WHY DO STATES SUPPORT CERTAIN REBEL GROUPS IN CIVIL WAR?

A DYADIC ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN POWER RELATIONS

by

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Abstract

Why do states choose to intervene in certain civil wars and abstain from taking an active role in others? I argue that the choice process of the possible interveners is characterized by a number of international factors, most important ones being internationalization of the conflict, and contiguity, alliance patterns, and shared population characteristics between the possible intervener and the state in conflict. I empirically examine the countries that experienced a civil war in the Middle East following the Iranian Revolution, using a conflict and possible intervener dyad, analyzing 18 instances of civil war covering a temporal span of 29 years, between 1979 and 2007. To capture the essence of strategic behavior, the dyadic data includes different variables from individual state level, dyadic level and system level. The results of the analysis show that contiguity, alliance and internationalization of the conflict provide the most robust explanations for third party support to rebel groups. With the results, we can claim that states perceive third-party intervention as leverage against other states. When there are no other options outside a militarized interstate dispute, states may choose to apply pressure using these conflicts as a foreign policy tool.

NEDEN DEVLETLER İÇ SAVAŞLARDA BELİRLİ AYRILIKÇI GRUPLARI DESTEKLER?

ORTA DOĞU GÜÇ İLİŞKİLERİNİN DİYADİK ANALİZİ

BATUHAN GÖRGÜLÜ

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Özet

Neden ülkeler belirli iç savaşlarda müdahalelerde bulunurken diğerlerinde aktif bir rol almaktan kaçınırlar? Devletlerin diğer iç savaşlara müdahalelere girişmeden önce göz önünde bulundurdukları uluslararası faktörler, bu seçim sürecinde devletlerin hareketlerini açıklamak için önemli araçlardır. Bu tezde, İran Devrimi'nden sonraki süreçte Orta Doğu'da iç savaş yaşamış ülkelerin çatışma ve muhtemel müdahaleci devlet çiftinin analiz birimi olarak kullanıldığı ampirik bir incelemesi yapılmıştır. 1979 ve 2007 yılları arasında 18 farklı iç savaş devlet seviyesinde, ikili ilişkiler kullanılarak, ve sistem seviyesinde analiz edilmiştir. Analizin sonuçları iki devlet arasındaki sınır paylaşımı ve ittifakın, ve çatışmanın uluslararası bir seviyeye çıkmasının ayrılıkçı gruplara üçüncü-parti desteğini en iyi şekilde açıkladığını göstermiştir. Bu analizin sonuçları, devletlerin ayrılıkçı gruplara sağladığı üçüncü-parti desteği diğer devletlere karşı bir dış politika aracı olarak kullanabildiğini göstermiştir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It has been almost two decades since the Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani claimed that Syria used the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 1992, which had been openly rebelling against the Turkish state since 1984, as a tool to apply pressure against Turkey.[1] In the same year, Hamas, the largest militant Islamic faction in the Israeli-occupied territories, entered a new alliance with Iran after Tehran publicly offered support for the intifada and media exposure in Iran to the Palestinian question.[2] These conflicts, between Turkey and the PKK, and Israel and Hamas have yet to come to a definite end, and we have seen many other cases of past and ongoing conflicts in which an interested third-party intervened. Syria has provided safe havens and ideological support for the PKK to aid against their struggle against the Turkish government. Similarly, Hamas has received weapons, military training and ideological support from Iran and Syria against Israel. As a couple of stark examples among numerous others, these snapshots reveal foreign powers often choose to involve themselves in such intrastate conflicts.[3]

This study asks why third party states support some rebel groups in a country that experiences civil conflict while other rebel groups do not receive any foreign support.[4] With this question, I aim to provide explanations to a number of the

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[1] "Kurdish leader hits out at militants; Barzani voices contempt for PKK and its commander." The Guardian (London), April 2, 1992.

[2] "Iran pledges to aid Hamas in fight for 'free Palestine'." The Independent (London), November 17, 1992.

[3] In this study, civil conflict and interstate conflict will be used interchangeably.

[4] Note that a third party can also support a home government against the rebels, as has been the case with Iran supporting the Turkish government during the last decade. While explaining when and how two states ally against a rebel group is an intriguing

previously unanswered questions raised by the theoretical literature on third-party intervention in civil wars using a novel research design. I claim that the choice of the foreign powers on whether or not to intervene rests on realist expectations. A better depiction of this choice process contributes towards building a more comprehensive theory for the civil war intervention literature. Being able to present the dynamics of such a choice process will allow us to review and integrate elements of external intervention into civil war research, that simultaneously takes into account the usage of foreign intervention in civil conflicts as a means of exerting policy tool for states. Existing studies have asked whether a civil war internationalizes (*e.g.* Gleditsch, 2007; Sarkees, 2000), however, due to their monadic design, these analyses have been unable to distinguish among different rebel groups within a home country. This thesis brings a novel perspective to the question of why we observe third-party interventions in certain conflicts as a foreign policy tool for the possible intervener.

To be able to answer the question why countries support certain rebel groups in civil war while others do not receive any foreign support, I will be observing the intervention patterns of countries and the inclusion of transnational components these intrastate conflicts will be of utmost importance to be able to understand the mechanisms of intervention in civil war. As such, this study is an innovation - it simultaneously looks at home-intervener country, intervener country-rebel group and home country-rebel group relations.

This thesis presents a discussion on the choice processes of possible interveners in civil conflicts in the Middle East from 1979 to 2007, providing both a descriptive theoretical background on intervention patterns of states, and statistical analyses to test the hypotheses built on the theoretical debates for correlates of external support for rebel groups. The first section motivates my research question through identifying gaps in literature and emphasizes where international relations literature falls short of capturing the concepts of intervention in intrastate wars. I propose a series of hypotheses; building on the existing literature on interstate interventions. The next section devises the research methodology that aims to address these challenges. More specifically, I discuss the methodological choices and motivate my spatiotemporal domain. In this section, I also present the data set that I will be using by introducing the

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academic endeavor in itself, this study will only focus on a third party's decision to support a specific insurgent group.

existing data sets and the variables. Section Four presents and discusses the findings, and gives a discussion on why certain suspects (*e.g.* contiguity, alliance) alongside others (*e.g.* shared populations, internationalization of conflict) turn out to be significant predictors of third-party involvement. The concluding section discusses the implications of my findings and establishes further avenues for research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL MOTIVATION

For many, the stable bipolar system that emerged after World War II predicted a significant decline in global warfare (*e.g.* Waltz, 1979; Gaddis, 1987). While the Cold War indeed reduced the number of interstate conflicts (Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla, 2001), other types of conflict, especially civil (intrastate) war and decolonization (extra-systemic) wars experienced a surge during *as well as* after this time period (Sarkees *et al.* 2003). Rendering support to Kegley's (1991) point that the great-power peace since 1945 should not be regarded as a move toward a more peaceful international situation, especially after examining the entire local and interstate system.

