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, retrieved on 8 June 2011

Assembly debate on 26 January 2010 (4th Sitting) (see Doc. 12112, report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs: MM. Çavuşoğlu and Sasi). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2010 (4th Sitting). See also Recommendation 1894.2010. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1701.htm, retrieved on 25 March 2011

Bancroft I.2010. "Strengthenin the External Dimensions of Dayton Bosnia" Global Experts: Analysis on Demand. http://www.theglobalexperts.org/comment-analysis/strengthening-external-dimensions-dayton-bosnia, retrieved on 15 May 2011.

Biserko S. 2010. "Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Key to Regional Stability" *Bosnian Institute* http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2672, retrieved on 24 May 2011

Bishara M. 2007. "A vote on Turkey's Identity". *The New York Times* http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/20/opinion/20iht-edbishara.1.6749019.html, retrieved on 23 May 2011

Bosnia & Herzegovina Constitution, Article V, Bosnia & Herzegovina Constitution. Article V(2) (c). 22. Ibid. Article V(2)(d). http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/bk00000_.html , retrieved on 5 May 2011

Central Intelligence Agency.2011. " Croatia" https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html, retrieved on 29 May 2011

Central Intelligence Agency.2011. " Serbia".https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html, retrieved on 29 May 2011

Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia Hercegovina. "EU assistance to BiH". http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=clanak&CID=20&jezik=2&LID=35, retrieved on 30 March 2011

European Commission Enlargement: Candidate Countries.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/index_en.htm, retrieved on 2 May 2011

European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union Policy Department. 2007. " The Constitutional Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina" *Briefing Paper*. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Briefing_Paper_KS.pdf retrieved on 30 March 2011

FY2010 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Justification, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010cbj/pdf/index.htm/, retrieved on 5 March 2011

Growing Ties with Turkey More Important than EU, Serbian Parliament Speaker Says." *Today's Zaman*. 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230394-growing-ties-with-turkey-more-important-than-eu-serbian-parliament-speaker-says.html, retrieved on 2 June 2011

Head J. 2011. "Keeping Turkey Focused on EU Challenge" *BBC News*. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11326425, retrieved on 21 May 2011

http://www2.uiah.fi/projects/metodi/172.htm , retrieved on 8 June 2011

International Crisis Group. 2011. "Bosnia: Europe's Time to Act". *Europe Briefing*: 51. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/B059-bosnia-europes-time-to-act.aspx , retrieved on 10 May 2011

Istanbul Triletaral Summit Declaration.24 April 2010. Istanbul. http://www.seecp-turkey.org/icerik.php?no=60, retrieved on 20 March 2011

Jelovac E. 2011."Destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Twenty Years Later in Karadjordjevo". *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*. http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2822/destiny-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-twenty-years-later-in-karadjordjevo.html , retrieved on 20 May 2011

Karajkov R.2009. "From Dayton to Butmir: The Future of Bosnia" *World Politics Review*. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4614/from-dayton-to-butmir-the-future-of-bosnia, retrieved on 20 May 2011

Ljubojevic A. "Party Systems Change in Serbia and Croatia Caught Between EU Conditionality and National identity", www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/578.pdf , retrieved on 10 May 2011.

Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo and Saferworld. 2010. The Missing Peace: The Need for a Long Term Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/The%20missing%20peace%20-%20English%20reduced.pdf   retrieved on 25 March 2011

Petritsch,W. 2010 "The Future of Bosnia Lies with its People", http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=3188, retrieved on 21 March 2011

Poulain L. and Sakellariou A. 2011. "Western Balkans: Is Turkey Back". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back , retrieved on 9 May 2011.

Resolution 1701. 2010. "Functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Parliamentary Assembly" http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1701.htm , retrieved on 10 January 2011)

Rossini A.2011. "A Stronger Europe in Sarajevo" *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*. http://greengopost.com/a-stronger-europe-in-sarajevo/ ,retrieved on 23 May2011

United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. "Background Note: Bosnia-Herzegovina". http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm , retrieved on 29 May 2011

United State Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.2011. "Background Note: Serbia". http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm , retrieved on 29 May 2011

Ülgen S.2011. "Turkey Rising" Carniege Endowment for International
Peace. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42272#Economy , retrieved on 23 May 2011

Yinanç B.2010. "Excluded by US and EU, Turkey Undertakes Own Mediation in Bosnia" *Hurriyet Newspaper*. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=excluded-by-us-and-eu-turkey-undertakes-its-onw-mediation-in-bosnia-2010-01-15 , retrieved on 20 March 2011

Yonemitsu.M. 2009. "Failure on Three Fronts". *European Voice.Com*. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/failure-on-three-fronts-/66276.aspx, retrieved on 17 May 2011