The increased salience of conflicts occurring within –rather than between- states (Henderson and Singer, 2000) has made civil war a popular topic in international relations literature.[5] A considerable amount of the research focuses on definitions (*e.g.* Sambanis, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), onset and escalation (*e.g.* Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 2001), duration (*e.g.* Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004; Regan, 1998) and severity (*e.g.* Lacina, 2006) of civil wars. However, to review these conflicts as a "part and parcel of the international system" like Modelski suggests (as cited by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008, p. 348) is the first and foremost step in recognition of the international dimensions of civil wars. To explain these dimensions of civil wars, one strand of literature has converged on the role of third parties in civil conflicts.

In this line of thinking, third party states often involve themselves with the insurgent group and the government. In exploring these interactions in civil conflict Gleditsch (2007, p. 295) argues, "international relations research usually insists that states do not exist in isolation but are influenced by their interaction and exposure to

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[5] See Sambanis (2002) for a detailed review of recent advances in the quantitative literature on civil war.

other states." Interestingly, studies looking at national level causes and consequences of civil war have often looked at the international dimension.

However, the inclusion of third-party intervention as a key independent variable in various models of civil conflict duration (e.g., Regan 2002) and outcome (e.g., De Rouen and Sobek 2004) reveals the importance of the role of third-party interveners in civil conflicts. As Sambanis (2002) suggests, the growing research on third-party roles in international relations literature has mostly focused on external intervention in the last couple decades; most studies that focus on third party intervention perceive the interactions between the state, the rebel group, and the third party as central to the civil war process (see *inter alia,* Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008; Carment, James, and Rowlands, 1997; Aydin, 2011; Findley, 2006; Regan, 2002). To provide a wider explanation, civil war intervention research needs to consider the causes of the conflict and the extent of the relationships between the civil war state, possible intervener and the insurgent group.

2.1. Approaches to External Intervention In Civil War

The study of external intervention in intrastate conflicts has gone through a long and arduous process. Regan (1998) points out to three relevant problems in past works that had risen in this process. First, most of the past civil war intervention literature only considers military activities that aim to affect the balance of power (and possibly, change the status quo) between the warring parties as an encompassing definition of intervention (Hufbauer and Schott, 1983). This definition does not include economic sanctions, diplomatic interventions or threats to use force, because of the lower risk associated with the decision to intervene in such a manner. Second, little interest has been shown in third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts compared to interventions in interstate conflicts. Last, he claims that there is relatively low systematic evidence to support the claims that have been put forth by these studies (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996). Still, we have seen a growing number of studies since the time of publication of Regan's work, on civil war intervention (see *inter alia,* Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Cetinyan, 2002; Regan, 2002) and contagion (Beardsley, 2011; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Braithwaite, 2010; Gleditsch, 2007; Kathman, 2010). Furthermore, these empirical endeavors give supporting evidence to previous prescriptive arguments put forth by Kaufmann (1996).

Scholars have employed a variety of different theoretical approaches to explain intervention in civil conflicts. Structural factors, conflict management, and the effects and conditions of intervention constitute the three main approaches in explaining civil war intervention. Structural factors consider the internal dynamics of the civil conflict, as a basis for civil war intervention. Using this approach, Carment, James, and Rowlands (1997) argue that conflicts with an ethnic component tend to attract more interveners, especially from the states that share ethnic ties with the insurgent group. Studies focusing on the conflict management aspect of intervention for the civil conflict, ask whether and how interveners aim to reduce the human cost in the conflict in the short term and resolve the dispute between the home state and the insurgent group in later stages (*e.g.* Regan, 2000). Other studies analyze the effects of intervention on civil war duration and outcome, explaining how an intervention might hasten the conflict termination (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000) or extend the duration of the conflict (*e.g.* Regan, 2002). While these studies have been able to capture the conditions under which civil wars terminate, prolong, or experience external intervention, they still do not explicitly specify the reasons of intervention and the choice process of the intervener in a civil war.

To observe a civil war, both the conditions for intervention should materialize, *and* the intervener should show its willingness. In other words, there should be both the opportunity and the willingness to intervene (Most and Starr, 1989). Relatively little attention has been shown to either the supply or demands side of this phenomenon (*cf.* Findley and Teo, 2006; Regan 1998). Rather, the ongoing debate among international relations scholars regarding the effects of intervention mostly focuses on a civil conflict's duration (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2003; Kathman, 2010; Regan, 2000) and its outcome (e.g. Gent, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2010). A parallel strand explores the design and timing of third party intervention in civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006). These three approaches are quite useful in developing a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the mechanisms of third-party intervention in intrastate conflict, and, in turn, necessitate developing a model to bring these dimensions towards understanding an intervener's choice to involve itself in a civil conflict.

2.2. Intervention in Civil War as a Choice Process

Existing studies on civil war intervention tend to overlook the decision process of the third-party intervener. "Attaining a coherent and useful definition of foreign intervention" is also further "complicated by the need to understand the nature of the conflict that underlies the intervention, as well as by the need to account for the complex mix of factors that can shape an intervention strategy" (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002, p. 8).

To counter these challenges, Balch-Lindsay *et al.* (2008) develop a framework that incorporates these dimensions into a single *civil war process* and highlight certain dynamics that can be identified using this approach. Modeling an intervener's decision to get involved in a specific conflict is an essential first step towards a comprehensive understanding of civil conflict dynamics. Assuming potential interveners are utility maximizers, we can expect a third party's *ex-ante* belief on expected utility of intervention to be the main influence while making a choice on whether to intervene in a conflict or not (Aydin, 2010). Being rational actors, states try to reduce the uncertainties before acting as an intervener. It is thus important to understand why some potential interveners choose not to do so as well, thus reaffirming Balch-Lindsay et al.'s (2008, p. 349) claim that third parties are central to the civil war process, "even decisions by third parties not to intervene overtly in a civil war has meaningful consequences for the manner in which civil wars evolve."

To comprehend the role and the decisions of third parties in the civil war process, such an approach is instrumental to be able to model the intervention decisions of states. If foreign states strategically select themselves as a party in the intrastate conflict, an interests-based explanation of civil war needs to be discussed in a way where the relations between the potential intervener and the civil war country, *and* the potential intervener and the insurgent group hold a high degree of importance. In doing so, we can identify the strategic decision making process of the potential intervener and factor in the usual suspects of realist, liberal domestic and rationalist explanations for civil war intervention outcomes in my empirical model.

An analysis of the causes and the choice processes of third-party intervention reveal certain trends in the patterns of interested third parties. Regan (1998) presents different theoretical explanations of why we observe interventions in civil conflict: from a realist perspective we may observe interventions only when clear national interests are at stake (Bull 1984; Morgenthau 1967). Dyadic power relations, foreign policy

similarities and existing rivalries between two states may explain the decision to intervene. Domestic policy goals also play a more important role while choosing to intervene. When ethnic affinities exist between the insurgent group and a potential intervener, the selectorate may pressure the leaders to pursue a foreign strategy to help their co-ethnics (*e.g.* Roy, 1997; Saideman, 1997). Finally, from an ideational perspective, such as interpreting third-party intervention as humanitarian intervention to prevent violence and shorten the duration of the war, a third party state may intervene when the conflict is "ripe for resolution" (Zartman, 1989) or to "stop the killing" (Licklider, 1993).[6]

2.3. The Neorealism vs. Liberalism and Neoliberalism Debate

The ongoing debate between "political realism" (or "neorealism") and "liberalism" (or "neoliberalism") points to another set of expectations regarding the propensity for a state to intervene in a civil conflict. Notwithstanding Sambanis's (2002, p. 225) assertion that neither theory can provide a sufficiently rich framework for explaining different aspects of civil war, both approaches yield valid and testable hypotheses for civil war intervention decisions. Indeed, Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 21) claim that their alternative explanations to realist assumptions do not completely reflect the political reality; "most situations fall between these two extremes" and should be explained using both assumptions. In this multilateral framework, identification of the countries that choose to intervene and the underlying reasons behind their choice should be noted. As such, adhering to only one set of assumptions would hamper the prospect

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[6] One may argue that rational choice theory, emanating from economics, can subsume all these three approaches. Economic rational choice theory focuses on the trade-offs between the opposing factions and gives us an insight on why fighting is so frequent even though it is a pareto-inefficient outcome (Hirshleifer, 1995; Fearon 1995). There are many explanations of civil war that utilize economic theories to understand the rent-seeking behavior, decreased time discounting observing a higher duration if decisive outcomes are not guaranteed (Fearon, 2004) or skewed ideas about military prospects (Collier et al., 2004). Political rational choice theory also follows a similar pattern to the explanations given for economic theory of war, yet the main factor to analyze while observing the actions of the agents are focused more on political oppression, collapsing institutions, system transition, or informational problems. Viewing intervention in civil wars in a similar vein, low expected costs accrued by the intervening state might result in a lower threshold of entry. While this approach helps us explain the intervention behavior of third party states, these ex-post illustrations alone do little to help without the expectations of realist, liberal domestic or ideational expectations.

of achieving an encompassing explanation concerning the intervention of foreign powers on their choices on whether to intervene or not.

2.3.1. The Neorealist Camp

The great-power peace in the bipolar post-World War II system has further shifted to a more stable system as the relative state capability consolidated in the hands of one state following the end of the Cold War. With the relative stability of the international system in this period, neorealism suggests that the system would experience less warfare. However, Gurr's (1994) findings show the surge of what he calls "ethno-political conflicts" since 1945; the number of such conflicts has doubled from the 1950s to 1990s and Sarkees *et al.* (2003, p. 53) interpret the majority of these ethno-political conflicts as "civilizational" according to Huntington's definition. This evidence falls in line with Brecher and Wilkinfeld's (1997, p. 1) claim that "the post-World War II international system has been characterized by persistent violence in many regions."

With a realist perspective, expectations of "new wars of the third kind" (Holsti, 1996) and a higher number of activities by paramilitary actors (Kaldor, 1999) emerge in an international system that is more "stable," since sponsoring political and/or territorial change through civil wars becomes a more effective strategy when the balance of power effectively prohibits conventional interstate warfare. If we consider intervention as a foreign policy tool in this framework, a state would be more likely to support an insurgent against a host that is stronger, against another state that supports the rival organization (or a state), or poses a high security threat. Note that, there are not a lot of studies that look at intervention as a foreign policy tool, resulting in an even lower number of studies that examine it at the interstate level. However, intervention can also be seen as a tool used by states to *influence* civil war dynamics (Lemke and Regan 2004) and will be treated as a foreign policy tool in itself.

Dyadic power relations can be considered one of the strongest explanatory factors to explain the reasons of third-party intervention, both in great-power intervention and in regional power intervention. Walt (1985) suggests that states desire to keep the balance of power between each other by forming alliances according to the threat responses from other sources. While the direction of the perceived risks may stay the same, states are expected to form these kinds of alliances with non-state actors, in a

similar pattern. When states do not (or cannot due to systemic consequences) confront each other in conventional warfare, they may use these alliances with the non-state actors to overcome possible imbalances of power. Examples abound in great-power intervention: the operations of the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan against the Afghan rebels are cases where great powers find themselves sponsoring a group as a means to achieve a larger agenda. If we apply a similar logic to regional systems, we see a similar pattern. Iran and Iraq using civil conflicts, as an opportunity to continue their power struggle following the Iran-Iraq War is such an example.

In both cases, we observe two states locked in a struggle to increase their relative capability while still refraining from open warfare. To illustrate, Iraq has provided economic and military support, and allowed access to its territory shortly before the end of the Cold War to the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (Mujahideen-e Khalq) that was formed to overthrow the theocratic regime in Iran. Likewise, Iran has followed the same strategy and has provided Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with weapons and military training and has also given access to its territory against SCIRI's struggle against the Iraqi government.

For our purposes, a higher ratio of state capabilities would mean a stronger possible intervener and stronger interveners can be expected to engage in economic and military interventions more aggressively. Conversely, high relative capability in favor of the state in the conflict will result in more passive interventions if there is a will to intervene. I predict that opportunity-based intervention will be more relevant when the intervening state has power parity with the host government, and the active interventions will increase with the relative power of the third party, leading to Hypothesis 1.

> *Hypothesis 1:* Among states willing to intervene, more capable states will choose to intervene, and they will commit more resources into supporting the rebel group.

Foreign policy dissimilarity and alliance patterns between states are other important factors to consider for third-party intervention, and stem from a line of thinking similar to dyadic power relations. States that frequently find each other in opposing camps, such as regarding the politics of a region, can use intervention as a tool

that provides leverage against the other. Also, policy similarity between a possible intervener and a rebel group may also provide a reason for intervention, as was the case in the U.S. involvement in Guatemala in 1954. This is further illustrated in Forsythe (1992) and James and Mitchell (1995) where even two allied states that have similar foreign policy goals may opt to use interventions to pursue their foreign policy goals.

The internationalization of the conflict is another point to consider about the nature of the interaction between the three actors in the conflict. In internationalized conflicts, we can expect a higher propensity to intervene by neighboring countries and allied states, because of the perception of an immediate threat from other international actors if they choose to take part in the conflict. We have established that intervention can be used as a foreign policy tool; thus, states would be willing to support their allies and exert influence when there are other non-allied major powers in the conflict:

Hypothesis 2: States will refrain from supporting the rebel groups in conflict in allied states.

Hypothesis 3a: States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups in internationalized conflicts.

Hypothesis 3b: States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups that are not considered terrorist organizations.

However, the security risks and the decision to intervene associated with dyadic power relations and foreign policy dissimilarity are exacerbated by spatial factors. Lemke (2002) provides a detailed analysis of the power projection capabilities of states in interstate conflict, augmenting the importance of the proximity of states. Borrowing the conceptual framework of opportunity and willingness from Most and Starr (1989), we can see that "[neighboring states'] proximity to the conflict opens the window of intervention opportunity" (Kathman, 2010, p. 991). While it is previously maintained that opportunity alone is not a sufficient condition for intervention, we can underscore the importance of contiguity for states that also have the willingness to intervene.

Third parties that share a border with a country that experiences civil war may be drawn to intervention for a number of reasons. Apart from the assumptions of higher threat responses from a neighboring country, or having foreign policy goals about overlapping interests that might clash, states need to be aware of possible contagion effects that can result from shared ethnic populations and shared religion (Gleditsch

2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). These ties become even more salient when the rebel group in a civil war shares kinship with a portion of the population of a possible intervener (Forsberg, 2008). This is not to say that contiguity is a necessary condition for intervention, as can be seen in Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah in Israel, but a factor that may increase a state's propensity to intervene in the conflict as a third party.

Contiguity and border sharing may have two opposite effects. The first one is regarding the threat response: as a potential intervener's likelihood of being infected by a contiguous civil war increases, the potential intervener's likelihood of intervening in the conflict also increases. Border sharing might amount to a higher threat perception for the intervener if the conflict is in close proximity:

> *Hypothesis 4:* States that share a border are more likely to intervene in each other's internal conflicts.

Another issue in intervention between contiguous states is that while one state interferes and harbors armed groups that operate on other countries borders, states affected by the civil war may not be able to find ways to directly deal with demonstration effects in other neighboring countries (Kuran, 1998) and a possible secession may lead to a further contagion effect (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). These factors may act as foundations for civil conflicts to cluster in space, and in time, causing a higher threat response from other neighboring countries. Such a perception would reduce the threshold of entry to civil war as a third party as a form of self-defense.

Also relevant to this discussion is the nature of the incompatibility between the rebel group and the state. That is, nature of the conflict is important for contiguous states. The effects of foreign intervention is twofold; the nature of the rebel group will define the possible reasons of intervention, may it be opportunism or threat response, while giving the possible intervener a justification to intervene. The close ties that we can draw from the nature of civil war concern the incentives to intervene. A territorial civil war will raise instability and translate as a higher security risk for contiguous states. Furthermore, if there are shared identities, a secessionist civil war can be a direct threat to the sponsor country such as contagion effects (Kathman, 2010). Therefore, it is safe to assume that neighboring countries will have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict. A governmental civil war can be said to have less of such effects for the

sponsor country, which would result in lesser cases and lower degrees of intervention, as their stakes in involvement are lower.

Hypothesis 5: States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups that are fighting revolutionary wars more, compared to rebel groups engaged in secessionist wars.

2.3.2. The Liberal and Neoliberal Camp

While neorealist claims may present plausible explanations for the intervention decisions of third parties and depict the possible reasons that arise from the relative position of the possible intervener in the international system, these assumptions have shortcomings in answering where these preferences come from. An explanation that is solely based on dyadic power relations, or potential threat responses is a naïve attempt at its best; there are other variables in the equation like the domestic support for the incumbent party, trade relations between the states, effects of international institutions or the international prestige of the country. As such, an analysis that considers the threat response from a rebel group that wages its war based on their ethnic identity and succeeds in seceding from the state *and* controls for the possible domestic ramifications of such an event in the case of a shared ethnic or religious background with that rebel group would be able to provide a better picture.

While the key assumptions of liberalism and neoliberalism may be characterized as antithetical to neorealism, they should be categorized together as rationalist approaches that benefit from one another. Furthering this assertion, following the main tenets of neoliberalism that had been laid out by Keohane's *After Hegemony* (1984), is the scholarly debate between Keohane and Grieco over the neoliberal assumptions (Grieco, 1990; 1993; Keohane, 1993). Their discussion has spurred considerable debate within the scholarly literature, over whether realist assumptions had been correctly analyzed by Keohane, and the debate revealed the converging points of these two perspectives. While these analyses of the structural anarchy in the international system had substantive differences, the analytical convergence of neorealism and neoliberalism show that hypotheses that are presented can be analyzed together using the same model. There are, indeed, multiple channels through which states can take action to reach their

goals when a militaristic action is not the only policy tool to exert (Keohane and Nye, 1987).

The three main characteristics of "complex interdependence," which challenge the neorealist assumptions, present us with three expectations of the behavior of states in such a situation: (1) There are multiple channels that connect societies, which can be summarized as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations; the latter only apply when we relax the realist assumptions of the "normal channels," which are interstate relationships. (2) Issues in interstate relationships are not arranged hierarchically, unlike neorealist claims that military security is the most salient issue that determines states' actions; many issues actually arise from domestic policies within and in between governments. (3) Military force may be irrelevant in resolving disagreements regarding economic or ideological issues (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Using these assumptions, we can construct a framework to provide alternative hypotheses to why states intervene in certain civil wars.

Third-party interventions in civil conflicts are "risky business"; yet, we do observe a higher frequency of outside interventions that "mask the extent of the risk" (Regan, 1998). Apart from the security risks highlighted in the previous section, applying liberal and neoliberal claims for interstate war to intervention decisions of states for our purposes reveal alternative explanations: democratic states and their leaders recognize other democracies as operating under the same principals considering norms *and* institutions, and act accordingly (see *inter alia,* Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003; Lipson, 2003; MacMillan, 1998; Russett, 1993); states commit resources on intervention that could be spent on public policies and domestic projects (*e.g.* Bove and Sekeris, 2011); trade relations between states contribute to a more peaceful environment (*e.g.* Hegre, 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999; but see Barbieri, 1996); or states may lose international prestige, since "prestige not only matters, but is also an important causal factor in international relations" (Kim, 2004, p.52) and government reputation (*e.g.* Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008) throughout the process. Therefore, the incumbent party in the potential intervener state should have sufficient incentives towards committing material and/or human resources in such interstate conflict beyond its borders. With such a wide range of assumptions, given these different expectations from states, it is important to draw the next set of hypotheses using these explanations.

Democratic peace theory is "probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace" (Rosato, 2003, p.585). Democratic peace

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theorists suggest that democracies rarely -if ever- go to war, and the correlations remain robust (*e.g.* Maoz 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett 1993).[7] Despite the challenges to the theory (*e.g.* Rosato, 2003; Spiro, 1994) and alternative explanations to why we observe such a scenario (*e.g.* Gartzke, 1998), the causal mechanisms highlighted in these studies provide us with enough incentives to view democratic peace as an empirical regularity (Kinsella, 2005). Furthermore, any possible evidence that points to an autocratic peace also corroborates any assumption on the relationship between polity similarity and lack of conflict - even if the assumptions are challenged for using a similar theoretical basis (see *inter alia* Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 1999; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Reiter and Stam, 2002).

Applying the basic tenets of democratic peace to third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts, we can expect states with similar regime qualities to potentially interfere less within each other's internal affairs. More specifically, democracies and autocracies will be less likely to intervene against each other. While Lemke and Regan (2004, p.163) report, "democratic linkages do not determine the outcome of intervention influence opportunities," their non-finding is contrary to what Hermann and Kegley find in their previous studies (Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Kegley and Hermann, 1995), motivating Hypothesis 6:

> *Hypothesis 6:* Among states willing to intervene, higher regime difference with the country experiencing civil war will result in a higher tendency to intervene.

Comparable to democratic peace theorists' claims, that joint democracy decreases states' propensity to go to war by increasing associated costs, states that trade extensively enjoy a similar kind of peace where a conflict would strain both economies (Hegre, 2000). Indeed, there are a slew of academic studies that indicate that "economically important trade" has benefits for reducing interstate violence.[8] Hegre also explores a possibility where the increased communication options between the inhabitants of the trading states, resulting in a further strengthening of peace-building

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[7] While an in-depth discussion of the democratic peace theory is beyond the scope of this section, a thorough discussion can be found in Russett *et al.* (1995).

[8] See Oneal and Russett (1999) for a detailed list of research reports that show the positice effect of trade relations for the reduction of interstate violence.

institutions. With this liberal set of theses regarding the conflict-reducing effects of increased trade relations, we can expect a decrease in conflicts with increasing development of states.

However, Barbieri (1996) provides an alternative explanation; we need to consider that states with tighter economic ties also find themselves where their economic linkages are shaped by the nature and context of the relationship. That is, states that benefit from a closer trade relationship are already interlocked in a situation where the actions of one could have direct repercussions for the other's goals. In a similar vein, Peterson (2011) suggests that third-party trade ties may be able to affect the dyadic relationship by tipping the balance for the favor of one side in the dyad.

These two contrasting arguments about trade dependency between two states also hold a high degree of importance for determining the type of the relationship between a civil-war-state and the potential intervener. Following the first strand of thought, we would expect a higher threshold of entry for the potential intervener for states that are highly dependent on each other economically, while the second would imply an already existing clash of international goals, allowing the use of intervention tactics to be able to trump over the other:

> *Hypothesis 7:* States with high degrees of trade dependency will be less likely to intervene in each other's internal conflicts.

With regime similarity and trade ties playing important roles in formulating the liberal framework for third-party intervention, the third major liberal discussion is the shared populations between the potential intervener and the rebel group engaged in a civil war. External intervention literature provides an integrated approach to international and internal war (Sambanis, 2002), and also gives us a domestic viewpoint from the actor's side. Shared ethnicity, religion and ideology between the rebel group in question can be used both as international leverage - a foreign policy tool to coerce other states into a preferred outcome, and as a domestic policy tool that can help the incumbent secure a portion of the electorate that would otherwise be against the intervention. After all, for such a campaign, whether it may be ideological, economic or military, there should be domestic support for the policy (Regan, 1998, p. 757). And similarly important, the actions of the third party also depend on the size of the shared population with the rebel group and the intervening state (Nome, 2012).

Transnational ties between the group in ethnic conflict and the intervener are multifaceted. There are many alternative situations where there can be more than one of the predetermined shared qualities; while Hezbollah in Israel has religious and ethnic ties with but has not received any form of aid from Saudi Arabia, we see multiple instances of support from Iran to Hezbollah without sharing any ethnic ties with the state. Observing such situations lead to Hypotheses 8:

Hypothesis 8: States willing to intervene will choose to aid rebel groups that share ethnic, religious and ideological ties with them.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design Decisions

As specified previously, a number of studies have asked whether a civil war internationalizes and identified intervention patterns using different research designs. This lack of consensus on which method to use, among scholars of international politics and conflict resolution, stems from the relative advantages and drawbacks of different designs. A survey of these designs point out to two major inferential challenges that a research should address, namely, the need to evade selection bias in the sample and to control for confounding explanations. This paper draws attention to yet another concern: to jointly model host-intervener-insurgent relations.

To understand why some states intervene, we should also understand why others do not. Basing our inferences on intervention cases only will lead to biased findings regarding why states support insurgents in other countries in its region. Furthermore, we should be able to measure the affect of our candidate explanatory factors in a ceteris paribus setting, *i.e.* we should be able to control confounding variables. To gauge this propensity in a number of countries' decisions over time, this study employs a cross-sectional time series dynamic logistic analysis.

3.1.1. Methodological Approach

Using a quantitative research design, compared to a qualitative research, shows its strengths for models dealing with empirical claims that are falsifiable, and that can be specified using *ex ante* information. To be able to test the validity of the presented hypotheses, large-N quantitative design "allow[s] us to evaluate a large number of hypotheses, while simultaneously letting us control for alternative explanations" (Bennett and Stam, 2004, p. 34-5). Such an approach may fall short of capturing human cognition, interpreting underlying causes of certain behavior of actors, or

psychologically based theories could provide a different set of results than rational choice arguments, which are addressed most efficiently using an experimental design (McDermott, 2002). However, for our purposes, we can expect better outcomes from the data and the statistical model that is established than a wide experimental or a quasi-experimental research, which would prove to be more effective when using an actor-centric approach.

The second task is to construct an appropriate empirical model. Bennett and Stam (2004, p. 44-45) establish the superiority of dyadic analysis from the perspective it offers to "test comparatively hypotheses drawn from multiple levels of analysis." Dyadic interaction captures the essence of strategic behavior and using the dyad-year makes it possible to interpret the expectations coming from different levels of analyses. Dyadic level analyses easily allow the inclusion of different variables from individual state level (*e.g.* regime type of the home state, nature of the civil dispute), dyadic level (*e.g.* contiguity, shared identities) and system level (*e.g.* polarity). Indeed, the directed dyad-year analyses are increasingly becoming the favored choices in international conflict studies (Green, Kim, and Yoon, 2001). Building on Bennett and Stam's (2004) framework for risk of conflict and applying it to civil war intervention framework, the relative advantages of a non-directed dyadic approach prove to be more effective.[9]

With these propositions in mind, I have designed and constructed a non-directed dyadic data set that will address the theoretical debates and allow an assessment of alternative answers, building on similar efforts by both interstate and intrastate intervention literature. Since the dependent variable is coded as both binary (whether there was an intervention to the civil conflict on that year by the possible intervener) and categorically (the nature and the extent of the intervention), to test the different possible relative effects, I have conducted binary logit models and multinomial logit models to inquire about the nature of the relationships.

3.1.2. Spatial and Temporal Approach

An equally critical issue for international conflict research is the choice of the spatial and temporal domain of the study. Most empirical large-N studies try to be as

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[9] Bennett and Stam (2004, p.44-56) provide a detailed comparison of directed vs. non-directed dyad approaches. Since our main goal is to determine the choice processes of the interveners, the variables that present the reverse case (*e.g.* intervener - conflict) would be excluded from the model for our cases.

comprehensive as possible, expanding their domains to the point where reliable data can be obtained. For example, most of the Correlates of War Project data sets date back to 1816, while UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is a project that codes both internal and external armed conflicts from 1946 to present.

Despite the tendency to be as comprehensive as possible, data availability and/or the posited theory's spatiotemporal specific variables may warrant restricting the spatiotemporal domain of a study.[10] Following Bennett and Stam's assertions about the reliability of a model across space and time, I choose to constrain my data set to be able to capture a high degree of variance within a relatively smaller space and a short amount of time, building on the premise that "states' preferences and expectations regarding their interactions with other states develop in the context of the states' domestic political and social culture" (Bennett and Stam, 2004, p. 175).

The choice of the region of the study was done considering the hypotheses presented in *The Behavioral Origins of War* Chapter 6 (Bennett and Stam, 2004). To be able to build a model based on theoretical assumptions *and* capture the nuances, I analyzed the civil war intervention patterns in various regions of the world. The choice of Middle East among these regions was done to counter the tremendously high variation in national and regional culture and ideology that exist in other regions. The Middle East presents us with an easily defined, yet varied enough set of ethnicities (*e.g.* Arab, Jewish, Iranian, Turkish, Kurdish), religions (*e.g.* Sunni Islam, Shi'a Islam, Judaism, Christianity) and ideologies (*e.g.* religious fundamentalism, liberal democracy, military dictatorship). This variation also exists within these groups, such as the different responses given to Sunni Kurds and Shiite Kurds, and within states, Syrian ruling party is Shi'a Muslim which governs a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, giving us a better understanding of interaction patterns within and between states. Finally, since it is not a big region, compared to Americas, Africa or Asia, states have the opportunity/feasibility to intervene but choose not to (Most and Starr, 1989) - thus giving us a meaningful group of non-events.

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[10] Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008), for instance, establish the importance of religion in formation of the public opinion on foreign policy issues in the Middle East, in response to Jelen's (1994, p. 391) assertion that "the role of religion in explaining attitudes toward issues of international relations is somewhat limited." While their ultimate conclusions are directed more towards the role of the American public opinion shaping the foreign policy decisions in the face of Middle Eastern attitudes, their results nevertheless illustrate how a specific spatiotemporal domain could be directed towards a certain research agenda.

In a region where shared ethnic and religious ties shape foreign policy attitudes, answering why third party states support some rebel groups in a civil war and refrain from participating in other conflicts as an intervener will provide us with ample opportunity to underscore the certain dynamics of civil war intervention. In doing so, I aim to capture the effects of the tighter religious and ethnic ties that shape the regional politics of the region.

3.2. Research Design

To explain the underlying choice mechanisms of civil war intervention, the data examines the countries that experienced a civil war in the Middle East following the Iranian Revolution, using a conflict and possible intervener dyad, and analyzes 18 instances of civil war covering a temporal span of 29 years, between 1979 and 2007. Within these 18 civil war cases, the data shows 2172 dyad-years of potential intervention out of which 271 were realized. Interventions are coded separately as ideological or economic support, access to territory and military support as weapons supply and training, and then aggregated into a single dependent variable.

In this study, civil war, in line with the Uppsala Conflict Data Project's definition, is defined as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state" (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 618-19). Unfortunately, such a clearly laid out framework does not apply to third-party interventions in civil war, as there are conflicting assumptions about how civil wars become internationalized.

Third-party intervention in civil conflicts is a rare phenomenon - Gleditsch (2007, p. 295) points out the fact that "only about 5% of the internal conflicts in the Uppsala/PRIO data for 1946-2003 are considered internationalized civil wars." However, the thresholds for coding for civil war are different, resulting in a different number of intervention cases. For example, Correlates of War project's civil war data show that 25% of the cases are internationalized civil conflicts (Sarkees, 2000). Furthermore, we have to keep in mind that states can intervene in civil wars in other ways: Regan (2000) speculates that third parties may intervene to put an end to the dispute, while Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) assume that third parties may also intervene to promote outcomes that might benefit their own interests.

These alternative explanations provide the rationale behind the coding scheme being coded differently for the different cases of intervention. Because a different mode of intervention (*i.e.* ideological intervention) is included in my data, and is from a smaller spatiotemporal domain, my data shows instances of intervention in 12.48% of the civil wars. Table 2 shows the relative frequencies of these intervention cases.

Nature of Intervention	Frequency	Percentage
Ideological support	155	57.19
Economic support	165	60.88
Access to territory	59	21.77
Weapons supply and military training	60	22.14

Table 1: Relative frequencies of intervention cases

Ideological support includes using propaganda, diplomatic pressure and showing the rebels in a good light as a means of intervention. Economic intervention is easier to measure, but a differentiation from the military interventions is needed, as these are not mutually exclusive concepts. An example here is the difference between procurement of arms and providing training for rebel troops; providing arms is an economic and military aid while training is an exclusively military support.

The difference between diplomatic interventions and military and economic interventions is that diplomatic interventions or attempts at mediation usually serve to preserve the status quo whereas the latter types of intervention are regarded as attempts at challenging the present conditions and tend to last longer (Regan and Aydin, 2006). While these claims are plausible to exclude certain attempts of intervention from existing models, I believe that a lot of information that may help us understand the intervention patterns of third parties is lost in the process. Indeed, Table 2 shows how relevant ideological support is for these intervention cases. Due to the relatively higher risks associated with providing safe havens, supplying weapons and giving military training to the rebel group, states with an intent to intervene, but cannot bear the risks of sustaining a longer and more severe conflict, utilize the former two options to help the rebel group in conflict.

3.3. Data

The widely used *Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset* (Gleditsch et al., 2002) serves as the backbone of the data set with the Uppsala/PRIO list of state-based armed conflicts to identify the civil wars. To code the intervention cases in the later dates, I have used the same definition for armed conflict and intervention. For other main independent variables, I have utilized data from existing data sets, combining several data to obtain the variables. Aggregated data is taken directly from different studies, using *EUGene* software (Bennett and Stam, 2000):

Variable	Unit of Analysis	Source	Original Citation
Intervention	Dyad-year	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4	Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002)
Capabilities	Country-year	COW national capabilities index v3.02 (CINC)	Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, (1972)
Alliance	Dyad-year	COW Alliance data set v3.03	Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, (1972)
Internationalization of Conflict	Dyad-year	UCDP External Support Project Primary Warring Party Dataset v1	Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér (2011)
Contiguity/ Distance	Dyad-year	Contiguity from COW Direct contiguity data v3.1; Distance computed in *EUGene*	Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman (2002)
Regime Difference	Country-year	Polity IV	Marshall and Jaggers (2002)
Trade Dependency	Dyad-year	IMF World Economic Outlook Database; COW International Trade v3.0	IMF (2010), Barbieri and Keshk (2012)
Incompatibility	Dyad-Year	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4	Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002)

Table 2: Data Sources

3.4. Independent Variables

The major independent variables that are listed in Table 2 are critical to the intervention decisions of states and require more detailed explanations as well as descriptive statistics before moving on to subsequent analyses.

3.4.1. Capabilities

This variable is a relative capability index that takes into account the ratio of the strengths of the two states. I use the COW national material capabilities index v3.02 (CINC Scores) identified in Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) to calculate the relative capabilities by dividing the CINC score of the possible intervener by the total CINC score in the dyad. The mean capability ratio is .3101868 with a standard deviation of .2533296.

3.4.2. Alliance

Alliance between states variable aims to capture the alliance patterns and is taken from the COW 3.0 Alliance data that was released in 2002. In my data set, the variable is of a binary nature and is coded as 1 if there was a defense pact, neutrality agreement or an entente between the states and 0 if there was no such agreement in the dyad. Missing values in the original data set are treated and coded according to COW alliance types for later dates.

3.4.3. Internationalization of conflict

This variable is coded using the UCDP External Support Project Primary Warring Party Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) and is coded 1 when there is at least one other third-party intervener in the conflict and 0 otherwise.[11] 1147 from the total of 2172 dyad-years has a third-party intervener.

3.4.4. Foreign terrorist organization

This variable is created using the United States Department of State list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The list designates the non-U.S.-based organizations that the U.S. Department of State has declared as terrorists and the variable takes the value of 1 for those groups in the conflict. 7 of the rebel organizations are FTOs: 1052 of the total 2172 conflict years include these groups.

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[11] Note that this third-party intervener can be supporting the government as well.

3.4.5. Contiguity/ Border Sharing

I use the COW contiguity and colonial/dependency data sets (Stinnett *et al,* 2002) to code the contiguity variable. Border sharing takes the value 1 when two states share a land border, or are separated by a river border and 0 otherwise. Contiguity takes a value between 1 and 5 and coded according to the coding rules set by the Direct Contiguity Data for water borders. Similarly, contiguity takes a value of 1 when two states share a land or river border, and takes a value between 2 and 5 for states that are separated by at least 12, 24, 150 and 400 miles of water, respectively.

3.4.6 Regime Difference

I use the Polity IV Data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) to create a variable that takes a value between 0 and 20, indicating the absolute value of the regime type (Polity score) difference between the states for the year of the civil war. This variable shows a U-shaped distribution; less than 30% of the observations take a value between 5 and 15.

3.4.7. Trade Dependency

To create a measure for trade dependency, I have used the COW International Trade v3.0 (Barbieri and Keshk, 2012) data set and the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. The total dyadic imports and exports for the year was calculated by adding the in and out flows indicated by the International Trade data set and divided by that year's GDP of the possible intervening state to be able illustrate the actor based approach.

3.4.8. Shared Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology

To capture the role of ethnicity, religion and ideology, I have created binary variables for each shared characteristic between the rebel group and the possible intervener. For each characteristic, I have determined the nature of the rebel group and the incumbent party in the intervening state. For explicit declarations of the rebel group about their identities, these variables take the value of 1 if the possible intervener shares at least 10% of the population with these characteristics unless the incumbent does not have a certain preference. To illustrate, Israel has about 20% Arab population, but the state is coded as Jewish for reasons of distinguishing Israel from other Arab states.

3.4.9. Incompatibility

Nature of the civil war - or the incompatibility between the rebel group and the state- is taken directly from the *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset* (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002) and coded as either territorial or governmental. 1,347 of the cases are coded as territorial disputes and 825 are incompatibilities concerning government (*i.e.* revolutionary wars).

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1. The Basic Model

The basic model is a logistic regression with the binary intervention variable as the dependent variable and the variables specified in sections 3.3. and 3.4 as the independent variables. However due to a severe loss in the number of observations, trade relationship between states is dropped from further analyses.[12] Time elapsed without intervention (*t), t-squared, and t-cubed* variables are included to counter the effects of autocorrelation.

The results of the logistic regression for third-party intervention in civil wars are reported in Table 3. This basic model reports the regression of the total intervention cases and supports a number of the presented hypotheses. Interestingly, state capability ratio, regime differences and incompatibility between the rebel group and the state do not play a significant role as a predictor of intervention for this model. These findings are counterintuitive and need to be addressed in further analyses. Since these variables can be argued to have direct links for perceived threat responses, using a different model to explain their relationship will be necessary.

Not surprisingly, interventions increase as alliances between states decrease and the presence of other interveners increase. We observe a lower propensity to intervene for groups identified as a foreign terrorist organization. Land border sharing has a significant positive effect for intervention. From the shared identities, shared ethnic background and ideology have significant positive effects for intervention, and shared religion does not have such effects. Finally, there is a negative and significant effect for conflicts after 1991.

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[12] When we do not include the missing values in the regression, about 80% of the observations are lost. If we treat the missing values for trade dependency as no trade between states, the model provides inconsistent results.

Intervention

State capability ratio	0.458
	(0.81)
Alliance between states	-3.455
	(5.21)**
Other intervener	1.940
	(5.28)**
FTO	-0.625
	(1.98)*
Land border sharing	1.544
	(5.22)**
Regime difference	0.016
	(0.60)
Host-Rebel shared ethnic background	1.144
	(3.30)**
Host-Rebel shared religion	0.192
	(0.68)
Host-Rebel shared ideology	1.579
	(5.46)**
Post Cold War	-0.722
	(2.47)*
Incompatibility	0.016
	(0.04)
Time elapsed without intervention	-6.747
	(6.54)**
Time elapsed without intervention squared	2.247
	(4.62)**
Time elapsed without intervention cubed	-0.210
	(3.66)**
Constant	-3.100
	(6.28)**
N	1,968

*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$*

Table 3: Logistic Regressions of Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts 1979-2007

4.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression

Before moving on to further discussion of the variables, we need a more detailed analysis to see whether or not the insignificant variables in the basic model have a different explanatory power. For the second model, interventions are categorized into two different levels: passive interventions and active interventions. Active interventions can be defined as any form of intervention that includes weapons supply, military training and access to territory. Passive interventions are coded mostly as ideological

support for the rebel group, but also include non-military economic support for the rebel group.

Intervention	Passive	Active
State capability ratio	-0.978	1.608
	(0.99)	(1.89)
Alliance between states	-24.559	-1.181
	(0.00)	(1.85)
Other intervener	3.783	-0.811
	(4.84)**	(1.41)
FTO	-2.786	2.658
	(5.36)**	(4.78)**
Land border sharing	0.372	3.410
	(0.73)	(6.84)**
Regime difference	0.051	-0.058
	(0.94)	(1.69)
Host-Rebel shared ethnic background	1.258	1.160
	(2.13)*	(2.55)*
Host-Rebel shared religion	1.692	-1.239
	(2.89)**	(3.10)**
Host-Rebel shared ideology	1.503	3.028
	(3.05)**	(5.83)**
Post Cold War	-4.103	0.541
	(4.97)**	(1.49)
Incompatibility	-0.029	-0.648
	(0.03)	(1.27)
Time elapsed without intervention	-6.768	-26.242
	(5.66)**	(0.00)
Time elapsed without intervention squared	2.588	3.347
	(4.36)**	(0.00)
Time elapsed without intervention cubed	-0.256	-0.113
	(3.56)**	(0.00)
Constant	-5.561	-5.147
	(5.62)**	(6.45)**
N	1968	

*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts 1979-2007

In this model, we observe the hypothesized effect for the ratio of state capabilities at 10% significance level that was missing from the first model. A stronger third-party means higher active intervention, but does not yield any significant result for passive intervention. Alliance patterns and contiguity variables also show a similar pattern, showing higher levels of significance for active intervention. Interestingly,

rebel groups identified as foreign terrorist organizations have a negative value for passive, and positive value for active interventions.

Different from the first model, shared religion has gained significance in the multinomial regression, having a positive effect for passive and negative effect for active interventions. In post-Cold War conflicts, the negative effect is revealed only for passive intervention cases and has lost its significance for other cases. Regime difference is significant at the 10% level for active interventions but has a negligible marginal effect for those cases. Finally, the incompatibility variable does not have a meaningful result for this model as well.

4.3. Analysis

Analyzing the hypotheses in the light of these two models, we can see that most of the neorealist assumptions provide explanations for third party interventions in civil wars. The analysis was not able to test for trade ties due to the high number of missing observations and regime difference did not reveal the desired statistical significance. However, it is evident that a neorealist, liberal domestic and neoliberal claims, when used together, hold answers for explaining the choice process of the possible interveners.

State capability ratio, alliance and contiguity, as the core neorealist variables, can be considered more salient for active intervention cases. This is due to the fact that active intervention requires higher levels of commitment from the third party to succeed, backing up hypotheses 2 and 4. States that have elevated threat responses and/or want to take a more active part in shaping of the region politics would need to consider their relative strengths and alliance patterns before taking part as a third party in such a conflict. As the other main neorealist variables, other international interveners have a positive effect for intervention cases in the first model, but a further analysis reveals that this translates as passive intervention if there are other third parties in the conflict. Again, the negative -albeit insignificant- coefficient for active intervention cases could mean that states refrain from allocating higher resources to a conflict where interests might clash with other third parties. Similarly, the foreign terrorist organization variable reveals a similar pattern for the interested third parties.

The post-Cold War variable shows a negative correlation between the tendency to intervene and the unipolar world system. This result can be interpreted as an indicator

of the perpetual peace where the presence of one major power reduced conflicts following the Cold War, and is in line with previous work (see Regan, 2000). However, since there was also a reduction of interstate wars following that period, states' opportunity and willingness to interfere, through supporting rebel groups, is not reflected in the active intervention cases.

Shared populations between the rebel group and the possible intervener can be interpreted in a number of ways. From the first model, we have seen that ethnic background and the ideological stance of the rebel group have an effect on the interveners' choice to intervene. Both characteristics increase the possibility of an intervention when the incumbent party in the intervening state also has those characteristics. While it may be argued that this result is an artifact of using the Middle East as the area that was studied, this effect is lost when we look at the second results.

Shared ethnic background and ideology between the rebel group and the intervening state maintain their positive effect for both kinds of intervention, with slightly reduced significance levels. However, the shared religion variable becomes significant at the 1% level and has a positive effect for passive, and negative effect for active interventions. Three *post hoc* explanations to these mixed results might be that: States that want to interfere in conflicts where they share a religious background with rebel group but do not have the opportunity to do so can try to show their support using other means. The second explanation is that shared religion may not be salient enough compared to the other characteristics to warrant a military intervention. With a lower threshold for entry, incumbent parties that use propaganda or provide economic support for that rebel group in hopes of gaining public support might not be willing to sacrifice resources to take a more active part in the conflict in fear of losing support by lowering the public spending. It can also be argued that this result is a statistical artifact from having a relatively smaller spatial domain and the lack of variance in terms of shared religious beliefs, since there are a high number of conflict dyad-years where Israel was dealing with a Sunni Muslim group which was receiving aid from the Arab League.

Looking at the fixed effects model for the first regression, we observe a 0.006 chance of intervention when the variables are set to their means (and modes for the binary variables). While this may seem like a low value, given Gleditsch *et al.*'s (2002) claim that 5 percent of civil wars are internationalized, we have to consider that there are no great powers in the data set and that the region studied has a relatively high number of smaller states with low capabilities. For instance, when we include the key

variables such as existing land borders and shared ethnic background, this value goes up to almost 8 percent possibility to intervene.

Looking at the most salient variables for the theoretical debates, I will provide a couple of examples for the change in the likelihood of intervention. For a possible intervener that hasn't intervened in the conflict -which has seen other outside intervention- for the past 4 years, with 9 points of polity score difference and a 1.3 times higher CINC score than the other non-allied state, and shared religion with the non-FTO rebel group fighting a revolutionary war before 1991, my model predicts a 4.58 times higher hazard rate for the contiguous state. If this state also shares an ethnic background and ideology, the likelihood to provide aid to the rebel group goes up to 29.4%, indicating a 50-fold increase compared to the original scenario.

Alliance patterns play a large role in my model; setting the other variables at their means and modes, presence of an alliance between states reduces the risk of an outside help for the rebel group by 31 times. Even in the previous scenario where the contiguous possible intervener that shares ethnic, religious and ideological ties with the rebel group, alliance between states reduces the risk hazard from 29.4 percent to 1.3 percent.

An interesting find here is that the t, t-squared and t-cubed variables show a curvilinear relationship, taking their maximum value (other than t=0) close to the 5 years with no intervention case. In that case, there is a 1.1 percent hazard rate when the other variables are held constant, an almost twofold increase compared to the 4 years with no intervention scenario. The hazard rate sharply declines until 2 years without intervention, then rises at its peak point at t=5 and starts its decline again. We can see that after an intervention, there is a two-year period of relative accord between states, and after the five-year period is passed, the risks of intervention are reduced to almost zero.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have provided different explanations to a number of the previously unanswered questions raised by the theoretical literature on third-party intervention in civil wars. I have tried to come up with hypotheses and illustrate the effects of relative state capability, alliance, international setting, and shared populations among other variables using the existing literature. It has been stated that in third party intervention literature the interactions between the state, the rebel group, and the third party are central to the debate, yet the relative scarcity of the scholarly work on the choice process of the third party reveal the need to come up with updated theoretical expectations.

With this research, we have observed that the neorealist assumptions about state power and threat responses translate relatively better than the liberal and neoliberal discussions about why states provide support to rebel groups for certain kinds of conflicts. To recapitulate, contiguity, alliance and internationalization of the conflict provide the most robust explanations for third party support to rebel groups. With these results, we can claim that states perceive third-party intervention as an invaluable tool as leverage against other states. When there are no other options outside a militarized interstate dispute, states may choose to apply pressure using these conflicts as proxy wars. The ambiguity that is associated with the nature of the civil war gives the possible interveners a wider ground to shape their foreign policies. Also, the contagion risks associated with civil conflicts help shape the border relations and alliance patterns between states.

Shared ethnic and religious population and ideology with the rebel group are other factors to consider for a state to provide support for the insurgency. The contagion risks that are present in contiguous states also exist for populations in other countries

that share similar identities. Furthermore, the incumbent party may use intervention as a means to strengthen their domestic presence through the use of rhetoric, claiming to be standing alongside the "freedom fighters" against other governments.

While these findings reveal important results and allows us to draw a pattern for third-party intervention choices, the analysis also reveals the flaws and deficiencies of such an approach to external intervention. The inconclusiveness that is borne out of the limits of empirical studies on civil war restricts the formation of a stronger theoretical foundation. And, in turn, most studies need to rely upon an imprecise theoretical background. What I have tried to accomplish with this thesis is to apply the literature that has its roots in a different era to contemporary studies, while backing my findings with the growing literature on intrastate warfare.

Still, while this analysis can illustrate certain characteristics of the choice processes of third-party interveners in civil war, it is not a complete piece of work. The relatively incomprehensive theoretical foundation of intervention studies exclusive to intrastate intervention, and the lack of data beyond certain variables and a certain period of time and space pose the biggest challenges for this literature.

However, even with a couple of unexpected results and the lack of an explanatory variable due to data collection problems, the analyses clearly indicate that the theoretical foundations of interstate intervention literature may be applied to intrastate interventions. As was demonstrated, the neorealist, liberal and neoliberal claims provide a foundation for the choice process of possible interveners in civil conflicts, and can be replicated using a similar research design. With the advent of an increasing number of studies concentrating on intrastate warfare and third-party intervention in the civil war process, the next step of this study will be to explore whether similar dynamics apply to other subregions around the world using a similar design.

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